

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Critical Assessments

Edited by Christopher Macann



London and New York

First published 1992
by Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
a division of Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc.
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Selection and editorial material © 1992 Routledge
Individual chapters © 1992 the respective authors

Phototypeset in 10/12pt Times by
Intype, London
Printed in Great Britain by
TJ Press (Padstow) Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Martin Heidegger: critical assessments.

I. Macann, Christopher
193

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Martin Heidegger: critical assessments/edited by Christopher
Macann.

p. cm.—(Routledge critical assessments of leading philosophers)

Includes bibliographical references.

1. Heidegger, Martin, 1889–1976. I. Macann, Christopher E.

II. Series.

B3279.H49M2854 1992

193—dc20 91–46751

ISBN 0-415-04982-2

To my mother:
whose illness prompted me to undertake this work
but whose death made it impossible for her
to witness its completion.

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Critical Assessments

Edited by Christopher Macann

VOLUME I: PHILOSOPHY

Contents

VOLUME I: PHILOSOPHY

| | |
|---|------|
| Editor's preface | xv |
| Acknowledgements | xvii |
| Introduction | 1 |
| <i>Christopher Macann</i> | |
| 1 The beginning and the end of philosophy | 16 |
| <i>Hans-Georg Gadamer</i> | |
| 2 'Time and being', 1925–7 | 29 |
| <i>Thomas Sheehan</i> | |
| 3 The preliminary conception of phenomenology and of the problematic of truth in <i>Being and Time</i> | 68 |
| <i>Jean-François Courtine</i> | |
| 4 Genetic phenomenology: towards a reconciliation of transcendental and ontological phenomenology | 94 |
| <i>Christopher Macann</i> | |
| 5 Heidegger's conception of space | 117 |
| <i>Maria Vilella-Petit</i> | |
| 6 Heidegger on time and being | 141 |
| <i>Joseph J. Kockelmans</i> | |
| 7 The ekstático-horizonal constitution of temporality | 170 |
| <i>Françoise Dastur</i> | |
| 8 What did Heidegger mean by 'Essence'? | 183 |
| <i>Alfons Grieder</i> | |
| 9 Theological resonances of <i>Der Satz vom Grund</i> | 213 |
| <i>Joseph S. O'Leary</i> | |
| 10 Heidegger, hermeneutics and ontology | 257 |
| <i>Reiner Wiehl</i> | |

| | | |
|----|--|-----|
| 11 | Being as appropriation <i>Otto Pöggeler</i> | 279 |
| 12 | Way and method: hermeneutic phenomenology in thinking the history of being <i>Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann</i> | 310 |
| 13 | Looking metaphysics in the face <i>Jean Greisch</i> | 330 |
| 14 | The power of revelation of affectivity according to Heidegger <i>Michel Henry</i> | 354 |
| 15 | An interpretation of Heidegger's Bremen lectures: towards a dialogue with his later thought <i>Kôhei Mizoguchi</i> | 370 |
| 16 | The end of philosophy as the beginning of thinking <i>Samuel IJsseling</i> | 383 |

VOLUME II: HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

| | | |
|----|---|-----|
| | Acknowledgements | ix |
| | Introduction <i>Christopher Macann</i> | 1 |
| 17 | The mirror with the triple reflection <i>Marlène Zarader</i> | 17 |
| 18 | Reading and thinking: Heidegger and the hinting Greeks <i>Kenneth Maly</i> | 37 |
| 19 | Beyond being: Heidegger's Plato <i>Robert J. Dostal</i> | 61 |
| 20 | Dasein as <i>praxis</i> : the Heideggerian assimilation and the radicalization of the practical philosophy of Aristotle <i>Franco Volpi</i> | 90 |
| 21 | Meister Eckhart and the later Heidegger: the mystical element in Heidegger's thought <i>John D. Caputo</i> | 130 |
| 22 | Heidegger and Descartes <i>Jean-Luc Marion</i> | 178 |
| 23 | The 1929 debate between Cassirer and Heidegger <i>Pierre Aubenque</i> | 208 |
| 24 | Hermeneutics in theory and practice <i>Christopher Macann</i> | 222 |
| 25 | The dialogue between Heidegger and Hegel <i>Denise Souche-Dagues</i> | 246 |
| 26 | The last thinker of the West <i>David Farrell Krell</i> | 277 |

| | | |
|----|--|-----|
| 27 | Critical remarks on the Heideggerian reading of Nietzsche <i>Michel Haar</i> | 290 |
| 28 | Heidegger and the principle of phenomenology <i>Klaus Held</i> | 303 |
| 29 | The question of being and transcendental phenomenology: reflections on Heidegger's relationship to Husserl <i>John D. Caputo</i> | 326 |
| 30 | Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty: Being-in-the-world with others? <i>Christina Schües</i> | 345 |
| 31 | Lask, Lukács, Heidegger: the problem of irrationality and the theory of categories <i>István M. Fehér</i> | 373 |

VOLUME III: LANGUAGE

| | | |
|----|---|-----|
| | Acknowledgements | ix |
| | Introduction <i>Christopher Macann</i> | 1 |
| 32 | Heidegger's conception of language in <i>Being and Time</i> <i>Jan Aler</i> | 14 |
| 33 | Language and silence: self-inquiry in Heidegger and Zen <i>Tetsuaki Kotoh</i> | 39 |
| 34 | Heidegger's language and the problems of translation <i>John Macquarrie</i> | 50 |
| 35 | Thinking more deeply into the question of translation: essential translation and the unfolding of language <i>Parvis Emad</i> | 58 |
| 36 | Heidegger's idea of truth <i>Ernst Tugendhat</i> | 79 |
| 37 | Heidegger on logic <i>J. N. Mohanty</i> | 93 |
| 38 | The essence of transcendence <i>Christopher Macann</i> | 121 |
| 39 | The language of the event: the event of language <i>Theodore Kisiel</i> | 151 |
| 40 | The transformation of language at another beginning <i>Robert Bernasconi</i> | 168 |
| 41 | Language and reversal <i>John Sallis</i> | 190 |
| 42 | Meaning adrift <i>John Sallis</i> | 212 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| 43 Poetry and language in Heidegger <i>Walter Biemel</i> | 222 |
| 44 Heidegger and Hölderlin: the over-usage of 'Poets in an impoverished time' <i>Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert</i> | 247 |
| 45 'The flower of the mouth': Hölderlin's hint for Heidegger's thinking of the essence of language <i>Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann</i> | 277 |
| 46 Heidegger on metaphor and metaphysics <i>Joseph J. Kockelmans</i> | 293 |
| 47 Heidegger and Ryle: two versions of phenomenology <i>Michael Murray</i> | 321 |
| 48 Wittgenstein and Heidegger: language games and life forms <i>Karl-Otto Apel</i> | 341 |

VOLUME IV: REVERBERATIONS

| | |
|---|-----|
| Acknowledgements | ix |
| Introduction <i>Christopher Macann</i> | 1 |
| 49 Heidegger and the thing <i>Jean-Pierre Faye</i> | 17 |
| 50 Heidegger's Nazism and the French debate <i>Tom Rockmore</i> | 33 |
| 51 Philosophy and politics: by way of Martin Heidegger <i>Joseph Margolis</i> | 78 |
| 52 The shadow of this thinking <i>Dominique Janicaud</i> | 104 |
| 53 Heidegger's Nietzsche and the Third Reich <i>Endre Kiss</i> | 135 |
| 54 Heidegger and the Imperial question <i>Eliane Escoubas</i> | 145 |
| 55 Fundamental ontology and political interlude: Heidegger as Rector of the University of Freiburg <i>István Fehér</i> | 159 |
| 56 Authenticity and Heidegger's challenge to ethical theory <i>Douglas Kellner</i> | 198 |
| 57 Who is Dasein? Towards an ethics of authenticity <i>Christopher Macann</i> | 214 |
| 58 The place of the work of art in the age of technology <i>Kathleen Wright</i> | 247 |

| | | |
|----|--|-----|
| 59 | Heidegger's poetics: the question of mimemisis <i>John Sallis</i> | 267 |
| 60 | Heidegger, well-being and madness <i>Charles E. Scott</i> | 279 |
| 61 | Heidegger, the possible and God <i>Richard Kearney</i> | 299 |
| 62 | Heidegger and the new images of science <i>Theodore Kisiel</i> | 325 |
| 63 | Heidegger and the physical sciences <i>Catherine Chevalley</i> | 342 |
| 64 | On the origin of nihilism – in view of the problem of technology and karma <i>Akihiro Takeichi</i> | 365 |
| 65 | Heidegger and Japanese thought: how much did he know and when did he know it? <i>Graham Parkes</i> | 377 |
| 66 | Does the saving power also grow? Heidegger's last paths <i>Otto Pöggeler</i> | 407 |

Editor's preface

For the past twenty years I have been working at a programme drawn up along much the same lines as the programme outlined in the Introduction to *Being and Time*, and comprising a phenomenological philosophy (constructed on ontological foundations and employing what I call a 'genetic' methodology) and an epochal interpretation of the history of modern philosophy. I am therefore committed to the view that it is far too early to relegate Heidegger (even, and even especially, first Heidegger) to the status of a historical philosopher, that the source represented by the *Gesamtausgabe* holds a resource which is very far from being exhausted and that therefore, in a certain critically significant sense, phenomenological philosophy still operates within a framework whose basic parameters were laid down by the thinking to which this collection of papers is devoted. It is for this reason that I have sought to bring together papers which treat Heidegger's work as a living body of thought rather than a historically determined *corpus*.

Despite, or even perhaps because of, my involvement in a programme inspired by the Heideggerian example, my personal acquaintance with Heideggerian scholars and thinkers was, prior to this editorial venture, quite limited. Perhaps the most agreeable aspect of my task has been the opportunity it afforded me to get to know those working in the field and to do so in the most satisfying manner, by publishing the work they so generously made available to me.

By far the most laborious feature of my editorial task has been the extraordinary number of translations (over one volume's worth!) I have had to do from the French and the German in order to make it possible to include papers from the two cultures which have contributed most to our understanding of Heidegger. I have however also been helped by the readiness of certain of my English-speaking contributors to do translations of their colleagues' papers as also by the efforts of several of my

foreign-language authors to get their papers into an English version. My task has also been greatly assisted by the willingness of so many of my contributors to write original pieces for this collection, thereby circumventing permissions problems while, at the same time, throwing fresh light upon the scene. It is not an exaggeration to say that, without the assistance and encouragement of so many of my authors, so many that it is impossible for me to name them individually, this huge collection could never have been put together.

At least two, entirely unforeseen, circumstances prompted me to undertake this work and made it possible for me to complete it on schedule. In the Summer of 1989, I returned to London after a Heidegger conference in Bonn, sponsored by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, to find my mother critically ill with cancer and in need of constant attention. *Critical Assessments* was a suitable labour for me to undertake while attending to someone who, however, did not live long enough to see the completion of the task that her condition made it both necessary and possible for me to take on. Richard Stoneman, the editor of the series, not only first proposed this project to me but, in the period of financial insecurity which followed upon my mother's death, advanced me a sum of money without which I should not have enjoyed the freedom to complete the project on time. To my mother goes the dedication of this work, while thanks are due to Richard Stoneman (and to his editorial assistant Heather McCallum, to Adrian Driscoll, Maria Stasiak and Virginia Myers) for the support he has shown over the two-year period when this project moved, sometimes with seemingly imperceptible slowness, from idea to reality.

Acknowledgements

Hans-Georg Gadamer 'The beginning and the end of philosophy'. First published in 1989 by Bouvier Verlag, Bonn as 'Anfang und Ende der Philosophie'. Translated by Christopher Macann and reprinted by kind permission of the author.

Thomas Sheehan '“Time and being”, 1925–7'. First published in *Thinking about Being* (ed. J. N. Mohanty) by Oklahoma University Press, 1984. Reprinted by kind permission of the editor and of Oklahoma University Press.

Jean-François Courtine 'The preliminary conception of phenomenology and of the problematic of truth in *Being and Time*'. First published in *Heidegger et l'idée de la phénoménologie* (ed. F. Volpi) by Kluwer Academic, 1988. Translated by Christopher Macann and reprinted by kind permission of the author and editor.

Christopher Macann 'Genetic phenomenology: towards a reconciliation of transcendental and ontological phenomenology'. Original piece written for this collection.

Maria Vilella-Petit 'Heidegger's conception of space'. First published as 'L'espace chez Heidegger. Quelques repères', in *Etudes philosophiques*, and extensively rewritten by the author for this collection.

Joseph Kockelmans 'Heidegger on time and being'. First published in the *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 8, no. 4, 1970 and reprinted in *Martin Heidegger*, ed. Ballard and Scott, Nijhoff, 1973. Reproduced here with the kind permission of the author and the editor of the *Southern Journal of Philosophy*.

Françoise Dastur 'The ekstático-horizonal constitution of temporality'. First published in *Heidegger Studies*, vol. 2 as 'La constitution ekstatique-horizontale de la temporalité' and rewritten by the author for this collection.

Alfons Greider 'What did Heidegger mean by "Essence"?' First published in the *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, vol. 19, no. 1, 1988 and reprinted by kind permission of the author and the editor of the *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Wolfe Mays.

Joseph O'Leary 'Theological resonances of *Der Satz vom Grund*'. Original piece written specially for this collection and published by kind permission of the author.

Reiner Wiehl 'Heidegger, hermeneutics and ontology'. First published by Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht as 'Heideggers ontologische Frage' in *Neue Hefte für Philosophie*, 23, 1984 and translated by Robert Wachterhauser for SUNY Press. Reprinted by kind permission of the translator and the editor of SUNY Press.

Otto Pöggeler 'Being as appropriation'. Translated by Ruediger Hermann Grimm for *Philosophy Today* (vol. 19, 1975) and reprinted in *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy* (ed. M. Murray) by Yale University Press, 1978. Reproduced here by kind permission of the author, the editor Michael Murray and Yale University Press.

Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann 'Way and method: hermeneutic phenomenology in the thinking of the history of being'. First published as 'Weg und Methode: zur hermeneutischen Phänomenologie des seinsgeschichtlichen Denkens' by Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1990 and translated by Parvis Emad. Reproduced here by kind permission of the author, the translator and the publisher.

Jean Greisch 'Looking metaphysics in the face'. First published as 'Guardare in faccia la metafisica' in M. Ruffenini (ed.), *Heidegger e la Metafisica*, Genova, Marietti and translated by Joseph O'Leary for this collection. Republished by kind permission of the author and translator.

Michel Henry 'The power of revelation of affectivity according to Heidegger'. This is ¶ 65 of *L'Essence de la Manifestation*, first published by PUF, Paris, 1963 and translated for Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague by Girard Etzkorn as *The Essence of Manifestation*. Reprinted by kind permission of the author and translator.

Kōhei Mizoguchi 'An interpretation of Heidegger's Bremen lectures: towards a dialogue with his later thought'. First published in an English translation in *Heidegger and Asian Thought* (ed. G. Parkes), University of Hawaii Press, 1987 and reprinted by kind permission of the editor and of the University of Hawaii Press.

Samuel IJsseling 'The end of philosophy as the beginning of thinking'. First published as 'Das Ende der Philosophie als Anfang des Denkens' in *Heidegger et l'idée de la phénoménologie* (ed. F. Volpi) by Kluwer Academic, 1988 and translated by Christopher Macann. Reprinted by kind permission of the author and editor.

Introduction

Christopher Macann

To think is to confine yourself to a
single thought that one day stands
still like a star in the world's sky.

(Heidegger, *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*)

In 1989 the world celebrated the centennial of Heidegger's birth. And already, within twenty years of his death in 1976, we are in a position to say that the one thought to which Heidegger dedicated his life (the thought about Being) stands still like a star in the world's sky.

How does thinking of this order arise? Heidegger gives us plenty of clues. 'Out of long guarded speechlessness and out of the careful clarification of the cleared ground arises the utterance of the thinker.'¹ What a warning to those who today, and by virtue of the pressures imposed by the institutional environment in which they are obliged to work, feel compelled to rush into print at the earliest opportunity! 'To know how to question means to know how to wait, even for a whole lifetime.'² The great danger is then surely that this patient, life-consuming thinking will be perverted in a manner with which we are only too familiar and against which Heidegger constantly warned us. In a poem from the same text as that previously cited we find the following, poetically voiced, warning: 'Few are experienced enough in the/difference between an object of scholarship and a matter of thought.'³

This difference between philosophical thinking and academic scholarship is to be found all over his corpus. 'It is not a matter of knowing philosophy but rather of learning how to philosophize',⁴ he says in one of his earliest texts, the *Grundprobleme*. Or again, more forcibly and critically still:

We no longer think but simply busy ourselves with philosophy. In the

kind of competitiveness which such a business demands, philosophy is openly done as an 'ism' and each 'ism' seeks to outdo the other. The pervasiveness of such a conception of philosophy is not accidental. It rests, and especially today, upon a real dictatorship on the part of publicity.⁵

Never has Heidegger's comment been more pertinent than *today*, not the 'today' to which Heidegger himself refers but *our* today. For there have never been more 'isms' than today. We have *existentialism* and *structuralism* and *de-constructivism* and *relativism* and *post-modernism* and *Marxism* and *critical realism* and so on and so forth, so many schools of philosophy which, more than anything else, are schooled in the art of promoting their cause by getting their own works published and their own men into the available university positions.

'All this', Heidegger tells us elsewhere, 'would be highly comical, were it not deeply sad, showing as it does that philosophy no longer reflects upon the things and problems themselves but upon the books of colleagues.'⁶ And how? By encouraging and even requiring that philosophers run from conference to conference, from symposium to symposium, from seminar to seminar, using for this purpose instruments of international travel and communication which were barely conceivable in Heidegger's day, no matter how keenly he might already have felt the inauthenticity of

people today who travel from one conference to the other and get the feeling that something is really happening, as if they had been really doing something. But in fact they have just relieved themselves from work, and have tried to conceal their own helplessness under the cover of idle talk.⁷

It is astonishing that some fifty years ago, and in a university environment very different from (and in certain respects much healthier than) our own, Heidegger should have anticipated a state of affairs that has become quite characteristic of our own time. Nothing seems to me to sum up our *present* situation more poignantly than this last citation: 'The most thought-provoking thing about this, our most thought-provoking, age is that we are still not thinking.'⁸

It is the underlying objective of this collection of papers on the thinking of Martin Heidegger to remain true to this vision of philosophical thinking as an on-going enterprise which will never be completed, which at all times exhibits an inherent tendency to lapse back into mere scholarship and so has constantly to be dragged back into the light of thinking by, amongst other things, reawakening the original, living meaning of the basic questions and doing so with a view to assuming the burden of

thinking as one's own and carrying it on to whatever conclusions are implied by the single thought under whose star any and every thinker is born.

To put it in other words, I have tried to remain true to the very wording of the series to which this particular four-volume set belongs: *Heidegger: Critical Assessments*.

Two major obstacles face any attempt to arrive at a critical assessment of the philosophical significance of Heidegger's philosophy. The first is that of *uncritical dismissal*, either in the form of more or less deliberate ignorance of his work (largely operative in the analytical circles in which I was originally introduced to philosophy) or in the form (for which the historically famous example is provided by Carnap's critique, briefly referred to in Gadamer's paper) of a rigorous application of alien criteria of validity, from which it readily transpires that Heidegger's philosophy is not worth bothering with since it fails to conform to even minimal requirements of truth and meaningfulness. In view of the ever-increasing importance ascribed to Heidegger's thinking in certain circles, such a dismissal is barely sustainable today and reflects more discreditably upon those who attempt to voice it than it does upon Heidegger himself. But there is a second danger, that of *uncritical allegiance*, a danger to which Heidegger's thinking seems peculiarly susceptible despite the fact that it is so obviously contrary to the spirit in which he conducted his own philosophical inquiries – as the accumulation of citations at the beginning of this Introduction clearly and unequivocally attests.

Surely, the greatness of a thinker is to be measured by the fruitfulness of his thinking, the range and diversity of the thinking to which his own inquiries gave rise, and this even when the philosopher may himself not have intended any such deviation from the norms established by his own work. The classical case in point is that of Kant, who naively supposed that the Critical philosophy had solved all outstanding problems in the discipline and that nothing more remained for philosophers to do but rigorously apply his own canons to the various branches of thought to which they might apply and who, consequently, looked askance at attempts by such varied thinkers as Fichte and Schopenhauer to carry on the Kantian tradition in ways which the master never approved. To make matters worse, though both Fichte and Schopenhauer claimed to be true inheritors of the Kantian philosophy, neither could find anything of value in the thinking of the other, a discrepancy enshrined in Schopenhauer's cryptically witty dismissal of Fichte's principal work as *Wissenschaftsleere*. And yet, despite Kant's barely suppressed exasperation at the 'misguided' labours of his disciples, the Critical philosophy did not bring the richness and variety of German philosophy to a close but rather marked the beginning of one of the most astonishing outbursts of philosophical creativity the world has ever known, a phenomenon which

led Heidegger, in his own highly unorthodox Kant interpretation, to turn against Kant a remark which he (Kant) had himself directed at Plato: 'it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in ordinary conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better than he has understood himself' (A 314 = B 371).

In the mouth of a Heidegger this remark is no haphazard and perhaps grudgingly conceded admission. For *Being and Time* laid the foundations of a hermeneutical method which refuses the very possibility of definitive and conclusive results in favour of an open-ended approach to the 'manifold meaning of being' (part of the title of the book by Brentano which served to awaken him from his theological slumbers). When Heidegger, in that famous passage from the Introduction to *Being and Time*, spoke of the *possibility* of phenomenology standing higher than actuality⁹ he had a quite specific target in mind. For the *actuality* of phenomenology at that time was marked by the thinking of his master, Edmund Husserl. In placing possibility above actuality Heidegger was surely creating for himself (and others) the leeway needed to question Husserl's conception of phenomenology and to recommend another, quite different, conception.

It might be argued that, in his later thinking, Heidegger rejected, as 'metaphysical' the kind of phenomenological thinking in which he had indulged at the outset of his career and that, consequently, such a project should not be attempted again. But this would lay Heidegger open to the charge that, having forced open the royal gate of metaphysics in order to secure admission for himself, he then took care to slam it shut behind him – so that no one else could come in after him. And this charge would be doubly incriminating. For not only did *Being and Time* win for Heidegger the audience which would later follow him down the far more esoteric paths of his later thinking and which he might have been condemned to pursuing in more or less Nietzschean isolation had it not been for the enormous success of his first published work; this later thinking was itself more personal and idiosyncratic than his first philosophy and therefore fell even more conclusively under the sway of that 'multiplicity of meaning' already acknowledged as a ruling principle in his hermeneutical philosophy, to the point that, in the end, philosophy, for Heidegger, is brought ever closer to poetry.

No doubt it was in view of the danger of uncritical allegiance that Heidegger himself chose as the motto for his *Gesamtausgabe* (the preparation of which occupied the last years of his life and the editorial responsibility for which he assigned to one of our contributors, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann) the following words: *Wege nicht Werke* (Ways not works). Authoritative pronouncements are enshrined in *works*. They cannot be captured in writings which are indicative of *ways*, ways of

thinking, ways which thinking might take, ways which do not necessarily lead anywhere, ways which are taken to set thinking in motion, not to get somewhere. It was surely also for this reason that Heidegger refused to permit his massive eighty-volume *Gesamtausgabe* to be accompanied by the kind of critical apparatus which has become customary today in scholarly circles. Heidegger wanted his *Complete Works* to feature as a source from which philosophers would draw not *information* but *inspiration*, the kind of inspiration which would set them on their own path of thinking.

But if Heidegger's thinking was designed to awaken in his readers a response which would direct them down the same path as that which he himself had pursued, we run up against a paradox. For paradoxically, though inevitably, 'same' means here 'different', that is, a path which would bring his students to *their own* thinking just as Heidegger had been brought to *his own* thinking by an obstinate, and often deliberately reticent, refusal to tread the beaten track. It is this inspirational response which is threatened by the second of the two dangers mentioned earlier, that of uncritical allegiance.

It is worth noting that uncritical allegiance is rarely, if ever, accorded to one thinker by another thinker. For example while, in general, *Being and Time* was received with immense enthusiasm by the philosophical public, this enthusiasm was by no means unqualified when it came to the leading spokesmen of the day. We know that Husserl's initial reaction to *Being and Time* was one of disappointment at the 'unscientific' direction phenomenology had taken with Heidegger (though this did not inhibit him from promoting the publication of the work in his own journal). Similarly, Jaspers intended to undertake a careful study of the work but found the labour insufficiently rewarding (for his own purposes) to justify the effort involved. Cassirer's objections to Heidegger's Kant interpretation are very clearly and effectively reproduced in the paper by Pierre Aubenque (see chap. 23, vol. II of the present work). And if we move on a generation to philosophers who were deeply influenced by Heidegger's first philosophy (I am thinking of figures like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty), we find thinkers whose works are not only cast in a very different mould but cast in a mould which Heidegger is sometimes constrained to reject as a mis-understanding of his own work – and I am thinking principally of Heidegger objections to the 'existentialism' Sartre claimed to find in *Being and Time* and which he (Sartre) worked out along quite different lines. In other words, those best qualified, by virtue of their own creative achievements, to judge the original quality of Heidegger's work have been those most likely to express reservations, or to develop Heidegger's thinking in directions he himself could not approve.

So, by a critical assessment of Martin Heidegger's work at least four

things will be meant. First, and most obviously, a critical appraisal of the value and validity of the various Heideggerian themes covered by the contributors to this collection. This involves bringing out the limitations as well as the strengths of the positions Heidegger assumed. Second, and less obviously, many contributors have sought to follow up their own critical intuitions and so to indicate, within the space available, alternative directions in which Heideggerian thinking might profitably be taken. Third, I have sought to solicit contributions from authors who have worked out their own philosophical positions, often in reaction to Heidegger. In this connection, I am particularly happy to be able to print a section from Michel Henry's *Essence of Manifestation*. Finally, I have also sought to trace the cross-cultural impact of Heidegger's thinking, sometimes upon thinkers who rejected, or who were never subjected to, the Heideggerian influence.

Nothing speaks more conclusively in favour of the legitimacy of such a critical approach to Heidegger's thinking than the fact that he himself adopted just such an approach, and not just to the thinking of others but also, and more importantly, to his own thinking, reproaching himself in the later course of his development for having written his first philosophy under the superseded, if not discredited, banner of 'metaphysics'. Hence the so-called *Kehre*, the 'turn' or 'turning' which both turned Heidegger away from the path indicated in the general programme outlined in *Being and Time* and returned him to beginning philosophy, to an ever more primordial quest for the origins of Western thinking in Greek thought.

The simplest, and therefore for this reason also perhaps most simplistic, way to present this reorientation is in terms of a shift from human being (*Dasein*) to Being (*Sein*). In a book on Heidegger's later philosophy, Kockelmans argues that, in *Being and Time*, 'Being' and 'World' are to some extent employed as equivalent terms and that therefore the task of investigating the meaning of Being, as such, had still not been satisfactorily completed in his first major work.¹⁰

But there is more to the *Kehre* than just this recognition of a task which had been assumed and never really carried through conclusively. More seriously, certain initial decisions carried his thinking in directions which were later to prove contentious. For instance, a great deal follows from his early decision to adopt Aristotle as his ontological guide. Had he chosen instead to follow up his genial insight into the primordial nature of the imagination (the insight developed at length in the Kant book and which forms, as it were, the core and the foundation of this unique interpretation) and to pursue this line of thought down the path which it had taken in German Idealism through Fichte to Hegel (the Hegel, say, of the *Anthropology*, which is the text in which Hegel comes closest to something like a *Dasein's* analytic), the primordial conjunction

of feeling and imagination would have brought him much closer to the researches being conducted by such contemporaries as Scheler and Cassirer (and anticipated the researches of a thinker like Michel Henry) and would have made it possible for him to establish a link between his own ontological investigations into the pre-objective, pre-predicative domain and investigations concurrently being undertaken in fields such as psychoanalysis, child psychology, anthropology, mythology and so on.

Instead, he chose to go back to Greek philosophy and, moreover, to that version of it embodied in Aristotle's theory of *praxis*; which led him to the rather strange conclusion that the 'saving grace' (in his early philosophy, the uncovering of an ontological domain against the ontic has something of the character of a 'saving grace') resides in such basic and familiar activities as tool using, driving cars, making use of communications systems; more generally, operating systems (whether mechanical or human) in the manner to which we have become accustomed in our present, technologically oriented, industrialized society. Undeniably, functioning in this practical way does lead to an overcoming of the distance and detachment implied in theorizing. But then the systems in question are all of them systems into which a large component of theoretical reason has already been invested. Worse, they are systems which are both the result of, and which confirm, an attitude of manipulation and control which it was one of the tasks of his later thinking to call in question. As he watched the world being transformed, in a seemingly irreversible manner, through the multiple and apparently limitless applications of science and technology, and as he watched the human and natural destruction which these same applications wreaked upon the face of the earth, it must have become ever clearer to him that the 'saving grace' had become the 'devil incarnate'.¹¹

When the 'saving grace' becomes the 'devil incarnate' a massive adjustment is clearly called for. But it is absolutely characteristic of Heidegger's 'turn' that it should not have taken the form of a renunciation of his earlier position but rather that of a reorientation (see the paper by von Herrmann). The primacy initially accorded to human being (*Dasein*) is never entirely given up, in favour, for instance, of a logic of Being. Rather, the residual persistence of human being is evident in the very terms employed to characterize the new articulation of the Being-relation – as openness, clearing, gift, mittence, en-ownment. *Dasein* is no longer the one who ap-propriates, makes own (see Pöggeler's 'Being as appropriation'). But, as ap-propriated by Being, en-owned, the recipient of the gift of Being, *Dasein* is still there, nevertheless.

But if the initial commitment (which called for this elaborate detour) is not one which we, who follow after, need make, it also follows that the conclusive realignment need not be one with which we have to fall in line. By taking our stand in a reassessment of the full potential of

ontological phenomenology (the field opened up with *Being and Time*), we are free to assume an alternative foundation which will not call for the elaborate 'destruction' which Heidegger performed upon his own earlier thinking, as well as upon the history of philosophy.

But why should one attempt such a reassessment? Obviously, only if it is possible to identify certain striking limitations inherent in the position assumed at the outset. Is it possible to identify such limitations? And if so, how can they be 'overcome' in such a way as to recreate, within the general field of ontological phenomenology, the same latitude (possibility) that Heidegger, the founder of this way of doing phenomenology, claimed for his own enterprise when he placed the possibility of his own (ontological) phenomenology above the actuality of Husserl's (transcendental) phenomenology? Here are some suggestions, suggestions which are by no means intended to be exhaustive.

First, the refusal of Husserl's transcendentalism seems to me not only unjustified, but unnecessary. Heidegger's reaction to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and his determination to develop phenomenology along alternative, ontological lines led to a situation which Merleau-Ponty, in his Preface to *The Phenomenology of Perception* rather inaccurately portrayed in terms of a *both-and* (both a philosophy of essences and of existence/a philosophy which reduces the world and a philosophy for which the world is always already there/a rigorous science and an interpretation of lived meanings); *inaccurately*, because the very *incompatibility*¹² of Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology means that these two ways of doing philosophy can only legitimately be presented in terms of an *either-or*, not a *both-and* – at which point the question necessarily arises: with what right can they *both* then be taken to fall under the same classificatory heading of phenomenology? Is it indeed possible *both* to distinguish and to clearly demarcate the respective spheres of transcendental and ontological phenomenology (and without such a preliminary clearing of the ground, confusion will reign) *and* to reconcile and reintegrate these very different, and indeed incompatible, ways of doing phenomenology?

I believe that a positive answer can be given to this question. Indeed, my own ontological phenomenology is devoted to laying the foundation for just such a task of reintegration. At this point however, it is much more appropriate to consider the problems that arise when a disjunction of the kind indicated above is not resolved. First, as Husserl understood only too well, the replacement of transcendental with ontological phenomenology of the Heideggerian variety carries with it the possibility (if not the necessity) of a depreciation (if not a dismissal) of rationality, both of the philosophical and of the non-philosophical kind. Nowhere is this reservation better expressed than in *Krisis*, that extended cry of pain

emitted by Husserl between 1934 and 1937 as he watched his cherished ideal of rationality fall into the abyss of Nazi irrationalism.

A second conundrum follows hard upon the first, the depreciation, if not the dismissal, of Ethics. Here the classic case in point is Kant rather than Husserl. It is one of the objections brought by Cassirer against Heidegger's Kant interpretation that a strict, and unqualifiedly ontological, interpretation of Kant's transcendental philosophy could not hope to come to terms with the significance of Kant's contribution to Ethics which, as we know, Heidegger himself was inclined to dismiss as a derivative discipline (along with logic, aesthetics, politics and so on).

A third implication follows hard upon the first two, a deeply ambiguous relation to what might be called 'voluntarism'. Perhaps the most critical failing of Heidegger's own critique of the voluntarism inherent in the 'philosophy of subjectivity' is his refusal to recognize the difference (or at least the relevance of the difference) between what might be called 'empirical' and 'transcendental' subjectivity. In as much as Heidegger refused to recognize that, in transcendental philosophy, an alternative conception of subjectivity (inwardness/consciousness) had been developed which already brought with it the 'saving grace' which he was seeking, the grace of a subjectivity which had learnt to 'overcome itself' by taking a further and conclusive 'step back' out of empirical subjectivity and into a sphere variously entitled 'transcendental' or 'noumenal', he was obliged to seek the 'saving grace' in question along other lines, lines leading back to a more primordial relation with Being, and so leading on, inevitably, to a critically ambivalent relation to the 'primitivity' of the 'will to power'. Out of the frying pan into the fire!

A second limitation, or delimitation, one which arises out of the first (the refusal of transcendentalism), is Heidegger's initial (and perhaps also conclusive) commitment to the *finitude* of human being. The Kant book brings out better than any other early text the extent of Heidegger's commitment to this principle. But is it as obvious as some contemporary philosophers would have us believe that this principle is self-evident, or even universally assumed to be such? With the possible exception of a certain interpretation of Buddhism (and such an interpretation is itself highly ambiguous), this assumption implies, even if it does not explicitly avow, a wholesale dismissal of religion as a peculiar, and pathologically engendered, *illusion*, whose survival can only be justified on the grounds that, in some instances at least, it does seem to prompt more considerate *social* behaviour on the part of its members. Precisely because, in the context of an all-pervasive materialism which itself underwrites our contemporary 'faith' in technology, the finitude of human being has virtually taken on the proportions of a self-evident assumption it should surely, today, be subject to the same rigorously critical scrutiny to which the religious thinking of past ages has already been subjected. For with

regard to nothing should philosophy be more critical than toward that which *appears* to be self-evident. For this reason, I am very happy to be able to include two contributions (by Richard Kearney and Joseph O'Leary) in which the theological implications of Heidegger's thinking are explored.

That a rethinking of the relation of philosophy and theology does not need to mean a dismissal of Heidegger's contribution to philosophy is evident in the light of the impact Heidegger's thinking has had upon theology, despite his relative silence on the subject. Rahner, Bultmann and Tillich are the names of just three theologians who have been deeply influenced by Heidegger. To take only the third of these, the starting point of Tillich's *Systematic Theology* is to be located in an interpretation, and theological reorientation, of Heidegger's first philosophy. It is interesting to note that in this, his seminal work, Paul Tillich should have felt obliged to appeal to the Fichtean notion of 'Being itself' in order to accomplish his synthesis of Heideggerian ontology and theology. It is also noteworthy that although Tillich published his *Systematic Theology* late enough (1951) to be able to take account of the *Kehre* (and some at least of its theological implications), he chose to go back to Heidegger's first philosophy for his philosophical grounding.

A third limitation can be identified in Heidegger's refusal to countenance any attempt to make the connection between ontological phenomenology and other relevant branches of the human sciences. I say 'refusal' not 'failure' because, on several occasions, he does explicitly *refuse* to make this connection despite its obvious relevance to the directives of primordially. And yet, in his study of Heidegger's theory of being-with (*Der Andere*), Theunissen will talk of an 'anthropological turn'.¹³ And with some justification. For, towards the end of his Kant book, Heidegger does talk of the laying of the foundations of metaphysics as 'philosophical anthropology'.

And so on to psychology. In his paper on the psychological implications of Heidegger's ontology (see chap. 60, vol. IV of the present work), Charles Scott shows how fruitful Heidegger's thinking has also proved to be for such psychoanalysts as Medard Boss and Binswanger. Merleau-Ponty's own investigation of the being-in-the-world of human being not only relies heavily upon the findings of behavioural psychology but is obliged to do so in so far as the being of human being is now determined in accordance with the fundamental principle of embodiment – as Christina Schües' paper shows. To these two instances, it would be appropriate to add a third, the opening up of the whole field of child psychology, primarily through the work of Jean Piaget but also through the labours of researchers such as Anna Freud and Melanie Klein. Moreover, this concern with the primary in connection with the psyche readily leads on, and especially through the work of Carl Jung, to a more general reassess-

ment of human spirituality – for instance, as exhibited and attested in the discipline of mythology. In this last connection I would mention especially Eric Neumann and the Swiss cultural anthropologist, Jean Gebser.

If the direction of Heidegger's first philosophy is regressive (and this directive is, to some extent, maintained throughout the course of his development), a movement from the derivative to the primary, from the grounded to the grounding, from the outcome to the outset, then surely, those branches of the humanities which are concerned with precisely this domain (of the primordial) *must* have a bearing upon the ontological revolution introduced by Heidegger into phenomenology? In this connection, I would strongly recommend the current work of Hermann Schmitz, whose ten-volume *System der Philosophie*¹⁴ is full of insights gleaned from a careful consideration of empirical research bearing upon human reality.

Thus far, we have taken into consideration only those delimitations which refer to possible ways of doing (or of orienting) phenomenology which Heidegger *explicitly* took account of in order precisely to be able to discount them. Two further limitations deserve to be mentioned, limitations which refer to ways of doing philosophy which Heidegger never himself seriously entertained and which, for this reason, remain excluded from the province of *his* consideration: analytic philosophy, on the one hand, and Eastern philosophy, on the other.

Heidegger's refusal of analytic philosophy, in particular, or the philosophy of the English-speaking world, in general, was, though rarely referred to, quite deliberate. In his *Introduction to Metaphysics*, in one of those rare passages in which he talks of the forgetfulness of being in terms of the emasculation of spirit, of a spiritlessness engendered by a utilitarian intelligence which skims over the surface of things, Heidegger lumps America (by implication the Anglo-Saxon world) and Russia together as the enemies of a spirituality whose high point is to be located in German Idealism.¹⁵ But a case for the exact opposite position can readily be made, as we all know, from the example of Karl Popper whose intellectual career encompasses a massive attack (to my mind, by no means as convincing or as conclusive as it appears) on German Idealism (*The Open Society and its Enemies* and *The Poverty of Historicism*) as the most important source (traceable to its roots in Platonism) of totalitarianism.¹⁶

More generally, I think it is appropriate to point out that the 'spirit' in which analytic philosophy is conducted is, in certain respects, 'healthier' than that which prevails in continental philosophy. In analytical circles there is no such thing as an unassailable theory or an unassailable theorist. Rather the contrary, progress in the field is measured by a procedure of 'challenge and response' from which no one is exempt and

from which no one can withdraw, without discredit, into genial immunity. Admittedly, the cut and thrust of analytical philosophy has much to do with a somewhat naive, because epistemologically biased, criterion of validity and with a marked reluctance to attempt anything like the elaboration of a complete philosophy. For all that, Heidegger's dismissal of the epistemological concept of truth does not merely reduce the scope of his theory, it confuses the issue in so far as it leads to an (ontological) extension which borrows much of its conviction from that which it seeks to surpass – as Tugendhat has shown.

Finally, Heidegger's determination to think the meaning of being strictly out of the Western tradition, beginning with the Greeks, deliberately overlooks the more original contribution of Eastern philosophy. Greek culture was not, in fact, the beginning of philosophical culture here on earth. Long, long before the Greeks came the Indians – and possibly also the Chinese. It is indeed astonishing that of all the great Western philosophers only one, Arthur Schopenhauer, should have shown a proper appreciation of the indispensable significance of Eastern philosophy – in his case, Indian philosophy. It should however be said that although Heidegger never sought to directly address (let alone assimilate) Eastern philosophy as such, he did at various points enter into a dialogue with Japanese philosophers, a subsidiary connection which I have been fortunate enough to be able to follow up through the good offices of Graham Parkes, the editor of a volume on *Heidegger and Asian Thought*.¹⁷

But, it will be objected, this attempt to recuperate, with a view to further developing, the general field opened up by Heidegger's ontological phenomenology only means that one has not read, marked, learnt and inwardly digested the implications of his later philosophy, that one has not come to terms with the claim, as it is so often voiced, 'that the only question which philosophers are permitted to address today is the question of the "closure" or "end" of philosophy'.

First, as Samuel IJsseling's paper reminds us, the so-called 'end of philosophy' is not an end *tout court* but is also the 'commencement' of something else which Heidegger called 'thinking'. But second, it seems doubtful to me that it is possible *for us* to start out where Heidegger left off, with the thinking that came after the *Kehre*. The very fact that the *Kehre* took place, in part, as an auto-critical reaction means not only that we have grounds (furnished by Heidegger himself) for being wary of Heidegger's own starting point but also grounds for thinking that what follows the *Kehre* cannot itself, and without further qualification, form a starting point for the development of any further thinking about Being, at least not unless, and until, we too have made our own move 'through phenomenology to thought'. The more I read the productions of those who have taken late Heidegger as their point of departure, the more

convinced I become that it is not possible to start out from the *Kehre* without the risk of lapsing into arbitrariness and unassailable, because inaccessible, idiosyncrasy.

'By their fruits ye shall know them.' Thinkers who have returned to the source from which Heidegger originally drew his inspiration have taken Heidegger at his word and produced phenomenological programmes of their own inspired by the Heideggerian example, have proved to be amongst the most fruitful thinkers of our time, even when the course of their thinking has adopted a very different trajectory. The two figures who spring most immediately to mind are, of course, Merleau-Ponty, whose own concept of being-in-the-world (partly inspired by Husserl) led him towards an investigation of embodiment, and Sartre, whose dualistic ontology (harking back to Descartes) permitted him to offer a graphic portrait of the existential implications of alienation. But there are others. In his seminal work, *Essence of Manifestation*, Michel Henry chose to suspend the primacy accorded to transcendence in the Heideggerian ontology and so found himself in a position to work out the implications of an *ontology of immanence*. In his massive, ten-volume work, *System der Philosophie*, Hermann Schmitz chose to suspend the primacy accorded to the future in the Heideggerian ontology and so found himself in a position to work out the implications of an ontology whose existential watchword might be: live more presently! Emmanuel Lévinas not only refuses the subordination of ethics to ontology (as Jean Greisch point out in his paper) but chooses to radicalize the alterity of the other with a view to promoting a sense of the irreducibility of personal relations. With regard to the many topics with which his thinking has come to terms, Professor Ricoeur has never ceased to hold in tension the three (for him mutually supportive), parameters of empirical investigation, transcendental critique and hermeneutical interpretation.

How one thinks is in part determined by what gives itself, at any given time, as having to be thought – the gift of being, the offer of which, Heidegger said later, would depend upon being, not upon us. But surely, of one thing we may be fairly certain. There will be no lack of themes in the years to come. To take only one example; from the very earliest times, and certainly before Plato, the word 'being' has been linked with that of the 'One' or unity. But never before has unity meant what it is coming to mean today, the global unification of the human species under the compulsive thrust of contemporary technology. Epictetus already talked of himself as a 'citizen of the world', but largely on the *tragic* grounds of his own uprootedness and enslavement. Today, we see the unity of the globe through satellite pictures beamed down from space. Corporate capitalism thinks of the world as a whole and already operates on a global basis, regardless of national frontiers. In fact, these frontiers are becoming ever less viable, whether they are dissolved through

agreement (the European Community) or forcibly overridden (the contemporary reaction against communist domination in Eastern Europe/the black revolt in South Africa).

The unification of the world is not however likely to proceed smoothly. In fact, I suspect that the next decades will prove to be amongst the most turbulent the world has ever seen. Momentarily, we are congratulating ourselves on the suspension of the Cold War. But this suspension can always itself be suspended. More realistically, the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the Third World makes it likely that a nuclear confrontation of some kind is going to take place before very long. In the meantime, the apparent withdrawal of the threat of world war is matched by an equally apparent advance in the scope and scale of local wars, wars whose barbarism surpasses that of the world wars themselves. Countries which, like Peru or Mexico, were historically (the Inca and Aztec empires) always able to feed their people adequately are now unable to provide for a rapidly increasing population despite the resources of agricultural technology (or perhaps because of them). Famine on a scale never before known faces Africa, and epidemics on a scale rarely seen before now confront not only the undeveloped world but its fully industrialized leaders. And even if all these dangers are overcome, or circumvented, by the intelligent use of technology, this very technology threatens to bring with it an environmental destruction for which there exists no parallel in past history.

The times ahead are going to be turbulent and, for this very reason, dangerous times. In times of danger, Nietzsche claimed, philosophers are needed. But surely not to debate the question of the 'end' or the 'closure' of philosophy, or to indulge in meta-theoretical assessments of the actual situation in the discipline, still less to fall back upon a scholarly examination, or critical deconstruction, of the texts which go to make up what has come to be known as the history of philosophy. Is this not the very moment to revive the time-honoured slogan: *To the things themselves!* The endless discussion of the 'end of philosophy' at a time when philosophers are needed to address the very real dangers that face humanity today seems to me one of the strangest acts of professional irresponsibility since Nero fiddled while Rome burnt.

Notes

1 Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* (GA) 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, S. 309).

2 Heidegger, GA 40, tr. Ralph Manheim as *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p. 172.

3 Heidegger, GA 13, tr. Albert Hofstadter as *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 5.

4 Heidegger, *GA* 24, tr. Albert Hofstadter as *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 2.

5 Heidegger, *GA* 9, S. 315.

6 Heidegger, *GA* 21, S. 84.

7 Heidegger, *GA* 20, S. 376.

8 Heidegger, *GA* 8, tr. by F. Wieck and G. Gray as *What is Called Thinking?* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 6.

9 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson as *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 63 (H. 38).

10 Joseph Kockelmans, *On the Truth of Being* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 47.

11 In *Identity and Difference* (tr. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969)) Heidegger actually uses, though admittedly only to refuse, the language of devilry. 'We can not of course reject today's technological world as devil's work, nor may we destroy it – assuming it does not destroy itself' (p. 40).

12 The incompatibility of first Heidegger and Husserl is quite clear, since Heidegger refuses the transcendental apparatus Husserl considers as essential to phenomenology. The incompatibility of later Husserl with first Heidegger is however not *so* clear, since Husserl does at least make use of the concept of 'world', even if not that of 'being-in-the-world'.

13 Theunissen, Michael, *Der Andere*, tr. Christopher Macann as *The Other* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), p. 170.

14 Hermann Schmitz, *System der Philosophie*, Band 1–5 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1964–80).

15 Heidegger, *GA* 40, pp. 37–9.

16 Popper's attack on German Idealism is much more puzzling than it appears. For if he was concerned to expose the philosophical sources of authoritarianism why did he not take account of Hobbes' *Leviathan*, one of the most unabashed defences of dictatorial rule ever put together by a philosopher? Could it have been because the audience for which he intended his anti-totalitarian diatribe was largely British? In which case one would have grounds for querying the genuineness of his moral crusade.

17 Graham Parkes, *Heidegger and Asian Thought* (Hawaii, University of Hawaii Press, 1987).

The beginning and the end of philosophy

Hans-Georg Gadamer

Heidegger's influence has always been linked up with well-founded and entirely intelligible countervailing forces. This has to be understood from the very beginning if we are to come to terms with Heidegger's talk about the end of philosophy and the commencement of thinking. The first major objection which can be brought against Heidegger is, of course, his relation to logic. This is not so much a matter of logic having made astonishing progress in the last decades while Heidegger, as with all those of my generation, was brought up on the old Aristotelian school logic. It is a matter of a deeper conflict which not only concerns Heidegger but continental philosophy in general. It is for instance always possible to tear apart statements by Heidegger in the manner we have become familiar with through Rudolf Carnap. In a paper which has become very well known, Carnap dismantled Heidegger's inaugural lecture at Freiburg entitled 'Was ist Metaphysik?' by a scrupulous application of the logical rules of the game. In that text Heidegger speaks openly of an annihilation of nothingness. If one sets out with Carnap to write this statement on the board, using for the purpose the instruments of mathematical logic, it becomes perfectly clear that it doesn't work. In this formal language in which everything is supposed to have an unambiguous meaning, no symbol can be found for 'nothingness'. One only finds a symbol for the negation of an expression. Heidegger's talk thereby becomes an inaccessible mystification. From the standpoint of predicative logic, an objection of this kind may very well be legitimate. But what then becomes of philosophy?

In the eyes of modern logic, Hegel is just as badly off. And what about the dark Heraclitus? We will have to ask ourselves what philosophical discourse is and with what right it can claim to flout the laws of predicative logic. Furthermore, this holds not only of philosophical discourse but of any form of inter-human discourse which falls under the

aegis of rhetoric. So it remains a matter of the primary importance for philosophy to determine why that which is allowed by language and forbidden by logic cannot simply be put down to feeling or to a poetic game, as Carnap surmised.

The second objection, which goes together with the specific theme of the commencement of philosophy, comes from the side of philology. We will find it difficult to rule out as unjustified the complaint brought by classical philosophy (to which I belong to some degree) against the violence of Heidegger's interpretations or even the incorrectness of certain of his interpretative strategies. We shall have to ask ourselves whether, for this reason, we can claim the right to overlook this great thinker or whether, on the contrary, we might ourselves be missing something important when we close ourselves off from Heidegger on account of the unwelcome impact of his thinking.

The third objection is that of science. On the one hand, we have the social scientists, who find that their field has been ignored by Heidegger or at least only addressed in piecemeal form. To dismiss 'society' as *das Man* is for them unwarranted. On the other hand, we have the natural sciences, who cannot understand what Heidegger means when he says 'there is no thinking in the sciences'. But perhaps such a claim demands thinking of a quite different kind from that of the empirical sciences.

All this can be summed up in the ruling prejudice to the effect that what Heidegger has to say after *Being and Time* is no longer provable, is a kind of poetry, or better still a pseudo-mythical thinking. Here we find Being talked about in such a way that 'it gives', that 'it sends', that 'it reaches'; goodness knows what else is said of this mysterious something which is Being. Relative to the annihilating nothing of the Freiburg inaugural lecture to which Carnap took exception, this is something different again, by comparison with which the above-mentioned 'nothingness' indeed appears almost harmless. We come up against a question here which cannot be so easily evaded and which, in particular, requires that we take account of the role that art, and above all Hölderlin's poetry, took on in the thinking of late Heidegger.

If I mention these objections brought against Heidegger in an introductory way, it is in order to make room for the comprehensive urgency of the theme in question. This is a question which has to be posed by our civilization. Brought into being by the West, it has nevertheless spread its net over the greater part of the world. It concerns the world view which lies at the root of science and scientific theorizing, a world view which is characteristic of our epoch. The inner drive towards 'progress' which lurks therein is slowly beginning to exert its influence as something that merits attention. It was forty years ago that Heidegger wrote his paper on the end of philosophy, and this paper reads today as though he had come to grips with precisely what has preoccupied us everywhere

in the meantime. Thus the topic of this paper, 'The beginning and the end of philosophy' is something that refers back to Heidegger's work. What does it mean to say that philosophy is at an end and that, at best, it has been dissolved into a number of specialized disciplines, disciplines which will perhaps be tolerated alongside the other sciences within the complex of our scientific culture? What contemporary trend is it that is being described with the formula: The End of Philosophy?

To be sure, this does not mean that nothing else is effective except the technological frenzy. When Heidegger talks of the end of philosophy, we all understand what he means. For this way of talking can only proceed from the West. In other parts of the world, philosophy was never set off so dramatically against poetry or religion, not in East Asia, nor in India, still less in the less well-known parts of the earth. 'Philosophy' is an expression of our *Western* destiny. To speak with Heidegger: an *ontological* destiny which, as a matter of fact, has become our fatality. Contemporary civilization strives to fulfil this destiny, or so it seems, a destiny which will bring the whole of humanity under the sway of the industrial revolution. Whether the latter is linked to this or that economy plays a subordinate role. A centralized economy, like that of the Russian five-year plan, seems to be extraordinarily similar to our own in its subjection to the necessities of capitalistic society. If we are hearing talk of the end of philosophy this has to be understood along the above-mentioned lines. We are becoming conscious of the fact that the distinction between religion, art and philosophy and perhaps also the distinction of science and philosophy, is not the same for all cultures but rather places its stamp upon the particular history of the Western world. One is forced to ask: what kind of a destiny is that? Where does it come from? How did it come about that technology was ever able to exert so autonomous a sway that it has today become the distinguishing mark of human culture? If we pose questions such as these, Heidegger's at first sight surprising and paradoxical thesis sounds, all of a sudden, astonishingly plausible; that it is Greek science and metaphysics the outcome of which has commanded the emergence of present-day world civilization.

To be sure, by comparison with earlier epochs, the technical civilization of today imparts a different stamp upon our history. In a well-known paper on technology, Heidegger himself admitted that technology does not represent the simple extension of a once-familiar handicrafts culture or even the perfecting of instrumental reason but has rigidified into a self-sufficient system.

Heidegger thought about this system under the provocative aegis of the name *das Gestell* (the frame or the set-up) – a truly Heideggerian concept. We will have to talk later about Heidegger's tendency to devise new concepts. But in order to get closer to the concept of *das Gestell*, one has only to think about a familiar application of the word. We talk,

for example, of the signal-box. That is, the regulative installation in every station which directs the tracks into the different platforms. From this standpoint, anyone can understand Heidegger's concept. *Das Gestell* is a key concept, the sum of such setting-up and directing, such ordering and securing. Heidegger has shown convincingly that we are confronted here with an all-determining thought structure which is by no means restricted to the industrial economy in the narrow sense. His thesis is that philosophy is coming to an end because our thinking takes place under the final direction of the *Gestell*.

Now Heidegger asks: where does all this come from? What is the beginning of this history? Obviously, the beginning is not to be located at the point where modern science becomes more and more dependent upon technological progress. Rather, modern science is itself already technology. This means that its relationship to natural entities is an assault which aims at breaking down a resistance. In this sense science is aggressive in that it compels entities to respond to the conditions of 'objective' knowledge, and this whether these entities are natural or social in character. To take an example with which we are all familiar because we belong to society: the questionnaire. The questionnaire is a document which attests to the fact that questions are forcibly demanded of one, questions which one is supposed to answer. Whether one does or does not want to answer, whether one can or cannot answer responsibly, we are nevertheless obliged to respond in the name of science. Social science needs its statistics just as natural science applies its quantitative methods to nature. In both cases it is the predominance of a method which defines what is scientific and worthy of scientific investigation, which means that what is to count as knowledge is controllable. No matter how complex and elaborate the concepts developed by scientific theorizing, it cannot be denied that the great breakthrough of the seventeenth century is still operative today. It emerged initially out of the physics of Galileo and Huygens and found its first fundamental articulation in Descartes' reflections. It is well known how the West managed to 'demystify the world' as a result of this breakthrough in modern science. The industrial exploitation of scientific research eventually made it possible for the West to emerge as the dominant planetary power by installing an all-powerful economic and communications system. But that was not the first beginning.

There is an older, so to speak, first wave of 'enlightenment' through which science and scientific research developed the world – and that is the beginning which Heidegger has in mind and which is always at the back of his mind when he speaks of the end of philosophy. This is the Greek discovery of *theoria*. Heidegger's provocative thesis is that this beginning of scientific enlightenment is the true beginning of metaphysics. To be sure, modern science arose as a result of a conflict with

'metaphysics', but is it not, for all that, a consequence of Greek physics and metaphysics? In this way Heidegger posed a question which has preoccupied modern thought for a long time. It can be illustrated with reference to a particular, well-known case. At the beginning of modern science in the seventeenth century, philosophers turned to the least well-known of the great Greek thinkers, Democritus. This led to Democritus being set up as our great predecessor, especially in the nineteenth century when the victory of modern science had taken hold of consciousness in general, a predecessor moreover who had been overshadowed by the obfuscating style of a Plato or an Aristotle. And so Heidegger was able to pose the question of our Greek origins in a much more radical fashion. He uncovered a deeper continuity in Western history which was initiated earlier and persists until today. This tradition led to the splitting up of religion, art and science and even survived the radicality of the European Enlightenment. How did Europe get on to this path? What is this path? How did it begin and how did it go on, until it finally found its most dramatic expression in Heidegger's *Holzwege*?

There can be no doubt that this development goes together with what in Germany is called a *Begriff* (concept). To say what a *Begriff* is seems almost as difficult as it was for Augustine to say in what time consists. We all know the answer and still cannot say in what it really consists. When it is a question of a *Begriff*, words always betray us. In a *Begriff* something is grasped together (*zusammengegriffen*), put together. In the very word *Begriff*, we find it implied that a *Begriff* apprehends (*zugreift*), comprehends (*zusammengreift*) and so conceives (*begreift*). Thinking in *Begriffen* (concepts) is therefore an actively appropriating (*eingreifendes*) and expropriating (*ausgreifendes*) thinking. Thus Heidegger grasped the history of metaphysics as the expression of an original Greek experience of Being, and moreover as that development of our experience of thinking which grasps beings in their Being, so that one can get a grip on it and, to this extent, hold it in one's possession. His formulation of the task of metaphysics thereby becomes one of grasping beings, as such, in their beingness. This is the definition, the *Horismos*, through which what is gets conceptualized. That was the genial achievement of metaphysics and not just a deviation from the straight and narrow path which the ancient atomistic philosophy was supposedly pursuing. It was the transfer of Greek metaphysical thought to Rome and so into the Christian Middle Ages which finally led to the emergence of the modern epoch with its humanistic renewal of the Greek tradition. This is a long story. Since I am also acting here in the role of an eye-witness, I should give notice that, by 1923, Heidegger had already described the modern epoch as the 'concern with indubitable knowledge'. This still unknown literary formula from Heidegger means that the truth (*Veritas*) has been suppressed by certainty (*Certitude*). It is, so to speak, the moral of this method that

small, even if modest, steps are to be preferred, provided only that they are absolutely controllable and certain. One sees how the Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy of today has remained truer to this scientific moral than Hegel or Heidegger himself. Heidegger's claim, a claim which he advanced with the whole weight of his imaginatively rich thinking, is simply that of having clarified the destinal unity of Western history, a history which began with Greek metaphysics and which has ended in the total domination of industry and technology.

A claim of this kind implied the need to go back behind propositional logic. It is very difficult to accomplish this so long as philosophy remains in competition with religion and art and poses questions which cannot be avoided but for which, nevertheless, there exist no demonstrable answers, for example, the question: 'what was there in the beginning?' The physicists cannot ask questions of this kind. If we ask them what there was before the Big Bang, they can only smile. From their own scientific standpoint, it becomes meaningless to ask such questions.

In spite of that, we all do this. We are all of us philosophers, bent upon asking questions even where there is no answer, or even where there is no clear way of arriving at an answer. This is what I meant when I talked about going back behind propositional logic. A going back behind what can be formulated in valid propositions. Such a going back has nothing to do with logic itself, with its validity and its indubitability. It does however have something to do with the fact that this monologically consequential argumentative procedure is incapable of laying to rest our imaginatively questioning thinking. The step back which takes place in such questions goes back not only behind the proposition to what we cannot avoid going on to question in everyday life; it even goes back beyond what we are able to ask and to say in our language. We continually find ourselves caught in a tension between what we are trying to say and what we are not really entitled to say. This is a constitutive linguistic need which pertains to humankind and which is assumed by every genuine thinker who, as such, finds himself unable to forgo the rigours of the concept (*Begriff*).

Language was not made for philosophy. So philosophy has to take words out of the language in which we live and confer upon such words a quite peculiar meaning. This results in artificial constructions which, in an ever-extending collegiate culture, lapse more and more into ghostly symbols behind which it is no longer possible to glimpse any hint of a living linguistic intuition. What follows therefrom is that tendency to *Falling* which Heidegger identified in *Being and Time*, a tendency which pertains to human existence as such. We make use of forms and norms, schools and institutions without thinking about them in an original way.

In our modern scientific age a new task arises, a task of a kind German Idealism was already familiar with but only resolved in part. I learnt

how to conceptualize this task from Heidegger. It consists in becoming conscious of the concepts which one employs to think. Where do such concepts come from? What do they contain? What is unintended and unconscious in such concepts when, for example, I use the word 'subject'? Subject is the same as substance. Subject and substance are both of them confirmations of the Aristotelian expression *Hypokeimenon*, which means 'foundation'. This Greek concept has admittedly nothing to do with the thinking 'I'. We readily and quite self-evidently (even if we underestimate what is at stake) speak of a fatal subject. We also, as 'philosophers', speak (with nervous overestimation) of the transcendental subject in which all objects of knowledge are constituted. How far philosophical concepts have been detached from their original usage! This is the task the young Heidegger resolutely set himself when he set about the destruction of the metaphysical conceptual tradition. Within the limits of what we are capable of, we have learnt from him how to work our way back along the path from the concept to the word, not however with a view to giving up conceptual thinking, but in order to restore to it its intuitional potential. In doing this we are doing no more than was done by the Greeks before us and, in particular, we are following Aristotle who, in Book Delta of his *Metaphysics*, set about the analysis of fundamental concepts and sought to build up their multiple meanings from ordinary linguistic usage. In other words, it is a question of reopening the way from the concept to the word, so that thinking speaks once again. Given the burden of a two thousand-year intellectual tradition, this is no mean task. It is very difficult to draw the boundary between a concept that has been developed with some precision and a word which lives in speech. We are all taken in by a conceptual terminology which stems from the metaphysical tradition and which lives on unthinkingly in thought. Heidegger had to make use of an extraordinary linguistic facility in order to make the language of philosophy speak again. Such an undertaking brings a great deal back to life. Indeed, a great deal still waits to be done along these lines, above all, an assessment of the Christian mysticism of a Meister Eckhart, Luther's bible and the expressive power of those modes of speech which have remained inaccessiblely ensconced in a discourse which employs picture language.

What was new about Heidegger was that he not only disposed of an extensive linguistic mastery, as did the shoe-maker Jacob Böhme, but that he also commanded that entire Latin School tradition which belongs to our conceptual language and, moreover, broke through this tradition by going back to its Greek origins. In this way he succeeded in rediscovering the intuitive word which lurked in the concept. This was his special contribution from the very beginning. By this we do not mean to deny that the development of a concept makes it necessary, in the interests of unequivocal definition, to reject some of the implications that have

accumulated in the course of its history. Even Aristotle did this. Similarly, it was a new Aristotle, an Aristotle with a new voice who, in the person of Heidegger, and from the time of his writings on the *Rhetoric* and on the *Ethics*, threw a new light upon metaphysics by going back beyond the neo-scholastic and Thomistic conceptual language and Aristotle interpretations. And so, in the end, it becomes understandable that, when one evokes a linguistic potential whose meaning cannot be written up on the board, one is not indulging in poetry or day-dreaming.

The potential inherent in language should serve the cause of thinking. This means that a concept should finally capture the meanings disclosed in a word through analysis. The analysis of a concept will distinguish a multiplicity of meanings all of which are operative in speech but which at the same time are restricted to a specific determination in any given discursive context, so that, in the end, one meaning takes the lead while the others are, at best, simply implied along with it in an auxiliary way. This is the thinking use of words. It is slightly different in poetry but not very different. Here it is also a matter of establishing the regulative meaning of a word so broadly that a meaningful unity emerges in poetic diction. Indeed, it is precisely through the ambiguity and multiplicity of meaning which words possess that language comes to acquire a depth. This can also happen in philosophy. The conventionally established univocity of an expression which, in itself, possesses several meanings, can let the other meanings which lurk in a word be articulated along with the former, and this can be carried so far that thinking can be thrown out of its habitual tracks. Heidegger often did this deliberately. He even called this the 'leap' (*Sprung*): thinking must, so to speak, be compelled to leap, in as much as the subordinate meanings of words or sentences are emphasized until they fall into explicit contradiction with the former. This can be of the first importance in a philosophical discussion as, for example, when a habitual meaning acquires an entirely new meaning through the multivocity of the word with which it is associated. Thus when Heidegger posed the question: 'Was heißt Denken?' he did not pose it in the conventional sense of *heißt*, where it means 'mean' but with an unexpected twist which brought out the subordinate meaning of *heißt* as 'offer'. This procedure should not be imitated even though, with Heidegger, it is always worth taking the new direction. Another example: in Heidegger's paper on technology, there is an explanation of causality and origin. Heidegger says there: in truth there is a rationale (*Veranlassung*). In connection with his presentation one suddenly becomes aware of what *Veranlassung* can mean. One discovers that a *Lassen* lurks therein. To bring something out (*Anhebenlassen*) always includes the implication that one lets it be (*läßt*). This is the kind of way in which Heidegger will encumber a normal German word so that it begins to say

something different. In this case, it says: something is allowed to be in its being, and in such a way that it stands out.

To be sure, when it is a matter of texts, trafficking with language in this way implies, in a certain sense, selling out the text. The text has its unitary intention even if the latter is not necessarily a conscious intention on the part of its author. In any case the recipient, the decipherer, is directed to what the text means. It is clear that Heidegger sometimes stands the underlying intention of a statement on its head. The word suddenly transgresses the normal ranges of its application and thereby begins to render visible what was not originally thought. Heidegger often mobilized etymology in this way. To be sure, if one appeals to scientific etymology in this fashion, one becomes dependent upon an ever-changing procedure of scientific validation. In such cases, etymology begins to lose its conviction. In other cases, on the other hand, etymology can bring to light what is implicit in our feeling for language and so confer confirmation and plausibility upon it. In such cases, Heidegger does succeed in tracing words back to the original experience from which they sprang.

In any case, it is clearly not so much a matter of statements as of words whose meaning potential can be recognized and brought to expression. Such a procedure has its precursors, above all Aristotle. The best known example is the Greek word for Being, *Ousia*, which acquired the meaning of *essentia* in Latinized metaphysics. This was the translation of *Ousia* which was taken over from Cicero. But what did this word mean in the spoken Greek of that time? In German we are well equipped to reproduce the configuration. *Ousia* means *das Anwesen*, the lie of the land, as we still say, a house or an individual domain. A farmer can say of his property: 'it's an attractive prospect [*Anwesen*].' The Greeks could say this too and they can still say it today. Those who know Athens well will appreciate the following confirmation. After the exodus of Greeks from the Middle East at the beginning of the twenties, the former Athens was increased by about one million refugees and spread out into the countryside. But everyone was housed in their own little property. So everyone still had his *Anwesen*, his spread. So that which as *Ousia* made up the Being of beings is still preserved in an actual intuition. The *Anwesen* is what is there and so makes up the essence (*Wesen*) of country living. He is in his own *Oikos*, his own domain, conscious of his own being, so to speak, and is so still. And so the word *Ousia* shows us that the genuine conceptual meaning can be clarified in the light of the original meaning of the word.

If one is aware of the entire verbal configuration consisting of *ousia*, *parousia*, *apousia*, one cannot but find Heidegger's employment of the concept *Vorhandenheit* unsatisfactory. I do not have a better proposal, but in the expression *Vorhandenheit* one is either too influenced by the connotation of simple existence in the sense of *existentia* as that term

was used in the School philosophy of the eighteenth century (which then takes the concept in the direction of the conceptual complex which belongs to modern experimental science), or else one is forced to rely on common parlance which, in any translation of the term into a foreign language, then makes it almost impossible to distinguish *vorhanden* from *zuhanden*. Neither of these two senses is to be found in the concept of *Anwesen*, which means something completely different from any existence of the object which is susceptible to weights and measures but which, nevertheless, cannot be assimilated to any behaviourally directed *procheiron*. In any case, when Heidegger decided on the expression *Vorhandenheit*, he neglected the difference between the understanding of being which belongs to modern natural science and that which pertains to the Greek Meta-‘Physik’, and therewith made it difficult to capture the presence of the divine in ‘Being’. This is what happens when one tries to let words speak – the attempt sometimes by-passes the genuine conceptual intention. From Heidegger one can learn both the risks and the opportunities which attach to using language in a new way.

Especially instructive is Heidegger’s translation of *Aletheia* as unhiddenness (*Unverborgenheit*). Greek usage would actually have made it more acceptable to say ‘unconcealedness’ (*Unverhohlenheit*). This is also how Humboldt translated it. When Heidegger thought of it as unhiddenness he was being true to his own vision, which carried his reflections back to the ever dimmer, because ever earlier, origins of Greek literary testimony. Hiddenness speaks in unhiddenness. In this way an association is brought to light which Heidegger wanted to release and whose content we are now in a position to grasp. In unhiddenness a suspension of ‘withdrawal’ (*Geborgenheit*) can also be found. What emerges through speech and reflection and so presents itself is precisely what lies buried (*geborgen*) in words and perhaps remains buried even if something of it is brought out, is unearthed (*entborgen*). We find lurking here in Heidegger’s conceptual ambitions the experience of Being as the counter-play of revealing (*Entbergung*) and concealing (*Verbergung*).

What follows from all this for language in philosophical thinking? Can we not glimpse herein the secret of the word, and even more, of the word-concept, namely, that it not only refers to something else in the manner of a sign but burrows ever deeper into itself? It pertains to the very nature of signs that they should refer away from themselves. It is quite an achievement to be able to understand even signs as signs. Dogs can’t do it. They don’t look there, where one is pointing but snap at the finger that points. We are already thinkers even when we only understand signs. How much more so is this the case when we understand words? This holds not only of the understanding of individual words but of how they are spoken in the unity of a melodic flux of speech which acquires its capacity to convince from the articulation of the whole discourse. They

always stand in the connections established by discourse, and discussing is not just a running-through of a complex of meaning-bearing words. It suffices to consider the vacuity of those illustrative phrases we find in a good foreign grammar book. They are intended to be empty of meaning, so that one will not be distracted by their content but attracted to them as words. This is not genuine discourse. A language is used to speak to someone and speaks through the tone in which it is voiced. And so we find genuine and specious tones, ways of talking which are convincing and which are unconvincing, true or false – and much of this is not dragged up out of concealedness and re-presented in language.

Heidegger also sought out an etymology for the word *Logos*. He held it to be the *legende Lese*. When I read this for the first time, I disapproved, found it a forced reading of the hidden meaning of the word. But it began to take hold nevertheless. For if one follows the unearthing of the semantic field which is in question here and then goes back to the well-known concept *Logos*, one finds this background working its way back into one's own intellectual and linguistic intuitions about the *Logos*. And so I would like to make the following avowal: the *Logos* is the *lesende Lege*. *Legein* means read, read together (*zusammenlesen*) and so bring together (*zusammenlegen*), so that it is brought together and gathered in as a harvest, like grapes from the vine. So what is brought together in the unity of the vintage (*Lese*) are not merely words which make up sentences. It is the very word itself, a word in which a multiplicity is brought together into the unity of the *Eidos*, as Plato will say.

This issue is of special significance in connection with Heraclitus. Heraclitus was for Heidegger the most attractive of all the early Greek thinkers. His sentences are like riddles, his words like hints. In Heidegger's little hut over Todtnauberg, we find etched into the bark of the door the inscription: 'Lightning steers everything'. In Greek of course. In this statement, as a matter of fact, Heidegger's basic vision is to be found, namely, that what is present is brought out in its presentness in the lightning stroke; for a moment everything is as clear as day, but only in order to sink back suddenly into the darkest night. This instant in which the 'present' is there was disclosed by Heidegger as the Greek experience of Being. This lightning stroke which allows everything to manifest itself at one blow is preserved as present for a short while. One can understand why Heidegger was so fond of Heraclitus' sayings. Here we find an entire statement which lets the belonging-together of uncovering and covering over become apparent as the basic experience of Being. Truly, what is brought to words here is a basic human experience. For we live in the knowledge that even the absent is present, *nooi* (in spirit). All thinking is like a streaming out and a projection out beyond the limits of our brief existence. We are, so to speak, unable to recognize – and can never

really forget – that it only lasts for a while, until the infinitude of spirit is limited by the finitude of death. Again, Heidegger gives expression to his experience in a quite simple word: 'It gives'. What is this *It* which gives here? And what does it *give*? All this swims in an unclarified haze and yet everyone understands perfectly well what is meant. '*This* is it. *It* is this.' Heidegger did no more than find words for this straightforward expression.

To be sure, the colossal task of thought consists in trying to preserve, to incorporate in words, in readily accessible discourse, this lightning stroke in which everything suddenly becomes clear. One day I was with Heidegger up in the hut. He read me a work by Nietzsche, which he happened to be writing about at the time. After a few minutes he interrupted himself, bringing his hand down on the table, so hard that the teacups rattled, and cried out in despair: 'This is all Chinese.' This was certainly not the manner of someone who wanted to be dark and difficult. Clearly Heidegger suffered from the need to find words which could move out beyond the language of metaphysics. How is the wholeness of a vision to be elicited from the dazzling clarity in which the lightning stroke shatters the night? How can a sequence of thoughts be put together in which words yield a new mode of discourse?

What are we to think, for example, of the 'ontological difference'? It is still for the most part being misunderstood as though someone – we – made this difference. This is quite out of the question. The ontological difference is the outcome which emerges from Being itself and which makes it possible for us to think. This is what will be at issue later and what is certainly stated in the perspective of the *Kehre*, or the 'Turn'. But if I may be permitted once again to draw upon my fund of knowledge as a contemporary witness I would like to report that in 1924, as Gerhard Krüger and I accompanied Heidegger back to his first Marburg home after the conference and asked him about the ontological difference, he definitely rejected the idea that it might be we ourselves who make this difference. One sees then that the *Kehre* came before the '*Kehre*'. Further, 1924 was not the moment of its first appearance. While I was still a student, at the beginning of the 1920s, we heard in Marburg that the young Heidegger had said in a lecture: 'It worlds.' This was really the *Kehre* before the '*Kehre*'.

One final question: how, in the perspective of the later Heidegger, are we to think the experience of death, an experience which in *Being and Time*, and in the context of his analysis of anxiety is so flexibly developed? How can the duality of covering and uncovering be thought? As the 'range' (*Gebirg*) in which death is buried? Is that not a way of talking about death which is reproduced in every human culture? Even where something like an after-life religion is installed? Certainly the description given in *Being and Time* is one which is drawn from Christian

sources. Our Western way of thinking is certainly not the only way of thinking about the experience of death. Other after-life religions, for example Islam, seem to think differently. Did the later Heidegger think his way out beyond his own Christian experience? Perhaps. In any case, he certainly thought his way back to its Greek origins. If one has not come to terms with the meaning of this Greek origin for Heidegger, it becomes virtually impossible to understand late Heidegger. This is not because of Heidegger himself but because of what we mean by philosophy and what our culture has demonstrated along the way to knowledge. We are still determined by this tradition and must allow ourselves to be empowered by it to ever new possibilities of thinking.

And in the meantime this should be said: what is so vital about Greek philosophy is that it went its way, the way of the spoken and responsive word without reflecting on *what* speaking is or *who* the speaker is. The Greeks had no word for the subject. The *Logos* is what is said, what is named, what is brought together and laid down. This is not seen as an operation on the part of the speaker but rather as an operation on the part of that from which everything comes together. A typical phrase by Socrates runs: 'it is not my *Logos*'. This holds for Heraclitus as well as for Socrates. The *Logos* is in common. Thus Aristotle rejected any theory which attributed to words a natural relation to things. Word signs are *kata syntheke*; that means they are conventions. But this does not mean unities which are arbitrarily put together at any time. They are unities which precede any differentiation in these or those words. This is the origin which has never begun but is always already effective. It grounds the indissoluble proximity of thinking and speaking and so survives the question concerning the beginning and the end of philosophy.

Translated by Christopher Macann

‘Time and being’, 1925–7

Thomas Sheehan

It is very significant that Heidegger chose *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, the lecture course he gave in the summer semester of 1927, to be the first publication in his monumental *Gesamtausgabe*.¹ The text is rich in many ways, but one of its major claims to fame may rest in a footnote, taken from Heidegger’s own manuscript of the course, that appears on page 1 of the published version. This elliptical footnote, which in fact functions like a subtitle for the whole volume, asserts that the lecture course represents a ‘New elaboration of *Sein und Zeit*, Part One, Division Three’.²

This footnote promises quite a bit indeed. It is well known that when Heidegger published *Sein und Zeit* in February of 1927, the book was lacking its crowning section – Part One, Division Three – entitled ‘Time and being’. The absence of this section, coupled with Heidegger’s announcement in 1953 that it would never appear, has raised doubts about the feasibility of his philosophical program and has led to an abundance of speculation, much of it misleading, about the so-called ‘turn’ from the work of the early Heidegger to that of the later Heidegger. But now it would seem that the problem can be solved. The lecture course *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, which Heidegger began on Saturday, April 30, 1927, just over eight weeks after the publication of *Sein und Zeit*, would appear to fill out the missing section that was to be the climax of Heidegger’s *magnum opus*. Indeed, on the second day of lecturing Heidegger provided his students with an outline of the course, and Parts Two and Three of that outline promised to be a complete elaboration of ‘Time and being’.³ And if we required further confirmation of the hypothesis that *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* fulfills the promise of *Sein und Zeit*, we would seem to find it in the new, 1977 *Gesamtausgabe* edition of *Sein und Zeit*. There Heidegger

has annotated the title of all of Part One of his treatise in the following way:

The Interpretation of Dasein in terms of Temporality [notation: 'The published portion covers only this much'] and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being [notation: 'For this, cf. the Marburg lecture course of 1927, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*'].⁴

But, for better or worse, the matter is not all that simple. To begin with, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (hereafter: *GP*) makes almost no advance into the uncharted territory of what *Sein und Zeit* (hereafter: *SZ*) called 'Time and being'. To be sure, *if* in the lecture course Heidegger had covered all the material that he outlined for his students, he would have filled out 'Time and being', albeit in a different order from what he had promised in *SZ*. But in fact the very few pages in *GP* that push into the area of 'Time and being' (on a strict reading, *GP*, 441–5) were reserved to the second half of the second-to-last meeting of the course (July 23, 1927) and, on the whole, are among the least satisfying of all the lectures. We are faced, then, with a paradox, or perhaps even with an error. The footnote at the beginning of *GP* promises us an elaboration of 'Time and being', but the text itself delivers, on a strict interpretation, only four pages of such an elaboration or, on a very broad interpretation, only 28 pages (*GP*, 441–69), most of which provide only schematic hints.

What are we to make of all of this in terms of the philosophical program that Heidegger outlined in *SZ* and that he claimed to have fulfilled over the course of his philosophical career?

Heidegger's one and only topic from beginning to end – what he called *the* issue of philosophy – was the kinetic structure of the disclosure of entities, that is, the movement that constitutes the analogical unity (or meaning) of the being of entities. At various points in his career Heidegger called this kinetic structure of disclosure the 'time-character' of being or the 'truth' of being or the 'clearing' of being. What all these titles point to in common is the *bivalence* that is intrinsic to the movement of disclosure. The 'being' or disclosive structure of entities is a phenomenological movement made up of a dimension of relative absence and a dimension of relative presence. Now, whereas traditional philosophy had always known about the presential dimension of entities, Heidegger took upon himself the task of pointing out the absential dimension of such disclosure. This absential dimension (in Greek: *lēthē*) is intrinsic to the presential dimension (in Greek: *alētheia*) of the kinetic disclosure of things. To put this in an imperfect neologism, we may say that Heideg-

ger's one and only topic was 'pres-ab-sence', the kinetic bivalence that makes up the disclosive structure (or 'being') of entities.

Now, whereas Heidegger had always intended to work out pres-ab-sence as the meaning of being, in his early works – and especially in *SZ* and *GP* – he approached the problem from within a transcendental framework. He did so specifically from an analysis of Dasein's projection of temporal schemata that would provide the horizon for the meaning of being. In his later works, however, Heidegger shifted away from the language and viewpoint of the transcendental framework and showed that the movement intrinsic to the disclosive structure of entities was responsible for the projective movement of Dasein. This shift constituted a regaining and a deepening of the archaic Greek viewpoint, where the autodisclosure of entities requires and governs the disclosive movement of man.

The main importance of *GP* for our purposes is that it did *not* complete the vector of *SZ*, indeed that it hardly advanced beyond the analyses contained in that work. That is, *GP* represents Heidegger's last effort to work out the kinetic meaning of being from within a transcendental framework. In the last part of this essay I shall use the incompleteness of *GP* as an occasion for discussing how Heidegger shifts away from the language and viewpoint of transcendental philosophy and effects the 'turn' into the pres-ab-sential structure of being.

On the way to that issue we notice some important questions that emerge with the publication of *GP*. If *GP* was intended to be a 'new' elaboration of 'Time and being', what happened to the first draft of that section? Were there other early programs for working out the kinetic meaning of being? What is the relation between the transcendentalism of *GP* and the very different approach of Heidegger's later thought? These are not just historical questions. They touch on the major issue of philosophy, the meaning of being.

In order to work out these questions and to arrive at the heart of Heidegger's thought, I divide this essay into four parts: I. Discussion of the *history* of the writing of *SZ*; II. Comparison of the *structures* of various programs for elaborating the meaning of being, from 1925 through 1927; III. An analysis of the *argument* of *GP*; and IV. Clarification of the *significance* of *GP* for the major issue, the meaning of being as pres-ab-sence.

I History: the genesis of *Being and Time*

Whatever the conditions of its gestation, *SZ* in the form we know it is a premature work, rushed into print under publish-or-perish conditions. Heidegger himself once spoke of the 'strange publication' of his 'long-

guarded work', and some 30 years after its appearance he remarked: 'The fundamental flaw of the book *Sein und Zeit* is perhaps that I ventured forth too far too early.'⁵ The haste is revealed in a number of ways. There is, for example, the laundry list of topics, scattered throughout the published pages of *SZ*, that Heidegger promises to treat in the unpublished part. One has the sense that Heidegger is just postponing these problems without having a clear idea of how he will answer them. Above all, the haste of composition can perhaps be seen in Heidegger's inability to bring the work to completion. What, then, were the academic pressures that gave us this truncated work?

A The politics of publish-or-perish⁶

The history of Heidegger's academic promotions between 1923 and 1927 is a story of books that he promised but never published or that he published but never completed. For example, he was called from Freiburg to Marburg in 1923 on the strength of some chapters of a projected book on Aristotle, which in fact never got into print. What he did in that instance was to rewrite his 1922 Freiburg course on Aristotle and submit it to the philosophy faculty at Marburg. This draft received rave reviews from Paul Natorp and Nicolai Hartmann, both of Marburg, and in recommending Heidegger for a position there they called this essay absolutely astonishing (*vollends etwas überraschends*). With high scientific quality, they said, it shows how the history of philosophy from the Middle Ages through Luther to modern thinkers is determined by Aristotle. Its method and careful etymologies, they went on, show a philosophical delicacy which step by step discovers heretofore unnoticed connections between issues. His method sheds light even for experts in the field, especially on decisive points passed over by nineteenth-century scholars. Needless to say, Heidegger got the job. And two years later, when Heidegger was applying for promotion, Hartmann would again remark on the powerful achievement, philological exactness (*Akribie*), and penetrating interpretation that characterized this manuscript on Aristotle, and he would emphasize how it illuminates whole epochs of thought in a way long unknown in philosophy.

But the work never appeared. Although in the summer of 1925 it was declared ready for the press, Heidegger's interest now lay in the new project that was to make his name. *SZ* had been maturing for some while. In his last two lecture days as a Privatdozent at Freiburg (July 18 and 25, 1923), Heidegger had read material that would become Part One, Division One, of *SZ*, and a year later at Marburg, in July of 1924, he presented the 'Urform' of *SZ* as a 6000-word lecture entitled 'Der Begriff der Zeit', which contained most of the essential theses of *SZ* from being-in-the-world to within-time-ness. Another year later, in the summer of 1925, he read the first draft of *SZ* in the Marburg lecture

course, *Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*. But just as this course got underway there began the politics of publish-or-perish.

On May 1, 1925, Nicolai Hartmann, then Ordinarius in the chair that had been vacated by the recent death of Paul Natorp, informed the University of Marburg that he would leave in October for Cologne. On May 19 Heidegger told the dean of his availability for Hartmann's position, and at a faculty meeting the following week Hartmann proposed Heidegger as his successor.

Then the trouble began. On June 24, after Hartmann had recommended to the faculty that Heidegger's name be the only one (*unico loco*) that they propose to the Ministry in Berlin as fitting for the position, Professor Rudolf Wedekind of the philosophy faculty raised the issue that would block Heidegger's promotion for two more years: his dearth of publications. Hartmann responded that, beside the still-promised book on Aristotle, the young scholar had a new and absolutely outstanding work (*eine neue und ganz hervorragende Arbeit*) in manuscript and ready for publication. To the best of my knowledge these words of Hartmann on June 24, 1925, are the first public mention of *SZ*, even though Hartmann gave the work no title. In any case, the faculty that day voted against an *unico loco* nomination. Instead, they proposed a three-person list with Heidegger's name in first place. On July 8, 1925, they briefly reversed themselves and proposed Heidegger *unico loco* by a vote of 6 in favor, 4 opposed, and 1 abstaining, but on July 18 they reverted to their former decision. The choice of Heidegger, incidentally, was not without opposition from the theology faculty, which used Rudolf Otto as its spokesman against Heidegger.

Between July 18 and August 3, 1925, Hartmann in the name of the faculty drafted in his own hand an extraordinary document to be sent to Berlin to the Minister for Science, Art and Education in support of Heidegger's nomination. In that document he calls Heidegger a researcher and teacher of the first rank, one who, besides his work on Aristotle, which is yet to be published, has recently produced a systematic work, now in press (sic), which is entitled – *Zeit und Sein!* (It seems impossible to ascertain whether that title, *Time and Being*, was a slip of the pen on Hartmann's part or actually the first title that Heidegger may have proposed for the work.) The book, says Hartmann, does nothing less than to broach the ultimate and basic questions of ontology in a synthesis of phenomenology – here for the first time freed from all [Husserlian] subjectivism – with the great tradition of metaphysics that stretches from the Greeks through the medievals to the moderns. Hartmann remarks that whereas older practitioners of phenomenology see it as a preliminary laying of foundations and thereby frequently give the impression of one-sidedness or narrow-mindedness, Heidegger's work gets right down to basic problems, breaks through stalemated positions,

and opens new horizons. There is simply nothing comparable to it in the broad field of Heidegger's contemporaries, he writes. Therefore, Heidegger's nomination, even though it is accompanied by that of Heimsoeth and Pfänder, stands far above the other two.

With a recommendation like that, Heidegger should have had the job in a walk. But it was not to be so. All through 1926 and most of 1927 the philosophy faculty at Marburg fought a running battle with the Ministry in Berlin over Heidegger's nomination. On January 27, 1926, the Minister wrote to the dean that, with all due respect for Heidegger's success in the classroom (which by then was somewhat legendary), the historical significance of the chair of philosophy at Marburg precluded Heidegger's being appointed to it until he had gained the respect and recognition of his colleagues by more publications. The Minister called for a new list of nominations.

On February 25, 1926, the faculty met and unanimously voted that Heidegger be urged to have *SZ* typed in several copies and given to the dean so that it might be submitted to a group of scholars for their evaluation. At the same time they underlined the urgency of having Heidegger produce the text at least in galley proofs. The dean paid a personal visit to Heidegger's office to pass on this news, and Heidegger replied that he was prepared to have the text in press by April 1, 1926.

In a little over eight weeks – until early March in his first-floor study at Schwanallee 21, Marburg, and thereafter at the farmhouse of Johann Brender near his retreat in Todtnauberg – Heidegger pulled together his lecture notes of *Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* into *SZ*. On April 2, 1926, six days before Husserl's birthday celebration in Todtnauberg (see the dedication in *SZ*), Heidegger wrote to the dean that the work was now in press and that by May 1, 10 to 12 signatures (160–92 pages) would be ready – that is, roughly the material up to the chapter on *Sorge*, or, in other terms, the material on *Dasein* that was covered in *Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*. However, it was June 18 before the dean forwarded the galley pages to Berlin in the face of the Ministry's renewed call for other names and an expanded list. Finally, on November 26, 1926, came the Minister's reply. Having examined the proof sheets, he still cannot give Heidegger the job. The pages were returned, as Heidegger recalled, marked 'Inadequate'.

Three months later, in February of 1927, the book was published as the fragment we know, minus 'Time and being' and all of Part Two, 'Phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology'. Heidegger had published *and* perished. He had rushed his 'long-guarded work' into print and in so doing had 'ventured forth too far too early', perhaps chiefly in an effort to get a job. That venture was to block the fulfillment of his philosophical program for years to come.

B The missing sections of Being and Time

What was the status of the 'second half' of *SZ* when its 'first half' was published in February of 1927? Had Heidegger completed by then a draft of 'Time and being', and, if so, what form did it take and why did it not appear? My purpose in raising and answering these questions is to search out what is unique about *GP*.

(N.B.: In the rest of the essay I shall abbreviate references to the structure of *SZ* in the following way. The whole of *SZ* was to be comprised of two Parts, each of which would contain three Divisions. I shall abbreviate the *Parts* of *SZ* with Roman numerals and the *Divisions* of *SZ* with Arabic numerals. Thus, *SZ* I.1 means *SZ* Part One, Division One. *SZ* II.3 means *SZ* Part Two, Division Three, and so on. As everyone knows, the only published sections of the work are Part One, Divisions One and Two, i.e., *SZ* I.1 and I.2.)

Much of *SZ* II ('Basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology, using the problematic of *Temporalität* as a clue') was sketched out by the spring of 1926. Specifically, a first draft of *SZ* II.1 ('Kant's doctrine of schematism and time, as a preliminary stage in a problematic of *Temporalität*') was delivered in the lecture course *Logik* from January 28 through February 26, 1926. And a first draft of *SZ* II.3 ('Aristotle's essay on time, as providing a way of discriminating the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology') was hinted at in *SZ* §81 and was read on July 6 and 13, 1927, in the lecture course of *GP*. But what of *SZ* I.3, 'Time and being'?

Heidegger's letter to the dean, written from Todtnauberg on April 2, 1926, merely said that the work was in press, but neither that it was completed as a whole nor how much beyond the 160 to 192 pages was finished at that time. Two weeks later, on April 16, 1926, Mrs. Malvina Husserl wrote to Roman Ingarden about Heidegger's 'just completed work' ('*seines eben vollendeten Werkes*'), and on April 28 Edmund Husserl wrote to Gustav Albrecht about Heidegger's 'book which is now in press' ('*seines eben in Druck befindlichen Buches*'). But many years later Heidegger remembered showing Husserl at this time the 'nearly finished manuscript' ('*das nahezu fertige Manuskript*') of *SZ*, and in 1963 he claimed that 15 signatures (ca. 240 pages) were forwarded to the dean and eventually to the Ministry in Berlin, that is, up through §47 of the chapter on death.⁷ On the basis of Heidegger's letter of April 2, 1926, I believe that it is most likely that during that month he sent off to Niemeyer Publishers something like the first 190 pages of *SZ* (i.e., up to around chapter vi of *SZ* I.1). While it is conceivable that he had finished all of *SZ* I.2 by this time, I think that it is not probable, just as it is very unlikely that he had actually completed *SZ* I.3 by the spring of 1926.

However, there are three bits of evidence that attest to the possibility that Heidegger completed a first draft of *SZ* I.3 sometime between April and December of 1926. None of these reports, however, is very strong; at best they provide clues or hints.

First: Concerning the famous footnote at the beginning of *GP*, F.-W. von Herrmann, the editor of *GP*, has written: 'The designation "*New elaboration*" means that an *older* one preceded it. The first elaboration of the Division "Time and Being" came about in the train of writing Divisions One and Two. As Martin Heidegger has communicated to me orally, he burned the first draft [*die erste Fassung*] soon after he wrote it.'⁸ But was this first draft anything more than a sketch? We cannot be sure.

Secondly, Heidegger informed H.-G. Gadamer that *SZ* I.3 was ready to be printed along with I.1 and I.2 in early 1927, but it was held back because Volume VIII of the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* had to be shared with (besides *SZ*) Oskar Becker's 370-page treatise on '*Mathematische Existenz: Untersuchungen zur Logik und Ontologie mathematischer Phänomene*'.⁹

Thirdly, a footnote in the first edition of *SZ* (but omitted in later editions) at p. 349 refers the reader ahead to *SZ* I.3, *chapter two* for a clarification of the origin of *Bedeutung* and the possibility of *Begriffsbildung* (the latter being a topic that Heidegger covered in his seminars of 1926–7 and 1927–8). This is the only reference to a specific chapter within *SZ* I.3, and it would seem to indicate that Heidegger had at least some kind of outline of 'Time and being' when he wrote the footnote.

But what about the content of this famous missing section? Thanks to an exchange between Heidegger and Max Müller, we have a sketch of some of the material from the first draft of *SZ* I.3. Müller writes:

In the first elaboration of *Sein und Zeit*, Part One, Division Three, which, as I mentioned above, was to bear the title '*Zeit und Sein*' and was to bring about a 'turn' in the treatment of being itself, Heidegger, according to a personal communication, attempted to distinguish a threefold difference.

(a) the '*transcendental*' [*transzendente*] difference, or ontological difference in the narrower sense: the differentiation of entities from their beingness.

(b) the '*transcendence-related*' [*transzendenzhafte*] difference or ontological difference in the wider sense: the differentiation of entities and their beingness from being itself.

(c) the '*transcendent*' [*transzendente*] difference, or theological difference in the strict sense: the differentiation of God from entities, from beingness, and from being.

But because it was not experienced but only set up speculatively,

this attempt at a draft was given up as itself being 'onto-theological', because it ventures an assertion about God which even now in the experience of 'essential thinking' is not immediately made.¹⁰

Moreover, in a marginal note to *SZ* 39 (published in the *Gesamtausgabe* version of *SZ*), where Heidegger gives the projected outline of his treatise, he glosses the title 'Time and being' with the following: 'The transcendence-related difference./The overcoming of the horizon as such./The turn around into the origin./Presence from out of this origin.'¹¹ While cryptic in many ways, this gloss allows of the following interpretation. When one makes the transcendence-related difference between the beingness of entities and being itself, then one has overcome horizontal perspectives, which in fact are based on the correlativity of subjectivity and beingness, and has turned around into the origin, *lêthē*, whence arises *alêtheia*. (We shall return to this towards the end of the next part of this essay.)

What might have made Heidegger destroy the first draft or sketch of *SZ* I.3? Besides the dissatisfaction that Heidegger reported to Müller, there is other evidence that soon after *SZ* went to the press he had hesitations about his program or at least about its formulation. On February 13, 1952, exactly 25 years after *SZ* appeared, Heidegger told the students in his Aristotle seminar at Freiburg that immediately after the printing of *SZ* he was startled (*ich habe . . . einen Schrecken bekommen*) to realize what while, as regards the *issue*, being was indeed alluded to and present in *In-der-Welt-sein*, nonetheless, as regards the *formulation*, being, as it were, only 'limped along behind' (*hinkt es gleichsam hinten nach*). Perhaps the shock of this realization is what prompted Heidegger, in the spring of 1927, to reformulate 'Time and being' all over again with *GP*'s new draft focused on what he called the four 'basic problems' of phenomenology, namely, the ontological difference, the whatness and howness of being, the unity and multiplicity of being, and the truth-character of being. This outline of the crowning section of Heidegger's treatise held up at least through the following summer, his last semester at Marburg, when he repeated that fourfold division in his course on Leibniz (July 10, 1928), although he rearranged the outline slightly. In the Leibniz course, what was the fourth section in *GP* (it is now called 'The veritative character of being') is made to precede what was the third section in *GP*, which is now called 'The regionality of being and the unity of the idea of being'. But the whole program seemed to be in trouble. That fall (October 14, 1928), during his first semester as Husserl's successor in Freiburg, Heidegger told W. R. Boyce Gibson that it would be 'some little time' – not likely by the next issue of the *Jahrbuch* – before the rest of *SZ* appeared.¹²

After the spring of 1929 we hear nothing more about the completion

of Heidegger's *magnum opus*. The project of *SZ*, which basically remains enclosed within the Marburg period, had apparently ground to a halt. In the 1953 Foreword to the seventh edition of *SZ* we read: 'While the previous editions have borne the designation "First Half", this has now been deleted. After a quarter of a century, the second half could no longer be added unless the first were presented anew.'¹³

II Structure: three outlines of the program

Over a span of exactly two years (May 4, 1925–May 4, 1927), Heidegger offered three different outlines of his treatise on the meaning of being (cf. the accompanying chart):

1. May 4, 1925: The outline of the course *Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (*GZ*), which appears on p. 10f. of the published version.¹⁴
2. April, 1926: The outline of *SZ*, published on p. 39f. of that work.
3. May 4, 1927: The outline of *GP*, published on p. 32f. of the text.

History of the Concept of Time (*GZ*), 1925

I. The phenomenon of time; the concept of time

1. Preparatory description: the field where time appears (= *SZ* I.1)
 - i. Phenomenology and the being-question } (= *SZ* Introduction)
 - ii. Dasein and the being-question }
 - iii. Everydayness and being-in-the-world (= *SZ* I.1, chaps. i–iv)
 - 1) Introduction
 - 2) Descartes
 - 3) Worldhood of the world
 - 4) Reality of the outer world
 - 5) Spatiality
 - 6) The 'who'
 - iv. Being-in and care (= *SZ* I.1, chaps. v–vi)
 - 1) *Entdecktheit* (*Befindlichkeit*, *Verstehen*, *Auslegung*, *Rede*, *Sprache*)
 - 2) Fallenness
 - 3) Fear and dread
 - 4) Care
2. The laying-free of time itself (= *SZ* I.2, chaps. i–iii)
 - i. Death
 - ii. Conscience and guilt
 - iii. Time as Dasein's being*

* The course ends here.

3. The conceptual interpretation of time (= SZ I.2, chaps. iv-vi)

II. History of the concept of time from today backward (= SZ II)

1. Bergson
2. Kant and Newton
3. Aristotle

III. The question of being-in-general and of the being of history and nature in particular (= SZ I.3)

Being and Time (SZ), 1926

I. Dasein as temporality; time as the horizon of the being-question

1. Preparatory analysis of Dasein
 - i. The task of this analysis
 - ii. Being-in-the-world as Dasein's basic state
 - iii. The worldhood of the world
 - 1) Introduction
 - 2) Worldhood
 - 3) Descartes
 - 4) Spatiality
 - iv. The 'who' and the 'they'
 - v. Being-in
 - 1) The 'there' (*Befindlichkeit*, *Verstehen*, *Auslegung*, *Rede*, *Sprache*)
 - 2) Fallenness
 - vi. Care as Dasein's being
 - 1) Dread
 - 2) Care
 - 3) Reality of the outer world
 - 4) Truth
2. Dasein and temporality
 - i-iii. The laying-free of temporality (cf. p. 436b)
 - iv-vi. Temporal interpretation of Dasein: first repetition of the preparatory analysis*
3. Time and being
 - i. Working out *Temporalität*
 - ii. Answering the question of the meaning of being
 - iii. Thematic analysis of Dasein, or renewed repetition of the preparatory analysis of Dasein
 - iv. Methodology

* The text ('First Half') ends here.

II. Destruction of the history of ontology

1. Kant's doctrine of schematism and time
2. Ontological foundation of Descartes's *cogito sum*
3. Aristotle's essay on time

The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GP), 1927

I. Discussion of four traditional theses on being

1. Kantian: being is not a real predicate
2. Medieval–Aristotelian: being comprises *essentia* and *existentia*
3. Modern: being's basic modes are *res extensa* and *res cogitans*
4. Logic: being as the 'is' of the copula

II. The fundamental ontological question about the meaning of being in general; the basic structures and modes of being

1. The problem of the ontological difference
 - i. Common time and temporality
 - ii. Temporality as self-transcendence and as horizon
 - iii. Time as the horizon for the question of being
 - iv. Being and entities*
2. The problem of the basic articulations of being (whatness, howness)
3. The problem of the modifications of being and of the unity of being's multiplicity
4. The truth character of being

III. The scientific method of ontology and the idea of phenomenology

1. The ontic foundation of ontology and the analysis of Dasein as fundamental ontology
2. The apriority of being and the possibility and structure of a priori knowledge
3. The basic elements of phenomenological method: reduction, construction, and destruction
4. Phenomenological ontology and the concept of philosophy

By comparing these three outlines we shall be able to see concretely the following: what *SZ* intended to accomplish but did not; whether and how *GP* promised to complete *SZ*; and above all what the so-called 'turn' in Heidegger's thought means. Because the outline of *SZ* is fairly well known, I will begin with that and then compare it with the earlier outline (in *GZ*) and the later outline (in *GP*).

*The course ends here.

A Being and Time, 1926

SZ was projected in two Parts. Part One, which as a whole was called 'fundamental ontology', was to use a new understanding of human temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) to determine the nature and structure of the time-character (*Temporalität*) of being in general and of its possible variations. Part Two, which was to be devoted to the destruction of the history of ontology, would use the time-character of being, which had been worked out in the fundamental ontology, as the clue for reducing the content of traditional ontology to the primordial and implicitly temporal experiences in which being has always been understood. It is worth pointing out that words like 'temporality' and 'time' had almost nothing to do with naturalistic *chronos*. Rather, they referred to the phenomenological *movement of disclosure* (what the Greeks called *alētheuein*), both in that part which human nature contributes to disclosure and in that part which is intrinsic to the nature of disclosure itself.¹⁵

Each Part of SZ had three Divisions, and in its published form the treatise got no further than Part One, Division Two. Part One as a whole bears the title: 'The interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality [=SZ I.1 and I.2] and the explanation of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of being [=SZ 1.3, unpublished].' That is, SZ I.1 would establish that the structure of human existence is care (*Sorge*); SZ I.2 would interpret the meaning of care to be temporality or existential movement (*Zeitlichkeit*); and SZ I.3 would show how *Zeitlichkeit*, in its horizon-forming function called *Temporalität*, determines the 'temporal' or kinetic meaning of being.

SZ I.1 reads human being as constituted by three moments: (1) existentiality: human being is ahead of itself; (2) facticity: human being is ahead of itself by being already in a world of meaningfulness; (3) fallenness: human being's already-ahead-ness opens up the realm of intelligibility within which man is present to – and for the most part absorbed in – the things of his concern. Now, these three moments which make up the structure of care can in fact be reduced to two. Existentiality and facticity are but two faces of one phenomenon: man's already-ahead-ness, his being in excess of himself and other things. In turn they make possible man's encounter with worldly things. Thus, Dasein is (1) already projected possibility, which (2) renders possible the encounter with entities. Dasein's relative self-absence allows things to be present, or his excess allows him access to entities.

In SZ I.2, after showing *what* Dasein is already-out-towards (namely, his ownmost possibility of death) and *how* Dasein is called to accept that aheadness (namely, in conscience and by resolve), Heidegger goes on to spell out the temporal or kinetic structure of care.

(1) As ahead of himself, man is *becoming* his ownmost possibility. The

moment of existentiality is grounded in man's existential futurity whereby he is becoming (or coming towards) himself.

(2) But to become that possibility means that, in going forward, one is returning to and indeed is reappropriating what he 'already is', his finitude. The moment of facticity is grounded in existential *Gewesenheit*. This word does not refer to the 'past' (*Vergangenheit*) but to one's own 'alreadiness', to one's essential and already operative possibility which one can appropriate anew.

(3) The two moments of *becoming* what one *already is* make it possible that man encounter things as meaningful. The moment of having access to worldly entities is grounded in the present as a *letting-be-present*.

Thus, human temporality – or better, existential movement – is the unifying ground of the structure of care, and it is generated (*zeitigt sich*) in the aforementioned three moments of self-transcendence (called the 'ekstases'). In fact, man is nothing other than this transcendence. Just as we collapsed the three moments of care into two, so we may do the same for the three moments of existential movement or temporality. (1) By becoming what he already is, (2) man lets things be present. Or, (1) because we are in kinetic 'excess' of ourselves and things, (2) we have meaningful 'access' to ourselves and things. In fact, these two moments, in which one can hear distant echoes of 'potentiality' and 'actuality', are rooted in Heidegger's retrieval of the hidden meaning in the Aristotelian notion of movement (*kinēsis*) as a phenomenon of actual presence (*energeia*) grounded in a hidden but dynamic potentiality (*dynamis*). In Heidegger's retrieval, the moment of 'potentiality' (man's relative self-absence in the sense of his already being out towards his nothingness) releases from itself the moment of actual presentness in which entities are met in their being. In its own way, then, human temporality or movement is a matter of presence-by-absence or pres-ab-sence.

While that is as far as the published form of *SZ* got, the next Division, *SZ* I.3, was to take the crucial step. The one and only issue of the treatise is the *movement of disclosure*. From one perspective this movement, which Heidegger called primordial time, is that which unifies Dasein's self-transcendence, and here it is called 'temporality' (*Zeitlichkeit*). But from another perspective this movement opens up and shapes the horizon that gives all modes of being their kinetic or temporal character, and here it is called the 'time-character' (*Temporalität*) of being. *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporalität* are the same primordial movement of disclosure seen on the one hand as human self-transcendence and on the other hand as the transcendental horizon that conditions the kinetic meaning of being. In *SZ* I.2, §69, section 'c' (*SZ* 365), Heidegger did make a stab at showing how *Zeitlichkeit* forms the horizontal schema for understanding *man's* being, but he did not spell out how it shapes the

horizon for understanding other modes of being. That task was reserved for SZ I.3.

By carefully noting hints that are scattered throughout the published portion of SZ, we can see that SZ I.3 was to unfold in four steps. The following is an effort to reconstruct the format of those four steps. The numbers in parentheses refer to the pages and paragraphs in SZ where the hints can be found.

The *first* step is usually called the 'working out' (*Ausarbeitung*) of the being-question or the 'laying free of the horizon' (*Freilegung des Horizontes*). This initial step was to show simply that the most primordial mode of the generation of temporality as the movement of self-transcendence is the horizontal schema of presence-by-absence which possibilizes the understanding of being in terms of time (cf. SZ 231b, 437c). What is here called the 'time-character' of being is only a preliminary name for that movement which Heidegger would later prefer to call the 'truth' or 'clearing' of being: disclosure as presence (*alētheia*) by absence (*lēthē*).

The *second* step, closely bound up with the first, was to be the 'answering' (*Beantwortung*) of the being-question by an elaboration of the temporal or kinetic determination (presence-by-absence) of being in general and of its possible variations: readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, Dasein, and subsistence (SZ 231b, 333b). Here too Heidegger was to have worked out much of what we called the laundry list of topics alluded to throughout SZ I.1-2: how the intentionality of consciousness is grounded in the unity of Dasein's self-transcendence (363 note), how time has its own mode of being (406a), how space and time are coupled together (368b), the condition of notness and negativity (286a), the distinction between the 'who' of existence and the 'what' of presence-at-hand in the broadest sense (45a), the temporal constitution of discourse and the temporal characteristics of language patterns (349c), the differentiation between the ontic and the historical (403c), the concrete elaboration of the world-structure in general and its possible variations (366d), how the forgetting of the world leads to ontologies of entities-within-the-world as 'nature' and to ontologies of value (100d), the clarification of whatness, howness, something, nothing, and nothingness (see WG in *Wegmarken*, 69). Specifically within the section on truth were to be discussed: the existential interpretation of science (357a), the 'is' of the copula and the 'as' scheme (349c, 360c), how *Bedeutung* arises (349c), the possibility of *Begrifflichkeit* (39b) and *Begriffsbildung* (349c), and the full treatment of *logos* (160a). Presumably in this section too Heidegger would have discussed the possibility of regional ontologies, which is based on what he called the 'non-deductive genealogy of the different possible ways of being' (11b), as well as the question of the ontological determination of positive-ontic science ('the kind of research in which *entities* are uncovered') and its kind of truth (230b).

The *third* step of *SZ* I.3 was to be a further repetition (within *SZ* I.2, chapters iv–vi already constituted a first repetition) of the existential analysis of Dasein on the same and truly ontological level at which the concept of being would have already been discussed (333b). This treatment was to be the proper realization (*Durchführung*, 13b) of the Dasein-analytic, and it would be the thematic analysis of human existence (436b) as contrasted with the preparatory and primordial analyses that made up *SZ* I.1 and I.2. As contrasted with the first repetition of the preliminary Dasein-analysis in *SZ* I.2 – chapters iv–vi, which were also called the ‘temporal interpretation of Dasein’ (see 17c, 234c, 304c, 333b) – the treatment of Dasein in *SZ* I.3 would be called the ‘renewed repetition’ (*erneute Wiederholung*: 333b, cf. 17b). Among the topics to be discussed here was, for example, that of ‘an adequate conceptual interpretation of everydayness’ (371f.).

The *fourth* step of ‘Time and being’ was to be methodological. Whereas *SZ* §7 had offered only a ‘preliminary idea of phenomenology’ (28a), *SZ* I.3 was to present the ‘[full] idea of phenomenology’ (357a). As far as I can see, this is the only topic that Heidegger, in *SZ*, promises to treat in this fourth area. The outline of *GP*, as we shall see below, offered a rich panoply of topics to be covered under the rubric of methodology.

B History of the Concept of Time, 1925

If we now compare the outline of *SZ* with the earlier outline of the course *Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (*GZ*), we discern the following issues. (Here I prescind from Heidegger’s long introduction on phenomenology.)

(1) *The world-analysis* (*GZ* I.1, chap. iii = *SZ* I.1, chap. iii). The most developed material of *GZ* is the analysis of the Umwelt, a theme which Heidegger had elaborated ever since his 1919–20 course at Freiburg (which was also called *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*). In *GZ*, out of the 25 lectures devoted to the preparatory analysis of Dasein (June 6 through July 31, 1925), 11 of them were dedicated to the analysis of the environment (June 22 through July 13).

Within the 1925 course we notice a different order from *SZ*. The Descartes section of *GZ* is placed *before* the paragraphs on the worldhood of the world – just the opposite from *SZ*. Moreover, in 1925 Heidegger places immediately *after* the worldhood analyses the section on the reality of the outer world, whereas this material is saved for later in *SZ* (*SZ* §43, ‘Dasein, worldhood, and reality’).

(2) *Being-in and Care* (*GZ* I.1, chap. iv = *SZ* I.1, chaps. v and vi). The material which *SZ* spreads over two chapters (‘Being-in as such’ and ‘Care as the being of Dasein’) is here lumped together under the comprehensive heading *Das In-Sein*, with the four articulations: discoveredness, fallenness, dread, and care.

(3) *Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität*. The 1925 lecture course makes it

clear that by 'time' (*Zeit*) Heidegger means the temporality of Dasein as self-transcendence (*Zeitlichkeit*) rather than the horizontal time-character of being itself (*Temporalität*). Time, says Heidegger on July 31 (p. 442 of the published text), is Dasein itself. It is that whereby human existence is its proper wholeness as being-ahead-of-itself. In fact, we should not say that 'Time is', but rather that 'Dasein, as time, generates (*zeitigt*) its being' (cf. *SZ* 328c). In other words, *GZ* did not get as far as the major differentiation between *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporalität* which is central to *SZ* and whose import Heidegger stressed to Father Richardson when he wrote that the temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) characterized in *SZ* I.2 is not yet 'the most proper element of time that must be sought in answer to the being-question'.¹⁶ It seems that the lecture course *GZ* was indeed on its way to *Temporalität* as the arena of presence-by-absence that gives all modes of being their temporal determination, but we will have to wait until January 11, 1926, during Heidegger's course on logic, before that concept properly emerges (*Logik*, p. 199).

(4) 'Time and being' (*GZ* III = *SZ* I.3). We notice that the projected content of *GZ* III, which generally corresponds to *SZ*'s 'Time and being', includes not only a fundamental ontology of the meaning of being in general (*die Frage nach dem Sein überhaupt*) but also two regional ontologies (. . . *und nach dem Sein von Geschichte und Natur im besondern*). The whole course, in fact, bore the subtitle: 'Prolegomena to the phenomenology of nature and history'. The 'Prolegomena' cover the existential analytic, the destruction of the history of ontology, and the fundamental ontology of being in general – in short, the material of the whole of *SZ* as Heidegger originally projected it.¹⁷ On the other hand, neither *SZ* nor *GP* promises any regional ontologies at all. At most they might have shown the derivability of regional ontologies from fundamental ontology under the rubric of a 'non-deductive genealogy of the possible modes of being' (*SZ* 11b).

(5) *The Destruction of the History of Ontology* (*GZ* II = *SZ* II). Finally we note the different location and the different content of the material on the history of ontology. In *GZ* it appears between the existential-temporal analytic and the elaboration of the meaning of being. That is to say, if *SZ* were to follow the outline of *GZ*, it would run as follows: *SZ* I.1-2; II.1-3; and then I.3. Moreover, the content of this area is different in *GZ*. Whereas *SZ* proposed to treat of Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle, here in *GZ* Heidegger proposes to treat Bergson, Kant and Newton, and Aristotle.

C The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 1927

In our comparison of *GZ* and *SZ*, the main points of interests concern the location and the content of what was to remain unpublished in *SZ*. What *SZ* calls 'Time and being' was, in *GZ*, comprised of both

fundamental and regional ontologies and placed after the destruction of the history of ontology. In *SZ* this section is composed only of fundamental ontology (the kinetic-temporal meaning of being and its variations), and it precedes the destruction. As we turn now to the outline of *GP* and compare it with those same unpublished portions of *SZ*, we note the following:

(1) *The kernel of 'Time and being' (GP II and III)* now has a twofold articulation: 1. fundamental ontology and 2. methodology.¹⁸ The section on fundamental ontology (*GP II*) is in turn articulated into four basic problems that are systematically derived from four traditional theses on being: (i) the ontological difference, drawn from Kant's thesis on being; (ii) the basic articulations of being as whatness and howness (or thatness), drawn from the Aristotelian and medieval thesis that the being of entities is both *essentia* and *existentia*; (iii) the unity and the multiple modifications of being, drawn from the modern thesis that the basic modes of being are *res cogitans* and *res extensa*; and (iv) the truth-character of being, drawn from the thesis of logic that all entities can be expressed through the 'is' of the copula. We have seen above that these four theses remain operative, although in a slightly rearranged order, as Heidegger's outline for 'Time and being' as late as his course on Leibniz during the summer of 1928. And we recall that the truth-character of being was to be treated in the *second* chapter of *SZ* I.3 (see *SZ*, first edition, 349n.), whereas here it is relegated to the *fourth* chapter of *GP II*.

(2) *The term 'ontological difference' makes its debut (GP II.1)* and seems to include both the *Ausarbeitung* of the being question (that is, the interpretation of *Temporalität* as temporal horizon) and the *Beantwortung* (thematic answering) of the being question, but it does not include the question of the variations of being. Moreover, within the chapter on the ontological difference there are four steps in the elaboration of the meaning of being, the first two of which are generally co-extensive with the material of *SZ* I.1–2. Those four steps are the following:

(i) *Time and Temporality (Zeit und Zeitlichkeit)*: Here Heidegger moves from Aristotle's notion of time (= *SZ* II.3) as the number of motion, to the roots of original time in man's threefold self-transcendence.

(ii) *Time as self-transcendence and time as horizontal (Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität)*: In this section the move is from temporality as constitutive of man's being, and towards temporality as formative of the horizon which determines all experience, including the understanding of being. It would seem from the title of this section (*GP* 389) that here Heidegger advances beyond the material contained in *SZ* I.2, that is, beyond *Zeitlichkeit* and into *Temporalität*. However, that is not the case; indeed, this section gets no further than the material found in *SZ* §69, section 'c'. One external proof of that is found in the programmatic sentence that opens the *following* section: 'Now we must get an idea of how

Temporalität, on the basis of the *Zeitlichkeit* that grounds Dasein's transcendence, makes possible Dasein's understanding of being' (GP 429).

(iii) Time as the horizon for the determination of being (*Temporalität und Sein*): Here begins the new elaboration of what SZ called 'Time and being'. However, as I shall show below, the advance beyond SZ is quite minimal.

(iv) Being and entities (*Sein und Seiendes*): Here the ontological difference was to be clarified on the basis of the distinction between Dasein's transcendence into the temporal ecstases and his return to the entities rendered intelligible within that horizon. Here too there is hardly any real advance beyond SZ.

(3) *The historical-destructive part* (GP I) is again relocated before the systematic treatment of the fundamental ontological question about the meaning of being, just as it was in GZ. In a sense, then, GP reverts to the pre-SZ model of GZ, where the historical-destructive part of the treatise was contained within, rather than following after, fundamental ontology. Furthermore we notice that the historical-destructive part of GP (that is, GP I) now deals with being rather than with time, and that what SZ reserved for treatment at SZ II.3 (namely, Aristotle and time) is incorporated within GP II.1.

(4) *In GP there is no mention of the second repetition of the Dasein-analytic that is promised in SZ.* In fact, there is not even an explicit mention of the first repetition of the Dasein-analysis (= SZ I.2, chaps. iv-vi), although pages 362-88 of GP present material from SZ I.2, chap. vi. While it is possible, but not probable, that GP III.1 ('The ontic foundation of ontology, and the analysis of Dasein as fundamental ontology') might have contained such a second repetition, it is more likely that this section would have been only methodological in nature, as indeed Heidegger seems to indicate when he delineates the scope of the section: 'So the first task within the clarification of the scientific character of ontology is the demonstration of its ontic foundation and the characterization of this founding' (GP 27).

D Conclusions

What may be concluded from this tedious comparison of outlines? In the first place, it is clear enough what Heidegger intended to do, namely, to show that the kinetic meaning of disclosure ('being') is presence-by-absence. That is, he wanted to show that the presence or *alētheia* or intelligibility of entities happens on the basis of a prior and possibilizing absence or *lēthē* or unintelligibility. Indeed, he wanted to show that man is correlative to both these moments of the disclosive process by virtue of his self-transcendence. That is, man's relative self-absence or already-ahead-ness is correlative to the *lēthē*-dimension of disclosure, and his being-present-to-things is correlative to the *alētheia*-dimension of

disclosure. It is also clear that in this early period Heidegger intended to complete *SZ* by drawing the kinetic meaning of being as pre-ab-sence from out of the self-transcendent and horizontal temporality of *Dasein*.¹⁹

In the second place it is clear that Heidegger's conception of the program for elaborating the temporal meaning of being is somewhat fluid from 1925 through 1927 (and even through 1928, if we count the reshuffling of the four basic questions in Heidegger's course on Leibniz). Not only is the program fluid; perhaps it is even in trouble. One sign of that is the way Heidegger keeps rearranging the order of 'Time and being' in relation to the destruction of the history of ontology. I take these rearrangements as a symptom of the deeper problem of the relation of system and history in Heidegger's program. In a word: How can a systematic ontology be reconciled with the historicity of human existence? If the transcendental condition which renders possible the systematics of being in *SZ* I.3 is *Dasein*'s own temporality and historicity, then the inquiry into being is itself characterized by historicity. To answer the question of the meaning of being in terms of time is in effect to show that the question of being is itself historical and that one has to question, historically, the very history of the question of being. It seems that Heidegger is aware of this problem and aware that the problem of system and history becomes the problem of relativism. Is the last word in this matter to be *veritas temporis filia*?²⁰

In the third place, and closely linked to the former two, is the question of the relation between time as self-transcendence and time as the horizon for the meaning of being. This is the problem of the relation of priority between *Dasein* and being, if indeed we can speak of these as 'two'. Does being have the structure of pres-ab-sence because of *Dasein*'s pres-ab-sential self-transcendence? Or is *Dasein* self-transcendent because being has intrinsically the structure of pres-ab-sence?

In the fourth place, lurking behind the above questions of history and system, temporality and truth, self-transcendence and being-as-the-transcendent, there is the question of the so-called 'turn'. We must say from the outset that the turn is not a move away from the fundamental standpoint of *SZ* (being as pres-ab-sence); it is not a new phase in Heidegger's development after the collapse of the *SZ* program in all its various forms. Rather, the turn was built into Heidegger's program from the start, and it always meant an overcoming of (1) the metaphysics of actuality and (2) the humanism of subjectivity.

Re #1: From the early twenties Heidegger always conceived of the turn as the step back from all forms of the metaphysics of actuality (being as presence) and into not only the Greek *alētheia* (which is still a matter of presence) but even further back to the possibilizing ground of *alētheia*, namely, *lēthē* (absence).²¹ To become aware of the *lēthē*-dimension is not to extinguish it but to let it be. In that sense the turn

is to be understood as '*Die Umkehr in die Herkunft*' (this is the gloss at SZ 39, which we mentioned above) – that is, the return to, the awareness and positive appropriation of, *lēthē* as the source or origin of intelligibility, so as then to see the 'derivation' of being-as-presence from out of this absence: '*Das Anwesen aus dieser Herkunft*' (ibid.). To overcome the metaphysics of actuality does not mean to abolish it but to reinsert it into the dimension of potentiality. But actuality (*energeia*) embedded in potentiality (*dynamis*) is what Aristotle means by movement (*kinēsis*). If one properly understands Heidegger's retrieval of the problematic of *kinēsis* in Aristotle, then one can see how Heidegger's turn towards the *lēthē*-dimension of disclosure means a regaining of being as movement.

Re #2: In so far as all modes of being human are correlative to modes of being itself, the modern humanism of subjectivity merely corresponds to the latest phase of the metaphysics of actuality. A positive recovery of the pre-metaphysics of 'potentiality' (*lēthē*, or *dynamis* properly retrieved) would correspondingly entail the discovery of a pre-humanistic understanding of man in terms of his living-into-possibilities (his self-absence). The correlativity between man's pres-ab-sence (SZ: *Zeitlichkeit*) and the pres-ab-sence that is being or disclosure (SZ: *die Temporalität des Seins*) is what Heidegger's thought is all about. We can also recognize here the problematic of 'authenticity' or proper selfhood. Man comes into his own by resolving not to be his own but to let himself go into the potentiality he already is. In so doing he wakes up to the fact that his transcendence is rooted in and governed by the *lēthē*-dimension of disclosure. (*Transzendenz aber von Wahrheit des Seyns her: das Ereignis*, new edition of SZ, 51 note a).

What then of the shift in language that characterizes Heidegger's work in the thirties? This does not make up the turn (*Kehre*) in the proper sense but is only a shift in direction (*Wendung*) within the turn.²² It merely evidences Heidegger's awareness that the turn from all forms of the metaphysics of stable presence into the non-metaphysics of privative absence (*lēthē*) could not be carried out within the language of the last form of metaphysics, transcendental horizontality.

The turn was to come into its own in SZ I.3. Here the whole project was to turn around, both in terms of *how* one thinks (the abandonment of subjectivity and 'the overcoming of the horizon as such') and in terms of *what* is to be thought (positive appropriation of '*Vergessenheit, Lēthē, Verbergung, Entzug . . .*').²³ Heidegger's abandonment of the program of SZ did not mean abandonment of the turn that had been built into that program from the beginning, but only of the transcendental language of metaphysics. SZ I.3, he later wrote, 'was held back because thought failed in adequately [showing] this turn and did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics'.²⁴

Yet for all that, Heidegger claims to have carried out the turn and to

have answered the question of the meaning of being. 'Contrary [to what is generally supposed], the question of *Being and Time* is decisively fulfilled in the thinking of the turn', he wrote to Father Richardson. And he specified. The clearing of the realm of intelligibility on the basis of *lēthē* as withdrawal is what 'being' means.²⁵

The above analyses of the various early programs for working out the temporal or kinetic meaning of being have brought us to the point where we can begin to study and evaluate the contents of *GP*. We shall see that *GP* does not in any way complete *SZ*. However, the fact that *GP* fails to complete *SZ* – indeed, that it failed to complete itself – has a positive meaning. It was a distant warning of the coming shift away from the transcendental language and framework of *SZ* so as finally to bring about the turn into 'the thing itself'.²⁶

III Argument: an analysis of *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*

GP was delivered in 22 two-hour lectures on Wednesdays and Saturdays from 30 April through July 27, 1927, excepting June 2–15 and July 7–12. Preceding the three Parts was a programmatic Introduction which revealed their systematic interrelation (*GP* 1–33).

A Introduction

The course opens with and sustains throughout (*GP* 2, 36, 81, 175f., 263, 353, 467) an implicit critique of Husserl's phenomenology. How does one single out 'the basic problems of phenomenology'? Not from any current definition of the art! Not only are there widely divergent conceptions of the nature and tasks of phenomenology, but even if these could be harmonized into a unified definition, this would provide little help in sorting out, much less in solving, the basic problems of phenomenology. For it is emphatically not the case 'that phenomenological research today has gotten to the center of the philosophical problematic and defined the proper essence of that problematic from out of its possibilities' (*GP* 3).

For Heidegger, phenomenology is neither scientific philosophy itself, nor one science among others, nor a pre-science for grounding the properly philosophical disciplines (ethics, logic, and so on). Rather, it is the method for doing scientific philosophy at all. Accordingly, in opposition to Husserl's tendency to separate phenomenology, as scientific philosophy itself, from the authority of the philosophical tradition, Heidegger asserts that phenomenology is only 'the more explicit and more radical understanding of the idea of scientific philosophy as this has been ambitioned throughout its development in ever new and coherently unified endeavors from the Greeks to Hegel' (*GP* 3). Thus, far from allowing any 'dog-

matic' (= Husserlian) definition of phenomenology to delineate the basic problems (*GP* 4), Heidegger will turn to history, both to discern in a preliminary way what scientific philosophy has claimed to be and to carry out a phenomenological-critical discussion of four traditional theses on being. This discussion, it becomes clear, is a 'retrieve' – 'the disclosing of a problem's original and heretofore hidden possibilities so that by the development of them the problem is transformed and thus for the first time has its content as a problem preserved' (*KPM* 195). From out of the four traditional theses Heidegger will shape the four basic problems of phenomenological philosophy. The circularity here is both obvious and, for Heidegger, inevitable (cf. *SZ* 152f.), and it points to the fundamental divergence of his 'historical' approach from Husserl's presuppositionless one.

A glance at the tradition shows that philosophy by its nature is scientific (not *Weltanschauung*) and specifically the science of being (and not of the acts and structures of consciousness). In a word, philosophy is ontology, 'the theoretical-conceptual interpretation of being, its structure and possibilities' (*GP* 15). And if phenomenology is to ontology as method is to science, then explaining the basic problems of phenomenology entails demonstrating 'the possibility and necessity of the absolute science of being' (*ibid.*).

The three Parts of *GP* are the steps to accomplishing this goal. Part One: An analysis of four traditional theses on being will point up their one common problem: an inadequate determination of the meaning of being due to an inadequate determination of Dasein as phenomenological locus of the understanding of being. Part Two: Heidegger will determine the unified meaning of being from out of human temporality by resolving the four 'basic problems of phenomenology' retrieved from the four traditional theses. Part Three was to lay out four elements of the methodology of ontology.

B Four traditional theses on being

Heidegger's discussions of each of the four theses is divided into three parts, roughly: (a) a presentation of the thesis, (b) a discussion of its implicit problem-area from a phenomenological viewpoint, and (c) a preliminary indication of the direction to be taken for an adequate resolution of the problem. In the following summaries I restrict myself to only the essential strands of the argument: how each thesis points beyond itself to the need for a fundamental ontology.

1. *The Kantian thesis* (*GP* 35-107): Kant states his thesis on being within the context of his refutation of the ontological argument for the existence of God, but Heidegger's interest is only in the ontological, not the theological, import of the thesis. Negatively, Kant's thesis declares that being is not a 'real' predicate, i.e., does not deal with or in any

way increase the conceptual content of a thing; it does not concern the *res* (whatness, hence 'realness') of the thing. Positively, the thesis maintains that being consists in the 'absolute position' of the thing as object in relation to the empirical faculty of judgment (perception). Although Kant leaves the thesis as such at that (apart from his application of it in refutation of the ontological argument), Heidegger pursues a double problem inherent in it. On the one hand, what Kant means by being as perception is unclear, for perception (*Wahrnehmung*) can mean either the act of perceiving (*Wahrnehmen*) or the thing perceived (*das Wahrgenommene*) or the state of perceivedness (*die Wahrgenommenheit*, 'the being-perceived of what is perceived in the perceiving comportment', *GP* 79). Heidegger takes it that the last is what Kant means by being, but the very unclarity in which Kant left the issue points to the need for a fundamental clarification of the manifold being-structure of perception. On the other hand, it would seem that perceivedness is not itself being, but must presuppose the actuality or being of the thing in question as prior to the possibility of being-as-perceivedness. This twofold unclarity of the Kantian thesis points to the need for a fundamental clarification of the manifold being-structure of perception.

Heidegger attempts this clarification by an analysis of intentionality. Perception is a perceptive being-directed-towards the perceived, such that the perceived as such is understood in its perceivedness. In this seeming commonplace one must avoid two things: on the one hand, erroneous objectivist readings of intentionality whereby it is taken as a relation of two things-on-hand: an on-hand psychic subject and an on-hand physical object. Perceiving would then be a psychic act that a subject happens to perform when there happens to be a physical object on hand. Rather, Heidegger shows that perceiving is intrinsically relational, even when that to which it relates (its *Wozu*) is only a hallucination. Intentionality, therefore, has an *a priori* character of relating: it is relationality as such. On the other hand, one must avoid an erroneous subjectivizing or immanentizing of intentionality which might express itself in the question, 'How do intentions reach an "outside" world?' Intentionality is neither subjective nor objective but is rooted in transcendence itself. Here for the first time in the course Heidegger introduces his term 'Dasein' in place of 'subject': man's very being-structure (Dasein) is transcendence; transcendence is the *ratio essendi* of intentionality just as intentionality is the *ratio cognoscendi* of transcendence. For Dasein there can be no 'outside' to which it must penetrate because there is no 'inside' in which it can be trapped. This clarification of perception as intentional likewise clarifies the second problem, the relation between being as perceivedness and being as actual presence-at-hand. As intentional, perceiving is always directed to the thing perceived so as to discover it; the thing's perceivedness is its discoveredness

(*Entdecktheit*). But if perception really discovers the thing as it is in itself (for such is the nature and goal of perception), then it must be guided beforehand by a prior understanding of the way-of-being and the kind-of-being (*Vorhandensein*) of the thing perceived. Perceiving must have a prior pre-conceptual understanding of that thing, one in which its being is disclosed (*erschlossen*). In the perceivedness that goes with this understanding, there is the prior disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) of the being of perceived things.

This discussion of the intentional character of perception opens onto the later discussion of the ontological difference between being and entities. Kant's assertion that being is not a real predicate says as much as that being is not an entity. The distinction between the perception of a thing as the perceivedness or *discoveredness* of an entity and the prior *disclosedness* (*Erschlossenheit*) of the being of the discovered thing points to the ontological difference between being and entities which is made on the basis of Dasein as transcendence: not just intentional transcendence to entities but transcendence 'beyond' entities to (i.e., the prior understanding of) their being.

This preliminary clarification of the Dasein-relatedness of being calls for a fuller analysis of how transcendence, determined by temporality, makes possible man's understanding of being. Likewise, the distinction drawn here between the disclosedness of being and the discoveredness of entities demands an analysis of the ontological difference between being and entities. Both tasks are reserved for GP II.1.

2. *The Aristotelian and medieval thesis that the being of entities includes both whatness (essentia) and presence-at-hand (existentia)* (GP 108-71). Just as the Kantian thesis shows the subject-relatedness of the notion of the existence (*Wirklichkeit*) of things, so the medieval *essentia* and *existentia*, when traced back to their Aristotelian origins, likewise reveal their relation to the intentional comportment of man and therefore call for an ontology of existence as a fundamental delineation of the unified meaning of being. Kant had shown that existence entailed relation to the subject (perception), but he took over unproblematically from scholasticism the notion of essence (in his *Realität*). Heidegger will show that essence too points back to the subject, specifically to productive comportment or *poiēsis* in the broadest sense.

From Suárez' *Disputationes metaphysicae* and, to a lesser degree, from Aquinas' *De ente et essentia*, Heidegger lays out a basic medieval lexicon of *essentia* and *existentia* and traces the various words (*quidditas*, *forma*, *natura* on the one hand, *actualitas* on the other) back to their corresponding Aristotelian terms. But those Greek words all point implicitly to the horizon of man's productive comportment (*poiēsis*). Why is *existentia* conceived as *actualitas* or *energeia*? Because of a relation to action (*Handeln*, *praxis*) or production (*Herstellen*, *poiēsis*) whereby something is

brought forth and made accessible to man. The same with *essentia*: The *forma* or *morphē* of something is determined by its *eidos prohaireton*, which, as priorly directing production, has the character of revealing what something is 'before' it is actualized (*to ti ēn einai, quod quid erat esse*). That which, in production, is 'prior' to actualization (viz., the *eidos* or *essentia* or nature of the product) is free from all the imperfection and incompleteness of the actual thing and so determines what something 'always already was', *to ti ēn einai, das jeweils schon voraus Wesende* or *Gewesenes* – used for the otherwise lacking perfect form of *einai* (cf. new SZ 114 note a).

Just as the words for existence and essence point to man's 'poetic' activity of letting things come forth as they are into accessibility or use, so too the words for entities. The *hypokeimenon* is what 'lies present' (*keisthai*) in the area of man's comportment as available to his use. As an *ousia*, an entity, according to the pre-philosophical use of *ousia*, is a present possession or usable reality; its state of being (*ousia, essentia*) is usability based on producedness. All of this is the unthematic and implicit horizon according to which the Greeks understood being, and it points to the need not only for a retreat from the medieval *essentia* and *existentia* to the Greek experience of being, but even more for a thematization and elaboration of what was only implicit in the Greek *energeia* and *ousia*.

A more original grasp of the basic articulation of being into essence and existence requires, preliminarily, a discussion of the intentional structure of productive activity and, in the long run, an ontology of human existence as *poiēsis* and *praxis*. Just as perception is perception of something as it is in itself, so too production, as intentional comportment, presupposes an understanding of the product's being-in-itself. Producing is at once a relating of the product to oneself and a freeing of it for its own being. This letting-free of one's products is essential to man's transcendence as intentional.

But can 'production' serve as the clue to *all* kinds of entities? What about nature, which requires no human production? Answer: Nature is known as such only in productive activity wherein *hylē*, as what is not produced, is required for what is to be produced.

But finally, the essence–existence distinction, even if rooted in production, does not apply to one kind of entity: human existence, where whatness or essence is of the unique sort, 'whoness'. Hence, even as clarified thus far, the essence–existence pair remains problematic until clarified in terms of the full meaning of being as such, its unity and multiplicity; and this, in turn, must await an ontology of man as the locus of the understanding of being. Not only does the second thesis point to the need for a deeper 'return to the "subject"' but it also calls for a clarification of the meaning of being and of the basic articulations

of being. All this is left to *GP* II.2. (Just how important Heidegger thought this analysis of the Aristotelian and medieval thesis to be is shown by the fact that he took it over whole into his 1928 course on Leibniz as the section, 'Essentia. Die Grundverfassung des Seins überhaupt' – and that he referred to it again in the 1935 course *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 140 = *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Doubleday/Anchor, p. 154; Yale, p. 184; as well as in *Nietzsche* II, 14.)

3. *The modern thesis* (*GP* 172–251), from Descartes to Husserl, differentiates the being of the critically normative self-conscious subject from that of its possible objects, but it misses the unique being of subjectivity. Heidegger shows the insufficiency of the modern turn to the subject by attacking Kant's understanding of personhood.

For Kant the essence of the ego lies neither in the transcendental unity of apperception (*personalitas transcendentalis*) and even less in the empirical self-consciousness of the ego of apprehension (*personalitas psychologica*), but rather in the moral ego, calculating, acting, taking itself as its goal, self-conscious before the law (*personalitas moralis*). But even here Kant misses the proper being of *acting*, wherein the moral person is goal for himself, and instead Kant sees the existence of the person on the model of the existence of a thing. The reason: Kant too reads being as 'producedness' insofar as he takes over unquestioned the medieval notion of finite being as createdness. Only a creative producer can know a substance in its full being; man as a finite and therefore receptive knower is confined to phenomenal reality. Thus Kant continues unbroken the metaphysical tradition which reads being as produced presentness (*Vorhandensein*).

For a more adequate treatment of the being of subjectivity Heidegger summarizes much of *SZ* I.1 on being-in-the-world (*GP* 219–47). The point is that even before explicit self-reflection and quite apart from any supposed introspection, man as being-in-the-world already co-grasps himself as mirrored in the matrix of purposefulness called world. Transcending himself into that matrix of meaning, man is at once for-the-sake-of-his-own-being and an understanding of being as such. Thus the proper being of subjectivity can only be decided out of a proper analysis of transcendence, and this will point not only to the unified meaning of being but also to differentiations of being that are more basic than subjectivity and nature. These questions are referred to *GP* II.3.

4. *In investigating the thesis of logic* (*GP* 252–320) that the 'is' of the copula applies to all entities regardless of their mode of being, Heidegger selects the characteristic views of Aristotle, Hobbes, Mill, and Lotze in order to show the rich manifold of meanings (whatness, thatness, true-ness) that can attach to being taken as the 'is'. But here lies a double problem. First, the multiplicity of meanings is not systematically derived from a prior idea of the unity of being; and secondly, the designation

of being as copula, by taking the assertion as a series of words to be connected, misses the priority of the sense of 'is' in terms of truth.

To arrive at a more adequate basis for the 'is', Heidegger rejects the notion of the assertion as a series of words corresponding to ideas and ultimately to objects, and cuts through to the *logos apophantikos* as intentional comportment embodying an understanding of being. But even this assertoric disclosure of being in apophantic predication and verbal communication rests on a deeper foundation. Being-in-the-world is the primordial hermeneutic (= event of interpretative understanding of intelligibilities) which discloses entities in their original and non-derived syntheses with the lived purposes of existence. Transcendence is original truth. The intentional structure of truth as disclosure, grounded ultimately in temporality, alone can provide access to the unified meaning, and with that to the truth-character, of being in *GP* II.4.

C Towards fundamental ontology

Each of the four theses, when broken down to its inner problems and possibilities, has pointed beyond itself to the need for reformulating the idea of being in general on the basis of an adequate ontology of human existence. Thus we are led to *GP* II, 'The fundamental ontological question about the meaning of Being in general and its basic structures and modes'. Whereas Heidegger here proposed to present and then to push beyond *SZ*'s analysis of temporality and spell out the time-character of being by resolving the four basic problems of phenomenology, the course (there were only six lecture days left) did very little more than summarize the published portions of *SZ*.

What is interesting for our purposes are the few steps that Heidegger takes at *GP* 441–5 beyond *SZ* and in pursuance of its promise to determine the meaning of being in general from the horizon opened up by man's temporal self-transcendence. The reasons for this interest are two-fold: positively, to find out how and at what point *SZ* I.3 would have built off of *SZ* I.2, and negatively, to find out why and at what point that continuation became impossible for Heidegger.

GP 389 begins the summary of the main material of *SZ*. Being shows up only in the understanding of being, which is intrinsic to Dasein: therefore, only by discovering the structures and ground of this understanding can we define the meaning of being in general. But all understanding is fundamentally the projection of possibilities into which one lives and from out of which one understands oneself. Projective understanding is rooted in Dasein's basic state of self-transcendence, being-in-the-world; and this in turn is grounded in the generation (*Zeitigung*) of temporality, or better, in temporality as self-generation in the primordial form of authentic, self-appropriated existence. I am who I really am by anticipating the most basic possibility which I already am, my death.

Authentic existence is the threefold structure of self-transcendence: being present to oneself and to things in the moment of existential insight (*Gegenwart* as *Augenblick*) by becoming (*Zukunft* as *Vorlaufen*) and renewing (*Gewesenheit* as *Wiederholung*) the most proper possibility that one is.

This primary temporality underlies the derived temporal structures of dealing with, e.g., tools in one's environment. A tool is for attaining some end: it has its being as 'in-order-to-ness'. Whenever I use a tool, not only do I already understand its being (what it is: a tool; how it is: available for doing something), but more, I implicitly relate myself to that being in a temporal way. I have the tool present to me (*Gegenwart* as *Gegenwärtigen*) by retaining it (*Gewesenheit* as *Behalten*) in terms of an expectation of what it can accomplish (*Zukunft* as *Gewärtigen*). Ordinary usage overlooks these moments and their temporal base, but when the tool is damaged or missing or just put up with, its structure, modified but still temporal, becomes noticeable. Not only that, but the various forms of breakdown of equipment make visible the modifications of the temporal moments of tool-oriented self-transcendence. Three examples will reveal the privative modifications of these ekstases.

1. *To lack or miss something.* To come out of the theater and find one's car stolen is certainly to experience the not-there-ness (*das Nicht-vorfinden*; GP 441 = SZ 335b) of the car. But not every instance of not-there-ness is an instance of missing (we don't miss last year's flu attack), rather only those in which something *needed* is lacking. We cannot say exactly, therefore, that to miss means to not-have-something-present, for it is precisely to have something present as needed (the car) when in fact it is not around. The experience of missing something reveals the privative modification of the ekstasis of having-present into having-unpresent. To express this privative character, Heidegger calls the modified ekstasis an *UNgegenwärtigen* as contrasted with a *NICHTgegenwärtigen* (cf. the Greek *mē on* vs. *ouk on*). To miss is to make present something expected but not present.

2. *To be surprised by something which unexpectedly but handily shows up.* Your car gone, you are about to step on a bus when a horn honks behind you – your best friend is offering you a ride. Having the bus present in terms of *that* expected ride means not expecting a more comfortable ride in a car. The non-expectation, however, is not an absolute absence of expectation (*Nichtgewärtigen*) but a relative or privative un-expectation (*Ungewärtigen*, GP 442b = SZ 355c), which, in fact, is what allows us to be surprised. The experience of surprise reveals the privative modification of the futural ekstasis of tool-use from expectation to un-expectation.

3. *Merely putting up with an implement.* Say no friend offers you a ride and you have to take the bus home. You have the bus present, you

retain it in terms of the expected arrival home, but you really do not 'take the bus into account' (*das Nichtrechnen mit*, SZ 355d) or 'retain' it to that end; rather, you merely put up with it. This 'not taking into account', however, is not absolute non-retention but a privative 'un-retention'. You 'hold on' to the bus by putting up with it as second-best. This phenomenon reveals, in tool-use, the privative modification of the ekstasis of alreadiness from retaining to un-retaining.

This is the point (GP 441 = SZ §69a) where the 'new working out' of 'Time and being' was to take off. Having seen – at least in the cases of Dasein and tools – the elaboration of the unity of self-transcendence, we now await the elaboration of the corresponding horizontal schemata (the 'whereunto' of the direction of self-transcendence) which condition the meaning of whatever is experienced in correlation with the ekstasis. At one pole, the threefold self-transcendence; at the other pole, the threefold horizontal schema – the whole constituting the ekstastic-horizontal correlation that is primordial temporality. We expect, too, that each horizontal schema will have both a positive and a privative moment. Out of the interrelation of presence and absence both in temporality as a whole (where becoming and alreadiness function as relative absence for having-present) and within each moment of temporality (which includes both positivity and privation) we would expect the elaboration of the analogically unified meaning of being in general as presence-by-absence in correlation with man's own existential presence-by-absence.

In fact, however, the further step Heidegger takes in that direction is very cautious – if not downright hesitant. 'In order not to complicate too much our view of the phenomenon of temporality, which in any case is difficult to grasp' (GP 435b), he imposes a double limit on the treatment. On the one hand, he restricts himself to the experience of dealing with tools only, and on the other he treats only of the horizontal schema that corresponds to the one ekstasis of having-present.

Correlative to but distinct from the self-transcendent moment of having a tool present, there is the horizontal schema whose time-character is called presence (*Praesenz*). In order to show the distinctness of the ekstastic and horizontal poles in their correlativity, Heidegger generally, but not consistently, uses German-based words for the ekstastic pole: e.g., *Zeitlichkeit*, *Zukunft*, *Gewesenheit*, *Gegenwart*; and Latin-based words for the horizontal pole: *Temporalität*, *Praesenz*, *Absenz*; cf. GP 433 and *Logik*, 199f. Having-present, as an ekstastical moment, has a schematic indication (*Vorzeichnung*, GP 435a) of that out-towards-which transcendence is, viz., the horizon of *Praesenz* (also called *Anwesenheit*). *Praesenz* thus constitutes 'the condition of the possibility of understanding readiness-to-hand as such' (434). Having-present, in fact, projects all it has present and could possibly have present in terms of this horizon of

presence or presentness and so understands those things as having a 'presential sense' (433b) and as 'present things' (*als Anwesendes*, 436a).

But recall that in the breakdown of a tool there occurs a privative modification of having-present to having-unpresent, or, from the viewpoint of the tool, a modification of its being from readiness-to-hand to un-readiness-to-hand (*Zuhandenheit, Abhandenheit*, 433b), from presentness to un-presentness (*Anwesenheit, Abwesenheit*, 436a).

Thus there is in general no horizon corresponding to 'missing' as a determined [mode of] having-present, but rather a *specifically modified horizon . . . of presence*. Belonging to the ekstasis of having-unpresent, which makes 'missing' possible, there is the horizontal schema of *absence* (441a).

This absential modification of the presence . . . which is given with [the experience of] missing is precisely what allows the ready-to-hand to become conspicuous [as lacking] (442b).

At this point Heidegger's advance stops. We have seen that the horizontal schema of *Praesenz* encompasses presentness, along with un-presentness as its privative modification. But this has been demonstrated only in the one horizontal schema corresponding to the one ekstasis of having-present in the one area of tool-use. Left undiscussed are: the other temporal schemata (with their privative modifications) in which tools are experienced; all the temporal schemata of non-tools; and above all, the analogically unified temporal meaning of being as such and in general.

But, although the advance stops quickly, Heidegger asks some weighty and portentous questions about the ground it covered and failed to cover. 'Within the ontological', he says (438b), 'the potential is higher than the actual' and 'everything positive becomes especially clear from the privative' (439c). Why? 'Parenthetically we may say that the reasons lie equally in the essence of temporality and in the essence of the negation that is rooted in temporality' (*ibid.*). However, if the rule that the potential underlies the actual and that the privative clarifies the positive helped to open the advance beyond SZ, it also has momentarily blocked further progress.

The modification of presence to the absence in which that presence, as modified, maintains itself cannot be interpreted more precisely without going into the characterization of this modification in general, i.e., into the modification of presence as 'not', as *negativum*, and without clarifying this in its connection with time (442a).

If the absential modification allows things to show up as lacking, then we meet the

fundamental but difficult problem: To what extent is there not precisely a negative moment (if we formally call the ab-sential a negation) that constitutes itself in the structure of this being, i.e., above all in readiness-to-hand? To ask the question in terms of basic principles: To what extent does a negative, a not, lie in *Temporalität* in general and likewise in *Zeitlichkeit*? Or even: To what extent is time itself the condition of the possibility of nothingness at all? (442 f.).

Time, we know, was only the first name for what Heidegger later called the truth of being. In both cases being is seen as pres-ab-sence. The last question above, therefore, is very close to asking: To what extent does presence itself, which must transcend the acts in which it is performed, contain within itself a privation (absence, nothingness, *lēthē*) which is the possibility of that very presence? The question teeters there. Granted that the modification of presence to absence has a character of negativity,

where does the root of this 'not' in general lie? Closer consideration shows that even the not – or nothingness as the essence of the not – can likewise be interpreted only from out of the essence of time and that only from time can the possibility of the modification, e.g. of presentness to absentness, be clarified. Hegel is finally on the track of a fundamental truth when he says: Being and Nothingness are identical, i.e., belong together. Of course the more radical question is: What makes possible such a most primordial belonging-together-ness? We are not sufficiently prepared to press on into this darkness . . . (443a,b).

GP is hardly a completion of *SZ*. But its formal significance, apart from the intrinsic interest of its content, lies in its incompleteness. To be sure, it shows how Heidegger might have completed *SZ* if he had chosen to continue in a transcendental framework. But more importantly it leads to the brink from which, beyond the transcendental framework, the absence can begin to be seen for itself.

IV Significance: 'The thing itself'

In asking about the significance of this publication, we must distinguish between what it may contribute to Heidegger scholarship and what it offers by way of insight into the phenomenological 'thing itself', being as pres-ab-sence.

There is plenty for Heidegger scholarship. We meet the first mention of the 'ontological difference', although the concept does not get developed. (On November 17, 1925, Heidegger did speak of '*ein fundamentaler ontologischer Unterschied*', but in reference to Husserl's ideal-real distinction in *Logical Investigations*. See *Logik*, p. 58). There are analyses of Aquinas, Scotus, Suarez, Hobbes, Mill and Lotze. There is a suggestive insight into the three stages of phenomenological method (reduction, construction, destruction) some months before Heidegger's contributions to Husserl's drafts for the *Encyclopedia Britannica* article.²⁷ More important, the work provides a good portion of Heidegger's Aristotle-interpretation, including the lengthiest analysis of *Physics* IV, 10-14 that we shall ever have from his courses (*GP* 330-61) and the first published, but by no means last, analysis of Aristotle's *De interpretatione* (*GP* 255-9; cf. *Logik*, pp. 127-42).

Important for the 'thing itself' is the fact that the course gives us Heidegger's final attempt to work out the meaning of being from within the transcendental framework. I take that incompleteness as more than merely a function of 'the limited number of lecture hours' (editor's epilogue, *GP* 473), for on a simple extrapolation from the hours devoted to *GP* I, which began in late April, *GP* II would have been finished only by mid-September and *GP* III not until the end of October. Moreover, one must ask why the handful of pages that push into 'Time and being' were reserved to the second half of the second-to-last meeting of the course (July 23) and, on the whole, are among the most unsatisfying of the whole work. We have seen from Heidegger's own indications that his program was wrapped in some uncertainty in 1927. This uncertainty may have a positive meaning insofar as it gives a distant warning of the coming shift that would allow a more adequate determination of the 'thing itself'. The following intends to give some clues for that determination.

The question that haunts *GP* and prompts the shift away from the transcendental framework is this: If entities are understood in terms of their presence, and if presence is projected in terms of privative absence, what is the root of privative absence? This is 'the problem of the finitude of time' (*GP* 437), which, in a later formulation, is the problem of the *lēthē*-dimension of *alētheia*: 'Wherever *alētheia* emerges, *lēthē* itself (which is what essentially becomes present in *alētheia*) remains absent precisely so that some thing can become unhidden as an entity.'²⁸ That is: entities become present against a background of privative absence which is intrinsic to the emergence of presence itself.²⁹

The point where *GP* breaks off and Heidegger's next phase begins is the brink from which he sees that the *lēthē*-dimension is intrinsic to being itself. The privative absence is not forged by man's projective self-absence, nor is it merely the unexplainedness of this or that entity (which

finally is embedded within a claim of the total intelligibility of reality) nor is it some occasional limit. Rather this privative negativity is intrinsic to being as pres-ab-sence. But to speak of being hiding and revealing 'itself' seemingly is to fall into the worst kind of metaphysical or mystical anthropomorphism.

How may we solve this problem? Discussion of the positive appropriation of absence – which is the turn – may be aided by two prefatory notes, one about the model and one about the language of the discussion.

1. Clearly the major model for Heidegger's exploration of being as pres-ab-sence is Aristotle's discussion of *kinēsis* in terms of *dynamis* and *energeia*, even though, to be sure, the model gets much transformed when put at the service of Heidegger's problematic.³⁰ In his seminar of 1928, 'Phenomenological exercises: interpretation of Aristotle's *Physics*, II' (thus the title, although it dealt with *Physics* III), Heidegger declared that the horizon from which Aristotle prepared the radical grasp of the conception of being was *kinēsis*, movement; the point, therefore, is to find the relation between movement and being (July 16, 1928). But being (*ousia*, or more specifically *energeia*) means always-being-the-same, self-identity, presentness and completion, whereas moving entities are intrinsically 'on the way' and incomplete: every 'now' points to another and different now, every moment is a 'yes, but . . .'. Moving entities are *mē on* and *aoriston*. Yet Aristotle's genius is that he grasped this privative state as a mode of being through the concept of *dynamis*. *Dynamis*, when seen in terms of *kinēsis*, is neither 'potentiality' nor 'mere possibility' but the positive event of appropriation-onto-*energeia* (*Eignung*, *Ereignung*); and an entity which has its being as *dynamis* is on *dynamei hēi dynaton*, an appropriated entity that is precisely in the state of being-appropriated-onto-*energeia*. *Dynamis* in this sense is, in effect, co-extensive with *kinēsis* as *energeia atelēs*: presence-by-absence. As bound up with *kinēsis* (and quite apart from the *arithmos kinēseos*), *energeia*, Heidegger says, is a *Zeitbezeichnung*, a time-designation (July 9). Of course, Heidegger's transformation of this model entails the reversal of the Greek priority of *energeia* over *dynamis* into the priority of *dynamis* over *energeia*. Intrinsic to that transformation is Heidegger's claim that the human understanding of being is itself the *Ur-kinēsis*.

2. Following the lead of Heidegger's later writings, discussion of the turn could well profit from retiring the term 'being' from the Heideggerian lexicon. Not only does the word, especially capitalized, almost inevitably suggest a metaphysical super-entity, but equally, talk of 'being itself' can lose sight of its analogical character. Heidegger is not after a univocal something subsisting on its own. Over and above the being of Dasein, the being of implements, the being of things present-at-hand, and the being of ideal objects, there is no second level of 'being itself'. Heidegger was merely searching for the analogically unified meaning of

being that is instantiated in all cases of the being of. . . . To translate *das Sein* I hesitantly suggest for now the term 'givenness', first, because it clearly implies a phenomenologically correlative locus of experience from which it is distinct but never separate – various forms of human perception (*Vernehmen*; cf. *EM* 106) in the broadest sense; and secondly, because the phrase 'givenness *itself*' seems less likely to denote something behind or in addition to the givenness of *entities*, but rather to connote a shift of phenomenological focus onto the unified analogical structure of givenness as *a priori* determinative of the regional modes in which things (or one thing) can be differently given in experience.

But with 'givenness' we have not yet arrived at Heidegger's problematic. Givenness denotes the state of an entity as given (*das Seiende als Seiendes* = *Seiendheit*), whereas Heidegger's question is not about the givenness of the given but about the very giving of givenness itself. If being is the givenness of entities (ontic disclosure or truth), what gives givenness (ontological disclosure or truth)? Or: If being accounts for ('is') the meaningful presence of things, what is the mode of the meaningful 'presence' of being?

In one sense we already know the answer: Absence possibilizes presence, possibility allows actuality, *lēthē* is the condition of *alētheia*. Furthermore, we already know the correlation-structure between man's self-transcendence and the pres-ab-sence that is 'being'. What is still undecided is the question of priority within that correlation. Let us begin by reviewing the correlation.

In terms of the phenomenologically transformed *dynamis-energeia* model, Heidegger deepens Husserl's empty-fulfilled model. Man is projected beyond himself towards his own self-absence, thereby opening an empty horizon which may be filled in by the entities which are given to experience. But this means that man has two distinct kinds of experience related to two distinct kinds of givenness. On the one hand, man experiences the recessive or withdrawn horizon which is the prior condition of the fulfilling presence of entities. On the other, he experiences the present entities. First, note their relatedness: Just as the experience of one's own privative absence is the basis of the experience of things (relative self-absence yields the realm of presence), so correlatively the experience of the givenness of the recessive possibilizing horizon is the basis of the experience of the meaningful givenness of present entities. Now note the difference: The givenness of the possibilizing horizon cannot properly be collapsed into the givenness of present entities. On comparison of the two, the horizon has a unique mode of givenness. It remains relatively absent or withdrawn in favor of the entities given within it. But at the same time *it still is given to experience*, although in the *privative* mode of relative absence. Specifically, the withdrawal or absence is given as correlative to the experience of one's own self-absence, whereas entities

are given as correlative to the experience of one's own presence. At one and the same time, man's presence-by-absence or temporal existence is correlative to (1) the presence of fulfilling entities and (2) the presence-by-absence of the conditioning horizon. In other words, any possible givenness of entities is based on the correlativity of the temporality of existence with the movement or 'time-character' of givenness itself.

The correlation established, the question now is whether the movement or time-character of givenness, as the condition of possible experience, is primarily due to man's kinetic temporality. More specifically: whether the possibility of error is rooted in man's finitude or in the finitude of the pres-ab-sence of givenness itself. Heidegger broaches the question in his essay 'On the essence of truth'.

Dasein as self-transcending has a disclosive function both with regard to a particular entity that happens to show up and with regard to the meaning-fraught complex of human purposes called 'world'. But everyday experience overlooks the world while it focuses on a particular entity: it conceals the world that it holds open. Or is it rather that the world, the realm of openness, 'conceals itself' in favor of the unconcealed entity? Yes, Heidegger asserts, the non-disclosure of *alētheia* is its most proper element. It is not something effected by Dasein's projective self-transcendence, yet nonetheless it is preserved as absential by Dasein's self-absence. The 'withdrawal' of givenness itself is prior even to Dasein's revealing-concealing relation to entities, yet Dasein preserves the *lēthē*-dimension of *alētheia* (= 'the mystery') by being projected beyond himself into the emptiness within which entities can appear.

Whereas *SZ* had read the correlation of Dasein and *lēthē* from Dasein's viewpoint, Heidegger's later position reads the correlation from the viewpoint of the *lēthē*. The later writings speak of man as 'drawn out' or 'claimed', correlative to the 'self-concealing' of the dimension which lends entities their presentness. But one experiences this withdrawal only as it is registered in one's being drawn into absence (*Geworfenheit*, *Angezogenheit*, etc.³¹), and one experiences the epochal givenness (*Geschick*) of worlds of sense only as this is registered in how one makes entities present in meaning. There can be no hypostasizing of 'something' that withdraws or gives, no objectification of 'something' that disposes over the movement that is one's temporality. There is only the experience of the self as ultimately not at its own disposal. From a Derridean perspective we might speak of man as being at the disposal of 'meaning'.³² This is hardly to import some romantic mysticism into philosophy, but only to take seriously and rigorously the full structure of the phenomenological correlation.

The later Heidegger claims to have transcended the transcendental framework and yet to have fulfilled *SZ*'s intentions of showing that the meaning of being is presence-by-absence. If *GP* had been completed, its

last sentence might possibly have read: 'The meaning of being is time; that is, givenness is given temporally because of the transcendental projection of the temporal horizons of possible experience.' If *per impossibile* GP had been completed in the late thirties, its last sentence might have read: 'The meaning of being is "movement" – that is, givenness is given in the unique state of withdrawal, and thereby man is drawn out into absence and into the finite possibilities of meaning.' In both periods the 'thing itself' is the same: being as pres-ab-sence in essential correlation with man as pres-ab-sence.

Notes

1 Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed., *Gesamtausgabe* II, 24 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975). English translation by Albert Hofstadter, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982). In the present essay I use my own translations from the German, and I refer to the German pagination. N.B.: Apparatus in this essay: I follow William J. Richardson's abbreviations for Heidegger's works: *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), p. xxxi. The number indicates the German page, and the letter indicates the paragraph on that page.

2 'Neue Ausarbeitung de 3. Abschnitts des I. Teils von "Sein und Zeit".'

3 Heidegger announced the projected outline of the course on May 4, 1927 (cf. GP 32f.). For the dating of lectures I rely on the Kyoto Manuscript of Simon Moser's *Nachschrift* of GP, a copy of which I have placed in the Phenomenology Archives at the University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma.

4 The notes read, respectively: 'Nur dieses in diesem veröffentlichten Stück' and 'Vgl. dazu Marburger Vorlesung SS 1927 (*Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*)' (new SZ 53, notes a and b). On p. 134 note b of the new *Gesamtausgabe* edition of *Wegmarken*, Heidegger remarks: 'The whole of the lecture course [= *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*] belongs to *Sein und Zeit*, First Part, Third Division, "Time and being".'

5 SD 88 (E.T., 80); US 93 (E.T. 7).

6 For the material of this section, which is drawn from my work in progress, *The Genesis of 'Sein und Zeit'*, I have relied in part on conversations with: Martin Heidegger, spring, 1971; H.-G. Gadamer, E. Tugendhat, and W. Biemel, January and May, 1975; M. Müller, K. Rahner, and F.-W. von Herrmann, fall, 1976; J. Ebbinghaus and Fritz Heidegger, summer, 1977; and on my articles, 'Heidegger's early years: fragments for a philosophical biography', in *Heidegger, the Man and the Thinker*, Thomas Sheehan, ed. (Chicago: Precedent Press, 1981) and 'The original form of *Sein und Zeit*: "Der Begriff der Zeit", 1924', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, X, 2 (May, 1979), 78-83 (Italian translation in *L'uomo, un segno*, Rome, III, 1-2 [August, 1979], 111-21).

7 Cf. Sheehan, 'Heidegger's early years', note 55.

8 Editor's Afterword to new *Gesamtausgabe* edition of SZ, p. 582.

9 Personal communication from Gadamer, Boston, April 12, 1974.

10 Max Müller, *Existenzphilosophie im geistigen Leben der Gegenwart* (Heidelberg: F. H. Kerle Verlag, 1949), p. 73f.

11 'Die transzendenzhafte Differenz./Die Ueberwindung des Horizonts als sol-

chen./Die Umkehr in die Herkunft./Das Anwesen aus dieser Herkunft', new *SZ* 53 note a.

12 W. R. Boyce Gibson, 'From Husserl to Heidegger: excerpts from a 1928 Freiburg Diary', Herbert Spiegelberg, ed., *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, II (1971), 72. For Heidegger's rearrangement of the order of *GP*, see his *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, Klaus Held, ed., *Gesamtausgabe* II, 26 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), pp. 193–94.

13 *SZ* v = *Being and Time*, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, trans. (London: SCM, 1962), p. 17.

14 In the classroom Heidegger entitled his course *Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs: Prolegomena zur Phänomenologie von Natur und Geschichte*. In the published version the title has been changed: *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, Petra Jaeger, ed., *Gesamtausgabe*, II, 20 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979). I follow Heidegger's own title, and I abbreviate it: *GZ*.

15 In this regard, see my essay 'Heidegger's "Introduction to the phenomenology of religion", 1920–21', *The Personalist*, LX, 3 (1979), 312–24, esp. pp. 315 and 320–23 (Italian translation in *Filosofia*, Turin, XXXI [1980], 431–46, esp. pp. 440–44).

16 M. Heidegger, 'Vorwort' to Richardson, *Heidegger*, p. xiii.

17 If we take the *Critique of Pure Reason* as prolegomena to a future metaphysics, and if we follow out the parallels with *SZ*, then we get something like the following:

| | Kant | Heidegger |
|----------------------------------|--|---|
| Critique as propae- deutic | I. Transcendental Doctrine of Elements | → <i>SZ</i> I.1–2 = <i>GZ</i> I = <i>GP</i> II.1–2 |
| | II. Transcendental Doctrine of Method, ch. 4 (History) | → <i>SZ</i> II.1–3 = <i>GZ</i> II = <i>GP</i> I.1–4 |
| System | I. Transcendental Philosophy (<i>Metaphysica generalis</i>) | → <i>SZ</i> I.3 = <i>GZ</i> III = <i>GP</i> II.2–4 |
| | II. Rational Physiology | → = regional ontologies |

18 At *GP* 78b Heidegger says *GP* II and III deal with the ontology of Dasein.

19 'We are ourselves the source of the idea of being. But this source must be understood as the *transcendence* of ekstatic Dasein. Only on the basis of transcendence does there take place the articulation of the various ways of being. A difficult and ultimate problem is to define the idea of being in general. Because the understanding of being belongs to transcending Dasein, the idea of being can be drawn from the subject.' 'From the last Marburg lecture course', translation (slightly revised here) by J. Macquarrie in *The Future of Our Religious Past: Essays in Honour of Rudolf Bultmann*, James M. Robinson, ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 321 = *Wegmarken*, p. 383.

20 At *GP* 460a Heidegger speaks of 'veritas temporalis', but clearly in a sense different from either Gellius' or Galileo's (cf. Friedrich Heer, *The Intellectual History of Europe*, Jonathan Steinberg, trans. [Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Co., 1966], p. 307). Some of the material of this paragraph is drawn from *SZ* 20–21.

21 Cf. 'Summary of a seminar': 'As its privation, the concealing of being belongs to the clearing of being. The forgottenness of being, which constitutes the essence of metaphysics and became the stimulus for *Being and Time*, belongs to the essence of being itself. Thus there is put to the thinking of being the task

of thinking being in such a way that forgottenness [= *lēthē!*] essentially belongs to it. The thinking that begins with *Being and Time* is thus, on the one hand, an awakening from the forgottenness of being . . . but on the other hand, as this awakening, not an extinguishing of the forgottenness of being, but placing oneself in it and standing within it. Thus the awakening from the forgottenness of being to the forgottenness of being is the awakening into appropriation.' Translation (here slightly revised) by Joan Stambaugh in *On 'Time and Being'* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 29f. = *SD* 32.

22 Cf. Heidegger, 'Vorwort' in Richardson, *Heidegger*, p. xvii.

23 Cf. new *SZ* 53 note a; new *Wegmarken* notes (on p. 328) to *Humanismus-brief* 159.

24 In the new *Wegmarken* Heidegger glosses the 'Sagen' of the old text with 'Sichzeigenlassen', *Wegmarken* 159 = 328.

25 'Vorwort' to Richardson, *Heidegger*, p. xix; *ibid.*, 'Lichtung des Sichverbergens (Zeit) erbringt Anwesen (Sein)', p. xxi.

26 Prof. Hans Seigfried, in a paper distributed at the Twelfth Annual Heidegger Conference (Villanova, Pa., May 27, 1978), has argued against the fact and the possibility of the turn in Heidegger's thought. He admits that 'Heidegger himself [in the *Humanismusbrief* and the *Vorwort* to Richardson's book] claims the necessity and the fact of a turn in the pursuit of the *Being and Time* project'. However, 'the claim is untenable and a simple mistake'; indeed 'in clearer moments, it seems, Heidegger himself recognized this mistake . . .'. The roots of Seigfried's misreading lie in his dogged neo-Kantian interpretations of Heidegger. Cf. his 'Descriptive phenomenology and constructivism', *PPR* 37 (1976), 248-61.

27 See Martin Heidegger, 'The idea of phenomenology, with a letter to Edmund Husserl', trans. Thomas Sheehan, *Listening: Journal of Religion and Culture*, XII (1977), 111-21.

28 This is a strict paraphrase rather than a translation of the text at *Wegmarken* 199 which more literally would be rendered: 'Whenever unhiddenness emerges, hiddenness itself (which essentially becomes present in this unhiddenness) remains absent so that the unhidden thing can appear as an entity.'

29 Cf. 'Physis . . . is a going back into itself, i.e., towards itself as always going forth'. Martin Heidegger, 'On the being and conception of *Physis* in Aristotle's *Physics* B, 1', trans. Thomas Sheehan, *Man and World*, IX (1976), 263 = *Wegmarken* p. 363.

30 Cf. my article, 'Getting to the topic: the new edition of *Wegmarken*' in *Research in Phenomenology*, VII (1977), reprinted as chapter 18 of *Radical Phenomenology: Essays in Honor of Martin Heidegger*, John Sallis, ed. (New York: Humanities Press, 1978). Also my 'Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle: *Dynamis and Ereignis*', in *Philosophy Research Archives*, IV, 1978.

31 *WD* 5 = *What is Called Thinking?* F. Wieck and J. G. Gray, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 9.

32 Cf. Jacques Derrida, 'The ends of Man', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XXX (1969), esp. 44-57.

The preliminary conception of phenomenology and of the problematic of truth in *Being and Time*

Jean-François Courtine

For Heidegger, the opening up of the phenomenological dimension implies, from the time of Marburg on, an appropriation but also a radical critique of the Husserlian idea of phenomenology in the form which it assumes as transcendental idealism in *Ideas*. It is this critique whose anticipation we can now read in volume 20 of the *Gesamtausgabe*,¹ which, in leading phenomenology back to its possibility, ceases to make of it a tendency to make it mean 'the changing and thereby continuing possibility of thinking, that is to say, of replying in its time to what has to be thought'.² Without going back here into the details of this critique and of this radicalization, we will study at greater length how the Heideggerian concept of phenomenology is worked out in *Being and Time*.

In the Introduction composed in 1949 to accompany the 7th edition of his inaugural lecture 'What is metaphysics?' Heidegger asked: 'Towards what, and on what basis, and in what sphere, would the intentionality of consciousness be able to unfold if man did not hold himself open ekstatically in the openness of being?'³ A question of this kind, a question in which we find a critique (first expressed much earlier) with regard to Husserl's thematization of intentionality,⁴ this question was already implied in the entire enterprise of *Being and Time*, even if one has to add the qualification that a formulation of this kind also hides – retrospectively – the path actually pursued in the course of almost twenty-five years. In fact, what underwent a change between 1927 and 1949 was not so much the interpretation of the ekstasis or of the ekstasis as rather that of the open itself, the openness of being. As Jean Beaufret said himself of this development, everything turns on ἀγῆθεια. This will be the proposition which we shall want to test here.

Can one legitimately argue in talking about *Being and Time* that everything already turns on the ever more refined understanding of this central term? Or again, formulated in interrogative terms: how is one to

understand Heidegger's remark in the *Parmenides* (GA 54, p. 42): '*Being and Time* represents that first attempt to think being on the basis of the fundamental experience that being has remained in a state of forgetfulness . . . '? Naturally, one thinks immediately of the first line of the first paragraph of *Being and Time*: 'The question [the *Seinsfrage*] has today lapsed into forgetfulness.' Gerard Granel correctly emphasizes – in a realm which bears upon the translation, that is, which develops in depth what has been said – that, in a certain sense, the question has always been forgotten because if it is 'out of Plato and Aristotle' that the question gets forgotten, it is also in them and through them.⁵

In the framework of *Being and Time*, how are we then to understand the forgetfulness into which the question of being has lapsed? Why until now – and in Husserlian phenomenology too – has this question been 'overlooked', 'missed' or 'neglected'?⁶ The basis for a first reply, already formulated in the lecture of 1925, and which constitutes a guiding motif for *Being and Time*, is furnished by the (problematic) concept of *Verfallen*, 'fallenness', or better, 'falling'.⁷ In the *Prolegomena*, it is *Verfallen* which is employed to explain, in the final instance, the breakdown of the Husserlian enterprise, attributable to two major 'omissions': the omission of the question of being as such and the omission of the question directed towards the being of intentionality. This is not, Heidegger notes,

an accidental neglect for which philosophers can be held to account. Rather, this history [*Geschichte*] of our being-there is itself revealed across such omissions. History interpreted not as a totality of official events but as a mode of becoming [*Geschehensart*] of being-there itself. Which means that being-there, in the mode of being of falling [*Verfallen*] – a mode of being which cannot be avoided – cannot have access to its being unless it stands opposed to the latter.

(GA 20, pp. 179–80)

Let us leave in abeyance the question of whether this concept of *Verfallen*, however decisive it might be with regard to the determination of the mode of being of *Dasein*, suffices to open up for us a way of acceding to the problematic of the forgetfulness of being, and try instead to determine more exactly the phenomenological feature of that question which arises in connection with the meaning of being. In the debate conducted by Heidegger with and against Husserl, the crucial point concerns the determination of what constitutes the proper subject matter (*Sache*) of phenomenology, or even of the rigorous and consequential interpretation of its leading maxim (*zu den Sachen selbst*).⁸ If the critique directed by Heidegger against Husserl can be regarded as radical, it is because, and only to the extent that, it is conducted in the name of phenomenology, in full recognition of the task which belongs to it and

in strict adherence to the maxim enunciated for the first time in the *Logical Investigations*.⁹ This is why, after reaching the extreme limit of each of his attempts at a critical dismantling, Heidegger could at the end always admit (this is a principle which still regulates the complex structure of paragraph 7 of *Being and Time*, including the final note): 'This obviously doesn't mean that we are not Husserl's disciples and intend to remain so.'¹⁰

If Husserl's phenomenology is not sufficiently radical, this is because it isn't sufficiently phenomenological, forgetful of its own guiding maxim for which Husserl from 1913 will substitute another principle, the 'principle of principles' (*Ideas*, §24), the 'principle of evidence'. With Husserl, phenomenology adopts intentionality as its special field of investigation, but without ever raising afresh the question of the being of intentionality. In fact, not only does Husserl's determination of consciousness as an absolute being in the sense of absolute givenness (*Ideas*, §§44–6) make it impossible to determine 'what being means here', what 'absolute being' means (*GA* 20, p. 140), it also entirely eliminates a question which, in truth, can no longer be posed once Husserl has aligned his phenomenological investigation with a preconceived idea, the modern (Cartesian) philosophical idea of an absolute science for which consciousness precisely constitutes the privileged object.

The fundamental question for Husserl is not at all that of the being character of consciousness. What is fundamental for him is rather this consideration, this question: how can consciousness in general become the object of an absolute science? What is fundamental and directive is the idea of an absolute science. This idea that consciousness has to be the region for an absolute science is not invented haphazardly. Rather, it is the idea which has preoccupied modern philosophy since Descartes.

Heidegger draws from this the decisive conclusion that, so far from being derived phenomenologically by way of a return to things themselves, the elaboration and the validation of pure consciousness as the thematic field for phenomenology remains the 'function of a traditional conception of philosophy' (*GA* 20, p. 147).

It is because it calls in question this subordination of phenomenology to the Cartesian idea of an absolute science – and therefore of a science of consciousness in its irrecusable self-presence – that Heidegger rejects the Husserlian interpretation of the reduction (*GA* 20, p. 151).¹¹ The critique here is founded on the fact that, in Heidegger's eyes, the Husserlian *epoché* 'deprives itself (methodologically) of the very basis upon which alone the question of the being of intentionality can be worked out'. The analytic of *Dasein* – as one knows – is precisely intended to

furnish such a basis. By defining being-there as being-in-the-world, it does in fact become possible to address the question of the being of intentionality.

If intentionality is to be questioned concerning its mode of being, it is necessary that the being which is intentional should be given in an original way, that is to say, experienced with regard to its way of being [*in seiner Weise zu sein*]. The original ontological relation to that being which is intentional first has to be mastered.

(GA 20, p. 152)

It is therefore on the basis of the Husserlian conception of phenomenology, while at the same time taking account of the fundamental omission from which it suffers in not elucidating in advance 'intentional behaviour and everything implied by it', that the question of being makes itself known phenomenologically as the question of the being of intentionality and the question of the meaning of being in general.

The question of being is not an arbitrary question. It is not a question which can simply be envisaged as one among other questions. Rather, it is the most urgent of all questions, and this in the full sense of phenomenology itself.

(GA 20, p. 158)

In the end, the only decisive reproach directed by Heidegger against Husserl is that of not having been sufficiently phenomenological and so, against the very principle of phenomenology, of having failed to work out the theme which legitimately belongs to it as its authentic point of departure: intentionality. 'Phenomenology – or so Heidegger would have it – is therefore with regard to the fundamental task of determining its own proper field of application, non-phenomenological, in other words, only pseudo-phenomenological!' (GA 20, p. 158).

The background constituted by the sustained debate with Husserl through the Marburg years makes it possible for us today to situate more exactly the phenomenological impact of *Being and Time*. If the fundamental phenomenological question – the one which draws all the consequences of the Husserlian enterprise or better of the 'breakthrough' represented by *Logical Investigations* – is that of knowing 'what being means', if it is a matter first of all of 'working out the "phenomenon of being" which precedes and so is determinative of the entire ontological enquiry',¹² there then arises the possibility of rereading the master work of 1927 from a phenomenological standpoint. How is it with this 'phenomenon "being"' (*dieses Phänomen "Sein"*)? Heidegger asked in 1925. What

is the phenomenality proper to being and how is being phenomenalized? Is this simply a way of talking, an approximate formula which has capitulated to the jargon characteristic of the phenomenological school? In *Being and Time* certainly, it is also a matter of the phenomenon of the world, of the phenomenon of anxiety, of care, etc.! But is it enough to underline the ambiguity, the equivocal character of the expression? Or does one, on the contrary, have to recognize the special right of being to be called 'phenomenon'? But then in what apparently peculiar sense should one understand the word 'phenomenon'?

With a view to trying to reply with some degree of precision to questions formulated all too abruptly, it would be appropriate to re-examine the way in which the being question is sketched out concretely in the introductory chapter of *Being and Time* and to follow, step by step, the movement through which the question is posed by attending to the formal parameters of the question and of its articulation.¹³ We will restrict ourselves here to an examination of Heidegger's overt expressions rather than steps actually taken, by limiting ourselves to the elaboration of the strictly phenomenological concept of the phenomenon.

How is the Heideggerian concept of the phenomenon to be distinguished from that of Husserl? Paragraph 7 of *Being and Time* is well known and has been only too amply commented on. We shall have to revert to it for a moment however because it is this paragraph, together with paragraph 9 of the *Prolegomena* (*Die Klärung des Namens 'Phänomenologie'*), which throws light upon the novelty and the scope of the Heideggerian interpretation of phenomenality, especially if one situates it in the context of the Introduction. Even if, or better, precisely because, in this paragraph, Heidegger first sets out phenomenology as a methodological concept, one has to guard against seeing in this text a development which is essentially methodological and susceptible of being separated without great loss from the development of the work as a whole.¹⁴ To be sure, the word 'phenomenology' should not be understood in the sense of such composite expressions as theology, ontology, sociology, etc., expressions characterizing the object of a particular field of research and which predetermine the content or the reality (*Sachhaltigkeit*) of a region or a domain of objects. Taken at this level of generality, as a science of phenomena, phenomenology could designate any scientific research, provided it is true that (relying upon the vulgar meaning of the concept of phenomenon) phenomenology can legitimately qualify 'any research which brings to light beings insofar as they make themselves manifest' (SZ, 35). What then distinguishes phenomenology 'as method' from the vulgar conception – and with a view precisely to applying a 'direct method of showing and validating' – is, first of all, the explicit thematization of its research, of its 'procedure'. But if one concentrates in this way upon the problematic 'formula' of its point of departure, its

development, its mode of access (*Ausgang, Durchgang, Zugang*), this is in fact always because the guiding question is the non-methodological question concerning phenomenality in general.

To be sure, in *Being and Time*, the analysis looks at first like a purely terminological analysis (cf. also *GA* 20, §9), in the sense that Heidegger interprets the very word phenomenology (which he analyses out into its constitutive elements). But this is only a first step which comes close to concealing the peculiar character of the movement of thought in this paragraph, which latter only emerges if one recalls that the word to be explained speaks Greek and that, before and above all else – the phenomenological circle if you want – it is a matter of learning how to listen to what is said with a Greek ear. A later remark by Heidegger is particularly clear on this score.

Direct experience with phenomenology acquired in the course of discussion with Husserl made it possible for the concept of phenomenology to be forged in the manner in which it makes itself known in the introduction to *Being and Time* (§7). Here the reference to the fundamental words of the Greek language, words which are interpreted in this context (λόγος = make manifest; φαίνεσθαι = show itself) played a determining role.

(*Qu IV*, p. 181)

In fact, listening to the Greek is already for Heidegger a matter of making a phenomenological commitment to the business of phenomenology. This is where we enter into the circle. The fundamental attitude, which is phenomenology, permits us to reconquer for the whole of philosophy a more original interpretation of the leading Greek words. Conversely, the more persistently we listen to what the Greek says, the more we are able to radicalize both the point of departure and the concept of phenomenology. At Cérisy, in 1955, Heidegger used these words to explain what might at first have passed for a rather scholarly linguistic analysis.

The Greek word only opens up a path in virtue of its being Greek. . . . In the case of the Greek language, what is said is, at the same time and in a special way, what that which is said calls by its name. . . . By means of the word, heard with a Greek ear, we are already directly in the presence of the thing itself, there before us.

(*Qu II*, p. 20)

What are the Greek words directly questioned and conjured up by Heidegger to elucidate 'phenomenologically' the very term

phenomenology? What is, in the final analysis, the function of the concept of ἀλήθεια?

The phenomenon of phenomenology can be elucidated in the first place on the basis of the Greek word φαίνόμενον, itself taken as a synonym for τὸ ὄν: what shows itself from itself, in itself, as itself. What shows: itself. This is certainly a formal determination but a decisive one all the same, since it is on the basis of this first sense of auto-manifestation that the other, in fact derivative, concepts of manifestation can be interpreted or reinterpreted. The return to the Greek, underscoring the opposition between φαίνόμενον and φαίνόμενον ἀγαθόν for example, allows, or indeed requires, that one make a first distinction between phenomenon and appearance (*Phänomen–Schein*). If phenomenon is in fact defined from the first as ‘that which shows itself from itself’, it is nevertheless necessary to recognize ‘this remarkable possibility that the entity shows itself precisely as that which it is not’ (GA 20, §9). What has to be noted here is that the appearance is itself what it is only in virtue of the fact that it is upheld by phenomenality, understood in the strict and primitive sense of auto-manifestation. ‘There is only as much appearance as there is being’, Heidegger notes.¹⁵ It is only because φαίνεσθαι means, in the first instance, *Sichzeigen* (self-showing) that, in the second instance it can also characterize something as passing for, seeming to be, looking like. . . . The contraposition of phenomenon and appearance is therefore intended in the first instance to bring out the original and fundamental sense of phenomenon: *das an ihm selbst offenbare Sein* – ‘being itself just as it is manifest in itself’.

This first distinction is certainly decisive but it remains insufficient and formal to the extent that it still leaves entirely open the question of the phenomenality proper to the phenomenon as such. This elementary proposition does however possess a second obvious merit. It makes it possible, or so it seems, to eviscerate as secondary such Kantian concepts as *Erscheinung* and *bloße Erscheinung*. *Erscheinung* – indicative phenomenon, appearance – in as much as, in announcing something it attests to something else which does not appear, assumes the form of a symptom, of an indication. The *Erscheinung*, qua appearance of – possesses a referential structure. *Anzeigen von etwas durch etwas anderes* – an indication of something which can only make itself known mediately by way of something else, a presentation which is both differed and destined to remain indirect. But even here *Erscheinung*, in the sense of an indicative phenomenon, is founded, in terms of its very possibility – at least if the indicative phenomenon is to make its appearance as such, that is, fulfil its mission, accomplish its indicative function – upon the phenomenon in the first and most fundamental sense.

It is therefore necessary to dismantle, to untie this indicative structure of *Erscheinung* (reference but also substitution, supplementation, rep-

resentation, if one wants to isolate the φαινόμενον (= τὸ ὄν) in its purity and its specificity.

In the lectures of Summer 1927 (*The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*), as in *Being and Time*, *Erscheinung* can always be interpreted in terms of the Kantian distinction between the 'phenomenon' and the 'thing in itself'. In this framework, which Heidegger hopes to dismiss definitively, phenomena would conceal as much as they would reveal something which, while remaining in the background, would be more 'stable', would contain more being without, for all that, the phenomena taken in themselves being reduced to nothing. Behind the phenomena there would always be something of which they would precisely be the phenomenal manifestations, in the sense of appearances or ap-pearances.

We can ignore here the supplementary distinctions introduced by Heidegger with a view to elucidating the ambiguity of the German word *Erscheinung* – in particular, the metaphysical distinction of *Erscheinung* (indicative phenomenon) and of *bloße Erscheinung* (pure appearance) – and so simply hold on to the basic opposition between the phenomenon (φαινόμενον, *Phänomenon*) and the appearance (*Erscheinung*). Phenomenon characterizes a special mode of presentation or of encountering something in as much as, *qua* phenomenon, the thing manifests itself in itself, manifests itself *in truth, just as it is*. When it is a matter of *Erscheinung*, on the other hand – of the appearance or the indicative phenomenon – we are always referred to something else, to a second reality which is no doubt announced, trans-appears or ap-appears, but which precisely never shows itself in itself.

Such an analysis – Heidegger lays particular stress on this – unfolds at first in a purely formal manner (formal rather than terminological). It tends to disengage the pure concept of the phenomenon while leaving the question of determining what is intended, *qua* phenomenon, entirely indeterminate. A being or a character of being? asks Heidegger. But before tackling this question, it is necessary to envisage different possible applications of the 'vulgar' concept of phenomenon and of the 'provisional' (or 'preliminary') (*Vorbegriff*) conception of phenomenology, such as is handed down to us in the obligatory, though mistaken, framework of a Kantian exemplification. This also means that such an exemplification is necessarily paradoxical (it would surely be possible to dispense with the thematic of *Erscheinung*, since it is understood in advance as secondary) and as such might well lead us astray.

Heidegger notes,

That which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the 'phenomenon', ordinarily understood, and as accompanying it in every case can, even though it thus shows itself unthematically, be brought

thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself in itself (the 'forms of intuition') will be the 'phenomena' of phenomenology.¹⁶

This first pre-determination must not be confused with the second, the true explanation (itself no doubt still ambiguous), of the phenomenon of phenomenology: what precisely does not show itself and which remains hidden, covered over, without ever entering in any way into the transitive structure of reference, of trans-lation or of trans-position. The being-concealed of the phenomenon of phenomenology – that which, in the first instance, and for the most part does not show itself, that which, with regard to what shows itself, remains in retreat, that which withholds itself – this in-apparent phenomenon, even if it can be apprehended in the Kantian framework as 'that which belongs essentially and simultaneously to what shows itself because it constitutes the meaning and the foundation of the latter' (SZ, 35 B), cannot be understood on the basis of the Kantian thing in itself, since the latter is 'essentially incapable of ever manifesting itself'. The non-manifestation of the thing in itself therefore possesses a structure which is radically different both from that of the phenomenon in the sense of the non-thematic, and from that of the properly phenomenological phenomenon, the phenomenon in retreat or covered over. 'The phenomenon' – Heidegger notes – 'as the indicative phenomenon of something, does not mean simply what manifests itself but the announcement of something which does not manifest itself by means of something which does manifest itself' (SZ, 36 A). If the showing of the phenomenon of phenomenology is not that of the Kantian *Erscheinung*, the remaining concealed or covered over proper to the phenomenon apprehended in its phenomenological concept (being or the being of beings),¹⁷ can no longer be identified with the non-manifestation of the thing in itself. What is it then which truly characterizes non-manifestation, in the phenomenological sense? What is the reason for its 'being-hidden'? Before returning to this important point, we shall have to follow Heidegger in his second approach to phenomenology by way of the key concept of the λόγος.

Here again – it has to be emphasized – the λόγος is itself interpreted 'phenomenologically' in its 'veritative' or 'demonstrative' dimension as what makes things or lets things be seen, as ἀποφάνσις. It belongs essentially to the λόγος, as Plato had established, to make manifest (δηλοῦν).¹⁸ The primordial function of the λόγος is de-monstrative or de-clarative, not in that it is effectively preferred but because it belongs to it constitutively to bring to light. It is *Aufweisung*. The λόγος shows, or better, shows what shows itself on the basis of itself and in itself. Why is it always necessary to show (and to show anew, as we shall see, over and over again) what precisely shows itself? To reply to this question

no doubt means being able to delimit (that is, trace the outlines but also mark the limits of) the Heideggerian interpretation of phenomenality at the time of *Being and Time*. Let us say, again quite crudely and provisionally, that what shows itself (the phenomenon) does in reality stand in need of that self-showing which is operative in the λόγος, to become entirely manifest, to be manifested. The ἀπόφανσις is precisely what renders manifest. It lets things be seen in as much as it brings to light (*aufweisendes Sehenlassen*). The proper task of the λόγος is ἀληθεύειν. To show itself, to articulate itself constitutes one of the privileged figures of ἀληθεύειν¹⁹ in the sense of discovering, withdrawing from its retreat, letting the being in question be seen as ἀλήθες (dis-interred, dis-closed). Such is, for Heidegger, the basic apophantic feature of the λόγος, the one which makes διαίρεσις possible, just as it does the σύνθεσις.

It is because the function of the λόγος as ἀπόφανσις consists in letting be seen what brings to light that the λόγος, is able to assume the structural form of the σύνθεσις. . . . The σύν possesses here a purely apophantic signification and means: letting something be seen, in its being together, as something.²⁰

The truth of the λόγος as speech, discourse, judgment always refers to a being-true or confirmation which belongs originally to the λόγος, even though the latter arises in its turn from ἀληθεύειν, which consequently assumes the form of making/letting be seen, discovering as uncovering (ἀλήθες) the being in question by letting it show itself from itself. To the extent that it dis-covers, brings to light, it can happen that the λόγος deceives or misleads in the sense of covering up. 'To place something in front of something else and so let it be seen and in this way to pass off the thing covered over as something which it is not [*Schein*].'²¹ This is the double play *Phänomenon*–*Schein* which makes discourse possible as true or false, on the assumption that *Schein*, even if it stands opposed here to the phenomenon, nevertheless only constitutes a degraded form of the latter.²²

The λόγος brought back in this way to ἀληθεύειν, apprehended in all its fullness and in accordance with its multiple guises, ceases to appear as the privileged and primordial locus of the truth, but presupposes, in virtue of its being the λόγος, a more original mode of dis-covering, that of touching/seeing, pure and simple, of naming. θίγειν καί φάναι;²³ αἰσθησις as a direct grasp of the ἰδέα, the νόησις understood as an immediate apprehension of the ἅπλα, are always dis-covering, always true.²⁴ It's the συμπλοκή, the σύν of the λόγος as λέγειν τι κατὰ τινος, letting something be seen as this or that, which opens up a space for the *Schein*, that of a giving itself out as – presenting itself as.

The 'terminological' elucidation of phenomenology, whether it takes

its cue from the φαινόμενον or the λόγος, indicates, in every instance, that the λόγος constitutes the decisive background for phenomenality in general, provided only that it always ends up by working out one and the same formal concept of the phenomenon along convergent lines and so furnishes a first, and equally, formal determination of phenomenology (λέγειν τὰ φαινόμενα = ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα).

As we have seen on the occasion of our distinction of the phenomenon and *Erscheinung*, there is nothing behind the phenomena. There is no other side to the phenomena. They don't conceal or hide anything. One could therefore never go behind the phenomena to find . . . what? Indeed it belongs to the very essence of the phenomenon to show and to show itself, to give and to give itself in itself.²⁵ The first move designed to recover the phenomenological acceptance of the phenomenon is a flattening move. The phenomenon is always one-dimensional.

But if the phenomenon is self-giving and, by virtue of that very fact, gives the thing itself – just as it is – it can however be that the phenomenon does not give itself or show itself. It can happen that what of its own accord should be brought to light remains hidden.

What is in itself visible and which ought to be luminous can very well remain hidden [*verdeckt*]. What in itself is visible and which is only accessible *qua* phenomenon in conformity with its meaning does not necessarily have to be accessible in fact. That which, in accordance with its possibility, is phenomenal, may precisely not have been given as phenomenon, but has yet to be given as such.

That which, in itself and in principle is *given* has yet to give itself. One has to give oneself phenomena, that is, what gives and gives itself! Why and how is one to give oneself what gives itself? Precisely because what is given does not give itself in the first instance and frequently not at all. This – the gift or the presence of the thing – remains in retreat, in the background, concealed.

One might well ask what, upon the plane of phenomenality, founds such a reticence, such a holding back or reserve? One has to admit, I think, that *Being and Time* does not throw much light on this point. The tendency toward recuperation, the tendency which is in question here, arises entirely out of the *Dasein* to which it is attributed straight off. This tendency responds in turn to the ontological constitution of being-there, to whom the characteristic of falling (*Verfallen*) belongs essentially. It's the mode of being of *Dasein* which explains why what gives itself is in reality always already covered over and in such a way that any letting/making itself be seen, if it is to be 'carried through methodically', will

always assume the form of a destruction or better of a deconstruction in the strict sense of that word (*Abbauen der Verdeckung*).

So one has to complete the first formal determination of the phenomenon and its phenomenality (the phenomenon is what, of itself, manifests itself in itself) with this other not less decisive thesis: being covered over, dissimulation is the *Gegenbegriff zu Phänomenon*²⁶ – not just simply the contrary of the phenomenon, its contradictory, but rather the counter-concept of the phenomenon and in this sense its complementary concept, the one which corresponds to it exactly as its *vis à vis*. But whatever can be a phenomenon is in the first instance and most frequently hidden and covered over. This covering over (*Verdeckung*) is itself capable of taking many forms, from dissimulation or masking (*Verstellung*) through internment, veiling (*Verschüttung*), to complete obliteration and forgetfulness.

If the possibility, even the threat, of covering over, belongs essentially to the very structure of phenomenality, it is because 'phenomena which have originally been perceived are later uprooted, torn away from what constitutes their ground'. Detached, expropriated in this way they 'remain unintelligible with regard to their true source'.²⁷ The phenomenon is naturally exposed to loss, to an obfuscation which enters into its transmission and becomes its tradition. This threat weighs permanently upon every phenomenon as such.

The covering-up itself, whether in the sense of hiddenness, burying, or dissimulation, has in turn two possibilities. There are coverings-over which are accidental; there are also some which are necessary, grounded in what the things so discovered consist in. Whenever a phenomenological concept is drawn from primordial sources there is a possibility that it may degenerate if communicated in the form of an assertion. It gets understood in an empty way and is thus passed on, losing its indigenous character and becoming a free-floating thesis.²⁸

But if it is both possible and legitimate to distinguish between coverings-over which are accidental and coverings-over which are necessary, still it has to be conceded that the covering-over which permanently threatens the phenomenon in the originality of its showing is necessary. No phenomenon can show itself once and for all. Consequently, what shows itself must always show itself anew (on the basis of its offering source, of the *Sache selbst*). Covering-over is so far unavoidable that it is 'given with the mode of being of uncovering, and of its possibility'.²⁹ Hence the essential fragility of the phenomenon, tied as it is to its obliteration, to its inevitable obfuscation. For us, the originality of the phenomenon has therefore to be continually recuperated against its almost necessary degradation or degeneration, since it is only the shadow thrown by

Verfallen, which latter features as a trait constitutive of our mode of being.

This implies naturally that the 'specific confrontation with the mode of the phenomenon has to be obtained in the first instance for all objects of phenomenological research'.³⁰ Since the phenomenon is never given nor secured in its phenomenality, the latter has always to be painfully reconquered, withdrawn from a multi-form covering-over. Here again, it is the peculiar structure of phenomenality which explains the necessarily methodical character of phenomenology. Things themselves are not given; still less are they given immediately in intuition, made available to a 'pure and simple' seeing. The phenomena have to be liberated. They can only be disengaged at the end of a development which seeks precisely to undo the dissimulations and disguises.

Zu den Sachen selbst – on the way to the phenomena and to the phenomenon κατ' ἐξοχήν, the phenomenon 'being'!

On the assumption that this general response to the question of the Heideggerian determination of the phenomenon has been admitted in principle, one can still ask why, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger develops a 'preliminary conception' or a 'provisional' concept of phenomenology, itself characterized as 'universal ontology'. Does Heidegger stick to this preliminary conception? What would a 'definitive' conception of phenomenology be like?

It should be noted first of all that neither in the *Prolegomena*, whose introductory section nevertheless establishes the context for the most sustained debate with Husserlian phenomenology, nor in the lecture course of the Summer term 1927 (*Basic Problems of Phenomenology*) does one find this distinction between the preliminary conception and the idea of phenomenology – even if in the latter an exposition of the idea of phenomenology is announced – though without ever being carried through. Why this distinction in *Being and Time*? The first reply which occurs to us is the one which Heidegger presents at paragraph 69. The complete exposition of the idea could not take place until 'the central problematic' of being and of truth had been brought to light, that is, until the close connection between being and truth had been explained and the existential concept of science had been developed. Phenomenology was in fact initially defined as the method of ontology, that is to say, of *scientific philosophy*.

Let us elaborate a little to confirm that this idea of a 'scientific philosophy' – phenomenology is scientific philosophy, science *par excellence* – must naturally not be allowed to conceal the opposition in principle between phenomenology, on the one hand, and the totality of the 'positive' sciences, on the other, that is to say, of all those bodies of research which bear upon an entity or a region of being which has already been

determined, brought to light. In his Tübingen lecture (1929), 'Phänomenologie und Theologie', Heidegger works out this radical difference between the positive sciences which are ontic in character and a phenomenological enquiry which is ontological and does so by way of a conceptual apparatus which is precisely phenomenological and close to that of Husserl. A phenomenological enquiry is required first of all to provide its own theme (the phenomenon, i.e., the phenomenon 'being').

The idea of science in general, to the extent that it is conceived as a possibility of being-there, shows that there are necessarily two kinds of science which are possible in principle: science of beings, ontic sciences – and the science of being, ontological science, philosophy. The ontic sciences each assume as their theme a given entity which is always disclosed, in a certain way before the disclosure effected by the science. We shall call the positive sciences the sciences of a given entity, of a *positum*. It is characteristic of such sciences that the objectification which they assume as their theme goes straight to the entity, by prolonging the pre-scientific attitude which already exists towards this entity. The science of being, on the other hand, ontology, calls for a fundamental conversion of attitude toward the entity in question. From the entity, the attitude shifts to the being of the entity. Nevertheless, the entity still remains the object of attention despite the change in attitude.³¹

Having finished with this point, let us return to paragraph 69. One can now understand why the finished conception of phenomenology can only be presented at the end, in the form of an idea, when the meaning of being and of truth have been explicitly developed, when the truth of being has been exhibited. If it is the case that phenomenology furnishes the method which responds to what is required (the question of the meaning of being, the question of the truth of being), one understands that the provisional concept cannot and should not give way to the idea until its own characteristic phenomenon has been disengaged. One can also explain in a very (too?) general way the claim to the necessity of a recuperation of the provisional concept by the idea, by underlining what, in the movement of *Being and Time* (what therefore also belongs to the internal logic of the enterprise which unfolds therein), is propaedeutical, preparatory or precursory. At paragraph 5 ('The ontological analytic of *Dasein* as the laying bare of the horizon for an interpretation of the meaning of Being in general'), Heidegger indicates for example that if 'an analytic of *Dasein* remains the first requirement in the question of being' and if therefore the analytic, so conceived, is 'entirely oriented towards the guiding task of working out the question of being', this analytic in its turn is not only

incomplete, it is also, in the first instance provisional [*vorläufig*]. It merely brings out the being of this entity, without interpreting its meaning. It is rather a preparatory procedure by which the horizon for the most primordial way of interpreting being may be laid bare.

Once this interpretation has been carried through or, more cautiously, once this horizon has been disengaged, this 'preparatory analytic of *Dasein* will have to be repeated on a higher and more authentically ontological basis'.³²

But this reply is undoubtedly too general and, as such, remains insufficient. In order to show this, the question at issue here will have to be reformulated in a more topical fashion. If it is important to represent the provisional concept of phenomenology as a methodological concept in its role as a guiding idea, is this not because the phenomenological characterizes, in the first instance and before all else, the initial step, the first move, the bias or the detour which aims at opening up an access to being in general and, quite specifically (reading the meaning of being off an exemplary being)³³ by way of the analytic of *Dasein*?³⁴

At this point we would like to venture the following hypothesis: the phenomenological method is indeed called for by the matter in hand (SZ 37 D, 38 C), in as much as the latter consists first of all – should it be added, in connection with *Being and Time* alone? – in bringing to light that comprehension of being which belongs constitutionally to *Dasein*, even if only initially in a pre-ontological mode. It is because the question concerning the meaning of being (what is at issue in this question, what it hopes to attain – *das Erfragte*) can only be posed concretely by way of the analytic of *Dasein* – *qua* fundamental ontology – that the phenomenological method becomes critical from the first to any ontological enquiry designed to save the question of being from forgetfulness.

This point emerges clearly, or so it seems, in the following passage from the *Prolegomena* where Heidegger does not hesitate to call the analytic which bears upon that entity which enjoys a privileged status in any ontological enquiry, for any elucidation of the phenomenon 'being', a phenomenology of *Dasein*, not only because it is this entity which poses the question of being which already understands being, but also because it *is* itself this very question, or better still, this questioning (*das Fragen*).

Working out the question of the meaning of being signifies: laying bare [*freilegen*] the one who questions in its capacity as a being, that is to say, *Dasein* itself. For only in this way can that which is sought be investigated in conformity with its own meaning. The one who questions is here co-affected by what the question itself has in mind [*das Erfragte*]. It belongs to the very meaning of the question of being

itself that the being who questions should be affected by what the question aims at. It is in the light of this meaning that it becomes appropriate to take account of the principle of phenomenology, at least if the question of being is going to be posed clearly. The one who questions is expressly given at the same time as the question but in such a way that at the same time and before all else he loses sight of himself in the dynamic of the questioning process. What we are going to try to do here is not to lose sight of this being, not to lose sight of it in the very perspective of [*im Hinblick auf*] the question of being itself. Thus the effective working out of the problematic is a *phenomenology of being-there*. For this very reason there can never be a definitive answer, or the answer can only be hypothetical [*Forschungsantwort*], in as much as the working out of the question concerns the being which includes within itself a *comprehension of being*. *Dasein* is not just the decisive issue from an *ontic* standpoint; it is so from an *ontological* standpoint also, at least for those of us *who are phenomenologists*.³⁵

Thus, this ontological privilege of *Dasein* becomes apparent from a phenomenological standpoint. And if the phenomenological method is to be recommended, it is in the first instance because it corresponds to the demand for a way of acceding to the being of this being which we are ourselves, and because it brings into play that kind of demonstration required by the manner in which this being comes to confront itself.

How does this being – both the closest and the farthest (SZ, 15–16; GA 20, pp. 201–2) – come to confront itself? How is it given to itself? How must it be brought to light phenomenologically with a view to a thematization of the phenomenon ‘being’? The quite specific difficulties which the elucidation of this being (the one who questions) with regard to its being – and in particular its susceptibility to falling – runs up against lie at the root of the application of a phenomenological method (in that formal sense to which reference has been made).

One could then go so far as to say that ontology is only phenomenological to the extent that it is a phenomenology and/or a ‘metaphysics of *Dasein*’.³⁶ The expression *Phänomenologie des Dasein*, an expression that can be found in the *Prolegomena*, has therefore to be strictly understood. It is because it focuses first of all upon *Dasein* and its disclosiveness (*Erschlossenheit*), upon its existence, that the enterprise has to be undertaken in a phenomenological fashion. It is therefore the ontico-ontological ‘primacy’ of *Dasein*, the necessity of an interminable ‘detour’ by way of the existential analytic, which calls for a phenomenological method in the very first instance.

Such a hypothesis immediately encounters a series of massive objections which we cannot, nor do we wish to, overlook. In the

'methodological' paragraph of *Being and Time*, Heidegger characterizes the phenomenon of phenomenology as the phenomenon of being (SZ, 35 C, 35 D, 37 D). Heidegger defines his research, fundamental ontology, as 'universal phenomenological ontology' (SZ, 38 C). He explicitly characterizes phenomenology as the science of being (GA 24, §23). Finally and most important of all, he only introduces the phenomenological method 'formally' with a view to bringing to light what has to constitute its proper subject matter intrinsically (i.e., with regard to its 'actual content' – *Sachhaltigkeit*), namely, the interpretation of the meaning of being. Being therefore becomes in a sense the 'cause', the 'matter' of phenomenology, but only to the extent that it is, in a more original sense, the matter of thinking – *Sache des Denkens*.

Before attempting to reply to these textual objections, objections whose legitimacy certainly cannot be ignored, we would like to follow up the hypothesis for a moment, with a view to bringing out its heuristic value. To insist upon what in *Being and Time* determines, or pre-determines, phenomenology to be a phenomenology of *Dasein* is also to confirm – this point, though familiar, is vital – the inextricable connection, more, the interconnection or the intimate belonging together of the question of the meaning of being and the question of the being of *Dasein* as *Da-sein* (being-there, or *die Lichtungsein*, as Heidegger will call it later).³⁷ It is to weld solidly – and this juncture remains critical to this very day – being and the understanding of being. Being is given – if it is given – as an understanding of being. Independently of this understanding, being is nothing.³⁸

To be sure, what has fallen into forgetfulness is the question concerning being. What has to be considered and worked out with the aid of a complex intellectual apparatus, is the question of the meaning of being. It is nevertheless true that in the perspective of *Being and Time* – the working out of the project if not the project itself – the phenomenological uncovering which is at work has as its initial object *Dasein*, the prior understanding of *Dasein* and of its everyday way of being. It is because, in the first instance and for the most part, *Dasein* is not given that it becomes important to open up an access to the being of *Dasein* and to the meaning of this being.

One of the fundamental features of *being-there* is that 'ontologically the closest and best known'; it is 'ontologically what is farthest and least known' (SZ, 15 C, 43 D, 311 B). In other words, it is that whose 'pre-givenness' (*Vorgabe*) can so little be taken for granted that 'its determination constitutes an essential part of the analytic of this being' (43 B). Far from being immediately evident, the 'right pre-givenness' has to be methodologically mastered by way of a development, a procedure which is as certain as possible about its point of departure and its rite of passage. The existential analytic therefore necessarily possesses

a methodological character (§63), given the formal structure of the *Seinsfrage*, but also the mode of presentation or of de-presentation of this peculiar being. 'The liberation of the originary being of *Dasein* has to be fought for against the tendencies of the prevailing interpretation which is onto-ontologically defunct' (311 B).³⁹ On the contrary, Heidegger continues,

the mode of being of *Dasein* requires of an ontological interpretation which aims at the originality of a phenomenal demonstration that it wrest the being of this being against its own tendency toward a covering-over of its being. . . . Consequently, the existential analytic constantly assumes a violent character.

(ibid.)

What are the consequences of this pre-determination of phenomenology (as a phenomenology of *Dasein*) with regard to the problematic of truth in *Being and Time*?

If paragraph 7 of *Being and Time* ends up (programmatically) with the elucidation of the phenomenon of being, one might hold that paragraph 44, which closes the first section, responds to it and contributes no less decisively to the elaboration of the concept of phenomenology. Not only because the analysis of the λόγος is taken up again and developed but also, and above all, because the bringing to light of the phenomenon of truth (through which the 'originary', or 'the most originary' phenomenon of truth is pursued) contributes in a decisive way to define the subject matter (*sachlich*, *sachhaltig*) of phenomenology.⁴⁰ As Heidegger emphasizes, this paragraph, designed to work out the central problematic of truth, or better, of the essential connection being-truth, does not limit itself to concluding and so closing the first section but gives the research a 'new departure', a second wind (214 A).

If it is true, as J. Beaufret said in 1927 and throughout the later work of Heidegger, everything turns on ἀλήθεια, how exactly is the phenomenon of truth presented in the economy of *Being and Time* and of paragraph 44? The phenomenon of truth is already announced in the context of the preparatory analytic which is the existential analytic of the being of *Dasein*, that is, if, with Heidegger (and the classical problematic of the transcendentals), we recognize that being goes necessarily together with the truth. One must however emphasize that in paragraph 44 the question of the connection of being and truth is only taken up under the much more determinate auspices of the 'originary link' *being-there-truth*. This is moreover confirmed in turn by paragraph 69, in which Heidegger announces the work still to be accomplished with regard to the central question of the belonging together of being and truth. How far therefore should we follow Heidegger when he presents this paragraph 44

as a 'new departure' (214 A) in the general problematic of the *Seinsfrage*? Let us recall schematically the main steps in the movement of paragraph 44: the destruction of the traditional concept of truth, designed to recuperate a more original concept of being-true; the elucidation of the ontological sense of the expression 'there is truth' and of the necessary presupposition that there is truth. To understand the move Heidegger makes in this paragraph and to appreciate what is really at stake, it is important, in our opinion, to stress the examination of the traditional doctrine of truth. This examination culminates in the discussion of the Husserlian problematic (6th *Investigation*, §§36–9) of the verification of a proposition. The identification which lies at the root of the verification of the proposition relates to the fact that 'the being intended shows itself just as it is in itself; in other words, in this that it is dis-covered to be identically the same as it is posited in the proposition'.⁴¹ This confirmation (*Bewahrung*) means in turn 'the manifestation of the being in its identity',⁴² wherein we find once again the formal determination of the phenomenon as φαινόμενον. The proposition ἀποφαίνεσθαι is true (i.e., verified) to the extent that it is apophantical, that is, that it dis-covers, declares the being itself. It lets the being be discovered precisely in its being-discovered. The truth of the proposition is therefore in the first instance that of ἀληθεύειν in the guise of ἀποφαίνεσθαι: letting it be seen, by disengaging it from its being covered over, the being in its withdrawal from retreat (being dis-covered). But the ἀποφαίνεσθαι of the λόγος ἀποφάντικος only constitutes one of the guises of ἀληθεύειν. Being-discovering through speech is a way of being of *Dasein*. But the possibility of the discovery of intramundane reality is itself originally founded in an exchange with those beings which are available (at hand) and the opening up of the world which goes along with the revelation (*Erschlossenheit*) of *Dasein*. With this openness of *Dasein* the most original phenomenon of the truth is attained. *Erschlossenheit* (opening, openness) names this fundamental modality of *Dasein* in accordance with which it is its there.⁴³

The 'aletheiological' teaching of *Being and Time*, in so far as it is presented in this paragraph, can be expounded in three theses. The first thesis: '*Dasein* is in the truth.' Again, and even more explicitly, 'Inasmuch as being-there is essentially uncovering, and inasmuch as, uncovering, it un-covers and dis-covers, it is essentially "true"'. But, for being-there, being in the truth also and especially means being 'in the truth of existence'. This last proposition recapitulates the following points made previously: if *Dasein* is its openness, if *Erschlossenheit* belongs to it constitutionally, the latter is always the openness of *Dasein* in its being-thrown (*Geworfenheit*). Which comes down to saying that openness is necessarily 'factual'. Facticity and being-thrown are therefore in the background of that project by means of which *Dasein*, open to the

potentiality for being (possibilities) and to its own potentiality for being – if it is true that the project is always projective opening – decides and decides for itself. Being in the truth is therewith exposed from the first to the alternative of authenticity and inauthenticity. In authentic opening, ‘*Dasein* can be open to itself in and as its ownmost potentiality for being’. And it is precisely this authentic openness which ‘the most originary phenomenon of truth makes manifest in the mode of authenticity’.⁴⁴

A second thesis is therefore immediately called for: being-there is in un-truth, from the moment that falling belongs to its ontological constitution. ‘The ontological constitution of *Dasein* is characterized by falling. From the very first, and for the most part, being-there is lost in its “world”.’ Caught up with intramundane beings, being-there allows itself, literally, to be taken. Heidegger continues:

Understanding, as a projection upon possibilities of being, has diverted itself thither. Its absorption in the ‘They’ signifies that it is dominated by the way things are publicly interpreted. That which has been uncovered and disclosed stands in a mode in which it has been disguised and closed off by idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. Being towards entities has not been extinguished but it has been uprooted. Entities have not been completely hidden; they are precisely the sort of thing that has been uncovered, but at the same time they have been disguised. They show themselves, but in the mode of semblance.⁴⁵

The dissimulation in question here, and which arises from inauthentic existence, which is itself certainly covering, runs the risk of being substituted for re-covering (*Verdecktheit*), defined in the first instance as the ‘counter-concept’ (*Gegenbegriff*) of the phenomenon. So one can very well ask whether the analysis of inauthentic existence does not constitute an *impasse* for a thinking which wants to be more attentive to both the reality and the status of the appearance.⁴⁶

In *Being and Time* in any case, it is as a function of its ontological constitution, characterized by openness but also as being-projected, project, falling, that one can understand why being-there, to the extent that it is from the first in the truth or in un-truth, always has to appropriate over again and ‘against appearance and dissimulation’ that very thing which has already been concealed in advance.

The facticity of being-there, to which closedness and re-covery are attached, comes to the fore in this way. If the truth has to be ‘wrested from being’, ‘torn away from its retreat’, if ‘factual dis-covery is in every instance, so to speak, a “seizure”’, this is because the phenomenon of truth is veiled from the first. Falling dissimulates the phenomenon as such in the appearance. This is also why the mode of being of openness is always thematized in accordance with one of its secondary

modifications which then takes the lead over all the others, the proposition and its apophantical 'as'. In this way truth is determined on the basis of, and in opposition to, the re-covering attributable to 'fallen' *Dasein*. At the time of *Being and Time*, Heidegger thought he could even find a confirmation of this analysis in the privative expression of the 'truth' with the Greeks. By way of the term ἀλήθεια, what makes itself known is 'the pre-ontological comprehension that being in un-truth constitutes an essential determination of being-in-the-world'.⁴⁷

To claim that *Dasein* is equi-primordially both in the truth and un-truth, is to affirm, in addition (the third thesis), that the truth must be counted among the *existentia*. It is in fact always 'made to *Dasein*'s measure' (*daseinsmässig*), and despite the fact that it is dis-covering/re-covering.

The connection between being and the truth, towards which the entire undertaking in *Being and Time* is directed, can only emerge if one has first established the necessary reference of the truth to being-there. In the same way that being refers to something like an understanding of being, the truth is always relative to a stance, an attitude or a decision on the part of being-there. This is why Heidegger can uphold the parallel thesis that 'there is truth only to the extent that and as long as being-there exists' and 'there is being – not beings – only as long as there is truth'. Being and truth, if they exist at all, are 'equi-primordial'.⁴⁸ In reality, and Heidegger makes a great deal out of this from 1927 on, neither being nor truth exist. There is being and truth, or again, being and truth take place. But if one tries to clarify this taking place in the retrospective light of the problematic of the topology of being, one has to appreciate that its proper locus is being-there itself rather than *Lichtung*, a being-there which is permanently confronted with the alternative of authenticity and inauthenticity.

Why, one might ask, does Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, stick to the preliminary conception of phenomenology without ever managing to expound his idea? To such a question one is tempted to reply, in retrospect of course, in the following manner: if, in *Being and Time*, phenomenology does not arrive at its idea, it is perhaps because it is developed under the auspices of a phenomenology of *Dasein*, as a result of which it falls short in a certain fashion of its central theme, the phenomenon 'being'.

Is it because the work remains unfinished, dedicated in essence to the preparatory analytic of being-there, to the elucidation of its meaning of being, and only in this way to the foundation of the *Seinsfrage* in the name of fundamental ontology? No doubt; but the question still stands whether this abbreviation, this way of proceeding, was designed to prepare the way concretely for the reversal (implied by the second point of

departure in paragraph 44), the turn that the third section of the first part was supposed to effect.

In other words, and giving the issue a polemical twist into the bargain, one might ask whether the later remark by Heidegger on the subject of the analysis of the surrounding-world and of the everydayness of the world – to wit, that it certainly constitutes an ‘essential discovery’, but that it only retains a ‘subordinate signification’ to the extent that it only represents a ‘concrete way of approaching the project . . . which, as such, does not entail an analysis of this kind except as a means which is itself secondary with regard to the project’,⁴⁹ – one might well ask whether such a remark could not be applied to numerous concrete analyses undertaken in *Being and Time*, including the analysis of the ‘phenomenon of truth’.

To be sure, Heidegger himself never says anything of this kind. On the contrary, he is inclined to suggest the contrary, as witness for example this indication from his UNESCO lecture: ‘In what way the attempt to think a given state of affairs can sometimes go astray and deviate from what has already been incontrovertibly demonstrated is attested here by the following text from *Being and Time* (SZ, p. 219): “the translation [of the term ἀλήθεια] by the term ‘truth’, and in particular the conceptual and theoretical definitions which go along with it, recover the sense of what the Greeks considered as taken for granted in their terminological employment of ‘ἀλήθεια’” (Qu IV, p. 134 n.).’ But what had already been demonstrated? To stick to the texts, nothing other than the elucidation of the essential connection between being and truth on the basis of the truth of existence. If, in a certain fashion, *Being and Time* misses the phenomenon of being, this is also because it misses the phenomenon of truth. It is, as we have seen, being covered over (*Verdecktheit*), itself interpreted in the framework of the thematic of *Verfallen*, which is held responsible for determining the counter-concept of the phenomenon.

If then, from the standpoint of its guiding idea, phenomenology, in Heidegger’s sense, is not to be distinguished from *aletheiology*, one has to push things as far as doubting whether *Being and Time* is still sufficiently phenomenological because it does not confront the question of ἀλήθεια – understood in such a way that λήθη makes up its root meaning. If *Being and Time* brings ἀλήθεια to light by defining the openness (*Erschlossenheit*) of being-there or better still by defining being-there by means of this openness as the one who is its ‘There’, then truth thereby becomes an *existentialia*. It is in fact being in the world, as Heidegger emphasizes, which constitutes ‘the foundation [*Fundament*] of the original phenomenon of truth’.

To work out the idea of phenomenology would then perhaps amount to deepening the phenomenon of truth, or again, thinking what the essay ‘On the essence of truth’ called the ‘non-essence’ [*Unwesen*] of the truth’,

thinking to the end the forgetfulness of being (of which it would no longer be possible to say that it represents the fundamental experience of *Being and Time*), thinking being in its withdrawal, its suspension, its reserve, its epoch, its absence.

If, in 1927, Heidegger still falls short of the 'phenomenon of being', this is no doubt because he has not yet taken account of the peculiarity of this strange phenomenon which precisely does not manifest itself. Being remains in retreat, hidden, missing. Being is missing and not accounted for. It has fallen into forgetfulness. If this was indeed the fundamental experience of *Being and Time*, one would still have to insist that Heidegger's entire enterprise was aimed at drawing being out of this forgetfulness, tearing it away from its retreat, by undoing whatever might have contributed to the obfuscation, the dissimulation of its phenomenality.

In fact, it is not until much later, at the end of what might be characterized in a sense as a total reversal, a *Kehre*, that Heidegger ventures to think that if being remains in retreat, if it is missing, this deficiency could well be due to being itself.⁵⁰ Being withdraws certainly, but such a withdrawal is precisely the withdrawal of *being*.⁵¹ It belongs to the phenomenality of being to withdraw.⁵² What is truly 'epochal' is phenomenality itself.⁵³

The phenomenological enterprise has to be radically modified. In fact, if 'concealing itself belongs to the predilection of being, that is to say, to that in which its essence is founded',⁵⁴ it could no longer be a matter of bringing to light what remained concealed, of remorselessly wresting from its retreat what, from the first, had already slipped away. In *Being and Time*, after having examined a constitutive feature of the being of *Dasein* (falling) and shown how, by 'persisting', man devotes himself to what is immediately accessible every day, to what is 'practical' and so finds himself cast adrift by virtue of his anxious agitation,⁵⁵ Heidegger was still able to appeal to a resolute conversion or better, to a resolute commitment to resoluteness, to the release of *Dasein* for its ownmost being in order that what thus remained in retreat, forgotten, should be brought to the light of presence. Such a step, directed toward a 'conversion', a transition from inauthenticity to authenticity based upon a strict correlation of *Erschlossenheit* and *Entschlossenheit*,⁵⁶ is thenceforward radically insufficient from the standpoint of rigorously thinking through the phenomenon of being as *Ausbleiben des Seins* – absence, the deficiency of being itself as being itself. While offering a commentary of Heraclitus' fragment 123, Heidegger deliberately emphasizes that 'it is not a matter of overcoming the κρύπτεσθαι of the φύσις and of getting rid of it'. The task is a different one, and 'much more difficult'. It consists in 'conferring upon the φύσις, in all the purity of its being, the κρύπτεσθαι which belongs to it'.⁵⁷

To respond to, without obfuscating, the withdrawal of being, which is being itself as secretive or enigmatic, this is the task which weighs upon any phenomenology for which the *Schritt zurück* constitutes the first step or, if you will, the ultimate metamorphosis of the reduction.

It is certainly tempting to interpret Heidegger's path of thinking as this procedure which, oriented from the very beginning toward the phenomenon of being, will lead from a phenomenology of *Dasein* to a resolutely aletheiological phenomenology, which will really be *aphanology* or, as Heidegger says himself a 'phenomenology of the non-apparent'.⁵⁸ However, in order that this expression should not remain a simple formula, it is necessary to show concretely how the mediation of the clearing, of the gift or of *Ereignis* remains authentically phenomenological, to show how the characterization of the phenomenological aspect of Greek thinking, as its fundamental aspect, does not presuppose an improper generalization of the concept or the pure and simple ambiguity of the concept.

Then, but only then, Heidegger's movement of thought can effectively appear as a *Weg in die Phänomenologie*.

Translated by Christopher Macann

Notes

1 Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* (GA) 20, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (Frankfurt, 1979).

2 'Mon chemin de pensée et la phénoménologie', *Questions IV (Qu IV)* (Paris, 1976), p. 169.

3 GA 9, p. 375. We cite here Jean Beaufret's free transposition. Heidegger wrote: 'wenn der Mensch nicht schon in der Inständigkeit sein Wesen hätte'. This 'instance' was explained a few lines further up as 'das offenstehende Innestehen in der Unverborgenheit des Seins'.

4 Cf. already in the Summer term 1925, GA 20, pp. 123ff.

5 Cf. G. Granel, *Traditionis traditio* (Paris, 1972), p. 116, n. 1.

6 GA 20, §§12–13.

7 GA 20, pp. 179–80.

8 Cf. in particular 'La fin de la philosophie et la tâche de la pensée', in *Qu IV*, pp. 121ff.

9 *Logische Untersuchungen II*, 1, 6.

10 GA 32, *Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes*, S. 40.

11 Cf. J.-F. Courtine, 'L'idée de la phénoménologie et la problématique de la réduction', in *idem* (ed.), *Phénoménologie et métaphysique*, pp. 159–209, esp. p. 166.

12 GA 20, p. 423. Cf. also the commentary by Marion, 'L'étant et le phénomène de la réduction', in *Phénoménologie et métaphysique*, ed. J. L. Marion and G. Planty-Bonjour (Paris, 1984), pp. 211–45.

13 GA 20, p. 197: 'Das formale Gerüst der Frage.'

14 Cf. J.-F. Courtine, 'La cause de la phénoménologie', in *Exercices de la patience*, 3/4 (1982), pp. 65–83.

15 GA 20, p. 119: 'wieviel Schein, soviel Sein.' Cf. also SZ, 36 C.

16 SZ, 31 C.

17 SZ, 31 B.

18 GA 21, *Logik, die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, p. 133, p. 142, GA 26, p. 181.

19 Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 3. Heidegger comments on this passage at the beginning of his Winter 1924–5 lecture course, *Platon: Sophistes*.

20 SZ, 33 B; cf. also GA 21, §§12–13.

21 SZ, 33 C; cf. GA 21, p. 162.

22 One might well ask here whether it is not precisely the inadequacy with which the concept of appearance (*Schein*) is worked out which marks the limits of the problematic of truth in *Being and Time*. It is not until 1935, in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*, and in connection with a reflection on *Oedipus-Rex*, that the ontological truth of *Schein* is plainly recognized.

23 Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, § 10, 1051b 24. Cf. Heidegger, GA 21, *Logik*, pp. 180–1, and esp. GA 31, *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*, §9.

24 GA 31, pp. 99–106.

25 GA 20, p. 118:

Es ist phänomenologisch widersinnig, vom Phänomenon zu sprechen als von etwas, als von Dingen, hinter denen noch etwas wäre, wovon sie Phänomenon im Sinne darstellender, ausdrückender Erscheinung wären. Phänomenon ist nichts, wohinter noch etwas wäre: genauer: bezüglich des Phänomens kann überhaupt nicht nach einem Dahinter gefragt werden, weil das, was es gibt, gerade das Etwas an ihm selbst ist.

26 *ibid.* 'Was Phänomenon der Möglichkeit nach ist, ist gerade nicht als Phänomenon gegeben, sondern *erst zu geben*. Die Phänomenologie ist gerade als *Forschung die Arbeit des freilegenden Sehenlassens* im Sinne des methodisch geleiteten Abbauens der Verdeckungen.'

27 GA 20, p. 119. Cf. also SZ, 36 C.

28 SZ, 36 D. Cf. GA 20, p. 119.

29 *ibid.* Cf. also SZ, 334 A: 'Degeneration'.

30 GA 20, pp. 119–20.

31 GA 9, p. 48. French translation in *Débat sur le Kantisme et la philosophie* (Paris, 1972), pp. 102–3. On the 'methodological' character of the change of attitude, of the 'conversion', see GA 24, pp. 28–9 and GA 20, pp. 136–7. On the existential concept of science, cf. J.-F. Courtine, 'Phénoménologie et science de l'être', in *Cahier de l'Herne Heidegger* (Paris, 1983), pp. 211–21.

32 SZ, 17 B and the note by R. Boehm and A. de Waelhens.

33 SZ, 7 A.

34 SZ, 37 D and the marginal note to GA 2, p. 50.

35 GA 20, p. 200.

36 *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, pp. 197, 206; cf. also *Entretiens de Davos*, p. 39; cf. GA 26, p. 214.

37 *Qu IV*, p. 317.

38 Let us emphasize that the procedure of late Heidegger, oriented toward being itself (*das Sein selbst*), already emphatically presented in the *Letter on Humanism*, based upon the possibility or the necessity of thinking 'being without beings' (*Qu IV*, pp. 48, 63), of thinking the *Es* of *Es gibt*, does not lead to

anything like an untying of the knot *Sein-Seinsverständnis*, being-understanding of being.

39 GA 20, pp. 179–80.

40 SZ, 37 D.

41 SZ, 218 A.

42 *ibid.* Cf. E. Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Berlin, 1970), pp. 337–45.

43 SZ, 220 F; 298 E.

44 SZ, 221 E; 297 B.

45 SZ, 222 A; 298 E–299 A.

46 Cf. *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, GA 40, pp. 75ff.

47 SZ, 222 C.

48 SZ, 226 D, 230 B, C. GA 24, p. 25.

49 *Qu I*, p. 130; *Qu IV*, pp. 309–10.

50 *Nietzsche II*, GA 40, pp. 353–5.

51 *ibid.* Cf. also *Der Satz von Grund*, GA 10, p. 113; *Holzwege*, GA 5, pp. 31–311.

52 *Nietzsche*, II, p. 383.

53 *ibid.*

54 *Vom Wesen und Begriff der Physis*, GA 9, pp. 300–1.

55 SZ, 178 D; cf. also *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, GA 9, pp. 195–6.

56 SZ, pp. 292–8.

57 Zähringen seminars, *Vier Seminare*, p. 137; *Qu IV*, p. 339.

58 *Qu IV*, p. 339.

Genetic phenomenology: towards a reconciliation of transcendental and ontological phenomenology

Christopher Macann

In his Introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger sought to establish the basic principles of a new phenomenology which would be ontological in character. In so doing, he distanced himself from his former master, Edmund Husserl, and from the kind of phenomenology which Husserl had already developed.

Nowhere is both the affinity with, and the contrast to, Husserlian phenomenology more explicitly expressed than in a passage in which Heidegger takes up the Husserlian slogan: To the things themselves! – and deploys it in a new way.¹ For the ‘things themselves’ concern both Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology in so far as *both* ways of doing phenomenology require that we first get back to things just as they present themselves with that *immediacy* which precludes pre-judice and pre-supposition. That Husserl arrives at ‘immediacy’ through an ultimate distancing (Reduction) whereas Heidegger tries to get there through a more primordial closing of the distance (Involvement) is no more important than the fact that, in one way or the other, they both seek to respond to the fundamental dictum – To the things themselves!

Phenomenology, Heidegger goes on to tell us, signifies primarily a *methodological conception*; that is, it concerns itself with the *how* rather than the *what* of philosophical research. Implied therein is the suggestion that the question *how* phenomenology accedes to the things themselves is by no means as unequivocal as Husserl might have thought, and that there might be another way of getting back to the things themselves. This other way is of course the way whose basic principles are set out in the two subsections devoted to the ‘Concept of the phenomenon’ and the ‘Concept of the *logos*’, from a combination of which Heidegger is able to arrive at his own ‘Preliminary conception of phenomenology’.

That such a latitude is being sought becomes clear from a passage at the very end of this critical section (7) devoted to ‘the phenomenological

method of investigation' where Heidegger re-evaluates the relation of possibility to actuality with specific reference to Husserl.

The following investigation would not have been possible if the ground had not been prepared by Edmund Husserl, with whose *Logische Untersuchungen* phenomenology first emerged. Our comments on the preliminary conception of phenomenology have shown that what is essential in it does not lie in its actuality as a philosophical movement. Higher than *actuality* stands *possibility*. We can understand phenomenology only by seizing upon it as possibility.²

When *Being and Time* was published, phenomenology was associated primarily, and almost exclusively, with the figure of Husserl who, in this sense, represented the *actuality* of phenomenology. In subordinating actuality to possibility Heidegger was not only claiming for himself the right to develop a *new* conception of phenomenology but also intimating that the phenomenological movement would only remain alive if such a re-conceiving of the nature, scope and objectives of phenomenology were constantly undertaken. What is important for philosophy, he reminds us in the Introduction to *Grundprobleme*, is not to know philosophy but to learn how to philosophize,³ which means keeping open at all times the primordial possibilities inherent in the *logos* of the *phenomenon*.

In this paper I propose to take Heidegger at his word. By first undertaking a careful examination of the sections of *Being and Time* in which Heidegger won his freedom from Husserlian phenomenology and claimed for himself the right to do phenomenology in a new way, I hope to find the basis for recommending yet another way of doing phenomenology, a way which, in particular, brings with it the advantage of reconciling and integrating transcendental and ontological phenomenology rather than leaving them standing as alternative, and competing, conceptions. I shall begin by following Heidegger's own differentiation of distinct concepts of the phenomenon but with a view to establishing an order of derivation between them. That is to say, not only will a basic and foundational concept of the phenomenon be established, a second and indeed a third concept will be recognized, as also an order of derivation accounting for the passage from the one to the other. I shall then use Heidegger's own analysis of the *logos* to locate different concepts of the *logos* corresponding to each of the concepts of the phenomenon which have already been differentiated, and also to reinforce the prevailing order of derivation.

This is the point at which my own programme will part company with that laid out by Heidegger. For, instead of systematically eliminating the secondary in favour of the primary, I shall recommend a re-evaluation of the secondary and, more important still, a recognition of the 'logic'

of the derivation of the secondary from the primary. In this way I shall arrive at a more Hegelian concept of phenomenology, one which traces the genesis of the different concepts of the phenomenon, each related and connected with its own appropriate concept of the *logos*. This logic of the derivation of secondary from primary concepts of the phenomenon will furnish the basis for a new way of doing phenomenology which might be called 'genetic phenomenology'. Finally, this 'genetic' phenomenology will be shown to be ontological in character.

A The preliminary exposition of phenomenology as the *logos* of the phenomenon

In the section (§7) devoted to the phenomenological method of investigation, Heidegger begins by splitting the expression into its two components in accordance with its Greek etymology. In subsection A, he deals with the 'Concept of the phenomenon', in subsection B with the 'Concept of the *logos*', bringing the two back together in the third subsection devoted to the 'Preliminary conception of phenomenology'. We shall follow this Heideggerian itinerary.

The term 'phenomenon', Heidegger tells us, is derived from the Greek where it signifies '*that which shows itself in itself*, the manifest'. Throughout what follows it is essential to bear in mind that, for Heidegger, this is the absolutely basic concept of the phenomenon upon which all the others are founded and to which they are consequently repeatedly traced back.

From this primary Greek concept of the *phenomenon* as that which shows itself in itself, Heidegger now moves on to the German concept *Schein*. *Schein* has two uses, a privative and general and a positive and specific. The privative use of *Schein* is introduced with a 'not', even though this negativity has later to be distinguished from that which characterizes the concept of *Erscheinung*. 'Indeed it is even possible for an entity to show itself as something which in itself it is *not*. . . . This kind of showing-itself is what we call seeming [*Scheinen*].'⁴ A little later Heidegger confirms the privative character of *Schein* when he says: 'We shall allot the term "phenomenon" to this positive and primordial signification of φαῖνόμενον, and distinguish "phenomenon" from "semblance", which is the privative modification of "phenomenon" as thus defined.'⁵ This privative concept of the phenomenon as 'semblance' is entirely general, in the sense that the privative character applies, in one way or another, to all the other concepts which will be derived from it, and in particular to that of the appearing – *Erscheinen*. However, there is another, quite specific connotation, which Heidegger has in mind when he talks of something 'looking like' (*sieht so aus wie*). This 'so . . . wie'

is also presented in terms of an 'as', as when he talks of something looking like but not in reality being that as which it gives itself out to be (*das so aussieht wie – aber 'in Wirklichkeit' das nicht ist, als was es sich gibt*). From his later discussion of the 'as' structure we know what Heidegger means here. He is talking about the *necessity* of things appearing 'as', whereby the semblant character of the appearing is meant not just that they may not appear in the same way to others or to the same person at some other time, but also, that the appearing is to be taken as an *immediate* apprehension of what manifests itself, just as and how it shows itself, without any critical reservations as to whether it might appear differently to others or under different circumstances and so might not really *be* the way it presently *appears*. For all that, Heidegger makes it quite clear that this privative concept of *Schein* is grounded in that of the phenomenon. 'When φαίνόμενον signifies "semblance", the primordial signification (the phenomenon as the manifest) is already included as that upon which the second signification is founded.'⁶

The concept of *Erscheinung* is, as such, a double derivative. First, that of which it is the derivative, namely the concept of *Schein*, is itself a privative modification of the fundamental concept of the phenomenon – as we have already seen. The sense in which *Erscheinung* is a derivative of *Schein* has still however to be determined. Etymologically, the derivation is apparent in the very structure of the concept, since *Er-scheinung* includes *Schein* as its root. Much more important, the concept of *Erscheinung* presupposes a difference between the appearing and what appears. What appears is, in one sense, the appearance but, in another sense, it is not. Heidegger uses terms like announce (*sich melden*), indicate, refer, etc., to characterize this difference. 'Thus appearance, as the appearing "of something" does not mean showing itself; it means rather announcing itself through something which does not show itself, but which announces itself through something which does show itself.' To emphasize the negative character of this difference, Heidegger continues: 'Appearing [*Erscheinen*] is a *not-showing-itself* [author's italics]', and moreover goes on to confirm that the '“not” we find here is by no means to be confused with the privative “not” which we used in defining the structure of semblance [*Schein*].'⁷ In other words, the concept of *Erscheinung* presupposes both a something and its appearance or appearing. And although it is by means of its appearance that the something appears, it itself does *not* appear. That through which, or by means of which, what appears makes its appearance does actually appear. The thing itself however does not appear but merely announces itself by way of something else which does appear.

It is important however to note that this difference between the appearance and the something of which it is the appearance does not run the lengths of an absolute disconnection. For it is in terms of just such a

conclusive disconnection that Heidegger then goes on to introduce a further and final concept of the appearance which he terms *bloße Erscheinung*. The difference between *Erscheinung* and *bloße Erscheinung* is brought out with reference to a difference between a something which *does not* appear and a something which *cannot* appear.

That which does the announcing – that which, in its showing itself, indicates something non-manifest – may be taken as that which emerges in what is itself non-manifest, and which emanates from it in such a way indeed that the non-manifest gets thought of as something that is essentially *never* [author's italics] manifest.⁸

Heidegger makes it clear that with this concept of 'mere appearance', he has Kant in mind. For in addition to using appearance in the first sense, Kant also uses the term appearance to talk of appearances as appearances of things in themselves which, as such, can *never* make their appearance.

In other words, this Kantian sense of the relation between appearance and thing in itself has to be distinguished from that inherent in any traditional substance theory such as that espoused by Locke or Descartes. To be sure, Kant further confuses the issue by also making use of the concept of 'substance', as the substrate underlying all appearances, as well as that of a 'transcendental object'. But in principle Heidegger is right in arguing that the ordinary use of *Erscheinung* deserves to be terminologically distinguished from that to which he gives the name 'mere appearance' (*bloße Erscheinung*). Indeed, he strengthens this distinction by talking about the 'mere appearance' as '“something brought forth” [*hervorgestellte*] but something which does not make up the real Being of what brings it forth',⁹ presumably because the noumenon is an intelligible entity (possibly also, and for this very reason, brought forth by a divine or creative intuition), whereas the phenomenon is strictly sensible.

What is noticeably missing in this critical review of the transcendental concept of 'mere appearance' is the Husserlian concept of the phenomenon. It is entirely characteristic of his strategy here that he fights his battle against transcendental philosophy on the Kantian terrain, rather than upon that occupied by his former master, Husserl. However, the omission of the Husserlian concept of the phenomenon conceals from view the extent to which Heidegger was actually pursuing a rather similar course, namely, the attempt to break through the historical legacy to a more primary conception of the phenomenon which would permit philosophy to get back to the things themselves. Thus, when Heidegger takes over the Husserlian slogan, he adds the explanation: 'It [the maxim] is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings; it is opposed to taking over any conceptions which only seem to have been

demonstrated.¹⁰ In order therefore to accommodate a Husserlian as well as a Kantian concept of *bloße Erscheinung*, it will be necessary to draw a distinction between '*bloße Erscheinung 1*' and '*bloße Erscheinung 2*'. The former will be taken to represent the Kantian, the latter, a Husserlian concept of 'mere appearance'.

Such a distinction is all the more necessary because, in a certain sense, a curious affinity prevails between the two, curious in the sense that one is almost obliged to talk of an affinity of opposites. What is common to the two is that the reality of the thing has become something purely ideal. The purely ideal character of the thing in itself means, for Kant, that it must be situated in a purely intelligible (i.e., noumenal) realm lying over and beyond that of the sensible (i.e., phenomenal). For Husserl, on the other hand, the ideality of the (transcendental) object means that it does, and can only, make its appearance in and through the phenomenal manifold as a *meaning* posited by intentional consciousness. Both Kant and Husserl subscribe to the unreality of the thing in itself. But whereas, for Kant, the noumenal unreality of the thing in itself is to be attributed to its ultimate *remoteness* from the human subject, for Husserl, the phenomenal unreality of the noematic object is to be attributed to the absolute *proximity* of that sphere within which alone it can appear, namely, the sphere of immanence. For Husserl, the thing itself cannot appear *not* because it is a something which exists over and beyond the realm of actual and possible appearances but because it is, in itself, nothing, a no-thing, the very opposite of anything thing-like, namely, an ideality or essence. Thus the Kantian 'noumenon', which is intrinsically *unknowable*, becomes the Husserlian 'noema', which is so constituted as to be intrinsically and pre-eminently *knowable*.

Sartre drew attention to the significance of this step when he opened his *Being and Nothingness* with the statement: 'Modern thought has realized considerable progress by reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it.'¹¹ A little later, and in direct relation to an examination of the relation of appearance and essence, he says:

That is why we can equally well reject the dualism of appearance and essence. The appearance does not hide the essence, it reveals it; it is the essence. The essence of an existent is no longer a property sunk in the cavity of this existent; it is the manifest law which presides over the succession of its appearances, it is the principle of the series.¹²

Not only does Heidegger ignore this transformation of the status of the intelligible with respect to the sensible in the two principal exponents of that transcendental style of philosophizing for which appearance is reducible to 'mere appearance', it is significant that he presents the different concepts of the phenomenon laterally, that is, without really

showing how they are derived each from the other. In such a context, what is important is to fix terminologically the bounds of each concept so as to avoid confusion. 'If one designates these three different things as "appearance", bewilderment is unavoidable.'¹³ What is covered over in this perfectly reasonable request for terminological clarity is the possibility of effecting a derivation of the distinguishable concepts, one which might, in the end, lead to the specification of a 'logic' of the genesis of one from the other.

In his account of Heidegger's preliminary conception of phenomenology (see chap. 3, vol. I of the present work), Jean-François Courtine recognizes the absolutely fundamental character of the distinction between phenomenon and *Schein*. And he is well aware that the derivation of the concept of *Schein* sets in motion a series of further derivations: *Erscheinung*–*bloße Erscheinung*. But he then goes on to argue that

we can ignore here the supplementary distinction introduced by Heidegger with a view to elucidating the ambiguity of the German *Erscheinung* – in particular, the metaphysical distinction of *Erscheinung* (indicative phenomenon) and of *bloße Erscheinung* (mere appearance).¹⁴

But if the secondary is generated on the basis of the primary and the tertiary on the basis of the secondary, then surely this very order of derivation will attest to a logic of the genesis which must be of more than accidental significance since it accounts for that very covering over which calls for an uncovering? But the question is, whether anything can be done with the genesis which is thereby suggested.

Before we attempt to lay out a logic of the genesis of the several concepts of the phenomenon which Heidegger has already distinguished, it would be best to first take account of Heidegger's own attempt to furnish the *phenomenon* with a *logos*. Perhaps we shall find not only that to each concept of the *phenomenon* a corresponding concept of the *logos* can be assigned but that the ultimate *logos* will turn out to be a *logic* of the genesis of the secondary from the primary – logic in the Hegelian sense of a necessary order of derivation.

Subsection B of ¶7 is concerned to offer a concept of the *logos* which will fit together with that of the phenomenon. Heidegger's main concern is to resist the temptation to effect an immediate translation of the *logos* into the realm of language, truth and logic, whereby it gets assimilated into epistemology. At the same time, the new concept of the *logos*, a concept which, according to Heidegger, is only a revival of the original Greek concept, must conceive of the *logos* in such a way that it is

susceptible to being brought into the realm of discourse. '*Logos* as "discourse" means rather the same as *δηλοῦν*: to make manifest what one is "talking about" in one's discourse.'¹⁵ This double intention, freeing the *logos* from theories of judgment on the one hand, and freeing it for its expression in discourse, on the other is, at the same time, designed to open up a concept of the *logos* which will fit together with that of the phenomenon, so that phenomenology can effectively be the 'logic' of the 'phenomenon'.

Heidegger proceeds about his business in two steps. First he suggests that the *logos* 'lets something be seen'. The use of a visual terminology to express the intelligibility of what is thereby apprehended attests to the residual, but still powerful, influence of Husserl and his 'eidetic vision'. Letting-be-seen is here clearly both differentiated from and connected to the self-showing characteristic of the *phenomenon*. What lets itself be seen is, and can only be, what shows itself. The supplement of meaning inherent in 'letting be seen' is then brought out through the notion of 'seeing as'. 'Here the *σύν* has a purely apophantical signification and means letting something be seen in its *togetherness* with something – letting it be seen *as* something.'¹⁶ Only in so far as the *logos* has the character of synthesis can a question of truth arise with regard to what lets itself be seen. 'Being false amounts to deceiving in the sense of covering up: putting something in front of something and thereby passing it off as something which it is not.'¹⁷

Subsection C of ¶7 puts subsections A and B together in a formulation which articulates the connection of *phenomenon* and *logos* – phenomenology. 'Thus "phenomenology" means ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα – to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.'¹⁸ The self-manifestation characteristic of the concept of the 'phenomenon' is put together with the letting-be-seen which defines Heidegger's use of the term '*logos*' and in such a way that the combination is fit for expression in a discourse which makes manifest what one is talking about. In place of any correspondence theory of truth, we have a letting be seen of what shows itself which finds expression in a discourse which communicates.

But the aim of subsection C is by no means confined to simply putting the *logos* and the *phenomenon* back into relation with each other. There is a much more important objective in view, namely, to conceive of the phenomenology which results in a manner sharply contrasted with that of Husserl's own phenomenology. Heidegger brings his new conception into focus through a notion of covering up, a notion which functions as the complement of that of the *phenomenon*. Bringing to light, uncovering, always implies the possibility of covering up. What gets covered up in the kind of regional ontology undertaken by Husserl in the name

of phenomenology is precisely the being of those entities whose prior demarcation (into distinct regions) serves as the point of departure for Husserl's own phenomenological analyses.

Thus Heidegger shifts the frame of reference of phenomenological philosophy in an ontological direction. While conceding that phenomenology, as a method, remains the way of access to the theme, he insists that the theme itself is being. Hence phenomenology is given out as being 'the science of the Being of entities – ontology'.¹⁹ The investigation of being in general is the science of ontology. But a further question arises with regard to the proper mode of access to being in general, a question which has in fact already been answered in the first part of the Introduction where Heidegger asks: 'Is the starting-point optional, or does some particular entity have priority when we come to work out the question of Being?'²⁰ So we already know the answer. Dasein is that being whose being must be interrogated first with regard to obtaining the proper mode of access to being and precisely because an understanding of being (of however indefinite a kind) already belongs to Dasein's own self-understanding.

So whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character of Being is other than that of Dasein, it has its foundation and motivation in Dasein's own ontical structure, in which a pre-ontological understanding of Being is comprised as a definite characteristic.²¹

From this acceptance of a Dasein's analytic as the correct mode of access to an understanding of being, Heidegger generates his own quite distinctive conception of phenomenology. First, the *ontological* implications of a Dasein's analytic are drawn. 'With regard to its subject-matter, phenomenology is the science of the Being of entities – ontology.'²² Second, the *hermeneutical* implications of a phenomenology of Dasein are drawn. 'Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation.'²³ Finally, the *existential* implications are confirmed.

And finally, to the extent that Dasein, as an entity with the possibility of existence, has ontological priority over every other entity, 'hermeneutic', as an interpretation of Dasein's Being, has the third and specific sense of an analytic of the existentiality of existence.²⁴

From all of the above Heidegger draws the general conclusion that 'philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of *existence*, has made fast the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it *arises* and to which it *returns*'.²⁵

B The genetic re-construction of phenomenology as the *logos* of the phenomenon

Let us retrace our steps with a view to taking account of what has been established. The key to an understanding of the new possibility opened up by Heidegger lies in the disclosure of different concepts of appearance. Heidegger begins with a (Greek) concept of the phenomenon broad enough to cover all the various ways in which being manifests itself – i.e., shows itself from itself. These alternative ways are then reduced to three (*Schein* – *Erscheinung* – *bloße Erscheinung*). The question is whether an order of derivation can be established between them and, moreover, what can be achieved by establishing just such an order of derivation.

We have already given reasons for thinking that such an order of derivation can be established. *Schein* stands for the immediate apprehension of whatever is encountered, just as it gives itself, and without any critical reservations as to whether or not it might be in itself as it appears. There is no being beyond, or behind, the appearing. Being is its appearing and nothing more. The term *Erscheinung* begins the work of critical inquiry. In order to allow for the possibility of the thing being other than it appears to be, a difference has to be presupposed between the thing itself and its appearance. Thus the term appearance contains a reference to something other than itself of which the appearance is an appearance. A step back has been accomplished with a view to determining whether or not things are as they appear to be or, in other words, with a view to permitting a theory of knowledge to be constructed on the basis of the epistemologically more relevant concept of *Erscheinung*. The further step back represented by the term *bloße Erscheinung* is one which is illustrated in very different, indeed opposite, ways by the transcendental philosophies of Kant and Husserl. On the one hand, *things in themselves* are expelled into a realm of the imperceptible, lying beyond appearances. On the other hand, *things themselves* are resolved into a succession of mere appearances which is itself then unified and connected through the notion of a noematic object.

In the light of the re-orientation of phenomenology in an ontological direction, our next step must be to bring out the connection between the concept of *Schein* (as one of three modes of appearing) and the specific mode of appearing relevant to ontological phenomenology. After that, we shall have to undertake a deeper investigation of the grounding procedure with reference to the concept of the *logos* and with a view to clearing the way for a genetic re-construction of ontological phenomenology as the *logos* of the *phenomenon*.

The first sentences of subsection A of ¶7 make the connection between *Schein* and *Phenomenon* quite clear. Heidegger goes back to the Greek

to point out that not only does the word *phenomenon* have the significance 'that which shows itself', but that it also has the signification of 'semblance' or 'seeming'. 'Thus in Greek too the expression φαίνόμενον "phenomenon" signifies that which looks like something, that which is "semblant", "semblance" [das "Scheinbare" . . . der "Schein"]'.²⁶ Further, when he goes into the structural interconnection of these two concepts, he makes it clear that the second is founded in the first.

Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes pretension of showing itself – that is, of being a phenomenon – can it show itself as something which it is not; only then can it 'merely look like so-and-so'. When φαίνόμενον signifies 'semblance', the primordial signification (the phenomenon as the manifest) is already included as that upon which the second signification is founded.²⁷

Thus the concept of semblance is presented as the 'privative modification' of the more original concept of the 'phenomenon'.

Relative to the concept of the phenomenon, that of *Schein* is derivative, and this is the reason why it is described as a privative modification. But there are more than enough clues to indicate the ontological character of *Schein*. Heidegger tells us that 'an entity can show itself in many ways, depending in each case on the kind of access [*Zugangsart*] we have to it'.²⁸ This kind of access is indicative of the perspectival and circumstantial character of any encounter with things. Entities show themselves and must show themselves from themselves in order for it to be possible for us to have access to them. Our access 'to' is however a partial and limited apprehension of what manifests itself. Ontologically speaking, it is secondary, though for us, it is primary. Further, the 'looking like' of semblance is described in terms of a 'so-wie' or an 'als was'. From the descriptions to be found later in *Being and Time* (especially ¶32), as also in his lectures on *Logik* (especially ¶12), we know that these structures are employed to characterize Dasein's circumspective involvement with things in the context of a world. Even the privative and, one might almost say, negative characterization of *Schein* – the showing itself 'as something which in itself it is not' – confirms the *ontological* status of *Schein*. For in this privative or negative characterization we find the origin of the mutually determining ambivalence 'revealing-concealing', an ambivalence which is basic to the ontological character of disclosure.

The relation of foundation is with Heidegger always so conceived that the derivative is ontologically less significant than the primary and indeed effects a concealment of the primary sense of the concept. This means that the transition first to *Erscheinung* and then to *bloße Erscheinung* is to be understood as a movement away from the domain of the ontologically primordial and in the direction of the ontically derivative. The Hegelian

presentation of the relative place of the concepts *Schein* and *Erscheinung* in the *Logic* should also be borne in mind here. For, in the *Logic*, *Schein* is the term used in so far as Being manifests itself in an immediate and unreflected manner. *Erscheinung* takes the place of *Schein* in the course of the transition from the doctrine of Being to the doctrine of the Essence. For the Essence is the mediated reflection of Being in and through itself.

It is time now to look a little more closely into the procedure of derivation. This can most effectively be done with reference to the concept of the *logos*, not merely in later sections of *Being and Time* but also in other texts, especially volume 21 of the *Gesamtausgabe*, entitled *Logik*.

It is possible to distinguish four main approaches to the ontological significance of the *logos* in Heidegger's first philosophy. Most of these approaches are themselves divisible into substrategies of one kind or another. And at times the borderlines between the approaches are difficult to sustain. However, for the purposes of our analysis, we shall distinguish the approach by way of the problematic of *meaning*, of *truth*, of *language* and of *being*. There is a sense in which these four problematics are themselves laid out in an order of derivation (or, conversely, of primordially), with this main exception, that the approach by way of the problematic of being is sometimes treated as the last result of the procedure of analytical derivation, at other times, as the first condition. There is no inconsistency here. For, as the first condition in the order of being, it is always presupposed by any ontological analysis of meaning truth or language even though, in the order of analysis, it is often treated last.

Characteristically, Heidegger's interpretative procedure combines a regressive with a progressive analysis. The analysis starts out upon that plane which is more readily accessible precisely because it is not genuinely primordial. It then inquires back into the grounding conditions. Once these conditions have been disclosed, the direction of the analysis is reversed with a view to accounting for the derivation of the secondary from the primary. This characteristic method is clearly stated in a passage from *Being and Time* immediately preceding Heidegger's investigation of truth and its ontological foundations.

Our analysis takes its departure from the traditional conception of truth, and attempts to lay bare the ontological foundations of that conception (a). In terms of these foundations the primordial phenomenon of truth becomes visible. We can then exhibit the way in which the traditional conception of truth has been derived from this phenomenon (b). Our investigation will make it plain that to the question of

the 'essence' of truth, there belongs necessarily the question of the kind of Being which truth possesses (c).²⁹

At the level of an ontological analysis of *meaning*, the so-called 'As-structure' is by far the most important element, though there are other elements to be taken into consideration, for example, the existential structures and the question of validity. The analysis of the 'As-structure' is most fully carried out in ¶32, where it leads on into a discussion of meaning. Heidegger first establishes the connection between understanding and interpretation. In the first instance, interpretation is presented in its most basic form as existential projection which interprets the world in terms of possibilities of being. Only later does Heidegger move on to the issue of textual interpretation, though even in this most basic understanding of interpretation Heidegger does have the latter at the back of his mind, as when he insists:

If, when one is engaged in a particular concrete kind of interpretation, in the sense of exact textual interpretation, one likes to appeal to what 'stands there', then one finds that what 'stands there' in the first instance is nothing other than the obvious undiscussed assumption.³⁰

Heidegger makes the move to a disclosure of the As-structure via a preliminary reference back to the concept of the ready-to-hand. The involvement character of the ready-to-hand is now brought explicitly into view as an 'in order to' which lets something be disclosed *as* something. 'That which has been circumspectively taken apart with regard to its "in-order-to", and taken apart as such – that which is *explicitly* understood – has the structure of *something as something*.'³¹ All instrumental dealing-with presupposes a prior understanding of what a thing is for and the laying out of this understanding is precisely the making explicit of its being *as*, or, in other words, its 'As-structure'. Understanding something 'as' is then further grounded in the triple structure of a fore-having, a fore-sight and a fore-conception. Clearly, this triple fore-structure is arranged in an order of primordially, somewhat in the manner of Kant's triple synthesis which is so ordered as to yield an analysis both from above and from below. But even the highest level, which bears upon the conceptualization of interpretation, is pre-predicative in the sense that it involves a conceiving in advance which is, moreover, not to be interpreted as an 'a priori'.

From the articulation of the fore-structures, the analysis moves on to the theme of meaning. Implied in this analysis is both a positive laying out of the meaning of meaning and a negative critique of current conceptions of meaning. 'Meaning is the "upon-which" of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure

from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception.³² From this it follows that meaning is an existential structure of Dasein, not a property of things. Only in so far as Dasein *is* can there be meaning, and not merely the meaningfulness of Dasein but also that of entities whose mode of being is not that of Dasein. Again, when the meaning of entities other than Dasein is in question, this meaning cannot be understood as the superimposition of meaning upon a meaning-free apprehension of the entity. There is no such thing as an as-free simply seeing³³ or a presuppositionless apprehension of something.³⁴ Indeed, Heidegger warns us that

when we merely stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a failure to understand it any more. This grasping which is free of the 'as' is a privation of the kind of seeing in which one *merely* understands.³⁵

And here we find ourselves right away on the terrain of the derivation of the secondary from the primary. However, rather than pursuing this theme on the plane of meaning (where it is only provisionally hinted at), we shall leave it to the plane of truth and language where it is much more extensively developed.

The very title of ¶33 ('Assertion as a derivative mode of interpretation') indicates that the regressive analysis is undergoing a reversal. The first sentences of ¶33 confirm the derivative character of Assertion. Interpretation is grounded in and derived from Understanding. What is articulated in interpretation and understood in advance as articulateable is meaning. Assertion is meaningful in so far as it too is grounded in and derived from Interpretation.³⁶ In turn, assertion, which Heidegger explicitly connects with judgment (*Urteil*) and therefore with truth (assertion as the primary locus of truth) sets in motion its own process of derivation. Indeed, the three structures in terms of which Heidegger actually analyses assertion (pointing out, predication and communication) are themselves indicative of just such a procedure of derivation.

The formula of the *Logik* is slightly different from that of *Being and Time*. In the *Logik*, Heidegger distinguishes (1) Pointing out (*Aufzeigen*), (2) Determination (*Bestimmung*) and (3) Communication (*Mitteilung*).³⁷ In *Being and Time*, it is Pointing out, Predication and Communication.³⁸ The difference here is however only nominal since Heidegger takes predication to be the condition for determination. A second difference in the mode of presentation is however worth noting. As befits a treatise on *Logik*, Heidegger connects the Greek concept of the *logos* more explicitly with the primary phenomenon of meaning and truth, and thereby places greater emphasis upon the procedure of derivation. For example, a great part of the material which, in *Being and Time*, is

distributed around Interpretation and Assertion is grouped, in the *Logik*, around two sections which deal with the difference between a primary, hermeneutical 'as' and a secondary apophantical 'as'. Moreover, since the *Logik* is primarily and almost exclusively devoted to 'the question concerning Truth', the regressive movement also has to operate at the level of language, and indeed moves back from the conventional acceptance of the statement as the locus of truth and the definition of truth as correspondence, back to a more primordial disclosure through which the 'As-structure' is brought to light.

To return to *Being and Time*; first, assertion is taken to signify 'pointing out' (*Aufzeigen*). It is no accident that the same root concept (*zeigen*) is employed here as was initially employed to characterize the *phenomenon*, with this critical difference, that in place of a self showing (*sich zeigen*), a showing itself from itself of being, we now have a showing which is a pointing out (*Aufzeigen*) of being. The primordial character of this pointing out is confirmed with a reference to the ready-to-hand way of understanding.

Second, assertion is characterized as predication. Heidegger talks of two senses of predication. The first and most primordial signification of predication lies in the pointing out of a unitary phenomenon – the being too heavy of the hammer. Here the emphasis is on its unserviceability as being too heavy. In the second sense of predication, there is not only a splitting of subject from predicate but the focus of attention undergoes a restriction (*Einschränkung*) to the hammer as such, and in such a way that the weight of the hammer can now figure as just one among many other possible predicates which, between them, give the hammer a determinate character. In the *Logik*, Heidegger employs the term 'concentrate' (*konzentriert*) in place of 'restrict' to characterize the way in which the focus of attention gets diverted to the thing itself as simply present at hand with certain determinations. Again, in the *Logik*, Heidegger talks extensively of a levelling down process (*nivelliert sich das primär verstehende 'als'*),³⁹ a terminology which he reserves in *Being and Time* for other phenomena, for example, the emergence of *das Man*. In place of the language of 'levelling down', Heidegger talks in *Being and Time* of a 'step back' or of a 'dimming down'.

Finally, assertion is characterized as communication (*Mitteilung*). Communication brings with it a whole series of derivations. As if to confirm the derivative character of communication, Heidegger brings back the three fore-structures in order to show just what kind of a modification each of them undergoes. At the level of fore-having (*vor-habe*), the 'with which' (*womit* – in the *Logik*, *wozu*) of the ready-to-hand turns into an 'about which' (*worüber*).⁴⁰ At the level of fore-sight (*vor-sicht*), the hermeneutical 'as' of ready-to-hand involvement gets turned into an apophantical 'as' of properties present-at-hand. At the level of fore-

conception (*vor-griff*), the appropriative 'as' of understanding no longer reaches into a totality of relations but gets levelled down to a simply seeing what is present-at-hand. But the procedure of derivation inherent in the fore-structures is only the preliminary to a more widespread derivation which leads on to discourse (*Rede*) and eventually to idle talk (*Gerede*). What is expressed in an original articulation of what has been seen gets communicated. And this communication of an understanding first developed in a context of actual seeing then gets retold outside of such a context and eventually becomes mere hearsay. In addition to this line of degeneration which leads into the inauthentic understanding of *das Man*, there is also the degeneration that follows upon the present-at-hand way of understanding language itself, language as the being at hand of a multiplicity of words, the binding and separating of language (synthesis and diaeresis) trivialized down to the synthesis and analysis of predicative judgment and eventually formalized into the purely relational structure of conceptual combination in a logical calculus.

The above analysis is taken up again in ¶44. Indeed, so conscious is Heidegger of the possible charge of repetitiousness that he calls his earlier presentation a 'dogmatic Interpretation'. However, the difference lies less in a distinction between a phenomenological and a dogmatic interpretation but elsewhere. The first analysis was conducted in the context of the structure of being-in, the most primordial of the three structures into which the overall structure of being-in-the-world is subdivided but one which still falls short of the more radical primordiality which Heidegger has in mind with the concept of 'care', a concept through which Heidegger hopes to bring the primordial totality of Dasein's being-in-the-world back into view as a structural whole. This structural need for a repetition is complemented by a change in emphasis from the *logos* as the locus of *meaning* to the *logos* as the locus of *truth*.

Heidegger begins his investigation here (¶44(a)), as he does in the *Logik*,⁴¹ with a statement of three theses which, he says, belong to the traditional conception of truth and which turn out in the end to be presuppositions without foundation: (1) That the locus of truth is assertion (judgment); (2) that the essence of truth lies in the agreement of the judgment with its object; (3) that Aristotle, the father of logic, was responsible for setting up both these misconceptions. The focus of his analysis turns on the second of these three theses and consists in an attempt to explain how the notion of truth as correspondence got set up in the first place. The method employed consists in a preliminary regressive inquiry into the ground of what is initially and naively taken for granted, followed by a progressive inquiry which accounts for the derivation of the secondary from the primary.

The regressive inquiry goes through two main steps. First, the ontological investigation of truth is stated to be one which rests on being-

uncovering. 'The *Being-true* of the assertion must be understood as *Being-uncovering*.'⁴² Or again a little later: 'The most primordial phenomenon of truth is first shown by the existential-ontological foundations of uncovering.'⁴³ Being-uncovering is itself also differentiated into a more primary and a more secondary mode. What is primarily true as uncovering is Dasein as uncovering (*Entdeckend-sein*). What is only secondarily true is what is thereby uncovered (*Entdeckt-sein*). Second, Being-uncovering is then shown to be grounded in the world's disclosiveness. Moreover, we are reminded that disclosedness is that basic character of Dasein according to which it is its 'there'.

The disclosure of disclosedness as a basic state of Being of Dasein in turn prepares the way for a progressive enquiry into the derivation of the secondary from the primary. For since Falling, along with thrownness and projection, also belongs to Dasein's state of Being, what is first in the ontological order gets covered up and becomes the last to be uncovered in the order of analysis, whereas what is last in the ontological order gets discovered as the first and most obvious 'truth' in the ontic order. However, though Falling is the existential structure which accounts for the derivation, the focus of the account now falls on the phenomenon of Discourse. For Discourse not only expresses the truth of disclosure in an original uncovering of inner-worldly entities, it also preserves the truth and so makes it readily available for utilization, even in contexts where no such disclosive uncovering actually takes place. Thus, the ready-to-hand utilization of Discourse as a being toward the truth becomes a present-at-hand conception of the truth, and this in a number of steps.

First, what was originally uncovered in a Being-toward inner-worldly entities now gets understood as something merely present-at-hand. Assertion, as expressed in Discourse, is still a pointing out which uncovers, but what is uncovered has a tendency to perpetuate itself as simply being what it is. Then, and as a result of the foregoing, the Discourse through which such an uncovering takes place gets understood as something merely present-at-hand. This analysis is one which Heidegger had already taken account of earlier and so is not repeated here. Finally, the relation between Discourse (now understood as judgment and as the locus of truth) and the world itself gets understood as something merely present-at-hand. Thus the correspondence theory of truth arises on the basis of a present-at-hand conception of the relation between language (as present-at-hand) and the world (as present-at-hand).

C Genetic phenomenology as ontology

Our investigation of the concept of the phenomenon led to the discovery of three distinct (German) concepts of appearance, each of which is grounded in, and traceable back to, a primary (Greek) concept of the phenomenon. The subsequent investigation of the concept of the *logos* served to confirm the presence of a corresponding procedure of derivation designed to show how the primary gets converted into the secondary and in such a way that the ontological import of the original root meaning of the concept is lost. In the context of Heidegger's archaeological investigation, the aim of the analysis is to recommend a regression to the ontological ground, a regression which at the same time would disqualify any derivative notion. Our intention is quite different, to let the derivative notions stand out in their own right with a view to disclosing a logic of the genesis of one from the other. More particularly, this method has the advantage that it enables us to retain the Husserlian conception of phenomenology rather than requiring of us that we discard such a conception in favour of the Heideggerian. But in order that the Husserlian as well as the Heideggerian conception of phenomenology be acknowledged, it will also be necessary to accord a phenomenological significance to the epistemological concept of *Erscheinung*, together with whatever concept of the *logos* belongs to it.

Our task in this final section will therefore be as follows: we shall establish a connection between each concept of the *phenomenon* and that concept of the *logos* which might be said to belong to it. In so doing we shall, at the same time, confirm the need for a new conception of phenomenology with its own quite distinctive, 'genetic' logic, a conception of phenomenology which conceives of the latter essentially in terms of a logic of the genesis of one concept of the *phenomenon* (together with its own specific concept of the *logos*) from another.

Throughout what follows however, it should be borne in mind that the original (Greek) concept of the 'phenomenon' is not merely the most basic concept of appearance but, as such, one which lies at the root of all the other derivative concepts. The *logos* of this most fundamental (Greek) concept of the *phenomenon* may be said to lie in the disclosedness of being in general. But any determination of the meaning of being necessarily rests upon its appearing. To the several ways in which being *does* manifest itself, there therefore correspond so many ways in which the *logos* of the *phenomenon* can be determined.

The concept of the *phenomenon* which belongs to the first and most primordial stage is obviously that of *Schein*. Semblance is the appearing of being in its original immediacy, that is, in such a way that, inherent in the revealing characteristic of such a mode of appearing, there lurks a concealing. The privative aspect comes to prominence in the concept

of 'semblance' or mere seeming, though, once again, it is necessary to insist that without such 'mere seeming' there could not be an appearing which could ever later be subject to the relevant criteria of validity. We may say that, for Heidegger, the *logos* of such an ontological concept of appearance, *qua Schein*, lies in uncovering or dis-closure. Precisely because disclosure is not disconnected from the appearing of being but is, on the contrary, intimately connected with the latter, this Heideggerian concept of the *logos* gets close to the original Greek notion of the *logos* as the unity of thinking and being.

Grounded in this ontological concept of the *phenomenon* (together with the concept of the *logos* appropriate to it), and derived from it, we find a quite different concept of the *phenomenon*. Only in so far as a distinction is drawn between the *phenomenon*, as it appears, and that of which it is the appearance does it become possible to talk of the *truth* of the *phenomenon* in a sense relevant to epistemology. Such a derivative notion of truth is, of course, that enshrined in the theory of adequation, which itself presupposes a radical distinction between two kinds of truth, the synthetic and the analytic. One might say that the differentiation of substance from appearance, on the side of being, is reproduced, on the side of language, by a distinction between two kinds of validation, one which does require a reference to a corresponding reality (synthetic truth) and another which requires no such reference (analytic truth). The *logos* here assumes the form of the conventional epistemological concept of truth. In conformity therewith we might also add that the *telos* of such a *logos* is to be found in formal logic. It is in this sense that Kant talked of the principle of non-contradiction as the 'highest principle of all analytic judgments' – whereby he also insisted that synthetic judgments must also conform to this condition as a necessary (though by no means sufficient) condition of their being true.

Finally, we find a third concept of appearance, that namely of *bloße Erscheinung* and, in conformity therewith, a transcendental concept of the *logos*. With Kant, such a transcendental concept of the *logos* finds its foundation in a priori *synthetic* judgments and the knowledge that can be derived from them; with Husserl, in an investigation of the a priori *structures* of a transcendentially reduced consciousness. It is however critical to our use of the concept of *bloße Erscheinung* that we should have chosen to follow the course marked out by Husserl rather than Kant, a course clearly and explicitly laid out in such texts as *Ideas I* or *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Here, we might say, the *telos* of the *logos* is transcendental logic.

With this threefold connection of the concept of the *phenomenon* with its own appropriate concept of the *logos* our genetic conception of phenomenology is, strictly speaking, completed. To be sure, this threefold derivation of the concept of the *phenomenon* together with its

corresponding concept of the *logos* is only the most summary sketch of a theory, but one whose inspiration can readily be traced back to Heidegger's own analyses, no matter how far its conclusions may stray from those which Heidegger himself wished to draw.

Rather than leaving things in this provisional state, it is, I think, worth taking one further step, a step which will take us in the direction of yet another concept of the *logos*, the *logos* as the logic of the genesis of the several conceptions of 'phenomenology' which have just been distinguished. The model for such a final concept of the *logos* is, of course, that offered by Hegel in his *Logic*. Critical to such a new 'genetic' phenomenology is not merely the recognition of a procedure of derivation (that we find already in Heidegger) but the re-evaluation of what, with Heidegger, is dismissed as derivative. That Heidegger is able to carry through such a strategy of dismissal is largely due to the fact that, effectively, he recognizes only two stages, the ontological and the ontic, which latter can be dismissed as being of little or no phenomenological significance. Hence the importance of accommodating the third concept of *bloße Erscheinung* primarily, and almost exclusively, with reference to Kant. As soon however as the transcendental concept of the phenomenon is widened to include Husserl, it becomes apparent that the devaluation of the derivative implies a rejection of Husserl's transcendental philosophy as *phenomenology*, a rejection which, if it had ever been explicitly articulated by Heidegger, would immediately have invited vociferous objection.

Genetic phenomenology of the kind outlined in this paper is *teleological* rather than *archaeological* in character. That is, it proceeds forward *from* the ground rather than backward *to* the ground. The dependence of such a teleological genesis upon a prior archaeological genesis is however clear. It is only possible to proceed from the ground if the ground has first been disclosed as such. However, it is important to appreciate that there are two ways back to the ground, one (the Heideggerian way) which follows what might be called a 'direct regression' from the ontic back to the ground and another, 'indirect regression' which passes by way of a transcendental investigation. It is critical to the concept of a genetic phenomenology which has been sketched out here that any such 'direct regression' should be replaced by a 'reflective detour'. Both in my study of Kant⁴⁴ and my study of Husserl⁴⁵ as well as in my ontological philosophy, *Being and Becoming*,⁴⁶ I have employed the concept of an 'ontological transposition' to allow for a movement of return to the origin which takes in rather than excluding transcendental philosophy. Indeed, I would even go so far as to suggest that implicitly, if not explicitly, Heidegger has himself adopted this very route and that, in consequence, Heidegger's first philosophy may be envisaged as

'radicalized phenomenology', in the quite specific sense in which Tugendhat deploys that phrase (see chap. 36, vol. III of the present work).

In the light of such an alternative conception of the movement of return it also becomes necessary to confer a phenomenological status upon epistemology. To bring to light the phenomenological status of epistemology is to recognize that the opposition which lies at the root of the epistemological conception of reality, the opposition of knowledge and its object, of words and things or, to use the older formulation, of subject and object, is not a *given* opposition but one which is brought into being by human being itself. To be sure, from within the intellectual configuration established by epistemology, the phenomenological character of epistemology is by no means apparent, so little so that the conception of truth with which epistemology operates (adequation or, as it is called, the 'correspondence' theory) is simply taken for granted – as Heidegger has shown. That epistemology may not recognize its dependence upon a specific concept of the *phenomenon* and, in accordance therewith, a correspondingly specific concept of the *logos*, only confirms what appears to be in question. The non-original is precisely that which is most readily taken for granted and so handed down as an incontrovertible acquisition.

The advantages of such a genetic conception of phenomenology are obvious. First, the essential insights embodied in Heidegger's own ontological conception of phenomenology can be preserved. They form, so to speak, the original *ground* for the entire genesis and, as such, the conclusive *goal* in which the genesis culminates. Second, it becomes possible to accord a phenomenological significance to epistemology (especially in its contemporary 'positivist' mode) and to the objectified world view with which it operates. It is indeed strange that at a time when analytical epistemology is coming to assume a dominant role in philosophy, and indeed threatens to usurp the entire terrain of philosophy, phenomenological philosophy should persist in dismissing what Husserl called 'the world of the natural attitude' as a *merely* ontic affair. Ordinary language, which is the language of what Heidegger called 'average everydayness', may not present us with any very extraordinary philosophical insights. But it has its part to play in the construction and preservation of that *familiar* world view which lies at the root of most of our practical and theoretical activities – as Wittgenstein has shown at great length and in the finest detail. More seriously still, any attempt to dismiss (formal) logical analysis as a product of the technocratic spirit and as a sign of the dissolution of all relations into relations of calculation and manipulation will simply hasten that philosophical demise which has already been anticipated by Heidegger and so contribute to, rather than call in question, the universal sway of technology. If logic, in the formal sense, is the 'enemy', it is an enemy which cannot be wished away but

one which, if it is to be restrained, will have to be subjected to the most strenuous, *critical* examination of the kind attempted by Husserl. In fact, Husserl has already shown in what sense formal thought rests in an essential dependence upon phenomenology, rather than the other way around; and I can see no reason why a similar kind of dependence cannot be brought to light from a more specifically ontological standpoint. Finally, and this seems to me to be decisive, rather than having to opt for *either* the Husserlian *or* the Heideggerian version of phenomenology, a genetic conception of phenomenology makes it possible to integrate them *both* within one overall framework that traces the self-manifestation of being and truth through its constitutive stages.

We know that it is one of the signal contributions of Heidegger's thinking about being that he should have brought the question of truth back into connection with the question of being and so have furnished the basis for what might be called an *ontological* concept of truth. In the last analysis however, it seems more reasonable to suppose, with Hegel, that truth is not to be located in any *given* concept of the truth, whether epistemological, transcendental or ontological (in the Heideggerian sense) but rather in the process whereby being becomes the medium in which the self-unfolding of truth occurs – genetic phenomenology. Moreover, if being *is* its appearing, and if therefore the specification of the several ways in which the logic of the phenomenon can be determined is nothing other than phenomenology, in its most fundamental and final sense, then there can be no essential difference between ontology and phenomenology. The logic of the self-manifestation of being is phenomenology, as ontology. To borrow, and then to invert, but without intending to subvert, a well-known phrase from Heidegger: *only as ontology* (and moreover as 'genetic' ontology), *is phenomenology possible*.

Notes

1 Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson as *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 50 (H. 28).

2 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 63 (H. 38).

3 *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, GA 24 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann), S. 1, tr. Albert Hofstadter as *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).

4 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 51 (H. 28).

5 *ibid.*, p. 51 (H. 29).

6 *ibid.*

7 *ibid.*, p. 52 (H. 29).

8 *ibid.*, p. 53 (H. 30).

9 *ibid.*, p. 53 (H. 30).

10 *ibid.*, p. 50 (H. 28).

11 Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'être et le néant*, tr. Hazel Barnes as *Being and Nothingness* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1966), p. 3.

12 Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 5.

13 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 53 (H. 30).

14 Jean-François Courtine, 'The preliminary conception of phenomenology', chap. 3 in vol. I of the present work.

15 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 56 (H. 32).

16 *ibid.*, p. 56 (H. 33).

17 *ibid.*, p. 57 (H. 33).

18 *ibid.*, p. 58 (H. 34).

19 *ibid.*, p. 61 (H. 37).

20 *ibid.*, p. 26 (H. 7).

21 *ibid.*, p. 33 (H. 13).

22 *ibid.*, p. 61 (H. 37).

23 *ibid.*

24 *ibid.*, p. 62 (H. 37–8).

25 *ibid.*, p. 62 (H. 38).

26 *ibid.*, p. 51 (H. 29).

27 *ibid.*, p. 51 (H. 29).

28 *ibid.*, p. 51 (H. 28).

29 *ibid.*, p. 257 (H. 214).

30 *ibid.*, p. 192 (H. 150).

31 *ibid.*, p. 189 (H. 149).

32 *ibid.*, p. 193 (H. 151).

33 *ibid.*, p. 190 (H. 149).

34 *ibid.*, p. 191 (H. 150).

35 *ibid.*, p. 190 (H. 149).

36 *ibid.*, p. 195 (H. 154).

37 Heidegger, *Logik*, GA 21 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann), S. 134.

38 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 196–7 (H. 154–5).

39 Heidegger, *Logik*, GA 21, S. 153.

40 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 200 (H. 158).

41 Heidegger, *Logik*, GA 21, S. 128.

42 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 261 (H. 218).

43 *ibid.*, p. 263 (H. 220).

44 Christopher Macann, *Kant and the Foundations of Metaphysics* (Heidelberg: Winterverlag, 1981), see esp. Part 3, sect. 8.

45 Christopher Macann, *Presence and Coincidence*, *Phaenomenologica* 119, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991), see esp. pp. 39–40, 53–4, 56–8, 72–80, 99–100 and 124ff.

46 *Being and Becoming* is as yet unpublished and indeed, as it stands, is incomplete. It is divided into four parts, a first part devoted to a genetic theory of consciousness, a second part devoted to natural philosophy (time/space/causality), a third part devoted to social philosophy (intersubjectivity/language/culture) and a fourth part devoted to practical philosophy (freedom/ethics/politics). Of this complete programme, Part 1, two sections of Part 2 (time/space), one section of Part 3 (intersubjectivity) and one section of Part 4 (freedom) are finished.

Heidegger's conception of space

Maria Villela-Petit

Space and the incomplete character of *Being and Time*

How is one to interpret the incomplete character of *Being and Time*, the absence of this third section which should have been called 'Zeit und Sein', given the further development of the Heideggerian work? Should we not ask ourselves what this incompleteness was implicitly bound up with? Was it simply, as appears at first sight, bound up with the question of being and of time, which *Sein und Zeit* seeks to connect in one single question? And what if this incompleteness also had to do with the third term that the dyad *being* and *time* had, in a certain manner, obscured, namely space and, in particular, the respective relations of space and time in the economy of *Sein und Zeit*?

An interrogation of this kind does not proceed solely from my interest in the question of space; it is also suggested by some remarks which Heidegger himself makes in the text of the lecture 'Zeit und Sein' (1968),¹ a lecture which adopted, let us not forget, the very title intended for the third section of *Sein und Zeit*, that which, precisely, had never been brought to completion.

The reading of this lecture calls for two acknowledgements. The first is that Heidegger names space and time together by employing the nomenclature *Zeit-Raum*. This titular procedure (whereby time and space are brought together through a common characteristic) is not to be understood as a tribute paid to relativist science. Rather, it signals, on the one hand, the inappropriateness of the propositional structure of language and, on the other, the incapacity of any physical theory to express what has to be thought here, namely, the deployment, the truth of being apprehended on the basis of the experience of what Heidegger calls *Ereignis*. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. For the moment, let us simply note that, by way of such a nomenclature, Heidegger

undoubtedly wanted to warn us against any attempt (including his own earlier attempt) to effect a transcendental appropriation of space by time or, in opposition to the former, and in the Hegelian manner, to attempt a sort of dialectical identity between space and time.

The second acknowledgement which a reading of the lecture 'Zeit und Sein' brings to light has to do with this remark: 'The attempt in *Being and Time*, §70, to trace the spatiality of Dasein back [zurückführen] to temporality cannot be sustained'.² What is at issue in this §70, to which Heidegger refers here? And is what he says here, in the form of a retraction, intended to cover this paragraph alone or does it not rather suggest, at the same time, the unsatisfactory character of the ontologico-phenomenological analysis of the spatiality of *Dasein* and of space proposed in the first section of *Sein und Zeit*?

Let us consider the first of these questions to begin with. In what does this withdrawal from what is no longer tenable (*Unhaltbar*) consist, in Heidegger's own words? To focus upon the title of this §70 alone: 'Die Zeitlichkeit des daseinsmässigen Räumlichkeit', one is obliged to recognize that there is nothing untenable to be found here. A phenomenologico-existential analysis of spatiality could very well be led to take account of temporalizing aspects, of the dominant implication of this or that temporal dimension, in the diverse modalities of the spatialization of Dasein.³ So the difficulty will have to be located somewhere other than in what, taken in isolation, is announced in the title of this paragraph alone. Once one gets into the reading of the paragraph, one quickly appreciates that Heidegger was trying to eliminate the possibility of adding to this title an 'and reciprocally' which would make it possible to write another paragraph entitled: 'Die Räumlichkeit der daseinsmässigen Zeitlichkeit.' It was precisely the possibility of just such a reciprocity which it was important for Heidegger to exclude. For it would, in addition, compromise his project of deriving historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) and inner-time (*Innerzeitlichkeit*) from originary temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) alone, to the exclusion of an element of spatiality. As Didier Franck remarks, 'if "spatiality" has to intervene in the derivation of inner-time from originary temporality, the whole project called *Being and Time* would thereby be called in question'.⁴

That Heidegger himself had seen the problem presented by spatiality for his attempt to found the being of Dasein upon its ekstastic temporality, is evidenced by the claim he makes at the beginning of §70: 'Thus with Dasein's spatiality, existential-temporal analysis seems to come to a limit, so that this entity which we call "Dasein", must be considered as "temporal", "as also" as spatial coordinately.'⁵ However, for him it was precisely a matter of circumventing the menace presented by 'spatiality' by reducing this menace to a kind of semblance against which one should be protected. Couldn't such a 'semblance' lurk in this 'und auch', leading

to an alignment (*Nebenordnung*), to an identification of the spatiality and the temporality of Dasein? But such an identification would have led to nothing less than the emergence of temporality as determining, in the final analysis, the meaning of the being of Care (*Sorge*) in as much as it structures Dasein existentially. Against the risk of such an identification, of just such a linkage (*Verkoppelung*), §70 is going to try and confirm the structure of temporality as the ground (*Grund*) of the ontological constitution of Dasein and of its modalities of being, amongst which spatiality figures.⁶

It is the temporal *distentia* which is going to found the spatializing *dispersion* (*Zerstreuung*) and therefore the spacing of the distancing and of the orientation characteristic of the spatiality of Dasein. At the end of §70, this foundational primacy of time, where the out-of-itself of existing as 'temporality' founds the *Da* of Dasein, is underlined in these terms: 'Only on the basis of ekstático-horizonal temporality is the irruption of Dasein in space possible.'⁷

But surely this understanding, moving as it does from the *Da* of Dasein, stands in the way of a fuller and more complete assumption of corporality (*Leiblichkeit*), a corporality implied by all the various modes of spatialization of being-in-the-world? A difficulty of this kind was suspected early on by Erwin Straus, this phenomenological outsider, for whom: 'The *Da* in which, in Heidegger's own words [*Anspruch*], our being is thrown, is our corporality with the structure of the world which corresponds to it.'⁸ In other words, with a view to getting rid of the dualism of mind and body (which is certainly one of the principal objectives of the fundamental ontology of *Sein und Zeit*), was it really necessary for Heidegger to subordinate the spatiality inherent in corporality to ekstastic temporality?

According to *Sein und Zeit*, nevertheless, the foundation of spatiality upon temporality not only serves to secure the independence of space with reference to time but also makes it possible to understand the dependence of Dasein with regard to space and, in this way, 'the well known fact concerning the abundance of "spatial images" in language'.⁹ This 'fact', let us recall, had been thematized by H. Bergson in *Time and Free Will* where space and language are found to be intricately interconnected. As for Heidegger, he claims to be able to explain it with reference to temporality itself. Does he not see in it, after all, the sign of a dominance of the *present* as the temporal dimension of concern (*Besorgen*),¹⁰ which is the mode of being of Dasein delivered over to its concerned everydayness, by way of which, for him, its spatiality is also made manifest?

Since we are not in a position to discuss this interpretation at length, an interpretation which touches upon both language, space and time, we will limit ourselves to pointing out that Heidegger himself will not

hesitate later to circumvent it, even to pronounce it wrong. In fact however, referring the spatialized images of language solely to the spatiality of everyday praxis might well have been an indication of the deficiency of the thinking on language in *Sein und Zeit* and, more especially, of the mystification of what, due to our belonging to the earth, to our habitation between heaven and earth, 'takes place', leaves its trace in language.

But let us get back to the development of §70 as a whole. What does the insistence upon designating temporality as a foundation (*Grund*) mean if not the persistence of the gesture, even the qualified gesture, of transcendental foundation?¹¹ The allusion to Kant in §70 – and even though Heidegger expresses a concern to take up a distance with regard to the posing of the problem by the latter – is indicative of the surreptitious continuation of this gesture. For what is it in fact that Heidegger objects to in Kant? Certainly not the intellectual gesture which seems to assure a certain primacy of time over space. But rather that deficiency in the Kantian ontology which, blinded by the metaphysics of representation, fails to gain access to a true ontologico-existential comprehension of human finitude. It goes without saying that in §70 one is very close to the reading Heidegger will give of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in his *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Written at the same time as *Sein und Zeit*, this work praises Kant for having seen that the question of man belongs to the question of being. The interpretative accent is placed upon the transcendental imagination as the root of the transcendental transcendence of the imagination which, according to Heidegger, is, in the final analysis, to be identified with originary time as pure self-affection. As he sets it out at §35: 'Time is the condition of the possibility of every act which is formative of representation, that is to say, it makes pure space manifest.' And further on, he adds: 'To admit the transcendental function of pure space does not in any way imply a refusal of the primacy of time.'¹²

It is impossible to overlook the fact that such an interpretation (debatable because unilateral) precisely tended to accentuate the primacy accorded to time over space in Kant. For this primacy was one which, in a certain sense, had already been accorded to time in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, that is, if one considers the criterion in accordance with which time, as the condition of the possibility of all representations, has a greater extension than space, since it is a prerequisite of the representations of external as well as of internal sense. To the former should be added his underestimation of the fundamentally spatial, as well as temporal, power of schematization. A primacy which, however, the *Refutation of Idealism* will serve to undermine. In any case, what concerns us here is to see how the Heideggerian interpretation of Kant, at the time of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, went along with (was congruent with)

the way in which *Sein und Zeit* had envisaged the relationship between spatiality and temporality.

From the foregoing it follows that if, as we find in §22 of *Sein und Zeit*, 'space, in a sense which has still to be determined, constitutes the world',¹³ this world, which is revealed to Dasein as belonging to its own proper structure of being (cf. Dasein as 'being-in-the-world'), would remain dependent upon Dasein (and not even, or at least only laterally, upon *Mitsein*). One sees here a subtle continuation of the privilege of interiority over exteriority, that very privilege which the understanding of Dasein, as being-in-the-world, tried to place in question. . . .

These difficulties, these apories and their consequences for the question of being were certainly foreseen, even if only in part, by Heidegger. From the beginning of the 1930s he sets out in a direction which will be thought through later as the 'turn' (*Kehre*), a turn which can be situated around 1935. But this change of direction within the frame of the same quest, that of being, is both preceded and prepared by a massive hermeneutical investment in Greek philosophy. And so begins that interpretation of Plato and of Aristotle as a function of what Heidegger understands by 'the beginning of metaphysics'. In connection therewith, he turns his attention to the question of the 'truth of being', which question now takes the place of that of the 'meaning of being', the question proper to *Sein und Zeit*. This is also the context in which we have to situate his meditation on *physis*, where he tries to rejoin pre-Socratic Greek thinking. In accordance with this 'initial' comprehension, it is being which offers itself as (*als*) *physis*, as he points out repeatedly in *Introduction to Metaphysics*.¹⁴ However, the deepening of the question of being will of itself bring with it a change of attitude with regard to the question of space. As we are now in a position to confirm on the basis of a reading of the *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, a work published in 1989 but which Heidegger composed around 1936–7. It is at this point in time, and not simply at the time of the lecture 'Zeit und Sein', that the wording *Zeit-Raum* impressed itself upon him.

Having made these points, we are left with two directions in which to proceed. The first consists in going back to the analytic of spatiality in *Sein und Zeit*, with a view to trying to bring out its limits; the second, in considering the effects of the turn (*Kehre*) on the thinking about space.

Space in the first section of *Sein und Zeit*

Let us turn to chapter III, entitled 'The worldhood of the world' (§14 to §24). Here Heidegger refuses to envisage the world as simply subsisting in space, therefore making a break with the classical attitude for which the

world did subsist, reduced to being nothing but the totality of bodies in the objective space of Euclidean geometry. In this way a critique of the attitude of modern philosophy is implied in as much as it forgets that geometrical space is itself constituted by an objectifying operation which can only be carried through on the basis of a world to which we are attached existentially and whose intrinsic spatiality we have to understand.

On the other hand, the approach to spatiality is not accomplished, as one might have expected, by way of a phenomenology of perception. The ontological strategy of *Sein und Zeit* makes this impossible. For, to isolate and privilege perception would be to abandon the concreteness of the being-in-the-world of Dasein in favour of a subject split up into a diversity of faculties or capacities. Heidegger, on the other hand, claims to have disclosed the world phenomenologically in the thickness of its concrete significations which, according to him, are first of all those which proceed from the daily practice of Dasein as being-in-the-world. From which it follows, as Franco Volpi has shown very clearly under the auspices of a 'reappropriation', that is, a creative translation of notions proceeding from the practical philosophy of Aristotle, that a certain priority has to be accorded to action and to doing in as much as, in everyday praxis, the latter both encompass and go much further than perception.

To understand such a step with regard to the problem of space, it is worth remembering that it has to be situated explicitly in the context of an attack upon Cartesian ontology which, under various forms, has not ceased to make itself felt throughout the course of modern philosophy. The confrontation with Descartes is so decisive here that it takes up the entire middle section of chapter III; from the very outset, it is stated that the exposition of the Cartesian ontology 'will furnish, by way of its antithesis [*negativen Anhalt*], a theme for the positive explication of the spatiality of the surrounding world [*Umwelt*] and of *Dasein* itself'.¹⁵ Thus, from the very beginning ontological dualism is called in question. The distinction between *res cogitans* and *res corporea* is rejected to the extent that this distinction would, if operative, obscure the spatiality proper to human Dasein while reducing the beingness of every natural being to *extensia*. With regard to a physical thing, all that is taken to be true is what manifests itself as subsisting (*Vorhandene*) for a theoretical consciousness, what can be rendered intelligible in physico-mathematical terms; the phenomenality of the world is thus relegated to the status of a subjectivo-relativistic appearance.

But whereas in Husserl's *Krisis* the critique of the forgetfulness of the *Lebenswelt* goes together with an attempt to understand the process of idealization which underpins the 'mathematization of nature' in modern physics where the interest focuses on Galileo (cf. §9), in *Sein und Zeit*

Heidegger tries above all to think the ontological legacy of such a procedure in Descartes and he interprets these ontological consequences in terms of a 'de-mundanization' of the world. This term designates the eclipse of any understanding of the effective modalities of our being in the vicinity of things with reference to the horizon and on the basis of the world. Correlatively, he talks of the de-mundanization of Dasein in modern times since thenceforward the latter takes its stand *vis-à-vis* an a-cosmic world, as a subject 'out of the world' and therefore capable of ignoring its originary spatiality.

With a view to re-discovering the spatiality of Dasein, Heidegger sets out from a description of the spatiality of the surrounding world (*Umwelt*). He takes as the guiding thread for this phenomenologico-ontological description, the being of those entities which present themselves with a primordially which precludes their reduction to *res extensa* or the in-itself of objectivist ontology. This kind of entity is one with which Dasein is concerned in virtue of the use (*Umgang*) which he makes of it in his daily life, with regard to which he is present in the mode of concerned involvement (*Besorgen*). It is those things which are close at hand (*Zur Hand*) which are ontologically determined by their availability (*Zuhandenheit*) for utilization. Thus they present themselves as tools or instruments (*Zeuge*) in their character of being-in-order-to (*Um . . . zu*): for instance, the hammer for the fabrication of the table or the construction of the house. In virtue of this structure of being which carries with it the determination of a reference to . . . (*Verweisung*), each instrument is revealed as always already inserted into a whole, an instrumental totality (*Zeugganzheit*).¹⁶ By way of an example of a totality of things structured with a view to their utilization, Heidegger evokes what happens in an office. The things which are to be found there are not disposed in such a way that each can be taken in isolation from the others. Together, and on the basis of their relations with others, they determine the 'physiomy' of the room. What we encounter in the first place is the room in that susceptibility for signification which belongs to it: an office and not just a volume geometrically defined by the four walls which its simple things fill up. We discover the room, Heidegger also tells us, as a residential instrument (*Wohnzeug*). Is it really necessary to point out that this expression betrays a thinking about dwelling, about housing, which does not go much further than a certain functionalism – which latter reminds us of what Le Corbusier was to recommend a little later, with this qualification that, in the context of an industrial civilization, Le Corbusier preferred to talk of a 'residential machine'.¹⁷

In sum the uncovering of the environment in *Sein und Zeit* shows it to be a totalization of meanings and objectives, the same as those constitutive of the connection linking instruments one with another (*Zeug-zusammenhang*, *Zeugganzes*). The analysis never ceases to implicate both

the spatiality proper to the being of an instrument and that inherent in the whole into which it is inserted. Those entities which are available for utilization are entities whose 'proximity' cannot be determined primarily by any system of measurement, but with reference to an oriented proximity which arises out of that concern which characterizes Dasein in its everydayness. The being of the instrument only acquires its meaning with reference to a practice and its proximity is therefore that of its instrumental accessibility. This does not mean that, as it were, it has to be dragged around, for it does have its place, a place where it can be found, and this implies that it is not to be regarded as a simple thing subsisting somewhere in a space which is unqualified and which has not been differentiated into subsidiary places. And just as an instrument is never encountered in an isolated fashion so a place is only what it is with reference to other places together with which it constitutes a network or a 'totality' of places (*Platzganzheit*).

In turn, since it has itself to be situated, the condition of the possibility of a totality of places lies in a wherein (*Wohin*) in general, a wherein which concerned involvement has in mind from the first. Thus every place has to be referred to a 'region', to a 'side', all of which is already implied every time one specifies the place of a thing from 'this side' rather than from 'that side'. The word we are translating by 'region' or by 'side' is *Gegend*. At the time of *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger is still far from having thought about *Gegend* or *Gegnet*, as he will do, on several occasions, after the *Kehre*. Here these *Gegende* are still thought as a function of the spatiality inherent in everydayness. However, for the determination of these regions which, for their part, confer a more general orientation upon the space of the surrounding world, one being, the sun, plays a privileged role. For its places, though changing, are places which are constantly and regularly available for the diverse and variable uses to which we put the light and the heat which they yield. They serve to differentiate the celestial regions which furnish pre-established points of reference for the terrestrial regions which these places occupy and articulate.¹⁸

That such a purely pragmatic consideration of the sun and its 'orients' by no means exhausts the existential meaning that its course has for us is clearly recognized by Heidegger when he adds: 'Churches and tombs are disposed according to East and West, the life and death parameters which determine Dasein in its inalienable possibilities of being.'¹⁹ But should he not then have gone on to question this availability, the *Zuhandenheit* of entities as the privileged *leit motif* of the uncovering of the spatiality of the world? Before trying to do justice to this question it is worth pointing out that the spatiality of the surrounding world is only existentially relevant because it is founded on the spatiality of Dasein. In other words, the spatiality of the surrounding world presupposes the

being of Dasein, to whose spatiality it belongs essentially to adopt an orientation and to make distances disappear. Its encounter with intra-mundane entities implies a making space (*Raum geben*), an arrangement (*Einräumen*) which makes possible a range of places upheld by gestures such as 'displace', 'remove', gestures which do not require the intervention of a theoretical attitude or the constitution of a geometrical space.

The analyses of §22 to §24 proceed as we have seen, in a regressive fashion, on the basis of an uncovering of the spatiality of the world in the direction of its ontological presupposition, namely, the spatializing being of Dasein. This now permits us to formulate more exactly the questions which the approach to spatiality in *Sein und Zeit* raises.

Without recurring to the importance of highlighting the existential primacy of the practical over the theoretical, there are grounds, nevertheless, for asking ourselves whether our way of encountering the spatiality of the world and of intra-mundane entities really should be restricted to that mode of involvement which Heidegger takes account of here which, obviously, takes as its paradigm the labour of the craftsman and the world which corresponds to it. To take only one of the essential features of the *Umwelt* disclosed by Heidegger's analysis of spatiality, 'totalization': *Zeugganzes*, *Platzganzheit*. It is a matter of integrating each instrument, and the place which belongs to it, in a sort of system of reciprocal reference on the basis of which each can be uncovered in its usefulness for . . . , in its pragmatic significance. This was already implied in the *Um* of *Umwelt*, which has to be understood in its double meaning of *um* – 'surrounding' and of *um* – 'in order . . .'. But what then becomes of our exposition of the open space of a countryside which suspends, 'disorients', even if only for a moment, the prevision which characterizes 'everyday praxis'? Is it not the case that concerned preoccupation (promoting the 'hold' and the hand as the organ of prehension), even if it does make possible a revealing of the spatiality of the world of everyday praxis, nevertheless puts into effect something like a 'reduction', to wit, a 'neutralization of its phenomenal appearance'? What are we to make of the presentation or of the donation of nature in its 'grandiose spectacles' (sky, sea, mountain, waterfalls, etc.), those very aspects which Kant takes account of in his analytic of the sublime in the third Critique, where it is already a question of poetic vision?²⁰

But it is not even necessary to leave the space of the home²¹ with its affective and identificatory investments to recognize the limitations of an analytic which only considers the spatiality of the world from the standpoint of its significance and of its practicality as a function of that specific existential which is involvement.

Besides, what is one to say of those worlds in which instrumentality cannot be isolated in as much as the available entity (the tool) incorporates

from the start other determinations and references than those of its utility alone? And how, on the basis of its *configurational* aspects, can one fail to attribute to the spatiality of the world a metaphorical and symbolic tenor which, to some extent, already encompasses and surpasses the pragmatic significance which is uncovered across our daily praxis?

Last but not least, the analytic of spatiality in *Sein und Zeit* suffers from the absence of any investigation bearing on the constitutive spacing of *Mitsein*, which latter impacts not only upon our understanding of the space of the world (spaces and distances of a social order), but also upon any consideration of the spatiality of Dasein itself as well as upon the question of *Jemeinigkeit*, that is to say, the question of selfhood or identity.²² How is one to understand Dasein's character of being 'mine' if one does not take into consideration the 'here' and the 'there' constitutive of intersubjectivity which, from the start, manifests itself as an intercorporeal phenomenon – as Husserl made amply clear in his *Vth Cartesian Meditation*? Once again we rejoin the question of embodiment which the very project of *Sein und Zeit* failed to articulate more exactly in its connection with the question of spatiality and of the *Mitsein*. The articulation of this question is however anticipated, but in a largely negative way, as emerges from §10 of the Summer 1928 lectures on *Leiblichkeit*, entitled 'The problem of transcendence and the problem of *Sein und Zeit*', where *Leiblichkeit*, *Mitsein* and the phenomenon of *Raumbedeutung* as the primary determination of every language (*Sprache*), are presented as having to be understood on the basis of spatial dispersion (*Zerstreuung*).²³

However, if, at the heart of the Heideggerian meditation, this tangle of crucial questions remains undeveloped, this is not true of other issues which we shall now go on to mention. Two digressions which, in *Sein und Zeit*, follow upon the course of the analyses of the spatiality of the world will serve to confirm the above. The first of these digressions arises in the context of entities which are not produced, natural beings the recognition of which is presupposed by any product whatsoever. This recognition of non-produced goods arises, Heidegger points out, as a function, or in view, of (*Wozu*) the work to be produced. 'But when this happens, the Nature which "stirs and strives", which assails us and enthrals us as landscape, remains hidden.'²⁴ It is therefore not always possible to reduce nature to the *Zuhandenheit*, as is explicitly underlined in §44.²⁵ These remarks in their turn relativize the choice of the *Umwelt* or of the instrument (*Zeug*) as the only available clues to any elucidation of the spatiality of the world and of Dasein.

The other digression goes in the same direction. It takes into account the hypothesis of a 'primitive world'. In this regard Heidegger remarks that 'what is ready-to-hand within the world just does not yet have the mode of Being that belongs to equipment'. And he adds: 'Perhaps even

readiness-to-hand and equipment have nothing to contribute as ontological clues in interpreting the primitive world. . . .²⁶ But if these remarks place his interpretation of everydayness in a new perspective they do not, for all that, suffice to dissuade Heidegger from treating entities encountered within such a world under the negative sign of a 'not yet'. 'It does not yet have the mode of being that belongs to equipment.' And he does not even bother to ask what 'reduction' (of symbolic attributes, etc.) might correspond to just such an 'accession'. However, in the Second Section of *Sein und Zeit* (where the analytic of the First Part is reconsidered from the standpoint of the foundational element of temporality), intra-mundane entities, together with nature itself (as landscape, field for agricultural exploitation, etc.), are uncovered in their historical (*geschichtlich*) character, which latter goes along with, and is indeed inseparable from, the historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of Dasein as being-in-the-world.²⁷

Nevertheless, the assumption of the historical character of the world of everyday life in this Second Section, entitled 'Dasein and temporality', an assumption which could not remain without its consequences for the question of the spatiality of the world, does not bring Heidegger to return to the disclosure of the latter; and that, as we already pointed out, because it pertained to the very project of *Sein und Zeit* that historicity should be derived from temporality alone. Be that as it may, it is no less true that the two digressions of chapter III from the First Section, that on nature and that on the primitive world, appear 'supplementary' with regard to the elucidation of spatiality as already explicitly carried through.

It is however worth noting that in *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, Heidegger tried to explain, even to give, in his own words, 'precise reasons' for the exclusion of nature from the analytic of spatiality. This is because, he tells us, the question of nature could only be introduced on the basis of the analysis of *Befindlichkeit*,²⁸ which latter is only pursued later on, namely, in the context of the analysis of that fundamental existential structure which is Care (*Sorge*). But these 'precise reasons' leave the real question entirely on one side: what of the spatiality inherent in *Befindlichkeit*, that is to say, in each of the affective moods (*Stimmungen*) by way of which Dasein experiences itself and finds itself in its being in the midst of beings? The absence of any interrogation on the spatiality of moods such as anxiety, joy, fear, boredom²⁹ can only be explained as a function of the very project of *Sein und Zeit* to found spatiality upon temporality. . . . But then, in what concerns the thinking about space, the incompleteness of this project, as well as leading to a deepening of the question of being, is going to mean, at one and the same time, an opening and the opening move of a new attempt.

Space after *Being and Time*

Even though it is always possible to find several 'turns' along Heidegger's path of thought, the critical shift is that executed in the famous turn, the *Kehre*, around 1935. With regard to what concerns space, it makes itself known in the lecture: 'The origin of the work of art' and in the course of lectures: *What is a thing?* (*Die Frage nach dem Ding*), and especially as it is only now possible to appreciate, in the text which has remained unpublished for so long, *Beiträge zur Philosophie*. Let us consider the course of lectures first of all. In the first part, Heidegger reviews the different ways in which philosophy has attempted to determine the being of the thing. He questions the relationship between the identity, the particularity of the thing and the categories of space and of time. To summarize: what is the relation of the *this* to the *here* and the *now*? Is space a simple framework, a system of co-ordinates making possible the determination of the spatial position of one thing relative to others? What are we to make of the limit, in things, between a without and a within? In the second part of the course Heidegger tries to characterize the field, the historical ground upon which the determination of the being of the thing rests in the *Critique of Pure Reason*; which determination now appears to Heidegger as the metaphysical centre of Kant's work. The point to stress concerns the gap between the Greek conception of movement and of locus and that of 'modern times', the position established by Galileo and Newton and on which Kant himself relies. For the Greeks, Heidegger recalls, thinking especially of Aristotle, 'the type of movement and the locus of the body are determined by the nature of the latter'. 'For any characterization and any estimate of movement, the earth is the centre . . . the stars and the heavens in general move *peri to meson*, around the centre, their movement being circular.'³⁰ On the other hand, with Newton, 'any body left to itself moves in a straight line and in a uniform fashion'.³¹ It is important to appreciate the consequences of such a transformation. For it not only affects the understanding of movement and of nature but also the position of *Dasein* at the heart of being. Among the consequences mentioned, let us consider, in particular, the change which the concept of *locus* undergoes. 'The locus', writes Heidegger, 'is no longer the place to which a body belongs in virtue of its intimate nature but simply a position which it assumes from a purely relative standpoint, that is to say, in relation to other positions.' Henceforward, 'the difference between terrestrial and celestial bodies becomes otiose'.³² What could this mean if not that the gap between the sky and the earth is abolished and that loci are now only neutral positions? The result is a flattening of physical space which, in accordance with a purely geometrical representation, is, from now on, nothing but a homogeneous medium whose attributes can only be derived from mathematical rep-

resentation. Conceived in this way, space does not have much to do with the spatiality of the world in which we find ourselves. What is more, it conceals this spatiality. This concealment, which touches both the spatiality of the world and that of Dasein, was thought by Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit*, on the basis of the Cartesian ontology and its dualism. In the course of lectures *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, on the other hand, where the interpretation of the history of philosophy is tied together around Kant, he envisages it on the basis of classical physics while at the same time recognizing, as Catherine Chevalley's paper (chap. 63, vol. IV of the present work) shows, that this physics is itself, at least in part, called in question by the new physics. Such then is the hermeneutical background against which Heidegger takes command, little by little, of a thinking about dwelling which proceeds along the same lines and conjointly with his thinking about being.

In addition, the lectures already announce two themes which are absent from the analysis of the spatiality of the surrounding world in *Sein und Zeit*, namely, that of the Earth and that of place (*Ort*). While in *Sein und Zeit* it was above all a question of 'place' (*Platz*), and of a 'network of places' (*Ganzheit von Plätzen*) seen as a function of the readiness-to-hand (*Zuhandenheit*) of an equipmental whole, it will from now on be a question of place (*Ort*) and of the relation between space and place. He goes back to the lecture, 'Der Ursprung der Kunstwerk', contemporary with the course of lectures, to deepen these themes. In this lecture, Heidegger further pursues his investigation into the thinghood of the thing and into the equipmental being of equipment but with this difference, that he now does this with a view to bringing to light the truth of the thing, or of equipment, on the basis of its manifestation in the work of art.

The inadequacy of the traditional determinations of the being of thing stands out most evidently when one questions the work of art. Thus the different philosophical conceptions of the thing stemming from the tradition, whether as 'informed matter' (*geformter Stoff*), or as 'support of qualities' (*Träger von Merkmale*, substantia + accidens), or as the 'unity of a multiplicity of sensations' (*Einheit einer Mannigfaltigkeit des in den Sinnen Gegebenen*) give themselves away as so many obstacles to any approach to the true being of the thing, and a fortiori to the truth of the being of the work of art. This obstacle has to be set aside as the condition without which it is impossible to open the way to an alternative approach to the question of truth. Normally tackled as arising out of the domain of science, as an epistemological affair, the question of truth is here paradoxically posed in terms of the work of art. Art is going to be set up by Heidegger as the phenomenological site where the truth of the being of entities makes its appearance. But if, as he says, art is the realization of truth, this can only be because the truth is not first and

foremost the object of a theoretical attitude, that it does not consist initially in an *adequatio rei et intellectus*. Rather than being conveyed by an objectifying judgment, the truth takes place as an event in the work of art. Thus Heidegger offers an alternative to the dramatic Nietzschean opposition between art and truth, 'an opposition summed up in *The Will to Power* with the adage: 'We possess art lest we perish of the truth',³³ namely, an alternative which might be expressed as follows: art as the realization of the truth.

This occurrence, this taking place of the truth is in turn set in relation to what Heidegger identifies as structuring the work of art. This 'structure' is not something internal to the order of 'representation' and which would be connected with the formal aspects of the work. It is identified by way of a contrast with what in *Sein und Zeit* was said on the subject of production: equipment (*Zeug*) or work (*Werk*). Here, what is produced refers back to what is not produced as to a simple material; for such is the understanding of natural beings brought to light from the standpoint of everyday praxis. The forest is considered as wood, the river as yielding hydraulic energy. The 'material' is absorbed into the product, the work itself being grasped in its being-for . . . depending on the use to which it is put. But in breaking the chain of utilitarian references in which the 'product' is caught up, the work of art opens up a more essential access to the truth of the product, a truth which is also the truth of the world to which the product belongs; in other words, that of the site to which it bears witness. As a guide to his meditation Heidegger chooses a canvas of Van Gogh in which shoes are depicted, shoes which he takes, in a way which is both debatable and has been largely debated,³⁴ for the shoes of a peasant. This meditation, which neglects the aesthetic aspects of the work in order to come to terms with its theme, to the point of making it impossible to identify the work in its singularity, can be summed up in two affirmations: 'Across these shoes', Heidegger writes, 'there passes the silent appeal of the *earth*.' And further on: 'This product belongs to the earth. It harbours the *world* of the peasant.'³⁵

By relating to the thing in this way, the shoes are made to appear in the work and in relation to what is co-signified in the work, that is, an Earth and a world. Thus Heidegger's meditation on Van Gogh's canvas makes Earth and world appear as the polarity which both holds open and furnishes our dwelling space with its dimensions. It does therefore point towards the rootedness of dwelling in a soil, a theme which, at the time, was not exempt from ideologically ambiguous connotations but which, at least in Heidegger's writings, was not associated explicitly with the theme of blood or with racism.³⁶

The second example of a work of art invoked by Heidegger will permit him to give a further and more adequate account of his thinking about

dwelling while at the same time furnishing him with an opportunity to consider the nature of the relation of *place* and *space*. Now the work in question is a Greek temple. This is what he has to say.

It is precisely the temple as a work which disposes and collects around itself the unity of the ways and relations through which birth and death, misery and prosperity, victory and defeat, endurance and ruination confer upon human being the shape of his destiny.³⁷

It is clear that the 'Greek temple', taken with this kind of generality, is not being considered from an architectonic standpoint but as a *place* that unites around itself an entire network of ways and significations which articulate its space and give a meaning to dwelling. This meditation invites the reader to move beyond the point of view of what would be an aesthetic objectification and so to see the temple at work in its efficacy as a work. The temple installs a mortal world, that of the Greeks, in as much as it articulates its topology and its signifying configuration at the same time as it makes the Earth manifest and, without annihilating its obscure face, makes manifest its power of withdrawal, its reserve, the gateway opening upon being. The temple therefore constitutes the link, the unifying trait between an Earth and a world. It is thanks to this landmark that an earth can manifest itself and appear as native soil (*der Heimatliche Grund*), and that a space of dwelling is thereby outlined. To sum up, a space *qua* dwelling, has to be thought on the basis of the places which it articulates.

Starting from the lecture: 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes', dwelling impresses itself as one of the most constant of Heidegger's meditative themes. This is attested in a much later text which merits our attention not only because it condenses a number of previously conducted analyses but also because it rings the changes on the terms employed in the lecture of 1935. We are talking of the lecture 'Building dwelling thinking', given in 1951 at the 'Second Darmstadt Symposium', a symposium devoted to 'Man and space'.

Before we begin, let us note that in the period between the lecture of 1935 ('Die Ursprung der Kunstwerk') and that of 1951 ('Bauen Wohnen Denken'), Heidegger's thinking on space is nourished by considerations stemming from the notion of *chora*. This is a very typically Heideggerian move. Greek thought, and especially pre-Socratic thought, provides him with the occasion for a remarkable meditative prolongation but one which, in reality, takes him further away rather than bringing him closer to the Greek text. Moreover, to all appearances the meditation sets out from a pre-Socratic expression while leading to something else, without this something else ever being consciously assumed. To take Heraclitus' fragment 109: in his course of lectures *Heraklits Lehre vom Logos*

(Summer term 1944), while criticizing the usual translations of *kechoris-menon*, Heidegger remarks that in *chorizein*, *chora* is to be found. This furnishes him with a pretext to 'translate' the Greek in a creative fashion, that is to say, not only to find in it a linguistic equivalent, namely, *Gegend* or *Gegnet* in the sense of surrounding world (*Umgebung*, *die umgebende Umgebung*), but, on the basis of this 'finding' to develop a meditation taking as its guide the distinction between *topos* (*Ort*) and *chora* (*Gegend*, *Gegnet*).³⁸

The meditation on *die Gegend* and its old form *Gegnet* is developed and deepened in 'Conversations along a country path' ('Feldweggespräch'), written a little after the course on Heraclitus to serve as a 'commentary' on *Gelassenheit*.³⁹ In this work, the accent is placed henceforward on the opening of *Gegend*. It names the opening which surrounds us (*das umgebende Offene*) and on the basis of which everything that is, is able to make its appearance. It is the *Gegnet* as 'free extent' (*die freie Weite*), with which we can enter into a relation of resonance, provided only that the things (*die Dinge*) which appear therein 'should have lost their objective character'.⁴⁰ The thinking about the *Gegend* is therefore the passage required in order to leave the terrain of representative thinking to which, according to Heidegger, Husserl's thinking about the transcendental horizon still belonged. In this sense, to take up again Heidegger's own words, it has to be seen as signifying 'the end of philosophy' and inaugurating (as the title 'conversation on thinking' suggests), 'the beginning of thinking', one might even say, of poetic thinking.

What distinguishes the region, the *Gegend*, is its gathering character. It holds together (*versammelt*) and unifies a plurality of places. Heidegger's thinking experience around the notion of *Gegend*, an experience which marks a break with an objectifying representation of space in favour of a meditative (rather than contemplative) approach arising out of concrete (non-abstract) language, must not be lost sight of when one tries to understand the lecture 'Bauen Wohnen Denken'. As its title indicates, this lecture is directed towards the question of dwelling. But the activity of building will have to be taken account of in a manner quite different from that implied by the means-ends schema which, he now tells us, 'closes off any access to essential relations'.⁴¹ We are certainly far from *Sein und Zeit*. . . .

What then does 'building' mean? To this question the answer would seem to be obvious: to construct according to a plan. But the answer undertakes a detour which brings to light the several layers of meaning encompassed by the word 'build'. For the root of the word *bauen*, *buon* means 'to dwell'. If this is so, the normal order of understanding (one builds to dwell) has to be inverted, and not because dwelling, or *bauen*, would come first chronologically but because, in *bauen*, building, *wohnen*, or dwelling is already in question. By that is meant that we

build according to the manner in which we dwell which is, in turn, the manner in which we *are* on the earth. By means of *bauen*, in the sense of dwelling, an unusual link is instituted between dwelling and being. Just such a link had already been outlined in the context of §12 on *In-Sein*. . . . But the implications of this link in what concerns space had not been drawn. Here, it is thanks to the etymological resources of language that the link can be made.

'I am' [*ich bin*], 'you are' [*du bist*] mean: I dwell, you dwell. The manner in which you are and in which I am, in which we other humans are on earth is dwelling. To be human means to be on earth as mortal, that is to dwell.⁴²

It is clear that 'being-in-the-world' is henceforward to be understood in terms of dwelling and that, in consequence, our dwelling and the spatiality which belongs to it can no longer be uncovered on the basis of everyday *praxis* alone. It encompasses all the dimensions of our human sojourn here on earth. It is therefore the configuration essential to that very sojourn which it is a question of clarifying. 'Bauen Wohnen Denken' refers back to the lecture 'Das Ding' which precedes it by about one year. In the two lectures, the configuration of dwelling is thought as a fourfold game. To dwell is to sojourn here 'on earth' and 'under heaven' which is its overhang. But to be on earth and under heaven means, in addition, 'to dwell in the presence of Gods [*Göttlichen*]' and to belong 'to the community of men'. Such are the names given to the terms in accordance with which the game of the world takes place and which have to be thought not separately but in line with the unity which they constitute. This is what is expressed by the prefix *ge* of the singular form *Geviert*. Dwelling now appears in the light of the game which gives it its dimensions, which is its measure. The polarity earth-world from 'The origin of the work of art' gives way to the world no longer understood as one of the terms of this opposition but as the unity of that game which joins earth and heaven, mortals and divinities.

From a schematic point of view one sees here a kind of 'square', which, by the way, is one of the most ancient figures of space, referring back as it does to the four cardinal regions (*Gegende*). All the same, for Heidegger, the *Geviert* is not a spatial representation. It signifies the gathering, the non-separation of terms which are distinct but between which a dwelling is played out. Unquestionably, though he makes no such allusion, Heidegger's meditation on the world reminds one of that passage from the *Gorgias* where Plato has Socrates say:

Wise men, Callicles, say that the heavens and the earth, gods and men, are bound together by fellowship and friendship and order and

temperance and justice, and for this reason they call the sum of things the 'cosmos', the ordered universe, my friend, not the world of disorder or riot.⁴³

But what with Plato was motivated by considerations pertaining to equality, the harmony necessary to instil wisdom in the individual and justice in the city takes on with Heidegger the meaning of an implicit critique of uni-dimensional dwelling, that kind of dwelling which no longer accords a place to the sacred in as much as it reduces the truth within the limits of scientific objectification. The figure of the *Geviert* allows him to break down what he himself had called the 'spherical character' of modern metaphysics, meaning that sphere of subjectivity which absorbs the world into the sphere of representation, thereby preventing Being from being considered on the basis of the Openness of Being.⁴⁴

Let us get back to building and to dwelling. Once dwelling has been thought in the light of a world-play, of *Geviert*, which latter stands opposed to *Gestell*, that is to say, to any imposition of technico-scientific rationality upon the world as a whole, it becomes possible to address the question of the constructed thing without running the risk of missing the belonging of building to dwelling. The constructed thing is in this case the bridge, any bridge. The meditation does not take it into account as might the engineer or the architect but in such a way as to let the totality of relations which attach it to the earth stand out. For the bridge gathers together the banks (while still permitting the river to flow) and the heavens (from which it receives its waters). Furthermore, it gathers together men (to whom it affords a passage) and the Gods (whose patron saint dwells there in effigy).⁴⁵ Only in this way, that is to say, provided one takes account of the plenitude of its signifying relations is the bridge truly thought on the basis of dwelling. The constructed thing has as its essence the management of places or, as he writes: 'The place does not exist before the bridge.' In other words, a place *qua* dwelling place cannot be defined by simple geometrical co-ordinates and on the basis of a homogeneous representation of space. It is not in space. On the contrary, it is on the basis of such places as a bridge that 'places and the various ways in which space is managed can be determined'.⁴⁶

This way of thinking about space on the basis of place was already present in 'The origin of the work of art' in the considerations relative to the subject of the Greek temple. However, the text 'Building dwelling thinking' places the main accent upon the specificity of the constructed thing which, *qua* place (*Ort*), is capable of generating space. As one of his recapitulative proposals puts it: 'The spaces we negotiate daily are "managed" by places whose being is founded on things like buildings.'⁴⁷ The simplicity of the meditation should not be allowed to obscure the

displacement which it aims to put into effect. It is a matter of tearing our thinking about space away from the horizon of a mathematization which reduces it without, for all that, going back to a 'physics' in the Aristotelian sense of the term. What he has in mind is another way of thinking place, whereby it is both given and expressed at one and the same time as dwelling place. For what was said of the thing is also valid of place, namely, that, from all antiquity, our thinking has been habituated to assess its being too poorly.

In 1969, in one of his last texts, *Die Kunst und der Raum*, Heidegger returns to the necessity of thinking the space installed by art in terms other than a subjectively conditioned transformation of the objective space of a physico-technical project. The key here are the plastic arts, a term which, in accordance with the German aesthetic tradition, applies equally well to architecture as to sculpture. Once again he appeals to that comprehension of art which emerged from 'The origin of the work of art', namely, art as the work of truth, in as much as truth means here the non-retreat, the uncovering of being (*die Unverborgenheit des Seins*). But if space managed or installed by a work of art can be called true in the sense that it is the place where an uncovering of being takes place, the question arises whether it is possible to discover what really constitutes the reality (*Eigentümlichkeit*) of this space. For Heidegger, this comes down to asking what lies concealed in the word *Raum*. He finds in the latter the dynamic trait of spacing, of *das Räumen*, in the English sense of 'making room'. This spacing is a liberating, a detaching with a view to the establishment of a dwelling. It is therefore a liberation with a view to the emergence of a dwelling place, of an apportionment of places. This meditation on spacing does not invert the relation place-space as it was thought in the previously quoted texts but brings out yet more forcibly the necessity for an inhabited space, founded on constructed things, to take place on the basis of the open space of a region (*Gegend*). Thus *Die Kunst und der Raum* interweaves the two threads of Heidegger's meditation on space: that which, starting out from an investigation of the being (*Wesen*) of the work of art, renews the thinking of the relation place-space and that which considers the region (*Gegend*), the free Extent (*die freie Weite*), on the basis of *Ereignis*. We shall return to this.

But what does the 'plastic' bring to the thinking about place and space, subject, of course, to the qualification that, as we stressed above, Heidegger's analyses are never directed toward a phenomenal appearing of individual works but attempt to read across art and its works a common structure of truth? While admitting the inadequate character of his remarks Heidegger attempts to think the plastic arts (architecture and sculpture) as 'places which become embodied and which, by opening a region and taking it into their safe-keeping gather together around

themselves a free space which accords to each thing a sojourn and to man a dwelling amidst things'.⁴⁸ In this way, the abstract character of an approach which makes of a work a simple volume with an enveloping surface which brings out the contrast between an interior and an exterior space is called in question. This point of view is abstract in the sense that it separates the edifice or the sculpture from the dwelling and ignores its capacity to gather man together at the very heart of a region. In addition, the work makes the place appear in its relation to the void. A void which is not a lack or a defect but whose productive efficacy has to be shown in the coming into being of a place.

Leaving architecture behind (the Greek temple) and turning towards sculpture, could we perhaps find a body of work which corresponds to Heidegger's meditation? Even though his text does not include any reference to a specific work, we shall at this point risk the name of Henry Moore. Surely the works of Moore are able to play with the void in such a way that, by defying the principle of organic continuity, they often introduce a discontinuity into the body, even a void? In addition, surely they resist the enclosure of a museum and seek to give birth to a place which gathers around itself the space of a region? This at any rate is what Roland Penrose suggests when he writes:

No site seems to defy sculpture more radically than the sky and the open horizon of a countryside and yet it's here that Moore finds the greatest affinity between nature and his own works. The wild slopes of the Scottish moors where several of his bronzes have been erected reinforce the grandeur and the dignity of this presence.⁴⁹

At the end of *Die Kunst und der Raum*, the reference to the plastic arts is revoked. The realization of the truth which reveals space in the work of art can do without any support, any plastic incarnation, and simply float in the air or vibrate in song, in the voice or in the sound of church bells. This is the meaning of the quotation from Goethe with which this meditation comes to an end:

Es ist nicht immer nötig, dass das Wahre sich verkörpere; schon genug, wenn es geistig umherschwebt und ubereinstimmung bewirkt, wenn es wie Glockenton ernst-freundlich durch die Lüfte wogt.⁵⁰

Other passages by Heidegger from about this same period are in agreement with this saying by Goethe. So, for example, we find him writing in 'The end of philosophy and the commencement of thinking': 'However, the clearing, the open, is not only free for brightness and darkness, but also for resonance and echo, for sounding and resounding. The clearing is open for everything that is present and absent.'⁵¹

Texts such as these insist upon an experience of space as the Openness which is revealed just as well by the place instituted by the work of art (whose surface vibrates to the play of light and shade) as by the resounding of sound (the church bell, for example) or of the voice. The possibility of thinking about art without resorting to the banal opposition of the temporal and the spatial arts is hereby subtly announced, since sound or voices call for that very openness of space which they at the same time bring to light.

The formula *Zeit-Raum* refers to just this experience, this temporal as well as spatial proof of the Open, as the medium in which the donation of being occurs. Already employed in *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, that is to say, in the earliest outlines of a thinking about *Ereignis*, it is in 'Zeit und Sein' that this formula takes on its full meaning. In fact, it is in this text that there arises the equivalence: *Es gibt Zeit, Es gibt Raum*: an equivalence which itself refers back to the experience of the donation of being: *Es gibt Sein*. Since for Heidegger it is the primary task of thinking to be the guardian of being, this task requires that the relation of space to *Ereignis* be taken care of.

As regards the nomenclature *Zeit-Raum*, a question remains as to whether it has anything to do with *you-zhou*, the term by means of which Chinese thinking calls 'space-time' the universe. Is the posing of such a question an underlining of the necessity of what Heidegger himself terms the ineluctable dialogue with the East? But such an unavoidable alignment also seems to mean that the thinking of the donation of being with Heidegger definitely turns its back on any thinking about a transcendence beyond space and time. This is all the more evident in view of the fact that Heidegger, in his project of the 'destruction' of metaphysics, abolishes any philosophical distinction between cosmology, psychology and theology, thereby wishing to suppress any 'creaturely' dependence between *cosmos* and *theos*, between the *cosmos* and the creative *logos*.

Let us leave these questions in abeyance, no matter how critical they might be and conclude more modestly with the question of inhabited space. There can be no question that the Heideggerian meditation frees the question of space from the disciplinary boundaries within which it used to be incarcerated (geometry, physics, geography, cosmology) or the limits which continued to be assigned to it by transcendental philosophy and by the philosophies of interiority. In this sense it still remains to be shown how Heidegger distanced himself little by little from the kind of Augustinian thinking which was so near and dear to him right up to *Sein und Zeit*, especially in what concerned time. As we have tried to show, thinking about space in its inseparable connection with time became with him a thinking about dwelling, which latter is in itself a thinking about Being. To get to this point called for a conversion of the

utilitarian and controlling viewpoint into a viewpoint consonant with the Opening of Being, a Being which is announced in every being but to which only poetic speech and meditative thinking is capable of responding, of appropriating in the manner required by *Ereignis*.

It nevertheless remains true that in his path of thought, his *Denkweg*, Heidegger left to one side all the social and political aspects of the space of dwelling. He missed their hidden dimensions. Moreover, the transformation in our ways of dwelling, of communicating, brought about by the scientifico-technical complex, were only envisaged by him from the negative standpoint of the forgetfulness of Being, the inverse of the positive standpoint of the domination of beings. It was Heidegger's personal idiosyncrasy that he refused the experience of the city, no doubt seeing in cosmopolitanism and cultural pluralism nothing but a rootlessness which might be captured in the expression 'the desert extends'. One certainly has no right to object to his preference for country paths and little towns like those German university towns in which he taught. And yet, without minimizing the defects of the cities and their degradation of our civilization, can one not also see therein the crucible of a unique experience, that of a plural society in which a new consciousness of self and of humanity might eventually emerge? This too deserves to be thought. Without wishing to underestimate the significance of his thinking about dwelling and the experience appropriate to it, should we not nevertheless recognize that, in the cities too, not to mention the planetary village, the Gods, as well as poets, may very well be present?

Translated by Christopher Macann

Notes

1 'Zeit und Sein', in *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969).

2 *ibid.*, p. 24.

3 As in the wake of *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976), English tr. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), the Dasein's analysis of a Binswanger links the style of certain modes of behaviour to the hypertrophy of one temporal dimension (generally the past) in the way of being-in-the-world of the patient.

4 D. Franck, *Heidegger et le problème de l'espace* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1986), p. 115. See also P. Ricoeur, *Temps et Récit III* (Paris: Seuil, 1985), chap. 3 ('Temporalité, Historialité, intra-temporalité') on the aporie of the Heideggerian hermeneutics of temporality. Finally, we should note that without ever thinking of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, in connection with the visual subject, refers to a 'unique space which separates and reunites, which upholds every cohesion (even that of the past and future) since this cohesion would not exist if it were not rooted in the same space', thereby rendering invalid any approach to the past and future which tried to dispense with space or which failed to recognize the interconnection of time and space.

5 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, S. 367.

6 Cf. *Sein und Zeit*, S. 367: 'Dann muss aber die spezifische Räumlichkeit des Daseins in der Zeitlichkeit gründen.'

7 *Sein und Zeit*, S. 369.

8 E. Straus, *Vom Sinn der Sinne, Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Psychologie*, 2nd edn (Berlin: Springer, 1956), S. 292.

9 GA 26, S. 174.

10 §69, (a) 'Die Zeitlichkeit des unsichtigen Besorgens' which privileges the 'present', as the temporal dimension of concerned preoccupation.

11 *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Summer term 1935) contains the following remark which appears as a response to an objection to the subject of the strategy of transcendental foundation in *Sein und Zeit*, a response by means of which Heidegger aims in particular at distinguishing himself from Husserl: 'Aber das dort gemeinte "Transcendentale" ist nicht dasjenigste subjektiven Bewusstseins, sondern es bestimmt sich aus der existenzialen-ekstatischen Zeitlichkeit des Daseins.' (Cf. GA 40, S. 20.) But in this way the ultimately foundational character of the temporality of Dasein is simply confirmed.

12 Cf. *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, GA 3, S. 254.

13 *Sein und Zeit*, S. 102.

14 Cf. *Einführung in der Metaphysik*, GA 40, S. 134, S. 148, etc.

15 *Sein und Zeit*, S. 89.

16 *ibid.*, S. 68-9.

17 It is worth noting that in *Einführung in der Metaphysik* Heidegger does not use the expression *Wohnzeug* when he evokes the 'school' as a 'dwelling place'.

18 *Sein und Zeit*, S. 103.

19 *ibid.*, S. 104.

20 See Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, §29; tr. James Meredith as *Critique of Judgment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952).

21 A sketch of this problematic is to be found in my essay: 'Le chez-soi: espace et identité' in *Architecture et Comportement*, vol. 5 (Lausanne, 1989), pp. 127-34.

22 In a passage from *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (GA 9), Heidegger tries to explain the approach to the Me and the You on the basis of being-self by noting that in *Sein und Zeit* it was only a question of being-self, of neutral selfhood, even when the sexual difference was in question. What interests us here is to note that at no time does he articulate the question of selfhood in connection with intersubjective spacing, which latter is however implied in the distinction of 'mine-thine'.

23 See GA 26, S. 173-4. The work by D. Frank, *Heidegger et le problème de l'espace* turns around these questions.

24 *Sein und Zeit*, S. 70.

25 Cf. *ibid.*, S. 211.

26 *ibid.*, S. 82.

27 See *ibid.*, §75, in part, also S. 389.

28 *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, French tr., p. 130.

29 See on this question the excellent work by Pierre Kaufmann, *L'Experience emotionnelle de l'espace* (Paris: Vrin, 1967).

30 *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, French tr., pp. 95-6; tr. W. B. Barton and Vera Deutsch as *What is a Thing?* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967), pp. 84-6.

31 *ibid.*, p. 97.

32 *ibid.*, p. 98. See here also the article by Catherine Chevalley (chap. 63, vol. IV of the present work.)

33 Cf. *The Will to Power*. See on this question Erich Heller's essay: 'Nietzsche's last words about art versus truth', which constitutes chap. 9 of *The Importance of Nietzsche – Ten Essays* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988).

34 See Meyer Schapiro, and the discussion of this text by J. Derrida in 'La vérité en peinture' in *La vérité en peinture*.

35 Cf. 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes' in *Holzwege* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1972), S. 233. English tr. Albert Hofstadter in *Poetry, Language, Thought* (Harper & Row, 1971).

36 On rootedness.

37 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes', S. 31, in *Holzwege*.

38 Cf. 'Heraklits Lehre vom Logos' in *Heraklit*, GA 55 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979), S. 335.

39 Cf. 'Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit – Aus einem Feldweggespräch über das Denken' in *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*, GA 13, S. 45ff.

40 *ibid.*, S. 47.

41 'Bauen Wohnen Denken' in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, 4th edn (Tübingen: Neske, 1978), S. 140. English tr. Albert Hofstadter in *Poetry, Language, Thought*.

42 *ibid.*, S. 141.

43 Cf. Plato, *Gorgias*, 508a.

44 Heidegger, 'Wozu Dichter?' in *Holzwege*, S. 283.

45 Heidegger, 'Bauen Wohnen Denken', S. 143ff.

46 *ibid.*, S. 148.

47 *ibid.*, S. 151.

48 Heidegger, 'Die Kunst und der Raum' (St Gallen: Eiker. Vlg, 1969), S. 11/GA 13, S. 208.

49 R. Penrose, 'Au coeur de la terre natale' in *Hommage à Moore* (Paris: éd. XXIème siècle, 1972), p. 12.

50 Goethe, cited by Heidegger, 'Die Kunst und der Raum', GA 13, S. 210.

51 Heidegger, 'Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens' in *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976), S. 72. English tr. Joan Stambaugh in *On Time and Being* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 65.

Heidegger on time and being

Joseph J. Kockelmans

Introduction

On January 31, 1962, Heidegger gave a lecture at the University of Freiburg in a Studium Generale directed by Eugen Fink. The title of the lecture, 'Zeit und Sein',¹ is a reference to the third section of the first part of *Being and Time*, which was originally announced under that title in 1927, but not published at the time. The first part of *Being and Time* was devoted to an interpretation of *Dasein* in terms of temporality, and to an explanation of time as the transcendental horizon for the question concerning the meaning of Being.² In 1927, however, Heidegger felt he was not able to deal adequately with the theme indicated by the title of the third section of Part I of the book and decided therefore to publish his work in incomplete form.³ In 1962 Heidegger stated explicitly that the lecture, 'Zeit und Sein', represented an attempt to solve the question which had been left unanswered in *Being and Time*; what he said in his lecture on the issue, however, is substantially different from what he would have said about it, had the essay been written in 1927. 'That which is contained in the text of this lecture, written 35 years later, can no longer be linked up with the text of *Sein und Zeit*', Heidegger wrote. 'And yet the leading question has remained the same; however, this simply means that the question has become still more questionable and still more alien to the spirit of the time.'⁴

A first reading of the text shows that in 1962 Heidegger continued to subscribe to the *basic* ideas developed in *Being and Time*. Therefore, however new this essay may be in many aspects, one must read it so that its interpretation will remain in harmony with the basic conception of his original view.⁵ On the other hand it is clear, also, that the text of the lecture contains many elements which transcend the general perspective of *Being and Time*. This is due mainly to the fact that Heidegger's

investigations from 1927 to 1962 on the meaning of Being (*Sein*) opened up new insights which could not have been expected on the basis of *Being and Time* in 1927. One sees in the Time-lecture, too, that whereas Heidegger's view on the meaning of Being and the aboriginal Event (*Ereignis*) is the same as that found in the main works written from 1935 to 1962, the conception of time defended in it is relatively new, and the explanation of the relationship between time and Being and their mutual relationship to the aboriginal Event (which constitute the main themes of the lecture), again move along lines which are new and partly even surprising.

The questions I wish to deal with in this essay are the following:

1) Precisely what does the Time-lecture say about 'time'? 2) How does Heidegger conceive of the relationship between 'time' and Being? 3) What does he say about the relationship between 'time' and Being on the one hand and the aboriginal Event on the other? But in order to be able to compare the later view with the view found in *Being and Time*, I wish first to add a few reflections on Heidegger's original conception of time and attempt to present an idea of what Heidegger might have said in the section 'Time and being', if it had been published in 1927. It seems to me that this way of approaching the Time-lecture is the one which will best enable us to appreciate the new ideas suggested here.

I am well aware of the fact that all of these questions are difficult as well as of far-reaching importance for a genuine understanding of Heidegger's thought. Obviously, I shall not be able to deal exhaustively with them within the space limitations set for this essay. But I hope, nonetheless, to be able to bring to light the elements which are vital for a preliminary understanding of the contributions Heidegger wished to make in his 1961 essay.

I Heidegger's original conception of time (1927)

As the title of the book would suggest, the concept of time occupies a privileged position in *Being and Time*. Already in the book's brief preface Heidegger presents his view on how Being and time are to be related. 'Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question concerning the meaning of Being. . . . Our provisional aim is the interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being.'⁶ In the title of the first Part of the book Heidegger returns to this relationship: the interpretation of *Dasein* in terms of temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*), and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question concerning the meaning of Being.⁷

The first part of the Book consists of two major divisions: A preparatory analysis of *Dasein* and a second division on the relationship between

Dasein and temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*). In the first division Heidegger takes as his guiding clue the fact that the essence of man consists in his ek-sistence, that toward which man stands out is 'the world', and thus that for this reason man can be described as 'Being-in-the-world'. The main task of the first division is to unveil the precise meaning of this compound expression; but in so doing the final goal remains the preparation of an answer for the question concerning the meaning of Being. Heidegger justifies this approach to the Being-question by pointing out that man taken as Being-in-the-world, is the only being who can make himself transparent in his own mode of Being. The very asking of this question is one of this entity's modes of Being, and as such it receives its essential character from what is inquired about, namely Being. 'This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term "*Dasein*".'⁸

A preparatory analysis of *Dasein*'s Being can only serve to *describe* the Being of this being; it cannot interpret its meaning. As a preparatory procedure it merely tries to lay bare the horizon for the most primordial way of interpreting Being. Once this horizon has been reached, the preparatory analytic of *Dasein* is to be repeated on a higher, genuinely ontological level. Heidegger repeats here that this horizon is to be found in temporality, taken as the *meaning* of the Being of *Dasein*. That is why on a second level all structures of *Dasein*, exhibited provisionally in the first division, must be re-interpreted as modes of temporality. But in thus interpreting *Dasein* as temporality, the question concerning the meaning of Being is not yet answered; only the ground is prepared here for later obtaining such an answer.⁹

If it is true that *Dasein* has a preontological understanding of Being and if it is true that temporality is the meaning of the Being of *Dasein*, then one can show that whenever *Dasein* tacitly understands and interprets Being, it does so with time as its standpoint. Thus time must be brought to light as the horizon for all understanding of Being and this horizon itself is to be shown in terms of temporality, taken as the Being of *Dasein* which understands Being. It is obvious that in this context our pre-philosophical conception of time is of no help and the same thing is true for the conception of time which has persisted in philosophy from Aristotle to Bergson. This traditional conception of time and the ordinary way of understanding time have sprung from temporality taken as the meaning of the Being of *Dasein*.¹⁰

Normally we conceive of time as an endless succession of 'nows', whereby the 'not-yet-now' (future) passes by the 'present now' to become immediately a 'no-longer-now'. The future thus consists of the 'nows' that have not yet come, whereas the past consists of the 'nows' that once were but no longer are; the present is the 'now' which at the moment is. On the basis of this conception we can make a distinction between

temporal and non-temporal entities; 'temporal' then means 'being in time'. Thus time, in the sense of 'being in time', functions as a criterion for distinguishing realms of Being. No one has ever asked the question of how time can have this distinctive ontological function; nor has anyone asked whether the authentic ontological relevance which is possible for time, is expressed when time is used in such a naively ontological manner. These questions must be asked here and it will be clear that if Being is to be understood in terms of time and if its various derivatives are to become intelligible in their respective derivations by taking time into consideration, then Being itself must be made visible in its 'temporal' character; but in this case 'temporal' no longer means 'being in time'. From this perspective even the non-temporal and supra-temporal are 'temporal' with regard to their being, and this not only privatively but also positively. It is this temporality of Being which must be worked out in the fundamental ontology whose task it is to interpret Being as such.¹¹

Temporality is furthermore the condition which makes historicity possible as a temporal kind of Being which *Dasein* itself possesses. Historicity stands here for the state of Being which is constitutive for *Dasein*'s coming-to-pass (*geschehen*) as such. *Dasein* is as it already was and it is what it already was. It is its past, not only in the sense that its past is, as it were, pushing itself along 'behind' it, and which *Dasein* thus possesses as a kind of property which is still present-at-hand; *Dasein* is its past in the way of its own Being which, to put it roughly, 'comes-to-pass' out of its future on each occasion. *Dasein* has grown up in a traditional way of understanding itself interpretatively. Its own past, which includes the past of its generation, is not something which just follows along after *Dasein*, but something which already goes ahead of it. But if *Dasein* itself as well as its own understanding are intrinsically historical, then the inquiry into Being itself is to be characterized by historicity as well. Thus by carrying through the question of the meaning of Being and by explicating *Dasein* in its temporality and historicity, the question itself will bring itself to the point where it understands itself as historical (*historisch*).¹²

After making these preliminary remarks which merely describe what is to be accomplished by the analytic of man's Being, Heidegger does not return to the question of temporality and time until the last chapter of the first division which is devoted to care (*Sorge*) as the genuine Being of *Dasein*. In trying to explain just what is meant by the compound expression 'Being-in-the-world' Heidegger first focuses on the ontological structure of the world,¹³ then he tries to answer the question of who it is that *Dasein* is in its everydayness,¹⁴ and finally proceeds to explain what is meant by 'Being-in-as-such'.¹⁵ In the introduction to this last issue Heidegger explicitly repeats that that being which is essentially constituted by its Being-in-the-world, is itself in every case its own 'there'

(*Da*). When one speaks of the *lumen naturale* in man, one refers to this existential-ontological structure of man that he *is* in such a way that he is his own 'there'. This means among other things that *Dasein* carries in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off; *Dasein* because of this 'there' is to be characterized by its disclosedness. By reason of this fundamental disclosedness *Dasein*, together with the Being-there (*Da-sein*) of the world, is 'there' for itself. In the existential constitution of *Dasein*'s disclosedness three equally constitutive components are to be distinguished, namely original understanding, original mood, and *logos* (*Rede*).¹⁶

After explaining the meaning of the compound expression 'being-in-the-world' along these lines by describing its basic constitutive elements, Heidegger sets out to account for the unity of *Dasein*'s Being: How are the unity and totality of that structural whole which we have pointed out, to be defined in an existential-ontological manner?¹⁷ Heidegger tries to answer this question by pointing out first that care (*Sorge*) is the unifying factor which integrates into a unity the multiple elements of the Being of that being whose Being is precisely such that it is concerned about its own Being. By taking his point of departure in a descriptive interpretation of anxiety (*Angst*) Heidegger is able to show that *Dasein* is a being who has the inexhaustible potentiality of transcending beings into Being; but, if *Dasein* has the ek-static nature of ek-sistence, it is always ahead of itself. *Dasein*'s ek-sistence, however, is essentially co-determined by thrownness; *Dasein* is like a process which is not its own source; it always is already begun and yet it is still to be achieved. Finally, *Dasein* in its essential dependence upon world is fallen to the 'world', to the intramundane things of its everyday concern and thus caught by the way things are publicly interpreted by the 'they'. Ek-sistentiality taken together with thrownness and fallenness explains why the very Being of *Dasein* is to be understood as care.¹⁸

In order to be able to show *Dasein*'s Being in its totality Heidegger turns to *Dasein*'s final term, death. He describes death as a genuine, but also as the ultimate possibility of man's Being. It is that possibility in which man's own Being-in-the-world as such is at stake. Death reveals to man the possibility of his further impossibility. In other words, death is that possibility which makes the potentiality which *Dasein* is, limited through and through. Man is thoroughly and irretrievably finite because his own death is that fundamental possibility which from the very beginning leaves its mark upon man's life and, thus, is a manner of Being which *Dasein* must assume as soon as it begins to ek-sist.¹⁹

In his fallen condition *Dasein* tries to forget the authentic meaning of death so that the question now becomes one of how one is to come to an authentic interpretation of the meaning of death, and thus to genuine authenticity. In Heidegger's view this can be shown by interpreting the

basic constituents of care (ek-sistence, facticity = thrownness, and fallenness) in terms of an existential-ontological conception of death.

Dasein which has come to authentic Being knows that death is constitutive for all of its possibilities and that the ultimate possibility of its own ek-sistence is to give itself up.²⁰ If *Dasein* genuinely realizes this then it no longer flees from the definitiveness of its end and accepts it as constitutive of its finitude and thus makes itself free for it.²¹ Now at the moment that *Dasein* understands death as its ultimate possibility, as that possibility which makes its own Being impossible, and at the moment that it accepts this final possibility as its very own by listening to the voice of conscience,²² *Dasein* begins to become transparent to itself as that which it is in itself, in its own Self. For death does not just appear to *Dasein* in an impersonal way; it lays claim to it as this individual *Dasein*. By listening to the voice of conscience, by really understanding the genuine meaning of death in 'guilt', and by accepting it as its own death, *Dasein* breaks away from inauthenticity in resolve.²³

Now it will be obvious that if all of this is to be true, then man's Being must be intrinsically temporal and temporality, in the final analysis, must constitute the primordial ontological basis of *Dasein's* ek-sistentiality.²⁴ For what does the authentic man do? He realizes his radical finitude by anticipating death, by including it in advance in every project. By anticipating death in all its projects *Dasein* receives its Being precisely as its own, as its ownmost 'personal' ek-sistence so that it really comes to itself.²⁵ But this coming-to-itself is what is meant by 'future', if the term is taken in its primordial sense: This letting itself come towards itself in that distinctive possibility which *Dasein* has to put up with, is the primordial phenomenon of *Zu-kunft*, coming-towards, future.²⁶

But *Dasein's* temporality extends not only to the future; it has also the character of a 'having been'. *Dasein* can project itself towards its own death only insofar as it already is. In order to realize its ownmost Being, *Dasein* has to accept, together with its own death, also its thrownness, its facticity, that which it is already. Death cannot be *its* death if it has no relation to what *Dasein* already is. Authentically futural, *Dasein* is equally authentically 'having been' (*Gewesen*). To anticipate one's ultimate and ownmost possibility is to come back understandingly to one's ownmost 'having-been'.²⁷

Thus far we have seen that *Dasein's* coming is a coming to a Self that already is as having-been; on the other hand, *Dasein* is what it has been only as long as the future continues to come. We must now turn to temporal nearness, the present. According to Heidegger, the genuine meaning of the present consists in a 'making present' (*Gegenwärtigen*). *Dasein*, as temporalizing, makes things present; this is the essential meaning of the present as it primordially appears to *Dasein*. Anticipating resolve discloses the actual situation of the *Da* in such a way that ek-

sistence, in its action, can be circumspectively concerned with what is factually ready-to-hand in the actual situation, that is, letting that which has environmental presence be encountered, is possible only by *making* such a being *present*.²⁸

The 'making present' of what has presence presupposes, on the one hand, the future as anticipation of *Dasein's* possibilities and, on the other, the return to what has-been. By virtue of *Dasein's* understanding of its own Being, thus, *Dasein* is able to understand the human situation as a whole; at the same time intramundane beings can manifest themselves to it in their belonging to a world. Thus, what Heidegger calls 'making-present' presupposes the 'having been' and the 'future'. The present is as the resultant of the two other ek-stases of time. 'Having been' arises from the 'future' in such a way that the future which has already been releases the present from itself. What is meant by temporality is precisely the unity of this structural whole; the future which makes present in the process of having been. Only insofar as *Dasein* is characterized by temporality can it realize its authentic Being. Thus temporality reveals itself here as the meaning of authentic care.²⁹

From all of this, it becomes clear that *Dasein* can realize its total unity only by temporalizing itself. This 'becoming temporal' includes at the same time future, having-been, and present. These three 'phases' of time imply one another and nonetheless are mutually exclusive. For this reason Heidegger calls them the 'ek-stases' of primordial time. We must now examine the nature of the relations which connect these ek-stases of time with the structural elements of care. According to Heidegger, care must be characterized by ek-sistence (having to be ahead of itself), facticity or thrownness (already being in the world), and fallenness (being absorbed in intramundane things). As basically Being-able-to-be (*Sein-können*), *Dasein* is always ahead of itself, ahead of what it actually is. That is why its understanding has the character of a project. It is precisely because *Dasein* possesses the ontological structure of projecting (*Verstehen*) that it can always be ahead of its actual being. However, being ahead-of-itself, *Dasein* always is already in a world and is of necessity involved in it. Thus, *Dasein* cannot go beyond itself without being 'thrown' into the world. This means that ek-sistence as Being-ahead-of-itself always includes facticity. Finally, *Dasein*, which is in a world into which it has been thrown, always discovers itself there as absorbed by that which immediately manifests itself there and with which it deals concernfully (fallenness). But now the relationship between *Dasein's* essential temporality and care will be clear at once. Heidegger expresses it as follows: "The 'ahead-of-itself' (ek-sistentiality) is grounded in the future. The 'being-already-in' (facticity) makes known the 'having been'. 'Being-at' (fallenness) becomes possible in 'making-present'."³⁰

After showing that the very Being of *Dasein* consists in care whereas

care, in turn, is understood in terms of temporality, Heidegger tries to explain how man's temporality in its modifiability is the principle for the distinction of his possible modes of Being. *Dasein* is essentially temporal; it temporalizes time. If it takes the temporalization of time upon itself, it *is* in an authentic way; however, if it takes itself as a temporal thing which finds itself in a temporal horizon, it is in an inauthentic manner. One has to realize, however, that *Dasein* would not be able to temporalize time authentically, if man did not always find himself already in a temporal openness, somehow connected with his own 'inner-temporality'. In other words, man can ek-sist authentically only if in his historicity he expressly endures his destiny of having to temporalize time as finite, that is as a mortal being. But this means that 'inner-temporality' and historicity are inseparable. When man turns toward historicity, he is able to ek-sist authentically; however, if he turns to his own 'inner-temporality' he forgets himself in his concern for what is ready-to-hand or in his presentation of what is present-at-hand.³¹

Ek-sistence, Being-present-at-hand, and Being-ready-to-hand, thus, are intrinsically connected with man's temporality. But this means that the temporality of *Dasein* is not only the principle for the division of *Dasein's* modes of Being, but the time which is temporalized by *Dasein* is also the principle of the division of the meaning of Being into possible significations of Being (namely Being as ek-sistence, as present-at-hand, as ready-to-hand, etc.). But this means, in turn, that a description of the various interplayings of the three dimensions of temporality can give us a guiding-clue for the division of the significations of Being.³²

We have defined *Dasein's* Being as care and found that the ontological meaning of care is temporality. We have seen, also, that temporality constitutes the disclosedness of *Dasein's there*. Now in the disclosedness of this 'there', the world is disclosed along with it. But this means that world, taken as Total-meaningfulness, must likewise be grounded in temporality. The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, taken as ek-static unity, has something like a horizon within it. For ek-stases are not simple 'raptures' in which one gets carried away; rather, there belongs to each ek-stasis a kind of 'whither' to which one is carried away. Let us call this whither of the ek-stases the 'horizontal schema'. The schema then in which *Dasein* comes toward itself futurally is the 'for the sake of which'; the schema in which *Dasein* is disclosed to itself in its thrownness is to be taken as that 'in the face of which' it has been thrown and that 'to which' it has been abandoned; this characterizes the horizontal schema of what has been. Finally the horizontal schema for the present is defined by the 'in order to'.

The unity of the horizontal schemata of future, present, and having been, is grounded in the ek-static unity of temporality. The horizon of

temporality as a whole determines that whereupon each ek-sisting being factually is disclosed. With its factual Being-there, a Being-able-to-be is projected in the horizon of the future, its being-already is disclosed in the horizon of having-been, and that with which *Dasein* concerns itself in each case is discovered in the horizon of the present. The horizontal unity of the schemata of these ek-stases connects in a primordial way the relationships of the 'in order to' with the 'for the sake of which' so that on the basis of the horizontal constitution of the ek-static unity of temporality, there belongs to *Dasein* in each case something like a world that has been disclosed. Just as the present (*Gegenwart*) arises in the unity of the temporalizing of temporality out of the future and the having-been, so in the same way the *horizon* of a present temporalizes itself equiprimordially with *those* of the future and the having-been. Thus, insofar as *Dasein* temporalizes itself, a world *is*. In temporalizing itself in regard to its own Being, *Dasein* as temporality is essentially in a world because of the ek-static-horizonal constitution of his temporality. The world, therefore, is not ready-to-hand as a piece of equipment, nor present-at-hand as a thing, but it temporalizes itself in temporality. It is there with the outside-of-itself typical for the ek-stases. If no *Dasein* ek-sists, then no world is 'there' either.

In all forms of concern and in all objectification the world is always already presupposed; for all of these forms are possible only as ways of Being-in-the-world. Having its ground in the horizontal unity of ek-static temporality, the world is transcendent. It is already ek-statically disclosed before any entities-within-the-world can be encountered. Temporality maintains itself ek-statically within the horizons of its own ek-stases and in temporalizing itself it comes back from these ek-stases to those entities which are encountered in the 'there'. Thus the Total-meaningfulness which determines the structure of the world is not a network of forms which a worldless subject lays over some kind of material; *Dasein*, understanding itself and its world ek-statically in the unity of the 'there', rather comes back from these horizons to the entities encountered within them. Coming back to these entities in understanding is the existential meaning of letting them be encountered by making them present.³³

There is finally a relationship between *Dasein*'s spatiality and its temporality. *Dasein* must be considered as temporal and 'also' as spatial coordinately. In clarifying this relationship, Heidegger says, it cannot be our intention to explain *Dasein*'s 'spatio-temporal' character by pointing out that *Dasein* is an entity which is 'in space as well as in time'. Furthermore, since temporality is the very meaning of the Being of care, it will be impossible to 'reduce' temporality to spatiality. On the other hand, to demonstrate that spatiality is existentially possible only through temporality is not tantamount to deducing space from time. What we must aim at is the uncovering of the temporal conditions for the possi-

bility of the spatiality which is characteristic of *Dasein* – a spatiality upon which the uncovering of space within the world is to be founded. When we say that *Dasein* is spatial, we do not mean to say that as a thing *Dasein* is present-at-hand in space. *Dasein* as such does not fill up space, but it rather takes space in, this to be understood in the literal sense. In ek-sisting *Dasein* has already made free for itself a leeway (*Spielraum*). It determines its own position or location by coming back from the space it has made free to the place which it occupies.

When *Dasein* makes room for itself it does so by means of directionality and de-severance (by making distances disappear). How is this possible on the basis of *Dasein*'s temporality? Let us give an example of our everyday concern with things. When *Dasein* makes room for itself and the things with which it is concerned, it has first to discover a region in which it can assign places to the things in question. In so doing it must bring these things close, and situate them in regard to one another and in regard to itself. *Dasein* thus has the character of directionality and de-severance. All of this, however, presupposes the horizon of a world which has already been disclosed. But if this is so, and if it is essential for *Dasein* to be in a mode of fallenness, then it is clear also that only on the basis of its ek-static-horizonal temporality is it possible for *Dasein* to break into space. For the world is not present-at-hand in space and yet only within a world does space let itself be discovered.³⁴

It seems to me that this brief resumé of some of the basic ideas of Heidegger's original conception of time should suffice to explain what Heidegger intends to say in his 1962 lecture. But before turning to the lecture itself I wish first to reflect for a moment upon the intrinsic limitations of his original view of time, particularly with respect to the problem concerning the meaning of Being.

II From *Being and Time* to 'Time and being'³⁵

In Heidegger's view *Being and Time* (1927) was meant to be a 'fundamental ontology' which was to prepare the way for a 'genuine ontology' whose main task it would be to focus on the question concerning the meaning of Being. Fundamental ontology consists substantially in an analytic of *Dasein*'s Being as Being-in-the-world, to be developed by means of a hermeneutic phenomenology. In the first part of the book Heidegger conceives of *Dasein* in terms of care, whereas in the second part care is understood as temporality: The meaning of the Being of *Dasein* is temporality. All of this was to prepare the answer for a more basic question concerning the temporal character (*Zeithaftigkeit*) of the meaning of Being itself. 'In our considerations hitherto, our task has been to interpret the primordial whole of factual *Dasein* with regard to

its possibilities of authentic and inauthentic Being, and to do so in an existential-ontological manner in terms of its very basis. Temporality has manifested itself as this basis and accordingly as the meaning of the Being of care. . . . Nevertheless, our way of exhibiting the constitution of *Dasein's* Being is only one way which we may take. Our aim is to work out the question of Being in general.³⁶ In other words, once temporality is laid bare as the meaning of *Dasein's* Being, the decisive step is still to be taken: The step namely which leads from this kind of temporality to the temporality characteristic of the meaning of Being. This last step is not taken in *Being and Time*. Heidegger published the book in an incomplete form and in the last sentences of it pointed to the work that in his view remains to be done: 'The existential-ontological constitution of *Dasein's* totality is grounded in temporality. Hence the ek-static projection of Being must be made possible by some primordial way in which ek-static temporality temporalizes. How is this mode of temporalizing temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way which leads from primordial time to the meaning of Being? Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being?'³⁷

By publishing the book in an incomplete form in 1927 Heidegger admitted that he had not completely succeeded in the task he had set for himself. The basic question he encountered was the following: Once the temporality of *Dasein* is grasped in the unity of its three ek-stases, how can this temporality of *Dasein* be interpreted as the temporality of the understanding of Being and how is the latter, in turn, related to the meaning of Being? Originally Heidegger thought he had found a way to answer this question, but it appeared almost immediately that that way led away from what he really wished to accomplish, namely to show that time is the transcendental horizon of the question of Being.³⁸ For on the basis of the analyses as they are actually found in *Being and Time* it is still not yet clear precisely what is to be understood by 'transcendence' taken as the overcoming of beings in the direction of Being. In addition there is the question of the exact relationship between *Dasein's* temporality and time as the transcendental horizon for the question concerning the meaning of Being. Exactly what is meant here by 'transcendental'? This much is clear: The term 'transcendental' does not mean the objectivity of an object of experience as constituted by consciousness (Kant, Husserl), but rather refers to the project-domain for the determination of Being as seen from the viewpoint of *Dasein's there*.³⁹ But even in this supposition it is still not yet clear what the precise relationship is between the temporality of *Dasein* and time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being, because it is not clear how *Dasein's* understanding of Being is to be related to the meaning of Being. Heidegger says that meaning is that in which the intelligibility of something maintains itself.⁴⁰ The meaning of Being then is that in which the intelligibility of Being

maintains itself. But what is the precise relationship between Being's intelligibility and *Dasein's* understanding of Being? In the introduction to the second part of the book Heidegger argues that 'to lay bare the horizon within which something like Being in general becomes intelligible, is tantamount to clarifying the possibility of having any understanding of Being at all – an understanding which itself belongs to the constitution of the being called *Dasein*'.⁴¹ But precisely what is meant by 'being tantamount to'? If one takes this statement literally, it means that *Dasein* has an absolute priority over the meaning of Being and then relativism seems to be the final outcome of the investigation. Heidegger saw this danger and it took him a number of years to find a way to avoid it without being forced into a position of having to appeal to a 'God of the philosophers', regardless of the concrete form in which this 'God' might be proposed.

There are a number of other issues which did not receive *final* answers in *Being and Time*, problems such as the idea of phenomenology, the relationship between ontology and science, the relationship between time and space, a further determination of *logos*, the relationship between language and Being, the relationship between Being and truth, etc.⁴² But rather than focusing on any one of these, let us turn our attention again to the problem concerning the relationship between *Dasein's* temporality and time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being, and this time from a slightly different point of view.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger was guided by the idea that in the ontological tradition Being was understood mainly as presence-at-hand⁴³ as continuous presence, and thus from one of the dimensions of time, namely the present. Heidegger wished to bring the onesidedly accentuated 'continuous presence' back into the full, pluridimensional time, in order then to try to understand the meaning of Being from the originally experienced time, namely temporality. In his attempt to materialize this goal, he was guided by a second basic idea, namely that each being can become manifest with regard to its Being in many ways, so that one has to ask the questions of just what is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permeates all of its multiple meanings. But this question raises others: What, then, does Being mean? To what extent (why and how) does the Being of beings unfold in various modes? How can these various modes be brought into a comprehensible harmony? Whence does Being as such (not merely being as being) receive its ultimate determination?⁴⁴

Heidegger had studied some of these modes of Being in the interpretative analyses of *Being and Time*, and thus, at the very end of the book, found himself led to consider the question of whether or not there is a basic meaning of Being from which all other meanings can be derived by *taking time* (understood as temporality) as a *guiding clue*. In view of

the fact that man's understanding is intrinsically historical, the further question must be asked of whether man's understanding of Being's meaning is intrinsically historical, also, or whether the understanding of Being can perhaps in some sense have a 'supra-temporal' character. In *Being and Time* Heidegger was unable to answer the first question adequately because he had not been able to find a satisfactory solution for the second. For upon closer consideration his conception of historicity as found in *Being and Time* seems to be ambiguous. Historicity is described in the book first as the genuine temporalization of time and the principle of the distinction between *Dasein's* modes of Being, and then later it is said that historicity is the medium in which all ontological understanding must maintain itself.⁴⁵ It does not seem to be possible to defend both theses simultaneously; and even if there should be a position from which one could defend both, even then it would still not be clear in what sense the meaning of Being itself is affected by historicity.

In the decade following the publication of *Being and Time* Heidegger eliminated part of the initial ambiguity by first examining more carefully how different significations of Being become differentiated in the fundamental meaning of Being and how temporality, indeed, is the principle of these distinctions. In so doing, he could maintain his original view that the meaning of Being is the 'Ground' in which all significations of Being are to be grounded and from which all understanding of Being nourishes itself. On the other hand, however, the meaning of Being cannot be understood in terms of an eternal standard being ('the God of the philosophers'); rather it must be conceived of as an abysmal, groundless 'ground'. For the *fact* that Being comes-to-pass in the way it does, and for the *fact* that an understanding of Being emerges in the way we actually find it, no one can indicate a ground, because each process of grounding already presupposes the meaning of Being. When the meaning of Being lets a determinate signification of Being become the standard signification, then it 'groundlessly' bars other significations and even itself *as* the ground of the manifold possible other significations. It is in this sense that Being shows and hides itself at the same time and why the meaning of Being is to be called 'truth', unconcealment, whose coming-to-pass is and remains a mystery and whose 'happening' is historical in a sense which cannot be understood on the basis of what we usually call history.

Furthermore, the world taken as the building-structure of the truth of Being is that organized structure which is stratified in many ways and is constructed according to the manner in which time temporalizes itself. This temporalization of time itself is historical and thus the stratification of the organized structure of Being's truth is historical, too; as such it can be distinguished in various epochs. In each epoch we find in the world as the building-structure of the truth of Being manifold organized

and systematized 'layers' of meaning all of which refer to basic forms of 'experience' between which there is a tension, and concerning which it is difficult to see how they can all belong together. Heidegger's main concern is to explain how in a certain epoch (particularly our own) all these 'layers' can belong together in a whole, the world, and how in this world as the building-structure of Being's truth for this particular era the 'courses of Being are already traced out' and how therefore Being can encounter us in these particular, different ways, and not in others; thus how in this world Being itself shows and hides itself at the same time.⁴⁶

But between 1927 and 1962 Heidegger never explicitly returned to the main question underlying the basic idea which directed all of these investigations: The nature of time. It is obvious that the conception of time as temporality, found in *Being and Time*, is not adequate to account for all of this. Whereas in *Being and Time*, where Being and time are concerned, the priority is attributed to man, in the later works the privileged position is given to Being. If the original relationship between Being and time is to be maintained, then it would seem logical to attribute a privileged position to time in the coming-to-pass of truth, also. But if both Being as well as time do not depend upon man in the final analysis, do they then perhaps refer to 'something' else which precedes them in some sense? This is indeed the main theme of the Time-lecture which we shall now consider.

III 'Time and being' (1962)

The 'Zeit und Sein' lecture begins with a short preface in which Heidegger explains that he intends to say something about the attempt 'which thinks Being without any reference to a foundation of Being from the side of beings'.⁴⁷ In other words, in this lecture there will be no reference to a *summum ens* taken as *causa sui* which could be conceived of as the foundation of all that is; nor is Being to be understood here within the perspective of the metaphysical interpretation of the ontological difference, according to which Being is thought of merely for the sake of beings.⁴⁸ Heidegger believed such an attempt to be necessary for at least two reasons. First of all, without such an attempt it will be impossible to bring to light in a genuine way the Being of all that which we today encounter in the world as beings and which are fundamentally determined by the essence of technique (*Ge-stell*).⁴⁹ Secondly such an attempt is necessary if one is adequately to determine the relationship between man and that which until now has been called 'Being'.⁵⁰

Many people believe that philosophy should be oriented toward 'world-wisdom'. According to Heidegger, philosophy today finds itself in a position in which it must stay away from useful 'life-wisdom', and must

abandon immediate understanding, because a form of thought has become necessary from which everything that makes up the world in which we live receives its determination (works of art, complicated physical theories, technical instruments, computers, etc.)⁵¹

What is contained in the lecture to follow, Heidegger says, is no more than an attempt and a venture. The venture consists in the fact that the essay is formulated in propositions whereas its theme is such that this way of 'saying' is incongruous. What is important in the essay, therefore, is not so much the propositions of which it consists, but rather that to which the questions and answers by means of which Heidegger tried to approach that theme, point (*zeigen*). These questions and answers presuppose an experience of 'the thing itself', and it is for this experience on the part of the reader that Heidegger's essay tries to prepare.⁵²

1 *Being and time*

The first part of the essay deals with the relationship between Being and time. These two themes are mentioned together here because, from the very origin of Western thought, Being has been interpreted as Being-present (*Anwesen*), while Being-present and Presence (*Anwesenheit*) refer to the present (*Gegenwart*) which, in turn, together with the past and the future constitute what is characteristic of time. Thus as Being-present Being is determined by time. But in how far is Being determined by time? Why, in what way, and from what is it that time re-sounds in Being? It is obvious that any attempt to think about this relationship with the help of our everyday conceptions of Being and time is doomed to failure.

In our everyday life we say that things are in time; or also that they have their time. This way of speaking, however, does not apply to Being, for Being is not a thing. And since Being is not a thing it is not in time either. And yet Being is determined by time. On the other hand, what is in time we call the temporal. The temporal refers to what elapses with time. Thus time itself elapses; but while elapsing continuously, time nevertheless remains as time. Now 'to remain' means 'not to perish', and thus 'Being-present'. But this means that time is determined by a kind of Being. But how then can Being be determined by time? We must, therefore, come to the conclusion that Being is not a thing and thus not something temporal, although as Being-present it is determined by time. And on the other hand, time is not a thing and thus not something-which-is, and yet in elapsing it permanently remains, without it itself being something temporal. Therefore, Being and time determine one another in such a way that Being is not something temporal and time is not something-which-is.

By adopting Hegel's dialectic approach one could try to overcome these contradicting statements by transcending Being and time toward a

higher and more encompassing unity. But such an approach would certainly lead away from the 'things themselves' and their mutual relations; for such a procedure would certainly no longer deal with time as such nor with Being as such, nor with their mutual relationship. The genuine problem with which we are confronted here seems precisely to consist in the question of whether the relationship between Being and time is a relationship which results from a certain combination of Being and time, or whether perhaps this relationship itself is primary, so that Being and time result from it. In order to find an answer for this question we must try to think circumspectly about these 'things themselves', that is about Being and time, which are perhaps the two main themes of thought. The labels 'Being and time' and 'Time and being' refer to the relationship between these two themes, to that which keeps these two themes together. To reflect circumspectly upon this relationship is *the* theme of thought.⁵³

Being is a theme of thought, but it is not a thing; time is also a theme of thought, but it is nothing temporal. Of a thing we say: It is. With respect to Being and time we are more careful; here we say: There is Being, and there is time.⁵⁴ 'There is', this English expression stands for the German '*Es gibt*'. This can be understood to mean: 'It gives' in the sense of 'there is something which grants'.⁵⁵ If we follow this suggestion then the question is one of what this 'It' is which grants Being and time. And also: What is Being which is granted here? What is time which is given here? Let us first try to think about Being in order to grasp it in what is characteristic of it.

Being which marks each being as such means Being-present (*Anwesen*). In regard to that which is present, Being-present can be conceived of as letting-something-be-present. It is on this letting-be-present that we must focus our attention here. It is characteristic for this letting-be-present that it brings something into unconcealment. Letting-be-present means to unveil, to bring into the open. In the process of unveiling there is a kind of granting at work which grants Being-present, while it lets-be-present that which is present, namely beings. In this process we come again upon a granting, and thus upon an 'It' which grants.⁵⁶ We do not yet know precisely what this granting means, nor do we know what this 'It' refers to. One thing is clear, however. If one wishes to think about what is characteristic of Being as such, he must abandon the attempt to understand Being from the viewpoint of beings, to conceive of Being as the ground of beings. On the contrary, he must focus his attention on this typical granting and that mysterious 'It' which grants. Being somehow belongs to this granting; it is the gift of the 'It' which grants. Being is not something which is found outside the granting, as is the case with a common gift. In the granting Being as Being-present becomes changed. As letting-be-present it belongs to the unveiling itself, and as gift it

remains contained in the granting. For Being is not. Being as the unveiling of Being-present is granted by a mysterious 'It'.⁵⁷

Heidegger is of the opinion that the meaning of this 'It grants Being' can be explained in a clearer way by means of a careful reflection on the various changes which have taken place in what has been called 'Being'. As we have mentioned, since the origin of Western thought in Greece, Being has been referred to as Being-present. And even today, in the era of modern technique, Being is still pointed to as Being-present, namely as Being-present in its availability on which one can continuously count (*Ge-stell*). The fact that Being must be referred to as Being-present manifests itself in an analysis of what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. We find the same thing back when we reflect on the meaning of *Hen*, *Logos*, *Idea*, *ousia*, *energeia*, *substantia*, *actualitas*, *perceptio*, *monad*, objectivity, Reason, Love, Spirit, Power, Will-to-will in the eternal return of the same.

The unfolding of the fullness which shows itself in these changes manifests itself at first sight as a history of Being. However, Being has no history in the way a city or a nation has its history. The history-like character of the history of Being is determined only and exclusively from the way Being comes-to-pass, that is from the way in which 'It' grants Being.⁵⁸

Now from the very beginning people have reflected on Being, but no one has ever thought about the 'It' which grants Being. This 'It grants' withdraws in favor of that which it grants, namely Being. And Being itself, in turn, was almost immediately thought of in terms of beings, that is in its relationship to beings.

According to Heidegger, the kind of granting which grants only its gift but which itself withdraws should be called 'sending' (*Schicken*). This becomes immediately clear when one compares the case in which someone gives someone else a present with the case in which he sends it to him. Viewing it from this perspective, one may say that Being which is granted is that which has been sent and which (as sent) remains in each one of the modifications which we find in history. Thus, the historical character of the history of Being must be determined from that which is characteristic of this sending, and not from an undetermined coming-to-pass.

History of Being, therefore, means mittence of Being. And in the various ways of sending, the sending itself as well as that mysterious 'It' which sends, hold themselves back in the various manifestations in which Being shows itself. To hold oneself back means in Greek *epochē*. That is why we speak of epochs of Being's mittence. Epoch does not mean, therefore, a certain period of time in the happening, but the basic characteristic of the sending itself, that is to say this holding-itself-back in favor of the various manifestations of the gift, namely Being with

respect to the discovery of beings. The sequence of the epochs in Being's sending is neither arbitrary nor can it be predicted with necessity. And yet what is co-mitted manifests itself in the mittence also, just as well as that-which-belongs-to manifests itself in the belonging-together of the epochs. These epochs overlap in their sequence so that the original mittence of Being as Presence is more and more concealed in the various modifications of the unveiling. Only the 'demolition' of these concealments (destruction) will grant to thought a provisional insight into what then manifests itself as the mittence of Being.

When Plato represents Being as *Idea*, when Aristotle represents it as *energeia*, Kant as positing, Hegel as absolute Concept, and Nietzsche as Will to power, then these are doctrines which are not just accidentally brought forth. They are rather the 'words' of Being itself as answers to an address which speaks in the sending but which hides itself therein, that is to say in that mysterious 'It grants Being'. Each time contained in a mittence which withdraws itself, Being is unconcealed for thought in its epochal variational fullness. Thought remains bound to the tradition of these epochs of Being's mittence. This is true also, and particularly so, when thought reflects upon the question of how and from what Being itself receives the determinations which each time are characteristic of it, namely from this mysterious 'It grants Being'. For this granting manifests itself as mittence.

But how are we to conceive of this 'It' which grants Being? From the preceding pages as well as from the title of this essay, Heidegger says, one might expect that this is to be found in time.⁵⁹

Briefly summarizing this part of the lecture, we may say that Heidegger for the greater part repeats his view of Being as contained in *Letter on Humanism* (1947) and later works. Just as in *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger states here that the basic conception of *Being and Time* is to be maintained in this new perspective, although he warns explicitly that we should not confuse *Dasein*'s historicity with the 'historicity' of Being itself. Finally, in this part of the lecture many references are made to the aboriginal Event (*Ereignis*) under the guise of that mysterious 'It' which grants. Heidegger is to return to this in the last part of the lecture. But let us first look at his view on time.

We all know what time is and just as was the case with Being we have a common sense conception of it. It will be clear once again that this common sense conception is of no help here. We do not yet know what is characteristic of time as such. We have just seen that what characterizes Being, that is to say that to which it belongs and in which it remains contained, manifests itself in that mysterious 'It grants'. That which is characteristic of Being is not something being-like (*Seinsartiges*). Trying to understand what Being is, we are led away from Being toward the mittence which grants Being as a gift. We may expect that the same

thing will be true for time and that is why our common sense conception will be of no avail here, either. And yet the titles 'Being and time' and 'Time and being' suggest that we try to understand what is characteristic of time, the moment we try to understand what is characteristic of Being. For, as we have seen, Being means Being-present, letting-something-be present, Presence.

Presence is not the present, although the former almost immediately leads to the latter. Present (*Gegenwart*) suggests past and future, the earlier and the later in regard to the 'now'. Usually time is described in terms of the 'now', assuming that time itself is the 'sum' of present, past, and future. We seldom think of time in terms of Presence. The conception of time in terms of the 'now', as a series of 'nows' which succeed one another, of a one-dimensional continuum, was suggested by Aristotle and has since been defended by many thinkers. It is this time which we refer to when we measure time, when a 'temporal interval' is to be measured.⁶⁰

But obviously all of this does not answer the question of precisely what time is. Is time and does time have a place? Time is obviously not *nothing*. If we wish to express ourselves more carefully, we should say here again: There is time (*Es gibt Zeit*). Time must be understood from the 'present' and this must not be taken as 'now' but as Presence.

But what is to be understood by Presence (*Anwesenheit*)? Presence is that which determines Being as letting-be-present and revealing. But what kind of thing is this? In *Anwesen* (Being-present) we find *wesen* and *wesen* means *währen* (to last, to continue). But by realizing this we much too often jump immediately from *währen* to *dauern* (to last, to endure); this duration, in turn, conceived of in the light of our common sense conception of time, is mostly understood as an interval between one 'now' and another one. However, our speaking about *An-wesen* demands that we become aware of a staying and lingering (*weilen*) and dwelling (*verweilen*) in this *währen* as *Anwähren* (continuous lasting). This *An-wesen* concerns us men. But who are we? In trying to answer the question we must again proceed carefully; for it could very well be the case that man is to be defined in terms of what we are trying to reflect on; man himself is affected by the Presence while this 'goes on' and it is because of this that he himself can be present to all that is present and absent. Man stands in that which thus goes on (*Angang*) and in which Presence takes place; it is man who receives the Presence which that mysterious 'It' grants as a gift, while he learns what appears in the letting-be-present. If this were not so, man would not be man.⁶¹

It seems that by talking about man, we have lost the way, Heidegger says; for we are trying to determine what is characteristic of time. In some sense this may be true, and yet we are closer to what we are looking for than it may seem at first sight. Presence means: The continuous

lingering-dwelling (*verweilen*) which concerns man, reaches him, and is granted to him. But from where does this granting reaching come? We must realize here, Heidegger continues: 1) that man is always concerned with the presence of something which is present, and that he never immediately heeds the Presence itself; 2) that which is no longer present still concerns man and as such it is still present to him; in what has been, Presence is still granted in some sense; 3) that which is not yet presented is present in the sense that it approaches man; in that which approaches man, Presence is already granted to him. From this it follows that Presence does not always have the character of the present.

But how are we to determine this granting of the Presence in the present, past, and future? Does this granting consist in the fact that it reaches us, or does it reach us because it is in itself a granting? There is no doubt that the future grants and adduces the past, whereas the past grants the future. And this mutual granting gives the present at the same time. In this way we attribute a temporal character to this mutual granting. And thus it is not right to call the unity of this mutual granting time, for time is not something temporal; nor can we say that present, past, and future are there 'at the same time'. And yet their mutual granting of one another to each other belongs together in a unity. This unity which unites them must be determined from what is characteristic of them, namely from the fact that they grant one another to each other. But what is it that they grant to each other? Themselves, that is to say the Presence which is granted in them. That which comes to light in the mutual granting of one another to each other of present, past, and future is the Open, or also the time-space. This time-space precedes what we commonly call space and time. It is a three-dimensional Open in that it comes to light by means of a three-fold granting of present, past, and future.⁶²

But from what are we to determine the unity of the three dimensions of this time-space? We know already that a Presence is at work in the coming of what is not-yet-present as well as in the having-been of what is no-longer-present, and in what we usually call the present. This Presence does not belong to one of these three dimensions to the exclusion of the others. While the three dimensions give themselves over to one another and precisely in this passing of the one to the other (*Zuspiel*) still another granting manifests itself which opens up a fourth dimension. It is this latter granting which is characteristic of time itself and which brings about the Presence which is typical in each case for the coming, the having-been, and the present. It keeps these latter dimensions separated, and nevertheless it keeps them in each other's proximity, also, so that these three dimensions can remain close to one another. This is why one can call the primordial granting in which literally everything begins (*anfängt*) and in which the unity of genuine time precisely consists, a

proximity which brings near (*nahernde Nähe*). It brings close to one another the coming, the having-been, and the present by keeping them apart. For it keeps open the having-been by denying it its coming as present, just as it keeps open the coming by withholding the present in this coming, that is by denying it its being present. Thus the proximity which brings near has the character of a denial and withholding.⁶³

Time *is* not. 'It' gives time. The granting which gives time is to be determined from the proximity which denies and withholds. 'It' grants the Open of time-space and guards that which is denied in the having-been and that which is withheld in the coming. This granting thus is revealing and concealing at the same time; while granting the Open of time-space it hides itself as granting.

But where now is this mysterious 'It' which grants time and time-space? Obviously this question is not correctly formulated, for time has no place, no 'where'. Time is that pre-spatial 'place' which makes each 'where' precisely possible. Since the beginning of Western thought, people have asked this question and many of them have said with Aristotle and Augustine that 'time is in the soul'. Thus, time cannot be without man. The question, however, is one of whether or not it is man who gives time, or whether it is man to whom time is granted. In the latter case the question still remains of who or what 'It' is which gives time. One thing is clear, however, man is what he is only and exclusively because he stands within the three-fold granting and 'endures' the proximity which denies and withholds, and determines this granting. Man does not make time, and time does not make man. Expressions such as 'making', 'producing', and 'creating' do not make sense here.⁶⁴

Notwithstanding the great differences, the preceding passage on time undeniably is strongly reminiscent of what was said in *Being and Time* about the 'horizontal schemata' and spatio-temporality. It seems to me that the last paragraph of the Time-lecture which we have just considered refers to these sections of *Being and Time* and reminds us that the perspective of *Being and Time* is and remains pre-understood in the current reflections on time. *Dasein* plays an essential part in the coming-to-pass of Being as well as in the coming-to-pass of time as the transcendental horizon of Being. It is clear by now, however, that in this complex process *Dasein* is not the one who grants, but rather the one to whom all of this is given. But this still entails that without *Dasein* the granting would not have taken place. In that sense it remains true that if no *Dasein* ek-sists, then no world is 'there' either. On the other hand, if it is true that *Dasein* does not have the priority in the coming-to-pass of Being and time, then all that which *Being and Time* tried to describe from *Dasein*'s point of view, must now be described from the viewpoint of that mysterious 'It' which grants Being as well as time. Where, in *Being and Time*, the horizontal schemata were understood as that which

Dasein's understanding projects, it is now said that 'It' gives time in such a way that in time the ek-stases grant one another to each other. In other words, where in *Being and Time* the ek-stases were determined by the 'for the sake of which', the 'in the face of', and the 'in order to' of *Dasein's* projecting, they are determined now by the Open which is granted by the 'It' while the three dimensions give themselves over to one another.

2 'It' grants *Being and time*

We have seen that we must say: There is something which grants Being as well as time. But what now is this 'It'? In answering this question, Heidegger suggests, we must not think of this 'It' as a 'power' or a 'God'. We must try to determine it from Being as Presence and from time as the transcendental domain in which the clearing of the multiform Presence is granted.

The granting which is found in 'It grants Being' manifests itself as a mittance of Presence in its epochal transformations, whereas in the expression 'It grants time', it appears as a lighting presenting of a four-dimensional domain, the Open, time-space. Taking into consideration that in Being as Presence time manifests itself, one could expect that genuine time, the four-fold granting of the Open, constitutes that mysterious 'It' which grants Being as Presence. Genuine time would then be the 'It' we have in mind when we say 'It grants Being'. The mittance in which Being is granted, would then consist in the granting of time. But is it really true that time is that mysterious 'It' which grants being? By no means, for time itself, too, is the gift of an 'It grants'. Thus this mysterious 'It' is still undetermined.⁶⁵

Heidegger points out that perhaps we find ourselves in a very difficult situation here in that we have to use sentences of Indogermanic languages which do not have a clear theory about 'impersonal propositions'. He invites the reader, therefore, not to pay too much attention to the propositions, but rather to the 'thing itself' to which they refer. What is meant by the 'It' must be determined from that granting-process which belongs to it, that is the granting which at the same time is mittance (*Geschick*) and lighting presenting (*lichtendes Reichen*).

In the mittance of Being and the presenting of time there manifests itself an ap-appropriation making Being as Presence and time as the Open that which they properly are. That which makes both, namely Being and time, what they properly are (*Eigenes*) and makes them belong together, is what Heidegger calls *Ereignis*, aboriginal and ap-appropriating Event. The *Ereignis* makes Being and time belong together and brings both to what they properly speaking are. In other words, that mysterious 'It' about which we have spoken is the *Ereignis*. And this *Ereignis* is ontologically prior to Being as well as to time, because it is that which grants

to both what they properly are. – This expression is correct and yet it is not completely true, because it hides the original relationship between Being, time, and the Event.

But what then is this ap-propriating Event? Before trying to answer this question we must point once again to two difficulties connected with this question. We have already seen that this typical Event is such that it cannot be captured in a proposition. Furthermore, in asking the question: What is this ap-propriating Event we ask about the quiddity (*Was-sein*), the essence, the mode of Being, the way in which the Event abides and is present. But this presupposes that we already know what Being is and how Being is to be determined from the viewpoint of time. We have already seen that the mittance of Being rests on the revealing-concealing presenting of the pluriform Presence in the Open domain of time-space. But this presenting as well as that sending belong within the Event, and thus cannot be presupposed in the determination of the Event.⁶⁶

That is why it is perhaps better to say first what Event does not mean. The word 'event' does not have its common meaning here. It usually means occurrence, whereas in this case it means the ap-propriation taken as a presenting and sending. In other words, whereas it does not make sense to speak about the occurrence of Being, it does make sense to speak about Being as Event.

In the past people have tried to conceive of Being as *Idea*, *actualitas*, Will, and so on. One could think that Heidegger is suggesting here that it is now time to think of Being as Event. That this is not so becomes clear the moment one realizes that any attempt to understand Event as a modifying interpretation of Being is tantamount to trying to understand Being in terms of a typical kind of being, namely an event. One might proceed here along the following lines. Until now we have tried to think about Being in terms of Presence and letting-be-present in its relation to the showing-and-hiding presenting of genuine time. In this way it became clear that Being belongs to the Event. Thus it is from the Event that the granting as well as its gift (Being) must be determined. In this case one could say that Being is a kind of Event, but Event is not a kind of Being. Such a solution of the problem, however, is too cheap in that it hides the original relationship. Event is not a *summum genus* under which one must distinguish Being as well as time. As we have seen, Being has manifested itself as the gift of the mittance of Presence which is granted through the presenting of time. As such Being remains a property (*Eigentum*) of the ap-propriating Event; Being vanishes in the Event. And the same is true for time. In the ap-propriating Event, Being as letting-be-present is sent just as time is presented there. In the Event, Being as well as time are ap-propriated (*ereignet im Ereignis*).

But what about the Event itself? Is there anything more we can say about it?

Heidegger is of the opinion that, indeed, one could say more about it. In the preceding pages we came across expressions such as 'denying', 'withdrawing', 'withholding', etc., which made it clear that a certain 'withdrawal' (*Entzug*) is characteristic of the aboriginal Event. This clue can and should be followed up in greater detail. But Heidegger refrains from doing so for purely practical reasons.⁶⁷ He concludes the Time-lecture with a few general remarks on certain characteristics of the Event.

We have seen that the sending in the mittence of Being was determined as a granting; that which grants was said to hold to itself, to adhere to itself, to withhold itself; it withdraws from the revealment. A similar statement was made in regard to the presenting characteristic of time. But if it is true that the Event withdraws from revealment we may say that the Event ex-propriates itself from itself and that a certain ex-propriation is characteristic for the ap-propriating Event. This does not mean that the Event gives up itself, but precisely that it preserves its own property.

We have seen, also, that in Being as Presence there manifests itself a process which is going-on and which concerns us men in such a way that the vital characteristic of our humanity is to be found in becoming aware of this procedure and thus taking it over. But this acceptance of Presence's going-on rests on the fact that we stand in the domain of presenting which the four-dimensional time has passed on to us.

Insofar as Being and time are found only and exclusively in the ap-propriation (*das Ereignen*) there belongs to this as a characteristic the fact that it brings man who receives Being to that which is characteristic of him as he stands within the domain of genuine time. This belonging-to rests on the complete ap-propriation characteristic of the ap-propriating Event. It is this complete ap-propriation which lets man enter this Event. This is why we cannot conceive of the Event as something opposite to us or as something which encompasses everything. Representational thought has as little access to the Event as does a speaking in propositions.

Finally, by going from Being to the mittence of Being and from time to the presenting of time-space we have gained some access to the Event. It is of importance, however, to repeat once again: The Event is not a thing. The Event *is* not, nor is there something which gives the Event. The only thing we can say is: *das Ereignis ereignet*. This tautology points to what hides itself in truth as *a-letheia*.⁶⁸

IV Conclusion

We must now return to the main question Heidegger left unanswered in *Being and Time*. There can be no doubt that his thought has made considerable progress since 1927. Part of this development was already evident in *Letter on Humanism* (1947), where the priority in the coming-to-pass of truth is given to Being and a historicity is attributed to Being itself which is distinguished from, and independent of, *Dasein's* temporality and historicity. In other words, it is stated in *Letter on Humanism* that the historicity of the understanding of Being is not identical with Being's own historicity. In this and other works of the same period it was not yet clear how Heidegger believed he would be able to avoid relativism once the finitude and historicity of the Being-process is explicitly recognized and admitted. In this regard in *Letter on Humanism* Heidegger seems to adopt the following point of view.⁶⁹ The thinking of Being thinks Being as this grants itself in mittences. The various mittences taken together constitute Being's history. 'That is why thought which thinks upon the truth of Being is as thought historical.'⁷⁰ When a foundational thinker thinks the mittences of Being and formulates this in words, then his thought is historical. When he retrieves the thought of an earlier foundational thinker then his thought is historical in a second sense, but both these senses are complementary; in both cases Being comes (future) to the thinker as having-been in what is (past) and is made manifest (present) through the articulation of words. That is why the fundamental structure of thought is that of recollection.⁷¹ All thinkers then are engaged in the identical task, namely to think the mittences of Being, but each one accomplishes this in a different way. That is why there is no real progress in foundational thought.⁷² That the coming-to-pass of Truth in foundational thought leads to different expressions is connected with the fact that Being discloses itself while partly hiding itself. From this it follows that each expression is equally meaningful provided it understands itself *as* historical. Refutation in foundational thought is absurd.⁷³ Heidegger himself is aware of the danger of relativism which remains present in this view, also. He believes that one can overcome this danger by realizing that relativism makes sense only within a subject-object opposition. Once it is realized that the truth of an object is not to be considered as relative to a subject, relativism loses its meaning.⁷⁴ But this does not answer the question adequately, and the danger of relativism was not yet completely overcome in 1947. For there can be no doubt that Heidegger does not admit an absolute truth in the sense that there is a truth which is 'eternal' or 'praeter-historical'. Furthermore, in his view there is no necessary link between the various epochs of Being's history. 'The epochs never permit themselves to be derived from one another and, indeed, to be reduced to the sequence

of a consecutive process.' On the other hand, there is a relationship between the epochs in that each later epoch comes 'out of the concealment of the mittance'.⁷⁵

When later in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1954) and *Identität und Differenz* (1957) the ambiguity of the *Ereignis* conception as found in *Brief über den Humanismus* is removed, Heidegger was in a position to sharpen his position in regard to the question of relativism. It seems to me that it is one of the main contributions of the Time-lecture that it makes this later view explicit. Heidegger emphasizes once again the finitude of man, the finitude of man's comprehension of Being, the finitude of the coming-to-pass of truth, that is the finitude of the *Ereignis* itself. And yet he asks the question of whether a contemplative turning toward the *Ereignis* could perhaps lead to the end of Being's history. Heidegger says that the experience for which the lecture tried to prepare the reader, does not lead to an identification of Being and thought (Hegel), and yet in some sense this experience does lead to the end of the history of metaphysics. True, the *Ereignis* contains possibilities of unveiling which thought cannot yet distinguish and even less can push aside as irrelevant; thus the contemplative turning toward the *Ereignis* cannot 'stop' future mittences. But could it perhaps be that after the experience has been lived in that contemplative turning toward the *Ereignis* one can no longer speak of Being's history. Before the experience is lived thought remains either within one of the epochs (relativism), or it tries to transcend this epoch by appealing to the 'God of the philosophers' or another absolute. However, once this experience is lived one can understand each mittance as one possible mittance in which the *Ereignis* itself withdraws.⁷⁶

Heidegger returns to this issue in the question concerning the meaning of the term 'change' as found in the lecture in the expression *Wandlungsfülle des Seins*. From within classical metaphysics this means the changing forms of expressions in which Being shows itself historically in each epoch. Then the question is: By what is the sequence of the various epochs determined? Or, from where is this sequence determined? Why is the sequence the way it actually is? Hegel thought that the sequence is determined by a necessity which at the same time is the highest freedom. Heidegger believes that *on this level* one cannot ask and answer this question. One can only say here that the history of Being is the way it is. This 'that' is the only datum which, for thought, is to be accepted inevitably and thus 'with necessity'. One can even indicate then a certain regularity in the sequence and (for instance) claim that the sequence is 'guided' by an increasing forgottenness of Being.⁷⁷

From the viewpoint of the Time-lecture, however, that is to say from the viewpoint of the *experience* for which it tries to prepare us, the term has a different meaning. In the lecture it is said that Being is changed into *Ereignis*. On that level, the expression does not point to the various

manifestations of Being which follow one another, but to the fact that Being (with all its possible, epochal manifestations) is taken back into the *Ereignis*. In other words, if the philosopher looks at the *Wandlungsfülle des Seins* as has always been done in classical metaphysics, then this fullness falls apart in epochs which are no longer related to one another in a way that can be justified with necessity. One can bring a unity to the multiplicity only by introducing the 'God of the philosophers' as the one who gives the series a goal, or eventually who constitutes this goal. One can bring a kind of unity to this multiplicity by setting up a law or rule which somehow justifies the sequence of the epochs, one similar to that suggested by Heidegger. But underlying this way of looking at things there is the classical conception of time which conceives of time in terms of isolated 'now'-moments which as such do not necessarily belong together.

However, if the philosopher looks at this 'fullness' from the viewpoint which Heidegger tries to suggest in this lecture, then the unity of the multiplicity is never broken. The question then is not how this particular and isolated epoch could ever change into another isolated epoch, but how the Being process as a whole 'changes' into the Event in which future and past are held together in the Presence. For in this case one understands, or perhaps more accurately stated, *experiences* that the various epochs are no longer mysteries, but are the necessary consequence of the inherent finitude of an aboriginal Event which presents the Open and grants Being, and in so doing withdraws in favor of this domain and its gift.

Notes

1 Heidegger, Martin: 'Zeit und Sein', in *L'endurance de la pensée. Pour saluer Jean Beaufret*, ed. René Char (Paris: Plon, 1968), pp. 13-71; also in: *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), pp. 1-25.

2 Heidegger, Martin: *Being and Time*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 63.

3 *Zur Sache*, p. 91.

4 *ibid.*

5 'Protokoll zu einem Seminar über den Vortrag "Zeit und Sein"', in *Zur Sache*, pp. 27-60, 29-35, 46-8. (These 'minutes' were written by Alfredo Guzzoni and later corrected and completed by Heidegger himself.)

6 Heidegger, Martin: *Being and Time*, p. 19.

7 *ibid.*, p. 67.

8 *ibid.*, p. 27.

9 *ibid.*, p. 38.

10 *ibid.*, p. 39.

11 *ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

12 *ibid.*, pp. 41-2.

13 *ibid.*, pp. 91-148.

- 14 *ibid.*, pp. 149–68.
- 15 *ibid.*, pp. 169–224.
- 16 *ibid.*, pp. 171–2.
- 17 *ibid.*, p. 225.
- 18 *ibid.*, pp. 228–41.
- 19 *ibid.*, pp. 279–90.
- 20 *ibid.*, p. 308.
- 21 *ibid.*, pp. 308–9.
- 22 *ibid.*, pp. 315–35.
- 23 *ibid.*, pp. 341–8.
- 24 *ibid.*, pp. 349–64.
- 25 *ibid.*, pp. 364–70.
- 26 *ibid.*, p. 372.
- 27 *ibid.*, p. 373.
- 28 *ibid.*, pp. 373–4.
- 29 *ibid.*, p. 374.
- 30 *ibid.*, p. 375.
- 31 *ibid.*, pp. 383–401.
- 32 *ibid.*, pp. 401–18. See for the foregoing passage also: Otto Pöggeler, 'Heideggers Topologie des Seins', in *Man and World*, 2 (1969), pp. 331–57, 337–45, and William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), pp. 71–93.
- 33 *Being and Time*, pp. 415–18.
- 34 *ibid.*, pp. 419–21.
- 35 See for what follows: Otto Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1963), pp. 63–6.
- 36 *Being and Time*, pp. 486–7.
- 37 *ibid.*, p. 483.
- 38 *ibid.*, p. 63.
- 39 *Zur Sache*, p. 29.
- 40 *Being and Time*, p. 193.
- 41 *ibid.*, p. 274.
- 42 *ibid.*, pp. 133–4, 203, 273, 382, 400, 402–3, 408–9, 411–12, 420, 423, 458, 487.
- 43 *ibid.*, pp. 41–9, 244–56.
- 44 Heidegger in a letter to William J. Richardson, *op. cit.*, p. x.
- 45 *Being and Time*, pp. 41–62, 424ff.
- 46 Pöggeler, Otto: 'Heideggers Topologie des Seins', pp. 337–45.
- 47 *Zur Sache des Denkens*, p. 2.
- 48 *ibid.*, p. 36.
- 49 *ibid.*, p. 35.
- 50 *ibid.*, pp. 1–2.
- 51 *ibid.*, p. 1.
- 52 *ibid.*, pp. 2, 27–8.
- 53 *ibid.*, pp. 2–4.
- 54 *ibid.*, pp. 4–5.
- 55 *ibid.*, pp. 41–3.
- 56 *ibid.*, pp. 5, 39–41.
- 57 *ibid.*, pp. 5–6.
- 58 *ibid.*, pp. 6–8.
- 59 *ibid.*, pp. 8–10.
- 60 *ibid.*, pp. 10–11.

- 61 *ibid.*, pp. 12–13.
- 62 *ibid.*, pp. 13–15.
- 63 *ibid.*, pp. 15–16.
- 64 *ibid.*, pp. 16–17.
- 65 *ibid.*, pp. 17–18.
- 66 *ibid.*, pp. 18–21.
- 67 *ibid.*, pp. 21–3. See for other approaches to the ‘Event’: *ibid.*, pp. 44–5.
- 68 *ibid.*, pp. 23–5.
- 69 Richardson, William J.: *op. cit.*, pp. 545–8.
- 70 Heidegger, Martin: *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Mit einem Brief über den ‘Humanismus’* (Bern: Francke, 1947), p. 81.
- 71 *ibid.*, p. 111.
- 72 *ibid.*, p. 81.
- 73 *ibid.*, p. 82.
- 74 Heidegger, Martin: *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), p. 261.
- 75 Heidegger, Martin: *Der Satz vom Grund* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), p. 154.
- 76 *Zur Sache des Denkens*, pp. 53–4.
- 77 *ibid.*, pp. 55–7.

The ekstatico-horizional constitution of temporality

Françoise Dastur

The title of this paper is borrowed from *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology*.¹ In the name of this title, I would like to raise some questions concerning the meaning and role of the concept of horizon in the Heideggerian thinking between 1926 and 1928, i.e. during the years immediately preceding and following the publication of *Being and Time* in February 1927.² For it is precisely on this subject that the lecture course from the Summer semester 1927 gives us explanations that were not forthcoming in *Being and Time*. In spite of the fact that the complete title of the first part of *Being and Time* – the second part was never published – runs: ‘The interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being’, the last sentence of the second section – i.e. the last sentence of the text published in 1927 – still assumes the form of a question: ‘Is there a way which leads from primordial *time* to the meaning of *Being*? Does *time* itself manifest itself as the horizon of *Being*?’³ The explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being should have constituted, in fact, the theme of the third section, under the title ‘Time and being’, as it is indicated in the plan of the book presented in section 8.⁴ A marginal note in Heidegger’s own copy (the famous *Hüttenexemplar*), a marginal note which is reproduced in the text published in 1977 in the *Gesamtausgabe*, refers the reader to the Marburg lecture course of the Summer semester 1927 entitled *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology* for an explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being.⁵ At the beginning of this lecture course there is a note indicating that these lectures constitute ‘a new elaboration of the third (section) of the first part of *Being and Time*’.⁶ We know, on the report of the editor of the *Gesamtausgabe*, Friedrich von Herrmann, that Heidegger burnt the first elaboration of this third section soon after it had been written.⁷ It has been necessary to recall

these detailed references in order to emphasize the fact that the 1927 lecture course throws a new light on what Heidegger calls, in *Being and Time*, the *Temporalität des Seins*, which should be strictly distinguished from the *Zeitlichkeit des Daseins*.⁸ The theme of the horizon as the correlate of a temporal extasis, on one hand, and the theme of the *Temporalität* of Being, on the other hand, are tightly knit together, as we can see from this sentence from the 1927 lecture course that reads: 'Temporalität is Zeitlichkeit with respect to the unity of the horizontal schemas which are its own.'⁹ We can of course find some indications about this in *Being and Time*. The expression *Temporalität des Seins* appears in §5 when, after having exposed the preliminary character of the existential analysis, i.e. of the theory of the Being of Dasein as care, Heidegger emphasizes that the temporal interpretation of care, which constitutes the second section (*Dasein und Zeitlichkeit*) does not yet furnish the answer to the leading question, that is, the question of the meaning of Being in its entirety (*Sein überhaupt*), but only provides an initial basis for arriving at such an answer.¹⁰ But in fact §5 (together with §8 which sets out the plan of the whole treatise), is the only passage in *Being and Time* where we can find a reference to the leading problematics of the book. The latter does not consist – it is necessary to recall – in furnishing the basis for a philosophical anthropology, but in the explication of time as the horizon for any comprehension of Being, starting from temporality as the Being of Dasein, i.e. of the being characterized by a comprehension of Being.¹¹ Only this explanation of *Temporalität* can give a concrete answer to the question asked in *Being and Time*, the question concerning the meaning of Being.¹² But to inquire about the meaning of Being does not consist in looking for what lies behind Being, but in questioning Being itself in so far it is included in the comprehensibility of Dasein.¹³ For 'meaning' is an existential of Dasein and not a property of a being; it is that within which the comprehensibility of something maintains itself, the horizon (the *Woraufhin*, literally, the 'whither') of the project from which something as such is comprehended.¹⁴ It is therefore comprehension itself and the conditions of its possibility which have to be questioned in order to bring to light the horizon for the donation of Being. And the condition of the possibility of such a comprehension is, precisely, temporality. But *Being and Time* does not show how all comprehension implies a comprehension of Being as such, which is itself possible only on the basis of the temporality of Dasein.¹⁵ This point is developed in §20 of *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology* under the head 'Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität'.

Being and Time also offers some indications about the ekstatio-horizonal structure of temporality. It is in §65, where temporality is characterized as the ontological meaning of care,¹⁶ that temporality is defined as sheer *ekstatikon* (*ekstatikon schlechthin*).¹⁷ But it is only in §69, which

deals with the temporality of being-in-the-world that, in less than three pages (§69 C), the temporal problem of the transcendence of the world is explicitly treated, i.e. what, in temporality, makes the event of the world possible – the horizontal ‘schema’ that constitutes the ‘whither’ (*Wohin*), the ‘rapture’ (*Entrückung*) in terms of which the *ekstasis* takes place.¹⁸ This analysis of the ekstático-horizonal character of temporality is taken up again and developed in *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology* and it is completed in the lecture course from the Summer semester 1928 entitled *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*.¹⁹ The first part of this lecture course consists of an analysis of transcendence and intentionality and is a prefiguration of the problematics of the text written in the same year (which Heidegger dedicated in 1929 to Husserl for his seventieth birthday) under the title *Vom Wesen des Grundes*. In a passage from this 1928 lecture course (where we find the very first auto-interpretation of *Being and Time*²⁰), Heidegger seeks to show, in a retrospective manner, that the entire second section of *Being and Time* is dedicated to the elaboration of a transcendence which is in fact only explicitly mentioned in §69 C. He recalls therefore that, in a note from page 263 in *Being and Time* (which deals with the Husserlian primacy of intuition), it is explicitly said that the intentionality of consciousness is based upon the temporality of *Dasein*.²¹ This note indicates moreover that the showing of the relation between intentionality and ekstático-horizonal temporality will be dealt with in the next section, i.e. in the famous third section. It is the only indication in *Being and Time* concerning the connection between the phenomenon of intentionality and ekstático-horizonal temporality, a connection which is also mentioned, but not explicitly developed, in *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology*.²² What is characteristic of the Marburg lectures (held in the period when Heidegger wrote *Being and Time*²³), is the continuity of the discussion with Husserl and the emphasis on the problem of intentionality, a problem which the lecture course from 1925 already recognizes as a phenomenon which will furnish contemporary philosophy with its own proper dynamic.²⁴ The lecture course from 1927, like the one from 1928, gives an essential place to the notion of intentionality. In the discussion of Kant’s thesis stating that ‘Being is not a real predicate’, which can be reformulated in a more positive way as ‘Being is position or perception’, Heidegger declares that the constitutive elements of the intentionality of perception are not only the *intentio* and the *intentum* but also the comprehension of the mode of Being of what is aimed at in *intentum*,²⁵ showing therefore that the ontological condition of the possibility of all intentionality as such is the comprehension of Being. He further emphasizes that the possibility of bringing to light the ontological difference also calls for an investigation of intentionality, i.e. of the mode of access to Being.²⁶ The investigation of intentionality is

necessary because, as Heidegger says (in his foreword to the *Lectures for a Phenomenology of Inner Time Consciousness*, edited by him, at Husserl's request, in April 1928), intentionality is not a key word, but the title of a central problem.²⁷ To dwell inside this problem does not mean that intentionality should be regarded as a master-key capable of opening all doors,²⁸ but grasped in its principal and philosophically central signification.²⁹ On the one hand, it is necessary to see that the idea of intentionality refers (beyond Brentano's conception of intentionality as the central notion of his Psychology from an empirical point of view) to the question posed by Plato and Aristotle, i.e. to the ontological question,³⁰ and precisely because the notion of intentionality annihilates the apparent problem of the subject-object relation³¹ considered by the theory of knowledge of the nineteenth century as the basis of its problematics and therefore breaks with the classical conception of subjectivity, i.e. with the opposition of consciousness and world understood as the juxtaposition of two equally present-at-hand beings. But on the other hand, it is necessary to become aware of its limits, i.e. of the fact that intentionality is understood by Husserl as *noesis*, as a rational determination which should not be referred to the entire personality – as Max Scheler thought was the case.³² As a dimension of existence itself, intentionality is therefore only an 'ontic transcendence', a transcendence in the vulgar meaning of the word, which, as a relation to beings, has itself to be founded upon an 'archi-transcendence', the transcendence of Being-in-the-world.³³ For the intentional relation is only the factual mode of an actually required appropriation of what is already surpassed, i.e. revealed on the basis of transcendence.³⁴

By way of the theme of intentionality, and so subject to the condition of seeing in intentionality a problem and not a solution,³⁵ the question of transcendence, as a dimension of existence, still therefore has to be raised. For to exist means nothing else than to bring about the distinction between Being and beings.³⁶ To the Husserlian phenomenology that sees in intentionality the archi-phenomenon, ontology therefore stands opposed as this other transcendental science³⁷ which, on the contrary, sees in transcendence, *qua* archi-transcendence, the condition of the possibility of all 'ontic transcendence', i.e. of all intentional behaviour. But this essential determination of Dasein, i.e. of the fact that it transcends itself by itself, depends upon the ekstatico-horizonal character of temporality. It is therefore now necessary to unfold the relation of transcendence to temporality. The term 'transcendence' is certainly not taken by Heidegger in its philosophical (medieval or modern) sense but only in the original sense of the word for which *transcendere* means to go beyond, to get across, to pass over.³⁸ What Heidegger calls the ontologically 'authentic' meaning of transcendence,³⁹ understands the *transcendens* as what goes over as such and not as that in the direction of

which a 'passing over' is undertaken. It is therefore not possible to consider Dasein as immanent nor the objects as transcendent, as is the case with the vulgar, i.e. Husserlian, meaning of transcendence, because such a transcendence is not the ontic transcendence of the subject-object relation, but the comprehension of oneself from that world which constitutes the true correlate of the surpassing movement. Dasein is a being that is in the modus of self-surpassing, in the modus of *epekeina*.⁴⁰ That is the reason why Dasein's selfhood does not imply a substantial centre from which the transcending movement is supposed to start, but is, on the contrary, founded upon transcendence itself – as the condition of its very possibility. But what makes the transcendence of Dasein possible is the ekstatic character of time.⁴¹ In order to understand what that means, it is necessary, first of all, to pay attention to the transformation inflicted upon the classical opposition between objective and subjective time by the Heideggerian thinking, once the subject-object relation has become invalidated as a plausible problem. In his 1928 lecture course, Heidegger emphasizes that he deliberately names original time 'temporality' in order to give expression to the fact that time is not a predonated being (a *Vorhandene*), but, on the contrary, something whose essence is temporal.⁴² This means that, strictly speaking, time is not, but temporalizes itself and so can never be imprisoned in an ontological concept.⁴³ To think time as temporalization means giving up the attempt to elaborate a physics, or even a psychology, of time. Featuring neither as a frame for worldly events, nor for the internal processes of the psyche, it has to be accepted that time does not exist in any way at all. The 1925 lecture course closed with this conclusive statement: 'Nicht: Zeit ist, sondern: Dasein zeitigt, qua Zeit, sein Sein' (Not: time is, but Dasein temporalizes its Being, as time).⁴⁴

This implies that the unfolding of time coincides with the unfolding of Dasein and that the movements of nature are, as such, completely free with regard to time: they acquire an intra-temporality only when they are encountered 'in' the time that we ourselves are.⁴⁵ The 1928 lecture course is even more explicit and declares that temporality is the *Urfaktum*, the originary fact, and that entering into the world of beings is the *Urgeschichte*, the originary history.⁴⁶ Such an identification of Dasein and time allows us to understand why Heidegger is much less interested in the analysis Husserl gives of the phenomenon of time itself (in his lectures on *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*) than in the elucidation of intentionality through the analysis of phenomena like perception, remembrance, expectation, etc. Many years later, when Heidegger gave a short speech at a conference organized for the thirtieth anniversary of Husserl's death, he peremptorily declared that his own question concerning time was wholly determined by the Being question and had been developed in a direction that always remained foreign to

the Husserlian investigation of time consciousness.⁴⁷ We find the same judgment in the 1928 lecture course, at a time when Husserl's lectures had just been published by Heidegger. Heidegger acknowledges, as he had already done in a note to *Being and Time*,⁴⁸ that Husserl's investigations on time constitute a measure of progress relative to contemporary psychology and the theory of knowledge, but he sees Husserl's essential achievement in the analysis of the intentional structures of time consciousness. For as far as the problem of time itself is concerned, nothing has changed relative to the tradition because time is still taken as something immanent, something internal to the subject. For Heidegger, what Husserl names 'temporal consciousness' is precisely time itself in its originary sense.⁴⁹ To understand that originary time is in fact nothing other than the totality of the modalities of temporalization belonging to existence means precisely to understand the ekstastic character of time. The phenomenon of 'expectation' as well as that of 'remembrance' are not only a way of perceiving the future and the past, but a way of interrogating the very sources of these modalities of time, not only a mode of time consciousness but, in an originary sense, time itself.⁵⁰ In the 1927 lecture course, Heidegger distinguishes clearly between the primary concept of future, past, present, i.e. the existential sense of temporality as unfolded by Dasein itself, and the expression of time that has always to do with intra-temporality. To characterize pure transcendence without the subject, that is, without Dasein, Heidegger makes use of the term *ekstasis* which, in its non-philosophical sense, simply means to stand out, which makes it a term appropriate to the literal sense of the word ex-istence. The 1928 lecture course is even more explicit in presenting originary temporality as a triple transport (*Entrückung*) without a centre, that is, without any substantial nucleus from which a temporal ekstasis could spring out, as a *raptus* through which the temporal dimensions are opened, or as a spring or swing (*Schwung*) that makes of temporalization the free swinging (*die freie Schwingung*) of originary temporality in its entirety, which alone can explain the Being-in-the-throw of Dasein, i.e. of the connection in Dasein of thrownness and projection (*Geworfenheit und Entwurf*).⁵¹

But this ekstastic character of originary temporality cannot be separated from the horizational character that belongs to all ekstasis as such. It is important to emphasize that the relation of the ekstasis to its horizon cannot be of the same kind as the relation of *intentio* and *intentum* (or *noesis* and *noema*) in ontic transcendence, that is, in intentionality. In this case, the correlate cannot be something determined because transcendence is precisely defined as the movement by which all limitations are exceeded. But the ekstasis is however not a transport towards nothingness, or a completely undetermined rapture. Rather, it projects an horizon which presents itself as a specific openness or as a schematic

pre-tracing (*schematische Vorzeichnung*) of what transcendence is aiming at.⁵² The term 'schematic' is an allusion to the Kantian transcendental schematism, about which Heidegger speaks in his lecture course from the Winter semester 1925–6 and again, in 1929, in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.⁵³ The Kantian schema is the representation of a general procedure of the imagination with a view to procuring an image for its concept;⁵⁴ in the same way, the horizontal schema of the temporal ekstasis is the condition of the possibility of the comprehension of Being.⁵⁵ But what is the exact meaning of horizon in this context? The 1928 lecture course gives the answer. Despite its usual meaning of a circular visual limit, the term horizon is not originally connected to seeing and intuition. It means, in accordance with the Greek verb *horizein*, what limits, surrounds, encloses.⁵⁶ The ekstasis, as pure rapture, surrounds and limits itself under the form of an horizon that makes it possible. Such an horizon, in spite of the fact that it belongs to ekstasis, is neither located 'in' the subject nor 'in' time or space, because it is not something that is, but something that temporalizes itself as pure possibility. Heidegger speaks of the horizon as constituting the *ekstema* of the ekstasis in analogy with the correlation of *noesis* and *noema* in the structure of intentionality, but in a completely different sense from that characteristic of the immanent structure of the noetic–noematic unity that remains internal to consciousness. The structure of transcendence, one that brings together the unity of all ekstases in the ekstematic unity of their horizons reveals the 'internal productivity specific to temporality', a productivity whose product is nothing else than the world itself. It is this productivity that Kant encountered for the first time in his theory of the productive transcendental imagination. And in spite of the fact that this genial intuition got forgotten later, it still testified to the fact that the Being of Dasein possesses the internal possibility of self-enrichment, not in an ontic, but in an ontological sense. This capacity for self-enrichment that characterizes Dasein is, in fact, nothing other than transcendence itself and it produces nothing ontic, but only this nothingness that is the world, a world which can never be understood as the sum of beings. Even though this nothingness is not a *nihil negativum*, it is, as Heidegger stresses, the *nihil originarium* that arises with and through temporalization.⁵⁷ Temporality finds its end in the horizontal schemata whose unity constitutes the nothingness of world. Since the very finitude of time precludes the possibility of its being projected upon something else, it is able to provide the ultimate light for the knowledge of beings and for the comprehension of Being. But we find no justification of the finitude of time in the 1927 lecture course since this would require a return to the question of Being-towards-death, a question developed in the second section of *Being and Time* and which alone permits us to understand what is said in §65, namely, that original time is finite precisely because it

temporalizes itself from the authentic future as anticipatory resoluteness (*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*), i.e. as authentic Being-towards-death.⁵⁸ But death is not an end in the sense of what puts a stop to Dasein but is, on the contrary, the foundation of its finite existence. In the same manner, the finitude of time (the corollary to the finitude of Being mentioned only in the Freiburg inaugural lecture of 1929: 'What is metaphysics?')⁵⁹ is not an extrinsic limitation of Dasein but, on the contrary, the origin and starting point of its very own Being, i.e. of all possible projection – a limitation which, because it is internal, makes possible its own surpassing, i.e. makes possible both ekstasis and transcendence.

The *Temporalität des Seins* therefore constitutes the unity of that horizon from which each being can present itself in the world. It is true that in §21, in *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger accords an apparently excessive importance to the horizon of *praesens* which latter constitutes the condition of possibility of the comprehension of the Being-ready-to-hand of the instrument, and it is equally true that the thesis developed in *Being and Time* to the effect that the future furnishes the direction for temporalization and is the primary phenomenon for originary temporality⁶⁰ is not reaffirmed in the 1927 lecture course, precisely because there is no mention of the finitude of time. But this does not mean that this thesis is given up or called in question, since it is taken up again in the 1928 lecture course.⁶¹ Moreover the primacy of the future is relative: it only characterizes the sense of originary temporalization, and that is the reason why such a primacy can be transferred to another ekstasis, depending upon the mode of existence of Dasein. Heidegger speaks in this respect of the unsteadiness of existence, an unsteadiness which comes from the fact that temporality is capable of modification and that the sense of temporalization can be changed by giving the primacy to an ekstasis other than the futural.⁶² The relation to the *Zuhandenen*, to the ready-to-hand, can occur only in the horizon of *praesens* which is the corollary of the primacy granted to the present (*Gegenwart*) and to presentation (*Gegenwärtigen*). In the *determined* perspective of a temporal interpretation of Being as Being-ready-to-hand,⁶³ the horizon of *praesens* is the leading horizon because it is the one which commands all relation to inner-worldly beings of any kind whatsoever – and in this sense it also commands the relation to the *Vorhandenen*, to the merely present being.⁶⁴ But it has to be stressed that only the unity of the horizons (not only of the *praesens* but also of what should logically be called the *praeteritum* and the *futurum*)⁶⁵ can accommodate what the 1928 lecture course already names as the event of the entrance into the world of beings (*das Ereignis des Welteinganges des Seienden*). Because this event is the primordial event (*Ureignis*), originary temporalization can only be the temporalization of the world itself as the ekstematic horizon for temporality in its entirety.⁶⁶

In the context of such an analytic of the *Temporalität des Seins*,⁶⁷ Heidegger still seems to be developing his project of an ontology¹ as a temporal and transcendental science.⁶⁸ But the 1928 lecture course also declares that this temporal analytic is at the same time *die Kehre*, the turning which brings ontology expressly back to the ontic metaphysics in which it has implicitly always stood.⁶⁹ Is this reversal to meta-ontology (mentioned in the 1928 lecture course) already, and of itself, the announcement of a *Kehre* which will allow us to think the epocality of Being and the foundation of this epocality under the name of *Ereignis*? It is difficult to answer this question as long as we do not have access to all the texts from the beginning of the thirties, and especially to the first version of 'The essence of truth' from 1930. It seems in any case that the transcendental perspective that allows the constitution of the 'metaphysics of Dasein' (developed in the writings published in 1929) as a continuation of the meta-ontological turning of 1928 must, on the contrary, be abandoned – so that the *Kehre* can be achieved. But 'abandoned' is perhaps not the correct word here: 'surmounted' says a marginal note from the *Hüttenexemplar* regarding the title of the third section in the plan presented at the end of §8 of *Being and Time*. This marginal note seems to suggest that only the surmounting of the horizon could allow a return to the origin.⁷⁰ Is this not an indication that the concept of horizon has finally proved to be inadequate to think the domain of openness, the *Spielraum* within which all beings can be encountered?⁷¹ In a text from the years 1944–5 that bears the title *Gelassenheit*, such a 'space' is given the strange name of *Gegnet*.⁷² Here representative and 'transcendental-horizonal' thinking is called in question as the dominating mode of thinking and a transformation of representative thinking into a waiting for the *Gegnet*, i.e., into an open extent⁷³ oriented toward the 'region'.⁷⁴ Such a transformation does not in fact require that the former point of view be abandoned, but rather that it should be seen in another light, after an effective change of position with regard to it. The horizon as such is also only the side, turned towards us, of an openness⁷⁵ which surrounds us and this openness should, as such, be named *Gegnet*, 'region' in the sense of a gathering locus for all extended and enduring things.⁷⁶ Surely the *Kehre* consists in considering the *Kehrseite*, the reverse side of that horizon which remains concealed from us and to any representative thinking that only draws the meaning of the terms 'horizon' and 'transcendence' from objects opposed to it?⁷⁷ To experience what 'lets' be – *sein lässt* – is to experience an horizon which leads us beyond such a representational, transcendental-horizonal thinking to a waiting that can never be understood as an anticipating because it has no object,⁷⁸ a waiting for the opening of that *Gegnet* to which we all belong. In the same manner, in 1949, the necessity of thinking the ekstasis more adequately will lead to the experience of endurance (*Aus-*

stehen), of the openness of Being. In this new light, the ekstatic essence of existence can no longer be understood as a Being-out-of-itself⁷⁹ because this could still imply a reference to the substantial centre of the self. Rather it now has to be understood as the Being *in* the truth of Being, as *Innestehen*, standing inside, *Inständigkeit*, in-stance.⁸⁰

That is why the ekstatico-horizonal constitution of temporality has to be reconsidered in the light of what Heidegger, after the *Kehre*, no longer calls the 'meaning of Being', but the 'truth of Being', the truth of a Being that is no longer understood as an *existential* of Dasein and as the goal of Dasein's transcendence, but as the origin of Dasein. For, as *The Letter on Humanism* puts it, if Being is brought to light for human being in the ekstatic project, this project does not however create Being. And so what is thrown into the project is not human being itself. Rather, it is Being itself that destines human being to be its own ek-sistence, to be the 'there' of Da-sein as its very own essence.⁸¹

Notes

1 See Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1975), *Gesamt Ausgabe* Band 24 (abbreviated GA 24), p. 279: 'die ekstatisch-horizontale Verfassung der Zeitlichkeit'. The term *Verfassung* which is here translated in a conventional manner by 'constitution' refers more precisely to the idea of 'composition' and has the meaning of an articulated totality.

2 On the circumstances of the publication of *Being and Time* see 'Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie' in Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), p. 88.

3 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 437 (abbreviated SZ).

4 SZ, p. 39.

5 See GA 2, p. 41.

6 GA 24, p. 1.

7 See GA 2, p. 582 (Nachwort des Herausgebers).

8 The distinction between *Temporalität* and *Zeitlichkeit* is essentially a terminological distinction: see GA 24, p. 324. But this distinction was not drawn from the very beginning. In the lecture course from the Winter semester 1925–6, Heidegger still uses the term *Temporalität* to characterize the Being of Dasein. He explains that *zeitlich* means to happen in time, whereas temporal means to be characterized by time (GA 21, p. 199). At that time Heidegger still understands *Zeitlichkeit* in the 'vulgar' sense of intra-temporality and that is the reason why he then prefers the term *Temporalität* to characterize the mode of Being of Dasein. He speaks there of the *Temporalität* of care, whereas in *Being and Time* *Temporalität* refers to Being and *Zeitlichkeit* to Dasein.

9 GA 24, p. 369.

10 SZ, p. 17. It is not possible to translate 'Sein überhaupt' by 'Being in general' because Heidegger, following Aristotle, insists on the fact that there is no generic unity of Being. That is why I propose to translate it by 'Being in its entirety', and this in line with the primal meaning of 'überhaupt' a word that

originally belonged to the vocabulary of the cattle keepers and so retains the meaning of 'the whole' in opposition to 'in detail'.

11 See *SZ*, p. 17.

12 See *SZ*, p. 19.

13 *SZ*, p. 152.

14 *SZ*, p. 151.

15 There is in fact an analysis of the temporality of comprehension to be found in *Being and Time* at §68a but it tends only to elucidate the temporal meaning of comprehension in general and not to elucidate the fact that temporality is the condition of the possibility of the comprehension that Dasein has from itself.

16 *SZ*, p. 323.

17 *SZ*, p. 329.

18 *SZ*, p. 365.

19 Heidegger, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik*, GA 26.

20 As Jean Greisch emphasizes in his presentation of the complete edition of Heidegger's works in *Martin Heidegger* (Paris: Cahier de L'Herne, 1983), p. 467.

21 GA 26, p. 215: 'Und daß die Intentionalität in der Transzendenz grundet, ist gerade hier [§363, Anm.] gesagt und als ontologisches Grundproblem fixiert.' The note itself says only: 'Daß und wie die Intentionalität des "Bewußtseins" in der ekstatischen Zeitlichkeit des Dasein grundet wird der folgende Abschnitt zeigen.' The term 'transcendence' does not appear in the note itself in spite of the fact that it can be found on the same page, 363.

22 GA 24, p. 448.

23 Heidegger recalls in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), p. 95, that he began to write *Being and Time* in 1923 and we know that the book was finished in 1926.

24 *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, GA 20, p. 34.

25 GA 24, pp. 100ff.

26 GA 24, p. 102.

27 See E. Husserl, *Vorlesung zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1928), p. 1: 'Auch heute noch ist dieser Ausdruck kein Lösungswort, sondern der Titel eines zentralen Problems.' It is necessary to recall that it was Husserl himself who asked Heidegger to edit his lectures and not the reverse. Regarding the history of the manuscript of these lectures see R. Böhm's Introduction to volume X of the *Husserliana* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966) and W. Mieszkiewicz's article in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* (1984).

28 See GA 26, p. 166.

29 See GA 26, pp. 167-8.

30 See GA 20, p. 184.

31 See GA 26, p. 168.

32 GA 26, pp. 167 and 169. In this lecture from the Summer semester 1928 during the course of which Max Scheler died (19 May 1928), Heidegger emphasizes Scheler's mediating role between Husserl and himself. Scheler refuses to see in intentionality a character of knowledge but does not go so far as to consider it a dimension of existence itself. He insists on understanding intentionality as a character of the still not thoroughly elucidated notion of personality.

33 GA 26, pp. 194 and 169.

34 GA 26, p. 253.

35 According to Heidegger, Husserl in *Ideen I* sees in intentionality a solution because he understands intentional being as the fundamental region of being, the region of pure consciousness and its correlates. Intentionality is then no

longer a question of presence but provides the 'final' solution for modern philosophy, i.e. the accomplished system of transcendental subjectivity. See the *Letter to Richardson* (1962) in W. Richardson, *Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), p. xiv: 'Meanwhile "phenomenology" in Husserl's sense was elaborated into a distinctive philosophical position according to a pattern set up by Descartes, Kant and Fichte.' On this point see Brisart's excellent paper: 'L'intentionnalité comme "titre d'un problème central" selon Heidegger', *Cahiers du centre d'études phénoménologiques* (CEP 2) (Louvain la Neuve: Cabay, 1982), pp. 32–84.

36 GA 24, p. 254.

37 GA 24, p. 374. See also SZ, p. 38 where phenomenological truth is said to be *veritas transcendentalis*.

38 *ibid.*, p. 423.

39 *ibid.*, p. 425.

40 *ibid.*

41 *ibid.*, p. 428.

42 GA 26, p. 264.

43 *ibid.*

44 GA 20, p. 442.

45 *ibid.*

46 GA 26, p. 270.

47 See M. Heidegger, 'Über das Zeitverständnis in der Phänomenologie und im Denken der Seinsfrage' in *Phänomenologie – lebendig oder tot?* (Karlsruhe: Badenia Verlag, 1969), p. 47.

48 See SZ, p. 433.

49 GA 26, p. 264.

50 GA 26, p. 263.

51 GA 26, p. 268.

52 GA 24, p. 435.

53 To show how the 'horizontal' thematic is dependent on a still transcendental questioning would require a thorough examination of all the texts Heidegger dedicated to Kant between 1925 and 1930. For the moment we can only stress the importance of transcendence in the Kantian sense and point out that this was as decisive for the elaboration of the Being question as Husserlian intentionality.

54 *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B. 180.

55 GA 24, p. 437.

56 GA 26, p. 269.

57 GA 26, p. 272.

58 SZ, §62.

59 *Was ist Metaphysik?* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1960), pp. 39–40. Being is finite because it 'needs' the transcendence of Dasein in order to be revealed, because (as *Sein und Zeit* puts it on p. 212) 'there is' (*es gibt*) Being only as long as Dasein is.

60 SZ, p. 331.

61 GA 26, p. 273.

62 GA 24, p. 408.

63 See the title in GA 24 of §21 a.

64 See SZ, p. 363, where it is stressed that the objectivation, which is the operation through which the mere presence (*Vorhandenheit*) of beings is given, has the sense of a distinctive presentation (*ausgezeichneten Gegenwärtigung*).

65 It should be stressed here that, on the one hand, and in a certain sense, every horizon, as a project of Dasein, has the sense of a future from which it

is possible to come back to the beings given within such an horizon but also, on the other, that the (implicit) primacy of the horizon of the *praesens* is the foundation for all traditional ontology. That is why Heidegger accords such importance to the temporal interpretation of Being as *Vorhandenheit*.

66 *GA* 26, pp. 273–4.

67 *ibid.*, p. 201.

68 *GA* 24, p. 201.

69 *GA* 26, p. 201.

70 *GA* 1, p. 39. The whole marginal note runs as follows:

‘Die transzendenzhafte Differenz

Die Überwindung des Horizonts als solchen

Die Umkehr in die Herkunft

Das Anwesen aus dieser Herkunft.’

71 See *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1973), §16, p. 67.

72 *Gelassenheit* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1979), p. 31.

73 *ibid.*, p. 41. The old form *Gegnet* for *Gegend* means literally what stands opposite and comes from *gegen*, meaning against or opposite to, and has to be formed on the model of the Latin *contrata*, region. Compare the French *contrée* and the English ‘country’.

74 *ibid.*, p. 52.

75 *ibid.*, p. 39.

76 *ibid.*, p. 42.

77 *ibid.*, p. 39.

78 *ibid.*, p. 44.

79 See *SZ*, p. 329 where the pure *ekstatikon* of temporality is understood as ‘das ursprüngliche “Aussersich” an und für sich’.

80 See *Der Rückgang in den Grund der Metaphysik* (1949) *Einleitung zu Was ist Metaphysik?* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1960), p. 15:

Die Stasis des Ekstatischen brucht, so seltsam es klingen mag, im Innestehen im ‘Aus’ und ‘Da’ der Unverborgenheit, als welche das Sein selbst west. Das, was im Namen ‘Existenz’ zu denken ist, wenn das Wort innerhalb des Denkens gebraucht wird, das auf die Wahrheit des Seins zu und her denkt, konnte das Wort ‘Inständigkeit’ a, schonsten nennen.

See also *Gelassenheit*, p. 62 and *Humanismusbrief in Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1967), p. 161.

81 *Wegmarken*, p. 168.

What did Heidegger mean by 'Essence'?

Alfons Grieder

1

The word 'Wesen' ('Essence') frequently occurs in Heidegger's writings.¹ It is indeed one of his key-words. Unless we understand what he means by it we are unlikely to understand his philosophy. After all, philosophy was for him essential thinking (*wesentliches Denken*). Yet 'Wesen' is also one of his most enigmatic terms and greatly in need of elucidation, despite the fact that he commented on its meaning in many places, scattered throughout his writings, from the thirties right through to the seventies. It is not only tedious to collect these comments but, as we shall soon see, difficult to understand and adequately interpret them.

In the following I shall focus on the three periods 1925–30, 1934–8, and 1949–57. In all three periods Heidegger's meaning of 'Wesen' is inseparable from that of 'Sein' ('Being') and 'Wahrheit' ('Truth'), and by the fifties its connection with 'Language', 'World' and 'Thing' assumes a new significance. From the mid-thirties he uses the word in an increasingly unfamiliar and puzzling manner. Its change of meaning is closely associated with the famous 'turn' ('Kehre'). One has to come to grips with this metamorphosis, otherwise what the later Heidegger has to say, for instance on art and technology, will hardly be intelligible.

Unfortunately, few commentators have bothered to analyse this term 'Wesen', and to my knowledge none has done so in sufficient detail and in a way which makes sense to the uninitiated too. Obviously, little is achieved by simply repeating Heideggerian phrases and assertions as if they were crystal-clear. (As a rule they are not at all.) I am aware, of course, that the following remarks and analyses are still in some sense provisional and cannot fill this important gap in the Heidegger literature: they will almost certainly have to be complemented and revised in the light of the many still outstanding volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe*.

2

Let us begin with *Sein und Zeit* (1927). Here the term 'wesenhaft' is more frequently encountered than 'Wesen'. The adjective 'wesentlich' repeatedly occurs, and so do various compounds such as 'Wesensbestimmung', 'Wesensstruktur', 'Wesensverhalt', 'Wesensgehalt', 'Wesenscharakter', 'Wesenserkenntnis', 'Wesensaussage'.² We notice a strange ambivalence, however. At the beginning of his treatise Heidegger writes:

Das 'Wesen' des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz³ (The 'Essence' of Dasein resides in its existence),

and he puts the term we are here concerned with into quotation marks. In subsequent places he drops the quotation marks, and we read for instance:

The analysis of this being took as its guiding thread what was in an anticipatory way determined as the Essence of Dasein;⁴

or

And if existence determines the being of Dasein and participates in the constitution of its Essence . . .⁵

On the one hand, then, Heidegger is inclined to put the term 'Wesen' 'on ice' as it were. On the other he seems to apply it without such reservations: indeed he intended *Sein und Zeit* to be a phenomenological description and interpretation of essential structures and essential characteristics of Dasein.

To understand the reasons for this ambivalence let us first recall that in *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger set out to clarify the sense of Being. The published first half of the work was meant to lay the foundation for that clarification. It is obvious that not only Being, but also the traditional distinction between essence and existence (*essentia* and *existentia*) was for him in need of elucidation, and the application of the traditional term 'existence' to Dasein highly questionable. He was unwilling to take this term 'essence' for granted as its meaning was at least partly determined in contradistinction to a suspect notion of existence. So why did he not drop it altogether, and with it all talk concerning what is 'wesentlich', 'wesenhaft', 'Wesensbestimmung', etc.? Is his procedure not viciously circular? As may be gathered from one of the above quotations Heidegger would have argued that his use of 'Wesen' and related terms is based on a 'Vorgriff', a preliminary conceptual understanding of Essence which he intended to clarify and justify in the course of the inquiry. He would

have argued that the circle in question, far from being vicious, is an unavoidable hermeneutic circle. Already at this stage, then, Heidegger must have believed that there is some proper sense of 'Essence' and that it does not coincide with that of 'essentia'.

Almost twenty years later, in a letter to Jean Beaufret, Heidegger commented on his famous proposition 'The "essence" of Dasein resides in its existence'.⁶ Again, he underlined that 'Wesen' must not be understood as *essentia* and 'Existenz' not as *existentia*. However, he also claims that the quotation marks in 'Wesen' indicate that here Essence has to be determined with respect to the ek-static character of Dasein; that Dasein essences (west) in standing out into the opening of Being (Dasein as Ek-sistence). Nevertheless, one main reason why the author of *Sein und Zeit* put the word into quotation marks was simply that he wished to guard against the misunderstanding that this Essence of Dasein was a 'what-being' (Wassein) or property of the kind we ascribe to beings which are present-at-hand (Vorhandenes). He emphasized instead that the Essence of Dasein is a way of being (eine Weise zu sein) for Dasein; it depends upon what Dasein chooses to be, upon possibilities it projects itself into; its Essence is inevitably of concern to Dasein and inseparable from its selfhood; Dasein is said to become 'essential' in authentic existence and resoluteness.⁷ In short, Heidegger wished to stress the fundamental difference between the Essence of Dasein, which is explicable in terms of existentials (Existentialien), and the Essence of beings present-at-hand. These have a different mode of being whose basic determinations are categories.⁸

Although committed to a phenomenological approach, Heidegger was aware that Husserl's *Wesensschau* (intuiting of Essences) constituted a philosophical problem.

By showing how all sight is grounded primarily in understanding (the circumspection of concern is understanding as *common sense* [*Verständigkeit*]), we have deprived pure intuition [*Anschauung*] of its priority, which corresponds noetically to the priority of the present-at-hand in traditional ontology. 'Intuition' and 'thinking' are both derivatives of understanding, and already rather remote ones. Even the phenomenological 'intuition of essences' [*Wesensschau*] is grounded in existential understanding. We can decide about this kind of seeing only if we have obtained explicit conceptions of Being and of the structure of Being, such as only phenomena in the phenomenological sense can become.⁹

In this passage Heidegger is less concerned with essences themselves than with the problem of intuiting them. However, essence and intuiting of essence belong together, as do, in a different way, the ready-to-hand

(Zuhandene) and the circumspection of everyday dealings. Not only does that intuiting derive from Dasein's understanding (Verstehen), but the mode of being of the intuited, too, is derivative, at least in the sense that it cannot be established what mode of being essences have unless the Being of Dasein has been explicated to some degree. Hence Heidegger was unwilling, at this juncture, to take Husserl's Wesensschau and phenomenological method for granted. The 'Vorgriff' he refers to does not extend to them but is confined to a particular way of seeing which concentrates on what is non-accidental in Dasein or in other beings, and to what constitutes the sense and ground of the immediately given.¹⁰

3

Some of the above points are borne out in Heidegger's Marburg lectures entitled *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, which he delivered in the summer semester 1927. He clearly takes his approach to be a phenomenological one:

Phenomenology is the title for the method of ontology, that is, of scientific philosophy.¹¹

His manner of characterizing the phenomenological Wesensschau is rather brisk, however:

Seeing and, in analysis, interpreting in an unprejudiced way and rendering accessible and holding fast on to suchlike as an intentional structure of making something, and forming one's concepts to measure regarding what is thus got hold of and seen – this is the sober sense of the much chatted about so-called phenomenological intuition of Essence.¹²

The intentional structures referred to are ontological structures, of course. Phenomenology is the seeing and interpreting of such structures, which Heidegger also calls essential.¹³ The above passage may be taken to indicate that Heidegger is not prepared to accept the Husserlian Wesensschau and the Husserlian essences. On the other hand, he is committed to the essential structures and Essence of Dasein and their accessibility.¹⁴ Significantly, no detailed explanation of this Essence and the way it is given, i.e. the correlated intentional structures, is provided here.

This omission is not surprising, in view of the main theme of the lectures: the clarification of certain fundamental ontological structures,

and the critical elucidation of some traditional ontological theses. For one of these is precisely

the thesis of medieval ontology (scholastics) going back to Aristotle: What-being (essentia) and existence (existentia) belong to the constitution of a being.¹⁵

In Heidegger's view the traditional distinction between essence and existence is in need of elucidation and cannot be properly understood unless the question of the sense of Being is posed and answered first. Commenting on that distinction he says:

Every being is *something*, i.e. it has its *What* and has as such a certain determinate possible *manner-to-be*. . . . For us the question arises: Can we, starting from the sense of Being itself, i.e. the temporal, find out on what grounds every being must and can have a *What*, a τί, a possible manner-to-be? Do these determinations, What-being and 'manner-to-be', sufficiently widely conceived, belong to Being itself? 'Is' Being, in accordance with its essence, articulated by these determinations? We thus face *the problem of the fundamental articulation of Being* . . .¹⁶

Heidegger then allows us to catch some glimpse of that phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology to which he intended to devote the Second Part of *Being and Time*.¹⁷ He tries to show that the notions of essentia and existentia originate from one of Dasein's fundamental comportments called *Herstellen* – producing, the making of something.¹⁸ The same applied, according to his analysis, to a number of Greek notions, in particular to μορφή, εἶδος, τὸ ᾧν εἶναι and οὐσία, all of which are closely connected with, and in one sense or other, precursors of 'essentia'.¹⁹ He claims that *Herstellen* and, ultimately, the ontology of Dasein and its temporality provide the horizon within which the notion of essentia has to be clarified. If he also held that this clarification must precede the explication of his own notion 'Wesen', then it is plausible to suppose that he postponed this explication until after the completion of substantial parts of his fundamental ontology and of the phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology.

A few further points are worth emphasizing. Heidegger questions and doubts the universal applicability of 'essentia' and its Greek precursors to all and every being. Precisely because he believed that these notions originated in the realm of *Herstellen* and its artifacts he was unwilling to grant them that ontological universality. In particular, he doubted whether the mode of being of Dasein can be understood in terms of essentia and existentia, and whether the Who of Dasein coincides at all

with the What in the sense of *essentia*.²⁰ However, in these lectures he also says:

In accordance with the Essence of its existence, Dasein is 'in' truth . . .²¹

Here the connection which Heidegger emphasized in his letter to Beaufret, and which was already explicitly made in *Being and Time*, is pointed out again: being 'in' truth belongs to the Essence of Dasein.²² The two doubts – the one arising from the who of Dasein, the other from its being 'in' truth – are closely connected. The phrase 'being in truth' echoes Kierkegaard's Essential truth and the authentic self-disclosure of Dasein that goes with it.

Finally, the following passage is of interest, especially in view of Heidegger's later meditations on Essence:

what each being, whatever is real, has already been, is in German denoted by *essence*. In this essence, τὸ τί ἦν, in the *was*, resides the moment of the past, the previous.²³

Relating back to Aristotle, and to Hegel's 'Essence is being passed away' (Hegel connects 'Wesen' with 'gewesen'), these lines also remind us that already for the Heidegger of the twenties the question of Essence was intimately bound up with that of temporality, a point we shall return to.

4

Heidegger's essays *Vom Wesen des Grundes* and *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* appear to have originated in the late twenties. However, while the former truly belongs to this time and stage in his philosophic development, the latter does not quite. *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, first published in 1943, is, in his own words, the repeatedly revised text of a lecture first delivered in 1930.²⁴ Its fourth edition of 1961 contains a short but important addition to section nine. The essay contains various traces of Heidegger's philosophic re-orientation in the thirties.

Although the word 'Essence' occurs in both titles, its meaning remains unclear in several respects. However, the texts – above all *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* – throw at least some light on the problem which concerns us. According to Heidegger, not only is the question of Essence inseparable from that of Being, but 'in the concept of "Essence" philosophy thinks Being'.²⁵ Essence and Truth are similarly intertwined, Essence of Truth and Truth of Essence interwoven.²⁶ Furthermore the question of the Essence of Ground is said to be interlaced with the questions of

Being and Truth.²⁷ There is little hope, then, of elucidating Essence without getting entangled with a number of other Heideggerian notions.

In *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* Heidegger says:

'Essence' . . . is understood as the Ground for the inner possibility of that which is at first and in general admitted as known.²⁸

Thus, the Essence of something, X, is the Ground for the inner possibility of X, where X is admitted as known. From the level of our first, common knowledge of things we have to penetrate to a deeper level, that of their inner possibility, if we want to find their Essence. We set about from 'truths' or 'grounds', say, as they are generally admitted, and determine their conditions of possibility. Of course, what Heidegger has in mind is not the Leibnizian logical possibility (consistency) at all, but something closer to, though distinct from, the Kantian transcendental conditions of possibility. In the two essays he points out that the Essence of truth as well as the Essence of ground are found in one and the same: in freedom.²⁹ Freedom here means: freedom of Dasein. Dasein is not conceived of as isolated from beings; but being-in-a-world belongs to its Essence, and so do Transcendence and Ek-sistence.³⁰ From what Heidegger tells us we cannot conclude that the Essence of all things is found in the Being of Dasein. However, we may at least take it to *depend* upon the Being of Dasein, and, correspondingly, take the way it is determined to depend upon fundamental-ontological considerations. It is not clear what the qualification 'inner' is meant to refer to. Probably he wishes to exclude any reference to such conditions of the possibility of things which are external to these things.

According to Heidegger, the Essence of truth is 'what characterizes each "truth" as truth'.³¹ His quotation marks indicate that 'truth' is first to be taken in the sense of 'what is generally admitted as truth'. To articulate something as a truth does not, in his view, necessarily imply that the Essence of what is thus articulated is also grasped; there may be a pre-conceptual and pre-ontological rather than conceptual and ontological understanding of its Being.³² Generalizing Heidegger's remark a little, we arrive at a second way of determining Essence: the Essence of something, X, is what characterizes each 'X' as X. For instance, the Essence of Dasein is that which characterizes each 'Dasein' as Dasein, the Essence of ground that which characterizes each 'ground' as ground. But does this second definition agree with the first? Is that which is the inner Ground of the possibility of something, X, the same as what characterizes each 'X' as X? Only if what characterizes each 'X' as X is not an ontic feature of 'X'; but an ontological condition of its possibility.

Vom Wesen der Wahrheit circumscribes Essence in yet a third way, namely as 'the hiding singular (Einzig) of the unique history of the

disclosure of the "sense" of what we call Being and for a long time used to think as beings in their entirety'.³³ In the light of this passage, Essences are out of the question: for Heidegger there seems to be one Essence only. This Essence underlies the history of disclosure of Being and beings alike. As we shall see, Essence is not 'in' history but rather founds history. Essence hides in at least two senses. Firstly in history, even in the past of philosophy, reigns what Heidegger calls the forgetfulness of Being; to an extent Being and Essence can be disclosed by humans, but humans have so far failed to bring about this disclosure. Secondly, however, he holds that all disclosure of Essence, Being, and beings as beings is necessarily tied to closure. It is with this in mind that we have to approach Heidegger's strange notion of Inessence (*Unwesen*). Inessence, he says, is essential to Essence: if Essence founds the history of the disclosure of Being and beings, and if this disclosure is inseparable from the closure, or hiding, of Being and beings, then Inessence too founds that history and is essential. On the other hand, in Essence as the hiding, the inessential (to be distinguished from the non-essential³⁴) comes into play. The way in which Essence and Inessence together come into play constitutes 'the essential possibilities of historical mankind'.³⁵ In this third approach much bears the stamp of the thirties. How precisely it fits in with the two earlier approaches is difficult to establish, because Heidegger gives us little to go by. However, if (as indicated above) what characterizes something as something is taken in an ontological sense as the Ground of its possibility, and if Essence is understood as the Ground of the history of the disclosure of Being, then the three ways of delineating essence need not be incompatible or incoherent.

Heidegger emphasizes again that 'Wesen', in his sense of the term, is not 'the empty "general"', not '“abstract” generality'.³⁶ Traditional essence (*κονόν, γένος*) he considers to have 'fallen away' (*abgefallen*) from Essence in his original sense. In this 'falling away' Inessence asserts itself. However, Inessence must not be identified with this 'fallen off' essence, which is only one – and a derivative – meaning of the term 'Inessence'.³⁷ A similar relationship holds, according to Heidegger, between Ground and the grounds or reasons which the traditional principle of reason (*Satz vom Grunde*) is concerned with; in this principle, too, Inessence asserts itself and obstructs our inquiry into the Essence of Ground.³⁸

5

By the mid-thirties Heidegger had begun to think in new ways about Essence; ways which are not at all peripheral to his philosophic development. In a note added to later editions of *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* he

explains that the lecture, first given in 1930, should have been followed by a second lecture entitled 'Von der Wahrheit des Wesens' (Of the Truth of Essence), but that this project failed for reasons indicated in his letter *On Humanism*.³⁹ There is little doubt, then, that thinking about Essence and Truth, in particular about the Truth of Essence, played its part in the famous 'Kehre'.

In the following I shall draw mainly on three texts dating from the period 1935–8: his lectures on Hölderlin's hymns 'Germanien' and 'Der Rhein' (1935/6, *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 39), the essay 'The origin of the work of art' (1935/6), and the Freiburg lectures entitled *Grundfragen der Philosophie* (1937/8, *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 45). These latter lectures contain some relatively detailed reflections of Essence, unfortunately in the form of a slightly confusing mélange of Aristotelian and Heideggerian trains of thought. Here the Truth of Essence, a theme hinted at but (to my knowledge) not dealt with in detail before, is finally taken up and to some extent elucidated.⁴⁰ It is hardly accidental that this happened at a time when Heidegger was intensely occupied with art and poetry: as we shall see, in a sense the Truth of Essence is for him the Essence of art, is Poetry.

In *Grundfragen* Heidegger's basic question concerns Truth, or rather the Essence of Truth. In pursuing this question he is led into an inquiry into Essence, essential knowledge (Wesenswissen), and essential Truth (Wesenswahrheit). When he speaks of the Truth of Essence he frequently means the Truth of the Essence of something – e.g., of a table, a window, a house. It is important to take note of this and also of the somehow conventional character of Heidegger's discussion of Essence in these lectures; the more radical notion of Essence which we find in his later writings has not yet come to the fore, although his 1935/6 Hölderlin lectures already contain some indications of it. In *Grundfragen* he makes the following main points: (1) the Essence of things is brought forth rather than found in the way facts are found;⁴¹ (2) essential Truth and essential knowledge are not grounded in anything and do not have to conform to anything (unlike factual truths which must conform to factual states of affairs), but essential Truth is itself the ground and measure and is as such 'original' ('ursprünglich');⁴² (3) factual truth and factual knowledge depend upon essential Truth and essential knowledge.⁴³ In the light of these three theses Heidegger tries to show that the (already Aristotelian) claim that truth is rectitude (Richtigkeit) is itself essential Truth, 'ursprünglich' and without foundation. Thus, Heidegger dismisses the view that all truth is rectitude.

Let us examine his points in more detail! According to (1) the Essence of things is brought forth ('hervorgebracht' is his term), brought to light, while previously it is concealed, hidden, unknown. This might be taken to imply that it was there before, though unnoticed. However, to bring

it forth is according to Heidegger not simply to notice, in a leisurely sort of way, what went frequently unnoticed. He speaks of 'Er-sehen' of Essence, indicating that an effort is involved in making it accessible, and a special 'vision' required to bring us face to face with it.⁴⁴ Unfortunately, the decisive point is not sufficiently clarified. Is this 'hervorholende Heraussehen' in the end constitutive of the Essence of things, or is it not? If it is, then the bringing forth Heidegger means is creative in a sense it would not be, if it were merely a matter of coming face to face with what was already there before any 'vision' comes into play. By the way, the term 'holen' is already made use of in 'The origin of the work of art', where artistic work is said to be a *drawing out* (to use Hofstadter's translation of the term);⁴⁵ but there too the basic ambiguity is unresolved, and it remains to some extent unclear how art, as projecting and disclosing, relates to Essence.

On the face of it, then, two interpretations seem possible: (a) the Essence of things is independent of whether it is 'seen' or not 'seen', but it may be brought forth and become accessible; or (b) the Essence of things is only what it is through being 'seen', and bringing it forth amounts to an articulation without which it could not be what it is. It might appear that (a) is the more plausible interpretation of the two. Does not Heidegger's choice of words – 'hervor-gebracht', 'Zu-Gesicht-bringen' – clearly point in this direction? If (b) were the correct view, would we not expect him to explain the constitutive character of 'seeing' and 'conceiving' ('Erfassen')? Yet interpretation (a) is hardly consistent with his main point: that Truth of Essence is not rectitude. For if the Essence of things were independent of the 'seeing', would not our 'vision' of them and whatever claims we make about them be true to the extent that they conform to this essence, and false to the extent they do not? If so, then essential Truth and truth of fact would be analogous in that both would be grounded in something else; hence both would be rectitude, Richtigkeit. But this is precisely the position which Heidegger rejects, and we are therefore back to (a), despite some obvious connotations of the word 'hervorbringen'. This is not to argue, of course, that for the author of *Grundfragen* Essence was simply a human creation. Rather we have to think of it as some primordial response of men to Being and beings in accordance with which these disclose themselves to men. Given this interpretation, what is Truth as disclosure, Unverborgenheit? Clearly, 'disclosure' could not simply be taken to mean the making accessible of something which was already there before and was there independently of being disclosed; rather, disclosure would have to be the coming-into-being of the 'disclosed'. Such a notion of Truth raises fundamental problems of its own. Pursuing them, however, would lead us far beyond the confines of this essay.

Heidegger's argument that if we did not 'see' or 'conceive' Essence,

we would be blind to particular things and what they are; that therefore factual truth depends upon essential Truth, seems fairly traditional.⁴⁶ Knowledge of Essence guides us constantly and everywhere, he says.⁴⁷ Facts are disclosed only if there is disclosure of Essence. In this context, however, Heidegger makes some less familiar remarks, too, which point forward to his later thoughts on Essence and also back to his meditations on art and poetry, in 'The origin of the work of art' and in the Hölderlin lectures. Speaking of our knowledge of Essence, he remarks:

This strange state of affairs indicates that it is not the immediately given facts – the singular actual, tangible visible and that which in each case is meant and argued – which has the definite nearness to our 'life'. 'Closer to life – to use the current term – 'closer to life' than the so-called 'actuality' is the Essence of things which (Essence) we know and do not know. The near and distant is not that which the so-called man of facts (Tatsachenmensch) thinks he grasps, but the nearest in Essence, which indeed remains for most the most hidden.⁴⁸

Already here, then, Essence is what brings about nearness, neighbourhood, and thus grounds our daily 'life' while remaining mostly hidden. Heidegger goes a step further, however, when he asserts that:

the authentic calling and saying is indeed the original positing of Essence, but not by convention and adjustment (Abstimmung), but by measure-giving sovereign saying.⁴⁹

Hence it is through Language that essence originates, and with it that nearness, which is said to guide us everywhere.

Other features of Heidegger's account of Essence are perhaps less obvious. For instance, he tends to avoid the term 'Wesenheiten' and the plural of 'Wesen'; he prefers to speak of the Essence of things rather than the essences of things. A hint that the Essence of one thing and that of another are not separable in the way philosophers, speaking of the essences of things, often take them to be. We should recall that according to Heidegger beings are disclosed in their entirety. He seems to think of the Essence of things as a way they are disclosed within a whole of beings. Another important feature is hinted at in an appendix entitled 'Die Wahrheitsfrage',⁵⁰ which appears to have been composed at about the same time as the preceding lectures. Here he makes use of the unusual term 'Wesung'; he writes of 'Wesung der Wahrheit', 'Wesung des Seins' and 'Seyns'), using 'Wesung' side by side with 'Wesen'.⁵¹ The untranslatable '*Wesung*' is meant to emphasize the historical event-character of Essence, the sudden uncalculable disclosure of a whole of beings, and (in a sense) of Being itself.⁵² In this event, Heidegger tells

us, What-being (Wassein) and How-being (Wiesein) are not yet dissociated but in original unity, and he adds: 'We speak of experience (Erfahren) of *Wesung* and mean by this the knowing, voluntary, attuned *moving into* (Einfahren) *Wesung*, to stand in it and to stand it.'⁵³ Here (and in later writings, as we shall see) Essence and movement are brought together: essential experience is moving into, and (we may add) being moved by, Essence;⁵⁴ being attuned belongs to it – it is e-motion.

6

Grundfragen der Philosophie throws much light on Heidegger's notion of Essence but contains only a few passing references to art. On the other hand, in 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes' and the lectures on Hölderlin's 'Germanien' and 'Der Rhein' much remains unclear just because the notion of Essence is left unclarified. Thus, with the publication of *Grundfragen*, a more thorough analysis of Heidegger's philosophy of art, as expounded in those writings of the thirties, is within reach. Of course, it is not my intention to attempt such an analysis here, and I shall restrict myself to considering how the notion of Essence relates to that of the work of art.

'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes' makes three basic assertions about the work of art: (1) that it is an event (or happening) of Truth (ein Wahrheitsgeschehen) and opens up the Being of beings, (2) that it sets up a World (stellt eine Welt auf) and sets forth Earth, (3) that the work of art speaks to us: art is Poetry (Dichtung) as projective Saying (entwerfendes Sagen).⁵⁵ The term 'Wesen' appears on almost every page. As in previous texts Heidegger questions its traditional meaning, but now in particular regarding its application to art. He refers to three works of art in order to illustrate his point: a Greek temple, Van Gogh's painting of a pair of shoes, and Meyer's poem 'Der römische Brunnen'. He points out that a Greek temple does not represent the idea of a temple, that Meyer's poem does not render the universal essence of a Roman fountain, and that Van Gogh's painting does not show us what all shoes have in common.⁵⁶ On the other hand he writes:

The picture that shows the peasant shoes, the poem that says the Roman fountain, do not just make manifest what this isolated being as such is – if indeed they manifest anything at all; rather, they make unconcealedness as such happen in regard to what is as a whole. The more simply and essentially the shoes are engrossed in their Essence, the more plainly and purely the fountain is engrossed in its Essence

– the more directly and engagingly do all beings attain to a greater degree of being alone with them.⁵⁷

This passage indicates that although Heidegger rejects the view that a work of art represents or expresses some general essence of things, he does hold that in the work of art Truth occurs and beings rise up into, and merge with, their Essence.⁵⁸

However, a reader trying to find out more about Heidegger's notion 'Wesen' is likely to be puzzled. 'Wesen' enters in at least three respects, and neither of these is clearly explained in the essay. Firstly, there are the Essence and essential features of the work of art itself. To this essence, we are told, belong the event of Truth, but also the setting up of a World and setting forth of the Earth, and further Poetry and Language.⁵⁹ Secondly, there is the Essence of beings which, through the work of art, 'rise up into, and merge with, their Essence'. This Essence is presumably what the projective Saying of art 'brings forth' (to use the term of *Grundfragen*). The bringing forth of their Essence opens a World. Thirdly, Heidegger speaks of the essential space (*Wesensraum*) of a work of art, the 'space' in which it 'essences' (*wesen*).⁶⁰ With the help of the context we may infer that this essential space is in fact the World which the work of art sets up, or opens. As we shall see, the verb 'wesen' does not here simply mean 'being present', but also 'to reign' or 'govern', even 'to pervade'. Let us stress the crucial point: *the Essence of the work of art consists in bringing forth the Essence of beings*. The event of truth we are concerned with here is one of *essential* Truth (in the light of *Grundfragen* we are entitled to assert it). It is also a historical event. Again, not in the trivial sense that it is found 'in' history, but in the sense that it founds history and its epochs. Beings in their entirety are disclosed differently, and their Being is determined differently in different epochs.⁶¹ 'Each time, a new and essential World opened up', Heidegger writes.⁶² Works of art brought forth the Essence of things in a new way, and in so doing set up a World. Each time beings were disclosed in their entirety, which neither means that each being was disclosed totally nor that no being remained undisclosed, but that the beings disclosed formed a whole due to an all-pervading and epoch-founding way of disclosure. As an event of Truth the work of art is said to be the strife of concealment and unconcealment. Heidegger's word 'Riss', by which he characterizes the work of art, may be translated as either 'rift' or 'drawing': art draws out the Essence of things and thus brings about a 'rift' of concealed and unconcealed, and also of Essential and Inessential.⁶³ The projective Saying he refers to is not anything separate from this bringing forth of Essence but one and the same. Language in Heidegger's original sense is this articulation of Essence and hence prior to, and much more than, an 'audible and written expression

of what is to be communicated'.⁶⁴ To summarize: In accordance with 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes', World and the Essence of beings are inseparable. Beings have their Essence through belonging to a World, in which beings as a whole are disclosed. As the World changes, Essence changes. World and Essence are historical. The Essence of beings concerns their Being. In art Essence is brought forth through projective Saying, and a World is opened up. The Essence of the work of art consists in bringing forth the Essence of things. As this Essence is brought forth and constituted in different ways, different epochs and a change of Essence arise – 'the history of the Essence of occidental art unfolds'.⁶⁵

When we turn again to Van Gogh's painting of the shoes, some questions arise. Heidegger's comments on the painting appear more questionable than might have been thought at first. What Essence – or the Essence of what – did the artist's projective Saying bring forth? As Heidegger assures us, this Essence cannot be some general notion or universal essence 'shoe' or 'peasant shoe'. In view of the above one would expect it to be some mode of Being of shoes which is due to a disclosure of beings in their entirety, which opens a world and founds an epoch. This is not quite what Heidegger tells us, however. He points out that the painting reveals what equipment is; that through the painting we find 'the equipmentality of equipment'.⁶⁶ This poses further problems. Firstly, is 'equipmentality' not precisely what Heidegger wants to exclude, namely a general notion, a traditional universal essence applicable to every piece of equipment? Or is there perhaps some mysterious individual mode of being equipment which cannot possibly apply to more than one pair of shoes and which is revealed in Van Gogh's painting? But of course, being equipment is for Heidegger not at all a general property inherent in shoes, bricks, hammers and the like; nor is it a general notion, or an eternal, invariable essence which exists somehow over and above particular pieces of equipment. What he denies is not so much the general significance of equipmentality as its identification with some general property, notion or traditional essence. Instead, equipmentality is meant to characterize a mode of Being, a way in which some beings are disclosed to humans. In the light of *Being and Time* and its analysis of equipment we may agree that if the painting discloses the Being of equipment, then it reveals a basic trait of our world and of the worlds which were historically realized. That analysis also shows that equipment is disclosed as a whole within a structure of in-order-to-relations.⁶⁷ Secondly, in what way, if any, does such a disclosure of the mode of Being of equipment set up a World? It goes without saying that long before Van Gogh created this painting Worlds were in existence and shoes put on and off, worn and bought, and all kinds of other equipment used. Presumably, the painting provides an essential insight over and above that 'pre-ontological understanding of Being' (to use an

earlier term of Heidegger's) which guides us in everyday life and guided people in past Worlds. What Heidegger has primarily in mind here is an ontological insight and not an ontic one. His main point is not that through the work of art we become more aware of what kinds of shoes there are, of their actual and potential uses, or of the role they play in our daily lives. When he writes that the painting provides us with a *knowledge* of what shoe-equipment *truly is*,⁶⁸ he means that by revealing its equipmentality it reveals to us what we tend to overlook and forget while using it: its Being and with it worldliness. Thus, we may at least understand one sense in which the picture is supposed to open a World: it is meant to give us an ontological insight into the worldliness of World. However, seeing that the equipmentality of shoes is not just characteristic of our or Van Gogh's World but also e.g., of the medieval and Roman Worlds, in what sense, if any, can the picture be said to *set up* a World, to *found* a World or a specific epoch? 'Van Gogh's painting has spoken', Heidegger insists. But in what way has it spoken of Essence? The essay does not tell us in sufficient detail, and we are left with a few puzzling questions.

7

Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen, 1962) comprises the texts, or enlarged texts, of a few lectures which Heidegger delivered in the years 1949, 1950 and 1955. Its first part, entitled 'Die Frage nach der Technik' also appeared in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1954) while the second part, 'Die Kehre' was published for the first time in 1962.⁶⁹ For anybody concerned with Heidegger's notion of Essence *Die Technik und die Kehre* is a most important text. However, commentators have frequently failed to address themselves to the problem of Essence and did not notice how closely it is bound up with the question of technology. Heidegger writes: 'It is technology which requires of us to think in a new sense what is usually understood by "essence". But in what sense?'⁷⁰ On the preceding page he remarks: 'Up to now we have understood the word "essence" in the current meaning.'⁷¹ Its current meaning is that of quidditas, whatness. It is not obvious whether he did in fact, up to page 29, use 'Wesen' consistently in this current sense. It is even less obvious in what new way 'Wesen' has to be thought of, in response to the question of technology.

'The Essence of modern technology shows itself in that which we call *Ge-stell*.'⁷² According to Heidegger, the Essence of technology is nothing technological.⁷³ He considers this Essence to be highly ambiguous.⁷⁴ On the one hand, as *Ge-stell* it is Being itself; it provokes man into disclosing the real as Bestand and (what is on order, stock).⁷⁵ On the other hand, modern technology appears as the opposite of disclosure, as closure,

blocking out, in a variety of ways: (a) it blocks out its own Essence,⁷⁶ (b) it blocks out Things,⁷⁷ (c) it prevents the nearness of World,⁷⁸ (d) it blocks the *πολίσεις*, the genuine bringing forth,⁷⁹ (e) it refuses the Truth of Being,⁸⁰ (f) it prevents man from encountering himself and his Essence,⁸¹ and (g) Ge-stell even conceals its own blocking out.⁸² We conclude that according to Heidegger, the Essence of technology consists in the provocation of humans into a peculiar disclosing of beings which is at the same time a closure and blocking out. At first sight one might see here merely the Heideggerian insistence that all disclosure is bound up with closure. However, he makes the more specific point that the seven-fold blocking out is a special and extreme kind of closure, unprecedented in the history of men.

Some linguistic signposts are meant to lead us on to the new sense of 'Wesen'. Firstly, Heidegger draws our attention to the German nouns 'Hauswesen', 'Staatswesen', and to the old word (still used by J. P. Hebel) 'die Weserei'. He points out that 'Wesen' does here not mean the universal, the general of the genus, but rather a way of 'walten', 'verwalten', unfolding and decaying. The word 'walten' is difficult to translate; the dictionary renders it as 'govern', 'rule'; but the word also has the more general sense of being active and 'in one's element' (e.g. in the phrase 'schalten und walten'). Die Weserei is the town hall, 'in so far as there communal life gathers and village life remains in play'.⁸³ Wesen, then, should be thought as that which governs – in the sense of: gathers, brings together, maintains, keeps in play. Secondly, Heidegger takes 'Wesen' in a verbal sense and emphasizes its reference to time; Wesen as *persisting* and *lasting*, not just *that which* persists and lasts.⁸⁴ Thirdly, he refers to the connection of 'das Wesende' and 'das Währende' with 'das Gewährende': with that which grants (Things).⁸⁵ According to Heidegger, then, 'Wesen', 'walten', 'währen', 'gewähren' belong together. It is in this context that the word 'Wesen' is given its meaning. Surprisingly perhaps, he does not draw our attention to that good old Alemannic phrase 'es Wäse mache' ('ein Wesen machen' – to put on a show, a display, make a fuss).

At first sight 'Wesen' as introduced in *Die Technik und die Kehre* seems to have nothing or little to do with the Socratic, Platonic or Aristotelian essences. However, Heidegger points out that these too were closely related to the temporal: and they were said to last. The Aristotelian τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι was considered to 'precede', to be prior to, particulars and by translating the term as 'the what-it-was-being' Heidegger attempts to bring out this reference to time.⁸⁶ As Essence governs, pervades, brings together the many particulars,⁸⁷ as it grants Being to them and grants us knowledge of them, it corresponds in his view to the Socratic and Platonic εἶδος or ἰδέα. However, these were understood as remaining forever invariant and in some sense beyond the variety of changing

things and instances.⁸⁸ This Heidegger did not accept: Essence is lasting (während) and changing (sich wandelnd). In short, then, Heidegger's notion 'Wesen' retains some fundamental traits of εἶδος, ἰδέα and τὸ τί ἐῖναι, while excluding (i) what he sees as their 'most current' and 'most superficial' character, namely to be simply the general with regard to a range of instances,⁸⁹ and (ii) the claim that essence is perennial-invariant, in some realm beyond time.

What, then, is Wesen according to *Die Technik und die Kehre*? To answer the question (tentatively at least) let us recall how Heidegger determines the Essence of technology. It is the Ge-stell (the Enframing, to use a current but easily misleading translation) and is said to be the lasting (das Währende), the gathering (das Versammelnde), and the granting (das Gewährnde).⁹⁰ However, this still leaves much undetermined and does not yet bring out a most crucial feature hinted at in the following lines:

For, according to all that has been said the Ge-stell is, rather, a destiny that gathers together into the provoking disclosure.

... the provoking into the ordering (Bestellen) of the real as that which is on order (Bestand, stock) still remains a destining that leads man into a way of disclosing.⁹¹

It is extremely difficult to translate this passage and preserve the meanings of, and connections between, the main verbs and nouns which Heidegger employs. Two points emerge, however: (a) the Essence of technology is a destiny (Geschick), and (b) it is a destiny that leads man into a particular way of disclosing the real – namely into disclosing it as Bestand. But what does he mean by 'Geschick', or 'destiny'? Obviously not some 'iron fate' which is imposed upon men by some non-human power; nor something which rules mankind eternally in the same way. 'Geschick' means, literally speaking, all that is sent, and all that we fit into. Here however it refers to a way of disclosure humans get into and find themselves confined to, for a certain time 'in history'. We have seen above that according to Heidegger such Geschicke do not simply occur 'in history' but bring about history; without them there would be no history at all. Geschick depends upon humans, and humans depend on Geschick. Those ways of mankind are not in the power of men: they cannot be brought about, continued or discontinued at will. They are what happens to mankind, or to peoples; what men are engaged in, neither in a purely 'passive' nor in a purely 'voluntary' manner. One destiny may give way to another, and thus a historical epoch may end and another begin to take its course. There was an ancient Greek way of disclosing the real, and now there is the technological way. Each time

humans disclose the real, and the real discloses itself to them, in a particular way. This way pervades all human thinking and doing, and the relation of men to beings as beings, and thus gives rise to an 'epoch' of history. Essence is this way of disclosing: the lasting (namely for an epoch), the gathering (of beings into a whole governed by a mode of disclosure), and the granting (making the real accessible to humans in a particular way).

8

Finally, I shall turn to Heidegger's book *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen, 1959). Under the title 'Vom Wesen der Sprache' it contains three lectures which he originally gave at Freiburg in 1957 and 1958. Here, in particular in the third lecture, the notion of Essence as a way of disclosing is further elaborated. Essence is now said to be das Be-wëgende – the Making way, or that which makes way.⁹² 'Be-wëgen' is then interpreted as the Saying of Language ('Essence speaks') and the interplay of the Fourfold (Heaven, Earth, Gods, Mortals).⁹³ Of course, it would be mistaken to believe that in the mid-fifties Heidegger suddenly discovered the intimate connection between what he called Essence and Language; it should be clear by now that this was a theme he had been preoccupied with long before.

As mentioned above, in *The Question Concerning Technology* we first encounter the term 'essence' with its traditional (and still current) meaning and are then directed to 'Essence' in the later and specifically Heideggerian sense. In the lectures on the 'Essence of Language' we find a similar deliberate division and transition, but now within one single sentence, the most important sentence of the essay, perhaps, and the one which is meant to provide 'the guiding word':

The essence of Language:
The Language of Essence.⁹⁴

In the first line, the word 'essence' is taken in its traditional-philosophical sense as the what-being, *Wassein*, while in the second line 'Essence' means a way of disclosing. Heidegger attempts to elucidate this latter sense as follows:

Now however the word 'Wesen' no longer means that which something is. 'Wesen' we hear as a verb [*Zeit-wort*] . . . 'Wesen' means lasting, enduring. Only, the turn of phrase '*Es west*' says more than just: It lasts and endures. '*Es west*' means: it is present [*es west an*], lasting it concerns us, moves [*be-wëgt*] and belongs [*be-langt*] us. Thought in

this way Wesen names the lasting, that which concerns us in everything, because it is that which moves everything.⁹⁵

The translation hardly speaks for itself. The slightly puzzling phrase 'wesend wie anwesend und abwesend' is difficult to render in English in such a way as not to confuse the reader even further, and I have therefore omitted it; Heidegger probably wants to say that we hear the word 'Wesen' as a verb meaning *wesen*, as in *anwesen* (being present) and *abwesen* (being absent). The word 'be-wëgen' is one of Heidegger's own linguistic creations and derives, as he explains, from the Swabian-Alemannic 'wëge' (making, laying out, paths or roads) and the High German 'bewegen' (to move).⁹⁶ 'Be-wëgen' means to *make* (lay out, prepare) ways and to *make way*, also to get under way; but here it does not at all mean to pass from one location in space to another. In the last sentence of the quotation one might expect the word *Wesen* to be put into quotation marks; for is it not the *word* 'Wesen' that names the lasting and what concerns us in all things? Or is Heidegger indicating here that *Wesen* names itself? This is indeed a possibility. For according to Heidegger it is above all Language that names; and as Language is said to be *Wesen's* 'ownmost character', *Wesen* too may be said to name things and even itself.

Wesen, *Essence*, is thus characterized in a twofold manner: (a) it is the Moving or (the term I shall from now on mainly use) Making-way; (b) it is that which speaks, that to which Language properly belongs. These are not two independent 'aspects' of *Essence*. In making way *Essence* speaks; and in Speaking it makes way. The Speaking we are concerned with here is the Making-way, and the Making-way of *Essence* its Speaking. Can we render this notion of *Essence* more intelligible at all? Let us try. In the previous section we found that *Essence* was conceived as an epoch-founding way of disclosing beings in their entirety. 'Way' must be understood in a verbal sense. Heidegger groups it together with other words such as 'wiegen' (to rock), 'wogen' (to wave, to surge), 'wagen' (to venture).⁹⁷ Here 'way' does not primarily refer to some static assembly of paths, but to the setting or laying out, finding, preparing of paths, and also to moving on a path to and fro. The setting out and the going to and fro is not meant in the spatial sense (as commonly understood), nor in the sense in which scientists may say that they have found a way or method. Rather, the ways and movements refer to the basic historical modes in which beings in their entirety disclose themselves as beings to humans. According to Heidegger this disclosure is tied to, and inseparable from, closure, not because wherever something is disclosed, something else just happens to be hidden too, but rather because disclosure depends on closure. Heidegger maintains that we find such ways of closure/disclosure in the physis of early Greek times, in the creation (the

world of created beings) of the middle ages, in the will to power and finally the Ge-stell in modern times. But what has all this to do with language? Very little, obviously, if we simply take a language as a system of signs and rules for the sake of communication. For Heidegger, however, Language is primarily a way in which Being discloses itself and beings appear as such, are *shown as beings*.⁹⁸ Given this primeval sense of 'Language', and given also that Essence is Making-way (in the sense explained), then Language may be said to belong to Essence. It may be asked on what grounds Heidegger used the word 'language' in this highly unusual way, and how precisely this primeval Language is connected with language in a more ordinary sense. However, these and other questions must remain open here, as I do not intend to give a detailed account of Heidegger's approach to language.

One last point should be mentioned: that Heidegger takes the Making-way and Speaking of Essence as constitutive of World. At this stage, however, the notion of World as expounded in *Being and Time* has been considerably modified. Now World is the interplay of the Fourfold: Earth, Heavens, Divines and Mortals.⁹⁹ The ways of disclosure, i.e. the Making-way and Speaking of Essence, are correspondingly interpreted as ways of interplay of the Four. It is these ways which grant the appearance of beings, are the enduring of a historical epoch, pervade, and gather together for a time, beings into a whole. Not surprisingly, Heidegger now says of Language that it is world-moving.¹⁰⁰ He means that the Language of Essence, by making way, laying out the paths of disclosure of beings as beings, and of Being itself, constitutes a World. Or, to use the phrase the later Heidegger was fond of: the Making-way of Essence constitutes *the worlding of World – das Welten der Welt*.

9

Let us try to sum up the preceding analysis and come to some – almost inevitably critical – conclusions. What did Heidegger mean by 'Essence'? It should at least be obvious by now that there is no simple answer to this question. The simple negative reply that he meant different things by it at different times is of course correct but insufficient and misleading. In the almost four decades considered, Heidegger's notion 'Essence' changed in quite fundamental respects. Yet this change was regulated by some relatively constant, though initially not fully clarified, philosophic intentions.

Among these 'constants' are the following:

- 1) Heidegger's conviction that philosophic thinking is essential thinking, or the thinking of the Essence of beings.

- 2) His refusal to identify this Essence with the essence of traditional metaphysics.
- 3) The insistence that the Essence of things concerns their Being and the way they are disclosed, as beings, to humans.
- 4) That this disclosure takes place within a World, the ways of disclosure structuring the World.
- 5) An intention to let himself be guided by the verbal rather than substantival sense of 'Wesen'.

These assertions are inevitably formal and sketchy, and merely indicate a range of possible orientations; words such as 'philosophic thinking', 'beings', 'disclosure', 'World', 'Essence' serve here as indicators only, each pointing to a sequence of more or less distinct Heideggerian notions.

Regarding the evolution of Heidegger's notion 'Essence', it is beyond question that significant shifts of meaning took place. To characterize this development let us distinguish three stages (a very rough distinction must suffice here):

- A. In the second half of the twenties his notion of Essence is hardly elaborated at all. On the one hand he suspends the traditional 'essentia' as questionable; on the other he makes frequent use of 'Wesen', taking his notion of *Wesen* to be a '*Vorgriff*', i.e., a preliminary grasp of something still in need of an ontological-phenomenological clarification on the basis of the first part of *Being and Time*. Although he determines the Essence of Dasein as existence and concerns himself with the analysis of what he took to be essential structures of Dasein, 'Wesen' remains a largely indeterminate notion.
- B. The thirties are marked by an original thrust towards a new though still preliminary conception of Essence. This development owes much to his intense occupation with the philosophy of art, the work of Hölderlin and Nietzsche, and with Greek philosophers (especially Plato, Aristotle, Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus). Essence, he holds, has to be brought forth by projective Saying (as in the work of art). In this way a World and historical epoch is founded. Essence is a way in which beings are disclosed as beings, which disclosure is bound up with closure (and World and Earth).
- C. In the forties and fifties his mature notion of Essence as Making-way emerges, in close connection with his attempt to come to terms with technology on the one hand, language on the other. Essence is further determined as the lasting, gathering, and granting, and thus can be seen to respond to the Platonic, Aristotelian and scholastic essences (conceived as persisting perennially, comprising particulars and granting the what-being of these as well as the possibility of their being known). But Essence as the Making-way, the speaking, and the

Moving of the Fourfold obviously takes us far beyond the philosophic tradition.

At stage A the Essence of Dasein is taken to be the key for unlocking the Essence of beings of other kinds, whatever this Essence may turn out to be. Dasein projects its own being-in-the-World; and through this project the Being of beings is disclosed. Worldiness is an existential, characteristic of the Being of Dasein. Language is a worldly manifestation of discourse, and hence (according to *Being and Time*) of 'the primordial existentials of disclosedness'.¹⁰¹ The development from A to B and C shows a shift away from the project of Dasein, in at least two respects: the Essence of things becomes historic 'Geschick' ('sent' rather than projected by Dasein; *Dasein* 'fits into it' instead of originating or founding it), and its movement of disclosure 'decentralized', as it were, and involving besides Dasein (or Mortals) also Divines, Heaven and Earth. Thus, worldliness and Language cease to be existentials in the strict sense of *Being and Time*. First it was Dasein who was said to speak, then it was the work of art, finally Essence itself. First, Making-way (if we may for a moment use this term in a general, formal sense) was Dasein's projective disclosing, then it was the event of Truth in the work of art, and finally the basic determination of Essence itself. In more than one respect the work of art became the focus of an intermediate position in this shift from A to C. For instance, Heidegger insists on the 'projective Saying of art' while playing down the artist's project of saying, which in 'The origin' remains peripheral. The event of Truth in the work of art is said to come about through strife; yet the strife meant here is not (at least not primarily) the artist's own, but that of Earth and World (some historic World). Heidegger's point is not that there is first World, which then enters into strife with Earth; but rather that through strife a 'thrust' into the unfamiliar and extraordinary occurs, and a historic World with its 'paths of essential directions'¹⁰² constitutes itself. Essence as Making-way and historic *Geschick* are here foreshadowed.

10

My objective was to give the reader an idea of what Heidegger meant by 'Wesen' and how his notion of Essence evolved. However, an exposition of this kind may easily create the impression that this notion is ultimately unproblematic and that philosophically all is well with Heidegger's approach – an impression I would prefer not to convey. I shall therefore end with a few critical reflections on what seems to represent the core of Essence. Seeing that his philosophy was, throughout the period under investigation, essential thinking, i.e., thinking of the essen-

tial, it is amazing how vague, ambiguous and fluctuating his conception of Essence was. Even what I called his mature notion is far from lucid and remained in many respects indeterminate. Of course, it is possible (though perhaps unlikely) that this judgement will have to be substantially revised once the *Gesamtausgabe* is complete. Some features of *Wesen* may readily be appreciated. That what there is discloses itself to men 'as a whole' in specific ways constitutive of historic epochs; that this disclosure is inevitably tied to specific ways of closure; that the closure/disclosure comes about above all through works of art and philosophic thought rather than the sciences: these are at least thought-provoking proposals. If it is so (to take a particularly pertinent case) that our modern technological age is characterized by an all-pervading mode of disclosure and 'blocking out' of what there is, a mode specific to this epoch of ours and not at all to Greek, medieval and even early modern times, then it is high time to think about it. But has Heidegger given us sufficiently clear indications of how to think about this fundamental constellation, how to think the Essence of things? Or are we simply plunged into the vague and controversial? To be fair to Heidegger, he never claimed to provide us with a precise, intersubjectively testable and generally acceptable theory. Far from it! He merely claimed to have made a few steps in a new direction and asked some basic questions about something that had long been forgotten – Being. He would have readily agreed that these questions – let alone the answers – remained tentative and to some degree vague, and that his way of recalling Being was bound to be controversial.

'The Essence of . . . ' is not only frequently encountered in Heidegger's writings, but it also occurs in a bewildering variety of phrases, such as

the Essence of a tree,
the Essence of a jug,
the Essence of science,
the Essence of man,
the Essence of Truth,
the Essence of Being,
the Essence of Essence,

to give a small but representative sample. A tree or a jug are particular beings. According to the above analysis of stages B and C, the Essence of beings is an epochal way in which their Being is disclosed (or in which they disclose themselves as beings) to men. Heidegger frequently emphasizes that this epochal way concerns the disclosure of beings *as a whole*. For example, in ancient Greek times the Being of beings was physis, in modern times objectivity (*Gegenständigkeit*, *Vorgestelltheit*), then will to power, and finally, in the technological age, beings show themselves as stock (*Bestand*).¹⁰³ In each case we are concerned with an

all-pervading way of Being of beings. Heidegger also speaks of the disclosure of the Being of a specific range of beings as when he determines the Essence of *Things* as 'versammelnd-ereignendes Verweilen des Gevierts' – 'the gathering-eventful dwelling of the four' (to offer one of various inadequate translations).¹⁰⁴ Now, the mode of Being of a jug cannot be identical with that of a tree, for instance. Jugs are man-made, trees are not (at least not in the same sense); trees grow and reproduce themselves in a manner jugs do not. On the other hand, neither Gegenständigkeit, nor Bestand, nor any other all-pervading way of Being seems to exhaust the Being of a jug, or that of a tree. How then is the Essence of any particular being, such as a jug, connected with those all-pervading ways? Do these differentiate themselves into a manifold of specific ways and traits of Being? Do we perhaps have to interpret the 'gathering' character of Essence primarily with an eye to *this* plurality rather than to that of particular beings?

As is well known, Heidegger insisted on the ontological difference, the fundamental distinction between beings and Being. Yet he speaks both of the Essence of beings and the Essence of Being, a fact which is puzzling. The Essence of beings, as we interpreted it, depends upon three conditions: that there 'is' Being, that there are men, and that the Being of beings is disclosed (or that they disclose themselves as beings) to men. Essence itself does not depend upon there being jugs or trees. That is, various kinds of beings may 'have' their Essence even if there were no jugs and no trees at all. However, Essence – the Essence of anything – cannot be detached from man, Truth, and Being. On these Essence depends – in an 'essential' manner, one is tempted to say; or, the Essence of Essence (Wesenheit, Essentiality) depends upon man, Truth, and Being. But can we speak of the Essence of Being, Truth or Essence in the same or at least in an analogous way in which we speak of the Essence of particular beings such as trees and jugs? The Essence of Truth would have to be the epochal way in which the Being of Truth is disclosed to men; the Essence of Being the epochal way in which the Being of Being is disclosed to them. What sense, if any, can be given to 'Being of Truth', 'Being of Being', 'Being of Essence'? As regards Truth, Heidegger calls it the Essence of the true (das Wesens des Wahren).¹⁰⁵ Thus the Essence of Truth would be the Essence of the Essence of the true, and hence an epochal way in which the Being of an epochal way of the disclosure of the Being of the true is disclosed. Logically complex states of affairs which it is difficult to see through! Furthermore, if Essence is the disclosure of the Being of beings and of Being itself, would we not have to conclude that Essence is the Truth of Being?¹⁰⁶ But how can this be brought into agreement with Heidegger's hints that Truth is the Essence of Being?¹⁰⁷ Of course, that Essence is the Truth of Being must not be taken to imply that the notion of Essence

is reducible to that of Truth of Being, and hence superfluous. For Truth and Being in turn have to be characterized by Essence, or rather Essencing ('Essence' taken in a verbal sense). Essencing is lasting and dwelling (Weilen, Verweilen);¹⁰⁸ Truth and Being last and dwell. It would be erroneous, however, to interpret this lasting and dwelling simply as 'going on in time', and to suppose that there is first a time, *in* which this or that may occur, for instance the disclosure of Being. Heidegger would have dismissed such a conception of time. Proper time belongs to Being and Truth and grants the appearance of beings. Essence seems to have its Time, Time its Essence, Truth its Being and Being its Truth, Being its Essence and Essence its Being. . . . It is obvious that for Heidegger Essence, Being, Truth, and Time belong together, are inseparable; but how precisely they are connected is far from obvious. In the end it remains unclear how 'Essence of Being', 'Essence of Truth' and 'Essence of Essence' have to be understood.

Heidegger seems to oscillate between an epochal Essence and an Essence which is in some sense transepochal. On the one hand he refers to some kind of epochal disclosure of the Being of beings, of Truth and Being itself. What the Being of beings, what Being and Truth are disclosed as characterizes an epoch; it is a way of disclosure which will give way to another.¹⁰⁹ On the other hand, Heidegger appears to hold that there is some proper Essence of beings, of Being and of Truth, an Essence which is not merely relative to an epoch. For instance, Heidegger frequently points out that man's Essence resides in his openness for Being, his Ek-stasis, his being the guardian of Being.¹¹⁰ It looks as if *this* Essence is his *proper* Essence, not just an epochal way among others in which his Being shows itself. We are given the impression that this Essence was involved throughout history, from early Greek times onwards, but that it remained concealed, and in our own technological age even 'blocked out'. If so, this Essence can hardly be taken to be an epochal way in which man's Being is disclosed but instead has to be some enduring fundamental way of being. By contrast, 'animal rationale' appears to refer to an epochal Essence of man, a way he was and understood himself. Now, we have to insist, I think, that something can only be disclosed to the extent it shows itself as it is. If man is the guardian of Being, and if animal rationale is not what he truly is, then he cannot be disclosed as the latter. We might say that *for* the age of Descartes he was animal rationale, that is, 'believed' to be such; but that he was then not understood as he truly is; as humans did not understand what man truly is there is a sense in which man *was not* what he truly is: the Guardian of Being – his proper, still unfulfilled and epochally undisclosed *possibility*. That is, we might take the proper Essence to be a possibility and 'potential' being of man, and animal rationale to be the Essence of man as he actually was and understood himself in seventeenth

century Europe. Although this may appear a plausible manner of resolving the problem of the 'two Essences' it is a rather un-Heideggerian way of overcoming it. The following account would be more in line with Heidegger's view: The one Essence of man – the guarding of Being – is an ongoing event of disclosure/closure, and epochs arise as ways in which this Essence refrains from disclosing itself in some respects to humans (refraining we take as *epoché*). This one Essence of man changes and manifests itself in different epochal ways of disclosure/closure, 'animal rationale' indicating one such way. However, this still does not remove the initial difficulty that seventeenth century man would have to be simultaneously both guardian of Being and animal rationale. Is man always guardian of Being, even as animal rationale? Was he never animal rationale at all, but did he merely for a time believe himself to be such? In my opinion neither of these two questions can be answered with a firm 'yes'; indeed it is not easy to see how the 'two Essences' can be made compatible. By the way, similar difficulties arise in connection with Heidegger's notion of truth. Here *Unverborgenheit* (Unconcealment, *alêtheia*) is taken to be the proper though long forgotten Essence of Truth, while for instance rectitude (*Richtigkeit*) is presumably an epochal Essence of Truth which, according to Heidegger, determined history since the time of Plato and Aristotle.

After all that has been said the patient reader may still wonder whether he has gained the crucial insight into the Essence of Essence, or into Heidegger's essential thinking. I have attempted to set up some signposts, but without any guarantee that they will lead on to some holy grail of Heideggerian philosophy. With some philosophers we feel that it is clear what they say, and the question is then whether what they assert is true, or how what they assert relates to other comments on the same or similar topics. Some philosophic texts, however, appear so unclear, puzzling and confusing that we first have to ask what, if anything, is asserted at all. Heidegger's place among the enigmatic thinkers seems assured. But before condemning him or treating him as a figure of fun, let us remember that sometimes the significant and profound appears in an initially unclear form. In a time like ours when so many relatively insignificant clear philosophers with relatively contracted horizons make so much noise, Heidegger's radical questions and far-reaching perspectives are bound to retain their appeal.

Notes

1 As a rule I have written crucial typically Heideggerian terms, such as 'Essence', 'Being', 'Truth' and others, with capital initials. However, in a few places (especially in Section 5) it was difficult to separate the genuinely

Heideggerian from non-Heideggerian meanings; in such cases I did not use capitals. Unfortunately, it was not possible to put German words and phrases into italics throughout as these had to be reserved for the titles of writings as well as for specially emphasized words or phrases. Unless otherwise stated, the subsequent translations from the German are my own.

The more frequently quoted Heideggerian works are referred to as follows (I have used the editions within my reach which, in most cases, do not differ significantly from earlier ones):

- GP *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 24, Frankfurt a.M., 1975.
 GFP *Grundfragen der Philosophie, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 45, Frankfurt a.M., 1984.
 TK *Die Technik und die Kehre*, 2nd edition, Pfullingen, 1962.
 SZ *Sein und Zeit*, 9th edition, Tübingen, 1960.
 UKW *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, Stuttgart, 1960.
 US *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, 3rd edition, Pfullingen, 1965.
 WG *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, 3rd edition, Frankfurt a.M., 1955.
 WW *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, 4th edition, Frankfurt a.M., 1961.

2 SZ, pp. 49, 52, 56, 121, 123, 136–7, 216.

3 SZ, p. 42.

4 SZ, p. 231.

5 SZ, p. 233.

6 'Über den Humanismus', in M. Heidegger, *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Mit einem Brief über den Humanismus*, 2nd edition, Bern, 1954; see especially pp. 68–72.

7 SZ, p. 323; the quotation marks in 'essential' are Heidegger's own.

8 Compare SZ, pp. 42–5.

9 SZ, p. 147 (transl. by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson).

10 Compare e.g., SZ, p. 35.

11 GP 24, p. 27.

12 GP 24, p. 161. As I am not of the opinion that only tailors ought to worry about elegance, I should like to apologize, once and for all, for the sometimes rather inelegant translations of Heidegger's phrases. However, it is important, in view of the objective of this paper, to keep as close as possible to the meaning of his words.

13 This is obvious from various places in these lectures (e.g., pp. 29, 219, 224, 239, 241–2) and from some of Heidegger's other writings of the period, especially *Being and Time*.

14 He goes on using terms such as 'Wesen', 'wesentlich', 'wesenhaft', much as he did in *Sein und Zeit*. See e.g., GP 24, pp. 9, 29, 31, 109, 135.

15 GP 24, p. 20. Here I had to translate Heidegger's term 'Vorhandenheit' as 'existence', for lack of another suitable term. In this context 'Vorhandenheit' is not at all synonymous with 'present-at-hand', the term used in *Being and Time*.

16 GP 24, pp. 23–4.

17 SZ, p. 39.

18 GP 24, pp. 148, 152–3, 158–60.

19 GP 24, pp. 149–51.

20 GP 24, pp. 169–70.

21 GP 24, p. 25.

22 SZ, p. 221.

23 *GP* 24, p. 120.

24 'Revised' is my translation, and interpretation, of Heidegger's slightly ambiguous term 'überprüft' which may in fact merely mean 'checked' or 'examined'.

25 *WG*, p. 2.

26 *WW*, p. 23.

27 *WG*, pp. 17, 50.

28 *WW*, p. 13. I hope I do not have to apologize for some harmlessly un-Heideggerian phrases which I had to resort to in the interpretation of this quote.

29 *WG*, pp. 53, 44, 50; *WW*, p. 12.

30 *WG*, p. 22; *WW*, p. 14.

31 *WW*, p. 5.

32 Compare *WG*, pp. 13–14. In *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* Heidegger mentions the 'Wesenblick' through which Essence is supposed to be revealed, thus suggesting that something over and above ordinary thinking and experience is required to discover Essence.

33 *WW*, p. 25.

34 *WW*, p. 20.

35 *WW*, p. 17.

36 *WW*, p. 25.

37 *WW*, p. 20.

38 *WG*, p. 53.

39 *WW*, p. 26.

40 Compare *WW*, p. 23 and *UKW*, p. 53.

41 *GFP*, pp. 83, 85–6.

42 *GFP*, pp. 81, 83, 86, 95–6.

43 *GFP*, p. 93.

44 *GFP*, p. 85.

45 *UKW*, pp. 80, 87; M. Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought* (transl. by A. Hofstadter), New York, 1971.

46 *GFP*, pp. 65–6, 84.

47 *GFP*, p. 81.

48 *GFP*, p. 82.

49 *GFP*, p. 80.

50 *GFP*, pp. 193–223.

51 Now this term is only occasionally put into quotation marks.

52 *GFP*, pp. 201, 210, 218.

53 *GFP*, p. 202.

54 Notice the relation of *Erfahren* and *Einfahren* which the English translation fails to preserve.

55 *UKW*, pp. 32, 37, 44, 60, 62, 63, 82–4. 'Earth' is a rather difficult notion giving rise to problems of its own. I shall make no attempt to interpret it in any detail here.

56 *UKW*, pp. 34–5.

57 *UKW*, pp. 60–1. This is A. Hofstadter's translation except that I have inserted the words 'Essence' and 'essential' where Hofstadter unfortunately uses 'nature' (for 'Wesen') and 'authentically' (for 'wesentlich').

58 'Rise up and merge into' is, approximately, what Heidegger means by 'aufgehen' (which Hofstadter translates as 'engross').

59 *UKW*, pp. 49, 62, 67, 85–6.

60 *UKW*, p. 39.

61 *UKW*, pp. 86, 88–9.

62 UKW, p. 88.

63 Compare UKW, pp. 51, 70–2.

64 UKW, p. 83; Hofstadter's translation.

65 UKW, p. 94.

66 UKW, pp. 32, 36.

67 See SZ, §§15 and 18.

68 UKW, p. 32.

69 TK, Vorbemerkung.

70 TK, p. 30.

71 TK, p. 29.

72 TK, p. 23.

73 TK, p. 23.

74 TK, p. 33.

75 TK, pp. 23, 37, 42–3.

76 TK, p. 21.

77 TK, pp. 37, 44.

78 TK, pp. 44, 46.

79 TK, p. 30.

80 TK, pp. 37, 45.

81 TK, p. 27.

82 'Das Ge-stell verstellt sogar noch dieses sein Verstellen.' TK, p. 44.

83 TK, p. 30. This translation is deficient in at least two respects, but I am unable to improve it: 'dörfliches Dasein' I rendered as 'village life', although 'Dasein' means 'being here', strictly speaking; 'town hall', the usual translation of 'Rathaus', unfortunately does not tie in with 'village life'.

84 TK, pp. 30–1.

85 The connection between 'to grant' and 'walten' is brought out e.g. by the fact that the German 'Walte Gott!' corresponds to the English 'God grant it!'

86 Compare GFP, p. 59.

87 'Was sie durchwaltet', TK, p. 5. See also GFP, p. 59.

88 TK, p. 30.

89 Compare GFP, p. 60.

90 TK, p. 31.

91 TK, p. 31.

92 US, p. 201.

93 US, pp. 201–2, 211, 214–15.

94 US, p. 200. Compare the similar Heideggerian inversion 'The Essence of Truth, the Truth of Essence'.

95 US, p. 201.

96 US, pp. 197–8.

97 US, p. 198.

98 Compare UKW, pp. 83–4.

99 US, pp. 211–15; see also *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, 2nd edition, Pfullingen, 1959, pp. 176–80.

100 US, p. 215.

101 *Being and Time* (trans. by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson), chap. 34, p. 161.

102 UKW, p. 59.

103 See e.g., GFP, p. 129; *Der Satz vom Grund*, Pfullingen, 1957, pp. 99–100; *Nietzsche*, vol. 1, Pfullingen, 1961, pp. 26, 235–40; *Holzwege*, Frankfurt a.M., 1950, pp. 226–7; TK, p. 16.

104 *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, Pfullingen, 1954, p. 172.

105 E.g., *UKW*, p. 53; *Parmenides, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 54, Frankfurt a.M., 1982, p. 242.

106 This must not be taken to imply that Heidegger agrees with the *Hegelian* thesis that essence is the truth of being; that being passes over into essence, to be dialectically sublated in it. What Heidegger calls Essence is more akin to the Hegelian 'Gestalten' of world spirit (but without their dialectic-progressive synthesis).

107 Compare *Parmenides, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 54, p. 242; *GFP*, p. 169; *Holzwege*, p. 332; *Nietzsche*, vol. 2, Pfullingen, 1961, pp. 335–6.

108 *Zur Sache des Denkens*, Tübingen, 1969, 'Zeit und Sein', p. 12.

109 Heidegger points out (in *Zur Sache des Denkens*, pp. 8–9) that 'epoch' refers to the refraining of being rather than to some section of a process. (The reader will recall that ἐποχή, refraining, abstention, was a key term of Greek scepticism and of Husserl's phenomenology.) Nevertheless, Heidegger clearly associates these epochs and ways of disclosure/closure with particular eras and their succession.

110 See e.g., *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit: Mit einem Brief über 'den Humanismus'*, Bern, 1954, p. 94; *Identity and Difference*, 5th edition, Pfullingen, 1976, p. 18.

Theological resonances of *Der Satz vom Grund*

Joseph S. O'Leary

Is God the ground of the universe, the ground of our being? Has this question any meaning? Like so many religious questions it is tantalizingly obscure. Under analysis each of its terms dissolves into the thinnest of mists, which we no longer much like to hail as the thickest of mysteries. What is God? What is 'the universe'? What is ground? What is 'our being'? The tone of these questions is now more likely to be one of irritated puzzlement than one of reverent wonder. One is tempted to jettison all these determinations as survivals of an older metaphysical culture, or to regard them as only murky expressions of religious sentiment: Faust's *Gefühl ist alles; Name ist Schall und Rauch*. Some theologians attempt to rethink theism by dissolving God into Buddhist emptiness or into the Lacanian real. God then becomes a quality of things rather than their creative foundation and cause.

In this crumbling of theistic language, it is natural that we should turn to the philosopher who has most devoted himself to topics considered beyond the pale of reason and speech. If metaphysics cannot give precision and grip to our God-language, perhaps a really profound phenomenology can? The remedy is a risky one, but the power of the phenomena at the heart of religion assures us that the turn to a thinking led by the phenomena cannot be fruitless.

Heidegger's essentialism

The word that came most easily to Heidegger's lips was: *Wesen* (essence). The method and content of his work can be summed up under the rubric: a thinking of essence. Whenever he brings the essence of something into view, in a phenomenological *Wesensschau*, in the course of one of those stubborn, patient analyses where he has us think 'into the wind of the

matter' (GA 13, p. 78),¹ the result is so illuminating that we are likely to overlook the rarefied character of his constructions. History, to the X-ray vision that cuts through mere contingencies and distracting loose ends, knows no other movement than a parade of shining essences, e.g.:

The metaphysical beginning of the modern period is a transformation in the essence of truth, of which the ground remains hidden. . . . In the beginning of the modern period the beingness of beings undergoes a transformation. The essence of this historical beginning resides in this transformation.

(N II, pp. 295–6)

Beginning, essence, transformation, ground . . . if these constructions have any validity at all they can only benefit from being reinserted in the pluralistic texture of empirical history.

Heideggerian *essences* replace metaphysical *foundations*. We can see them only when – by a step back, or a leap of thinking – we relinquish our clinging to foundations. The dominant figure in the science of Heidegger's time is that of the *field*. His own thought moves in the field of essences (the open, the region) mapping its topology. He suggests an affinity with Einstein's space–time field in naming the open in which being is given to thought, the four-dimensional *Zeit-Raum* (ZSD, pp. 14–17). For the theological equivalent of this, one can point to Karl Barth, a phenomenologist of the Word of God, whose field of thought was the truth of revelation, grasped in its essential topology. Barth knew well the plurality of forms that Christian discourse had taken, the plurality of ways in which the divine Word made itself heard across the oblique testimonies of Scripture and church tradition. But all these forms are under judgment, and the Word which judges them is a unitary, essential instance. The judgment falls particularly heavily on non-Christian religions, seen as deluded human constructs, whereas Christianity in its essence is not a religion, but the hearing of the Word in faith. At the heart of the other religions lies no such essential revelatory and salvific event.

Today, a pluralist theology is in the making, which bears the same relation to Barth as the post-modern novel does to Proust or as the pluralistic music of Zimmermann or Stockhausen bears to Wagner. The great works of this pluralism are not cathedrals which contain and unite everything, but crossroads open to an irreducible variety of divergent cultural realms. Theology is learning to celebrate a pluralism of religious systems based in different cultural forms of life, and to see Christianity itself as a vast congeries of local theologies. Religion becomes as polymorphous as art and all its experiments are granted legitimacy, subject only to the criterion of quality, which, as in the case of art, eludes

universal formulation and presents itself in a different guise in each new cultural or historical context. The tension between essentialism and pluralism in Heidegger's thought – which is a cathedral of being, but also, to a lesser extent, a potential crossroads of dialogue – resonates with the most basic tension in religious thinking today.

The problem of theologians is: how retain the depth of Barth's meditation, the firmness of his sense of Christian identity, while embracing a pluralism that sees divine truth at work in all authentic religions? The problem of philosophers may be: how retain the depth of Heidegger's meditation, his sense of having a foothold in being, while recognizing the pluralism of philosophical languages and allowing all unitary categories to be dissolved into the multiplicity of disparate usages which they feebly attempt to mask?²

For it is increasingly apparent that the luminous meanings Barth and Heidegger established cannot be immunized against the floods of information about cultural and anthropological diversity which provide the element in which reflection of a humanistic order is today obliged to move. Heidegger's and Barth's essences are swallowed up and relativized in that pluralistic element. Their passion for the essential is alien to the more open-ended world of post-structuralism and chaos theory, where reason pursues cross-disciplinary connections, fascinated by its own margins and the dissolution of established identities. Intelligibility in this economy of thought is not the constitution of an essence but the grasp of connections. The passion for the essence of the Word of God has been abandoned by theologians who are more impressed by the historical diversity of religions and see their own tradition as an amalgam just as impure as any other. Heidegger's passion for the truth of being is seen as the last dam built by the West against its dissolution in the pot-pourri of emergent cultural holism.

There is a tension between his sense of the finite historicity of Western tradition and the implicit claim to universality in the way he talks about being. In a philosophy centred on reason such a claim is indispensable, since it is of the essence of reason that it aims at universality. But no such imperative is inscribed in Heideggerian wonder at the coming to presence of beings. This discourse on being has the radiance of an aesthetic tradition – it is universal more as Mozart is than as Euclid is. Jean Beaufret stresses the finitude of being and takes it to mean that 'being' is conceived historically as the theme of Greek reason: 'Heidegger has too much respect for the "other" to pretend to resolve the still enigmatic unity of Western thought, or the infinitely more enigmatic problem of the possible unity of the human species' (*Encyclopaedia Universalis*, 11 (Presse Universitaires de France) p. 261). Indeed he is the thinker who has most vividly revealed the pluralism within Western culture and between the West and other cultures, for the differences he

indicates are differences that count, irreducible epochal and cultural essences, not a mere encyclopedic assortment. He is a pluralist in that he is aware of the existence of other fields and is content to let them be; but he focuses his own thought on the field of Western metaphysics conceived as a unity.

Beaufret's association of the finitude of being with history applies in the case of the limited mittences of being that happen in the course of the history of being, but as far as I can see the field of being that is brought into view in the thought of the *Ereignis* is not finite in any historical sense, but only in so far as its dimensions are those of a world, a dwelling for mortals, on whose mindfulness it depends for its radiant deployment. As a prophet of the *Ereignis* Heidegger shows no modest sense of the limits of Western tradition. The word is put forward as a name for the very essence of reality itself, and Heidegger boldly suggests that its status and scope are comparable to the Chinese Tao. In alluding to the world-formula sought by Heisenberg (*ZSD*, p. 1) he betrays the immoderate ambition to think time, space and being from their unifying origin. I feel that he overreached himself at this point. In erecting the *Ereignis* as the *caput mortuum* of his thought he consigned his critical reprise of Western metaphysics to a closed system of essence instead of opening it out into a pluralistic dialogue. Still the variety of trails that lead to this dogmatic summit exhibit the pluralistic texture of Heidegger's own thinking, and his efforts to force them to converge remain blessedly inconclusive. A pluralistic reprise of Barth might show the same thing.

Heidegger's brooding on the essence of metaphysics and of what metaphysics conceals is strongly defended against empirical falsification or even modification. Whenever he is so imprudent as to step outside the phenomenological theatre of the essentializing operations, his vacuous and reactionary pronouncements on politics, culture and (in the seminars with Medard Boss) psychotherapy reveal the 'blindness' on which his 'insight' depends. At those embarrassing junctures the thoughtful differentiation of essences gives way to crude identifications – of Russia and America, or – most scandalously – of Nazism and technology. The clairvoyance with which he summons forth the essence from philosophical or poetic texts or certain phenomena of existence turns into pathetic delusion in those realms of cultural or political judgment in which one cannot make declarations about the essence without immersing oneself in a study of the facts. But even within the limits of a pure phenomenology of being, does not his refusal of pluralist solicitation entail a narrowing or a premature arrest of thought?

In what follows I shall try to discover possibilities of a pluralistic loosening up of Heidegger's style of thinking in connection with three topics: (1) his account of the essence of metaphysics, onto-theology, the history of being; (2) his proposal of a leap of thinking or a step back

from metaphysics to its forgotten origin; (3) his account of that origin itself, the truth of being, the *Ereignis*; and (4) the implications for theology. In spoiling the purity of Heidegger's essences, we must take the risk of losing the colour and relief of his vision and falling into a mere encyclopedic indifferentism. That danger has menaced the efforts of post-modernist theoreticians to think pluralism and difference more thoroughly than Heidegger's essentialism allowed. (Deleuze and Foucault, through diligent empirical study, have escaped this danger better than Derrida, Lyotard or De Man.) The pullulation of differences cannot have the power and strength that comes from insight into essence. Yet it seems that a relinquishing of essence is an imperative of contemporary thought in every field – in literary and religious studies and even in science. In forfeiting the unity of the *Ereignis* and rejoicing in a plurality of finite human worlds – many 'clearings' rather than a single one – do we devalue the world in which we live, making it just one among many possibles, and thus a mere fiction? Or is this multiplicity of the essence of human worldhood, so that the pathos or splendour of its finitude cannot be tasted without it? In any case there is not a choice; we are obliged to be tolerant under pain of being fanatical – the fate of not a few dogmatic Heideggerians.

The plurality of reason

Heidegger's project of 'overcoming metaphysics' has been the most popular of his philosophical proposals, especially among theologians, literary critics and theorists of the post-modern. A critical reconsideration of this project can never be superfluous; for even the most zealous overcomers can hardly deny that justice must be done to the metaphysical tradition and its rational claims. It may be claimed that Heidegger's most mature and serene enactment of an overcoming of metaphysics is found in *Der Satz vom Grund* (*The Principle of Reason*), and that it is also in this work that the questionable aspects and the limitations of his thought are most apparent.

(Linguistic problems, which I cannot discuss here, begin with the translation of the title. The vision of essence that comes to speech in Heidegger depends heavily on the contingencies of the German language and the lucky accidents of his own manipulations of it. In translation it invariably loses much of its imposing force. Thus cultural relativity gnaws away at the pretensions of essence. Religious thinking is also at the mercy of the contingencies of language; even the basic dogmas of the Church are unthinkable except in Greek. Translation plays the same treacherous role for Christianity as for Heidegger.)

The notion of ground was one of Heidegger's central preoccupations,

rehearsed with references to Aristotle, Leibniz, Crusius, Kant, Schelling and Schopenhauer in 1928–9 (*GA* 26; *GA* 9, pp. 123–75). Many of the historical queries one might pose while reading *Der Satz vom Grund* turn out to have been touched on, if not fully resolved, in these earlier discussions. In *Der Satz vom Grund* academic issues are left behind, leaving us free to follow a clear line of thought according to the rhythm of thought itself. But does the tangled history of the philosophy of causes and reasons admit of being grasped in such a serene play of thinking? Can thought gain access to a single perspective in which everything falls into place? Perhaps Heidegger's meditation needs to be refocused as merely one possible way of viewing the question, a modest clearing in a jungle it cannot pretend to master.

An Introduction to Metaphysics (1935) opens with a striking phenomenological evocation of the inevitability with which the question 'Why does anything exist rather than nothing?' emerges in human experience (*GA* 40, pp. 3–32). The 'rather than' (*potius quam*) carries the existential thrust of the principle of sufficient reason, a principle on which the being of beings depends. It imposes itself not only with a logical necessity and universality, but also at the existential level, emerging in the deepest human experiences. It is not surprising that this renewal of the why-question was taken up as the point of departure for the transcendental Thomist arguments of Karl Rahner. But Heidegger never sought to answer the question along such metaphysical lines; the answer is rather a leap away from the question, toward a different way of thinking the being of beings, not as indebted to a cause or reason, but as freely granted, as a 'there is' which is 'without why'. Aristotle's *aition*, 'that to which a thing is indebted for its being that which it is' (*GA* 9, p. 245), is apprehended as a letting-be of beings (*VA*, pp. 15–19).

In *Der Satz vom Grund* this shift is ingeniously anchored in Leibniz's formula, when we hear it in a new way: instead of 'nothing is without ground' it becomes 'nothing *is* without ground'. We listen, successively, to the harmonics of the two accentuations of the proposition. The basic chord of the atomic age undergoes an enharmonic shift into the basic chord of a post-metaphysical thinking. This eschatological reversal is of the same order as the shifts effected by the characteristic Heideggerian chiasmus of the type: 'The essence of speech is the speech of essence.'

The first question we must put is this: does Heidegger so absolutize the principle of reason – in both the first and the second accentuations – as to project a simplistic and rigid picture of the history of metaphysical thinking? We can pursue several aspects of this query: (1) the self-evidence and universality attributed to the principle; (2) the way in which the principle is claimed to point beyond itself by its own enigmatic character; (3) the role of the principle in metaphysics grasped as onto-theology and history of being.

I Is there a unitary principle of reason?

1 Simplistic treatment of Leibniz

Heidegger's notion of ground is a unitary one not only at the metaphysical level but in his own essential thinking. The metaphysical unity of ground is secured by Leibniz's historic enunciation of the principle of sufficient reason. Henceforth, ground is no longer in danger of falling apart into a variety of causes and principles. Yet the perfection of Leibniz's principle serves to highlight the lack of the essential thinking of ground, which Heidegger intends to provide. In 1928 the principle simply occluded the essence of ground: it was 'questionable whether the problem of the ground coincides with that of the "principle of ground"' and whether it is posed at all by this principle' and discussion of the principle served only to 'provide the occasion and mediate a first orientation' for thinking of the essence of ground (*GA* 9, pp. 125–6). The later Heidegger's more radical method of 'looking metaphysics in the face' (*GA* 29/30, p. 5)³ forbids such facile leaps and obliges him to come to more intimate grips with the power of the principle of reason.

Yet there is a limit to his engagement in both periods, in that he glosses over the immense variety of forms this principle has taken in the contexts of different philosophers' systems.⁴ As one historian remarks: '“Sufficient reason” acquires its meaning more from the context in which it is used than from any established definition attached to the words themselves.’⁵ Before Leibniz, one might cite many discussions of causality which implicitly recognize the validity of some such principle, perhaps allowing a variety of retrospective formulations of it for each of them. There are a plurality of formulations in Leibniz himself: it is a logical principle: all predicates are precontained in the notion of the subject; it is a principle underlying events: everything that happens is a consequence of the notion of the monadic substance to which it happens; as a principle grounding existence, it is the (determinative, rather than merely sufficient) principle of the most perfect; in the physical world it is a principle of efficient causality, which has merely phenomenal status.⁶

Heidegger gives a nod to this diversity but tries to put it aside as a merely historical problem:

Admittedly the principle underlies . . . manifold interpretations and evaluations. For the present purpose, however, it is convenient to take the principle in the version and role which Leibniz first explicitly gave it. But just here it is controverted whether the *principium rationis* was for Leibniz a 'logical' or a 'metaphysical' one or both.

(*GA* 9, p. 128; see *GA* 26, pp. 135–6)

Here we seem to catch Heidegger eluding the plurivocity of the notion

of ground; it is presumed that some unitary instance underlies the diverse interpretations; the suspicion that the diversity of interpretations sheds doubt on this unity is repressed. The principle of reason is declared to be much too rich to fit into the current distinctions made concerning it (GA 26, p. 145). It can be lit up only in that region in which the nature of the logical and the metaphysical, truth and ground, are first to be determined. Just as the essence of truth (unconcealment) cannot be adequately grasped in Leibniz's formulations in terms of subject and predicate, so the essence of ground eludes the terms of the principle of sufficient reason. 'The problem of the ground finds its home only there whence the essence of truth derives its inner possibility, in the essence of transcendence' (GA 9, p. 135). Though this Dasein-centred topology is later abandoned, the realm of the truth of being remains the locus of the authentic sense of ground. Both early and late the task of thinking the essence of ground from its origin presupposes some unitary sense for the expression 'ground' which is never put in question. Since the same can be said for the expressions 'truth' and 'being', one may well have qualms about the project of grasping phenomenologically how being, truth, and ground belong together. And when it came to the crunch, Heidegger himself, we suspect, let this project drop in favour of loose variations on Heraclitean notions of *Logos* and cosmic play.

No effort is made to clarify the principle by descending to its applications, with the result that the principle retains an almost oracular obscurity – in both accentuations, it is a word from being, which casts a hypnotic spell. As Vincent Descombes points out,⁷ Leibniz's principle applies primarily to matters of contingent existence – justifying them as the best states of affairs possible; whereas Heidegger, in accord with his usual practice of listening to metaphysical texts with an ear for the repressed wonder at 'the marvel of all marvels: *that beings are*' (GA 9, p. 307), wants the principle to be an utterance about being. Even in raising the question 'why are there beings rather than nothing?' Leibniz wants to justify the contingent existence of things whereas Heidegger wants to deepen a sense of the mysterious fact that 'beings are'. Has Heidegger understood Leibniz better than he understood himself, or is he interested in understanding Leibniz at all? Either his thinking of being grounds and masters reason or it is a skilful avoidance and oblivion of reason. Perhaps Heidegger's thought will remain fruitful and challenging only as long as we are unable to decide this issue, only as long as the mutual solicitation, the tug-o'-war, between reason and thinking maintains its tension.

In hailing Leibniz as paradigmatic, Heidegger tones down the idiosyncratic speculative charge the principle carries for the great rationalist. He sees that 'the Leibnizian derivation of the *principium rationis* from the essence of propositional truth thus reveals that a quite determinate

idea of being in general lies at its basis', namely, 'the monadologically understood "subjectivity" of the *subjectum* (substantiality of substance)' (GA 9, p. 135; cf. GA 26, pp. 86–123; *N II*, pp. 436–57). However, in *SG* he gives prominence to versions of the principle that sound quite innocuous and seem self-evident (helped by Wolff and his successors who had released the principle from Leibniz's speculative web). Shorn of its dazzling speculative applications the *principium grande* risks becoming a banality. Its rational force is simplified to an existential claim that hangs over ground-seeking humanity at all times. It becomes the heart-beat of the modern world. Aspects of modernity that do not fit it are glossed over.

2 Simplistic account of science

Leibniz's reduction of cause to reason is quite anti-modern in its opposition to Hobbes' and Newton's reduction of causality to merely efficient causality. 'The principle demands that everything that happens to a thing, including the causations, have a reason.'⁸ This is a retrieval of Plato's glorification of the Forms as the supreme *aitiai*. Leibniz invokes the key passage, *Phaedo* 97C, in his polemic against a causality not reducible to reasons.⁹

Seen from the point of view of its cosmological application, the principle of reason is less modern than is claimed. We see that it is a compromise, an effort at conciliation [between modern rationality and] the possibility of a musical experience of the world.¹⁰

In presuming that the modern universe is tightly bound in a network of Leibnizian deductive intelligibility, Heidegger gives an impoverished account of the texture of contemporary science. The law of universal causality is for positivists no more than a piece of methodological advice on what regularities to expect.¹¹ Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle (1927) seemed to make a breach in the stability of causality within science, though his view is criticized as a positivistic inference from the impossibility of knowing the cause of a given event to the meaninglessness of talking of its cause.¹² H.-J. Engfer states:

Modern theory of science seems to exclude any conclusive sufficient or adequate grounding of what is known: the principle of sufficient reason has now as a causal principle only the status of a hypothesis which can neither be verified nor falsified, a 'pragmatic presupposition' of research.

(*Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, 7, pp. 1132–3)

One wonders if Heidegger has not chosen the wrong target in making

so much of a principle which has so questionable a hold on the contemporary mind. Yet his critique stems from the cultural milieu in which 'acausality was being espoused years before the enunciation of Heisenberg's Principle, which was seized upon as a triumph rather than a disaster'.¹³ He might accept all the scientific criticisms of causality and still maintain that they only verify the powerful hold of the principle of reason.

The recently much-treated controversy about the nature and scope of the validity of the principle of causality has a basis and ground only through the fact that the participants in the controversy all stand under the same claim for the delivery of the sufficient reason of our representations.

(SG, p. 99)

The principle of sufficient reason, because not interrogated in its essential claim, functions all the more smoothly and powerfully in scientific and technological discourse. The 'only fruitful way' out of this rationalism 'leads through modern axiomatic representation and its hidden grounds' (SG, p. 42).

But how is this maxim compatible with the leap that Heidegger actually makes? He leaps from the principle of reason to the source from which it springs; but he does so from relatively abstract versions of the principle, never descending into the details of modern axiomatic thinking. He apprehends this thinking very globally as taking place at the behest of the principle of reason, which is 'something other than science itself'. 'The drive and the urge to remove contradictions within the multiplicity of conflicting theories and irreconcilable states of affairs stem from the claim of the *principium reddendae rationis*' (SG, p. 59). This is a wooden and monochrome account of scientific activity. Heidegger is merely vehiculating a common belief about the nature of science, which can do no justice to the vast complexity of the textures of causes, reasons and explanations in scientific discourse or in philosophical discourse including Leibniz. In attempting to make this belief operative as an analytic principle he falls headlong into a journalistic rhetoric about the 'atomic age'.

3 The pluralism of religious conceptions of ground

If this essentialist conception of ground cannot do justice to the complexities of Western philosophy and science, still less could it handle the no less complex notions of cause and reason in Indian and Chinese thought, notably the many varying accounts of 'dependent co-arising' in the Buddhist tradition. Nor can it deal with the variety of languages in which the biblical God is spoken of as maker and cause of the universe. Heidegger's understanding of this tradition is a threadbare one: religious

thinking has often been hampered by simplistic notions of cause and reason, but Heidegger himself is simplistic in what he says of the creator God of the Bible and the Scholastics (which he tends to conflate).

'Behold the heavens and the earth: they cry out that they have been made' (Augustine); that is superb, but it needs to be thought through in a way that does justice to the plurality and the obliqueness of the ways in which the world intimates its divine ground. In so far as the history of metaphysics and theology does conform to the rigid structure of onto-theology that Heidegger imposes on its variety, the notion of God as first cause enjoys a stability to which it is not entitled and which occludes the enigmatic polyvalence with which the world speaks to us of that great mystery which lies at its ground.

4 The existentializing of the principle of reason

Heidegger's unconcern with the pluralism in the history of the principle of sufficient reason is due to his primarily existential interest in the human quest for grounds and the modern rationalization of the universe in terms of grounds. It is a Kantian rather than a Leibnizian or even Wolffian version of the principle of reason that is uppermost in his mind, for it is in Kant that the principle as shaping existence and the human world comes most clearly into perspective.

What Kant says of the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason, that it is 'a remarkable pointer to investigations which are still to be carried out in metaphysics,' holds true equally of his own highest principle of all synthetic knowledge, insofar as therein the problem of the essential interconnection of being, truth and ground lies hidden.

(GA 9, p. 136)

Being, truth and ground here have little in common with scientific notions of existence, fact, cause or explanation. Kant is stretched into existential-phenomenological shape in accord with the existential resonances of his mapping of the relation between reason and world.

Kant followed Crusius in restricting the principle to the phenomenal realm, eventually reducing it to an epistemological matter, which Heidegger translates as the grounding activity of Dasein. Things in themselves elude the principle of reason. Kant's noumenal space is thus a predecessor of the Heideggerian realm of being as groundless ground. Heidegger's existential translation of Kant permits him to eschew discussion of the epistemological or logical detail of the quest for grounds and to focus on its most simple features. However, it would not be correct to say that Heidegger accepts Kant's reduction of the principle to an epistemological, subject-centred one; for to Heidegger Kant's subject-centredness is a distortion of the phenomenality of being; the search for

grounds is an aspect of that phenomenality and as such cannot be seen as merely subjective. There is no objective ground beyond Dasein's apprehension of being as ground, not because of an epistemological phenomenalism, but for quite the opposite reason: being is truly manifest in its phenomenality; it cannot be meaningfully distinguished from its phenomenality; there is no being-in-itself beyond the phenomenality of being. Kant has served to break the power of the principle of reason, its power to point to unknown, hidden causes and grounds. Heidegger venerates the principle as an existential phenomenon and wrestles with it to regain access to the authentic phenomenality of being. But it seems that his method of thinking is inherently unable to do justice to the metaphysical reach of why-questions. It can demystify such questions in their historical forms (including especially the theological ones) by showing how they overleap the phenomena at their base; but it cannot repress the stirrings of reason that prompt their recurrence in an unpredictable variety of forms and contexts.

The phenomenology of the 'Why?' is less dramatic, more mundane, in *Der Satz vom Grund* than in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. The focus is on everyday thinking, not on privileged moods in which the question 'why?' sounds in the depths of the soul:

human understanding itself everywhere and always, where and when it is active, is forthwith on the lookout for the ground on the basis of which that which encounters it is as it is. . . . The understanding demands a basis for its statements and its assertions. Only statements with a basis are comprehensible and sensible.

(SG, p. 13)

There is nothing ambitious or questionable about this description, which provides a solid point of departure for Heidegger's meditation.

Without being rightly aware of it, we are always in some manner or other claimed by and called to the task of attending to grounds and the ground. . . . Our behaviour in every case takes into account what the principle of sufficient reason says.

(SG, pp. 13–14)

Many classics of metaphysics begin with such declarations on the essence of the human. The opening of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, on the universal desire to know, is echoed in that of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, on the way human reason is forced by its own nature to pose questions to which the answers lie beyond its capacities. The opening of *Der Satz vom Grund* in turn echoes both texts. All three are stylized sketches of the mind and its activities, shaped by the scientific and theoretical prac-

tices of the cultures to which they refer. A pluralist account of human dealings with principles and reasons could undermine at the base the universality and necessity here claimed for the Leibnizian principle. But it might also make these dealings less amenable to any pretence to have mastered their upshot from the vantage of a more originary kind of thinking.

5 The incubation period

Implicit in all our behaviour and ever echoing in our ear is the statement: 'nothing is without a ground.' Why then did it take over two thousand years of philosophy before Leibniz was able to enunciate that proposition explicitly? 'How strange, that a principle that lies so near to hand, and that – unarticulated – guides all human representation and comportment everywhere, should have taken so many centuries to be articulated' (*SG*, p. 15). The principle of identity as signifying a dialectical self-relation also had a long incubation period: 'For it is the philosophy of speculative idealism, prepared by Leibniz and Kant, that first establishes through Fichte, Schelling and Hegel a lodging for the intrinsically synthetic essence of identity' (*ID*, pp. 11–12). In both instances, Heidegger may be making a mountain out of a molehill. After all, isn't identity already recognized as dialectical self-relation (*auto d'heauto tauton*) in *Sophist* 254D and doesn't *Timaeus* 28C ('what has come to be must necessarily have come to be by some cause') come close to formulating the principle of reason? (Leibniz's best of all possible worlds echoes *Timaeus* 30A: 'all things should be good and nothing evil as far as possible', cf. 41B, 46D.) If the principle of reason is sleeping here, its sleep seems of the lightest.

Moreover, when Leibniz rethinks ground or Hegel rethinks identity, are they bringing to light something concealed over millennia, or are they not rather inventing a new style of thinking, a style that in our day may seem rather old-fashioned? Heidegger preserves as much as he can of the timeless and monolithic character of these principles by treating their historical formulation as a revelation of what has always lain hidden. What makes this view doubly implausible is that the emergence of the principles sends being into a still deeper sleep, while one awaits the true enunciation of the essence of identity and ground in the recovered light of being, which Heidegger brings. But looking at these proceedings naturalistically, should we not say that Heidegger, too, is inventing a new style of thinking, within a certain cultural and historical context, a style that is also already taking on an old-fashioned air?

Before Leibniz, Heidegger claims, the sheer generality and self-evidence of the search for grounds prevented us from stepping back and viewing it in its unity as a principle. But this coming to prominence of the principle of reason is not an unambiguous advance into the light. It

throws into deeper darkness the unquestioned fringes of the principle of reason. We do not seek to understand the principle of reason since it shapes all understanding; thus the step to its explicit formulation is a dizzying self-apprehension of the light in which all our thinking takes place. Yet when the light becomes self-reflexive it becomes less light; the self-apprehension fixes it and dims it.

A pluralistic reading of these claims could sight here a variety of processes whereby reflection dims the light of immediacy, but would at the same time refuse a stylized dialectical ordering of these processes in the manner of Hegel or a reduction of these processes to a single one, the forgetting of being, in the manner of Heidegger. Similarly, the move beyond reflective insight to a more originary apprehension is a simplification; there is a bundle of such possible moves in different contexts; and each of them is the creation of a new language, not a stepping back to some primitive immediacy. Both the reflective grounding of metaphysics and the essential thinking of Heidegger are epochs within the complex texture of human awareness, bracketings of its complexity in order to explore its possibilities in a stylized form. When thinking opens itself to an awareness of its own complexity, pluralism and irrepressible creativity, then it puts aside the props of these metaphysical and neo-metaphysical orderings.

II Is the principle of reason inherently enigmatic?

1 A self-contradictory principle?

The principle is so obvious that any intellectual puzzling about it seems superfluous and unnatural. 'And yet – perhaps the principle of reason is the most enigmatic of all possible propositions' (*SG*, p. 16). Heidegger has been teasing at such apparent self-evidence at least since his querying of banal notions of being at the beginning of *Sein und Zeit*, and his suspicions already focused on the self-evidence of the basic laws of thought: 'Suppose that it belongs to the essential character of philosophy to make just that which is self-evident into something incomprehensible, and that which goes without question into something questionable!' (*GA* 26, p. 6). It is not just petrified philosophoumena that are open to question, but the everyday understanding of being, and the everyday routine of seeking reasons for things; unquestioned, this routine tightens into a tyranny, as the principle of reason extends its sway into every department of life.

In questioning the principle, Heidegger never invokes the plurality of its possible forms or interpretations, which might cause its unity to unravel. Rather, he seeks to subvert it by finding an enigma in its essential structure; an enigma which can be resolved only by a more originary clarification of this essential structure. The enigma is one that

bothered post-Leibnizian philosophers: namely, that the principle of sufficient reason lacks a sufficient reason, and is thus intrinsically placed in contradiction with itself (*SG*, p. 37).

To accentuate the enigma, Heidegger dwells on the necessity and universal scope of the principle. 'What it posits, it posits as something necessary. This it utters as something un-circumventable through the double negation "Nothing . . . without . . ."' (*SG*, p. 18). He never considers the view that

the principle of sufficient reason may be applied to everything save to itself and to such elements of discourse as function as explainers in a given context. Such a limitation of the range of the principle of sufficient reason, far from curtailing the programme of attaining a rational understanding of the world, is rather a condition for its consistent fulfilment, for it avoids both vicious circles and the assignment of a fictitious 'final reason of things'.¹⁴

Does he resolve the puzzle? He claims to do so by a step back into the light: 'On what is the principle of ground grounded? . . . What light does the principle need in order to be luminous? Do we see this light?' (*SG*, p. 18). Compare 1928:

It is easily seen that this thesis, namely, the principle of reason taken in its broadest sense, itself requires to be grounded. And that this grounding is clearly only to be attained with the clarification of the essence of being in general.

(*GA* 26, p. 138)

To this one may object that if the essence of being grounds the principle of reason it does so with a quite other kind of grounding than that which the principle in its first accentuation so imperatively demands. The inner contradiction of the principle is thus not resolved; unless by a complete collapse of the principle in its first accentuation in favour of the looser connections of the second.

2 Much ado about nothing?

'The principle of ground is the ground-principle of all ground-principles. This indication ushers us with a scarcely perceptible push into the abyss of riddles that yawns about the principle and about what it says' (*SG*, p. 21). The principle of identity, for example, can be interpreted as 'the belonging together of different things on the ground of the same. On the ground? The same comes into play here as the ground of the belonging-together' (*SG*, p. 22), so the principle of identity appears to depend on the principle of reason. But the principle of reason 'presupposes that

it is determined what a reason is, that it is clear in what the essence of reasons consists' (*SG*, p. 23). How can a ground-principle take something so essential for granted?

The abysses Heidegger finds here are scarcely hinted at in most discussions of sufficient reason. Indeed, Heidegger's awe presupposes that the question of ground is one that governs human existence through and through and that involves the whole of being. Is he transposing onto a logical puzzle the pathos that properly appertains only to the sense of the ungroundedness of existence that one has in the experience of anxiety? Or is he exploiting an apparent antinomy, somewhat as Kant did, in order to dissolve the metaphysical question of ground into an existential vertigo? Infiltrating the riddles of reason with the obscurities of existence, he risks losing a precise grip on both.

The self-evidence of the principle could have been undermined by a more prosaic logical analysis, which would have whittled down its claimed necessity and universality rather than forcing it to a paroxysm in which it begins to undermine itself. The detected antinomy could be dissipated if one showed that the unitary principle, rather than rendering transparent their essential law, occludes a great variety of grounding activities, which are irreducible to a single rubric. A similar plurality might also be uncovered in everyday searches for reasons and grounds.

'The principle of ground is the ground of the principle. . . . Here something coils in on itself, yet does not close itself off, but at the same time unbolts itself. Here is a ring, a living ring, something like a snake' (*SG*, p. 31). The vertigo induced by these reflections indicates something like a black hole of thought into which reason cannot proceed without becoming twisted. Metaphysics is thus overcome by its own devices. Yet is this the trail back to the origin that Heidegger actually follows? The change of accentuation engineers a shift from representational thinking of beings to contemplative listening to being. The logical riddles of the basic principles play at most the role of disabling metaphysical thinking as it tries to reach back to its ultimate grounds.

Having used logical antinomies to launch the leap of thinking, Heidegger leaves them unsolved. Did he really take them seriously or were they a mere pretext?

Heidegger took reason seriously all his life. [To echo Carlyle: 'Egad, he'd better!'] True, but now we can see that he did that in order to make a leap out of its domain into the play. He took reason seriously just long enough to show that there is a sphere of play outside the reach of the principle of reason.¹⁵

This seems an accurate description of Heidegger's strategy – but can one choose to patronize reason in this way?

3 The strict formulation

Heidegger turns to the strict formulation of the principle of reason as the *principium reddendae rationis*, the principle that 'for every truth (that is, according to Leibniz, for every true proposition) the ground can be given back' (*SG*, p. 44). Allers objects that this is not the stricter version for Leibniz, but a methodological version; whereas the looser version is ontological. Moreover *reddere* means simply to give, rather than to give back, and *principium grande* means simply 'big' rather than 'mighty' principle. Here, as in the ontological reading of 'the rose is without why', Heidegger's attention to the archaic or etymological undertones of words can be defended for its fertility in launching thought. Descombes points out that *reddendum* does not have the imperative thrust Heidegger gives it, and does not justify the transition marked in a comment of Derrida's rendering of Heidegger's account: 'From the moment that reason can be delivered [*reddi potest*], it must be.'¹⁶

How explain this leap in the modalities? Since when has the possibility of something sufficed to determine its necessity? This transition is still more astonishing than that of the so-called ontological argument. . . . For we see here, in addition to the illegitimate transition from a weak to a strong modality, a personal ('destinal') surcharge of the necessity in question.

One might justify such exegesis on the basis that 'The immoderateness of metaphysics demands that the translator always choose the meaning which is most serious, most difficult and which bears most consequences'.¹⁷ Heidegger is always on the alert for the great world-shaping forces indicated by a mere rustle in the language of the texts he studies. What is only a gentle hint in Leibniz is pregnant with the immoderate demands of Reason that will sound ever more mightily in Kant, Hegel, Marx, contemporary science and technology. It is because we find ourselves under the sway of this unconditional demand of the principle of reason that we are sensitive to the faintest intimations of its force in the Leibnizian text. However, Descombes rejects this way of reading Leibniz as a surrender to the very immoderateness it aims to overcome. Heidegger allows the awesome claim of the principle of reason to swallow up all philosophical reasoning in a single massive call from being. Had he instead relativized the principle of reason by putting it back in its historical context in Leibniz and others, he might have found a more serene path beyond the darkening of the world in technology, one more practicable and more convincing than the apocalyptic leap to which he finally invites us.

Our representations do not become genuine knowledge unless their

ground can be delivered (SG, p. 45). Is this second version of the principle confined to cognition only? No, it insists that the object of cognition must be something grounded (SG, p. 46). It means: 'Something "is" only, that is, is identified as a being, when it is stated in a proposition that satisfies the ground-principle of ground as the ground-principle of the giving of grounds' (SG, p. 47). It is a requisite for existence. The might of the demand for the delivery of the ground, which dictates whether anything deserves to be recognized as a being, lays claim on everything that is. 'Only that which is brought to a stand in a grounded representation can qualify as being' (SG, p. 54). Again, the metaphysical force of this is blunted by Heidegger's focus on its implications for the phenomenality of being and world.

'Whence speaks this claim of the ground to its own delivery?' (SG, p. 57). To hear the language of this claim we must attend to it phenomenologically rather than continue to obey it somnambulistically as the ultimate force behind the 'atomic age': 'The claim to the delivery [*Zustellung*] of the ground is for science the element in which its cogitation [*Vorstellen*] moves as the fish in water or the bird in air' (SG, p. 59). But to realize this is more difficult than to be aware of the radioactivity of the atmosphere, which we have instruments to measure (SG, p. 57). An element of nuclear panic or paranoia seems to be associated with this magnification of the power of the principle of reason. This power is uncanny, unhomely: it takes away from contemporary humanity the ground under their feet; the more we blindly comply with its claim, the less we can build and dwell in the realm of the essential (SG, p. 60). This play between delivery of the ground and withdrawal of the ground under our feet (*Entzug des Bodens*) is our sinister epochal variant of the 'play of being' to which reference is made later (SG, p. 109, 188).

All of this now has a fifties air to it, and seems inapplicable to the contemporary condition, which we cannot see as explicable from a single principle. If our consumerist world-culture were so firmly in the grip of a principle, then the promised leap and reversal would be attractive. But its uniformity has nothing to do with metaphysical reason; it floats detached from any claim of the ground; we can leap from the ground all too lightly, but with little hope of landing in a play any more substantial than that which is going on. The pluralistic texture of our experience dissolves the claim of unitary grounds, and also of unitary leaps. What path of thinking can negotiate the promise and threat of this state of affairs?

III Metaphysics as onto-theology and history of being

1 A phenomenological perspective

Heidegger's gaze on metaphysics is a phenomenological one; that is why he pays so much attention to the obstacles to this gaze, the natural

tendency to turn one's eyes away from any deeper apprehension of the metaphysical enterprise. The plot is thickened from the fact that metaphysics itself is an effort to look in the face a truth that everyday reason looks away from. By bringing into one's gaze the shape of one's thinking – not of any ordinary thinking, but that thinking that has attained metaphysical status – one finds that metaphysics itself is constitutionally inadequate to the phenomenon of being; that being is manifest in metaphysics as that which remains withdrawn. What comes into view is the finitude and brokenness of thinking, not in the sense that the grasp of reason fails to seize its object or that its systems crumble, but in the sense that the more it succeeds the more the truth of being eludes it.

Heidegger projects an essence of metaphysics, most tightly formulated as onto-theology, which need not be perfectly congruent with the empirical development of the history of philosophy. Great historical hypotheses are not falsified by a few facts that fail to fit; indeed their greatness is shown by the number of such discordant facts that they can take in their stride. Heidegger's hypothesis is sufficiently well-grounded and illuminating to be immune to random empirical objections; it will lose its force only when replaced by a better one. The objection that he ignored the Hebraic component in the history of philosophy should be expanded to embrace his systematic ironing-out of all pluralistic interferences in his focusing of the Greek essence, an essence that has sufficient autonomy to support Heidegger's constructions, which can be replaced only by a better account of what metaphysics meant.

Starting from a sense of the pluralistic texture of intellectual history, how might we revise, or eventually replace, Heidegger's constructions so as to make them more fruitful for our own intercultural regime of thinking?

2 What is onto-theology?

Onto-theology is the supreme self-grasp of the intelligibility of being. It is a product of the question of ground.

Since being appears as ground beings are the grounded, but the highest being is that which grounds in the sense of the first cause. . . . The onto-theological constitution of metaphysics stems from the sway of the difference, which holds apart and together being as ground and beings as grounded-grounding.

(*ID*, p. 63)

The authentic phenomenology of being and beings in their difference resides in

a realm which the leading words of metaphysics, being and beings,

ground-grounded, no longer suffice to say. For what these words name, what the way of thinking led by them represents, stems as the different from the difference. Their source no longer allows itself to be thought in the field of vision of metaphysics.

(*ID*, pp. 63–4)

The onto-theological constitution of metaphysics originates from the effort to think about 'being' and 'beings' in terms of identity and causal or explanatory grounds (cf. *GA* 42, pp. 87–8, 130–47). For metaphysics, being is that which all beings have in common, being-as-such. Thought of in its generality, being-as-such is an identity in difference which provides the horizontal onto-logical dimension; thought of as a whole being-as-such is referred to a supreme being, the apex of the vertical theological dimension, who unifies beings-as-a-whole. Both lines of thought proceed in mutual dependence.

Metaphysics thinks the being of beings both in the foundational [*ergründend*] unity of the most general, i.e., that which everywhere amounts to the same, and in the founding [*begründend*] unity of totality, i.e., that which is highest over all. Thus the being of beings is thought of beforehand as grounding ground.

(*ID*, p. 49; cf. *GA* 9, pp. 378–9; *ZSD*, p. 62)

Metaphysics seeks the being of beings by grounding it in a highest being (the cause of existence) or an exemplary mode of being (the ground of essence, e.g. the Kantian subject as the condition of possibility of all objectivity); the transcendent, theo-logical and transcendental, onto-logical modes of grounding coincide in the Hegelian 'determination of the highest being as the absolute in the sense of unconditioned subjectivity' (*N II*, p. 347). What is afoot here is no wooden construction but the self-constitution of reason, faithful to its own most intimate principle.

Heidegger makes much of the notion of *causa sui*, which Pierre Hadot defines as the production of God's existence through his essence (*Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* 1, pp. 976–7). He sees it as the logical culmination of onto-theo-logy, a kind of death's head before which it is impossible to pray (*ID*, pp. 51, 64). He presented an attractive version of the idea in Schelling's account of the interplay between ground and existence in God, with its echoes of Eckhart and Boehme (*GA* 42, p. 204) and its basis in the paradox that while God, the ultimate reason for the existence of anything at all rather than nothing, himself depends on the principle of reason, the mighty working of the principle must itself have a cause: 'The principle of reason is valid only in so far as God exists. But God exists, only in so far as the principle of reason is valid' (*SG*, p. 55). The controverted status of the *causa sui* within meta-

physics – a metaphorical expression in Plotinus (Stanislas Breton, *HQD*, pp. 253–6), replaced by divine *aseitas* in the Scholastics, rejected by Kant, treated as a simple expression of the purity of being in the later Schelling – is ignored by Heidegger, who probably sees it as a failure of metaphysics to recognize its own logic.

When Christians have asked such questions as ‘What is the ground of God’s being the ground of creation?’ they have tended to answer by radicalizing the grounding nature of God, but not by saying that God is *causa sui*. The question of ultimate grounds in Christian thinking leads to the abyss of divine freedom; his actions are grounded in free decrees whose motives are ‘unsearchable’ (Romans 11.33). All theology can do is defend God’s actions against the charge of absurdity or contradiction and meditate on their appropriateness (*convenientia*) to divine goodness and justice. Such an ‘overcoming of metaphysics’ based on the ‘difference’ of divine transcendence and freedom is of no interest to Heidegger. His aim is to overcome metaphysics from within, tracing the inner transformations of its essence. Measured against the pattern of onto-theology isolated by Heidegger, all traditional metaphysicians (Leibniz and Hegel included) provide impure amalgams of metaphysical reason and mythical or biblical factors.

If for one moment the possibility is admitted that this distillation of the essence of metaphysics is only a possible interpretation among others, then the project of overcoming metaphysics by tackling its essential structure falls to the ground, and a more flexible and mobile strategy must be devised, one that recognizes the irremediable impurity of the tradition and the impossibility of moving to a less pluralistic level of thinking. The refusal of the onto-theological possibilities of thinking then becomes one of the possible tactics whereby one moves from a vaguely defined ‘metaphysical’ regime of thought to a dimly apprehended post-metaphysical economy. In each case one identifies possible schemata of ‘metaphysical’ thinking, whose limits can be discerned, and one tests the styles of thinking that may emerge when one leaps beyond these schemata. In the context of such a project of conquering new spaces for thought it is a matter of secondary importance whether the schema to be overcome ever had any identifiable embodiment in history or whether it subsisted only in an irreducible plurality of guises. The fragility of Heidegger’s reconstructions of the essence and history of metaphysics argue for such a pluralistic reinterpretation of his experiments in overcoming.

3 The history of being

‘The leap [away from metaphysics] is a backward-looking leap. It looks back into the realm from which it has leaped away, in order to keep it in view’ (*SG*, p. 129). After the leap of thinking we may revisit the various detours which have prepared it and bring into view their inner

connection (SG, p. 96). 'In leaping, the leap becomes a thoughtful appropriation of the destiny of being' (SG, p. 158). The first major theme to be reviewed is that of the incubation period, now seen in a new light in view of the fact that 'what the principle truly says, being, is really still sleeping' (SG, p. 97). The incubation period is now revealed as an epoch in which being as being withdrew itself. The emergence of the principle in the strong form of the *principium reddendae rationis* is seen as a change in the destiny of being, the release of the full might of the principle; but this release brings with it the complete eclipse of the possibility that the principle can be grasped as a 'Satz ins Sein' (leap into being) (SG, p. 98), and entails a still more decisive withdrawal of being as being.

The question 'whence speaks the demand of the ground for its delivery?' (SG, p. 100) also appears in a new light. What holds sway in this all-prevailing demand is 'the destiny of being in a previously unheard manner. . . . Thought first brings into view the essence of being in the extremest withdrawal of being' (SG, p. 101). The leap which places us on the way to an exploration of the 'place' of the principle of reason is a leap away from a region which can now be surveyed from the distance this leap has accorded (SG, p. 107). Then the destiny and withdrawal of being comes into view: 'being destines itself to us in withdrawing itself' (SG, p. 108), that is 'being turns to us comfortingly and becomes clear and in this becoming clear grants the temporal space of play in which beings can appear' (SG, p. 109).

Heidegger sees the historical necessity of Kant's leap or of his own as dependent on the ways in which being grants itself from epoch to epoch. Similarly, 'it would be foolish to say that the medieval theologians misunderstood Aristotle; rather, they understood him differently, in accord with the different way in which being granted itself to them' (SG, p. 136). Such language is defensible only if the successive grantings of being are in each case rigorously demonstrated by phenomenological studies of characteristic thinkers of the epoch. That would demand a tentative and open-ended quality to the characterization of the epochs. Heidegger's language seems to posit at the heart of each epoch a single founding event, a granting-cum-withdrawing of being, which shapes and gives unity to the whole epoch. A more open-ended and tentative account of the shifting ontological sensibilities of the West could have increased the phenomenological power of Heidegger's analyses while dismantling the eschatological myth in which he wraps them. His benchmark identifications and discriminations of the characteristic phenomenological upshot of various styles of thinking are caricatures when they shift from the register of description to that of prescription, when instead of noting that Plato tends to think being as *eidos* he goes on to pronounce that Plato cannot think being except as *eidos*, or when instead of noting that

the modern age tends to grasp being as objecthood for the subjectivity of reason (*SG*, p. 138) he makes this the sole central truth of the modern age, its very being.

The history of being depends on a definitive grasp of the essential nature of the mittence of being characteristic of successive epochs. This is an impossibly rigid expectation, which omits all the diversity of the interpretations to which every great thinker is exposed. However the strictly phenomenological focus of Heidegger's account reduces the scandal of his historical essentialism. Heidegger's governing phenomenological inquiry to the great metaphysical systems is not the merely preliminary one: 'What is the texture and structure of the thinking afoot here?' but rather: 'How stands it with being?' (*GA* 40, p. 36). The sequence of the answers to this inquiry forms the 'history of being', and provides a solid enough phenomenological core to this theorem, to which the critique developed by Habermas and others fails to do justice.

The historical picture of a progressive withdrawal of being and forgottenness of being is a stylization rendered implausible by its suggestions of the mythic. Yet no other language seems to Heidegger to capture the phenomenological essence of the process of forgetting of being. The notion that metaphysics has reached its culmination and its end in German idealism (*SG*, p. 114) and in technology also seems to need demythification, which would entail reducing the grandiose project of 'overcoming metaphysics' to the modest one of a critical questioning of metaphysical tradition in view of its occlusions; the massive opposition of metaphysics and the thinking of being as being could similarly be broken down into a series of local critical engagements. Finally, instead of awaiting an eschatological turn-about in which 'being as such awakens in such guise that it gazes at us from its awakened essence' (*SG*, p. 97), thinking should attend to the great variety of modes in which one is addressed by being, none of which can be established as pure or definitive or as a historical moment of arrival. We can practise Heidegger's art of listening all the better if we abandon his hope of picking up pure signals of being.

'The history of Western thought rests in the destiny of being. That, however, in which something else rests must itself be rest' (*SG*, p. 143), that is, the gathering of movement. Not only is each epoch unified by its central principle as identified by the historian of being, but the entire history is unified by reference to being itself whose destining presides over it. One's doubts redouble at this further leap to a position of such extreme generality which totally eludes verification or falsification. That the history of thought rests in the destinings of being, Heidegger insists, is not a mere opinion, but is received from being. A partial verification can be found in our subservience to the claim of the principle of reason (including its transcendental and dialectical forms) and the withdrawal

of being that corresponds to this. We stand in the clearing of being as those taken into the claim of the being of beings; we find ourselves caught up in a project of being (*SG*, p. 146).

'Through the fact that the being of beings grants itself as the objecthood of objects the destiny of being brings itself to a previously unheard of decisiveness and exclusiveness' (*SG*, p. 149) to which corresponds 'the most extreme withdrawal of being' (*SG*, p. 150). This continues to beg the question. Heidegger makes much of the indefinability of being, though insisting that we understand somehow the sense of the words 'being' and 'is' (*SG*, pp. 153-5). But his theory of the history of being has given concrete determinations to the notion of being that seem to have little to do with the everyday phenomenon of being. Withdrawal (*Entzug*) may indeed characterize the phenomenon of being, but a historical sequence of grantings and withdrawals introduces elements into the notion of being that quite clutter and distort its phenomenality. That being somehow is, one quite recognizes, but that it somehow acts, in an ordered sequence, seems a drift into inappropriate categories.

Philosophical thinking moves from 'what is more manifest to us' to 'what is more manifest in itself' (Aristotle, *SG*, p. 112). But its stylization as one from beings to being as such is only one of the possible languages that can serve as vehicle and stimulus of this movement. Sankara's movement from atman to Brahman or Nagarjuna's from conventional truth to absolute truth or Lao-tse's from things to void cannot be reduced to the ontological schema nor is the converse reduction possible. This plurality of paths must limit the bearing of Heidegger's sketch of the history of being. Moreover, it leaves open alternative perspectives on the history of Western thought, notably those which can be constructed in the light of the biblical heritage and its influence. Jewish and Christian constructions of history have been even more myth-bound than Hegel's and Heidegger's (which are in part a sublation of those constructions): the conflict of myths reveals history as a battlefield of warring interpretations; acceptance of this pluralism opens a new conversation about history, as an open field of possibilities rather than the cumulative realization of a pattern. This conversation is oriented by concern for the future rather than desire to conquer the past.

The questionable nexus

1 The leap of thinking

In the discussion of Leibniz in the first lectures (broken off at *SG*, p. 81), Heidegger engages quite firmly the conceptual and argumentative texture of metaphysical thinking. The core of Heidegger's thinking is phenomenological, going behind or beyond the level of thinking to which con-

cepts and arguments belong. Yet unless it engages with concepts and arguments the strength of such phenomenological thinking cannot be demonstrated. At a certain point, however – with the introduction of Angelus Silesius' rose (*SG*, p. 68), the emergence of the second accentuation, 'nothing *is* without ground' (*SG*, p. 75), and the 'leap of thinking' concealed in this abrupt change of accent (*SG*, p. 95) – Heidegger forsakes such critical argumentation as he listens for what lies unthought in the principle of reason, the way in which being announces itself as ground. It is here that the central rift in Heidegger's thinking comes into view.

Does he at this point fall away from this concentrated interrogation of Leibniz into a pot-pourri of his favourite myths and dogmas? This danger certainly looms and Heidegger himself shows an awareness of it in the care with which he maps out the implications of the leap, going back over earlier questions from the new vantage it yields. As Greisch remarks:

The operation of detachment which permits the transition to the other way of thinking paradoxically appears as both simple and complex. It is simple, for all that is asked is the performance of a 'leap of thinking.' It is complex, for this leap itself has to be thought.¹⁸

It is on this leap that his thinking stands or falls. Heidegger has certainly put his best foot forward on this occasion, dramatizing the event of the leap with great art, shoring it up with sober and persuasive reflections, and finding felicitous words to speak of its strangeness, its necessity, the freedom it yields, the landscape it opens up. If the leap were simply a leap away from reason it might not be easy to argue with Heidegger, though it would be easy to dismiss him. But the leap is a leap to the ground of reason. Not however to a metaphysical ground, but to an apprehension of the phenomenological essence of truth to which reason belongs, in which reason finds its dwelling, its home. However, though *Der Satz vom Grund* approaches it via the notion of being as ground, the goal of Heidegger's thinking back is not adequately named by this expression: the *Ereignis* which grants being is rather to be thought of as a phenomenological focusing of the truth of being. To see Heidegger as tracing 'a return back into the ground, the origin' (*ZSD*, p. 33) is a misreading of his thought according to the metaphysical pattern.

The leap of thinking is not a leap away but a leap home to the *Ereignis* in which being and thinking fundamentally belong. Just this claim conceals, I suspect, the central weakness of Heidegger's thought. The questionable stylization of the metaphysical tradition we have queried in the previous section is motivated by a vision of reason, metaphysics, as a derivation from and a decline from originary contemplative thinking.

Whenever Heidegger tries to explain how metaphysical notions arose on the basis of the forgetting of this originary domain there is an unconvincing gap in the account. Its two ends don't meet. Conversely, whenever he vaults beyond reason to the region of thinking his feat of transcendence fails to exemplify the status he claims for it. It is not a leap back to the ground, the origin, but rather a leap elsewhere, related to the rational tradition only in an oblique, marginal or tangential way. Heidegger has attained a realm from which the tradition of metaphysics can be questioned and helped to open itself to its phenomenological context – which is far richer than Heidegger is prepared to envisage, so rich that it eludes the control of the thinker of being just as much as that of the metaphysician. Heidegger has not attained a vantage point from which the history of metaphysics can be controlled and mastered in its 'essence'. Rather, reason and its processes maintain their autonomy alongside and in tension with contemplative thinking. Nor can the thinking of being pretend to have such privileged insight into the essence of these processes that it knows what scientists and logicians are doing in advance of any study of their work. Rather than seeing reason as a 'stiff-necked adversary'¹⁹ to be overcome, thinking had best acquire a sense of its own limits, recognizing that if its privilege is to attend to things that elude the mastery of reason, reason's privilege is to penetrate where poetic thinking can never follow.

Heidegger has allowed its full force to the Leibnizian principle, never contesting its claim, yet slowly negotiating a space of freedom beyond the grasp of the principle, a space in which Christian theologians will surely find an occasion to rediscover divine freedom as well. Having led us into the darkest secrets of the atomic age by his musings on the might of the principle of reason, he suddenly produces a poem about a rose: 'The rose is without why; it blossoms, since it blossoms, attends not to itself, asks not if it is seen' (SG, p. 68). This introduces the turn (*Kehre*) in the argument, the step back or the leap away from the dominance of 'why' to the granting of ground indicated by the word 'since'. 'Why' seeks the ground; 'since' provides a ground, in a new sense (SG, p. 70). 'Between the blossoming of the rose and the ground of its blossoming there intervenes no attending to grounds, whereby the grounds could first come to be *as* grounds' (SG, p. 71).

Is Heidegger eluding the principle whose power he has so eloquently evoked? Or does he rather allow the principle its unrestricted sway, while indicating its inherent limits (which correspond with the limits of metaphysical reasoning): no being can be without a ground, yet this does not begin to exhaust the phenomenality of a being. 'The principle is valid *of* but not *for* the rose; of the rose in so far as it is an object [*Gegenstand*] of our representation; not for the rose in so far as the latter stands in itself, is simply rose' (SG, p. 73).

Being is given; it is the ground of beings in a sense that is missed if we busily go in search of their grounds. The question 'why' puts the ground at a distance; the answer 'since' reveals its nearness. The rose's avoidance of the principle of reason and its provision of ground in a different sense reveals that 'The principle of ground [in its first accentuation] says *nothing about the ground*' (SG, p. 75) and prompts us to listen to it in the second accentuation, which indicates *being and ground* as imponderables lurking in the apparently so transparent principle.

'*The principle of ground, understood in the usual way, is not a statement about the ground but about a being in so far as it is in each case a being*' (SG, p. 82). This discovery brings us into 'a critical zone of thought' (SG, p. 84) where every step exposes us to errance. The principle now says: '*To being belongs something such as ground. Being is groundlike, ground-ish. . . . Being deploys its essence in itself as grounding*' (SG, p. 90).²⁰ 'Being "is" in its essence: ground. Therefore being can never now first have a ground, which would ground it' (SG, p. 93). This independence of ground makes being the *Ab-Grund* ('abyss'). What is the accord between these two propositions: 'Being and ground: the same. Being: the *Ab-grund*' (SG, p. 93)?

2 Can thinking ground reason?

In naming being as a ground that does not need to be further grounded has Heidegger resolved the riddle of the principle of reason? The faulty nexus between thinking and reason in Heidegger can be discerned in the unbridged gap between ground in the normal logical and metaphysical sense and being-as-ground. Similarly, what is called 'truth', 'error', 'being', 'nothingness', 'identity', 'difference', '*logos*', at the level of the thinking of being has but an equivocal relationship to what these terms denote in metaphysical discourse. To begin with they have a plurality of senses in their use in metaphysical argument, as in everyday usage, whereas Heidegger adheres to a univocal sense for each of these terms and so can discourse freely on their 'essence'.

It may be that, starting from a particular example of 'truth' or 'ground' in a particular context, one can think back to the more essential depths of the phenomenon which thus comes into view. But the paths of such thinking back do not converge in a single bourne – the region of the *Ereignis*. They are trails of exploration as diverse as the styles of artistic creation or of religious imagination. A single unifying idea fails to impose itself. The big words, the transcendentals – being, good, beauty, ground – are only gasps before the immensity of things. Nor is 'God' a unified concept. The meaning of the word is inherently, thoroughly, contextual, as is the meaning of the word 'being'. There are contexts in which neither word has any meaning and in which the universal features of 'everyday understanding of being' or sense of the absolute have deployed and

dispersed themselves in quite different verbal universes. When people ring the changes on 'God' and 'being' they are doubly blinding themselves against the pluralism of the stories through which humans create and explore their worlds. The 'God' that is dead is the univocal God; language about God retains its sense as a constantly self-correcting, self-renewing language, variant from culture to culture, from context to context, changing at its margins into other varieties of religious language, such as language about the absolute, emptiness or the Tao.

It may be that the basic tenet of the phenomenality of being is based on a misappropriation of Husserl's categorial intuition; gradually it becomes apparent that the major phenomenological *Sache* for Heidegger is not being but world, the open realm of manifestation. The forgetfulness of world in the natural attitude (everydayness) or in metaphysical world-constructions cannot be translated directly into an oblivion of being as being. The two lines of criticism fall apart and the latter is never given a firm phenomenological content.²¹ But Heidegger might accept that the phenomenon which conceals itself in the presence of being can be called 'world' just as well as 'being'. Descombes notes the 'defect of construction'²² of the question of being which he sees as condemning Heidegger's search for the unthought-of Western metaphysics to remain a pipe dream.

But do these criticisms rest on a careful consideration of Heidegger's development of a 'phenomenology of the unapparent' (*GA*, p. 15)?²³ What Descombes proposes instead is merely the 'ontological clarification of the presuppositions of an epoch'.²⁴ But this remains on the level of conceptual thinking, affords little scope for the liberating leap to a contemplation of the *Sache selbst*. How does one explicate the ontological implications of a poem? Whatever the inadequacies of Heidegger's commentaries, they have opened up a meditation on the essence of literature – in Maurice Blanchot for example – which can never be recalled to the platitude Descombes recommends, which risks being absorbed by the 'cybernetic' (*ZSD*, p. 64). 'The dialogue of thinking with poetry is long. It has scarcely begun' (*GA* 12, p. 34). Heidegger's meditative thinking has an autonomy and a strength which is independent of his constructions of being and its history. Beneath all great philosophical utterances lies a fathomless unthought and Heidegger is the one thinker who has provided us with a compass for exploring that dimension. The aporias of his thought are a challenge to pursue its project along new lines.

Heidegger's search for originary phenomenological senses of 'being' and 'true' is in tension with the emergence of non-phenomenological senses in ancient Greece contemporaneously with scientific and philosophical thinking. Being, within metaphysics, figures as ground, in a sense that is not primarily phenomenological (see *ZSD*, pp. 2, 36–7), and that cannot be reduced to the phenomenological (as *Der Satz vom Grund* seems to attempt). Even at the humble everyday level from which

both types of discourse begin, there is a gulf between the phenomenological sense of being as presence and the logical functioning of the word 'to be'. If one says: 'it is true that three and three are six' one has to draw on senses of 'to be' and 'true' that are autonomous in regard to such phenomenological matters as presence and concealment. These senses of being and truth neither transcend nor fall short of the phenomenological senses. They are simply other.

The fusion of the copulative, existential and veritative senses of 'is' constitutes a grammatical mistake. The effort to hold them together in a unitative way under the rubric of the *pollachos legetai* does not work phenomenologically – it forces Heidegger to gloss over the 'wonder' of the veritative sense ('it is' = 'it is true') and dismiss it as mere correctness (*Richtigkeit*) or as simply 'ontic'. The veritative sense can be brought into view phenomenologically only as something that gives the slip to phenomenology. Faced with the fact that some simple utterance – 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' – is true and not false, phenomenology finds it has nothing to say, whereas reason may find here a starting point for deep metaphysical probings. Conversely, the sense of being as presence, of truth as unconcealment, eludes the kind of reasoning that deals in logical and factual truths. This mutual eluding of the phenomenological and the rational, neither of which can ground the other, is a situation no more enigmatic than the mutual eluding of, say, chemistry and music. We do not have a world-formula that can reveal these various perspectives unfolding from a single unitary instance.

Thinking of being does not succeed as 'an endeavour which brings the essence of metaphysics to the fore and thereby brings it within its limits for the first time' in view of an 'originary appropriation' of the metaphysical tradition (*GA* 12, pp. 103–4). Thinking can open up new realms but it is not qualified to declare a closure on the range of reason.

3 The supremacy of play

What grounds a being is nothing that can be cast in the form of a rational account, but is the donation of its presence from the event of being. This grounding phenomenon loves to conceal itself: 'Being conceals itself as being, namely in its initial destinal belonging-together with the ground as logos. . . . As it conceals its essence, being allows something else to come to the fore, namely the ground in the form of *archai*, *aitiai*, *rationes*, *causae*, principles, causes and rational grounds' (*SG*, p. 183) to all of which attaches a character of self-evidence that masks their forgotten origin. Being can now no longer be explained by reference to a ground; as grounding it is itself groundless; so to thought remains the duty of corresponding to the measure of being, not by any unsuitable procedures of reckoning or measuring, but by thinking being as being (*SG*, p. 185). To think thus is to be drawn into the play of the world, a play 'without

why'. 'Being as ground has no ground, plays as the non-ground, abyss, of that play which as a destiny plays to us being and ground' (*SG*, p. 188). The cryptic conclusions demand to be supplemented by Heidegger's discussions of Heraclitus in *GA* 55 (cf. *VA*, pp. 207–29; *GA* 15, pp. 9–226).

A question remains, as with all Heidegger's reductions of metaphysical principles to pre-metaphysical openings of being: does the principle of sufficient reason really derive from the play of the world? Does reason not have an autonomous force independent of the aesthetics of play? Has Heidegger in his step back really restored metaphysics to its forgotten essence, or has he lost it from view? Is the emergence of the principle of reason governed by a destining of being, that is by a phenomenological instance of manifestation and withdrawal, or does it emerge like the laws of mathematics and logic through a process of thinking which cannot be brought under the aegis of the phenomenological? Does the principle of reason cast the truth of being in the shade by its very nature or only because it is applied ruthlessly in matters where it cannot be normative or adequate?

Some later texts (*Zur Sache des Denkens*) may show a willingness to let metaphysics go its own way, as the effort to ground scientific reason in the most strenuous reflection possible, and to abandon the effort to found such rationality in the contemplative attention to the phenomenality of being. Scientific philosophy may be one of those 'sieves which let through only quite particular aspects of the matter' (*GA* 55, p. 229) – but the same may be equally true of contemplative thinking. When Heidegger claims that only *Seinsdenken* grasps the truth of what is and that it has an essentiality and radicality from which merely rational thinking is barred by its very constitution, is he not in fact appealing to a form of that absolutism which he so often undermines in the work of his predecessors? To be sure, mystics and Zen masters depreciate the devices of reason in a similar style, but do they go so far as to claim that all rationality derives ultimately from Zen or mystic insight? It is this extra claim that allows Heidegger to take his place among the great metaphysicians. But the step back to 'thinking' may exact the relinquishment of any claim to such a place. To have retrieved the contemplative dimension of philosophy is enough; it is exorbitant to claim to have retrieved the foundation of its rational dimension as well. If reason marches on, oblivious of Heidegger's intervention, that is not necessarily a great tragedy. The thinker of being like the mystic can perhaps flourish only in marginality. Sufficient to have planted seeds of reflection which may have here and there a greening effect on the landscape of science and philosophy (cf. *ID*, p. 67). His thought, attuned to the one thing necessary, may afford a place of retreat when one tires of the struggle to grasp the world by reason. But it does not seem that its

role is to criticize and direct the operations of reason. Its relation to them can only be an oblique one.

There is a version of reason which reduces the being of beings to what can be mastered by concepts and definitions. 'Now this easy intelligibility becomes the standard for what obtains or can obtain, and that now means for what may be or be called a being' (GA 65, p. 336). Reason which makes itself small makes reality small as well. If there are occasions on which metaphysical, logical and scientific reason must reassert its dignity over against Heidegger's depreciation, it is also a mark of true rationality to recognize the value of Heidegger's mapping of the margins of the rational. If in his attempt to restore reason to its fuller context, Heidegger tended to bring philosophy down the blind alley of a pure thinking of the phenomenon of being, none the less he struck out on paths that free reason from a self-ideal of dispassionate objectivity, giving it a more contextual and participatory notion of its own operations. Conscious of the presence of *Seinsdenken* as its other, reason moves more humbly and more soberly, instead of chattering loudly in self-obsessed arrogance; the effect is similar to that produced on Christianity by an awareness of its coexistence with Judaism and Buddhism.

Pluralism at the origin

1 The deconstructive opening-up of Heidegger

Derrida undoes Heidegger's essentialism by focusing on the fact that Heidegger uncovers the originary as 'different', as inherently other, thus unsettling the grounding and founding movement of his return to the essence. For the essence as Heidegger locates it is always marked by heterogeneity in regard to that of which it is the essence – the essence of technology is not anything technological, the essence of truth is non-truth, being comes into view as non-being. Derrida characterizes Heidegger's 'powerful thinking repetition' as 'a retreat or an advance towards the most originary, the pre-archi-originary which thinks . . . no other content than that which is there, be it as the promise of the future, in the heritage of metaphysics'.²⁵ In thus bringing being into view – as given and possibilized from out the e-vent of being (ZSD, p. 8) – Heidegger invents a new sense of the originary, one which is *hétérogène à l'origine*, heterogeneous to anything metaphysics think of as origin, not a *fundamentum inconcessum* but one which is *concussum* (ZSD, p. 34), one which always reveals itself as other, as a rift. It looks then as if Heidegger himself is aware of the questionability of his claim to ground metaphysics in the thinking of being, and that the grounding progressively turns into its opposite, an ungrounding, an uncovering of irreducible enigma at the heart of the basic notions of metaphysics throughout its history.

Yet for Heidegger enigma retains a quiet authority that teases us out of thought. It is the essential heart of things, and remains immune to pluralistic dissemination. Ludic and an-archic readings of Heidegger, such as those of Caputo and Reiner Schürmann²⁶ may find much to nourish them in the final pages of *Der Satz vom Grund* which create a sense that we have moved from a prison to a playground; but such readings miss the degree to which the *Logos* – however enigmatic it has become – remains a principle, an essence, a unifying factor; only as such does it retain the quiet power that can overcome the might of the principle of reason.

Whither leaps the leap away, when it leaps away from the ground? Does it leap into an abyss? Yes, in so far as we only think of the leap and in the field of vision of metaphysical thinking at that. No, in so far as we leap and release ourselves. Whither? To the place into which we have already been released: in belonging to being. Being itself however belongs to us; for only with us can it be as being, that is, be present.

(ID, p. 20)

Being is abyss, *Ab-grund*, only because it is itself *Grund*, ground (SG, p. 185). The play of being is 'free of all arbitrariness' (SG, p. 186), so much so that Heidegger can retrieve in a new key Leibniz's 'Cum Deus calculat fit mundus' which he translates 'While God plays, world becomes' (SG, p. 186).

Caputo dilutes this sense of order when he writes:

There are no hidden comforts, no hidden assurances, no steadfast guarantees concealed in this play. The play has the improbability of a child at play and an uncertainty which is marked by the question ['whether and how, hearing the movements of this play, we play along with and join in the play' (SG, p. 188)].

There seems to be little uncertainty about the serene order of the play of being, as far as its essence is concerned, though our failure to participate may imperil its actualization. It is misleading to say that by our participation in the play we 'deny it rest and arrest' as Caputo goes on to say; metaphysics, as an arrest of thinking, is to be overcome, but thinking itself rests in the play of being. It has nothing of the arbitrary improbability of a game of chance. To say of the dominant epochal terms that 'there is no grounding of these elemental words' and 'they cannot lay claim to anything more than a certain historical aptness', a situation which is 'one of the most embarrassing things in the history of metaphysics', is to smuggle into Heidegger's thought something that it

conspicuously lacks: an emphasis on the contingent pluralism of the historical languages of metaphysics.

Heidegger's 'destinal formations' (*ID*, p. 58) replace Hegel's epochs and Nietzsche's theory that 'as the law [*Gesetzlichkeit*] of history nihilism unfolds a series of different stages and forms of itself' (*N II*, p. 279). Their sequence is not a chance one, though it is also not a necessary one (*ZSD*, p. 9). For Heidegger, the law underlying the nihilistic sequence of the mittences of being is the *Ereignis* which is their principle; thought of the *Ereignis* ends the history of being by recalling it to its source (*ZSD*, p. 44). 'The *Ereignis* is the law, in so far as it gathers mortals in the appropriation to their essence and keeps them therein' (*GA 12*, p. 248). It is the true *Grund*. The strangeness and otherness of this *Grund* which turns out to be an *Ab-grund* does not license Caputo's interpretation, that 'everything is caught up in a certain fortuitousness', nor his suggestion that 'television and advanced forms of communication will spread the message' . . . of the apocalypse without truth and revelation'.²⁷

Schürmann, who tries to think with Heidegger beyond Heidegger in seeing the movement to the *arche* as betraying an an-archic thrust, does not do justice to the primacy, strongly affirmed in Heidegger, of identity – the belonging together of being and thinking in the *Ereignis* – over difference. Far from being a differential pullulation the *Ereignis* is a gathering of things into their essence. Heidegger remains a traditional metaphysician to the degree that the *Ereignis* is the truth, the ground, the essence of all that is: It first dawned on him as a great revelation in the 1936–8 manuscript (*Beiträge zur Philosophie: Vom Ereignis*), which rather than being thought of as Heidegger's second masterpiece or even as his one true masterpiece (thus Otto Pöggeler in various publications) should rather be seen as the magma from which his masterly later writings were to emerge. It is clear that Heidegger is constructing a first philosophy:

The truth: ground as abyss [*Abgrund*]. Ground not: whence, but wherein in the sense of belonging. Abyss: as time-space [*Zeit-Raum*] of the struggle; the struggle as struggle of earth and world, since relation of truth to what-is! . . . [Truth] is the ground as what takes back and what pervades, which towers above the hidden without abolishing it; the affective tone which sounds as this ground. For this ground is the *Ereignis* itself as deployment of the essence of being.

(*GA 65*, p. 346)

The *Ereignis* is what lies at the heart of the simple there-isness of being, the '*il y a*' of one of Rimbaud's *Illuminations* (*ZSD*, pp. 42–3). Beings do not emerge into presence in the medium of flat objecthood nor of

Husserlian transcendental consciousness. Teasing at the mode of the givenness of being Heidegger moved beyond all former apprehensions of objectivity and subjectivity and came up with his own apprehension of the event of being, one which cannot be adequately expressed in propositions (ZSD, p. 25) but only in the visionary simplicity of the poetic word as found in the essential poets. And the heart of this word is a silence, which is inscrutable. The difference emergent here is of a contemplative order, which deconstructionism no less than metaphysical rationalism is quite incapable of espousing.

2 Mutual irrecoverability of faith and thinking

But it seems that in mapping the world according to the *Ereignis* Heidegger glossed over the pluralistic texture even of such contemplative simplicity, and hypostatized a unitary element in which all things fall into their proper place, in which the world worlds and the thing things according to their proper natures. Even the deconstructive version of the *Ereignis* as essentially difference, unless it is worked out in terms of a concrete pluralism, still risks projecting a unitary instance which undercuts all religions and philosophies as the unnameable other.

In some ways theologians are in a better position than philosophers when it comes to detecting the pluralistic texture of reality even at the depths involved here. Perhaps some theologians have identified their own radicality with that of Heidegger, misread in a still metaphysical sense, as Derrida suggests in the humorous closing pages of *De l'esprit*. The more alert, however, have stumbled on the differentiations inevitably emerging in any encounter between biblical thought and the thinking of being. The dialogue between Heidegger and the theologians does not converge on the celebration of a single bedrock reality, beneath being and Spirit alike. Rather it is an experience of difference, of a gulf between the radicality that proceeds from the metaphysical tradition of naming being and the biblical tradition of naming God (and there are other gulfs, notably with the Buddhist tradition of emptiness). When abyss speaks to abyss in this way, a relativization is inevitable.

Heidegger cannot be recuperated in a theological scheme, such as that which seeks in the *es gibt* the presence of the Creator who 'gives' beings (Maria Villela-Petit, *HQD*, p. 95). Such religious constructions spoil the integrity of the phenomenon, and are a failure to let being be being. The *Ereignis*, the granting of being, is a gracious event, a constant source of wonder; but the invocation of the Creator to provide that wonder with a ground seems only to undermine it, to rationalize it. Here then is a depth of which theology cannot speak. Conversely, the Bible cannot be recuperated in a Heideggerian scheme, despite his attempts to bring it under the rubric of the Sacred – and thus is broken the imperialism of the thinking of being. As both traditions realize their finitude the

question of an ultimate originary instance becomes more profoundly obscure. One can practise 'faith' and one can practise 'thinking of being'; the coexistence of the two practices can involve a greater or lesser degree of interaction. To claim the all-importance of one and the relative triviality of the other (as Heidegger presumed theologians would have to do) is a formula for fanaticism.

The hypothesis of a single unitary granting of being and world certainly provided a grand theme for phenomenology; but it seems destined to dissolve into acceptance of the infinite plurality of human worlds as historically constituted. One may talk of an abstract form of worldhood in general, but this is something far more tenuous than the richly furnished world on which Heidegger meditates. There is a biblical experience of world on the basis of a vivid sense of dependence on the Creator which is neither reducible to onto-theological ratiocination or assimilable to the Greek experience of world (Heidegger's alternative ways of dismissing it). A tension between different forms of the worlding of world, worked out in different cultures, may be constitutive of the post-modern experience of the worlding of world. Within each culture the way the world worlds is undergoing constant modification. There is then no step back from the technological world to a unitary experience of the fourfold, but only an opening-up to a great variety of ways of being-in-the-world. This variety blurs any unitary notion of the truth of being and any unitary notion of God. Philosophical and religious languages, like artistic and literary ones, multiply according to the laws of historical and cultural pluralism.

It is misguided to set up a Pascalian clash between the *Ereignis* and the God of Abraham (see *HQD*, pp. 172–3) since both 'God' and *Ereignis* are unstable notions that dissolve into a plurality of historically constructed contemplative perspectives. The dialogue of theology with Heidegger (or of the biblical with the philosophical tradition) is much like the dialogue with literature – it offers a great variety of points of encounter and a great variety of points of tension, much as any exchange between human beings does. The pluralistic coexistence of the thinking of faith and the thinking of being cannot be reduced to a simple pattern by the imposition of an approved Christian evaluation of Heidegger's thought or of an approved Heideggerian reading of Christian tradition. That is not to say that the dialogue will not occasion many firm judgments, both positive and negative; but the mutual solicitation is inherently open-ended, a space of thought whose contours cannot be rigidly demarcated – just as the contours of the encounter between Christianity and Platonism cannot be demarcated, even today.

3 For a general theory of pluralism

The acceptance of pluralism both in reason and in thinking does not invalidate the movement, the basic inspiration, of Heidegger's thought – the reaching back from convenient conceptual lucidities to the obscure wonder of the presence of things – but it diversifies this movement into a great variety of local and contextual paths of thinking. Each of these can be the critical overcoming of some form of blindness or forgetfulness and the bringing to light of some 'essential' phenomenon. Within the great religions such thinking back will try to renew the original impact of the revelation from which the tradition lives, but of course all such retrievals are recreations; even in the Pentateuch what a gulf there is between Deuteronomy and the earlier traditions it repeats! Any discipline may be inspired by the orientation of Heidegger's depth-hermeneutic of retrieval/recreation; thus his influence may extend as his doctrines wither.

Heidegger's insight into the *Ereignis* is not a pure intuition of essence. It is a cultural product, the fruit of an engagement with poetic and mystical traditions. Greisch finds a lack of coherence between the phenomenology of the *Ereignis* as simple, ineffable 'identity' – in which being and thinking (*Identität und Differenz*), or being and time (*Zur Sache des Denkens*), belong together – and the phenomenology of the carrying out (*Austrag*) of the difference between being and beings.²⁸ He suggests that the coherence can be found by pursuing the matter further, entering more fully into the simplicity of the *Ereignis* and leaving the question of the difference to metaphysics; but it seems the destiny of any phenomenology of 'world' or of 'being' to come undone in a pluralism of perspectives. The *Ereignis*, as 'the post-metaphysical name of the Pre-Socratic *aletheia*',²⁹ as 'the most unapparent of the unapparent, the simplest of the simple, the nearest of the near and the farthest of the far' (*GA* 12, p. 247) – and as too much else besides – is a rubric under which a variety of contemplative perspectives are forced into unity.

As for the next grand principle, the fourfold, subordinate to the *Ereignis* almost as the *Nous* is to the *One* in Plotinus, it, too, seems to patch together into a dreamlike unity phenomenological quantities that are more convincing when left separate – mortal *Dasein* as the 'there' of being, and the struggle between the concealment of earth and the openness of world, make perfect sense in certain particular contexts, but the gracious dance of earth, sky ('world' in the first version, *GA* 65, p. 310), mortals and gods is just pleasantly poetic; can one believe that it lights up a structure at the heart of things, one of universal import? Had Heidegger attended more to the particularity of the worlds of his poets (instead of fusing them into a single phenomenological amalgam dominated by Hölderlin – as Heidegger interpreted him) he would have relinquished the search for a unified phenomenology of world, as Paul Ricoeur

in *Time and Narrative* relinquishes the search for a unitary phenomenology of time. Or at least he would have been more prudent in expounding the form of the phenomenality of world, refraining from giving it such charged concrete content. To justify the identification of being with world Heidegger has to posit that being is always manifest in a time-space, as the 'abode of the moment [*Augenblicksstätte*] for the founding of the truth of being' (GA 65, p. 323), a moment of destiny in which the space of history is concentrated.

4 The theological leap to a pluralism of origins

Theological imitations of Kant's transcendental leap ground Christian revelation in a metaphysics of human spirit opening onto the divine; they remain within the realm of subjectivity, subjectivity not in the sense of subjectivism but as 'the essential law-character of the grounds which sufficiently provide the possibility of an object' (SG, p. 137). This, too, must be relinquished in the thinking leap to the truth of revelation (this phrase, too, is shorthand for a variety of contemplative perspectives), a leap which can only happen as a response to the call and claim of the divine Word. Barth is the one who has succeeded best in such a naming of the essence of Christianity, eclipsing the previous efforts of Schleiermacher, Feuerbach or Harnack. What is lacking in Barth is the pluralism which opens the truth of revelation to the truth of the other 'great beginnings' in the religious sphere.

What is the element in which the great beginnings can encounter one another? Is it the element of being? Of Buddhist emptiness? Of the biblical Holy Spirit? Of dialogue? Of an ethos of liberation? It is not, at least, any of the metaphysical elements that have been proposed as the ground of theology: the transcendental consciousness of Rahner, the Hegelian realm of spirit, the Whiteheadian realm of process, or the older Augustinian and Thomist ontologies. Nor is it the kerygmatic-existential element of Kierkegaard, Barth or Bultmann, for this demands to be released from its narrow isolation and exposed to the wider sweep of religious and human reality. Nor is it any discourse that savours of old ecclesiastical wineskins. Great as are the historical constructions of the churches, they appear in the light of the present interreligious horizon far too shrivelled and sectarian to serve as vehicles of spirit. They, too, are to be overcome.

The dimension towards which we must think is one in which all the great religious texts can speak their essential truths with the maximum resonances. It must be pneumatic, 'empty', liberational, dialogal in the strong sense of mutual solicitation. Only so can it allow the essence of religion to be released from its counter-essence of sectarianism, intolerance, fanaticism, fundamentalist sclerosis. What is the unifying element in which these qualities can flourish? These qualities are not ahistorical

attributes. They emerge with a special force at this specific historical moment in a conversion away from sectarian traditions, in a movement of expropriation that brings us into a new communality. How name this process? Just as the new realm of the thinkable opened up by Heidegger's leap can be discerned only in light of the previous history of thinking, now seen for the first time as a destining of being, so the new realm opening up in religious awareness can be grasped only in a critical retrieval of religious traditions as happenings of revelation, happenings always intrinsically pluralistic and open-ended.

5 God as Creator in a pluralist perspective

Heidegger raged throughout the thirties and forties against the reduction of beings to 'products' which the belief in a creator brought about.³⁰ Jean Beufret objected to the monopoly enjoyed by God in the Christian view of being:

In the beginning God created, or rather created for himself, the heavens and the earth and finally his man. Everything is there, Heidegger says: the earth, the heavens, humans, the God – except the essential. . . . For in the scriptural narrative three of the four depend on a *Primus* who is their origin and their centre as well. In place of the divine priority or primacy, Heidegger names a Fourfold or rather *Uni*-fourfold of which the centre is none of the four.

(HQD, pp. 28–9)

The centre of the Fourfold is the holy as the chaos which yawns.

K. Rosenthal remarks that 'the subordination of the God or the gods to chaos is the contrary of what is intended in the creation narrative'.³¹ But Beaufret points out that Heidegger is using the term 'chaos' in a special sense 'in the closest connection with an originary interpretation of the essence of *aletheia*, as the bottomless as it initially opens up' (*NI*, p. 350) the Open as it first opens to bring everything into its grasp, to accord to each differentiated being its presence within limits. (Michel Haar points out that Hölderlin only once uses 'the holy' as a substantive and that 'the idea of a genesis of the gods from the Sacred is visibly unilateral and excessive'.³²)

Jean-Luc Marion sees here an idolatry of being and the sacred as a screen against the sovereignty of God (HQD, pp. 60–6). Maria Villela-Petit defends Heidegger on the grounds that in the Bible God appears as a being, so that the experience of God depends on a prior experience of being (HQD, pp. 91–2). Heidegger does not present being as the ground for God but as the space in which God is encountered (HQD, p. 94). He is clearing the space for a renewed encounter with God, though his way of putting this is highly misleading, e.g. 'the divinity as

it deploys its essence receives its origin from the truth of being' (GA 13, p. 154). One might add that Marion's project of thinking God as love 'outside' the question of being, and his dismissal of the play of being as mere inanity, could undercut the human basis for a full-blooded encounter with the divine. His Pascalian gesture of putting being at a distance – the distance measured and granted by the Cross – seems phenomenologically tenuous. But the entire framework of this debate is undercut if we register the historical texture both of the scriptural language of creation and the Heideggerian language of being.

Marion intends to verify this Pascalian subordination of the order of being to the order of charity on the purely philosophical plane through a phenomenology of love. One gathers that love will continue to let being play, but will judge its play to be 'inane'. Pascalian *ennui*, in its indifference to beings, 'suspends the claim of being and by that very fact confirms that the claim precedes being and alone makes it possible. The pure form of the call comes into play before any specification, even of being.' This is rather dizzyingly rarefied; in prising the claim structure apart from being and siting it 'beyond being' is Marion making an apologetic attempt to discern the presence of a Creator through a depreciation of being? In ascribing such powers to *ennui* Marion seems to betray a notion of being as a projection of Dasein, a quasi-idealistic understanding from which Heidegger increasingly distanced himself, and to miss the simplicity and undeniability of the *es gibt*.³³

Dasein's refusal to hear the call of being reveals a new existential, 'a counter-existential, which suspends Dasein's state of being destined to being' to which corresponds 'a new abyss, anterior, or at least irreducible, to being', namely 'the pure form of the call' which is the unrecognized condition of possibility of Heidegger's call of being. Here it seems that a unitary logic that insists on the primacy of a single principle, whether being, or the call in general, or love, or the other, or God, suppresses the plurality of forms which each of these take and the ample room for interaction between them. Is not the human being always addressed by many calls, irreducible in their variety: the quiet call of being, the urgent call of duty, the cry of the oppressed, the lure of the beautiful; this variety of calls is found within the biblical kerygma alone – which is not exhausted by the 'Hear, O Israel!' of Deuteronomy 6.4.³⁴

A more originary language of faith is not to be constructed from a general unitary form – whether the *Ereignis* or the pure form of the call or the Word of God. It can emerge only from a plunge into the concrete texture of the world of faith, both in its past sources and its present enactments. One might distil pure forms of logic or ontology independently of the complexities of the metaphysical tradition, but there are no such pure forms in the world of faith, because that world is not a unitary realm. There is no eidetic science of the religious, either to be

read off from a privileged tradition (the form of love from Christianity, the form of spiritual liberation from Buddhism), or to be constructed a priori and later filled with concrete content. In this respect faith is more like art or literature than like ontology or logic.

Not only does Christian identity vary from epoch to epoch and from culture to culture but it is constitutionally dependent on its others: the question what Christian faith is cannot be thought through to the end without an ongoing reference to Judaism, Islam, modern secularism, Hinduism, Buddhism. This means that the question is never fully thought out. Christian faith remains an open-ended project, intersecting with many other open-ended projects. God is revealed and is at work in Christianity, but not in such a way as to curtail or disrupt its dialogal dependence on the other traditions that coexist with it; and by Christian principles God is revealed and at work in all those other traditions as well. Christianity is far more a diachronic adventure than a synchronic system of tenets. The involvement with metaphysics is an important part of this story, which cannot be undone by a single leap elsewhere. It is a story to be told and retold, therapeutically. Its significance cannot be encapsulated in a single definitive *Wesensschau*.

These remarks may apply also to Levinas's reduction of ontology to a prior foundation in the claim of the other person (*HQD*, pp. 238–47). That claim seems to arise in an ontological desert – to the point that being lacks the certainty of its 'justification', which it can find only by attending to the moral claim which alone is ultimately or originally significant. But a quarrel of precedence between ethics and ontology supposes that both are grasped as unitary instances. The radical pluralism to which the ethical tear in the texture of ontology points is missed when one talks of grounding ontology in ethics. This unconvincing hierarchy of grounding relationships – metaphysics founded on *Seinsdenken* founded on the ethical – must yield to a pluralistic autonomy of all three instances, each an end in itself, or rather, each a language in itself, intersecting the others richly, but not in a way that admits a synthetic concord of the three languages. There is a touch of absolutism in the refusal of Heidegger, Levinas and Marion to entertain such a possibility. Heidegger does dally with it a little, in leaving the relation of his thought to theology and to 'the other great beginnings' open-ended; but usually only to quickly add the Parmenidean warning that whatever is 'comes to pass in the dimension of being' (*GA* 15, p. 437).

To set this dimension against the creation-perspective is to be deceived by abstractions. If one lets both languages melt back into their historical contexts, it may be found that both have valuable functions, but that neither can serve as an all-purpose explication of the world. Unless this is done each style of thought is doomed to wage iconoclastic war against the other. Thus Beaufret has to repress the biblical Creator: the music

of Bach, though used to celebrate the divine primacy, 'speaks of the relation of the divine to the Uni-fourfold rather than of its isolation as supremacy over the rest of what is'. 'Being in the Greek sense opens no possible access to the God of the Bible, but to a "theology" completely other than that of the Creator of heaven and earth' (*HQD*, pp. 31, 34). Heidegger tries to bring Christ, the prophets and the Holy Spirit under the aegis of a Hellenic and Hölderlinian notion of the sacred (*VA*, p. 183). This effort to grasp the biblical in terms of the fourfold never succeeds; it is felt to be the imposition of an idolatrous screen cutting short the movement of faith which the phenomena evoke. But the converse imposition of the creation-perspective on other poetic apprehensions of nature may equally lack phenomenological justice.

Michael Zimmerman makes a suggestion which Heidegger himself does not explicitly rule out:³⁵

Does this conception of God exhaust the Jewish tradition of the Creator? Or does the Jewish tradition have a non-productionist, non-metaphysical experience of God, one that was 'corrupted' at the hands of St. Paul, St. John and other early Christians influenced by Greek metaphysics, especially Platonism? If the Jewish God may be construed as non-metaphysical, then perhaps there is *another* possibility for renewing the West: an originary encounter with the God of the Old Testament.³⁶

One should add: an originary encounter with the God of St Paul and St John, who is essentially Spirit, and only to a minor degree shaped by Hellenistic conceptions; and indeed with the God of Christian faith of all periods, who is always in tension with the metaphysical constructions of his nature. 'Lift up your eyes on high and see: who created these? He who brings out their host by number, calling them all by name' (Isaiah 40.26, RSV). In such texts the event of creation (of absolute divine Lordship) is in resonance with the election and liberation of Israel and the confounding of the might of the nations and their false gods. There are many other traditional ways of imagining creation, each of which deserves close literary and phenomenological study. None of them are simply reducible to productionism, not even the Johannine 'all things were made [*egeneto*] through him' (John 1.3) or the Pauline 'since the creation of the world his invisible nature . . . has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made' (Romans 1.20), though in this latter text a Greek metaphysical component is undeniable.

The rhetoric of Creation seems to license talk of God as ground, usually in a sense that would be more pleasing to Samuel Clarke than to Leibniz; but closer phenomenological analysis of it may show that it frustrates the quest for grounds. The multiplicity of ways of conceiving

the Creator dissolves the unitary notion of ground into a plurality of projections of the absolute or the supreme real. Our thought, our faith, are drawn toward this realm, but can never reach a point of arrest; they reach out into the plurality of the mystery as art reaches out. It turns out that the inherited conceptions of God are only starting-points in the dialogue about that reality to which talk of God points, a reality that can henceforth be explored only in dialogue with Buddhism. That reality is in some sense 'grounding' but how this is to be said and thought remains more than ever an open question.

Notes

1 Abbreviations: Works of Heidegger: *GA* = *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt: Klostermann); *SG* = *Der Satz vom Grund* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957); *SZ* = *Sein und Zeit* (*GA* 2); *VA* = *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954); *ID* = *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957); *N* = *Nietzsche* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961); *ZSD* = *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969); *HQD* = *Heidegger et la question de Dieu*, ed. R. Kearney and J. O'Leary (Paris: Grasset, 1980).

2 See Jean-Luc Petit's discussion of this pluralism for the category of action in *L'Action dans la philosophie analytique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990).

3 Jean Greisch, in his contribution to these volumes, seems to confine Heidegger's attempt to revision metaphysics to the period from 1928 to 1936, but the programmatic text he quotes (*GA* 65, p. 176) looks forward as well as backward. Even if the thought of the *Ereignis* became a higher priority, pursued independently of metaphysics, Heidegger never ceased to return to the question of the essence of metaphysics.

4 Heidegger already begins to reduce the variety of historical discourse on causes and grounds to a single monolithic 'essence of ground' when he attempts to discover what unites the four *aitiai* of Aristotle (*GA* 9, pp. 124–5, 273–94). He describes a variant Aristotelian set as 'four manners of possible grounding, laying and giving of ground: essence, cause, argument (in the sense of: "a truth"), motive' (*GA* 26, p. 137). Ute Guzzoni has criticized this too unitary and dynamic account which apprehends the *aitiai* under the rubric of production (*Herstellen*), which was not Aristotle's concern (*Grund und Allgemeinheit* (Meisenheim: Anton Hain, 1975)). Heidegger admits that the origin and order of the Aristotelian *aitiai* are obscure, but maintains none the less that they indicate that 'to being belongs ground' (*GA* 26, p. 138). Isn't this rather massive utterance an imposition on the pluralism of Aristotle's analyses?

5 John Edwin Gurr, *The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Some Scholastic Systems 1750–1900* (Marquette: Marquette University Press, 1959), p. 161; Schopenhauer notes 'its extremely varied applications, in each of which it acquires a different meaning' (*Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Deussen, III (Munich, 1912), p. 4).

6 C. D. Broad, *Leibniz: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 6–12; Benson Mates, *The Philosophy of Leibniz* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 154–5.

7 Vincent Descombes, *Philosophie par gros temps* (Paris: Minuit, 1989).

8 Gilles Deleuze, *Le pli: Leibniz et le baroque* (Paris: Minuit, 1988), p. 55.

Heidegger thinks Leibniz equates cause and reason (*SG*, p. 43–4), but Rudolf Allers notes texts in which Leibniz distinguishes cause as the ‘reason outside the thing’ from reason as inherent (‘Heidegger on the principle of sufficient reason’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 20 (1958/9), pp. 365–73.)

9 Leibniz, *Discourse on Metaphysics*, para. 20, pp. 35–6; see G. Vlastos, ‘Reasons and causes in the *Phaedo*’, in Vlastos (ed.), *Plato I* (New York: Doubleday, 1971), pp. 132–66.

10 Descombes, *Philosophie par gros temps*, p. 113.

11 Jonathan Powers, *Philosophy and the New Physics* (London: Methuen, 1982), p. 43.

12 See Werner Heisenberg, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. W. Blun *et al.*, vol. C 1 (Munich: Piper, 1984), pp. 29–39; *idem*, *Physics and Philosophy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 90:

If we wanted to know why the alpha-particle was emitted at that particular time we would have to know the microscopic structure of the whole world including ourselves, and that is impossible. Therefore, Kant’s arguments for the a priori character of the law of causality no longer apply.

13 Powers, *Philosophy and the New Physics*, p. 150.

14 Mario Bunge, *Causality* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 246.

15 John D. Caputo, *Radical Hermeneutics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 225.

16 *Cahier du Collège International de Philosophie* 2 (1986), p. 16.

17 Descombes, *Philosophie par gros temps*, pp. 102–3.

18 Jean Greisch, *La parole heureuse* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1987), p. 227.

19 Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 112.

20 The principle of identity, similarly heard in a new way, also reveals its ontological import:

Properly, it sounds: A is A. What do we hear? In this ‘is’ the principle says how each and every being is, namely: itself the same as itself. The principle of identity speaks of the being of beings. The principle holds as a law of thinking only in so far as it is a law of being.

(*ID*, p. 12)

21 See Klaus Held, ‘Heidegger und das Prinzip der Phänomenologie’, in *Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989), pp. 111–39.

22 Descombes, *Philosophie par gros temps*, p. 127.

23 See Jean-Luc Marion, *Réduction et donation* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989), pp. 90–7. Unconvincing is Marion’s claim that Husserl himself was engaged with the *Seinsfrage* (*ibid.*, pp. 217–40); ontology was in the air at that time, but Husserl’s discussion of it centres on matters having nothing to do with what for Heidegger was the *unicum necessarium*, and which he found hinted at in the categorical intuition.

24 Descombes, *Philosophie par gros temps*, p. 124.

25 Derrida, *De l’esprit* (Paris: Galilée, 1987), p. 183.

26 Reiner Schürmann, *Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987).

27 Caputo, *Radical Hermeneutics*, pp. 202, 203, 225, 205.

28 Jean Greisch, 'Identité et différence dans la pensée de Martin Heidegger', *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 57 (1973), pp. 71–111.

29 Greisch, *Parole heureuse*, p. 305.

30 Hugo Ott, *Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1988) makes much of this, tending to underestimate the intellectual validity of Heidegger's critique of scholasticism and 'Christian philosophy'.

31 'Martin Heideggers Auffassung von Gott', *Kerygma und Dogma* 13 (1967), pp. 212–29; p. 224.

32 In *Friedrich Hölderlin*, ed. J.-F. Courtine (Paris: Cahiers de l'Herne, 1989), p. 504.

33 Greisch notes the total absence of the *es gibt* in 'Réduction et donation', *Révue de métaphysique et morale*, 1991; Villela-Petit contests Marion's Dasein-centred reading of the *Letter on Humanism* (*HQD*, pp. 89–90, vs Marion, *HQD*, pp. 65–6).

34 Greisch, 'Réduction et donation', pp. 297, 283, 296, 295.

35 For Robert S. Gall (*Beyond Theism and Atheism: Heidegger's Significance for Religious Thinking* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1987), pp. 29–30) Heidegger is so radically anti-theological as to make 'unaccountable' the recourse to him proposed in my book *Questioning Back: The Overcoming of Metaphysics in Christian Tradition* (Minneapolis: Winston, 1985). I was building on the 'analogy of proportion' proposed by Heidegger to his theological colleagues in the fifties, and which no doubt indicates a mellowing of his position from the texts of the thirties on which Gall relies.

36 Michael Zimmerman, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 183. Zimmerman's discussion of 'productionist metaphysics' – like so many discussions of onto-theology – fails to engage Heidegger's critique of the principle of reason and his awareness of the force of that principle.

Heidegger, hermeneutics and ontology

Reiner Wiehl

Heidegger's thinking concerns itself with the fundamental question of European metaphysics. What is strange and unusual about this thinking is above all its contention that European metaphysics has not yet 'authentically' asked in any way its own most fundamental and defining question. Insofar as it has not yet even expressly entertained it, Heidegger claims that European metaphysical thought has been without a conception of its own essence and remains without a conception of itself. The question, which until now has not been authentically thought, is the question concerning the Being of beings, the question of the meaning of Being posed in terms of the ontological difference between Being and beings. This provocative thesis is formulated by Heidegger in ever new approaches and variations and is constantly repeated. Through willful interpretations of the classic components of European metaphysics he attempts to confirm it. Accordingly, all the classical thinkers of European metaphysics, whether Plato or Descartes, Leibniz or Kant, Hegel or Husserl, failed to consider that basic question 'authentically'; they failed to think it fundamentally. Their obvious 'forgetfulness of Being' led them to philosophical answers that failed to address the authentic and original question of metaphysics. Moreover, within the limits of metaphysical thought this failure remained, with a certain inevitability, unintelligible.

Heidegger's interpretations of metaphysics, which have meanwhile become classic, do not intend simply to undergird his contention concerning the hidden and unthought essence of this metaphysics. Heidegger intended above all that these interpretations open up new ways of thinking Being that, while allowing this unthought to be thought, simultaneously allow it to be preserved in its status as 'that which could not have been thought before' (*Unvordenklichkeit*). This demand to bring the unthought, as opposed to the thought, into the circle of the thinkable, the evident paradox of making this unthought into the thinkable and

that which is thought and doing it in such a way that it simultaneously retains its not being thought (*Ungedachtsein*) is a strong challenge to philosophical thinking. One can say that this challenge directly or indirectly finds its present-day response in a highly stimulating hermeneutical activity directed at the classical texts of traditional metaphysics. But this answer to the provocation of Heidegger's thinking must remain inadequate as long as the individual interpretations, however intelligent and subtle, do not say where they stand with respect to the alleged unthought of previous metaphysics.

Heidegger himself clearly saw the dangers and the risk of failure in his own thinking of Being. It was not just modesty and discretion regarding method when he described this thinking as being-on-the-way and thereby set it in sharp opposition to a thinking that develops from an absolute starting point to a definitive goal. And it was not simply a renunciation of audacity or pure prudence when he spoke of a 'step back' when he could have spoken of a 'step forward'. It could very well be – he ponders the possibility in his philosophical discussion with Hegel – that this 'step back' may fail, given the frantic development of modern technology, the heir of the old metaphysics. And still another danger could bring the new thinking of Being to naught, namely the danger that lies hidden in our facility to mistake the thinking of Being for the traditional contents of metaphysics so that 'everything that gives itself along the way of this "step back" will only be used and processed as a result of representational thinking'. In either case, he feared that the 'step back' will have possibly been in vain.

But is this testimony to the dangers of failure that threaten the new thinking of Being perhaps only the expression of an extreme and unredeemable demand made upon thought? Did Heidegger himself perhaps sense that such a thinking, which wants to think the unthought as such, that which is forgotten in the entire tradition of metaphysics, may easily get lost in the limitless realm of that which is not binding (*das Unverbindliche*)? Is the marked refusal of every possible mediation (*Vermittlung*) between the thought and the unthought, the renunciation of the production of a conceptual relation between the one and the other, a sign of disdain for that hermeneutical enterprise in which the interpretation is more important than an authentic understanding of the subject matter (*Sache*)? Or does the preservation of the irreducible difference between thought and the unthought, between the manifest and the hidden, concern something else? What is at issue – a philosophical truth or, ultimately, a philosophical error?

Heidegger's testimony to the dangers that threaten the new thinking of Being refers to an aporia basic to this thinking. On the one hand, like every thinking that aims at insight into some questionable issue (*Sache*), this thinking must try to gain an appropriate distance from this

issue so that it can show itself in its proper light. Hence it is justly demanded of this new thinking of Being that a distance, appropriate to the sought-after essence of metaphysics, be gained as a condition of the possibility of being able to think this essence. The 'step back' must meet this condition by gaining the proper distance, which involves a step away from and possibly beyond metaphysics. But where does this step lead? Which way out does such a thinking intend to take? For on the other hand such a thinking of Being comes from the metaphysical tradition and it is, thanks to this origin, a metaphysical thinking that is grounded in the essence of metaphysics and it is to this essence that his thinking must correspond. Must not such a thinking lose the ground under its feet when it attempts to distance itself from its own essence for the sake of a supposedly 'objective' distance? Can the thinking of Being as a metaphysical thinking take the required step back at all if it is true that metaphysical being is the final and most primordial Being? Does this not demonstrate that Heidegger's attempt to think the unthought of traditional metaphysics is, even before the possibility of failure, from the very outset meaningless, even absurd?

Now it is no exaggeration to say that no one saw this aporia so clearly or brought it so unmistakably to general awareness than Heidegger himself. He interpreted this aporia as the fate of metaphysics in our time. The most characteristic traits of his new thinking of Being are connected directly with this interpretation. Hence his refusal to characterize his own thinking as a metaphysical thinking; hence, also his peculiar formulation of coming to grips with (*Verwindung*) metaphysics, which mitigates (*ablösen*) the talk of 'overcoming' (*Überwindung*) and 'destruction' (*Destruktion*). In particular the 'hermeneutical ambiguity' that attaches to all of his interpretations of traditional metaphysics corresponds to this aporia and its interpretation of the history of Being. All of these interpretations say basically one and the same thing: that in all that metaphysics has hitherto thought there is an unthought that is not to be mistaken for the thought and that does not allow dialectical mediation. Thus, this contradiction between the thought and unthought, the manifest and the hidden, shows up in all forms of traditional metaphysics. Hermeneutical ambiguity defines the human way of relating in terms of a relation to Being and the world. But this ambiguity just as much defines the relation of thinking to metaphysics. Heidegger sees an essential belonging-together between both ambiguities, for the essence (*Wesen*) of man and the essence of thinking Being belong together for him. Both ambiguities are sedimented in human language, for language expresses itself both in our relation to Being and world and in thinking the Being of beings. Heidegger attempted in the language of his thinking to correspond to both these hermeneutical ambiguities and to the aporia described and its own interpretation of the history of Being. Hence his

language of thinking seems to vacillate between a literal faithfulness to the language of metaphysics and another unfamiliar (*unvertraute*) language of the new thinking of Being. These languages, however, are inseparable. They are only apparently different languages. Both intend the same: they intend to intimate something in their very hiding of something. They intend to leave something unexpressed in their referring to it. In short, they intend to correspond to the essence of truth.

What these two inseparable ways of speaking intend simultaneously to intimate and hide is not ultimately the feared-for loss of meaning of the traditional language of metaphysics and the hoped-for gain in meaning from the language of this new thinking of Being. Both expressions of thinking intend much more to preserve the essence of human thought and thereby to make further thinking possible. The question concerning the possible success or failure of Heidegger's thinking of Being is accordingly inseparable from the other question: Are the characteristically winding and strange paths of this new thinking attempts to overcome the aporia of metaphysical thinking and thereby to arrive on the other side of metaphysics on the firm ground of an unquestionable valid knowledge? Or is this thinking with its constant being-on-the-way and its concomitant unending attempts at new approaches satisfied if it illuminates this aporia, addressed simply as the fate of metaphysics in our present age, without any demand to resolve this aporia, but, instead, rejecting every attempt to explicitly develop the conditions of its possible transcendence (*Aufhebung*)? Is Heidegger's apparently extremely demanding thinking in the final analysis in a specific sense undemanding? Heidegger makes it intentionally difficult for his readers to decide one way or another. He plays with both possibilities of either making or renouncing this demand, perhaps for the sake of the authentic hermeneutical ambiguity, which must leave undecided whether the thinking of Being today has stepped out of the ambit of traditional metaphysics, or whether it even can.

And yet even with the value that this intentionally ambiguous thinking and speaking places upon consistency, one question cannot be dismissed out of hand: Hasn't Heidegger taken too seriously this aporia of metaphysical thinking that we have described? Hasn't he blocked off without reason all paths to its resolution through his arbitrary interpretation of the history of Being? What really compels us to comprehend this aporia as the inescapable fate of metaphysics in our day? Why not see it instead as a possible occasion and contingent point of departure for metaphysical knowledge in our age?

It is not by accident that this aporia reminds us of the old argument of indolent reason, according to which learning is absurd because without a presupposed knowledge it is impossible but with such knowledge it is superfluous. There appears to be a real kinship between this and the old sophistic game of unmediated opposites. For while we have, in the case

of these sophistries the unmediated opposites of being and nothing being played upon in order to produce the appearance of the impossibility of becoming and movement, we have in the case of Heidegger a conceptual game concerned with the absolute difference between essence and ground (*Grund*), a difference that threatens concept and knowledge with absence of sufficient reason (*Grundlosigkeit*) and unfathomableness (*Abgründigkeit*). Must one not ask in the face of this kinship and in light of the lack of mediations (*Vermittlungen*) whether Heidegger hasn't simply revived the ancient sophisms and lent them a profundity through his admittedly epochal interpretation of the history of Being that, for all that, is not beyond question? Or is this kinship and proximity something superficial, only a deceptive illusion that obscures the real meaning of Heidegger's thinking of Being?

Already ancient philosophy, particularly Plato's, noticed this strange proximity between the then modern sophistry and the ancestral speculative mythology, and it saw in this neighborly mingling a danger to well-grounded knowledge and clear human insight. Against this danger Plato developed the idea of a philosophical knowledge and the concept of a clear, well-grounded knowledge. He grounded this idea on both experience and thought and linked up this concept of cognition with the modes of thought, that is, the thought of experience and the thought of beings. And finally he elaborated this mode of thought into the first attempt at a philosophical, fundamental science, the science of dialectic. The thinking of experience, the recollecting of the perceived and the supposedly known, created, when methodically pursued, a counterweight against the nonbinding and seductive thought games played with sophisticated and mythologizing paradoxes. Moreover, the thought of beings as beings served not only as an instrument to disentangle the confused and to illuminate the dark and obscure, but it made it possible to lay the foundations of a philosophical science concerned with first principles and causes. Ever since Plato's initial founding of a philosophical science of first principles, all metaphysics has been based on these two fundamental supports; on experience and on thought. These two, however, are bound together by common principles.

2

Heidegger's new thinking of Being, however, has contrasted these two fundamental instances of secured and well-grounded knowledge to his own; the thought of experience with the experience of thought and the thought of beings with the remembrance of Being. But what does such a contrast mean? What insight can thereby be gained? Do these contrasts point to the possibility of a new speculative mythology, in the manner

of pre-Socratic thought, through which the tradition of metaphysics as a science of first principles will be overcome? Or is this characterization of the new thinking of Being as speculative mythology one-sidedly influenced through the critical perspective of Plato? Is this opposition and contrast in any way sufficiently determined to answer questions of this sort?

One is tempted to see in the philosophical hermeneutics founded by H.-G. Gadamer a counterproposal to the Heideggerian thinking of Being, and in his relationship to the latter to see something like a repetition of the old philosophical history of the Platonic critique of speculative mythology and its sophistic application. But the history of philosophy knows pure repetition, in the strict sense of the word, just as little as actual history does. Instead we find both stronger and weaker analogies in the basic traits of different histories, as well as progression and even regression in problems and their solutions. In fact, Gadamer's hermeneutics is far removed from a renewal of traditional metaphysics and from a revival of its idea of a philosophical science of first principles. To be sure, this hermeneutics has contributed to the defusing and neutralization of the ontohistorical aporia of Heidegger's thinking. Gadamer himself wants to see in his historical hermeneutics no unbridgable opposition to Heidegger's thinking of Being. Rather, he sees the essential difference to be in the posing of questions and problems. But this difference points unintentionally in the direction of an opposing position.

A sign of this can be seen in the loss of significance that the fundamental aporia of the metaphysical thought of Being suffers in historical hermeneutics. For a loss of significance always inevitably occurs when a single and absolute essence (*Wesen*) splinters into a multiplicity, thereby losing the original unity of its essence. Gadamer's hermeneutics has, in fact, replaced the one and single history of the thinking of Being with a multiplicity of histories of interpretations and so has apparently relativized the meaning of the one absolute history of Being. For the manifold histories of understanding Being and self-understanding do not initially present a unity subsisting in and for itself. Rather in each of these different, individual histories a distinct historical context of effects (*Wirkungszusammenhang*) constitutes itself from one or more other histories. In such a context of effects, the different histories that belong to it form a historical relation of ideal simultaneity, regardless of their lack of real simultaneity. A definite, particular history, regardless of what kind, allows its determinate character as such to be known in the mirror of other histories that project a spectrum of this character. A history that allows the character of another history to be known acts as its 'effective-history' (*Wirkungsgeschichte*). The temporal relation of an 'effective-history' is a dual relation involving being past (*Nachzeitigkeit*) and being simultaneous (*Gleichzeitigkeit*) with respect to all histories over against

which it functions as an effective-history. Accordingly, there belongs an effective historical reflection to each history, with respect to the determination of its character. Hence the character of a history can present itself with many shadings in accordance with the number of effective-histories that belong to the history in question.

The absolute ontological history of thinking (*Seinsgeschichte des Denkens*) is, from the standpoint of historical hermeneutics, only a particular history, even if a meaningful history. Thus what is binding in principle for each history binds it as well. The possibility of knowing its character is dependent on effective-historical reflection. This character can display itself in innumerable shadings in one of many other histories. Given this in-principle infinite multiplication of the one absolute ontological history of thinking, (*Seinsgeschichte des Denkens*) the absolute and irreducible difference between the determination of essence and the ground of essence loses that eminent significance which that history possessed as its constitutive aporia. In the splintering and multiplication of the one absolute history of Being, that one major aporia splinters and multiplies itself into innumerable lesser aporias. These in no way lose their meaning only because of their indeterminate number. Their relation to *understanding* differentiates itself from the relation of that fundamental aporia to *thinking*. This thinking intends to preserve the absolute difference between essence and ground for its own sake and for the sake of Being. It leaves this difference, and with it the aporia, as it is, and it always only gives it new expression.

In contrast, understanding looks always for agreement in communication. In the attempt to come to an understanding, historical hermeneutics asks a question for which an answer is sought. Such an approach implies that an answer can be found even if it is not completely convincing, even if it leaves behind something not understood or even, perhaps, if something not understood is engendered. The relation between a history and its effective-history presents itself in respect to this immanent aporia as a relation of question and answer. In its context of effects with other histories effective-history forms a structural whole of question and answer. The difference between Gadamer's historical hermeneutics and Heidegger's thinking of the history of Being is not just a difference in the estimation of the history of Being in comparison to other histories, nor is it simply a difference in the weight given to the two fundamental concepts of understanding and thinking within the whole structure of the human comportment toward Being. These differences in estimation refer rather to specific differences in the determination of basic, historical relations of the relation between absolute and relative Being, between the unity and multiplicity of beings, and further, between question and answer, Being and self, and between truth and mediation.

Initially, specific differences of this kind find a unified expression in a

different position with regard to the problem of ontology. Gadamer consciously gives his hermeneutical philosophy an ontological foundation in order to mark itself off from a methodological hermeneutics, that is, from a technique or method. In contrast, the idea of an ontological grounding of Heidegger's thinking of Being runs counter to the meaning of this thinking, to its self-characterization as being-on-the-way, as well as in the consistency with which it maintains its irresolvable hermeneutical ambiguity. For this ambiguity claims that in this epochal thinking of Being it cannot be definitely decided whether thinking still moves within the essential realm of traditional European metaphysics or whether it has already reached the ground of this essence and thereby has pushed beyond the sphere of its validity and influence. And it cannot be definitely decided whether that which has been thought in the metaphysical tradition is being thought about further in another form and way of speaking or whether Heidegger is not already in the realm of the unthought when he attempts to think in these new forms of expression and ways of speech. In the face of such an indecisiveness and undecidability, the talk of a new ontology as opposed to the old is, at least provisionally, meaningless.

In contrast to this, what is the meaning of the ontological self-grounding of hermeneutics? What we find first of all, instead of hermeneutical ambiguity (*Zweideutigkeit*) in relation to the thinking of Being in traditional metaphysics is a certain manifold of ambiguities (*Vieldeutigkeit*)¹ which determines Gadamer's relation to traditional metaphysics and distinguishes it from Heidegger's ambiguity, even when this 'many-sided' ambiguity is often superimposed on Heidegger's ambiguity. This many-sided ambiguity marks certain strengths and weaknesses of ontological hermeneutics, particularly in comparison to the strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger's thinking of Being. Hermeneutical ontology defines itself as a universal ontology of experience and language. With this self-grounding, hermeneutics certainly neither intends a new ontology in the place of the traditional one, nor does it intend simply to take over traditional ontology just as it is and to undergird itself with this foundation. Gadamer's hermeneutical ontology of experience and language cannot be forced into a dichotomous framework that separates old and new. In this 'neither-nor' it is analogous to the hermeneutical ambiguity of Heidegger's thinking of Being.

But the many ambiguous ways it relates to traditional ontology and metaphysics points in yet another direction. It remains undetermined whether the ontological region of experience and language is primary with respect to the region of traditional ontology only according to time or also according to Being and knowledge. In its ontological foundations philosophical hermeneutics leaves a question unanswered that presented a key problem for traditional metaphysics to which it sought an answer

in the form of a methodologically basic principle, namely, the principle of the difference between that which is 'for us' and that which is 'in and for itself' the first and most original principle. The old metaphysics was well aware that a region of Being preceded it, a sphere of experience, of everyday language and pragmatic behavior from which it took its own point of departure. But it recognized the priority of this region only in a limited sense, namely in the sense of a certain temporal priority. While in its own sphere – the sphere of true and authentic knowledge of first principles – it claimed absolute priority. This absolute priority is a priority in a three-fold sense, namely a priority in respect to *Being* and to *time* as well as to *knowledge*. Now certainly the historical hermeneutics of our day is in no way a stranger to the classical principle of methodological mediation, of the systematic ordering of beings according to basic priorities. On the contrary, this hermeneutics makes a specific hermeneutical use of this principle in its effective-historical ontology and its logic of question and answer. In this respect, a given effective-history consequently has, in a certain sense, priority for us *vis-à-vis* its preceding history and in another sense it does not. Similarly, with regard to the relation of question and answer, there are priorities in more than one sense and in more than one respect. In this sense it follows that a given effective-history is prior to its prehistory (*Vorgeschichte*) with respect to *knowledge*, but not in a temporal sense. And it is this priority of a knowledge 'for us', considered as effective-historical, that allows us to see the point of departure of a question in this effective-history, which seeks its answer in the historical context in which it has its ontological and logical locus. At the same time, it appears that the hermeneutical use of this classical principle of mediation is not limited to its application in the sphere of effective-historical ontology and the logic of question and answer. On the contrary, it seems that this principle is being applied beyond these realms to the relation of hermeneutics as a whole to traditional metaphysics. For the hermeneutical ontology of experience and language advances the claim to be both more original and more comprehensive than traditional metaphysics. It claims absolute priority over traditional metaphysics.

From the standpoint of such absolute priority, traditional metaphysics necessarily appears as derivative and secondary. Paradoxically, it takes on the appearance of a particular ontology insofar as hermeneutics presents itself as a general, that is, universal, ontology. The strength of Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy over against Heidegger's thinking of Being lies in this definition of its own fundamental relationship to traditional metaphysics. While Heidegger's thinking of Being takes a path that remains continually on-the-way to and beyond the ground of thinking, hermeneutical philosophy gives itself from the start such a primordial and comprehensive foundation that it must appear

meaningless to want to think beyond it toward something still more primordial. It is this apparently absolute primordially and breadth that lends hermeneutics its specific distance from metaphysics and thereby makes possible the conditions of a possible critique of metaphysical thought. In this manner, hermeneutics places itself within the traditional ambit of contemporary philosophical critiques of metaphysics.

Moreover, the breadth of its foundation also opens up worlds of experience and linguistic expression that demand a new right and significance of their own over the predominance of metaphysical thinking. These are worlds of nonmetaphysical experience and language within a general culture shared with metaphysics, as well as the nonmetaphysical worlds of experience and language of other cultures. In this respect, Gadamer's hermeneutics is related to Cassirer's *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*. In a similar fashion, hermeneutics seeks insight into the comprehensive foundations of cross-cultural research; in a similar fashion, hermeneutics is a philosophy of culture and a general cultural anthropology. On the other hand, hermeneutics shares with Heidegger's thinking of Being the attempt to come to grips (*verwinden*) with metaphysics. In this, hermeneutics shows itself to be, in a certain respect, more successful in gaining a theoretical distance to metaphysics than Heidegger's unfathomable (*abgründigen*) thinking of Being.

But how are we to interpret the intellectual proximity of hermeneutical philosophy to such opposing positions as those of Cassirer and Heidegger? Does the former succeed in bridging these extremes? Is hermeneutical philosophy in any way suited to such a task? What differentiates how hermeneutics comes to grips with metaphysics from a transcendental-philosophical critique of metaphysics in the style of late Neo-Kantianism? The strength of philosophical hermeneutics is, as it is with any philosophical theory, simultaneously somehow its weakness. Thus the laying of the philosophical foundation of a hermeneutical praxis in a universal ontology of experience and language certainly could not be thought out more comprehensively. At any event, it has extended and enriched the region of prelinguistic worlds of expression through presenting it as a special kind of language world.

But this extraordinary *breadth* of the hermeneutical grounding has been paid for with a loss of *depth*. At least this picture forces itself upon us when one compares this self-grounding with the unfathomableness (*Abgründigkeit*) of Heidegger's thinking of Being, which places the whole essence of a ground (*Grund*) in question. If Heidegger wins depth at the cost of breadth, Gadamer reverses this relationship. And in both cases signs of the trivial begin to show themselves, as it always does where philosophical thought can do one only at the cost of the other. Thus even hermeneutics has its characteristic triviality which lies precisely in its ontological self-grounding. Its actual weakness, however, lies in its

failure to clearly distinguish between philosophical theory and a theoretical principle, between ontology and an ontological principle. An ontological principle no more makes an ontology than a logical principle makes a logic. This pertains to both the ontological principle of effective-history and to the logical principle of the correspondence of question and answer. Both principles are not by themselves sufficient to 'ground' an ontology and an ontological logic.

3

An ontology is an interrelated whole, a system of ontological principles formulated with respect to a definite manifold of beings, which is, in turn, determined by these principles. This interrelation demands a manifold of logical principles for its systematic presentation. This systematic unity of these principles belongs to that ontology and they present us with a constitutive logic for the same. An ontological logic belongs to every ontology and makes up the form of its presentation, a form that is intrinsic to it as its inner form. An ontology is universal with respect to the universality of its principles and with respect to the universality of the manifold of beings for which the same principles are valid as universal principles. Hermeneutical philosophy's neglect of the difference between an ontology and an ontological principle makes its ontological foundation ambiguous in many ways (*Vieldeutigkeit*). The hermeneutical ontology of experience and language is ambiguous both in terms of its concept and in terms of its function. This ambiguity allows a series of different interpretations. According to one such interpretation, hermeneutical philosophy is not an ontology at all in the strict and proper sense of the word. Rather, it specifies several general conditions that form the outer limits for a possible universal ontology that, before all else, requires future elaboration in conjunction with the development of a hermeneutical, ontological logic. Accordingly, both the principle of effective-history would have to be developed into a universal ontology of histories and historical relations, and the logical principle of question and answer would have to be elaborated as a universal theory of forms and structures. In this way, the universal ontology of histories and the logic of forms and structures would form an interconnected theoretical whole. Then the infinite multiplicity of human experiences and linguistic forms of expression would allow themselves to be thought as embedded in determinate historical relations and as formed and structured in respect to determinate structural relations.

A second possible way of interpreting a hermeneutical ontology is based on the supposition that certainly in theory one must differentiate between an ontology and one or more ontological principles or, more

exactly, between an ontology and an indeterminate multiplicity of ontological principles, but that in each concrete case no such difference can be made without qualification and with sufficient clarity. On this supposition rests the distinction between 'strong' and 'weak' ontologies. An ontology is strong inasmuch as it can make this difference clearly visible and it is all the more strong the better it succeeds in doing so. Thus we can take as a model of such a strong ontology those which satisfy the following conditions: an undetermined multiplicity of principles is developed into a unified ontological framework within which each individual principle, as an ontological principle, is, with respect to every other principle, univocally determined according to its concept, position, and function. At the same time, this ontological framework makes it possible to recognize the completeness of all the principles, as well as their general and special validity for a certain region of being. And finally, it holds for this model of a 'strong' ontology, that it can bring any other principle that has no well-defined logical place within it into a well-defined logical relation with those principles that belong to it, be it into a relation of a specific compatibility or of specific incompatibility.

In contrast, 'weak' ontologies are those that do not satisfy the general conditions of a strong ontology. And they are all the weaker the further they remain from the model of a strong ontology, and the less they are in a position to develop an indeterminate manifold beyond a mere 'rhapsody' of general principles into a well-defined ontological framework. Even if the difference between a strong and a weak ontology has been sketched only provisionally and, in reality, remains a relative difference, still this definition suffices to enable us to characterize hermeneutical philosophy with regard to its self-grounding as a very weak ontology.

This characterization holds by no means only in comparison to the paradigmatic strong ontologies of traditional metaphysics, such as, for example, Hegel's ontology, which has always been recognized, even by Heidegger and Gadamer, as a paradigm of a very strong ontology. Hermeneutics is also a weak ontology compared to itself insofar as it is considered not only as an actual ontology but also a possible ontology for which it provides a general context of meaning. Both these ontological interpretations of hermeneutical philosophy have primarily a theoretical character. According to each, the infinitely many-sided, in each case concrete hermeneutical practice of communication and interpretation retains a theoretical basis, be it in the form of the conditions of a possible strong ontology, be it in the form of an actual, even if weak ontological foundation. Here the individual ontological principles function as theoretical elements whose validity extends to the infinite multiplicity of the possibility of human experience and expression as the matter and content of hermeneutical practice.

Besides such a primarily theoretical interpretation of the foundations

of hermeneutical philosophy a pragmatic-ontological interpretation is also possible. In this case the ontological principles do not function as theoretical building blocks of a possible or actual ontological foundation but as pragmatically valid principles of an ontological interpretation. A pragmatically valid principle, such as effective-history, is not to be confused with a methodical rule of procedure for understanding or interpretation. Rather, it presents, so to speak, a metahermeneutical principle, which is in one way or another applicable to interpretative contexts, which are more or less regulated in various ways. Despite their differences, all three ontological interpretations of hermeneutical philosophy agree in their claim that the presupposed ontological principles are valid for the comprehensive contents of human experience and expression and that they function for these contents as formal principles of the most general sort.

From such an ontological interpretation of the self-grounding of hermeneutics, we may now distinguish an interpretation which, from the point of view of its actual content, may be called the ontological self-interpretation of hermeneutics. Here we must seek the universal ontological foundation of concrete hermeneutical practice in the complete range of the possibilities of experience and expression. And correspondingly we find here that within this given complete framework the individual experiential and expressive elements function as ontological principles in regard to the comprehensive multiplicity of possible interpretative contexts.

Analogous to the three formal-ontological interpretations of hermeneutical philosophy presented above we can think of three interpretations that are content-oriented. The first provides only the general boundaries for the conditions of a possible ontology of experience which is to be formulated with respect to the multiplicity of experiential and expressive possibilities. The second implies what can be called a 'weak' ontology of experience. This weakness can be defined analogously to the aforementioned weakness, namely as inadequately differentiating between the context of the experience and an individual experience. In the third, we have finally the pragmatic-ontological interpretation according to which the individual principles of experience function as principles of a pragmatic-ontological interpretation of all possible contexts of interpretation.

By means of this fundamental difference between form and content within the ontological self-interpretation of hermeneutical philosophy, we can discern a further fundamental ambiguity. It remains an open issue whether the hermeneutical-ontological principles have the character of general thoughts and basic concepts or whether they pertain to general experiences and modes of expression or whether we have to do with mixtures of one with the other. Accordingly, hermeneutical philosophy leaves the fundamental ontological relation between thinking and

experience undetermined. Thereby possibilities of distinguishing between the thinking of experience and the experience of thinking are left open. As we have already said, an ontological logic belongs implicitly or explicitly to a philosophical ontology, and its principles serve the systematic development of ontological principles in their mutual conceptual and functional determination. In this, we must take into account throughout that the principles of this logic may be distinguished from the corresponding ontological principles only in regard to their function, not, however, in regard to their conceptual determination and logical space. To this extent, the difference between an ontology and an ontological logic has a purely functional character. But however one distinguishes between an ontology and its ontological logic, the ambiguity of one brings in its wake a corresponding ambiguity in the other. Thus analogous to the three, or, as the case may be, six ontological interpretations of hermeneutics, we can think of a corresponding plurality of interpretations of that hermeneutical-ontological logic that belong to hermeneutics. According to the first, such a logic serves only to provide the general framework of the conditions for a possible ontological logic; according to the second, we have to do with a weak logic, the weaknesses of which corresponds to that of the ontology to which it belongs; according to the third, we deal finally with a pragmatic-hermeneutical logic. Over against the pure theoretical differences between thoughts and experiences, between conceptual and linguistic realities, the logical principles of hermeneutics behave like the ontological principles, ambivalently.

This is not the least of reasons why the relation between ontology and ontological logic remains open and relatively inexact in hermeneutical philosophy. The hermeneutical ambiguity of the principles affects especially the ontological and logical function of essences, justifications, and definitions. Contemporary hermeneutics gives at least the appearance of assigning absolute priority to understanding and interpretation over thought and knowledge. Such a move has conditionally disabled the essentially different priorities of traditional metaphysics and its epistemology; perhaps even turned them upside down into their opposites. Along with this change of epistemological priorities, a change in attitude took place simultaneously with regard to the traditional validity claims of the principles of 'essence', 'justification', and 'definition'. Thought, for traditional metaphysics, was directed toward the determinate goal of knowledge of essences, of adequate justification and conclusive definitions. In contrast, understanding and interpretation cannot be said without qualification to be built on a universally binding and definitive ideal of knowledge. Of course, every attempt at understanding and communication has its provisional, immanent goal that regulates it in this instance. And such an attempt must satisfy certain criteria and conditions if it is finally to be recognized as a successful, as a sufficient, and as an ulti-

mately true understanding. Nevertheless in such a process of understanding it always remains at first an open issue to what extent these criteria and conditions are valid only in this and not other processes, and to what extent they can claim beyond this a general or even an absolutely general binding validity. In any case, these criteria and conditions do not without qualification simply correspond to those of an essential, basic, and definitive knowledge of truth. Rather, it appears that much understanding can reach its goal even without any insight into essence or without adequate self-justification. But this does not mean that the principles of true knowledge can be fundamentally divorced from the processes of understanding and interpretation.

If philosophical hermeneutics grants an absolute priority to understanding and interpretation over thinking and knowledge, then it seems that it is in a position to claim that an unmistakable freedom has accrued to the first-mentioned epistemological procedures in their relation to the principles of thinking and knowledge, that is, to essences, justifications, and definitions. Thus it can be that these principles never come directly into view in the attempt to understand. But it can also be the case that this attempt to understand directs itself specifically and consciously toward a pre-given essence, toward a given justification or definition, as its determinate object and content. On the other hand, a specific understanding can present itself in the form of an essential insight, a specific justification or definition. And neither can we rule out the possibility that understanding, regardless of the difference between form and content, will orient itself at least indirectly by those principles, at least unconsciously and in an unfathomable (*abgründige*) manner.

But is understanding's relative independence of the principles of thought and knowledge sufficient to justify the priority of understanding over thought and knowledge? Have we thereby found sufficient means to differentiate one of these epistemological attitudes (*Verhalten*) from the other? The position of hermeneutical philosophy with respect to the principles of 'essence', 'justification', and 'definition' is, as it is with respect to any principles, fraught with a many sided ambiguity. Thus it remains entirely open whether or not and to what extent these principles play a specific role in the event of understanding and interpretation. Moreover, this ambiguity, which in general characterizes the hermeneutical use of principles, does not disappear even if we presuppose that philosophical hermeneutics allows these principles at least a certain limited meaning in the processes of understanding. Also in the case of the principles of 'essence', 'justification', and 'definition', one can clearly distinguish conceptually what neither hermeneutical praxis nor its ontological self-justification sufficiently distinguishes, namely the general conditions of the possible validity of principles, so-called weak principles, and the pragmatic use of principles.

What is 'weak' in such principles is not to be confused with the mere insufficiency of their conceptual and functional determination. 'Weak' also implies even here a particular form of indeterminacy and ignorance. We must differentiate a weak essence from a definition of an essence that is obviously insufficient, just as we must distinguish a weak reason from an insufficient justification, and a weak definition from an inadequate definition. A weak essence is, furthermore, not to be confused with a concept of essence, such as we find in nominalism, where essence is seen as a subjective-linguistic posit (*Setzung*) without objectively real content. Rather in this context we take a weak essence to be an essential unity of coherent phenomena and essential determinations of a subject matter (*Sache*), which, despite the obvious unity of this evidence, does not allow itself to be known on this basis, whether because, as an essential unity of this questionable subject matter, it does not have sufficient state of stable determination (*hinreichenden Bestand*) or whether because it points beyond its unity to a primordial unity of determinations, even if this turns out to be a hidden essential ground of the matter at issue. Analogous determinations of weakness, as opposed to mere inadequacy, obtain for justification and definitions.

Weak principles, as we have denoted them here, can also be characterized as aporetic principles. This aporetic character determines the indeterminate and unknowable nature of weak principles. Inasmuch as the hermeneutical use of these principles leaves open to what extent they do or do not fulfill their function, it also leaves undecided the direction in which thinking led by these principles takes understanding. We cannot decide whether it is in a direction of growing insight into essence or in increasing distance from such; whether it is in the direction of an always adequate justification or in the opposite direction; whether it is in the direction of a conclusive definition or back to a conceptual tentativeness.

4

This presentation of the many-sided ontological-logical ambiguity of hermeneutical philosophy in its use of principles is not an end in itself. More than anything else it should help us gain a critical perspective on the problems of Heidegger's thinking of Being, his intentional obscurities, and his hermeneutical ambiguities. Before all else, the consideration of the hermeneutical ambiguity (*Zweideutigkeit*) of this thinking of Being, mirrored in the manifold of ontological ambiguities (*Vieldeutigkeit*) of Gadamerian hermeneutics, should make clear how the strenuous attempt of that thinking to think the unthought in traditional metaphysics unavoidably calls forth of itself its own thought. As we have said, Heidegger's hermeneutical ambiguity has its own strengths and weaknesses as

does Gadamer's manifold of ontological ambiguities. A comparison of both promotes, at first, that which is common or at least the appearance of a fundamental commonality. This is the thought of the absolute priority of Being, of Being over thinking and knowledge, over consciousness and human existence. In light of this absolute priority of Being one is tempted to speak of the highest ontological principle of hermeneutics and the thinking of Being under which all other ontological and logical principles, from whatever source, are subsumed. This highest ontological principle presents itself under many names and in many forms, sometimes under its own name, sometimes as the principle of finitude and limitation, sometimes as the principle of substantiality and existence. However these principles are related to the highest principle, however they represent it, in any case certain priorities are posited. Priority is given to finitude over infinitude, to the conditioned over the absolute, to thing-like substantiality over self-conscious subjectivity, to the concrete, individual existence over the abstract and general essence.

It was not without reason that Gadamer stressed the internal consistency and unity of this thought with the much discussed '*Kehre*' in Heidegger's thinking of Being, which occurred after *Sein und Zeit*. He maintained that it was not first after the '*Kehre*' but already in his magnum opus that Heidegger placed the absolute priority on the question of Being before all other questions of metaphysical thought. In this interpretation, Gadamer shows where despite the difference in their questions, he sees the essential common element of his hermeneutical thought with Heidegger's thinking of Being, that is, in the recognition of the absolute priority of Being as the highest ontological principle. From such a vantage point the '*Kehre*' seems to be the essential common concern of their thought. The '*Kehre*' is first of all and primarily a turn in opposition to that turn of thought that Kant termed 'Copernican' and took as a general characteristic of his newly founded critical transcendental philosophy. Kant's 'revolution' was also in a certain sense a turn, namely a reversal of the traditional priority of Being over knowledge in favor of the opposite absolute priority of thought, of the knowledge of objects, of the conscious knowing subject over Being. In light of Kant's Copernican revolution, the turn of both hermeneutical thinking and the thinking of Being appears as a 'return' to the original thought of Being before that turn, as a 'step back'.

But doesn't this commonality of a turn (*Kehre*) of thinking, of a step back in hermeneutical thinking and in thinking of Being, hide an essential difference? What is to say that this step back takes a different direction in each case; in one case back to the dialectical ontology of Plato and in the other case still farther back to the beginnings of Greek ontological thought in the Presocratics? Isn't this different direction of the 'step back', that is, the different region that is reached by each 'step back',

an indication perhaps of the significance of the difference between the many-sided ontological ambiguity of hermeneutics and the hermeneutical ambiguity of the thinking of Being?

This question is directly related to another: Have we adequately understood the meaning of this 'turn' (*Kehre*) of thought, of this 'step back' in general? Is not the interpretation addressed above at the very least misleading? Is not the observed proximity addressed above at the very least misleading? Is not the observed proximity of Gadamer's hermeneutics to the philosophy and cultural anthropology of late neo-Kantianism not the only thing that speaks against this interpretation? Does not Heidegger's high regard for Kant's thesis that 'being is not a predicate', a thesis that he brought into express proximity to his own thought, just as much argue against this interpretation? In fact, both Heidegger and Gadamer have essentially promoted this misleading interpretation. And it is just this interpretation that has produced the no less misleading impression of a kinship with other very influential tendencies of thought in our time. Hence, in Marxism, economic 'Being' is given priority over the political and cultural 'Being' of human beings. Thereby an absolute priority of Being over thought, of objectivity over subjectivity is claimed. In a similar manner, psychoanalysis – as metapsychology and therapeutic practice – makes use of this absolute principle of Being in that conscious knowledge gives place to the conditioned priority of the unconscious being of the modern psyche. Existentialism and structuralism also belong among those theories that give precedence to Being absolutely and to absolute Being over knowledge: the first in the form of the priority of concrete existence over abstract essence; the second in the form of the priority of structural over subjective Being. It is this elementary use of the absolute foundational principle of Being that gives the appearance of a real commonality between these highly divergent and different theoretical frames and thus has enabled their incidental syntheses. But is the use of this fundamental ontological principle in such an elementary way really meaningful? Is the use of this principle in any way sufficiently defined in order to speak of a theoretical foundation thanks to its employment? It seems that the employment of such a principle draws its alleged meaning from the completely meaningful task of correcting the widespread self-overvaluation of human consciousness and thereby of counteracting the genesis of a false consciousness of the theoretical and practical capabilities of human beings. But is this fundamental principle useful at all for such a task? Are not maxims of reason much more effective in promoting theoretical and practical insight in the life practices of human beings than an abstract conceptual formula? In fact, this absolute principle of Being finds its application as a critical court of appeal over philosophical theories that overestimate human consciousness, which appear to aid and abet the human spirit, such as, in particular, the

philosophical theories of transcendental and speculative idealism. But is this critical use against traditional theories any better justified? Is it any more effective in its critical intent? Is it true at all that philosophical idealism necessarily fosters the overestimation of the human spirit against the power of nature? Or does this interpretation hold only for a certain reductive reading of idealism? Does not idealism after all make something clear to humans other than their own essential determination?

This positing of a highest and absolute foundational principle is in no way sufficient to render powerless an ontology as whole and this even to a lesser extent if, as in the case of idealism, this principle is integrated into its opposed position in a determinate way. For in this idealism, the priority of Being over thought is not a meaningless idea. Rather, it is conceived in connection with the opposed priority and this in a carefully differentiated and methodically harmonized manner. The theoretical foundational relation of nature and spirit rests here on a general ontological foundation whose individual ontological priorities are ordered according to the priorities of Being, of time, and of knowledge – for us and in and for themselves.

There are many deficiencies observable in the use of this ontological foundational principle in the postidealistic and antiidealistic movements of the recent and most recent past. Such a deficiency lies already in the isolating and absolutizing of a single foundational principle. For the positing of the absolute priority of Being yields in general no ontological principle, but instead only a quite general concept of such a principle, without any content and without any guidance in how to obtain such a content. Instead, the unmethodical use of this absolute principle of Being fosters the resuscitation of those old metaphysical errors that Kant set out to definitively defeat in his critique of reason and its 'Copernican revolution'. These are the old metaphysical errors of confusing principles and categories that now present themselves again in different forms and contents. Such confusions are, as always, the confusion between form and content, of possibility and actuality, and ultimately all the confusions that are possible between the abstract and the concrete.

A further deficiency in the use of this absolute foundational principle arises from the consistency of its isolation. In its absolute autonomy, in its isolated use without those complementary principles, which give this use a determinate meaning in the first place, we see the general loss of the validity of this principle that we have denoted as the principle of mediation, that is, the systematic ordering of beings according to well-ordered priorities. In place of the methodically interconnected context of things, worked out according to well-differentiated priorities of Being, time, and knowledge – priorities on the one hand for us and on the other hand in and for themselves – we find, henceforth, individual contingent positings of this or that absolute priority. And this methodical

foundational principle of traditional ontology appears only in a reduced form, be it as the difference between the priorities time and knowledge or of Being and time. The widespread and widely recognized talk of the decline of the great systems of modern philosophy in the course of the nineteenth century signifies by no means only that the universal ontological foundation dissolves and that its corresponding conceptual vocabulary loses its general binding force, but it also signifies that philosophy suffers the loss of a universally recognized method. In place of this loss we find isolated and occasional use of this or that principle and as a consequence of these uses, ambiguities, and confusions about principles.

Heidegger's thinking of Being and Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics have, more or less, consciously placed themselves squarely within this effective context of this recent and most recent history of metaphysics. To this extent, the hermeneutical ambiguity of Heidegger and the ontological ambiguities of Gadamer are reflections of this effective context. *Being and Time* is not only the title of Heidegger's magnum opus, it is also a key for understanding this effective context that emphasizes the loss of validity of that methodical foundational principle of traditional ontology: 'Being and time' and *not* 'Being and time and knowledge in relation to us and in and for itself'.

The hermeneutical ambiguity of Heidegger's thinking of Being corresponds to the paradoxical situation in which an ontological principle as a foundational principle is opposed to a degenerate (*verfallenden*) ontology. It is paradoxical because such degeneration requires no counterforce and because that which is valid cannot be disarmed through an isolated and contingent principle. But the many-sided ontological ambiguity of hermeneutics also corresponds in its own way to the effective-historical context in which it stands. It is not difficult to recognize in the manifold of ambiguities of the ontological self-grounding of this thought, the ambiguity of its use of ontological and logical principles in the above-named movements of the past and present century, which, like hermeneutics, rest on the foundational principles of Being.

But have we adequately understood Heidegger's hermeneutical ambiguity and Gadamer's ontological ambiguity in taking them as reflections of an effective history? What is the specific difference between these reflections?

Heidegger has attempted to think the hermeneutical ambiguity that he discovered as the destiny of metaphysics; not simply its most recent destiny, but rather its ancient destiny implicit from its inception. Yet hasn't he simply repeated in another form Nietzsche's thought that the destiny of European metaphysics, and with it the destiny of European culture, is nihilism? Is the hermeneutical ambiguity in the end only another expression for the completely primordial skepticism, for an unfathomable (*abgründig*) nihilism? Without a doubt, Heidegger had

other intentions. It was not by chance that he characterized Nietzsche as the last metaphysician. He did so to avoid having to characterize himself as the last. His thinking of Being aims to go beyond nihilism in that he conceives this to be the most conclusive form of metaphysics; namely, as the ultimate consequence of the attempt of thought to gain a sufficient ground. For this reason his thinking of Being seeks no sufficient grounding. Rather, it intends to think the essence of a sufficient ground in order to think beyond this essence. But does this thinking succeed in getting beyond the thinking of this unfathomable nothing (*abgründigen Nichts*)? Can it think beyond nihilism? Does it enable us to think our way around nihilism? Didn't Nietzsche himself run aground precisely on this problem? Hermeneutical ambiguity corresponds to fundamental, ontological, hermeneutical truth. This is more primordial than the truth of metaphysics, which in the end turns out to be only the result of a successful thought process, a successful act of knowing that brings to light nihilism. This hidden and late-emerging nihilism in the truth of metaphysics is not, however, the unthought-of metaphysics. Were it so, it could not appear as the ultimate consequence of metaphysics. Hermeneutical truth intends to open a place for the secret, for the unthought, for the ineffable on the other side of the effable nothing of nihilism. But is the unthought really thought in this thinking of truth, in the thoughtful preservation of its countertrait of 'disclosedness'?

Gadamer's historical hermeneutics has integrated this fundamental ontological and hermeneutical concept of truth into his own hermeneutical thought and displaced it into its own conceptual space of ontological and logical ambiguities. Truth, in Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy, is as ambiguous as the ontology and the hermeneutical use of ontological and logical principles. Hermeneutical truth contains something of that idea of a critique that limits human knowledge to that which is humanly possible. But, on the other hand, we cannot fail to overhear an emphatic augmentation of our experience found in the completed fullness of inexhaustible being, which is experienced in the essence of the work of art. Lastly, we should not fail to recognize a sobering significance of a truth that appears in connection with the many ambiguities, in that it exhorts us to the idea of univocal and complete determination. All these descendants of the hermeneutical concept of truth have a great deal in common with the concept of truth in traditional metaphysics.

In comparison to all these many ambiguities, the strength of Heidegger's thinking of Being lies in 'the univocity of hermeneutical ambiguity'. But is this ambiguity really so 'univocal' as it appears? In fact, it only superficially conceals all those ontological ambiguities previously developed. Every one of their possible meanings can be considered in light of hermeneutical truth. A particular affinity appears to exist between 'weak' ontologies and weak principles on the one hand and hermeneutical

truth on the other. But in order to think the unthought-of metaphysics, Heidegger's thinking of Being attempts to avoid ontological thinking. He attempts to avoid the use of ontological and logical principles by thinking these principles in light of hermeneutical truth, that is, in terms of their own hermeneutical ambiguity. In this respect, thinking of Being is fundamentally different from hermeneutics, which, with all of its many-sided ambiguities, remains within the ontological, logical realm of principles and possible justification. In contrast, Heidegger attempts to avoid the many ontological and logical ambiguities of traditional metaphysics and its effective history in order to be able to think the unthought. In this manner he shows, whether intentionally or unintentionally, not the unthought-of metaphysics but rather the unthought of his own thinking of Being.

Translated by Brice R. Wachterhauser

Note

1 Wiehl is obviously playing here on the difference between *zwei* (two) and *viel* (many). Both *Zweideutigkeit* and *Vieldeutigkeit* can be translated as 'ambiguity'. The latter, however, suggests in this context a more complex, many-sided ambiguity. – Trans.

Being as appropriation

Otto Pöggeler

Part one

Being and Time

Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, takes up Plato's question of what the expression 'being' (*seiend*) actually means. In fact, he sees himself forced, first of all, to reawaken an understanding of the question of the meaning of Being (SZ 1¹). This question must be understood if one is to inquire after the Being of beings and the modes in which Being becomes materialized in other than a naive and short-sighted manner. 'And precisely the ontological task of a nondeductive, constructive genealogy of the various possible modes of Being requires a preunderstanding of that which we actually mean by this expression: "Being"' (SZ 11). The question of Being (*die Seinsfrage*) is not the 'concern of a free-floating speculation on the most general generalities', but rather, is both the most fundamental question and the most concrete. If ontological research does not wish to remain suspended without a foundation, it must presuppose a clarification of this basic question (SZ 8ff.).

While the question of the meaning of Being still occupied a central position in the investigations of Plato and Aristotle, it was later forgotten. Being is held to be the most general and most empty concept and thus, an undefinable but yet self-evident concept. 'Thus, that which, as something hidden, drove the philosophizing of the ancients to, and kept in, restless activity thereby achieved a crystal-clear self-evidence, such that whoever now asks about it (i.e., *die Seinsfrage*) is charged with a methodological error' (SZ 2). How did this come about?

Metaphysics asks: what is Being? It inquires after the Being of beings. It orients itself toward the beings which it finds in the 'world' and can thus represent them. Metaphysical thinking is, from the very beginning, representational (*vorstellendes*) thinking. It therefore has the temporal

structure of a pure making-something-present. Beings, understood as that which actually is, are interpreted in terms of presence, 'i.e. they are conceived as presence ($\sigma\upsilon\sigma\tau\alpha$)' (SZ 26).

If the Being of beings is grasped as presence, it is understood with respect to a specific mode of time, the present (SZ 25). Metaphysics, however, does not further pursue the problem hidden in the fact that Being as presence is always already understood within the horizon of time. Metaphysics does not inquire after Being as such, but rather, forgets and disguises the whole question of Being. Even though Being, as presence, is, in a still hidden manner, thought in the light of time, ontology from its earliest beginnings seems to focus all its efforts on the attempt to keep the primordial characteristics of time out of consideration. Ontology supersedes time or levels it off to static time, i.e., eternity. The meaning of Being is then determined on the basis of this 'frozen' time, but in such a way that this meaning is never considered by itself. Thus, the Being-question as the question of the meaning of Being itself never really becomes a problem. When Heidegger inquires after Being and time, he raises the question of Being itself. The delineation of the meaning of Being is no longer to be merely presupposed, but must be thought through in itself. In contrast to this, when Being in metaphysics is understood as presence, the temporal moment remains simply in the present and thus the meaning of Being remains that which is always left unthought.

With the question concerning Being and time, Heidegger addresses to metaphysics the decisive question: Is it possible or not to go behind the presupposed understanding of Being? Have metaphysics and its central discipline, the doctrine of Being, i.e., ontology, even got to their own ground if they presuppose that Being must be grasped as presence? If the answer is no, how is time to be thought of within a 'fundamental ontological' investigation, if presence itself is to be thought of from the horizon of time? How is time, within whose horizon the meaning of Being is delineated, to be thought? When Heidegger speaks of Being and time, time does not mean something which stands alongside Being, which perhaps must be superseded if Being itself is to be expressed. Being and time are rather so intertwined that one can be understood on the basis of the other. Neither does time mean that time alongside of which space is situated, but rather, that primordial movement to which even space belongs, a movement which, as Being itself, releases beings from out of itself. That time which is meant in the title of *Being and Time* cannot be understood on the basis of traditional metaphysical thinking at all. Time has a fundamental ontological function in metaphysics, to be sure, since Being is understood, in a hidden manner, as presence from a temporal horizon. Yet, metaphysics obtains no knowledge or understanding of this ontological function, and has no insight

into the ground of the possibility of this function. 'On the contrary: Time itself is taken as a being among other beings, and the attempt is made to grasp time in its Being-structure within the horizon of that inexpressibly naive understanding of Being which is itself oriented toward time' (SZ 26). What time is, is read off from those beings which are themselves in time. In this manner, time itself is naturally not thought of in its Being.

Since Heidegger inquires after Being and time, he must show, in contrast to that manner in which the concept of time plays a role in traditional ontology, 'that and how the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time, provided it be correctly viewed and correctly made explicit'. He must critically detach himself from the traditional concept of time 'which has persisted from Aristotle to Bergson, and even later' (SZ 18). Proceeding from the problematic of temporality, Heidegger raises Western metaphysics anew as something concerning which a decision must be made. The second part of *Being and Time*, which was planned but never published, was to have given the 'principle characteristics of a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology on the basis of the problematic of temporality'. Heidegger had wanted to go back beyond Kant and Descartes to Aristotle, whose treatise on time was to have been treated as 'a way of discriminating the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology' (SZ 39ff.).

How can the problematic of 'Being and time' – that which is left unthought by metaphysics – be taken up? How can time be primordially intertwined with Being? Being is always the Being of beings and for this reason, the formulation of the question of *Being and Time* can be found via an explanation which interprets beings with respect to time. If Being is to be thought as fundamentally interconnected with time, then time must show itself when the Being of beings is questioned. Among the beings in question, one being assumes a privileged position: Dasein. By Dasein, Heidegger understands man as the 'there', i.e., as the place of the disclosure of Being. It is Dasein which raises the question of Being. Therefore, Dasein which raises the question, must be disclosed in its Being if the question of Being itself is to become transparent. Dasein can ask about Being because it is distinct from other beings in that, in its Being, Dasein is concerned about this very Being. Since the essence of Dasein lies in 'ek-sistence', in its being-able-to-be (*Sein-können*), understanding Being is a characteristic of the Being of Dasein. Thus, Dasein has not only an ontic priority – as being among beings – but also an ontological priority: Dasein is in itself ontological: it has an understanding of Being. This does not mean, to be sure, that Dasein immediately develops an ontology as a questioning after Being which is simply transparent to itself. Dasein's being-ontological is at first merely a preontological, unclear, and unconceptualized understanding of Being.

However, Dasein not only understands itself in its Being, but also the Being of beings which are unlike Dasein. The soul of man, as metaphysical tradition says, is in a certain sense everything that is. Thus, Dasein becomes the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of all ontologies (SZ 11ff.).

Dasein, as a privileged being, must first of all be explained in its Being, if ontology, the science of Being, is once more to be raised as a problem, and if access is to be gained to the question of Being and time. The Being of Dasein must show itself as primordial temporality in order that on the basis of the temporality of Dasein, that time, in whose light the meaning of Being comes to be determined, can be thought. That is why Heidegger, during the summer semester of 1923, entitles a lecture course *Ontology or Hermeneutics of Facticity*, and the analytic of Dasein becomes for him the way to determine the meaning of Being. Heidegger forces into harmony here the metaphysical tradition, which thinks Being in a hidden manner in the light of time, and a nonmetaphysical and antimetaphysical tradition, which brings the temporality and historicity of man's factual ek-sistence into view. Or more precisely, Heidegger's thinking proceeds from that utmost tension which is indicated by the titles *Ontology or Hermeneutics of Facticity* and *Being and Time*. Since one was unable to relive the tension of this course of thought in the way that Heidegger did, his thinking was misunderstood on the one hand as a traditional, static ontology, and on the other hand as a historicism radicalized into an existentialism.

Since Heidegger poses the question of Being on the basis of man's understanding of Being, he, in a certain sense, led to transcendental philosophy. Husserl had radicalized phenomenology into a doctrine of transcendental constitution, and Heidegger places himself in the context of this school of thought. Husserl had attempted to open up for philosophical investigation that region of primordial origins in which the constitution of every being occurs. *Being and Time* is dedicated to Husserl: Heidegger takes over Husserl's orientation toward questions of origin, and in his analytic of Dasein inquires after the mode of Being of that transcendental ego which carries out the constitution of beings (*des Seienden*). He grants Dilthey, as well as Husserl and Scheler that they, indeed, no longer grasp the person as something 'thing-like', or as a substantial entity. And yet, Heidegger says, the actual mode of Being of the person has not yet been made properly clear and has always been covered up time and again by the traditional anthropological determinations (SZ 46ff.). Such determinations remain oriented within the traditional and inadequate conception of Being, even then and precisely then, when the person is no longer 'reified' as a mere thing and is determined directly through 'nothingness'. The question of the mode of Being of that being 'in which "world" becomes constituted', is, as Heidegger wrote to Hus-

serl, the central problem of *Being and Time*. 'It must be shown that the mode of Being characteristic of human Dasein is totally different from that of all other beings, and that precisely this mode of Being, such as it is, contains the possibility of transcendental constitution.' Heidegger's transcendental ego, however, is not the *cogito* of Descartes and not the pure consciousness of Husserl. Rather, it is 'ek-sistence' taken as the essence of Dasein and characterized by Being-in-the-world, care, finitude, temporality, and historicity. 'Transcendental constitution is a central possibility of the ek-sistence of the factual Self. . . .'²

In the *cogito sum*, the mode of Being of the *sum* must again become problematic, if the meaning of Being is to be successfully determined as no longer oriented toward 'thing' and 'substance'. On the other hand, the mode of Being of the *sum* cannot be properly determined without a deepened determination of the meaning of Being. On the one hand Heidegger's 'ontology' must not be understood on the basis of the pre-Kantian ontology, which was oriented toward things, but from the critical, transcendental-philosophical point of departure; on the other hand, Heidegger's transcendental philosophy is oriented from the very beginning toward that Being which supersedes beings to such an extent that it is 'transcendence per se'. Heidegger thus uses the term 'transcendental philosophy' not only in Kant's sense, but also in the sense of the scholastic doctrine of transcendentals (SZ 38). In his Kant book (1929), he treats Kant's transcendental philosophy as metaphysics, i.e., ontology. He attempts to show, in the same sense in which he formulated the problematic of *Being and Time*, that the foundation of transcendental philosophy collapses and the abyss of metaphysics becomes revealed when the I think of the transcendental ego is seen in its primordial relationship to time. Thus, that which was left unthought by metaphysics is now finally allowed expression.

The fundamental ontology of *Being and Time* is concerned with that which metaphysics has left unthought and thus, with the ground (*Grund*) and the abyss (*Abgrund*) of all metaphysics and ontology. The structure of the first part of this work is determined by the attempt to tear thought away from its orientation toward things and to lead it back to its ownmost self and its temporality so that, through the clarification of transcendental constitution, it becomes possible to give a determination of the meaning of Being. In the first part, the basic structures of Dasein are outlined. Here it becomes clear also, why traditional and, in particular, our everyday thinking is oriented toward things that are present-at-hand. The second chapter shows that ek-sistence, in its essence, is temporal and historical, and thus makes transcendental constitution possible. In the third section, which was not published then, the temporality of Dasein, as that being which understands Being, was to have been treated as the transcendental horizon of the question of Being, so that within this

horizon, the determination of the meaning of Being which was the main issue of these investigations would have been made possible, and thus ontology would have been brought back to its ground, i.e., its foundation, which had been up to that point left unthought.

Since thought is placed in a primordial relationship to temporality and historicity, this investigation can reach a ground only there, where it always already is, i.e., in history. Since there can be no radically new beginning on the basis of 'the things themselves' (as Husserl had required), Heidegger himself introduces the destruction of metaphysics, the return to the primordially historical, into phenomenology. There can be no systematic presentation apart from such a destruction. Therefore, Heidegger adds to the first, more systematic section of *Being and Time* a second, more historical section. Yet, the basic issue here is not the juxtaposition of the two sections, but rather their interdependence. The first section is permeated with 'historical' references; the second is concerned with a 'systematic' task.

I would like to attempt to establish the point of departure of *Being and Time* somewhat more precisely by means of a few more references to the published portion. The first section of this work gives a 'preliminary analysis of the fundamental characteristics of Dasein'. The fundamental structure of Dasein is described as Being-in-the-world. This structure is then examined according to its various moments, and finally grasped in its unity as care. Dasein is not to be thought of as a worldless subject, from which (at least since Descartes) the attempt had to be made repeatedly to bridge the gap between it and the 'world'. Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is always already alongside of things. While Husserl's constitutive phenomenology attempted to clear the way to an absolute, all-constituting ego, Heidegger posits, as the essence of man, the 'there' of that Being which makes human being possible in such a manner that it always already places man in the totality of beings, as oriented toward things. Phenomenological constitution is made possible by means of a Being which is not at our disposal. Thus, phenomenology becomes ontology for Heidegger. Ontology no longer furnishes merely the guidelines for phenomenological constitution, and no longer merely precedes phenomenology, as in Husserl. Phenomenology rather refers to the method, whereas ontology designates the content of one and the same enterprise.

The tendency of metaphysics to trace everything back to an ultimate ground is once more realized in Husserl. In the modern era, this ground has been found in an unconditioned subjectivity. Heidegger breaks this 'will' toward an unconditioned subjectivity. Being, which is not at our disposal, places man into the totality of all beings, but in such a way that man comports himself to beings as beings, and thus is the clearing, the 'there' of Being. The fact that Being is not at our disposal holds

sway over man as his 'dispositionality' (*Befindlichkeit*). This reveals the fact that man finds himself (*sich befindet*) within the totality of all beings. This 'dispositionality' also opens up access to nature thought of in a primordial manner or, as Heidegger later says, the 'earth'. The Self is understanding determined by mood, and not pure consciousness. The point of departure from pure consciousness stems from an unsurmounted Cartesian dualism; it cannot be completed by a consideration of man's 'bodiliness' since man is neither body and soul, nor mind as a synthesis of both, but rather the factual Self. 'The one-sided observations of somatology and pure psychology', observes Heidegger with regard to Husserl,³ 'are possible only by reason of the concrete whole of man which, as such, initially determines his mode of Being.' Heidegger is concerned with the concrete wholeness of man when he determines Dasein as factual ek-sistence, as the unity of thrownness and project, or of moodedness and understanding. Dasein is just as little a worldless 'I' or a pure consciousness as it is an isolated individual. Rather, it is always already with others, and even arises primarily in the 'Anyone' (*das Man*).

Dasein is, however, not alongside of things and with other people in the sense that it conceives of them in a purely theoretical attitude as abstract entities, merely present-at-hand. Rather, everything is bound to a 'for-the-sake-of-which' made possible by Dasein's being-able-to-Be. Thus, things are not primarily presented in the temporal mode of presence characteristic of what is present-at-hand, but enter into a more primordially thought temporal design (*Zeitspielraum*). Being is no longer revealed by the *intuitus*, which is oriented toward seeing and directed toward the being-present of what is present-at-hand, nor even by Husserl's *intentio*, but by care. The intentional relationship becomes rooted in that achievement of Dasein which is concerned with the 'meaningfulness' of things, and which thus is always factual. That which is in the world is, philosophically, not first discovered in its pure potentialities, in order afterwards to receive back its factual being in a colorless and totally empty realization. Rather, facticity – which is irreducibly unique and historical, and thus cannot be converted into an idea – has already entered into the world. Heidegger's historical conception of world is oriented toward the New Testament, toward Augustine and Dilthey, but not toward the Greek conception of the cosmos. Heidegger accuses the ontological tradition (which originated from Greek thought) of having passed over the phenomenon of the world – and explicitly in Parmenides – even at its very beginning and of continuing to pass it by (*BT* 100). In place of the unrecognized world-phenomenon, a distinct region of eternal entities arose. For this reason, 'even the relationship to the world, in the sense of a distinct comportment to this being, was interpreted as νοεῖν, as intuitus, as no-longer mediated perception or reason'.⁴ Heidegger wishes to turn this tradition of thought back to a more primordial

experience when, in *Being and Time*, he begins with a clarification of the structure of Being-in-the-world.

The analysis of Dasein, furthermore, lets one grasp why the traditional understanding of Being is governed by an inadequate ontology of what is present-at-hand (SZ 130) and a logic (SZ 129) that is grounded therein. Because Dasein is Being-in-the-world, it is 'proximally and for the most part fascinated by its world' (SZ 113). In this manner, Dasein does not take the world as such into view. Because it is a characteristic of Dasein that it is thrown in among beings it remains, as long as it is, 'being thrown'. It is cast into the swirl of that inauthentic understanding of Being which arises from having fallen prey to beings. The constant danger of fallenness belongs to Dasein, which as Being-in-the-world is 'in itself tempting' (SZ 177). As Being-in-the-world, Dasein not only falls prey to beings, but even understands itself on the basis of thinglike beings; it lifts these beings out of their movement and the ever-changing relationship to itself; it assures itself of them by going beyond things which are present and merely present-at-hand, to something eternally present and always present-at-hand. When Heidegger speaks of presence-at-hand, he does not wish to discuss primarily the question of the reality or the 'independence from consciousness' of things, but rather, to point out that sudden changeover by which the original relationship to things becomes a mere seeing of something merely present-at-hand. This changeover is not only factually present in our knowledge; it is the ideal of our traditional conception of knowledge. 'The idea of the *intuitus* has guided all interpretations of knowledge from the beginnings of Greek ontology until today, whether or not that *intuitus* can be factually reached' (SZ 358). Thus, since Descartes, mathematical thinking has been given a priority, because thinking was always oriented toward the eternally present. Mathematics, however, is concerned with that which is always present, always remains, and outlasts all change. And it is precisely mathematics which reveals the all-leveling changeover from our primordial relationship to things to a mere 'presence-at-hand' in its final radicality (SZ 96).

It is precisely because Heidegger retrieves ek-sistence from fallenness that he can primordially unveil the temporality of ek-sistence. The second section of *Being and Time* shows that the 'essence', i.e., the ontological meaning, of Dasein lies in temporality, and that care as the articulated structural totality of the Being of Dasein is to be understood in terms of temporality. The result is a deeper understanding of the fact that Dasein is tempted to fall a prey to being, and thereby to become inauthentic. Inauthentic thought and behavior are oriented toward that which is in time, and in this manner are set in opposition to authentic thinking and behavior, which grasp themselves as the temporalization of time. The determination of Dasein in terms of temporality expresses a decision in regard to the metaphysical concept of time. This conception of time

ultimately remains oriented toward that which is in time, and thus fails to grasp primordial temporality, the temporalization of time itself. Primordial temporality is historicity. Still, the temporality of the 'common' conception of time; which is oriented toward what is in time, is equiprimordial with historicity and is, in a sense, thereby justified (SZ 377). Dasein, as the temporalization of time and thus as transcendental constitution, is only historical and world-founding insofar as it (as factual ek-sistence) is already in the world alongside beings that are in time. Everydayness and inauthenticity cannot simply, once and for all, be left behind. Dasein can only be authentic when it continually tears itself away from inauthenticity, which thus is always already presupposed.

The unfolding of the temporality of Dasein into the equiprimordial structures of historicity and inner-temporalizing shows the ontological direction of the analysis of Dasein, whose goal it is to reveal temporality as the horizon of the understanding of Being, and to gain a victory over the metaphysical understanding of Being. Yet even the analyses of the second section, such as those of death and conscience, which at first seem to be solely an ek-sistential appeal, serve primarily an ontological purpose, provided they are properly understood. They sharpen the insight that Dasein, as factual ek-sistence, is temporality rooted in moodedness or thrown project (*geworfener Entwurf*). As understanding or as being-able-to-Be, Dasein is possibility, but it is authentically this possibility only when it constantly anticipates the utmost unsurpassable possibility. This utmost possibility is death. To die – 'i.e., to feel death as present (Luther)' – deepens that possibility which Dasein is, to the utmost possibility which is boundless impossibility, namely, the impossibility of each and every mode of ek-sisting as a determinate being-able-to-be. That possibility which Dasein, as being-able-to-be, *is* springs from an ultimate impossibility of anticipating this utmost possibility as an anticipation of an ultimate impossibility, in that it gives Dasein to understand that it is 'guilty'.

Being guilty does not mean here the incurring of moral guilt but, quite formally, 'being the ground of a negativity'. With regard to its first aspect, this negativity arises from the fact that Dasein has not laid its own foundation, which is its thrownness, but must nevertheless accept this thrownness. Through the acceptance of this thrownness, Dasein must itself become this foundation, which yet is not Dasein itself but which Dasein must rather always first let be given to itself. It 'has been released from its basis, not through itself but to itself, so as to be as this basis' (BT 284f.). When Dasein, as the understanding of Being, resolutely brings itself before Being, the access to Being shows itself as determined by a 'not'. Dasein is powerless before Being. Dasein is always already in debt to Being because Being proves itself to be the condition for the

fact that Dasein is. This having-to-go-into-debt of Dasein appears in Heidegger's later works in a new fashion, as thinking is brought into a relatedness with thanks and thanksgiving. In *Being and Time* the concept of guilt does not, therefore, accentuate a 'dark aspect' of Dasein, but is much more part of the attempt to find an ultimate foundation for thinking, as was attempted by Schelling in a similar, though metaphysically speculative, fashion. Schelling, after his *Investigations concerning the Essence of Human Freedom* thought he could go beyond Hegel's metaphysics by means of a more deeply laid foundation for metaphysics.

Yet, being-guilty as the basis of negativity still has a second aspect, and Heidegger's analysis derives this aspect, too, from that type of thinking which the late Schelling attempted to develop under the heading of 'positive philosophy'. Dasein is not nugatory merely as a result of its concrete project insofar as this project is a distinct choice, which may choose one thing only while, at the same time, having to give up something else. Thrownness has always already marked off a region of possible choices. Dasein discovers its factual possibilities in resoluteness, and thereby its Being-in-position as a Being-in-a-position, i.e., as situation. Resolute ek-sistence is certain of its own truth only insofar as it takes note of the 'situational' character of this truth. Ek-sistence should not become frozen in one determinate situation, but must leave itself free for a possible taking-back or a resolute repetition. The truth, in which ek-sistence stands, is thus always 'located'. Its light streams into the openness of a 'there', which is distinguished by a situation, and therefore also by temporality and historicity. Being gives itself only into a bounded openness, and is to this extent characterized by a 'not' (*Nicht*). This imitation cannot be overcome by a speculative metaphysics of history.

The ontological aim of *Being and Time* is obvious throughout. This goal leaps into view if one casts only a first, superficial glance (and this, of course, without some sort of self-induced blindness) at the basic concepts, inasmuch as they are characteristic of Heidegger on the one hand, and of the metaphysical tradition on the other. In Heidegger, a radical isolation takes place which leads to an always factual ek-sistence. (This ek-sistence need not be a single individual, but may also be a community.) Within the metaphysical tradition, on the other hand, facticity is seen as mere realization. The irreplaceability of each Dasein does not come into view, and the situation, as historical localization, is left unconsidered. Metaphysics does not orient itself toward the openness of the future as a tensely drawn possibility, which arises out of an utmost impossibility, but rather toward 'reality', which then is transcended toward a compelling, eternal necessity. If no eternal soul substance can be found in the Self, there is certainly still a pure subjectivity which remains constantly present-at-hand through all changes from subject to subject. The constant

unrest in the being-able-to-Be of man's ek-sistence is stilled. Eternity, as continuously abiding presence, takes the place of temporality and historicity. Thus, in the search for something eternally certain and perpetually present-at-hand, which one can cling to, all sense of being threatened is left behind. Thinking steps out of primal uncanniness and makes itself at home in something eternally present-at-hand. Man's resting in this eternity overcomes all being-guilty and all negativity. Finitude enters into an endless being-with-itself.

Heidegger's exposition of the basic concepts of metaphysics finally focuses on the question of whether or not Being can be understood as continuous presence. Does not an understanding of Being which grasps Being as continuous presence shrink back from the actual task at hand, namely that of bringing the temporal character of this presence to expression? These questions were to have been worked out in the third and unpublished section of *Being and Time*, which had as its task the 'explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being'. The fact that Heidegger increasingly put off matters until they could be treated in this section and in the investigations which were to follow it indicates to what a great extent the whole work was directed toward this section. Thus, the discussion of the forgetting of the world by Western thought (100), the new determination of logos (160), the fuller development of the idea of phenomenology (357), ontology (230), and science (357), and the discussion of the problem of language are all postponed for later treatment. The 'as' in 'taking-something-as-something' and therewith presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand are to be later clarified (333, 351, 360, 366, 436f.); everydayness is to be more deeply understood (372); the relationship of space and time worked out anew (368); and the question of how time has its own mode of Being is to be answered (406). The whole ek-sistential analysis demands a 'renewed recapitulation within the framework of a fundamental discussion of the concept of Being' (333, 436). The published portion of *Being and Time* therefore quite concretely fails to hit the mark. For this reason, Heidegger states quite explicitly at the end of the published portion that what he has done is only a way, i.e., a way toward working out of the question of Being.

The working out of the question of Being is the attempt to inquire into the meaning of Being as such, whose characterization remains simply an unthought presupposition of metaphysics. In the introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger explicitly gives an 'exposition of the question of the meaning of Being'. All questioning, he says there, asks about something, namely, that which is asked about (*das Gefragte*). It inquires after that which is asked about in that it asks something. It has in addition that which is interrogated (*das Befragte*). That which is asked about is

determined by that which is interrogated and is directed toward that which is to be found out by the asking (*das Erfragte*). 'Furthermore, in what is asked about there lies also that which is to be found out by asking; this is what is really intended' (SZ 5). In the question of Being, that which is asked about is Being. That which is interrogated are beings, and among these beings, one being, i.e., Dasein, in particular. That which is to be found out by the asking is the meaning of Being. The published portion of *Being and Time* gives an analysis of that which is interrogated, i.e., Dasein, but purely for the sake of that which is asked about, i.e., Being. Nevertheless, the investigation does not reach that which is to be found out by the asking, i.e., the meaning of Being. Thus, the investigation fails to reach its goal and is prematurely broken off.

This is not to say that the investigation was not leading up to that goal. To be sure, Heidegger does not ask about some Being-in-itself beyond the world – for in this case, Being would simply be a determinate being once more – but asks rather about the meaning of Being, and thus, he asks the question of how Being is revealed to man. To ask the question concerning the meaning of Being means to ask about a possible understanding of Being. 'Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself' (SZ 151). The meaning of Being means that horizon of understanding in which Being is revealed (not, however, an 'ultimate meaning of Being'). Within this horizon, Being enters that primordially thought truth which Heidegger calls nonconcealment. Being – not beings – is only 'insofar as truth is' (BT 230). Being 'is' as truth, as the openness and intelligibility of beings, as that clearing in which beings may appear. The meaning, i.e., the truth and openness of Being, 'is' only in the *Da* (i.e., there) of Dasein, which is nothing other than a realm of openness. The question of the meaning of Being and the question concerning Dasein's being-understanding aim, even though from different directions, at the same central point, in which the meaning of Being and Dasein's being-understanding are one. 'But to lay bare the horizon within which something like Being in general becomes intelligible, is tantamount to clarifying the possibility of having any understanding of Being at all – an understanding which itself belongs to the constitution of the being called Dasein' (SZ 231).

The clarification of the understanding of Being is carried out in the published portion of *Being and Time*. The Being of a being, i.e., the meaning of the Being of Dasein, is determined so that Dasein may show itself to be the place of the truth of Being, as the one who understands the meaning of Being. Since Heidegger grasps Dasein primordially as the temporalization of time, authentic ek-sistence is revealed as that place in which Being can be temporal. Time is thus able to disclose itself as the horizon for any and every understanding of Being. 'The projection of the meaning of Being in general can be carried out within the horizon

of time' (SZ 235). *Being and Time*, taken in its basic intention, aims at this turning point in which the thinking of the temporality of Dasein enters into time as openness, as the meaning or truth of Being. Yet precisely there where Heidegger finished his preparations and arrived at his ownmost formulation of the question, he lacked the appropriate language in which to express his basic intention. He thus broke off the attempt. Since only the first two sections of *Being and Time* were published, there arose the misunderstanding that the so-called 'reversal' (*Kehre*) indicated a turning away from an earlier (ek-sistentially philosophical) position to an (ontologically historical) position which had been worked out later. A glance at the course which Heidegger's thinking takes, however, makes it quite plain that the published portion of *Being and Time* was already thought out on the basis of the 'self-reflective' consideration of the relationship of Being to beings or (as the case may be) of beings to Being. Furthermore, the work itself shows that, from the very beginning, man's ek-sistence enters into play only from a consideration of the 'reversal'. *Being and Time* begins with an exposition of the question of the meaning of Being; indications are constantly given that the analytic of Dasein is on the way to a determination of the meaning of Being, and actually already presupposes a conception of this meaning and therefore is caught up in a circle. The completion of the 'reversal' is not turning to a new position but rather a return to the original point of departure and a return to that ground upon which this circle-of-thought has rested from the very beginning. This ground is, of course, not only the basis of Heidegger's own thinking, but also that which was left unthought by metaphysics.

The break

Why, we must ask, does Heidegger prematurely break off what was attempted in *Being and Time*, and how does he still manage to bring his thought to its goal? In *Being and Time*, it is stated that 'that which is to be found out by the asking', i.e. the meaning of Being, demands its own manner of being grasped, which manner may not be oriented toward beings (SZ 6). In the *Letter on Humanism*, then, Heidegger admitted, in retrospect, that the thinking of *Being and Time* denied to the 'reversal' an appropriate language, because it could not be carried out within the language of metaphysics.⁵ Metaphysics conceives of beings as beings; it inquires after the Being of beings, but not after Being itself. Metaphysics thus presupposes a determinate conception of the meaning of Being, merely insofar as it does not think through the character of that time in whose light Being becomes determined. Thus, the conceptual framework of metaphysics prevents the question of Being itself from being raised. In fact, this question simply fades away if the questioning does not give up the language of metaphysics. Heidegger has attempted to substantiate

this thesis through a reflection on the thought of Ernst Jünger, a contemporary of Heidegger's on this path of thought.⁶ Jünger believed himself to have gone beyond the 'zero meridian' of nihilism, and yet his conceptual framework still remains within the sphere of metaphysics. If, however, the question concerning Being itself is the first and only fruitful step toward the overcoming of nihilism,⁷ then the conceptual framework of classical metaphysics must be abandoned, since it does not allow this question to come into focus. After the failure of *Being and Time's* endeavor, Heidegger still attempts to bring his questioning to its destination, in that he seeks radically to overcome metaphysics by a *return into the ground of metaphysics*.⁸

The question of the meaning of Being brings that which metaphysics leaves unthought and ungrounded, i.e., the abysslike ground of metaphysics, to expression. An excursus through the history of metaphysics (which the second portion of *Being and Time* was supposed to have attempted) must reveal the abysslike ground so that thought, by means of its own questioning, may return into it. Heidegger now considers above all the beginning, the completion, and the end of metaphysical thought, from the earliest Greek thought, to the philosophy of mediation of German Idealism, and to Nietzsche. Nietzsche is not treated as that existential thinker whose utterances must be held in suspension. Rather, Nietzsche is drawn quite close to Aristotle, and taken simply in his most basic ideas. As a metaphysical thinker, Nietzsche thinks from the idea of the eternal recurrence. Yet, as a 'thinker of eternity', he is not the prelude to a philosophy of the future, but rather, the consistent end of the metaphysical tradition. Metaphysics represents beings in their Being, but in this representation it relates them to subjectivity. This subjectivism, which was present from the very beginning in metaphysics, finds its radical completion in Nietzsche, who made the will to power the *essentia* of all beings. Metaphysics thinks Being as perpetual presence: metaphysics reaches its completion when Nietzsche determines the *existentia* of beings to be the eternal recurrence of the same. Nietzsche's doctrine, as the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of all things, overthrows the metaphysics of essences because now there can no longer be any essential difference between things. Thus, metaphysics ends with Nietzsche. Heidegger seeks not only to bring metaphysics to this end, but even the whole of Western history which, even in the phase of our scientific-technical organization, is still determined by metaphysics. Heidegger understands the all-destroying world wars of our time in the light of the final history of metaphysics. He interprets metaphysics and its end with the help of the concepts and catchphrases of total war.

Nietzsche's attempt to overcome nihilism does not overcome nihilism at all, but rather entrenches it all the more firmly. In a thought which thinks from the viewpoint of the will to power and the eternal recurrence

of the same, Being cannot appear in its truth, cannot appear as that destining (*Geschick*) which it, in fact, is but which is 'not simply at our disposal'. As Heidegger stated in his Nietzsche lectures during the summer semester of 1939, 'In the eternal recurrence of the same, the final historical essence of this last metaphysical explanation of beingness [*Seiendheit*] – i.e., as the will to power – is conceived of in such a manner that the essence of truth is denied any possibility of becoming that which is most questionable, and the meaninglessness which is thereby placed into power unconditionally determines the "horizon" of our times and brings about its completion'.⁹ The completion of meaninglessness reveals itself to the historical-technical consciousness of our time not as the end, 'but as the "liberation" for a steadily-increasing loss of Self, and ultimately, to an intensification of everything'. 'One neither knows nor ventures that Other, which in the future will be the One and Only, because it was already abiding in the very beginning of our history, even though ungrounded: the truth of Being, our standing in this truth, out of which world and earth alone struggle to achieve their essence for man, and man, in this struggle experiences the reply of his essence to the God "of" Being'. Only in a new experiencing of Being can nature and history find man and God in their essence. Since the end of metaphysics forcibly brings about this new beginning, i.e., of a 'standing in' truth insofar as essential thinking should continue to exist at all – thinking is obliged to repeat the first beginnings of thought, the earliest Greek thought, and redecide all those decisions on the basis of which metaphysics arose. Heidegger demands to go back into the ground of the first beginnings of thought. 'What has been in the first beginnings of thought is thereby forced to rest upon the abyss of its ground, which has remained ungrounded up until now, and thus, for the first time, to become history.'

This newly beginning thought, which arises from the end of metaphysics, raises once more the question which *Being and Time* had to leave unanswered. The completion of the reversal, toward which *Being and Time* not only tended but out of which this whole work was already conceived, cannot simply be considered a further carrying out of the point of departure of *Being and Time*. The 'reversal', as Heidegger actually carries it to completion, is a turning away from this first point of departure, which still asked about the Being of beings in the metaphysical manner of questioning. Just as a skier does not make a turn arbitrarily or out of pure high spirits, neither does Heidegger arbitrarily break off the train of thought of *Being and Time* just when it is in full motion. An abyss had opened up before him, the abyss of the meaningless which had been revealed by Nietzsche's bringing metaphysical thinking to a close.

Thought cannot simply by-pass this abyss. Insofar as thought does not wish to carry out merely an underground restoration and ever again fall

into the same abyss, it must itself enter this abyss. Thought must go through metaphysics to that which remains unthought in metaphysics; it must appropriate metaphysics before it can abandon it. That is why Heidegger asks the question: *What Is Metaphysics?* (1929), why he attempts an *Introduction to Metaphysics*,¹⁰ which aims at a basic overcoming of metaphysics. Already the fact that Heidegger takes up the leading concepts of metaphysical thought in order to do away with them one after the other, indicates that he wishes to overcome metaphysics by appropriating it and thinking through it to that which it left unthought. Metaphysics is simultaneously ontology and logic. Already in his Kant book, Heidegger rejects formal and transcendental logic (in contrast to Husserl's efforts at that time). Formal logic, he says, must be deprived of its privileged position in metaphysics, which it has maintained since antiquity. The very idea of a formal logic is questionable. The idea of a transcendental logic is simply meaningless.¹¹ In the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, the heading 'ontology', which was first adhered to, is rejected also. Heidegger wishes to separate himself from other contemporary 'ontological' efforts in philosophy (p. 31). The *Letter on Humanism* thus states that ontology – in keeping with its name – always thinks only the meaning of beings, and therefore not Being itself. Heidegger seeks first of all to establish a connection between the sciences and the wanting-to-have-an-awareness of Dasein. However, the sciences, which supposedly were to have been metaphysically grounded, finally become mere derivatives of a metaphysics which itself is to be overcome. This consideration, which takes up the wanting-to-have-an-awareness of Dasein on a new level, is placed in opposition to the sciences. The later Heidegger does not wish to have his thought understood as phenomenological research or even as philosophy. That is why he now seeks out art. Art emerges out of an inner necessity into the horizon of the thinker who prepares himself to think the truth of Being: primordial art, of whose end metaphysics speaks, sets the truth of Being into motion; it makes beings 'more being' (*seiender*) by guarding Being in beings. The disclosure of the world, as it occurs in art and, above all, in poetry seems to be the only one which stands on that primordial level upon which thought, too, seeks to make itself at home. Thought itself has a hidden poetic character because it no longer is the metaphysical proposing presentation of beings in their Being as continuous presence, but reaches out into an open future, thereby bearing presence and absence simultaneously. At this point Heidegger comes close to early Greek aphoristic thinking as well as to the more recent Western 'sayings of the soul which should be sung rather than spoken' – an expression through which Nietzsche for some time laid himself open to the experience of the god Dionysus, who is simultaneously presence and absence.

Yet it is not a 'poetry' beyond metaphysics which leads into the abyss-

like ground of metaphysics, but rather the attempt to retrieve primordially the questions of metaphysics. Shortly after *Being and Time*, Heidegger attempts in the lecture *What Is Metaphysics?* and in the essay 'The essence of reasons' to reflect upon the 'Nothing' (*das Nichts*), and upon the Nothing between Being and beings, i.e., the ontological difference. In this way, Heidegger meets the demand which he himself had made in the analysis of guilt and conscience in *Being and Time*, namely, the demand to raise the problem of the ontological origin of Nothing (SZ 285ff.). Since Nothing is thought of as a 'no' with regard to all beings, the question arises of why there are beings at all, rather than Nothing? Not only facticity of Dasein, but even the fact that there are beings as such is called into question in this metaphysically greatly expanded problem. When metaphysics asks something of this nature, it turns to a highest being as the ground of all other beings. In this fashion, however, metaphysics does not think Being as such. By including in his question a '... rather than Nothing' Heidegger cuts off the path to a highest, unquestionable Being. He reduces this question to the question of the meaning, the truth or openness of Being itself. In the leading question of metaphysics – i.e., What are beings? – which asks about the Being of beings, the fundamental question is presupposed, in which the meaning of Being itself – that which is left unthought by metaphysics – is brought into question.

The meaning or the truth of Being, as that which metaphysics leaves unthought, is the abysslike ground of metaphysics. The truth of Being is that center in which being and Dasein (which has an understanding of Being) come together, in which the 'reversal' thus completes itself. That thinking which wishes to bring the abysslike ground of metaphysics to expression must enter into this center. Heidegger reflects upon this center when, in the two decades after the appearance of *Being and Time*, he makes the problem of truth and Being the foremost theme of his thought. The lecture 'The essence of truth' and the essay 'Plato's doctrine of truth' give some insight into his working on this theme. Heidegger reflects upon the unthought foundation of the Western conception of truth, that non-concealment which must ever again be wrested from forgottenness and hiddenness, and which thus first makes truth as the *adequatio* of thought and thing possible. Truth, which is thought of as a nonconcealment, is the happening of truth (*Wahrheitsgeschehen*), and in this happening prevails the temporality of Dasein and that time in which Being itself gives itself in its openness. We are concerned here not simply with the essence of truth in the sense of Dasein's standing-in-truth, but rather, concerned even more with the truth of Being taken as abiding Being, i.e., with truth as the openness of Being. In this way, the 'reversal' is completed: Dasein as Being-in-the-world no longer stands at the center of these considerations, but rather Being in its meaning and its truth,

and thus Being as that which makes 'world' possible. Thought no longer moves from beings to Being, but rather from Being to beings.

If the relationship of Dasein to Being is determined by a double nothing then Being in its transition to beings is characterized by a double 'superiority'. There is, of course, no Being without beings – Being is the 'granting' of beings – but yet, Being brings about in itself the difference between Being and beings. It releases beings out of itself into openness, and among these beings there is Dasein as the privileged place of Being's openness. However, for its part, Dasein, taken in itself, does not have Being at its disposal. To this a second aspect is to be added, namely, the place of the openness of Being is bounded by the fact that at each given time it 'whiles' in a determinate way (*Jeweiligkeit*): the openness or nonconcealment of Being takes place at each given time only upon a background of concealment. Being, which appropriates Dasein as the place of its disclosure, remains fundamentally not at Dasein's disposal, just as it ever again transcends the mode of abiding characteristic of Dasein.

Being, taken as the unavailable and at each time historical destining of Being (*Seinsgeschick*), reveals itself in its meaning, or in its openness and truth, as the event of appropriation (*Ereignis*). 'Ereignis' does not mean here, as it still did within the terminology of *Being and Time*, a certain occurrence or happening, but rather Dasein's complete self-realization in Being, and Being's appropriation (*zueignen*) to Dasein's authenticity. The word 'Ereignis' cannot be made plural. It determines the meaning of Being itself. It is, as a *singulare tantum*, a key concept of thought like the Greek word *logos* or the Chinese word *tao*.¹²

Being as the event of appropriation: with this definition Heidegger's thinking has arrived at its goal. In the event of appropriation, time, in whose light Being has always been understood, though in a hidden manner, is simultaneously thought also. Heidegger's thinking returns to its own ground in that it brings the abysslike ground, that which was left unthought by metaphysics, to expression. Thus, the way of thought finds its course to the continually circumnavigated center. Thought gradually finds its genuine structure by thinking its only thought. As a carrying out of the question of Being, and thus as the carrying out to completion of thought's way, Heidegger's thinking strictly limits itself to adhering to that one and only thought 'which one day will remain fixed like a star in the heavens of the world': 'To approach a star, and only this. . . .'¹³

Part two

In his confrontation with metaphysics, Heidegger raises the first and last questions of thought anew. Thus, that which was left unthought by

metaphysics achieves expression. Heidegger seeks to think that which was left unthought by returning to the ground of metaphysics. He thinks Being in the sense of the appropriating event. This determination of the meaning of Being was thought through in 1936 but did not appear in an exact formulation until twenty years later.

Because Heidegger thinks the meaning of Being itself, he can take up the metaphysical question of the Being of beings, of Being in its various modes of realization. He seeks to secure beings in the truth of Being. In so doing, he cannot simply take over the logic of metaphysics, but must forcibly bring about a new decision concerning the *logos*.

Through the return to the ground of metaphysics, that which has been thought by metaphysics is posed anew as something which must be decided upon and, in this manner, can be primordially adopted. By means of a meditation which is focused on Being's history, Heidegger reflects upon the characterizations of the meaning of Being which, although prevailing in various phases of metaphysics, were not expressly put into question there. Thus, Heidegger seeks to place metaphysical thinking back upon that ground which itself has remained unthought, to incorporate his own thinking into that 'happening' of the truth as it comes to us from our tradition.

I cannot go further into all these efforts of Heidegger's, of which at least some bits were made available in lectures and essays. Nevertheless, I still would like to attempt three things: First of all, I would like to reflect once more upon the course of Heidegger's thinking as a whole, to be able to more accurately grasp the central point and the inherently tense unity of Heidegger's thought, and thereby ward off some misunderstandings. Thus, I shall pay particular attention to what the word 'ground' (*Grund*) means in the discussion of fundamental ontology and the return to the ground of metaphysics. Secondly, I would like to give at least a few indications of how Heidegger seeks to think that-which-is on the basis of the event of appropriation, and determine the *logos* which his thinking follows in so doing. Finally, I would briefly like to show how Heidegger's thought gains its cohesiveness by placing traditional, metaphysical thought back upon its ground, which has remained unthought.

The ground

Heidegger's thinking grows out of a reflection upon metaphysics. But what is metaphysics? Metaphysics (ontology in the broader sense) seeks to determine beings in their Being, and to articulate Being according to its various modes of realization. This is why metaphysics asks the question: What are beings? At one point, metaphysics asks about beings as beings in general, or about beings as such; then it is general metaphysics (ontology in the narrower sense). Metaphysics, however, does not only inquire after those characteristics which can be discovered in every being,

in beings as such, but it inquires also after that Being which makes a particular, individual being to be what it is. It is then special metaphysics (*metaphysica specialis*). Metaphysics, from the very beginning, asks about beings as beings only in such a manner, that it defines beings as a whole in terms of a privileged being – a highest or divine being. When, in the Christian faith, God was understood as the creator of mankind and the world, theological metaphysics was incorporated into the three parts of traditional *metaphysica specialis* (natural theology, psychology, cosmology).

Metaphysics asks about beings in such a way that it grounds the Being of beings in a highest being, and defines it in terms of this highest being. Metaphysics thinks beings in their Being, but does not determine this Being in its own proper meaning, but rather thinks it immediately in terms of a highest being, which for its part is determined in terms of a meaning of Being which is not thought in itself, as such. Being and beings are not kept apart in such a way that the meaning of Being could become problematic. The meaning of Being remains unthought; its meaning is merely presupposed. Metaphysics, as representative thinking, orients itself toward thinglike beings, which it finds present in the 'world' as present-at-hand. It thus understands Being, and even the Being of the highest being, in terms of presence-at-hand or presence. Since it is never explicitly put into question, this understanding of the meaning of Being takes place only in a hidden manner in the light of time: presence (*Anwesenheit*) is thought of from the perspective of the temporal mode of the present time (*Gegenwart*). It is for this reason that Heidegger asks: If Being is determined as presence, how then is time itself to be thought of which in a hidden manner is cothought with the notion of presence? 'Through the question contained in the expression "Being and Time", that which was left unthought in all metaphysics is indicated.'¹⁴ The question about Being and time seeks to think that which metaphysics has always forgotten to think: the meaning of Being itself.

Heidegger finds an approach to that time in whose light the meaning of Being comes to be determined by examining the Being of that being which is characterized by an understanding of Being, in terms of temporality. That being which is so characterized is Dasein. Metaphysics can find no approach to the question of Being and time because it must interpret time in its Being in terms of a 'now', precisely because it understands Being in terms of an inadequately thought-through temporal mode, namely, 'the present time'. Metaphysical thinking orients itself toward that which is present-at-hand within the world, and transcends this present-at-hand to something which is eternally present at hand or present. Thus, this sort of thinking must overlook that typical standing-out toward a future which is not simply at one's disposal which is characteristic of primordial temporality. Time is grasped as a succession of

now-points which are present, were present, or will be present. Christian theology reveals a more primordial relationship to time and temporality, i.e., a relationship of standing-out toward a future which is not at one's disposal. Heidegger mentions frequently in *Being and Time* the impulses which he received from the theological thought. It is these impulses which have led him to that path which his questioning takes.

Heidegger asks about Dasein and its temporality merely for the sake of the question of Being. The privileged position which Dasein receives does not mean that a subjectification of all beings is to be undertaken. Of course, Heidegger's thought remains separated by an abyss from that kind of metaphysics which, by means of a transcendental reflection, believes itself capable of defining the 'gradation' of beings with respect to Being. But precisely because Heidegger reflects upon the fact that we can approach beings which are not like Dasein merely through that openness which Being receives in our understanding of it, these beings can 'speak' to man in their total otherness and foreignness, without immediately being anthropomorphically misinterpreted. The analysis of Dasein should not be understood as giving support to modern anthropologism in any way. In such anthropologism, man is put into the position of the highest being. Everything which is delivered over to man. Beings are only insofar as they are for man and given over to him. Everything revolves around man and seems to be connected with him. Man, made thusly dependent upon himself, becomes understood as 'nihilistic' in the sense of 'merely temporal' and 'finite'. As a matter of fact, *Being and Time* has been misinterpreted as just such an anthropologism. One was thus forced to regard the thought of the later Heidegger as a turn to a completely different position. In Heidegger's later thinking, the foundation upon which everything is founded is supposed to be no longer resolute ek-sistence, but rather, a mythologized Being.

Yet, neither Dasein nor Being is an ontic fundament, an ultimate ground in the sense of metaphysics. Thus, it is meaningless to say that Heidegger has changed his view by substituting one fundament (Being) for another (man). Dasein is the 'there', the place of the truth of Being, and therefore by no means 'something' different from Being. And yet, there actually is an equivocation in Heidegger's earlier speaking about a fundamental ontology supposedly to be discovered through the analysis of Dasein. It sometimes appears as if the analysis of Dasein were not only the way to the working out of the question of Being, but even prior – if not superior – to it, its 'fundament'.¹⁵ These various 'tensions' which are found in Heidegger's course of thought are obviously not to be simply explained away, for then Heidegger's thought could not be regarded as an authentic 'searching for the way'. One must bear in mind, however, that Heidegger constantly calls attention to the fact that the analysis of Dasein must already presuppose a clarification of the meaning of Being,

and that this analysis must be repeated after the clarification of the meaning has appeared to be successful. Thus, there can be no talk of a one-sided grounding of the question concerning Being through a clarification of man's understanding of Being. Furthermore, Heidegger explicitly puts the equivocation which is inherent in his speaking about fundamental ontology into question at the end of *Being and Time*: 'Can one', he asks, 'provide ontological grounds for ontology, or does it also require an ontical foundation? And which being must take over the function of providing this foundation?' (SZ 436).

It is a characteristic of metaphysics that it presupposes an ontic foundation for ontology, and lets the meaning of Being be determined from the perspective of a particular being. In contrast to this, Heidegger cuts off the path to a highest being, which is no longer questioned in its Being, with the question: 'Why is there anything at all, and not simply Nothing?' In this way, thought enters into the happening of truth, in which the meaning of Being itself becomes revealed. Since Heidegger pays particular attention to the temporal character of this happening of truth, to the concurrence of concealment and nonconcealment, he succeeds in determining the meaning, and therefore the truth, of Being, by explicitly discussing the temporal moment which, as presence, remains hidden in the traditional understanding of Being: Being as the event of appropriation.

That which was left unthought by metaphysics, not merely the Being of beings, but the meaning of Being itself, comes to be thought. In this way, metaphysics comes to its 'ground'. What the word 'ground' may mean here is explained by Heidegger where he rethinks the fundamental concepts of metaphysics: identity, difference, and ground. Heidegger does not simply ask what identity, difference, and ground have to say about beings, but asks rather, how they belong to Being itself, Being as the event of appropriation. The identity of Being is 'self-sameness' (*Selbigkeit*), and not equivalence (*Gleichheit*). Identity articulates beings in their essence in such a manner that this essence remains a 'determining characteristic' (*Eigentum*) of the event of appropriation. The essence of, e.g., technology or poetry, is not the transtemporal validity of an eternally present, unchanging idea, but rather that destined (*geschickt*), historical essence which is not simply at our disposal. This essence reveals itself each time in a strict, but still temporal commitment when Dasein accepts the destining of Being (*Seinsgeschichte*), and as the 'there' of Being is 'identical' with it. Beings can then be understood in their Being as beings. If beings are understood in their Being, the difference between Being and beings is broken open. This difference (*Unterschied*), the ontological difference (*Differenz*), constitutes the center of that thinking which, as meta-physics, transcends being to Being. Heidegger seeks to show how this difference is at the same time the carrying-out of 'overcom-

ing' or transcendence, as well as 'arrival' or presence. Just as Heidegger thinks transcendence from the perspective of Dasein, as the act in and through which Dasein's understanding being-able-to-Be supersedes beings and in which this being simultaneously arrives at a new truth before Dasein's attuned moodedness, he also thinks the transition of Being to beings as the simultaneous arrival of beings in the unconcealment of Being. The carrying out of the difference – the happening of truth – is thought of as the carrying out of the event of appropriation. In contrast to what is the case in metaphysics, Heidegger no longer grounds the transcendence from beings to Being in a highest being which grounds itself and everything else, i.e., a *causa sui*. If Being is conceived of as a 'ground', it not only grounds beings, but must itself be grounded in a highest being. In this way, metaphysics becomes onto-theo-logy: it thinks Being on the basis of the divine as the ground (*logos*) of all beings. Being and beings are then not kept sufficiently distinct, so that Being cannot reveal itself in its meaning and be determined as the event of appropriation. Being itself does not become a problem here. Even the highest being is understood as something eternally present-at-hand, because the understanding of Being has oriented itself above all toward beings which are simply encountered, toward things present-at-hand. Even if, in a new approach, thinking is grounded in an ultimate 'I think', even then this 'I think' is, in turn, understood from the perspective of eternal presence as a 'pure, primordial, unchanging consciousness', which in every consciousness remains the same and thus is its ground.

Metaphysics, as the science of grounds, comes to completion in the technique of an absolute knowing, which makes available an ultimate ground. In contrast to this, thought (in Heidegger's sense) remains directed toward historical Being, which is nondeterminable and not simply at our disposal, and which is thought as the 'destining of Being' (*Seinsgeschick*), as the event of appropriation. The meaning of Being as the 'ground' which remained unthought in metaphysical thinking, can perhaps be thought of as an 'abysslike ground', but in the final analysis cannot really be thought of as a 'ground' at all. The discussion of ground is given up after having been explicitly worked out. Because the event of appropriation is just itself, and nothing more, it is without a 'why?' which asks about grounds or reasons. 'It remains', Heidegger says at the conclusion of his lecture on 'The principle of sufficient reason', 'just play: the highest and the most profound play. But this "just" is everything, the one, the only.'¹⁶

Being as the event of appropriation is neither an ultimate ground nor a highest being, but this is *not* so precisely because it is the 'granting' of beings (*das Geben vom Seienden*), because it is the 'it grants' itself. The 'it grants' (*es gibt*) is not a 'ground for the world': neither is it the power over its 'granting': it is not God, who 'creates' beings. Being as

the event of appropriation gives beings into openness, and allows them to reveal themselves as the Being 'of' beings.

Being as nondeterminable, historical destining of Being which is not simply at our disposal grants at any given time the clearing in which beings become manifest. It thus makes possible the 'bursting open' of the world as an historical world (history to be taken here in the sense in which it is not limited only to man). Since Heidegger seeks to develop a primordial concept of world (world as 'Fourfold'), he overcomes the forgetfulness-of-the-world characteristic of Western ontology which had already been discussed in *Being and Time* (100). Being, as the Being of beings, itself becomes a 'derivative' of world. The more Heidegger enters into his own thinking, the more he leaves metaphysical concepts behind. He even drops the fundamental concept 'Being', because it is a specifically metaphysical concept. He is able to drop this concept because that which metaphysics thought under this heading is the event of appropriation, when it is rethought by means of a reflection on the meaning of Being.

That which is

When Heidegger seeks to think Being in its meaning, when he seeks to think the event of appropriation, this does not mean that he rejects the question of the Being of beings. Rather, this whole question becomes fruitful in a totally new fashion when the meaning of Being is thought of as the event of appropriation. Heidegger's overcoming of metaphysics still maintains a positive attitude toward metaphysical questions. That thinking which on its 'forest trails' (*Holzwege*) abruptly becomes confronted with that which was never before trodden, i.e., the question of the meaning of Being, reaches this question in that it comes out of metaphysics and thinks back through metaphysics to that which metaphysics left unthought. This thinking ever again travels along those paths which metaphysics has opened up for it; it takes up the metaphysical question concerning the Being of what is. 'Does the soul speak? Does the world speak? Does God speak?' These questions conclude the prose piece 'Der Feldweg' (1953). 'Everything addresses renunciation toward the Self-same. Renunciation does not take. Renunciation grants.' The questions of *metaphysica specialis* about the soul, the world, and God are once more brought back into the question about 'that which is the Same', about Being. Thus, these questions can become fruitful in a new sense. The extent to which Heidegger has always borne these questions with him is shown by a mere glance at the course his thought has taken.

At the end of his Duns Scotus book, Heidegger – addressing himself to the scholasticism and mysticism of the middle ages and to Hegel – calls for a 'philosophy of the living spirit, of active love, of the worshipful intimacy with God [*Gottinigkeit*]'.

The sharpest possible distinction

between theology and metaphysics follows immediately upon this leap into the theological metaphysics of the West. He appeals to Luther, who in the name of a 'theology of the cross' rejected the 'theology of glory', which – in its metaphysics understood as theodicy – calls evil good and good evil (as Luther says in the twenty-first thesis of the Heidelberg Disputation). When thought sees itself thrown back upon itself, it must come to grips with Nietzsche who, as the 'last German philosopher who passionately sought God', expresses the fate of the West in his declaration: 'God is dead!' Only in this way can thought, with Hölderlin, enter inquiringly the level of the holy, in which the Divine, God or gods, have the abode where they can appear. Inasmuch as this thought abandons the God of the philosophers as a dead, merely being, and 'defined' God, it perhaps comes closer, as Godless thinking to the 'godly God'. It holds true for this thinking that 'Whoever has experienced theology in its own roots, the theology of the Christian faith as well as that of the philosophers, prefers today to remain silent about God within the realm of thought'.¹⁷

Nature is to be thought primordially as 'earth', so that it can be torn free from both the one-sided objectivization of science, and from technology with its one-sided interest in permanent availability and usefulness. Thus, nature can be experienced anew on the basis of the event of appropriation. Man is no longer thought of as a 'subject', but rather as the one who has to carry out the event of appropriation. The work of art, the thing, language are thought from the viewpoint of the event of appropriation.

The Being of that which is is not simply understood from the perspective of continuous presence, from the 'idea', thought of statically, or with reference to an unchanging universal. Rather, it is asked if the Being or the essence of beings is not to be properly understood as a 'historical abiding' [*Wesen*], from the perspective of the event of appropriation. That thinking which orients itself toward 'seeing', which represents beings as beings with respect to a Being or essence which is continuously present, is transformed into an explaining thinking which grasps the essence of beings as historical abiding, or as the 'place' which at any given time it always gains through the event of appropriation. If truth is to be thought of as a happening, then representational thought must make a fundamental change. It can no longer orient itself simply toward the temporal mode of the present, but rather, must 'stand-out' toward time more primordially. Heidegger has brought this fundamental change in thought to completion by conceiving of ontology as phenomenology, but phenomenology as hermeneutics, and then by going back from hermeneutical thought to a thinking which follows a *logos* that remained concealed in metaphysics, and was not primordially developed either in theological or historical hermeneutics.

The character of Heidegger's thought has been variously misunderstood. It is believed that talk about Being must be completely empty, if Being is not grounded in a being. It was said that ontology was to be placed upon an ontic foundation, e.g., God, or at least an eternal world or man himself. As a matter of fact, that thinking which Heidegger himself characterizes as 'preparatory' is marked by a certain 'emptiness' or formalism (e.g., within the analysis of Dasein, Heidegger distinguished between 'existential' and 'existentiell'). In fact, however, the relationship to beings is already posited along with the thinking of Being. The early Heidegger therefore spoke of the formal-indicative nature of his concepts. The formalism of these 'indications' is not that of an empty, self-sufficient form which is separated from its content. Rather, the relationship to the fulfillment through the content is already posited in the form, but held back and in suspension, so that the formality is maintained. The form is not an empty shell, but rather always ready to make the leap to the concrete through a content. This fulfillment is held back, however, because it is irreducibly factual. That for which resolute Dasein resolves itself, 'which' reveals itself in Being as the event of appropriation, remains open, since thought can neither posit it nor derive it without destroying the character of the event of appropriation.

It has been further said of Heidegger's 'ontology' that it fails to achieve its sought-after formalism, since it springs from a particular-historical understanding. However, this abstract alternative, namely that between the ontological-universal and the ontic-historical, also fails to do justice to his formal-indicative conceptuality.

When Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, brings a particular structure to light, it appears to be a phenomenon in the sense of Kant's 'condition for the possibility of experience', or Plato's *eidos*. The provisional conception of phenomenology, as Heidegger develops it at the beginning of *Being and Time*, must lead one to hold Heidegger's investigations to be eidetic investigations in the sense of Husserl's phenomenology. Nevertheless, whoever understands *Being and Time* in this fashion must be shocked when Heidegger, in this work, quotes Count York's statement to the effect that, with regard to the inner historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of self-consciousness, a systematization which is separated from historiography (*Historie*) is simply inadequate (SZ 401f.). If, however, the meaning of the Being of Dasein lies in its factual ek-sistence, which properly speaking is historicity, then for such a Dasein no purely unhistorical possibilities can be in actual fact essential. The universality of formal-indicative concepts is only a certain sort of 'universality', which always aims toward its fulfillment in that which at any given time is historical. For this reason, Heidegger had already proposed the destruction of a systematization in *Being and Time*. For the same reason, Heidegger later attached the analyses of *Being and Time* to that region

of history where they belong. Thus, it is shown by the lecture 'What is philosophy?' for instance, how that moodedness which as a rule (and thus in a certain universality) determines man is capable of being grasped only with the perspective of a basic mood (*Grundstimmung*), which at each given time is characteristic for an epoch.

The meaning of the Being of Dasein, as grasped through the existential analysis, can just as little be made into an 'idea', as the meaning of Being can be determined on the basis of a statically thought idea. The universal, binding character of Heidegger's thought does not come about through the contemplation of something which is always, ideally present, but rather, because it 'stands out' toward a destining which at any given time makes our historical abiding possible. The identity of this abiding, which achieves only a certain 'universality', is derived from the event of appropriation. The enduring of the destiny, however, is only then binding, and not simply arbitrary, when it thinks from what has been into the future. This thought moves within the circle of historical understanding, and for this reason must seek, in a never-ending motion, to get behind those presuppositions which it has always already made for itself. It 'grounds' itself by moving back and forth in this circle. Of course, it must allow the ultimate 'ground' upon which it rests to be historically handed over to it, as something which is not simply at its disposal. It can never (as in Hegel) supersede this immediacy in an all-grounding dialectic. The final paradox of this thought's circular but never ultimately terminated movement lies in this, that the emergence of the historicity of thought itself happens historically.

Since Heidegger moves within the circle of historical understanding, he must make the initial presupposition of this understanding, i.e., language, a theme for reflection. And thus, it is not an uncritical aspect of thought which manifests itself in his 'etymologizing', but rather a critical aspect: the attempt to put into language those very presuppositions which thought makes when it speaks. Hamann, in his metacritique, once objected against Kant, that the highest and final purification or critique of reason, namely the purification of language, could never be achieved. According to Hamann, language is the organon and criterion of reason: and yet language is historical. However, since Heidegger pays particular attention to the incorporation of thought into historical language, one may also characterize his thought as 'metacritical', at least insofar as it can be measured against critical theory at all.

Of course, one does not recognize the metacritical character of Heidegger's thought in its necessity if one simply keeps staring at his often noted etymologies, or dismisses Heidegger's thinking as 'mere' poetry. It is even possible to gain access to Heidegger's methodological procedure through the Western tradition of thought (and not just exclusively from early Greek aphoristic thought). Heidegger attempts a topology,¹⁸ i.e.,

a saying of the place, and thus a thinking of the truth, of Being, where he analyzes such guide words and guiding principles as '*physis*', '*logos*', 'Nothing is without ground', or 'man dwells poetically'. If we call these guide words and guiding principles '*loci*' or '*topoi*', we gain a second meaning for the word 'topology', a meaning which Heidegger himself, however, does not consider. We may thus connect Heidegger's thinking with a tradition which was once of utmost importance. In his attempt to make a science out of philosophy, Aristotle distinguished 'Topics' or 'Dialectics' from 'Apodictics' as the properly rigorous method of philosophy. Even Vico still made mention, though with somewhat different intentions, of the priority which 'Topics' has over 'critical theory', i.e., over the exact methodology of our era. The Christian dogmatists (e.g., Melanchthon) utilized most decisively and for the longest time, the term '*loci*' because they were striving for a systematization while still having to heed the irreducible historicity of faith. Heidegger's latest endeavors of thought, too, form a topology, i.e., they are designations of the place, or sayings of the place of Being's truth, with the help of a selection of loci or a collection of the guiding concepts and principles of Western thought. Modern philosophy, linguistics, and research into the history of concepts all, in their own particular ways, attempt something similar. Furthermore, the methodically developed limitation to only exemplary guide words and guiding concepts is today a necessity. We have only to consider Dilthey's work, which remained fragmentary, to see that the traditional methods of research in the human sciences are no longer adequate for historical reflection.¹⁹

The later Heidegger, of course, rejects any attempt at constructing 'methods' in order then to reflect upon them. He does not even wish explicitly to propose that manner in which the event of appropriation needs thought as the hermeneutical circle itself. Instead, he wishes in his thought to turn more primordially back to and to dwell in the hermeneutical relationship itself, in which the meaning of Being is 'announced' to Dasein, which already has an understanding of Being (SZ 37). We have seen already that even the formal-indicative concepts are not to be thought of as universal forms, through which representational thought gets a grip upon beings, but rather a guidance toward the happening of truth. The guiding words upon which the later Heidegger reflects are to be understood as clues and indications, which are addressed to questioning thought so that it may enter more purely into the event of appropriation. Thus, as a thought which 'explains' it may gather together everything which is into the event of appropriation.

Hanging-together

To determine Being in its meaning as the event of appropriation, to secure beings as beings in the truth of Being, i.e., the event of appropri-

ation, to attain the '*logos*', i.e., the language which is capable of properly responding to the event of appropriation: this is what Heidegger attempts. That destiny, as which Being itself prevails, which is not at our disposal and cannot be conceptually determined, is to be experienced as such. This experiencing should neither be covered over by a dialectic, in the sense of a metalogic (Hegel), nor should this experiencing be altogether avoided, as is the case when thought, confronted with the traditional conceptual forms, yields to the historical representation of the past, thereby failing to do justice to historicity (Dilthey). This experiencing can be authentically endured only if thought goes through metaphysics and overcomes it, both as ontology and logic, from the 'ground' on upwards.

On the basis of its understanding of Being as continuous presence, traditional ontology grasps the Being of beings as a continuously present, ideal something. Heidegger seeks to ground this ontology through the return to a mode of thought which thinks Being's historical abiding from the event of appropriation. In the same way, he seeks to go back through traditional logic (and not merely to bypass it) to a more primordial *logos*. The young Heidegger wrote: 'What is logic? Already here we are faced with a problem, the solution of which is reserved for the future.' Then as thinking became the endurance of a future which was not at one's disposal, Heidegger held that the whole idea of logic was dissolved in the swirl of a more primordial questioning.²⁰ But Heidegger is concerned precisely with giving that thought which springs from the event of appropriation a 'logical' and not simply a rhapsodic form. For this reason he seeks, by means of a reflection upon the fundamental principles of logic, to go back to the ground of traditional logic and thus discover the *logos* of his own thinking. Naturally it goes without saying that through this return to the 'ground' of metaphysics, traditional logic and contemporary logic just as little lose their rights, within their own limits, as do the demonstrations of unchanging essences. The rather uncautious polemic which prevails today between 'hermeneutical' philosophy and logical positivism serves only to obliterate the fact that a fruitful dialogue between those who are attempting to construct a 'hermeneutical' logic (Lipps) and the representatives of logical positivism is more than possible.

True, in his own thinking, Heidegger never made the possible positive meanings of 'idea' or 'logic' thematic, at least in the classical sense of these words. His thinking complies only with the free-floating structure of a whole, the moment we eliminate those one-sided formulations and directions of questioning which grew out of the attempts at a breakthrough and out of those polemical arguments which, to be sure, are occasionally necessary. Thus, one might pose the question, whether or not the experience of a continuously present idea as well as logic, and connected with it the whole of classical metaphysics, are to be considered

a derivative or even degenerate mode of thought, or if they should not rather be considered a mode of thinking that, within certain limits, does in fact do justice to primordial phenomena.

If the answer to this question is to be other than a merely traditional or positivist-pragmatic presupposition, it must be arrived at through a thinking which enters into dialogue with that which metaphysics has left unthought. Only such a debate over Being preserves the possibility of reappropriating that which metaphysics has in fact thought. Heidegger himself does not think that which metaphysics has left unthought exclusively in terms of the event of appropriation, but also attempts, by means of his ontological-historical reflections, to raise anew the question concerning those particular articulations of the meaning of Being which dominated certain phases of metaphysics, even though they were not explicitly thought through in themselves. The understanding of Being as *Idea*, *energeia*, objectivity, will to power, etc., must be thought through on the basis of what was not thought in it, i.e., time as the horizon of the understanding of Being. In this manner, thought, as it has been understood up until now, is to be placed back onto its own ground.

Heidegger, however, does not think that which metaphysics left unthought by placing himself at the 'end' of history and making the law of a self-contained system into the law of history, and thus superseding history (Hegel). Much more, Heidegger's thinking places itself into history in the full knowledge that it itself is finite and historical. The reflection which brings to completion the step backwards into that which has always at any given time been left unthought does not itself arrive at a final end or absolute completion.

Heidegger thinks his single thought, in that he goes back to what metaphysics left unthought, and thus frees himself for a thought yet to come. His thinking is a *way of thinking* and not simply a way which Heidegger brings to completion, but rather a way by means of which metaphysics goes beyond itself. The necessity of Heidegger's thought grows out of the fact that it must bring into language that which thought, up to now, has left unthought. This thought gains its binding character in that it is concerned with the whole of the Western tradition, which determines us all. The dialogue with Heidegger must gain its rigor from this binding character, from the relationship to the Same.

Notes

Translated by Rüdiger H. Grimm in *Philosophy Today* (Celina, Ohio 45822) 19 (Summer, 1975) from 'Sein als Ereignis', *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 13 (1959), omitting the introductory discussion. Reprinted with permission of the author and the editor.

1 SZ refers to the 7th ed. of *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen, 1953) and the corresponding marginal pagination of *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, 1962).

2 See Walter Biemel, 'Husserls Encyclopedia Britannica Artikel und Heideggers Anmerkungen dazu', in *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie*, 12 (Leuven/Utrecht, 1950), pp. 246ff.; see especially p. 274.

3 *ibid.*, p. 279.

4 *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, 4th ed. (Frankfurt, 1955), p. 41; *The Essence of Reasons*, trans. Terrence Malick (Evanston, Ill., 1969), p. 94.

5 *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Mit einem Brief über den 'Humanismus'*, 2nd ed. (Bern, 1954), p. 72; *Letter on Humanism*, trans. Edgar Lohner, *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, vol. 3, ed. William Barret and Henry Aiken (New York, 1962), p. 280.

6 *Zur Seinsfrage* (Frankfurt, 1965); see especially p. 26; *The Question of Being*, trans. William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde (New Haven, 1958), p. 72.

7 See *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Tübingen, 1953), p. 155; *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, 1959), p. 203.

8 Since the 5th edition (1949), *Was ist Metaphysik?* has been prefaced with an introduction bearing this title.

9 *Nietzsche* (Pfullingen, 1961), vol. 2, pp. 27ff.

10 The lecture course given under this equivocal title during the summer semester of 1935 was published in 1953.

11 *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main, 1951), pp. 200ff.; *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington, Ind., 1962), pp. 229ff.

12 See *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen, 1954), p. 25; *Identity and Difference*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York, 1969), p. 36.

13 *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* (Pfullingen, 1954), p. 7; 'The thinker as poet', trans. Albert Hofstadter, in *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York, 1971), p. 4.

14 *Was heisst Denken?* (Tübingen, 1954), p. 42; *What is Called Thinking?*, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York, 1968), p. 103.

15 See SZ, pp. 13ff.; *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, pp. 200ff.; *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, pp. 229ff.

16 *Der Satz vom Grund* (Pfullingen, 1957), p. 188. See also my book, *Der Denkweg Martin Heidegger* (Pfullingen, 1963).

17 *Identität und Differenz*, pp. 51, 71; *Identity and Difference*, pp. 54, 72.

18 *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*, p. 23; 'The thinker as poet', p. 12.

19 See my essay, 'Dichtungstheorie und Toposforschung', *Jahrbuch für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 5 (Cologne, 1960), pp. 89–201.

20 See 'Neuere Forschung über Logik' in *Literarische Rundschau*, vol. 38, ed. J. Sauer (Freiburg, 1912), p. 466. See also *Was ist Metaphysik?*, 7th ed. (Frankfurt am Main, 1955), p. 37; 'What is metaphysics?' trans. R. F. C. Hull and Allan Crick, in *Existence and Being*, ed. Werner Broch (Chicago, 1967), p. 343.

Way and method: hermeneutic phenomenology in thinking the history of being

Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann

To Hans-Georg Gadamer
on his 90th birthday

In his first elaboration of the question of being in terms of fundamental ontology Heidegger characterizes the method of this ontology (in Section 7 of *Being and Time*) as both 'phenomenology' and 'hermeneutic phenomenology'.¹ However, not only do the terms *phenomenology* and *hermeneutics* disappear from *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*² – where he takes the second way, i.e., elaborates the question of being according to the history of being – but there is also no mention of a 'method' that thinking in terms of the history of being might have. And yet, those who pay attention, not only to the external use of such terms, but also to what is most fitting in phenomenological seeing and the self-showing of the *Sache* (*Sichzeigenlassen der Sache*) know that thinking in terms of the history of being is *also* phenomenological through and through – that is, is guided by the self-showing of the *Sache* for thinking.

But the question still remains: why does Heidegger retain the principle of phenomenology while he abandons the terms *phenomenology* and *hermeneutics*? In the 'Dialogue on language'³ he responds to this question: 'This happened, not – as is often thought – in order to deny the importance of phenomenology, but rather to let my own pathway of thinking remain in the realm of the nameless' (GA 12, p. 114). At the end of Heidegger's 'My way into phenomenology' there is a still more articulate confirmation that thinking in terms of the history of being remains bound to what is most fittingly phenomenological:

Phenomenology . . . is the possibility of thinking, at times changing and only thus persisting, to correspond to the claim of what is to be thought. If phenomenology is thus experienced and kept hold of, it

can disappear as title, in favour of the *Sache* of thinking, whose disclosure remains a mystery.⁴

This says everything that is decisive regarding the point that we are making. Elucidations of the preliminary conception of phenomenology in *Being and Time* already conclude with this remark: 'The only way to understand phenomenology is to grasp it as possibility' (GA 2, p. 52). For Heidegger the phenomenological way of dealing with 'things themselves' lies in its *enabling character of possibility*. As possibility, phenomenology is higher than its actuality in any given case, because as possibility phenomenology can always be grasped anew and more originally.

Because phenomenology, as the method of self-showing of the *Sache* of thinking, is essentially at the service of this *Sache*, therefore phenomenology as the possibility of thinking transforms itself *along with the transformation of the Sache which shows itself*. If Husserl sees the *Sache* itself as intentional consciousness and transcendental subjectivity, Heidegger sees the *Sache* in a transformed way, as being what gets disclosed in Dasein's understanding of being. But with this transformation in the *Sache* there is also a transformation in the very meaning of phenomenology: as possibility, now understood in a new way. And when the *Sache* is again transformed within Heidegger's thinking of being – such that being as such is no longer thought within the transcendental-horizonal perspective, but as the unity of the relation of the truth of being to Dasein and of Dasein's essential relation to the truth of being – then this transformation yields a new and transformed understanding of phenomenology. And yet, throughout this manifold transformation, phenomenology *remains thinking's possibility*.

At this point phenomenology is characterized as that possibility which 'corresponds' (*entspricht*) to the 'claim' (*Anspruch*) of what is to be thought. By characterizing phenomenology as that possibility of thinking which makes possible this 'corresponding with the claim of what is to be thought', Heidegger clarifies phenomenology precisely as the enactment of thinking in terms of the history of being. For both of these words, *claim* and *correspondence*, are the root-words by which the unity of the *relation* (*Bezug*) of being to Dasein as well as Dasein's *comporting relationship* (*Verhältnis*) to being is grasped conceptually and in language within thinking in terms of the history of being. The unity of this relation and this comporting relationship is what thinking in terms of the history of being thinks as *the unfolding of being itself* (*Wesung des Seins selbst*), as *Ereignis*. In its way of enactment, thinking which thinks being's root unfolding as *Ereignis* is phenomenology. Thinking being in terms of the history of being thus becomes such a pure enactment of phenomenological self-showing of the *Sache* itself that the title 'phenomenology' can fall away.

As we stressed at the beginning, Heidegger calls phenomenology as the possibility of thinking being: *hermeneutics*. In the afore-mentioned 'Dialogue on language' Heidegger declares emphatically that, in the transformation from the transcendental-horizonal perspective to the perspective of thinking in terms of the history of being, phenomenology retains its basic hermeneutical character. There he speaks of the 'hermeneutical relation' and elucidates it as the bringing of a manifestation *in* the hearing of the message as the unconcealing of the twofold of emergent emergence (*Anwesen und Anwesendes*). This wording of the basic hermeneutical feature of phenomenology in terms of the history of being comes out of that context wherein claim and correspondence belong together, i.e., comes out of *Ereignis*. Thus there is no doubt that, in its enactment, thinking in terms of the history of being is determined phenomenologically and hermeneutically. Our *task*, then, is to work out the hermeneutical-phenomenological structure in the thinking in terms of the history of being.

It is true that, as it understands itself, thinking in terms of the history of being no longer talks about *method*. Instead it replaces methodological considerations with reflections on the *way* or *pathway* of thinking. In thinking in terms of the history of being, the words *way* or *path of thinking* are not used as metaphors. If we recall that *way* or *óðós* is the root-word in the word *method* – a coming together of the Greek words *μετά* and *óðós* – then we are called to understand, in this reflection of 'way', the transformed shape of hermeneutic phenomenology. In thinking in terms of the history of being, the word *way* is the root-word for the 'problem of method' as it fits the thinking of being. But because what is said with the word *way* in the thinking of being cannot be compared with modern thinking on method – either in philosophy or science – and because 'way' here is the direct opposite of 'method' in the modern sense, Heidegger no longer uses the word *method* in his reflections on the way. Rather he employs this term only in the sense of its modern usage. Hence his reflections on the question of the 'way' immediately mark this 'way' off as distinct from the modern understanding of method. Thus the title 'Way and method' indicates the pathway of thinking of being in its difference from the method of modern thinking and representation. With this differentiation the word *way* constitutes the basic hermeneutical-phenomenological feature of thinking in terms of the history of being.

Our task, again, is to work out the hermeneutical-phenomenological structure of thinking in terms of the history of being. But before we can do this, we must bring to mind explicitly how hermeneutic phenomenology functions as the method of dealing with the question of being in terms of fundamental ontology.

1 Hermeneutic phenomenology within fundamental ontology

(a) *The three senses of hermeneutics*

By interpreting the two root-words of Greek thinking that make up the term *phenomenology*, Heidegger defines phenomenology as 'letting what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself' (GA 2, p. 46). Phenomenology is the manner of dealing with, the mode of access to and the manner of determining the theme of fundamental ontology. The theme of fundamental ontology, however, is Dasein in its *Existenz*, i.e., understanding being. In the enactment of its *Existenz* Dasein understands, along with its own being, the manifold being of beings that are not Dasein as well as the meaning of being in general. Understanding being through existing, discloses being as a whole, existentially-horizontally, or transcendently. Therefore the task of phenomenology as a method is step by step to let Dasein – in its *Existenz*, i.e., understanding being – be seen as what shows itself of itself from itself, such that Dasein's understanding of being shows itself as the transcendental-horizonal disclosure of being as a whole.

The *logos* of phenomenology, we are told, has the methodological character of ἐρμηνεύειν (GA 2, p. 50). Phenomenological description in the sense of showing and demonstrating what is to be seen from itself has the 'methodological sense' of interpretation (*Auslegung*). With this characterization of the methodological sense of phenomenology as interpretation or ἐρμηνεύειν, Heidegger distinguishes *his* notion of phenomenology from that of Husserl, who defines phenomenological description as *reflection* – a reflection which takes place in reflective acts as intentional acts of consciousness of a higher level.⁵ Thus interpretation is distinct from reflection.

But this distinguishing characterization is not sufficient, because phenomenological analysis which proceeds reflectively can understand itself as interpretive, too – interpretation of the intentional act of consciousness as the intentional object of the reflective act. The distinction between interpretation and reflection will be adequately made only when interpretation is no longer determined as an intentional act of consciousness, but rather from out of the mode of being of Dasein, i.e., from *Existenz*.

As theoretically explicit enactment, phenomenological interpretation is rooted in the *existential mode of being of interpretation*, as discussed in Section 32 of *Being and Time*. And interpretation understood existentially is essentially the unfolding and laying out of what is projected in advance in a *projecting understanding*. It is because Heidegger considers philosophical questioning itself to be 'a possibility of the being of each existing Dasein' (GA 2, p. 18) that Dasein exists as thrown projection – in the *Existenz*-possibility of a questioning which is phenomenological

and fundamental-ontological (Dasein as thrown into its *Existenz*, i.e., understanding being) – and as interpreting what is thus projected. Section 63 of *Being and Time* characterizes the root character of ontological interpretation as projection and the unfolding of what is projected. The being which, in the pre-phenomenological enactment of *Existenz* according to the *Existenz*-possibilities of being-in-the-world, is implicitly projected as *Existenz* – and as the being of beings other than Dasein – this being is explicitly and thematically projected in the *phenomenological enactment of Existenz* and gets interpreted in terms of its structural content. In this sense the question of being is ‘the radicalizing of an essential tendency of being that belongs to Dasein, i.e., of the pre-ontological understanding of being’ (GA 2, p. 20).

Hermeneutical-phenomenological thinking is not reflection, but rather a *projecting-interpreting understanding*. Because hermeneutic phenomenology as the method of fundamental ontology thematizes Dasein (in terms of its being, i.e., understanding being) by projecting and interpreting, phenomenology is the hermeneutical phenomenology of Dasein. Through ἐρμηνεύειν as a projecting-interpreting seeing of what shows itself of itself, ‘the proper meaning of being and the basic structures of Dasein’s own being are *made manifest* to the understanding of being that belongs to Dasein’ (GA 2, p. 50). Thus Heidegger elucidates interpreting by going back to the Greek sense of the word ἐρμηνεύειν which as interpreting also means proclaiming and making manifest. *Phenomenological interpreting as making manifest* is what Dasein itself accomplishes. In the phenomenology of Dasein and out of an understanding of being which is always already unthematically in enactment in and through the ἐρμηνεύειν which Dasein explicitly enacts, Dasein makes manifest to itself the basic structures of its own being (which are concealed in its unthematic understanding of being), the mode of being of beings other than Dasein, and the meaning of being in general. Dasein’s making manifest to itself takes place as interpreting unfolding of the projecting understanding of being which has been explicitly thematized. Because the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of ἐρμηνεύειν in the sense elucidated, this phenomenology is characterized as *hermeneutics*. This is the first sense of the word *hermeneutics*.

The second sense of hermeneutics follows from the first. In the existential root-structures of Dasein, which simultaneously constitute the understanding as *understanding of being*, the being of beings other than Dasein, the manifold modes of beings, and the manifold of what beings are are all horizontally disclosed. But along with temporalization of the temporality of Dasein, the temporalized horizontal time, i.e., *Temporalität*, is disclosed as the unity of the meaning of being of all beings other than Dasein. By phenomenologically uncovering the root-structures of Dasein and of the meaning of being that is understood by means of these

structures, the horizon of investigation for an ontology of beings other than Dasein opens up. Considering ontologies of beings other than Dasein, hermeneutics of Dasein as understanding being (hermeneutics in the first sense) becomes hermeneutics in the second sense, i.e., in the sense 'that it works out the conditions for the possibility of every ontological investigation' (GA 2, p. 50). It is in view of this task that the words hermeneutics of Dasein appear without quotation marks. But when they appear with quotation marks – 'hermeneutics of Dasein' – this indicates that hermeneutics which serves regional ontology.

The third sense of hermeneutics is also included in the first. The meaning of being as such can be phenomenologically interpreted and laid open only after Dasein is interpreted with regard to its *Existenz*, wherein Dasein implicitly understands the meaning of being. Considering the priority of this task within fundamental ontology, hermeneutics gets its third sense as 'the analytic of the existentiality of *Existenz*' (GA 2, p. 50).

As far as the sequence of steps is concerned, this third sense of hermeneutics is the 'primary' one, because only by taking this step can hermeneutical-phenomenological fundamental ontology come to an answer to the basic question concerning the meaning of being.

(b) *Conditions for the enactment of hermeneutics*

Phenomenological hermeneutics *is* interpretation in a certain sense. However, it is called *hermeneutics* because it is not interpretation in its pre-theoretical mode of being nor the theoretical way of comportment known as interpretation of texts, nor 'the methodology of historical humanistic disciplines' (GA 2, p. 51). This phenomenological hermeneutics interprets Dasein in its being as a projective and interpretive understanding. It is this phenomenology which shows first and foremost that, in its being, Dasein is constituted by projection and interpretation. The phenomenological-hermeneutical insight into the ontological constitution of Dasein also includes an insight into the mode of enactment of any phenomenological interpretation of one's own Dasein, namely that what enables this phenomenology is precisely what it brings forth, i.e., projection and interpretation, as they belong to the ontological constitution of Dasein.

The *mode of being* of the hermeneutic phenomenology of Dasein and its understanding of being is *explicit projection* and *explicit interpretation* of what is projected. There is no interpretation without projection and no projection without interpretation. Thus at the beginning of Section 32 of *Being and Time* we read: 'The projection of understanding carries within itself the possibility of self-unfolding. We shall call the unfolding of understanding: *interpretation*' (GA 2, p. 197). Moreover we read: 'Existentially, interpretation is based in understanding, not the other way

around' (ibid.). Interpretation does not shape the understanding; rather, as appropriation, interpretation emerges from that primary understanding which takes shape in projection. For this reason hermeneutics of Dasein is a projective-interpretive understanding of Dasein and its understanding of being.

However, projection is what it is as projection only in conjunction with the existential mode of being of *thrownness*. Projection can only disclose projectively what it is thrown into. For the hermeneutics of Dasein this means that explicit projection projects Dasein unto its *Existenz*, i.e., understanding being – an *Existenz* given in advance to projection by thrownness, as what is explicitly projectable.

Moreover, co-original with thrownness and projection is *Rede*,⁶ the root unfolding of language. Both of these basic existentials 'are co-originally determined by *Rede*' (GA 2, p. 177). For the hermeneutics of Dasein this means that when thrown projection is explicitly enacted – when Dasein is projected unto its *Existenz*, i.e., understanding being – this projection holds what is projected in an articulated understandability that stems from *Rede*.

If interpretation is existentially based in the projective understanding and if this understanding is what it is in conjunction with thrownness and articulated *Rede*, then the *totality* of explicit projection, thrownness and articulated *Rede* is where the phenomenological interpretation of hermeneutics is based.

Only when we see these subtle interconnections clearly do we grasp the extent to which interpretation is subject to the three conditions of enactment, namely fore-having, fore-sight and fore-grasping. We might say: what is projected in the explicit projection – or: what is projected in the *hermeneutic enactment of the thrown and articulated projection* – is what is primarily understood as *fore-having*. As appropriation of understanding, phenomenological interpretation moves within a being that understands Dasein, which is projected unto its *Existenz*, i.e., understanding being. It is this Dasein that has become fore-having for interpretation. Interpretive disclosing carries out the appropriation of what is primarily understood (thought still in a hidden way) under the guidance of a regard for that unto which what is projected is to be interpreted. This 'regard' which guides interpretation in advance is the *fore-sight*. In accord with its ontological relationship to its fore-having, interpretation already reaches ahead into a graspability which it (interpretation) draws from fore-having and into which it (interpretation) brings what gets interpreted. The third condition of enactment of phenomenological interpretation is *fore-grasping*. Because phenomenological interpretation is based within the totality of thrownness, projection and *Rede*, the conditions for the enactment of this phenomenology are fore-having, fore-

sight and fore-grasping. Thrownness is carried out in fore-having; projection, in fore-sight; and *Rede*, in fore-grasping (cf. *GA* 2, p. 200).

(c) *The circle of hermeneutics*

Fore-having, fore-sight and fore-grasping are the conditions for enacting any interpretation and thus also for enacting the phenomenological interpretation of hermeneutics. All interpretation – including hermeneutic interpretation – moves within this threefold structure. This structure implies that, when something is phenomenologically interpreted by hermeneutics, hermeneutics must have understood this something in advance – in an understanding which takes shape in a primary projection. With fore-having, fore-sight and fore-grasping as conditions for enactment, interpretation dwells in a *fore-understanding* of what interpretation is to interpret and make its own. For this reason no interpretation – and thus also no phenomenological hermeneutic – is ‘a pre-suppositionless grasping of something given in advance’ (ibid.). Interpretation of hermeneutics, too, operates essentially within a fore-understanding which takes shape and unfolds in the *hermeneutic projection* of Dasein, which projects Dasein unto its *Existenz*, i.e., understanding being. In so far as interpretive understanding nourishes itself from the projectible fore-understanding, in a certain sense it moves in a circle, though not an empty one. Rather, this circle deepens and differentiates understanding. This circle of understanding, the *circle of hermeneutics*, ‘is the expression of the existential fore-structure’ (*GA* 2, p. 203).

Because the circle of hermeneutics is the essential structure for interpretive understanding, this understanding requires that we ‘enter’ this circle ‘in the proper way’ (ibid.). Interpretation of hermeneutics must have understood

that its first, constant, and final task is not to let fore-having, fore-sight and fore-grasping be given by flashes of inspiration and popular conceptions, but to solidify the scientific thematic by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves.

(ibid.)

This is a characterization of the enactment of interpretation in view of its basic *phenomenological* feature and its three conditions for enactment. Interpretation must see to it that what is understood in fore-having, fore-sight and fore-grasping is obtained from the things themselves, i.e., from what shows itself by itself. Only when projection projects Dasein in its existing understanding of beings – as Dasein shows itself by and from itself – can the interpretation of what is thus phenomenologically projected be in turn enacted phenomenologically.

As stated already, philosophizing Dasein *makes manifest* to itself the

basic structures of its own being, the mode of being of beings other than Dasein, and the meaning of being as such through ἐρμηνεύειν of the phenomenology of Dasein and out of its non-thematic understanding of being. For the sake of this hermeneutic proclamation (*hermeneutische Kundgabe*) philosophizing Dasein explicitly projects the existing understanding of being, which is otherwise enacted only implicitly. Hence we can call this project the 'hermeneutic project', which belongs essentially to the interpretation of hermeneutics.

2 The basic hermeneutical-phenomenological feature of thinking in terms of the history of being

(a) *The hermeneutic relation*

Heidegger's oft afore-mentioned 'Dialogue on language' is of extraordinary significance for our inquiry, because in that text with a few sharp strokes he marks out *the transformed structure of hermeneutic phenomenology in thinking in terms of the history of being*. In this dialogue we read that 'ἐρμηνεύειν is that revealing which brings tidings because it is capable of hearing for a message' (GA 12, p. 115). A little later we read: 'All of this makes it clear that hermeneutics does not mean just interpretation, but goes even deeper than that and means bringing of a message and tidings' (ibid.). What Heidegger then calls 'hermeneutic relation' is, as relation, the bringing of a message by way of listening to it. Bringing tidings is ἐρμηνεύειν, which takes place in hearing for a message. The message which is passed along to listeners is 'being itself', i.e., 'the emergence of the emergent, the twofold of the two out of their onefold' (GA 12, p. 116). We are told that it is this twofold that lays claim on 'humans in their root unfolding' (ibid.). And the root unfolding of humans consists 'in corresponding to the claim [*Zuspruch*] of the twofold' (ibid.). Humans correspond to this claim by listening to the message of the twofold, by proclaiming the message that they hear, and by bringing tidings of it.

This characterization of the hermeneutic relation articulates thinking in terms of the history of being – a thinking that thinks the relation (*Bezug*) of being to Dasein and the comports relationship (*Verhältnis*) of Dasein to being, thinking this whole relation as *Ereignis*.

But which *experience* of thinking is it that transforms the initial posing of the question of being in terms of fundamental ontology into the approach to this question in terms of the history of being? What is called 'claim' (*Anspruch*) and 'appeal' (*Zuspruch*, *Zusage*) in thinking in terms of the history of being has the same structure of relation as the 'throw of being' (*Wurf des Seins*) in the *Letter on Humanism*.⁷ It is the 'throw of being' that gives rise to the 'thrownness of Dasein'.⁸ Thus it is the

phenomenological experience of the *origin of thrownness in being's throw* ('throwing forth') of the truth of being that opens up the way for thinking the question of being in terms of the history of being.

However, we cannot enter the pathway that works out the question in terms of the history of being without having gone the way of elaborating that question in terms of fundamental ontology. The way-opening experience of existential thrownness as coming from the throw of the truth of being is, finally, the decisive insight into being's root unfolding as *Ereignis*.

In this context there is a key passage from that work of Heidegger's which, by way of a sixfold, conjoined lay-out, opens out the elaboration of the question of being in terms of the history of being, namely *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. This key passage states that:

the thrower of projection experiences itself as thrown, as appropriated by being. The opening which is achieved through projection is an opening only when it occurs as the experience of thrownness and thus as a belonging to being. This is the essential difference *vis-à-vis* all *transcendental* ways of knowing with regard to the conditions of possibility.

(GA 65, p. 239)

One cannot fail to hear here that thrownness of projection is the same as its *being-appropriated* through being for the sake of the root unfolding of the truth of being. *Appropriating* means that humans are determined as 'proper to being' (GA 65, p. 263) in terms of being's relation to them. The thrown projection which occurs in terms of appropriating takes place in such a way that it picks up the 'counter-movement of appropriating' (GA 65, p. 239). But depending on how projection picks up this 'counter-movement', the *free* character of projection comes into play.

Already in *Beiträge* Heidegger sees the relation of appropriating (being-thrown) as *needing* (*Brauchen*) and the projective relationship to the appropriating truth of being as the *belonging* (*Zugehören*) of humans to being's root unfolding: 'In order to unfold, being needs humans. And humans belong to being so that they accomplish their uttermost calling as Da-sein' (GA 65, p. 251). The onefold of appropriative needing and projective belonging makes up the 'innermost occurrence' in *Ereignis*. It is this innermost occurrence, the *unfolding of being as Ereignis*, that Heidegger calls 'the turning in *Ereignis*' (GA 65, p. 407). In one of the most precise formulations Heidegger says: 'The turning unfolds between the call (to the one who belongs) and hearing the call (by the one who is being called). The turning is a re-turning' (ibid.). Thus *Beiträge* thinks the *basic structure of thinking in terms of the history of being*, which

from now on undergirds, guides and governs all of Heidegger's writings, including what is properly called his 'later philosophy'.

When thinking thinks being as such in its unfolding as *Ereignis* and as the returning in *Ereignis*, then this thinking gets accomplished as a listening which hears for the appropriating call of being, i.e., hears for the message, and as a manifesting of what is heard. In hearing-for, thinking receives the truth of being as what throws itself forth. Thinking experiences its *throwness* in this receiving. By bringing tidings of what it receives, thinking comports itself *projectively* towards and preserves the truth of being which throws itself forth (cf. *GA* 12, p. 119). In the language of thinking and in the word of the work of thinking, thinking preserves/shelters being's root unfolding as *Ereignis* and the turning in *Ereignis* – whose root unfolding is thrown forth and projected. In hearing for the call, thinking comports itself phenomenologically-hermeneutically: *phenomenologically*, in so far as thinking lets the self-showing of things themselves or being as such be seen; *hermeneutically*, in so far as in projection thinking brings tidings of the self-showing and, in preserving/sheltering, interprets what throws itself forth and is projected, bringing it into the articulated word of the work of thinking.

The transformation of hermeneutic phenomenology in the thinking in terms of the history of being follows from thinking the root unfolding of being as *Ereignis*. In hearing-for a message, hermeneutic bringing of tidings shows in itself the structure of *Ereignis* as an occurrence. When Heidegger says that humans stand within the twofold through the *hermeneutic relation*, the term *Bezug* (relation) does not mean *Beziehung* (connection). Rather it means *Brauch* (need) in the sense that we discussed above: human being in the root unfolding as *Ek-sistenz* is needed by the truth of being and for this truth, so that humans belong to 'a need which claims them' (*GA* 12, p. 118).

The hermeneutic relation in which humans stand takes place when the appropriating-needing relation to the truth of being and the appropriated relation belonging to the truth of being come together. This becomes clear when Heidegger says that the relation in which humans stand, in accordance with their root unfolding, is called 'hermeneutical, because it brings tidings of that message' (*GA* 12, p. 128). This message 'claims humans in order that they correspond to it' (*ibid.*). In the word *message* we must think solely the truth of being which in its throw to humans discloses them as *Dasein* and throws them into *Dasein*, such that they exist as thrown. Similarly we must think the bringing of tidings by the message solely as claimed, i.e., as a thrown projection which corresponds to the appropriating throw of the truth of being. Correspondence is the mode of enactment of projection. Thus the word *message* is the fundamental word in hermeneutics for the *throw*, i.e., for the 'bringing of the tidings'. This word is also the fundamental word in hermeneutics for the

projection as projected from within the throw of the truth of being. In so far as in their projective thinking humans bring tidings of the message that they have heard, they are 'messengers of the message' (ibid.). Bringing tidings of the message is also 'a course/pathway taken by the message' (ibid., p. 148).

Within the fundamental-ontological perspective, phenomenological hermeneutic is characterized as an ἐρμηνεύειν which, as the explicit, projective interpreting that lets-be-seen-from-itself, makes the fundamental structures of Dasein's ownmost being and the meaning of being as such manifest to the understanding of being that belongs to Dasein. What is disclosed through hermeneutical (philosophical) projection is given in advance (by thrownness) as projectible and interpretable. What is given in advance to this projection is Dasein as it exists implicitly in its understanding of being – Dasein which as such is projected hermeneutically onto its existential structures and onto the meaning of being as such, disclosed existentially and horizonally.

If we now turn to the experience marked by the history of being, according to which Dasein's *thrownness* into the disclosure of being as a whole stems from the *throw* of the disclosure of the truth of being, then what is projectible by hermeneutic projection is no longer solely given in advance in thrownness, but comes from out of the throw of the truth of being. But then ἐρμηνεύειν no longer means *making* manifest, but rather *bringing* tidings of what throws itself forth.

But why did the thrownness which was phenomenologically-hermeneutically laid out in the transcendental-horizonal perspective prove inadequate for the thinking that determines being as such? Because the transcendental-horizonal perspective could not let the *historicality of being itself and its truth* be thought. To be sure, the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time* thinks through the historicality of Dasein, its existing in the possibilities of being-in-the-world, comprehended either as appropriate or inappropriate. But what is left unthought in this ontology is the historicality of the disclosure of being as a whole. And it becomes necessary for Heidegger to think the historicality of being itself when he undergoes the phenomenological experience that *the WAY that beings emerge gets historically transformed*. We can think the mode of emergence of beings as standing reserve (*Bestand*) in the root unfolding of technique only when we phenomenologically-hermeneutically think the historicality of the truth of being as the *historically transformed unfolding of being*. We gain an insight into the historical unfolding of being itself when we experience and think thrownness into the disclosure of being from out of the appropriating throw of being.

(b) *The way of regioning*

Phenomenological-hermeneutic thinking, bringing tidings of the message heard in listening, takes place as a 'way' of thinking. The question now concerns this 'way' as a pathway and how this pathway relates to thinking and to what is to be thought. The elucidation of these questions takes place in a reflection on 'way'.

A decisive reflection on 'way' is found in the series of lectures entitled *Das Wesen der Sprache: The Root Unfolding of Language*⁹ (GA 12, p. 167). The question concerning the root unfolding of language occupies an eminent place in the elaboration of the question of being by thinking in terms of the history of being. In the 'Dialogue on language' we read in this regard: 'Language, accordingly, is the predominating and sustaining element in the relation of human beings to the twofold. It (language) determines the hermeneutic relation' (GA 12, p. 116). We mentioned at the beginning that reflection on the 'way' as a pathway of thinking being differs from method as it is understood in the modern sense. The fact of this differentiation already makes clear that, in dealing with the 'way', we are dealing with the incomparable 'question of method' as it pertains to the thinking of being. Because the word *method* gets its determination in terms of the modern understanding of method, the thinking of being renounces the word *method* when it reflects on 'way'. This is true, even though, when considered in its literal sense, the word *method* means 'along the way' and would be an appropriate word for the kind of going that occurs as thinking of being on a 'way'.¹⁰

How does Heidegger characterize the root unfolding of method in modern science? As a way of knowing, scientific method is not just an 'instrument at the service of science' (GA 12, p. 167). The modern conception of method does not have the character of serving, but of dominating. This character shows itself in the manner in which for its part method 'takes sciences into its service'. The relationship between *subject-matter* and *method* in the sciences indicates a priority of method over subject-matter. The domineering character of the scientific method reflects the domineering position of the subject in the modern sense, which in its representational and domineering relation to beings represents and produces them solely as objects, eventually reducing beings to an orderable standing reserve. Method controls subject-matter, i.e., the beings to be examined scientifically, in such a way that not only does method determine the subject-matter, but also 'places the subject-matter into the method', thus making subject-matter 'subordinate' to method (ibid.). Gathering up, Heidegger characterizes the relationship of method to subject-matter in modern science by saying: 'All power of knowing lies in the method. The subject-matter is taken up and absorbed by the method' (ibid.). The method prescribes *what* is to be considered a valid

object of knowing and *how* this object is to be known. Beings themselves do not provide the pattern for access to them. Rather, method forces beings to show themselves according to method's instructions. This domineering way in which modern method unfolds is an essential way for the modern subject to establish its reign over beings.

Considering how thinking being differs from scientific representation, we might expect to see in the thinking of being a simple reversal of the relationship of method to subject-matter. But this is not the case. Heidegger says: 'Here there is neither a method nor a subject-matter' (ibid.). This is to say that in the thinking of being there is neither a method nor a subject-matter as these terms are posited in scientific representation. That thinking of being has no subject-matter does not mean that this thinking is without a matter for thinking. That thinking of being has no method does not mean that this thinking is without a pathway. It simply means that the relation between matter for thinking and pathway of thinking in the thinking of being is a totally different relationship from that of subject-matter to method in the thinking of the sciences.

Instead of method and subject-matter, thinking of beings thinks 'way' and 'region'. Whereas in characterizing scientific thinking Heidegger puts method ahead of subject-matter, in characterizing the thinking of being he first mentions 'region' and then 'way'. Region is called a region 'because region regions and makes free what is to be thought by thinking' (GA 12, p. 168). As in all basic words from Heidegger's later thinking, the word *Gegend*/region, too, at first seems strange. But as in all basic words from Heidegger's later thinking, the word *Gegend*/region, too, is drawn from letting the matter show itself. When Heidegger says *Gegend gegenet* (region regions), he is reaching back to the Middle High German word *gegenen* – a word which is lost in the modern High German – which means *entgegenkommen* (coming over against) or *begegnen* (meeting). When *Gegend* takes place in the regioning of the region, what is to be thought comes over against thinking; it meets thinking. Regioning of the region frees up for thinking what is to be thought.

But 'regioning of the region' as 'coming over against' shows the same structure as the message that belongs to the *hermeneutic relation*, i.e., from the disclosing of the twofold of emergence and emergent that thinking takes up. The basic disclosing character of the regioning of the region is what Heidegger thinks as freeing or freeing up – from out of concealment into the open of unconcealment.

In the same way 'regioning of the region' shows the same structure as the call (*Zuruf*), appeal (*Zuspruch*) or claim (*Anspruch*). But this is nothing other than the 'throw' of being from which the thrownness of Dasein emerges into the truth of being. In that it regions, region frees up 'what is to be thought by thinking', i.e., the matter to be thought. In a broad and formal sense region and what it always frees up is the

'subject-matter' of thinking. But this subject-matter is not just posited by the 'method' which controls it; rather, it is freed up by a preliminary appeal for thinking as what is to be thought. What is freed up as the matter for thinking is what shows itself by itself; and this self-showing lets thinking hear the call, the message. Because what is to be thought is freed up by the regioning of the region, therefore thinking comports itself to it as the self-showing of the matter itself, as a *phenomenological* thinking.

This way of thinking, which receives what is its to think from the freeing up that occurs in the region, 'dwells in the region by going the ways of the region' (ibid.). To the extent that thinking grasps what is in each case freed up, it *becomes* a way for thinking. The genitive 'ways of the region' is a *genitivus possessivus*. These are ways which belong to the region in as much as this region frees them up. When thinking hears, understands and unfolds what is freed up as what meets thinking, then thinking sets upon a way that gets shown from the region. In the thinking of being, 'the way belongs in the region' (ibid.).

It is important to note this determination of the relationship between way and region, in order to distinguish *this* relationship from the relation of method and subject-matter in modern thinking and representation. Whereas in modern thinking subject-matter belongs to method, in the thinking of being way always belongs to the region. In scientific representation subject-matter submits to the method which controls it. By contrast, in the thinking of being the way is joined to the region, because it is the region which, in its freeing up the being which it must think, lays out the way to be gone. For such a thinking the 'method', now thought as 'way', gets its determination from within the matter to be thought, in so far as this matter opens access to itself in a preliminary way.

What in 1959, in the lecture trilogy *Das Wesen der Sprache*, Heidegger thought in the phrase 'ways of the region' he had first worked out in *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, his second major work, after *Being and Time*. In *Beiträge* he worked out the phenomenological-hermeneutic thinking of *Ereignis* in terms of the history of being. *Beiträge* refers to thinking in terms of the history of being as '*Gedanken-gang*': 'a pathway of thought which runs through and lights up the hitherto concealed realm of being's unfolding and obtains this realm in its ownmost character as *Ereignis*' (GA 65, p. 3). The 'work of thinking' which occurs as thinking in terms of the history of being can and must be 'a *pathway*, with all the ambiguities of that word: a going and at the same time a way – thus a way which goes itself' (GA 65, p. 83). And this way is the way of access to being as *Ereignis*. Of course, being the way it is, this way is freed up by the appropriating throw of the truth of being; and only as 'always freed up in appropriated projection can it be grasped and gone.

For this reason the way of thinking's projection 'does not have the firm contours of a map' (GA 65, p. 86). Instead the land/region *emerges* only *through the way*, granted that this way 'is determined by being itself', i.e., is freed up in the appropriating throw as a projectible and goable way (GA 65, p. 80).

In making this sharp distinction between way and method, Heidegger is not engaging in self-criticism regarding his initial account of the 'phenomenological method'. From the outset Heidegger's understanding of method in the 'letting what shows itself by itself be seen from itself' is contrary to the modern understanding of method. The phenomenological method that is worked out in Section 7 of *Being and Time*, as a method of letting what shows itself be seen from itself, is precisely *not* the same as a method which controls the subject-matter of scientific knowing. Rather it is a method which is joined to the philosophical subject-matter, namely the meaning of being as such and the ontological make-up of Dasein, i.e., understanding being. As far as the phenomenological method of *Being and Time* is concerned, the matter for thinking has the first and last word. As self-showing of the matter itself, phenomenological method is completely and diametrically opposed to the modern understanding of method. The modern understanding of method is as far removed as is possible from the basic phenomenological attitude. This understanding of phenomenological method, which Heidegger also calls the *formal* concept of phenomenology, was instituted by Husserl and summed up in the maxim 'to the things themselves'. Heidegger's thinking from beginning to end lives off this understanding of phenomenology – an understanding which the later Heidegger formulated simply as 'letting the matter show itself'. For this reason the only proper way of access to Heidegger's thinking is the way of *phenomenological* interpretation.

(c) *The turning in Ereignis and the circle of hermeneutics*

As it is outlined for the first time in *Being and Time*, phenomenological hermeneutic includes in essence a fore-understanding, given in fore-having, fore-sight and fore-grasping, and – along with this fore-understanding – the circle-structure of hermeneutics. How do both fore-understanding and the hermeneutic circle-structure fit in the *hermeneutic relation* of thinking in terms of the history of being?

We find instructive responses to these questions again in the 'Dialogue on language'. As Heidegger specifically points out, what is discussed in this dialogue – particularly with regard to the question of language's root unfolding – is significant for *all* the issues of thinking in terms of the history of being. In that dialogue Heidegger characterizes the question concerning the root unfolding of language, as well as the question concerning being as such, as putting a question to (*Anfrage-bei*) and asking after (*Nachfrage-nach*). In the question of being we put a question to

being and ask after being itself, i.e., being's root unfolding. In order to initiate this questioning and inquiry, we must open ourselves to a 'regard' or 'sight' which, as Heidegger emphasizes, is not limited to the questions just touched upon (GA 12, p. 164). That to which we put the question and ask after 'must already have been addressed to us' (ibid.). The structure of having already been addressed by what is to be taken into the question is the structure of the necessary fore-understanding within which every question originates.

This regard which must open up questioning as putting-the-question-to and asking-after, in order to see through its own conditions of enactment – this regard we can call the *hermeneutic regard*. Heidegger formulates this in a general way when he says:

Putting the question to something [*Anfrage*] and asking after something [*Nachfrage*] need here and everywhere first to be addressed by that which touches them in questioning and which they pursue in questioning. The starting point of any question always already dwells within the appeal of that to which the question is put.

(ibid.)

In the realm of thinking in terms of the history of being every question receives its essential and necessary fore-understanding from the appeal or that which first of all enables questioning as such. As a putting the question to something or asking after something, questioning would run into a vacuum, were it not guided in advance by what questioning asks about and searches for (cf. *Being and Time*, Section 2). The question of being as such has its fore-having in the appeal of that to which the question is put and which is asked after. As a questioning, this question looks to this *fore-having*, within a *fore-sight* and a *fore-grasping*. This questioning that always already dwells within the appeal is the structure of the *hermeneutic circle*.

If questioning in the realm of thinking in terms of the history of being is so decisively made possible from out of the appeal, then questioning is not 'the genuine gesture of thinking . . . but rather hearing the appeal of what must come into question' (ibid.). Such an *essential hermeneutic insight* into the basic posture of thinking in terms of the history of being does not abolish questioning as questioning, in favour of a mere listening. This by no means denies the questioning character of thinking in terms of the history of being. It is simply and solely a matter of detecting the condition for initiating and enacting the question. If it turns out that the starting point for the question has the appeal of fore-having as its condition, then *mere questioning* can no longer be the basic posture of thinking, but rather an understanding that hears what is offered for questioning and asked after. Only if thinking above all is an understand-

ing hearing of that which lights up as what is to be thought and questioned – only then can thinking begin its questioning in the right manner (as putting a question to something and asking after it) and enact it step by step. In the enactment of questioning, thinking is primarily an understanding hearing of that which thinking inquires into.

The thinking which thus makes its basic posture transparent to itself is not at all a thinking without questioning, but attempts to gain clarity about that which *makes possible this thinking's ability to question*.

Thinking of being which receives its fore-having for its enactment from a hearing understanding of what is offered to it has the character of a *self-joining*. This thinking does not exercise control *over* the matter that this thinking has to think. Rather, this thinking is joined to the matter for thinking which is thrown toward thinking as something to be thought. The basic *phenomenological* attitude of this thinking speaks from out of that joining, in which the matter to be thought shows itself for this thinking's enactment of questioning. But the basic phenomenological attitude of this thinking is at the same time its basic *hermeneutic* character. Hearing understanding of the appeal of that 'to which all questioning is put by asking after the root unfolding' (ibid.) is the same hearing that we are familiar with in the 'hermeneutic relation' as that hearing of the message which brings tidings of it.

Thinking in terms of the history of being accounts for the essential hermeneutic insight into the hearing understanding of the appeal of that which is put into question when, as is the case in questioning the root unfolding of language, this thinking formulates the following directive for the continuation of its questioning thinking: root unfolding of language: language of root unfolding. The expression which follows the latter colon is the formal indicator of the *fore-understanding* of what is asked after. Thus thinking in terms of the history of being is also held within that peculiar movement which *Being and Time* calls the *circle of understanding*.

There is an instructive passage in *Beiträge zur Philosophie* in which – as is to be expected from everything that we have said so far – the *circle of hermeneutics is transformed and re-rooted into the 'turning in Ereignis'*. This passage reads:

The innermost occurrence in *Ereignis* and its widest reach lies in the turning. The turning that unfolds in *Ereignis* is the hidden ground for all other turnings and circles – each one subordinated, unclear in its origin, remaining unquestioned, and wanting to be taken as the 'very last' turn or circle. (Cf. the turn in the contexture of the guiding question and the circle of understanding.)

As presented earlier, *the turning in Ereignis* is the appropriating relation of being to Dasein and the appropriated-projecting belonging of Dasein to the unfolding of the truth of being. The appropriating relation, or as Heidegger puts it in *Beiträge*, 'being's breakthrough [*Anfall*] as appropriating the *Da*' (ibid.) is that appeal which has always to be heard and understood before thinking can put a question to being or ask after it. Questioning as putting-a-question-to and as asking-after gets enacted according to the hearing understanding of the appeal as a thinking projection. Only what is projected in the hermeneutic project out of hearing the appeal can be interpreted in the narrower sense as a thrown-projection. The *circle of understanding* is rooted in the turning which unfolds in *Ereignis* as the counter-movement of the appropriating-throw and appropriated-projection.

Thinking in terms of the history of being which thinks the root unfolding of being (being as such) as *Ereignis* and as the turning in *Ereignis* – and which is understood in its character of enactment as appropriated from out of *Ereignis* – is a phenomenological and then a hermeneutic thinking. Not only does phenomenological hermeneutic or hermeneutic phenomenology think the root unfolding of being as *Ereignis*, but it also has its enabling ground in *Ereignis* and in the turning that belongs to *Ereignis*.

The interpretive glimpse into the basic phenomenological-hermeneutic feature of thinking in terms of the history of being leads to this insight: in its manifold ways Heidegger's thinking can be appropriately and adequately interpreted only if each stage of interpretation heeds the *basic hermeneutic-phenomenological* character of this thinking. We owe hermeneutic phenomenology as *phenomenology* to Edmund Husserl's original establishment of this basic philosophical posture. Only one who has thoroughly mastered Husserl's phenomenology in the sense of its actual maxim 'to the things themselves' and who has worked through this phenomenology by enacting it – only such a one is called upon and capable of entering into a philosophical dialogue with Heidegger's thinking, as caretaker of this phenomenological-hermeneutic thinking and of the two ways of elaborating the question of being.

Notes

1 *Sein und Zeit, Gesamtausgabe (GA)* 2.

2 *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, GA 65.

3 'Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache', in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, GA 12, pp. 79ff.

4 Martin Heidegger, 'Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie', in *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), p. 90.

5 Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. II, Part 1, Husserliana Bd. XIX/1, ed. U. Panzer (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), para. 3.

6 Given the central role that *Rede* has in Section 34 of *Sein und Zeit*, this word moves deeper than any meaning or connotation it has in its ordinary usage. For reasons as to why in Heidegger's German *Rede* cannot be taken simply at face value and identified with 'discourse', 'speech' or 'talk' see F.-W. von Herrmann, *Subjekt und Dasein* (1985), p. 103.

7 Martin Heidegger, *Brief über den Humanismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1981), p. 18.

8 *ibid.*, p. 33.

9 'Das Wesen der Sprache', in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, GA 12, pp. 147ff.

10 For a discussion of the difference between *way* and *method* see also Martin Heidegger, 'Der Fehl heiliger Namen', in *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*, GA 13, pp. 231ff.

Looking metaphysics in the face

Jean Greisch

So sind wir zum letzten Mal in all diesen umwegigen Versuchen einer Kennzeichnung der Metaphysik gescheitert. Haben wir dabei nichts gewonnen? Nein und ja. Gewonnen haben wir nicht eine Definition oder dergleichen. Gewonnen haben wir wohl eine wichtige und vielleicht wesentliche Einsicht in das Eigentümliche der Metaphysik: dass wir selbst ihr gegenüber ausweichen, uns von ihr selbst fortschleichen und uns auf Umwege begeben; dass aber keine Wahl bleibt, als uns selbst aufzumachen und der *Metaphysik ins Gesicht zu sehen*, um sie nicht wieder aus den Augen zu verlieren.¹

My title was suggested by the poster of a congress on 'Heidegger and metaphysics' carrying a sketch by Paul Klee of a human face whose principal feature was an enormous eye. The phrase 'looking metaphysics in the face' is not my own invention but comes from Heidegger himself, who uses it several times with marked emphasis in the introduction to *The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics*, a course given at Freiburg during the Winter semester 1929–30. It occurs in the text I have chosen as epigraph:

So for the last time in all these circuitous efforts at a characterization of metaphysics we have failed. Have we gained nothing in the process? No and yes. We have not gained a definition or anything of that sort. But we have gained an important and perhaps fundamental insight into what is proper to metaphysics: that we ourselves edge away from it, side-step it and embark on detours; but that no choice remains except for us to set forth anew and to *look metaphysics in the face*, never to lose sight of it again.

Metaphysics, if we take these statements seriously, would then be essen-

tially a matter of looking, a particular optical system. This was indeed the sense in which Heidegger envisaged it from the time of his Habilitation thesis, at the end of which we find the following statement: 'Philosophy cannot in the long run do without its proper optics, which is metaphysics.'²

1 An exposed reading of Heidegger

Later we will examine the context of our epigraph, clarifying in particular the reference to certain 'detours'. For the moment let us focus on a twofold question: What does it mean – for Heidegger and for us – to 'look metaphysics in the face'? Was Heidegger himself able to fulfil the aspiration expressed in that formula, or did he himself not progressively and increasingly lose sight of metaphysics? These are not random questions; they emerge from a concrete hermeneutical site, a precise moment in the history of the reception of Heidegger's problematic. Otherwise it would be arbitrary to single out from the vast stretch of thinking covered in the 1929–30 course a brief formula which might after all be no more than professorial rhetoric. What defines the site for the reading I present here is an *exposure* – in every sense of the word – to the powerful initiative of Emmanuel Lévinas in developing the theme of the face of the other, a theme which is both phenomenological and metaphysical. Read in this light, Heidegger's apparently harmless reference to 'the face' claims our attention as something that deserves to be thought about, and that should not be allowed to slip by unquestioned. It may be that a rigorous confrontation between the thought of Lévinas and that of Heidegger – doubtless the two most empathic thinkers of our time – is the royal road to grasping in terms accessible to contemporary thought the invitation which Heidegger at a given epoch in his thinking addressed to his hearers and his future readers: 'look metaphysics in the face'.

To make progress in this line of questioning, it is essential to respect on both sides the singularly complex *données* of the problematic, instead of confining ourselves to convenient clichés. In dealing with Heidegger there is a temptation to fall into the cliché that has been canonized during a whole phase in the reception of his thought, namely the hasty reduction of the relation between 'Heidegger and metaphysics' to a clear-cut and massive opposition – 'Heidegger *against* metaphysics'. Of course it cannot be denied that the latter slogan has a certain legitimacy; it is warranted by too many texts of his to allow it to be ignored. It is true that from a certain period – roughly from about 1936, the time of the famous turn (*Kehre*) in his thinking – Heidegger, after long study of Nietzsche, makes much of the exhaustion (*Verendung*) of metaphysics and postulates the necessity of another beginning for thought

(*andersanfängliches Denken*). However, the complexity of the terminology he chooses (*Verwindung-Überwindung*, relinquishment-overcoming) shows that 'to lose sight of metaphysics' is not a simple business. The process of overcoming is regularly described as nothing less than a conversion to another way of looking, or as exposure to the gaze of the *Ereignis* (appropriation), of which we had been hitherto unaware. This theme of the new way of looking is richly orchestrated in a major text, surely destined to play a decisive role in the future interpretation of the genesis of Heidegger's thought: the *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (*Contributions to Philosophy*) recently published in the *Gesamtausgabe* on the occasion of the centenary of the philosopher's birth.

The central theme of this new post-*Kehre* way of looking is expressed at the conclusion of the essay '*Überwindung der Metaphysik*', which is devoted to the problematic of the *Verwindung* of thought's previous way of looking:³ that which we must look in the face is the *Ereignis* which itself is looking at us.⁴ Precisely because we know that Heidegger thus turned his gaze in another direction than that of metaphysics, it is of great importance to us to be clear on what looking metaphysics in the face meant to him at an earlier phase of his itinerary. The concrete hermeneutical site of my inquiry is further defined by this conviction: that what is most needed for a lucid grasp of Heidegger's achievement today is not so much to reflect more deeply on the nature and difficulties of the Heideggerian *exit* from metaphysics as to grasp correctly the conditions of his *entrance* into metaphysics. Instead of confining ourselves exclusively to the question: how did Heidegger (or did he) succeed in *leaving* metaphysics, we should take up the more opportune and promising query: how, for what reasons, did Heidegger (or did he) succeed in *entering* into metaphysics? Or to put it more dramatically: it is by the gate of life rather than by the gate of death that we can best enter into the issue of Heidegger's relation to metaphysics.

2 From Husserl's eyes to the gaze of the *Ereignis*

The question thus formulated may occasion some surprise. For is it not obvious that in the first period of his thought Heidegger was a metaphysician? But just this is what is open to question, not only for the interpreters of Heidegger, but, in my opinion, first of all for Heidegger himself! Instead of immediately imputing to him a metaphysics, we must recognize the fact that at the beginning of his philosophical itinerary nothing was less evident for him than that he could install himself in metaphysics! The motives that prevented him from declaring himself a metaphysician are quite complex. The most obvious ones are of a polemical order, and they surface throughout the lecture courses of the period

preparatory to *Being and Time*. The term 'metaphysics' had become too inflated at that time not to inspire mistrust in one who was struggling for an intransigent intellectual probity. It is not surprising that Heidegger does not adopt the analyses of Peter Wüst who was noisily announcing the 'resurrection of metaphysics'. But this polemical antipathy cannot be separated from a more positive and for that reason more decisive philosophical motive. Since we have placed our reflections under the sign of the metaphor of looking, we cannot omit mention of the remarkable avowal of Heidegger in his 1923 course *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity*: 'My travelling companion in research was the young Luther and my model Aristotle, whom Luther detested. Kierkegaard gave me impulsions, and as for the eyes, it is Husserl who put them in my head.'⁵ If it is Husserl and he alone who gave Heidegger his eyes, it follows that it is with Husserl's eyes, in other words those of phenomenology, that one is supposed to look metaphysics in the face. Now for someone like Heidegger who estimates – sincerely, not hypocritically – that it is Husserlian phenomenology and it alone that furnishes the basis for a radical rehandling of the question of being, to define a metaphysical position could not be a matter of course. For a phenomenological ontology, metaphysics as an academic tradition has ceased to exist. Nor is it at all obvious that it can recover an existence outside academic tradition. Such a recovery demands that one reinvent the phenomenological signification of the term 'metaphysics'. (And here we come on the first basic reason necessitating a confrontation of the positions of Heidegger and Lévinas: both of them, though for dissimilar motives, tackle the same task of giving a phenomenological signification to the term 'metaphysics'.)

My reflections thus far imply a particular reading of the itinerary of Heidegger. I would propose the following perhaps over-schematic periodization:

(1) In a first period, corresponding to the phase of the elaboration of *Being and Time*, the question of metaphysics is posed for Heidegger only in a lateral way, that is, as a question whose primordial importance is sensed and which for that very reason has to be deferred. Other tasks take priority: that of developing a hermeneutics of facticity which would realize all that the philosophers of life had unsuccessfully promised to accomplish; that of an existential analytic permitting the constitution of a fundamental ontology. This first period may be seen as ending in 1927 with the course *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* which is of capital importance for the explication of the ontological programme sketched in *Being and Time*, especially for the interpretation of the problematic of the ontological difference.

Nothing better indicates the problematic status of metaphysics in this

period than the ambiguity attaching to the status of the existential analytic. Should it be seen as a 'metaphysics of Dasein'? That is what is suggested by several expressions in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, where we read, for example, that 'Fundamental Ontology is the metaphysics of human Dasein which is required for metaphysics to be made possible'.⁶ Heidegger is indebted to Kant for the realization that before being a theoretic discipline metaphysics 'belongs to human nature', hence the task of clarifying in what exactly this natural disposition consists. This is the specific task of the existential analytic, which thus indeed is pursuing a 'metaphysical' goal. But nothing guarantees that it has already attained this goal. The problematic title, 'metaphysics of Dasein', indicates a task rather than the solution of a problem, and the perception of that task is inseparable from the admission that 'metaphysics is the title of a fundamental philosophical difficulty'.⁷ As we shall see, this dilemma or aporia is connected with the fact that behind the title 'metaphysics' is concealed a more fundamental and decisive problem, that of the status of *first philosophy* (*protê philosophia*).

We are thus obliged at least to put to ourselves the following question: does the existential analytic exhaust the totality of metaphysics or does it represent only a partial aspect, the prolegomena, of a much larger task? But we could go on to ask whether the very nature of the existential analytic does not forbid us to confuse it with metaphysics properly speaking. Warnings against this confusion permeate the reinterpretation of *Being and Time* which Heidegger proposed in 1928 in the course *The Metaphysical First Principles of Logic beginning from Leibniz*. The dominant theme of the twelve leading theses of which this self-interpretation is composed is the neutrality which characterizes the existential analytic and the fundamental ontology associated with it. As a mere *analytic*, Heidegger reminds us, the existential analytic necessarily involves a 'metaphysical neutrality' because in it 'the metaphysics of Dasein is not yet central'.⁸ In other words: let us not seek in *Being and Time* a *metaphysical* position of any kind, because so far there is no question of anything but a mere *analytic*, neutral in respect to every metaphysical engagement and demanding that all questioning of an ethical kind be left aside.⁹ One could also show – and it would not be irrelevant to the confrontation for which I am here preparing the ground – that in the same self-interpretation metaphysical neutrality and ethical neutrality (not to be confused with indifference!) support one another.¹⁰

One could seek a genetic explanation for this alternation between two viewpoints – the description of the analytic in terms of a 'metaphysics of Dasein' and the prohibition, in almost contemporary texts, against identifying the analytic with metaphysics. But this would, I feel, be a futile enterprise. The ambivalence of Heidegger's language must be taken

for what it is: the expression of an aporia which attests to the problematic status of metaphysics and the difficulty of 'looking it in the face'.

(2) The second period, opening at the end of the twenties and the beginning of the thirties, can be said without exaggeration to be devoted to really looking metaphysics in the face. To look metaphysics in the face now means first of all to undertake an enormous labour of reappropriation of the founding texts of the Western metaphysical tradition: Aristotle, Kant, Leibniz, Hegel and Schelling. A passage from the *Beiträge* indicates that this work of reappropriation did not proceed haphazardly but was directed by a systematic intention:

To make visible the unfathomable pluriformity of Leibniz's way of questioning, yet to think Da-sein instead of the monad.

To repeat the principal steps of Kant, yet to overcome the 'transcendental' approach through Da-sein.

To question through Schelling's question of freedom, yet to set the question of the 'modalities' on another foundation.

To bring Hegel's systematic under a gaze that masters it, yet to think in a quite contrary manner.

To risk the confrontation with Nietzsche as the one who is nearest, yet to recognize that he is the one who is farthest from the question of Being.¹¹

Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Nietzsche: it can easily be seen that this series in fact corresponds to the major courses of this second period. In 1936, at the moment of the emergence of another new way of looking, in the most decisive change of all, Heidegger no doubt judged it necessary to reaffirm one last time the systematic purpose that animated the work he had done until then. 'To look metaphysics in the face' all through this period meant chiefly to ask himself about the *possibility* of a metaphysics! That meant to re-enact, in all its strangeness and outside the reassuring limits of an academic discipline, what one may call the '*meta*' function. An external, but revelatory, symptom shows the change of climate from the first period: in the course of this second period the term 'phenomenology' disappears from the titles of the courses – which of course does not mean that the cause of phenomenology is abandoned! – to be replaced by the term 'metaphysics'. After *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* Heidegger first interests himself in the logic of Leibniz, but choosing to read it as the proposal of a metaphysics, as the title of the course shows: *The Metaphysical First Principles of Logic beginning from Leibniz*. Then comes *The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics*, 1929–30, which provided our basic formula. All these changes of title conceal deeper changes in the way of approaching the issues, changes sufficiently

important to be announced in the language of the turn, *die Kehre*, a term which now makes its appearance in the Heideggerian vocabulary. It is important not to confuse this with the famous turn in the question of being evoked in the *Letter on Humanism*, a turn situated around 1936 as the marginal notes of that text make clear.

(3) The interpreter who accepts the validity of this Heideggerian self-interpretation must thus deal with two turns: the 'metaphysical' turn of 1928–30 and a later turn which coincides with the discovery of the *Ereignis* and the exit from metaphysics. This second turn brings with it a mutation in the way of looking. One recalls the well-known passages from *Identity and Difference* which show – not only as an etymological exercise – that the *Ereignis* is an affair of looking,¹² because it is it which has always been looking at us.¹³ On their own such passages might seem too allusive to be exploited, but a careful reading of *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, now the principal document of the new turn, shows the degree to which throughout the discussion of the *Ereignis* the issue is one of discovering 'another way of looking'.

To learn this unprecedented way of looking is the task which from now on prevails more and more exclusively in Heidegger's thinking to the end. In the absence of a detailed analysis of this transformation of the way of looking, I shall content myself with a few summary notations, important for my thesis. I note first a negative declaration bearing on his relationship to metaphysics: 'In the domain of the other beginning there is neither "ontology" nor "metaphysics".'¹⁴ These lofty titles, each of which in its own way resumes the destiny of Western thought, are now no more than 'transitory names'. Moreover, since ontology has always been closely associated with logic, the other beginning signifies the rupture of that alliance almost as old as thought itself. But how is one to replace logic, especially the most accomplished logic produced by the history of philosophy, that of Hegel's *Science of Logic*? To this question Heidegger's response is curious, not to say paradoxical: the essence of logic consists in a *sigetics*.¹⁵ In thesis form: the logic of the *Ereignis* is a *sigetics*. I attempted to trace the contours of this paradoxical logic in my work *La parole heureuse*. My guiding hypothesis in that analysis was that the 'philosophy of language' of Heidegger's last phase should in reality be understood as an attempt to define the 'logic' of the other beginning of thinking. What was a mere working hypothesis in that work now finds explicit confirmation in Heidegger's statements in the *Beiträge*, for instance in paragraph 89, 'The transition to the other beginning': '“Logic” as a doctrine of correct thinking transforms itself into meditation on the essence of *language* as inaugural naming of the truth of being.'¹⁶ Numerous statements in the same work confirm, if that is still necessary, that the key figure in this transformation is Hölderlin

and that this poet occupies a unique place in the history of being grasped in the light of the *Ereignis*, so that 'the historical determination of philosophy culminates in knowing the necessity of creating a hearing for Hölderlin's word'.¹⁷

3 Beyond the science/*Weltanschauung* alternative

After this summary account of the genetic hypothesis which underlies the following reflections, I would like now to attempt a kind of reading backwards, through defining in a more precise way the state of the problem in the intermediary period which, for reasons which will progressively appear, seems to me the most promising for the confrontation for which I am preparing the ground. To do this I shall recommence from the text about 'looking metaphysics in the face'. The formula occurs in the long preliminary discussion which opens the course of the Winter semester 1929–30, *The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics*. The first chapter of the preliminary discussion is entitled: 'The detours in the direction of the determination of the essence of philosophy (metaphysics) and the unavoidable necessity of looking metaphysics in the face'.¹⁸ This talk of detours makes sense only on the premise that metaphysics is no longer what it was for the venerable tradition prevailing at least since Suarez and until Wolff: a firmly established discipline of philosophy, of which one could undoubtedly question one or other affirmation but of which the existence and the identity were not open to question. The first fundamental prejudice which Heidegger attacks at the opening of his course is just this conviction that metaphysics is an established discipline of philosophy.¹⁹ Contrary to appearances, metaphysics does not exist, it must be invented! This slogan, no doubt a rather cavalier one, sums up the message Heidegger wants to impress on his hearers at the outset. This unprecedented open-endedness of the question of the nature of metaphysics, no longer simply a matter of defining the epistemological status of an already existing discipline, makes it necessary to deal with various 'detours' which suggest themselves as we try to determine the essence of philosophical thinking. These detours take many forms and are of unequal value; but in each case one proceeds by a comparative method, that is, one tries to understand what metaphysics is through a comparison with what it is not. Heidegger insists that the first decision one must make is to refuse to be bound by the conventional alternative: either metaphysics is a science or else it is only a world view (*Weltanschauung*). Metaphysics as the *epistèmè zêtoumenê* (the science which is sought) which Heidegger wants to found can be neither of these. Against the upholders of absolute knowledge and against the neo-Kantians, it must be clearly asserted that philosophy (metaphysics) owes

nothing to science and is not comparable with it. But it must be said equally firmly that this does not condemn philosophy to be only the expression or elaboration of a world view.

This is not the first time that this alternative has occupied Heidegger's attention: the problem of the relationship of philosophy and world view comes up as early as 1919 in a course corresponding to the 'War need semester for war participants' which forms the first part of *GA 56/7* and carries the significant title: *Towards the Determination of Philosophy*.²⁰ Whether because Heidegger was conscious of addressing an audience traumatized by the experience of war or because he wanted to tackle a problem that was in any case a topical issue since Dilthey, this course, the earliest of those which have been preserved, begins with the *Weltanschauung* issue. For a disciple of Dilthey this term was not yet synonymous with ideology, though there is some overlap. The same issue occupies a considerable place in most of the introductions to the later courses up to *The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics*, where it is directly linked with the question of the possibility or impossibility of finding a definition of philosophy. In 1919 it seems to be connected rather with the 'philosophico-political' problem of university reform. Heidegger takes a stand in this debate at the start when he declares:

the much-discussed reform of the university is entirely misled and is a complete misconception of every authentic revolutionizing of the mind, if it now expands itself in proclamations, protest meetings, programmes, leagues and federations: means hostile to mind at the service of ephemeral ends. We today are not ripe for *genuine* reforms in the domain of the university. And becoming ripe for this is the affair of a *whole generation*. Renewal of the university means rebirth of genuine scientific consciousness and ordering of life.²¹

Against the phraseology of a philosophy degraded to 'ideology', it is above all important to recover the originary idea of science. Now this refusal to let himself be harnessed to the cause of an ill-conducted university reform is motivated by the notion that Heidegger has formed of philosophy in the proper sense, of which the primary and fundamental vocation is to realize itself as proto-science, *Urwissenschaft*. In his eyes, science understood in this originary sense is inseparable from a certain form of life. The *Urwissenschaft* is rooted in what he designates as an 'archontic form of life', that of 'the researcher who lives absolutely in the pure contents and origins of his problematic'.²²

Heidegger is aware that this bold position obliges him to match himself against a universal prejudice according to which 'every great philosophy perfects itself in a world view',²³ which proposes to give directions for living. What is the philosophical value of this universal need of a world

view which can be found just as much among the peasants of the Black Forest as among religious believers or factory workers, political militants or even scientists who advocate a 'scientific world view'? Can or should the philosopher recognize himself in this type of need? Two philosophical positions seem to be present here. On the one side, the widespread attitude that entirely ratifies the equation, philosophy = world view. On the other, the more nuanced position of the neo-Kantians, whom their obsession with the epistemological problem kept from making the world view the true immanent task of philosophy, and who saw in that notion rather an exterior limit of philosophy. But for Heidegger both positions are insufficiently radical. Going against all previous philosophy, he advances a still more radical personal thesis: the world view is a phenomenon foreign to philosophy, in other words: philosophy (correctly understood) has strictly nothing to do with a world view (correctly understood).

Hence the importance of clarifying the notion of philosophy 'correctly understood'. As we have seen, it has been designated *Urwissenschaft*, proto-science. This title seems to include a paradoxical demand, implying a vicious circle: how can one found such a science of the 'ultimate principles' which 'are to be grasped only from themselves and in themselves'?²⁴ To begin with, one must become aware that this circle is unavoidable and that the various efforts to bypass it lead to so many impasses. For there is no lack of attempts to locate on another ground this foundation of the science of foundations. The most facile of these has recourse to the genetic approach to the history of philosophy. If this has the merit of recalling that 'philosophy in the course of its history has always stood in a some determinate relation to the idea of science'²⁵ and has given itself the task of matching itself against scientific knowledge, the historical method on its own cannot resolve the specific problem of understanding which decides access to the idea of philosophy as a proto-science. Heidegger registers a first negative finding which contains a problem to be elaborated in later courses:

there does not exist a genuine history of philosophy, unless it be for a historical consciousness that itself lives in genuine philosophy. All history and history of philosophy in a capital sense *constitutes* itself in that life in and for itself which is itself historical – in an absolute sense.²⁶

The comparative approach which works out a typology of attitudes – in the manner of Karl Jaspers – is still more impracticable, since it brings us back directly to the *Weltanschauung* problem, as shown by Simmel's view that 'art is an image of the world, seen through a temperament; philosophy, on the contrary, can be apprehended as a temperament, seen through an image of the world'.²⁷ If then the only business of

philosophy is to create a world view, one has lost sight of the very idea of a proto-science. Heidegger, in these early days, rejects as well the way of 'inductive metaphysics' (Külpe, Messer, Driesch),²⁸ which relies on the particular empirical sciences in order to derive a philosophical idea of science as such. Must we conclude then that the viable interlocutors for the philosopher are the theoreticians of the teleological critical method invented by such major neo-Kantians as Rickert, Windelband and Lotze? It is indeed against these, some of whom were his own teachers, that Heidegger had first to match himself, as we see in his courses at the beginning of the twenties.

Heidegger saw from the start that it was not enough to adopt the opposition established by Rickert between the 'law of nature' as principle of explanation and the norm as principle of judgment which was at the heart of the so-called teleological critical method. Even if this method was a considerable improvement over a purely genetic one, it turned out to be incapable on its own of furnishing a criterion adequate to found philosophically an axiomatics.²⁹ The great neo-Kantian masters did not really succeed in bridging the gulf between empirical fact and universal validity. Or rather, they succeeded in doing so only by adopting a very special formulation of the method, namely the *Wissenschaftslehre* of Fichte for which 'the ought is the foundation of the is' (*Das Sollen ist der Grund des Seins*).³⁰ But as the fate of the Fichtean doctrine itself showed, the price to be paid was a heavy one: 'his teleological method turned about to become a constructive dialectic.'³¹ It is precisely because they could not agree to this option and had discovered 'the internal impossibility of a dialectic-teleological deduction of the system of the necessary forms and operations of reason',³² or in other words the sterility and unproductivity of dialectic, that the neo-Kantian theorists of the teleological critical method found themselves obliged to have recourse to the empirical sciences, psychology or history, in order to find a material 'cellaring'.³³ At least Heidegger owes this much to the great neo-Kantians: they closed off the path of dialectic to him for ever.

Heidegger turns his critical gaze on these experiential data which are necessary presuppositions of the teleological method. Does not the obligatory reference to them destroy the method of founding an axiomatics on the *ought* alone? It is maintained that the ideal norm is itself given independently of the real psychical elements that provide the material 'cellaring', and this trans-experiential *Sollensgegebenheit* would even be the originary objecthood, *Urgegenständlichkeit*?³⁴ But this decisive phenomenon, the very core of the method, remains entirely obscure, and the reference to it also further undermines the pretensions of the method to be a purely theoretical formation. Thus:

When without the least disquiet, because of an absolute blindness to

the world of problems enclosed in the phenomenon of the ought, one applies the ought as a philosophical concept, the result is unscientific chatter, which is not ennobled by the fact that one makes this ought the foundation stone of an entire system.³⁵

Rickert is the chief target of this polemic. Heidegger proceeds to quiz him with a view to clarifying the play of presupposition inherent in the apparently so obvious notion of *Sollenserlebnis* (sense of the ought). What is the relation between the notion of the ought and value? Are they synonymous or does one ground the other? Why insist that only a value can give any ought its basis? 'An ought can also be based on something that is' (*auch ein Sein kann ein Sollen fundieren*).³⁶ Moreover, the phenomenon of realizing that 'something has meaning' has its own originary constitution, not reducible to the ought.³⁷ These criticisms do not amount to a fundamental rejection of the legitimacy of describing knowledge in terms of the ought. Heidegger himself takes over the opposition between a derivative *Für-Wert-Erklären* (designation as value) and the originary phenomenon of *Wertnehmen* (apprehension of value).³⁸ But he presses the question as to whether truth itself can be said to constitute itself as an originary apprehension of value. He rejects the equation of *validity* with *value*, which Rickert wanted to make the point of departure of all philosophy, thus justifying the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason. 'To end the confusion about the problem of validity it is essential to keep the phenomenon of value at a distance',³⁹ though truth may be a value in some wider context. In any case the numerous unjustified presuppositions that have come to light show how premature is the attempt to make first philosophy a philosophy of values. At most the status of the philosophy of values will be a derivative and partial one.

Heidegger agrees with Rickert that the one-sided domination of the theoretical should be overcome. This is not to be achieved by declaring a primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason, but rather by investigating how the proto-science which is sought – thus one might name a future 'metaphysics' – constitutionally needs to have recourse to a pre-theoretical sphere: 'the theoretical itself as such refers back to something pre-theoretical'.⁴⁰ That presupposed material basis of the theoretical is to be sought in the psychical in the widest sense. This prompts immediately another fundamental question: 'what, basically, is the psychical?' This question clearly goes beyond all questions about the epistemological status of empirical psychology; it asks whether there is a way to consider the psychical which would make of it the originary sphere in which the proto-science which is sought could establish itself.⁴¹ But this implies the necessity of dwelling descriptively in this sphere, renouncing theorems and opinions about it, so as to see how the

significations of things are constituted there and according to what mode of givenness.

Recalling the importance of the motif of the *es gibt* (there is, there is given) in the later thought of Heidegger it seems to me altogether remarkable that from the beginning of his teaching the question of the mode of givenness of phenomena is already formulated in terms of *es gibt*. 'Can there really be anything, if there are only things? In that case there are no things at all; there is not even *nothing*, because in a universal dominance of the sphere of things there is not any "there is" either. Is there a "there is"?'⁴² This question which at first sight seems a clumsy professorial play on words in reality marks the threshold which gives access to the identification of phenomenology as the 'theoretical proto-science'. And it is indeed to this first major philosophical decision that the science/*Weltanschauung* alternative brings us, for phenomenology and it alone makes it possible to transcend that opposition. But in Heidegger's eyes that represents a decision which has the allure of a true philosophical conversion, rendered still more solemn by the emphatic declaration:

we find ourselves at a methodical crossroads which decides the life or death of philosophy in general, before an abyss: either into nothingness, that is, the absolute domination of things, or else we manage to leap into *another world*, or more exactly: for the first time into the world as such.⁴³

So *hic Rhodos, hic salta*: every hearer of Heidegger is supposed to grasp that the first decisive choice is that for phenomenology as proto-science against the neo-Kantian philosophy of culture and values.

4 Towards grasping metaphysics without detour

In 1929, in the introduction to the course on *The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics*, the choice just mentioned has long become a reality, so that now the question can be posed as to where this choice allows one to go. It is all the more remarkable that Heidegger still feels the need to present this alternative once again to his hearers. But now the refusal to be bound by the science/*Weltanschauung* alternative has a different meaning: it is directly linked to the question of the possibility of metaphysics. Heidegger here embarks on what could be called, in Schelling's language, a 'tautological' determination of metaphysics, that is, one that tells directly what metaphysics is, one that attempts to grasp 'without detour' that which renders metaphysics incomparable with anything else.

One might well doubt whether this is possible, a doubt scarcely dispelled by the fact that, having set aside the twofold impasse of science

and world view, Heidegger proceeds to embark on yet another detour: the comparison with religion and art. This comparison played a major role in the thinking of some neo-Kantians, especially Rickert. The detour it inaugurates is qualitatively different from the preceding one, for while the passage through science and world view is unfaithful to the distinctive character of metaphysics, 'an unwarranted disparagement of its essence', the comparison with art and religion represents 'a fully warranted and necessary placing of its essence on an equal footing'⁴⁴ with them. It might be said that the first detour is in every case a road that leads nowhere, a *Holzweg*, while the second, though it too is closed off, seems none the less to promise a fruitful encounter. Another detour suggests itself: research into the history of the word 'metaphysics' – 'a remarkable history of a remarkable word'⁴⁵ – and of the discipline it names. This approach also fails to yield experience of the thing itself, for 'philosophy does not allow itself to be apprehended and determined by detours and as something other than itself'.⁴⁶

Rather surprisingly, the discussion now continues as if it devolved on the utterance of a poet, Novalis, to supply the password of a tautegorical interpretation of metaphysics and with it our capacity 'to look metaphysics in the face, never to lose sight of it again!'⁴⁷ 'Novalis says once in a fragment: "Philosophy is essentially homesickness, a drive to be at home everywhere" ' (*Die Philosophie ist eigentlich Heimweh, ein Trieb überall zu Hause zu sein*).⁴⁸ It is this statement which enables Heidegger to characterize the fundamental affect of metaphysics. Philosophy wants to be at home everywhere – which implies that it has no other home than this 'everywhere', in other words that its 'element' is none other than that uncanniness evoked in connection with anxiety in *Being and Time*. Novalis also intimates that something drives philosophical existence and keeps its quest going; it is this drivenness (*Getriebensein*), and not some limitation of its cognitive powers, that is the true mark of its finitude. Finally, the saying of Novalis has value only if assumed in the first person; the adventures it launches are always singular ones. The fragment thus prompts three questions: what is the world? What is finitude? What is singularization, that is, the solitude of *Dasein*? Taken together these three questions define the space within which metaphysical thinking proceeds.

Note that this poetic way of access occasions yet again a comparison between science and philosophy which is unfavourable to the former: while poetry is the 'sister' of philosophy, 'all science in relation to philosophy is perhaps only a handyman'.⁴⁹ Even if one makes allowance for the element of pedagogic exaggeration in the introduction to a course, this distribution of roles poses a riddle: why, on the basis of what criteria, is the poetic word not also a mere detour – at best an 'illustration' – on the way to metaphysics? In virtue of what does it yield

access to metaphysics? One might ask a still more sceptical question: what are the criteria which allow one to say that it is a poet which speaks in the fragment quoted and not a mere philosophical dabbler?

Be that as it may, once the fundamental mood (*Grundstimmung*) of homesickness is introduced, all the elements seem to be in place to characterize not only the major themes of metaphysical thinking but also its style or economy. Of this style Heidegger gives a twofold characterization – in two variations, so to speak, on the semantics of the German term *Begreifen*, to grasp, conceive, comprehend. On the one hand, metaphysical concepts or conceptuality presuppose that one has oneself already been grasped by a fundamental mood (*Ergriffenheit*).⁵⁰ On the other, metaphysical thinking should be conceived as ‘*inbegriffliches Denken* [thinking as total grasp] in this double sense: going to the whole and penetrating one’s existence’.⁵¹ Thus from a double point of view metaphysical thinking eludes the logic of conceptual representation. It plunges into an *Ergriffenheit* of which representation is not capable and, contrary to the habitual notion of it as a conceptuality reduced to abstract generality, it embraces all in itself, including in the first place the existence of the one involved in this activity. This implies that it is a ‘high-risk’ activity to which there inevitably attaches an element of ambiguity. Here Heidegger indulges in a third variation on the semantics of *Begreifen*, passing to the theme of *Angriff*, attack: ‘in philosophizing the Dasein in man directs its attack against man’.⁵² This means at least that the religious associations of *Ergriffenheit* must be left aside. Whatever else about metaphysics, it will never be a ‘beatific vision’, but is rather ‘the combat with the insurmountable ambiguity of all questioning and of all being’,⁵³ which is not of course to be seen as despairing activity, quite the contrary!

By this unconventional approach to his subject, Heidegger creates a problem which occupies him for the rest of the introduction to the course: why must recourse be had to the history of the term ‘metaphysics’ in order to characterize the functioning of the thinking just described? Or again: why not leave the term ‘metaphysics’ to itself? The question is all the more warranted in that the history of the word ‘metaphysics’ teaches us that it is not in fact an *Urwort*, a word of origin, one that ‘has formed itself out of a fundamental and originary human experience as its utterance’.⁵⁴ This is the case for such terms as *physis*, *logos* and *aletheia*, but the complex and eventful history of the term ‘metaphysics’ which Heidegger is intent on tracing has no such originary dimension.

At the end of his reconstruction of this history, Heidegger is faced with the following choice: once one had rejected metaphysics as a philosophical discipline, why still keep that which is most accidental – one is tempted to say most nominal – namely the term ‘metaphysics’? And his response is again quite disorientating: whatever about the history of this

word, it retains after all a link with that which should most deeply interest the thinker, namely the Aristotelian project of a *first philosophy* which is for him not the Aristotelian designation of one philosophical discipline among others but the characterization of philosophy in the proper sense. We could say that *metaphysics* is a name, doubtless misleading, but none the less unavoidable, to signal the fact that in speaking of *first philosophy* it is in reality *fundamental* philosophy – or rather fundamental philosophizing – that one seeks to determine. Such is the true nature of the task Heidegger assigns himself in this matter: instead of letting oneself be led by the traditional signification of the title,

*to first supply its signification to the already existing title starting from an originary understanding of the protê philosophia. In short: we should not interpret the protê philosophia starting from metaphysics but should rather, inversely, justify the expression 'metaphysics' by an originary interpretation of that which is afoot in the protê philosophia of Aristotle.*⁵⁵

In this sense the expression ‘“metaphysics” is the title of a problem’⁵⁶ and nothing else. And the only question one can address to the historical tradition of metaphysics is the question of the reasons for which this problem has never been perceived as a problem so that one has been content with a merely *exteriorizing* treatment, which consisted in making the supra-sensible a being-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*) of a superior order, thus *confusing* continually supra-sensible being and the non-sensible characteristics of beings, and finally installing oneself in a complete *indifference* to the problems.⁵⁷

5 The chiasmus of the gaze

If then our dealings with the notion of metaphysics in reality concern the identity of *first philosophy*, we discover the true reason which makes the confrontation between Heidegger and Lévinas absolutely unavoidable. For the famous question of Lévinas, ‘is ontology fundamental?’,⁵⁸ makes sense only if we understand it as an effort to promote ethics to the rank of a first philosophy and thus place metaphysics above ontology. Implicitly present from the first pages of *Totality and Infinity*, the thesis of the primacy of ethics over ontology is formally enunciated in a version which puts directly in question the Heideggerian conception of the ontological difference: ‘Before the unveiling of being in general as the basis of knowledge in general, there pre-exists the relation with the being that expresses itself; the ethical plane comes before the ontological one.’⁵⁹ My working hypothesis on the capital point of difference between the

two thinkers is then the following: this debate, or *Auseinandersetzung*, between the positions of Lévinas and Heidegger is as necessary and as inevitable at the level of a post-Husserlian philosophy as that between Plato and Aristotle was necessary and inevitable at the dawn of metaphysics.

Let us try to make more precise the meaning of this confrontation and its stakes. As the quotation from Heidegger mentioned above makes clear, it was the jolt of the Aristotelian *einai pollachos legetai* discovered through the work of Franz Brentano thanks to the friendly and paternal complicity of Conrad Gröber which decided the direction of his philosophical itinerary. In Heidegger's self-interpretation the reference to that central motif of Aristotle's ontology plays a capital role, as attested by the 'Dialogue with a Japanese', the 'Le Thor Seminar', and the following passage from the *Zollikon Seminars*:

The impulsion of all my thought goes back to a statement of Aristotle which says that being is enounced in a multiplicity of ways. To tell the truth, that statement was the lightning-flash which triggered the question: what then is the unity of these multiple significations of being, what is the meaning of 'being' as such?⁶⁰

At first sight there is nothing of this sort in Lévinas's intellectual career. However, there is another text in the classical metaphysical tradition which occupies a similar place in his thought to that occupied by Aristotle's phrase in Heidegger's, the place of an epigraph and leitmotif which decides an itinerary. I refer to the famous Platonic motif of *epekeina tês ousias*, beyond being (*Republic* 509B). Already at a very early date, as we see from the first preface to *De l'existence à l'existant*, we find Lévinas invoking this motif to postulate the necessity of an 'exit from being and the categories which describe it'. In his eyes the Platonic formula means

that the movement which brings an existent to the Good is not a transcendence by which the existent raises itself to a superior existence, but an exit from being and the categories which describe it – and *ex-cendence*. But *ex-cendence* and Happiness necessarily stand on a basis of being and that is why it is better to be than not to be.⁶¹

Thus referred to the history of metaphysics the issue controverted between the two thinkers becomes a fundamental question bearing on the very nature of first philosophy: is metaphysics first of all an 'agathology' which places the good above being or is it rather in the first place an effort to elucidate the various senses of the word 'being'? Are these two approaches necessarily hostile to one another and if so for what

reasons? More exactly: what becomes in Heidegger of the motif of *epekeina tês ousias*? Inversely: how does Lévinas on his side interpret the Aristotelian motif of *einai pollachos legetai*?

These are assuredly vast questions. But the play of contrast between the historical epigraphs adopted by the two thinkers throws a decisive light, in my opinion, on the meaning of the choice between 'ontology' and 'metaphysics' as the name of first philosophy. That play is rendered more complex by the fact that in both cases the choice has to meet the requirements of a phenomenological *Ausweisung* (evidencing). There can be no question in the present context of opting definitively. Before resolving the alternative in one direction or the other one must meditate on it as such. Placing myself on the Heideggerian side, I would like to conclude by at least indicating some elements of a reply which are no more than altogether provisional benchmarks in view of a more thorough reflection.

If it is really first philosophy that is responsible for the 'problematic word' (*Problemwort*) 'being' the thinker is obliged to thematize the horizon whence the question of being arises. This is what Heidegger indicates in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, in a series of interrogations which are guided by the metaphor of looking:

How is the question 'What does Being mean?' to find its answer if it remains obscure as to from whence in general we can come to expect this answer? Must we not first ask: From whence in general do we lay hold of the point of view from which to determine Being as such and thus to win a concept of Being from out of which the possibility and the necessity of the essential articulation of Being becomes understandable? Hence the question of 'First Philosophy', namely, 'What is the being as such?' must drive us back beyond the question 'What is Being as such?' to the still more original question: *From whence in general are we to comprehend the like of Being, with the entire wealth of articulations and references which are included in it?*⁶²

What is striking in this cascade of interrogations is its progressive radicalization commanded by the question: 'in which direction should one direct one's gaze?' Once it is articulated, this question must draw the thinker irresistibly to some 'beyond being', giving a certain inevitability to the encounter with the Platonic *epekeina tês ousias* to which Heidegger devotes considerable space in the 1927 course *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* as well as in the Leibniz course of the following year.⁶³

These references are more than a formal nod, as their insistent recurrence shows. There is nothing incidental about their appearance, which occurs in discussions of the key concept of Heidegger's ontology, namely the concept of understanding. To make of ontology the discourse in

which is deployed the *understanding* of being implies the need 'to find a sufficiently original concept of understanding'.⁶⁴ This concept entails the existential structure described as '*to project oneself upon a possibility*'.⁶⁵ And what holds for existential understanding must hold a fortiori for ontological understanding in turn: 'We understand a being only as we project it upon being. In the process, being itself must be understood in a certain way; being must in its turn be projected upon something.'⁶⁶ This understanding of being is inseparable from a fundamental mood which makes itself felt as a pre-understanding to be explicated in what Heidegger still calls a 'scientific ontology'. 'It is in the objectification of being as such that the basic act constitutive of ontology as a science is performed.'⁶⁷ But this constitution of ontology as a science (in a sense that lies beyond the science/world view alternative), in other words as an explication of the ultimate conditions of possibility of the understanding of being, implies the necessity '*of inquiring even beyond being as to that upon which being itself, as being, is projected*'.⁶⁸ It is in the course of this attempt 'to get beyond being to the light from which and in which it itself comes into the brightness of an understanding'⁶⁹ that Heidegger encounters the Platonic formula designating the Good as *epekeina tês ousias*. 'The understanding of being is rooted in the projection of an *epekeina tês ousias*'⁷⁰ he states explicitly. Far from adopting this formula in isolation, he immediately indicates that his interpretation demands a new reading of the entire allegory of the cave:

We, too, with this apparently quite abstract question about the conditions of possibility of the understanding of being, want to do nothing but bring ourselves out of the cave into the light, but in all sobriety and in the complete disenchantment of purely objective inquiry.⁷¹

'What we are in search of is the *epekeina tês ousias*.'⁷² What is the bearing of this search? Does it refer the understanding of being to an ethical transcendence? To the contrary, what is astonishing to the contemporary reader aware of Lévinas's use of the same motif, is that in all these reflections Heidegger scarcely adverts to the fact that the light of understanding comes specifically from the idea of the Good. That theme is touched on only towards the end of the analysis, but is instantly dismissed for a precise reason: the Platonic idea of the Good is itself tributary of an ontology of production (*Herstellung*) which makes of the Good 'the demiourgos, the producer pure and simple'.⁷³ And Heidegger wants to hear nothing about a demiurgic ontology! That is why his own interpretation – that is, his attempt to find a phenomenological signification for the *epekeina tês ousias* – quickly turns its back on the idea of the Good to introduce another motif, of which the least one can say is that it does violence to the Platonic text: it is originary temporality that

becomes for him the true name of the *epekeina tês ousias*. This shift is comprehensible if one recalls that understanding as such is structured temporally and that 'the instant [the *Augenblick*, the twinkling of an eye]⁷⁴ plays a signal role in it.

In the course on Leibniz, the same movement is repeated, though now the leading problem is that of the essence of transcendence. 'Dasein itself is transgression' (*Das Dasein selbst ist der Überschritt*).⁷⁵ Transgression, the act constitutive of Dasein, is not presented as the abolition of a limit – as it would be for Hegel: the transgression of the finite/infinite difference – but is a stepping beyond beings.⁷⁶ In other words, transgression is nothing other than the putting into operation of the ontological difference itself. This new concept of transcendence, which Heidegger opposes to the deficient epistemological and theological concepts of transcendence,⁷⁷ leads inevitably, once again, to a confrontation with the *epekeina tês ousias*. This time the critique of Plato takes a different course: the Platonic formulation of the ideas errs in making intuition – *theorein* – the act in which transcendence is supremely realized. Plato himself, under pressure from the phenomena themselves (!), was obliged to see that true transcendence exceeds the correlation idea/intuition.⁷⁸ A more originary transcendence emerges in the *epekeina tês ousias*. But again Heidegger shrinks from the idea that this more originary transcendence could announce itself through the idea of the Good. This time the reason for his shrinking is clearly indicated: it is the fear of falling back into the rut of a philosophy of values. Thought can make progress in this domain only by untiring phenomenological patience which attends to the mode of donation of the phenomena. From being an idea, the Good must return to being a phenomenon. Then it can manifest its true structure, as *Umwillen* (that in view of which we will). Thus in a *coup de force* Heidegger connects the transcendence of excess that emerges in the idea of the Good to the concept of world.⁷⁹ The idea of the Good then merely confirms the fundamental fact that Dasein is nothing other than the freedom to project a world. So again the way is cleared that leads to originary temporality as ultimate response to the riddle of transcendence. It is not the idea of the Good that allows Dasein to understand itself; on the contrary: 'Dasein as temporality poses to itself the task of understanding itself in its temporalization.'⁸⁰ And it is for this reason alone that one may say – what Kant already wanted to show – that metaphysics is part of human nature as such. Heidegger creates a forceful synthesis of the Aristotelian *hou eneka* (*Umwillen*), the Platonic *epekeina tês ousias* and the *potius quam* (rather than) of the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason⁸¹ to make of the productive transcendental imagination (which is the other name of originary temporality) 'the first instant in which metaphysics tries to liberate itself from

logic⁸² and, we may add, borrowing the terminology of a later course, the instant in which ontology is obliged to change into *ontochrony*.⁸³

But can such an invocation of an originary temporality in favour of which the idea of the Good is eclipsed really be the last word on the riddle of transcendence? Or to put the same question in a more phenomenological way: is this all that can be said about the structure of the *Umwillen*? Is there not also an *Umwillen* which cannot be reduced to the projection of a freedom but which consists precisely in exposing oneself to the other? Such questions bring into view the gap between the Heideggerian and Lévinasian treatments of the Platonic motif. When it is a matter of determining the relations between metaphysics and transcendence,⁸⁴ Lévinas, too, allows himself to be guided by the word of a poet, in this case the voice of Arthur Rimbaud declaring that 'real life is absent'.⁸⁵ This poetic utterance places us at the antipodes to the statement of Novalis quoted above, in so far as it implies a fundamentally different determination of metaphysical desire: 'Metaphysical desire does not long for a return, for it is the desire of a country in which we were not born.'⁸⁶ It is because metaphysical desire is oriented to the absolutely other who is the other person that it becomes necessary to say that 'metaphysics precedes ontology'⁸⁷ and that ontology – including Heideggerian ontology as first philosophy – is suspected of being a philosophy of power and injustice.⁸⁸

It is to Plato's credit that he glimpsed the 'non-nostalgic character of desire and of philosophy',⁸⁹ despite the insufficiency of eros to manifest its true essence. In introducing the idea of the Good separated from the totality of essences, Plato obliged thought to articulate the relation between separation and the absolute. It is in this sense that the motif of *epekeina tês ousias* confronts us with a question which is quite central for any first philosophy worthy of the name: that of the articulation of transcendence and intelligibility. Thus for Lévinas the transcendence which the idea of the Good unveils has the sense of a separation from, a rupture with all forms of participation in a totality. To retrieve this sense we must step back from neo-Platonism to Plato himself:

Plato did not in any way deduce being from the Good: he posits transcendence as surpassing the totality. It is Plato who, alongside needs which are satisfied by filling an emptiness, glimpses as well aspirations which are not preceded by suffering and lack and in which we recognize the pattern of desire, the need of one who lacks nothing, the longing of one who does not fully possess his being, who goes beyond his plenitude, who has the idea of the infinite. The place of the Good lies beyond all essence in the most profound teaching, the definitive teaching – not of theology, but of philosophy.⁹⁰

The task of the phenomenologist as Lévinas conceives it and as he tries to carry it out in the rest of his book is to show in what sense 'the excess measured by desire is face'.⁹¹

'Looks which cross give birth to strange relations' says Paul Valéry in *Tel quel*. Nothing allows us to imagine that in coining this phrase Valéry was thinking of what Lévinas calls 'the oddnesses of the ethical'.⁹² But a little farther on when he is discussing the 'exchange' of looks and notes that it produces 'a transposition, a metathesis, a chiasmus of two "destinies"', we may ask ourselves if this is true only of the looks that we exchange with others. Are we not entitled to transfer the same remark to the look which thought turns on its own history' to read there – perhaps – a destiny. The confrontation of Heidegger and Lévinas seems to me in this sense not only a chiasmus between two 'destinies' but equally one between two possible destinations of thought.

Notes

1 Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe (GA)* 29/30, p. 5.

2 'Die Philosophie kann ihre eigentliche Optik, die Metaphysik, auf die Dauer nicht entbehren', *Frühe Schriften*, GA 1, p. 348.

3 'Es ist das Ereignis, in dem das Sein selbst verwunden wird' (*Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), p. 71): 'It is the ap-propriation in which being itself is relinquished.'

4 'Wie aber naht ein Geleit, wenn nicht das Ereignis sich lichtet, das rufend, brauchend das Menschenwesen er-äugnet, d.h. er-blickt und im Erblicken Sterbliche auf den Weg des denkenden, dichtenden Bauens bringt?' (*Vorträge und Aufsätze*, p. 99): 'And how can a leading instance come near us, unless the *Ereignis* lights up, which calls, uses, eyes the human being, that is, brings the human being into its view and in its gazing conducts the mortal on the way of thinking, poetizing building?'

5 Martin Heidegger, *Ontologie: Hermeneutik der Faktizität*, GA 63, p. 5.

6 Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, tr. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 1; *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 4th edn (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1973), p. 1.

7 *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p. 4; *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, p. 7.

8 Martin Heidegger, *Die metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, GA 26, p. 181.

9 GA 26, p. 171.

10 For this analysis see my forthcoming study, 'Ethique, Métontologie, philosophie première: Quelques considérations hypocritiques'.

11 Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, GA 65, p. 176.

12 See especially *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), pp. 24–5.

13 Compare the formula already cited from 'Überwindung der Metaphysik', in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*.

14 *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, p. 59.

- 15 GA 65, p. 79.
- 16 GA 65, p. 177.
- 17 GA 65, p. 422.
- 18 *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit*, GA 29/30, pp. 1–15.
- 19 GA 29/30, p. 2.
- 20 Martin Heidegger, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie. 1. Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem. 2. Phänomenologie und transzendente Wertphilosophie*, GA 56/7.
- 21 GA 56/7, p. 4.
- 22 GA 56/7, p. 5.
- 23 GA 56/7, p. 8.
- 24 GA 56/7, p. 16.
- 25 GA 56/7, p. 18.
- 26 GA 56/7, p. 21.
- 27 GA 56/7, p. 22.
- 28 GA 56/7, p. 27.
- 29 GA 56/7, p. 36.
- 30 GA 56/7, p. 37.
- 31 GA 56/7, p. 37.
- 32 GA 56/7, p. 40.
- 33 GA 56/7, p. 41.
- 34 GA 56/7, p. 44.
- 35 GA 56/7, p. 45.
- 36 GA 56/7, p. 46.
- 37 GA 56/7, p. 47.
- 38 GA 56/7, p. 48.
- 39 GA 56/7, p. 50.
- 40 GA 56/7, p. 59.
- 41 GA 56/7, p. 60.
- 42 GA 56/7, p. 62.
- 43 GA 56/7, p. 63.
- 44 GA 29/30, p. 4.
- 45 GA 29/30, p. 5.
- 46 GA 29/30, p. 6.
- 47 GA 29/30, p. 5.
- 48 GA 29/30, p. 7.
- 49 GA 29/30, p. 7.
- 50 GA 29/30, p. 10.
- 51 GA 29/30, p. 13.
- 52 GA 29/30, p. 31.
- 53 GA 29/30, p. 31.
- 54 GA 29/30, p. 37.
- 55 GA 29/30, pp. 61–2.
- 56 GA 29/30, p. 85.
- 57 GA 29/30, p. 62.
- 58 See Emmanuel Lévinas, 'L'ontologie est-elle fondamentale', *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* (January 1951), pp. 88–98.
- 59 Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totalité et infini* (Hague: Nijhoff, 1961), p. 175; *Totality and Infinity*, tr. A. Lingis (Hague: Nijhoff, 1969).
- 60 Martin Heidegger, *Zollikoner Seminare* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1987), p. 155.

61 Emmanuel Lévinas, *De l'existence à l'étant*, 2nd edn (Paris: Vrin, 1981), p. 1.

62 *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p. 153; *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, p. 217.

63 See also *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, in *Wegmarken* (GA 9), pp. 160–2; Alain Boutot, *Heidegger et Platon* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987), pp. 154–67. See also: *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (WS 1931–2), GA 34, pp. 95–117.

64 Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, tr. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 275; *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, GA 24, p. 390.

65 *Basic Problems*, p. 277; GA 24, p. 392.

66 *Basic Problems*, p. 280; GA 24, p. 396.

67 *Basic Problems*, p. 281; GA 24, p. 398.

68 *Basic Problems*, p. 282; GA 24, p. 399.

69 *Basic Problems*, p. 282; GA 24, p. 400.

70 *Basic Problems*, p. 284; GA 24, p. 402.

71 *Basic Problems*, p. 285; GA 24, p. 404.

72 *Basic Problems*, p. 285; GA 24, p. 404.

73 *Basic Problems*, p. 286; GA 24, p. 405.

74 *Basic Problems*, p. 287; GA 24, p. 407.

75 GA 26, p. 211.

76 GA 26, p. 212.

77 GA 26, pp. 207–8.

78 GA 26, p. 237.

79 'Das Ganze der im Umwillen liegenden Bindung ist die Welt', GA 26, p. 247; 'The whole of the binding that lies in that whereto one wills is the world'.

80 GA 26, p. 274.

81 'Ratio est in Natura, cur aliquid potius existat quam nihil' (C. J. Gerhardt, *Die philosophische Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, VII, p. 289); 'There is a reason in Nature, why something exists rather than nothing'; see GA 26, pp. 141–4.

82 GA 26, p. 272.

83 See Martin Heidegger, *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*, GA 32, p. 144.

84 Lévinas, *Totalité et infini*, pp. 3–23.

85 *ibid.*, p. 3.

86 *ibid.*, p. 3.

87 *ibid.*, p. 13.

88 *ibid.*, pp. 16–17.

89 *ibid.*, p. 34.

90 *ibid.*, p. 76.

91 *ibid.*, p. 33.

92 'But in truth the apparition in being of those "oddnesses of the ethical" – marks of the humanity of man – is a rupture in being, a rupture carrying a distinct significance, even if being closes over it again' (Lévinas, *Ethique et infini*, pp. 91–2).

The power of revelation of affectivity according to Heidegger

Michel Henry

As with Scheler, so also the thought of Heidegger is characterized, in counter-distinction to classical philosophy, by the importance which it accords to the phenomenon of affectivity ontologically grasped and interpreted as a power of revelation, as well as by the fundamental meaning which Heidegger's thought recognizes in it. This meaning is immediately apparent and shows itself in the fact that affectivity is not merely taken as a power of revelation in the ordinary sense of the word, a power of revealing something, this or that thing, but precisely *the power of revealing to us that which reveals all things, namely, the world itself as such, as identical to Nothingness*. The fact that the fundamental ontological and peculiarly decisive meaning of the power of revelation peculiar to affectivity most often remains unnoticed and does not call it in question merely shows that this power is in principle indifferent to the manner in which thought understands and habitually interprets it, to the manner in which the subject understands himself, the subject who experiences a feeling and then interprets it in order to hide its true meaning and what is in each instance agonizing in this meaning.

Nevertheless, in anxiety this meaning appears: 'Anxiety is the fundamental feeling which places us before Nothingness', thus opening to us the Being of everything which is, for 'the Being of a being is comprehensible . . . only if *Dasein*, by its very nature, maintains itself in Nothingness'. That anxiety places us face to face with Nothingness and thus opens Being itself to us, this is what confers upon it its fundamental and decisive character, and not the intention of arbitrarily making it a privileged tonality among others: 'Anxiety is declared to be the decisive fundamental faculty [736] [*Grundbefindlichkeit*], not in order to proclaim, from the point of view of some *Weltanschauung* or other, a concrete existence-ideal but solely with reference to the problem of Being as such.'¹

The specifically ontological fundamental character of anxiety is nevertheless not peculiar to it; in anxiety, affectivity itself is envisioned together with the power of revelation which in general belongs to it, viz. the power of maintaining itself face to face with Nothingness. For this reason, such a character is found in every affective disposition; regardless of what it is, this disposition opens the world to us in every case, its meaning in all cases is ontological. Fear opens the world to us as that through which the undeniable object whose approach arouses fear comes to us. In the same way, hope projects the space which separates it from that in which it sets itself to hope and wherein first the hoped-for thing shows itself to it. Hope and fear certainly do not discover the world in the same way that anxiety does; they do not hand us over to Nothingness in the same way. The discovery of fear is inauthentic, it takes place according to the mode of *Verfallen*. By this we must understand that fear guards against a being which it fears and not against its origin, namely, against the world as such; in fact, it hides from this, from the origin of all fears behind a being which it attends to. Attention to a being presupposes the discovery of the world and moves about in it. The inauthenticity of fear is a mode of this discovery, a mode of anxiety and its disguise. *The different tonalities are none other than modes according to which in various ways, whether authentic or not, either by making it apparent or by hiding it, the revelation peculiar to affectivity takes place, namely, the discovery of the world as such and its Nothingness.*

Transcendence is what discovers the world in the very act whereby it projects it beyond a being as its horizon. [737] *To the extent that affectivity opens the world to us and places us face to face with Nothingness, its power of revelation resides in transcendence itself and is constituted by it.* The following evidence henceforth presents itself without delay: *The essence of revelation peculiar to affectivity and taking place in it is completely lost to Heidegger, confused by him with the essence of the ontological understanding of Being to which it nevertheless remains heterogeneous both in its structure and in its phenomenality.* Thus stripped of the power of revelation which properly belongs to it and whose essence is in no way recognized, affectivity keeps its ontological meaning, and more specifically, the power of revealing something only insofar as, confused with transcendence, it works after the fashion of transcendence and in the manner of an act taking place in the milieu opened by transcendence, regardless of the mode, whether authentic or inauthentic, according to which such an act takes place: 'One's mood discloses in the manner of turning thither or turning away from one's own *Dasein*.'² Because affectivity, to the extent that it accomplishes the work of revelation, works after the fashion of transcendence, namely, on the foundation in it of the ontological power of the understanding of Being, a given feeling and every possible feeling in general, can be no more than a brute and blind

fact, of itself foreign to the element of phenomenality, a fact only through the mediation of this power and as a mode of understanding. 'Every *Befindlichkeit*', says Heidegger, 'is one in which one understands.'³

To the extent that the power of revelation which is thought of as belonging to the ontological understanding of Being and residing in transcendence, affectivity, in keeping with the *eidos* of this power, necessarily reveals something other than itself and its own essence, something other, namely (1) the world, i.e. the pure milieu of otherness, and (2) a being which [738] manifests itself in this milieu in the form of Being-other and as an object. Nevertheless, this is a far cry from limiting the power of affectivity to the revelation of the world. Each *Befindlichkeit* 'discloses the total Being-in-the-world in all those items which are constitutive for it'.⁴ Disclosing the total Being-in-the-world in all its items, affectivity reveals the world as co-belonging to this total structure and carried along by this structure, but also and in a more essential manner, carried along by Being-in as such, existence itself ontologically interpreted and grasped as constituted by this 'Being-in', by transcendence. Nevertheless, affectivity does not float in thin air, as an abstract power separated from existence and burdened with grasping it; it is the affectivity of existence and belongs to it as its most essential determination. That affectivity reveals the total Being-in-the-world in all its items consequently means that in it, in each of the tonalities in which existence exists and realizes itself, is revealed existence itself, existence as ontologically interpreted and grasped as Being-in and as transcendence. Here the radical meaning of the power of revelation peculiar to affectivity is discovered, viz. that of revealing, not merely a being, not merely the world wherein a being appears, but the very power which discloses the world to us in the projection of Nothingness. With affectivity there comes a sort of possibility which transcendence has, by revealing itself to itself and hence maintaining itself in itself within the structure of this revelation and its unity, of constituting itself as a coherent and concrete essence.

Such a possibility for transcendence, for existence, of revealing itself to itself and hence of constituting itself as a coherent and concrete essence, the possibility for the ontological foundation of every possible manifestation in general of founding itself, is neither theoretical nor abstract; because it defines the essence of existence and its ultimate foundation, this possibility is visible in it as its affectivity [739] and can be recognized in each of the dispositions and tonalities in which existence exists and realizes itself. For example, fear reveals not merely or primarily the object whose menacing approach arouses fear nor the milieu in which this approach takes place and in which the menacing object arises; this object could not be menacing and could not arouse our fear unless existence, rather than simply surpassing itself toward the object as toward an exterior reality which would not really concern it, permits it to turn

back as it were, back to this existence which is handed over to the object at the very interior of the relation which it maintains with the object, unless in fear existence originally reveals itself to itself as handed over to the world and bound to it. This revelation of existence to itself in fear – existence in fear – it is true, hides fear from itself; it hides the anxiety which harks to existence handed over to the world; fear projects this anxiety onto a being to which it attends and which it takes as its origin or cause. The flight of existence toward the object of its fear nevertheless presupposes, as flight from itself, its revelation to itself, the original self-revelation of existence such as takes place in its very affectivity. Nevertheless, it pertains to the original self-revelation of existence in affectivity that, as revelation of the world which is consubstantial and contemporaneous with it, it can take place either in an authentic or in an inauthentic way.

The original self-revelation of existence in affectivity takes place in an authentic way in anxiety. In anxiety, existence ceases to lose itself in the intramundane being about which fear is anxious; rather, this being has moved into the shadows of indifference; the tasks which it calls for and through whose mediation it presents itself to us in a mode of life fallen into daily banality appear deprived of meaning; now there alone appears, as its true Being, the Nothingness of a being, the world as such. Moreover, anxiety, in its encounter with the world and its Nothingness, does not merely reveal the world, it finds itself returned to Being-in-the-world as such, to existence [740] itself as handed over to the world. To the extent that it is handed over to the world, existence is first of all handed over to itself; this is precisely what reveals to it its anxiety; this anxiety brings existence face to face with itself, it reveals it to itself, it reveals to it the fact of its existence and at the same time what it is, i.e. its Being handed over to itself as Being handed over to the world. That the revelation of existence itself, of its Being handed over to itself in order to be handed over to the world, takes place in an inauthentic manner in fear and likewise in the ensemble of affective tonalities of existence, while it takes place in an authentic manner in anxiety, this means that *this revelation is not peculiar to anxiety; like the revelation of the world, the revelation of Being-in-the-world, the revelation of existence to itself is the fact of affectivity as such.* For this reason, such a revelation takes place in each of the affective tonalities of existence, tonalities which precisely represent diverse modes according to which this revelation takes place, viz. *the modes of revelation to itself of existence as originally and essentially constituted by its affectivity.* Each affective disposition, says Heidegger, 'brings Dasein more or less explicitly . . . face to face with the fact that it is'.⁵

The ontological determination of the power of revelation peculiar to affectivity is identical to that of affectivity itself, to the determination of

its nature and the essential structures which constitute and define it. Because in its affectivity, in each of the tonalities in which existence exists and realizes itself, while it reveals the world to which it is related and handed over, existence reveals itself to itself such as it is; feeling, on the foundation in it of this essence which constitutes feeling and determines it, permits itself to be determined as what it is, as a feeling which is never merely or primarily a feeling with regard to the world and to what manifests itself in the world, i.e. a feeling with respect to an object, but also and [741] necessarily, in this revelation of existence to itself which constitutes its affectivity, a way for it to sense itself, to experience itself, a feeling of self. Hence it is that pleasure, for example, 'is not only pleasure in something', or the pleasure of possessing it, 'but also a state of enjoyment – a way in which a man experiences joy, in which he is happy. Thus, in every sensible (in the narrow sense of the term) or non-sensible feeling, the following structure is to be found: feeling is a feeling *for* . . . and as such is also a way of feeling oneself.' And further on: 'Feeling is having feeling for . . . so that the ego which experiences this feeling at the same time feels itself.'⁶

Nevertheless, upon what is the structural determination of feeling as feeling of self founded? What is the essence of existence insofar as it reveals itself to itself in its affective dispositions? *In what does the power of revelation peculiar to these dispositions, the power of revelation of affectivity, consist?* 'In every mood wherein "things are this or that way" with us, our own *Da-sein* is manifest to us. We have, therefore, *an understanding of Being* even though the concept is lacking. This pre-conceptual comprehension of Being, although constant and far-reaching, is usually completely indeterminate.'⁷ The power of revelation of affectivity consists in the ontological understanding of Being. The essence of existence insofar as it reveals itself to itself is transcendence. When, therefore, in anxiety, for example, existence, no longer being able to lose itself in the object of its concern and coming into conflict with the world, finds itself returned to itself, to the *in-der-Welt-sein* as such, then its revelation, the revelation of existence to itself, credited to anxiety, is the fact of transcendence and finds its essence in the structure of the ontological understanding of [742] Being and takes place as a mode of this understanding: 'But when our "*Verstehen*" has come up against the world, *it is brought to in-der-Welt-sein* as such through anxiety.'⁸

Because in anxiety existence finds itself face to face with itself, the in-the-face-of (*Wovor*) of anxiety turns out to be identical to the about-which (*Worum*) existence is anxious, namely, its own existence. Because the revelation of existence to itself takes place in anxiety as a mode of the ontological understanding of Being, the *Worum* of anxiety is not merely identical to its *Wovor* as having the same object; it further finds in it, in the structure of a mode of presentation which it essentially

achieves as a presenting in-the-face-of its own structure. It is in this ontologically radical sense that the *Worum* of anxiety is identical to its *Wovor*, insofar as it itself takes place as a *Wovor*, as a mode of transcendence. To put existence in the presence of itself, to confront it with itself in such a way that this 'bringing-in-the-face-of' does not merely mean 'to reveal' in some undetermined manner, but designates the mode according to which this revelation takes place and also its internal structure as constituted by transcendence, this is the fact of affectivity in general.

Because this bringing of existence into the presence of itself takes place in each instance in affectivity as a mode of transcendence, it is likewise in every instance and necessarily invested with the form of an ecstasy. The ecstatic structure of the relation to self of existence in affectivity is visible in all its tonalities, including those wherein this relation takes place according to the inauthentic mode of 'decadence'. If fear reveals existence to itself and consequently is essentially determined in its very possibility as a fear for self (*Sichfürchten*), it is a 'specific ecstatical unity [743] which makes the *Sichfürchten* existentially possible'.⁹ In the same way hope, to the extent that it is never merely the awaiting of a future good but first concerns, as hope for self, him who hopes, presupposes the ecstatic relation of existence with oneself as the only possible ontological foundation of 'hoping for something for oneself' which really constitutes 'the affective character . . . of hope itself'.¹⁰ If the relation of existence to self, i.e. its revelation to self in affectivity, takes place in every case as a mode of transcendence and for this reason is invested with an ecstatic structure, this is because this revelation is not the fact of affectivity considered as a specific power, distinct from existence and serving as its foundation, but that it rather belongs to existence itself as identical to transcendence. It pertains to transcendence, to existence, upon the foundation in it of its own structure, namely, precisely as existence, as transcendence, to relate itself to itself at the same time that it relates itself to the world. 'It is essential to *Dasein* that along with the disclosedness of its world, *it has been disclosed to itself, so that it always understands itself*'.¹¹ Here we see in its full light the fundamental ambiguity of the Heideggerian *Erschlossenheit*. The revelation of existence to itself is ontologically homogeneous with the revelation of the world; the power of affectivity whether it be understood as the power of revealing existence or of revealing the world is the same, it is the power of transcendence.

The power of the revealing of existence to itself, thought of as the power of affectivity, is not merely ontologically homogeneous with the power of revealing the world; it is not merely a question of the same power either, as if this power could freely 'wheel and deal' either with existence itself or with the [744] world; *it is through one and the same*

act of this unique power that there takes place conjointly and necessarily in affectivity, the revelation of existence and of the world. The unique power whereby there takes place conjointly and necessarily in one and the same act of this power the revelation of existence and of the world is time. Time, in its original temporalization, is the movement whereby existence, projecting the horizon of the future in advance of itself and coming into confrontation with it, turned back by it and brought back to itself, discovers in the unity of this twofold movement, in the ecstasy of the project 'in advance toward' contemporaneous with the ecstasy of the return 'back upon', both the world as finite world and its own existence to which it is handed over. *The power of revelation of affectivity is precisely the power of time.* It is time which, in fear, opens up the horizon wherein the menacing object to come arises; it is time which permits this object to turn back to the menaced existence and in this turning back to it, uncovers existence to itself in the ecstasy of its inauthentic past. It is time which causes the pure horizon of the future to arise in-front-of 'anxious existence' as a finite horizon, as the horizon of its death; it is time which, permitting this existence to turn back to itself starting from this horizon, uncovers existence to itself in the ecstasy of the authentic past as a finite, fallen existence handed over to the world as to its own death. That the revelation of existence to itself, and in parallel fashion the revelation of the world, takes place in affectivity in an authentic or inauthentic fashion, results precisely from the fact that it pertains to temporality to temporalize itself in principle in different ways, whether authentic or not. Nevertheless, temporality is only transcendence itself in the mode of its effective and concrete accomplishment such that its temporalization necessarily occurs in an ecstatic form so that the different ecstasies which constitute it and in which it takes place, constitute diverse modes of realization of transcendence itself. Consequently, that the power of revelation of affectivity is [745] that of time means that the power of revelation of affectivity is the power of transcendence.

When it is understood as the power of transcendence, the power of revelation peculiar to affectivity is lost – together with the very nature of affectivity as constituted by this power. *The existential ontological interpretation of affectivity as temporality brings about the disappearing of what properly constitutes the affective character of what is affective and loses this character in principle; it loses in principle the essence of affectivity as such.* Heidegger had a presentiment of this truly essential lacuna in the philosophy of affectivity as presented in *Sein und Zeit*: 'If we are to interpret *Befindlichkeit* temporally, our aim is not one of deducing *Stimmungen* from temporality and dissolving them into pure phenomena of temporalizing. All we have to do is to demonstrate that except on the basis of temporality, *Stimmungen* are not possible in what they

“signify” in an existentiell way or in how they “signify” it.”¹² However, just what are these *Stimmungen* independently of what they ‘signify in an existentiell way’, independently of their power of revelation understood as the power of transcendence? The thought of Heidegger is characterized, at least this is one of its most remarkable traits, by the deliberate rejection of psychologism considered as one of the modes of thought of consciousness which clings to a being without asking about its Being; it is characterized, as far as feeling is concerned, by the refusal to consider it as a ‘fact’, a ‘psychic fact’, a ‘state of the soul’, a ‘lived state’, all of which are determinations in which the Being of affectivity, the essential and fundamental meanings with which it is invested as an original power of revelation, are lost, whereas feeling itself, fallen to the level of an object, henceforth presents itself as the simple correlate of a thought or an action.

This ‘falling’ of feeling is particularly obvious in [746] the modern world of technology where the will, treating everything in its relation to itself and in this way considering it as the object of its will and its action, renders thought blind to what takes place and encloses the event in its blindness in such a way that nothing, not even suffering, precisely because the latter is itself reduced to the condition of an object on which one can act, is capable of producing any change: ‘Even the immense suffering found all over the world cannot directly inaugurate any change because we experience it merely as suffering, viz. passively, as an object for action and consequently as lodged in the same regions of Being as action: in the region of the willing of the will.’¹³ Furthermore, this is why at this time when metaphysics is ‘breathing its last’, in this world of technology which constitutes the last step of metaphysics and finds in psychologism as it does generally in the extraordinary development ‘of the human sciences’ to which technology gives rise a remarkable illustration among others ‘under the reign of the will’, therefore, ‘it almost seems that the Being of suffering as well as the Being of joy is closed off to man’.¹⁴

However, the surpassing of the metaphysics of the will and the surpassing of the psychologism cannot take place with regard to feeling, this latter cannot be anything more than a state viz. the ontological element of manifestation, and hence, as Heidegger explicitly states, ‘a mode of self-consciousness’, a ‘pure feeling’,¹⁵ unless this ontological element which constitutes the Being of feeling is grasped as being its own, as its own essence. Nevertheless, what element does the philosophy of transcendence possess in order to sketch an ontological interpretation [747] of the Being of feeling, unless it be transcendence itself? *To the extent that he rejects psychologism, Heidegger finds himself forced to found the Being of feeling on the ecstatic relation of Being-in-the-world and to understand it as a determination of this relation.* ‘Freedom’, says

Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, 'means participation in the revealment of what-is-in-totality, freedom has attuned [*abgestimmt*] all behavior to this from the start. But this attunement [*Gestimmtheit*] or mood [*Stimmung*] can never be understood as "experience" and "feeling" because, were it so understood, *it would at once be deprived of its being* [*Wesen*] and would only be interpreted in terms of, say "life" and "soul" – which only *appear* to exist in their own right [*Wesensrecht*] so long as they contain any distortion and misinterpretation of that attunement. A mood of this kind, i.e. the ex-sistent exposition into what-is-in-totality, can only be "experienced" or "felt", as we say, because the "experient" without having any idea of the nature of the mood, is participating in an attunement revelatory of what-is-in-totality.'¹⁶

The reduction of the essence of affectivity to the essence of transcendence takes place in two ways. First of all, affectivity is understood as a determination of transcendence in such a way that transcendence, the ex-sistent exposition into what-is-in-totality, is invariably affected by a tonality, bound to it and always accompanying it, transcendence takes place as an affective attunement. 'All understanding', says Heidegger, 'is accompanied by a state-of-mind.'¹⁷ Or again: '*Dasein* is constituted by *Erschlossenheit* – that is, by an understanding with a state-of-mind.'¹⁸ Because understanding always takes place in a certain affective situation, it is logical for the problematic to ask, [748] when faced with a determined mode of its accomplishment, 'which *Stimmung* corresponds to this understanding'.¹⁹ The *Erschlossenheit* of *Gewissen*, for example, may thus be characterized as the understanding by existence of its abandonment, an understanding to which anxiety corresponds as its specific tonality.²⁰

Nevertheless, on what is the correspondence of understanding and the *Stimmung* in *Erschlossenheit* founded? Why does transcendence necessarily become reality in an affective form? The impossibility of permitting the affective character of transcendence merely to subsist side by side with it as an unfounded determination and as a gratuitous presupposition, explains why an attempt is made very quickly – in spite of the affirmation of the irreducibility of *Stimmungen* to the pure phenomena of temporalization – to give a foundation to these *Stimmungen*, not merely their existentiell meaning but specifically their affectivity, on the very Being of understanding which they determine in each case, i.e. on the ecstatic structure of temporality. The reduction of the essence of affectivity to the essence of transcendence now takes place in such a way that it leads to their pure and simple confusion. This confusion is obvious when it is said that we must 'exhibit . . . the ontological structure of having-a-mood in its existential-temporal constitution', that more precisely, '*Befindlichkeit* temporalizes itself primarily in having-been', that is to say 'in the *Geworfenheit*', that 'the existentially basic character of *Stimmungen* lies in bringing one back to something', in brief, that the properly ontological

element of affectivity, its Being, resides in the ecstatic structure of transcendence and in the concrete modes of its temporal accomplishment. Because its Being, that which is properly ontological in it, resides in the very structure of transcendence, affectivity is not merely juxtaposed [749] to transcendence and henceforth as an unexplained determination, but the affective character of understanding ceases to be a presupposition without foundation and it is possible to comprehend 'how the ecstatic unity of one's current temporality will give any insight into the existential connection between one's *Befindlichkeit* and one's *Verstehen*.'²¹

That the ontological structure of affectivity resides in its existential-temporal constitution is not something that can be merely affirmed. Heidegger undertakes to show it. If the simple waiting for a menacing object which approaches is not fear, this is because 'it is so far from being fear that the specific character which fear as a mood possesses is missing'. This character resides, according to Heidegger, in the fact that the waiting of fear concerns existence itself; it is not a simple waiting but a sort of 'anticipation', it resides in the fact that 'in fear the awaiting [anticipation] lets what is threatening come back to one's factually concerned potentiality-for-Being', namely, to come back to existence itself, co-discovered by itself in this movement of turning back to, namely, in the ecstasy of the past. 'The awaiting which fears is one which is afraid "for itself", namely, fearing in the face of . . . fearing about; *therein lies the character of fear as mood and as affect*.'²² *However, the discovery of existence by itself in the ecstasy of the past as 'factual' existence which is approached by the menacing object coming back to it from the future, as such, i.e. as a transcendent perception homogeneous to the simple perception of the menacing object in the future, no more than this latter, does not contain anything affective, or anything which can constitute something like an affective characteristic such as the characteristic of 'Stimmung' of fear. Such a discovery could very well take place in a purely theoretical consciousness, in a consciousness which is indifferent – or better a-tonal – to its own existence [750] and to the object which comes toward it. Moreover, it is as a consciousness of this sort, viz. as a purely theoretical consciousness, indifferent and a-tonal, that the discovery of existence to itself would take place, if it were to take place in the ecstasy of the past or, in a general way, as a mode of transcendence. Founded solely on the ecstatic relation, no fear is possible.*

No anxiety is possible either. Never could a grasping of an existence abandoned and doomed to death, as to that which dominates the very horizon of its world and its time, be able to arouse the *Stimmung* of anxiety if it were to take place under the form of a simple apperception and as a mode of understanding, as an ecstatic relation. Actually, such an apperception is of itself no more than the indifferent presentation of an indifferent object, and the understanding of existence as Being-unto-

death in no way determines this understanding as anxiety. This it cannot do; *the abandonment of existence handed over to the world in death is not terrifying or agonizing, unless the power which discovers this abandonment is capable not only of discovering it – in what is of itself the a-tonal opposition of the ecstasy – but of being terrified, of being anxious, unless this power is not merely an understanding but is once and for all constituted in itself and prior to everything which it can understand, as affective and capable of being determined affectively, as affectivity.* Understanding is assuredly affective and for this reason the a-tonal consciousness of the simple apperception here postulated by the problematic as that of ecstasy, namely, of opposition, never takes place, or takes place only as an indifferent consciousness. The affectivity of understanding resides, not in itself nor in the ecstatic structure which the understanding develops in each case, but in the anti-structure of this structure, in the anti-essence of transcendence. The entire ambiguity of the philosophy of transcendence consists in presupposing the affectivity of understanding, a presupposition which does not merely presuppose the essence of affectivity but which, by reducing it to that of the understanding itself and confusing it therewith, denies it. [751]

The preceding remarks are valid, let it be understood, for all species of feelings including those which, like resentment, presuppose opposition and seem to find in it a principle of sufficient explanation. Let us consider revenge. According to Nietzsche, it is 'the resentment of the will toward time and its "there was"'.²³ Actually, the will comes into conflict with time, with its 'passing' and with what takes place in it and with the past, as a thing before which it is powerless and from which it suffers. The suffering impotence of the will determines in it the spirit of revenge whereby it belittles everything which happens and even life itself, while at the same time it posits the absolute of supraterrrestrial ideas. This spirit of revenge determines man's meditations, namely, the manner in which he understands his relation to the Being of a being and lives this relation. Because this spirit of revenge determines man's relation to the Being of a being, Nietzsche, says Heidegger, 'from the outset thinks revenge metaphysically'.²⁴ What is important in revenge is not so much that to which it is opposed, namely, time and its 'there was', but the very fact that it is opposed to it, i.e. opposition as such. This is why the spirit of revenge endures when, rather than despising it 'a man who suffers much takes life under his wing',²⁵ lives it as a broadened experience (Dionysius) and absolutizes the becoming in the eternal Return of the identical.

The fact that in vengeance opposition as such is important, this is precisely what makes of it a metaphysical characteristic. 'Metaphysical thought', says Heidegger, 'rests on distinction'.²⁶ Actually, not on the distinction between what truly is and what is merely apparent, but on

the distinction whereby existence [752] relates itself to Being as constituted by this very distinction, as opposition. Opposition to Being understood as time – whether this opposition be instituted in order to ‘value’ or devalue it – is Being itself, is time. With the metaphysical thinking of revenge, there arises the possibility of an exhaustive existential-temporal interpretation of the Being of this feeling, for revenge is completely explained by time when it designates a relation to time constituted by time itself. However, that which is lacking to this existential-temporal interpretation of the Being of revenge is no less than the affective character of the relation whereby existence relates itself to what takes place and assumes an attitude regarding it, is nothing less than the affective character of revenge. Because such a character never resides in opposition as such, so neither can opposition explain other feelings which seem to find in it and in the separation which in each case constitutes their natural origin, viz. the suffering of separated-Being, i.e. nostalgia. It is true that transcendent Being – and the world in general – which never finds the condition of its presence and its proximity except in the remoteness of separation arouses our suffering: ‘Nostalgia’, says Heidegger, ‘is the pain which the proximity of remoteness causes us.’²⁷ But the transcendence of the world, if it constitutes the foundation of the separation from which nostalgia suffers, never constitutes the foundation of the suffering characteristic of this separation, i.e. nostalgia itself and its affectivity, which does not reside in the act of this transcendence, but in its original auto-affection and in the very essence of affectivity.

That transcendence never constitutes the foundation of affectivity and does not constitute its essence we see in the fact that it likewise does not found that to which affectivity is bound by virtue of an essential connection, namely, ipseity. Such a connection can be comprehended in the existential-temporal interpretation of affectivity where the [753] power of revelation of affectivity, understood as the power of time, no longer concentrates on the world, but on the existence handed over to it, in such a way that this existence takes first place as the peculiar, and so to speak, specific content of this power, in such a way that it is existence itself which in affectivity discovers itself and reveals itself to itself. That this revelation to self of existence, its original relation with self, and ultimately its Being-self, presents itself as an essential determination of its affectivity and as consubstantial with it we see still more clearly when it is said, with regard to hope, that its ‘character as a mood lies primarily in hoping as hoping for something for oneself’, which, adds Heidegger, ‘presupposes that he has somehow arrived at himself [*ein sich gewonnen haben*].’²⁸ The ‘having arrived at self’ of existence, presupposed in it as the very possibility and essence of its affectivity, because it constitutes this essence, can be seen in each of its tonalities: in fear to the extent that it is originally and necessarily determined as ‘fear for

self'; in anxiety which, in the same way, is possible only as the anxiety of *Dasein* confronted with its own existence and as anxiety for it. *It is precisely because the having-arrived-at-self of existence and its original revelation to itself, plus that which in every case determines it as a self, find their foundation in the ecstasy of the past that the past plays, in the ontological interpretation of affectivity as temporality, the role peculiar to it and ultimately presents itself as the foundation peculiar to affectivity and its essence in such a way that the different tonalities appear as diverse modes of its realization, that, for example, the 'Befindlichkeit' of anxiety is explicitly presented as constituted by a specific ecstatic mode of the past.*²⁹ However, in its relation to itself such as takes [754] place in the ecstasy of the past, existence can relate *itself* to whatever it is related only to the extent that it is henceforth constituted in itself as a self; it can relate itself as *to itself* only to the extent that this Self, cast into the milieu of otherness opened by the past, and yet presenting itself in this otherness as a self and as its own self, is nothing other than the objectification of its original Self and its representation.³⁰ No more than opposition in general, and precisely because it is a mode of this opposition, can the ecstasy of the past constitute the ipseity of existence consubstantial with its affectivity or constitute its foundation; rather it presupposes ipseity as its peculiar condition.

The impotence of opposition as constituting of itself the essence of ipseity becomes obvious when the problematic undertakes to determine the 'transcendental, fundamental structure of the transcendence of the moral self'.³¹ It is noteworthy that the question of this determination of the Being of the self starting from transcendence intervenes interior to an analysis explicitly oriented toward grasping the essence of respect and through it toward the essence of feeling in general. How does this determination of the essence of ipseity starting with transcendence take place in feeling, and more especially in respect? How does respect constitute in itself the Being of the Self? Insofar as it reveals this Self. 'In respect for the law, the ego which experiences this respect must also, in a certain sense, become manifest to itself. This manifestation', adds Heidegger to emphasize its essential character, 'is neither subsequent [to the acts] nor is it something that takes place only occasionally.'³² *In what does it consist? In no way in respect itself nor in what makes it what it is or in the original revelation of its Being to itself which is as such constitutive of its affectivity as well as of its Being-self [755] and of the essence of ipseity in it.* The revelation of the ego to itself in respect, as Heidegger and Kant understand it, is only indirect; it takes place through the mediation of a complex process which, far from founding the Being of the ego, rather presupposes it as the very condition for its accomplishment. Such a process is nothing other than transcendence itself. The revelation of the ego to itself taking place 'in respect', but in fact through

the mediation of transcendence, breaks down as follows: Respect uncovers the law in such a way that this uncovering is precisely the task of transcendence; nevertheless, the law is the law of action, it commands action; consequently it implies and presupposes an ego which submits itself to its commandment and accomplishes it. To this simple presupposition of an acting self submissive to the law is actually related the entire content of a proposition such as the following: 'Respect for the law – this specific way of making the law manifest as the basis of the determination of action – is in itself a revelation of myself as the self that acts.'³³ Thus, the order of factors, the hierarchy of essences, is reversed: From opposition taken as self-evident, from the representation of the law, viz. ultimately from the simple concept of the law, is deduced the real existence of an ego who nonetheless constitutes the ontological condition for the possibility of and the foundation for this representation, for this concept as for all opposition in general, while this deduction is baptized with the name of a 'disclosure'.

Far from being able to be deduced from the representation of the laws and as that which is submissive to it, the ego rather constitutes the ontological condition for the possibility of and the foundation for this representation, for opposition in general; this we see in the fact that reason presents the law to itself³⁴ in such a way that the Being of this [756] reason, and prior to this, its Being-self, i.e. that which allows it to present the law to *itself*, is again simply presupposed in such a way that the ego which presents the law to itself, for lack of appearing in respect and of being grasped in respect as its very affectivity, is now no more than some condition 'x', some metaphysical reality. Between the metaphysical reality of the ego of reason which posits the law and the empirical reality of the ego which submits to it in respect a difference now intervenes which stems not merely from the fact that the first ego eludes the sphere of experience in which the second is plunged but from the very nature of the relation which is established between the two, insofar as this relation, mediated through the representation of the law and constituted by it, is constituted by the difference itself as such.

Because the two egos, the one which posits the law and the other which submits to it, are defined starting with the difference of the representation and consequently as essentially different, the affirmation of their unity, the affirmation according to which 'respect for the law' (with regard to the metaphysical ego wherein it finds its origin) 'is respect for oneself'³⁵ also remains without foundation. The ontological interpretation of the Being of the ego starting with transcendence, here more precisely starting with the representation of the moral law, presupposes in each case not merely the ipseity of the two egos which it is led to posit starting from this representation but also the ipseity of the ego as such, *and*

furthermore it likewise causes the break-up of this ego into an unthinkable plurality of different and irreducible egos.

To the ego of experience which encounters the law and to the metaphysical ego which posits it, there is now added a third, the one which becomes real in the submission of the first to the second and through it: 'I am myself in this act of submitting to myself.'³⁶ Such an ego, [757] progressively realizing itself in the free and contingent submission of a first ego to a super-ego is the authentic and true ego, 'the true Being-self', as if this did not first of all have to designate the very essence of the ego and its possibility, as if this essence or any essence in general could ever realize itself progressively and be something which becomes. Because it rests ultimately on the same foundation or rather, as far as the essence of ipseity is concerned, on the same absence of foundation, the philosophy of transcendence joins classical mythology and reaches its achievement in it. By submitting itself to the law which becomes for it the law of pure reason, the ego raises itself to the latter, raises itself to itself as being free in such a way that it is henceforth impossible for it to despise itself. 'Consequently, respect is that mode of being-as-self of the ego which prevents the latter from "rejecting the hero in his soul".'³⁷ Thus a definition of the hero is substituted for the ontological determination of the essence of ipseity. Since it is not able to reveal itself as itself and in its essence, it 'reveals the ego in its "dignity" ',³⁸ and a feeble ontology once again yields to moral enthusiasm.

That the interpretation of the Being of the self, starting with the representation of the moral law, and in general starting from the essence of transcendence, should inevitably fail as does the interpretation of the essence of affectivity starting from the power of revelation peculiar to transcendence, namely, starting with transcendence itself, these confirm the problematic in its acquired results, which means that the essence of ipseity and likewise of affectivity which founds this essence and is consubstantial with it, cannot be founded on transcendence or understood starting with it but only by starting from what it really is; the essence of ipseity can be understood only as immanence. [758]

Translated by Girard J. Etzkorn

Notes

This chapter originally formed ¶65 of Michel Henry's *The Essence of Manifestation*. This was first published as *L'Essence de la manifestation*, 2 vols (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1963). Numbers in square brackets refer to the pages of this original edition.

1 Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, tr. James S. Churchill. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962) 246.

2 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) 390.

3 *ibid.* 385.

4 *ibid.* 235.

5 *ibid.* 321.

6 Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 164.

7 *ibid.* 234. [Henry's italics]

8 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 393. [Henry's italics]

9 *ibid.* 392.

10 *ibid.* 396.

11 *ibid.* 317. [Henry's italics]

12 *ibid.* 391.

13 Martin Heidegger, *Überwindung der Metaphysik*, in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, I. 3 ed. Pfullingen: Neske, 1967, 90–1.

14 *ibid.* 91.

15 Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 164.

16 Martin Heidegger, *On the Essence of Truth*, tr. R. F. C. Hull and Alan Crick, in *Existence and Being*. (London: Vision Press Ltd., 1949) 338–9. [Henry's italics]

17 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 310.

18 *ibid.* 304.

19 *ibid.* 342.

20 *ibid.* 333, 343.

21 *ibid.* 390.

22 *ibid.* 391–2. [Henry's italics]

23 On this point and the analyses which follow, cf. Martin Heidegger, *Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra?* in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, I, 3 ed. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1967) 107 and 93–118.

24 *ibid.* 104.

25 *ibid.* 114.

26 *ibid.*

27 *ibid.* 100.

28 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 396.

29 Cf. *ibid.* 395. – The same remark is made about fear: 'The specific ecstatic unity which makes it existentially possible to be afraid, temporalizes itself primarily out of the kind of forgetting characterized above . . . as a mode of having been . . .' 392.

30 The theory of the constitution of this transcendent Self is one of the tasks proper to the Phenomenology of the Ego. There was no room for it among the topics of these present investigations.

31 Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 166.

32 *ibid.* 165.

33 *ibid.*

34 *ibid.*

35 *ibid.*

36 *ibid.*

37 *ibid.*

38 *ibid.*

An interpretation of Heidegger's Bremen lectures: towards a dialogue with his later thought

Kōhei Mizoguchi

The positive reception of Heidegger's philosophy in Japan can be roughly divided into two types. The first focuses entirely on the earlier period of Heidegger's thought, as does the great majority of Europeans who appreciate his philosophy. The other views the later Heidegger as of extremely positive value, and tries to reinterpret his early period from this latter standpoint, as Heidegger himself does. This tendency in Japan is probably due less to a desire to follow Heidegger himself very closely than to a recognition of an affinity with Oriental thought, and especially with Zen Buddhism, in the later Heidegger. This evaluation is largely attributable to the Kyoto School established by Kitarō Nishida, who tried to universalize and rationally explain his Zen Buddhist experiences through his encounters with Western philosophy.

The European philosophy which Kitarō Nishida critically confronted and assimilated was extremely broad-ranging, but Nishida only had occasion to learn of Heidegger's early thought, and therefore he could not help but be critical of Heidegger's failure to escape from what he perceived as a subjectivistic locus.¹ This position of Nishida's was intensified by his coinage of the term 'the logic of place' in his later years, wherein he anticipates Heidegger's 'turning' (*Kehre*) and goes beyond him, reaching the standpoint of 'absolute nothingness' (which for Nishida is also absolute realism and absolute objectivism, transcending the polar opposition of subject and object). Nishida's 'absolute nothingness' goes beyond the standpoint of Hegelian abstraction (*Idee*); it is a philosophy of fundamental place, which lets things be the self-limitation of this place, and which accepts the reality of things as they are, established from that basic standpoint. According to this philosophy, the working of the self-limitation of 'place' is at the same time the self-consciousness of the historically grounded human self having a concrete physical body.

If we may be allowed a comparison, the thought of absolute nothing-

ness, as far as its form is concerned, has the character of a synthesis of the 'topological' thought of the later Heidegger and the 'existential' thought of the early Heidegger. Thus the Kyoto School, which tries to follow the tradition of Nishida, naturally esteems very highly the topological thought of Heidegger after his turning. In addition to structural similarities, of course, the existence of common terms and elements also plays an important role in making possible the dialogue between these two different traditions. But at the same time, the danger of lapsing into subjectivity (or losing our objectivity) always lurks within the posture of such a cross-philosophical dialogue. This danger increases in the philosophies of Nishida and Heidegger, which are both grounded in basic experience, and also try to go beyond the usual styles of thinking and forms of expression. To retain our objectivity, therefore, we must always be conscious of their differences. This should be a fundamental precondition of our mental attitude towards the appeal of any foreign philosophical tradition, and serve to shock us out of preconceptions which might otherwise lead us into subjectivism. With these provisos in mind, then, this essay will attempt to interpret Heidegger's Bremen lectures, *Einblick in das was ist* (1949), which both express the fruits of his middle period and serve as an approach to his later thought.

Heidegger gave four successive lectures under the above title: 'The thing' (*Das Ding*), 'The enframing' (*Das Gestell*), 'The danger' (*Die Gefahr*), and 'The turning' (*Die Kehre*). Taken as a whole, these lectures connect the shift from the 'being-historical thought' (*seinsgeschichtliches Denken*) of his middle period with the notion of 'Event' (*Ereignis*) which is central to his later thought. To put it a little differently, these lectures suggest certain relations between Heidegger's topological-transcendental side and his being-historical side, which constitute the most difficult problem in understanding both Heidegger and his appraisals by the Kyoto School. While Nishida and the later Heidegger show some similarities in their topological and transcendental standpoints, there is a discrepancy between their views on the historicity of thinking itself, most visible in their specific critical analysis of the contemporary historical world. For Heidegger, the modern technical world is analyzed and characterized concretely as the Enframing, which is a privative form of the coming-to-pass (*Geschehen*) of Being itself, and this analysis comes from his being-historical thought and his topological investigations. Nishida also treats the world as a concrete historical bodily presence. But even if he formally emphasizes the historical world, since he sees history in an abstract and formalistic view as the 'self-limitation of absolute presence', he fails to look specifically at historical periods and analyze them. The presence or absence of this critical analysis will not ultimately be due to whether they treat history as a central issue, but to how radically historically grounded they see themselves as being. I want to focus on this problem

of the historicity of thought as one of the noteworthy differences between us and Heidegger. In the following interpretation, I shall treat the problem of the historicity of thought as a problem of the relationships between event (*Ereignis*) and Enframing (*Gestell*). In particular, I shall focus on an analysis of the internal structure of Heidegger's thought, as an attempt to lay the groundwork for a concrete philosophical dialogue.

I

The overall title of the lecture series which we are considering here, *Insight Into That Which Is* (*Einblick in das was ist*), is itself significant. This title has a double meaning, which suggests the twofold nature of the lectures' contents. First of all, 'that which is' signifies the things which exist and present themselves to us. But of course it does not just refer only to the various things and events before our eyes. As Heidegger says, 'Without Being . . . all beings would remain without being'.² Thus, beings have to be seen from the perspective of Being. Moreover, we must take the relative pronoun 'which' (*was*), following Heidegger's technical vocabulary, as referring to the active expression of essence (*Wesen*). Then 'that which is' expresses the 'belonging together' (*Zusammengehörigkeit*) of Being itself and the particular things which are for us within it. 'Being could not come to presence without beings'.³ So 'Insight into that which is' implies firstly the investigation into and thinking about the coming-to-presence of Being, in terms of beings that are proximally present. Heidegger treats the primary mode of the being of beings in terms of technology (*Technik*). Enframing (*Gestell*), in turn, refers to the destiny (*Geschick*) of Being which controls in and through the form of technology. If we follow the structure of being-historical thought, then the things which are must be taken from the assembling (*versammelnde*) presence of history, and thus Enframing is understood as the ultimate completion or fulfilment of metaphysics, the collective state of Western traditional metaphysical essence. In this sense, for Heidegger, the interpretation of the present period and of historical thought becomes one. So 'Insight into that which is' is firstly an inquiry into technology, namely a philosophical investigation of the nature of technology, or Enframing.

If Heidegger's thought had stopped at the standpoint of the traditional ontological questions, *Insight Into That Which Is* might have finished with the question concerning technology. This is because ontological issues tend to take as their central theme the study of the being of beings; their enterprise begins and ends there. In fact, the system of ontological-metaphysical inquiry treats truth as fixed and static, overlooking the ever-changing reciprocity between truth and the being of the

people who are inquiring into it. As far as the being of truth is concerned, the being of the inquirer is not necessarily essential to the being of truth itself. However, for thinking which takes as its basis the dynamic reciprocity of truth and the 'historical' (*geschehende*) being of its inquirers, truth becomes something whose appearance (*Erscheinen*) is dynamically modified through that reciprocity with existence.⁴ Therefore a philosophy which looks into the essence of technology, witnesses or experiences the essential modifications of Being as it is presented to human beings, within the belonging together of human beings and Being (*Zusammengehören von Mensch und Sein*),⁵ which in other terms is the mutual reciprocity of thinking and truth. It is here that the relative pronoun 'which' (*was*) in his title takes on the secondary meanings of an active verb. The philosophy which would look into the essence of technology – that which is – by experiencing the presence of that essence, gains the possibility of witnessing a new world different from that technology. In this sense the 'that which is' (*was ist*) no longer signifies the modern technological way of being, but the coming-to-presence (*Wesen*) of the new, modified world. This modification of the world does not of course mean a change in the subjective perspective of beings. The entire mutual interrelationship between Being and beings undergoes a revolution. In my view, 'that which is' means in Heidegger 'what truly is', and this means 'what essentially is' (*was west*), and that is the essential being (*Wesen*) of another new and authentic world as Event (*Ereignis*).

It is true that at the end of his lectures, Heidegger himself views 'that which is' as the presence of Being itself.⁶ But even Being itself is not something independent of beings, but refers to the whole, including both elements in their belonging together. If that were not the case, Being itself would, Heidegger emphasizes, again become something structurally similar to a metaphysical substance. We must also interpret from this perspective his position that the thing has no special elemental status in the Fourfold (*Geviert*), when he develops the Fourfold in his lecture 'The thing'.

Heidegger takes this changing world (it is still a potential world) as the world in which things themselves each express their own peculiar characteristics (*dingen*). It is a presence (worlding) of the world itself in which the four elements of earth and heaven, mortals and divinities, are constantly and reciprocally reverting (*enteignen*), particularized into their individual being, and at the same time unified (*vereignen*) in their nature – a world of mirror-play (*Spiegel-Spiel*). He calls this world the Fourfold, and these kinds of happenings 'Event' (*Ereignis*).⁷ Thus this 'Insight into that which is' is a philosophical inquiry into things, and things as they come to express themselves as things. But if we take the modifications of this world as the movement of Being itself, then an 'Insight' (*Einblick*) does not simply mean an insight from the human side. Rather, it refers

primarily to a 'flash' (*Einblitz*) of the whole turning of affairs.⁸ Thus *Insight Into That Which Is* is also 'The turning' (*Die Kehre*).

Especially in this case, the relationships between Enframing and Fourfold are not clear and distinct, but harbor problems. While both can be seen as the presence of Being itself, Enframing should be taken primarily in terms of a refusal of the world as the neglect of the thing (*die Verweigerung von Welt als die Verwahrlosung des Dinges*).⁹ On the other hand, the Fourfold, as the preserver of Being (*Wahrnis des Seins*), is also regarded as the truth of the presence of Being (*Wahrheit des Wesens von Sein*). Fourfold and Enframing are not similar (*das Gleiche*), but are the same (*das Selbe*). Yet in another place, Heidegger calls Enframing the prelude (*Vorspiel*) of Event.¹⁰ Furthermore, the world as Fourfold is never a single mode of Being. Here, we once again confront the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity from *Being and Time*, and the eschatological dimension of Heidegger's middle and later periods. Whether Heidegger's thought can contribute to modern philosophy depends largely on how we interpret this relation between Fourfold and Enframing.

Thus *Insight Into That Which Is* comprises first 'The enframing', then 'The thing', and then 'The turning'. What is then the relation of these to the remaining lecture, 'The danger' (*Die Gefahr*)? If we follow Heidegger, the Danger means the essence, coming-to-presence itself, of Enframing, which is the essence of technology. Heidegger tries to explain this curious relationship between the Danger and Enframing from the Old High German etymological root *fara*, which connotes both urging forward and exposing to danger. Leaving aside the accuracy of this derivation, we can explain the essence of the dominant function of the setting (*Stellen*) within 'Enframing' as urging (*Nachstellen*), and that urging as Danger (gathering of urgings). At the same time, the extremity of Danger which we feel within the word we read as 'Danger' points to a peculiar privative 'hiddenness' (*Verborgenheit*) in the nature of Being itself. The Danger also expresses the coming to presence of hiddenness which is a fundamental tendency of Being itself. 'Enframing comes to presence as Danger'.¹¹ Therefore Enframing, as the Being of beings, refers to the present unhiddenness (*Unverborgenheit*) of beings which are.

Then 'The danger' refers to the coming-to-presence of Being itself which withdraws itself by conferring Enframing, namely the experience of the coming-to-presence of Being itself in the period in which Enframing dominates. In other words, 'The danger' comes to refer to a constellation of hiddenness and unhiddenness as a whole, or the simultaneous presence of both elements. From another perspective, if we can say that Being itself can turn, then Being itself can turn in that constellation. This is the terminus of the correlative circular movement of thought and experience itself (both of which progress from technology to Enframing). It

expresses the extreme experience of Being itself, under the domination of technology. Here we have the conclusion and gathering of the workings of the being-historical thought (*seinsgeschichtliches Denken*) which Heidegger had carried out through his middle period. So 'The danger' is 'The turning' from 'The enframing' to 'The thing', and that which gives form to the point of contact of that move. The locus of this movement, which is given form and opened by the Danger, is the one and only place where we can treat the problem of the relations of Enframing and Fourfold. It is here that the experience of the domination of Enframing, as oblivion of Being, as distress, and as pain¹² (*Seinsvergessenheit*, *Not*, *Schmerz*), comes to take on a definite meaning, because this experience first proclaims the possibility of the modification of the world. Thus Heidegger's lectures on *Insight Into That Which Is* are formulated on the necessary internal relations of each lecture, and as a whole, they point to one 'occurrence' of Being – or in Heidegger's words, the Event.

Now as we noted before, these lectures occur in the order: 'The thing', 'The enframing', 'The danger', and 'The turning'. But if we follow the above interpretation, considering their internal relations, the lecture on 'The thing' ought to come last. Then why is it put first? For the time being, we can think of two reasons. One is based on the peculiarly cyclical nature of Heidegger's thought, on the insight that 'Primordial [*anfänglich*] earliness shows itself to man only at the end'.¹³ Thus the world of Event presented in 'The thing' is at once the last element and the earliest origin, and so is placed at the beginning as the origin. The second point is a problem of methodology which is essentially related to the first issue. In order to accomplish the fore-project (*Vorentwurf*) in terms of the hermeneutic circle, 'The thing' is placed first and so gives from the start to the subsequently developed thought a horizon which becomes a locus where the thought is achieved, and can later serve as a criterion. In this case, too, that which is placed first can also be placed last.

As has been often pointed out, the world of the Fourfold as Event articulated and developed in 'The thing' is a Presocratic Greek world dominated by myth (*muthos*), and is thus the oldest and earliest world. But Heidegger's philosophy does not assert simply its recurrence. If we follow being-historical thought, the oldest things endure in hidden form and are gathered even into the present age, as having been (*Gewesen*). For Heidegger, the oldest thing is at once the beginning and therefore the origin (*Anfang und Ursprung*). Those ancient origins which are now hidden are in fact the truth of Being itself. So if we want to think about the truth of Being, we first have to recollect the past (*das Gewesene*) itself. That is at the same time not only the oldest of things, but when we think about it, it must become the first thing to stand in our memories.

In other words, we have to 'pre-think' (*Vordenken*) against the arrival of the earliest origins again in the future. Heidegger writes: 'Recollecting the past is pre-thinking into that which is unthought and should be thought. Thinking is recollecting pre-thinking [*Denken ist andenkendes Vordenken*].'¹⁴ Thus the position of 'The thing' as the first lecture is most significant.

There arises here another confusing problem. Even if the world of Event is based upon the past, as long as it is pre-thought to be in the future, then it is no more than a possible world and not the real world of experience and actual occurrences. Moreover, the object of this kind of thinking has the danger of becoming merely a kind of thought-construction or idea. In one dialogue Heidegger mentions the arrival of Event as follows: 'I don't know if this will ever happen or not! But within the essence of technology, I see the first glimmer [*Vorschein*] of a much deeper mystery, of what I call the "Event"'.¹⁵ Does it suffice that we treat this as simply another case of Heidegger's often-touted prophetic personality? If we take Heidegger as being merely prophetic here, then we learn nothing from this statement, for there is no ultimate conclusion nor universal theory of Being within this view of his forward-looking thought of Event. Rather, it is precisely at this point that we find the most basic characteristic of Heidegger's perpetual inquiry into 'that which must be thought'. We may say that this is the integrity of Heidegger's thinking. Thus an interpretation which over-emphasizes the notion of Event is in danger of mistaking the basic direction of his thought. It is here that we see the decisive gap between Heidegger, who follows the process and direction of historical thought, and Nishida, who tries to draw out all reality based on a dialectical theory from absolute nothingness as the ultimate ground. Heidegger tries to ground the forward-looking character of his thought in a historical process. Therefore it is more appropriate to take his thought as the unification of the present, the future, and the past, based on the entirety of his *Insight Into That Which Is*. This entails a re-examination of the meaning of the lecture. 'The thing' in its relation to the whole, from the standpoints of the cyclical nature of his thought and the structure of the hermeneutic circle.

II

The ontological hermeneutic circle, as presented in *Being and Time*, must be taken for the basic and necessary structure of human thought of which the basis is the mutual interdependence or correlativity between historical existence itself and the object of thought.¹⁶ In the working of the hermeneutic circle, a fore-project takes over the past as legacy, and

is revised through concrete interpretation and then concretely articulated. If we apply this kind of structure to the present case, then the world of the Fourfold presented in 'The thing' covertly plays the role of fore-project for Heidegger's thought, and as a criterial horizon, through a concrete interpretation of the present world as Enframing it itself becomes concretized, resulting in a new expression of the world of Event.

The world of the Fourfold as Event is not simply a world prophetically anticipated, rather it is the criterial horizon for the ontological interpretation in a broad sense of the present technological world. This may be recognized at several points. For example, only by using the world of Event as a criterion can we perceive the deficiencies of previous Western metaphysical systems which return into Enframing: 'oblivion of Being', 'neglect of the thing', the loss of true closeness (*Nähe*) in 'uniform distance' (*das gleichförmig Abstandslose*).¹⁷

The being-historical thinking of Heidegger's middle period had continually seen that kind of negative, privative structure within the history of Western metaphysics, and thus tried to interpret and accomplish the fore-project of Event by making this Event a criterion and clue. This fore-project of Event was already made within a limited realm and covertly through Heidegger's turning. Of course this is not something concrete or thematized from the beginning; it shows its concrete form first through the process of circular practice.

Moreover, the criterial characteristics of the Fourfold go so far as to take the privative characteristics of Enframing as the coming-to-presence of Being itself. For example, this can be seen in the case of *The Question Concerning Technology* (*Die Frage nach der Technik*). In this treatise, Enframing is regarded not only as the coming-to-presence of Being itself, but also as a derivative of the producing and exhibiting (*Her- und Darstellen*) seen in the ancient Greek *technē*.¹⁸ For there is a similarity between Enframing and the revealing (*Entbergen*) as bringing-forth (*Her-vorbringen*) seen in *technē*. Thus we can interpret the present world of technology as the working of the revealing of Being. On this point as well, the world of the ancient Greeks again functions as a fore-projected criterion for drawing out an interpretation of Heidegger. But in this case, the world of the Fourfold as Event which takes ancient Greece as its model is again the recurrent conclusion reached through a hermeneutic circle. Here we have to reflect more closely on that circular structure.

The horizon of meanings (*Sinnhorizont*) which bears the role of the fore-project in the movement of the hermeneutic circle does not exist independently in itself, nor is it derived or invented purely from thought. If we follow the thought of the earlier Heidegger and of other hermeneutic philosophies, the horizon of meanings originates and is derived dialogically from the past as history which already forms its present basis.¹⁹ In this regard, insofar as Heidegger tries to take over the ancient Greek

experience of Being as the true past, that Greek experience becomes the criterion and the fore-project underlying all interpretation of Being. But the situation is not so simple when the problem concerns the ontological horizon of meanings itself, since the ontological horizon of meanings has already been transmitted in some form or another from the past, before meeting with the past clearly and thematically. Gadamer calls this transmitted horizon of meanings 'prejudice' (*Vormeinung*).²⁰ Here the horizon of meanings itself as prejudice is already a historical past condition, upon which the thematic engagement with the past can for the first time take place, and based on which dialogical circle a modified horizon of meanings becomes possible. The immediate past horizon of meanings, as 'prejudice', is the primarily transmitted horizon of meanings of the present period, but it is not necessarily either self-conscious nor are its origins clearly discerned. Rather, it is because those origins are unknown that that prejudice wields its power.

But when Heidegger started down the road towards the question of Being in *Being and Time*, the first problem he encountered, in trying to clarify its meaning and origins, was the ontological horizon of meanings as just this prejudice. He did not start his analysis from the authenticity of Dasein, but rather from 'everydayness'. This shows that he took the prevalent prejudice for the fundamental reality, and therefore for the basic issue. Now if we want to look at prejudice for what it is, and treat it as a new problem of its own, then we need a new horizon that is not under the sway of prejudice. Again following the ideas of hermeneutic philosophy, that new horizon must be formed out of the dialogical interaction of prejudice and tradition. In Heidegger's case, the formation of a new horizon of meanings whereby to take prejudice for itself does not come immediately out of the encounter with the tradition of ancient Greece. Ever since *Being and Time*, the early Greek experiences of Being were a leading thread to which Heidegger continually referred.

This is not to say that the form and expression of ancient Greek experience directly guided all the concepts and analysis of *Being and Time*. Rather, what first contributed to forming the horizon of prejudice was traditional Western metaphysics, which he later was to characterize as privation – especially the philosophy of the eighteenth century onwards – which had already confronted and criticized such traditional metaphysics from a limited realm. (We may consider, among others, the names of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Dilthey, and Husserl in particular.) But it is Heidegger's horizon that becomes a problem again in terms of its prejudices; it is here that the clear and dialogical encounter with ancient Greece first takes place. Thereafter, within this encounter, prevalent prejudice and traditional Western metaphysics, which help form the horizon by which that powerful Greek tradition is interpreted, become a single great historical prejudice.

What does all of this clarify? First, insofar as we continue to have a limited perspective on the structure of the hermeneutic circle, then the new horizon formed from Heidegger's central encounter with ancient Greece must be formed from a dialogical encounter between Greece and the (later Western) metaphysical tradition as the prevalent prejudice. So of course we cannot call this new horizon objectively and historically equivalent to the ancient Greek experience of Being. Heidegger himself achieves 'the effort to think through original thinking more originally',²¹ and recognizes this point when he calls that which must come 'the other beginning' (*der andere Anfang*). Secondly, the newly-formed horizon becomes a criterial horizon for the interpretation of both ancient Greek experience and the traditional and currently predominant interpretations of Being; but insofar as this new horizon is formed from a kind of fusion in the encounter with these two traditions, we cannot imagine that either will be completely adequate for a self-interpretation of this new horizon as a whole.

To put it a little differently, it is not the case that of the two – the ancient Greek experience and the predominant modern interpretations of Being – one would become a standard of truth, and the other merely a derivative. So, we cannot take the Fourfold of ancient Greek experience presented in 'The thing' as referring simply either to Heidegger's 'protection of the truth of Being', nor to a unique form of the coming-to-presence of the world itself (worlding), nor to the expression of that which is awaited in the future. Rather, the fore-projected horizon leading Heidegger is not yet adequately and concretely articulated. So the world of the Fourfold as Event presented in 'The thing', even if it appears to take the final form of a fore-project itself, in the movement of the hermeneutic circle, is nevertheless in its basic nature something different. Nor can we say that the world of the Fourfold is a criterion by which the Enframing comes to be interpreted. As Heidegger tried to express their relations above, both are identical in their revealing (*Entbergen*), and with respect to the coming-to-presence of Being, not equivalent but the same. At the same time, Enframing is the privation of the Fourfold, and the 'luminescence of things to come'. But these complicated expressions show us rather that their relations are not yet adequately experienced or understood. Heidegger could not achieve a dialogue synthetically fusing the classical Greek experience of Being and the traditional Western metaphysics which presently wields power in our prejudices; he was not able adequately to structure a horizon of meanings fusing the two. If that were possible, then from the viewpoint of the Fourfold, Enframing would be something other than mere privation; it would be given a concrete basis. Similarly, the world of the Fourfold would be locatable within the united whole of the present Enframing

and the Fourfold and not need to be based in some future state separate from the present.

If we can make the comparison here, Nishida's standpoint of 'absolute nothingness' tries to combine at one stroke both authenticity and inauthenticity, by locating it in the self-development of the dialectical self-determination of absolute nothingness. While this move of Nishida's philosophy bypasses metaphysics in its traditional sense, by grounding everything at once in absolute nothingness, it retains the metaphysical character of affirming everything in its hierarchic order of Being. Conversely, everything is ultimately reduced to the absolute presence of absolute nothingness, by which it takes on a trans-historical position. Certainly Nishida himself thinks of the historical world as 'the self-determination of the absolute present', and 'immanence as transcendence'.²² But the specific historical contents of that self-determination are the focus of the world and neglected within 'unlimited creativity'. Even if the philosophy of absolute nothingness talks about historical determination, it fails to look at itself within that context. The world of technology which appears privative to Heidegger is indiscriminately given a positive valuation as the active intuition of absolute nothingness in Nishida's philosophy.²³

By contrast, because he wants to ground his thought in history and to avoid placing the authentic Event within a transcendently absolute present, Heidegger tries to base his thought on the historical future. We do not have time to examine the implications of these differences here, but if we limit ourselves to Heidegger's side, we might make the following conjectures. The fore-project guiding Heidegger's thought may best be sought within the 'and' linking Enframing and the Fourfold – and the domain opened up through their relationship might provide for the first time a criterion for interpretation. It is perhaps this question which covertly guided Heidegger's thinking on this issue.

Contrary to our original intentions, we have here abandoned the standpoint of looking at *Insight Into That Which Is* as a complete movement of the hermeneutic circle for which 'The thing' is both fore-project and result. The lectures in their entirety constitute an attempt at a dialogue between current prejudices and ancient Greek experience, in the progressive pursuit of the formulation of a new horizon of Being. From this perspective, 'The danger' and 'The turning' express the hidden points of contact in the dialogue between 'The thing' and 'The enframing'. This also sheds light on the role and position of the world of the Fourfold as Event, which are full of mysteries uninterpretable at a glance. Heidegger's pre-thinking is not towards the world of the Fourfold, but rather towards the unifying and fusing dialogue of Greek and modern thought hinted at in the 'and' linking the Fourfold and Enframing.

Based on this understanding of the internal relations and the overall

meaning of these complicated lectures, we can gain a better perspective on our own activities of interpretation. There has been hardly any work done on the internal criticism of Heidegger's idea of Event, which is central to his later thinking, nor of his lectures on *Insight Into That Which Is* taken together – except for the work of Otto Pöggeler. This may be partly due to the fact that these lectures were not published as a whole, but more importantly to the fact that his thinking about Event takes a form which hardly admits of any criticism. That difficulty of criticism rests rather in our own tendency to view Heidegger's thought on Event as his ultimate teaching. If so, then the way to the idea of Event is closed to us, insofar as any approaches to Event are not indicated by Heidegger except through the 'Turning of Being' and the 'Leap' (*Sprung*). For by what kinds of criteria, in what way can we criticize a philosophy of something we have never even approached, much less experienced?

At this point, we can simply point out certain questions which arise. If the thought of Event originates in the dialogue with Greek philosophy and takes ancient Greece as its model, is it not always something progressively self-determined, and not the ultimate conclusion of Heidegger's philosophy, nor adequate to express the entire domain of his problem? If this question is appropriate, then it gives us another chance and indeed a sounder ground upon which critically to re-examine the dialogue which Heidegger is conducting. Such a critical re-examination would start, not from a one-sided use of ancient Greece as a criterion, but from the possibility of the fusion of the Greek experience with the present horizon of meanings. Then we come to wonder whether it is necessary for the present horizon of meanings to include a dialogue with ancient Greece – or, to put it differently, whether the 'dialogue with ancient Greece' itself is not already one of Heidegger's prejudices, which needs to be reconsidered. The possibility of this criticism in turn prepares the way for the dialogue with Nishida's philosophy.

Translated by Carl Becker

Notes

1 Cf. *Nishida Kitarō Zenshū* (*The Complete Works of Nishida Kitarō*) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965–6), 10:406.

2 Martin Heidegger, *Was Ist Metaphysik?*, 9th ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1965), *Nachwort*, p. 46.

3 *ibid.*

4 We can see how the ideas of the appearance of truth in the twentieth century are influenced by Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes*; see H. Rombach, *Leben des Geistes* (Freiburg i. Br., 1977), p. 302.

5 Cf. Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), p. 17.

6 Heidegger, *Die Technik und die Kehre* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1962), p. 43 (abbreviated as TK below).

7 Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, vol. 2 (Pfullingen: Neske, 1967), p. 52f. (abbreviated as VA below).

8 TK, p. 43f.

9 TK, p. 46f.

10 This is from *Identität und Differenz*, p. 25; in other contexts Heidegger uses the expressions *Vor-Schein* and *Vor-Erscheinung*. Cf. Heidegger, *Vier Seminare* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977), p. 105; also R. Wisser, *Martin Heidegger im Gespräch* (Freiburg/München, 1970), p. 73.

11 TK, p. 37.

12 Cf. TK, p. 38; and also Heidegger, *Nietzsche II* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), p. 391f. Concerning *Schmerz*, cf. Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1965), p. 27.

13 VA 1:22.

14 Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1965), p. 159. Concerning *Vordenken*, cf. *Identität und Differenz*, p. 30.

15 R. Wisser, *Martin Heidegger im Gespräch*, p. 73.

16 Cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 10th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1963), p. 148ff.

17 VA, 2:38.

18 VA, 1:13, 20.

19 Cf. H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, 4th ed. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1975), p. 250ff. (*Grundzüge einer Theorie der hermeneutischen Erfahrung*).

20 *ibid.*

21 VA, 1:22.

22 Nishida Kitarō *Zenshū*, 11:442.

23 *ibid.*, 10:353.

The end of philosophy as the beginning of thinking

Samuel IJsseling

In the middle of the sixties, Heidegger wrote a few texts which take the end of philosophy as their express theme.¹ They can be read as the development of earlier texts which deal with the overcoming of metaphysics and in a broader context they can be understood as a development and radicalization of what in *Being and Time* and in the 'Marburg Lectures' was still characterized as the destruction of traditional ontology. What is at issue in this discussion of the end of philosophy, Heidegger tells us, is 'the attempt, repeatedly undertaken since 1930, to reformulate the questions of *Being and Time* in a more original way'.² The carrying through of the destruction of the ontological tradition in which, according to *Being and Time*, 'the question of being first achieves its true concreteness', belongs essentially to this posing of the question.³

The frame of reference into which Heidegger fits the problem of the end of philosophy, generates, on the one hand, a thinking exchange or dialogue with Hegel and, up to a certain point, also with Husserl and Nietzsche; on the other hand, it gives rise to reflection on, or an entry into, the essence of technology and modern science and, before all else, of computer science. The opposition Heidegger establishes between philosophy and thinking also belongs within this frame of reference. And finally, there belongs within this framework the attempt to achieve 'a determination of the matter of thinking'. And – as we hope to show – *one* aspect at least of this matter of thinking is, for Heidegger, what remains concealed in the end of philosophy, that is, what really happens when philosophy comes to an end. It belongs to the matter of thinking to ponder what is peculiar to the end. We want to try and throw some light on these three points.

In the frame of reference in which Heidegger poses the problem of the end of philosophy, there belongs, in the first place, the thinking exchange, or the dialogue with Hegel. What is astonishing is not, as Heidegger notes in *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology*, that

philosophy is, 'in a certain sense, thought to an end by Hegel';⁴ and that the theme of the end of philosophy is expressly raised. In the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel sets himself the task of 'bringing philosophy nearer to the form of science – that goal whereby it can lay aside the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge'.⁵ In actual or absolute knowledge philosophy arrives at its completion. According to Heidegger, this completion is the radicalization and realization of the whole original project of philosophy since the Greeks, and in particular of the Cartesian philosophy. Theme and method have become one and the same, and in absolute knowledge the being of beings as presencing has, in the form of substantiality and subjectivity, reached the fully developed certainty of self-knowing knowledge. According to Heidegger, there is a tendency to suppose that philosophy has achieved its highest perfection here at its end. Heidegger is of the opinion however, that it is not possible to talk of perfection. He writes:

Not only do we lack any criterion which would permit us to evaluate the perfection of one epoch of metaphysics as compared with any other epoch. The right to this kind of evaluation does not exist. Plato's thinking is no more perfect than Parmenides'. Hegel's philosophy is no more perfect than Kant's. Each epoch has its own necessity. We simply have to acknowledge the fact that a philosophy is the way it is.⁶

For Heidegger, completion of philosophy does not mean perfection but rather 'being gathered in its most extreme possibility'.⁷ It may be noted here that in *Being and Time* the 'most extreme possibility' of Dasein is death and that it gives expression to the finitude of Dasein. If Heidegger talks about the completion of philosophy as 'being gathering in its most extreme possibility' the finitude of philosophy is also announced therewith.

A thinking conversation with Hegel oriented around what is peculiar to the end of philosophy is not a matter of criticizing Hegel, or even of contradicting him. In the essay 'Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?' Heidegger says: 'The business of mounting refutations never succeeds in getting on the path of thinking. It belongs to that smallness of spirit whose expression is required for the maintenance of publicity'.⁸ And a few pages earlier he says: 'The unique thing that thinking is capable of saying can be neither logically nor empirically proved or disproved'.⁹ It is a matter not of mounting refutations but of a 'dialogue', as Heidegger calls it in the appendix to the Nietzsche volume in the *Gesamtausgabe*.¹⁰ There he tells us that this dialogue is not a fault-finding or an underlining of failures. It is the establishment of limits, not with a view to denying the latter as limiting or to doing better or trying to show that one has done

better. The limits belong to its greatness. The limits of anything great are the margins of what is other and created. These limits are constitutive for philosophy and belong to the finitude of philosophical thinking. This finitude – again itself an aspect of the end of philosophy – is not based solely, or in the first instance, upon the limitedness of human faculties but upon the finitude of the matter of thinking or upon the finitude of being itself.¹¹

In this connection Heidegger speaks of the unthought, of the unthought *in* thinking. Here too the 'reference to the unthought in philosophy is not a criticism of philosophy'.¹² The unthought is not a lack but belongs essentially to philosophy. In *What is Called Thinking?* Heidegger writes: 'The more original a thinking is, the richer will its unthought be. The unthought is the most precious gift that a thinking has to convey'.¹³ And in *The Principle of Reason* he writes:

The greater the work of a thinker, the richer is what is unthought in this work, that is to say, what initially and exclusively through this work emerges as having not yet been thought. Of course, this unthought has nothing to do with what a thinker might have overlooked or not mastered and which his more knowledgeable successors have to make good on.¹⁴

The unthought increases, so to speak, to the extent that more is thought. For this very reason, according to Heidegger, the unthought is greatest with Hegel, who thought everything that could only be thought. In my opinion, a reading of Heidegger is not possible in which this unthought does not in any way possess a positive content. It is true that with Heidegger the unthought is sometimes ambiguous and there are texts which convey the impression that it is something positive. In any case, it is never what in the metaphysical tradition is called the *ineffable* or what surpasses our thinking. It is rather what reveals itself in anxiety, in the depths of boredom, or at and in the end of philosophy. This becomes still clearer with Heidegger's deliberations about the essence of technology and modern science.

The end of philosophy manifests itself most evidently in modern technology or, as Heidegger expresses it,

as the triumph of the controllable institution of a technologically scientific world and the social order which corresponds to this world. The end of philosophy means: the beginning of that world civilization which is founded in Western European thinking.¹⁵

The end of philosophy is therewith now understood as the *resolution* of philosophy into technical science. In a certain sense, a first step towards

this resolution is the *release* of the sciences from philosophy and the institution of their independence.¹⁶ A technologically scientific interpretation of thinking is bound up with this. Thinking becomes philosophical and the latter is conceived and developed in a technologically scientific fashion. This already comes to light in the Greek era as a decisive trait, as a direction. Many other steps are important in this development, as, for example, the translation of Greek thought into Roman, which is imperialistic and has the character of power-oriented knowledge – truth is what holds out and possesses power – and further on, the translation of Roman into the Roman-Christian, in which the being of beings is understood as brought into being in the sense of creation. A decisive step is the formulation of ‘The principle of sufficient reason’ with Leibniz, which latter required a long ‘incubation period’, as Heidegger tells us, but which was already announced in certain features of the entire metaphysical tradition. From now on, everything is in principle susceptible to calculation and control, planning and mastery. *At the End* now means this, that being is no longer understood as subject or object, as was the case with Descartes, Hegel and Husserl, but as disposable reserve. The so-called subject–object schema as the basis for an explanation of all appearances loses its significance. Industrial society is, as Heidegger tells us, neither subject nor object,¹⁷ and what is known as the enframing (*Gestell*) no longer belongs within the horizon of representation, and so remains foreign to traditional thinking. Today’s world is guided by technological science in which truth is equated with efficiency and in which, through such cybernetic key-words as information, regulation and feed-back, primary concepts such as ground and consequence, cause and effect, subject and object, theory and practice, concepts which played a leading role in science hitherto are transformed in an almost uncanny manner. A new basic attitude comes into being, a new relationship, and the key word for this basic attitude is *Information*, whereby Heidegger remarks somewhat cynically that we have to hear the word in its American-English accent.¹⁸ This information, as for example the data stored up in DNA which determines the manner in which the organism develops, can be understood neither as subject nor consciousness nor as object nor matter. It is neither the same, as was the Platonic εἶδος nor the Aristotelian μορφή nor *forma*. All of our philosophical categories have lost their meaning. It is a monstrous, uncanny possibility, a ‘most extreme possibility’, that all philosophical concepts have become meaningless. This possibility belongs to the essence of the end of philosophy.

To reject or to criticize Hegel is as unimportant for Heidegger as it is to pass judgment upon technology or the entire development which has led to it, although Heidegger is sometimes the victim of his own rhetoric. He writes in *Identity and Difference*: ‘To be sure, we cannot repudiate the technological world of today as the work of the devil nor should we

destroy it, assuming that it does not do this to itself.¹⁹ There is no evil genius of technology but only the secret of its essence. This essence is being itself²⁰ which, to a very large extent, remains ambiguous. It is, so to speak, that which makes possible and permits the appearance of what we today call reality, but it also conceals within itself the most extreme danger. We cannot destroy technology or overcome it, let alone reverse it, but it can destroy itself, either through a nuclear war or through the total destruction of the environment, as Heidegger wrote in 1950. It can also bring with it the needlessness of that complete thoughtlessness which Heidegger takes to be much more dangerous. Technology and science would then lose their meaning. Here we run up against that most extreme limit which can no longer be thought.

Technologized science is that into which philosophy is resolved, and according to Heidegger, that is a *legitimate advance*.²¹ At the end of philosophy, that direction which philosophical thought has been pursuing in the course of its history from the very beginning makes itself known.²² This history is the history of being itself and, in a certain sense, it is the technicians who are most true to this history and who follow its direction most faithfully, although Heidegger never formulated it quite so explicitly. In this history or in the coming-to-its-end of philosophy something still remains hidden: a task of thought. This task consists, in the first place, in *pondering* what really comes to pass at this end. To ponder this belongs to the matter of thinking.

In connection with this entire problematic, the opposition Heidegger draws between philosophy and thinking plays a large role. And here it should be noted that Heidegger often uses the word thinking for philosophy and the word philosophy for what he understands by thinking. Moreover, it is not a matter of an absolute opposition. On the one hand, there remains in philosophy something which is still *always* kept from thinking and, on the other, thinking can probably never occur entirely without philosophy.

Philosophy is for Heidegger metaphysics, or, in the end, ontology. And this then possesses an onto-theological constitution. Metaphysical thinking is an explanatory and a grounding thinking. It inquires into causes and grounds, into motives, conditions of the possibility and it never rests content with the thing itself because it is always looking for something else behind the thing, a more original thing. It is – especially since Descartes – a representational thinking which, because it always understands its subject matter as that of a representing subject or as represented object, is even less capable of sticking with it. It may also assume the form of a reasoning process, a logical progression that also keeps on going right past the subject. Metaphysical thinking can, in addition, take on the form of a conceptualization which seeks to see everything in one large connection or in a unity and which is character-

ized by a making-own (*sich-eigen-machen*) or appropriation (*Aneignung*) or by interiorization. This conceptualization – a word that Heidegger otherwise seldom employs – is directed to the freeing of everything from its alienness, its strangeness and to taking it up into itself as being-with-itself. It is domestication. Philosophy is, above all since Descartes, a seeking after security, after certainty, a safe-keeping. Truth then becomes the complete certainty of self-knowing knowledge. This understanding of truth is characteristic of modern times and so it is also not accidental that modern philosophy begins with doubt and no longer with wonder and moreover with a view to transforming this doubt into certainty as soon as possible. One form of metaphysics at the end is calculative thinking, which has been especially successful since Leibniz and which claims sovereignty over everything, computes everything and takes account of everything. This thinking can, according to Heidegger, proceed better and much more quickly through thinking machines, computers which in one second flawlessly calculate thousands of relationships. In connection with such a thinking, human being is an inconvenience. At the end, or with the completion of philosophy, this thinking will simply become data storage and data processing. At that point, traditional metaphysical concepts have lost their meaning.

This metaphysical thinking with its – according to Heidegger – secretive history and development makes it possible for modern man to master and control everything. At the same time, this very man is mastered and bewitched by this thinking and it is precisely this that slips out of his command and control in an almost uncanny fashion. That means that in this thinking something still lies concealed which remains alien to it, something to which the thinking in question has no access and which escapes it. In other words, metaphysical thinking is enveloped by a limit, by a margin which makes this thinking possible, which limits it and determines it and, at the same time, also continually threatens it.

To metaphysical thinking, Heidegger counterposes another kind of thinking which he calls recollective (*andenkende*) thinking. Under Hölderlin's influence, it is also associated with celebrating, greeting, remembering, thanking. It is an abiding-with, a wonderful tarrying, a holding out, an ability to wait – indeed for a lifetime – a stepping back, an abode. It reminds us perhaps of Far Eastern wisdom which was not alien to Heidegger or of a probing of reality of the kind to be found in Paul Klee, a man who astonished Heidegger and whose theoretical and pedagogical writings the latter perused thoroughly. In my opinion, it can also be understood as the realization and the radicalization of the original idea of phenomenology. Thinking as the enduring of being, as an abiding with beings in their being, an abiding with thinking and precisely in view of the fact that we really do think in this way and finally, as an abiding

with what determines our thinking, what calls us to think, what commands our thinking and so points the way.

One question which keeps on arising is: is such a thinking (still) possible? Does it not once again and necessarily amount to a metaphysico-technical thinking? If we are dominated by metaphysico-technical thinking and, in the end, are solely directed by the key concepts of computer science, is another kind of thinking then still possible? One should not underestimate this difficulty and Heidegger is himself fully aware of the seriousness of this problem. He will contend that this other thinking can *only* be prepared, that it is essentially, and indeed remains, untimely and can *always* only be a task. It requires quite specific strategies to guard it and to protect it against the danger which threatens it to an ever-increasing degree from the side of the sciences and their cybernetic organization within a self-regulating world civilization. Heidegger knows that this other thinking can never be a purely university or academic affair because these organizations, with their indigenous research operations, their conferences and their literary directives are carried along by the metaphysico-technical thinking and themselves belong to world civilization. Still less can it subsist outside of a particular historical, technico-economic, politico-scientific, institutional and linguistic frame of reference. For this reason, the greatest possible care has to be taken to prevent it from being the victim of the attempt to interpret it and to integrate it within the existing frame of reference. Much of Heidegger's rhetoric must be viewed in this light.

Heidegger's strategy – if one may use this word for his path of thought – is a matter of transgressing the limit, a transgression which, in general, is immediately reprovved or neutralized by the dominant thinking. A transgression with respect to which a limit, an end, must first be established and with respect to which, finally, a question has to be asked with regard to the determination of this limit, this end. For Heidegger, a limit is never the place where something comes to an end but, on the contrary, where it begins. A limit is constitutive for what is. The establishment of a limit, its transgression and the question concerning the determination of the limit, belong to the problematic of the end of philosophy. The question concerning the essence of the limit of thinking or concerning the finitude of all thinking is the question concerning the determination of the matter of thinking which – according to Heidegger – is itself finite and whose finitude is much more difficult to experience than the previous positing of an absolute.²³

Heidegger employs many and various names to describe the matter of thinking, as for example, being itself, the event of appropriation (*Ereignis*), ἀληθεία, distinction, clearing, difference as difference, decision and many, many others. All these names and their multiplicity have in turn a strategic significance, that is, they refer not to a positive content but

simply point in a specific direction. They incline the glance. They are *pointers* (*Winke*) or *paths* (*Wege*).

Here, it might be thought that one runs up against a transposition into another language, and into another frame of reference of what, in the Marburg lectures, Heidegger still called the 'phenomenological reduction'. There he distinguishes it markedly from that of Husserl. Whereas for Husserl the phenomenological reduction is a method for leading the phenomenological viewpoint from the natural attitude of human being living in the world of things and persons back to transcendental consciousness and its noetico-noematic experiences (experiences in which the object is constituted as a correlate of consciousness), for Heidegger, the phenomenological reduction leads the phenomenological viewpoint back from the always *determined* conception of beings to the understanding of the being of these beings.²⁴ Whereas for Husserl the wonder of wonders is transcendental subjectivity, a subjectivity 'beyond which it is pointless to question back', and which proves to be 'the one and only absolute being',²⁵ for Heidegger, the *wonder of all wonders*, as one can read in the Postface to *What is Metaphysics?* is 'that entities exist'.

The reduction or the leading back becomes, in the later Heidegger, *way*, or better ways. In the multiplicity and the character of these ways lies the 'step back'. Way and 'step back' cannot be understood here as a method, because the concept of method belongs within the realm of metaphysico-technical thinking. The becoming-a-method of the way – a process which, in the epoch of the completion of thinking, is, in a certain sense, brought to a close in the conclusion of Hegel's *Science of Logic* – is constitutive for metaphysics and for the end of philosophy.²⁶ Way and 'step back' mean here not an isolated movement of thought but the way in which the movement of thought takes place, and a long way which demands a duration and endurance whose scale we cannot know.²⁷

The 'step back' moves out of metaphysics into the essence of metaphysics and is, from the standpoint of the present and the insight one has into it, the step out of technology into that *essence* of modern technology which can now be thought for the first time.²⁸ Metaphysics and, at its end, technology constitute a determinate conception of beings or a determinate way of dealing with things and with human beings. The *essence* of metaphysics or technology – Heidegger calls it what is 'to be thought' – is being itself and points in the direction of ἀλήθεια, of clearing, of difference, etc. Ἀρχή or ἄρχειν, that is, the mastery of metaphysics or technology is what makes possible, determines and limits metaphysics and technology. It is, as it is called in *What is Metaphysics?* the *ground* of metaphysics and technology. At that time, step back still meant 'regression into the ground of metaphysics' – in the words of the title of the Introduction, subsequently added. Later, the word *ground*

becomes problematic, because it still belongs to metaphysical thinking, just as does the word being.

The *essence* of metaphysics is probably also the *end* of metaphysics as what is to be thought, and end is here to be understood in a spatio-temporal sense. In *Identity and Difference*, where the problematic of the 'step back' is extensively handled, Heidegger says that with the step back it is a matter of a step out of the already thought into an unthought from which the thought receives its *essential space* (*Wesensraum*).²⁹ Heidegger frequently thinks the essence and the end of metaphysics in terms of the categories space, spatiality, place, limit. Clearing too, the free openness, is supposedly that in which pure space and everything in it which is present and absent receives its all-gathering and preserving place.³⁰ Space, place and end belong together.

Heidegger writes: 'With the step back philosophy is neither abandoned nor does it disappear into a memorial for thinking human being.'³¹ The step back out of metaphysics into its essence does not mean that the discipline gets thrown out of the cultural circuit of philosophical 'formation'. It is much more a matter of the attempt to make of philosophy an 'over against' with respect to itself, a *factum*, a work, a work of language – I would like to say here: as text, and text must here be regarded as an abode, as a place or a *there* where being occurs as discovering and covering up, as revealing and concealing (both necessarily *and* accidentally). The step back out of metaphysics can for this reason only be carried through as an analysis of metaphysics, as an analysis of technology. And this analysis can only be endless because it is directed towards and upon an unthought which essentially remains unthought and which becomes more extensive to the extent that more is thought and thought in a more original manner. Most of Heidegger's texts after *Being and Time* consist in endless analyses of great texts out of the history of philosophy, analyses whose goal is not to say better what was said there, to criticize, and still less to refute them but rather to get on the track of what *happens* in these texts.

When one tries with Heidegger to approach philosophy as a work, as a work of language, one must avoid at least three things; first, this work should not, and cannot be regarded as the pure product of humankind. That would be a form of subjectivism, whereas the philosopher tries to say what is given to him to say and tries to show what shows itself from itself. Second, the work of philosophy should not, and can not be regarded as a more or less adequate reproduction or presentation of a reality given from outside philosophy. To conceive of truth as adequation may well be correct but belongs to the finite sphere of metaphysics and never succeeds in seeing what is accomplished along the way in philosophy as a work. Third, the words and sentences out of which the work is constructed cannot be viewed as signs or a complex of signs, which is

supposed to indicate a reality given outside the work. 'The essence of speech is not determined out of the sign-character of words', Heidegger writes in *What is Called Thinking?*³² '*Saying is showing.*' Indeed, Heidegger claims that the moment in which the word's *showing* became a signifying was one of the most important moments in the history of truth, of the understanding of truth as adequation and of the understanding of being as present at hand or 'continual presence'. In 'The origin of the work of art' we read:

Where no language prevails . . . there is also no openness of beings and also, accordingly, no openness to what is not and to emptiness. In as much as language first names beings, such naming first articulates beings and makes beings appear. This naming first nominates the entity in its being and out of its being.³³

And another passage. 'Through the word, in language, things first are and become what they are.'³⁴ 'Language first grants the very possibility of standing in the midst of the openness of beings.'³⁵ And 'if our essence did not take up its stand in the power of language, the totality of beings would remain closed to us, the entities which we are ourselves no less than the entities which we ourselves are not'.³⁶ What is said here about language is especially valid for the language of the thinker and for that linguistic work which is philosophy.

Philosophy as a work can be understood neither as a human product nor as a more or less adequate reproduction of a reality present at hand nor as a constellation of signs. More positively expressed, it can be said that every great philosophy is a building, a construction. As a construction, it is not an image or a representation of the world. Rather, it institutes or grounds a world. The building of philosophy stands there as the temple at Paestum stands there and, in this standing there, it opens up a world, confers a visage upon humans and Gods and makes things visible. Philosophy is a finite and limited place where reality is revealed and, at the same time, concealed. On the basis of this revealing and concealing, there arises something like what we call a world. The building that philosophy is cannot subsist without human beings but, for all that, it does not find its origin in human beings. The construction of a philosophy is, before all else, a matter of receiving and remaining open, hearing and listening. In a certain sense, philosophy constitutes itself. It is not however a *creatio ex nihilo* but is necessarily put together out of pre-given material. This material is not, as in architecture or painting, made up of stones or of colours but, as in poetry, of *words*. The fragments and sections which are taken over from, and have to be taken over from, already existing philosophical texts also belong to that material out of which a philosophy is built. Not one work, not one text

stems completely from itself. Rather, it continually refers to other texts to which it is related. A text is always taken up in a context of meaning or a referential totality. The network of references to other works is a condition of the possibility for the emergence and the understanding of a work. At the same time, it also creates the greatest obstacle for this emergence and this understanding, and it establishes its confines. As Heidegger writes: 'Modern thinking is in its basic traits much less accessible than Greek thinking, for the writing and works of the modern thinker are built differently, more intricate, intermingled with tradition and everywhere inserted into Christianity.'³⁷ On the basis of this 'developed state of affairs', philosophy runs the danger of deteriorating into 'groundless chatter' and becoming totally incomprehensible, and that means that instead of *uncovering*, it *covers up*. This danger, or so says Heidegger, is inherent in the language by which philosophy is guided. Language is – according to a famous text from Hölderlin which Heidegger is happy to cite – 'the most dangerous of the goods given to human being'. In Heidegger's opinion, it is the danger of dangers and indeed for several reasons. First, because 'the greatest good fortune of the first, instituting speech is at the same time the deepest pain of loss'.³⁸ Second, because any, even the purest, the most original and the deepest forms of expression can be taken up into a readily accessible way of talking. Words get used, used up in being used, and indeed necessarily so. And third: in the course of reproducing, of repeating, it is never established whether the original words still put into effect what they were formerly able to effect. This belongs to that which Heidegger calls the 'dis-essence [*Un-wesen*] of language' and, as he expressly remarks, it can never be avoided.³⁹

Because philosophy is a construction it can also be subject to a *destruction*, or perhaps better, a de-construction. This leads us to the question concerning the relationship between the end of philosophy and what, in the Marburg period, was called the destruction of traditional ontology. Heidegger has frequently repeated that this destruction will not bury the past in oblivion and that it is not a negation or condemnation of the past to oblivion. It is a critical taking apart of concepts which were handed down and, in the first instance, necessarily applied and, at the same time, it is a regression to the sources from which they were drawn.⁴⁰ In *Being and Time* Heidegger speaks about an investigative exposition of the 'birth certificates' of ontological concepts and he says:

But this destruction is just as far from having the *negative* sense of shaking off the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this must always mean keeping it within its limits.⁴¹

It is clear that this destruction can only be carried through as an analysis of the factically present ontology. It runs parallel with the analytic of Dasein which belongs, together with the destruction, to the dual task of *Being and Time*. Dasein's analysis and destruction are two sides of fundamental ontology or the question of being.

The most important, though often overlooked, feature of the destruction is that it is guided by the question: what does really happen in the history of philosophy? What happens when a philosophy constitutes itself as a specific philosophy? The answer to this question runs: being itself happens, ἀληθεύειν as uncovering and covering up, clearing, etc. but that brings with it in the first place ever new questions. More concretely: at the end of his Kant book Heidegger writes with reference to his interpretation of Kant: 'Don't ask what Kant says but what *happens* in his laying of the foundation of metaphysics. The interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* carried out above is aimed solely at the laying bare of this *happening*.'⁴² He says much the same thing with regard to his interpretation of Schelling and Hegel, of Leibniz and Descartes. More generally expressed: Heidegger poses questions like *What is Metaphysics?* and *What is Philosophy?* Here, the *is* must be understood transitively, as he himself remarks.⁴³ That means: what allows the, or a, philosophy to be what it is and to be as it is? Or *What is meant by Thinking?* whereby 'means' is meant something like require, evoke, call into existence, orient, etc. Or again: 'Regression to the ground of metaphysics' and return to the source. These questions question into the *matter of thinking*. And precisely the same problematic, though now thought out in a more original fashion, comes back again in the question concerning the end of philosophy. What happens when philosophy comes to an end, is gathered up in its most extreme possibility? The answer to this question runs again: being itself, here thought as withdrawal, expropriation. In this sense, the problematic of the end of philosophy is the same as that of the destruction of ontology. But there are differences. There is a tendency to see the difference in the fact that, for philosophers, destruction was still a task and that philosophy in the end destroys itself. It is true that the role and responsibility of the thinker in *Being and Time* are greater than with the later Heidegger. But if one formulates the problem in this fashion, one only too readily assumes that the destruction and the end of philosophy are an annihilation. More important is perhaps the fact that the destruction is directed towards reaching an *original level*, a ground in which philosophical concepts are rooted and grounded or a source from which they were drawn, whereas that cannot be the case with the end of philosophy. Still, one has to proceed carefully with words like origin, ground or source in connection with *Being and Time* – in any case, this is my view, though such an interpretation is perhaps disputable. Indeed, the original has always already been lost and refers

in the last instance to a past which never was present. In other words, the origin, the ground or the source is, according to *Being and Time*, Dasein itself, which is essentially finite, never in possession of its self and never really with its self. Besides, the question of *Being and Time* is how something like Dasein is possible. Dasein is the being that is *there*. On the other hand, the question concerning the end of philosophy is also directed towards something more original, towards what makes this end possible. Even here the question runs: what is the end of philosophy?

To conclude, I would like to come back once again to the Heidegger-Hegel relationship in connection with the problematic of the end of philosophy. In the end, one can pose the question whether Heidegger's thinking is an inverted Hegelianism. This is a severe reproach, and all the more so since Heidegger somewhat cynically remarks that 'since Hegel's death everything has simply become a movement in reverse'.⁴⁴ And he specifically wants to get away from this movement. Heidegger: an inverted Hegelianism? Even Derrida hinted at this years ago when he posed the question of whether Heidegger's thinking might not constitute the deepest and most powerful defence of what he sought to bring to discussion under the title 'philosophy of presence'.⁴⁵ Derrida would no longer express himself in this way but the problem remains. Heidegger's thinking – a Hegelianism because he followed Hegel in still trying to think what Hegel's thinking actually makes possible, namely, what it means to say that philosophy reaches its completion in technology and what lies hidden in this end. An inverted Hegelianism, because Heidegger always starts out from history, with the supposition – in opposition to Hegel – that the commencement is what is most strange and powerful, and that what comes thereafter is not a development but a levelling down in the form of simple diffusion, a not being able to remain within the commencement in which philosophy does not proceed toward absolute knowledge but much rather towards technology, a technology which neither understands itself nor masters itself nor calls itself into question nor is even able to call itself into question. It is not difficult to cite texts from Heidegger which say this kind of thing. Everything depends on the question of what Heidegger means by *end* and by *commencement*.

Commencement (*Anfang*) is clearly distinguished by Heidegger from beginning (*Beginn*). One can say that philosophy begins with the Greeks and that calculative thinking begins with Leibniz. This beginning lies behind us. The commencement however lies before us precisely as the to-be-thought and the unthought. It is not a matter however of an unthought which can be thought. It is far more of a *limit* and in this sense also an *end*; a limit which makes thinking possible in limiting. This limit cannot be thought in the sense of an appropriation. But if one pays

attention to precisely what happens when thinking takes place, if one abides by what happens in philosophy when thinking dwells, one runs up against the limit, against the 'other' of thinking. Even the expression 'the other of thinking' which Heidegger intentionally avoids can easily be misunderstood if one views the other in the light of the dialectic, or if one links it up with the limitations of the human faculties. It is much more the finitude of being itself. Just as a distinction obtains between beginning and commencement so also does it between end (*Ende*) and end (*Ende*). The end of philosophy can mean that philosophy ceases, either in the nineteenth century, with the absolute knowledge of Hegel, or in the twentieth century, with technology. This is however not the end of philosophy with which Heidegger is concerned. The end which concerns Heidegger is already there with the Greeks, at that moment in which philosophy establishes itself. In our time, it has reached a culmination or has been gathered into its most extreme possibilities, but it accompanies all thinking.

What remains most questionable with Heidegger is perhaps that he always thinks the outset and the outcome in the light of history and historicity. The concept of 'history' (*Geschichte*) is, in my view, the most questionable in Heidegger's thinking and a concept which can only be phenomenologically justified with great difficulty. Perhaps Heidegger already appreciated that and, for this reason, speaks of 'destiny' (*Geschick*). According to Heidegger, destiny is not to be thought out of a happening which can be characterized by means of a course of events and through a process. Sending (*Schicken*) means preparing, arranging, bringing each thing to that place where it belongs, making room for, assigning. Destiny is what furnishes the temporal play-space (*Zeit-Spiel-Raum*) in which beings can make their appearance and in which philosophy in general first becomes possible. This furnishing is a self-proffering and self-withdrawal and therefore also essentially bound up with commencement and end. The phrase 'destiny of being' is however not an answer but a question, amongst other things, the question concerning the *essence* of history, the *essence* of commencement and end.⁴⁶ To think this belongs to the task of thinking at the end of philosophy.

Translated by Christopher Macann

Notes

1 The most important are: 'Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens', in *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), pp. 61-90, and *Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens* (St Gallen: Erker Verlag, 1984).

2 'Das Ende der Philosophie', p. 61.

- 3 *Sein und Zeit, Gesamtausgabe (GA) 2*, p. 26.
- 4 *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 24*, p. 400.
- 5 Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1952), p. 12.
- 6 'Das Ende der Philosophie', p. 62.
- 7 *ibid.*, p. 63.
- 8 *Vorträge und Aufsätze, GA 7*, p. 121.
- 9 *ibid.*, p. 119.
- 10 *Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst, GA 43*, p. 277.
- 11 *Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung*, p. 20.
- 12 'Das Ende der Philosophie', p. 76.
- 13 *Was Heißt Denken?*, GA 8, p. 72.
- 14 *Der Satz vom Grund, GA 10*, pp. 123–4.
- 15 'Das Ende der Philosophie', p. 65.
- 16 *ibid.*, p. 63.
- 17 *Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung*, p. 12.
- 18 *Der Satz vom Grund, GA 10*, p. 202.
- 19 *Identität und Differenz, GA 11*, p. 33.
- 20 *Die Technik und die Kehre*, p. 38.
- 21 *Die Frage nach der Bestimmung*, p. 13.
- 22 *ibid.*, p. 7.
- 23 *ibid.*, p. 20.
- 24 *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 24*, p. 29.
- 25 Husserl, *Formale und transzendente Logik*, *Husserliana XVII*, p. 278.
- 26 *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, GA 13*, p. 233.
- 27 *Identität und Differenz, GA 11*, pp. 46–7.
- 28 *ibid.*, p. 48.
- 29 *ibid.*, p. 49.
- 30 'Das Ende der Philosophie', p. 73.
- 31 *Die Frage nach der Bestimmung*, p. 20.
- 32 *Was heißt Denken?*, GA 8, p. 123.
- 33 *Holzwege, GA 5*, pp. 60–1.
- 34 *Einführung in die Metaphysik, GA 40*, p. 63.
- 35 *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung, GA 4*, p. 35.
- 36 *Einführung in die Metaphysik, GA 40*, p. 63.
- 37 *Der Satz vom Grund, GA 10*, p. 123.
- 38 Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein', GA 39, p. 60.
- 39 *ibid.*, pp. 63–4.
- 40 Cf. Samuel Ljsseling, 'Heidegger and the destruction of ontology', in *Man and World*, 15 (1982), pp. 3–16. Included in J. J. Kockelmans (ed.), *A Companion to Martin Heidegger's 'Being and Time'* (Washington, DC, 1986), pp. 127–44.
- 41 *Sein und Zeit, GA 2*, p. 22.
- 42 *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, GA 3*, p. 193.
- 43 *Was ist das – die Philosophie?*, p. 22.
- 44 *Vorträge und Aufsätze, GA 7*, p. 76.
- 45 J. Derrida, *Positions* (Paris: Minuit, 1972), p. 75.
- 46 *Der Satz vom Grund, GA 10*, pp. 108–9.

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Critical Assessments

Edited by Christopher Maçann

VOLUME II: HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

First published 1992
by Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
a division of Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc.
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Selection and editorial material © 1992 Routledge
Individual chapters © 1992 the respective authors

Phototypeset in 10/12pt Times by
Intype, London
Printed in Great Britain by
TJ Press (Padstow) Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Martin Heidegger: critical assessments.
I. Macann, Christopher
193

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Martin Heidegger: critical assessments/edited by Christopher Macann.
p. cm.—(Routledge critical assessments of leading philosophers)
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Heidegger, Martin, 1889–1976. I. Macann, Christopher E.
II. Series.
B3279.H49M2854 1992
193—dc20 91–46751

ISBN 0-415-04982-2

Contents

VOLUME II: HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

| | |
|--|-----|
| Acknowledgements | ix |
| Introduction | 1 |
| <i>Christopher Macann</i> | |
| 17 The mirror with the triple reflection | 17 |
| <i>Marlène Zarader</i> | |
| 18 Reading and thinking: Heidegger and the hinting Greeks | 37 |
| <i>Kenneth Maly</i> | |
| 19 Beyond being: Heidegger's Plato | 61 |
| <i>Robert J. Dostal</i> | |
| 20 Dasein as <i>praxis</i> : the Heideggerian assimilation and the radicalization of the practical philosophy of Aristotle | 90 |
| <i>Franco Volpi</i> | |
| 21 Meister Eckhart and the later Heidegger: the mystical element in Heidegger's thought | 130 |
| <i>John D. Caputo</i> | |
| 22 Heidegger and Descartes | 178 |
| <i>Jean-Luc Marion</i> | |
| 23 The 1929 debate between Cassirer and Heidegger | 208 |
| <i>Pierre Aubenque</i> | |
| 24 Hermeneutics in theory and in practice | 222 |
| <i>Christopher Macann</i> | |
| 25 The dialogue between Heidegger and Hegel | 246 |
| <i>Denise Souche-Dagues</i> | |
| 26 The last thinker of the West | 277 |
| <i>David Farrell Krell</i> | |

| | | |
|----|--|-----|
| 27 | Critical remarks on the Heideggerian reading of Nietzsche <i>Michel Haar</i> | 290 |
| 28 | Heidegger and the principle of phenomenology <i>Klaus Held</i> | 303 |
| 29 | The question of being and transcendental phenomenology: reflections on Heidegger's relationship to Husserl <i>John D. Caputo</i> | 326 |
| 30 | Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty: Being-in-the-world with others? <i>Christina Schües</i> | 345 |
| 31 | Lask, Lukács, Heidegger: the problem of irrationality and the theory of categories <i>István M. Fehér</i> | 373 |

Acknowledgements

Marlène Zarader 'The mirror with the triple reflection'. First published in the *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 1, 1986 as 'Le miroir aux triple reflets' and translated by Cozette Griffin-Kremer. Reprinted by kind permission of the author.

Kenneth Maly 'Reading and thinking: Heidegger and the hinting Greeks'. First presented at the Loyola University of Chicago in 1989 and due to be published by Indiana University Press in a volume edited by John Sallis and entitled *Commemorations: Reading Heidegger*. Reprinted by kind permission of the author and editor.

Robert J. Dostal 'Beyond being: Heidegger's Plato'. First published in the *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, vol. 23, no. 1, 1985 and reprinted by kind permission of the author and editor.

Franco Volpi 'Dasein as *praxis*: the Heideggerian assimilation and the radicalization of the practical philosophy of Aristotle'. First published by Kluwer Academic as 'Dasein comme Praxis' in *Heidegger et l'idée de la phénoménologie* (ed. F. Volpi), 1988, and translated by Christopher Macann. Reprinted by kind permission of the author and editor.

John D. Caputo 'Meister Eckhart and the later Heidegger: the mystical element in Heidegger's thought'. First published in the *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, vol. 13, no. 1, 1975. Reprinted by kind permission of the author and editor.

Jean-Luc Marion 'Heidegger and Descartes'. First published in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1987 as 'Heidegger et Descartes'. Translated by Christopher Macann and reprinted by kind permission of the author and editor.

Pierre Aubenque 'The 1929 debate between Cassirer and Heidegger'.

x Acknowledgements

First published by CERF in the collection *Ernst Cassirer: de Marbourg à New York* (ed. Jean Seidengart), 1990, and translated by Christopher Macann. Reprinted by kind permission of the author.

Christopher Macann 'Hermeneutics in theory and in practice'. Original piece written for this collection.

Denise Souche-Dagues 'The dialogue between Heidegger and Hegel'. Translated by Christopher Macann and published by kind permission of the author.

David Krell 'The last thinker of the West'. First published by Penn State Press, 1991 in *Intimations of Mortality*. Reprinted by kind permission of the author and the editor of Penn State Press.

Michel Haar 'Critical remarks on the Heideggerian reading of Nietzsche'. Original piece written for this collection and published by kind permission of the author.

Klaus Held 'Heidegger and the principle of phenomenology'. First published by Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1988 as 'Heidegger und das Prinzip der Phänomenologie' in *Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie*. Translated by Christopher Macann and reprinted by kind permission of the author.

John D. Caputo 'The question of being and transcendental phenomenology: reflections on Heidegger's relationship to Husserl'. First published in *Research in Phenomenology* (ed. J. Sallis), 1978, by the Humanities Press and reprinted by kind permission of the author and editor.

Christina Schües 'Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty: Being-in-the-world with others?'. Original piece especially written for this collection.

István M. Fehér 'Lask, Lukács, Heidegger: the problem of irrationality and the theory of categories'. Original piece made available by kind permission of the author and with the consent of Deborah Chaffin, the editor of a forthcoming publication, *Emil Lask and the Movement Toward Concreteness*, in which this piece will appear.

Introduction

Christopher Macann

We are too late for the gods and too
early for Being. Being's poem,
just begun, is human being

(Heidegger, *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*)

Reduction: Construction: Destruction. These are the three key terms in terms of which Heidegger, in his Marburg lectures of 1927, prepared the ground for the programme outlined (though never completed as planned in *Being and Time*). The first of these three terms implies a *backward* reference to Husserl, the master from whom Heidegger was at this very time winning his independence as a thinker. The second, implies a *contemporaneous* reference to *Being and Time*, Heidegger's first (and in a certain sense also his last) great constructive achievement. The third implies a reference *forward* to Heidegger's extensive critical coverage of the history of philosophy, designed to support and confirm the position established in his own philosophical thinking. Though only the third of these three terms is specifically relevant to this volume on Heidegger's approach to the history of philosophy, all three terms require careful consideration since they are used here in a sense which is by no means obvious.

Reduction. The term is taken from Husserl – as is made clear by Heidegger's own mention of Husserl in the following passage:

For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction . . . is the method of leading phenomenological vision back from the natural attitude of human being whose life is involved in the world of things and of persons to the transcendental life of consciousness and to the noetic noematic experience in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. *For us*, the phenomenological reduction means leading

phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being, no matter what the character of such an apprehension might be, to an understanding of the Being of this being (projecting upon the way it is unconcealed).

(*Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (Gp)*, GA 24, S. 29)

In his article on 'The question of being and transcendental phenomenology', John Caputo rightly lays great stress on this passage, and regrets that Heidegger did not have more to say on the subject of the reduction. That Heidegger never again sought to understand his own movement of thought out of the concept of the reduction already indicates that, in reality, this concept did not have much to do with his own conception of phenomenology. And this is confirmed by the very different use he makes of the equivalently phenomenological term 'transcendence', whereby it no longer means either the surpassing of the act side of the correlative procedure to the object side, or the surpassing of the sphere of immanence toward the objectively real which, as such, is transcendent to consciousness. On the contrary, by transcendence Heidegger now means, more or less, the surpassing of beings toward their being – in other words, much the same as he means by 'reduction'. That, for Heidegger, reduction and transcendence mean much the same thing while, for Husserl, the one means the very opposite of the other (a movement from natural objects to transcendental consciousness, on the one hand – a movement from transcendental consciousness towards intentional objects, on the other) simply confirms the irreconcilability of the two conceptions of phenomenology.

Interpreters of the relation of Husserl to Heidegger tend to divide into two camps, those who emphasize the discontinuity and those who emphasize the continuity between two thinkers, both of whom shared the same starting point in phenomenology and one of whom, at least, never ceased to proclaim his commitment to the phenomenological way of doing philosophy. In fact however, in both instances we are necessarily faced with a difference in identity or identity in difference. For example, in his study on social ontology, *The Other*, Michael Theunissen, while conceding the paucity of the references to Husserl in *Being and Time*, pays especial attention to the continuity between the two by talking of an 'anthropological shift',¹ the transformation of intentional constitution into projection² and the transformation of an empty indication into its concrete fulfilment³ – to the point that the theory of being-with can appear as a 'radicalization' of positions to be found in Husserl.⁴

Similarly, in his paper on 'Heidegger and the principle of phenomenology', Klaus Held appeals to the principle of evidence as the link that binds Heidegger to Husserl. At the same time, Held focuses upon the concept of 'world' as the key to any understanding of the transformation

which Husserlian phenomenology undergoes. This focus does a double service. It not only throws light upon the transition from Husserl to Heidegger (from the world-less transcendental subject to the being-in-the-world of *Dasein*) but also helps to explain Husserl's own 'turn' to a later 'genetic phenomenology' of the life world. Indeed, Held presses his case so far that the theme of the world horizon actually also throws light upon Heidegger's own *Kehre*. In place of the structure of 'projection' which, according to Heidegger's own later self-interpretation, still carries Husserlian connotations of 'subjectivism', we find a concept of *Gelassenheit* characterized by a 'self-withdrawal' which creates the leeway for disclosedness. And yet the starting point in a *Daseins analytik* is never entirely lost sight of, even if the order of priority (*Dasein-Sein*) is reversed. 'Clearing', Held tells us, ' "needs" *Dasein* as the place where world emergence can alone come to be.' The significance Held attributes to the renunciation of will-ful-ness certainly helps to explain the anti-voluntarism of Heidegger's late philosophy, even though, in my view, it seems to underestimate the extent to which, for Husserl, the reduction can also be regarded as an overcoming of wilfulness, admittedly, an overcoming which, in the context of Husserl's phenomenology, represents a surrender to 'reason' rather than to 'being'.

In my own independent examination of the relation of transcendental to ontological phenomenology, I sought to bring out the affinity (as also the opposition) between these two conceptions of phenomenology in terms of what might be called an 'inversion effect' (a movement 'upward' from the natural attitude to transcendental consciousness contrasting with a movement 'downward' from the ontic to the ontological). But however successful such an inversion might be in explaining the difference, it could not have accounted for the identity (or affinity) between the two positions without also appealing to what might be called a 'conversion effect'. Critical to an understanding of the conversion of transcendental into ontological phenomenology is a structure which I call the 'ontological transposition'. And critical to my presentation of the structure of an 'ontological transposition' is a shift (only implicit in Husserl's thought, though it can always be made explicit) from a principle of 'presence' to an alternative principle of 'coincidence'. Hence the title of the work: *Presence and Coincidence*.⁵

If a procedure of this kind is indeed legitimate, it means that an alternative way back to the origin is thereby made available. For Heidegger, the way back (and this is also true of Husserl's 'life-world' enquiries into the 'pre-predicative' foundations of natural consciousness) to the origin passes by way of phenomena encountered, in the first instance, upon the 'ontic' plane. I call this an 'objective regression'. The way made available by an 'ontological transposition' I call the 'reflective detour'. The advantage of the long way around (via transcendental consciousness)

lies in the fact that, so far from excluding transcendental phenomenology from the analytical circuit, it actually requires the inclusion of the latter within the movement of return. But if, in the end, and despite the step back effected by the reduction, transcendental phenomenology rejoins ontology in its investigation of the pre-predicative structures of the life-world, this can only be because the method of constitution is nothing but a transcendental re-construction of an originally operative construction. Hence the 'indirect' (Ricoeur speaks of a 'long way' rather than a 'short way') way back, via the 'reflective detour', only takes us back to what was originally lived out in, or by, an anonymous (Merleau-Ponty's term), operative (Husserl's term) intentionality, a *practical cogito* to borrow from Merleau-Ponty yet again.

Such a distinction between the primordial, as originally lived, and the primordial, as conclusively recovered, in turn calls for a distinction between the *order of being* and the *order of analysis*. In the order of being, the ontological sphere is the first – the primordial in the literal sense of that word. But in the order of analysis, it is the last. This discrepancy between the order of being and the order of analysis is one which is certainly implicitly (even if not explicitly) acknowledged by Heidegger in *Being and Time*, for example, in a passage where he says:

Here 'Being-ontological' is not yet tantamount to 'developing an ontology'. So if we are to reserve the term 'ontology' for that theoretical enquiry which is explicitly devoted to the meaning of entities, then what we have in mind in speaking of Dasein's 'Being-ontological' is to be designated as something 'pre-ontological'.⁶

But if the reduction, in any sense whatever, still does open the way to an understanding of the being of beings, how does such a 'step back' out of what is proximally and for the most part simply *given* take place? Husserl furnishes a method. The nearest to such an account in Heidegger is to be found in the phenomenon of anxiety – and it is for this reason that it has often been said that 'anxiety' is Heidegger's reduction. What is important is the recognition that *some such procedure* is essential if the ontic plane upon which Heidegger's analyses take their start is not to capture and absorb the attention of Dasein (as is indeed suggested by the structure of Falling) to such a point that the move back can never actually be accomplished (or its accomplishment accounted for). As soon however as one substitutes the 'reflective detour' for anything like an 'objective regression', not merely the 'step back' out of the ontic plane becomes perfectly intelligible (since it is negotiated along Husserlian lines) but the movement of return also becomes perfectly intelligible (since the radicalization of transcendental philosophy itself enforces just such a movement of return).

Construction. The reduction is complemented by a construction. Some care is needed in the use of this term. For in *Being and Time* the term 'construction' is used in a negative sense to denote the introduction of dogmatic principles from the outside. As John Caputo points out: 'The genuinely phenomenological construction is not impressed from the outside, but is prompted from within by the things themselves.' In other words, the sense in which Heidegger employs the term in his *Grundprobleme* is the sense in which *Being and Time* will furnish the construction that complements the reduction. Since Heidegger's constructive achievement falls within the compass of volume I, let us leave aside the complex question of construction to focus finally on the third of the three terms, the one most appropriate to this volume on Heidegger's relation to the history of philosophy.

Destruction. 'Destruction' here means going back to the historical sources of leading philosophical concepts to see how they got established with the meanings that have become familiar to us as inheritors of the tradition and with a view, more particularly, to uncovering the original founding experiences out of which these concepts arose and which, in the course of the historical development, got covered up or rigidified into false or inflexible 'constructions'. The Heideggerian term 'destruction' thus has much in common with what has lately become known as 'de-construction', with this absolutely critical difference that, for Heidegger, destruction is always, and necessarily, the complement of construction whereas, for the de-constructivists, destruction appears to have become an end in itself, not merely cut off from its constructive complement but actually refusing the very possibility of any such complement.

But if, for Heidegger, 'construction' and 'destruction' do complement each other, it follows that Heidegger's reading of the history of philosophy will be seen to lay the ground for his philosophy, while his philosophy will furnish the necessary hermeneutical clue to a certain way of understanding the history of philosophy. While Hegel alone among modern philosophers accords to the history of philosophy the importance attributed to it by Heidegger, Heidegger's ambition is quite different from Hegel's, indeed, in a certain sense, its exact antithesis. While Hegel looks back at the history of philosophy for confirmation of the developmental logic which he articulates in his pure philosophy and therefore not merely accepts this historical process as such but insists upon the impossibility of working out a developmental philosophy in the absence of the relevant guide-lines furnished by the history of philosophy,⁷ Heidegger sees in the history of philosophy the great obstacle to a proper understanding of being, an obstacle which cannot, for this very reason, be simply circumvented (let alone ignored) but has to be confronted head-on. So far from the history of philosophy exhibiting an ever more perfect approximation to the conclusively correct (Hegelian)

conception of reason, history conceals a truth which was there at the beginning and which has to be rediscovered by first undoing the very process by which it has been concealed from view.

But how far back does one need to go or, more emphatically still, is one *obliged* to go (to uncover the truth of Being)?

The quest for primordality, as Marlène Zarader's paper beautifully shows, led Heidegger to trace the understanding of being back not merely to the Greek but to ever more primordial Greek sources, Aristotle first of all (who saves philosophy from the distortions of Platonic ideation), then back beyond Plato to the pre-Socratics and then back still further to a yet more fundamental origin in the light of which even pre-Socratic thinking takes on the guise of a misunderstanding. For a thorough investigation of the Aristotelian origins of Heidegger's first philosophy, I am indebted to Franco Volpi whose paper treats the subject in a masterly fashion. But the other dimensions of Heidegger's involvement with Greek thinking are also admirably handled by Maly (the pre-Socratics) and Dostal (Plato).

If we follow the Heideggerian principle that the *further* back one goes in the history of philosophy the *nearer* one comes to an acknowledgement of the primordial truth of Being then a very obvious query arises. Why only go back to the Greeks, who were cultural infants at the time when the more ancient cultures of the East had already seen some of their greatest days? Why go back to Greek when a much older language (Sanskrit) attests to a philosophical tradition (the Vedantic) which not only goes back further but goes so far back that it reaches beyond written language to an oral, and for this very reason poetic, tradition which was only later transcribed into writing? This is no incidental question, because the Vedantic tradition is founded on a principle which, if interpreted in a certain, not particularly obtuse, way could well be regarded as the most primordial ontological principle of all: the identity of Atman, or soul and Brahman, or God. And now we are immediately brought face to face with the figure of Sri Aurobindo.

I had hoped to elicit a paper comparing the work of Heidegger and Aurobindo. In the absence of such a contribution I would like to say a few words here. The driving force of Indian philosophical thinking, from its origins in the Vedantic texts right through to present times, has been spirituality – religion in the broadest sense of that word. The greatness of the Indian tradition lies in the fact that, not content with intellectual constructions (which are, nevertheless, to be found in great abundance), they developed a life-practice – meditation – specifically designed to awaken the consciousness needed to engender and confirm the insights expressed in their writings. Indian philosophy is, from beginning to end (and even in its most abstruse extrapolations), an 'empiricism', provided only that one is prepared to extend the concept of experience to cover

a specifically *spiritual experience* recuperated and prompted by way of a specifically *spiritual practice*. This is why Sri Aurobindo had to write his philosophy twice, the first time as a philosophical theology (*The Life Divine*), the second time as a philosophical psychology (*The Synthesis of Yoga*) – though in truth these disciplinary terms ‘theology’, ‘philosophy’, ‘psychology’ meant little or nothing to Aurobindo who was by academic training, a philologist, and by personal vocation, a poet.

The parallels between Heidegger and Aurobindo are not merely extraordinary in themselves but all the more extraordinary for having been developed in complete isolation each from the other. Heidegger is noted for his mastery of the Greek language and his attunement to the inner dynamics of Greek philosophical thought. Aurobindo was not only a classicist by training (he won prizes for Greek and Latin verse compositions both as a schoolboy and as a university student at Cambridge), he then went on to master a much older language (Sanskrit) together with the philosophical tradition that belongs to it (the Vedantic philosophy). Heidegger is noted for his later efforts to bring philosophy and poetry closer together. Aurobindo was not only appreciative of the writings of the poets, he was himself a poet of the first rank and, indeed, the author of the longest poem in the English language (*Savitri*), a poem which can only be adequately compared with Milton’s *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*, on which it was to some extent modelled. Like Heidegger, Aurobindo was also actively engaged in politics (more actively than Heidegger ever was). But whereas Heidegger (however marginally) was for a while involved with one of the more lamentable regimes of the century, Sri Aurobindo spent a significant portion of his life actively engaged in contesting (verbally) the British occupation of India – a cause whose legitimacy few would question. Indeed, had he so chosen (which means, had he been ready to spend a great part of his life in gaol) he could have been the Gandhi of the Indian independence movement and did indeed live long enough to witness the accidental (?) conjunction of Indian Independence Day with his own 75th birthday (15 August 1947).

More relevant for the specific purposes of this volume, Aurobindo worked out a developmental theory (both of consciousness and of the history of consciousness) which exhibits a quite characteristic trait. For Aurobindo, any examination of what ‘has been’ is always undertaken in view of a prognostication, the anticipation of what is ‘yet to be’, in so far as this ‘yet to be’ is indicative of a spiritually higher attainment. Even the move away from the origin (which Aurobindo interprets somewhat along Heideggerian lines as a spiritual diminishment) is a necessary ‘descent’ without which the new ‘ascent’ would not be possible. For the turning away from the world, characteristic of traditional Indian spirituality, led, in the end, to a spiritual sterility and inefficacy which finds its corrective in Western materialism which, for its part, however blind it

might be to the spiritual destiny of humankind, does lay the foundation for the revitalized spirituality which finds expression in his own work.

We are now in a position to contrast three models for the interpretation of the history of philosophy, with particular reference to the development of a philosophy. The first is the Hegelian model which sees the development of the history of philosophy as a cumulative progress leading up to, and so ending with, the work of the interpreter.⁸ The second is the Heideggerian, which sees the development of the history of philosophy as a persistent degeneration from original sources, ending up with the interpreter as the philosopher who captures the moment at which philosophy is no longer able to continue to philosophize in the traditional manner.⁹

However different these two interpretative models might be (IJsseling talks of an 'inversion'), they do at least agree in thinking that philosophy (Western philosophy, at least as traditionally conceived) comes to an end with the philosophy of the interpreter. But there is a third interpretative model, a model which sees the need for a careful examination of the development of the history of philosophy and, moreover, recognizes the importance of a return to origins – but only as a preparation for a further advance. This is the model represented by the thinking of Sri Aurobindo. In the context of this third model, the task of the philosopher is seen in a very different and, I would argue, more fruitful and certainly more hopeful, light; to master a philosophical tradition, with especial reference to its original sources, to contribute to it, and then to leave that contribution as a legacy to be developed further by those still to come. This means not being the last, the conclusive, the final term but a link in a chain whose backward reach gives one some grounds for speculating about developments yet to come. To the Heideggerian task of overcoming the dichotomy of 'realism' and 'idealism', a dichotomy intrinsic to the Western tradition, Aurobindo opposes a more comprehensive task, the task of overcoming the dichotomy of spiritualism (the East) and materialism (the West). And the reality of such an 'overcoming' resides, for Aurobindo, not so much in a new kind of thinking as in a new way of being, a new spirituality for which Aurobindo invented the term 'supramental' – a term which bears many of the same traits as those brought out by Jean Gebser in his quite independent discovery of an 'a-perspectival world' or an 'integral consciousness'.¹⁰

There can be no doubt that philosophy has moved on beyond the point reached with the Hegelian system. The twentieth century has certainly produced its own great figures (e.g. Husserl and Heidegger to mention only two) of whom one, at least, has done his best to disqualify the Hegelian claim to ontological supremacy and for reasons which Souche-Dagues finds highly suspect (see chap. 25, vol. II of the present work).

In due course of time we shall be in a position to determine the validity of the Heideggerian claim.¹¹

For the time being, it seems more pertinent to raise a question with regard to the very desire to represent a given thinker as conclusive, terminal, the thinker through whom an entire intellectual tradition is summed up and consummated, the thinker whom no successor can think of thinking beyond. Surely, there is something pretentious about the very attempt to voice such a claim, however it may be set about with neutralizing qualifications?¹² It is worth recalling that humankind is a very recent experiment in life. The dinosaurs reigned for over 140 million years and perished of the perilous extravagance of overgrown bodies. We have been here little more than one million years and are surely entitled to hope for an ascendancy of comparable duration, that is, unless we too *soon* perish of the even more perilous extravagance of overgrown minds – by which one can surely only mean one thing, minds that, in some sense or other of that nebulous term (so dear to Aurobindo and yet so resolutely disapproved by Heidegger), have failed to develop the ‘spiritual’ potential inherent in human being.

One thing is clear however. Whether we adopt the conclusive model of the history of philosophy or whether we adopt the transitional model, which sees human being as a ‘being on the way’ (*homo viator*, to use Gabriel Marcel’s phrase), this decision will retrospectively colour the way in which we view the history of philosophy and therefore the way in which we view Heidegger’s own extensive interpretations.

In his paper on ‘Heidegger and Descartes’, Jean-Luc Marion has succeeded in bringing out the continuity of modern philosophy, *despite* the apparent finality of Heidegger’s interpretation. Not content to merely trace the obvious antagonism between Heidegger and Descartes, and to do so in depth and detail, he has tried to bring out the sense in which this nominal antagonism conceals a deep-rooted allegiance to the ‘subjective turn’, the very turn from which Heidegger was himself, at the time, already trying to turn away. This is not only surprising in itself but also helps to explain the further turn away from anything like a *Daseins analytik*. In spite of everything he might have said to the contrary, ‘mineness’, according to Jean-Luc Marion, conceals a component of ‘egoity’, ‘projection’ an element of the a priori which marks Heidegger’s continued affiliation with a tradition he was later to dismiss (and to seek to ‘overcome’) as ‘metaphysical’. But then even this ‘overcoming’ continues to remain bound by the parameters of modernity!

Such a view is fundamental to any understanding of the French response to Heidegger. Again and again, leading figures in the French phenomenological tradition have tried to save the Cartesian heritage of a philosophy of consciousness against Heidegger’s critique and this despite their deep indebtedness to the revolution inaugurated by Heidegger.

That both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty (to cite only the two best-known French philosophers of the post-war era), should have attempted to do just this is too well known to be worth pursuing further. But it is worth noting that a very recent book on the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur is entitled *The Cogito and Hermeneutics*,¹³ precisely because the author (Domenico Jervolino) sees in the life's work of his subject an attempt to reconcile the Heideggerian claims of a hermeneutical philosophy with the seemingly rival claims of a *philosophy of consciousness*.

Although Aristotle was the figure from whom Heidegger drew the inspiration to inaugurate his reversal of the respective primacy of *theoria* and *praxis*, and Descartes the only figure to whom Heidegger devoted a specific section of *Being and Time* (if we exempt the section on 'Hegel's conception of time' in the second part), it is, in my view, Kant whose 'haunting' presence is most evident throughout *Being and Time*. It is not just that, in the celebrated Kant book, published shortly after *Being and Time*, Heidegger was able to put into practice the hermeneutical principles first elaborated in *Being and Time* (see my article in this volume); the very structure of *Being and Time* itself attests to a close assimilation of the procedure adopted in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Just as important as Heidegger's indebtedness to Kant for the structures and procedures of *Being and Time* is his conversion of the Kantian, transcendental philosophy into a (proto)ontology. And just as significant as the interpretative transformation he works upon the Critical philosophy is the fact that he does not, as we have already noted, attempt to subject the Husserlian transcendental philosophy to an equivalent transformation but rather distances himself from Husserl's project with a view to reclaiming for himself the right to the very slogan Husserl adopted to characterize his own intellectual endeavour: To the things themselves! While Kant is interpretatively appropriated (for ontology), Husserl is expropriated (from phenomenology), not so much by way of an explicit critique of Husserlian phenomenology (though elements of such a critique are to be found all over the first philosophy) as rather by way of Heidegger's own development of an alternative phenomenology.

Both the ontological *appropriation* of Kant and the complementary phenomenological *expropriation* of Husserl bring with them the same result, a refusal of the transcendental in favour of the ontological, a refusal of 'heights' in favour of 'depths'. But if one takes up a stand outside this decision one can see that *both* options correspond, in a certain sense, to what has been meant by the term 'metaphysics'.

Through a historical accident, philosophy became linked with the nomenclature 'metaphysics'. And yet the name is appropriate in as much as it designates a thinking which passes 'beyond' what is ordinarily taken to be the real, the physical (After the Physics). This straining beyond the ordinary toward the extra-ordinary, this surpassing of the physical,

typically assumes two forms, a movement 'up' or 'forward' and a movement 'down' or 'backward'. These are only metaphors. And yet it is easy enough to clothe these metaphors with the trappings of historical figures. In Plato, we find the first tendency, in Aristotle, the second; in rationalism, we find the first tendency, in empiricism, the second; in Kant, we find the first, in Hegel, the second; in turn, Hegel's attempt to embody logical categories in and through the concrete historical processes through which they manifest themselves gets interpreted by Marx as yet another abstract speculative endeavour which must itself be 'turned on its head' by recourse to the concrete historical situations in which men live and out of which therefore they are obliged to think. Finally, and in this century, we find, in Husserl, a recapitulation of the Platonic vision of the pure forms (*eidōs*) worked out in conjunction with a Kantian transcendental procedure.

In the light of history, it therefore comes as no surprise that Husserl's upward-oriented, abstractive intellectual enterprise gets corrected with the Heideggerian regression to the ground. In fact of course, and as I think every one of the great thinkers themselves always appreciated, both dynamics are essential. The movement upward and forward will become a sterile and vacuous endeavour (Kant's 'light dove' mistakenly imagining that its flight would be still easier in empty space) if it is not constantly brought down to earth again. But the 'plunge' into the depths may not only bring philosophy 'down to earth', but also perhaps lead down to 'infernal' realms beneath the earth, not just the ground (*Grund*), but even, perhaps, the abyss (*Abgrund*). Hence the need not merely to *ask* but also to seek an *answer* to the question concerning the proper relation which obtains between these two, seemingly contrary, directives.

Heidegger is fairly consistent in his choice of the path directed toward the depths.¹⁴ He refuses the terminology historically linked with the heights, the terminology of consciousness, of subjectivity, or worse still, of transcendental consciousness and transcendental subjectivity. The few occasions on which he resorts to the language of *Geist* he does so more with a view to executing a rhetorical flourish than an effective analysis. And yet the refusal of the heights is much more problematic, and indeed much less conclusive, than might appear to be the case. The Husserlian reduction is rejected, and yet we are left with a 'step back'. The Kantian appeal to 'higher faculties' is dismissed, indeed to such a point that apperception hardly figures in Heidegger's assessment of the significance of the Critical philosophy. And yet 'Conscience' calls Dasein back out of its fallenness in the 'They'. The traditional problem of solipsism disappears and yet the style of Heidegger's thinking takes on an ever more self-absorbed and idiosyncratic tone – as Christina Schües has shown in her paper comparing Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. But if the two *opposed* metaphors of heights and depths leave things antinomically

unresolved, what of the image of the circle, the image of heights transformed into depths and depths into heights?

Despite the obvious inversion, Hegel and Heidegger share one common feature in their respective conceptions of the history of philosophy, not merely that, in reality, they both tend to operate with a linear conception of philosophy and of its historical development (the one moving forward, the other backward) but that they do so despite a *nominal* (indeed almost a logical) commitment to a cyclical conception (the hermeneutical circle/the onto-logical circle). To take Hegel first, the famous passage from the Preface to the *Phenomenology* makes the circular character of ontological reasoning clear.

True reality is merely this process of reinstating self-identity, of reflecting into its own self and from its other, and it is not an original and primal unity as such, not an immediate unity as such. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle which presupposes its end as its purpose, and has its end for its beginning; it becomes concrete and actual only by being carried out, and by the end it involves.¹⁵

But if one turns to the third Part of the *Encyclopedia* entitled 'Philosophy of spirit', and to that division of it which most closely approximates a Dasein's analysis, the first division devoted to subjective spirit, one finds, at the beginning, an 'Anthropology'. As the beginning, this anthropology should surely have been presented in such a way as to lay the ground for the reflective recuperation undertaken in the third Division in the name of Absolute Spirit. But such is Hegel's commitment to a progressive conception of Process that the beginning in the Natural Soul is presented as the 'sleep of the soul' and punctuated with disparaging remarks about the original affinity of man and animal and about negroes being the children of humankind. So far from recommending a recuperation of the origin, the Hegelian conception of history presents us with a *process* which is a uniform *progress* from African pre-civilization, through oriental civilization, to a European cultural culmination which has little in common with its origins and which, for this very reason, is marked by a *superiority* which, philosophically speaking, is attested in its capacity to articulate the logic of the process, initially in a rudimentary way; finally, in a completely finished fashion, i.e., the Hegelian philosophy. This conception of 'progress' was by no means a preconception peculiar to Hegel but a prejudice common to his time.

It was not until the twentieth century made us aware of the destructive implications of scientific reasoning that we found ourselves in a position to re-evaluate the significance of so-called 'primitive' culture and civilization. The closeness to, respect for, and affinity with nature, which we have lost, we find in the Bushman, as the writing of Laurens Van der

Post attest. The sense of the sacred pervading all of nature, we find in the American Indians as also in the Australian Aborigines. The two oldest cultures of all, the Indian and the Chinese, are unanimous in pointing back to an original, archaic civilization which was, or is reputed to have been, in certain respects, a 'golden age'. Here Heidegger would seem to be the surer guide.

With Heidegger, the notion of circularity enters in with the famous question of the 'hermeneutical circle'. But the circularity of the 'hermeneutical circle' does not really consist in an understanding which accomplishes a circle, for which, therefore, going back is only possible by moving forward and for which, equivalently, moving forward brings understanding back. What is at issue is something quite different, something which, in analytical language, might be called 'presupposing what one is supposed to be proving'. It is for this reason that Heidegger frequently presents his position as a response to the logical charge of circular reasoning. 'It is not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle, or even of a circle which is merely tolerated. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing.'¹⁶ Or again:

If we must first define an entity in its Being, and if we want to formulate the question of Being only on this basis, what is this but going in a circle? In working out our question have we not 'presupposed' something which only the answer can bring?¹⁷

What is presupposed is, of course, that pre-ontological understanding of human being which serves as a guide for the disclosure of the existential structures which will be taken to characterize Dasein. Amongst these structures we find Understanding. 'The circle in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning.'¹⁸ In turn this means that there can be no escaping the circle whose structure is therefore taken to typify the very structure of ontological understanding itself. 'We must rather endeavour to leap into the "circle", primordially and wholly, so that even at the start of the analysis of Dasein we make sure that we have a full view of Dasein's circular Being.'¹⁹ 'What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way.'²⁰

So the right strategy consists not in trying to avoid the circle but in getting right into the circle – and, one is tempted to say, moving around it in the right way, except that, for Heidegger, there really can be no moving 'around'. Instead of an 'around', what we find is a linear regression backward, back beyond beings to their being, back beyond the ontic to the ontological, back beyond the existentiell to the existential.

To sum up: with Hegel, we find a more explicit articulation of the circularity of philosophical understanding, but his commitment to 'progress' makes it impossible for him to envisage the 'process' as one

whereby philosophical understanding would have to take seriously its first and most original expressions. Heidegger leaves us in no doubt about the negative implications of 'progress' and therefore makes clear the need to return, but the recuperation of the origin does not bring with it an 'advance' but rather recommends a critique of the 'forward march' of technological reason. At least hypothetically, from these two models a further possibility springs to mind, that of envisaging the discipline of ontology as a procedure whereby the way 'on' is seen to lead 'back', the way 'forward' to culminate in a movement which, of its own accord, leads us 'backward' to the origin.

There are many reasons for insisting upon the appropriateness of the above conception of the circle or, if you prefer, the spiral. First, I would argue that Heidegger's ontological revolution would never have been possible without the intellectual resources made available to him by Husserl. Second, unless some way of accounting for the relation between transcendental and ontological phenomenology is explicitly avowed, we are left in the embarrassing situation of being confronted with two irreconcilable ways of doing what, for good reasons, goes by the same name: phenomenology. Third, if a determined attempt is not made to integrate the two rival conceptions of phenomenology, the discipline of ontological phenomenology may, and especially in the hands of its less well-versed disciples very readily will, take on connotations quite contrary to those intended by its founding father – something akin to a pragmatic, even behaviouristic, interpretation of human reality.²¹ Fourth, the need for a recuperation of the primordial not only serves to remind us of the destructive implications of so-called 'historical progress', it also helps to bring out the constructive implications of what used to be dismissed as 'primitive' – as also the potentially reconstructive implications of scientific technology. The ecological movement is nothing but an extended commentary (written in scientific language) upon a natural attunement which has been lost only because we have temporarily ceased to take account of what once we were (and which we can never finally cease to be) – creatures of nature.

Or, if you prefer, creatures of God – *Deus sive Natura*.

Nobody would have applauded more wholeheartedly than the divinely inspired Aurobindo, the following passage from Heidegger, a passage which, through a commentary on Hölderlin, reproduces the spirit of the poetically voiced citation placed at the head of this Introduction:

It is the time of the gods that have fled *and* of the god that is coming. It is a time of *need*, because it lies under a double lack and a double Not: the No-more of the gods that have fled and the Not-yet of the god that is coming.²²

Notes

1 Michael Theunissen, *Der Andere*, tr. Christopher Macann as *The Other* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984), p. 170.

2 Theunissen, *The Other*, p. 171.

3 Theunissen, *The Other*, p. 173.

4 Theunissen, *The Other*, p. 176.

5 Christopher Macann, *Presence and Coincidence*, *Phaenomenologica* 119 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1991).

6 Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson as *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 32 (H. 12).

7 'The same development of thinking which is portrayed in the history of philosophy is portrayed in philosophy itself, but freed from that element of historical externality, purely in the element of thinking.' From the Introduction to the *Encyclopedia*, §14.

8 In truth, Hegel sees the history of philosophy as ending with the philosophy of the interpreter only in the sense that it is in the past, and in the past alone, that the philosopher is able to grasp the essence of the process – *Wesen ist was gewesen ist*.

9 This retrospective vision is, of course, qualified by Heidegger's prospective anticipation of a new kind of 'thinking'. For instance, in his essay, 'The end of philosophy and the task of thinking' Heidegger talks of 'the possibility that the world civilization which is just now beginning might one day overcome the technological-scientific-industrial character as the sole criterion of man's world sojourn'. From *On Time and Being*, tr. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 60.

10 Jean Gebser, *Ursprung und Gegenwart*, tr. Noel Barstad and Algis Mickunas as *The Ever Present Origin* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1984).

11 Heidegger qualifies his claim by saying that it may take as long for philosophy to reach its 'end' as it has already taken for its entire development up to the present.

12 Heidegger raises this question of pretension in a passage from 'The end of philosophy and the task of thinking'. 'Is there not an arrogance in these assertions which desires to put itself above the greatness of the thinkers of philosophy?' p. 60.

13 Domenico Jervolino, *The Cogito and Hermeneutics*, tr. Gordon Poole (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1990).

14 What one demands of a philosopher above all else is consistency. That Heidegger's thinking about philosophy and about the history of philosophy fit together is a measure of his ability to respond to the requirement of consistency. However, Hegel's position on the status of the origin is also worth noting. From the standpoint of Nature, the origin is the most concrete. From the standpoint of Mind, the origin is the most abstract because it lacks all those thought determinations through which it will be concretized.

15 G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, tr. J. B. Baillie as *The Phenomenology of Mind* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1910), p. 81.

16 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 195 (H. 152).

17 *ibid.*, p. 27 (H. 7).

18 *ibid.*, p. 195 (H. 153).

19 *ibid.*, p. 363 (H. 315).

20 *ibid.*, p. 195 (H. 153).

21 A recent work, *Inwardness and Existence*, by Walter Davis, seeks to

retrieve the category of 'inwardness' in Hegel and to carry it over to an understanding of Heidegger (as also Marx and Freud) which would make any pragmatic or behaviourist interpretation of Heidegger's refusal of subjectivity impossible.

22 Martin Heidegger, 'Hölderlin and the essence of poetry', in *Existence and Being* (Chicago: Regnery, 1949), p. 289.

The mirror with the triple reflection

Marlène Zarader

. . . Die
Sternblume, ungeknickt, ging
zwischen Heimat und Abgrund durch
dein Gedächtnis.

Paul Celan

These pages have a double objective. In the first place, to show that the way in which Heidegger interprets the pre-Socratics – in consequence, the way in which he understands their relation to later thinking, whether it is a matter of later Greek thinking or of that which stems from the latter – attests to a notable evolution in the course of the work, an evolution in which it is possible to distinguish three distinct periods, each irreducible to the other. In the second place, to show that, no matter what the period in question, the status accorded to the early Greeks carries with it the main lines of Heidegger's thinking at that time, thereby making possible a division of his entire work. These main lines of thought are to be found variously sketched in each of the periods in question; on the one hand, a certain conception of history as well as the manner in which Heidegger himself stands in relation to this history, on the other, a certain conception of being (more exactly, of the question of being), as well as the way in which Heidegger defines the task of thinking with regard to this question.

This double project implies that I stick to the main lines (my objective being precisely to set them out here), letting go of the more detailed analyses – to which I have devoted a more extensive study elsewhere.¹

I

The first period was that of Marburg. The master work obviously remains *Sein und Zeit*, but the context in which it was developed can now be brought to light more clearly since we are now in possession of several lectures given by Heidegger during the years 1923–8.²

What is the status he attaches to the earliest Greek thinkers? The first point to note is that, in Heidegger's view, no break can be made between the pre-Socratics and Plato. Thought through in a fundamental continuity, they are for the most part characterized by an undifferentiated plural: 'The Greeks'. This is because, at this time, Heidegger was most concerned with what separated 'the Greeks' from the rest; though even here it is not possible to talk of a break, in the strict sense of that word. What is regarded as distinguishing the former from the latter is something in the order of a covering over. The questions which were still 'alive' with Plato and Aristotle have lost their appeal, as well as their urgency, in the 'hardening'³ inaugurated by the tradition. If in this epoch thinkers still play a model role, it is the Greeks', and if it is possible to attribute a leading role to certain figures it is to Plato and Aristotle,⁴ through whom a 'battle of giants over being' makes itself known.⁵

Moreover, this battle will have to be resumed in order to carry it further still than Plato and Aristotle succeeded in doing. The latter are therefore the object of a double critique. On the one hand, they proved incapable of carrying their investigations through to the end, and of bringing them to full clarity and this because they failed to get as far as the crucial question concerning the 'meaning' of being. This is why their investigations have to be prolonged. On the other hand, and more seriously, they already began to formulate an answer by understanding being within the field of *Vorhandenheit*. In this respect they still belong themselves to the very tradition which it is necessary to 'de-construct'.

The task entered into during the Marburg period is therefore characterized by a double movement of 'return to the origin'. On the one hand, a movement backwards, in the order of the historical luminaries, back toward the origin of the entire Western tradition. This movement assumes the form of a return to Greek ontology and by way primarily of the Aristotelian problematic. On the other hand, a movement in depth, in the order of the conditions of the possibility, back towards the Aristotelian problematic, which now finds itself subjected to a new phenomenological inquiry.⁶

It might well appear as though this double move were something like the first attempt – still incomplete, since not pushed back to the pre-Socratics – at that movement towards the origin which characterizes the later works. This is not however the case, and I would like to indicate

quickly the structural differences which make up the specificity of this period.

In the first place, if Heidegger is guided by the double concern of 'climbing higher' (in history) and of 'digging deeper' (in the process of questioning), these two concerns do not, nevertheless, coincide. By that I mean that the phenomenologically inspired movement in the direction of the foundations of Platonic-Aristotelian conceptuality make no claim to rejoining, or recovering, a more original *moment*. The destruction of the tradition certainly brings with it a 'remembrance' (*Erinnerung*) of the inaugural texts (Plato-Aristotle), but the critical work accomplished on these texts does not in any way imply the 'commemoration' (*Andenken*) of another text which would precede it. In climbing upwards into the transcendental field no *trace* is encountered in history.

In the second place, if Heidegger's research aims at a deepening of the process of questioning it does not, for all that, attempt to disengage another question. To be sure, Heidegger makes it clear that the Platonic question has not been posed in a sufficiently radical way, but it is nevertheless this question which remains, in his view, what is 'worthy of being questioned'.⁷

Hence the paradoxical character of this first position adopted by Heidegger *vis-à-vis* ontology. While, in a certain respect, being more critical than it will be later, it is, in the final analysis, much less critical. It is more so, first because it adopts the radical language of 'destruction' (instead of the more prudent language of *Verwindung*), and then because it remains caught in a perspective of denunciation (an unavoidable perspective, once the covering over has been charged to the account of the thinking, without yet having been attributed to being itself). But at the same time it is much less so to the extent that the critical accent bears much more upon the issue of transmission (where the question is no longer posed and therefore implicitly finds itself resolved) than on that of inauguration (where this question, even though inadequately clarified, at least has the merit of being posed). But, as we shall see later, as soon as another 'inaugural injunction' has been issued, it will prove necessary to go back beyond Plato towards another question. It will be this latter question which will then have to be worked out and not the Platonic question.

To put it more broadly, in spite of the renewal inaugurated in the process of ontological questioning, the general configuration within which such a process is inscribed remains unchanged. Throughout these years there is only one beginning for Heidegger (even though the latter is still not considered from the double standpoint: manifest/latent); from which there consequently follows only one single history which is indissolubly linked with that of being and of ontology (in accordance with the requirements of ontology itself, which claims that being is certainly its question).

As a result, Heidegger cannot situate himself other than in the perspective of a continuation of this same history (which has to be brought to its truth). Furthermore, the task of thinking is defined as the 'accomplishment' of metaphysics, and the question of being is reduced to the explicit elucidation of its 'meaning'.

To conclude: the status of the Greeks, in the course of these years at Marburg, is ambiguous. But it is the Greeks, *as a whole*, who are both solicited and criticized at one and the same time. So far from it being the case that remembrance and critique are distributed about distinct figures (the pre-Socratics/Plato), in two distinct moments of history (original/derived), divided into two questions (fundamental/directive) and into two registers (un-thought/thought), none of these splits are operative – in any case, they are not operative *as such*.

I do not want to spend any more time on these early years. A recent article, devoted to Heidegger's relation to the Greeks through the Marburg period,⁸ succeeds in bringing out very well the specificity of this first epoch. For my part, I would simply like to pursue the movement on further and bring it to a conclusion, by showing the nature of Heidegger's relation to the Greeks through the remainder of his itinerary.

II

The second period is far better known.⁹ It begins with the 'turn' (i.e. towards the beginning of the 1930s) and continues throughout most of Heidegger's works. What occurs to Heidegger at this time is that forgetfulness of being, formerly attributed to thought, must be turned back onto being itself: it is being which 'makes itself' forgotten, precisely because the act of drawing back belongs to its development as such, or rather, constitutes the sole means of this development. This entails an immediate consequence. Although it is necessary to distinguish two planes – one in which being develops, and whence it can thus be reached (the *Dasein*), and one in which it is forgotten (history) – the thinker searching for being is henceforward concerned only with one plane: that of history, where being develops specifically *as* forgotten. It is thus within this plane, and to the extent that it is absent, that being might be reached.

Does this mean that the difference between the giving of being and its conjuring away has disappeared from the Heideggerian problematic? Not at all. This difference is shifted within the only plane that subsists, and it is within this plane alone that the double figure now develops. History is in fact not only the site of forgetfulness/withdrawal (the one being identified with the other). It is the site of withdrawal and of forgetfulness: the place where the withdrawal of being takes place (which

is inherent to being itself) and the forgetfulness of this withdrawal (which, all the while being founded on the former, none the less remains within the realm of thought). That is to say that it is the realm of a *double* concealment.

What is to be the position of the thinker with regard to history understood thus? Since there is a doubling of concealment, the task will necessarily be one of duplication. On the one hand, there is no question of tearing it away from its withdrawal, but on the contrary, of retaining it more firmly than ever, that is, of recognizing it as this withdrawal itself. But, on the other hand, how would it be possible to recognize the withdrawal, if not by tearing it away from the forgetfulness in which it was held captive throughout our long history? Thus appears the necessity of a sharing out: the taking over by thought of the first plane of concealment (withdrawal) implies going beyond the second (forgetfulness).

However, if *forgetfulness* can be undone, it can only be so for Heidegger by rediscovering *memory* (I shall come back immediately to this link, which is as rich in consequences as in presuppositions). And whence would the thinker rediscover memory, if not from this inaugural time in which being, while *already* happening in its withdrawal, had not yet taken on the veil of forgetfulness? This is the privilege of the 'Greek morning'; it does not consist at all in being not having withdrawn there yet, but rather in its dispensing itself as what it is in reality, that is, as withdrawing – a withdrawing which was lost as such in later history, that is, forgotten and ever more decisively covered over.

Thus we see something like a genesis of prevalence granted to the pre-Socratics taking shape. It is in order to carry out the separation of the two registers of concealment that Heidegger is led to the split in the Greek world.¹⁰ And it is precisely the link established from the one to the other (a link between a separation in the order of meaning and a split in the historical order – or, if one prefers, a link between forgetfulness, which must be undone, and memory, which must be rediscovered) which constitutes the specificity, as well as the limits, of this second period.

It all happens in fact as if Heidegger, committed since the turn to a thinking which attempts to break with the categories of presence (and which does in fact break off by affirming that being dispenses itself enigmatically as withdrawal), does not manage to go to the limits of his own audacity. Being is certainly understood as withdrawing, thus as forgotten, but *it is necessary* (Heidegger seems to think) that it was not always forgotten, thus that the concealment which constitutes it was not concealed from the start: it is necessary that it be, for an instant at least, revealed outright as the withdrawal it is and that, for this reason, the decisive act through which it *escapes* should none the less have been

given. In other words, it is necessary that the truth of being *should have taken place* – be it only for the time of a flash of lightning.

It is this flash of lightning – or, to put it more rigorously, the idea of its dazzling light which went out as quickly as it came¹¹ – which disappears, as we shall see, from the very first texts. It was only when Heidegger had finished the long turn-around outlined in the beginning of the 1930s that he broke the last ties with the former conceptuality. To remain subject to these ties, in fact, was not only to think being as a presence. It was also to think that the absence, that absence which constituted the true character of being, had given itself at one time to the present, thus marking out a privileged instant in history. When being had become an absence never given as such, an absence understood as having always/already made itself absent, the movement was finished. But, at the same time, the ‘Greek morning’ had lost its privileged position.

Before going on, I would like to make a point clear that might lead to misinterpretation. Heidegger never stated that the first Greeks had *thought* being or truth better than their successors. Consequently, he never envisioned or encouraged any sort of *return* to the pre-Socratics. On the contrary, he unceasingly insisted on the fact that what he is commemorating, on the basis of a renewed meditation on the Greek language, had never been thought – and not even in the beginning. None the less, in his eyes, there is still a difference between the pre-Socratic beginning and what follows it. What does it consist of, then? This is a question too rarely asked and to which the texts offer only one answer in the final analysis: this difference consists of a greater or lesser *nearness* to the unthought, a nearness that finds its meaning completely in the *category* (which one can judge to be risky) of *experience*. What is not thought can in fact be experienced, thus constituting a sort of space where thought moves: this is the case of the first Greeks, and their privilege. It can thus no longer be the object of any experience, that is, it cannot only remain unthought, but even find itself, as such, covered over. It is this covering over which constitutes the long history of metaphysics.

Thus, Heidegger’s interest, beyond Platonic ontology, for what he calls the ‘Greek morning’ is not to be interpreted in the naive perspective of a return. It remains true that throughout most of his work, Heidegger divides up the Greek landscape, formerly seen as unitary, according to a cleavage based on the Platonic idea. Just as we have noted for the first period a (relative) privileging ‘of the Greeks’ – who are supposed to have thought what the later tradition forgot – so what stands out in the second period is a (far more radical) privileging of the ‘first Greeks’ – who *experimented* with what no one had thought, but what the later tradition, inaugurated by Plato, was not even to experience. Here we

see how Heidegger distances himself from the first period (since he recognizes that no one, not even the first Greeks, thought the truth of being), as well as how he remains removed in relation to the third (since he none the less affirms that this truth did have its witnesses in history).

What are the consequences for the ensemble of the second Heidegger's thought of this fundamental position he adopted toward the Greeks? The first, consisting of a new conception of the beginning, immediately entails a second, i.e. a radically new reading of history. That is, by granting the status of 'initial thinkers' to those who were formerly only 'pre-Socratics', Heidegger makes two distinct shifts possible. (1) The departure point is duplicated. It can no longer be reduced to the manifest beginning, which opens up with Plato, but includes a completely different one – hidden, covered over, unrecognized – which appeared with the very first Greeks. (2) At the same time, history is dissociated – it is no longer something which manifests itself on the basis of the Platonic question, but which assumes the form of another question, a hidden question, which emerges with the first Greeks. Thus to affirm, as did the metaphysical tradition, the inaugural character of Socratic-Platonic conceptions is not only to misunderstand the genuine beginning. It is, far more essentially, not to take into account a whole side of history – i.e., to condemn oneself to misunderstanding its essential doubleness.

We must now consider each of these shifts more closely. First, the duality of departure points. What is the precise status of each of them? Two elements deserve to be emphasized. Initially, both of them have a function of inauguration. On the one hand, the Greek morning sets in motion a particular question which, from Plato on, will be forgotten. However, on the other hand, the Platonic act not only stands in relation (misrepresentation) to what goes before it. To the extent that what precedes it was never thought, this act too has an inaugural status. We thus find ourselves in the presence, not of one initial time and of a simply derived stage, but of two initial times. Second – and paradoxically – the one (Platonic ontology) is closely dependent upon the other (the initial setting in motion), since it is only constituted by the recuperation, in the mode of a recovering, of the former time. In this sense, it has a secondary or derived position in relation to the other.

How can we reconcile these two aspects? In other words, how can we explain the fact that Platonic ontology is secondary, while being, in a certain sense, primary? How can we claim that one time is derived from the other without falling back upon the linear illusion, the metaphor of the line (which would eliminate the inaugural duality)? There is only one solution and it is the one Heidegger adopts: he affirms that there are two departure points, but they do not have the same status. The one has an original status, the other only a derived status. The one inaugurates our destiny, though we still cannot define it as the beginning of

thought (since it does not belong to its order), while the other inaugurates the history of thought, without being the source of what is destined to be part of it.

Hence, what we see becoming clearer, in what at first appeared to be a simple doubling of the departure point, is a gap between an unthought origin and a thought beginning, a gap that does have a hierarchy, since the one finds its truth in the other. It is in the light of this doubling and this gap that we can consider the second consequence, i.e. the dissociation of history.

First, the doubling. If, from Heraclitus to Plato, we find not so much a debate about the same question as rather the setting up of two distinct registers of questioning, we are dealing with a double derivation. On the one hand, that of manifest history, that of the directing question (*Leitfrage*): it begins with Plato, and is brought to a high point in the work of Nietzsche, is called metaphysics and is interpreted, in its truth, as the history of the beingness of being. On the other hand, there is a secret history, that of the fundamental question (*Grundfrage*): it begins with the first Greeks, escapes from thought in the very act of its first emergence and is only recollected with Heidegger. It is called the history of being and is interpreted, in its finally unbound truth, as the history of a withdrawal.¹²

Second, the gap. All that has been said up to this point only makes up a first presentation, necessarily temporary. For, in reality, the history of metaphysics is itself, throughout its long development, the history of being. In these conditions, is it possible to sustain the argument that we are dealing with two derivations? Yes and no. No, in the sense that there is in fact only one line. Yes, however, in the sense that this line, in its own particularity, is a Fold, and that it more than allows, namely actually requires, two registers of decoding: our history can be considered in the light of the thought (history of metaphysics) or of the unthought (history of being). Why can we not dispense with this folding? Because it is only by a folding that the line, in its unity, finally becomes thinkable: our history can only be explained in the order of the thought on condition that it is returned to the order of the unthought.

Between these two registers, where does Heidegger stand? At the very heart of their conflictual unity. He is in fact the one who, because he knows how to distinguish, can articulate. In Heideggerian terms: the one who, because he can recognize Difference, can think it as unity.¹³ This leads us to a third consequence, parallel to that noted during analysis of the first period. The question was the following: how does Heidegger define his own position in relation to history? In order to measure the course thus far, let us recall the answer that was given at that time. History still being conceived of in a unequivocal manner, Heidegger located himself then in continuity with it, i.e. within the direct line of

ontological questioning. However, in order to pursue the same question further, he had, on the one hand, to return to his point of departure (the 'reminiscing' about what had formerly been considered as the beginning, i.e. Plato/Aristotle), while, on the other hand, he had to examine the latter 'in depth' and in a line of thinking inspired by Husserl's phenomenology.

In relation to this first picture, the second period carries out a triple shift. First, the critical work done on Platonico-Aristotelian conceptuality can no longer be termed 'examination in depth', because it requires a leap, a passage to another register. Second, this 'leap beyond' does not touch a more fundamental stratum in the order of meaning, but a more original inscription in the order of history: it takes us back toward the other departure point and this is why it is called the *Schritt zurück*. Third, and finally, since this other departure point never belonged to the order of thought, it can no longer be a question of 'reminiscing' about a 'beginning' (even if earlier than the Platonico-Aristotelian beginning aimed at during the first period), but rather of the 'commemoration' of an 'other beginning' (*Anfang*, and no longer *Beginn*). Briefly: what was formerly conceived of as a movement back to the foundations of Platonico-Aristotelian conceptuality now becomes a step back in the direction of the origin.¹⁴

A certain number of other consequences follow from this, consequences which it is best to interpret in the light of those already brought out in the analysis of the first period. First of all, the task of thought. In line with the movement of examination in depth (of the Aristotelian scheme), it was formerly defined as 'realization' (of metaphysics). In line with the movement of the *Schritt zurück* (in the direction of the Greek morning), it is now defined as *Andenken*. It is no longer the conclusion of a question already asked at the beginning, but rather the recollection of another question, unthought from the origin. This definition of thought as memory signals in two directions at the same time. First, while the idea of a culmination indicated that it was a matter of taking a question asked (if insufficiently elaborated in the beginning) further still, the idea of a recollection indicates that it is necessary to return to a question that was never asked as such, even if it came from even further back. This first connotation of the term recollection would thus respond to the question: what must one think? However, on the other hand, the idea of a culmination also indicates that this insufficiently elaborated question allows for a more satisfactory examination, that it could (and must) be brought to the clarity of a concept, i.e. be made the object of what *Sein und Zeit* termed an 'explicit elucidation'.¹⁵ The idea of recollection indicates that this unthought origin toward which one must return can never be grasped, discovered or uncovered, with regard to what it 'is': one can only remember it, or better still, commemorate it, within a 'faithful

thought'. This second connotation of the term recollection would thus respond to the question: how must one think?

These two connotations are obviously not unconnected. If what one must meditate upon is a trace which thought never conjugated in the present, then this can only be meditated upon in the future perfect. The word 'recollection' says both: it says that what we are to be faithful to lies far behind, at the origins of our history, as something always/already withdrawn, and it says that, in order to be faithful to it, thought must transform itself: it must no longer be the grasping of a substance, not even the elucidation of a meaning, but the recollection of a difference.

There is finally a last consequence – which is also, by right, the very first, and which will enable us to close the circle. The question of being transforms itself. It is no longer a question of bringing to light a unity of meaning given at the same time as 'being'; it is a question of directing oneself toward the darkness wherein it takes shelter, i.e. of remembering that which withdraws. What then does withdraw throughout the long, supposedly unequivocal, history of metaphysics? It is precisely this doubleness and its enigmatic unity. That is, being as Difference.

The end of our analysis thus offers the key to all that precedes it. If the entire second period of Heidegger's itinerary can be characterized by a series of cleavages – and cleavages formerly poorly understood, which Heidegger had to construct patiently – it is because being 'is' Difference – and a difference withdrawn from the start, which encourages its own misunderstanding, thus the obliteration of the cleavages.

III

Is there a third period? That is obviously the question which this new treatment of the subject will arouse. Taking the *Kehre* into account and utilizing it to better bring out the fundamental positions adopted in the course of a life's work, both these processes are based upon an interpretation which is largely underwritten by Heidegger himself. However, to affirm that at the end of his development he would have committed himself to another turning point in which positions adopted during the previous decades would have been placed in doubt or seen as out-dated is certainly running a risk: that of proposing a division which, even if it does run through his work, is never made the explicit theme of it.

I do think, none the less that we cannot pass over this new division and that the outlining of a 'third period' is necessary for several reasons. Necessary, first of all, because of the theme we have developed here. The privilege granted to the Greek morning is often projected upon the ensemble of Heidegger's thought, as if, by making the one coincide with the other, the former could be used to define the latter. We have however

seen that *it had not been clearly outlined* at the beginning of his development and we shall also see that *it had already been set aside* by the end of it. A subtle setting-aside that was not always clearly marked out but for which the main evidence is provided to us by Heidegger himself when he *renounces*, on a decisive point, the interpretation which dominates his work. Of course, he utilized this dominant interpretation for some thirty years in any number of texts. The renunciation comes at the very end and in a few pages. Unless we decide (and according to what criteria?) that certain texts will be taken as determinative for the understanding of a thinker while others will be ascribed to accident or a break in the train of thought, it remains difficult for us to take for granted an interpretation which Heidegger himself did not recognize as his own.

Second, if his view of the Greeks cannot be dissociated from a particular way of locating the beginning, defining history and thinking the question of being (as I have attempted to show for the two preceding periods), then we may presume that such a noticeable change in his understanding of the first Greeks must imply – or indicate – an equally significant modification in the ensemble of his thought. Do the later texts (those of the 1960s) indicate such a modification? It is only by being attentive to the difficulties and discordances which characterize these later texts that we have any chance of resolving the question of this third period. Do these discordances, once clearly set apart, agree with one another? Do they make up a relatively homogeneous setting? And, if this is the case, how can this unity of the later texts be structured in accordance with the other ‘periods’ in Heidegger’s development? It seems to me that one of the tasks of contemporary criticism is perhaps to respond to these questions.

We must not forget that, if Heidegger did not really outline this ultimate unity in its specificity and its difference from the other periods, he did nevertheless grant it a place and a name. Its place is in the collection *Zur Sache des Denkens*, which contains the three most significant texts on the new positions: ‘Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens’ (1964), which corrects and modifies the former interpretation of the ‘Greek morning’, ‘Zeit und Sein’, and the ‘Seminar’ devoted to it (1962), which presents the double question of being and history in a new and quite troubling light.¹⁶ The name which delimits a space for a thinking which is still unexplored and with regard to which it is a question, says Heidegger, of ‘committing oneself’, is *Ereignis*.¹⁷

Let us take up again, point by point, each of the shifts carried out in the course of these last years. The gesture which will mark our point of departure is the re-establishment of the previously interrupted continuity between the pre-Socratics and Plato. It was assumed until then that Plato had initiated a change in the essence of truth, making it move from an uncovering (ἀλήθεια) to rectitude (ὁμοίωσις).¹⁸ More generally, it was

assumed that the 'Greek morning' constituted a privileged time in history when something of being stood out in its own truth and was, at least within the register of experience, perceived as such. But here is what Heidegger writes about ἀλήθεια and the 'change of essence' in truth which was thought to have taken place in Plato:

We must recognize that ἀλήθεια, the uncovering in the sense of the lighting up of presence, is henceforth and exclusively [*sogleich und nur*] to be experienced [*erfahren*] as the rectitude [*Richtigkeit*] of representation and statement. But then, even the affirmation of the mutation of the essence of truth [*von einem Wesenswandel der Wahrheit*] which would have led from uncovering to rectitude, is no longer tenable. Instead of this, we must say: ἀλήθεια, as the lighting up of presence and presentification [*als Lichtung von Anwesenheit und Gegenwärtigung*] in thought and word, happens henceforth [*sogleich*] in the perspective of ὁμοίωσις and adequatio, that is, in the perspective of a conformity [*Angleichung*] in the sense of a correspondence [*Übereinstimmung*] between representation and what is present.¹⁹

This text is rich in information. The dividing line between the initial 'experience' and later philosophy is considerably clouded over. Metaphysics, of course, retains its status as a derived construction which cannot be understood in itself. But Heidegger formerly believed one could discover, in the Greek morning, the 'original' figure. He now recognizes that this figure, in its first blossoming and its very first giving, was already derived, that it was *derived from the beginning*, that there was no original nor any covering over. It is this reunifying of the Greek scene which seems to constitute the basic shift. For the moment, we need to examine the various consequences, as we did for the preceding periods.

The first is that it is no longer necessary to retain the principle of a double *beginning*, one more original than the other. Of course, we must look at something which, in some of its features, still resembles an 'origin'. But no one in history, and no time in history, was close to it. What underwrote and legitimized the distinction of the beginnings was precisely this subtle hierarchy of closeness. Once this has been broken down, it is no longer necessary to retain two points of departure: one having opened in the split second of a lightning stroke, without being recognized or thought, and the other, which took place in the decline of this split second, and which was alone to have a posterity in the order of thought. No longer having the room to develop in history itself (even on the threshold of this history), the inaugural bolt of lightning was never really able to *take place*.

If thus 'the Greeks' are again thought of as a unity, if what happens with Heraclitus is only and immediately (*nur und sogleich*) what will be

made thematic by Plato and will continue until Nietzsche, then the initial complication, belonging to the second period, can be abandoned: occidental thought begins with the very first Greeks; Plato limits himself to continuing them; ontology does not begin anything (not anything, in any case, which is of the order of a break); there is only one beginning and it is an errant beginning.

The second consequence: this reunified beginning results in a *history* which is itself simplified. It is best however to be quite precise here. To speak of simplification does not in any way mean affirming that the Fold would disappear. But what is new is that the hidden side is, to a certain extent, let loose: not having ever reached land, even in the beginning, *it loses its anchor point in history*. Of course, as early as the second period, the unthought was recognized as having always been unthought. But, precisely, it did 'reach land', in such a way that the history of thought was not to be assimilated simply to history as such. Beyond the strict register of thought, there were those of experience (*Erfahren*), of premonition (*Ahnen*), still others perhaps – registers which rightfully belonged to occidental history, which were even dominant in its beginnings (the whole meaning of 'morning') and which allowed the unthought to insert itself, even obliquely, *in this history*. While now occidental history, since its very first opening and in all its dimensions, is played out entirely on *one* of its sides. As for the other side, it remains what must be aimed at or thought, but it no longer overlaps anything which takes place; it does not rejoin any historical trace; it has had no witness – *and thus no guarantor* – in history.

The third consequence: how did Heidegger see himself in relation to history thus understood? As long as the unthought retained its anchor point in history, Heidegger had no need to depart from this history in order to think it. He did indeed need to make a 'leap', but it was an intra-historical one, since he made it by moving back from the derived to the original, i.e. from one beginning to another. The movement played itself out less *in history* than *in relation* to it. It is less a 'step back' than a 'step to the side'. History being entirely grasped as a unity, the person who attempts to think it, i.e. to send it back to its unthought truth, can no longer place himself *in* it. There is simply no room left for him in this history, because there is no trace he can insert himself into.

The fourth consequence: the task of thought, the leitmotif of the lecture of this title²⁰ is that it is now a question of thinking 'the lighting up of presence' (*die Lichtung von Anwesenheit*). Is this a shift in relation to the task defined previously? Indubitably. But this shift cannot be accomplished unless we distinguish the different occurrences of the word *Lichtung* in Heidegger's work. *Lichtung* has only one meaning, clearly defined: it names the unapparent opening whence comes that which is given. But by 'what is given', Heidegger sometimes means the present

or being – and in this case, the unapparent opening from which it comes is presence itself. Taken in this context, *Lichtung* denotes being. In the text we are dealing with, by ‘what is given’, Heidegger means presence or being – and in this case, the unapparent opening from which it comes is an even more initial land. In this context, *Lichtung* no longer denotes being, but the whole possibility of its being given – that is, it exactly matches the semantic field of the word *Ereignis*. To sum up, the word *Lichtung*, which indicates a formal movement of withdrawal of giving, receives a different ‘value’ according to the quality of what is given (and thus of what withdraws): *Lichtung von Anwesenheit* is not synonymous with *Lichtung als Anwesenheit*.²¹

Once this confusion has been cleared up, the task of thought as it is defined in the 1964 text (‘Das Ende der Philosophie’) is no longer distinguishable from the one presented two years earlier in ‘Zeit und Sein’. In both cases, the task no longer consists in thinking being (in order to recognize it as difference) or in illuminating history (as the history of being). It consists in thinking their common origin. Their origin, i.e. *that whence* they were dispensed from being as time, thus *that whence* our history could be what it was. But moving back to this land of giving also makes possible a double gesture, for which it is important to evaluate the link.

(1) The claim that this history, as such, is *terminated*. And this, to the precise extent to which it was carried back to that which granted it. If the history of being is, as Heidegger always said, the history of the withdrawal of presence in its different historical periods, it cannot be sent back to that which formulated this withdrawal without coming simultaneously to its closing. It is thus revealed that the history of being only perpetuated itself through the unthought which it enfolded (and not in spite of it) and that, once ‘illuminated’ it lost at one and the same time its secret and its very drive. Thus the first ‘disturbing’ theme of the ‘Seminar’ is legitimized: that of an end to history.²²

(2) The claim that this history (precisely because it was taken back to its provenance and found its conclusion there) can be *abandoned*. It is in this sense once again that the ultimate ‘step back’ becomes the very first ‘step aside’. Having projected ourselves into the land of the *es gibt*, this makes everything which is derived therefrom thinkable, everything which came under the heading of presence and history of being. But this also allows us to see the broader realm of what is not derived, which remains unknown for us, as well as unnamed. This means that it opens onto the possibility of another thought and perhaps of another future which would no longer be a history. Thus the second disturbing theme of the ‘Seminar’ falls into place: our history no longer constitutes what is to be thought.²³

It is in this context that we may best insert the fifth consequence, i.e., the last position adopted by Heidegger in relation to the *question of being*. In fact, it is only the translation of the preceding double statement. Committing oneself to the land of the *Ereignis* is in effect reaching the 'essential provenance' of being, thus taking it back to its 'ownness' – and it is at one and the same time a way of having done with it. The work of explanation being complete, it no longer has a claim upon us. Hence the third disturbing theme of the 'Seminar': that of a 'taking-leave' of the question of being.²⁴

These two statements (the history of being is finished/it can be abandoned) are not only linked together. They are also articulated most closely with the whole series of 'consequences' which I brought out as characteristic features of the last period. The fact of thinking the *end* of history and jointly its *abandonment* (fourth consequence) has the condition of its possibility in the leap Heidegger made in locating himself *outside* this history (third consequence), a leap having its own condition of possibility in the act through which history, formerly split, was *reunited*, this reunification being entailed by the fact that truth – or its trace – was no longer to be inserted *in* it (second consequence).²⁵

What did these last analyses tend toward? Toward showing, first, that a number of disconcerting statements by the later Heidegger have a unity (i.e. are concordant among themselves) in their reference to *Ereignis*, understood as the realm of donation. Second, that this realm proposes answers – *new answers* – to the ensemble of those questions (the beginning, history, the task of thought and the question of being) which formerly allowed us to recognize different 'periods' in Heidegger's itinerary. Third and most important of all, it is in the light of the differentiation between *Ereignis* and the question of being that it is possible to understand the relation of necessity which unites the third period to the two before it. What is more, the status granted to the Greeks enjoys the status of a *privileged sign* even if it does not possess that of a driving force. It only remains to elaborate upon these last two points.

In the second part, we saw that the division of the Greek landscape went hand in hand with a whole series of splits, themselves contemporary with the central attempt: thinking being as difference. What stands out in the third part is that the reunification of the Greek landscape (taken as the point of departure for the analysis) cannot itself be dissociated from a withdrawal from the ensemble of divisions, itself contemporaneous with a new attempt: 'diverting the focus of being'²⁶ (therefore of the difference).

The passage from one period to another thus appears in its necessity. What happens at the end of his work and explains all the shifts we have followed is that the question – i.e., also the task – is henceforth elsewhere. What was divided can be withdrawn under the heading of unity,

because what is to be thought now is the *relation* between this re-established unity and its possible *outside*. In clear terms: what is to be thought is no longer the difference between being and beingness, but the relation between being (which *is* only through its difference to beingness – though it is no longer this which is being insisted upon) and its giving; no longer the difference between metaphysics and the thought of being but the relation between the thought of being (which alone can elucidate metaphysics – though this is no longer what is being insisted upon) and another thought. What is the condition for such a change? I shall propose – with caution – that it consists in the fact that Heidegger, no longer seeing any privileged time in history, can henceforth distance himself from it and consider it as an ensemble.²⁷ And what is its consequence? It is that the relation between this ensemble and its other, that is, between a unity and the outside from which it comes (and to which it can be led back), can become a question. It is indeed this question which moves to the very centre (under the auspices of the term ‘giving’) when thought ‘commits itself to *Ereignis*’. That is, *Ereignis* elucidates not only the internal coherence of the third period but also its insertion into the ensemble of Heidegger’s itinerary.

In these pages, I have attempted to outline a double curve of development. Along the first, we find the little history of the Greek morning with its triple status: first understood as the beginning (hesitant) of what Plato and Aristotle will raise to full conceptuality, then as a starting signal (decisive) for a question that ontology will condemn to forgetfulness, finally as the beginning (henceforth without glory) of this forgetfulness itself. The history of the Greeks in Heidegger’s works is thus that of a unity broken and then re-established, but re-established after an overthrow: if Plato appears in the beginning as a continuation or realization of the pre-Socratics (in the register of truth), at the end, it is the pre-Socratics who appear as a prefiguration of Plato (in the register of misunderstanding).

On the second curve, we find the great history, History itself as it can be grasped through Heidegger’s triple project: first to continue it by delving into it, then to elucidate it by recollecting it, finally to abandon it, by taking leave of it. For me, the principal interest in the outlining of these two curves lies in their articulation: because the one closely adheres to the other, follows it in each of its movements, we are able to bring this movement to light.

However, this revealing is not without danger. By elucidating – in a light which we can justly call relatively stark – Heidegger’s positions, I have partially altered their nature. Left on their own within the text where they had their being, their outlines were not so keen nor their

contrast so marked. By emphasizing, as I have done, the breaks in the itinerary, I have betrayed the continuity. For there is indeed a continuity. Heidegger always moves along the same path, a path one can (and must) grasp as a unity. It is none the less true that this unity is not simple, that it has 'stations' – stations which one can (and must) bring to light as well. This obligation is all the more impelling in that Heidegger, at the end of his life, made an attempt at an auto-interpretation under the heading of unity: emphasizing the continuity of that preoccupation which led him from Brentano to Trakl, or the persistence of the question leading from *Sein und Zeit* to 'Zeit und Sein'. This is a possible (and accurate) light to see it in, but it is not the only one possible, nor the only one that is accurate. For Heidegger's itinerary is at once continuous and discontinuous. By insisting as he does on the unitary aspect, Heidegger left us to come to terms with the differences, without himself carrying out the work of differentiation. It is up to us to take this on, that is to outline the limits that were not immediately evident. As my objective was to make them intelligible, I was forced to *exaggerate* them.

This objective having been at least partially achieved, it remains for me to undo what I have been doing throughout these pages – to recall that the duality of the question was already sketched out as early as *Sein und Zeit*, that the going beyond presence, accomplished in *Ereignis*, was already played out in the very thought of presence as it was developed in the heart of his works; that, in one or other of its dimensions, *Ereignis* is the *accomplishment* of the question of the truth of being which is itself closely contiguous with the question of the 'meaning' of being, etc. Thus, Heidegger's itinerary does not strictly include – except for purely occasional questions – *changes in course*. It does however include, in the strict sense, *turning points*, places where the path curves inward, where the direction is modified and refined, without truly recanting – but in finding its end elsewhere and otherwise. The Greek morning which the prophetic Heidegger neglected at first and which he later sought out and recognized as blind, formed here the site of a *topography of turning points*.

Translated by Cozette Griffin-Kremer

Notes

1 Cf. *Heidegger et les paroles de l'origine* (Paris: Vrin, 1986).

2 The volumes presently available are volumes 20, 21, 24, 25 and 26 of the *Gesamtausgabe* (GA).

3 *Sein und Zeit* (SZ) (GA 2), §6, p. 22.

4 Cf. *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, GA 24, p. 453 (French tr., p. 382). Heidegger confirms here that 'at the beginning of ancient philosophy',

being is still taken as beings, that is, 'explained with the help of ontic determinations'. And he adds: 'This way of interpreting being will remain current for a long time in Greek philosophy, even after the decisive progress brought about by Plato and Aristotle in the posing of the problem'.

5 SZ, §1, p. 2.

6 For this double movement the *Logik* (GA 21) should be consulted. Also, *Die Frage nach der Wahrheit* (GA 21) and *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*.

7 A claim which obviously has to be qualified. If a question is posed in another manner (in a more radical manner etc.), is it still the same question? Without pretending to be able to resolve this question here, I would like nevertheless to propose several components of a reply. (1) It is indubitable that the question of the 'meaning of being', posed in *Sein und Zeit*, is *already more* than that characteristic of ontology, namely, of the 'being of beings' (even if the latter is envisaged from the standpoint of a unity of signification). (2) It could be however that is *not yet* that of the 'truth of being', characteristic of the later texts. (3) Between this 'already more' and this 'not yet' there reigns a difference of *radicality*. It has to do with the fact that in the movement of the 'already more', the word 'being' keeps its earlier meaning – which it loses, by contrast, in the execution of the 'no longer'. What I mean is that what is decisive in the transition from the problematic of 'meaning' to that of 'truth', is that 'being' no longer says the same thing in the one expression as in the other. When Heidegger was pursuing the meaning of being, it was a matter of that being furnished by ontology, even if its meaning, as well as the horizon of this being, was not made explicit by it. When he starts to pursue the truth of being, it is a matter of that being which reveals itself to ontology, and of which it has never spoken, which it never even succeeded in envisaging – the history of thinking then being recognized as envisaging, under the name of being, a different question altogether, namely, that of the beingness of beings.

If these distinctions can today be drawn more finely, it is evidently on account of the publication of the lectures. Previously we were obliged to read the first eight paragraphs of *Sein und Zeit* in the light of writings subsequent to 1930. So naturally we were inclined to project upon it distinctions which, while being certainly pre-figured by it, were however not operative in it. The interest of a text like *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* is precisely that of having permitted this to appear in another light.

8 J. Taminiaux, 'Heidegger et les Grecs à l'époque de l'ontologie fondamentale', *Etudes phénoménologiques*, No. 1, ed. Ousia, 1985.

9 We may note that publication of the Marburg courses is quite recent – and still unfinished – and that the texts from the later years, perhaps due to insufficient distance, have remained fairly little analysed by current criticism.

10 Naturally, it is also because he reads the pre-Socratics, and so on. I do not claim to propose a universal key, but am trying simply to bring out *one* dimension of explanation by putting this split back into the horizon of necessity which can, at least partially, give some account of it.

11 Cf. for example *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1978), p. 221: 'Once, however, in the beginning of Occidental thought, the essence of language burst forth [*aufblitzte*] like a flash of lightning in the light of being. . . . But the flash of lightning went out suddenly.' And, a few pages later (*ibid.*, p. 237), Heidegger takes it up again: 'This first lighting up of the essence of language disappeared immediately, it was covered over.' Taking only the example of the word *logos*, it would be easy to show that, for Heidegger, *all* the 'fundamental

words' (*physis*, *alétheia*, *eon*, etc.) also burst forth in light only to go out immediately.

12 For the distinction *Grundfrage/Leitfrage*, cf. particularly *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (1935, GA 40), as well as *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*, GA 31.

13 i.e. think it, not as a simple *Unterscheidung*, but as an *Austrag*, a term for which Heidegger asks us to understand both the differend and its conciliation. For the development of this terminology (and this thought), see particularly: *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), p. 63 and *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1975), p. 25.

14 Of course, it is understood that the origin in question here is not only in history: it stems from the scheme (transformed, for that matter) of the 'foundation'. In exactly the same way, the *Schritt zurück*, mentioned above, is not only a step backwards in history: it also stems from the scheme (transformed) of 'examination in depth'. I am not affirming at all that we move here from one order (of meaning) to another (of history). I am saying that henceforth the two move together and that it is precisely this conjunction which was absent in the first period.

15 SZ, §2, p. 6.

16 *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1960). The collection also contains the short text entitled 'Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie', 1963. It is understood that the later period is not limited to the texts cited. However, if it is brought out in a number of other texts, it is in these that it is most clearly made into a theme.

17 I have shown elsewhere, in a comparative chart of different occurrences of the theme (*Heidegger et les paroles de l'origine*), that *Ereignis* is certainly named in earlier texts, but that is only properly thought out during the decade 1950–60, and is only fully explicated at the end of the decade and the beginning of the next.

18 'Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit', *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1967), pp. 135–9 (*Qu. II*, pp. 152–5).

19 'Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens', in *Zur Sache des Denkens*, p. 78 (*Qu. IV*, pp. 135–6).

20 'Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens'.

21 This structure is developed by Heidegger himself, but in another text and with regard to another term: that of 'letting'. There he distinguishes the two acts of 'letting the present happen' (to the presence) and 'letting presence happen' itself. The distinction is clearer in German, where one can follow the passage from the pair *Anwesend/Anwesen* (characteristic of his 'mature' works) from the pair *Anwesen/Anwesenlassen* (characteristic of later texts). Cf. 'Zeit und Sein', in *Zur Sache des Denkens*, p. 5 (*Qu. IV*, pp. 18–19), as well as the corresponding commentary in the Seminar, *Qu. IV*, pp. 39–40 (69–70).

22 'Seminar über den Vortrag Zeit und Sein', in *Zur Sache des Denkens*, pp. 44–5 (*Qu. IV*, p. 75). For the analogy on this point with Hegel, cf. *ibid.*, p. 53 (87).

23 *ibid.*

24 *ibid.*, p. 58 (93).

25 That is, the very last hypotheses of Heidegger would simply be impossible – even impossible to envision – within the scope of the second period alone to which the ensemble of Heidegger's itinerary is often reduced. One does not abandon that which one holds oneself within; one can only elucidate it differently on the basis of a new perspective made possible by the place occupied in the

space of the within. However, if one is outside, it is the whole of the territory which may be neglected at the same time that it is circumscribed. To sum up, if Heidegger was able to envision the exploration of an 'elsewhere' at the end of his work, it is because he was already there.

26 'Zeit und Sein', in *Zur Sache des Denkens*, pp. 5–6 (*Qu. IV*, p. 19).

27 But have we here really the condition or simply one of the dimensions of the change? I admit I do not see this very clearly.

Reading and thinking: Heidegger and the hinting Greeks

Kenneth Maly

The scope of this presentation is a gathering of reading, thinking and hinting in their evocative possibilities – possibilities opened up within the work of thinking that we call ‘Heidegger’. The early Greek context for this presentation is twofold: Anaximander and Parmenides. The textual context is threefold, three texts of Heidegger’s: ‘Der Spruch des Anaximander’ (called ‘The Anaximander fragment’ in English translation) from *Holzwege* (GA 5), *Grundbegriffe* (GA 51) (whose last section is devoted to Anaximander) and the short text on Parmenides and the ensuing discussion in the ‘Seminar in Zähringen 1973’ from *Seminare* (GA 15).¹

Specifically, the work of thinking attempted here is a weaving of reading, thinking and hinting into and out of those three Heidegger-texts, then a weaving of the texts on Anaximander with the text on Parmenides and finally a weaving of the whole problematic of ‘being’ as it unfolds from out of the questions of reading, thinking and hinting – as they are probed, tested and tried at the fire of this first beginning with the early Greeks.

Thus this presentation, in the process of its unfolding, will be of service to two issues of paramount importance to Heidegger-scholarship at the present juncture in philosophy, exactly one hundred years after his birth: first, by engaging the core issues of Heidegger’s thinking in terms of texts that have appeared in the *Gesamtausgabe*, it participates in that thorough and in-depth reinterpretation and reappropriation of Heidegger’s works that is called for by the ongoing publication of the *Gesamtausgabe*. Second, by engaging texts from different years in Heidegger’s life-work and by letting the one question that runs through all of these texts be seen in its several hues, it shows the ongoing unfolding in the turns and turnings in Heidegger’s work *from within the texts themselves*, rather than from the perspective of textual hermeneutics, comparison of texts, or commentary *on* these texts.

This presentation is not intended as an external commentary on Heidegger's thought – thus commenting *on* Heidegger and then either dividing his thought into 'periods' or placing his thinking here or there within the history of metaphysics. Rather, it wants to go underneath such commentary, underneath to the subtle but very forceful evocation to the matter for thinking (*das Zudenkende*), which is always the same (even a unity, a one?) and which a proper reading of the texts opens up.

This presentation unfolds in a series of imagings, imagings that image or show or let be seen the question that is imaged in the imagings. And finally, since *what* gets imaged in the imaging is always the one question (the question of being/disclosure/self-showing), the imagings are always imaging being as self-showing. Since being as self-showing is itself an imaging, this presentation is a series of imagings of imaging itself.

First imaging: the place of opening

That place where the question opens up for us – what is it? Where is it? How to name, provisionally, that place where the question carries with it and within itself its own energy (*energeia*) or work?

In *Grundbegriffe* (GA 51) Heidegger portrays an unavoidable and unresolvable tension, the tension whereby on the one hand being (or the 'is') is, while on the other hand every attempt to think that being results in its being transformed into a being. Although being is somehow other than beings, when we think 'being as such', we end up thinking it as *a* being, turning everything upside down, perverting, inverting, turning everything topsy-turvy – putting a misleading and inappropriate shape to the question.

In Paragraph 17 of *Grundbegriffe* Heidegger says this place of tension, of unresolvability, in several ways:

- (a) We stand between two equally unsurpassable limits: On the one hand, insofar as we think and say 'being "is"', we immediately make being into a being and thereby deny the proper work (*energeia*) of being. *Being gets disavowed by us*. But, on the other hand, as long as we experience beings, we can never deny the 'being' and the 'is'. (GA 51, p. 80)
- (b) On the one hand being cannot be gotten around; on the other hand, when entered into, being gets immediately made over into '*a* being'. (GA 51, p. 81)
- (c) In every attempt to think being, being always gets turned the wrong way and changed into *a* being – and is thus destroyed in

- what it is in its core. And yet: being in its otherness from beings (being other than beings) cannot be denied. (GA 51, p. 82)
- (d) Being shows itself to be both at the same time: it is put forward as unavoidable and indispensable, even necessary – and at the same time incomprehensible and ungraspable. (GA 51, p. 82)
 - (e) [I add here a quotation from *Introduction to Metaphysics*, where the same tension is expressed]: The word *being* is undefined/indefinite [*unbestimmt*] in its meaning, and still we definitely [*bestimmt*] understand it. ‘Being’ turns out to be (shows itself as) something highly definite, but totally indefinite, undefined – even ambiguous.²

The place of opening, as portrayed and laid out here, is that place where being both is and is not graspable, where being cannot be denied and at the same time gets thought as itself *a* being – and thus no longer itself: being as such – where being is disavowed and at the same time undeniable.

From the point of view of logic, this place is one of contradiction – and often gets dismissed for its impossibility. In dismissing this place, logic renounces and then loses being and its domain. (The uncanny part of this is that this renouncing, which is at its root a loss, gets taken as a gain. ‘Reality’ is simplified, manageable – and its managers are more secure – within this renouncement. No wonder that they blindly call this loss a gain! (cf. GA 51, p. 40).) The discipline of logic will never enter into this domain.

We are presented here with an aporia, a place that is difficult or even impossible to pass through. The mode of metaphysical thinking is to think *about* this aporia, only to realize that there is no way out.

What Heidegger proposes and evokes is a different way of thinking: not thinking as thinking *about*, but thinking as expanding into, having a genuine root connection to this aporia, not as a ‘no way out’, but rather as what is worthy of thought (*denk-würdig*): what calls for, requires, draws forth thinking.

Gathering up: the place of the opening of the question is the aporia (no way out) of being’s always getting turned into *a* being, or of being’s being unavoidable and intrinsic to what is and at the same time being incomprehensible in its ‘is-ness’. Rather than thinking *about* this aporia, we are called to expand into the domain of being in its aporetic and unresolvable character.

It might seem as if what we are describing here is a refined and more subtle shape of the ontological difference. But it is utterly different. Although the words used and the grammar may *seem* to be about the ontological difference, what is being said is in a dimension that is fundamentally *not* that. This can be seen in two ways: first, the being that is

spoken of here (speaks itself) is not the being *of* beings – it is not the difference between beings and the being of those beings. (We will see later that the very word *being* is unsuited for saying this region/domain.) Second, what is opened up in this unresolvable matter/*Sache* is not a difference at all. There is no difference here, even though language and grammar differentiates. Thus I would suggest not using such words as *discord*, *dispersal*, *dichotomy* – or even *difference* – to name this place of opening. This *Sache* in its unresolvability cannot be named *difference*, however one spells or pronounces the word.

Rather it is an opening. At work is an expanding. This gets heard in the *energeia* of the opening. What is called for is a language that says this domain in its folding and unfolding, in the movement that it carries *in itself*. What is called for is to see the aspects and shapes of the tension in the imaging of weaving and nuance rather than in any imaging of juxtaposition or opposition.

Second imaging: entering into the clearing of being

How to enter the question of being, the domain of being? Given that the place of opening is aporetic, *how* does thinking expand into this aporia?

The tension that we have just described in the first imaging – namely that being, in every attempt to think it, gets turned or perverted into a being, thus losing its root character, while at the same time being as other than beings cannot be denied – appears to logical thought as a contradiction or paradox. We, on the other hand, must try to go all the way into the tension of the two ‘equally unsurpassable limits’, into the tension of being’s being unavoidable *and* incomprehensible, into the definite indefiniteness of being, into being’s otherness even as it is always thought as not other than beings, into the tension of the unresolvability.

The word that Heidegger uses for this ‘going all the way into’ is *erfahren*. We usually translate *erfahren* as ‘to experience’. But simply to render *erfahren* as ‘experience’ carries two risks: (1) that we in our thinking will miss the point of this deep penetration or entering into the dynamic of this tension and (2) that by using the English word *experience* we fall prey to a dimension of interiority or subjectivity that the word carries with it in its usual connotation as well as in its etymology from the Latin.

If we take the word *erfahren* back to its roots, we find the verb *fahren* – to travel, to wander; to let go; to ride; to move, go, travel – and then the prefix *er-*. *Er-* has a root connection growing out of the prefix *ur-*, referring to origin or source. *Ur-*: from the source or origin, out-and-

out, thorough, through-and-through. With this connection *er-* means: all the way into, into and out of the origin. Thus *erfahren* means:

to get by going through
 to go all the way into/through
 to move/pass through
 to be drawn through
 to become versed in
 to let go into.

Erfahren means 'to experience', but in the deeper sense of going all the way into and being thoroughly *in* the *Sache*.

Heidegger says that we need 'to go all the way into [*erfahren*] the situation that, placed between the two limits, we are delivered into a unique situation or place from which there is no way out' (GA 51, p. 81). Thus thinking's way into the question is to get all the way into and to stay with the fact that there is no way out of the question. This 'no way out' (*Ausweglosigkeit*) or impasse presses upon us in a twofold manner: (1) how the question or domain of being is both unavoidable and incomprehensible, how we are called to think being in its being other than beings, even as we always think it *as a* being and (2) how, once our thinking has entered this domain, there is no way out. (Again, logic will not help; for it gets out by jumping the fence!)

In presenting the unresolvability of this question, Heidegger opens up a pathway with several clues or steps as to how we in our thinking might enter into this space of unresolvability.

(1) 'this extreme "no way out" might come from being itself' (GA 51, p. 81). 'Being itself unfolds in such a way that *it* brings . . . thinking into this "no way out" ' (GA 51, p. 82). Our entry into the unresolvability is granted by being itself as it emerges in the dynamics of unresolvability. (2) One possible response is to close our eyes to the aporia. Another possible response is to eliminate the aporia by disallowing the question of being. But there is a third possibility: to move into and to stay with the 'no way out' situation abandoning all haste to get out of it (cf. GA 51, p. 82).

Being has cast itself upon us as the 'light' by virtue of which beings appear and get seen. We cannot fight against or refuse this casting of being – nor would we want to, Heidegger says. But at the same time being withdraws when we try to say it – and we are left only with beings. This continual tension is our proper dwelling place; its name is *Da-sein*.

Thus, by staying in and with the 'no way out', we find that, as humans thinking, we are left in a region that simply has/is this utter openness, dynamically in tension. In this context Heidegger says: 'In a strange sort of way being has exploded our own *human essence*' (GA 51, p. 89).

(3) Staying within this domain of unresolvability, the 'recollecting of

being (gathering oneself unto being) is remembering or becoming wakeful to the first origin of Western thinking. This remembering or being wakeful to the first origin is a preparatory thinking [*Vordenken*] into the more originary origin' (GA 51, p. 92). This preparatory thinking needs to be *unbeeilt*: unrushed, needing its own time (not the hasty moving quickly from one thing to another). It also needs to be *ungerahmt*: unframed, not de-fined, needing its own opening and expanding (not the limitation of the space of positions or niches, as in 'this niche' and then 'that niche'). This remembering is being transported into the being itself which still unfolded in that origin and which always still unfolds, even when thinking's focus is on beings alone. Thus being in its originary character is always close to us – as close as can be. Therefore, what seems like being transported *into* that domain is really only remembering and being awake to our being always already there.

(4) To be awake to, being within or expanding into the domain of 'no way out', is to be gathered into being. This 'being gathered into' is, very simply and in each case, a transformation (*Wandlung*) in our way of being. This transformation needs beforehand a preparedness, the state of being prepared (*Bereitschaft*). This preparedness needs beforehand a preparation, getting prepared (*Vorbereitung*). This preparing needs beforehand an attentiveness (*Aufmerken*). Finally, this attentiveness needs beforehand that first reminder of being (*erste Erinnerung in das Sein*) (cf. GA 51, p. 93). All of this remains anticipatory.

In the *Spiegel* interview Heidegger said that this preparing a readiness is really all that we can do. Thinking is awakening the preparedness of awaiting. Central to this awaiting is the character of the domain as showing to those who stay with it that being reveals itself as what we precisely feel the lack of. It shows that we carry a want, we miss something. (Think of *Angst* in *Being and Time*.) Heeding this want – or what we miss – brings us into the simple and straightforward way of a region that is not beings-oriented (cf. GA 51, pp. 4f.).

The dynamics of tension are always at play. The thinking called for in this dynamic, in the claim that it makes upon us in our thinking, is not logical or rationally oriented. It is an other thinking. This other thinking might awaken and clarify this preparedness.

But what kind of thinking is this?

Third imaging: from dialectical to tautological thinking

In a little piece called 'Zeichen' (first published in 1969 in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, now in *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*, GA 13) Heidegger writes:

The method of dialectical mediation misses the phenomenon. . . . By itself keen wit cannot get to what still withdraws from our thinking. . . . Dialectic is dictatorship over the unquestioned; and in its net every question is choked off [stifled, smothered] and suffocates.³

Dialectical thinking is the thinking that we in our epoch have to deal with. With Fichte, Schelling and Hegel – prepared for in Kant – Western thinking reached its pinnacle in dialectical thinking. In the historical unfolding of Western thinking, ‘thinking becomes knowingly dialectical’.⁴ But dialectical thinking misses the phenomenon, does not keep open the question that root thinking persists in.

How can we move all the way into (*erfahren*) dialectical thinking – which is the thinking of our historical unfolding – such that it gets shown to be in need? How can we move all the way into dialectical thinking such that our ‘experience’ expands into and calls for another thinking?

What is dialectical thinking? When thinking becomes dialectical, it enters that realm ‘within which it can think itself completely’.⁵ Thinking thinks itself, mirrors itself to itself, is reflective. This can be seen by looking at how dialectical thinking alters the traditional principles of logic. In dialectic the principle of identity, $A = A$, takes on a new dimension. For dialectic $A = A$ has to be more than simply a static identity, an identity of something with itself that cannot be unfolded further. Dialectic introduces something *more* than that. Thus Hegel in the *Science of Logic* writes: ‘There resides in the *form of the proposition* in which identity gets expressed *more* than simple abstract identity.’⁶ In order for A to equal A , there has to be a setting up of an opposite. This leads to contradiction, but now not simply *formally* logical. Rather the contradiction is itself in motion and sets in motion. This movement is essential for the unfolding of spirit. Hegel writes in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: ‘Spirit achieves its truth only in that it finds itself in the absolute split (i.e. contradiction).’⁷

This dialectical thinking is self-enclosed. By being a thinking that thinks itself, is self-reflective in an absolute sense, dialectic cannot reach the strange and estranging character of the unresolvability of the being-question. It cannot reach what is proffered in the phenomenon and that which persists as questionable.

In dialectical thinking reason defines identity, not taking into account movement or transformation that goes beyond it. In dialectical thinking change gets explained in an infinite series of *positions* – one and then the other (as is ‘logical’). As self-enclosed, dialectical thinking takes on a superiority, residing in the subject. In this superiority and priority, given to itself by itself, dialectical thinking shows itself to be in the calculative mode in its heightened form. Dialectical calculative thinking, finally, overpowers human beings, driving them back from their core-

being and reducing them to orderable and disposable items in the 'resource-bank' of the way of 'technique' – disposables within the age of *Ge-stell*. In this domain the flight from another, non-calculating thinking has become hardened (hard and fast) and thus institutionalized.

What is called for in the unresolvability of the being-question, in the thinking that is called to respond to the aporia, in the going all the way through and into unresolvability, is another way of thinking. What is called for is a thinking that thinks the movement or *energeia* in the aporia of being, but not as an oppositional movement. What is called for is a thinking that does not go back and forth between differences, but one that expands into the clearing of the onefold of being in its own unique movement. What is called for is a preparation for preparedness for transformation – awakening the preparedness.

In one of the very last pieces of writing by Heidegger, the short text on Parmenides that he read during the Seminar in Zähringen in 1973, Heidegger names this other kind of thinking: tautological thinking.

Τὸ-αὐτὸ-λόγος.

The Greek word αὐτός means generally: self, the very one, the same. Within these general meanings are hidden some other meanings that open up what tautological thinking might be. Αὐτός also means: of itself, natural, not made. Αὐτός sometimes has the character of the whole, taken together, as in αὐτόρριζος, roots and all. Αὐτοῦ means: in this very place, on the spot, the core movement. Αὕτως means: even so, just as it is.

In speaking of being (εἶναι), Parmenides, Fragment VIII, 29, says: 'ταῦτόν τ' ἐν ταυτῷ τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτὸ τε κεῖται': the self-same, together with itself, just as it is in this very place, is situated within the core movement/tension of itself.

The thinking of τὸ αὐτό is tautological thinking, a thinking that stays with the self-same movement/*energeia*, together with itself. We say that a tautology is a redundant saying, one that repeats the same. Ταυτολογέω: I repeat the said, or: I say the same. Ταυτολογία is a repeating of what was already said. But what happens in the repetition?

It is a saying over again what has already been said. It is a seeking again (*re-peto*) what has already been sought. It is doing over again.

Τὸ αὐτό λέγειν is to say/gather up the same as before, in common, a sharing, in the same place. Emphasis is added in the repeating saying, but the question and its place are the same.

Tautological thinking is precisely a thinking that not only does not demand proof, but is outside the realm of proof. It thinks the same movement/*energeia* that is, together with itself, in the very place where it is the same with itself.⁸

To move from out of dialectical thinking into tautological thinking is *not* a turn or return to identity or unity. Dialectical thinking injected

movement and *energeia* into the principle of identity that it inherited from Aristotle. Still, however, dialectical movement duplicates identity in its very opposition to it, by being self-enclosed and by keeping and enhancing the *positions* in and from which it operates. Tautological thinking does not renounce the movement of difference, but sees another, deeper movement – not merging differences, but thinking from a space where the difference-character of differences does not hold/bind/determine its own unfolding. (Thus tautological thinking *does* call into question the *irreducibility* of difference.)

In tautological thinking and saying there is lack of positions and of certainty. The words of semantic/logical consistency yield a certain certainty, but the imaging of tautological thinking extends and expands beyond the words, always to a 'more', an excess. That excess images the no-position, always ongoing and expanding, of being.

Rather than dialectical, this thinking moves in terms of the preciseness of a point within space, in terms of the point of focus/attentiveness within the expanding opening, in terms of the self-unfolding of the one/same within ongoing connectedness/gathering.

The question remains: is tautological thinking legitimate? Wherefrom does it take its bearings? What is its measure? The single response is: from being, of course. But with the transformation in the shape of thinking, there is a concomitant transformation in the way that being gets said. Along with the move from dialectical subjective thinking to tautological thinking – and part and parcel of that move – is a call for *re-naming* the question of being. This re-naming stems from the ever tighter and more rigorous binding that binds a thinker to the same. In the *Spiegel* interview Heidegger says: 'All great thinkers think the same – this same is so essential (deep) and rich that no single thinker accomplishes (exhausts) it; rather every thinker is bound even tighter and more rigorously [*strenger*] to it.'

Fourth imaging: re-naming the question of being

In persisting in the question of how to enter into the clearing of being, a return to the beginning or origin is called for. In the Seminar in Zähringen Heidegger says:

As I see it, the entry into the root domain of Dasein . . . that entry which would enable going all the way into [*die Erfahrung*] standing within the clearing of being, can take place only with a return, in the form of a detour, to the origin.

(GA 15, p. 394)

Heidegger sees this same, this deep, rich and enriching same that all thinkers are so rigorously bound to – this place of opening, the unresolvability of the ‘no way out’, being situated in the ‘no way out’ regarding thinking being in its suchness (i.e. the enigma that being, when thought, gets perverted into *a* being) – as that hidden dimension that lies underneath all shapings of Western philosophy and functions as the sustaining origin of all these shapings. Thus Heidegger’s thinking returns to the first beginning with the early Greeks, with the provocation that thinking carry a way of being that is *not* reduced or perverted.

Within the network of the historical transformations of being, there is indeed a kind of lineage of being; there is historical variation. However, the question: why did being unfold in a certain way and not in another – or: what ‘caused’ this particular unfolding – is not answerable. But in *each* shaping of the unfolding, reflection can take us back to the original (*das Anfängliche*) – not to retrieve what was then, but to respond to it from here, to think it in its ‘futural’ sense, i.e. as coming upon us (*das Zukommende*).

How is this re-turn (turning back) to the first beginning with the early Greeks possible and appropriate? This re-turn takes place within an echo. It ‘takes place as that hearing which opens itself to the sayings[s] . . . [of this first beginning] from out of our era’ (GA 15, p. 394). This turn is in echo as it turns to the echo of the first beginning with the early Greeks.

An echo is a reverberation. It is a repetition, in which the style or play of the original question resounds – without the emergence of the original question as originally asked. Within that resounding – from there to here – and within our thinking’s response lies the provocation and evocative possibility. In the re-turn, in echo-thinking, to the saying/showing of the first beginning is the possibility (the only one? the most fruitful one?) of entering that place of opening described in the first imaging.

It is in this sense of the place of opening that I read a sentence from ‘The end of philosophy and the task of thinking’:

Accordingly, the day may come when thinking will not shun (will be able to hear) the question of whether . . . the free open [the opening as such, the place of opening as the place of being] may not be that alone within which . . . everything emerging into presence and falling away from presence in them truly occupies the place which gathers and shelters everything.¹⁰

In *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (Paragraphs 81 and 82) Heidegger addresses this return and echo in terms of a *Zuspiel*, literally ‘a pass to (us)’. In its root sense *Spiel* is ‘moving freely’ (as in *Spielraum*: a place/

space in which to move freely). Thus *Zuspiel*: freely moving to, from there to here. This free moving of the first beginning with the early Greeks 'is not a historical contribution or the start of a "new system", but is in itself the root preparation for the other beginning – the preparation that initiates transformation'.¹¹

The earliest name for being is τὸ χρεών in Anaximander, followed by εἶν in Parmenides. In reading these texts from early Greek thinking, Heidegger's own work has been to open up the domain of being as such, to think being for what it is: not defined in terms of beings, but rather told in its own right. Thinking this domain was an ongoing work for Heidegger, enjoining many years and spanning the history of metaphysics, from its start to its extreme possibility in the root-character of technology. Underlying this whole history is the decisive move in thinking whereby beings and being were no longer distinguished, whereby *what* emerges into presence and the emergence as such were no longer thought as different. What was not thought was being or the emerging as such.

In 'Der Spruch des Anaximander' Heidegger writes: 'The real core of emerging, and with that the difference between emerging and *what* emerges, got forgotten' (GA 5, p. 364). A marginal note here says: 'The difference [*Unter-schied*] meant here is infinitely other than all being that remains being *of* beings. Thus it is no longer appropriate (no longer in accordance) to name the difference with the word *being/Sein*' (GA 5, p. 364). And in *Grundbegriffe*, *Unterscheidung* is read as an expanding and an opening.

If we read this in accordance with the unresolvability of the question as presented earlier, then (1) *Unter-schied* is always already dynamic, a being at work (*energeia*), even self-oscillating – thus saying 'opening' rather than 'difference' – and (2) once Heidegger's thinking has delved this deeply into the question that guides all his thinking – into the same to which every thinker is bound so tightly – the word *being/Sein* is no longer fitting or appropriate. This calls for a re-naming of being, a re-naming of the *Sache* at the heart of the work of thinking that we call 'Heidegger'.

Heidegger does this re-thinking and re-naming in the three texts that provide the context or encircling for my presentation. He does this by re-thinking τὸ χρεών in Anaximander and εἶν in Parmenides. (Heidegger's texts in which he reads Heraclitus do the same re-thinking, each in its own way.)

The way into these early Greek sayings initially takes us aback; we are surprised, startled and confused. Everything is strange. Rather than trying to make these sayings accessible to us in our terms, we need to go all the way into (*erfahren*) *our* being excluded – seeing ourselves as distanced from them.

This distance is not a non-relation. On the contrary this distance,

when properly entered into, brings us nearer. Today's priority given to knowledge or information reduces and contracts the questions of these sayings of the first beginning into answers of metaphysics. Dialectic diminishes (reduces) over against the hidden fruitfulness (possibility) of the shapings of this originary opening. Thus these sayings of Anaximander and Parmenides demand of us to get some distance from the usual interpretations (or 'readings'). We are called to something quite different: 'Simply listening to that from out of which the saying there comes' (GA 51, p. 100).

Let me here – all too briefly – let Heidegger's reading of τὸ χρεών and εἶν emerge for the reading that it is: one that re-opens [the matter/*Sache*] named in the German word *Sein* and the English word *being* and, in that re-opening, re-names the *Sache*. To ask the question: what is the name of the *Sache*? is to point to something most essential in the *Sache*. For the name of anything says the deepest root character of that thing. The name is not merely an arbitrary label, but is essentially an imaging of the thing itself. *Therefore, to re-name [the matter/Sache] of being is to say that deep root character in a deeper, more originary way.*

The Anaximander Fragment reads:

ἐξ ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών· διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν.¹²

Heidegger's rendering into German reads:

Von woheraus aber der Hervorgang ist dem jeweilig Anwesenden auch die Entgāngnis in dieses (als in das Selbe) geht hervor entlang dem Brauch; gehören nämlich lassen sie Fug somit auch Ruch eines dem anderen (im Verwinden) des Unfugs entsprechend der Zuweisung des Zeitigen durch die Zeit.¹³

My rendering of the German into English reads:

The place from out of which emergence comes is, for everything that emerges, also the place of disappearance into this (as into the same) – in accordance with exigence (brook); for they let enjoining and thereby also reck belong to each other (in the getting over) of disjoining, responding to the directive of time's coming into its own.

The first step into this saying is taken with the words γένεσις and φθορά: emerging and disappearing, coming forth into presence and withdrawing. Traditionally these words were taken to be about things, beings: the coming forth of beings and their going away. To think in a Greek

way, we must think the 'forth' and the 'away'. When we do that, however, we see that emerging and disappearing do not refer primarily to beings, but to the movement itself, i.e., the words are to be taken *in themselves* as describing *being* and therefore they say the emerging as such, rather than emerging/disappearing things/beings.

This takes place κατὰ τὸ χρεών: in accordance with τὸ χρεών. The usual translation is 'necessity': what compels and what must inescapably be. But if thinking expands into this word in its Greek-ness, the word suggests χράω, χράομαι – and then ἡ χεὶρ: the hand. Χράω: I reach for, extend my hand – and then I hand over, let something belong.

Thus τὸ χρεών is the handing over of emergence; this handing over hands out (furnishes) emergence *to* what emerges and thus holds (in its 'hand') and preserves what emerges as precisely what it is, holds it in its hand, i.e. in emergence itself.

(GA 5, p. 366; E, p. 52)

The German word for emergence is *das Anwesen*. The more usual English translation of *Anwesen* is 'presencing' or 'presence'. I deliberately use the word *emergence*, to avoid the danger of implying a 'presence' in 'presencing' – thus letting thinking think in terms of presence rather than 'presencing'. The *Sache* in Heidegger is clearly *not* presence, but *Anwesen* in its work of emergence, i.e., in its work as *being*: The published English translation fell and slipped on this very danger. It reads: "Τὸ χρεών is thus the handing over of presence [*Anwesen*], which presencing delivers to what is present."¹⁴ This translation suggests that there are two realms named here: the realm of what comes to presence (beings) and the realm of presence, with *Anwesen* (presencing) as the movement *between* these two realms. Much of Heidegger-scholarship has stumbled on this rock, by not staying long enough or working closely enough with this realm of *Anwesen* itself, thus getting lost by taking the *Sache* of *Anwesen* to be one of *presence*. Frankly, *presence as such* – separated out from emerging ('presencing' if you will) is only an issue for metaphysics (named by Heidegger as *Anwesenheit*) and is never the *Sache* of being.

Τὸ χρεών as handing over or furnishing Heidegger ventures to call in German: *der Brauch*, use/usage, making use of, service, serving oneself with something, the reach over; *brauchen*: to reach over, require; *sich gebrauchen*: lend oneself to. *Brauchen* is *bruchen*, Latin: *frui*; to enjoy by having at hand. "“*Brauchen*” thus says: to let something that emerges emerge as emergent . . . to hand out (furnish) something unto its own essence and to hold it as thus emerged in its preserving hand' (GA 5, p. 367; E, p. 53).

Given that γένεσις and φθορά name the work of being as such – and not of beings – so too does τὸ χρεών, that in accordance with which

γένεσις and φθορά are what they are, namely the opening of being. Enjoying by having at hand, furnishing, handing over (*der Brauch*) is not said of human comportment, but rather names the way in which being itself unfolds in its connection with what emerges, a connection that has to do and deals with what emerges as it is: τὸ χρεών (cf. GA 5, p. 368; E, p. 54).

This word, τὸ χρεών/*der Brauch* is not easy to render into English. The more obvious words *need* or *use/usage* hardly convey any of this rich nuance of furnishing, handing over, allowing to emerge. English has two, not readily accessible words: *exigence* (from *exigo*, *ex-ago*: I drive forth/out, carry forth/out, dispatch, turn out) and *brook* (from Middle English *broc*: breaking/bursting forth, yielding, bearing forth). I offer both of these words, each somewhat awkward, as a way to say what Heidegger says here, in the German word *der Brauch*.

In the Anaximander fragment τὰ πολλά and τὰ πάντα are the names for τὰ ὄντα (beings) in general. However, ὄν and ὄντα were originally ἑόν and ἑόντα. With that their rootedness in the word εἶναι was secured. Indeed Parmenides and Heraclitus always use ἑόν and ἑόντα. The move from ὄν to ἑόν is the decisive move into the region of being. And this move in our thinking is an echoing re-turn to the place of opening within the first beginning in the thinking of Parmenides and Anaximander.

‘But ἑόν (“being”) is not simply the singular of the participle ἑόντα (“beings”)’ (GA 5, p. 345; E, p. 33). Rather ἑόν names the region of being as such, the one, the same, that binds all thinking. Everything depends on a proper reading of ἑόν.

Without exaggeration . . . we could say that the [whole] unfolding of the West depends on how the word ἑόν gets translated, provided that the translation rests on the translation to the truth of what comes to language (gets said) in ἑόν.

(GA 5, p. 345; E, p. 33)

Τὰ ἑόντα, the word that really names what comes to language in Anaximander, ‘names that which, unspoken in thinking, speaks in all thinking, even as it itself remains unspoken. The word names that which from then on lays claim to all of Western thinking, whether expressed or not’ (GA 5, p. 351; E, p. 38).

A few decades after Anaximander, in Parmenides, the word ἑόν (and εἶναι) is named explicitly as the fundamental, root word for Western thinking.

In ‘Der Spruch des Anaximander’ Heidegger says that Parmenides thinks ἑόν – as the emerging of what emerges – in terms of the ‘hidden and unresolved fullness of the disclosure of beings’ – unresolved as it is thought from out of ἀλήθεια, ‘the disclosing sheltering’ (GA 5, p. 352;

E, p. 39). Here *έόν* is thought from out of the disclosure of *έόντα* (beings) and is thought in terms of *Unverborgenheit* as disclosing/revealing/concealing. Disclosure is named 'the open region'. The focus here is on the expanding/staying of the opening (*Unter-scheidung*) that comes to language in the word *έόν* (cf. *GA* 5, p. 363; E, p. 48).

Unspoken in Anaximander, spoken in Parmenides, the word *έόν/είναι* says: 'Emergence into disclosure [*Anwesen in die Unverborgenheit*]. Hidden in that statement is [the imaging that] *Anwesen* itself brings disclosure with it. Disclosure itself is emergence. Both are the same, but not identical' (*GA* 5, p. 370; E, p. 55).

Thus the first stage in Heidegger's thinking *έόν* in Parmenides is in terms of *Unverborgenheit*/disclosure: *ἀλήθεια/entbergendes Bergen* (as the fullness of *Unverborgenheit*)/emerging sheltering (as the fullness of disclosure). The second stage in Heidegger's thinking *έόν* in Parmenides is in terms of *Anwesen*/emergence. It is to *έόν* as *Anwesen*/emergence that the small piece read at the Seminar in Zähringen turns to. This piece of writing (*GA* 15, pp. 401–7) – one of Heidegger's last pieces of writing – along with the transcript of the discussion that followed Heidegger's reading of the text during the Seminar, opens up a new dimension or turn in the work of thinking that we call 'Heidegger'. There his thinking works explicitly tautologically, saying the same as indeed it itself. That same is *έόν*.

The context in which Heidegger read this brief text on Parmenides was the question of entering into being. It is the same theme as the one named with *Da-sein*; for both have to do with clearing/*Lichtung* – with opening.

Parmenides names this theme or realm for thinking: *τò έόν* – which, Heidegger says, names neither *beings/das Seiende* nor *being/das Sein*, but rather *τò έόν: Anwesend: Anwesen selbst*: emergent (coming forth, unfolding): emerging (coming forth, unfolding) itself.

He begins with Fragment VI, 1:

έστι γὰρ εἶναι

Is: that is to say, being.

The saying refers to being, not to beings. Being is. Heidegger hesitates on this, because one can say 'it is' only of beings. Being precisely is not. But Parmenides says here: *being/das Sein* is. Heidegger asks: are we capable of hearing this Greek word, that speaks of *έστι* and *είναι*, with a Greek ear? (*GA* 15, p. 397). Or: do we think the Greek saying of the words *έστι* and *είναι* in a Greek way? Finally: in using the words 'is' and 'being', do we think precisely enough at all? (*GA* 15, p. 405).

Thought in its Greek way, the word *είναι* says: *anwesen/to emerge*. This verb speaks more precisely. It brings us, in a greater revealing,

closer to the *Sache* to be thought. In accordance with this we must render ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι as: *anwest nämlich anwesen*: emerges, that is to say emerging.

(GA 15, p. 405)

What is being thought here is not being in its difference from beings, but rather only emerging: being as emerging, or simply: emerging itself.

The word of Parmenides that names this *Sache* is τὸ εἶν. Heidegger says τὸ εἶν as *anwesend*: *anwesen selbst* or *anwest nämlich anwesen*: emerging: the emerging itself; unfolding: the unfolding itself; emerges, that is to say emerging; unfolds, that is to say unfolding – emerges emerging.

Where and how does emerging¹⁵ emerge? ‘into disclosure’. But then εἶν is the ‘heart’ of disclosure/ἀλήθεια. Τὸ εἶν, ‘itself residing in itself, is decisive for and disposes disclosure through and through’ (Parmenides, Fragment VIII, 4, as Heidegger reads it in GA 15, p. 405).

What does this say with regards to ἀλήθεια? Heidegger says: we must think ἀλήθεια as τὸ εἶν: emerging, emerging itself.

Heidegger finishes his short text on Parmenides with this remark:

The remark in the poem of Parmenides lets us see:

‘The emergent emerging itself disposes
the revealing unfolding disclosure that encircles.’

‘*Das anwesend: anwesen selbst durchstimmt
die schicklich entbergend es umkreisende Unverborgenheit.*’

(GA 15, p. 407)

This says, not so much that εἶν/emerging lies at the core of ἀλήθεια/disclosure – it does say that – but more that to think ἀλήθεια is to think it as emergent emerging. Thus on the one hand it is helpful to think ἀλήθεια in its two components, λήθη and the ἀ-. Thus: hiddenness/closure and revealing/disclosure. The danger in that way of thinking is that the *Sache* remains a twofold, a dichotomy, with two positions. Heidegger explicitly tells us that he himself fell prey to this danger in ‘The end of philosophy and the task of thinking’, when he suggested that λήθη is the heart of (lies at the root of) ἀλήθεια. In the discussion that followed his reading of the Parmenides text (in Zähringen), Heidegger says that what he suggested in that earlier essay – that λήθη lies at the heart or root of ἀλήθεια – is simply not true: Parmenides did not say anything like that (cf. GA 15, p. 395). Rather to think the whole of ἀλήθεια is to think εἶν: emergent emerging.

Τὸ εἶν allows thinking to think the one, the same, in its ongoing work of emerging. Thus it never rests anywhere, neither thinking nor the *Sache*; it never allows one or the other dimension to settle out and be

'at the bottom' or 'at the top'. Tautological thinking is needed to do this kind of thinking work. The word *emerging/Anwesen/τὸ ἔόν* names tautologically in that there is within it no dichotomy, even as it carries within it the highest tension and movement.

The way of thinking that Parmenides calls for here is *πυθέσθαι: erfahren*: going all the way into. Parmenides names this more precisely (goes further into it) in Fragment VI, 1:

χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τε . . .

Incumbent is

saying (letting the self-showing) and

(thereby ensuing) facing up to

and taking it in.

(GA 15, p. 406)

Heidegger names this kind of thinking a *reines Erblicken*: pure beholding, simply taking it in, being awake to.

In thinking (as pure beholding) *τὸ ἔόν* (as emergent emerging), the question of being (the place of its opening) is expanded beyond being (as being, *Sein*, *ὄν*, *ens*) and beyond being (as in *Sinn des Seins*) to *ἔόν*: emergent emerging. In fact the word *being* no longer names the *Sache*.

With this kind of thinking there is no proving, no logical argument, no dialectical thinking, no foundational explaining. Rather what holds this thinking is what comes over against it; what turns its gaze to it. Simply put, this kind of thinking *is* phenomenological.

Fifth imaging: hinting's many hues

Being as a *question* opens up within that point where being as other than beings is unresolvable; dialectical thinking opens out into tautological thinking; and being is renamed as *ἔόν/Anwesen/emerging*. Saying these several imagings cannot happen within the confines of logic or calculative thinking. Rather saying shows itself as suggesting, intimating, surmising – in short: saying is hinting.

The most revealing word from early Greek thinking, for showing this imaging of hinting, is Heraclitus, Fragment B93: *ὁ ἀναξ, οὗ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει*. The work of thinking that we call 'Heidegger' comes back to this fragment again and again. An English rendition that pulls together several of Heidegger's German renderings of this fragment might go something like this: 'The sublime one whose place for intimating saying is at Delphi neither discloses (only) nor conceals (only), but rather hints, gives signs, points to, intimates.'¹⁶

Heidegger renders the crucial word, *σημαίνει*, into German as *winken*

(be-deuten) and as *Zeichen geben*. In 'Erinnerung an Hans Jantzen' Heidegger says, simply: 'Hinting [*Der Wink*] is the revealing and simultaneously concealing showing.'¹⁷

In 'Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein"' Heidegger says:

Originary saying does not only immediately reveal, nor does it only simply and plainly conceal; rather this saying is both at once. And in this way it is a hinting [*ein Winken*] in which what is said intimates what is unsaid and what is unsaid intimates what is said and *to be said*. It is a hinting in which what is in tension intimates the accord [*Einklang*] that it is and the accord intimates the tension within which alone it oscillates (flourishes).¹⁸

In *Heraklit* Heidegger says:

A marking [*Zeichen*] is something that is shown or revealed . . . [which] unfolds essentially in a not-showing. . . . The showing of markings is the originary way in which what later gets differentiated – disclosing for itself and concealing for itself – *still holds sway unseparated* . . . thought in a Greek way, 'markings' are the *self-showing of emerging itself*, to which this self-showing belongs.¹⁹

Emerging itself emerges as the ταῦτόν τ' ἐν ταὐτῷ τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτό τε κεῖται: the self-same, together with itself, just as it is in this very place, within the core movement/tension of itself. Its proper way of showing itself is as a hinting/intimating.

At the end of a series of poems entitled *Winke* (*Hintings*, privately printed in 1944, now in *GA 13: Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*), Heidegger writes: '“Hintings” are words of a thinking that (a) in part needs this expression but (b) is not fulfilled in the expression.'²⁰ Why? Because such a thinking thinks being – now ἐόν/*Anwesen/emerging*.

It belongs essentially within the αὐτό of the free open/opening – that opening named in ἐόν/*Anwesen/emerging* – that it can only be said tautologically. Tautological thinking is a hinting thinking.

In *Grundbegriffe* Heidegger uses the word *ahnen* for this hinting. Hinting as intimating or surmising. What is intimated has no position and is not conclusive. To intimate is to have a feel for what comes over or befalls one. This is only intimated, but is more essential than any certainty in calculating what is not-essential. What is called for is to surmise (let befall one) that from out of which beings emerge (emerging itself) and to say with what is so surmised/intimated. 'Thinking in and for intimating/surmising is essentially stronger and lays greater claim

than any formally conceptual discrimination in whatever realm of the calculable' (GA 51, p. 12).

This kind of thinking can only be practised; it cannot be talked about or 'ascertained'. In the lecture course text of 1923 entitled *Ontologie* (GA 63) Heidegger says simply: 'Phenomenology can be appropriated only phenomenologically.'²¹

Sixth imaging: what belongs to reading as its ownmost

The look of that which has claimed us – the look of being, now named emergent emerging, *έόν* – is the deepest possible confirmation of the thereness of being as emergent emerging. And the look of being continually proffers and confirms our relation to that thereness – manifesting and nourishing it in its disclosure, in its 'truthing'.

Proper reading – reading in its ownmost – has its appropriate concern in this look. As Heidegger says in 'Was heißt Lesen?': 'Without proper reading we cannot see what turns its gaze to us.'²² We cannot gaze on what emerges.

Do we know at all anymore what reading is? Where do we read unto – and where from? Why do we read at all? How is proper reading? What is called forth and evoked in proper reading? These are the unspoken questions with which the work of thinking presented here began, some months ago.

There are two areas of concern in opening up proper reading. First, normally and traditionally we in our thinking are held back from proper reading by *our* own comportment. Our comportment does not heed what turns its gaze to us. Rather we assume a certain definition and normally have always already comprehended (conceptualized) the *what* of the words read. In this sense proper reading is a matter of a renewed attentiveness.

Reading is not based on 'our' ability to decipher and interpret. It goes deeper than that. It calls for a detachment from 'personal' inclinations and in that detachment opens out to that which claims reading/thinking in its look/gaze. The look of things always already shows the look of *έόν*, of the emergent emerging. In reading we are called (evoked) to foster a fertilizing contact with the pregnancy of *έόν*, to be open to what we read in our reading in *its* turning its gaze to us. Reading in this way, we 'fall into round' – to use a potter's expression – and thinking reading takes its shape *from* that which gazes upon it. This is the *έόν*/emergence in the first beginning with the Greeks. Indeed, the hinting character of that first beginning stems from attentiveness to precisely this domain, which calls for a thinking that reads properly, rather than a thinking that

runs roughshod over the written text, always already knowing what is to be found there.

Think of this mode of thinking/reading as a hand-craft. It works by handling the words, the reading. This is the place of *έόν* as such – *έόν* in its suchness, the suchness of *έόν*. *Έόν* is what turns its gaze and touches us; it is the name for the opening cast to us in the unresolvability of being-beings; it is thinkable tautologically, and not dialectically; and it calls for a hinting/intimating thinking, rather than the direct hit of a calculating, resolving thinking.

The second area of concern in opening up what proper reading is is that traditionally we are held and entangled within the web of ordinary grammar. We usually allow 'grammar' to give us the definitive word on language and how it speaks. What we have been trying to do here has actually been held back by grammar.

Sentences in their sentence-structure cannot reach far enough into that which turns its gaze to us. Though having grammatical shapes, words and sentences always carry an imaging that is not bound to that grammar. Words then become guide-words for imaging beyond grammar; this imaging is evoked by what turns its gaze to reading.

Thus we are called to be more attentive, more gathered, for what lies deeper in the words, though not deeper *than* the words (cf. *GA* 51, p. 68).

If we hear language within the deeper saying of the word, only then is it on the mark – and the affordance of the origin hidden in the first beginning (i.e., the neighbourings of the first and the other beginnings, as original beginnings, both) hints and haunts it.

Proper reading is attentive to the evocative character in what turns its gaze to us. Thus pure beholding evokes the deeper root saying.

Words take on the shape of the clearing/opening. Words do not grasp (conceive) objects, but rather evoke. Words render seeable and hearable and touchable.

The reader is thus led into the region or regioning of opening that imaging words image.

For this to take place, words move away from their grammatical expression into evocative saying. In evocative saying words do not show a ready-made content, but rather carry an appeal – by indirection and hinting. This appeal carries the reader over to evocation – and thus to a transformation in thinking.

In hinting saying, that which casts its gaze on the reader, there is no defined or definitive content. Rather there is the free receiving and discerning of the opening/clearing.

This is the opening/clearing that lets beings be, that lets echoing words resonate with silence/stillness. This resonance of echoing words and of stillness names the one, the same, self-oscillating *έόν*: emerging.

Seventh imaging: drawing to a close

This presentation has carried the intention, not to resolve the question, but to be attentive to its re-shaping, to come closer or nearer to the question in its own *energeia*.

In thinking as well as in hinting and in proper reading there is a responding, not only to the known, but also to the unknown. Thinking and the hidden are inseparable – and require the ongoing work of our response. Thus thinking always takes place in and is a response to a showing extending and expanding beyond the shown. This is the torso-dimension of all root thinking: it always points beyond. In reading, the writing that one reads always points beyond – this excess is not something beyond the text. Rather it is carried in the text as the process or *energeia* of emerging itself.

Recognizing the ambiguity in this expanding beyond the shown – and letting that ambiguity be what it appears to be – opens up a deeper way of showing, of self-showing.

In a sense what we do here is a construction – even of ambiguity – but more fundamentally than that it heeds/respects/even honours a trace ‘naturally’ left within.

I am reminded of a poem by Rilke, in which he sings of a torso of Apollo. The torso glows like a candelabra in which the look/gaze of the torso is held and sparkles and shines. If the torso did not so glisten, did not so carry within itself the life of the eye or the chuckle of the heart, then it ‘would not break out of all its borders, like a star: for there is therein no point that does not see you’.²³ It is this *energeia* of expanding beyond that is carried in language that says/shows; and it is in proper reading that this expanding emerging turns its gaze upon the reader.

Within the context of such an opening, the question of being cannot at all any longer be taken or read as a metaphysical question. Given this bond to the expanding of opening, all forms of Heidegger’s question open out beyond the metaphysical – be it the move from *Sinn des Seins* to *Wahrheit des Seins* to *Wahrnis des Seins* to *Unverborgenheit* to *έόν/Anwesen selbst*, be it the move from subject to *Dasein* and *Erschlossenheit* to *Geschick des Seins* to *Ereignis*.

In every case the work of thinking is held to this opening. In order to see this, we must take very seriously Heidegger’s own ‘corrections’ of his work. Examples of Heidegger’s ‘corrections’ come up in the several texts that we have worked with here:

(1) As already mentioned, in the Seminar in Zähringen in 1973 Heidegger says that his statement (in ‘The end of philosophy and the task of thinking’) that *λήθη* is the heart of *ἀλήθεια* simply does not work. That is not how Parmenides says/thinks/intimates the *Sache*.

(2) There is clearly a re-thinking of the Anaximander fragment from the time of the lecture course *Grundbegriffe* (1941) to the writing of 'Der Spruch des Anaximander' (1946). This is seeable (a) in that in the later text Heidegger no longer considers the whole of the Anaximander fragment as handed down to be authentically by Anaximander himself and (b) much more importantly, in that the central word for naming the *Sache*, τὸ χρεών, is thought in its root unfolding as *Brauch* only in the later text.

(3) In *Grundbegriffe* Heidegger tries to uncover a deeper sense to the words *be-greifen* and *Begriff*, whereby they might be able properly to name the *Sache*. In the Seminar in Zähringen he no longer holds out this possibility for the word *Begriff*. 'The Greeks do not have *Begriffe*. *Begreifen* is a way of comportment that takes possession of. The Greeks do not grasp [*be-greifen*]' (GA 15, p. 399).

(4) In 1973 Heidegger explicitly states that the phrase *Sinn des Seins* from *Being and Time* does not say the *Sache* that is to be thought (GA 15, pp. 345 and 373).

How shall we read these changes? The question is not: is Heidegger metaphysical here? Or just where and how is Heidegger a metaphysician? Rather the question is how to read underneath and deeper than the *grammar*, to what is evoked in the saying? Evocative thinking is always directed toward the *Sache* and emerges from out of the *Sache*. To home in on a word or concept – or even a phrasing – as metaphysical is to miss the point. Heidegger above all grants the indeterminate dimension, the perhaps in the look of εἶναι. Thus the way is involved in the undeterminable and non-conceptualizable – therefore always hinting. The way is always open to revision (a re-seeing) and thus to a new opening to the same.

Again we hear the Zuspil from *Beiträge zur Philosophie*: 'Coming to grips with the necessity of the *other* beginning from out of the originary bearing of the first beginning.'²⁴ This thinking is always ongoing, playing one beginning out for the other – always attentive to the *Sache* of being, now named εἶναι/*anwesen*/emerging. The issue is not how Heidegger 'has changed his mind', but rather how the work of thinking that we call 'Heidegger' comes to grips with the *Sache* by staying always more decisively and more rigorously with the same.

Finally, reading, thinking and hinting call for forgetting Heidegger for Heidegger's sake and becoming involved in the onefold of the always oscillating expanding into the clearing of being, the opening that is named in εἶναι: emergent emerging. To think in the 'Heideggerian mode', then, is to expand into the one question and to respond thoughtfully to it.

Hinting reading thinks along with the text. Hinting thinking reads the text for what it evokes. Thinking reading hints in such a way that what

turns its gaze evokes. Thus, in proper reading is *der Einsprung in die Wesung des Seins* – or *Einsprung in die Anwesung des Anwesens*.

Notes

1 The three works referred to here are, in chronological order: *Grundbegriffe*, vol. 51 of the *Gesamtausgabe*, Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1941, ed. Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1981); 'Der Spruch des Anaximander' (1946) in *Holzwege*, vol. 5 of the *Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1977); and 'Seminar in Zähringen' (1973) in *Seminare*, vol. 15 of the *Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Curd Ochswald (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1986). Hereafter these three works will be referred to in the text as GA 51, GA 5 and GA 15. References to GA 5 will be followed by an E (e.g. GA 5, p. 345; E, p. 33); the E refers to the published English translation of 'Der Spruch des Anaximander', entitled 'The Anaximander fragment' and appearing in Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, tr. D. F. Krell and F. A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).

2 *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (GA 40), ed. Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1983), p. 83; *Einzelausgabe* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953), p. 59.

3 *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* (GA 13), ed. Hermann Heidegger (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1983), p. 13.

4 'Grundsätze des Denkens', in *Jahrbuch für Psychologie und Psychotherapie*, iv (1958), 34.

5 *ibid.*, p. 37.

6 Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Buch, II, Lass, ii, S. 31.

7 Hegel, Vorrede to *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952), pp. 29–30.

8 The preceding several paragraphs appeared earlier, in a slightly different form, in my essay 'Parmenides: circle of disclosure, circle of possibility', *Heidegger Studies*, i (1985), 13.

9 'Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten', *Spiegel* interview with Martin Heidegger, 23 September 1966, in *Der Spiegel*, no. 23, 1976, p. 212.

10 'Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens', in *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969), pp. 72f.

11 *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (GA 65), ed. F. -W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1989), p. 170.

12 In GA 51 Heidegger takes this whole fragment to be authentic and by Anaximander himself; in the *Holzwege* essay he says that he is inclined to consider only . . . κατὰ τὸ χρεῶν διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας as from Anaximander himself. However, he adds that the first part of the saying, though probably not from the hand of Anaximander, should not be simply excluded, but rather kept as an indirect witness to Anaximander's thought by virtue of the strength and saying-power of his thought (GA 5, p. 341). For my purposes here the philological question – significant as it might be – has no bearing, in that the earlier part remains 'Anaximandrian' if not by Anaximander himself.

13 The first and the last part of this German rendition by Heidegger comes

from GA 51, p. 101; the middle part (that part *alone* that Heidegger considers to be by Anaximander himself) comes from GA 5, p. 372.

14 Cf. *Early Greek Thinking*, p. 52.

15 Heidegger's own text here – the one that he read to the group assembled for the seminar – reads: *Anwesen* (emerging) (GA 15, p. 405). The *transcript* of the text reads: *Anwesenheit* (presence) (GA 15, p. 398). I find this discrepancy to reveal a significant difference in meaning. The word *Anwesenheit* covers up the poignant and sharply focused dimension of Heidegger's thinking in this short text.

16 For a complete listing of Heidegger's many readings of this fragment, see Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad (eds), *Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1985), pp. 54f.

17 'Erinnerung an Hans Jantzen: Wort der Freunde zum Freund in die Abgeschiedenheit' (Universitätsbuchhandlung Aberhard Albert, Freiburg i. Br., 1967), p. 20.

18 'Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein"', (GA 39), ed. Susanne Ziegler (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1980), pp. 127f.

19 *Heraklit* (GA 55), ed. Manfred S. Frings (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1979), p. 179, italics added.

20 *Ontologie* (GA 63), ed. Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1988), p. 46.

21 *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* (GA 13), p. 33.

22 'Was heißt Lesen?' in *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* (GA 13), p. 111.

23 Rainer Maria Rilke, 'Archaischer Torso Apollos', in *Der neuen Gedichte Anderer Teil*, quoted here from R. M. Rilke, *Gesammelte Gedichte* (Frankfurt am Main: Insel-Verlag, 1962), p. 313.

24 *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (GA 65), p. 169.

Beyond being: Heidegger's Plato

Robert J. Dostal

For Martin Heidegger metaphysics is Platonism.¹ Heidegger's attack on metaphysics is equivalently an attack on Platonism. Brief comments about Plato are not uncommon in Heidegger's published works, but there is only one published essay devoted exclusively to a text of Plato – 'Plato's doctrine of truth'.² This essay's principal thesis is that Plato transformed the notion of truth from unconcealment (*Unverborgenheit*) to correctness. Though this was written at a time (1930/1) when Heidegger's thought was making the famed and controverted turn (*Kehre*), the critique of Plato remains essentially the same throughout Heidegger's work. There is, of course, the late concession in 'The end of philosophy and the task of thinking' that 'the assertion about the essential transformation of truth [in Plato] . . . from unconcealment to correctness is . . . untenable'.³ But, as we will see below, this does not alter Heidegger's unrelenting critique of Plato.

Unlike other aspects of Heidegger's work, his Plato critique has not elicited widespread discussion, presumably because he himself wrote so little on Plato. The best responses to Heidegger's essay on Plato have come from those close to and sympathetic with Heidegger's work yet unsympathetic with his Plato interpretation. It was perhaps the sharp criticism of Paul Friedländer more than any other that motivated Heidegger's late concession.⁴ Friedländer had been a colleague of Heidegger at Marburg and a member of the *Graecum* in which Heidegger participated at a time when Heidegger's Plato critique was taking shape.⁵ Another notable critic was Gerhard Krüger, a student of Heidegger at Marburg.⁶ He criticized Heidegger, just as Friedländer had done before and as Stanley Rosen (a student of Leo Strauss, another student of Heidegger at Marburg) has done more recently, for Heidegger's neglect of the ontological on behalf of the epistemological in Plato.⁷

The most compelling response to Heidegger's reading of Plato,

however, has been that of Hans-Georg Gadamer – another Marburg student of Heidegger. Though Gadamer almost entirely foregoes taking direct issue with Heidegger, his own life-long work on Plato constitutes a challenge to Heidegger's view of Plato. Gadamer attests to this when he writes of his own Plato interpretation: 'Behind it all, however, stood the constant provocation which Heidegger's own pathway of thought means for me – in particular his interpretation of Plato as the decisive step in the direction of the forgetfulness of Being of "metaphysical thinking"'.⁸ A large thesis of Gadamer's Plato interpretation is the proximity of Plato and Aristotle. Gadamer would defuse much of Aristotle's critique by showing not only its inappropriateness but also the sources of Aristotle's own doctrine in Plato. This is relevant to the matter at hand since Gadamer thereby counters both Heidegger's acceptance of Aristotle's critique of Plato and Paul Natorp's defense of Plato and sharp critique of Aristotle. Heidegger's own view, I suggest, can in part be understood as a response to Natorp and the 'Neo-Kantian' Plato.

With the major thesis of this almost consensual critique of Heidegger's Plato interpretation I am largely in agreement.⁹ What I mean to do here is to expand the context within which Heidegger's Plato interpretation should be considered. First of all, the then prevailing Neo-Kantian interpretation of Plato, especially that of Natorp, will be seen to establish in part the framework within which the early Heidegger came to Plato. Secondly, Heidegger's Plato essay should be considered within the context of the development of Heidegger's own thought. The recently published lectures from Heidegger's Marburg period provide us with a view of the early development of his understanding of Plato. They exhibit a fundamental continuity with the later Plato essay. They also provide, at least at first glance, a kind of puzzle: what Heidegger so provocatively ignores in the Plato essay is the focus of his attention in the Marburg lectures, viz., the controversial statement in the *Republic* that the Good is 'beyond being' (*epekeina tes ousias*) (509B). As those lectures would have it, what Heidegger seeks for the completion of his project is an adequate treatment of the *epekeina*. And further, the term *epekeina* names the completion of his ontological project in the title 'metontology'. The Plato essay was written some two or three years later at a time (1930/1) when Heidegger was writing *On the Essence of Truth* (*Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*), whose basic theme is the same as the essay on Plato – truth. Though the 'turn' in Heidegger's thought is impossible to fix with respect to a single text, I suggest, contrary to Hannah Arendt, that these essays are contemporaneous with at least the beginning of the turn and the abandonment of the ontological project of the Marburg period, the project of *Being and Time*.¹⁰ Accordingly, the problem of truth as Heidegger grappled with it at this time is extremely relevant to any understanding of the Plato essay. Here too the Marburg lectures

allow us to see more clearly the difficulties Heidegger faced in the completion of his project. One of the primary shoals upon which it founders is the attempt to establish an ontological notion of truth in opposition to the prevailing epistemological view. The consideration of this attempt brings us to another puzzle – Heidegger's lack of recognition of the proximity of his own position to that of Plato. Plato, I suggest, was neither a realist nor an idealist as Heidegger construes these positions. I am suggesting further, that Plato's notion of the ideas – whatever the stage of development – is not adequately captured by either a transcendent 'other world' view or a Neo-Kantian transcendental view. Like Heidegger, Plato was concerned less with the epistemological criteria for truth than with the ontological conditions for truth. Our recognition of this proximity helps explain why a teacher with such a short-sighted interpretation of Plato should have students who are such perceptive readers of Plato.

1

The immediate context for the approach of Heidegger to the age-old conflict of Aristotelianism and Platonism is the controversy over this conflict in Weimar Germany. This was the time when Heidegger taught at Marburg (1922–8) and counted among his students Gadamer, Krüger, and Strauss together with Jacob Klein, Karl Löwith, and Arendt among others. His colleagues included Friedländer and Natorp, the eminent Neo-Kantian.¹¹ This was the time when the reign of Neo-Kantianism faltered in academic philosophy in Germany. This dethronement was due in large part to the phenomenological movement led primarily by Edmund Husserl but also by Max Scheler and, not least, by Heidegger (which is not to say that the turn to Hegel and Marx by philosophers like Lukács and Horkheimer was unimportant). The quarrel between Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology was not only systematic but historical as well. The battle was carried, especially by Heidegger, to the interpretation of the classical philosophical texts. The most important text was the work of Kant, the Neo-Kantian interpretation of which was then fundamentally challenged not only by Heidegger but by Scheler, Hartmann, Heimsoeth, and others.

But also of importance was the reading of Aristotle and Plato. The predominant Neo-Kantian view was to dismiss Aristotle on behalf of Plato. Gadamer reminds us that Hermann Cohen used to handily dispose of Aristotle by calling him an 'apothecary'.¹² More important for the interpretation of Plato at this time in Germany was the Plato interpretation of Natorp, whose *Platos Ideenlehre* ('Plato's doctrine of ideas') provided the Neo-Kantian interpretation of Plato.¹³

Natorp argued two major theses which were closely related: first, the proximity of Plato to Kant, and, secondly, the idealistic stance of both Plato and Kant. The subtitle of the work is 'An introduction to idealism', by which Natorp means Plato's introduction to the transcendental idealism of Kant. For Natorp, Kant in fact accomplished what he said of himself with respect to Plato: 'we understand him better than he has understood himself' (A314/B370).¹⁴ Plato's 'doctrine' of ideas is interpreted by way of Kant's categories and transcendental ideas. Natorp insists again and again that 'the truth of that which is (*ta onta*) . . . is in the positings of thought [*Denksetzungen*]' (PI 133). The ideas are 'pure objects of thought [*reine Denkobjekte*]' and the 'proper possession of consciousness [*eigener Besitz des Bewusstseins*]' (PI 134). Being itself is finally 'positing in general [*Setzung überhaupt*]' (PI 335). *Logos* is interpreted as the positing of judgment. As the prominence of the term 'positing' (*Setzung*) in these few but representative citations suggests, Natorp's Kantianism was not unaffected by the idealist critique of Kant.¹⁵

In any case, for Natorp the single issue that ties together his reading of the Platonic dialogues is the question whether the ideas of Plato are to be understood in accord with Aristotle's critique as constituting a second independent realm of entities, a *hyperouranios topos*, or whether the ideas are to be understood rather as 'pure objects of thought' as the above citations suggest. As the latter, the Platonic doctrine of ideas introduces idealism into Western thought.¹⁶ The Aristotelian transcendent interpretation of the Platonic ideas is to be rejected for a transcendental interpretation.¹⁷ Because it is so important to find the transcendental in Plato where often the tradition had found the transcendent, even the famed statement of the *Republic* that the Good is 'beyond being' gives Natorp little pause. What might appear to be beyond thought, nonetheless 'lies in the region, in the genus of the thinkable'.¹⁸ Given this correction of the mistaken traditional and Aristotelian view of Plato, the transcendental Plato can be enlisted as an idealist in the quarrel between idealism and realism.

The early Heidegger understood the problem of interpreting Plato in precisely the terms set down by Natorp. Either the ideas reside in a place beyond the heavens or in transcendental subjectivity. Heidegger acknowledges in *On the Essence of Ground* (1929), perhaps in deference to Natorp's interpretation, that the tendency toward the latter is prefigured (*vorgebildet*) in Plato.¹⁹ Despite this prefiguration, however, Heidegger agrees with Aristotle's critique of the transcendent character of the ideas in Plato. Only later, according to Heidegger, through the mediation of Christianity do the ideas find their home in subjectivity and, finally, in the will to power. What Gadamer, the student of both Heidegger and Natorp, does in his recent work on Plato is, in part, to retrieve Natorp's critique of Aristotle's treatment of Plato to counter

Heidegger's Aristotelian critique of Plato. Gadamer's retrieval does not, however, claim Plato on behalf of Kant, as Natorp did.

What fundamentally is at stake in Natorp's and Heidegger's reading of Plato is the status of transcendental philosophy. Natorp identified his Neo-Kantian idealist philosophy with transcendental philosophy. This he opposes to the transcendent philosophy of the dogmatic Aristotelian tradition. The early Heidegger also hoped to develop an appropriate transcendental philosophy, but he opposed the idealism of Natorp and the Neo-Kantians. Where Heidegger differs from most of his contemporaries is that he did not take sides in the idealist–realist quarrel. He criticized both factions and proposed a transcendental philosophy that is neither idealist nor realist.²⁰ His fundamental thesis – that phenomenology is ontology – and his corresponding attempt to provide an ontological interpretation of Kant contributed to the confusion of the initial reception of his work. The transcendental and phenomenological status of his work as well as his dependence on Kant seemed to make him an idealist. Yet his attack on any philosophy of consciousness, be it Neo-Kantian or Husserlian, and his repeated invocation of Aristotle in an explicitly ontological project made him appear to be a realist. In his discussion of idealism and realism in *Being and Time* Heidegger rejects the usual alignment of Plato with Kant to align Kant with Aristotle.²¹ Thus though he would disagree with Natorp about Plato, he does, as we have just seen, acknowledge that the subjectivism of modern idealism is 'prefigured' in Plato. Plato starts us on the path to idealism.

Though Heidegger thinks that he has found an alternative to the either/or of idealism and realism, he is happy to consign Plato to this very alternative. Heidegger would escape the dilemma of the transcendental vs. the transcendent, but he allows Plato to be confounded by this same dilemma. This dilemma, I suggest but shall not argue here, is no more appropriate to Plato than to Heidegger. In sum, Heidegger pushes Plato in the opposing directions of Aristotle and Natorp. Plato is either Aristotle's Plato with the single idea of the Good in the place beyond the heavens or the Neo-Kantian idealist of transcendental subjectivity. These two differing views, according to Heidegger, mirror one another – just as Nietzsche mirrors Plato. They represent the dilemma of objectivism/subjectivism which modern philosophy cannot escape and which Heidegger proposes to resolve by eradicating it at its root in the metaphysics of Plato.

Let us begin our closer consideration of Heidegger's interpretation of Plato with the essay 'Plato's doctrine of truth', the only essay devoted

exclusively to Plato. Then we can turn back to the earlier and similar Plato interpretation to find its sources in Heidegger's own explicitly metaphysical project. We can illuminate thereby both the intentional ignorance of the later essay and the problems Heidegger grappled with in his early attempt to establish a scientific metaphysics.

The primary thesis of 'Plato's doctrine of truth' is that Plato transforms the notion of truth from unconcealment to the 'correctness' (*orthotes*) of sight and, accordingly, of 'expression' (*Aussage*). This transformation is exemplified in the allegory of the cave in the *Republic*. Such a transformation changes 'the place' of truth from a characteristic of beings or things themselves to a feature of human comportment toward things: 'The essence of truth gives up the characteristic of unconcealment. . . . In *orthotes*, the correctness of the look, lies everything. . . . Truth becomes *orthotes*, the correctness of perception and expression. In this transformation of the essence of truth a change of the place of truth occurs at the same time. As unconcealment, truth is still a characteristic [*Grundzug*] of the being itself. As correctness of the "look", however, truth becomes a characteristic [*Auszeichnung*] of the human comportment toward being [*Seienden*]' (PL 136–7).

This transformation of the understanding of truth is the cornerstone of the metaphysical tradition. With this view of truth, Plato, according to Heidegger, starts down the path that leads to the dilemma of modern philosophy and the subjectivism and humanism of contemporary thought. It was more than accident or convenience that led Heidegger to publish the second edition of this essay in 1947 with the *Letter on Humanism*. This 'letter' develops the charge of humanism that Heidegger makes in the Plato essay: 'The beginning of metaphysics in the thought of Plato is at the same time the beginning of "humanism"' (PL 142). Heidegger's objection to humanism is, of course, its subjectivism. This he ties closely to another theme prominent in his later thought – technology. Metaphysical thought is 'technical thought' wherein knowledge is subordinated to production – if not human production, then divine.

Heidegger knows full well that no simple identification of Plato with modern metaphysics can be made. He insists in this essay, for example, that the contemporary notion of value (*Wert*) is not at all appropriate to the Platonic notion of the good (*to agathon*). Nonetheless for Heidegger there is a kind of continuity of the tradition. Nietzsche is called in the Plato essay the 'most unbridled Platonist' (*zügelloseste Platoniker*) (PL 133). The transformation of truth in Plato is the great event that sets the way for modern subjectivism as evidenced, for example, in Nietzsche.

Though the late concession (1964) mentioned above acknowledges that the thesis about Plato's transformation of truth is mistaken, Heidegger does not in that lecture or anywhere else recant his description of the

traditional metaphysical notion of truth or his attribution of that notion to Plato. Accordingly this late concession affects not so much his Plato interpretation as his interpretation of the Pre-Socratics, and his attempt to find there the doctrine of truth as unconcealment. In the 'Seminar in Zähringen' (1973), for example, Heidegger takes up his older reading of Parmenides to revise it, and in the 'Seminar at Thor' (1969) he sticks essentially to his earlier critique of Plato. Here, rather than insist on Plato's transformation of the notion of truth, Heidegger suggests that Plato 'makes firm' or 'sets fast' (*festsetzen*) in a decisive way the interpretation of the Being of beings as 'presenting presence' (*anwesende Anwesenheit*) which is already to be found in the Pre-Socratics.²²

In the Plato essay Heidegger's primary argument for 'correctness' as the Platonic notion of truth concerns the Platonic *idea*. He urges that the essence of Plato's *idea* is appearance (*Aussehen* and *Schein*) and visibility. Through the *idea* the epistemological primacy of the metaphor of sight is supposedly established for the metaphysical tradition. Further, the ideas are fixed and immovable. Although in this essay Heidegger does not take his interpretation beyond the cave story to consider the discussion of the dialectic that follows it in the dialogue, he elsewhere suggests that the Platonic dialectic is basically categorization (*kategorieren*).²³ Accordingly, from the time of Plato and Aristotle the fundamental task of philosophy has always been to establish a table of categories, a list of ideas. Since the highest reality is *idea*, then according to Heidegger's view Plato's ontology renders Being (*Sein*) as essence or 'being-what' (*Was-Sein*). He comments that subsequent to Plato the true *esse* is *essentia* and not *existentia* (PL 131). Thus essentialism is established – of which nominalism is only the inverse. By introducing the concept of existence (*Existenz*) and its accompanying existentials in *Being and Time*, instead of the traditional categories, Heidegger sought a way out of the traditional impasse of essentialism or nominalism, objectivism or subjectivism, Plato or Nietzsche.

The obvious difficulty for Heidegger's interpretation of the cave allegory is the role of the sun which represents the Good. Here Heidegger is forced to consider the ontological import of the allegory which he for the most part ignores, as the critics have properly pointed out. When he first considers the sun, he acknowledges that the sun, as representative of the Good, has a double function. The sun not only provides light such that things may be seen, but the sun also gives warmth which maintains life. More strongly, it not only lets things be seen but it is their origin and cause: "The Good" maintains the appearing of the appearance, within which the presenting [*das Anwesende*], takes its stand in that which it is' (PL 135).²⁴

Only after Heidegger presents and argues his major thesis – that for Plato everything rests on the correctness of the look²⁵ – does he return

to this other aspect and acknowledge that Plato does nonetheless retain something of an ontological notion of truth, i.e., that truth is placed in the thing itself and not in the look: 'In a certain way nonetheless the "truth" must still hold fast as a character of the being [*das Seienden*], because the being as the presenting [*das Anwesende*] in the appearing has Being [*das Sein*] and this brings with it unconcealment' (PL 137).²⁶ The 'must' is indicative of the way, for Heidegger, Plato is forced against his own view to this acknowledgement – forced by the *Sache selbst*, as it were. Insofar as this runs contrary to Plato's primary view, there results an equivocation (*Zweideutigkeit*) on the notion of truth. In typically Heideggerian fashion the way things are (here, truth as unconcealment) shows through the covering over of it by metaphysics (here, Plato's correctness of the look). My quarrel with this aspect of Heidegger's interpretation is not with the suggestion that these two tendencies exist in Plato. They surely do. My complaint is that Heidegger does not deal with them more sympathetically. In fact, these two aspects of truth are just the two that Heidegger in *Being and Time* recognizes as necessary for any account of truth. There he accepts both as part of the phenomenon of truth and makes it his task to show how together these seemingly equivocal notions of truth together constitute the phenomenon of truth. Plato, like Heidegger, wants to provide a treatment of truth adequate to both these dimensions – dimensions that are not simply incompatible or equivocal. Plato is not singlemindedly fixed on truth as correctness.

In his argument for the thesis that 'everything rests on the look' Heidegger cites the statement from the allegory of the cave that the idea of the Good is itself the *kuria* (*Herrin*, mistress) of truth (517C 4). From this he goes on to suggest that the *idea* has the mastery of truth. In Heidegger's analysis *idea* becomes *blepein* which, in turn, becomes the 'look' (*Blick*). The 'look' has mastery. But this treatment of the text is not entirely satisfying, for it is not the *idea* simply that has mastery; it is rather the *idea* of the Good. Heidegger suggests that Plato, by making the *idea* of the Good 'mistress', places truth under the yoke of *idea*. It would be better to note that the yoke under which truth serves is not *idea* as such but the *idea* of the Good. In another Platonic metaphor, the truth is the offspring of the Good.

Heidegger's failure or refusal to adequately place this allegory in the larger context of the dialogue frustrates any reader of the *Republic*. Though Heidegger does deal briefly (PL 133–5) with the discussion of the Good and even refers to 509B, he ignores the famed statement by Socrates at 509B (when the sun allegory is introduced in the dialogue) that the Good is not being (*ousia*) but 'beyond being' (*epekeina tes ousias*). Certainly this makes it difficult to treat the Good simply as an idea. The ideas are presented by Plato as true being (*ousia*), but the Good is beyond being. It is the very cause (*aitia*) of being. As the source

of light the sun is more difficult to see than any thing. Rather it lets things be seen for what they are, while it itself remains, for the most part, unseen. Though Plato does call the Good an idea, unlike the other ideas it is never in the *Republic* called *eidos* as the others are.²⁷ Heidegger translated *eidos* as *Aussehen* or 'appearance'. In accord with this, the Good should not be understood as an appearance. Rather the Good presents no appearance. It is beyond the forms. It is their very ground. Heidegger, of course, recognizes its pre-eminence but sees it only as the pre-eminent idea, the idea *par excellence*. He uses the Platonic phrase – 'the idea of all ideas' (PL 133). He does not adequately attend to the significant distinctiveness of the Good.²⁸

This slighting of the difference of the Good from the other ideas is surprising in the context of the classical tradition wherein Neo-Platonism makes this distinction fundamental. But it is even more surprising in the context of the development of Heidegger's own thought. In the Marburg period, the period of the project of *Being and Time*, though Heidegger pays little attention to Plato, this phrase from the *Republic*, '*epekeina tes ousias*', is one of the most prominent and oft-repeated classical citations by Heidegger. Not only is the phrase frequent and used at important junctures in the argument of the lectures, this phrase provides the name for the sort of ontology – metontology – which Heidegger proposed for the completion of the project begun in the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time*. Given the importance of this phrase to the classical tradition and to Heidegger himself, its absence in this essay is quite obtrusive.²⁹

3

Two things are decisive for the interpretation of Plato presented in 'Plato's doctrine of truth'. First, the difference between the Good and the ideas is slighted, i.e., the *epekeina* is ignored. Secondly, notions of truth as correctness and as unconcealment are taken to be simply equivocal. The former is attributed to Plato, the latter to a more originary and more appropriate notion that shows through in spite of Plato. Looking at Heidegger's Plato interpretation by way of Heidegger's own development reveals both a critique of Plato that remains essentially the same and an earlier view that neither ignores the *epekeina* nor assumes the incompatibility of correctness and unconcealment. How can this be? Let us look first at the earlier Plato critique and then at the more significant philosophical issue concerning the *epekeina* and truth.

We should recall first of all that the early Heidegger was not as inimical to metaphysics as he became after his 'turn'.³⁰ Though *Being and Time* and *Basic Problems in Phenomenology* eschew the title of metaphysics,

in the last lectures at Marburg, *The Metaphysical Principles of Logic Beginning with Leibniz* (*Die Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*) Heidegger explicitly and repeatedly refers to his own philosophical project as metaphysics, composed of fundamental ontology and something he there calls metontology.³¹ The problem of the term 'metaphysics' in the early Heidegger is roughly comparable to the problem of Kant's use of the term. Both are sharply critical of the tradition of metaphysics and both propose to accomplish an appropriate metaphysics themselves. Both criticize the traditional metaphysics for being insufficiently scientific. With the turn, however, Heidegger abandons the incomplete project of *Being and Time*, abandons metaphysics, and abandons science.

The historical part of this early project (Part Two of *Being and Time*) was to be a destruction (*Destruktion*) of the history of ontology or metaphysics. The rhetoric of destruction is weakened considerably in the *Metaphysical Principles* when Heidegger comments that the ancients need not be overcome and wonders if critique is at all appropriate. What must be fought, he says, are the bad 'administrators' (*Sachwalter*) of the tradition.³² Needless to say, in the Plato essay as well as in these lectures Heidegger attacks not the contemporary interpretations of Plato but Plato himself. Nor is he always so modest with respect to his own place in the tradition. He does insist that the entire metaphysical tradition points to his own metaphysics of Dasein.³³

The principal chapters of Heidegger's destructive treatment of the tradition in *Being and Time* were to be devoted to Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant – the historical figures to whom Heidegger felt himself closest. This is less the case with Descartes but there Heidegger, as in the *Basic Problems*, was to examine Descartes' dependence on medieval scholasticism. Among the ancients it is Aristotle whom Heidegger favors. When in the lectures on truth in the winter semester of 1925/6 (the time when he was writing *Being and Time*) Heidegger attempts to counter the dominant Neo-Kantian notion of truth as judgment, he does so by first countering the contemporary notion with that of Aristotle and Aristotle's equation of Being and truth in the *Metaphysics* (Book Theta, 10).³⁴ Having undermined the contemporary notion with the more originary Aristotelian notion, he then goes on to criticize Aristotle. It seems fair to say that in his Marburg period Heidegger uses Aristotle not so much to criticize Plato as to criticize modern philosophy. He finds Aristotle appropriate for this task in part because of his acceptance of Aristotle's critique of Plato and in part because of the Neo-Kantian alignment with Plato. This is not to say that he attempted to simply follow Aristotle.³⁵ Rather Aristotle, too, was inadequate, especially with respect to the analysis of time. The source that provided the leverage against even Aristotle was, for the early Heidegger, Christianity, especially Paul's

eschatological and 'kairological' notion of time with its priority of the future.³⁶ While the young Heidegger criticizes the Greek philosophical tradition from the perspective of the Judaeo-Christian tradition assisted by Luther and Kierkegaard among others, he comes to see, while still at Marburg, that the continuity is more significant than the discontinuity. Thus he can say in *Basic Problems* (1927) that Plato's doctrine of ideas was tailor-made for the Judaeo-Christian world view.³⁷ He leaves Kierkegaard for Nietzsche, for whom Christianity is Platonism for the masses. The later Heidegger turns not so much to Christianity as to the Pre-Socratics for resources against the philosophical tradition. He later attributes his preference of Aristotle over Plato to the former's archaism.³⁸

The continuity that Heidegger finds between Greek philosophy and Christianity is a large one that incriminates Aristotle as well as Plato and is decisive for his critique of Plato and the identification of Plato with the entire metaphysical tradition. This continuity for Heidegger rests on the Greek understanding of Being as 'production' (*Herstellung*). Heidegger treats Aristotle's four causes as exemplary of the thesis. The constitution of any being is understood as analogous to the production of an artefact – involving material, design, agent, agent's purpose. Accordingly, essence (*Was-sein*), which translates *ousia*, means the 'production of the produced in the sense of the disposable present-at-hand'.³⁹ Two concepts are essential to this view of Being – production and being-present-at-hand (*Vorhandensein*).⁴⁰ By way of production, being-present-at-hand, Heidegger asserts, is the pre-eminent notion of Being throughout the Western tradition. God or the demiurge is the ultimate producer. Thus all metaphysics is onto-theological. This underlies our own contemporary technological frame of mind.

Though Heidegger himself chides those who would read Aristotle as a 'disguised Church Father' (*MP* 190), his own production thesis is consonant with the Christian appropriation of Greek philosophy. This is particularly apparent with respect to Plato in *Basic Problems*, when Heidegger makes the *epekeina* or, synonymously, transcendence his central theme. There he talks of Plato 'bumping up against' the *epekeina*, the phenomenon of transcendence. He acknowledges that with this problem: 'we understand . . . that philosophy has not made any further progress with its cardinal question than it had already in Plato. . . . [W]e are moving within one of Plato's fundamental problems' (*BP* 282–3, *Gp* 400). He does not develop an interpretation of 509B but he recognizes that it could undermine his production thesis. He dismisses this possibility in the following way: 'It appears as though our thesis that ancient philosophy interprets [B]eing in the horizon of production in the broadest sense would have no connection at all with what Plato notes as [the] condition of [the] possibility of the understanding of [B]eing. Our interpretation of ancient ontology and its guiding clue seems to be arbitrary.'

What could the idea of the good have to do with production? Without entering further into this matter, we offer only the hint that the *idea [tou] agathou* is nothing but the *demiurgos*, the producer pure and simple. This lets us see how the *idea [tou] agathou* is connected with *poiein*, *praxis*, *techne* in the broadest sense' (BP 286, Gp 405).⁴¹ Here Heidegger invokes the *Timaeus* to indicate the continuity of Platonism with Christianity much as the early Christian philosophers did. Similarly, in the Plato essay transcendence is interpreted theologically.⁴²

Nowhere in the Marburg lectures published thus far does Heidegger develop his critique of Plato, but in *Metaphysical Principles* he does indicate precisely how he was to criticize Plato two years later in 'Plato's doctrine of truth'. Here he lists six aspects of the transcendence of the Good. These include:

- (1) The Good is hard to see.
- (2) The Good is the cause or ground of the just and beautiful and their fellowship (*koinonia*).
- (3) The Good gives light so that things can be seen.
- (4) The Good grounds the inner possibility of truth and reason.
- (5) The Good is the principle (*arche*) of all.
- (6) The Good is above beings and their Being.

These six guide his own analysis of the transcendence of Dasein, yet Heidegger suggests that the third should provide the basis for the interpretation of the cave allegory: 'Here is where the cave allegory should be fully interpreted.'⁴³ This is exactly what he does when he sits down to write his essay on Plato.

In these lectures he touches briefly on the ontological problem of participation (*methexis*) as suggested in (5) and (6) above – something he avoids for the most part in the later Plato essay. The question is unavoidable Heidegger says: 'Is the world a realm of ideas, a *hyperouranios topos*, toward which reason, which has sunk into Dasein, looks? Or is the world the entirety of ideas which are in the subject from its birth?' (MP 234). As we noted above, this way of putting the question is precisely the way it was put by Natorp in his Plato interpretation. Heidegger does not take up the latter question, but the context suggests its inappropriateness. Concerning the former question Heidegger comments that Aristotle saw that such an approach leads to a doubling of beings (MP 235). This comment suggests that Plato did not see it.

In either case the ancient view centers on 'intuition' (*Anschauung*) such that the way is prepared for the modern subject-object relationship. Heidegger is careful not to accuse Plato or Aristotle of having this problem *per se*. Earlier in the lectures Heidegger comments that the problem of ancient philosophy and ontology cannot be dealt with adequately in terms of realism or idealism (a criticism of Natorp among

others) because the ancients' fundamental problem was ontological and not epistemological (*MP* 180). Nonetheless, the subjectivity of the subject is a critical problem for the ancients according to Heidegger and the resolution of the problem by means of intuition sets the stage for the modern epistemological problem. Heidegger is not careful in his Plato essay to distinguish the ancient ontological stance from the modern epistemological one, but the general thesis is the same in these Marburg lectures as in the later essay: the Platonic treatment of truth sets up the quagmire of subjectivism and objectivism. Had Heidegger pursued his own cautionary note about the difference between ancient ontological approaches and modern epistemological ones, had he examined the cave story under more aspects than the third of the six he recognized as possible, and had Heidegger been less ready to accept the demiurgic resolution of the *epekeina* question – then he would have been prepared to deliver a more appropriate reading of the cave story. Numbers (4), (5), and (6) are each as relevant for an interpretation of the cave story as (3), which Heidegger makes the principle of his own interpretation. But why should he have failed to provide such a reading, for which he had laid such excellent groundwork – and upon which his students would read Plato only to correct the reading of their teacher?

4

To answer this question requires attention to the systematic problems with which Heidegger struggled in the attempt between 1927 and 1931 to complete the ontological project begun in *Being and Time*. The published text of *Being and Time*, of course, constitutes only two thirds of Part One of a projected work of two parts. Part Two was to consist of historical studies, the 'destruction' mentioned above. The stumbling block for Heidegger, it seems, was not so much these historical analyses, which for the most part he delivered in lectures or published independently.⁴⁴ Rather, his principal difficulties lie in the concluding systematic section, which was to be entitled 'Time and being'. Of this section Heidegger later remarks 'Here everything is reversed.'⁴⁵ The significant 'turn' in Heidegger's thought took place shortly after he left Marburg for Freiburg to take Husserl's chair. He was then attempting to think through the projected reversal in the project of *Being and Time*. The turn taken was not the turn projected.⁴⁶

The recent publication of the lectures Heidegger gave at this time give us an indication of these difficulties. The two lecture series discussed above are especially helpful in this regard. A footnote to the first sentence of *Basic Problems* states that these lectures are a 'new working out of the 3d section of Part I of *Being and Time*'.⁴⁷ Albert Hofstadter

is surely wrong to suggest that they represent in effect the completion of the project, for they too provide only a fraction of what they project.⁴⁸ The lectures of a year later, the last Marburg lectures, do not set for themselves the task of developing the thematic of 'Time and being' as *Basic Problems* does, but they rather comment at a slight distance on 'The problem of being and time'. Both sets of lectures conclude with a reference to Plato.

In *Basic Problems* Heidegger sets for himself the task of establishing an appropriate concept or idea of Being itself by way of the resolution of four problems concerning such a concept. The four problems are the following:

- (1) the ontological difference of Being from beings;
- (2) the fundamental articulation of Being, i.e., the unity of whatness and howness (traditionally *essentia* and *existentia*) in the idea of Being;
- (3) the unity of the multiplicity or regions of Being; and
- (4) the question of truth.

The first three are aspects of the fundamental metaphysical problem that the young Hegel refers to as identity and difference, that medieval scholasticism treated by way of the analogy of Being, and that Plato discussed as the One and the Many. Heidegger poses these problems in terms of the apparent indifference of Being and Being's originary plenitude. The last of these four problems calls for an ontological basis for the understanding of truth.

Inevitably the most prominent theme of the lectures is not so much Being as such as the problem of understanding Being. This follows from *Being and Time* in which the often overlooked leading question asks after the meaning of Being (*Sinn von Sein*). It is we human beings as Dasein who must come to terms with Being. The systematic treatment of Being as such rests on the preparatory analytic of Dasein – the published text of *Being and Time*. In accordance with the treatment of the understanding in that work, all understanding is projective, i.e., any item is understood insofar as it is integrated into a larger projected, though not necessarily thematized, context. The understanding of Being as such is unlike the understanding of any particular being, however. Failure to recognize this ontological difference has, according to Heidegger, caused much of the greatest confusion in the history of philosophy. Not the least of these confusions is the projection by 'vulgar' metaphysics of a *Hinterwelt*, a second world behind this one. Though he does not do so here, Heidegger often accuses Platonism of just this.⁴⁹ It is in the context of just such discussions that Heidegger likes to insist on the transcendental status of the science of ontology – it is not the science of transcendent being but the transcendental science of Being. The con-

fusion between the two, he often points out, is apparent in Aristotle's two senses of 'first science' – the science of Being qua being or of first being. To resolve the former question by means of the latter gives us the production thesis of the present-at-hand.

Heidegger suggests the following succession of understanding for any ontological inquiry: the understanding of beings and the projection toward Being, the understanding of Being and the projection toward time. When this notion of projecting beyond Being toward time is first suggested in the lectures Heidegger develops it explicitly in terms of the Platonic *epekeina tes ousias*: 'What we are in search of is the *epekeina tes ousias*' (BP 285, Gp 404). That which is beyond Being and which Heidegger refers to as the *epekeina* is time. Here, however, the phenomenological analysis of time as the triadic 'ecstatic' unity of temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*), which *Being and Time* provided, is deemed insufficient. This analysis is retained but is to be deepened by finding the origin of temporality as *Zeitlichkeit* in temporality as *Temporalität*, a deeper a priori structure. This theme of temporality as *Temporalität* is tied directly to the interpretation of world, for the temporal world is that which goes beyond or transcends – it is the sought for *epekeina*. As worldly being, or Being-in-the-world, Dasein itself is called the transcendent: 'what is truly transcendent is the Dasein' (BP 299, Gp 425).

In this sense ontology is a science of transcendent being, but Dasein, not God, is the transcendent being. Transcendence is a finite transcendence. The 'of' in 'science of transcendent being' is both a subjective and an objective genitive and in a way that only the last Marburg lectures make clear. There, commenting on the science of metaphysics, Heidegger suggests that the science has two principal parts: fundamental ontology and metontology. The former is equivalent to Part One of *Being and Time* – both the preparatory analytic of Dasein and the intended treatment of Being as such (Section 3: 'Time and being'). As in Kant, the 'critical' question of the limits of understanding is placed before the systematic metaphysics proper. Metontology is both beyond Being (*epekeina tes ousias*) and after (*meta*) the treatment of Being. It returns to Dasein and what Heidegger calls a metaphysics of existence where ethical questions might properly be raised. This analysis would be ontical, 'existenziell', as opposed to the earlier ontological and 'existenzial' treatment of *Being and Time*. The primary theme of this ontical study of the human was to be freedom. In classical terms the *epekeina* of Plato was to be interpreted through the *hou heneka*, the final cause, of Aristotle. Heidegger never worked out this metontology because he never completed to his own satisfaction the treatment of Being as such.

A decisive problem Heidegger faced with respect to the idea of Being itself was that of truth. Though the *Basic Problems* does not get beyond the first of the four main problems mentioned above, the lectures

conclude by expressing concern about a certain aspect of the truth question, i.e., the problem of the objectification of the science of philosophy. How does the treatment of truth provided in *Being and Time* apply to the work itself? The objectification inherent in the other sciences does not present the difficulty that such objectification does for philosophy, since the 'positive' sciences properly have objects. The 'object' of philosophy is primarily Being itself which is not an 'object' as such. It is rather no thing – hence the theme of the Inaugural address at Freiburg, 'What is metaphysics?'. Heidegger's question concerns how the pre-thematic and non-objective awareness of Being can be thematized, i.e., objectified. In concluding this lecture series (*Basic Problems*) Heidegger appeals to the Platonic notion of reminiscence yet adds a cautionary note: 'Here we must in all sobriety understand clearly that temporality is in no way something that is to be beheld in some superabundant and enigmatic intuition (*Intuition*); it discloses itself only in conceptual labor of a specific sort. But also it is not merely hypothetically supposed at the beginning without our having some vision (*Blick*) of it itself' (BP 327, Gp 465). What are we to make of the suggestion that we have a vision of, perhaps better, a glance (*Blick*) at Being but no 'superabundant and enigmatic intuition'? The latter is what Heidegger takes Plato to have offered us. The lectures end by citing approvingly Kant's attack on the Plato of the seventh letter as an enthusiast. Plato's 'conceptual labor' was insufficiently rigorous.

This problem of the objectifying character of the science of philosophy is apparent, though inexplicit, in *Being and Time*.⁵⁰ There is, as I have pointed out elsewhere, a methodological indifference that makes phenomenological analyses possible; yet indifference is everywhere attacked as the fault of a metaphysical tradition which takes Being merely as the present-at-hand.⁵¹ Consonant with *Being and Time*, we must ask how the silent and differentiated voice of conscience can be given a seemingly indifferent voice? Or, as *Basic Problems* frames the question, how can the apparent indifference of Being to its modes and regions be understood not as the nothingness of indifference but as the richness of a source (*Ursprung*)?

The resolution of this question that *Being and Time* anticipates seems to rest on the distinction of the originary and derived levels of truth. Heidegger writes there that the notion of truth as propositional and expressive is not mistaken. Truth does take this form. But this form of truth is based on a more fundamental and 'originary' truth experience – truth as unconcealment. Similarly Heidegger does not simply throw out the traditional notion of truth as adequation. He, like Kant, expressly adopts such a notion and then asks 'what are the conditions of the possibility of truth being such?'

Heidegger's analysis moves from the propositional and '*adaequatio*'

level to the higher ontological level – from correctness to unconcealment. He nowhere, however, successfully shows how the move back down from the ontological to the ontical and propositional level is possible.⁵² This latter move would be of great importance in relating the science of philosophy to the positive sciences. Heidegger's lecture 'Phenomenology and theology' shows that he has not adequately worked out this relationship of philosophy to the positive sciences.⁵³ But more importantly this move is essential to the self-justification of ontology as a science, i.e., as objectified and thematized.

The difficulty in making this move is reflected in the systematic difficulty of moving from fundamental ontology to the proposed metontology, for the doctrine of Being is not developed by Heidegger with the conceptual rigor that he himself demands. A concept or 'idea' that is not merely indifferent is not worked out satisfactorily. Had it been worked out, there remains the problem of the move back down to Dasein. Heidegger plays here with the German terms '*Kehre*' and '*Umschlag*' and the Greek *metabole*. This last problem is rather like that posed by Glaucon in the *Republic* concerning the cave story: 'Do you mean that we must do them this wrong and compel them to live an inferior life [i.e., the life in the cave] when the better is in their power [i.e., the life under the sun]?' (520 D). This is the political reflection of the methexis problem in Plato. *Contra* Heraclitus, for Plato and Heidegger the way up and the way down are not the same. Heidegger's silent voice of conscience finds no adequate scientific thematization. Soon hereafter in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* Heidegger abandons the claims of philosophy to scientific status. Soon thereafter he abandons philosophy for thought (*Denken*) which is the nearest neighbor to poetry.

After leaving Marburg in 1928 Heidegger gave lectures on the theme of truth during the winter semester of 1930/1. Though these lectures have yet to be published, we have from the lectures both the Plato essay and the essay 'On the essence of truth'. The theme of science (*Wissenschaft*) is abandoned but the question of the possibility of the correctness of an expression or proposition in a 'ground' or deeper (higher) ontological level remains the same. As before, this ontological ground is Being itself, the questioning of which is a question about the whole. The appropriateness of the answer can find no external measure or Archimedean point. Here Heidegger offers for the thought of philosophy the '*Gelassenheit der Milde*' – the mildness of letting beings be.⁵⁴

Within the tradition there have been perhaps no two thinkers more fully aware than Plato and Hegel of the problems that accompany the task of

philosophy precisely because philosophy demands the truth of the whole. Hegel's critique of representational thought, which Heidegger takes up and which exhibits itself in the problem of the objectification of scientific language, follows from this very concern. Plato in his own dialectical and dialogical way faced this same problem. Had Heidegger hearkened less to Hegel and his demand for conceptual rigor and more to the irony of Plato, he might have recognized a proximity of his own thought to that of Plato which would have undermined his sharp critique.

He could have learned more from Natorp in this regard – not only about the inappropriateness of ascribing the doctrine of two worlds to Plato but also of the significance of *eros* for Plato. In his introduction to *Metaphysical Principles* Heidegger in a paragraph skips through the history of philosophy mentioning the key conceptions concerning subjectivity in Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, and Hegel. For Plato he mentions *logos* and *psyche*. Now Natorp titled his appendix to the second edition (1920) of his *Platons Ideenlehre* 'Logos–Psyche–Eros'. The absence of any attention to *eros* in Heidegger's comments on Plato is perhaps the most remarkable feature of his Plato interpretation. It is remarkable not only in that it is an important central theme in Plato or that the notion played an important role in the contemporary debate on Plato (Natorp, for example) but rather in the fact that this notion is very like Heidegger's own notion of transcendence.

As suggested above, both *Metaphysical Principles* and *On the Essence of Ground* culminate in a treatment of the freedom of Dasein – a theme in itself very unPlatonic. But the concept of freedom as transcendence is developed, commensurate with *Being and Time*, in terms of weakness (*Ohnmächtigkeit*) and necessity – an analysis that is more classical than modern. Further, though freedom is central to Heidegger's analysis, the will is not. For this analysis of Dasein as free and transcendent being, we are prepared by the treatment of Dasein as temporal being. Temporality is explicated by means of 'ecstasy' – Dasein's standing outside itself in a temporal world. This, Heidegger suggests, is the origin of the derivative notion of intentionality as developed by Husserl and first introduced by Plato when Plato suggests that all *logos* is a *logos tinos* – a *logos* of something. One should not, according to Heidegger, explain transcendence by means of intentionality but rather should explain intentionality by means of transcendence. But Heidegger does not see that, rather like his own notion of transcendence that grounds intentionality, so too Plato's notion of *eros* grounds *logos*. In the 'erotic mania' of philosophy one comes to stand outside oneself and in the truth. Heidegger would call this the ecstatic character of Dasein.⁵⁵

We must recognize that the fundamental problem that Heidegger was grappling with as he struggled with the completion of *Being and Time* and formulated his critique of Plato is the problem of truth. He wanted

to avoid both naive objectivism and theologism. He also wanted to avoid the subjectivism found, for example, in Nietzsche, Natorp, and Sartre. He hoped to establish an understanding of truth that was neither transcendent in the 'other worldly' sense nor transcendental in the sense of the Neo-Kantians – alternatives, in my view, equally inappropriate to Plato. Truth, for Heidegger, is not to be a matter of positing by the subject. It requires a measure (*Mass* or *Massstab*). Yet with regard to the self-grounding character of the truth of the whole, with which the science of philosophy concerns itself, the measure cannot be external to the truth. For Heidegger the truth authenticates itself in the event of its unconcealment. The 'vision' (*Blick*) which Heidegger acknowledges as an aspect of this event is like the Platonic intuition which he criticizes. It is entirely appropriate that Heidegger should try to illuminate this 'Blick' through Plato's notion of reminiscence. Heidegger's inability to work out thematically the pre-thematic 'Blick' of Being together with his critique of 'sight' as the appropriate metaphor for truth as unconcealment leaves him waiting for the voice of Being.

Had he attended to the notion of the Good and man's erotic attachment to it, he might have noticed that for Plato the transcendence of the Good (*Republic*) is to be reconciled with the beautiful symmetrical measure of the mixture of life (*Philebus*). The Good is the mixture which the human in its weakness and finitude longs to attain.

The recognition of this proximity to Plato does not deny their very significant differences. On the contrary, it lets us see more clearly their opposition, which can be located most simply in the eternity of the 'Blick' for Plato and the historicity of the 'Blick' for Heidegger. Heidegger's understanding of reminiscence as '*die gewesende Zukunft*' (the future in the process of becoming past) is, taken by itself, Platonic. That to which man erotically aspires (Heidegger's projection of one's ownmost possibility) is the recovery of that which one once was. We remember what we are going toward.⁵⁶ But Heidegger allows himself no myth that introduces the suprahistorical, as Plato consistently does.

We saw how, for Heidegger (early and late), the demiurgic myth of the *Timaeus* incriminates Plato in 'production' metaphysics and onto-theology. Yet there is a late recognition by Heidegger (albeit expressed in the third person) of the proximity of Plato to his own thought wherein his usual critique is at least partially suspended. It occurs in the same publication in which Heidegger declares once again that metaphysics is Platonism. In the 'Summary of a Seminar on the Lecture "Time and Being"' the early Plato is exempted from the line of thought that runs from the Greek philosophical notion of *poiesis* through *creatio* to *Setzung*. Here Heidegger acknowledges that in the light metaphor of the Platonic *parousia* there is no *poiesis* or making (*Machen*): 'In this he [Plato] is

undoubtedly close to Heidegger.⁵⁷ Perhaps in the end Heidegger did learn something about Plato from his own students.⁵⁸

Notes

1 In the lecture 'Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens' Heidegger claims: 'Durch die ganze Geschichte der Philosophie hindurch bleibt Platons Denken in abgewandelten Gestalten massgebend. Die Metaphysik ist Platonismus.' This lecture is published in *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), 63; in English translation by Joan Stambaugh, *On Time and Being* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 57. Heidegger makes the same claim in *Nietzsche* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), 2:222.

2 This essay was first published in 1942. In 1947 it was published in book form with the *Letter on Humanism*. It is cited here from *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967). Though the essay has been translated, all translations used here are my own. Hereafter it is referred to as PL.

3 *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 78; *On Time and Being*, 70.

4 Friedländer objects to Heidegger's minimalization of the ontological aspect of the Good. He criticizes as well Heidegger's etymology of *aletheia* as *a-lethe*. He points out that Plato himself discusses its etymology in the *Cratylus* and renders it *ale-theia*, 'divine whirlwind'. He argues further that nowhere in the Pre-Socratics or in Homer is *aletheia* used in Heidegger's sense of *Unverborgenheit*. See Chapter 11 in vol. 1 of *Platon* (Berlin: DeGruyter, 1954).

Heidegger, who seldom responds to criticism, responded very briefly to Friedländer's criticism by way of a question in the lecture 'Hegel und die Griechen', (1958) published in *Wegmarken*, 271. He is not yet ready here to make the concession he makes six years later in the lecture 'Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens'. There Heidegger admits: 'It is often and justifiably pointed out that the word *alethes* is already used by Homer only in the *verba dicendi*, in statement and thus in the sense of correctness and reliability, not in the sense of unconcealment' (*On Time and Being*, 70; *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 77).

5 See Walter Biemel's biographical study, *Martin Heidegger* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 15.

6 Gerhard Krüger, 'Martin Heidegger und der Humanismus', *Studia Philosophica*, 9 (1949): 93-129. Krüger's principal work on Plato is *Einsicht und Leidenschaft: Das Wesen des Platonischen Denkens*, 4th ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1973).

7 Stanley Rosen, 'Heidegger's interpretation of Plato', *Essays in Metaphysics* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1970), 51-78. See also chapter 5 of his *Nihilism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969).

8 Hans Georg Gadamer, *Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1978), 7. This is now being translated into English by P. Christopher Smith. Here and elsewhere Gadamer indicates that the initial key to his reading of Plato was the rejection of the Aristotelian critique of Plato's 'Ideenlehre' by Paul Natorp as well as by J. Stenzel and N. Hartmann. Gadamer has published many articles on Plato. Most of these have been collected in two volumes: *Platos dialektische Ethik* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), and *Kleine Schriften* 3 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1972). Some of these have been collected and translated into English by P. Christopher Smith in *Dialogue and Dialectic* (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). See also 'Plato and Heidegger', *The Question of Being* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978), 45–63.

9 The most recent addition to this critical consensus is William A. Galston's 'Heidegger's Plato: a critique of *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*', *Philosophical Forum*, 13 (1982), 371–84. He criticizes Heidegger's essay much like the criticisms mentioned above for inadequately providing the context for the allegory of the cave (for Galston, the political aspect is the most significant part of the context ignored), for focusing onesidedly on the epistemological issue, and for ignoring the difference between the ideas and the Good. Galston does not address the larger context of this essay in Heidegger's work.

10 See the chapter 'Heidegger's Will-not-to-will' in Volume Two of *Life of the Mind* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978). She places what she calls the 'reversal' between volumes 1 and 2 of *Nietzsche* (1939). I do not deny that there is evidence of the turn here, but I follow Heidegger himself and date the beginning of the turn with *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (1930).

11 See Gadamer's evocative treatment of philosophy in Marburg in the 1920's in his *Philosophische Lehrjahre* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977). Gadamer adopts as a motto for his own autobiography the very motto that Natorp chose for his own: 'De nobis ipsis silemus' – which is the motto Kant borrowed from Francis Bacon for the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Gadamer concludes his recollection of Natorp as follows: 'Lassen Sie mich mit einer persönlichen Erinnerung schliessen: wenn wir jungen Leute mit dem pietätlosen Blick der Jugend den kleinen eisgrauen Mann [Natorp] mit den grossen aufgerissenen Augen, in seinem Lodencape von wahrhaft monumentaler Unscheinbarkeit, des öfteren in der Begleitung des jungen Heidegger der Rotenburg heraufwandern sahen – der jüngere dem ehrwürdigen Greis respektvoll zugewandt, aber meist beide in langen, tiefen Schweigen, dann rührte uns in solcher stummen Zwiesprache zwischen den Generationen etwas von Dunkel und Helligkeit der Einen Philosophie an' (67–8).

12 Gadamer, 'Martin Heidegger und die Marburger Theologie', *Kleine Schriften* 1 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1967), 84, translated by David E. Linge in *Philosophical Hermeneutics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 201.

13 Paul Natorp, *Platos Ideenlehre* (Leipzig: Meiner, 1921), first published in 1902, hereafter cited in the text as *PI*. The second edition, which left the text untouched but added notes and an appendix, substantially modified the interpretation, rendering Plato less Kantian and more Plotinian.

14 In the Preface to *Platos Ideenlehre* Natorp writes that 'the introduction to Plato is the education into philosophy. . . . Philosophy, however, according to its strictest historical concept is nothing other than idealism' (V). Kant is for him the highest fulfillment of the philosophical tradition. In the appendix added to the second edition Natorp writes defensively 'Whoever completely holds a Marburger capable of wishing to show that Plato was a Kantian according to Marburg observance falsifies the entire meaning of the philosophical effort, which one honors with the title "Marburg school"'. In the same context he asserts: 'Whoever can overlook the elements (*Züge*) in Plato that look forward to Kant and those in Kant that look back to Plato must have understood them both equally poorly' (462).

15 Natorp was aware of the importance of post-Kantian idealism for his own Kantianism. Gadamer comments that the root of Natorp's Neo-Kantian view of Plato lies in Hegel's dialectic of the 'verkehrten Welt' which thinks of the supersensible world of the understanding as a 'tranquil realm of laws' (*ruhiges Reich von Gesetzen*). Thereby the Platonic idea is understood through the modern notion of a law of nature. In *Philosophische Lehrjahre*, 66.

16 *PI* VII: 'Aber den Begriff des Idealismus haben wir gemein, und die Grundansicht, dass der Idealismus, der von den Ideen Platos, und nicht etwa Berkeleys, benannt ist, auch in Platos Ideenlehre seine erste, ursprünglichste, fast muss man sagen unmissverständlichste Ausprägung gefunden hat.'

17 According to Natorp Aristotle's critique rests on an early and undeveloped notion of the ideas as presented, for example, in the *Phaedo*. Referring to them there as *auto kath' auto* (66A, 78D, 100B), Plato gives ground for such an understanding. Assuming a developmental view of Platonic doctrine, Natorp urges that this notion is more Socratic than Platonic. He summarizes his own argument as follows: 'We will see how he [Plato] in the *Theaetetus*, the *Phaedo*, the *Symposium*, and the *Republic* comes step by step closer to the overcoming of the transcendent on behalf of the transcendental, in order to achieve it in the *Parmenides*' (*PI* 88). For Natorp the telling dialogue is the *Parmenides*. Aristotle, according to his view, leaves the problem too early; he lacked the necessary dialectical perseverance (*PI* 224). The basis for this lack is the 'eternal inability of dogmatism to transport itself to the standpoint of critical philosophy' (*PI* 385).

18 *PI* 191: 'Auch für uns gibt es hier Einiges zu verwundern. . . . Aber hier sollen wir uns gar etwas denken, das über beides, das Denken und das gedachte Sein hinaus liegt. Aber doch wiederum liegt es im Bereiche, in der Gattung des Denkbaren.' Elsewhere (*PI* 463) Natorp suggests that the *epekeina* of Plato finds its clear formulation in Kant's notion of the transcendental. This reading of the *epekeina* is substantially modified in the notes (nn. 6, 14, 16) to the second edition. Here the ideas are beyond the distinction of the subjective and objective (526 n. 6). And the Good ascends to the sphere of the Plotinian One (532 n. 14), which lies above the twofold correlations of knowledge and object of knowledge, theory and practice, and so on.

19 *Wegmarken*, 57. This has been translated by Terrence Malick under the title *The Essence of Reasons* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 95.

20 Idealism is a broad target. Heidegger would criticize thereby Husserl as well, at least so far as both Husserl and Neo-Kantianism establish an ultimate ground in the transcendental ego. Heidegger identifies the primary difference between Neo-Kantianism and Husserl as lying in their respective notions of truth. For the Neo-Kantians truth lies in judgment. For Heidegger, Husserl's notion of intentionality is a more originary notion, one that leads to Heidegger's own notion of truth. In this regard see especially Heidegger's *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975), 24: 285–6; in English translation by Albert Hofstadter: *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 201. Hereafter these will be cited respectively as *Gp* and *BP*. In the *Logic* lectures of 1925–6 (*Gesamtausgabe* 21: 60) Heidegger suggests that Husserl initially took up the notion of idea and ideal being in a Platonic way influenced by Lotze but soon saw through it and gave it up. Yet in the still unpublished *Beiträge* (1936–8) Heidegger accuses pre-hermeneutical phenomenology of understanding truth as the correctness of representation. See O. Pöggeler, 'Heideggers Neubestimmung des Phänomenbegriffs', *Neuere Entwicklungen des Phänomenbegriffs, Phänomenologische Forschungen* vol. 9 (Freiburg: Alber, 1980), 155.

The suggestion, then, that Heidegger's critique of Plato is also a critique of Husserl is appropriate in a certain way, but the thesis of Douglas McGaughy that the Plato essay is a response to an essay by Eugen Fink, who used the cave story to interpret Husserl's phenomenology is surely wrong, for Fink's essay ('Was Will die Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls') was first published in 1934

(*Tatwelt* 10), three or four years after Heidegger wrote the Plato essay. McGaughey was misled by the later publication date of the Heidegger essay. See Douglas McGaughey, 'Husserl and Heidegger on Plato's cave allegory: a study of philosophical influence', *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 16 (1976): 331–48.

There is an extremely important but often unnoticed close relationship between the thought of Natorp and Husserl. In important reviews of the *Logische Untersuchungen* and of the *Ideen* Natorp proclaimed the proximity of their positions. Iso Kern argues that the single most important source of Husserl's development after 1920, i.e., Husserl's development of genetic phenomenology, was the work of Natorp. See Iso Kern, *Husserl und Kant* (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1964), especially 326–73.

21 *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1967), 208; in English by Macquarrie and Robinson, *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 251.

22 See *Vier Seminare* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967), 75. Decisive for the late Heidegger's comments about Plato and the Pre-Socratics is Heidegger's shift away from the question of truth. In some of his last published comments (*Vier Seminare*, 82) he describes his own pathway of thought as having three phases. The leading questions for these phases are the following: (1) the meaning of Being (*Sinn von Sein*), (2) the truth of Being (*Wahrheit des Seins*), and (3) the topology of Being (*topos des Seins*). The Plato essay was written as Heidegger began the second phase. According to Heidegger in *Vier Seminare* (134) *aletheia* (unconcealment) has nothing to do with *Wahrheit* (truth).

See Pöggeler's comments on Heidegger's move away from *Wahrheit* as his leading question in "'Geschichtlichkeit" im Spätwerk Heideggers', *Heidegger und die hermeneutische Philosophie* (Freiburg: Alber, 1983), 160–1; and also his 'Zeit und Sein bei Heidegger', *Zeit und Zeitlichkeit bei Husserl und Heidegger, Phänomenologische Forschungen*, 14 (Freiburg: Alber, 1983), 186.

23 *Neitzsche* 1: 529ff. See Rosen's apt criticism of this view, 'Heidegger's interpretation of Plato', 64–5.

24 "'Das Gute" gewährt das Erscheinen des Aussehens, worin das Anwesende in dem, was es ist, seinen Bestand hat.'

25 PL 136: 'An der *orthotes*, der Richtigkeit des Blickens, liegt alles.'

26 'In gewisser Weise muss Platon jedoch die "Wahrheit" noch als Charakter des Seienden festhalten, weil das Seiende als das Anwesende im Erscheinen das Sein hat und dieses die Unverborgenheit mit sich bringt.'

27 Gadamer points this out in *Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles*, 20–1.

28 One could perhaps defend the narrowness of Heidegger's interpretation in the following way. It is impossible to adequately provide the context for this allegory in the space of a lecture or a short essay. Heidegger is interested here in the problem of truth, not the problem of Being. Thus the objection that the ontological significance of the sun is not adequately dealt with is irrelevant, especially since this famous phrase stands outside the text of the cave allegory. Such a defense, however, ignores that precisely what Heidegger wanted to escape was such a distinction of truth and Being. His charge against Plato is that Plato was the decisive historical thinker to drive the wedge between truth and Being. Thus my criticism of Heidegger's interpretation is not that he failed to provide the full context but that he failed to provide the relevant context – that which undermines his thesis. In the Plato essay (PL 141) Heidegger does briefly consider the Good as highest cause and explains it away as theological. As we shall see

below, this fits with Heidegger's 'productivity thesis' concerning Greek ontology which Heidegger worked out in Marburg.

29 For Heidegger's explicit mention of the *epekeina* see *Gp* 401–5, 425, 436 (*BP* 283–6, 299, 307); *Von Wesen des Grundes in Wegmarken*, 56–8, in English 92–9. See also the last Marburg lectures from the summer of 1928: *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978) 26: 143, 237, 246, 284. Hereafter these lectures will be referred to in the text as *MP* (*Metaphysical Principles*).

One can identify, as Gilson does in *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute, 1949), two primary developments in the Western metaphysical tradition with respect to the doctrine of Being and the understanding of God. The one thread of development identifies God with Being and finds its root in Aristotle. Biblically Yahweh's identification of himself to Moses in the burning bush as 'I am who am' is for this school fundamental. The other line of development begins with the *epekeina* of Plato. It finds its most significant development in the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus. This is taken up by Augustine, the Pseudo-Dionysius, and Meister Eckhart. For Eckhart, to be does not belong to God. Heidegger is not concerned with a doctrine of God. The few early remarks by Heidegger about God characterize Him as a being among beings. But the significance of Augustine and Eckhart for the early Heidegger is well-documented. *Dasein* is often described provocatively in phrases traditionally assigned to God. Most dramatically, in the Introduction to *Sein und Zeit* *Dasein* is called the '*transcendens schlechthin*' (the simply transcendent), and, further, *Dasein*'s essence is said to be its existence. So too, *Dasein*'s understanding of Being rests on a projection beyond Being (the *epekeina*). *Dasein*, in the transcendence of its freedom, is identified with the *epekeina*.

30 Heidegger's relationship to metaphysics after he turns away from his own explicitly metaphysical project is not a matter of simple opposition and rejection. Metaphysics, for Heidegger after the turn, is both nihilism and the fate of Western thought. As such, metaphysics is not a matter for acceptance or rejection. The complexity of his relationship to metaphysics after the 'turn' cannot be developed here. In the 'Introduction to *What is Metaphysics?*' (1979) Heidegger discusses the relation of thought (*Denken*) to metaphysics primarily in terms of 'overcoming' (*Überwindung*). In 'The question of being' (*Zur Seinsfrage*, 1955) 'overcoming' takes place within the 'getting over' (*Verwindung*) of metaphysics (*Wegmarken*, 245). In the lecture 'Time and being' (1962) Heidegger by way of conclusion says: 'Therefore, our task is to cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itself' (*Zur Sache des Denkens*, 25; *On Time and Being*, 24).

31 See especially the appendix ('Kennzeichnung der Idee und Funktion einer Fundamentalontologie') to Section 10 ('Das Problem von Sein und Zeit').

32 *MP* 197; one can find similar comments in the later Heidegger, for example, in the *Letter on Humanism* (*Wegmarken*, 176) and in *Vier Seminare*, 75.

33 *Gp* 106: 'Es ist aber auch deutlich geworden, dass die Ontologie des *Daseins* das latente Ziel und die ständige mehr oder minder deutliche Forderung der gesamten Entwicklung der abendländischen Philosophie darstellt' (*BP* 75).

34 *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 21 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976). Though Heidegger's critique of truth as judgment is oriented primarily around Lotze and secondarily toward Rickert, this critique also applies to Natorp. These lectures ignore Plato but wrestle with the fairly standard interpretation of Aristotle based primarily on *De Interpretatione* that sees truth as judgment for Aristotle as well. Heidegger would counter this with his reading of *Metaphysics*, Theta 10, which is also invoked in the Plato essay (PL 138).

For Heidegger these two sources in Aristotle represent the very equivocation (*Zweideutigkeit*) on truth that he discerns in Plato.

35 Nor do I mean to say that Heidegger did not see important agreements between Aristotle and Plato. This essay does not explore Heidegger's agreement with Aristotle's critique of Plato since in the primary essay under consideration Heidegger insists on the fundamental agreement between Plato and Aristotle on the two major theses: (1) the equivocation on the notion of truth, and (2) the theological interpretation of transcendence.

Heidegger came to Marburg in 1923 on the strength of an unpublished essay which interpreted Aristotle phenomenologically. The essay was sent to Natorp, who held the chair at Marburg, via the mediation of Husserl, for whom Heidegger was the Assistant in Freiburg. It was represented as the introduction to a large work on Aristotle. Of this essay and Heidegger's frequent teaching of Aristotle at Marburg Gadamer writes: 'At that time I was strongly influenced by Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle, the real intention of which was still not completely evident, namely, its critique of ontology, and which in essence repeated Aristotle's critique of Plato in the form of an existential, situation-oriented philosophical critique of the idealist tradition' (*Dialogue and Dialectic*, 198). In the *Prolegomena* lectures of 1925 (*Gesamtausgabe* 20:23) Heidegger places his own work in the context of the Aristotelian school of the anti-Hegelian Trendelenburg, whose students included both Brentano and Dilthey. See also in this regard Gadamer's autobiography *Philosophische Lehrjahre*, 24, 212ff., and his essay 'Martin Heidegger und die Marburger Theologie', 82-92; as well as Thomas Sheehan's, 'Heidegger's early years: fragments for a philosophical biography', *Listening* 12 (Fall 1977), 3-20.

36 'Kairological' is from St. Paul's term *kairos* (= (sacred) time), e.g., Rom 13:11. For the significance of Christianity for the early Heidegger see the following: Otto Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1963), especially 36-45; Thomas Sheehan, 'Heidegger's "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion"', *The Personalist*, 60 (1979): 312-24; Karl Lehmann, 'Christliche Geschichtserfahrung und ontologische Frage beim jungen Heidegger', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, 74 (1966): 126-53; Hans Georg Gadamer, 'Martin Heidegger und die Marburger Theologie' and 'Heidegger and the history of philosophy', *Monist*, 64 (1981): 423-44; and 'Die religiöse Dimension in Heidegger', *Archives de Philosophie*, 34 (1981), 271-86. These three are reprinted in Gadamer's *Heideggers Wege* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1983).

37 Gp 168: 'Die antike Ontologie war in ihren Fundamenten und Grundbegriffen trotz anderer Ursprünge der christlichen Weltauffassung und Auffassung des Seienden als ens creatum gleichsam auf den Leib zugeschnitten' (BP 118). In *An Introduction to Metaphysics* translated by Ralph Mannheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 106, lectures from 1935, Heidegger states: 'Nietzsche was right in saying that Christianity is Platonism for the people.' For the German, see *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953), 80. He refers here to Nietzsche's comment in the Preface to *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (*Beyond Good and Evil*).

38 See, for example, *Nietzsche* 2: 228 and 409; and 'Vom Wesen und Begriff der *Physis*', *Wegmarken*, 312.

39 Gp 153: 'Der Grundbegriff der *ousia* betont dagegen mehr die Hergestelltheit des Hergestellten im Sinne des verfügbaren Vorhandenen' (BP 109).

40 We cannot consider the relevance of Heidegger's notion of being-ready-to-hand (*Zuhandensein*) for his own understanding of production.

41 See also MP 237. Gadamer distinguishes the demiurgic activity of the

Timaeus from the Judaeo-Christian concept of creation in *Dialogue and Dialectic*, 163, 181, 193.

42 PL 141. Later, in the Nietzsche lectures Heidegger seems to take this back (*Nietzsche* 2: 225).

43 MP 144: 'Hier wäre das Höhlengleichnis ausführlich zu interpretieren.'

44 The Kant interpretation is in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1929); in English translation by James Churchill, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962). This book was a development of the lectures of the winter semester 1927/8: *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Gesamtausgabe* 25 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977). The interpretation of Descartes and medieval thought is provided, at least in part, in the *Basic Problems* lectures. The Aristotle section is least available. The closest attention to Aristotle from the Marburg period which is available can be found in the *Logic* lectures mentioned above (winter semester 1925–6).

45 *Letter on Humanism* in *Wegmarken*, 159: 'Hier kehrt sich das Ganze um.' In English translation by Frank Capuzzi in collaboration with J. Glenn Gray, *Basic Writings* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 208. I follow Heidegger here and disagree with Pöggeler who places the *Kehre* in *Sein und Zeit* not between Sections 2 and 3 of Part 1 but between Part 1 and Part 2, i.e., not between the preparatory analytic of *Dasein* and 'Time and being' but between the systematic ontology of Part 1 and the historical destruction of the tradition in Part 2. See his 'Heidegger's Topology of Being' in *On Heidegger and Language*, ed. Joseph Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), 120–1.

46 Was this shift in Heidegger's thought a 'turn' or a 'reversal'? Terminologically Kenneth Maly is correct to point out that Heidegger uses *Kehre* and not *Umkehr* or *Umkehrung*, and thus 'turn' or 'turning' is more appropriate than the commonly used 'reversal'. The one statement of Heidegger that runs contrary to this is the one just cited in the *Letter on Humanism* where the verb used is *umkehren*. See Maly's note to his translation of the later essay 'Die Kehre' in *Research in Phenomenology*, 1 (1971): 8. Heidegger briefly discusses the *Kehre* in the context of the project of *Being and Time* in the *Metaphysical Principles*, 201.

47 Gp 1: 'Neue Ausarbeitung des 3. Abschnittes des I. Teiles von *Sein und Zeit*.' Given the manner in which these texts are edited it is not clearly necessary that Heidegger authored this note, though since it was published before Heidegger's death we should be able to assume he approved it.

48 'Translator's Introduction', *Basic Problems*, xvii. Heidegger's introductory outline of the lecture series proposes 3 Parts, each with four sections. The lectures represent only Part One (historical) and a portion of section 1 of Part Two. Parts Two and Three were to resolve the problems set up historically in Part One. Very little of the project is accomplished.

49 Sometimes he talks of the 'tradition of Platonism' which might allow an important distinction between Platonism and Plato, but in *An Introduction to Metaphysics* he directly accuses Plato of this: 'It was in the Sophists and in Plato that appearance was declared to be mere appearance and thus degraded. At the same time being, as *idea*, was exalted to a suprasensory realm. A chasm, *chorismos*, was created between the merely apparent essent here below and real being somewhere on high' (106; 80 of the German edition). See also *Nietzsche* 1: 18; and *Nietzsche* 2: 541.

My objection to the widely held 'two worlds' interpretation of Plato does not ignore that the relationship between the visible and the intelligible constitutes

an important problem for Plato. Though the argument against the 'two worlds' interpretation of Plato cannot be made here (and there is certainly much to support such a view), I mention only that in the introduction to the discussion of the divided line and the cave, Socrates presents a simpler version of the divided line which has three parts and not two. *Doxa* is somehow between 'is' and 'is not'. Contrary to Parmenides, *doxa* both is and is not (477A–480A).

50 See the discussion of thematization in Section 69.

51 See my article "The problem of "indifference" in *Sein und Zeit*", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 43 (September 1982), 43–58.

52 The discussion of truth in Section 44 of *Being and Time* tries to show how the ontological condition of the possibility of the usual and undeniable notion of truth as 'adequation' or 'correspondence' is truth as 'unconcealment' and how correspondingly 'expression' (*Aussage*) and the 'apophantic as' are founded on interpretation (*Auslegung*) and the 'hermeneutic as'. It explains further how the more 'originary' notion, i.e., unconcealment, has been covered over by the traditional correspondence notion. It also attempts to show how falsity and untruth are possible, if *Dasein* ontologically is 'in the truth'. But the question how this originary notion of truth as unconcealment, presumably experienced in the authentic moment, is relevant to propositions, judgments, or science is not taken up. Perhaps after 'ascending' to the treatment of the meaning of Being as such, the 'descent' after the projected 'turn' would have addressed this question, i.e., perhaps in the terms of Heidegger's original project this question was more appropriate to 'metontology' than to 'fundamental ontology.' Ernst Tugendhat makes a similar argument in *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Berlin: deGruyter, 1970), 330–62.

53 In this lecture which dates from 1927 the relation between theology and philosophy is discussed as the problem of the relationship between two sciences – the positive science of theology and the ontological science of philosophy. Here Heidegger asserts that theology does not require philosophy to ground it but needs philosophy to look after its scientific status: 'Die positive Wissenschaft bedarf der Philosophie nur mit Rücksicht auf ihre Wissenschaftlichkeit' (27). Though theology needs philosophy, philosophy does not need theology. Philosophy is not to give 'direction' but only 'correction'; with faith philosophy jointly leads (*mitanleiten*) theology. This joint direction (*Mitleitung*) is characterized as 'formal-anzeigend' (formally pointing out [the ontological region]). Heidegger asserts that the content of theological concepts, e.g., sin, require a return to the ontological concept, e.g., guilt. He follows this by denying that the theological concept of sin is simply built onto the ontological concept of guilt. The source of the content for theology is the experience of faith. Nonetheless what philosophy corrects formally are the fundamental concepts of theology, for any theological concept presupposes an ontological one. The notion of tracing a concept back to an ontological presupposition which is formal and in opposition to the proper origin (*Ursprung*) runs contrary to the usual transcendental treatment of concepts by Heidegger, for whom the ontological presupposition is the source. A further difficulty of Heidegger's description here of the relationship of these two sciences is his description of philosophy as the 'deadly enemy' (*Todfeind*) of faith. This deep enmity is represented as that between believing (*Gläubigkeit*) and the free self-assertion of the self (here not *Selbstbehauptung* but *Selbstübernahme*). How these enemies can together 'jointly direct' is not made clear.

Insofar as this relationship can be taken as representative of the relation of philosophy to any 'positive' science, the relation of joint direction remains vague. In the introduction to the Kant lectures of 1927/8 Heidegger gives a similar

statement of the relationship of the ontical positive sciences to the ontological science of philosophy. Here he explicitly adopts the Husserlian notion of regional ontologies upon which the expression *formal-anzeigend* depends. In the Husserlian systematic the regional ontologies are complemented by a *formal* ontology. Heidegger clearly has not worked out adequately how his rejection might affect the understanding of the relationship of philosophy to the positive sciences. What would be required for such a clarification would be the completion of his own fundamental ontology which is, of course, not done. Though Heidegger can talk confidently of the problem of thematization in the ontical or positive sciences, he has not been able to work out the problem in the science of philosophy itself, which is the problem of its 'formal' character. Thus the relationship between the two thematics, the two sorts of science, remains unclear. See the lecture 'Phänomenologie und Theologie' published in *Phänomenologie und Theologie* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1970). This has been translated by James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo in *The Piety of Thinking* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976).

See also *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Gesamtausgabe 25, especially 17–39.

54 *Wegmarken*, 94–5. This becomes a very prominent theme in his later thought. See especially the late work entitled *Gelassenheit* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959) which is translated by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund under the title *Discourse on Thinking* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).

A note added to the lecture on truth (p. 97) tells us that the lecture ('On the essence of truth') was to have been expanded with a second section entitled 'On the truth of essence'. This failed, the note reads, 'for the reasons that are mentioned (*angedeutet*) in the letter "On Humanism"'. The reasons provided there refer to the proposed 'Time and being' section of *Being and Time* and say only that 'thinking failed' and 'did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics'. The *Letter* also states that the lecture 'On the essence of truth' provides a certain insight into the thinking of the turning (*Wegmarken*, 159; *Basic Writings*, 208).

55 On behalf of Heidegger's interpretation of Plato, one might object that this overstates the significance of *eros* for Plato, especially for the allegory of the cave in which *eros* is never mentioned and for the *Republic* in general which seems, for the most part, to suppress *eros*. My comment about Heidegger's ignoring *eros* in Plato concerns Heidegger's interpretation of Plato in general and not just his reading of the allegory of the cave, though a good case can be made that *eros* is essential to human nature and its philosophical potentiality, such that the release of the prisoner is called 'natural' (*ei phusei*) (515C). I cannot attempt here an adequate treatment of *eros* in Plato or in the *Republic*. I suggest, however, that *eros* is, for the most part eliminated from the discussion of the *Republic* up until Book V because of the political concern of the discussion. The political and the public require moderation and constraint. The philosopher, however, is by nature at odds with the requirements of the public and political realm. He is private, an *idiotes*, and erotic. Thus in Book V of the *Republic* when the philosopher is introduced, *eros* is introduced into the dialogue. See the description of the nature of the philosopher at 490 A–B. He is the lover of knowledge (*philomathes*) whose love (*eros*) does not cease until he comes into touch with the nature of each thing itself. He consorts with what really is (*toi onto ontos*) and begets *nous* and truth. See also 475E_{ff.} and 485B_{ff.} See the excellent treatments of *eros* in the *Republic* by Arlene Saxonhouse 'The philosopher and the female in the political thought of Plato', *Political Theory*, 4

(1976): 195–212, and by Stanley Rosen, 'The role of *eros* in Plato's *Republic*', *The Review of Metaphysics*, 19 (1965): 462–75. It is the case that the most extensive treatments of *eros* are to be found in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, but that does not mean that the erotic character of the philosopher is not clearly present throughout the other dialogues. See, for example, *Phaedo* 67B, *Philebus* 58D, *Theatetus* 148Eff., *Timaeus* 42A, *Sophist* 222E, and *Lysis* 218A–B. As much as the value of *eros* for Plato may be mainly pedagogical, so too is philosophy 'pedagogical'.

56 Oskar Becker, an early colleague of Heidegger's at Freiburg, works out the difference between Plato and Heidegger as that between *Dawesen* and *Dasein* in 'Platonische Idee und ontologische Differenz' published in *Dasein und Dawesen: Gesammelte Philosophische Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1963), 157–91. Becker ignores too much the historical task of remembering in Plato. For Heidegger's treatment of the '*gewesende Zukunft*' see *Sein und Zeit*, 326 (*Being and Time*, 374).

57 *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 49; *On Time and Being*, 45–6.

58 I am indebted to Kathleen Wright and George L. Kline, as well as an unnamed reader for this journal, for their careful reading of this paper. I am grateful also to Bryn Mawr College for the support provided by a Junior Faculty Research Leave during which I carried out a part of the research for this paper.

Dasein as *praxis*: the Heideggerian assimilation and the radicalization of the practical philosophy of Aristotle¹

Franco Volpi

1 Introductory considerations: the presence of Aristotle in the work of Heidegger

There has never been any doubt as to the importance of Aristotle for Heidegger's thinking. Even at those moments which were least favourable for a comprehension of the meaning and the constant presence of Aristotle in the work of Heidegger, it would have been difficult to ignore the significance Heidegger accords to certain central themes belonging to the thinking of Aristotle, such as the problem of being or the problem of the *physis*, problems which, in Heidegger's speculations, also become dense thematic points which are continually recovered in the course of his development. Besides, Heidegger himself frequently underlined the importance that Aristotle has assumed in the formation and the development of his philosophical perspective.² And if, in addition, one considers how many important studies on Aristotle have been motivated or inspired by Heidegger,³ one has at one's disposal reasons for supposing that the Heideggerian reading of Aristotle has penetrated much deeper than the published texts would, up to a few years ago, have allowed one to conclude. In any case, even if one limits oneself to the former, it is possible to trace the influence of Aristotle on Heidegger throughout the entire extent of his thinking, reaching from the youthful reading of the dissertation of Franz Brentano *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* right up to the interpretation of being and the concept of *physis* in the essay written in 1939 and published in 1958.⁴

However, hitherto it has not been possible to reconstruct the continuous line of Aristotle's influence across the totality of Heidegger's work. It is only today, thanks to the publication of the university lectures, that one is in a position to get a more exact idea of the intensity of Heidegger's confrontation with Aristotle and to try and reconstruct it in its

essentials. One can also say the same for Heidegger's confrontation with other great founding moments in metaphysical thinking, such as the works of Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel and Husserl.

In particular, the publication of the lectures for the Winter term 1925/6: *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*,⁵ and of that of the Summer term 1927: *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*,⁶ has contributed documents of the first importance for the reconstruction of, and the confrontation with Aristotle. The same thing holds, one might say, of the lectures given in the Summer term 1931: *Aristoteles, Metaphysik IX, 1-3: Vom Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft*⁷ and of certain parts of the lectures from the Winter term 1929/30: *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit*.⁸ Numerous elucidations are also to be found in the publication of the lectures from the Summer term 1924 on *Rhetoric*,⁹ in that of the following term 1924/5 on Plato's *Sophist*¹⁰ (which, in its first part, carries a detailed interpretation of book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*) and finally in the lectures from the Summer term 1926: *Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie*,¹¹ in which Heidegger handles the history of Greek philosophy from Thales to Aristotle and the final part of which is devoted to an interpretation of the totality of the Aristotelian philosophy. We will also find a number of fundamental indications, with regard to the beginning and to the first decisive development of the Heideggerian interpretation of Aristotle, in the lecture course from his first teaching assignment at Freiburg. Today, we are in a position to confirm this from the first of these lecture courses (which have just been published), that from the Winter term 1921/2: *Phänomenologische Interpretation zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*,¹² and in such a way that one can only hope that the other lecture courses from the first Freiburg teaching period, lectures which have not yet been included in the anticipated publication programme (on the grounds that one is not in possession of the original manuscript) might one day be published. By the same token, one has to hope that the celebrated interpretation of Aristotle, which Heidegger sent to Natorp and a résumé of which he even considered publishing in Husserl's *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, will also be published.¹³

2 The confrontation with Aristotle during the ten-year period of silence which precedes *Sein und Zeit*

In what follows, I will try to bring to light a speculative core whose impact upon the confrontation of Heidegger with Aristotle was, in my opinion, considerable at a particular moment, that is, during the ten-year period of silence which precedes the publication of *Sein und Zeit*

and which coincides with the years of the first teaching at Freiburg (from 1919) and with those of the teaching at Marburg. The main reason for this limitation is that, both from the thematic point of view and from that which concerns the intensity of the confrontation, this period is without doubt the most interesting and, at the same time, the least investigated of Heidegger's extended engagement with Aristotle. In fact, I think – something that would have appeared strange only a few years ago – that this phase of Heidegger's thinking can be characterized in a definitive fashion by a radical appropriation and a voracious assimilation of Aristotle's ontology and of practical philosophy and this, more specifically, not only where Heidegger mentions Aristotle and interprets him explicitly but also and more especially, where he doesn't talk about him and seems to concentrate upon the speculative elaboration of the problems which converge later in *Sein und Zeit*. It's for this reason that, in order to grasp the full meaning of the confrontation of Heidegger with Aristotle, one has to take care not to be misled either by a zealous determination to verify the philosophical exactitude and extent of the Heideggerian reading or by too exclusive a concentration upon what Heidegger says about Aristotle explicitly. It is more important to adopt a perspective suitable to grasping and understanding how Heidegger takes up, assimilates, transforms and realizes certain of Aristotle's problems and determinations by rethinking them in relation with the fundamental questions which he confronts within his speculative horizon.

A few preliminary remarks are necessary in order to sketch out, at least in its main lines, the general horizon within which I see the confrontation of Heidegger with Aristotle taking place in this period. In my opinion, this confrontation is characterized (1) by the fact that it is to be situated in the framework of a radical resumption of fundamental themes which the Greeks thought out for the first time in a manner which has become decisive for the history of Western philosophy, themes which, since Hegel and Nietzsche, nobody has been able to take up as radically as Heidegger. (2) It is also characterized by a specific methodological disposition which can be designated, very generally, as a placing in question of the Western metaphysical tradition, a questioning which becomes more and more radical, to the point of ending up with a demand for an overcoming (*Überwindung*, *Verwindung*) of this tradition. In the period under consideration, this calling in question is defined by Heidegger himself as 'destruction', and more precisely as phenomenological destruction (which, together with reduction and construction make up the triple articulation of the phenomenological method).¹⁴ (3) Finally, from a thematic point of view, the confrontation with Aristotle up to *Sein und Zeit* is characterized by the fact that it bears fundamentally upon three main problems which are also the main problems of *Sein und Zeit*, namely the problem of truth, the problem of the ontological

constitution of human life and the problem of time; the general horizon within which Heidegger confronts all these problems is certainly one which is marked by the question of being.

Of these three main problems, I will in particular consider the one which is central for the comparison I propose to make between *Dasein* and *praxis*, namely, the problem of the ontological constitution of, and of the fundamental and unitary modality of being which belongs to, human life. First of all one has to ask how Heidegger comes to identify and to treat this problem within the horizon of that question of being which he begins to raise, as he says himself, as early as his reading of Brentano's dissertation.

3 The problem of the unity of being *qua pollachos legomenon* as the guiding principle of Heidegger's research

There are undoubtedly many elements and speculative suggestions which have played a role in the formation of the Heideggerian problematic and which it would be worth our while to examine in detail. In the framework of an analysis of the relation with Aristotle, allow me to limit my task here to the elucidation of the only function, in the genesis of the three problems indicated, played by the question of being *qua pollachos legomenon*, a question which Heidegger takes notice of mostly by way of Brentano's dissertation.

According to the autobiographical testimony which he himself volunteered in *Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie*, his attention was from the very beginning captured by the problem of the plurivocity of being and, in consequence, by the question of understanding and of determining the fundamental and unitary sense, if there is one, which upholds the plurality of the others. In other words, if Being is to be expressed in multiple and diverse modalities and significations, what is its fundamentally unitary meaning, what does Being itself mean?¹⁵ As is well known, in his dissertation, Brentano examined the four fundamental significations of being (the *pollachos* can consequently be considered as a *tetrachos*) which Aristotle catalogues and examines, especially in the *Metaphysics*, to wit: (1) the meaning of being according to the categorial figures (*to on kata ta schemata ton kategorion*), (2) the meaning of being in as much as it is true (*to on hos alethes*), (3) the meaning of being according to the power or the act (*to on dynamei e energeiai*), (4) the meaning of being in itself or incidentally (*to on kath'hauto kai kata symbebekos*). Faithful to the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, Brentano did not however limit himself solely to describing the doctrine of the four fundamental significations but also tried to grasp their unitary connection in terms of the analogical unity of being. More precisely, in his attempt at a solution,

he placed especial emphasis upon the fundamental character of the categorical signification and considered substance (*qua* primary category) as the unitary term to which all the other significations were related. So Brentano conceived ontology as ousiology, by interpreting being in a categorical horizon – to the point that he went so far as to attempt a sort of deduction of the categories on the basis of the general concept of being.¹⁶

When, therefore, in *Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie* Heidegger declares that from the time of this reading of Brentano the problem of Being and of its unitary meaning did not cease to bother him,¹⁷ I think we have to take this testimony seriously, not as if it were an idealizing stylization of his philosophical formation aiming to display a constant attention for the question of being, even at the beginning but, on the contrary, as a credible document attesting to the effective genesis, in his youthful reflections, of the problem which was to remain central throughout his entire thinking. If one takes the autobiographical testimony of Heidegger seriously one can even take matters further than he was willing to explicitly acknowledge on this issue and recover the traces of an intensive reflection on the four meanings of being not only in the first writings – especially in the doctoral thesis on Duns Scotus¹⁸ which deals with the categorical signification of being – but also in the later speculation from the 1920s to *Sein und Zeit*, which, on the surface, no longer has anything to do with the problem of being *qua pollachos legomenon*.

The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that the fundamental direction of Heidegger's philosophical research in the course of the 1920s consists in a research into that unitary and fundamental sense which upholds the plurivocity of being. In particular, I want to suggest that, with this end in view, Heidegger at this time probes the four meanings, one after the one, to verify which among them can be considered as the fundamental and unitary meaning. Soon left unsatisfied by the ousiological and analogical solution sustained by Brentano,¹⁹ Heidegger, in the 1920s, concentrates his in-depth examination upon the meaning of being *qua* true. Behind this examination there clearly emerges the intention of determining whether this signification can assume the role of the fundamental meaning. Amongst the texts presently published, the lecture course from the Winter term 1925/6 (*Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*), but also the conclusive part of that from the Winter term 1929/30 (*Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit*) and the first part of that of the following term (*Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie*) attest to the central character of the equation of Being and truth for the Heideggerian comprehension of Being – all of which points out the value of the phenomenological reading of Aristotle. And in my opinion it is also necessary to concede that, with the same aim in view, Heidegger goes on as well to examine the signifi-

cation of being from the standpoint of actuality and potentiality, as is attested by the lecture course from the Summer term 1931 (*Aristoteles, Metaphysik ̸, 1–3: Vom Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft*), again with a view to determining whether it can hold up as the fundamental signification.

In this context I would also like to suggest the hypothesis that, later on, Heidegger sees in the three significations of being assembled by Aristotle a fundamental point of departure, within the metaphysical domain, for recovering, by digging down beneath it, a more originary and primary pre-metaphysical determination of Being. I conclude that it is by questioning the four fundamental significations of being according to Aristotle that Heidegger comes to finalize these characteristics which more and more he will attribute to Being itself in so far as it is thought out of an originary experience. In attempting to go back beyond the determination of the *on hos alethes*, Heidegger comes to attribute to Being the character of *aletheia* and that, by the same token, it is by questioning the determination of the *on dynamei kai energeiai* that he comes to attribute to Being, thought in a more originary manner, the character of *Physis*.

I would now like to show how, on the basis of his prevailing interest in the problematic of the plurivocity of being and the unitary meaning which upholds it, Heidegger arrives at a recuperation of Aristotle's practical philosophy (and principally of the thematic of the 6th book of the *Nichomachean Ethics*), when, in the course of the 1920s, he concentrates upon the signification of being as true.

4 The central character of the signification of being *qua* true and the topology of the loci of the truth

A preliminary remark is called for concerning the phenomenological character of the attitude with which Heidegger prepares the confrontation with Aristotle and carries it through. This character concerns the methodological attitude just as much as the thematic horizon of the confrontation. Moreover, one should not believe that, in announcing the phenomenological inspiration of his reading of Aristotle, Heidegger simply wanted to pay a tribute of gratitude to his master Husserl or, worse still, cover and conceal from him his detachment from phenomenological orthodoxy by using a purely nominal title. In effect, the methodological attitude which in *Sein und Zeit* is characterized by 'destruction' and which, let us say up to the *Kehre*, embodies the spirit in which Heidegger confronts the tradition, undoubtedly owes its origin to a variation and an integration of the phenomenological method theorized by Husserl. Just as for Husserl the philosophical attitude of the reduction

which stands opposed to the natural and naive attitude of common sense places the former between brackets, so with Heidegger, an analogous critique has to be exercised, even when facing the evidence of the history of thinking, that is to say, when faced with the philosophical positions assumed and accepted by the tradition. And just as with Husserl the reduction was connected to phenomenological constitution, so, with Heidegger, destruction is a function of ontological foundation and construction. As Heidegger himself makes known, reduction, destruction and construction constitute the three essential and equally original elements in the phenomenological method.

The conceptual interpretation of being and its structures, that is, the reductive construction of being, necessarily implies a destruction, or, in other words, a critical *de-construction* [*Abbau*] of the received concepts which are at first necessarily operative in order to go back to the source from which they were drawn. . . . The three fundamental elements of the phenomenological method: reduction, construction, destruction are intrinsically dependent upon one another and have to be founded in their mutual belonging together. Philosophical construction is necessarily destruction, that is to say, de-construction, brought about by way of a historical return to the tradition, to what has been transmitted; this does not in any way mean a negation of the tradition nor a condemnation obliterating the latter but, on the contrary, a positive appropriation of this tradition.²⁰

But in what concerns the phenomenological configuration of the thematic horizon within which Heidegger approaches Aristotle and, in particular, his practical philosophy, one has to bear in mind that this approach was adopted in the context of a concentration upon the problematic of being *qua* true and that the circumstance which was certainly determinative in this analysis is that Heidegger arrived at it on the basis of an in-depth study of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (the traces of which can now be seen in the first part of the lecture course of the Summer term 1925 published under the title *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*).²¹ In the course of reflecting upon the comprehension of the truth proposed by Husserl, Heidegger systematically develops a conviction which had already taken root in Husserl's work, to wit, the conviction that judgment, assertion, understood as a synthesis or dihairesis of representations, does not constitute the original locus of the manifestation of truth but a dimension which has undergone a restriction with regard to the ontological depth and the originary extent of the phenomenon. Developing this conviction in a systematic way, Heidegger finishes up questioning three traditional theses on the truth, to wit: (1) the thesis that the truth consists in an *adequatio intellectus et rei*, (2) the

thesis that the originary locus of its manifestation is the judgment, in as much as it is the connection or division of representations and of concepts, (3) the thesis that the authorship of these two theorems has to be attributed to Aristotle.²²

In fact, with his thesis that not only acts of synthesis but also monothetic acts of simple apprehension can have a truth-character, Husserl had already called in question the traditional theory of truth as adequation. With this end in view he had also introduced a decisive distinction, namely the distinction between the truth of the proposition or of the judgment (*Satzwahrheit*) and the truth of intuition (*Anschauungswahrheit*), the latter is considered the more originary truth and therefore represents the foundation of the former. In addition, Husserl had introduced a fundamental innovation, recognized by Heidegger, which consists in the distinction and the theorization of categorial intuition. Conceived on the analogy of sensible intuition, it enabled Husserl to explain that modality of the apprehension of the elements of judgment whose identification (*Ausweisung*) goes beyond the sensible intuition, elements which, in the traditional theory of truth, had been understood as belonging to the domain of the categorial.²³

Deepening the direction in which these Husserlian theses proceeded, Heidegger theorizes a fundamental distinction between the purely logico-categorial meaning of being-true (*Wahrsein*), which belongs to the proposition, and the ontological meaning of truth (*Wahrheit*), which belongs to the phenomenon of truth in its originary scope. In Heidegger's eyes, it is precisely this originary ontological depth of the phenomenon of truth which Aristotle takes account of as the decisive dimension, even if, clearly, he also recognizes the restricted signification of that being-true which is referred to the proposition. In consequence, Heidegger seeks to restore to those Aristotelian texts which bear upon the truth their originary scope, by freeing them from the fixed prejudices of a certain interpretative tradition which had prevailed hitherto and which can, according to Heidegger, even be found in a reading of Aristotle like that of Jaeger, which is innovative in other respects. Thus, the Heideggerian calling-in-question of the traditional theory of truth, initiated by the Husserlian phenomenological approach, goes along with a highly ontological reading of certain basic texts of Aristotle, such as *De interpretatione* I, *Metaphysics* IX, 10, *Nichomachean Ethics* VI.

Heidegger proceeds toward an uncovering of the more profound ontological meaning of the phenomenon of truth by way of a kind of triple argumentative progression:

(1) First of all, he distinguishes the semantic aspect of the *logos*, that is to say, the property of having a signification, an aspect which belongs to every form of the *logos*, and the apophantic character which is not

present in every form but only in that form *par excellence* of the *logos* which is the *apophansis*, predication or assertion. The specificity of this particular form of the *logos* consists in the fact that it is a synthesis or a dihairesis of concepts and in the fact that, as such, it possesses the character of being-true or being-false, more precisely, of being-able-to-be-true or being-able-to-be-false.

(2) Then Heidegger inquires into the ontological foundation of predicative discourse, of the *logos apophantikos*, with a view to identifying the ontological condition of the possibility of its being-true or being-false. And he finds it in the ontological constitution of human life i'tself, in *Dasein*, which contains in itself the intrinsic possibility of assuming; even better, of being itself an uncovering attitude, that is to say, of opening, and of opening itself in relation to, being.

(3) Finally, deepening his calling-in-question, Heidegger inquires into the ultimate ontological foundation of the uncovering of being by *Dasein*. And he arrives at the conclusion that this foundation is to be sought in the fact that being itself has the ontological constitution of something which gives itself, which is accessible to and perhaps grasped by the particular being which bears within itself the uncovering attitude, that is to say, *Dasein*. With reference to the latter, being is potentially *manifestativum sui*. It is evident, manifest, disclosed, *un-verborgen*, *a-lethes*. The truth conceived as *a-letheia*, as *Un-verborgenheit*, is therefore an ontologically constitutive character of being itself. It is an ante-predicative determination with reference to which the being-true or being-false of predication is a derived and restricted property.²⁴

Following this argumentative progression, Heidegger arrives at a sort of topology or hierarchy of the loci of truth which he develops by assimilating certain Aristotelian theses in a radicalizing elaboration. In a somewhat expeditious but adequately synoptic fashion one can sum up the framework of this topology of truth as follows:

(1) The true is above all being itself in as much as it possesses the character of being manifest, disclosed. With this thesis Heidegger revives the ontological potency of the Aristotelian understanding of the truth which can be expressed in the equation: *on hos alethes*.

(2) The true is secondly *Dasein* itself, human life, in the sense that it is uncovering and that it develops this characteristic in its fundamentally uncovering attitudes. Behind this thesis it is not difficult to see the recovery of an Aristotelian idea, to wit, the idea of the Aristotelian determination of the human soul (psyche) as being-in-the-truth (*aletheuein*). In Aristotle, in fact, and especially in Book VI of the *Nichomachean Ethics*, Heidegger sees an analysis of the different ways in which the soul uncovers being, is in the truth, an analysis which has not yet been obscured by modern theoretical prejudices. And he therefore sees in

this analysis the first complete phenomenology of the fundamentally uncovering attitudes of human life, of *Dasein*.

(2.1) First of all, there is the specific modality of uncovering proper to the human soul and which distinguishes it both from the Gods and from the other animals: it is made manifest by way of the *logos*, which institutes the links and precisely under the five modes of being-in-the-truth proper to the soul: *episteme*, *techne*, *phronesis*, *nous*, *sophia*;²⁵

(2.2) but this modality of uncovering, determined by the *logos*, is founded in a direct and immediate manner of acceding to being and of uncovering it, which latter takes place either in the *aisthesis*, about which Aristotle says that it is always true (*aei alethes*),²⁶ or in the noesis, which apprehends its object through a direct contact by, so to speak, touching it and which, for this reason, and because it neither effects a synthesis nor a diaresis, cannot be false but can simply not take place (in the *agnoein*).²⁷

(3) The true is finally the form *par excellence* of the *logos*, to wit, the *logos apophantikos* or *apophansis*, that is to say, predication or assertion in its affirmative (*kataphasis*) or its negative (*apophasis*) form. And this holds either in the sense that the *logos* is an *aletheuin qua legein*, or in the sense that the *logos* is *alethes qua legomenon*.²⁸

It will now be necessary to undertake a deeper examination of the way in which Heidegger, having detached the comprehension of the phenomenon of truth from this latter dimension, that is, from the derivative and restrictive structure of predication, finishes up by radicalizing his inquiry into the traditional metaphysical conception of the truth. If, indeed, and thanks to his appropriation of Aristotle, Heidegger gains an ontological outlook which permits him to take the problem up again in a radical manner, there still remains open the question of the non-explicit presuppositions upon which even the Aristotelian conception of the phenomenon of truth is founded, and founded as a character of being *qua* manifest. The question Heidegger poses is the following:

What does Being have to mean if being-uncovering is to become comprehensible as a character of Being and even as the most authentic of all? If, in consequence, beings have in the end to be interpreted relative to their Being on the basis of being-uncovered?²⁹

Even at this time, towards the middle of the 1920s, the vision of the problem which characterizes and will characterize Heidegger's thinking more and more is being clearly formed. Here already Heidegger thinks it possible to claim that the unquestioned foundation of the Aristotelian equation of Being and truth consists in the presupposition of a well-defined relation between Being and time and therefore in the

presupposition of a certain comprehension of Being and of time themselves. Why? Because, in order that the truth, in the sense of being-uncovering, of being-disclosed (*a-letheia*), can be characterized as an ontological characteristic of entities, the being of entities must first be implicitly understood as presence (*Anwesen*), for only what has previously been understood as present can later be determined as discovered, as disclosed, that is to say, as true (*a-lethes*) in the sense suggested by the Heideggerian etymology of the Greek word. But the interpretation of Being as presence has its implicit foundation in the presupposition of an unquestioned connection of Being with time, in the context of which the dimension of the present is taken to be the determinative dimension of time. In other words, with regard to an understanding of time which privileges the dimension of the present, there corresponds an interpretation of Being in which the primacy is consequently accorded to presence.

In this way Heidegger clears and, at the same time, prepares the ground for his interpretation of the history of metaphysics. Indeed, he arrives at the conviction – confirmed a little later by the celebrated interpretation of the Platonic myth of the cave – that metaphysical thinking is structured and takes form as the thinking of presence, that is to say, as a thinking which does not pose, in a sufficiently radical fashion, the question of the relation between Being and time in all its articulations. Heidegger arrives at this conclusion by way of his interpretation of the problem of truth in Aristotle from the time of the lecture course of the Winter term 1925/6. In a passage from this course which is very significant in this regard, he says:

The pure being-uncovering of beings, as Aristotle conceives it with reference to the simple, this pure being-uncovering signifies nothing other than the pure present, non-displaced and immovable, of what is present. Being-uncovering [*Entdecktheit*], that is to say in this case the pure present is, as present [*Gegenwart*], the supreme mode of presence [*Anwesenheit*]. But presence is the fundamental determination of Being. So, being-uncovering, as the supreme mode of presence, that is as present, is a mode of being and precisely the most authentic mode of being of all, presence itself which is present. . . . That is to say: since Being is understood as presence and being-uncovering as present, and since presence [*Anwesenheit*] and the present [*Gegenwart*] are present, Being as presence can and even must be determined by the truth as present, and in such a way that the present is the supreme mode of presence. Plato already designated Being as present. And the term *ousia* which, in the history of philosophy, is peddled in a completely senseless fashion as substance, means nothing other than presence in a well-determined sense. One has to

emphasize that the Greeks, Plato and Aristotle, did in fact determine Being as presence. But they were very far from understanding what that really means when they determined Being as presence and as present. . . . Once one has understood this problematic of the intimate connection of the understanding of Being on the basis of time, one is then certainly in possession of a clue with which to return to an elucidation of the history of the problem of Being and of the history of philosophy in general.³⁰

Following which, Heidegger, from this moment on, tries to get back either beyond the ultimate presupposition on which the ontological understanding of the phenomenon of the truth is based or beyond the unquestioned presuppositions of Western thought which, from Plato to Husserl, take on for him the form of a metaphysics of presence.

If however the progressive radicalization of the calling-in-question of the comprehension of truth certainly already indicates the final direction in which Heidegger will deepen his confrontation with metaphysics, and if it exhibits several aspects which make it interesting and which provide a motive for further examination, nevertheless it seems to me that it is still not carried through in the spirit and with the intentions which will later characterize his proposal with regard to the overcoming of metaphysics. Or better: if Heidegger already envisages here the possibility and the necessity of calling-in-question the fixed philosophical themes of the tradition, this calling-in-question still does not aspire to overcome, and so to abandon, metaphysical thinking with a view to moving off in another direction. Rather, it is a matter of a calling-in-question which proceeds from the conviction that metaphysics is not built on a sufficiently radical basis and which does not therefore envisage an overcoming of metaphysics in the sense of *Überwindung* or of *Verwindung* but rather of a foundation which is more truly original. In fact, at this time Heidegger still thinks that it is possible to achieve a radical foundation for ontology by way of a Dasein's analytic and, in consequence, right up to the Kant book of 1929, he calls his programme 'fundamental ontology' or 'metaphysics of Dasein', thereby attributing to the terms 'ontology' and 'metaphysics' a meaning which is entirely positive. It is precisely with a view to a radically founded construction that Heidegger assumes the methodological attitude of the 'destruction', an attitude which allows him to clear the way.

In what concerns the foundational attitude of this programme, I don't think it is an accident if, up to the *Kehre*, Heidegger pays special attention to Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Husserl; and if, after the *Kehre*, on the contrary, with the progressive radicalization of his critique and with the circumventing of metaphysics, he abandons any foundational intention. And it is also significant that this progressive radicalization

ripens within a horizon which is marked by the confrontation with Nietzsche, that is to say, with the densest and most advanced point in the corrosive critique of Western philosophy, a horizon which is marked at the same time by an assiduous restitution of pre-Socratic thinking, that is to say, a thinking which precedes the metaphysical decision of the West, a horizon which is marked finally by an affinity for, and a proximity to, the twilight theophany of Hölderlin which, with reference to the destiny of metaphysics, represents the alternative, and the possibility of the new God to come.

5 The uncovering structure of Dasein and the focalization of the horizon of *praxis*

To return to the question of the role of the problematic of the plurivocity of being and, in particular, of the signification of being as true, one might say that it is while analysing this last signification in the horizon of the founding intentions mentioned above that, in the course of the 1920s, Heidegger comes to place at the centre of his speculative efforts the problem of the apprehension and determination of the fundamental ontological structure of human life, of the psyche, of Dasein, more exactly, of the latter in its specific character as being-uncovering, in its being an *aletheuein*. So it is within the typically phenomenological horizon of the problem of the constitutive structure of the 'subject' that Heidegger interprets the Aristotelian determination of the psyche as *aletheuein*, and it is by way of this juncture of a phenomenological approach with Aristotelian elements that he paves the way for his analysis of existence.

But why is *praxis* central, and where does it get this characteristic? From what is the importance of the *Nichomachean Ethics* (an importance announced in my title) derived? There are many indications which, in my opinion, speak in favour of the hypothesis that Heidegger arrived at an Aristotelian determination of *praxis* while trying to solve the problems that Husserlian phenomenology had raised but which, in his view, the Husserlian understanding of subjectivity had left open rather than resolved.

In Heidegger's view, Husserlian phenomenology got stuck in a fundamental aporie, to wit, the aporie of the belonging of the subject to the world and of the simultaneous constitution of the world by the subject. Heidegger did not find satisfying the solution proposed by Husserl, a solution which consisted in distinguishing the psychological subject which participates in the world and the transcendental subject which constitutes the world, and which distinguishes the reality of the former from the ideality of the latter. Certainly, Heidegger shares with Husserl the conviction that the constitution of the experience of the world cannot be

explained by retreating to a being which has the same modality of being, the same ontological constitution as the world. Heidegger, however, distances himself from Husserl because the Husserlian determination of transcendental subjectivity seems to him to have been won, predominantly and unilaterally, on the basis of a theoretical consideration of the acts of the life of consciousness.³¹

Why this impression? Because, by way of his analysis of the phenomenon of truth and by way of the topology of the loci of its manifestation, Heidegger comes to be convinced that *theoria* is only one of the different possibilities and modalities of the uncovering attitude through which man accedes to being. Alongside *theoria* and before *theoria* there is, for example, the uncovering attitude of *poiesis* or that of *praxis* by means of which too man is related to being and apprehends it. Heidegger takes his bearings from Aristotle precisely because Aristotle still retains the plurality of the uncovering attitudes of human life and, in the 6th book of the *Nichomachean Ethics*, offers the first systematic analysis differentiating the three fundamental uncovering attitudes of the soul, to wit, *theoria*, *poiesis* and *praxis*, together with the specific forms of knowledge which go along with them, namely, *sophia*, *techné* and *phronesis*.

In consequence, I think that one's chances of coming to terms with the speculative labour of Heidegger during the 1920s are improved if one rereads the analysis of *Dasein*, developed in the fundamental ontology, in the light of the phenomenological reading of Aristotle, in particular, the *Nichomachean Ethics*, and if one pays attention to the fact that the results of this voracious assimilation of Aristotle are often deposited in passages and in argumentative connections where Heidegger does not speak about Aristotle explicitly.

6 Aristotle's practical philosophy as the background to the analysis of existence: correspondences, transformations, differences

It is precisely the Aristotelian horizon of certain fundamental determinations developed by Heidegger in his analysis of existence which I want to bring out by identifying the correspondences by means of which one can see how Heidegger takes up again and reformulates the substantive meaning of equivalent concepts from the practical philosophy of Aristotle in a few fundamental terms of his own analysis.

The first correspondence, a correspondence which is so obvious that it stands in no need of a special proof, is the correspondence between the three fundamental modalities of being, namely, *Dasein*, *Zuhandenheit* and *Vorhandenheit*, modalities distinguished and determined in the lectures from the 1920s, as also in *Sein und Zeit*, and the three Aristotelian determinations of *praxis*, *poiesis* and *theoria*. (1) *Theoria* is the uncover-

ing attitude which has both a descriptive and a veritative character, for it is directed toward the simple affirmation of the way in which things behave, the apprehension of the truth of beings; the knowledge which belongs to it is *sophia*. According to Heidegger, when human life assumes this uncovering attitude, being presents itself in a modality he calls *Vorhandenheit*.³² (2) *Poiesis* is the productive, manipulative, uncovering attitude, in which one finds oneself when one handles entities and this attitude aims at the production of works. *Techne* is that kind of knowledge which guides the latter towards its objective. When one assumes this attitude, beings present themselves to us in that modality of being which Heidegger calls *Zuhandenheit*. (3) *Praxis* is the uncovering attitude which is realized in this form of action, whose goal is contained in itself (*hou heneka*), that is to say, in its success as action and not in something external to it (*heneka tinos*). *Phronesis*, or prudence, is the kind of knowledge which belongs to the latter and which gives it its orientation. My hypothesis is that the uncovering attitude of *praxis* is the attitude on which Heidegger bases his analyses, with a view to attaining the fundamental thematic determinations with which he designates the ontological structure of human existence, of *Dasein*.

This last correspondence, which certainly appears as the most problematic and the most disputable, but which, in my view, is for all that the most significant and the most central, has to be developed in greater detail. But first, it would be suitable to make a brief remark about the nature of the Heideggerian recovery of the fundamental meaning of the three determinations of *praxis*, *poiesis* and *theoria*. It is obvious in fact that Heidegger does not commit himself to a simple recovery of these determinations but that, in taking them up, he profoundly modifies the structure, the character and the connection of these determinations. The most perceptive transformation seems to me to be the accentuation, better the absolutization, of the ontological character which, to a certain extent, they also possess with Aristotle, but which, with him, is not the only character, not even always the determinative character. Let me explain: Heidegger explains the Aristotelian determinations of *praxis*, *poiesis* and *theoria* as if they were only modalities of being, thereby rigorously excluding any understanding of their ontic significance. Clearly, what interests Heidegger, from the standpoint of a determination of the fundamental ontological structure of *Dasein*, are not particular *praxeis*, *poieseis* and *theoriai* but only the ontological power of these concepts. To be sure, in Aristotle's text he finds indications which can sustain his highly ontological reading: if, for example, one considers the distinction between *praxis* and *poiesis* brought to light in the *Nichomachean Ethics* VI, in connection with *Metaphysics* IX, 6, one can see quite clearly that even with Aristotle it is not a question of a purely ontic distinction, that is to say, that it does not refer exclusively to particular

actions amongst which certain would be *praxeis* and others *poieseis*. It is a distinction which also has a philosophical and ontological meaning to the extent that it points out a modality of being. With the result that it is capable of referring to the same ontic class of actions while introducing an ontological distinction: making a speech, for example, can be either a *poiesis*, a production of *logoi*, or a *praxis*, the exercise of an activity which is its own goal; the distinctive character of this activity, its distinctive modality of being, which arises out of the intention and out of the goal with regard to which it is executed, does not become apparent at the ontic level but only upon the ontological plane. It is the ontological quintessence of the Aristotelian concepts of *praxis*, of *poiesis* and of *theoria* that Heidegger underlines in his interpretation and which he extracts and absolutizes through his recuperation of these concepts in the determinations of Dasein, of *Zuhandenheit* and of *Vorhandenheit*.

One other determinative transformation is the change of order in the hierarchy of the three attitudes. It is not *theoria* which is considered to be the supreme attitude, as the highest and preferred activity for man. Rather, in the ontological context established by Heidegger, it is the attitude of *praxis*, linked to a whole series of other determinations implied by it, which becomes the central connotation, to the extent that it is conceived as the fundamental modality of being and as the ontological structure of Dasein. Together with this reversal, there goes a change in the relation with the other determinations: *Zuhandenheit* (which recovers the determination of *theoria*) and *Vorhandenheit* (which corresponds to the determination of *theoria*) are connected and tied to Dasein (for which, ontologically speaking, *praxis* is the modality of being). They indicate, respectively, the ways of being in which, correlatively, beings are bound up depending on whether Dasein, the 'originary *praxis*', is articulated together with beings in the constative and observational attitude or in the manipulative and productive. *Poiesis* and *theoria*, together, are both modalities of the unitary attitude of Dasein which Heidegger names *Besorgen*. In this way, by tracing *poiesis* and *theoria* back to a deeper common dimension, Heidegger obtains two further results: he shows the connection between *Zuhandenheit* and *Vorhandenheit*, between *poiesis* and *theoria* and between the latter and Dasein, the originary *praxis*. In addition, and against the traditional conception, he succeeds in showing that *theoria* is not an originary attitude but that it is derived from a modification of the poietic attitude (in consequence, as is well known, from the phenomena of *Auffälligkeit*, of *Aufdringlichkeit* and *Aufsässigkeit*³³).

Ontological interpretation, hierarchic displacement and unitary structuration are the determinative transformations to which Heidegger subjects the Aristotelian concepts of *praxis*, *poiesis* and *theoria* in the recovery of their substantive meaning. But what is the rationale for

these transformations? In view of the impossibility of offering a detailed analysis, I will limit myself here to what seems to me to be the basic reason. This consists, in my opinion, in the fact that Heidegger moves progressively towards the conviction that the Aristotelian determinations in question, as they are presented in the *Nichomachean Ethics*, are in fact indicative of the three fundamental uncovering attitudes of human life, the three forms in which the soul is in the truth, and that they therefore constitute the first completely phenomenological analysis of Dasein, but that Aristotle does not succeed in posing explicitly, and in a sufficiently radical manner, the problem of the unity which lies at the bottom of these three determinations and which sustains them. In other words, Aristotle did not succeed in grasping the fundamental ontological constitution of human life. According to Heidegger, as is well known, this omission is due to the fact that, by remaining within the horizon of a metaphysics of presence, Aristotle remains tied to a naturalistic understanding of time which prevents him from seeing that the unitary structure of human life is originary temporality.

7 Dasein as the 'ontologizing' of *praxis*: the practical origin of the determinations of existence (*Zu-sein*, *Sorge*, *Jemeinigkeit*, *Worumwillen*, *Befindlichkeit* and *Verstehen*, *Gewissen*, *Entschlossenheit*) and the consequences

But why then, and in spite of this critique, does one have to insist on the fact that the understanding of the modality of the being of Dasein is drawn from an ontologized concept of *praxis*? Because it seems to me that several indications speak in favour of this thesis, which tells us in an undeniable fashion that the characterization of Dasein and the determination of its fundamental structures are accomplished within an eminently 'practical' horizon (in the Aristotelian sense of *praxis*). By interpreting the structures of Dasein across the filigree of the Aristotelian understanding of *praxis* and of its sustaining categories, I will then try to bring to light the structural, conceptual and even sometimes terminological correspondences between Heidegger's and Aristotle's vision of the problem, without thereby ignoring or denying the differences. In as much as the points taken into consideration previously prepare the way, the legitimacy of this reconciliation of determinations which, on the surface, are so divergent will appear self-evident, both in and of itself, and in the context of the concepts and terms which this reconciliation makes possible. Besides, one can count upon the confirmation deriving from the fact that Heidegger himself, in his interpretations of Aristotle, and notably of the *Nichomachean Ethics* from the 1920s, explicitly under-

stands the *episteme praktike* as an ontology of human life, of Dasein, and also suggests the equation of Dasein and *praxis*.³⁴

7.1 *Having-to-be (Zu-sein) as a practical determination*

To begin with, in my opinion, one has to read the characterization of Dasein as having-to-be (*Zu-sein*) in an eminently practical sense. Having-to-be is introduced by Heidegger in paragraphs 4 to 9 of *Sein und Zeit*. With this characterization, indicative of the modality in which Dasein is and relates itself to its being, Heidegger wants to stress that this relation of Dasein to its being is not carried through in an attitude of observation and assertion, in a sort of turning back upon itself, in a theoretical and reflective introspection, but rather in a typically practico-moral attitude in which what is at stake is the very being of Dasein and in which one has to come to a decision about this being and uphold, whether one wants to or not, the weight of this decision. In other words, Heidegger wants to point out that Dasein does not in the first instance stand in relation to its being with a view to asserting and describing its significance and essence, to saying, for example, that it is *animal rationale*, but to decide what to do with this being, to choose, amongst different possibilities, the one which he will assume as his own and realize.³⁵

To be sure, one cannot ignore the fact that Heidegger only retains the practical connotation of the ontological structure of Dasein as having-to-be as long as he pursues the project of apprehending and of determining the structure of Dasein in its specificity on the basis of Dasein itself in its purity. One knows that, later, when Dasein is no longer understood in itself but out of the horizon in which it is always already constituted, Heidegger will systematically eliminate all trace of this practical connotation and will determine the 'open' character of existence no longer as having-to-be, but as *ek-sistence* in the opening of being.³⁶ But precisely the very insistence with which Heidegger retracts the practical characterization of Dasein leads one to believe that it is the right way to recuperate the first Heideggerian understanding of the ontological modality of existence.

7.2 *Care (Sorge) as the root of the practical structure of Dasein*

It is only on the basis of the practical comprehension of the auto-referential structure of Dasein that it becomes possible to grasp, in its structural unity, the other existential connotations that Heidegger proposes. It becomes understandable, for example, why Heidegger designates the fundamental modality of *Erschlossenheit*, the open character of Dasein and the unity of the existential determinations by means of a concept which, from the thematic point of view, comes from practical philosophy, namely, the concept of care (*Sorge*). The determination of *Sorge* through which Heidegger takes up again and points out the

phenomenon which Husserl designated as intentionality is, in my opinion, drawn from an ontological interpretation of the character of human life, designated by Aristotle through the term *orexis*. The proof? It is enough to collate the passage from Aristotle's text in which the term *orexis*, or the corresponding verb *oregomai*, appears and to see how Heidegger translates them. One discovers that he always makes use of his term *Sorge*. The most notable passage comes from the beginning of the *Metaphysics* where the initial proposition '*pantes anthropoi tou eidenai oregontai physei*' is translated by Heidegger as 'Im Sein des Menschen liegt wesentlich die Sorge des Sehens', whereby it is important to stress not only the correspondence between *oregontai* and *Sorge* but also the ontological interpretation of *pantes anthropoi* by 'Im Sein des Menschen'.³⁷

Within the same practical horizon one also comes to understand better why Heidegger designates as *Besorgen* (at the root of which lies the productive-manipulative disposition of *poiesis* rather than the constative-descriptive disposition of *theoria*) the modality within which *Dasein* lays itself open to and relates itself to things, and as *Fürsorge* the modality of being through which *Dasein* is in relation with others. One understands better because these determinations have their common unitary root precisely in the practical character of *Sorge*, and that indicates, again, that the entire structure of *Dasein* is practical in nature.

It isn't necessary to recall here how Heidegger directs his analysis toward an investigation of the unitary foundation which sustains the auto-referential practical structure of *Dasein*, indicated by *Zu-sein*. As is well known, Heidegger finds this foundation in the idea, thematized and conceptualized by him, according to which *Dasein* is not something that is realized and fulfilled in the momentary actuality of a pure activity but is structurally a *capacity* (*Seinkönnen*) which surpasses and reaches beyond the confines of presence in order to be exposed to the temporal ecstasis of the future, in which the projection of its possibilities is unfolded, and the past, which is always the horizon and the inevitable context for projection. So, for Heidegger, *capacity* is a modality of being characterized by a fundamental ontological and temporal suspension proper to *Dasein* in as much as the latter is originally open and free-for; and since this liberty is not something that *Dasein* chooses but which belongs to its very ontological constitution, it follows that *Dasein* perceives it as something which it cannot get rid of, as a weight, the weight of the unbearable lightness of its being which makes itself known in the *Grundstimmung* of anxiety.

Heidegger draws certain fundamental conclusions from the ontological interpretation of the practical structure of *Dasein*.

(1) Against the metaphysical priority of the present and of presence, he upholds the primacy of the future. Precisely because *Dasein* is related

to its being in a relation of a practical kind, when deciding about its being the being which represents what is at stake in this decision is always a future being, for – as Aristotle frequently underlines – deliberation (*bouleusis*) and decision (*prohairesis*)³⁸ bear upon the future.

(2) The being toward which Dasein stands in relation in the practical auto-reference is always the very being of Dasein itself, and it's for this reason that Heidegger attributes to it the character of *Jemeinigkeit*, being in every instance mine. I surmise that with this determination Heidegger is rethinking, and giving an ontological interpretation of the meaning of, a characteristic which belongs to the knowing of *phronesis* and which Aristotle formulates when he says that *phronesis* is a *hautoi eidenai*.³⁹

(3) In view of all these elements Heidegger upholds a radical distinction between the ontological constitution of Dasein and that of beings different from Dasein, by basing it on the consideration that Dasein is the only being ontologically constituted as a *Zu-sein*. Upon this distinction Heidegger also founds the ontic and ontological priority of Dasein, and he criticizes the inadequate radicality of the metaphysical differentiation of man and nature, subject and object, consciousness and world, precisely because they are not rooted in a true apprehension of the fundamentally unitary structure of human life.

(4) The practical determination of the being of Dasein finally implies the rejection of the traditional theory of self-consciousness, conceived as a knowledge of self of a reflexive and informative kind and obtained by way of an *inspectio sui*, by way of a sort of turning back of consciousness, or of the subject, upon itself. The identity of Dasein is constituted practically to the extent that the latter refers, according to its own nature, to its *Zu-sein*, by assuming the latter or by not assuming it. In addition, this self-reference is not developed exclusively by means of transparent acts of the understanding but also depends upon 'inferior acts', on moods, on the sensible and passive components of human life. In this way Heidegger puts a double distance between himself and the metaphysical tradition where the specificity of the being of human life is re-duced and restrained within the objectifying categories of pure observation and within a theoretical horizon dominated by doctrines of presence and of consciousness.

The practical structure which designates and determines the ontological constitution of Dasein is the result – and this is still my contention – of a kind of speculative sedimentation (in Heidegger's thinking and even in the terminology of this period) of the essential meaning of the determinations of being and of the moral life of man presented by Aristotle in the *Nichomachean Ethics*. We are talking here of a sedimentation produced in the form of an ontological interpretation and whose intention is to validate and to realize the ideas which it takes up again. To be

sure, by linking the Heideggerian analysis of existence so closely to Aristotle, doubts inevitably arise, doubts which can moreover be based, at least apparently, on Heidegger's own text. In fact, in his presentation of the programme of an existential analytic, Heidegger quite explicitly distances himself from Aristotle: he criticizes, for example, the Aristotelian thesis in accordance with which the primacy of man is founded on the fact that the soul, in as much as it knows, is a kind of reflection of all beings, or this other thesis according to which the essence of man consists in his *anima rationalis*. Nevertheless, one should note that Heidegger did not fail to acknowledge, on several occasions, his indebtedness *vis-à-vis* Aristotle. This even happens in the course of his existential analyses where, ordinarily, Heidegger covers up and effaces the traces of his productive assimilation.⁴⁰ Let us therefore consider which are the relevant determinations of Aristotle's practical philosophy taken up in Heidegger's existential analysis. To do this, and so to verify our thesis, it will be necessary to reread the critical passages from the existential analysis in a spirit which I would call a deciphering rather than interpreting, a spirit which is however well supported by the Marburg texts and which, in addition, finds ample support in *Sein und Zeit*.

What is taken up first of all is the general framework of the problem which engages Aristotle's attention. In fact, one can say that in the horizon established by the consideration of *episteme pratike* – a term, I want to emphasize, translated by Heidegger as *Ontologie des menschlichen Lebens* – Aristotle considers human life in totality as a *praxis* and not as a *poiesis*;⁴¹ and *praxis* is considered as the specific *kinesis* of human life, which is not simply oriented toward the conservation of life itself, towards living pure and simple (*zen*), but which is *bios*, the project of life which, once vital conservation is assured, comes to terms with itself in the space which opens up before it in relation to the problem of how to live, that is, to the choice of the preferable form of life for man, to the problem of living well (*eu zen*) and to the means suited to realizing this goal. This means that man, *qua* political animal endowed with *logos*, carries the weight of the responsibility of deliberating (*bouleusis*), of choosing and of deciding (*prohairesis*) about the modalities and the forms of his life by turning toward that which he takes to be the best. As we know, it is the wise man, the prudent man (*phronimos*), who succeeds in deliberating well, in choosing and deciding well and who realizes right action (*eu pratein*), the good life (*eu zen*) and therefore happiness (*eudaimonia*).

This fundamental intuition of Aristotle's is taken up again in my sense by Heidegger and reformulated by means of a transformation which ontologizes and radicalizes it while accentuating its substantial significance. In fact, for Heidegger *Dasein* too is that particular being whose being is always in question and this most especially in that eminently

practical sense in which *Dasein* has to decide about the forms and modalities of its own self-realization, even in those limiting cases where this decision is a matter of not deciding or abstaining from making a decision. As Aristotle would have it, *Dasein* is the being who must decide, *ta hautoi agatha kai sympheronta*.⁴² And just as with Aristotle, one's success in life is determined by following the *phronesis*, with Heidegger too it's only when *Dasein* is attentive to the call of conscience and recognizes this 'having to decide' as its task and as its very being, that is, when it recognizes itself in its practical character by assuming the latter in the projection of its own possibilities, in the realization of its *praxis*, it is only then when *Dasein* takes responsibility for its being that it realizes itself as authentic (*phronimos*).

It is also possible to maintain that, in the 1920s, Heidegger is concerned to identify and determine the *Grundbewegtheit*, the fundamental characteristic of mobility proper to the being of human life in the practical self-reference by which it is determined. In the Aristotelian thesis in accordance with which *praxis* is *kinesis tou biou*, the movement specific to human life,⁴³ Heidegger sees decisive support for, and substantial confirmation of, the direction of his research, which leads him to distance himself from Husserl in order to come nearer to Aristotle and, at the same time, to filter his reading of Aristotle through the problems which he inherited from Husserl. In this way a highly productive interaction ensues between the demand for a speculative enrichment, which makes use of Aristotle, and a reading of Aristotle which is fertilized by a speculative orientation which determines in advance the problems to be tackled.

It is not possible to offer here an analysis of Aristotle's understanding of *praxis* and it is still not possible to pursue in detail the interpretation offered by Heidegger of Book VI of the *Nichomachean Ethics* due to the absence of certain texts like the Winter 1924/5 lectures on Plato's *Sophist*, the introductory part of which contains a detailed reading of Book VI, or the Summer 1926 lectures, the last part of which is entirely devoted to a general interpretation of Aristotle's ontology, including what Heidegger calls the ontology of human life, that is, the *episteme praktike*. But the evidence in our possession does nevertheless suffice, in my opinion, to indicate at least the basic direction of Heidegger's thinking.

In what concerns the central concept of *praxis*, Heidegger thinks he detects in Aristotle, as we have seen, a dual employment of the concept: an ontic employment in which the term indicates particular *praxeis* and in accordance with which these *praxeis* are certainly distinguished but at the same level as the *poieseis* and the particular *theoriai*: this is how it is used for example at the beginning of the *Nichomachean Ethics*; and a philosophical and ontological use in which *praxis* does not indicate

particular actions but a modality of being. In this latter sense, *praxis* is the concept employed to determine the modality of being proper to human life, its specific *kinesis*. It is this use of the term one finds, for example, in *Nichomachean Ethics* VI, 5, or in *Metaphysics* IX, 6. The fundamental structure of this *kinesis* is *orexis* in its two consecutive moments of *dioxis* and *phyge*, and what characterizes human life more exactly is an *orexis* closely bound to *nous praktikos* and susceptible of being oriented by the *dianoeisthai* of the *logos*, in the case of *phronimos*, by an *orthos logos*. *Praxis* arises out of the juncture of these two moments, *orexis* and *nous*, by way of the process of deliberation (*bouleusis*) which ends up in choice and in the decision to act (*prohairesis*). If the *orexis* is right and the *logos* true, there results not only good deliberation (*euboulia*) but also the success of the *praxis*, *eupraxia*.

Reflecting in depth upon the Aristotelian structure of *praxis* and upon the determinations which it contains, Heidegger draws therefrom, I think, so many fundamental determinations which he no longer considers as particular moments of action but, due to his having 'ontologized' the concept of *praxis*, as ontological characteristics of human life. It follows that in his existential analysis one finds, hidden and disguised in an ontological envelope, an entire series of conceptual and terminological correspondences with the Aristotelian conception of *praxis*. But before examining them, it is necessary to insist again upon the nature of the transformation that Heidegger accomplishes in taking up the Aristotelian understanding of *praxis*.

It has already been pointed out how Heidegger, both with and against Husserl, appropriates the Aristotelian characterization of the three fundamentally uncovering attitudes (*praxis*, *poiesis*, *theoria*) and it has already been emphasized that with this appropriation he criticizes the lack of an explicit position on the problem of the fundamentally unitary determination which upholds all the others, and traces this lack back to the metaphysical horizon of presence and to that naturalistic understanding of time which prevents Aristotle from grasping the fact that the unitary structure of human life is originary temporality. Taking up again Aristotle's fundamental indications but freeing them at the same time from the metaphysical hypotheses by which they are conditioned, Heidegger thinks that it is important to reformulate these practical determinations as ontological designations, as modalities of being: this is where one finds the origin of their ontologizing interpretation. In other words: against the theoretical and objectifying unilaterality of modern metaphysics, Heidegger finds it worthwhile to take up again the fundamental intuitions of Aristotle's practical philosophy, intuitions which lie outside such a unilaterality. However, it is still necessary to purify them of the metaphysico-anthropological slag in which they are embedded. From an inadequately pure ontological point of view, the Aristotelian understanding of

praxis is situated in the general framework of a prior conception of man as *animal rationale* and remains bound to the latter. It depends upon and falls with such a conception. According to Heidegger, on the contrary, since the validity of my metaphysical and anthropological framework is in doubt, the practical understanding of human life no longer refers to anything which can be relied upon. Every substantive support which was operative in the tradition is now considered derivative and defective with regard to an originary action, to that *praxis* which constitutes the being of *Dasein* and which must be understood in and for itself regardless of any pre-determination and pre-constitution. In the absence of any region in which it can be constituted, *praxis* has to be self-constituting; and in this way it becomes the originary ontological determination, self-sufficient, its own objective. It becomes *ou heneka*, *Worum-willen*.

Here we come across a fundamental difference. With Aristotle, the practical issue represents a particular way of viewing human life, precisely in as much as the latter is capable of action and in as much as it is itself action. It is therefore just one particular issue among others, alongside, for example, the physical, biological or psychological issue. In addition, it is not a privileged issue but, by virtue of the lesser degree of precision (*akribēia*) to which it lends itself, it has been considered a sort of *philosophia minor*. In any case, it does not exhaust the understanding of human life. With Heidegger, on the other hand, practical determinations are not determinations which exist alongside other possible determinations but represent the ontological constitution of *Dasein* itself. This means that as constitutive, their content is not something that *Dasein* can freely choose to have or not to have but is something from which it cannot be abstracted. Decision, for example, or *praxis* itself, are not conceived as possibilities which *Dasein* can realize or not, but become ontological predicates which characterize its being before, and therefore independent of, its will, its choice, its decision.

This brings with it another displacement in the characterization of *praxis*. There, where it is conceived as a possibility which one can grasp or not, *praxis* takes on a, so to speak, positive connotation. It is a possible way of realizing the being of man but not necessarily the only way. But if it becomes the very ontological structure of *Dasein* it is its inevitable character, the impossibility of avoiding it which is then underlined and accentuated. Hence, *praxis* is not only in question in the execution of determinate actions or in the pursuit of particular goals, it precedes each execution and each pursuit. And it is precisely this characteristic of inevitability, arising from the 'ontologization' of *praxis* as a structure of *Dasein* which confers upon the being of *Dasein* the characteristic of weight, which conveys the impression that the lightness of this being is unbearable.

The 'ontologization' of *praxis* then provokes a last transfiguration. It results, so to speak, in the evaporation of its specific weight as an activity and in the loss of certain characteristics which, with Aristotle, belong to it constitutively; above all, its inter-personality and its rootedness in a *koinonia*. With Heidegger, 'ontologization' drives *praxis* into a sort of heroic solipsism which deforms its very appearance.

So it appears undeniable that the Heideggerian 'ontologization' of the Aristotelian concept of *praxis* provokes some fundamental transformations and displacements. But in spite of these transformations and displacements, the prevailing correspondences will still have to be examined by considering how the Heideggerian determination of the 'open' structure of Dasein takes up again the decisive moments of the Aristotelian understanding of the moral being of man.

7.3 *The articulation of Sorge in the complementary determinations of Befindlichkeit and Verstehen*

It is well known that Heidegger establishes the openness of the being of Dasein, its *Erschlossenheit*, by affirming the originary unity of Dasein and world. The unitary sense of *Erschlossenheit* and of its *Existenzialien*, is care (*Sorge*), its three structural moments are *Befindlichkeit*, *Verstehen* and *Rede*.⁴⁴ However, the simple translation of these terms, almost impossible in any case, does little to help one grasp the meaning which Heidegger confers upon them. Rather, it tends to conceal this meaning. It might be helpful to consider that, with these concepts, Heidegger takes up again, rethinks and elevates to ontological rank so many transitional determinations of the being of man as 'subject' of action, by transforming them and inserting them into the ontologically more profound and more radical context established by his metaphysics of Dasein. In *Befindlichkeit*, he elevates to ontological rank and leads back to its unitary root, the determinations of the acting subject which had traditionally been thought within the framework of the doctrine of the passions, that is to say, as moments of passivity, of receptivity and finitude.⁴⁵ Similarly, in *Verstehen*, I believe that Heidegger ontologizes the active moment of projection and of spontaneity. The two moments are, in addition, co-originary with regard to the third moment, *Rede*, which will be left here in parentheses, but about which one can say that it designates the ontological foundation of the rational and discursive character of Dasein. What has to be underlined is the correspondence of these moments to two central determinations of the Aristotelian theory of action. Let us see how.

*Befindlichkeit*⁴⁶ represents the ontologization of ontic moods in as much as it is the ontological foundation of their possibility. In *Befindlichkeit*, which is rooted in *Sorge*, Dasein is open to its having-to-be. It is confronted with the nudity of its 'daß es ist und zu sein hat', more precisely,

in such a way that its 'whence' (*Woher*) and its 'whither' (*Wohin*) are hidden from it. This is its *Geworfenheit*. What Heidegger wants to point out with this determination is that there belongs to the constitution of *Dasein* not simply elements which are pure, transparent, suited to spontaneity and rationality but also moments which are troubled and opaque, the condition of the possibility of which he tries to determine through the concept of *Befindlichkeit*. For Heidegger, in other words, human life constitutes both itself and its own identity by taking account not only of its transparence, its self-determination and its spontaneity but also in assuming as its own, the opacity of its *Stimmungen*, which latter follows precisely from the fact that it is, in its fundamental structure, *Sorge*. The constitutive function of *Stimmungen* is valid even for the purest attitudes of human life, that is to say, for *theoria*, about which Aristotle says, as Heidegger reminds us, that it can only take place in the calm of *rhastone* and of *diagoge*.⁴⁷

In order to bring out the relation to Aristotle what is important here is that Heidegger, in the very paragraph in which he deals with *Befindlichkeit* (§29) explicitly cites Aristotle, more exactly, the doctrine of the passions (*pathe*), especially as presented in book II of the *Rhetoric*. While disengaging this doctrine from the context in which Aristotle situated it, Heidegger maintains that it has to be interpreted as 'the first systematic hermeneutics of the everydayness of being-with-one-another' (*die erste systematische Hermeneutik der Alltäglichkeit des Miteinanderseins*), and he also notes that since Aristotle hardly any progress has been made in the understanding of the passions, at least until phenomenology. In addition, we also know that Heidegger devoted the lectures of the Summer term 1924 to this ontological reading of the Aristotelian doctrine of the passions. Even if, in order to offer a more precise evaluation, we should wait until this text has been published, one can already affirm without hesitation that this retrieval of the Aristotelian doctrine of the passions plays an important role in the Heideggerian project of a complete and radical comprehension of the structure of human life, comprehension of such a kind that it cannot be reduced exclusively to an analysis of cognitive acts, still less to scientific cognition.

In what concerns the complementary determination with regard to *Befindlichkeit*, that is, *Verstehen*,⁴⁸ one can say very generally that it represents the ontological condition of the possibility of active and spontaneous determinations, of the auto-transparence of *Dasein*. It is the determination which reflects the productivity of capacity (*Seinkönnen*). In spite of the meaning suggested by the German term and even more, by the Latin translations, *Verstehen* indicates the ontological status of *Dasein* in as much as it is activity, in as much as it has the character of *Entwurf*, in as much as it projects its being by relating itself to itself in the practical attitude referred to above. Without entering into the details

of the analysis of this determination, it is enough to take up again the synthetic definition which Heidegger gives of it: *Verstehen* is 'the existential being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-being; and it is so in such a way that this being discloses in itself what its being is capable of'.⁴⁹

The fact that Heidegger considers *Verstehen* as an ontological modality of *Seinkönnen*, that he attributes to it the structure of the project, and that he associates its signification with the ontic signification of 'knowing how to do something' certainly places this determination within the horizon of practical comprehension. To be sure, *qua* ontological, strictly speaking, it precedes any distinction between theory and *praxis*. But that doesn't prevent its thematic connotation, arising from the field of *praxis* and the fundamental features of the phenomenon of acting from which it proceeds, being filtered through the ontological network. If, for example, one takes the retrieval of the treatment of *Verstehen* conducted in the lecture course of the Summer term 1927: *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, where the filter for excluding every ontic determination is not so tight as in *Sein und Zeit*, one finds the claim (highly significant for my thesis) that *Verstehen* is 'the true sense of action' (*der eigentliche Sinn des Handelns*).⁵⁰ Heidegger's determination to refuse any interpretation of *Verstehen* in the sense of a cognitive operation opposed to *Erklären* is also, and evidently, directed toward defending the practical conception of *Verstehen*.

But the practical horizon for the Heideggerian comprehension of *Verstehen* also becomes apparent in the function which the latter fulfils in the constitution of the identity of Dasein. The structure of the project proper to *Verstehen* also implies a knowledge, a sight (*Sicht*), which accompanies and orients the projecting. It is the self-knowledge through which Dasein achieves transparence, *Durchsichtigkeit*. This last term is the one Heidegger employs, as he points out himself, to avoid the identity of Dasein being conceived in the horizon of *Warhnehmen*, of *Vernehmen*, of *Beschauen* and of *Anschaun*, that is to say, in the horizon of acts of apprehension of a theoretical kind, acts upon which the traditional understanding of self-consciousness depended. The Heideggerian effort to be rid of the theoretical horizon of presence therefore gets deposited in the determination of *Verstehen* and of *Durchsichtigkeit*; on the other hand, the effort to reach a more originary comprehension of the being of Dasein also gets deposited therein. However, as the terms chosen by Heidegger and the explanations which he gives demonstrate, it seems to me evident that this more radical originality is attained through the ontological exploitation of the thematic field of *praxis*, even if the ontological elimination of every ontic element aims at placing the originary comprehension of the being of Dasein at a more profound level than that of *praxis*, ontologically conceived.

The hypothesis I am going to risk is that through *Verstehen* (and in

spite of all the transformations which are produced and which I do not wish to deny) Heidegger rethinks and reformulates the substantive meaning of the function which, in the Aristotelian theory of action, is filled by the *nous praktikos*. Just as the latter is the complement of *praxis*, so *Verstehen* represents the determination corresponding to *Befindlichkeit*. To be sure, *Verstehen* is not confined within the limits of a theory of action but concerns the totality of *Dasein*: as such it is to be explained with reference to things like *Besorgen* (implying *poietic* and theoretical attitudes), with reference to other things like *Fürsorge*, and with reference to itself as *Worumwillen*. And it has its roots, just like *Befindlichkeit*, in the unitary structure of *Sorge*. And so it obviously finds its place elsewhere than in the *nous praktikos* of the Aristotelian comprehension of action. But in spite of this displacement, in conceiving of the being of *Dasein* as *Sorge*, as complementary to and co-originary with *Befindlichkeit* and *Verstehen*, of *Geworfenheit* and *Entwurf*, of *Reluzenz* and of *Praestruktion*, that is to say, as the unity of passivity and activity, of receptivity and spontaneity, of horizon and constitution, one can say that Heidegger takes up again and reformulates, in an ontologically radicalized framework the same problem as Aristotle grasped and confronted in Book VI of the *Nichomachean Ethics* where he says that man is the *arche* which is at the same time *orexis dianoetike* and *nous orektikos*.⁵¹ And just as with Aristotle the connection of *orexis* and of *nous* always takes place across the *logos*, in an analogous fashion Heidegger theorizes the co-originality of *Befindlichkeit* and *Verstehen* with *Rede*.

To be sure, Heidegger insists upon the differences. He tells us that

care, as an originary totality, 'precedes' in an apriori-existential fashion, any 'behaviour' and 'situation' of *Dasein*: which means that it too is always already to be found therein. It follows that this phenomenon does not in any way express a primacy of the practical attitude over the theoretical attitude. The purely intuitive determination of something present is no less characterized by care than is a 'political action' or calm resignation. 'Theory' and 'praxis' are possibilities of being of a being whose being has to be determined as care.⁵²

This passage, which appears opposed to my thesis, in fact confirms it. For, on the one hand, Heidegger can obviously and with reason proclaim the differences to the extent that he interprets *Sorge* not as a determinate comportment of *Dasein*, whether theoretical, practical or *poietic*, but as the unitary ontological foundation which renders possible all the different comportments. But, on the other hand, in order to specify the essential characteristics of this unitary foundation he has recourse to determinations and to concepts which he borrows from Aristotle's practical philosophy. The very fact that on several occasions he experiences the need

to distract us from an interpretation of *Sorge* in this sense, rather than allaying our suspicions only confirms that it is precisely in this direction that the source of his determination has to be sought.

Similarly when, immediately afterwards, Heidegger says that 'the phenomenon of care in its totality is essentially something that cannot be torn asunder; so any attempts to trace it back to special acts or drives like willing and wishing or urge [*Drang*] and addiction [*Hang*], or to construct it out of these will be unsuccessful'; and when he adds: 'willing and wishing are rooted with ontological necessity in *Dasein's* care; they are not just ontologically undifferentiated experiences occurring in a "stream" which is completely indefinite with regard to the meaning of its being'. This is no less the case with urge and addiction which too are grounded in care in so far as they can be exhibited in *Dasein* at all. In affirming all this Heidegger obviously wants to underline the extreme radicality of his comprehension of the being of *Dasein* as *Sorge* and so to confirm the ontological precedence of *Sorge* with regard to the traditional practical determinations which he mentions. But the necessity of drawing a line between the ontological level of *Sorge* and that of the other determinations depends precisely upon the fact that, outside of all that, and from the thematic point of view, *Sorge* is homogeneous with them. Besides, it is precisely this very homogeneity which allows *Sorge* to be the unitary ontological foundation. Because it is only between homogeneous elements that a relation of foundation can be established.

This homogeneity between care and the other traditional practical determinations of *orexis* and *appetitus*, of inclination and addiction, becomes even clearer and more undeniable in the treatment of the phenomenon which Heidegger handles in the lectures of the Summer term 1925. In this course, Heidegger presents the phenomenon of *Sorge* in a closer relation with the moments of drive (*Drang*) and addiction (*Hang*) which he seems to consider as the explanation for the structure of *Sorge* itself. In spite of the fact that Heidegger never ceases to underline the difference in ontological depth between the traditional determinations and his own, the appearance of *Sorge* in the two moments of *Drang* and *Hang* confirms its correspondence with *orexis* and its two moments of *dioxis* and *phyge*.⁵³

7.4 *Gewissen as the 'ontologization' of phronesis*

In the light of these considerations, one also understands why, as Gadamer recalls, confronted with the difficulty of translating the term *phronesis*, Heidegger could exclaim: 'Das ist das Gewissen!'⁵⁴ Evidently, he was thinking of his determination of conscience (*Gewissen*) as the locus where potentiality for being, the fundamental practical determination of *Dasein*, becomes manifest to itself. In *Sein und Zeit* (§§54–60), it is indeed the case that conscience is characterized as the locus for the

'attestation by *Dasein* of its authentic potentiality-for-being' (*daseinsmäßige Bezeugung eines eigentlichen Seinkönnens*); there, where *Dasein* is ready to listen to the appeal of conscience in the attitude of wanting-to-have-a-conscience (*Gewissen-haben-wollen*) and of resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*), it is able to attain the authentic realization of existence.⁵⁵ In an analogous fashion, with Aristotle, *phronesis* is the knowledge which constitutes the horizon in which *praxis* can succeed as *eupraxia* and human living, which is, in sum, a *praxis*, can be realized as living well (*eu zen*). And just as with Aristotle, *phronesis* always implies knowledge of *kairos*⁵⁶ so conscience, with Heidegger, is always referred to the *Augenblick*.⁵⁷

So Heidegger certainly had his reason for translating *phronesis* by *Gewissen*; and, for my part, I think I have reason for thinking that *Gewissen* is the ontologization of *phronesis*. The passage from the *Nicomachean Ethics* which arouses the Heideggerian exclamation to the effect that *phronesis* is *Gewissen* furnishes, in my opinion, both the occasion and the motive for an ontologizing operation. Consider the end of chapter 5 from Book VI where Aristotle, after having given a definition of *phronesis* as *hexis elethes meta logou pratike peri ta anthropoi agatha kai kaka*, admits that even this definition does not suffice to entirely exhaust its essence. For it is something more than a *hexis*. Curiously enough, Aristotle does not succeed in saying what it is, but limits himself to developing a proof which confirms his claim: 'any *hexis* can be forgotten but *phronesis* cannot be forgotten'.⁵⁸ I suppose that in reflecting upon this question: in what is *phronesis* 'more'? Heidegger must have arrived at the conclusion that, if it is more than a *hexis* and if, therefore, it cannot be overlooked, it must be a characteristic of the soul itself. It therefore has to be ontologized. But the ontologization of *phronesis* yields as a result *Gewissen*.

7.5 *Entschlossenheit* as the 'ontologization' of *prohairesis* and the other possible correspondences

One could continue this catalogue of correspondences and indicate how the same ontologization is accomplished by Heidegger in the case of other determinations of Aristotle's practical philosophy. I am going to limit myself here to an inventory. With the term *Jemeinigkeit*,⁵⁹ as I have already indicated, Heidegger ontologizes the determination by means of which Aristotle designates a characteristic which belongs to *phronesis*, the fact that it is a 'knowledge concerning the self' (*to hautoi eidenai*). And again: the designation of *Dasein* as *Worumwillen*⁶⁰ is the ontologization of the determination of *praxis* as *hou heneka*. In fact, since the distinctive characteristic of *praxis* is the fact that it is not with reference to anything else (*heneka tinos*) like *poiesis*, but that it contains in itself its own goal (*hou heneka*) and since *Dasein* is pre-eminently an ontologized

praxis, the latter must possess, *par excellence*, the characteristic of *hou heneka*. This is the characteristic that Heidegger attributes to it with the designation *Worumwillen*.

Finally, the determination of *Entschlossenheit*⁶¹ is, in my opinion, the ontologization of *prohairesis*, with this difference, that the latter is situated as a special moment within the Aristotelian theory of action, while *Entschlossenheit* is a characteristic of the being of *Dasein*. An indisputable confirmation of this latter correspondence comes from the fact that, in translating Aristotle, Heidegger renders *prohairesis* by *Entschlossenheit*. Among the passages which attest to this, the one which seems to be particularly significant occurs in the lecture course of Summer 1926, on the *Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie*. Heidegger interprets the passage from Book IV, 2 of the *Metaphysics*, where Aristotle differentiates philosophers into dialecticians and sophists, and translates:

Dialektik und Sophistik haben gewissermaßen dasselbe Gewand angezogen wie die Philosophie, aber sie sind es im Grunde nicht; die Sophistik sieht nur so aus. Die Dialektiker zwar nehmen ihre Aufgabe ernst und positiv, sie handeln vom *koinon*, aber es fehlt ihnen die Orientierung an der Idee des Seins. Beide bewegten sich um dasselbe Gebiet wie die Philosophie. Die Dialektik unterscheidet sich durch die Art der Möglichkeiten: sie hat nur begrenzte Möglichkeiten, sie kann nur versuchen; die Philosophie dagegen gibt zu verstehen. Die Sophisten unterscheiden sich durch die Art der Entschlossenheit zur wissenschaftlichen Forshung: sie sind unernst.

What has to be underlined is that Heidegger translates here with *Entschlossenheit zur wissenschaftlichen Forshung* what, in the original Greek, stands as: *prohairesis tou biou*.

8 Conclusive considerations: from Heidegger to Aristotle and from Aristotle to us

I hope that the correspondences I have pointed out will, if not prove, at least render plausible, the general thesis with regard to a retrieval by Heidegger of the framework for the problems posed by Aristotle's practical philosophy, and to a general correspondence between the practical-moral understanding of human life with Aristotle and the Heideggerian existential analysis. With this in mind, I would like to finish up by citing a passage which shows very clearly, and yet again, how Heidegger struggles to get close to Aristotle or, if you prefer, to bring Aristotle close to himself. Towards the end of the lecture on the 'Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie', having dealt with the five modalities of the

aletheuein of the *psyche* and the movements which correspond to them, Heidegger poses the problem of the unitary structure of the *psyche*, of the being of human life, and he replies by giving, with Aristotle, the following definition of man: '*anthropos* ist *zoion*, dem die *praxis* zukommt, ferner *logos*. Diese drei Bestimmungen zusammengezogen: *zoe pratike tou logon echontos* ist das Wesen des Menschen. Der Mensch ist das Lebewesen, das gemäß seiner Seinsart die Möglichkeit hat, zu handeln.'⁶²

To be sure, one must also add that in taking up again the Aristotelian determinations of *praxis*, Heidegger 'ontologizes' them and that this ontologization is the equivalent for him of a radicalization. For it permits him to grasp the fundamental unitary connection which upholds these determinations and which is, notoriously, temporality conceived in an originary way (*Zeitlichkeit*). At the end of all this, and once he has carried through his 'ontologization', Heidegger takes up a distance with regard to Aristotle. Aristotle was not able to see originary temporality as the unitary ontological foundation of the determinations of human life which, nevertheless, he grasped and described, because he remains within the horizon of a naturalistic, chronological and non-chairological understanding of time. Even the celebrated aporie of the relation between the *psyche* and *chronos* explicitly raised by Aristotle (*Physik* IV, 14, 223 to 21, 29) which is handled in a magisterial manner by Heidegger in his commentary on the Aristotelian treatment of time,⁶³ seems to be insufficient, in Heidegger's eyes, to extract Aristotle from the horizon of the naturalistic understanding of time.

And yet: Aristotle does anticipate correctly, even if only at the ontic level, the intuition which Heidegger raises to the ontological power with the equation of *Dasein* and *Zeitlichkeit*. This is a conjecture which can be based upon a passage from *De anima* III, 10, where it seems as though Aristotle attributes to man, as a specific characteristic distinguishing him from animals, the perception of time (*chronou aisthesis*).⁶⁴ The attribution is, to tell the truth, controversial; but the fact that Heidegger, who shows that he knows the passage very well, nevertheless interprets it without hesitation in this sense, and the fact that, in addition, he links the perception of time with the capacity for action in order to define the specific character of human life, lends unquestionable credence to this conjecture. To explain the difference between the *orexis* of animals and that reasonable action proper to human life, he refers to the passage mentioned at *De anima* III, 10, and he translates:

Der Gegensatz von Trieb und eigentlich entschlossener, vernünftiger Handlung ist eine Möglichkeit nur bei lebendigen Wesen die Möglichkeit haben, Zeit zu verstehen. Sofern das Lebendige dem Trieb überlassen ist, ist es bezogen auf das, was gerade da ist und reizt, *to ede*

hedy: darauf strebt der Trieb hemmungslos, auf das Gegenwärtige, Verfügbare. Aber dadurch, daß im Menschen die *aisthesis chronou* liegt, hat der Mensch die Möglichkeit, sich *to mellon* zu vergegenwärtigen als das Mögliche, um des willen er handelt.

Can one still remain in doubt about the deep furrow that the voracious interpretation and assimilation of Aristotle has dug in Heidegger's speculative path? Obviously, I think not; but I also think that it is no longer possible to doubt that Heidegger's thinking succeeds in reactivating and reformulating the substantive meaning of certain fundamental problems posed by Aristotle with a radicality of which no one else seems capable today. In this sense, and especially for the phases on which I have concentrated my analysis, this thinking represents one of the most dense and significant moments in the presence of Aristotle in our century. By means of it we are referred back to Aristotle and from Aristotle to us. With a view to gaining an awareness of the problems of the contemporary world, of nihilism and technology, Heidegger has taught us that it is necessary to immerse oneself in the Aristotelian bath – and this before any speculative utopianism, before every form of rebellion or dadaist thinking in which most of those who have wanted to take up his challenge and try to think the problems which we inherited from him, have fallen.

I know that the Heideggerians are going to say: you have completely reduced Heidegger to Aristotle, to the point of finding in Aristotle a correspondence and even an anticipation of the fundamental discovery made by Heidegger at Marburg, the specification of the unitary ontological structure of Dasein in originary temporality. The non-Heideggerians, on the contrary, will protest as follows: what you have tried to pass off as Aristotelian doesn't have much to do with Aristotle and looks more like a philosophical pastiche produced by a fascination with Aristotle.

My response: I know that one has to be on one's guard against this danger but one has to risk it. If I gave the impression of levelling Heidegger down to Aristotle, the optic distortion is inevitable and I apologize for it. I simply wanted to show – against the old existentialist interpretation, and against more recent interpretations which only see in Heideggerian thinking (much too expeditiously and much too rapidly), the overcoming of the tradition – how Heidegger spanned this tradition and entered in depth into a confrontation with its dominant founding moments by reinstating the substantive sense of the confrontation with Greek culture. I am aware that I adopted only one among other possible routes and that I threw light upon only one of the numerous facets of Heidegger's work. I am also aware that what I have done is only a first step on the way to understanding the meaning of Heidegger's speculative path, a step which necessarily has to leave aside other possible readings without moreover trying to compete with them. Finally, I am particularly

aware that the interpretation I have proposed still has to face the explicit retractions undertaken by the second and last Heidegger. But if it is objected that my reading gets under way by neglecting the interpretation Heidegger himself has given to his thinking, I have to reply: if that is a sin, it is a sin I have committed voluntarily. Moreover, I have no intention of repenting.

Translated by Christopher Macann

Notes

1 For the citation of writings by Heidegger published in the *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975ss.) we will use the sign GA followed by Arabic numerals to indicate the volume.

2 Especially with regard to autobiographical considerations contained in the letter to W. J. Richardson from the beginning of the month of April 1962 and published as the preface to the study by the latter entitled *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, *Phaenomenologica* 13 (La Haye: Nijhoff, 1963), pp. vii–xxiii, and in 'Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie' (1963) reproduced in M. Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), pp. 81–90; cf. also the preface to the first edition (1972) of the *Frühe Schriften*, reproduced in GA 1, pp. 55–7.

3 I am thinking here, in the first place, of that interpretation and reproduction of Aristotle's practical philosophy proposed by Hans-Georg Gadamer in the celebrated chapter on the contemporary interpretation of Aristotle's Ethics from *Wahrheit und Methode* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1960), of certain interpretations of Eugen Fink (*Metaphysik der Erziehung im Weltverständnis von Platon und Aristoteles* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1970), but also of numerous monographs such as: Walter Bröcker, *Aristoteles* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1935); Helen Weiß, *Kausalität und Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles* (Bale: Haus zum Falken, 1942); reprinted (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967); Wilhelm Szilasi, *Macht und Ohnmacht des Geistes* (Berne: Francke, 1946) (in particular the second part which contains the interpretations of the *Nichomachean Ethics* VI, *Metaphysics* IX and XII and *De anima* II); Karl Ulmer, *Wahrheit, Kunst und Natur bei Aristoteles. Ein Beitrag zur Aufklärung der metaphysischen Herkunft der modernen Technik* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953); Alfredo Guzzoni, *Die Einkeit des on pollachos legomenon bei Aristoteles* (Freiburg University, Ph.D. thesis, 1957); Ernst Tugendhat, *Ti kata tinos. Eine Untersuchung zu Struktur und Ursprung aristotelischer Grundbegriffe* (Freiburg-München: Alber, 1958); R. Boehm, *Das Grundlegende und das Wesentliche. Zu Aristoteles' Abhandlung 'über das Sein und das Seiende (Metaphysik Z)'* (La Haye: Nijhoff, 1965); Ernst Vollrath, *Studien zur Kategorienlehre des Aristoteles* (Ratingen: Henn, 1969), and *Die These der Metaphysik. Zur Gestalt der Metaphysik bei Aristoteles, Kant and Hegel* (Ratingen: Henn, 1969), pp. 15–92; Fridolin Wiplinger, *Physis und Logos. Zum Körperphänomen in seiner Bedeutung für den Ursprung der Metaphysik bei Aristoteles* (Freiburg-München: Alber, 1971); Ute Guzzoni, *Grund und Allgemeinheit. Untersuchung zum aristotelischen Verständnis der ontologischen Gründe* (Meisenheim: Hain, 1975); Karl-Heinz Volkmann-Schluck, *Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979); Ingeborg Schüßler, *Aristoteles*,

Philosophie und Wissenschaft. Das Problem der Verselbständigung der Wissenschaften (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982).

4 M. Heidegger, *Vom Wesen und Begriff der Physis, Aristoteles, Physik B, I*, reproduced in GA 9, pp. 239–301.

5 In 1976 in GA 21 (text established by Walter Biemel).

6 In 1975 in GA 24 (text established by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann).

7 In 1981 in GA 33 (text established by Heinrich Hüni).

8 In 1983 in GA 29–30 (text established by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann).

9 GA 18.

10 GA 19.

11 GA 22.

12 Appeared in 1985 in GA (text established by Walter Bröcker and Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns).

13 Cf. E. Husserl, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden*, *Phaenomenologica* 25 (La Haye: Nijhoff, 1968), pp. 25–7. In a letter addressed to Gadamer (from the year 1922) Heidegger sets out in detail the contents of this interpretation: 'First part (ap. 15 sheets) deals with *Nich. Eth. Z*, *Met. A*, 1–2, *Phys. A*. 8; the second (same length) *Met. ZHQ*, *De motu an.*, *De anima*. The third part appears later. Since the Jahrbuch will be published later I can offer you a separate copy.' The letter is quoted in G.-G. Gadamer, *Heideggers Wege* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1983), p. 118. (Gadamer lost the copy of the manuscript Heidegger had sent him during the bombing of Leipzig, but another copy of the manuscript has since been found and published in *Dilthey-Jahrbuch*, 6 (1989), pp. 228–69.

14 Notoriously, Heidegger clarifies the meaning of the 'phenomenological destruction' of the history of ontology in *Sein und Zeit* (GA 2), §6. Further valuable information is to be found in the lectures of Summer 1927, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, where one learns how Heidegger is able to get the idea of a destruction from an extension of the Husserlian method of reduction and how, as a result, he conceives the triple articulation of the phenomenological method of reduction, destruction and construction (cf. GA 24, §5).

15 Cf. Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens*, p. 81.

16 Cf. F. Brentano, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* (Freiburg: Herder, 1862; reprinted Hildesheim: Olms, 1960).

17 In addition to Brentano's dissertation, Heidegger also mentions the treatise by Carl Braig, *Vom Sein, Abriß der Ontologie* (Freiburg: Herder, 1896); for the analysis of the contents of this last work, in connection with the genesis of the problem of Being in the young Heidegger, I refer the reader to my monograph *Heidegger e Aristotele* (Padova: Daphne, 1984), pp. 52–64.

18 M. Heidegger, *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus* (1915), reprinted in GA 1, pp. 189–411.

19 In a later but nevertheless very interesting statement which is to be found in the lecture course of Summer 1931, Heidegger says:

Since medieval times, the first proposition of *Met. IX*, 1, had served as the basis for the conclusion that the fundamental meaning of being in general – even for the four meanings together, not just for one (the categorial meaning) and its multiplicity – was *ousia*, which it was customary to translate as 'substance'. In the 19th century this tendency became even more pronounced (especially with Brentano) because, in between, being-possible and being-real had been recognized as categories. This is the reason why it has become a received opinion that the Aristotelian doctrine of being was a 'doctrine of substance'. This is a mistake, issuing in part from an inadequate interpretation

of pollachos; more precisely, it was not understood that what was being opened up here was simply a question. (Even W. Jaeger's reconstruction of Aristotle was based upon this error.)

(GA 33, pp. 45-6)

20 GA 24, p. 31. In the same context of the Heideggerian development of the phenomenological method one finds illuminating indications in the ontological orientation which Heidegger provokes in the self-understanding of phenomenology. The latter is not a redirection of the natural attitude towards a philosophical disposition which opens up a perspective on the constitutive operations of subjectivity but it brings about a transition for any ontic consideration of being to its ontological consideration, that is, to a consideration which bears upon the modalities of being and, therefore, upon the being of beings. But listen to Heidegger:

Being must be grasped and thematized. . . . The apprehension of being, that is, phenomenological research, is directed necessarily and in the first instance at beings, but only in order to be definitively re-directed from beings and led back to their being. The fundamental element in the phenomenological method, in the sense of a leading back of the questioning from beings naively apprehended to being, we designate by the expression *phenomenological reduction*. Therewith we make use of a central term of Husserl's phenomenology, though only in a nominal and not in a real way. *For Husserl*, the phenomenological reduction, which he first worked out expressly in *Ideas*, is a method for reading back the phenomenological viewpoint from the natural attitude of humans living with each other in a world of things, to the life of transcendental consciousness and its noetic-noematic lived experiences in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. *For us*, the phenomenological reduction means the leading back of the phenomenological viewpoint from an apprehension of beings (however determined) to an understanding of their being.

(GA 24, pp. 28-9)

Here, as also in the objections advanced on the occasion of the drafting of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* article, the Heideggerian critique of Husserlian phenomenology seems not to be an immanent critique which moves back within the Husserlian position to its specific presuppositions. In my opinion, it assumes the form of a sort of ontological torsion which gets away from the Husserlian position right away and, so to speak, attacks it from the rear. And it has to be added that Heidegger introduces, with reference to Husserl, a decisive change not only in the attempt to understand the philosophical approach in an ontological and non-transcendental sense but also in the attempt to understand the motives which provoke the redirection of the natural attitude towards the philosophical. The redirection does not consist in a fictive operation which takes place in the head of the professional philosopher but lies rooted in a fundamental *Stimmung*, that is in an anxiety in which the conversion from inauthenticity to authenticity is prefigured and in which, consequently, there takes place that assumption of the existential disposition which is the philosophical disposition *par excellence*.

21 GA 20, pp. 13-182. The original subtitle of the lecture 'Prolegomena zu einer Phänomenologie von Geschichte und Natur' very clearly announces Heidegger's intention to keep close to Husserlian phenomenology, at least with respect to its terminology.

22 Cf. M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §44, and GA 21, p. 129.

23 These positions are presented in the 6th *Logical Investigation* (sect. II, chap. VI: 'Sinnlichkeit und Verstand') which is the Husserlian text to which Heidegger prefers to refer. With regard to the confrontation between Heidegger and Husserl, I refer the reader to what I have written in 'Heidegger in Marburg: Die Auseinandersetzung mit Husserl', *Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger*, 37 (1984), pp. 48–69, and in 'La trasformazione della fenomenologia da Husserl a Heidegger', *Teoria*, 4(i) (1984), pp. 125–62.

24 One can find this argumentative progression in the lecture from the Winter term 1925/6 (cf. GA 21, p. 1, Hauptstück). It can also be found in that of the Winter term 1929/30 (GA 29/30, §72–3), where the quest for the ontological foundation of the phenomenon of truth takes a significant turn. The emphasis is no longer on the uncovering attitude of *Dasein*, but rather on its being-free (*Freisein*), that is, no longer on the spontaneity and the productivity of *Dasein*, but on the ontological character (being-free) of the horizon constitutive of its condition. Finally, it can be found in the lectures from the Summer term 1930 (GA 31, §9), where, in interpreting *Metaphysics* IX, 10, Heidegger concentrates on the *on hos alethes*.

25 Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, 3, 11139 b 15–17.

26 Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* III, 3, 427 b 12; 428a 11, 428 b 18.

27 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, 10. Heidegger, at least twice, spends a considerable time on the interpretation of this critical chapter of the *Metaphysics*, in the lectures from 1925/6 (GA 21, pp. 170–82) and in that of 1930 (GA 31, pp. 73–109).

28 Heidegger insists upon this differentiation in the introduction to the lectures from the Winter term 1924/5, to wit: (1) *to pragma esti alethes*, (2) *he psyche aletheuei*, (3) *ho logos hos legein aletheuei*, (4) *ho logos hos legomenon esti alethes*. Obvious traces of this topology of the loci of truth are to be found in *Sein und Zeit*, §§7B and 44.

29 GA 21, p. 190.

30 GA 21, pp. 193–4.

31 As is well known, the Heideggerian critique of Husserl's understanding of consciousness makes itself known on the occasion of their unsuccessful collaboration on the drafting of the article on phenomenology for the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. The different drafts of this article and Heidegger's critical remarks have been published in *E. Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie, Vorlesung Sommersemester 1925*, ed. W. Biemel, Husserliana IX (La Haye: Nijhoff, 1962). Cf. in addition the article by W. Biemel, 'Husserl's Encyclopaedia-Britannica-Artikel und Heideggers Anmerkungen dazu', *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, 12 (1950), pp. 246–80. Today, it is also necessary to take into account the detailed articulation of the Heideggerian critique in the university lectures: cf. GA 20, §§4–13; 21, §§6–10; §§4–5. A confrontation with Husserl (more exactly with the article 'Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft') is also to be found in the first Marburg lectures (*Der Beginn der neuzeitlichen Philosophie*, 1923–4, GA 17).

32 Confirmation of this correspondence comes from the suggestive conjunction that by *Vorhandenheit* Heidegger translates (and, I would add, 'ontologizes') the Aristotelian idea of wonder (*thaumazein*), in which the desire for knowledge is rooted: '*dia gar thaumazein hoi anthropoi kai nun kai to proton erxanto philosophēin, ex arches men ta procheira ton atupon thaumasantes*' (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, 2, 982b 12–13).

33 Cf. M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §16 and also 69b.

34 Traces of this understanding and of this suggestion can be found first in

texts from this period published by Heidegger himself: from the *Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers' 'Psychologie der Weltanschauungen'* (1919/21; GA 9) to the book on *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1929; GA 3). For example, in the lecture 'Phänomenologie und Theologie' (1927) one finds the statement: 'Existieren [ist] Handeln, *praxis*' (GA 9, p. 58). But they are to be found explicitly elsewhere, especially in university lectures, notably in the introductory part of the lecture from the Summer term 1924/5 on the *Sophist* and in the concluding part of the latter from the Summer term 1926 on the 'Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie'. While waiting for these texts to be published, one can draw valuable hints from the book by H. Weiß, *Kausalität und Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles*; H. Weiß, who attended the lectures given by Heidegger, makes a fairly circumstantial summary of the Heideggerian interpretation of Aristotle's practical philosophy in chap. 3 of his book, by entitling it significantly: 'Menschliches Dasein – praxis' (pp. 99–153).

35 The practical structure of the reference of Dasein to its being has been well analysed by E. Tugendhat, *Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung. Sprachanalytische Interpretationen* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979), pp. 164–244.

36 The withdrawal of the emphasis placed upon the practical connotation of Dasein as having-to-be and the substitution for the former of a thematization of its ontological horizon as ek-sistence is to be found in numerous writings, for example, in the last part of *Was ist Metaphysik?* (1929), in *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (1930, 1943), especially in §4, in *Einleitung in die Metaphysik* (1935), in the *Brief über den Humanismus* (1946), in the *Einleitung* to the 5th edition (1949), of *Was ist Metaphysik?*, and besides in marginal notes from the 'Hütten-exemplar' of *Sein und Zeit*, published in the GA 2. In what concerns the emphasis accorded to Aristotle, I find it very significant that the conversion from one perspective to the other should be clearly announced in the reproduction of the interpretation of the phenomenon of truth with Aristotle, previously handled in the lectures of 1925/6 and in the lectures of 1929/30 in an interpretative direction that Heidegger himself declares to have been altered (cf. GA 29/30, §72–3).

37 Cf. GA 20, p. 380. Previously, in place of *Sorge* Heidegger had employed the term *Selbstbekümmern* (corresponding to the Greek *epimeleia*), a use which one finds, for example, in the review of Jaspers's *Psychologie der Weltanschauung* (cf. GA 9, pp. 1–44, in particular pp. 30–5), and in the lecture course of the Summer term 1920/1 *Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion*.

38 Cf. for example Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* VI, 2, 1139b 7–11, and III, 5.

39 *ibid.*, VI, 1141b 34.0.

40 In a revealing note from *Sein und Zeit*, §42, for example, Heidegger says that if he

came to accord a dominant role to that 'care' which governs the previous analytic of *Dasein*, it is in the context of his attempts to interpret the Augustinian anthropology – that is the Greco-Christian – with reference to the foundations established in the Aristotelian ontology.

The fact that Heidegger here talks only of the Aristotelian ontology and does not mention the practical philosophy should not deceive us for, according to him, the latter is also an ontology and, more specifically, an ontology of human life.

41 '*Ho de bios praxis, ou poiesis estin*' (Aristot. *Politics* I, 4, 125a 7).

42 Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* VI, 5, 1040a 26.

43 Cf. Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics* II, 3, 1220b 27 and 6, 1222b 19.

44 Cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §§39–45.

45 The fact that Heidegger translates the Augustinian term affection with *Befindlichkeit* brings an important counter-proof against this association. It is to be found in the lecture *Der Begriff der Zeit* (1924), where Heidegger quotes Augustin *Lecture XIII*, 27:

in te anime meus, tempora metior, noli mihi obstrepere quod est. Noli tibi obstrepere turba affectionum tuarum. In te, inquam, tempora metior. Affectionem, quam res praetereuntes in te faciunt, et, cum illae praeterient, manet, ipsam metior praesentem. Non eas, quae praeterierunt, ut fieret: ipsam metior cum tempora metior.

Heidegger paraphrases:

In Dir, mein Geist, messe ich die Zeiten. Dich messe ich, so ich die Zeit messe. Komme mir nicht mit der Frage in die Quere: Wie denn das? Verleite mich nicht dazu, von dir wegzusehen durch eine falsche Frage. Komme dir selbst nicht in den Weg durch die Verwirrung dessen, was dich selbst angehen mag. In dir, sage ich immer wieder, messe ich die Zeit; die vorübergehend begegnenden Dinge bringen dich in eine Befindlichkeit; die bleibt, während jene verschwinden. Die Befindlichkeit messe ich in dem gegenwärtigen Dasein, nicht die Dinge, welche vorübergehen, daß sei erst entstände. Mein Mich-befinden selbst, ich wiederhole es, messe ich, wenn ich die Zeit messe.

(M. Heidegger, *Der Begriff der Zeit*, ed. H. Tietjen (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1989), pp. 10–11.

46 Cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §29.

47 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, 2, 982b 22, quoted by Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §29.

48 Cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §31.

49 'Das existenziale Sein des eigenen Seinkönnens das Dasein selbst, so zwar, daß dieses Sein an ihm selbst das Woran des mit ihm selbst Seins erschließt' (Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §31).

50 *GA* 29, p. 393.

51 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, 2, 1139b 4–5. Cf. the treatment of *orexis* in Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, vol. I (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), pp. 66–8.

52 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §41.

53 Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, 2, 1139a 21–3. The correspondence between *Sorge* and *orexis* is all the more interesting in that Heidegger goes out of his way to find a determination corresponding to *Sorge* not only in Aristotle but also in Kant. He thinks he can find it in the *Gefühl der Achtung*, which is at the bottom of *personalitas moralis* (cf. *GA* 24, pp. 185–99). Heidegger emphasizes explicitly that the Kantian concept of *Gefühl der Achtung*, conceived on the analogy of such opposed determinations as *Neigung* (which arises in the course of the self-elevation of practical reason) and *Furcht* (which arises in the course of the submission of the law) would correspond to the Aristotelian concept of *orexis* with its two moments of *dioxis* and *phyge* (cf. *GA* 24, pp. 192–3).

54 Cf. H.-G. Gadamer, *Martin Heidegger und die Marburger Theologie* (1954), reproduced in the already cited collection by the same author, *Heideggers Wege*, pp. 29–40, in particular pp. 31–2. But cf. also the slightly different version of

the same episode in H.-G. Gadamer, 'Erinnerung an Heideggers Anfänge', *Itinerari*, 25 (1-2) (1986) (dedicated to Heidegger), pp. 5-16, esp. p. 10.

55 The importance of conscience for Heidegger can be measured by the fact that in 'Anmerkung zu Karl Jaspers' *Psychologie der Weltanschauung*' Heidegger has already made known the need to analyse this concept and its history in connection with the problematic of existence, and not simply as if it were a matter of a task of scholarship (cf. *GA* 9, p. 33).

56 Cf. for example, Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* I, 4, 1096a 26, 32 (where *kairos* is defined as *to agathon en chronoi*) or III, 1, 1110a 14 (where Aristotle says that the *telos tes praxeos* is *kata ton kairon*).

57 Cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §68.

58 '*Lethe tes men toiautes hexeos estin, phroneseos de ouk estin*' (Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* VI, 5, 1140b 29).

59 Cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §9.

60 Cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §§18, 26, 41, 69c.

61 Cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §§60, 62.

62 The end of this passage is also important: 'Derselbe Mensch taucht dann wieder bei Kant auf: der Mensch der reden, d.h. begründend handeln kann.' It is not necessary to note that it is a question of the same man that one finds in Heidegger.

63 Cf. *GA* 24, §19a.

64 Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* III, 10, 453b 5-8.

Meister Eckhart and the later Heidegger: the mystical element in Heidegger's thought

John D. Caputo

Part one

I Heidegger and medieval mysticism

In the 'Introduction' to his habilitation dissertation at Freiburg, *The Doctrine of Categories and of Meaning in Duns Scotus* (1916), the young Heidegger praised the 'objective' orientation of medieval philosophy: 'Scholastic psychology, precisely inasmuch as it is not focussed upon the dynamic and flowing reality of the psychical remains in its fundamental problems oriented towards the objective and noematic, a circumstance which greatly favors setting one's sight on the phenomenon of intentionality' (*DS*, 15).¹ While modern philosophy is characterized by a keen sense of subjective experience, the Scholastic thinker is concerned primarily with the object of knowledge, with 'being'. The Scholastic, he says, is typified by an 'absolute surrender' to the 'content' of knowledge (*DS*, 7). In a sentence which is prophetic in the light of what he would later call the 'subject matter of thinking' (*die Sache des Denkens*) Heidegger observes: 'The value of the subject matter [*Sache*] (object) dominates over the value of the self (subject)' (*DS*, 7). Because thinking 'tends into' (*intendere*) being, the medievals spoke of the 'intentional' character of knowledge. Thus the Scholastics' neglect of subjective experience at least kept them free of the 'unphilosophy of psychologism' (*DS*, 14). Heidegger found in the medievals an anticipation of the work of Husserl, who would come to Freiburg this same year (1916) and whose *Logical Investigations* he had been studying for some time (*ZSD*, 82). Both Husserl and the author of *De modis significandi*² reject the reduction of the laws of logic to the empirical constitution of the human mind; both

seek a 'pure' grammar which delineates unchanging relationships between the parts of speech and which holds true *a priori* of every possible empirical language (*DS*, 149–50). The simple but challenging task for thinking in the medieval world was to subordinate the 'individuality of the individual' (*DS*, 7) to the demands of the subject matter, to its unchanging structures and 'objective meanings'. That is why one can read through the great *Summae* of the thirteenth century without once catching a glimpse of the personalities of their authors.

But it would be a mistake, Heidegger contends, to think that behind the objectivity and formalism of the Scholastic there is nothing 'living'. On the contrary, 'the theoretical posture of the spirit is only one' of its possible attitudes and perhaps not even the most important (*DS*, 236). Hence the text we cited above continues:

In order to reach a decisive insight into this fundamental character of scholastic psychology, I consider a philosophical, or more exactly, a phenomenological examination of the mystical, moral theological and ascetical literature of medieval scholasticism to be especially urgent. In such a way alone will one push forward to what is living in the life of medieval scholasticism. . . .

(*DS*, 15)

Behind the impersonal disputations of the scholastics there is the life of the soul which seeks God in the practice of morality and asceticism. The speculative theology and philosophy of the Middle Ages is not opposed to its mystical tradition but rather expresses in a conceptual way what the mystic has experienced:

If one reflects on the deeper essence of philosophy in its character as a philosophy of world-views, then the conception of the Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages as a scholasticism which stands in opposition to the contemporaneous mysticism must be exposed as fundamentally wrong. In the medieval world-view, scholasticism and mysticism belong essentially together. The two pairs of 'opposites' rationalism–irrationalism and scholasticism–mysticism do not coincide. And where their equivalence is sought, it rests on an extreme rationalization of philosophy. Philosophy as a rationalist creation, detached from life, is powerless; mysticism as an irrationalist experience is purposeless.

(*DS*, 241)

Philosophy is the conceptualization of what the living historical man experiences. And for the young Heidegger, the experience of the mystic is the experience of medieval man intensified and 'writ large'.

The Heidegger who offers this sensitive interpretation of medieval thought is not only conversant with Husserl's 'transcendental phenomenology', but is equally concerned with the problem of history, and especially with the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, whose *Collected Writings* were a significant source of his reflections in 'the exciting years between 1911 and 1914',³ and of Heinrich Rickert, his mentor at Freiburg to whom the *Habilitationsschrift* is dedicated. With Dilthey and Rickert, the young Heidegger speaks of the necessity of understanding an historical epoch in terms of its 'goals': 'But where it is a matter of reaching a living understanding of an "age" and of the accomplishments of the spirit that were productive in it, then an interpretation of its meaning which is guided by an ultimate conception of its goals becomes necessary' (*DS*, 231). And this is what he says he hopes to find in a study of medieval mysticism. For philosophy cannot be content with the abstract, thinking subject: 'The epistemological subject does not signify the most important meaning of the spirit, let alone its whole content' (*DS*, 237–8). Philosophy must penetrate to the living, historical spirit. Thus philosophy must go beyond logic and the theory of knowledge to metaphysics itself. One can already see the author of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (*KPM*, 25–6): 'One cannot see logic and its problems in a true light unless the context in which they are interpreted is translogical. *Philosophy cannot for long dispense with its true optics, metaphysics*' (*DS*, 235). There is need for a 'metaphysical-teleological interpretation of consciousness' (*DS*, 235): metaphysical, because it goes beyond the logico-epistemological view of consciousness to the living historical spirit; teleological, because the living spirit is end-directed and meaning-seeking.⁴

No inquiry into medieval thought can prescind from 'the world of experience of medieval man' (*DS*, 235). 'The fundamental structure', Heidegger says, of the 'whole attitude of life of medieval man' is to be found in what he calls 'the transcendent and primordial relationship of the soul to God' (*in dem transzendenten Urverhältnis der Seele zu Gott*: *DS*, 1). In this relationship, neither the absoluteness of God nor the integrity of the soul is destroyed, but the soul – 'stretching out into the transcendent' – is given to share in God's absolute value. This contrasts sharply, he says, with our 'modern experience', whose richness and variety is measured by its absorption in the 'breadth of content' (*inhaltliche Breite*: *DS*, 240) of sensible reality. The medieval man subordinated the variety and multiplicity of the sensible world to a 'transcendent goal'.

The importance of these texts for the historian of Heidegger's development should not be underestimated. For the notion of the soul 'stretching out into the transcendent', of the primordial and transcendent relationship of the soul to God, foreshadows the relationship of *Dasein*⁵ to

Being. As the soul transcends beyond the multiplicity of sensible things in the world to God Himself, so Dasein transcends beings to Being itself.

Of all the medieval mystics, Heidegger draws special attention to Meister Eckhart,⁶ a thinker in whom the unity of 'mysticism' and 'philosophy' (*DS*, 241) is clearly exemplified. For not only was Eckhart one of the outstanding figures in the history of medieval mysticism, he was also one of the great Dominican 'masters' at Paris. Some forty years later, Heidegger would say: 'The most extreme sharpness and depth of thought belongs to genuine and great mysticism. . . . Meister Eckhart testifies to it' (*SG*, 71). The evidence of Heidegger's interest in Meister Eckhart at this time is indisputable. The 1915 inaugural lecture, 'The concept of time in the science of history', begins with a citation taken from Eckhart on the distinction between time and eternity.⁷ In 1919 Heidegger held a lecture course on *The Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism* in which the role that Eckhart played is testified to by the fact that a student in this course wrote a book on Eckhart, approaching him from a very Heideggerian point of view.⁸ And in the habilitation dissertation itself Heidegger promises us a work of his own on Meister Eckhart: 'I hope on another occasion', he says, 'to be able to show how Eckhartian mysticism first receives its philosophical interpretation and evaluation' in connection with 'the metaphysics of the problem of truth' (*DS*, 232, n. 1).

What does Heidegger mean by an interpretation of Eckhart in terms of the 'metaphysics of truth?' A metaphysical investigation, we have seen, means an historical-teleological analysis of the living spirit, which in the case of medieval philosophy centers on the notion of the transcendent relation of the soul to God. 'Truth' for the medieval philosopher means the 'true' (*verum*), which is the 'transcendental' relationship between thinking and being (*DS*, 80ff.). The 'true' is convertible with 'being' (*ens*) itself, and so 'transcends' the categories (of Aristotle); every being as such is true. In a text that Heidegger would later cite in *Being and Time* (*SZ*, sec. 4, p. 14), Aquinas calls the true a 'relational transcendental', i.e., one that arises from being considered in relationship to something, in this case to the intellect.⁹ According to the scholastic notion of the true, every being is accessible to thought and all thinking is directed to being. Thus if the significance of Eckhart is to be found in connection with the metaphysics of truth, then this must mean that the living relationship between the soul and God represented in Eckhart's mysticism constitutes a 'model' (*SD*, 54) in terms of which one can conceive the relationship between thinking and being. The relational transcendental (truth) is to be thought of in terms of the transcendent relation (of the soul to God).

Whether this is what Heidegger meant in 1916 we cannot be sure because the work on Meister Eckhart never appeared, nor have the

lectures of 1919 been published. It is in any case a suggestion which Heidegger himself pursued in his own later works. For there is no stronger analogy to the relation between Dasein and the coming to pass of the Truth of Being in Heidegger's later thought than that between the soul and God in Eckhart. The extensive parallels between Eckhart and the later Heidegger are not accidental. Moreover, if Heidegger's references to the writings of Eckhart are any indication, his interest in the Meister never subsided. In the works that have appeared since 1947 Heidegger cites Eckhart seven times to our knowledge. Twice (*K*, 39; *VA*, 175) he cites directly from the Middle High German text. On two other occasions (*WD*, 95–6; *G*, 36) he refers to pivotal elements in Eckhart's teachings. Twice (*SG*, 71; *FW*, 4) he comments upon the depth of this man whom he has called both a 'master of thinking' (*VA*, 175) and a 'master of life' (*FW* 4). On a seventh occasion (*FND*, 76) he refuses to call Eckhart a 'modern' and therefore – for Heidegger – a 'subjectivistic' thinker. Moreover, Heidegger's description of thinking as *Gelassenheit* (mhd. *gelâzenheit*) employs Eckhart's very vocabulary, as Heidegger himself points out (*G*, 36).

Heidegger has said that his beginnings in theology have determined his path of thought (*US*, 96). Hitherto it has been thought that Heidegger's theological interests culminated in his concern with Kierkegaard in *Being and Time* and in his discussions of 'hermeneutics' in the later work. But it seems to us that a decisive source of Heidegger's thought in Western theology has up to now been overlooked, viz., Meister Eckhart.¹⁰ The main burden of the present study, then, is first, to show the extensive parallels that exist between Eckhart and Heidegger and, secondly, to assess their philosophical significance. For after having shown that a relationship exists, one must still determine what to make of it. Are we to suppose, e.g., that 'thinking' (*Seinsdenken*), as Heidegger conceives it, and mysticism are the same?

One last remark before proceeding with this analogy. The relationship between Heidegger and Eckhart is a suggestive theme for the historian of German philosophy, for it brings together the earliest and the latest stages of German speculation. It suggests a fundamental continuity in German thought whose middle term is surely the great idealist systems of the nineteenth century. In Eckhart, the Idealists and Heidegger, one finds a similar structure: a transcendent reality (God, the Absolute, Being) comes to pass in man; and man is conceived not 'anthropologically' but ontologically as the locus of the realization of the transcendent (as the 'ground of the soul', 'spirit', 'Dasein'). This is a topic of such proportions that we cannot hope to do it justice in these pages. We must be content to offer suggestions about it where space permits. Moreover, we do not hold that the relation of Heidegger to Eckhart is mediated by the Idealists, but that it grows directly out of Heidegger's acquaintance

with Eckhart from his earliest studies in Scholasticism, and out of the aborted effort he made to discover 'what was living in the life of medieval scholasticism' (*DS*, 15; cf. *infra.*, n. 31).

The analogy between Heidegger and Eckhart can be conceived in terms which Heidegger has himself suggested. Speaking in 1960 to theologians at Marburg interested in his work, Heidegger recommended the following analogy: Being : thinking :: God : the thinking conducted within faith.¹¹ This structure, derived from the medieval doctrine of analogy (*DS*, 70ff.), is called the 'analogy of proportionality'. It signifies a similarity of relationships, a proportion of proportions. And it is an apt formula as well for relating Eckhart and Heidegger: as God is to the soul in Eckhart, so Being is to Dasein in Heidegger. This does not imply that Being is 'really' God, or that Heidegger has 'substituted' Being for God, for the relationship of the terms of this analogy is not direct but structural: each plays a similar role within similar structures.

Having established Heidegger's interest in Eckhart, our procedure now will be as follows: to work out the relation of the soul to God in Meister Eckhart (II); to compare the relation of Being and Dasein with Eckhart's mysticism (III); and finally, to examine the import of this comparison for our understanding of Heidegger (IV).

II Eckhart's speculative mysticism

Our analysis of Eckhart will begin with a discussion of the metaphysical account of God in his Latin writings. We will then examine the major themes of his mystical doctrine, the 'ground of the soul', the 'birth of the Son' and 'detachment', in his vernacular works. The metaphysics will provide a speculative foundation for the mysticism; the mysticism will offer the 'living' correlate to the metaphysics.

The metaphysics of God

In the 'Prologues' to the *Opus Tripartitum*, Eckhart sets out the 'first proposition' from which, if one is careful, nearly all that can be known of God can be deduced (*LW*, I, 165). The proposition is: being is God (*esse est deus*). He does not say, as did Aquinas, that God is being (*deus est suum esse*), but he adopts instead the more extreme expression that being is God. Aquinas, realist and Aristotelian, emphasized that creatures possessed their own proper and proportionate share in being, while God possessed the unlimited fullness of being itself. But the mystic Eckhart stresses instead the radical dependency of creatures upon God.¹² Of itself, he says, the creature is 'absolutely nothing' (*nihil penitus*), a 'pure nothing' (*ein reines Nichts*: *Q*, 170), not even a modicum. The creature does not have being 'in itself' at all, but only 'in God'. Created

things have being, Eckhart holds, the way air has light (LW, II, 274–5). The air does not ‘possess’ the light; it simply receives it for as long as the sun illumines it. The light is not ‘rooted’ in the air, but in its source, the sun. In the same way, the creature does not ‘possess’ being, has no ‘hold’ on it, but instead continuously receives being from its source, being itself. Being is God, that is to say, being belongs properly only to God, in whom alone it is originally ‘rooted’ (LW, II, 282).

If being is God then it follows that nothing of the perfection of being is lacking to Him. God is the purity and plenitude of being (*plenitudo esse, purum esse*: LW, III, 77). He precontains and includes (*praebeat et includat*: LW, I, 169) in a preeminent way the limited and multiple perfections which have been ‘lent’ (Q, 119–20) to creatures. Moreover, if being is God, then God is ‘one’. He possesses His being in a timeless simplicity which entirely excludes the successiveness and multiplicity, i.e., the ‘negativity’ of creatures. God is the ‘negation of negation’ (*negatio negationis*: LW, I, 175).¹³

The neoplatonic emphasis which Eckhart places on the ‘unity’ of the divine being is developed in the German works in terms of the distinction between the ‘Godhead’ (*Gottheit, divinitas*) and ‘God’ (*Gott, deus*). ‘God’ refers to the divine being insofar as it is related to creatures and consequently insofar as it is named on the basis of these relationships. Hence ‘God’ is called good as the cause of the goodness of creatures, wise because of the order He has established in the universe, etc. But the ‘Godhead’ is the divine being insofar as it remains concealed behind all the names which are attributed to Him. The Godhead is the ‘One’ which is purer than goodness and truth, which is even prior to the Son and the Holy Spirit. The ‘One’ refers to God: ‘There where He is in Himself, before He flows out into the Son and the Holy Spirit. . . . A master has said: the one is a negation of negation’ (Q, 252). The Godhead is the absolute unity of the divine being, the negation of all multiplicity, not only of the multiplicity of creatures but even of the multiplicity of Persons in the divine Trinity. The Godhead is the deeper ‘ground’ (*Grund*: Q, 264) from out of which even the Persons of the Trinity flow. But because this ground is ‘hidden’, it is just as much an ‘abyss’ (*Abgrund*: Q, 213).¹⁴

While Eckhart frequently vests his thought in the language of Aquinas, the direction his thought is taking is quite different. Indeed, he goes on to deny the central tenet of Thomas’s metaphysics, the primacy of *esse*. After accepting Aquinas’s arguments for the identity of being (*esse*) and understanding (*intelligere*) in God, he states in his *Parisian Questions* that he has reached a very unthomistic conclusion: ‘I am no longer of the opinion that He understands because He is, but that He is because He understands, so that God is intellect and the act of understanding, and the act of understanding is the ground of being itself’ (LW, V, 40).

There is something higher – or deeper – in God than ‘being’ and that is ‘understanding’. God is *not* being, formally speaking:

In God there is neither being (*ens*) nor the act-of-being (*esse*), because nothing is formally present in both the cause and that of which it is the cause, if the cause is a true cause. But God is the cause of all being. Therefore being is not formally present in God.

(*LW*, V, 45)

Eckhart attempts to reconcile this position with the one he adopted in the *Prologues* – that *esse est deus* – by arguing that being does not belong to God ‘formally’ but rather in a ‘higher’ sense. This is because God is ‘a true cause’, i.e., one which is of an essentially higher kind than its effect, in this case, creatures. Now creatures have ‘being’ properly speaking, for to be ‘created’ is to receive being. But God is the cause of the being of creatures. And since He is a ‘true’ or transcendent cause, He does not share ‘being’ with creatures in a ‘univocal’ sense (*LW*, V, 51). Thus God does not have being, properly speaking, but the ‘purity of being’ (*puritas essendi*: *LW*, V, 45).

But the purity of being is identified by Eckhart as understanding. For the understanding is *not* being, but that by which being is known. Ideas are not things but the means by which things are known. In order to know something, the soul, Eckhart says (following Aristotle), must be ‘pure’ of, ‘unmixed’ with, ‘separate’ from, that which it knows. If the eye were colored then it would see all things under that color. The understanding is separate from being and contains the form of every being in a pure way. God is the highest ‘separate substance’, the most removed of all from time and multiplicity, the absolute ‘purity of being.’ Hence God knows all beings and is not any particular being. His proper name is not being, therefore, but the purity of being, viz., understanding.

The ‘naked essence’ of God, the pure, simple, inner life of God, is the life of understanding, or, as Eckhart translates *intellectus* in his vernacular sermons, the life of ‘Reason’ (*Vernunft*):

If we take God in His being, then we take Him in His vestibule, for being is the vestibule in which He dwells. But where is He then in His temple, in which He shines forth as holy? *Reason* is the temple of God. God dwells nowhere more authentically than in His temple, in Reason. As that other master said, God is His Reason, which there lives in knowledge of Himself alone, abiding there only in Himself, where nothing ever troubles Him. For He is there alone in His stillness. In His knowledge of Himself, God knows Himself in Himself.

(*Q*, 197; cf. *Q*, ‘*Einleitung*’, 23)

By assigning such primacy to the understanding, Eckhart is defending the traditions of his order against the Franciscans who emphasized the divine will. Eckhart takes over the 'self-thinking thought' of Aristotle and contours it to the needs of his Christian metaphysics. As such, Eckhart's *Vernunft*, the life of God knowing Himself, provides a neglected link in the familiar connection between Aristotle and Hegel. When Hegel identifies the Absolute as the absolute 'Idea', he agrees with the Dominican-Aristotelian intellectualism of the Middle Ages, and with the German Eckhart in particular.

The activity of thought thinking itself is entirely self-contained, beginning and ending in the divine mind itself. Hence it is for Eckhart the supreme form of 'life'. With Aristotle, Eckhart held that a living thing is

that which is moved from itself as from an inner principle and in itself. But that which is not moved except by some external thing neither is nor is said to be living. From this it is evident that everything which has an efficient cause prior to and above itself, or a final cause outside of or other than itself, does not live in the proper sense. But such is the case with every creature. Only God as the ultimate end and first mover lives and is life.

(LW, III, 51)

God requires no efficient cause to set Him into activity, nor does He act for the sake of any end outside of Himself. He is the cause and principle of all things, but He requires no cause or principle for Himself. Hence Eckhart cites with approval Proposition VII of the *Liber XXIV Philosophorum*: 'God is the principle without principle, the process without variation, the end without end' (LW, III, 16, n. 1). The life of the self-thinking thought is self-sufficient, self-complete. The life of God, Eckhart says, is 'without why'. While it is the explanation (or 'why') of all other things, it itself stands in need of no explanation of its own being (LW, III, 41). Thus God created the world, not out of any lack in Himself which He hoped to fill up (a 'why'), but out of the welling up within Himself (*ebullitio*) of His own life which spills over into creatures. In an unusually rhapsodic passage for the Latin writings Eckhart says:¹⁵ 'Life means a certain overflow by which a thing, welling up within itself, first pours itself fully within itself, each part of itself in every other, before it pours itself out and wells over into something external' (LW, II, 22). While it would be an exaggeration to see in Eckhart the first process theory of God, it is true that he emphasized the living and active quality of the divine nature.¹⁶ He saw God as the process of life giving birth to life, a process which flows into the Trinity itself and then flows over into creatures.

The ground of the soul

The transition to Eckhart's mystical doctrine may be made by returning to the pivotal text, cited above, in which Eckhart spoke of the divine Reason. It continues: 'Now let us take it [knowledge] as it is in the soul, which possesses a trickle of Reason, a little spark, a twig' (*Q*, 197). Eckhart sets up a correlation between God and the soul. As God possesses a hidden ground which is Reason itself, so the soul possesses its own hidden ground, which is but a 'little spark' (*Fünklein*), a drop, a small share, of the divine Reason.¹⁷ In virtue of this divine spark, the soul alone among all creatures is able to penetrate to the hidden ground of the divine being. Because of its small share in the divine intellectuality, the soul is akin to God and able to unite with God: 'Intellect properly speaking belongs to God and "God is one"'. To the extent, therefore, that each thing possesses intellect or intellectual powers, to that extent it is one with God' (*LW*, IV, 269–70; e.t., 212). Because of their mutual intellectuality, there is an intimate and profound correspondence between the soul and God. As God's Reason is the hidden sanctuary of His Being, so the soul's spark of Reason is its inner temple (*Q*, 153). Here God and the soul unite: 'Here God's ground is my ground, and my ground is God's ground' (*Q*, 180).

When Eckhart speaks of the 'little spark' of Reason, it is important to realize that he is not referring to the faculty of discursive reasoning, the power which uses concepts and representations. In the vernacular sermon '*Impletum est*' he distinguishes three kinds of knowledge:

The one is sensible: the eye sees things, even at a distance, which are outside of itself. The second is rational and much higher. But with the third is meant a noble power of the soul, which is so high and noble that it grasps God in His own naked being. This power has nothing at all in common with anything else.

(*Q*, 210)

The first two powers are directed outwards to creatures, the first in terms of their sensible properties, the second in terms of their essential or intelligible properties. The second power, which Eckhart here calls 'rational', proceeds by means of concepts and representations (*Vorstellungen*: *Q*, 138; *Begriffe*, *Q*, 318; in Latin, *species*), which in the classical Aristotelian theory are signs of external things and are themselves symbolized by words. But of the third power, 'the ground of the soul', he says that it 'has nothing in common with anything'.¹⁸ It is not concerned with creatures, nor is it in any way like creatures; it is related solely to God, and to His 'naked Being' (the Godhead).

By means of its 'faculties' – sensation, will and (discursive) reason –

the soul is directed outwards to creatures. By the use of these faculties it performs 'outer works', not only of laboring and eating, say, but also of praying and fasting (*Q*, 76). The ground of the soul, the very 'being' (*Wesen*)¹⁹ of the soul, on the other hand, is prior to the emergence of the faculties and is the 'root' (*Wurzel*: *Q*, 318) of all outer works. Hence Eckhart says that one should be holy in one's being, not merely in one's work; if a man 'is' holy, his 'works' will be holy. We are not sanctified by our works, our works are sanctified by us. There is no 'activity', no commerce with creatures, in the ground of the soul because the ground of the soul is prior to the faculties by which one 'acts'. It was not in Aquinas but in the German Dominican tradition – in Albert the Great (d. 1280) and Dietrich of Vrieberg (d. 1310) – that Eckhart found the idea that the essence of the soul was a 'hidden recess of the mind' (*abditum mentis*).²⁰ In this innermost ground, the soul is still and silent (*Q*, 237–8) and ready for a union with God which is denied to the 'faculties', inasmuch as they are immersed in the daily business of life.

Stripped of all relationship to creatures, Eckhart invests the ground of the soul with all of those properties which he otherwise reserved for God. Like God, it is timeless, living in an eternal now, never 'growing old' (*Q*, 162). Similarly, it is 'one and simple' (*Q*, 164) because in it there is no distinction of faculties, no multiplicity of activities. Moreover, he says:

It is neither this nor that; despite this, it is something which is raised up above this and that like the heavens above the earth. Consequently, I name it now in a more noble way than I have ever named it. . . . It is free of all names and emptied of all forms, wholly simple and free as God in Himself is simple and free.

(*Q*, 163)

It has so little to do with anything created that it has no identifiable creaturely property. Like the Godhead itself, it is nameless.

There is thus a special correspondence, an exclusive reciprocity, between God and the soul. Only the ground of the soul is pure enough and simple enough to receive God; and only God is pure and simple enough to enter the ground of the soul (*Q*, 164, 252). 'God is nearer to the soul', he says with St. Augustine, 'than it is to itself.' And again: 'Where God is, there is the soul; where the soul is, there is God' (*Q*, 207). The soul is the place of God, as God is the place of the soul (*Q*, 213). The ground of the soul is a 'place' among creatures into which God may come, a place for God's advent into the world.

The birth of the son

The advent of God into the soul, the event that takes place in the soul, is described by Eckhart as the 'birth of the Son'. The place that the soul makes for God, he says, is God's 'birthplace' (*Q*, 415). Eckhart takes his point of departure for this doctrine from St. John and from this point on, whatever affinities Eckhart may have to Eastern mysticism,²¹ his position is distinctively Christian. He frequently cites the *First Letter* of St. John:²² 'Think of the love that the Father has lavished on us, by letting us be called God's children; and that is what we are' (I John 3: 1). For Eckhart John is to be taken at his word, and John says that we are not only 'called' God's children, but 'that is what we are'. This can only mean one thing: 'As little as a man can be wise without wisdom', he says, 'so little can he be a son without the filial being of the Son of God . . . ' (*Q*, 317). And even more strongly:

The Father bears His Son in eternity like to Himself. 'The Word was in God and the Word was God.' He was the same as God and of the same nature. Yet beyond this I say: He has begotten Him in my soul. . . . The Father bears His Son in the soul in the same way that He bears Him in eternity, not in any other way. He must do it, whether he wishes to or not. The Father bears His Son incessantly, and I say still more: He bears me as His Son, and as the same Son. (*Q*, 185)

The process by which the Father bears His Son in eternity is extended to the ground of the soul so that the Father bears His Son in the soul. Moreover, He bears the soul itself as that very Son. The Son is born in the place that the soul makes for Him and the soul is assimilated to that Son. The generation of the Son in eternity and the Incarnation of that Son as man is a universal event for Eckhart which is extended to the soul itself:²³ 'It would mean little to me that the "Word was made flesh" for man in Christ, granting that the latter is distinct from me, unless He also [was made flesh] in me personally, so that I too would become the Son of God' (*LW*, III, 101-2; cf. *Q*, 415).

Although Eckhart's formulations are in the strongest possible language, his position is essentially orthodox (Théry 199; 242-4; 266-8). For not only is there a doctrine of mystical union expressed in terms of divine sonship in the Johannine gospel,²⁴ but the notion that the Son is born in the soul has a long history in orthodox Christian theology before Eckhart.²⁵ In keeping with this tradition, Eckhart distinguishes between the Son by nature and the Son 'by grace' (*Q*, 119-20; 208). The Son by nature is the eternal Word Himself; the Son by grace is the ground of the soul which has been 'formed over' (*überbildet*: *Q*, 103) in the image

of the Son by reason of the residence which the Son takes up in the soul. Grace is the 'codwelling' of the soul and God together (*Q*, 398).

Eckhart elaborates the doctrine of the birth of the Son in two important ways: first, in terms of an 'image', and secondly, in terms of a 'word'. A father is one who generates his 'image' (*Bild*) or likeness. For an image, there are two requisites (*Q*, 224–6). First, there must be a likeness between the original model and the image. But while this is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient one: 'There can be no image without likeness, but there can indeed be a likeness without an image. Two eggs are equally white, yet one is not the image of the other' (*Q*, 224). The second requirement is stronger, viz., that the image be sustained in its very being as an image by the model: 'An image takes its being immediately and solely from that of which it is an image' (*Q*, 226). The image of a face in the mirror, e.g., is not only like the face of which it is the image, but it also derives its being from the face, in the sense that the image persists only so long as the face is present; if the face were removed, the image would vanish. Now the relation of a son to his father fulfills both these requirements. Yet even here a distinction is to be made. A human father brings about the being of his likeness, his son, but because of the disunity between a human father and son – they are distinct and separate substances – the human son may continue to live after the father has died, thus impairing the perfection of the second requirement. The divine Father on the other hand is essentially a process of giving birth, the divine Son essentially a process of being born. The being of each is their relationship to one another. And since it is the same eternal birth process which is extended to the ground of the soul, the soul too is made in the authentic and true image of the Father. The soul is formed in the image of the Father (*überildet*) by the Father Himself.

For the Father to bear His Son is also, according to Eckhart, for Him to speak the eternal Word. According to medieval theology, the essence of the Second Person is to be the 'thought' in which the Father knows Himself. The 'Son' is the 'concept' or that which is 'conceived' by the Father. The Second Person is thus the 'Word' in the sense of a '*verbum cordis*', a silent inner word (or 'concept') of which the vocal word (*verbum vocis*) is the outer sign.²⁶ If the Father bears His Son in the soul precisely as He does in eternity, then He also 'speaks' His Word in the soul just as in eternity (*Q*, 236–8; 287). The Word has nothing to do with a spoken sound. Indeed it is even opposed to such. The Word which God speaks in the soul is 'hidden' and easily ignored. To hear what is spoken in silence, one must be silent oneself: 'All voices and sounds must be put away and a pure stillness must be there, a still silence' (*Q*, 237). And: 'In stillness and peace . . . there God speaks in the soul and expresses Himself fully in the soul' (*Q*, 238). The truest

word, the most perfect language, is silent. In the best tradition of negative theology, Eckhart denies the ability of human language to express the divine nature: 'What one says about God is not true; but what one does *not* express is true' (*Q*, 242-3). But not only 'voices and sounds' disrupt the silence that Eckhart has in mind, but all concepts, images and representations: 'The best and most noble thing of all which one can attain in this life is to remain silent and let God work and speak. Where all the powers have removed all their works and images, there is this Word spoken' (*Q*, 419-20). Nothing created is able to express the divine being. Not only spoken or written words, but even inner concepts are incapable of comprehending the simplicity and plenitude of God (*Q*, 242-3). The only 'concept' which adequately expresses the likeness of the Father is the uncreated 'Word' itself, which the Father speaks. All human language, interior and exterior, must be silenced in order to let the Father speak.

Detachment

While the birth of the Son in the soul is the work of God, it cannot be accomplished without the soul's assistance. So necessary is the soul's participation in this process, so intimately does it share in the Father's work, that Eckhart does not hesitate to say that the soul 'cobears' (*mitgebiert*: *Q*, 161) the Son, that it 'collaborates' (*mitwirkt*: *Q*, 94-5) with God. There is only one work, which the Father initiates and with which the soul cooperates.

The soul cooperates with God's action by the practice of 'detachment' (*Abgeschiedenheit*). Eckhart uses the word '*Abgeschieden*' to translate the Latin '*separatus*' (*DW*, V, 438-9, n. 1). The '*substantiae separatae*' (*die abgeschiedene Geiste*) are the substances which are 'separate' from matter and its conditions (angelic natures). Eckhart also uses '*Abgeschieden*' as a translation of '*abstractus*', that which is 'removed from' or 'drawn away from' matter and its conditions. The 'separate substances' are pure of matter and so purely intellectual beings. For insofar as a substance is removed from (*separatus*, *abstractus*) material qualities, it is able to acquire knowledge of these qualities. But God is removed not only from matter but from every form of particularity, and so God comprehends all being. God is *not* being, formally speaking, but intellect. God is the absolutely abstract or separate substance.

Because this is so with God, Eckhart puts the same demand upon the soul which would unite with God:

This immutable detachment brings man into the greatest likeness with God. For God is God because of His immutable detachment, and from detachment He has His purity and simplicity and unchangeability. Consequently, if a man should become like to God, insofar as a

creature can have likeness with God, then this must come about through detachment. . . . And you should know this: to be empty of all creatures is to be full of God; and to be full of all creatures is to be empty of God.

(DW, V, 541–2)

The soul must detach itself from all creatures, and so purify and simplify its being, just as God is pure and simple. But what does it mean for the soul to become 'detached'? Eckhart means neither that one should become physically separated from things by entering a monastery (Q, 59), nor that one should long for death and 'separation from the body', as the *Phaedo* counsels. Detachment is a matter of the 'heart' (DW, V, 539). The detached heart considers creatures to be 'nothing' (of themselves). It does not seek created goods, but desires only God Himself. Detachment means 'to be receptive of nothing other than God' (DW, V, 540), to desire nothing other than God, to serve no one but God. The detached heart has 'nothing to do with anything', with 'this or that', i.e., with any creature. Having thus purified its heart of any affection for created things, the soul takes on the 'separateness', the 'no-thingness', of God Himself and so becomes a receptacle fit for God alone: 'Only He [God] is so simple and subtle that He can be contained by the detached heart. Hence detachment is receptive of nothing other than God' (DW, V, 540). The unity of Eckhart's metaphysical and mystical thought of which the youthful Heidegger spoke (DS, 241) is nowhere more apparent. The *substantia separata* of the scholastic metaphysician becomes the 'detached heart' (*abgeschiedene Herz*) of the German mystic. The 'living' or 'existential' correlate of the metaphysics of *intelligere* is the mystical life of detachment.

Eckhart also discusses the way in which the soul readies itself for the birth of the Son in terms of what he calls '*Gelassenheit*', a notion which we take to be identical with 'detachment'. The root of the word, *lassen*, means to let go, to relinquish, to abandon. The soul in *Gelassenheit* abandons or relinquishes whatever would impede God's advent into the soul. But *lassen* also means to 'permit' or 'let'. Thus the soul which has abandoned the obstacles to the birth of the Son simultaneously lets or permits God to bear His Son in the ground of the soul. The first moment is negative – to be empty of creatures – the second is positive – to be full of God.

The principle of perversity in the soul and the greatest obstacle to its union with God is 'self-love' (*Eigenliebe*) or 'self-will' (*Eigenwille*):

People say: Ah, Lord, I would very much prefer that I stood as well with God and that I had as much devotion and peace in God as other

people have. And I would also prefer that things would go along for me in the same way [as with others] or that I too might be as poor.
(Q, 55)

Eckhart's diagnosis of such complaints is this: 'In truth, it is your "I" which is protruding. It is self-will and nothing else' (Q, 55); and his remedy: 'Consequently, begin first with yourself and abandon yourself [*lass dich*]!' (Q, 55). It is not so much what a man does that matters, but what he is. He should do nothing because it is his own will, even if as an outer work it is praiseworthy (giving alms, say), but only because it is God's will, even if it is less praiseworthy (earning money, e.g.).²⁷ If a man abandons everything but not himself, then he has abandoned nothing. But if he abandons himself, then he has abandoned all (Q, 36, 185). The 'resigned' (*gelassen*)²⁸ soul does not pray that God's will conform to its own – that it be given something it desires – for that is still self-will. Nor does the resigned soul even will that it itself should conform to the will of God. Rather it has no will at all of its own; it is entirely divested of willing (Q, 304).

Such a soul is completely at God's disposal; it is empty of creatures in order to be full of God: 'Where the creature ends, there God begins to be. Now God desires nothing more of you than that you go out of yourself according to your creaturely mode of being and let God be God in you' (Q, 180). The fully resigned soul is a pure and empty vessel into which God can be received. Like a good vessel, it is closed on the bottom – to creatures – and open on the top – to God (Q, 228). Like the power of seeing in Aristotle's *De anima* which is pure of all color, the soul is pure of everything created, and so it can receive God purely, precisely as He is in His 'unconcealed' (*unverhüllt*: Q, 147) being, and not inasmuch as He is the 'object' of human desire.

If the soul is fully divested of its own will and given over to God's, then Eckhart says it lives 'without why'. We have seen above that Eckhart uses this same expression – 'without why' – to describe God's being. A living thing is that which moves from within. This is preeminently true of God, who is the beginning of all things without Himself having a beginning (*principium sine principio*). God lives without why. The soul too in *Gelassenheit* takes on this same quality of life without why. Some men love God, Eckhart says rather pointedly, the way they love a cow – for its milk (Q, 227). But the soul in *Gelassenheit* is disinterested in itself. If a man loves God for the good that God can give him, then he does not love God but himself. 'Love has no why' (Q, 299). If a soul works for the sake of its own self-aggrandizement, of procuring external goods, then its works are not living but dead (Q, 268), for they are moved from without (Théry, 236–7). The soul must love God for no other reason (why) than God Himself. Then it will be like life itself: 'If one asks life

for a thousand years, "why do you live?" if it were able to answer it would say nothing other than "I live in order to live" ' (Q, 180). God – like life – needs nothing external to Himself in order to be justified. The soul which lives with such perfect abandonment, such uncalculating love, enjoys a freedom and spontaneity like to God's own. It works for the sake of working. One must drive the money changers from the temple of the soul, Eckhart says (Q, 154); the money changers are those who love God only for profit. They are spiritual mercenaries who serve God for wages. They have not learned that they are now sons, not servants (John 15: 14; Q, 186), God's friends, not His hirelings (Q, 154–5), free men, not slaves.

Eckhart often says that God 'needs' the truly detached soul in order to bear His Son there: 'It is God's nature that He give, and His being depends on the fact that He give to us, if we are submissive to Him. If we are not and we receive nothing, then we do Him violence and kill Him' (Q, 172). God appears to be under the same necessity of nature to bear His Son in the soul as He is in eternity:

The Father bears His Son in the eternal knowledge, and He bears Him as fully in the soul as He does in His own nature. And He bears Him in the soul as His own, and His being depends on the fact that He bear His Son in the soul, whether He wishes to or not.

(Q, 172)

The soul apparently provides a necessary complement, an indispensable medium, in which the divine life is completed and fulfilled.

But this is not really Eckhart's view. It is quite clear that the divine life is a self-contained and self-sufficient process. Even the process by which God creates is a 'welling over' and an overflow (*antequam effundat et ebulliat extra*: LW, II, 172), not an attempt to fill up a lack. Moreover the birth of God is the result of grace (*gratia*), which is a free giving, and not of the necessity of nature. Finally, even in the vernacular sermons, where Eckhart states his position in the most extreme manner, he eventually qualifies his assertions. Hence the passage in which he spoke of 'killing God' continues: 'If we are not able to do this in Him Himself, still we may do it in ourselves and as far as it concerns us' (Q, 172). The death of God in question turns out to be a death in and for the soul, not in God's own being. We are able to stop the flow of God's life into our souls. No Dominican master at Paris, and certainly not the author of the 'Prologues', would hold that anything of the perfection of *esse* could ever be lacking to God.

But what the German preacher did mean by this bold language is to be found in his defense (Théry, 241–2) of such texts as we have cited (Q, 172, 185). In the first place, he says, this is an 'emphatic expression,

commending God's goodness and love'. This is the assertion of a preacher who means to inspire the soul to the 'highest virtue' of detachment. Because Eckhart demanded a perfect abandonment – without why – to God, he found it necessary to assure his listeners of the goodness of God and of the fact that it belongs to the necessity of the divine nature to return love with love. Secondly, he wished to insist that it is the same Son which the Father bears in eternity and which the detached soul receives by grace. It is the same necessary process of filiation which occurs in eternity which is extended – by grace – to the soul which has prepared itself for it. The soul comes to be by grace the self-same thing which God is by the necessity of His nature.

Whatever Eckhart's own intentions may have been, his expressions have fathered a long tradition of the divine 'need' of man in the German tradition. Among the mystics, God's need of man is found in Jacob Boehme and in the mystical poet 'Angelus Silesius' (Johann Scheffler: 1634–77), in whose *The Cherubic Wanderer* it receives its classic expression:²⁹

God Does Not Live Without Me

I know that God cannot live an instant without me;
Were I to become nothing. He must give up the ghost.

One Sustains the Other

God is as much set in me as I am in Him;
I assist His essence and He preserves mine.

In the philosophical tradition, God's need of man certainly recalls the nineteenth-century Idealists. Where Eckhart says that the 'highest striving of God' (*Gottes höchstes Streben*: Q, 208) is to bear the Son in the soul, Fichte's absolute Ego will also be a process of striving (*Streben*), not for the birth of the Son in man, but for the achievement of moral order in and through him.³⁰ And perhaps the most important representative of all is Hegel himself, for whom the Absolute is estranged from itself until it attains self knowledge in and through speculative thought.³¹

Part two

III Heidegger and Eckhart

Space does not permit us to pursue Eckhart's thought in any greater detail. We must instead turn to Heidegger and develop the striking parallel of the latter's thought to that of the mystic of Hochheim.

Dasein and the ground of the soul

Both Eckhart and Heidegger reject any merely 'anthropological' account of the essence of man. Neither is content to say that man is one being among others, differentiated by his 'rational faculty'. Man must be understood instead in relationship to something which transcends beings altogether. The essential 'greatness' of man is nothing human or anthropological, but rests in his being the privileged 'place' (*Stätte*: *Q*, 213; *Ortschaft*: *HB*, 77) in which the 'transcendent' comes to pass.³² Hence neither Eckhart nor Heidegger speak of 'man', but of the 'ground of the soul' or the 'Dasein' in man. And as the ground of the soul is the sanctuary or temple of God, so for Heidegger Dasein is the place which is needed by and used for the Truth of Being. Heidegger as much as draws this analogy of his thought to Eckhart for us himself. Referring to a text from the *Talks of Instruction* (*Q*, 57) in which Eckhart distinguishes those who are great in their 'being' from those whose 'outer works' alone are great, Heidegger comments: 'Let us consider that the great being [*Wesen*] of man is that it belongs to the essence [*Wesen*] of Being and is used by the latter to preserve [*wahren*] the essence of Being in its Truth [*Wahrheit*]' (*K*, 39).

Let us take a closer look at this comparison. Dasein is not a term for anything psychological; it is not a 'faculty' of the 'mind', nor is it 'consciousness'. It is the process by which a 'world', and the things that are in the world, become manifest. Dasein is the ecstatic relationship of openness to Being in which and through which Being reveals itself. Dasein comes to pass 'in' man, but it is not equatable with man. For man is a being, and Dasein is the process by which beings come to be manifest.

But Eckhart makes a comparable claim about the ground of the soul. For the highest power of the soul is so noble, he says, as to be nameless. 'This power has nothing in common with anything else' (*Q*, 210). It is neither 'this nor that'. It is not a faculty of the soul, but prior to all faculties. It is not identifiable with anything at all, anthropological or otherwise. It is not a being, just the way Dasein is not an existent entity (*ein Seiendes*), but a place within entities wherein God reveals Himself

in His 'naked Being'. The ground of the soul is not man's 'specific difference'. That is why we have underlined the importance of Heidegger's characterization of the enlivening attitude of medieval mysticism as 'the transcendent and primordial relationship of the soul to God' (*DS*, 1). For Heidegger has taken over this same *structure* in his own mature philosophical writings: the structure of a relationship to the transcendent which comes about in man, but is not identifiable with anything 'human'.

By its 'faculties', Eckhart held, the soul performed outer works and concerned itself with created things, thus running the risk of entirely forgetting the 'hidden ground' which is deeper than all faculties. Heidegger too warns of the danger of becoming so preoccupied with the business of everydayness as to forget the question of the meaning of Being. In the later Heidegger, 'fallen' Dasein is so devoted to the challenge of mastering and manipulating things that it is unmindful of the deeper Truth of Being which technology conceals. Both Eckhart and Heidegger describe a comparable 'fallenness' into everyday existence, and both interpret it as a forgetfulness of a silent, hidden ground in which the everyday is transcended.

Moreover, neither Eckhart nor Heidegger claim that there is anything contemptible about the 'outer' man, but only that it is something 'derivative', resting on deeper grounds. For Eckhart, the ground of the soul is not the opposite of its faculties, but the root out of which they flow. Eckhart does not repudiate the Aristotelian definition of man as the rational animal; he simply denies that the entire essence of man is thereby circumscribed. By the same token Heidegger holds that it is in virtue of its relationship to Being that all of Dasein's relationships with beings are made possible (*WG*, 13; *WW*, 20). The way in which Dasein comprehends Being filters down into the way in which beings are understood (*SZ*, §3). Like Eckhart, Heidegger is prepared to admit that the definition of man as the 'rational animal' is not 'false' (*HB*, 74-5) as far as representational thinking is concerned. His complaint is only that there is a realm beyond representational thinking, which alone can provide the most adequate interpretation of the Being of man (*HB*, 67-8).

Finally, Dasein and the ground of the soul are each related to the transcendent in terms of 'identity'. Both God and the soul, Being and Dasein, 'belong together' and find in each other their 'proper element'. Eckhart repeatedly says that the soul and God are 'one' in the sense that each alone is simple and pure enough as to be able to unite with the other. There is in Heidegger a comparable insistence on the togetherness of Being and Dasein. Being and Dasein are not two beings which are related to one another, but two poles of a pure relationship. All one may really speak of is the process by which Truth comes to pass: Being emerging out of concealment into un-concealment in its 'there' (*HB*, 69) and Dasein letting Being be in its Truth. This is, according to Heidegger,

the hidden truth of the *Satz der Identität*, of the 'leap' (*Satz*) out of representational thinking into the 'belonging together' (*Identität*) of Being and man (*ID*, 20–5). This reciprocity of Being and Dasein is clearly reminiscent of the intimate relationship of the soul and God in Meister Eckhart.

Birth and event

According to Meister Eckhart, the ground of the soul provides the place in which the event of the 'birth of the Son' occurs. According to Heidegger, Dasein provides a 'clearing' in which the 'Event of Appropriation' (*Ereignis*),³³ the Event of Truth, comes to pass.

In order to explain what he means by this Event, Heidegger employs a structure very much like that used by Eckhart in his account of the birth of the Son, viz., a 'relation'. For Eckhart, the being of the Father is to bear and that of the Son is to be born, and this unique situation, found only in the Trinity, in which a relation is not an accidental feature superadded to a substance but the very substance of the beings themselves, is called by the medievals a 'subsistent relationship'. And since the birth of the Son is an extension of the inner life of the Trinity to the soul, Eckhart adopted this same vocabulary in speaking of the relation of the soul and God. The relation of Being and Dasein is of the same sort, because for Heidegger Being 'is' (*west*) the very process of coming to pass in Dasein, and Dasein 'is' the very process of letting Being reveal itself. The 'Being' (*Wesen*) of each is their relationship to one another. Hence Heidegger might well have spoken of something like a 'subsistent relationship' between Being and Dasein. In fact one does find a comparable expression in his works. In his lecture on 'The thing' he speaks of 'mortals' (*Dasein*) as '*das wesende Verhältnis zum Sein als Sein*' (VA, 177). *Wesen* of course is taken verbally and so the phrase means: 'the relation to Being [*Sein*] whose being [*Wesen*] is to be [*wesen* taken as an infinitive] a relation.' Or using Adamczewski's translation of *Wesen* as 'way to be',³⁴ the phrase means: 'the relationship to Being whose way to be is to be related.' However it is translated, Heidegger means that the very Being of Dasein is its relationship to Being. Now the Event of Appropriation is the event of the 'mutual relation' of Being and Dasein, in which both Being and Dasein come into their 'own', that is, in which Being is provided with a place of disclosure and by which Dasein is opened to the truth of Being.

Moreover, the 'relation' of Dasein to Being even fulfills Eckhart's requirements for the relation of an 'image' to its original exemplar. We recall that it was not sufficient for the Son to be 'like' the Father in order to be His 'image' but it was also necessary that He be sustained in His very being as an image by the Father. Now Heidegger's account

of the relationship of Being and Dasein conforms remarkably to what Eckhart demands of a 'true image' and relation:

But how is Being related to ek-sistence, provided that we may so rashly ask this question at all? Being itself is the relationship [*Verhältnis*] insofar as it [=Being] holds [*halt*] ek-sistence [*Ek-sistenz*] in its existential, i.e., ex-static essence [*Wesen*] in itself and gathers it [=*Eksistenz*] to itself as the dwelling place of the truth of Being in the midst of beings.

(HB, 77)

Heidegger here (and elsewhere: WD, 1-2) plays on the root *halten* in the word *Verhältnis*. Dasein is 'held' in its relationship to Being by Being itself. And in a sentence which could very well have been written by Meister Eckhart, Heidegger says, 'A relationship to something would be a true relationship if it [=x] is held in its [x's] own essence by that [=y] to which it is related' (G, 50). This meets Eckhart's requirement for a 'true image' exactly. The relationship of Dasein to Being is not the 'doing' of Dasein but of Being. Being itself brings Dasein into relationship with itself, and sustains that relation. What Heidegger means by this may be seen by contrasting this position, found in the later works, with the one that he holds in *Being and Time*. The author of *Being and Time* spoke of the necessity for Dasein to raise the question of Being anew, radically to interrogate Being. Even as late as 1935 Heidegger spoke of questioning Being as a matter of 'resolving', of 'willing to know' (EM, 16). But it seems to have been one of the decisive realizations of the later Heidegger that Being does not submit to human interrogation, that Being is not the 'answer' to a 'question' (SD, 20-1), but that it is rather a 'gift', a 'favor' (*Gunst*: WM, 49) which is bestowed upon man. If Being is grasped at all, it is because Being reveals itself on its own initiative to Dasein, although of course man must be open to this revelation. But man himself cannot bring about this revelation of Being. This is exactly as with Eckhart. It is the Father Who bears His Son in the soul, although the soul's cooperation is indispensable.

Eckhart also formulated the doctrine of the divine birth in terms of the 'eternal Word': for the Father to bear the Son in the soul is to speak His Word (*conceptum*, *verbum*) in the soul. For Heidegger too, the Event of Truth can be expressed in terms of a primordial language. In the Event of Language, Being comes to pass in the word and man is brought into his proper essence by means of this authentic discourse (US, 30, 258-9). Like Eckhart, Heidegger holds that this language is something over and beyond human talk, that it is a more original language which is nothing human at all. It is instead, according to Heidegger, the primal address of Being itself. It is not man who speaks, he

says, but Language itself (*die Sprache spricht: US*, 12). This seems to mean that the impulse to speak can on certain occasions originate in Being itself, so that, in this sense, Being speaks 'through' man. Like Eckhart, too, Heidegger characterizes this primal language in terms of silence. Because the original speaking of Language itself is quiet (*US*, 30, 262–3), it is only heard in silence and listening (*US*, 252–4). The most authentic talk is reticence and reluctance to speak. Moreover, this 'silence' to which both Eckhart and Heidegger refer is not only external but also involves the cessation of all images and concepts. In sum, as for Eckhart the most authentic speaking consists in letting the Father speak His Word in the soul, so for Heidegger the most authentic discourse consists in letting Being come to words in language.

One cannot overlook, however, the criticism which Heidegger voices of the 'theological' interpretation of language (*US*, 14–15), in which Eckhart's views seem to be included. For even though theology attributes a divine origin to language, Heidegger says, basing this view upon the opening sentence of St. John's Prologue (exactly as Eckhart does), it nonetheless remains within the traditional metaphysical understanding of language. Theology still adheres to the traditional distinction between the 'inner concept' and the 'outer word', taking the latter to be the externalization of the former. With the tradition, theology holds that the inner concept is the 'truer' language, but it insists that the truest concept of all is nothing created, but the uncreated Word itself. For Heidegger on the other hand this whole framework is faulty, for words are not to be understood as signs of concepts, and concepts as signs of things (*US*, 243ff.). Rather the 'thing' comes to be, i.e., to 'appear', in the first place, only through language (*US*, 232–3, 193–4). Language lets things be; it is the 'condition' (*Be-ding-ung*) of things. What Heidegger calls for is a language tempered by silence, free of 'conceptual' or 'representational' thinking, and which overcomes the distortions of all metaphysical language. Hence while Eckhart praises mystical silence, Heidegger calls for a renewal of language, a renewal which he thinks is to be found in the poets. While in Eckhart we meet a classic representative of the *theologia negativa*, in Heidegger we find a thinking which is to be conducted in proximity to the poets, but which nevertheless retains in a 'secular' way something of the flavor of negative theology.³⁵

Gelassenheit

While the birth of the Son in the soul is the work of God, there is a sense in which it is the soul's work also, inasmuch as it cannot be accomplished without the soul's cooperation, without its 'detachment' and 'resignation'. The self-disclosure of Being in Dasein is the 'work' of Being, but it cannot be accomplished without Dasein's cooperation. Speaking of the 'thing' in which the fourfold intersects, Heidegger says,

'When and how do things come about as things? They do not come about *through* the machinations of men. But they also do not come about *without* the watchfulness of the mortals' (VA, 180). Just as for Eckhart the soul must utter its *fiat*, so Heidegger's Dasein must open itself to the workings of the Event. The proximity of Heidegger to Eckhart in this matter is so great that Heidegger can find no better word to describe the posture of Dasein than Eckhart's own: *Gelassenheit* ('releasement').³⁶

To be sure, Heidegger immediately points out the difference between his use of the word and Eckhart's: 'But what we call releasement obviously does not mean casting off sinful self-seeking and getting rid of self-will in favor of the divine will' (G, 36). For Eckhart the soul which had not attained resignation was full of 'self-love' (*Eigenliebe*) and 'self-will' (*Eigenwille*). Heidegger is not interested in the problem of 'self-love', but of what he calls 'subject-ness' (*Subjectität*: HW, 236). Heidegger singles out a perversion which, while distinct from that described by Eckhart, is clearly analogous to it. The perversion is not 'sinful self-seeking' but setting up the thinking subject as the highest principle of Being and subordinating everything to the dictates and demands of the thinking subject. On this point at least, Heidegger has no quarrel with the common understanding of the history of modern philosophy: it begins with the discovery of the *ego cogito* by Descartes and it is consummated by the absolutizing of the ego in Hegel.³⁷ This is a perversion which entirely inverts the essence of man (N II, 366); for it refuses to acknowledge the priority of Being and sets up the priority of a being, man, in its stead (a failing quite analogous to the spiritual error of 'pride', in which man – the creature – sets himself before God – the Creator).

With Descartes the being is reduced to an 'object' presented to a subject. Leibniz leads this to its ultimate consequence by formulating the 'principle of rendering a sufficient reason'. With this principle human reason lays down the rules by which Being must abide: no being can be unless a sufficient reason is rendered to the thinking subject (SG, 31–75). There is no question of 'sin' here, but there is the same ring of perverted self-importance. Rational thinking is 'attached' to its own concepts (*Vorstellungen*) and rules (*Grundsätze*) to which it expects Being to conform. The history of metaphysics is the history of reason's prescriptions about what Being must be – idea, substance, spirit, matter, will, etc. (ID, 64). But for Heidegger, Being is 'the Overwhelming' (*das Überwältigende*: EM, 115) and man is but a 'mortal' cast forth by the 'throw' of Being (HB, 71, 75, 84).

If the Dasein of *Being and Time* was characterized by self-sufficiency and self-possession (*Eigentlichkeit*), the Dasein of the later works is described in almost opposite categories.³⁸ Man is not the 'lord' of the earth, of 'beings', but the 'shepherd' of Being. The virtues of the shepherd are his watchfulness, his patient waiting, and of course his

poverty and humility (*WM*, 49; *HB*, 90). The 'poverty' of Dasein is that it has no power of disposal over Being, that it depends upon Being's 'favor', if truth is ever to come to pass. It has 'divested' itself of its rational presuppositions about what Being must be. But like Eckhart, indeed like the Sermon on the Mount itself, Heidegger ascribes the greatest 'worth' (*Würde*: *HB*, 90) to the 'poor' in spirit, because it is through Dasein's poverty that the truth of Being itself is preserved. The fault of the metaphysics of 'subjectness' is, therefore, not that it assigns too much to man, but that it assigns him too little. For it does not see man as the place of the preservation of the Truth of Being (*HB*, 66). The true worth of Dasein is that, by releasing itself from its rational presuppositions, it 'admits' (*einlasst*) itself into the Open in which Being reveals itself (*WW*, 14–15).

Like Eckhart, Heidegger distinguishes two 'moments' of releasement, a negative and a positive. Where Eckhart said that the soul must be 'empty of creatures', Heidegger speaks of the necessity of 'being loosened' (*Losgelassenheit*: *G*, 51) from beings and the thinking concerned with beings ('representational', 'calculative' or 'transcendental-horizonal' thinking). Indeed, in *What is Metaphysics?* Heidegger very nearly adopts the word *Abgeschiedenheit* to describe this moment of releasement, speaking of the need for a 'separation from beings' (*der Abschied vom Seienden*: *WM*, 49) in order to attain the 'favor' of Being itself. In Eckhart this negative phase of detachment implied a discipline of freeing the soul from the love of creatures. In Heidegger, too, there are the same overtones of asceticism and self-discipline. The 'separation from beings', he says, is the 'sacrifice', i.e., the surrender of the powers of calculation for the sake of a higher truth. It is this ascesis which enables Heidegger to insist that his thought is not 'arbitrary' but 'strict' (in keeping with Husserl's determination of the nature of phenomenology). Although it does not have the 'exactness' of mathematics, the thinking concerned with Being (*Seinsdenken*) is strict and 'disciplined', because it must strenuously resist the inclination to 'rationalize' Being, to 'explain' it in terms of cause and effect, to reduce it to the highest being and first cause. Strict thinking must stay purely in the element of Being itself (*HB*, 56).

But there is a second, positive moment of releasement. Just as for Eckhart detachment meant not only to be 'empty of creatures' but also to be 'full of God', so releasement means not only to be 'loosened from beings' but also to be 'open to Being' (*G*, 25–6, 51). The first moment is negative, a willing not to will, not to 'represent'. It is active and ascetic. The second moment attains the perfection of releasement. Here there is no question of willing of any kind, but a simple openness to Being which 'lets' Being be, just as Eckhart spoke of letting 'God be God' (*Q*, 180). And as to the resigned soul the unconcealed and truly

divine God is revealed, so in Heidegger Being discloses itself in its truth, free of all metaphysical disguises, to the thinking which is released.

We are now in a position to clarify a criticism which Heidegger makes of Eckhart's view of *Gelassenheit*: 'Releasement can still be thought within the realm of willing, as happens in the old masters of thinking, e.g., in Meister Eckhart' (G, 35–6). Now if Heidegger means by remaining 'within the realm of willing' that Eckhart holds that *Gelassenheit* is a will to not will, then he is clearly mistaken. For both thinkers maintain that this is but a preliminary phase of *Gelassenheit*, and that the perfection of *Gelassenheit* is the suspension of willing altogether. This is a point on which Heidegger and Eckhart are in complete agreement. It is more likely that Heidegger means that Eckhart remains within the realm of willing insofar as Eckhart recommends that we be released into another, higher will. Heidegger's criticism amounts to the accusation that Eckhart remains within the history of metaphysics because he has replaced Being itself with a being, the will of the highest being. This is a point of great importance and we will have occasion to return to it in our concluding remarks below (IV).

The proximity of Heidegger to Eckhart on the question of releasement is manifested in another way. We recall that Eckhart said the fully resigned soul should live 'without why', i.e., with a disinterested love of God. This same phrase – *ohne Warum* – reappears in Heidegger's *Der Satz vom Grund*. The reason for this is that Heidegger is commenting upon a couplet from Silesius's *Cherubinic Wanderer* which bears that same inscription:

Without Why

The rose is without why; it blossoms because it blossoms;
It cares not for itself, nor does it ask if it is seen.

(CW, I, No. 289)

Silesius's poem draws upon an anthology of mystical writings composed by the Jesuit Sandaeus, in which Eckhart and his disciples Suso and Tauler are amply represented.³⁹ Silesius, the contemporary of Leibniz, offers an apparent exception to the 'Principle of sufficient reason', according to Heidegger: something – the rose – is without a 'reason', a 'why'. But the poet has no interest in denying the Principle. He says that the rose is without 'why' – not without 'because' (*weil*). 'Because' supplies the 'ground', whereas 'why' only seeks after it. The rose is not without a ground. Leibniz's principle is true *of* the rose, but not *for* the rose, says Heidegger (SG, 73). The rose does not *seek* the ground of its blossoming. It does not interrogate the origin and outcome of its blossoming, but is content with the simple activity of blossoming. The rose illustrates the same point which Eckhart makes when he says that the

soul which lives 'without why' is like life itself. Life does not need an explanation and a rationale for itself. Life is not desired *for* something other than itself but *because* it is life: life is without why; it lives because it lives (Q, 180).

In the way that Eckhart said the life 'without why' befitted both God and the soul, so Heidegger sees in the rose a twofold model. In the first place, the rose is like Being itself (SG, 188). Like the rose, Being is the simple process of emerging out of itself:

The blossoming is grounded in itself, has its ground by and in itself.
The blossoming is a pure rising forth from out of itself. . . .

(SG, 101–2; cf. p. 73)

Hence the rose represents Being as *physis* (SG, 102): the emergent-enduring-power (*aufgehend-verweilend-Walten*: EM, 3). The language of Heidegger in this matter is very close to Eckhart's talk of the 'life' of God as the process of 'welling up' within Himself and then overflowing first into the other Persons of the Trinity and finally into creation itself. Heidegger's *physis* and Eckhart's 'life' are akin: each is a process of rising up out of an inner recess into manifestness (self-emergence); and each is a 'self-sufficient' process in the sense that it rises up *because* it rises up, needing no outward impulse or motivation. The blossoming of the rose is equally a model for each.

But the rose has a further role to play for Heidegger: 'What is unsaid in the verse, and everything depends on this, is rather that man, in the most concealed ground of his being [*Wesen*], never truly is until he is in his way like the rose – without why' (SG, 72–3). Thus the rose is also a model for Dasein (just as it was a model for the soul in Silesius's poem). Dasein must be 'without why' inasmuch as it must suspend all rational interrogation of Being.⁴⁰ The thinking concerned with Being does not demand that a 'reason' be 'rendered' for Being. Being 'is' (*west*) *because* it is. Being is the ground of beings, but there is no ground for Being itself. Hence it is just as much an 'abyss' (*Abgrund*). Being is the final 'because' for every question. With Being itself Dasein must surrender its search for further explanation: 'The because is swallowed up in a play. The play is without why. It plays as long as it plays. There remains only play: the highest and the deepest' (SG, 188). Being is an inexorable 'because', and all that Dasein can do is 'let' Being be, free of reason's categories and 'first principles'. But that is the essence of releasement.

There is one last point to be made in connection with the notion of *Gelassenheit* in Heidegger and Eckhart. Eckhart, we noted above, unwittingly fathered a long tradition of God's 'need' of man in German thought. Now the relation of Dasein to Being which Heidegger expresses

in the word '*brauchen*' seems to stand in the shadows of that tradition. Ordinarily, *brauchen* means 'to need' or 'to use'. But for Heidegger it does not precisely signify either of these. Being does not 'use' Dasein insofar as this implies 'utilizing' (*Benutzen*: WD, 114). To 'utilize' something is to subordinate it to the user, to make of it a mere instrument, like the hammer. Dasein is no 'tool' for the 'cunning' of Being. Nor should we think *brauchen* in terms of 'needing'. For it is not appropriate to imagine that Being – Truth itself – is dependent upon man (*G*, 64–5). This is to fall back into the error of Cartesian subjectivism. Nor is Being's relationship to Dasein one of 'necessitating' (*Benötigen*: WD, 115) it, for the 'sacrifice' of Dasein to Being must be free (*WM*, 49), just as Mary's fiat was free.

If Being does not utilize or need or necessitate Dasein, just what does *brauchen* mean? Heidegger answers that 'only proper use [*Brauchen*] brings what is used into its essence [*Wesen*] and holds it there. . . . To use something is to let it enter into its essence, to preserve it in its essence' (WD, 114; e.t., 189). *Brauchen* must be understood in the light of the fact that Being and Dasein belong together, that each complements and provides the proper element for the other. Each 'helps' (*hilft*: WM, 50) the other into the fullness of its being (*Wesen*). Without Dasein there is no clearing in which the Event of Truth may occur. Yet Dasein does not determine how the Event will come out, which is the sense in which Truth is independent of Dasein. *Brauchen* means something like 'assisting' or 'helping' rather the way God and the soul 'help' and preserve one another in the *Cherubinic Wanderer* (CW, I, No. 100). That is why Heidegger says that *Es brauchet* is to be thought in conjunction with *Es gibt*.⁴¹ The 'It' which 'gives' is the same as the 'It' which 'uses', and the It which gives is the Event itself (*SD*, 20). But the Event comes to pass as an appropriation process: it 'bestows' upon Dasein its proper essence and, in so doing, the Event, too, comes about in a manner which is 'appropriate' to itself. This mutual self-appropriating is the giving of the 'It gives' and the using of 'It uses'. And while this position is not Eckhart's, it belongs to a philosophical and mystical tradition of which Eckhart is, willingly or not, the forefather.

Being and beings

The last major theme in the writings of Meister Eckhart to which the work of Heidegger invites comparison is the relationship between God and creatures. The analogue in Heidegger's thought is the relationship between Being and beings. Thus our original proportionality may be expanded:

God : soul : creatures :: Being : Dasein : beings.

Eckhart insisted, as we saw above, on the radical dependency of the

creature upon God. Creatures have being the way the air has light. This position is not pantheistic, as the best modern scholarship points out;⁴² but it does stress the intimacy and proximity of God and creatures. Creatures are 'immediately touched' and 'penetrated' by God, the way the air is totally filled by the light of the sun (*LW*, I, 173). The upshot of this is not that one should take flight from this world in order to find God but, on the contrary, since creatures are filled with God, that one should learn to find God in creatures. If God is concealed to a man by created things, the trouble is not with things but with the man (*Q*, 55). One must learn to seize God in creatures: 'A man does not learn this [finding God] through flight while running from things and turning oneself into a solitude of an outward kind. He must rather learn an inner solitude, wherever and with whomever he may be. He must learn to break through things and to seize God in them and to hold His image steadfastly in himself in an essential way' (*Q*, 61). Creatures are nothing in themselves. Consequently, one must not take them 'in themselves' but 'in God' (*Q*, 379). One must not avoid creatures but must be related to them in the right way. To take creatures in themselves is self-love and attachment; but to regard them with a detached heart is to see them in God and to see God in them.

In Heidegger there is a comparable proximity between Being and beings. Being is always the Being of beings (*WG*, 15). Being 'never is' (*nie west*) without beings (*WM*, 46).⁴³ And as there was with Eckhart, so there is in Heidegger an error which consists in taking beings apart from Being, in occupying oneself with beings and forgetting Being. The error is not 'worldliness' (cf. *WG*, 24–6) but 'metaphysics': 'Insofar as it always represents beings as beings [*das Seiende als das Seiende*], metaphysics never thinks upon Being itself' (*WM*, 8). Metaphysics falls short of Being itself because it invariably 'represents' Being in terms of a being – the highest being (*God*), the thinking being (the subject), and so on. And as Eckhart warned that the desire for creatures was a desire for nothing (*Q*, 171), so Heidegger regards the present age, in which metaphysics has run its course to completion (*SD*, 61ff.), the age of technology (*Technik*), as one of 'nihilism'. Nihilism, according to Heidegger, is the age in which Being has become a vapor, a vacuous abstraction (*EM*, 27–9), 'nothing at all' (*N I*, 338). The phenomenon of 'fallenness' described by the author of *Being and Time* now consists in thinking what is 'given' while forgetting the 'It' which 'gives' (*SD*, 8), just as for Eckhart the worldly heart is concerned with creatures to the neglect of the Creator.

But just as Eckhart does not recommend that the soul leave the world to find God, so Heidegger thinks it only 'foolishness' to suggest that we do away with technology. We are not interested in 'some kind of renaissance of preSocratic philosophy', he says. This would be 'idle and

foolish' (*WM*, 11). Nor does he wish to relinquish the use of technological tools:

The equipment, apparatus and machines of the technological world are for all of us today indispensable, for some to a greater extent, for others to a less extent. It would be foolish blindly to assail the technological world. It would be shortsighted to wish to condemn the technological world as the work of the devil.

(*G*, 24; cf. *ID*, 33; *K*, 24–5)

But neither does Heidegger make the by now familiar suggestion that it is not technology which is evil but the use to which it is put, that technology is 'neutral' and that we must learn to master it, instead of letting it master us (*K*, 5). Technology is not neutral because it is a 'mission of Being' (*Seinsgeschick*) in which Being remains concealed. Technology is a name for the epoch of Being in which the illusion is perpetrated that Being is nothing more than a 'store of energy' which awaits man's use (*K*, 26), and that logico-mathematical thinking is the uniquely valid kind of thought (*G*, 26). This is nothing neutral, but a concealment of Being. The real problem that technology presents, according to Heidegger, is the distortion it makes in the essence of Truth and therefore in the essence of man (*VA*, 164). The problem is not with 'machines and equipment'. This is very much like Eckhart's diagnosis of the disconsolate soul: the trouble is not with peoples or places but with 'you yourself' (*Q*, 55).

Eckhart advised the soul not to leave the world but to change its attitude towards it. Correspondingly, Heidegger tells us not to do away with technology, but to learn how to gain a new ground and foundation in it (*G*, 26). Man cannot change the course that Being takes in history – the way the soul cannot change the will of God. Hence man must learn to think the present historical situation in terms of the 'mission of Being' – the way the soul must learn to view everything in terms of the will of God. Heidegger describes the new attitude that *Dasein* must have in the technological world as follows:

We are able to use technological objects and yet with suitable use keep ourselves so free of them that we are able to let go of them at any time. We are able to make use of technological objects as they ought to be used. But we are also able simultaneously to let them alone as something which does not concern what is innermost in us and proper to us.

(*G*, 24)

The new attitude – which of course is 'releasement' – says 'yes' to the

utilization of technological equipment, but 'no' to the distortion it makes of the essence of truth. Viewing technology as a mission of Being itself, this attitude is alert to a truth which technology conceals: 'The meaning of the technological world is concealed' (G, 26). And releasement stays open to this hidden meaning: 'I call the posture in virtue of which we hold ourselves open for the concealed meaning of the technological world: openness towards the Mystery' (G, 26). One must not think upon technology technologically but in terms of the mission of Being. And in this light technology appears as a derivative and 'untrue' form of a more primordial '*technē*' (K, 34) which is to be found among the early Greeks (VA, 160). As the soul finds God in all places and people and things, so meditative thinking finds even in modern technology the traces of a pristine disclosure of the Event of Truth. For the 'thinking which thinks in terms of Being as mission' (*Seinsgeschickliche Denken: N II*, 335), technology is a withdrawal of a primordial truth.

Original *technē* is a making which does not exploit 'nature' but which is accomplished in harmony with it. Hence it does not conceal the truth of nature but it reveals it. Original *technē*, says Heidegger, brings about the 'truth' in 'things'. The 'things' of original *technē* are the subject of some of the later Heidegger's most interesting accounts, accounts which are at once 'phenomenological' in the sense of *Being and Time* (hence in the sense of a phenomenology of the *Lebenswelt*), and yet profoundly in accord with the later *Seinsdenken*. We recall the bridge in 'Building, dwelling and thinking' (VA, 145ff.), the 'jug' in 'The thing' (VA, 153). The jug, e.g., unites the earth out of which it is made, the heavens whose rains it collects and contains, the gods to whom it can present a wine offering, and mortals whose thirst it satisfies. In the jug the 'four-fold' of earth and heavens, mortals and gods, which represent to Heidegger an original and truer state of things, one which has all but been forgotten, is collected together and brought to appearance (VA, 170-2). With such making there can be a proper dwelling (*Wohnen*) in the world (VA, 159). The world becomes again a place in which man is born and ages and dies, in which he works and rests and prays, in which he discovers the sense of 'being human'.

Hence, as the soul for Eckhart is at peace with the world and no longer disturbed by its dangers, so Dasein is reconciled with technology (G, 25), while it nourishes the hope of another day (K, 31) in which technology is assigned its proper place and is no longer taken to be 'something absolute' (G, 25).

IV The import of the analogy

The analogy that Heidegger's thought presents to Meister Eckhart is unmistakable. We must now turn to the implications that this analogy holds for our understanding of Heidegger. The proximity of Heidegger to Eckhart might very well represent to some a basis for writing Heidegger's work off as 'true philosophy'. To others it might show that he belongs to a long tradition of 'deep thinkers'. We shall steer a middle course between these predispositions by raising three simple and straightforward questions. In the first place, the parallel of Heidegger to Eckhart raises anew the entire problem of 'humanism' in the later Heidegger, for it is characteristic of mysticism to allow man to be swallowed up in a 'mystical self-effacement'. What does this analogy suggest, then, about the loss or the preservation of the humanity of man in the later Heidegger? Secondly, to what extent are Eckhart and Heidegger saying anything different from one another? Heidegger might very well have 'overcome metaphysics', but not in such a way as to have said anything that has not been said many times before by those who are not metaphysicians. Finally, is Heidegger himself a 'mystic' and his thought a 'mysticism'? What interest can 'philosophy' have in a thinker such as Heidegger?

(1) The most serious question raised by the controversial 'shift' in Heidegger's thought concerns the place of man in his philosophy. This is a troublesome issue, in which the deep transformation which Heidegger's thought has undergone comes plainly into view. Dasein is no longer conceived in terms of its freedom and self-possession, as the being which 'has its Being to be' (SZ, §4, p. 12), which must actively take over and choose its Being. Rather the Being of Dasein is to stay open to the address of Being. Its characteristic mood is not 'anxiety' but 'composure' (*Gelassenheit*). It does not raise the question of Being but lives 'without why', waiting for Being's self-disclosure. And, as if intentionally to complicate the issue, Heidegger's later works frequently denounce the notion of 'humanism'.

As we have already shown, this position has all the earmarks of the mystic's – and in particular of Meister Eckhart's – notion of the surrender of the soul to God. However, Heidegger's views are not for that reason inconsonant with any form of 'humanism', if 'humanism' means the attempt to establish the dignity of man and to preserve his essence. For Eckhart himself considered the union of the soul with God to be something which brings the soul into the fullness of its being. It certainly is not effected at the cost of the loss of the identity of the soul. This was something that the youthful Heidegger sensed about medieval mysticism when he said that the 'transcendent relation' of the soul to God is one in which both the absoluteness of God is affirmed and the integrity of the soul is preserved (DS, 239). The reason for this is that God and the

soul are not 'two things'; on the contrary God and the soul belong together: 'Many simple people think that they should look upon God as if He stood there and they stood here. But that is not so. God and I are *one*' (Q, 186). Were they not 'one' their union could be brought about only at the expense of one or the other. But the soul and God are of a kind: they are both so pure and detached, so removed from creatures, that they belong exclusively to each other.

Because the union of the soul and God is something that 'befits' each, is 'appropriate' to each, Eckhart is able to emphasize that nothing of what is 'proper' (*eigen*) to the soul is lost when it unites with God. As living things, he says, we act 'on our own', 'out of our own grounds' (*wir aus unserm eigenen wirken*). If we are united with God, then God must take over our being, but not in such a way that we are then moved by God as 'from the outside'. Rather, God must become 'our own' so that in being moved by God we will be moved 'from within on our own': 'If we should then live in Him or through Him, then He must be our own and we must work on our own' (Q, 176). So much 'our own' does God become for the detached heart that Meister Eckhart will not only say that that it is God who bears his Son in the soul, but also that it is the soul itself which bears the Son in itself (Q, 160; Théry, 264–5). Living 'in Him and through Him', according to Eckhart, is not a form of self-diremption, as it is portrayed in Hegel's discussion of 'unhappy consciousness', but a higher form of self-possession.

Eckhart's detached heart constitutes a model of 'religious humanism', i.e., the attempt to realize the fullness of being human by rooting human existence in the love of God. Whether or not such a program constitutes a 'true humanism' is a problem that can be finally decided only 'from within', by those who actually have undertaken such a life. But it is at least clear that there are no *a priori* arguments against the position that Eckhart adopts. Moreover, if we consult the history of Christian spirituality, we discover a number of interesting examples of individuals who testify in favor of what Eckhart says. One thinks for example of Francis of Assisi, a man whose love of God and spirit of poverty led him not to a 'contempt of the world' but, quite the contrary, to a rather remarkable sense of joy. It is simply nonsense to find in Francis a joyless self-effacement, an 'unhappy' and 'divided' consciousness.⁴⁴ What seems to be the case instead is that in Francis, who practiced the detachment of which Eckhart spoke, some ideal form of 'being human' was attained – to be sure, not one that all men must follow, but a unique and genuine one nonetheless.

The problem of 'humanism' in Heidegger is quite comparable to that in Eckhart. One main thrust of the word *Er-eignis* is to emphasize that Being and Dasein find in each other their 'proper' (*eigen*) complement. Just as he had said of the medieval *unio mystica*, Heidegger can say of

the Event of Truth that in it neither the 'transcendence' of Being (SZ, §7, p. 38) nor the integrity of man is destroyed. On the contrary, the Event of Truth provides the basis for a 'higher' humanism: 'Humanism now means, in the event we determine to hold on to this word: the essence of man is essential to the Truth of Being' (HB, 94). Humanism means to bring man into his essence and so to provide for the real 'worth' of man (HB, 75), a worth which every metaphysical humanism is unable to grasp:

One must be clear about the fact that, by this means, man remains enclosed in the essential realm of *animalitas*, even when one does not equate him with animals but rather attributes to him a specific difference. One is always thinking in principle of the *homo animalis* even if the *anima* is put as *animus* or *mens* and later as subject or person or spirit. Such a way of putting man is the manner of metaphysics. But man's essence is thereby taken in too lowly a way. . . . Metaphysics is closed off to the simple and essential certitude that man 'is' [*west*] only in his essence [*Wesen*], in which he is addressed by Being. Only in this address has he found that wherein his essence dwells.

(HB, 66)

The humanism which Heidegger repudiates is the metaphysical view which cannot rise above the conception of man as the rational animal. This rejection of humanism has nothing to do with recommending the inhumane (HB, 95), but with opening man up to the Truth of Being.

The 'Event' (*Er-eignis*) of Truth takes over in the later Heidegger the role that was once assigned in *Being and Time* to 'authenticity' (*Eigentlichkeit*), by which Dasein was brought back to its deepest and most individual possibilities and in which the hold which the 'they' exerts was broken. But the 'ownmost possibility' of Dasein in the later works is identified with its role in providing a place of disclosure for the Truth of Being. Nonetheless, one wonders whether this is anything more than a merely verbal maneuver. What possibilities for man lie in the 'Event'? The whole notion in the later Heidegger of a 'higher' humanism has a tendency to slip into a rather vacuous play on words.

However, it is possible to determine the renewal of human existence which Heidegger has in mind. Heidegger's thought originates, in part at least, in the phenomenological movement and so in Husserl's refutation of 'scientism', the theory that the only objective account of the world and of man is that supplied by the physical sciences. Heidegger's work has always in one way or another been a continuation of this protest against scientism. Just as with the earlier phenomenological analyses, meditative thinking attempts to gain access to a world to which calculative thought is closed off, a world which the later works call the 'fourfold'.

The technological world must be subordinated to the world in which man 'dwells'. To the extent that this is not done, man's 'dwelling' in the world is disrupted and even destroyed. The world of the 'fourfold', on the other hand, is eminently 'humane' – because it is more attentive to man's 'mortality' and to his belonging to the 'earth' (*humus*), because it affirms the truly 'divine' God and sees in the heavens the measure of lived time. It is interesting to note in this connection that the essay on the fourfold 'Building, dwelling and thinking' (1951) was addressed by Heidegger to a post-war Germany that was in the midst of a great housing shortage. 'Building', he holds, is more than a problem for civil and mechanical engineering; architecture is not merely a mathematical art. The real problem of housing, he concludes, is our ignorance of how to 'dwell' (VA, 162). Like Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger struggles to establish the primacy of the 'life-world'. But Heidegger's effort is considerably more enigmatic – some might say 'profound' – because he thinks the world in which man dwells may be attained only by an attitude of 'openness to the Mystery' concealed in technology (G, 26).

One might further object, however, that according to Heidegger it is impossible for man to remake the world, to render it humane. And that is true enough in the sense that the movements of history (*Geschichte*) originate in the mission (*Geschick*) of Being (HB, 81); they are not subject to human control. While that is so, it remains true that the world cannot be remade *without* man's cooperation (K, 34, 38–9; VA, 180). Unless man is 'released' from the illusion that technology is something absolute and is open to the original *technē* concealed within technology, then the 'turn' (*Kehre*) in Being will never come to pass. Man cannot remake the world himself (a Marxian revolution for Heidegger is 'subjectivism' (HB, 88–9)), but he can 'let' it be remade. Like the man of God who holds that the world will never be reconstituted so long as men do not have recourse to God, Heidegger holds that the precondition for a renewal of the world is a thinking directed to Being. If man is open to Being, then – perhaps – Being will disclose itself to man. But in this 'perhaps' lies one of the largest difficulties with Heidegger's thought, and one which we shall examine in greater detail in the second question.

(2) If the movements of Heidegger's and Eckhart's thought are in so many ways parallel, if they even stand together in offering a view of a 'higher' humanism, then just where does Heidegger really differ from Eckhart? To answer this question, let us first turn to the concluding paragraphs of *The Talks of Instruction* in which, it seems to us, Eckhart expresses the 'spirit' of his thought:

To the extent that you are in God, to that extent will you have peace, and to the extent that you are outside God, you will be outside of

peace. If only something is in God it will have peace. As much in God, so much in peace. By this test you will know how much you are in God: by whether you have peace or lack peace. For where you lack peace, you *must* necessarily lack peace, for the lack of peace comes from the creature, and not from God. Everything that is in God is only to be loved; there is nothing in God which should be feared.

(*Q*, 100; e.t., 108)

Eckhart's God is a God of love. Of all the sacred authors it is from John that he draws the greatest inspiration. It is John, the 'beloved disciple', who writes: 'Think of the love that the Father has lavished on us, by letting us be called God's children; and that is what we are' (I John 3: 1). And around this text Eckhart is able to build his entire mystical speculation. God is first and foremost a loving Father for Eckhart, not a just judge or a supreme being or a first cause. The relationship between God and the soul is not one of fear – of offending God, of violating His Law – but of loving trust. Everything that is in God is to be loved, nothing is to be feared. 'Love cannot mistrust', he says, 'it can only trustfully await something good' (*Q*, 75). In the hands of a loving father one knows only trust and peace. And we are in the strongest sense God's sons, for we are not only 'called' children, but 'that is what we are'.

The situation is radically different, however, in Heidegger's case. For Heidegger must never speak of Being as loving or benevolent or fatherly. This is to treat Being as if it were the good will of the highest being. And that, as we have seen, is precisely the point upon which he criticizes Meister Eckhart's conception of *Gelassenheit*: it remains confined within the realm of willing (*G*, 35–6).

Dasein must be released not to the good will of the Father but to Being itself. But what is Being? In *Der Satz vom Grund* Heidegger answers: 'Being and ground [*Grund*]: the same. Being as grounding has no ground but rather as the abyss [*Abgrund*] plays that game which as mission [*Geschick*] plays up to us Being and ground.' Being for Heidegger is not the 'reason' (*Grund*, *ratio*) of Western metaphysics, but the ground which is equiprimordially an abyss. It is not a principle of thoroughgoing intelligibility, but it is just as much unintelligible. If the Heidegger of *Being and Time* protests what has become of 'human existence' in Hegel (*KPM*, 127, n. 196), the later Heidegger protests what has become of 'Being'. For in Hegel, whose claim to have consummated Western metaphysics Heidegger accepts, Being is identified with Absolute Reason and so is dissolved into a principle of lawfulness and regular development. The sequence of historical epochs is regulated by the principle of unfolding rationality. There is, as Leibniz demanded, a 'why' for every

historical event and every historical epoch. The distance that Heidegger has put between himself and Hegel's notion of Being is made plain in the minutes of the seminar on 'Time and being':

By what is the succession of epochs determined? Whence is this free sequence determined? One naturally recalls Hegel's history of the 'thought'. For Hegel history is dominated by necessity, which is simultaneously freedom. Both are for him one in and through the dialectical course, which is the way the essence of the spirit is. With Heidegger, on the other hand, one cannot speak of a 'why'. Only the 'that' – that the history of Being is such as it is – can be said. Consequently, in *Der Satz vom Grund*, Goethe's verse is cited:

How? When? and Where? – The gods remain silent.

You keep yourself in the *because* and do not ask *why*?

(ZSD, 55–6; cf. SG, 206ff.)

Heidegger's Being is a ground without ground, as Eckhart's God is 'principle without principle' (*principium sine principio*) in the words of the *Liber XXIV Philosophorum* (LW, III, 16, n. 1). For Eckhart this means that God is the fullness of being (*plenitudo esse*), a principle of consummate goodness and perfect intelligibility, the final explanation, the ultimate rationale which needs no reason beyond itself. But for Heidegger, Being is a ground which does not itself admit of explanation. Being comes to pass as it does. That is all one may say. At the end of 'Time and being', Heidegger writes: 'What does there remain to say? Only this: the Event of Appropriation comes to pass [*Das Ereignis ereignet*]' (ZSD, 24). No further determination of the Event can be made. One must be satisfied with 'because' and not ask 'why?' Dasein must be 'without why'. And whereas for Eckhart this meant that the soul should act not because God commands it to act, but rather in loving unity with, and on the basis of, God's indwelling presence (Théry, 236–7), for Heidegger it means that Dasein must openly acknowledge the inscrutability of Being.

Because the Event is both ground and abyss, Heidegger calls it, in one of his most striking characterizations, a 'play' (*Spiel*).⁴⁵ The history of Being is the history of the play of Being, of its fluctuating retreat and advance, revelation and concealment. The process has no more rationale than that, and to the extent that one gives it a rationale one forces the categories of metaphysics upon it. Thus Leibniz's remark, 'When God calculates the world is made', is emended by Heidegger to read, 'While God plays the world comes to be' (SG, 186). And Heidegger cites with approval the following fragment from Heraclitus:⁴⁶ 'Time is a child playing a game of draughts; the kingdom is in the hands of a child' (cf. SG,

187–8). Not only might one say ‘It gives’ (*Es gibt*) and ‘It uses’ (*Es brauchet*), but now we may add ‘It plays’ (*Es spielt*): ‘Because is swallowed up in the play. It plays because It plays. There remains only play: the highest and the deepest’ (SG, 188).

That is why, where the author of *The Book of Divine Consolation* can speak of peace, Heidegger speaks of a ‘venture’, a ‘wager’ on the outcome of a portentous game: ‘We must venture out into the play of language upon which our being is staked’ (WD, 87). Again, man must confront ‘the high and dangerous play upon which the being of language has staked us’ (WD, 84). Technology (*Technik*) is the ‘danger’ (*Gefahr*) for Heidegger. It is a concealment of the Truth of Being. It distorts the meaning of nature, of dwelling in the world, of thinking and of man himself. It is a danger which man did not bring on himself but which Being itself has perpetrated. Being itself has withdrawn in its truth and has advanced in the form of an untruth. The illusions of the age of technology are mistakes for which no man is responsible.

Accordingly Dasein does not ‘trust’, it can only ‘hope’ (VA, 41–2). Indeed, Heidegger has undermined all possible ‘grounds’ for trust (and even for hope). For, in the first place, having broken with the metaphysical tradition of the ultimate intelligibility of Being, he has divorced Being from all rationale, from all lawful becoming, from all rational governance. Moreover, he has also divorced Being from any possible personalistic conception. It is no accident that there is *no* talk of ‘father’, ‘son’, or ‘giving birth’ in Heidegger’s account of the relationship between Being and Dasein, whereas these are the dominant expressions in Eckhart’s Christian, indeed Johannine mysticism. And in my view this must be counted as the most decisive difference of all between Eckhart and Heidegger. Heidegger uses many metaphors to explain the relationship of Being and Dasein – giving, using, thanking, playing, saying, etc. – but never ‘giving birth’ as a ‘father’ generates his ‘son’.⁴⁷ The reason for this is not that the relationship of father and son is an ‘ontic’ relation between things, because that is also true of giving and playing and all the rest. The point is that some ontic relations are capable of being reworked and transformed so as to become possible ways of speaking – in a ‘non-objective’ way (PT, 37ff.) – about Being and Dasein, and some are not. The relation of father and son is not susceptible of such a reworking because it is a radically personal relationship, and as such involves such dispositions as love and trust. And it is as plainly nonsensical to describe Being in these categories as it would be to describe it in terms of the categories of Hegel’s *Logic*.

And so Heidegger asks: Will the illusions of the age of technology pass (ID, 71)? Will the ‘West’ (which Heidegger takes to be a true ‘evening-land’ [*Abendland*]) become the eve of a new day? Will man ever get beyond the conception of himself as the ‘rational animal’ (SG,

210–11)? These are only questions: no one knows the answers. The answers depend upon the possibilities that inhere in the Event, possibilities that Heidegger himself calls 'dark' and 'uncertain' (ZSD, 66). One does not 'trust' in the outcome of the Event. The best one can do is wait (G, 37); the only 'serenity' (*Gelassenheit*) one has is to know there is nothing more one can do. Dasein may prepare for the possibility of a 'new beginning': it may open itself to it. But Dasein can neither effect it nor trust in its coming to pass. Eckhart so trusted that God would return love with love that he said we could 'force' God to come to us (Théry, 218–19). Eckhart said that although there are unknown depths in God, and the Godhead is an 'abyss' of which nothing can be spoken, still there is nothing to fear in God; everything in God should only be loved (Q, 100). But there is nothing in Heidegger's *Ereignis* to love and almost everything to fear and mistrust. This seems to me to constitute a serious problem with Heidegger's thought, and one to which insufficient attention is paid.⁴⁸ It is hard to see how the 'releasement' for which Heidegger asks can continue to make any sense once it is detached from its religious context, i.e., from its relationship to a loving God, and is related to the idea of Being which he puts forward.

It is true that Heidegger does speak of the Event as 'giving' and of Dasein as 'thanking', which does endow the Event with something of a benevolent aspect (WM, 49; WD, 94). Such personalistic language is close to Eckhart's, for the Father gives the 'gift' (*gratia*) of the Son and the soul is indeed grateful. However, while one may accept Eckhart's expressions quite literally, all Heidegger has done is to adopt another 'model' for thinking out the relationship of Being and Dasein. The Event does not literally give, because literally to give is to give a 'gift', and a 'gift' is an expression of good will, whereas the relationship of Being and Dasein must be gotten beyond the realm of willing. Giving implies a benefactor and it implies gratitude, neither of which Heidegger seriously means to suggest. What Heidegger does mean by the model of 'thanking' seems to be this. The revelation of Being is nothing that Dasein can bring about – e.g., through its 'questioning' as *Being and Time* supposed. Only Being itself can effect it. Consequently, if Being is revealed to Dasein it comes 'gratuitously', as it were, and as a 'gift' (or 'favor'). Dasein however cannot and will not receive the gift if it is not disposed towards the giver as a recipient should be, viz., with 'gratitude'. The correct disposition of Dasein towards the self-revelation of Being is 'openness' towards it or simply 'thinking' (*Seinsdenken*). Hence Dasein's 'gratitude' is 'thinking'; its 'thinking' (*Denken*) is 'thanking' (*Danken*). The whole notion of 'thanking' therefore rests not on any personalistic overtones of the Event but on the kinship – etymological or otherwise – of '*Denken*' and '*Danken*'. Indeed, the whole notion of 'giving' arises out of a sentence in *Being and Time* which Heidegger

would like to reinterpret and which uses the phrase *es gibt* (SZ, §43, p. 212).

There is nothing benevolent about the giving of the Event; there is no gratitude in the thanking of Dasein. Heidegger is not talking about any sort of personal presence, but about 'manifestness'. He does not conceive of the coming to be of manifestness in terms of the loving care of a father but, on the contrary, in terms of a 'world play' (*Weltspiel*). While the 'concern' (*Sache*) of Eckhart's thinking is with a loving Father, the 'concern' of Heidegger's thought is history and the secular.

(3) Does it not emerge from this discussion that Heidegger is a mystic, although of a rather different cut than Eckhart? There are varieties of mystical experience, and not all mystics subscribe to the notion of a personal and loving Father, as Eastern mysticism testifies. One can amass an impressive argument in favor of 'Heidegger's mysticism'. To begin with, Heidegger himself has repeatedly said that what he is doing is *not* philosophy (ZSD, 61ff.). The sum and substance of philosophy is metaphysics, he says, and his thinking goes beyond metaphysics. It is something of a strange phenomenon, after all, to see so many books and articles and lectures by professors of philosophy devoted to a thinker who vigorously protests against being considered a philosopher. How seriously have these authors considered Heidegger's protests?

If 'mysticism' is a non-discursive, directly intuitive experience of a 'truth' which neither common sense nor rational argumentation can attain, then Heidegger seems to bear the essential trademark of the mystic. 'Sound common sense' is for him the thoughtlessness of the 'they'. 'Reason' is the illusion that Being submits to the prescriptions of the thinking subject. The 'Truth of Being', to which reason and metaphysics have no access, can be attained only in a 'leap' (*Satz, Sprung*: WD, 4-5; SG, 95-6) which reminds us strongly of the *intuitus mysticus*. Heidegger does not offer arguments for his position. To 'argue' is to fall victim to the illusion that 'reason' is the final arbiter of what is true. In the later Heidegger, argumentation is replaced by a cryptic, even oracular tone. Compared to the later works *Being and Time* is a carefully developed work. To illustrate this point a lecture is given in 1962 which bears the same title as the third, unpublished Division of *Being and Time*, 'Time and being'. Some twenty-five pages long in its printed form, it concludes that all there is to say is *Das Ereignis ereignet*. And the last sentence of the lecture is an apology for the fact that the lecture itself is an obstacle to the saying of the *Ereignis*. The lecture makes affirmations, whereas the sentences in which the Event is to be expressed are not assertions (*Aussagen*). They are not 'true' or 'false' nor do they demand a 'justification' ('sufficient reason').

It is a long way from the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues, who does not relent until a sound argument is brought forth, to 'Time and being'.

The later Heidegger has intentionally left the Platonic dialogues behind, and with them the whole notion of argumentative thinking. If philosophy must give arguments, then Heidegger has indeed left philosophy, just as he says.

Nonetheless, it does not follow that he has left philosophy for mysticism. The book on Eckhart was never written, after all, but there are numerous essays on the poetry of Hölderlin and Trakl. If Heidegger's 'thinking' (*Denken*) has gone beyond philosophy it has moved more in the direction of poetry than of mysticism. We recall the divergence of Heidegger and Eckhart on the nature of language. Heidegger does not wish to cut off propositional language for the sake of silence – which would be a typically mystical move, and which Eckhart advocated – but for the sake of a non-propositional language, a language akin to that of the poet. Heidegger insists upon reticence and carefulness about language, not upon mystical silence, and he finds this care only in poetry (*WM*, 50–1). Hence even if the mode or style of the later Heidegger is inconsonant with what most Western thinkers have traditionally called philosophy, it does not follow that it is mysticism.

However, there is an even stronger reason for distrusting the suggestion that Heidegger is a mystic, a reason which, it seems to us, justifies the great interest that 'philosophers' have shown in his work. It concerns not so much the 'style' of his thought but its 'content'. We remarked above, in contrasting Heidegger with Eckhart, upon the 'secular' character of Heidegger's work. We wish to understand this word in its deepest sense: 'secular' is that which characterizes the *saeculum*, the age; but an age or epoch is always, for Heidegger, a 'mission of Being'. Hence the secular character of Heidegger's work consists in his commitment to comprehending the history of the West, and to comprehending the present age in terms of Western history, a commitment quite foreign to Eckhart who wished to see God in things so that we might one day – in eternity – see things in God (*Q*, 61). Heidegger's thinking is for a 'time of need', the age of technology, in which he holds the 'truth' of being human and of Being itself is covered up. The age of technology is for him a metaphysical event, and he wishes not to condemn it but to think it through. The technological age summons man, according to Heidegger, to a meditation upon the history of Western metaphysics.

Hence the question which Heidegger asked in 1929 remains the essential one: What is metaphysics? Metaphysics is to be overcome, but it is not to be laid aside (*WM*, 9). On the contrary, metaphysics contains the truth of Being in a concealed way (*WM*, 44). Heidegger's thought consists in a dialogue with the history of metaphysics in the hope of uncovering what it has concealed. From Aristotle's question about the being as such Heidegger 'retrieves' the question about the Truth of Being. From Descartes' reduction of the world to *res extensa* he retrieves the

primordial spatiality of Dasein (*SZ*, §21, p. 101). In Leibniz's formulation of the principle 'no being is without a ground', Heidegger hears the 'ringing together' of Being and ground, the ringing of Being as the groundless ground. From the idea of truth as correspondence (*adequatio*) Heidegger is able to think truth as unconcealment. In Nietzsche's 'history of nihilism' Heidegger finds the history of metaphysics itself (*N II*, 343).

Metaphysics has always been the medium in which Heidegger learned what he says. His thinking has largely consisted in finding another way of saying what he has learned. He says what metaphysics would say were it able – the Truth of Being (*N II*, 353–4, 397). The history of metaphysics is the hiding place of Being, and Heidegger's thought has been a radical attempt to uncover the wealth hidden *in* and *by* that tradition (*HB*, 77). Heidegger does not renounce metaphysics but lays bare its essence. And who but 'philosophers' would be interested in such a task? It is very doubtful that his thinking will interest any who are not interested in metaphysics, and even more doubtful that it can be comprehended by any who do not comprehend metaphysics. Heidegger has invigorated contemporary philosophical thinking and, despite what he himself says, deals with issues that are only of interest to those who think in that tradition which begins with the presocratics and which all have called 'philosophy'.

What, then, does this question of Heidegger's mysticism amount to? Just this, I think: that one way of understanding Heidegger is to see his thought in an analogy with a mystic like Meister Eckhart; that certain analogies can be drawn between Heidegger and the mystics, analogies which are instructive and illuminating and indeed even based on the historical evidence of Heidegger's early interest in medieval mysticism. But to argue that Heidegger is a mystic is to distort much more of Heidegger's thought than it illuminates. The analogy is but an analogy.

One must be careful not to be fooled by Heidegger. He appropriates the talk of the mystic, and much of the structure of the 'mystical union' of the soul with God, but he makes these things over for his own purposes and to his own liking. Heidegger has been interested in theological issues from the very beginning of his studies, and he has long been transforming the ideas and the language of the Western religious tradition. He did this in *Being and Time* (fallenness, guilt, conscience) and he has done it again in his later work. For Heidegger, Being is a 'play' and the task of thinking is to 'play along' (*mitspielen*: *SG*, 188) with Being. To bring Being to language is a 'game' (*WD*, 83), for Being as primordial language holds itself back and resists saying. Hence Heidegger must resort to all available resources to bring Being to words; all are 'fair game'.

The mystic for Heidegger is a kin and an ally, who says a great deal of what Heidegger himself wants to say: there is more to thinking than

reasoning; true language depends upon silence; in *Gelassenheit* a deeper truth reveals itself. And so Heidegger freely takes over and uses what he finds of service in the mystic, and particularly in Meister Eckhart. But Heidegger remains throughout his own man. The mystic is concerned with the eternal, the 'thinker' with time. Even the poet is to be distinguished from the thinker (*WM*, 51), for the poet does not think Being as Being but as the 'holy'.⁴⁹ While Heidegger's thinking is conducted in proximity to the poet and to the mystic, Heidegger's abiding interest lies in the age old 'issue' (*Sache*) of philosophy, the question of Being. It is this question which first stimulated his thinking and it is to this question that he has subsequently subordinated all other alliances.⁵⁰

Notes

1 We refer to the works of Heidegger with the following abbreviations: *DS*: *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1916). *EM*: *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, 2. Auflage (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1958). *FND*: *Die Frage nach dem Ding* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1962). *FW*: *Der Feldweg*, 3. Auflage (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1962). *G*: *Gelassenheit*, 2. Auflage (Pfullingen: Verlag G. Neske, 1960). *HB*: 'Brief über den "Humanismus"' in *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit Mit einen Brief über den 'Humanismus'*, 2. Auflage (Bern: A. Francke Verlag, 1954). *HW*: *Holzwege*, 4. Auflage (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1963). *ID*: *Identität und Differenz*, 3. Auflage (Pfullingen: Verlag G. Neske, 1957). *K*: *Die Technik und die Kehre* (Pfullingen: Verlag G. Neske, 1962). *KPM*: *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 3. Auflage (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1956). *N I*, *N II*: *Nietzsche*, 2 Bände (Pfullingen: Verlag G. Neske, 1962). *PT*: *Phänomenologie und Theologia* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1970). *ZSD*: *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1969). *SG*: *Der Satz vom Grund*, 3. Auflage (Pfullingen: Verlag G. Neske, 1965). *SZ*: *Sein und Zeit*, 10. Auflage (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1963). *US*: *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, 3. Auflage (Pfullingen: Verlag G. Neske, 1965). *VA*: *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, 2. Auflage (Pfullingen: Verlag G. Neske, 1959). *WD*: *Was Heisst Denken?*, 2. Auflage (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1961). *WG*: *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, 5. Auflage (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1965). *WM*: *Was ist Metaphysik?*, 9. Auflage (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1965). *WW*: *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, 4. Auflage (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1961). All translations are our own. When we consult the following translations, we refer to them by 'e.t.' after citing the original text: *G*: *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. John Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper, 1966). *WD*: *What is Called Thinking?*, trans. F. D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper, 1968).

2 Martin Grabmann would later show the author to be one Thomas of Erfurt, not Duns Scotus.

3 Hans Siegfried, 'Martin Heidegger: a recollection', *Man and World*, III, 1 (February, 1970), 4.

4 Cf. Karsten Harries, 'Martin Heidegger: the search for meaning', in *Existential Philosophers: Kierkegaard to Merleau-Ponty*, ed. G. A. Schrader (New York:

McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 162–8, and Richard Schmitt, *Martin Heidegger on Being Human* (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 55–102.

5 We leave '*Dasein*' untranslated and always refer to it in the neuter.

6 Meister Eckhart of Hochheim (1260–1327/9) was the most celebrated preacher of his day and the foremost representative of fourteenth century German mysticism. A bull in 1329 condemned twenty-eight propositions extracted from his writings. Consequently the Latin writings were largely ignored until H. S. Denifle revived interest in them in 1885. It was through his German treatises and sermons that Eckhart exerted his influence on the German tradition. Our references to Eckhart's works will be as follows: *LW: Meister Eckhart: Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke*, hrsg. im Auftrage der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, *Die Lateinische Werke*, ed. Ernst Benz et al. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1936–). *DW: Die Deutsche Werke*, ed. Josef Quint (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1936–). *Q: Meister Eckhart: Deutsche Predigte und Traktate*, ed. and trans. Josef Quint (München: Carl Hanser, 1963). Théry: Gabriel Théry, 'Edition critique des pièces relatives au procès d'Eckhart', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age*, I (1926), 129–268. There is no better antidote to the extravagant misinterpretation to which Eckhart is exposed than this document, which is the record of his defense against the charge of heresy. We have consulted the following in preparing our own translations: *Meister Eckhart: Selected Treatises and Sermons*, ed. and trans. James Clark and John Skinner (London: Faber and Faber, 1958), referred to as 'e.t.'

7 Martin Heidegger, 'Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft', *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, CLXI (1916), 173.

8 Käte Oltmanns, *Meister Eckhart*, 2. Auflage (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1957); cf. especially p. 10. See n. 10, *infra*.

9 Thomas Aquinas, *Questiones Disputatae de veritate*, Q, I, a. 1, c.

10 In a work which appeared after our study was completed, Reiner Schürmann – *Maître Eckhart ou la joie errante: Sermons allemands traduits et commentés* (Paris: Editions Planète, 1972) – offers an excellent interpretation of Eckhart which relies heavily on Heidegger's views. As he notes (p. 339, n. 91) this has already been attempted by Oltmanns but with questionable results. His own efforts are more successful, I think, because he depends upon the later Heidegger and not, as did Oltmanns, upon *Sein und Zeit*. Schürmann's thesis is that the confusion that has surrounded Eckhart for six centuries is due to interpreting his thought as a 'metaphysics' concerned with substances considered statically. In fact, Eckhart is concerned not with substance but event (p. 66, n. 46), and with the 'path' of the soul *en route* to God ('peregrinal ontology'), which is the path of detachment (p. 170). A concluding section (pp. 380ff.) confronts Heidegger and Meister Eckhart on *Gelassenheit* (and in particular, G, 23–8). See also Schürmann, pp. 11, 98, 164, 201, n. 94, 210, n. 112, 219, 283–4, n. 28. There are at least two basic differences between Schürmann's work and ours: (1) His work is not a comparison of Heidegger and Eckhart, but an interpretation of Eckhart which has recourse to the thought of Heidegger; our concern is with an assessment of Heidegger on the basis of a comparison with Eckhart. (2) While Schürmann does discuss the differences between Eckhart and Heidegger (pp. 358–61, 365–7), he does not seem to hold that their consequences are as grave as we will point out below (IV). Heidegger's 'way' (*Denkweg*) is hardly one of joy (*la joie errante*), though this aptly describes Eckhart's experience (pp. 14, 367, last paragraph).

Eckhart's importance for Heidegger is also briefly noted by Laszlo Versényi, *Heidegger, Being and Truth* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 152

and Reuben Guilead, *Etre et liberté: Une étude sur le dernier Heidegger* (Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1965), pp. 172–3.

11 *The Later Heidegger and Theology*, eds. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 42–3.

12 Vladimir Lossky, *Theologie négative et connaissance de Dieu chez Maître Eckhart* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1960), pp. 335–6.

13 If this phrase resembles anything in the Idealists, it is the 'one' of Schelling's *Identitätsphilosophie*, although Eckhart's 'one' does not stand in need of mediation or diversification because it is already the fullness of being (*plenitudo esse*).

14 The 'abyss' (*Abgrund*) of the Godhead is another of those seminal ideas of Eckhart. It reappears again most notably in Jacob Boehme's *Un-grund* and so in Schelling (see n. 16). Some have – with good reason – placed Heidegger's *Nichts* in this tradition. Cf. William Kluback and Jean Wilde, Preface, in Martin Heidegger, *The Question of Being* (London: Vision, 1956), p. 9 and E. B. Koenker, 'Potentiality in God: Jacob Boehme', *Philosophy Today*, XV (Spring, 1971), 44ff.

15 Compare this passage with the depiction of 'life' in Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. Baillie (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp. 220–4.

16 Cf. John Loesch, 'The God who becomes: Eckhart on the divine relativity', *The Thomist*, XXV (July, 1971), 405–22.

17 Heidegger refers to this 'little spark of the soul' (*Seelenfünkeln*) in *WD*, 96. He regards it as an unsuccessful attempt to transcend the notion of man as the 'rational animal'. Only the notion of *Dasein* and of its 'memory' (*Gedächtnis*) seizes man in his relationship to Being. And of course, Eckhart's notion cannot 'succeed' in Heidegger's terms, for Eckhart is not interested in conceiving of the soul as a relationship to Being, but as a relationship to God. In Eckhart's terms, Heidegger does not succeed in gaining a view of man in his essential relationship to God. Once again, the similarity between Eckhart and Heidegger is structural.

18 This indicates how free of any vestige of an anthropological conception Eckhart wished to keep the *Fünkeln*. Heidegger's criticism of Eckhart in *WD*, 95 (cf. *supra*, n. 17) does not at all take this into account.

19 Eckhart uses *Wesen* as a translation of *esse* and hence in its original sense as 'Being', the verbal sense which Heidegger of course wishes to revive. Cf. *Anmerkungen*, Q, 537–8.

20 Martin Grabmann, *Der Einfluss Alberts der Grossen auf das mittelalterliche Geistesleben: Das deutsche Element in der mittelalterlichen Scholastik und Mystik* (München, 1926–36), II, 324–72. Cf. Etienne Gilson, *A History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 431–6. The idea is ultimately of Augustinian origin.

21 D. T. Suzuki, *Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist* (New York: Macmillan, 1969). Rudolf Otto, *Mysticism East and West*, trans. B. Bracey and R. Payne (New York: Macmillan, 1962). Shizuteru Ueda, 'Maître Eckhart et la buddisme zen', *La vie spirituelle*, 53 (January, 1971), 34–5, 40–1.

22 All scriptural citations are from *The Jerusalem Bible* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966).

23 The Idealists too insisted that the Incarnation was not restricted to the empirical individual Jesus of Nazareth.

24 *The Jerusalem Bible*, 'The New Testament', p. 411, n.a.

25 Hugo Rahner, 'Die Gottesgeburt', *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie*, 59 (1933), 333–418. Rahner concludes: 'The idea flowed to him from a thousand

sources; it is age-old; it is one of the essential pieces of Christian mysticism of all centuries' (p. 411).

26 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Ia, Q. 27, a. 1, c.

27 Eckhart's mystical doctrine seems remarkably at times to resemble Kant's 'moral formalism'. For both thinkers no merely 'material' principle should ever determine the will; for both, material principles are principles of 'self-love'. What Kant calls 'heteronomous' activity, Eckhart calls 'dead works'.

28 Because *Gelassenheit* means surrendering one's own will and accepting God's, we have translated it sometimes as 'resignation' and sometimes as 'abandonment'. In ordinary German it means 'composure'. Cf. n. 36, *infra*.

29 Angelus Silesius, *Cherubinischer Wandersmann*, Eingeleitet und unter Berücksichtigung neuer Quellen erläutert von Will-Erich Peuckert (Bremen: Carl Schünemann Verlag, 1956), I, No. 8; No. 100. Hereafter *CW*.

30 Cf. Ernst von Bracken, *Meister Eckhart und Fichte* (Würzburg, 1943).

31 That is in part why Hegel cites the following text from Eckhart in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*: 'Das Auge, mit dem mich Gott sieht, ist das Auge, mit dem ich ihn sehe, mein Auge und sein Auge ist eins. In der Gerechtigkeit werde ich in Gott gewogen und er in mir. Wenn Gott nicht wäre, wäre ich nicht, wenn ich nicht wäre, so wäre er nicht. Dies ist jedoch nicht Noth zu wissen, denn es sind Dinge, die leicht missverstanden werden und die nur im Begriff erfasst werden können' (*Sämtliche Werke, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, I (Stuttgart: Frommanns, 1959), 228). For Hegel, Eckhart seems to say that the Absolute came to know itself in the same act in which man rose to a knowledge of the Absolute. Whereas in fact Eckhart is alluding to the Aristotelian doctrine that the knower-in-act and the knowable-in-act are one, and to *De trinitate*, Bk. IX, c. 12, in which Augustine says that the knower and the known, when thus united, conceive a common offspring – for Eckhart, the Word which is born in the soul (Théry, 224–5, 238). Moreover, Hegel's text is corrupt. The first sentence should read: 'Das Auge, in dem ich Gott sehe, das ist dasselbe Auge, darin mich Gott sieht; mein Auge und Gottes Auge, das ist ein Auge und ein Sehen und ein Erkennen und ein Lieben' (Q, 216). The second sentence I find nowhere in Quint, although it is doctrinally akin to Q, 267–9. The third and fourth sentences, which would be easily misinterpreted if one were not familiar with the distinction between *Gott* and *Gottheit*, are found in another sermon altogether and should read: 'Wäre aber ich nicht, so wäre auch "Gott" nicht: dass "Gott" ist, dafür bin ich die Ursache; wäre ich nicht, so wäre Gott nicht "Gott". Dies zu wissen ist nicht not' (Q, 308). *Gott* is a name assigned to the divine being in virtue of its relationship to creatures. Hence if I were not – i.e., if I were not created – God would not be called 'God', i.e., the cause of being. Eckhart also refers to the ideal preexistence of the self as an Idea in the Divine Mind. The last half of the fourth sentence, which represents Hegel's but not Eckhart's views, I find nowhere in Quint.

The faultiness of Hegel's text and the misuse he makes of it indicate the extreme caution with which one should proceed in bridge-building between Eckhart and the Idealists. Heidegger himself had much more reliable information about Eckhart, including the Latin works. In fact, Heinrich Ott, in a conversation at the Heidegger Colloquium at Pennsylvania State University (October, 1969), told me that Heidegger had expressed to him an even *greater* interest in the Latin works than the vernacular. On the question of Eckhart and the Idealists, cf. Ernst Benz, 'Die Mystik in der Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus', *Euphorion*, 40 (1952), 280–300. Ingeborg Degenhardt, *Studien zum Wandel des Eckhartbildes* (Leiden: Brill, 1967), pp. 110ff.

32 We have chosen 'transcendent' as a neutral term to refer indifferently to Heidegger's 'Sein'.

33 Joan Stambaugh's translation of '*Ereignis*' as 'Event of Appropriation' takes into account both senses of the word which Heidegger intends, viz., 'coming to pass' and 'appropriation' (cf. Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper, 1969), p. 14, n. 1). Schürmann quite rightly stresses that Heidegger and Eckhart articulate the *Gottesgeburt* and the *Ereignis* in the language of 'Event' and 'happening', and not of substance (see Schürmann, pp. 66, n. 46; 201, n. 94).

34 Zygmunt Adamczewski, 'On the way to being', in Heidegger and the Path of Thinking, ed. John Sallis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1970), pp. 13–18.

35 In assigning such importance to the poet Heidegger is anticipated by Shelling, not by Eckhart.

36 Since Heidegger uses *Gelassenheit* to emphasize the necessity of 'letting' Being be, his English translators have rendered it as 'releasement', a convention we shall adopt as well (cf. William Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), p. 504. See *supra*, n. 28).

37 Cf. *FND*, 76 where Heidegger discounts the possibility of beginning 'modern' philosophy with Eckhart instead of Descartes. This is because Eckhart repudiates the 'ego' as the highest principle of philosophy, placing the value of the subject matter before that of the self (*DS*, 7).

38 In this context *Eigentlichkeit* sounds more like *Eigenwille* than its opposite, which raises the question of the compatibility of the later notion of *Gelassenheit* with *Being and Time*'s view of *Eigentlichkeit*.

39 Jeffrey L. Sammons, *Angelus Silesius*, Twayne's World Authors Series (New York: Twayne's Publishers, 1967), pp. 44–5. On Eckhart and this saying of Silesius, see Ueda, pp. 38ff.

40 How is the later Heidegger to be reconciled with the author of *Being and Time*, for whom the essence of Dasein consisted in raising the question of Being? See my 'The rose is without why: an interpretation of the later Heidegger', *Philosophy Today*, 15 (Spring 1971), 3–15.

41 In ordinary German, of course, *es gibt* means 'there is' (French: *il y a*). But Heidegger takes it literally as 'It gives' (cf. *SZ*, §43, p. 212; *HB*, 78ff.; *SD*, 1–25).

42 Lossky, pp. 307–20.

43 See the controversy surrounding this text in Richardson, pp. 562–5.

44 Cf. Johan Huizinga, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), pp. 139–40; Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism* (New York: Dutton & Dutton, 1961), pp. 439–40.

45 I have explained the 'play of Being' more carefully in my 'Being, ground and play in Heidegger', *Man and World*, 3 (February, 1970), 26–48. Using Heidegger's 'play' of the foursome and Angelus Silesius (*CW*, II, no. 198) as a basis, Schürmann (pp. 204ff.) construes a 'play' – the word is not Eckhart's – between God and the soul in Eckhart. Even so, there is nothing of the ominous wager which belongs to Heidegger's play of Being in Schürmann's hypothesis.

46 Heraclitus, Fragment 52, in Kathleen Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), p. 28.

47 Adamczewski's translation of *Ereignis* as 'bearing' would therefore be misleading (cf. Zygmunt Adamczewski, 'Martin Heidegger and man's way to be', *Man and World*, 1 (1968), 369ff.).

48 Laszlo Versényi has pointed out such difficulties (cf. Versényi, pp. 152–8).

49 This seems to mean that the poet experiences Being but he does not express it in the language of the thought of Being (*Seinsdenken*). Hence it is up to the thinker to 'translate' the poet.

50 One can hardly close the question of Heidegger and mysticism with an examination of Heidegger's relation to Eckhart. The whole area of his affinities to Eastern mysticism needs to be discussed. Cf. 'Heidegger and Eastern thought', *Philosophy East and West*, 20, 3 (July, 1970). See also Peter Kreeft, 'Zen in Heidegger's *Gelassenheit*', *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 11, 4 (December, 1971), 521–45.

Heidegger and Descartes

Jean-Luc Marion

1 The continuing presence of Descartes in the development of Heidegger's thinking

Although it is more or less taken for granted that Heidegger never ceased to be concerned with Nietzsche or Aristotle, his relation to Descartes can very easily appear to be secondary. Neither those who comment on Heidegger nor those who examine Descartes have much to say on the relation of the former to the latter, indeed both are quite likely to ignore it altogether. Whatever the reasons might be for this oversight they cannot diminish the significance of one solid fact: even if one only considers the matter chronologically, Descartes appears at the very outset of Heidegger's career and preoccupies him right up to the very end. To take account solely of the texts which have already been made available through the publication of the *Gesamtausgabe* (in 1985), evidence of an intense debate with Descartes is to be found from 1921 right up to 1974.

In a course of lectures, given as a *Privatdozent* at Freiburg during the Winter term 1921/2, under the title *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die Forschung*, the only course of lectures prior to the Marburg period which is still available, Heidegger does not so much deal with Aristotle as sketch out an introduction to phenomenology; however, this introduction opens up a philosophy. Instead of Aristotle it is Descartes who is in question. First taking account of the *Ich-Metaphysik* in its Kantian and phenomenological moments he ends up with Descartes, whose limitations are already clearly marked out. The 'sum' is certainly supposed to be as primary for Descartes but it is precisely at this point that the difficulties emerge. For instead of sticking to the 'sum' he already opens up a pre-conception of the meaning of being in the mode of a simple affirmation (*Feststellung*) and moreover an affirmation of the indubitable character of being (*Unbezweifelbaren*).

The fact that Descartes was able to deviate in the direction of a posing of the epistemological question and even, from the standpoint of the history of ideas (*geistigesgeschichtlich*), managed to inaugurate such a question only gives expression to the fact that the 'sum', its being and its categorial structure, did not present a problem for him. Rather the meaning of the word 'sum' was for him understood in an indifferent sense (*indifferenten . . . Sinn*), absolutely unrelated to the ego, formally objectified (*formal gegenständlich*), uncritically assumed and therefore not elucidated.¹ From the time of this sketch of an interpretation, Descartes appears as having accentuated the certainty of the *ego* and having simply assumed the *sum* in an uncritical fashion. In other words, the mode of being exemplified by the *sum* is taken in its supposedly most obvious sense, as indisputable and common to all and therefore is in fact thought on the basis of an acceptance of the mode of being which pertains to objects. Descartes emphasizes the question of the *ego* (hence the inauguration of a theory of knowledge) and overlooks the question of the *sum* (hence an objectifying interpretation of every *esse*). Paradoxically, in the eyes of the young Heidegger, Descartes already poses the question of the mode of being of the *sum*, precisely in overlooking it in favour of a question about the status and the power of the *ego*. This confrontation with Descartes, sketched out so early, is more amply developed from the time of Heidegger's residence at Marburg. In fact, this period opens and closes with a course of lectures explicitly devoted to Descartes. In his first winter term (WS 1923/4), Heidegger undertakes an *Introduction to Modern Philosophy* (*Der Beginn der neuzeitlichen Philosophie*); it was supposed to appeal to the figure of Descartes, at least if you are ready to believe the testimony of the last course of lectures given at Marburg in the summer of 1928. 'This course, given in the Summer term of 1928, attempted to come to terms with Leibniz. . . . In my first term at Marburg, 1923/24, I sought to adopt a corresponding position with regard to Descartes, which latter was then incorporated into *Sein und Zeit* (§19–21)' (*Wegmarken*, GA 9, p. 79). It should be emphasized that this last course of lectures not only confirms that the earlier course was devoted to the study of Descartes and, moreover, that it consequently anticipated what was said in *Sein und Zeit* §19–21 but also that it dealt with Descartes in so far as the latter was continued in Leibniz who,

like Descartes, sees in the I, in the *ego cogito*, the source from which all metaphysical concepts have to be drawn. However, with Leibniz as well as with his predecessor (Descartes) and his successors, this return to the I remains ambiguous because the I is not grasped in its essential structure and in its specific mode of being.

(GA 9, pp. 89–90)

From these texts drawn from his period at Marburg, but also from the preceding period one has to conclude – all the more because others will undoubtedly confirm this clear preoccupation – that Heidegger, from the very beginning of his ‘path of thought’ appreciates the importance of Descartes; but he does not attribute it to what, according to the tradition, his contemporaries saw it as consisting in, namely, the establishment of the *ego* upon the plane of a transcendental (or quasi-transcendental) principle. He locates it on the contrary in what Descartes himself conceals behind the evidence and the dignity of the *ego cogito* – in the indeterminateness of the mode of being of this *ego*, whose *sum* remains indeed so indeterminate that it falls under the sway of the mode of being of objects. So Heidegger does not question the *ego cogito* with regard to the primacy of its cognitive origin but rather the ontological indeterminateness of the *esse*, that which it conceals from view rather than that which it proclaims. Thus the encounter with Descartes marks Heidegger’s point of departure more clearly than his other confrontations.

But this stand is also characteristic of his later texts. To limit oneself to one strictly chronological criterion, it should be emphasized that Descartes remains an essential preoccupation right up to the end. (1) In 1969, the second ‘Thor Seminar’ recalls Descartes’ historical position: ‘What happened between Hegel and the Greeks? The thinking of Descartes’; or ‘With Fichte one finds the absolutization of the Cartesian *cogito* (which is only a *cogito* to the extent that it is a *cogito me cogitare*) into an absolute knowledge’ (*Questions IV*, pp. 263 and 282).² (2) In 1973, the ‘Zähringen Seminar’ carries the interpretation of the Cartesian *cogito* to its height on the basis of the question of being:

subjectivity is not itself called in question with regard to its being; since Descartes, in fact, it is the *fundamentum inconcusum*. Throughout the entirety of modern thought, proceeding from Descartes, subjectivity consequently constitutes the obstacle standing in the way of the question concerning being.

(*Questions IV*, pp. 319–20)

(3) In 1974, one of the very last texts, ‘Der Fehl heiliger Namen’ (‘The lack of sacred names’), once more points to this obstacle by taking up again the theme of the first course of lectures at Marburg: ‘At the beginning of modern thought we find/In an orderly manner and before any elucidation of the matter of/the thinking of the *Treatise on Method*:/Descartes’ *Discourse on Method* and the/Regulae ad directionem Ingenii’ (GA 13, p. 233). Even from a chronological standpoint, Heidegger’s thinking constantly comes to terms with that of Descartes, and in a confrontation which is just as constant as that which links him to Nietzsche or Aristotle. This textual fact which confirms the frequency with

which Descartes is cited in the works of his maturity does not nevertheless suffice to elucidate Heidegger's encounter with Descartes. Rather, the very existence of such a confrontation demands to be understood. The abundance and the persistence of Cartesian references only itself becomes intelligible with reference to the concepts which both motivate and justify it. What identifiable conceptual reason leads and constrains Heidegger, from the beginning to the end of his itinerary, to discuss Descartes?

2 The phenomenological motive for the originary confrontation with Descartes

At the very moment when Heidegger was expounding and critiquing Descartes at Marburg, Husserl was expounding and approving Descartes at Freiburg in a course of lectures given in the winter term 1923/4, from which the work *First Philosophy* was drawn. In fact Husserl did not wait as long as this (nor, a fortiori) until the *Paris Lectures* of 1929 to place Descartes at the centre of his reflections; well before *Ideas*, his lectures at Göttingen had already undertaken this task in 1907, as also in other texts.³ Phenomenology, at least in its Husserlian form, had, well before Heidegger, already linked its destiny with the interpretation of Descartes. Nothing of any phenomenological significance could be decided, at least in principle, without a discussion about Descartes. The Descartes that Heidegger encounters enjoys the status of being phenomenologically motivated if not that of being a phenomenologist. At first Descartes appeared for Heidegger in a positively phenomenological light through the intermediary of Husserl. In other words, Husserl's authority, especially after the turn of 1907, had invested Descartes with a phenomenological dignity such that all discussion about Descartes reverts to a discussion with Husserl. More precisely, any discussion of those Cartesian themes which Husserl had sanctified was equivalent to a theoretical discussion with Husserl himself. The equivalence between Descartes and (Husserlian) phenomenology can be deployed in two directions; either Descartes is a phenomenologist because he anticipates Husserl; or Husserlian phenomenology is not fully phenomenological, because it remains trapped in Cartesian positions which have not been criticized, or even recognized. Very early on, Heidegger decides to take the second direction. The distance that he takes up with regard to the Husserlian interpretation of phenomenology will be carried through by way of a critique of the Cartesian presuppositions which lurk in the latter. Descartes will undergo a critique, but a critique which is at first addressed just as much against Husserl who is now regarded as being less of a phenomenologist

in virtue of his Cartesian heritage. So Descartes appears as Husserl's non-phenomenological motif.

Thus, in the course of lectures given in the summer of 1925 and entitled *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, Heidegger attempts in §11 an 'immanent critique of phenomenological research', by examining how the latter manages to determine pure consciousness. In other words,

For us, [i.e., Heidegger] the question remains: does the elaboration of the thematic field of the phenomenology of intentionality [i.e., that of Husserl] bear upon the question concerning the *being of this region*, upon the *being of consciousness*; that is, what does being in general mean here when one says that the sphere of consciousness is a sphere and a region of *absolute being*? What does *absolute being* mean here? What does being mean when it is used of the being of the transcendent world, the reality of things? . . . Has phenomenology in general been able to establish the methodological basis to render intelligible this question concerning the *meaning of being*, a question which ought to have been raised first of all and which nevertheless remains unasked? . . . Has the region of consciousness – pure consciousness – been determined in its being as the fundamental field of intentionality, and if so how?!

(GA 20, pp. 140–1)

It should be noted that here, in 1925, Heidegger puts to Husserl and to the region of consciousness the same question and the same critique which he had been putting to Descartes and his *ego cogito* since 1921. Establishing the epistemological priority of the ego and of consciousness constitutes an advance but it does not dispense with the need to determine the mode of being of this first term. Descartes is repeated with Husserl, not only positively, with the bringing to light of the condition of all certainty in knowledge, but also negatively, with the evasive forgetfulness of the mode of being proper to originary certainty. Husserl must certainly have encountered and noted 'an unsurpassable difference of essence' (*ein unüberbrückbarer Wesensunterscheid*; *Ideen I*, §43/Husserliana III, p. 99), 'a genuine abyss of meaning' (*ein wahrer Abgrund des Sinnes*; *Ideen I*, §49/Husserliana III, p. 117) between consciousness and the reality of the world. For all that, is it possible to see this gap as one with 'a necessary and absolute being' (*ein notwendiges und absolutes Sein*; *ibid.*)? In short, is it possible to think an epistemological gap by naming an onto-ontological gap, as if 'the most radical difference in principle between modes of being in general, that between consciousness and reality' (*die prinzipielle Unterschiedenheit des Seinsweisen, die kardinale die es überhaupt gibt, die zwischen Bewusstsein und Realität*; *Ideen*

I, §42/Husserliana III, p. 96) followed from the very fact of the irreducibility of consciousness to what it constitutes? It would have been better if Husserl had not limited himself to repeating the epistemic terms of the opposition – an absolutely certain because knowing consciousness and a reality which is contingent and relative, because known – and undertook instead to work out the respective modes of being of the two terms; for the reasoning he employs to sketch out these two modes of being arises out of a duality – certainty, contingency – which wholly belongs to the mode of being of that very worldly reality and therefore arises out of being being understood as subsisting permanently in the present. Like Descartes, Husserl takes up residence in that sphere of being proper to consciousness, with the result that he evades the supposedly fundamental question of its mode of being. Thus consciousness pays the price, so to speak, of its epistemic priority, with an implicit, but unqualified, submission to that mode of being which belongs to the world. Husserl carries through his abandonment of the question of the being of consciousness by relying implicitly upon Descartes. In fact, he quotes Descartes both to define and to obscure the mode of being of consciousness: 'L'être immanent est aussi indubitablement au sens de l'être absolu en ce que principiellement *nulla "re" indiget ad existendum*' ('Das immanente Sein ist zweifellos in dem Sinne absolutes Sein, dass es prinzipiell *nulla "re" indiget ad existendum*'; *Ideen I*, §49/Husserliana III, p. 115).

Several comments are called for here. (1) Husserl certainly thinks he has defined the mode of *being* of consciousness since he deduces absolute-being from immanent-being. (2) To tie things up, he cites the authority of Descartes, *Principia Philosophia*, I, §51: '*Per substantiam nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam rem quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum.*' The encounter between these two thinkers certainly cannot be put down to chance since, in addition to their agreement over the epistemic primacy of the *ego*, they also concur in defining the mode of being of the latter by way of substantiality. (3) Husserl, however, modifies Descartes' formula: he omits the *alia* in '*alia re*', and only accepts *res* in inverted commas: '*. . . nulla "re" . . .*' Why? Obviously because *alia* (*res*) would imply that consciousness was itself, and first of all, a *res*; but Husserl precisely intended here to oppose consciousness to *realitas*; he therefore has to contravene accepted philosophical procedure and modify that part of Descartes' formula which would have implicitly extended *realitas* to *res cogitans* to retain only the application of substantiality to the *ego*. (4) This arrangement, and the difficulty which makes it necessary, proves already that Husserl is, in connection with Descartes, employing an insufficient and unadapted determination. For Descartes, in fact, substantiality covers not only the *res cogitans*, but also (though not without difficulty) the whole of *res extensa*, and so

contradicts – rather than confirms – the Husserlian privilege accorded to consciousness: ‘*substantia corporea et mens sive substantia cogitans*’ (*Principia Philosophia*, I, §52). A second contradiction may be added to the first. For Descartes, finite substance, thinking as well as extended, attests to a radical deficiency *vis-à-vis* God, and in such a way that the substantiality which the ego has to share with extension (first disagreement with Husserl), is only valid relative to God and is in no way absolute (second disagreement with Husserl). (5) These differences do not cast doubt on Husserl’s intimate familiarity with Descartes; they prove, on the contrary, that his dependence was much more powerful than any divergence in matters of detail.⁴

An encounter as exemplary as this – Husserl citing Descartes to attempt a determination of the mode of being of consciousness – could not have escaped the attention of Heidegger. In fact, the same lecture course of 1925 takes note of Husserl’s formula and identifies it, with precision, as a recuperation of Descartes. He is therefore able to cast suspicion upon its ontological inadequacy. Immanence, indubitability and absoluteness do not in any way make it possible to think the *being* of consciousness.

This third determination – absolute being – is not, in its turn, to be regarded as determining beings themselves in their being, but as grasping the region of consciousness itself from within the order of constitution and attributing to it, and from within this order, a being which is formally anterior to any objectivity.

(GA 20, p. 145)

The Cartesian distinction does not make it possible to found the difference between the regions – which is itself ontological. Heidegger reduces to nothing both the endeavour and the textual adaptation Husserl imposes upon Descartes’ formula. In this case it is Heidegger who defends the orthodoxy of the Cartesian text and precisely because he stands opposed conceptually to Husserl. There is more, Heidegger continues. Not only does Husserl go astray by taking up again and forcing upon Descartes an inappropriate response, not only does he conceal the authentic determination of the mode of being of consciousness by thinking that a simple recuperation of Cartesian certainty will suffice, but he gets things even more radically wrong by assuming a Cartesian question which has no phenomenological legitimacy.

The first question for Husserl is certainly not that of the character of being of consciousness [*nach dem Seinscharakter des Bewußtseins*], what prompts him is rather the following consideration: *How can consciousness in general become the possible object of an absolute*

science? What motivates him most fundamentally is the *idea of an absolute science*. But this idea that *consciousness has to be the region for an absolute science* is not one which he himself simply discovered but is the idea which had occupied *modern philosophy* since *Descartes*. The working out of pure consciousness as the thematic field for a phenomenology is not arrived at *phenomenologically* by a return to *things themselves* but by a return to a traditional conception of philosophy [*nicht phänomenologisch im Rückgang auf die Sachen selbst gewonnen, sondern im Rückgang auf eine traditionelle Idee der Philosophie*].

(GA 20, p. 147)

Let us assess the extent and the precision of Heidegger's critique of Husserl. (1) The question of the mode of being of consciousness receives no response because Husserl remains dependent upon Descartes. (2) Husserl, in sketching out the authentically phenomenological difficulty of the being of consciousness, emphasizes the non-phenomenological ideal of a certain science of consciousness. We are at this point not very far away from the patricidal declaration launched in this same course of lectures. 'Phenomenology is then, with regard to the duty of determining its own proper field, non-phenomenological!' (GA 20, p. 178).⁵ (3) If Husserl deviates from phenomenology, he does so because of the persistence in him of the Cartesian ideal of a *Mathesis universalis et universalis (sima) sapientia*, so defined in the *Regulae*. From Heidegger's point of view, Descartes therefore plays the unworthy role of obstructing Husserl's path toward phenomenology. Between Husserl and a true phenomenology, therefore between Husserl and Heidegger, Descartes arises as a unique obstacle. The 'affinity' which unites Husserl and Descartes⁶ therefore designates a unique phenomenological obstacle which phenomenology will have to overcome if it wishes to be what it is. Henceforward, to make progress along the phenomenological path which Husserl has abandoned, Heidegger will not merely have to abandon Husserl but 'destroy' what held him to Husserl – Descartes himself.

In this way it becomes possible to understand why Descartes was so important for Heidegger. The chronological importance of the debate which he arouses follows from the phenomenological radicality of the question he poses – precisely by not posing it. To think about Descartes certainly does not mean, for Heidegger, to repeat the *instantiation* of the *ego* as others, like Hegel, Schelling and Husserl, have tried to do in their own way, nor yet to turn it on its head, like Nietzsche, but to destroy it with a view to bringing to light, as the phenomenon which was hidden by it up until then, the mode of being of the *ego* (or of what was supposed to take its place), and in such a way that it can be distinguished from the mode of being of intra-mundane entities. Destroy-

ing the *ego* does not come down to abolishing it ontically but rather undertaking to bring out its ontological dignity – in short, destroying the *ego* opens the way to *Dasein*. In this sense, the importance of Descartes in Heidegger's thinking comes down to his constituting the obstacle *par excellence* standing in the way of the ontological fulfilment of phenomenology. In as much as he stands in the way of the ontological fulfilment of phenomenology with his conception of the *ego*, Descartes makes it difficult for us to appreciate the significance of *Dasein*.

3 The first omission: the indeterminateness of the 'ego sum'

In 1927, and in accordance with what had been sketched out since 1921, Descartes appears, in *Sein und Zeit*, as 'an extreme counter-example' (*Sein und Zeit*, §18/88, 37). By featuring as the extreme counter-example of the ontological problematic of mundanity Descartes pushes phenomenology to its last extremity by misunderstanding the mode of being of worldly beings; but by doing this he calls in question – as we shall see – the mode of being of all beings, beginning with *Dasein*. In fact, 'the interpretation of the world begins in the first instance with some entity within-the-world; so we shall accordingly try to clarify this approach ontologically by considering what is perhaps the most extreme form in which it has been carried out [in seiner vielleicht extremsten Durchführung]' (p. 89, lns 5–7), namely, the Cartesian ontology of the world. In this extremity it is moreover a question of the 'phenomenological destruction of the "*cogito sum*"' (p. 89, ln. 27) which is announced by Heidegger as the third part of his debate with Descartes after §§19–20, sketched out in §21 and referred to the unpublished 'Part Two, Division 2' (p. 89, ln. 28). The objection brought against Descartes applies to two deficiencies, that *vis-à-vis* the world and that *vis-à-vis* the *ego*, both of whose modes of being fall short, though in a different way. It should also be noted that the objection brought against Descartes precedes the celebrated analysis of the *res extensa* of §§18–21,⁷ where it only finds a first confirmation though it appears initially with reference to the *cogito sum* and right from the Introduction to *Sein und Zeit*. This is valid, let us remember, for the entire plan announced in §8 and therefore for the part which remained unpublished. The principle which introduces subjectivity into the whole of modern philosophy has two characteristics: it claims to bring about an absolutely certain beginning and, at the same time, thinking about being is not to be found there in as much as the *esse* is masked by the *sum* and so remains unthought in the shadow cast by the *ego*, the only thought in evidence.

Since, in the course of this history certain distinctive domains of

Being have come into view and have served as the primary guides for subsequent problematics (Descartes' *ego cogito*, the subject, the 'I', reason, spirit, the person), these regions, in conformity with the thoroughgoing way in which the question of Being has been neglected, remain unquestioned as to their being and the structure of their being. (§6/H. 22, lns 13–18)

Or again:

In taking over Descartes' ontological position Kant made an essential omission [*ein wesentliches Versäumnis*]: he failed to provide an ontology of *Dasein*. This omission was a decisive one in the spirit of Descartes' ownmost tendencies. With the '*cogito sum*' Descartes had claimed that he was putting philosophy on a new and firm footing. But what he left undetermined [*unbestimmt*] when he began in this 'radical' way was the kind of Being which belongs to the *res cogitans*, or – more precisely – the meaning of the Being of the '*sum*'. By working out the unexpressed ontological foundations of the '*cogito sum*', we shall complete our sojourn at the second station along the path of our destructive retrospect of the history of ontology. Our interpretation will not only prove that Descartes had to neglect [*versäumen*] the question of Being altogether; it will also show why he came to suppose that the absolute 'Being-certain' of the *cogito* exempted him from raising the question of the meaning of the Being which this entity possesses.

(§6/H. 24, lns 16–29)

A number of remarks should be made at this point. (1) §6 of *Sein und Zeit* calls Descartes in question firstly, and before all else, on the grounds of the meaning of the being of the *sum*; or rather, the Cartesian omission of the meaning of being in general is noticeable first and foremost with regard to the *ego cogito*; only the order in which the first part is arranged and the absence of the second part can convey to the reader the feeling that Heidegger emphasizes the doctrine of *res extensa* in his debate with Descartes. (2) However, the *ego cogito* and the *res extensa* furnish the phenomenological destruction undertaken by *Sein und Zeit* with two comparable 'omissions': Descartes misconstrues the mode of being of the *ego*, because he holds to the certainty of its existence without distinguishing such an epistemic category from an ontologically determinative existential; if he holds here to the idea of certainty, it is because he is going to transpose it over to the *ego* on the basis of that domain where it has first been demonstrated as an object of a methodical science, namely, extension; for if, epistemically speaking, the object depends upon the *ego*, at least with regard to this tacit and indecisive (let us call it nebulous)

ontology, the *ego* borrows its own interpretation as certain from the *res extensa*. In any case, the two 'omissions' go together and display the same inadequacy: the indeterminateness of the meaning of being. (3) The two dimensions of this peculiar inadequacy exactly anticipate the two regions distinguished by Husserl: the absolute region of consciousness, the relative region of the things of the world. And, just as Descartes fails to think them as such, Husserl also fails to think their respective ontological meanings. It is therefore quite in order to treat and spell out these two deficiencies brought by *Sein und Zeit* against Descartes as two integral parts of the 'destruction' of the history of ontology; so, positively speaking, as a breakthrough beyond the phenomenological obstacle presented by Descartes.

Usually presented as the thinker of the *cogito sum*, Descartes could more properly be seen as incapable of thinking this same *cogito sum*, or at least of thinking the *sum* on the basis of the *esse*; for Descartes reduces the *sum* to the *cogito* and the *cogito* to the *ego*. The *ego* itself can only be characterized by an epistemic determination – that of a first and absolutely certain principle which renders possible any knowledge of other beings. Proceeding from beings which are known to the knower, the extension of this certainty is only able to satisfy the requirements of a method through a procedure of generalization by leaving indeterminate and in the shade the question of the meaning of being for the *ego*. This indeterminateness marks Descartes' first and most radical omission: 'a total ontological indeterminateness with regard to the *res cogitans sive mens sive animus*' (§6, pp. 24, 31); or again:

Descartes, to whom one attributes the discovery of the *cogito sum*, as the point of departure for all modern philosophical questioning, examined – within certain limits – the *cogitare* of the *ego*. By contrast, he leaves the *sum* completely unclarified [*unerörtert*], even if he can be regarded as having posed the *sum* on as original a plane as the *cogito*.

(§10/455, 39–46, 4)

In condemning such a lack of determinateness, Heidegger is not contesting the certainty of the knowledge of the *cogito qua cogito*; it is even very remarkable that he does not get involved in the fashionable, though idle and facile, debate about the legitimacy of the reasons which led to a demonstration of the original, absolutely indubitable and necessary, existence of the *ego qua cogito*. Heidegger's critique bears on another point altogether: does the epistemic certainty which offers the *ego* as the first certain object for a knowledge of what in fact it is itself suffice for an ontological determination of its own proper mode of being? By his very silence on this point Descartes lays claim to the univocal character

of certainty (which keeps the same meaning and validity when it is transferred from known objects to the knowing subject). But this univocality is only founded (moreover as the medieval *univocatio entis*) upon an entrenched indeterminateness; better: this certainty remains not merely ontologically indeterminate but entirely indifferent to the question of the various modes of being of the meaning of being. Descartes assumes first of all that this certainty applies in the same way to the entire (though heterogeneous) series *cogitatum-cogitato-ego*. But he simply assumes that, just as the *cogitatum* is, in the light of the nebulous ontology of the *Regulae*, supposed to find the concrete determination of its mode of being in certainty, the *ego* too requires no other determination of its meaning of being than this same certainty, purely and simply. The certainty of the *ego cogito* does not therefore do away with the indeterminateness of the *sum* nor of the *esse* but simply reinforces it. This evident certainty allows Descartes to abandon any interrogation on the mode of being implied by this very certainty and results in its meaning of being being regarded as obvious, self-evident. '*Nota est omnibus essentiae ab existentia distinctio*' (Adam and Tannery (AT), VII, 194, 12), was his response to Hobbes. Descartes not only misses the question of the meaning of being, he masks this very omission by remaining blind to the epistemic evidence of the *cogito*. Descartes' first omission consists in his having left himself out of account.

This failure to come to terms with an omission finishes up however by deciding the mode of being of the *ego*: if Descartes fails to think his *sum* as such he still does think it implicitly on the model of intra-mundane being and in accordance with a reflective (*Rückstrahlung*) comprehension of the world on the basis of the explication of *Dasein* (§5/16, 1), for '*Dasein* is inclined to fall [*verfallen*] into the world in which he finds himself and to interpret himself reflectively [*reluzent*] on its basis' (§6/21, 11–12).⁸ By virtue of the failure of any approach to the meaning of the being of the *ego*, the mode of being of intra-mundane beings becomes the attractive and interpretive pole of the mode of being of non-intra-mundane beings. The Cartesian *ego* (as also its substitutes and derivatives throughout the entire metaphysical tradition right up to its Husserlian avatar) differs essentially from *Dasein* in this: it is not seen to exist and therefore is not thought in accordance with its own proper mode of being but is always, and from the first, distorted by those intra-mundane beings from which it quite improperly borrows its own mode of being.

4 The second omission: the permanence of intra-mundane beings

But the impropriety has now been reduplicated. For, just as the Cartesian interpretation of the *ego* fails to take account of its manner of being and

also fails to understand this omission, so the absence of this interpretation condemns the *ego* to being swallowed up in the mode of being of intra-mundane beings to which moreover it does not belong in principle, with the result that the interpretation of the manner of being of intra-mundane beings fails, with Descartes, to take account of the phenomenon of the world by replacing the latter with the univocal and minimum subsistence of what lies at hand (*Vorhandenheit*). In accordance with an analysis as celebrated as it is ambiguous and ephemeral,⁹ the mundanity of the world is manifest less by the subsistence of being at hand (*vorhanden*) than by their interplay as instruments, handy and ready-to-hand (*zuhanden*); in this interplay, a being is defined by what it is used for (*um . . . Zu*), and with regard to an end which, under the diverse aspects served by interests, utility, function, organization, etc., etc., ultimately depends upon that 'to which it returns' (*Bewandnis*), therefore, to *Dasein* itself, which, in this way, opens the way to the world in its mundanity. The subsistence of the present-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*) only follows from *Zuhandenheit* by way of a deficiency and impoverishment of the ready-to-hand and in response to theoretical demands alone. The object required by the theoretical attitude can only remain isolated as an atom of evidence persisting in its perfect subsistence, neutralizing all finality in its pure objectivity. The object of the theoretical attitude is obtained through just such a methodological reduction and abstraction. It does not precede what is utilizable and ready-to-hand but follows it through an impoverishment and elimination. This operation which inverts the phenomenological pre-eminence of the *Zuhandenheit* over the *Vorhandenheit* comes from Descartes. The privilege which this method accords to mathematical knowledge does not rest, for him, upon the intrinsic excellence of this science but upon its ability to attain the certainty and the permanent subsistence of an object. The primacy accorded to mathematics follows, according to Descartes, from the privilege accorded from the first to the permanent subsistence of an objectivity whose certainty is the very meaning of the being of intra-mundane beings.

If anything measures up in its own kind of Being to the Being that is accessible in mathematical knowledge, then it *is* in the authentic sense. Such entities are those which always are what they are. Accordingly, that which can be shown to have the character of something that constantly remains (as *remanens capax mutationum*), makes up the real Being of those entities of the world which get experienced. . . . The kind of Being which belongs to entities within-the-world is something which they themselves might have been permitted to present; but Descartes does not let them do so. Instead, he prescribes for the world its 'real' Being, as it were, on the basis of an idea of Being whose source had not been unveiled and which had not been

demonstrated in its own right – an idea in which Being is equated with constant presence-at-hand.

(§21/95, 36–96, 12)

‘The constant presence-at-hand of things’ (*ständige Dingvorhandenheit*; 99, 15) is only able to fix the meaning of the being of intra-mundane beings by degrading it to something which is susceptible to certainty and this at the expense of the phenomenality of the world. The interpretation of being in general as the permanent subsistence of the present-at-hand not only misses the meaning of the being of the *ego* by leaving its *sum* undetermined as such; it also, and before all else, misses the meaning of the being of those intra-mundane beings with regard to which, nevertheless, it claims to provide the perfect knowledge. These two limitations meet in a common and more original inability to think the being of beings in general.

What assessment could the historian of philosophy – if perchance he were able to detach himself from the philosopher – give to such an analysis and ‘destruction’ of Descartes? Without anticipating a more extensive discussion which would have to be conducted in another context, we will stick here to three remarks.

(1) Heidegger confirms that *ständige Vorhandenheit* obscures and monopolizes the meaning of being by relying on the Cartesian interpretation of *res extensa* as *substantia*, itself reduced to what *remanet* (= *verbleibt*) in every reduction (according to AT, VII, 30, 19 and on and *Principia Philosophiae*, II, §4, cited in *Sein und Zeit*, §§19 and 21). This reference is obviously very correct. However it hides another reference which attributes permanence (*remanet*) first to the *ego* and before the *res extensa* itself. For before asking ‘*Remanetne adhuc eadem cera?*’ and replying ‘*Remanere fatendum est*’ (*Meditatio II*, AT, VII, 30, 19–20), therefore before encountering the *res extensa* (which, it should be said, does not yet appear in the analysis of the piece of wax), Descartes had already reduced the *ego* to the *cogito* ‘*ut ita tandem praecise remaneat illud tantum quod certum est et inconcussum*’ (AT, VII, 25, 22–4). If permanence characterizes certainty as a (failed) manner of being, it should have been introduced with the first certainty and it is therefore with regard to the *ego cogito* that the diagnosis of permanent subsistence should have been conducted. Each time that it thinks, the *ego* remains. Such an omission of a Cartesian reference is surprising when it comes from so precise a connoisseur of Descartes as Heidegger, and all the more so since this first ‘remaining’ confirms, rather than the reverse, the general thesis advanced by *Sein und Zeit*. *Vorhandenheit* not only determines intra-mundane being but, through a species of reflection (*Rückstrahlung*), flows back upon the *ego* itself and closes it off from all access to its true being. It could be objected,

and quite rightly, that since §§19–21 only deal with the kind of mundanity that is missing in Descartes, they are not required to mention a text dealing with the *Vorhandenheit* of the *ego*. If this reply is admitted however, another question arises. Did Heidegger not make use of the ‘remaining’ of the *ego*, established in AT, VII, 25, 22–3 in the second part, section 2, devoted to the ‘ontological foundations of the “*cogito sum*”’ (§8/40, 4)? But this hypothesis would imply that he took advantage of a text which supported it at the very moment when he ignored it!

(2) The omission of the meaning of being in general is marked, in Cartesian texts, by the inadequacy of the doctrine of substance. Heidegger pertinently points out that substance is not supposed to affect us directly: ‘*non potest substantia primum animadvertit ex hoc solo, quod sit res existens, quia hoc solum per se nos non afficit*’ (*Principi Philosophia*, I, §52, cited §20/94, 4–6). Thus, the inquiry into the nature of substance is, from the first, diverted into an inquiry into its principal attribute, which itself remains unknown in principle. There follows a radical ‘equivocation’ about the term (§20/94, 27; §19/20, 2), in the course of which its ontological is confused with its ontic meaning, with a view to circumventing the former that much more easily and taking refuge in the treatment of the latter.

The debate about the distinction between finite and infinite substance, a debate to which Descartes accords a primary importance, only succeeds in reinforcing this basic orientation towards the ontic meaning of the term *substance*. The Cartesian treatise on substance in *Principia I*, §§51–4 totally ignores Aristotle’s discussion about the οὐσια, which is at least ontological in intent. For the most part this reproach, brought by Heidegger against Descartes, seems justified.¹⁰ The debate is deepened with a second, less visible but more important criticism. In bringing what is ontological in *substantia* under the ontic, Descartes necessarily confuses the ontological difference:

Because something ontical is made to underlie the ontological, the expression ‘substantia’ functions sometimes with a signification which is ontological, sometimes with one that is ontical, but mostly with one that is hazily ontico-ontological. Behind this slight difference [*Unterschied*] of signification however, there lies hidden a failure to master the basic problem of Being.

(§20/94, 29–33)

To this *grundsätzlichen Seinsproblem*, Heidegger adds, in a note to his personal copy, a simple formula: *ontologische Differenz* (ibid.). A decisive addition! For it shows that by obscuring the ontological in *substantia*, Descartes prompted the very apriori in which Husserl remains trapped in as much as he thinks it possible to distinguish substances (or ‘regions’)

solely on the basis of ontic criteria, that is, without undertaking to distinguish (ontologically) their respective modes of being. Finally, he shows that Descartes failed to confront the difference between being and beings, the only difference which would have made it possible for him to fix ontologically the distinction between beings and substances. The convergence between these two shortcomings – the meaning of the being of the *ego* and the meaning of the being of intra-mundane beings – results from the original evasion of the ontological difference. The reintegration of Descartes in the history of metaphysics by way of what in *Sein und Zeit* is still only called a ‘destruction of the history of ontology’ (§6), is supposed to bring to light in him the essential feature of metaphysical thinking: that it fails to come to terms with the difference between being and beings. Since, in *Sein und Zeit*, this difference still remains implicit, even though it is effectively operative, it only represents an objection to Descartes under the form of the two omissions with regard to the meaning of the being of beings. This does however suffice to trace the phenomenological inadequacies of Husserl back to their genealogical source in the Cartesian ontology – something that had to be demonstrated.

(3) Could one not, nevertheless, bring against the analysis of *Sein und Zeit*, the objection that Descartes did indeed work out a theory of the world? Surely the mundanity of the world first becomes an explicit problem when the *ego* asks itself whether it is not alone in the world, ‘*me solum esse in mundo*’ (AT, VII, 42, 22), and then again when he undertakes to prove its existence in *Meditatio VI*? These two references only however suffice to draw an argument in favour of the thesis upheld by *Sein und Zeit*. In the first case, the *ego* only eventually accedes to other beings on the basis of itself, that is to say, on the basis of the ideas which it is capable of entertaining with regard to those beings. Thus they are represented as determined in advance *qua* certain objects, therefore in accord with subsisting persistence (*Vorhandenheit*). God does not constitute an exception to this determination and, symptomatically, there is no place for the other to be found therein.¹¹ In the second case, the very fact that the ‘existence of the external world’ has to be proved constitutes – more the absence of a convincing proof of which Kant complained in taking up the Cartesian theme (§43/204, 9 and 25) – the true phenomenological ‘scandal’. For the world can only owe its existence to such a proof in as much as it is first reduced to the status of a presentation standing in need of realization, that is, of *Vorhandenheit*. Proving (or not) the existence of the world presupposes that one had already missed the mundanity of the world – i.e., its appearance within the phenomenological horizon.

These two Cartesian omissions therefore really come down to one – that of having grasped ‘the being of “*Dasein*” solely in the mode of the

being of the *res extensa*, as substance' (§21/98, 7–10). And it is from this standpoint that he addresses Kant.

The 'consciousness of my *Dasein*' means for Kant: consciousness of being being present-at-hand [*Vorhandenheit*] in Descartes' sense. The term '*Dasein*' therefore designates just as well the being present-at-hand of consciousness as it does that of things [*sowohl das Vorhandenheit des Bewußtseins wie das Vorhandenheit der Dinge*].

(§43/203, 25–8)¹²

5 *Dasein* as the 'destruction' of the *ego cogito*

Descartes' two omissions with regard to the thinking about being can be traced back in the end to one unique incapacity to think the being of beings outside the context of *Vorhandenheit* which, in turn, results from a misunderstanding of the ontological difference – at least in so far as it is taken in accordance with its negative formulation: 'Being can never be explained in terms of beings' (§43/203, 3–4).¹³ The *ego* is set up by Descartes, and after him by Kant no less than by Hegel, as a privileged being with a view to rendering other beings intelligible and to taking account of the meaning of being to be found in them, in short, to furnishing them with an ontic guarantee and an ontological legitimacy. But at the same time, and to an ever increasing extent, the meaning of that being which belongs to it remains completely undetermined. The indeterminateness of the mode of being of the *ego cogito* invades every other being and takes away from them their ontological solidity – 'the absence of any ontological ground [*ontologische Bodenlosigkeit*] for the problematic of the self [*Selbst*] from the time of Descartes' *res cogitans* to Hegel's concept of spirit' (§64, n. 1/320). In other words,

'if idealism' signifies tracing back every entity to a subject or consciousness whose sole distinguishing features are that it remains *indefinite* in its Being and is best characterized negatively as 'un-Thing-like', then this idealism is no less naive in its method than the most grossly militant realism.

(§43/208, 6–11)

In consequence, what separates Descartes (and those he made possible) from the question about the meaning of being is what separates the *ego cogito* from *Dasein*. *Dasein* recovers in it an echo of what the *ego (cogito)* already exhibits. *Da-*, there, this unique spot where everything else can consequently take place; but with the *ego cogito* the everything else only has the status of *cogitatum* because I am limited, *qua ego*, to the *cogitare*.

By contrast, on the basis of *Dasein*, the *Da* imparts upon everything else nothing less than *Sein*, being. There where the *ego* invites thought or rather lets itself be thought (even to turn itself into a simple thought) without ever giving rise to being in any determined or determining sense, *Dasein* gives being by determining the manner of being of other beings, since in advance, and by right, it determines itself to be according to its own proper manner. The *ego* certainly *is* but it is without thinking about itself since it only thinks of thinking the thinkable whose respective manner of being is no more fixed than its own. By thinking about itself as only being through and for the exercise of the *cogitatio*, it masks the complete absence of any decision with regard to the being of beings (reduced to the status of pure and simple *cogitata*) first by way of the epistemic evidence of its ontologically mobile existence and then by way of the certainty of the other truths. *Ego cogito*, not *ego sum* still less *Dasein* – the very formula betrays the indeterminateness which both disqualifies Descartes ontologically and accounts for the two omissions for which he is responsible. Henceforward, any interpretation of Descartes to be found in *Sein und Zeit* will have to be thematized solely in line with this opposition between the *ego cogito* and *Dasein* and in conformity with the declaration in principle that ‘the *res cogitans* is neither ontically nor ontologically equivalent to *Dasein*’ (§14/66, 27–8).

It only remains to develop these oppositions. With regard to the first, the *res cogitans* is not ontically equivalent to *Dasein* since the *res cogitans* possesses only an ontic awareness of itself and since *Dasein* does not think of itself (from the point of view of the *res cogitans*) as being itself another *res cogitans*. Although this opposition is never explicitly developed by Heidegger, it can easily be reconstituted in at least three steps. (1) The *ego* is a thing which shares the realitas of intra-mundane beings whether ready-to-hand or present-at-hand; by contrast, ‘the being of *Dasein* has at the same time been distinguished from [*abgegrenzt gegen*] the modes of being (ready-to-hand, present-at-hand, reality, *Zuhandenheit*, *Vorhandenheit*, *Realität*) which characterize entities with a character other than *Dasein* (§44/230, 18–20). The *res* of the *ego* leads to the Husserlian difficulty of effectively distinguishing the region of consciousness from the region of the world. *Dasein* cannot be counted among the number of real things nor does it admit reality into itself since it precedes and renders possible the very mode of being of reality. (2) The *ego* can be defined in terms of the absolute primacy in it of the theoretical attitude. It is born out of doubt, but this doubt does not itself become applicable until every immediate relation (whether pressing, useful or necessary) has disappeared: ‘no conversation . . . no care nor passion’ (AT, VI, 11, 8, 9–10), ‘*curis omnibus exsolvi*’ (AT, VII, 17, 13–18, 1). By contrast, ‘scientific research is not the only nor even the most proximate mode of being of this entity (sic *Dasein*)’ (§4/11, 35–6).

In fact, *Dasein*'s relation to the world is based upon concern, a concern which manipulates and utilizes beings as ready-to-hand, therefore without the least trace of disinterest. *Dasein* arrives at a theoretical attitude only later and by a procedure of subtraction. 'If knowing [*Erkennen*] is to be possible as a way of determining the nature of the present-at-hand by observing it, then there must first be a *deficiency* in our having-to-do with the world concernfully' (§13/61, 26–8). *Dasein* is not limited to adopting the theoretical attitude by challenging the so-called 'natural' attitude (in fact, concerned utilization of being as ready-to-hand), but both establishes and surpasses the one and the other because, more radically still, it makes them possible. (3) Finally, the *res cogitans* is confined to the domain of the *cogitatio* and devolves upon the other *res* that of *extensio*, this in accordance with an almost irremediable split. As a result, the *res cogitans* slips out of space – which also slips away from it. Because *Dasein*, on the contrary, is not defined from the first by the representation of what is present-at-hand (*vorhanden*) it does not exclude the disclosure of a fundamental spatiality. The 'spatiality of *Dasein*' (§23/104, 33) is based upon the de-severing (*Entfernung*) by means of which it abolishes the distance between an entity and itself. This same abolition of the distance, or deseverance, qualifies the original ekstasis of *Dasein*, its being-in-the-world. By contrast with the subject of idealism, based upon the *ego cogito*, 'the ontological "subject" properly so called, namely *Dasein* . . . is spatial' (§24/111, 33–4). *Dasein* is neither non-extended in the manner of the *ego cogito* nor extended: it is spatial, not non-extended. Thus, by refusing to take over the common title of *res*, *Dasein* is not constrained *vis-à-vis* the *res cogitans* but, on the contrary, surpasses it by not allowing itself to be limited either by the theoretical attitude or by the non-extended. This merely confirms that, taken as an entity, *Dasein* does not coincide with the *res cogitans*.

But since the 'ontic characteristic of *Dasein* consists in this, that it is ontological' (§4/12, 11–12), its ontic opposition to the *res cogitans* can only prepare the way for the ontological opposition which distinguishes it from its opposite (this time on the basis of itself and not its opposite). Undoubtedly the *res cogitans* can lay claim to a multiple 'primacy' but not to just such an 'ontological primacy'. On three points at least the opposition between them becomes irreducible.

(1) With regard to *Dasein*, its being is at issue; this being has to decide about its very own being and, in this decision, not merely its own (mode of) being is at issue but being pure and simple, therefore the mode of being of other entities which, for their part, are incapable of deciding either about themselves or about anything else (§4/12, 4–12; §9/41, 28–42, 2, etc.). *Dasein* enters into a surprisingly uncertain relation with itself. So very far from being reassured about itself by coming to know itself

as such, it only knows itself by coming to terms with the game that is being played with regard to itself – the game of its being that being whose being is at stake and which always has to decide with regard to this privileged being. *Dasein* only knows itself authentically when it recognizes that its being is in question, undecided and all the more uncertain for being placed beyond the possibility of certainty. *Dasein* is at stake. And such a stake is, in the end, beyond both uncertainty and certainty and definitely sets *Dasein* in opposition to the *ego cogito*. Undoubtedly, Heidegger is wrong textually to characterize it as a *fundamentum inconcussum* (§6/24, 34–5); however, Descartes does indeed see in it a ‘*fundamentum, cui omnis certitudo niti posse*’ (AT, VII, 144, 24–5), ‘quite firm foundations’ (AT, VI, 31, 18–19); and Descartes certainly wants to see it as unshakeable: ‘*minimum quid . . . certum et inconcussum*’ (AT, VII, 17, 7). More, the *ego* itself immediately takes on the figure of a foundation, better of an autarchic and self-sufficient foundation: ‘a foundation which is entirely my own’ (AT, VI, 15, 6). In thinking itself, the *ego* takes hold of itself and makes itself its own; not only is all uncertainty thereby surpassed but the certainty of the foundation, which is henceforward definitive, extends to every other *cogitatum* to come. The *ego* certainly decides about itself but only to abolish any play in this its own self-certainty. And if the *ego* decides, in the future, about other entities, it will only be to reduce them, as so many *cogitata*, to its own certainty. Thus *Dasein* does indeed inaugurate a game, that of the being of other entities through its own, there where the *ego* closes off all uncertainty, first of all in itself, then in the *cogitata*.

(2) *Dasein* exists, but existence is defined as possibility: ‘*Dasein* always comports itself on the basis of its existence, of a possibility of itself to be itself or not to be itself’ (§4/12, 25–6). Existence signifies: being outside oneself, and in such a way as only to be in the mode of a possibility of being and in accordance with the stake which brings this entity into a play with its being, therefore with being itself; existence implies the ekstasis of a *Dasein* thrown out of itself in the play of being, with regard to which it is up to him to decide. When the *res cogitans* takes hold of itself with certainty by saying ‘*ego sum, ego existo*’ (AT, VII, 25, 12–27, 28),¹⁴ it immediately interprets its *sum*, therefore its being, as an existence. Could this be the kind of existence which characterizes *Dasein*? On the contrary, Heidegger insists:

when we choose to designate the Being of this entity (sic *Dasein*) as ‘existence’ this term does not and can not have the ontological signification of the traditional term ‘*existentia*’; ontologically, *existentia* is tantamount to Being-present-at-hand, a kind of Being which is essentially inappropriate to entities of *Dasein*’s character.

(§9/42, 8–12)

Does one have to prove that Descartes, in fact, means by *existentia* the counterpart of a simple essential possibility, which is abolished by certain and unequivocal permanence? He himself does not even bother to define existence considering, as he does, that it is self-evident. '*Neminem enim unquam extitisse tam stupidum crediderim, qui prius quid sit existentia edocendus fuerit, antequam se esse concludere potuerit atque affirmare*' (AT, X, 524, 10–13). For the *ego cogito*, *existentia* implies the inauguration of the *Vorhandenheit*; for *Dasein*, existence signifies the abandonment of self and a surpassing of *Vorhandenheit* with a view to entering into that possibility which it is definitively.

(3) Finally, 'to *Dasein* there belongs essentially being-in-the-world' (§4/13, 12–13). Contrary to the Husserlian limitation, intentionality is not confined to the theoretical attitude because the relation to the world does not concern, first and foremost, the constitution of things. Intentionality is enlarged and radicalized to the point at which, in advance and out of itself, it opens up the 'I' upon something like a world. This is the only way in which it is possible to move from one entity to the being of all the others. This critique of Husserl which plays an important part in the composition of *Sein und Zeit* and which is to be found throughout the text is also valid of Descartes, on account of the 'affinity' which unites them. Descartes in fact reaches the *ego cogito* on the basis of a hypothesis with regard to his independence *vis-à-vis* the entire possible world. The *ego* appears in fact when, and only on condition that, worldly beings disappear under the sway of hyperbolic doubt. The *ego* is defined as follows: 'a substance whose entire essence or nature consists solely in thinking, which is not located anywhere and which does not depend upon any other material thing' (AT, VI, 33, 4–7). Heidegger is perfectly justified with reference to Husserl and to Kant (and therefore also Descartes) in talking of a 'worldless "I"', '*weltlose Ich*' (§63/316, 1), of a 'worldless subject', '*weltlose Subjekt*' (§75/388, 23). The classical difficulties of an opening on the world from a Cartesian standpoint do not have to be recalled here. They simply confirm the diagnosis made by Heidegger. Thus *Dasein* is certainly not to be found in the *res cogitans* since the *ego* can be defined as the very opposite of *Dasein*, an entity whose being is not in question. Reciprocally, *Dasein* can be defined as the very opposite of the *ego cogito*: that entity which is *not* in so far as it thinks. With regard to the *ego cogito*, *Dasein* therefore undertakes a relation of 'destruction'.

6 *Dasein* as the 'confirmation of the *ego cogito*'

Such a relation of destruction would however be pointless if an ontology could not be found in the *ego*, limited as it is to thinking. For the

'destruction' always bears upon the 'history of ontology'. So some kind of metaphysical situation has to be imputed to the ego, a situation which inserts it into the history of a misunderstood ontological difference. The reappraisal of the *ego cogito* follows therefrom since it still exhibits a figure of the being of beings, even though only in an obscure and forgetful manner. But this historical (historicist rather) imputation would not enjoy any legitimacy if the *ego cogito* could not justify its ontological pertinence even inauthentically and obscurely, not just in the course of the history of ontology but in the 'new commencement'. Even if only to retain its hermeneutical role in metaphysics, the *ego* has to hold on to and reserve for itself a potentiality for being. We shall therefore have to examine *Sein und Zeit* to see if it does justice to these two postulates concerning the *ego cogito*.

From the – dominant – point of view of his 'shortcoming', the Cartesian *ego* finds itself unable to manifest the meaning of being, a property which characterizes *Dasein* alone. The ontico-ontological antagonism between the *ego cogito* and *Dasein* appears sufficient (§5) to permit us to balance it out (without either insisting upon it or weakening it) by taking note of another relation between these same antagonists. To be sure, the *ego cogito* is presented as the most extreme adversary of *Dasein*. However, *Dasein* would not be engaged in so urgent a task of destruction if certain of its very own characteristics could not be found therein. It is in fact impossible for *Dasein* not to recognize itself in at least four characteristics of the *ego cogito*, and this in accordance with a spirit of rivalry which is all the more disturbing for being aggravated by these very similarities:

(1) *Dasein* 'does not come to an end [*Ende*] when it simply ceases, but it exists in a finite manner [*existiert endlich*]' (§65/3209, 37–8); finitude cannot be added as something extrinsic to an existence which, for this reason, would not enjoy an infinite (*endlose*) duration; it provides an essential determination for a *Dasein* which exists only for a term, for a death which comes to it out of the future; in as much as it marks the being-toward-death of *Dasein*, finitude opens the way to its own ekstasic temporality through the primacy of the figure which stands opposed to that temporality of *Vorhandenheit* which accords the primacy to the present as enduring. But the *ego cogito* is also characterized by finitude: '*cum sim finitus*' (AT, VII, 45, 21): this latter finitude does not simply possess an anthropological function (the *ego* must die, it is lacking in perfections, etc.), but quasi-ontological, for it is in fact this finitude which provokes doubt, therefore brings out the *cogitatio* which, in turn, institutes the beings of the world as so many *cogitata* to be constituted; for this reason, the finitude of the *ego* determines the meaning of the being of beings other than the *ego*. The relevance of this connection certainly remains hidden to and by Heidegger since he only envisages

the finitude of the *ego* in the horizon of a 'Classical-Christian anthropology' (§10/48, 27)¹⁵ and so reduces the relation between finite and infinite substance to an efficient production, with a view to refusing all originary validity to Cartesian finitude. It still holds however that the *ego* can only establish the beings of the world as *cogitata* (either on the basis of itself *qua cogito* or indissolubly), because it exists in accordance with an essential finitude. Furthermore, the later mediation developed by Heidegger on the *cogitatio* – Representation, *Vorstellung* – will continue to develop this implication. So *Dasein* confirms the *ego* from the standpoint of finitude.

(2) *Dasein* is the being whose being is in question only on condition that this being is its own, in person: 'its essence consists much rather in this that each time it has its being to be as its own [*es je sein Sein als seiniges zu sein hat*]' (§4/12, 22–3); or again:

That Being which is in issue for this entity in its very Being is in each case mine. . . . Because *Dasein* has in each case mineness, one must always use a *personal* pronoun when one addresses it: 'I am', 'you are'.

(§9/42, 23–9)

Dasein could not be itself, that is, be that very own being whose being is in question, save in a personal way. Nobody can take the place of *Dasein*; *Dasein* cannot stand in for anyone else; even if it's you who are *Dasein*, this *you* will have to say 'I' of itself, just like myself; even and even especially if the role of *Dasein* is played by someone else, this role must be played in the first person because it has to be played *in person*. Thus, even if *Dasein* does not call itself an *ego cogito* at first, it can only say, *-sein* by saying '*Ich bin*', therefore '*ego sum*'. Thus *Dasein* inevitably talks of itself, at least in the first instance, as an *ego cogito*: '*ego sum*' (AT, VII, 25, 12 = 27, 9), '*je suis*' (AT, VI, 32, 19 = AT, II, 38, 9–10 = AT, III, 247, 2, etc.). This comparison seems absolutely decisive. In fact, Descartes did not simply inaugurate the liaison between the *cogitatio* and existence in a 'subject'; he linked them in a 'subject' which is itself always interpreted (in the theatrical sense of that term) in the first person, or better, in a personage (*persona*, in the theatrical sense) which has to be played in person (again theatrical in that it assumes the function of an 'I' – by saying 'I', *hoc pronuntiatum*, *Ego* (AT, VII, 25, 11–12). Descartes' successors will tend, on the contrary, to eliminate this engagement of and to the ego; or rather, to replace the first formula with another which nobody has to perform in person: '*sum cogitans*'; or again, they will abolish it altogether either by the way of subtraction (Malebranche), or by that of generalization (Leibniz). What distinguishes Descartes is therefore not simply the necessary liaison he establishes

between two simple natures (*cogitatio* and *existentia*) but, more particularly, the performance of this necessary link between them by the non-substitutable *ego*. In this respect he exactly reproduces the non-substitutability which characterizes *Dasein*. So *Dasein* confirms the *ego* from the standpoint of mineness (*Jemeinigkeit*).¹⁶

(3) The finitude and non-substitutability of *Dasein* comes to it from the fact that it is in such a way that its being is an issue for it; this manner of being belongs to it in virtue of its being-toward-death, for death is the ownmost, the most absolute and the least surpassable possibility. In fact, 'death is the possibility of the pure and simple impossibility of *Dasein*' (§50/250, 39–40). Faced with death, *Dasein* finds itself exposed to its own, last impossibility, partly because death is inconceivable to us ontically (unimaginable), partly because death brings to an end that very possibility which *Dasein* is (more even than the possibility of its doing this or that). But the *ego cogito* knows a similar paradox, not with regard to its death but with regard to its liberty. For possibility arises in Cartesian terms with absolute freedom, the only infinity formally located in the finite *res cogitans*. The impossibility of this absolute freedom becomes apparent when it confronts divine omniscience and omnipotence, which latter destroy the very notion of the possible. In such an encounter the *ego cogito* not only confronts the impossibility of that possibility (liberty) which the theory requires of it; it also confronts the possibility of impossibility since, in the practical order, it decides to act as if it could act freely even though it is incapable of comprehending such a possibility. In each action, the *ego cogito* acts as if it were free and as if the impossible (an event not necessarily pre-determined by God) became once again open to possibility.¹⁷ The possibility of the impossible applies therefore to liberty just as it does to being-toward-death. Thus, once again, *Dasein* confirms the *ego* as the possibility of impossibility.

Even if one concedes the textual basis of these comparisons, they will appear superficial and even pointless considering the gulf (both ontological and ontic) which Heidegger never ceases to place between the antagonists. How can one avoid disqualifying these fragile similarities when one bears in mind the indeterminateness which afflicts the *ego cogito* (§6/24, 21 and 31; 25, 11; §10/49, 28, etc.)?

(4) But precisely this indeterminateness itself remains undetermined and in such a way that it can be employed to bring the *ego cogito* and *Dasein* together as much as it separates them. Notice that for a long time *Dasein* itself, under the auspices of the 'I', itself remains 'undetermined' (§25/116, 6); up to the analysis of anxiety, its being (and not simply that of the *ego*) remains 'ontologically undetermined' (§39/183, 21–2). In other words, getting rid of indeterminateness presents a difficulty even for *Dasein*, to the point that the final §83 leaves one with the impression that it still has not been resolved. There is more. The charge of

indeterminateness, brought first against the *cogito* and then again against *Dasein* reaches a positive and legitimate phenomenological determination in the most decisive moments of *Sein und Zeit*. Three instances at least attest to this. First, that anxiety where *Dasein* opens itself to anxiety in a totally undetermined way (*völlig unbestimmt* §40/186, 18–19, in the same terms as 24, 31); *Dasein* does not open itself to anxiety in the face of a determinate being because it is precisely affected by the impossibility of finding such an entity, an entity from which it can flee or which it can repel; thus ‘the specific indeterminateness of that in the face of which *Dasein* finds itself in anxiety makes itself apparent: the nothing and the nowhere (*das Nichts und Nirgends*)’ (§40/188, 28–30). In short, it is through indeterminateness that *Dasein* arrives at that determinateness which belongs to it in accordance with care (*Sorge*), at anxiety. It is this indeterminateness which makes it possible for *Dasein* to transcend being with a view to a nothingness which will come back again later to being. Indeterminateness is in this instance ontologically determinative. Second, because being-toward-death represents a possible way of being for *Dasein* it brings with it the indeterminateness of the moment of death. ‘With the certainty of death there goes the indeterminateness (*Unbestimmtheit*) of its ‘when’ (§52/258, 23–4; see also §53/265, 22, etc.). The indeterminateness of the moment of death holds *Dasein* open in the possible which, in its turn, brings to light a temporalization through the future; so in this instance, indeterminateness determines temporally. Third and last, that resoluteness through which *Dasein* decides (possibility) about itself in its very being (anxiety) bears the character of ‘positive’ indeterminateness (§57/275, 3):

To resoluteness, the *indefiniteness* characteristic of every potentiality-for-Being into which *Dasein* has been factually thrown, is something that necessarily *belongs*. Only in a resolution is resoluteness sure of itself. The *existentiell indefiniteness* of resoluteness never makes itself definite except in a resolution; yet it has, all the same, its *existential definiteness*.

(§60/298, 30–5)¹⁸

The ontic indeterminateness (indefiniteness) of *Dasein* guarantees its existential (therefore ontological) indeterminateness. In fact, this indeterminateness indicates that *Dasein* is not interested in any determinate entity but engages itself in the horizontal projection of all beings in general, therefore, in the end, transcends beings in general toward their very being. From our point of view, it is worth emphasizing here that indeterminateness can assume an eminently positive meaning, on condition that it frees *Dasein* from any determinate being and frees it for being in general. Where are we to draw the line between the indetermin-

ateness of the *ego cogito* and the indeterminateness of *Dasein*? It certainly cannot be drawn on the basis of a distinction between determinateness and indeterminateness but between two modes of indeterminateness – ontic, on the one hand, ontological, on the other. The *ego cogito*, ontically determined as a particular real being among others, remains ontologically indeterminate. Ontologically determined (as the sole being whose being is in question), *Dasein* remains, as such, ontically indeterminate in the face of determinate beings. The *ego cogito* and *Dasein* share a certain indeterminateness but they manifest it differently – in accordance with an ontological difference. Subject to this indispensable qualification, one may conclude that *Dasein* confirms the indeterminateness of the *ego* – to the point of almost being the very opposite of the latter.

7 The recuperation of a Cartesian horizon in *Sein und Zeit*

What conclusions can be drawn from these conditional confirmations? Unquestionably, the 'destruction' of the *res cogitans* would not have been so urgent at the time of writing the Introduction to *Sein und Zeit* if *Dasein* had not been able to recognize itself in it so clearly. The *ego* appears to *Dasein* as a deficiency but more particularly as a danger whose fascination is still sufficient to impose norms and which, for this very reason, has to be resisted, at least more arduously than Husserl did. In its ceaseless struggle to mark off *Dasein* from the *cogito*, *Sein und Zeit* therefore had to go over its inadequacies step by step, undo its decision and reverse its orientations. However belligerent it might be, such a confrontation cannot avoid a certain mimetic rivalry where the conqueror sometimes appears to have been conquered by his victim, in some way or other. In short, precisely because *Sein und Zeit* never ceases to call it in question, the *ego cogito* appears more enigmatic in itself and closer to *Dasein*. Because the analytic of the one only proceeds by way of a destruction of the other, it confirms the continued validity of the former.

If the '*cogito sum*' is to serve as the point of departure for the existential analytic of *Dasein*, then it needs to be turned around, and furthermore its content needs new ontological–phenomenal confirmation. The '*sum*' is then asserted first, and indeed in the sense that 'I am in a world'. As such an entity, 'I am' in the possibility of Being towards various ways of comporting myself – namely, *cogitationes* – as ways of Being alongside entities within-the-world. Descartes, on the contrary, says that *cogitationes* are present-at-hand, and that in these an *ego* is present-at-hand too as a worldless *res cogitans*.

It is simply stupefying that, at the end of the preparatory analytic of *Dasein* and after carrying through his 'destruction' of Descartes, Heidegger should still be sketching out the possibility of a retranscription of the analytic of *Dasein* in terms – certainly displaced and reinterpreted – of the Cartesian *ego*. Undoubtedly, this historical figure must have exerted a powerful fascination if he still found it necessary to refer to him after his critique of historical avatars and of the phenomenological tradition. *Dasein* is itself disentangled from the figure of Husserl's constituting consciousness by a repetition of the *ego sum* against Descartes' *ego cogito*. Far from disappearing in one or another *Kehre*, this attempt at a repetition covers Heidegger's entire thinking as is confirmed by a seminar held in 1968.

The paragraphs devoted to Descartes in *Sein und Zeit* constitute the first attempt to escape from the prison of consciousness, or rather not to get into it. It is certainly not a question of restoring realism against idealism; for, by limiting itself to establishing the reality of a world for the subject, realism remains dependent upon Cartesianism. It is much more a question of thinking the Greek meaning of the ἐγώ.

(Questions IV, p. 222)

Heidegger had certainly undertaken something in the order of a topical overcoming of the *ego* in the direction of the ἐγώ when he commented on the *Protagoras* (*Nietzsche II*, p. 135, etc.); but he surely carried this through more radically with his analytic of *Dasein* – a non-Cartesian *ego* with which perhaps he went even further than the Greeks ('über das Griechische hinaus', *Zur Sache des Denkens*, p. 79). In short, *Dasein* represents a fulfilment just as much as a destruction of the *ego* since such a destruction comes down to determining the *sum* – which Descartes left undetermined. That this ontological determination is carried through by way of a multiform ontic indeterminateness reinforces the appearance of a new 'affinity' – between Descartes and Heidegger and against Husserl.

This Cartesian haunting of *Sein und Zeit* can be illustrated by two other arguments. More exactly, it provides two other questions with an argument.

(1) The penultimate paragraph of *Sein und Zeit* introduces a strange formulation of what is normally called the *cogito*. 'This absolute negativity [sc. Hegel] offers a logically formalizable interpretation of Descartes' *cogito me cogitare rem* in which he sees the essence of consciousness' (§82/433, 12–16). The lecture course of Summer 1927, *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, will persist with this claim: 'The *cogitare* is always, according to Descartes, a *cogito me cogitare*' (GA 24,

p. 177). Heidegger knew perfectly well that Descartes had never presented the *cogito* in this way.¹⁹ Why then did he advance and uphold this new claim? Because, if he did not reproduce the letter of the Cartesian texts, he did at least produce the metaphysical essence of what, with the primacy of the *ego cogito* over the *cogitata*, came to be in the history of being – namely, the essence of representation. In fact at this point, and just before it got lost in inconclusiveness, *Sein und Zeit* still makes possible that long and continuous mediation of representation which finds expression first in the principle of reason and then in technology.²⁰ The continuity between the interrupted effort of 1927 and the essays on the history of metaphysics which culminate in *Nietzsche* and *Holzwege* is sustained, despite the *Kehre*. But it is sustained through the intermediary of Descartes. Not only does the Cartesian theme traverse the whole of *Sein und Zeit* (to whose homogeneity it contributes considerably), it also prepares the analytic of *Dasein* and the ‘destruction of the history of ontology’ for the lengthy meditation to come on the theme of *Seinsgeschichte*. The *ego* of *cogito me cogitare (rem)*, as the intimate adversary of *Dasein*, projects *Sein und Zeit* towards what nevertheless recedes from it.

(2) But, precisely, the ghostly presence of the Cartesian theme also prevents *Sein und Zeit* from advancing further along the way which leads beyond metaphysics. Even if one admits that it can be invoked in the singular, the *Kehre* makes itself known through two carefully researched, if not unequivocally established, disappearances: that of the language of metaphysics, that of the ‘subject’, including thereunder, in the end, *Dasein* itself. To be sure, *Dasein* will only be eliminated slowly, but it seems indisputable that the ontological difference will only find its classic formulation by eliminating the mediation between being and beings. Certainly, the language of metaphysics will persist, both as a point of departure and as a residue; but it seems to be more or less established that the phenomenological vocabulary of *Sein und Zeit*, whether transcendental or ontological, is, in every possible instance, demolished after 1935. *Sein und Zeit*, on the contrary, makes use of the vocabulary of metaphysics (which it pretends to question) through and through and so remains affiliated with subjectivity (even if only to destroy it). Amongst the motives for these impediments the least significant is certainly not the powerful shadow of the *ego cogito*, which ceaselessly obscures the phenomenological discoveries which *Dasein* is only capable of achieving against it. The adversary (singled out and only too well known) – the *ego* – conquers by the very mimicry which it imposes upon its conqueror, *Dasein*. In fact, Heidegger was only able to get away from his point of departure in *Sein und Zeit* by breaking with *Sein und Zeit* itself. But just as this break was never complete, it was not consummated with

Heidegger's dismissal of Descartes, who continues to speak loud and clear in the last *Seminars*.

In the context of ambiguities such as these two conclusions are clearly called for. First, even the most historical or systematic of Descartes' interpretations cannot dispense with a discussion of the Cartesian hermeneutic offered by *Sein und Zeit*. Second, the understanding of *Sein und Zeit* in the light both of its phenomenological point of departure and its 'destruction of the history of ontology', as also in its analytic of *Dasein* and right through to its inconclusive conclusion, must remain closed just as long as the Cartesian theme of the *ego* is not, in all its multiple dimensions, placed at the centre of the interpretation. In *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger and Descartes are both interpreters each of the other.

Translated by Christopher Macann

Notes

1 GA 61 (Frankfurt, 1985), Anhang I, p. 173. In the earlier texts, references to Descartes are, to our knowledge, very incidental (for example GA 1, p. 43).

2 *Questions IV* (Paris, 1976): the original is given here in French. See *ibid.*, pp. 122, 220, 245, 289 and 320. On the relation of Descartes to Fichte and Hegel one should consult the recent research of A. Philonenko 'Sur Descartes et Fichte' and B. Bourgeois 'Hegel et Descartes' (in both cases more reserved than Heidegger) in *Les Etudes philosophiques*, 2 (1985), pp. 205ff. and 221ff.

3 When does Husserl begin to discuss Descartes? We find a reference to the latter as early as *Logical Investigations I*, LU, t. 2, 64, and he is discussed at length in an Appendix, added as a complement to the 6th Logical Investigation, LU, t. 3, 223, 235, 240, 241. But he is only considered here as an opponent. On this see F.-W. von Herrmann, *Husserl und die Meditationen des Descartes* (Frankfurt, 1971).

4 On the importance of the difference between finite and infinite substance which Heidegger, like Husserl, overlooks, see von Herrmann, *Husserl*, pp. 17–20 and, from the point of view of this study, my work *Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes* (Paris, 1986), chap. III, §13, pp. 161ff.

5 Regarding the bearing of this accusation, see our essay 'Being and the phenomenon,' in *Phénoménologie et métaphysique* (Paris, 1984).

6 'Here we can already recognize an affinity [*Verwandschaft*] with Descartes. What is worked out, certainly at a more elevated level by phenomenological analysis, as pure consciousness is the field that Descartes confusedly anticipated under the title of *res cogitans*, the global field of the *cogitationes*, while the transcendent world, the paradigmatic index of which is furnished for Husserl by the fundamental layer of the world of material things, is characterized as *res extensa* by Descartes. This affinity is not limited to a contingent fact. Husserl explicitly assumes a relation to Descartes when he declares that this mediation has reached its peak.' ('Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs', SS. 1925, GA 20, p. 139). A note by Heidegger in his personal copy of *Sein und Zeit* confirms the permanence of his conclusion about this 'affinity'. While criticizing the Cartesian reduction of the phenomenon of the world to material nature, he

adds 'Critique of Husserl's construction of "ontologies"!' *Sein und Zeit* §21/98, n. a).

7 This analysis should be completed and confirmed by the parallel represented by 'Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs', §22. 'Das traditionelle überspringen der Frage nach der Weltlichkeit der Welt am Beispiel Descartes' (GA 20, pp. 231ff.).

8 See *Sein und Zeit*, §123/58, pp. 33–8 and the note from the personal copy 'Rückdeutung, regressive interpretation'. Conversely, the *Abkehr/hinkehren* game in the context of anxiety §40/186, pp. 3–8.

9 On its posterity in the later work see H. L. Dreyfus, 'De la techne à la technique: le statut ambigu de l'ustensilité dans *L'Etre et le Temps*', in Heidegger (Paris: L'Herne, 1983), pp. 202ff.

10 See *Sein und Zeit*, §21/100, pp. 7–14. The apriori character of the Cartesian doctrine of substance cannot be overestimated, see *Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes*, chap. III, §§13–14.

11 On this point, see our sketch: 'L'unique ego et l'alteration de l'autre', in 'Intersoggettività, socialità, religione', *Archivio di Filosofia* liv, 1–3 (1986).

12 Similarly in 'Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs', §22/GA 20, p. 239.

13 The familiar formula 'being can never be explained by way of beings' (208, 3–4 = 207, 30 and 34, §2/6, 18, §41/196, 17f.), received decisive confirmation in a note to Heidegger's personal copy: 'Ontologische Differenz' (ibid., 208). Thus we find explicit confirmation that the indeterminateness of the meaning of being leads to (or results from) a misunderstanding of the ontological difference by Descartes.

14 This formula – decisive – only appears in the *Meditationes*; however, Heidegger does not seem to make of it a special case.

15 Similarly in *Sein und Zeit* §6/24, 30f.: §20/92, 6f.: §21/95, 5–25; §44/229, 36–40.

16 That Cartesian 'egoity' anticipates Heideggerian 'mineness' is confirmed by the similarity of the objection brought against them by Pascal (*Pensées* 397 and 597) and E. Lévinas (*Totalité et infini*, p. 61, etc.) respectively – the objection of 'injustice'. For other more positive conceptions of the 'Ich bin' see *Sein und Zeit*, §58/281, 25–7; §60/297, 15–17; §63/313, 28–30; §64/317, 27–8f.

17 For a confirmation of this interpretation of Cartesian liberty as the possibility of the impossible, one might refer to my: *Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes*, chap. III, §15, pp. 203–16.

18 Similarly *Sein und Zeit*, §62/308, pp. 16–40.

19 Heidegger adds: 'obzwar nicht eigens und ausdrücklich gemeint' (GA 24, p. 177). In fact several of Descartes' statements could be employed more or less to validate his claim though he does not cite them. For instance, AT VII, 33, 12–14; 44, 24; 352, 1–18; 559, 6–7: AT V, 149 (see *Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes* (Paris, 1981), 391f.).

20 The principal mediations on the *cogito me cogitare* (with, it is true, the frequent omission of the final *rem*) are to be found successively in 1938, 'Die Zeit des Weltbildes', in *Holzwege*, GA 5, pp. 108–9 (n. 9), 'Der europäische Nihilismus', in *Nietzsche II*, p. 48 etc., and in 1936–46, 'Berwindung der Metaphysik', in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, I, p. 65, etc. One should also add all the developments devoted either to the *subjectum* or to the *re-presentatio*. Some further references and indications are to be found in my sketch: 'Heidegger et la situation métaphysique de Descartes', *Bulletin Cartésien IV*, in *Archives de Philosophie*, 38(2) (1975).

The 1929 debate between Cassirer and Heidegger

Pierre Aubenque

Between 1923 and 1931 Cassirer and Heidegger engaged in relations which, without being close, were marked by mutual esteem and, at least at the beginning, by a quite considerable community of interests, aiming at nothing less than the renovation of the philosophical enterprise and at the extension of its field of employment. In a note to *Sein und Zeit* (p. 51, n. 1), Heidegger invokes the second part of the *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*¹ and praises Cassirer for having made 'mythic existence' the theme of a philosophical interpretation which surpasses the bounds of 'ethnological research' and furnishes the latter with the 'leading themes' which it lacked. Heidegger simply doubted whether Cassirer would be able to find an adequate basis for a hermeneutics of existence (envisaged in all its manifestations) in the architectonic of Kant's *Critique* and, referring to a note from the *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (p. 16) which invoked the horizons opened up by phenomenology, he emphasized that, resulting from a meeting at Hamburg in December 1923, Cassirer and he were in complete agreement on the 'necessity of constituting an existential analytic'. What followed would show that Cassirer and Heidegger did not in fact mean the same thing by this requirement. In his review of Cassirer's work on myth, which appeared in 1928 in *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, Heidegger deplores the fact that the very 'phenomenology of mythic consciousness' which Heidegger himself had considered essential should be limited to an 'extension of the transcendental problematic in the neo-Kantian sense: to grasp not merely the unity of nature but also the unity of culture as referring back to certain laws of spirit'.² In proceeding in this way, Cassirer neglects the essential question, which is that of the mode of being of 'spirit', of its rootedness in a human existence to the very structure of which there belongs something like 'myth in general'.³ To sum up, what was lacking in Cassirer's analyses was a 'foundation in a radical ontology of existence'.⁴

In his own long review of Heidegger's work *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, published in 1931 in *Kant-Studien*, Cassirer proves to be just as critical. While acknowledging the 'interior passion' and the 'genuinely philosophical temperament' which made it possible for Heidegger to 'carry us right to the vital centre of the problems',⁵ while affirming his agreement with the importance Heidegger accords to the doctrine of the 'productive imagination' (p. 63), he reproaches him with 'seeking to refer, indeed to reduce' all the faculties of knowledge to the imagination (p. 72). In so doing, he fails to appreciate the transcendence of spirit and 'dissolves the idea of the "Logic" in the cross-currents of a process of originary questioning' and, in accordance therewith, reduces liberty to a foundationless foundation, to wit, the 'abyss [*Ab-grund*] of Dasein' (p. 82). At this point Cassirer even raises the tone somewhat. Heidegger's formulas 'are to be understood out of Kierkegaard', but they are alien to the spirit of Kant, the philosopher whom Heidegger is claiming to critique. For

Kant is above all a thinker of the *Aufklärung* in the most beautiful and elevated sense of that word. He strives toward the light and toward clarity at the very point at which he reflects upon the most profound and most hidden 'foundations' of being. . . . The philosophy of Heidegger, it has to be said, bears the marks of another style.⁶

The debate between Cassirer and Heidegger on the interpretation of Kantianism and, by way of it, on the very meaning of philosophy, found its culmination at Davos in March–April 1929, on the occasion of the university lectures organized for the second consecutive year in the township of Grison. One of the objectives of these meetings was to bring together, on the neutral soil of Switzerland, French and German intellectuals, to organize, as one of the participants, Jean Cavaillès, was to proudly declare, an 'intellectual Locarno'. In fact, and to stick simply with the philosophers, two Frenchmen, A. Spaier and Léon Brunschvicg, contributed to these meetings. But the list (by no means exhaustive) of young French philosophers, still unknown students at the time, who took part in these lectures, is impressive: Jean Cavaillès, M. de Gandillac, E. Lévinas, P.-M. Schuhl. On the German side, the two 'stars' who, to all appearances, outshone their French equivalents, were Cassirer and Heidegger. Among the German students present, O. F. Bollnow and J. Ritter should be mentioned since we are indebted to them for a valuable summary (*Protokoll*) of the discussion between Cassirer and Heidegger. The general theme of the lectures was: 'Man and generation'. It was apparently addressed as such by the historians of the literature who had been invited to Davos. 'In return', as Jean Cavaillès noted ironically, 'the professional metaphysicians paid little attention to the question,

assuming, no doubt, that all came down to a matter of philosophy.⁷ For all that, it is possible to connect the general theme of the lectures 'What is Man?' with the lectures by Cassirer on philosophical anthropology and with those of Heidegger on *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and the Task of Laying the Foundations of Metaphysics*. These lectures by Heidegger offered in fact a sketch of the interpretation of Kantianism which he was going to make known a few months later with the publication of his work on *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. The discussion which took place between Cassirer and Heidegger in the 'Arbeitsgemeinschaft' (and whose proceedings were summarized by Bollnow and Ritter), dealt with Heidegger's interpretation of Kant and furnish, live, Cassirer's first reactions, together with the objections which will be developed a little later in connection with the already cited review of Heidegger's work.

Most of the documents relevant to this discussion have already been edited (some for the first time) and translated into French in a work published by me in 1972 in collaboration with Pierre Quillet.⁸ The only important text which eluded us is the very lively and objective *compte rendu* by Jean Cavaillès, a copy of which I obtained thanks to Maurice de Gandillac, and a few passages from which I have transcribed in the appendix to this piece [not included – ed.]. In what follows, I would like to try to bring out the meaning and the presuppositions of the discussion at Davos by relying primarily upon the official summary. But the latter will be clarified and made more specific with the help of the summary of the conferences and the review by Cassirer of Heidegger's work.⁹

What furnishes the apparent basis of the debate and its explicit point of departure is the opposition between the neo-Kantian interpretation of Kantianism as a general theory of knowledge and, in particular, as an attempt to lay the foundations of scientific knowledge, and Heidegger's own interpretation that sees in Kantianism an enterprise which seeks to found metaphysics on an analytic of the finite existence of man.

This point of departure is soon superseded to the extent that Cassirer, despite his particular admiration for Hermann Cohen, cannot be considered, and does not consider himself to be, an orthodox neo-Kantian. For Cassirer, even if the mathematical science of nature can be regarded as a 'paradigm', it does not in itself 'constitute the whole problem' (*P*, p. 30). Science does not exhaust the productivity of spirit which is manifest with equal right in the constitution of symbolic forms in general, whether they take the form of language, of myth, or of culture. Spirit cannot be reduced to reason or understanding. Cassirer himself brought out the importance of the transcendental imagination with Kant, for whom it functions not merely as an intermediary but as an original and autonomous power, in effect, a *synthesis speciosa*, that is, a faculty

productive of images and symbols whose legitimacy is on a par with that of the pure concepts of the understanding.

The agreement on this last point between the two philosophers is frequently underlined by Cassirer (pp. 30, 32). But what, for Cassirer, is only an extension of neo-Kantianism becomes, with Heidegger, a radical inversion (p. 43). Even if Heidegger and Cassirer both admit the central character of the imagination, a more detailed analysis makes it possible to appreciate that, for Cassirer, the spontaneity of the productive imagination announces and prefigures that of the understanding while, for Heidegger on the contrary, the element of the *speciosum*, to be found in the synthesis of the imagination, is the element which leads all synthesis, including that of the understanding, back to the facticity of an originary 'reception'.

The fact that the mathematical science of nature should be regarded by Cassirer as a paradigm is enough to have Heidegger place his interlocutor in the neo-Kantian camp, that is, in a foundational enterprise which culminates in the constitution of scientific objectivity. But a foundation presupposes a 'ground' as Heidegger says (*P*, p. 43), a *terminus a quo*, as Cassirer prefers to put it. They both agree in seeing finitude as the point of departure for the Kantian enterprise. Heidegger has no difficulty in getting Cassirer to accept what he establishes at length in his Kant book: the finitude of man manifests itself in the 'derivative' character of the kind of knowledge of which he is capable; deprived of intellectual intuition, that is, of an intuition which would be capable of creating its object, like God's *intuitus originarius*, he is only equipped with a 'derivative' intuition, that is, an intuition subject to the condition of the 'reception' of an object. Without the receptivity of intuition, understanding would lack an object and its spontaneity would be useless. But, with the exception of this point in common (by no means a trivial one: before them one hardly ever insisted upon 'receptivity' in the Kantian tradition, except to see therein a cunning of spontaneity), the interpretations diverge in an irreversible fashion. Heidegger's central idea, which Cassirer brings out very clearly in his review of the book, is that one does not escape from one's point of departure, and that every attempt to escape from it simply continues to bear the traces of it. According to Heidegger, Kant's insistence upon spontaneity

should not be understood or pointed in a direction which contradicts the point of departure of the Kantian problem. It should always be borne in mind that it is an expression of the finitude of human knowledge and not a denial or abolition of this finitude. . . . The original link with intuition can never be broken, the dependence upon it which it brings with it can never be set aside. It is not possible to break the chain of finitude. All thinking as such, indeed any 'purely logical'

employment of the understanding, already bears the imprint of finitude.

(R, p. 61)

The 'finitude' of thought rests on the fact that it is 'empty' if it is not filled with intuition, that in this sense it is therefore derivative and dependent and from the very moment in which it imposes its law upon what is sensibly given. In short, finitude is not only for Heidegger the *terminus a quo* of human knowledge and existence (here Cassirer agrees); unsurpassable and insurmountable, it stamps its mark upon the *terminus ad quem* (which is, for Heidegger, the question of being), a conclusion which Cassirer vigorously contests (pp. 40, 42–3).

Cassirer's arguments against the affirmation of the unsurpassable character of finitude are of two kinds. The first calls in question the legitimacy of the distinction between finite and infinite knowledge. It takes its stand on the model of that divine understanding with reference to which human knowledge is characterized negatively as finite. Citing Kant, Cassirer reminds Heidegger that such an understanding is itself 'a problem . . . that is, an object the very possibility of which cannot be represented in any way'.¹⁰ The only use, added Kant, that can be made of the idea of a divinely creative intellect is 'purely negative', or in other words, that of an infinite understanding. Heidegger, against whom this appeal to Kantian orthodoxy is advanced as an objection, has no trouble in agreeing with it. For the Cartesian argument to the effect that one has to have the idea of infinity in order to think the finite (and which would require that one sees in the idea of an infinite understanding something much more than a 'problem') is only valid 'from a formal point of view' (P, p. 35). 'Materially speaking', that is, in the order of real dependence, it is finitude which is constitutive, infinity being derived by means of the purely negative idea which we have of the latter. Heidegger's strategy consists in tracing back to finitude, as to its very basis, everything that at first sight seems to stand opposed to it in Kant. To Cassirer, who underlines the productive and therefore already 'spontaneous' character of the imagination and illustrates this point by invoking the 'originary' character (in Kant's sense 'creative') of the *exhibitio originaria* by means of which Kant typifies the imagination of the schematism, Heidegger retorts: 'Originary certainly, but this originaryity is an exhibition of the representative capacity, of the free "self-giving" which harbours the necessary relation to a "receptivity"' (P, p. 35). The necessity which obliges originaryity to proceed by way of exhibition seems to Heidegger to be a supplementary proof of finitude. In a more general way, the fact that the 'ontological comprehension of being' (ibid.) has to pass by way of a purely 'ontic' experience of beings is precisely that of finitude. This is how the, at first sight, seemingly odd affirmations

of Heidegger (affirmations which are not expressed with the same degree of radicality in his published work) are to be explained: 'Ontology is an index of finitude. God does not possess it. And that man has this *exhibitio* is the most convincing proof of his finitude. For only a finite being stands in need of ontology' (*P*, p. 35). One might add that only a finite being stands in need of 'this infinity' which breaks out in the imagination (*ibid.*)

Cassirer's second argument concerns the Kantian status of an understanding whose spontaneity is not eliminated but only solicited by the receptivity of that intuition which furnishes the occasion for it but also, and more especially, requires it. Cassirer thinks he stands in the direct line of Kantianism when he claims that: 'In the field of experience and of its phenomena, understanding possesses an integrally creative character. . . . In this way, the limitation of understanding bears witness to its irreducible spontaneity, *par excellence*, its authentic and not simply derivative creativity' (*R*, p. 64). Certainly, Heidegger does well to recall that human knowledge is, in its entirety, dependent upon intuition and even that all thinking, even including that of divine thinking, is 'at the service of intuition' (*R*, p. 65). But, as Cassirer remarks, service is not servitude:

The function fulfilled by the understanding in the service of intuition does not take away from it anything of its liberty nor of its autonomy. It serves intuition but is not subordinated to intuition; it remains its objective without being subjected to it or commanded by it. To such an extent indeed that the being of intuition, as determined intuition – and what would a being be deprived of all determination? – depends upon the function of the understanding.

(*ibid.*)

But this function of the understanding comprises, according to Cassirer, a positive element of infinitude: it concerns the requirement, imposed upon it by reason, to investigate 'the absolute totality of the synthesis of conditions' (p. 67). But Heidegger, once again, turns the argument around: the fact that the totality has to pass by way of a synthesis, that it stands in need of a 'construction', that the idea which sums it up should be purely regulative and not constitutive, that a progress to infinity is needed to approximate asymptotically toward its realization, this is precisely what is meant by finitude. One is reminded here of Hegel's 'bad infinity', with this difference, that this bad infinity is not due to a provisional self-limitation of understanding but is bound irrevocably to the ecstatic structure of *Dasein*.

At one point in the discussion at Davos, Cassirer introduces the military metaphor of a breakthrough (*Durchbruch*) and asks:

Does Heidegger want to give up this objectivity, this form of absoluteness which Kant reclaims in the ethical domain, in the theoretical domain, and in the *Critique of Judgment*? Does he want to withdraw completely back upon the closure of finite being and, if not, where is the breakthrough towards this sphere of objectivity?

(P, p. 33)

Heidegger does not reply directly to this question but one can see what his reply would have been: the 'breakthrough' refers back to an originary break (*Bruch*); the fact that man stands in need of a breakthrough in order to gain access to objectivity and to intelligibility is the sign of a non-possession, of a non-coincidence with self, therefore of finitude. By way of the metaphor of a 'breakthrough', it is the entire debate on transcendence which is in question. For Cassirer, transcendence is surpassing; it is the sign of man's participation in intelligibility; it expresses the pre-eminent dignity of reason, even human reason. In the temporal order, it is that which renders possible a progress towards the light. With Heidegger, transcendence is a movement immanent to Dasein, an expression of the ecstatic structure of temporality; it opens no other avenue for man than the awareness of his dereliction and his anguish in the face of the nothingness of a 'ground' which is in truth an abyss (*Abgrund*; P, p. 43).

An essential dimension would have been absent from the debate at Davos if the ethical question had not been broached. It is Cassirer who takes the initiative and this part of the discussion is all the more interesting for the fact that Heidegger has nothing to say on this point in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, as well, or so it seems, as in the talks given at Davos. Cassirer's argument is clear: if it is true that human knowledge is limited and that any intuition of the intelligible is denied him, that the 'breakthrough' does not go so far as the appropriation of new territories, then the practical activity of reason no longer knows these limitations.

It is here that we find the abrupt passage to another order. The barriers which limit us to a determinate sphere suddenly fall to the ground. Morality, as such, leads beyond the world. At this point a sort of breakthrough is accomplished which certainly constitutes the decisive metaphysical moment. It's a question of the transition to the *mundus intelligibilis*. This holds for the ethical, for it is in the ethical sphere that a point is reached which is no longer relative to the finitude of the knowing being, but where an absolute is posited.

(P, p. 31)

Cassirer might have relied here upon the universality and unconditionality of the moral law. He makes the mistake of introducing the notion of an 'imperative' (*P*, p. 30). Heidegger immediately takes advantage of this weakness. To Cassirer's suggestion that 'in the categorical imperative there is something which surpasses finite being' he objects that 'it is precisely the concept of the imperative which attests to the intrinsic relation to a finite being' (*P*, p. 84). In fact, though Heidegger does not insist upon it, he might have cited in support of his claim the Kantian doctrine of the imperative which limits its application, even in the case of the categorical imperative, to 'rational and *finite*'¹¹ beings. The categorical imperative is, in particular, the specific form which the moral law takes in the case of a rational being, certainly, but also a finite being, that is, a being blind to the transcendent Idea of the Good and whose will, contaminated by the proximity to sensibility, is not even holy (even if it can be *pure*), that is, does not coincide immediately with the moral law. The imperative form which the moral law has to assume in the case of man gives expression to the fact that the relation of a rational and *finite* being to the moral law is a relation of 'dependence', that is, of 'obligation' (*Verbindlichkeit*), and of 'constraint' (*Nötigung*). On this basis it becomes comprehensible that, as Kant puts it explicitly,¹² 'the imperative is not valid for a *divine* will and, in general, for a *holy* will'.

Cassirer would no doubt reply here that the imperative form which the moral law assumes in the case of man does not change its content, that is, its rationality. He comes back to this problem in the review of Heidegger's book, with reference to 'respect', to which Heidegger had devoted a brief analysis¹³ with a view to showing that, even in the practical order, feeling intervenes, that is, self-affection, submission to 'pure receptivity'. Cassirer reproaches Heidegger here for not

distinguishing between the sphere of specifically *ethical* problems and that of *psychological* problems. The content of the moral law is not, according to Kant, founded on the feeling of respect; the latter in no way constitutes its meaning. This feeling simply indicates the way in which the law, which is absolute in itself, is represented in finite empirical consciousness. It does not belong to the foundation of the Kantian ethic but to its application.

(*R*, pp. 70–1)

Cohen precisely distinguished between the question: 'What is the moral law?' and the question: 'Under what concept (or rather by way of what experience) does it appear within the human horizon?' Heidegger clearly is only interested in the second question. Cassirer, without ignoring the relative pertinence of the latter, thinks that the reply to the first question alone is essential and brings out the authentic meaning of

Kantian rationalism. This debate is concentrated in the end on the notion of freedom. In the discussion at Davos, Heidegger (more attentive once again to the processes which are revealed in them than to their intelligibility) talked of Kantian freedom as 'liberation' and he stipulated:

This liberation does not consist in, so to speak, freeing oneself for the formative figures of consciousness and for the kingdom of form, but in becoming free for the finitude of Dasein, plunging into the dereliction of Dasein, plunging into the conflict which is inscribed in the essence of freedom.

(*P*, p. 44)

Cassirer replies in his review:

The noumenal meaning of the idea of freedom . . . remains . . . rigorously separated from the manner in which it appears and presents itself in the sphere of psychic phenomena. . . . Kant repeatedly comes back to what concerns the idea of freedom and in consequence the idea of practical reason *itself*: it is a pure 'intelligible', unconnected with purely temporal conditions. It is a pure glimpse across the a-temporal – at the horizon of the supra-temporal.

(*R*, p. 71)

One can imagine Heidegger interrupting yet again on another score: why does the intelligible have to be 'glimpsed'? And what is a 'horizon'?

But it would be pointless to pursue this issue once the antagonistic principle has been identified. This is something upon which the two interlocutors seem to have reached some measure of agreement at the end of the discussion at Davos. Not without a certain sadness on Cassirer's part: 'It would lead nowhere to keep on underlining this opposition. We have reached a point where little can be expected from purely logical arguments' (*P*, p. 47). The *medium* of language has not functioned as it ought to have done, that is, as mediation (*Vermittlung*). It persists nevertheless, or at least that is Cassirer's 'postulate' and his 'requirement', as the context of 'mutual comprehension', right down to the differences:

Each speaks his own language, and it is unthinkable that the language of one should be transposed right over into the language of the other. And yet we understand each other through the intermediary of language. There is something like *the* language. And something like a unity over and beyond the infinity of different ways of speaking. This

is the decisive issue for me. And this is why I start out from the objectivity of symbolic form.

(P, p. 47)

It is obvious on the other hand that Heidegger does not expect anything to come of 'simple mediation' (P, p. 50) and he even seems to experience a certain sense of triumph at not having found it. In place of the *logos* or even a *dia-logos* through the development of which one might have been able to reach an agreement, he opposed once again the 'finitude of man', a finitude which 'manifests itself in a particularly radical manner' in philosophy and therefore makes it impossible for the latter to free us from it. Finitude can be translated here by what J.-F. Lyotard will call later the 'differend' and what Heidegger calls the 'differentiation' (*Unterscheidung*) of points of view. Only the recognition of differences at their root, a recognition which excludes any pretence of dialectical reconciliation, makes it possible to preserve the radicality of the question, which otherwise runs the risk of being constantly softened and finally forgotten.

In the context of a debate on Kant, it is not without interest to consider how these two antagonistic philosophies are confirmed by different attitudes towards the history of philosophy. Both Cassirer and Heidegger rely upon Kant's text. But Heidegger prefers to invoke philosophical themes isolated from their context (like the schematism, the imperative, finitude), because they seem to him to be more successful in revealing the un-thought (that is, the not-yet-thought) of the Kantian question. Cassirer is quite right in objecting that he extravagantly neglects the very context which is alone capable of conferring upon these texts the intelligibility intended by their author. Running the opposite risk from that assumed by Heidegger, which is to occasionally overlook the letter of this or that marginal or erratic assertion, Cassirer invokes the coherence of the Kantian system as a whole, its rationalizing and emancipating finality, its inscription in the general movement of the *Aufklärung*. With a view to supporting his interpretations, Cassirer invokes the understanding of Kant displayed by such contemporaries of his as Schiller or Guillaume de Humboldt. The historical argument is admittedly a double-edged sword. For against Schiller, who sees in Kantianism an evocation of an 'earthly anguish' through the aspiration towards the 'reign of the ideal',¹⁴ it is always possible to counter with Heinrich von Kleist who wants to preserve nothing more of the Kantian morality than the hardness of the imperative and the fearful transcendence of the Law.

In privileging the point of departure, the *terminus a quo*, of the Kantian process of questioning, Heidegger knows that he is neglecting its explicit development. But he thinks that this development is the result of a sort of inertia which leads the question inevitably towards a

'solution', which leads contradiction towards its 'overcoming', which leads thinking towards the 'system', and, in this way, forces it out of its original questionability. The radicalism of the point of departure is still operative, but there comes a time when it is obscured and denied: 'Kant found himself brought through his own radicalism to a position before which he could only withdraw' (A, p. 24). This is the justification Heidegger offers for the 'violence' of his interpretation in his book on Kant,¹⁵ a violence designed to climb back up the slope of the degradation which rationalization and subjectification represent for Heidegger, a descent which he will call later 'onto-theology'. Cassirer insists vigorously upon this violence, however theoretical it might appear:

I strenuously object to the legitimacy, the *quid juris* of the violence exerted by Heidegger against Kant. Heidegger no longer speaks here as a commentator but as a usurper who undertakes, one might almost say, to cut right through the Kantian system with a view to subjecting it to, and using it for, the ends of his own problematic. Faced with such a usurpation, restitution has to be demanded: the *restitutio in integrum* of the Kantian doctrine.

(R, p. 74)

In fact, a certain violence does make itself felt in Heidegger's discussion of 1929, extending beyond the technical problem of interpretation. Cassirer the humanist, the man of vision and culture, seems to be bothered by it even though, to judge by the testimony of the other participants, relations between the two men never ceased to be courteous. One can imagine the astonishment and the distress of Cassirer (and he was not alone), reading in the summary put about at Davos by Heidegger himself that 'Kant's position' (this position before which, to tell the truth, 'he could not fail to withdraw') means: 'destruction [*Zerstörung*] of what hitherto had furnished the foundations of Western metaphysics (Spirit, Logos, Reason)' (A, p. 24). And what did Heidegger have in mind when he claimed that 'the task of philosophy consists in prising man away from the laziness of a life limited to utilizing spiritual products, prising him away from this life to throw him back, in a certain sense, upon the harshness of his destiny' (P, p. 46)?

There was certainly an element of provocation in this speech. The Heidegger of 1929, still young and having already attained a measure of philosophical glory, was addressing (and before an audience of students, most of whom he had already won over) a representative of what was still in Germany, and by way of neo-Kantianism, the dominant philosophical tradition.¹⁶ And he seemed to be enjoying the role of iconoclast, *vis-à-vis* a personality whom a witness described as 'olympian'.¹⁷ To anyone who thinks that the debate between these two men could have been

altered, particularly on Heidegger's side, by extra-philosophical interventions, I would like to point out that the radicality of philosophical confrontation between the defenders and the opponents of classical rationalism was frequently translated in the period of the 1920s and 1930s into a certain violence of tone and, in particular, the brutality of metaphors which are wilfully 'heroic' (Cassirer cannot be entirely excused here with this metaphor of the 'breakthrough'). It is hardly necessary to note that Bergson, who in the *Two Sources of Morality and Religion* was going to denounce the 'dismantling power of the intellect', saw in the act of philosophizing an ultimately painful 'tension' and was about to confer the task of founding an 'open' morality not upon the universality of a law but upon the 'heroic' example of an individual whose very existence is an 'appeal'. Hence, the astonishing page which literally evokes the march of the Valkyrie and with which the third chapter of *Creative Evolution*¹⁸ comes to a close. In this regard, Heidegger could even appear the more sober contestant to a witness like Jean Cavaillès who, in the end, ranks him among those who seek to 'construct a system of concepts' rather than among those who attempt to 'translate profound and personal intuitions by means of a complicated verbal symbolism'.¹⁹

In as much as the debate at Davos announces other controversies it is, in my opinion, a matter of controversies which are equally philosophical and which have not ceased to be of concern to us. They can be grouped around a question of foundations which was already clearly articulated at Davos and bears upon the conditions of the exercise and legitimacy of reason. Against Cassirer and the entire rationalist tradition, Heidegger maintains that reason is neither an *index sui* nor a *causa sui* nor a *norma sui*. He takes the expression 'Critique of Reason' in an almost juridical sense. But can reason be both the judge and the plaintiff before the tribunal of reason? Only by pushing beyond reason does it become possible to situate reason or, what comes down to the same thing, to 'de-construct' it. Cassirer, on the contrary, knows no other anchorage than reason which, precisely because it is transcendent, overcomes – and passes judgment upon – its own initial finitude. Heidegger is only ready to acknowledge the rootedness of reason in finitude and he forbids it the exorbitant privilege of being the sole instance, capable therefore of conferring upon itself the task of being its own critic. In this way he is able to escape the challenge of a critique from outside. But then, if the judgment of reason ceases to be for Heidegger the centre of reference, he finds himself confronted with the obligation of letting it be known what criterion he proposes to substitute for that of rationality. The least one can say is that he never got to the bottom of this task.

It only remains to say that the discussion at Davos announces, or even inaugurates, a number of contemporary debates on the crisis of reason and culture, on the 'dialectic of enlightenment', on the uni-dimensional

effects of rationality, on the tyranny of the *logos*, on the end and the overcoming of metaphysics, on post-modernity. Thanks to Cassirer and Heidegger this debate was set out in such a way that it could be generalized and carried to the highest theoretical level in the years to come.

Translated by Christopher Macann

Notes

1 Ernst Cassirer, *Die Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen*, tr. Ralph Manheim as *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955).

2 M. Heidegger, Review of E. Cassirer, 'Das mythische Denken' (2nd part of *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*) in *Deutsche literaturzeitung*, 21 (1928), col. 1000-12.

3 *ibid.*, pp. 95, 99.

4 *ibid.*, p. 95.

5 E. Cassirer, 'Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Bemerkungen zu Martin Heideggers Kant-Interpretation', in *Kant-Studien*, 36 (1931), pp. 1-26. French tr. by P. Quillet, in *E. Cassirer-M. Heidegger, Débat sur le kantisme et la philosophie and other texts of 1929-31*, presented by P. Aubenque and tr. from the German by P. Aubenque, J.-M. Fataud and P. Quillet (Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), *Débat*, p. 83. All our references in parentheses refer henceforward to this translation.

6 Underlined by the author, p. 82.

7 J. Cavaillès, 'Les deuxièmes cours universitaires de Davos', in *Die II. Davoser Hochschulkurse, 17. März bis April* (Davos, 1929), pp. 65-81, 70.

8 *E. Cassirer-M. Heidegger, Débat*. This work, which is out of print today, had a secret and tormented history which I am in a position to release to the public seventeen years after the event, that is, after the principal protagonists have died. In 1968, Heidegger told me that as far as he was concerned I had his permission to publish this work, with the sole condition that the published text of the 'protocol' should not be presented as if it had been revised by him, a condition which was respected. Shortly after the publication of the work, the publisher Beauchesne received an official letter from the German publisher, Vittorio Klostermann, who claimed the entire copyright for himself and, under the threat of a court action, called for the destruction of the printed copies. From a letter V. Klostermann addressed to me later it transpired that he was wrongly informed by a reader at his firm who misled him with regard to the meaning of my 'presentation', which was thought to be an anti-Heideggerian pamphlet! When I talked with him, Heidegger took refuge behind his editor, to whom he had in effect (something we did not know at the time) already confided the exclusive rights to his work (in fact, one year later, V. Klostermann went on to publish the German text of Bollnow-Ritter's Protocol in the 4th edition of *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*). To avoid a court case against Heidegger which we might very well have won (the question of author's rights being juridically controversial) but which I had no intention of engaging in, the director of the collection, P. Marcel Regnier and myself, in agreement with J.-M. Fataud and P. Quillet decided to withdraw the volume from sale. Recently, an agreement with Gallimard, who possess the exclusive rights to the French translations of

Heidegger, was sufficient to make possible a reprint of this work. I would like to take this opportunity of thanking the editors and the family of Ernst Cassirer who, though equally concerned, never offered the least objection to our publication.

9 In what follows, *P* refers to the Protocol, *A* to the summary, and *R* to the review of Heidegger's work done by Cassirer.

10 Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 311 (quoted by Cassirer, *R*, p. 64).

11 Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, A 58 (tr. Picavet, p. 32); A 146.

12 *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, BAS 40. Cf. *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, A 145.

13 *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 2nd edn, p. 146.

14 Fr. Schiller, *Das Ideal und das Leben* (cited by Cassirer, *R*, p. 83 and, in part, *P*, p. 42).

15 Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, p. 182; cited by Cassirer, *R*, p. 73.

16 In view of the fact that in my oral communication I used the word 'establishment' with reference to Cassirer, Mme E. Pinto rightly remarked that Cassirer was not at all representative of the university 'establishment'. In fact, if he was Rector of the University of Hamburg, it remained the case that the latter, a more recent creation, was certainly not among Germany's most prestigious. But neo-Kantianism was solidly implanted at Berlin, where Nicolai Hartmann taught, as it was at Marburg. Besides, Cassirer belonged through his family to the enlightened and liberal faction of the Berlin upper middle class and could pass as one of its thinkers.

17 L. Englert, in the brochure cited at note 7 above. Also cited by G. Schneeberger, *Nachlese zu Heidegger* (Berne, 1962), p. 4.

18 Numerous texts intended to illustrate the irrationalist current, particularly with reference to Germany, have been brought together by G. Lukács in *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft* (Berlin (Est), 1954), whose title literally reproduces – could it have been a coincidence? – the formula used by Heidegger in his summary of the papers given at Davos (*A*, p. 24). If, in Lukács' work, Cassirer is not mentioned by name, and if neo-Kantianism is more or less spared, still Heidegger receives no more severe criticism than that addressed to Husserl, to Jaspers . . . and even to Wittgenstein.

19 J. Cavallès, 'Les deuxièmes cours universitaires', p. 79.

Hermeneutics in theory and in practice

Christopher Macann

Heidegger's *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* is a unique contribution to philosophical literature. At the time of writing, it was the only example of an attempt by a philosopher to interpret the thinking of a major historical figure in such a way that the basic structures of the interpreter's own philosophy emerged in the course of the interpretative transformation of the work under examination. No doubt this is why it attracted so much attention in its day¹ and why it has continued to prompt voluminous critical attention right up to the present time.

In this paper, I would like to do three things; first, to show the connection between the hermeneutical principles laid out in *Being and Time* and the putting into practice of these theoretical principles with regard to Heidegger's interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*; second, to assess the validity of Heidegger's Kant interpretation; and third, to recommend to the attention of the reader an alternative procedure embodied in my own Kant interpretation.²

At the end of the Introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger outlines a programme which he never completed as anticipated. Part One is the systematic part of the programme. It falls into three parts: (1) the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein; (2) Dasein and temporality; (3) Time and being. The first two sections of Part One make up the two parts of *Being and Time*. The third section was never completed as originally envisaged. First delivered as a lecture much later in 1962, it opens up an entirely new way of thinking about Being – as Maria Vilella-Petit has stressed in her paper on Space (chap. 5, vol. I in the present work). Part Two falls under the head of a so-called 'phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology'. Again, it falls into three parts: (1) a study of Kant's doctrine of the schematism. (2) An investigation into the ontological foundations of Descartes' *cogito*. (3) A study of Aristotle's essay on time.

At the time of writing *Being and Time*, Heidegger already had a great deal of material accumulated towards an interpretation of Aristotle, material which served as the basis for his promotion to the rank of *professor extraordinarius*, and which was later published in such volumes of his *Gesamtausgabe* as the *Logik* (GA 21) or the *Aristoteles* volume (GA 33). *Being and Time* itself contains extensive analyses of the ontological foundations (or lack of them) of Descartes' dualistic philosophy and the discussion with Descartes continues right to the end – as Marion's paper shows. But it was the Kant material which underwent the most radical transformation, basically from a study of the schematism into three entirely distinct bodies of material each of which occupies an entire volume of the *Gesamtausgabe*.

Though Heidegger's debate with Kant permeates other texts which do not take Kant as their specific theme,³ it is the three volumes specifically devoted to Kant which merit special attention. First, there are the so-called Marburg lectures of 1927/8, now published as volume 25 of the *Gesamtausgabe*. Second, there is the famous *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, published in 1930, shortly after the publication of *Being and Time*, and now issued as volume 3 of the *Gesamtausgabe*. Finally, there are the so-called Freiburg lectures, delivered in 1935/6, and now published as volume 41 of the *Gesamtausgabe*. Though this paper will bear almost exclusively upon the published Kant book of 1930, a word on the other texts is called for.

The Marburg lectures differ from the Kant book in a number of ways. First, Heidegger uses the Introduction not only to offer his own ontological interpretation of Kant's Introduction to the *Critique* but also to present his own conception of ontological phenomenology or, as he already terms it, of 'fundamental ontology'. Second, the main body of the text works out in much greater detail the specific points of Heidegger's Kant interpretation. Third, although the lectures conclude with a section on the schematism, volume 25 of the *Gesamtausgabe* really takes the exposition of Kant's text no further than the transcendental deduction. This latter limitation is made up in the Kant book which deals extensively with the schematism. Indeed, Heidegger goes so far as to claim that 'these eleven pages of the *Critique of Pure Reason* form the heart of the whole work'.⁴ However the Kant book, in its turn, does not carry the analysis into the *Analytic of Principles*, let alone the *Dialectic*. Again, in part this limitation is made up in the Freiburg lectures, now entitled *What is a Thing?*⁵ which focuses its Kant interpretation upon the second main section of the *Transcendental Analytic*, or, in other words, on the *Analytic of Principles*. Like the Marburg lectures (and unlike the Kant book), the Freiburg lectures begin rather than end with the explicit articulation of the ontological understanding that makes the work of interpretation possible.

In one sense therefore, these three major contributions to Heidegger's understanding of the Critical Philosophy could be seen as successive attempts to cover the entire corpus of the *Critique*, at least as far as the Dialectic. In fact however, these three works differ not just in scope or in detail but in their basic intention, not to mention the way in which they work out their respective intentions. Both the Marburg and the Freiburg lectures share a certain stylistic simplicity, the simplicity befitting the context of communication, that of a university lecture. And so both volumes of lectures open (rather than close) with an account of the philosophical orientation which establishes the context for the interpretation. But whereas Heidegger's Marburg lectures take their start in a presentation of the fundamental principles of phenomenological ontology in general, the Freiburg lectures take their start in a more specific question concerning the thing.

The relative difficulty of the Kant book is however due not to any incidental obscurantism but to certain *methodological* necessities, necessities imposed by the hermeneutical procedure itself, which is much more strictly adhered to in the Kant book than in the lectures. Whereas the lectures first offer an ontological interpretation of transcendental philosophy, or of the thing, and then go on to show how the relevant sections of the *Critique* confirm this interpretation, the Kant book stages the interpretative transformation in such a way that, starting fairly close to a recognizable rendering of Kant's intentions, Heidegger is able to move the Critical philosophy ever further away from any conventional rendering and in the direction of his own, ontological interpretation. This is why the Kant book is organized around four sections, each of which is entitled a 'Laying of the foundation' (the use of the concept of 'laying' carries with it an essential connection with the concept of 'laying out' which in German means interpretation – *Auslegung*). Instead of beginning with a section in which he sets out his interpretative hypotheses, he begins with a presentation of the traditional concept of metaphysics, the concept which, in a certain sense, Kant overcomes. To be sure, the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments is already laid out as the possibility of 'ontological knowledge', but this latter is still somewhat ambiguously expressed as the 'precursory comprehension of the being of the essent'.⁶ More significantly, it is in the fourth and last section (not the first section) that Heidegger develops, in what he calls a 'repetition', the ontological philosophy which was actually presupposed from the very beginning. In other words, the Kant book is organized in a manner calculated to highlight the procedure of interpretation itself.

But in order to see in what sense this is so, we first need to take a preliminary look at Heidegger's conception of the method of interpretation, as it is set out in *Being and Time*.

A The hermeneutical method

The sections in which Heidegger lays out his theory of understanding and interpretation are the three sections 31, 32 and 33. These sections are however not just thematically but also structurally integrated into the work as a whole. The basic division of *Being and Time* is into two parts, the first devoted to being, the second to time. The first part is itself organized around the basic structure being-in-the-world. The unitary configuration 'being-in-the-world' is split up, for analytical purposes, into its three constitutive components; the *world* (which is examined under the head of 'The worldhood of the world'), the one *who* is in the world (which is examined under the head of 'Being-with and being one's self'), and *being-in as such*. It is in the context of the third of these components, being-in as such, that we find the three sections in question here.

The question of interpretation is located in chapter V, for the simple reason that interpretation is here connected with understanding, one of four *existentialia* of which the other three are state-of-mind, falling and discourse. But although the correct procedure would seem to be to begin with an examination of the three *existentialia* which operate at the level of experience and to proceed on from there to an examination of their expression in and through language, this is not how Heidegger does actually proceed. Rather, state-of-mind and understanding are examined first as ontologically equi-primordial structures in which the Being of the 'there' maintains itself. Interpretation is then examined as a phenomenon grounded in understanding. The analysis of assertion arises as a derivative mode of interpretation, one moreover wherein the primordially of interpretation is covered over. The investigation of assertion then leads on naturally to an inquiry into language, more specifically, the grounding of language in discourse. Only after this discussion of language has been concluded is the everyday being of the 'there' presented in terms of the existential structure of falling which, appropriately enough, begins with an account of language as fallen, i.e., idle talk (*Gerede*).

The two sections (32 and 33) devoted explicitly to interpretation belong within the exposition of understanding. However, since interpretation is grounded in understanding and since the analysis of assertion is devoted to the levelling down of the primordial possibilities inherent in interpretation, it is the section on being-there as understanding (§31) and understanding and interpretation (§32) which are most relevant for our purposes.

Heidegger opens §31 with an explicit affirmation of the equi-primordially of state-of-mind and understanding. State-of-mind always has its understanding, and understanding always has its mood. In as much as *Dasein* is its 'there', the world is always there for it too. On the side of *Dasein*, being-in is disclosed to it as the 'for-the-sake-of-

which' (*Worumwillen*). On the side of the world, being is disclosed as significance (*Bedeutsamkeit*). 'Significance is that on the basis of which the world is disclosed as such.'⁷ Having recuperated, for his analysis of understanding, structures taken account of previously, Heidegger moves on to make the connection between the existential comprehension of understanding and possibility. Possibility, understood as potentiality for being, is explicitly contrasted with logical possibility or the contingent possibility of what is not actual but might be. 'Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of.'⁸ In turn, potentiality-for-being is analysed out in terms of the structure of 'projection'. 'As projecting, understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it *is* its possibilities as possibilities.'⁹ Further, projection of possibilities can be either authentic or inauthentic in so far as Dasein either does or does not understand itself out of the world in which it finds itself, or rather out of its own self as existing being-in-the-world.

Heidegger opens §32 with a reaffirmation of the connection between understanding, projection and possibility. 'As understanding, Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities.'¹⁰ But the theme of being-towards-possibilities is no sooner announced than it is qualified in a way which leads directly over into interpretation. This qualification is expressed in terms of the notion of a counterthrust (*Rückschlag*). That is to say, understanding, as projection of possibilities, encounters a resistance which forces it to develop itself in relation to. . . . The realization of possibilities of being does not consist in the mere projection of such possibilities but in the effective working out of such possibilities. The key concept in terms of which Heidegger analyses the essence of interpretation, as the development of understanding, is that of what he calls the 'as-structure'. That which is there for interpretative understanding is always taken 'as'. This hermeneutical 'as' is not to be understood as a signification which is thrown over the object. Rather, any involvement with entities encountered within the world is guided in advance by a prior understanding which can be articulated in terms of three fore-structures – fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception. In so far as meaning gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight and a fore-conception, and in so far as meaning is that in terms of which the intelligibility of something maintains itself, it follows that whatever is understood 'as' is not *discovered* to possess such a meaning but is always already understood in terms of just such a meaning structure. Hence, interpretation necessarily moves in a circle. That which one *seeks* to understand has always already been understood in advance, though this understanding in advance may not have, and usually has not, been rendered thematic. So far from such a circle proving vicious (*circulus vitiosus*) and as such to be avoided, it is only in so far as interpretation

gets into the hermeneutical circle in the right way that the understanding which is thereby developed can assume the form of a genuinely primordial kind of knowing.

In these sections on understanding and interpretation the primary objective is to lay out that sense of interpretation which is relevant to an understanding of entities encountered within the world, or indeed of the world itself. However, there are passages in which Heidegger moves from the plane of being to that of textual interpretation. That such a move is called for is of course founded in the fact that the ontological articulation of understanding itself results in a text which must be interpreted in order to be understood. Unfortunately however, the principal passage in which Heidegger talks about textual interpretation is one wherein he restricts himself to a negative critique of a supposedly presuppositionless understanding.

If, when one is engaged in a particular concrete kind of interpretation, in the sense of exact textual Interpretation, one likes to appeal to what 'stands there', then one finds that what 'stands there' in the first instance is nothing other than the obvious undiscussed assumption of the person who does the interpreting.¹¹

However, this brief and indecisive passage will suffice to furnish us with a clue as to the way in which interpretation takes place at the level of the text.

An inauthentic understanding of a text is one in which the interpreter simply assumes that there is something there to be understood and that such an understanding not only can be, but ought to be undertaken in abstraction from the 'being-there' of the one who interprets. By contrast, authentic understanding of a text occurs when the interpreter recognizes the inevitability of pre-conceptions, which pre-conceptions can however be made explicit in the course of the interpretation and in such a way that, in working out an understanding of the text, the interpreter also comes to an understanding of himself or herself as the one undertaking the interpretation. Textual interpretation is, for Dasein in general, just one among many other possibilities of being and indeed one of the least significant. For the philosopher however, that is, for the one for whom an understanding of the essence of interpretation is of critical significance, textual interpretation assumes a privileged position. For it is precisely through an understanding of the texts of other philosophers that a philosopher develops his or her own self-understanding and in so doing finds him or herself in a position to lay out this self-understanding explicitly in the form of a philosophy. In turn, this 'philosophy', as the explicit working out of primordial possibilities inherent in the being-there of the

philosopher, will serve as the predetermined framework for any further textual interpretation.

With this remove to the level of textual interpretation, we find ourselves upon the plane required to come to terms with Heidegger's Kant interpretation. The interpreter always and invariably comes to a text with certain theoretical presuppositions. The task of interpretation will require that he *neither* simply let these presuppositions direct the work of interpretation in an unselfconscious fashion (that is, without any recognition of the presuppositions as such), *nor yet* that he attempt to suppress these presuppositions in the interests of a neutral, detached and so impartial, assessment. For Heidegger, the latter attitude is an interpretative attitude like any other and already involves a projective decision which is all the more insidious for being unrecognizable as such.

A much more complicated interaction between interpreter and text comes to take the place of these two *naïve* approaches. First, the interpreter must hold himself open to the text, receive the meaning conveyed in the reading of the text and make sense of it in *its own* (not yet *his own*) terms. In a second moment, he must respond to the text in a manner which is implicitly guided by his own 'pre-ontological understanding'. In a third and final moment, he must seek to build into the unity of a distinctive viewpoint the insights engendered through his interaction with the text, insights peculiar to his own way of reading the text. What comes at the end is therefore only the explicit articulation of what was already there implicitly from the beginning. This, I suggest, was the kind of procedure involved in Heidegger's own interpretation of Kant's text.

B The Kant book

But why then did Heidegger never say that, in his Kant book, it was his intention to subject the Critical philosophy to an interpretative procedure which would make it possible for him to bring to light structures which match and reflect the fundamental structures of *Being and Time*? This is no idle question. For although Heidegger must have known what it was he was trying to accomplish, he never really acknowledges that *this* is what he is doing but rather indicates, repeatedly, that his own *highly idiosyncratic* interpretation represents *the* revelation of Kant's most basic intentions. 'The fundamental purpose of the present interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to reveal the basic import of this work by bringing out what Kant "intended to say".'¹² Implied in statements of this kind is a claim to the effect that Kant's basic intention had *never before* been recognized as such, since never before had a critic attempted anything like an ontological interpretation of the *Critique*. Later on we

shall try to evaluate this claim. For the moment, it will suffice to consider how he goes about the work of interpretation.

There are three movements going on simultaneously throughout the entire Kant book. The first is a movement *forward* in the expository treatment of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Heidegger does not stick rigidly to this agenda. But, on the whole, his interpretation proceeds through the *Critique* in the order in which it was written. Second, there is a movement *back* in the direction of an ever more primordial, or original, interpretation of the *Critique*. Hence, the 'violence' which Heidegger does to the text tends to increase with each succeeding section as his interpretation comes ever closer to that conception of metaphysics which is his own rather than Kant's. And finally, we find what might be called a movement *around*, a circular movement which reproduces the directives of the hermeneutical circle itself. That comprehension of the project of metaphysics which is simply assumed in a preliminary way at the very beginning gets eventually set out in the last section as the result of what Heidegger calls a 'repetition'.

The Kant book is set out in four sections with the rather resounding titles: (1) 'The point of departure of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics'; (2) 'The carrying out of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics'; (3) 'The laying of the foundations of metaphysics in its basic originality'; and (4) 'The laying of the foundation of metaphysics in a repetition'. The recuperation of the Kantian architectonic in an architectural metaphor ('Laying of the foundation') is not only deliberate but serves to emphasize the importance of Heidegger's specifically ontological interpretation. The *teleological* mode of Kant's transcendental investigation (where the 'step back' is in the direction of a higher, transcendental realm) is transposed in an *archeological* direction, thereby becoming an inquiry into the *arche*, the origin or ground of knowledge.

Heidegger opens his analysis with a distinction drawn from school metaphysics. The point of recurring to the distinction between *metaphysica generalis* and *metaphysica specialis* is however only to show how the latter leads on to the former through the typically Kantian 'Copernican revolution', as a result of which one of the branches of *metaphysica specialis*, namely, the study of man (the other two being God and Nature) becomes the foundation upon which the entire inquiry into being in general is based. In what sense this is so is made plain in the next section in which Heidegger interprets the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments (as presented in Kant's own Introduction) as the possibility of the precursory comprehension of the being of the essent. Thus, from the very outset, Kant's *transcendental* investigation is interpreted as a body of *ontological* knowledge, indeed as a *Daseins analytik*.

This is particularly evident in those passages in which Heidegger interprets the transcendental character of the *Critique* in terms of the

phenomenological problematic of transcendence and, moreover, interprets the latter in an ontological rather than a transcendental manner. Taking B 25 as his text ('I entitled *transcendental* knowledge all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*') Heidegger interprets as follows:

Thus transcendental knowledge does not investigate the essent itself but the possibility of the precursory comprehension of the being of the essent. It concerns reason's passing beyond [transcendence] to the essent so that experience can be rendered adequate to the latter as its possible object.¹³

Section 2 forms the core of the work and indeed covers the greater part of the *Critique* from the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Logic through the Transcendental Analytic and so on to the Highest Principle of All Synthetic Judgments. It is divided into two parts (A and B), the first of which is concerned with establishing a thesis with regard to the finitude of human knowledge. Not only does §2 *begin* with a preliminary specification of the two sources of knowledge (intuition and understanding), but Heidegger also uses this preliminary specification to announce the primacy of the former over the latter. 'Thinking is simply in the service of intuition.'¹⁴ Intuition stands in an essential dependence upon the object and can only reveal what is already there to be intuited. That this dependence upon the object is not intrinsic to intuition as such but is a mark of the finitude of our human intuition is brought out by way of a contrast with divine intuition, i.e., *intuitus originarius*. Human, as opposed to divine, intuition is non-creative. Non-creative intuition furnishes understanding with a material from which first concepts and then judgments can be composed. But no matter how remote from its source finite knowledge may proceed it always stands in an essential dependence upon intuition and therefore upon objects which must first be received in sense before they can be understood.

An interesting interpretation of Kant's concept of the thing in itself serves to reinforce yet again the ontological character of Heidegger's interpretation. Drawing upon a citation from the *opus postumum* where Kant suggests that the thing in itself is not something different from the appearance but merely the same thing viewed under a different aspect, Heidegger argues that what lies 'behind' the appearance (*qua* thing-in-itself) should be interpreted not as what lies 'beyond' the appearance (in a transcendent sense) but rather as what lies concealed in the revealing characteristic of the appearance.

The preliminary affirmation of the finitude of human knowledge calls in question the legitimacy of the very possibility of metaphysics in so far

as it has already been defined in terms of the precursory, experience-free knowledge of the ontological structure of the essent. Thus the original question as to the possibility of the a priori synthesis narrows down to this: 'How can a finite being which as such is delivered up to the essence and dependent on its reception have knowledge of, i.e., intuit, the essent before it is given without being its creator?'¹⁵ Understanding forms its concepts from itself and therefore functions as an autonomous faculty, save in so far as its material is drawn from intuition. Unless therefore intuition can furnish a material from itself, that is, without receiving it from objects, the project of ontological knowledge will fall to the ground. In accordance with this requirement, space and time are then disclosed as two pure intuitions which are capable of generating a manifold of pure intuition spontaneously. Although his presentation of the two pure forms of intuition is at this point entirely provisional (as is Kant's own presentation in the *Aesthetic*) Heidegger advises us in advance that, in the course of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics, time will come to dominate more and more.

For the time being however, it is not so much time as the imagination which is brought to the fore. The isolation of intuition and understanding and, more significantly, of pure intuition and pure understanding raises the question of how these two faculties join together to make knowledge (both ontic and ontological) possible. Pure intuition, as pure, and pure understanding, as pure, are, as it were, already appropriate to a synthesis in which they should co-operate. But since intuition is a sensible faculty and understanding an intellectual faculty, the synthesis of the two cannot be understood in terms of the intrinsic nature of these two faculties in and of themselves. Something else is needed. Although the first introduction of the faculty of imagination is entirely provisional, still, from the first, Kant does introduce imagination as a faculty of synthesis.

Synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere result of the power of the imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever but of the existence of which we are scarcely ever conscious.¹⁶

Heidegger makes a double use of this citation, to bring out the synthetic character of the imagination and to bring out its essential primordially. The primordially of the imagination, which is only indicated here by the *obscurity* of the workings of the imagination, is further reinforced with reference to the metaphor of a root which puts out two branches.

It would take us too far out of our way to consider in detail how Heidegger establishes his case. It is worth noting however that, quite characteristically, he proceeds in a series of stages each of which represents a further step back in the direction of the ground. He begins by

acknowledging pure intuition and pure thought as the *two essential elements* of pure knowledge. He then enquires into that *unity* of pure knowledge which is made possible by the imagination. He then enquires into the *intrinsic possibility* of this very unity. His analysis, which focuses largely upon the A Edition of the Deduction, accomplishes amongst other things a necessary devaluation of the faculty of apperception (the other obviously unifying faculty) in favour of the imagination. He then goes on to examine the schematism which he terms the 'heart of the whole work'¹⁷ and which he interprets as establishing the *ground* of the intrinsic possibility of the unity of pure ontological knowledge. Finally, and as a sort of summation of all that has gone on before, he uses the Highest Principle of All Synthetic Judgments to effect a *complete determination* of the essence of ontological knowledge.

The third section is the place where, according to Cassirer, Heidegger no longer speaks as a commentator but as a 'usurper'. This third section is divided into three parts but, effectively, the division is into two, a first part focusing upon the faculty of the imagination as the ground of unity and a second part devoted to time – *Being and Time*. In part A, Heidegger investigates the formative and unifying capacity of the imagination – the imagination as forming the horizon of objectivity in general, as unifying intuition and thought and as furnishing the root of that structure of transcendence through which the elements are not only unified originally but spring forth in their derivative separation. In part B he effects a truly extraordinary derivation of all the other faculties from the imagination. Pure intuition is shown to be, essentially, imagination (§28). Pure theoretical reason is shown to be, in essence, imagination (§29). Pure practical reason is shown to be, fundamentally, imagination (§30).

In part C, Heidegger begins by taking the previous analysis one step further. The transcendental imagination is shown to be primordial time. There follows a fascinating interpretation of the temporal character of the triple synthesis whereby each of the three dimensions of the triple synthesis is aligned with a different dimension of time – the synthesis of apprehension with the present, the synthesis of reproduction with the past and the synthesis of recognition with the future, an alignment which immediately reminds us of the corresponding strategy in *Being and Time*, where each of three *existentialia* (understanding/mood/falling) is aligned with a different dimension of time. Finally, Heidegger connects time with the self in such a way that the self is shown to be temporal in its being.

In the fourth and last section, Heidegger draws all the conclusions which follow from the analysis conducted up to that point. More specifically, he draws from his previous analyses conclusions which align the *Critique*, fairly straightforwardly, with the metaphysical project attempted in *Being and Time*. He begins by introducing the concept of a repetition. 'By a repetition of a fundamental problem', he tells us, 'we understand

the disclosure of the primordial possibilities concealed in it.¹⁸ The key word here is 'possibilities'. For the previous analyses have revealed the transcendental imagination as the ground of the intrinsic possibility of the ontological synthesis, i.e., transcendence. But no sooner does he state this result than he insists that the result is not what has actually transpired in the course of the interpretation. Instead, he broadens the discussion to the point that the laying of the foundation can be seen as the establishment of metaphysics as anthropology, to be sure, a philosophical anthropology which, as such, can have nothing to do with any empirical study of Man.

And right away the discussion is now set on a tack which will permit Heidegger to introduce all the central themes of his Dasein's analysis, which now becomes that philosophical anthropology towards which all the interpretative analyses have been tending. Thus the repetition of the primordial possibilities inherent in the Critical philosophy turns out to be a reproduction of the central theses of *Being and Time*. It would be pointless to go through this reproductive procedure in detail. Suffice it to say that, in this fourth and final section, we find, yet again, the finitude of human being, as also the definition of the being of Dasein in terms of existence and being-in-the-world, the temporality of Dasein, the structure of projection, the concepts of forgetfulness and re-membering, of care and anxiety. We seem to be worlds away from Kant, and yet it is this move away from Kant which permits Heidegger to rejoin the themes first announced at the very beginning of the study where he talked of the traditional concept of metaphysics and its division into *metaphysica generalis* and *metaphysica specialis*. This closing of the circle is a typically Heideggerian move and sets his signature upon the entire study.

In order to hammer home even more forcefully the parallel between *Being and Time* and the Kant book, it would be worth reproducing briefly the successive stages of this repetition. The Introduction to *Being and Time* is devoted to an exposition of Heidegger's new conception of phenomenology and, as such, lies outside the scope of the parallel. The first section of Part One (devoted to Being) introduces the notion of a philosophical anthropology as the analytic of Dasein and so corresponds to the analysis of the relation of *metaphysica generalis* to *metaphysica specialis*. The second section introduces the unitary configuration being-in-the-world as the leading theme. This corresponds, in the Kant book, to the ontological interpretation of Kant's question: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? in terms of the problematic of transcendence. In the third, fourth and fifth sections the unitary configuration being-in-the-world is broken up into its constituent components, the world in which (the Worldhood of the world) the *self* which is in (the Who) and *being-in* as such. In the Kant book, this corresponds to the resolution of the question concerning the possibility of ontological

knowledge, or transcendence, into the component elements which make up the faculty theory of knowledge, more specifically, intuition and understanding. In the first instance the co-operation (i.e., the ontological unity) of these two faculties is explained in terms of the imagination as a 'between'. But in the second instance this 'between' of the two essential components is re-presented as a 'beneath' of the between. Imagination is shown to be capable of connecting intuition and understanding only because it functions as the primordial root from which the two derivative branches stem. This second step corresponds to what is accomplished in *Being and Time* when being-in as such is grounded in the structure of care. And it brings the analysis developed under the auspices of being to a close. Part Two of *Being and Time* is devoted to a temporalization of the structures disclosed in the course of the previous analysis of Dasein. This corresponds, in the Kant book, to the analyses devoted to the temporalization of the fundamentally unifying function of the imagination and to the gradual emergence of time as the primary theme of the *Critique*.

C Transformational hermeneutics

In this third part of my paper, I want to bring out the limitations of Heidegger's Kant interpretation and to draw alternative conclusions from these same limitations. In so doing, I hope to turn against Heidegger the very sentiment which he expressed when he justified his own interpretation in the light of the Kantian phrase 'understanding a thinker better than he understood himself'.

What is to me most surprising about the way in which Heidegger goes about his business in the Kant book is that, despite the hermeneutical revolution for which he was himself in large part responsible, he *still* tends to depict his interpretation as the real, the underlying, the conclusive truth of the *Critique*. For example, in the second section, he writes: 'To lay the foundation of metaphysics in totality is to reveal the internal possibility of ontology. Such is the true sense of that which, under the heading of Kant's "Copernican revolution", has been constantly misinterpreted.'¹⁹ Such passages are to be found all over the book, for example, where he writes: 'All transformation of the pure imagination into a function of pure thought is the result of a misunderstanding of the true nature of the pure imagination',²⁰ or again: 'The fundamental purpose of the present interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to reveal the basic import of this work by bringing out what Kant "intended to say".'²¹ Why could he not have presented his interpretation as an interpretation, that is, as a *possible* way of envisaging the *Critique*, a way confirmed and justified by the ontological phenomenology set out

in *Being and Time*? Could it be that he was afraid of not being taken seriously if he did not present his interpretation in the same *definitive* manner as most other commentators? But then, by the time he came to write his Kant book, he was already a philosopher of international stature, one who moreover, from the very beginning, never ceased to claim for the thinker, as opposed to the scholar or the critic, special prerogatives. Notoriously, some of the worst comments made upon historical philosophers are made by the most creative thinkers (one thinks of Kant's own remarks on Leibniz or Locke or Berkeley), worst because, effectively, the thinker presents his predecessors as attempting, unsuccessfully, to do what he himself has succeeded in doing effectively – in Kant's case as proto-Critical philosophers. It is not the violence done to the texts of historical philosophers which is worrisome but the fact that the interpreters seem to have been blissfully oblivious of the violence they had themselves inflicted. Here Heidegger could have worked a salutary corrective had he not proceeded *in the same way*, affirming his own interpretation as the *correct* understanding and dismissing other, often much more orthodox interpretations, as *misinterpretations*.

There are two particularly unorthodox biases expressed in the Kant book. The first is his dismissal of any epistemological interpretation of the Critique. 'The purpose of the *Critique of Pure Reason*', he tells us, 'is completely misunderstood, therefore, if this work is interpreted as a "theory of experience" or perhaps as a theory of the positive sciences. The *Critique of Pure Reason* has nothing to do with a "theory of knowledge".'²² In view of the fact that most of the analytical interpretations of the Critique (which means almost all of the studies written in English) do assume that the Critique is, above all else, a theory of knowledge, Heidegger's heresy comes as a refreshing corrective. But it implies a quasi-total rejection of almost everything that has ever been written on the *Critique of Pure Reason*, by far the greater part of which does at least assume that this work has *something* if not *everything*, to do with epistemology. By simply replacing one bias with another, he called in question the most valuable legacy of the hermeneutical revolution, the explicit recognition of the unavoidability of multiple interpretations.

The second, extra-ordinary bias expressed in the Kant study consists in his *identification* of transcendental philosophy with ontology. Again, this standpoint is to be found throughout the study but it is found expressed in a particularly sharp and clear-cut fashion in a passage where he writes: 'the laying of the foundation of ontological knowledge strives to elucidate this transcendence in such a way that it can be developed into a systematic whole (transcendental philosophy = ontology).'²³ Or again: 'For Kant, what matters above all, is the revelation of transcendence in order thus to elucidate the essence of transcendental (ontological) knowledge.'²⁴

Moreover, this hermeneutical identification of transcendental with ontological phenomenology is only a repetition (or application) of the position already assumed in *Being and Time*, as is evident from the following passage from the Introduction. 'With regard to its subject-matter, phenomenology is the science of the being of entities – ontology.'²⁵ Heidegger might have chosen to present his phenomenology as an alternative to, or indeed as the complement of, Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Instead, he re-defines phenomenology in such a way that it becomes (at least for him) equivalent to ontology. Could it have been respect for his master which led Heidegger to reduce his critical comments upon Husserlian phenomenology to the minimum?²⁶ Effectively however, the absence of any explicit attack upon Husserlian positions need not leave us in any doubt as to his intentions. For the battle with transcendental philosophy, a battle which might have been waged upon the Husserlian field, was in fact fought out against Kant. So Heidegger's transformation of Kant's transcendental philosophy into ontology must be seen alongside his attempt to win his freedom from Husserlian phenomenology by first carving out, from within the Husserlian domain, an ontological preserve of his own and then *extending* the bounds of this preserve until it came to coincide with the discipline of phenomenology in general – thereby excluding the Husserlian conception altogether.

In my Kant book, I took as the starting point for my own ontological interpretation of the *Critique* these evident inadequacies of Heidegger's interpretative position. I asked myself whether it might not be possible to effect a series of presentations of the *Critique*, each of which would represent a different way of interpreting the *Critique*. And further, I asked myself whether it might not be possible to set out these different interpretations not just in what might be called a 'lateral' frame of reference, as so many alternatives to be juxtaposed one alongside the other, but rather in an integrated succession. In other words, I asked myself whether it might not be possible to lay out the successive presentations in such a way that any given presentation might be seen as the necessary pre-condition for its successor, and so that the interpretation which ensued would display a *logic of the transformation* of one presentation into another.

Merely by refusing the Heideggerian exclusion of any epistemological and any distinctively transcendental interpretation of the *Critique* whilst, at the same time, accepting the Heideggerian ontological interpretation, I was able to generate three distinct ways of interpreting the *Critique*, an epistemological, a transcendental and an ontological. However, like Heidegger, I had an end-point in mind, a goal towards which the entire interpretative transformation would be directed and which would both make explicit, and so also confirm, the standpoint from which the entire

work of interpretation was undertaken. This presupposed end-point, or goal, consisted in what I call a 'genetic ontology'. The idea of a genetic ontology was based upon a developmental conception of phenomenological philosophy which, as such, would move through the several stages represented by the three methodologies of epistemology, transcendental philosophy and ontology, and so would be capable of integrating these three methodologies in one unitary frame of reference.

The goal to be attained in turn recommended an alternation between a static and a genetic procedure, and this not merely at the end but along the way to the end. Since the interpretative method employed by Heidegger turns largely upon Kant's faculty theory, it proved necessary to define the distinction between a static and a genetic procedure in terms of just such a faculty theory. A static procedure was defined as one based upon the *simultaneous co-operation* of the fundamental faculties, a genetic procedure, by contrast, was defined as one based upon the *successive instantiation* of the fundamental faculties.²⁷

The interpretative schema made possible by the recognition of the three methodologies, together with the alternation between a static and a genetic procedure is one which, in principle, generates six alternative ways of viewing the *Critique*: ontico-static (analytical epistemology) ontico-genetic (genetic epistemology), phenomenologico-genetic (Hegelian phenomenology), phenomenologico-static (Husserlian phenomenology), ontologico-static (Heideggerian ontology) and finally ontologico-genetic.

By the very nature of things, an *ontic* presentation is one which does not venture beyond the objective plane or which, when it does so, only does so by way of a regressive question into the *conditions of the possibility* of what is already actual. In the light of such a venture, the faculty of understanding has to be taken (more or less as we find it in the Transcendental Logic) as the faculty representative of the higher faculties in general,²⁸ and the scope of Kant's transcendental argumentation is consequently strictly limited to a regressive question concerning the *sine qua non* of what is empirically actual, namely, an already constructed experience of objects. With regard to the possibility of an *ontico-genetic* investigation, we find, interestingly enough, in Piaget's child psychology, a genetic epistemology which exhibits a three-step genesis (sensori-motor, concrete and formal operations) and which also assumes that formal thought figures at the apex of the entire epistemological hierarchy (The Highest Principle of all Analytic Judgments). Indeed, a Piagetian genetic epistemology might have been used to investigate the process by which an objective reality is constructed in the first place.²⁹ However, precisely because this kind of genetic epistemology utilizes a *psychological* rather than a *philosophical* method, I made no attempt to interpret the Critical philosophy in this manner. Instead, I used the Hegelian progression (basic to the organization of parts A and B of the *Phenomenology of*

Spirit) from sense, through understanding, to self-consciousness (apperception?³⁰) to carry the interpretation out of the objective sphere (broadly defined) and into the sphere of a properly reflective consciousness (*phenomenologico-genetic* presentation). Thereafter, and along lines which are already prefigured in Heidegger's interpretation, understanding disappears as one of the fundamental faculties.³¹ Its place, as the highest faculty, is now taken by apperception (in relation to pure imagination and to pure intuition).

From this point on, the Critical project is resumed upon a strictly transcendental plane through an examination of the inter-relation of the three transcendental faculties of apperception, imagination and intuition³² and with a view to instituting a transcendental phenomenological interpretation of the faculty theory. This kind of comparison (between Kant and Husserl) is one which is familiar to the literature from Iso Kern's study of *Kant and Husserl*. However, whereas, by and large, Kern's procedure consists in bringing out the *differences* between the two great transcendental philosophers from a standpoint outside the two main bodies of thought, my method consists in finding affinities through a work of interpretation which seeks to view Kant from a Husserlian standpoint.

In order to bring out the Husserlian character of the kind of transcendental analyses conducted by Kant (especially in the A edition of the Deduction), the distinction between appearance and representation has to be interpreted in such a way as to bring to light something in the order of a phenomenological reduction.³³ An appearance is always the appearance of something (substance) which does not itself appear in the appearing, and in this sense presupposes the existence of just such a something. But a representation is so constituted that nothing may correspond to what is represented, *vorgestellt*, or held *before* consciousness. Thus the concept of representation is indicative of the disclosure of a sphere of immanence within which, and within which alone, a principle of transcendence can, and has to be, found. Second, in place of the analytic or regressive procedure (from the conditioned to the condition of its possibility), appropriate to the epistemological interpretation, the emphasis is switched to the synthetic or progressive procedure (from the condition to the conditioned) in order to exhibit the constitutive capacity of the analyses conducted in the Deduction. This synthetic or progressive procedure can be justified with regard to the so-called 'subjective deduction'³⁴ and yields an understanding of Kant's enquiry into the objectivity of experience which already anticipates Husserlian phenomenology.

Perhaps the most obvious indication of such an affinity is to be found in the concept of the 'transcendental object', a concept which is only to be found in the A edition of the Deduction. This concept of the transcendental object mediates between two alternatives, one of which, one might

say, creates too great a distance between appearance and reality while the other brings the two too close to each other. The transcendental object is not a *thing in itself* lying over and beyond the limits of sensible experience but precisely something which manifests itself in and through appearances. On the other hand, the transcendental object is not to be reduced to the epistemological notion of *substance, qua appearance*. Thus, by neither overstepping the bounds of the phenomenal nor yet reducing the phenomenal to the substantial, as *substrate of appearance*, Kant opens up a way of envisaging the essential unity of a manifold of appearances which leads straight into Husserlian phenomenology. There can be no doubt that Husserl had the Kantian model in mind when, in *Ideas I*, the text in which he made his major breakthrough into transcendental phenomenology, he (Husserl) took over, at a critical point, the Kantian terminology of a transcendental object.³⁵

However, the point of carrying through a phenomenologico-static presentation is not just to re-construct the *Critique* along strictly transcendental lines but to lay the basis for what I call an 'ontological transposition'. It is a central contention of my Kant interpretation that an ontological interpretation of the *Critique* can only be arrived at by 'transposing' or carrying over the transcendental dimension of the fundamental faculties into an inverted ontological mode. This is effectively what Heidegger did when, for example, he interpreted the a priori synthesis as a precursory comprehension of the horizon of objectivity in general – but without acknowledging the source from which this ontological derivation actually stems. Thus instead of simply interpreting transcendental truth as ontological fore-knowledge, from the very outset, I prefer to make a distinction between the a priori and the genuinely *prior*. By an a priori investigation is meant the *ultimately conclusive* disclosure of those structures of consciousness which make the objectivity of an already constructed experience possible. By an investigation into the *prior* construction of experience is meant a *genuinely original* enquiry into the process by which such an experience gets built up in the first place. Thus, the opposition a priori–prior goes along with such equivalent oppositions as found–ground, constitute–construct, all of which not only permit a distinction between an ontological and a transcendental interpretation of the *Critique* but also allow for the establishment of an essential connection between these two, sharply contrasted, interpretations.

For instance, Kant's theory of space and time effects a reversal of the conventional conception of space and time as frames of reference for that in which we find ourselves. Instead of thinking of ourselves as situated in space and time, Kant invites us to think of space and time as situated 'in us'. But this 'being in us' of space and time is susceptible to a double interpretation, the one characteristically transcendental, the other characteristically ontological. Space and time may be 'in us', as

forms of the mind. Alternatively, we may conceive of ourselves as spatial and temporal in *our very being*. The pure forms of space and time which are initially interpreted along more conventionally Kantian lines as pure forms 'in the mind' are finally interpreted along ontological lines to mean embodiment (the body as the space that is in me) and action (the temporalization of my being as a body).

Strictly speaking, this means, in the end, that the ontological domain will figure twice. In the first instance, the pure forms will function as so many practical structures ('schemas of action' to use a Piagetian terminology) through whose operations an objective reality is constructed in the first place, of course, in a wholly immediate and unreflected fashion. Once an objective reality has been constructed, it can then be subjected to analysis. The philosophical methodology appropriate to the investigation of such an already constructed reality is epistemology. Transcendental philosophy emerges, in the first instance, as radical epistemology, an epistemology that opens up the distinction between the empirical and the transcendental in order precisely to trace the objectivity of the object back to constitutive structures of consciousness. This reduction *to* consciousness brings about the 'destruction' of an already constructed reality, a destruction which prepares the way for something in the order of a 're-construction'. In this sense, what is ordinarily thought of as 'phenomenological constitution' comes to take on the meaning of a 're-construction'. Only in the light of just such a transcendental philosophical project does a properly ontological philosophy become possible. And the task of such a philosophy consists then in the attempt to bring to full self-conscious awareness those very processes and procedures which were originally responsible for the construction of that very reality which forms the starting point of any transcendental investigation.

Simply to articulate such a programme is however already implicitly to be committed to an ontologico-genetic interpretation, not merely of the *Critique*, but also of the several methodologies brought to light in the course of the attempt to articulate all the various ways in which the Critical philosophy can be interpreted. Interestingly, this new ontologico-genetic presentation can be represented as an extension of the phenomenologico-genetic presentation. Since the latter carries the analysis from an objective to a reflective plane, and since the more specifically Husserlian phenomenological interpretation leads on to an (Heideggerian) ontological conception, this latter (the last in the order of analysis) can, in turn, be regarded as the first (in the order of being) stage in a three-stage genesis which moves *from* the ontological, *through* the epistemological and so on *to* the transcendental stage.

Such a programme of *interpretative transformation* is, by the very nature of things, *much more complex* than that carried out by Heidegger. And

so a question arises as to whether the effort involved (not to mention the violence done to the text) can be justified in the light of the conclusions that can be drawn therefrom. And here I would simply like to offer a few concluding remarks.

First, the richness of Kant's thinking becomes a positive force to be reckoned with, not a negative factor to be explained away. Kant has often been criticized for the apparent contradictions which abound in the *Critique*. In my view, many of Kant's central concepts should be treated as symbols rather than concepts, symbols in the sense that they unify in one term a multiplicity of meaning and so offer a context for textual interpretation – 'le symbole donne à penser', to use Ricoeur's apposite phrase. This multiplicity of meaning must remain confusing unless and until it can be disentangled. A disentangling of the multivocity of certain central concepts is already effected in as much as the concepts in question are assigned to different theoretical contexts, contexts in which their distinct meanings are separately voiced. Thus each presentation can be regarded as an internally consistent configuration, many of whose key terms will, in the context of other configurations, acquire meanings which may not be consistent with the meaning they assume in the given context.

Second, the exclusively ontological orientation of Heidegger's interpretation forces him to devalue, indeed virtually to disqualify, the faculty of apperception in favour of imagination. And yet, on the face of it, apperception is not only presented by Kant as the highest faculty but as the unifying faculty *par excellence*. Kant calls this key faculty the transcendental unity of apperception and, as such, it possesses two distinctive traits. It represents the highest unity of consciousness on the one hand and the reflective self-identity of consciousness on the other. Moreover, as that self-identity ($I = I$) which identifies itself with the unity of consciousness, it is also the faculty primarily responsible for integrating the other fundamental faculties within itself. Whereas Heidegger's interpretation concentrates upon the imagination to the *exclusion* of apperception, an interpretation which accords a pivotal role to apperception will also be one which is required to take account of the *inclusion* of intuition and imagination under apperception in the general structure of an a priori synthesis. Moreover, and thanks to the structure of an ontological transposition, apperception is required to figure *both* as a transcendental *and also* as an ontological faculty. The highest founding faculty becomes the lowest grounding faculty. Unification from above is converted into unification from below. Thus, the substance of Heidegger's own ontological interpretation is retained but in a way that does justice to the dominant role of the faculty of apperception.³⁶

The dismissal of apperception belongs along with Heidegger's more general depreciation of transcendental philosophy. And this brings with it implications which far transcend the scope of his Kant interpretation.

For instance, it helps to explain Heidegger's tendency to interpret the history of Western philosophy as leading up to and so becoming consummated in technology. Technological thinking is thinking in view of a manipulative practice, and we are becoming ever more aware of the dangers which attend an uncritical extension of calculative-manipulative thinking. But by substituting his own ontological, for Husserl's transcendental, phenomenology, Heidegger failed to take account of the sense in which Husserl's phenomenology is already an overcoming of calculative-manipulative thinking and perhaps a more effective overcoming than that represented by the recollective (*andenkende*) thinking of late Heidegger. To be sure, Husserl's phenomenology radicalizes, and indeed *absolutizes*, the sphere of subjectivity. But the transcendental subjectivity which emerges therefrom is anything but calculative or manipulative in intent. Indeed, in his late work *Crisis*, Husserl traced many of the aberrations of the times through which he was then living to a naive regression to wilful partiality and held out, as a redeeming hope, the classical ideal of a purely disinterested, theoretical reason. Not only is this ideal dismissed by Heidegger and his disciples as a product of subjectivism, the other great subjectivist ideal, the ontologico-theological ideal of an absolute knowledge or, at least, an absolute spirituality is also disqualified (see Souche-Dagues, chap. 25, vol. II in the present work).

Coupled with this dismissal of the spirit and intent of transcendental philosophy there goes a depreciation of its ethical implications. Cassirer, in his debate with Heidegger, was quick to fasten upon this feature of Heidegger's Kant interpretation – as Pierre Aubenque has shown in his paper on the subject (chap. 23, vol. II in the present work). Though, on the surface, it might not seem that Husserl had much to say on the subject of ethics, those who are familiar with what, to my way of thinking, represents one of the very greatest contributions to ethical theory of this century, Scheler's *Materiale Wertethik*, will know how deeply indebted Scheler was to transcendental philosophy in general (the first part of Scheler's work is devoted to a critique of Kant's formalistic ethics) and to phenomenological philosophy in particular.³⁷

The kind of interpretation which I undertook in my Kant book seems to me to come closer to the spirit, and the theoretical ambitions, of the hermeneutical revolution than does Heidegger's own version. First, the working out of a multiplicity of alternative presentations forces upon the reader an awareness of that very 'as-structure' in terms of which Heidegger laid out his own theory of interpretation. Whoever says interpretation says *more than one* possible way of understanding. It is precisely this multiplicity which is missing from the Heideggerian account. But the question is whether the recognition of multiple possibilities of understanding means that the work of interpretation is committed to the necessity of *indefinitely many* alternative ways of understanding – in

which case we would seem to have avoided the naive conclusiveness of *one* for the chaotic inconclusiveness of *many*. By generating a *finite* number of alternative presentations in accordance with a *well-defined* principle, and by staging the succession of presentations in such a way that something like a *logic of the genesis* of one presentation from another emerges in the course of the interpretative transformation, it becomes possible to envisage the presentations in question as forming a *systematic totality* which effectively exhausts all the methodological possibilities available to the work of interpretation.

Finally, this methodological logic is one which not only describes a circle and but which also finishes up by closing the circle, and this in a double sense. At the specific level of textual interpretation, the fore-knowledge which was presupposed in advance is eventually laid out as the goal towards which the several steps of the interpretative transformation tends throughout. In this sense, my own interpretative transformation moves in the same direction as Heidegger's ontological interpretation. At a much more general level however, a thesis is developed with regard to the respective relations of epistemology, transcendental philosophy and ontology, which are now themselves shown to move in a circle, and precisely because, in a certain sense, ontology figures twice, as the *first* in the order of being and as the *last* in the order of analysis. Heidegger's distinction between a pre-ontological way of being of Dasein and the discipline of ontology helps to bring out this twofold location of ontology. We are (pre-)ontological in our being, and from the very beginning. However, it is only in so far as we move away from the (pre-)ontological origin that we are capable of developing the conceptual resources needed to make sense of this origin and to do so in terms of that discipline which is called ontology.

Moreover, it is also clear that, in some sense, this methodological circle has actually already manifested itself at least twice in the course of the history of modern philosophy; first, in the movement from rationalist and empiricist epistemology (based upon Aristotelian logic) through Kantian transcendental philosophy and so on to Hegelian ontology and then again in the move from positivist epistemology (based on a much more powerful symbolic logic) through Husserlian transcendental philosophy and so on to Heideggerian ontology.³⁸ That a certain reading of the history of modern philosophy confirms the logic of a transformation of epistemology into transcendental philosophy and transcendental philosophy onto ontology seems not only to offer support for this conception of the relation between the various methodologies in question, it also makes it possible to envisage the all-embracing methodology of 'interpretative transformation' as a *science*, in that time-honoured sense in which, for Hegel, the essence of scientific philosophy lies in its *systematic* character.³⁹

Notes

1 See the paper by Aubenque for an account of the Cassirer–Heidegger debate over Heidegger's Kant interpretation.

2 Christopher Macann, *Kant and the Foundations of Metaphysics* (Heidelberg: Winterverglag, 1981).

3 See especially the extensive presentation of Kant's doctrines in the *Logik* (*Gesamtausgabe* (GA) 21) and the volume on human freedom (GA 31).

4 Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, GA 3, tr. James Churchill as *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962). This work will be cited hereafter as *The Kant book*.

5 Martin Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen*, GA 41, tr. W. B. Barton and Vera Deutsch as *What is a Thing?* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967).

6 *The Kant book*, p. 20.

7 Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson as *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 182 (H. 143).

8 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 184 (H. 144).

9 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 185 (H. 145).

10 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 188 (H. 148).

11 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 192 (H. 150).

12 *The Kant book*, p. 206.

13 *The Kant book*, p. 20.

14 *The Kant book*, p. 28.

15 *The Kant book*, p. 43.

16 Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, tr. Norman Kemp-Smith as *The Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Macmillan, 1929), A 78 = B 103, cited by Heidegger, *The Kant book*, p. 66.

17 *The Kant book*, p. 94.

18 *The Kant book*, p. 211.

19 *The Kant book*, p. 17.

20 *The Kant book*, p. 202.

21 *The Kant book*, p. 206.

22 *The Kant book*, p. 21.

23 *The Kant book*, p. 93.

24 *The Kant book*, p. 171.

25 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 61 (H. 37).

26 Despite frequent references to a 'worldless subject', to a self-enclosed sphere of immanence and the impossibility of conceiving of transcendence as a transcending of such a sphere and so on, statements which clearly imply a reference to Husserl, Husserl's name is only mentioned, in a purely informative way, at two points (H. 38 and H. 47), the other references being hidden away in the notes.

27 Macann, *Kant and the Foundations of Metaphysics*, p. 16.

28 In the first instance the epistemological hierarchy is surmounted by formal thought in accordance with the 'highest principle of analytical judgment', see Macann, *Kant and the Foundations of Metaphysics*, p. 43.

29 Note the title of one of Piaget's earlier works: *La construction de la réalité chez l'enfant*.

30 As is well known, in his *Phenomenology*, Hegel takes as his clue to the stages set out in section A (consciousness) and B (self-consciousness), the Kantian faculty theory. From a starting point in the realm of sense, the exposition moves

through the secondary sphere of understanding before finishing up in the domain of self-consciousness. To be sure, the tautology $I = I$, in terms of which Kant formulates the reflectivity of apperception is, for Hegel, the mark of the inadequacy of this preliminary concept of self-consciousness. For all that, it is the highest faculty of apperception which Hegel has in mind with his concept of self-consciousness.

31 The first section of Part Three of The Kant book considers the 'three-fold division of the fundamental faculties' and finds grounds, in Kant, for the replacement of the provisional triptich (sense–imagination–understanding) by a more fundamental triptich (sense–imagination–apperception).

32 Although, strictly speaking, this third part should be divided into two, a part devoted to the phenomenologico-static and a part devoted to the ontologico-static presentation of the essential connection of the fundamental faculties, I have, for reasons of economy and in the light of a structure I call the 'ontological transposition', regrouped the two parts under the one head of an *ontologico-static* presentation.

33 The notion of a reduction is worked out in the section entitled 'Immanence'. As a result of the substitution of the concept of representation for that of appearance, the relation (of correspondence) to the object has to be determined by way of a structure of coherence.

34 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A xvii, p. 12.

35 The language Husserl uses in §131 is that of the 'determinable X'. In the synthesis of recognition in a concept Kant uses similar language to talk of a something in general = x (A 104) or the 'representation of the object = x ' (A 105). He will also talk of this transcendental object as a 'correlate of apperception' (A 250), which is presumably why it is also legitimate to talk of apperception as the 'transcendental subject of our thoughts = X' (A 346 = B 404).

36 Implicitly, though only implicitly, Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1956) effects just such a re-interpretation of the faculty of apperception. Not only is the starting point of Fichte's philosophy the $I = I$, the efficacy of the I is defined as a practical activity (*stellen*) rather than a theoretical representation (*vorstellen*).

37 In the preface to the first edition of *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, Scheler has this to say: 'I owe to the significant works of Edmund Husserl the methodological consciousness of the unity and sense of the phenomenological attitude.' *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, tr. Manfred Frings and Roger Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. xiv.

38 Part II of my overall ontological programme envisages an 'epochal interpretation' of the history of modern philosophy from Descartes on. The principle underlying such an 'epochal interpretation' is very simple, to find epochs corresponding to the several stages of the ontological genesis.

39 For example, in a passage from the preface to the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* Hegel writes: 'daß das Wissen nur als Wissenschaft oder als System wirklich ist und dargestellt werden kann'; G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952), S. 23.

The dialogue between Heidegger and Hegel

Denise Souche-Dagues

In 1950, in his Preface to the 2nd edition of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger explained what he meant by a 'thinking dialogue' (*denkendes Gespräch*) between those who think (*zwischen Denkenden*), and recognizes that he has often been reproached for the violence (*der Vorwurf des Gewaltsamen*) of his interpretations. The laws, he explains, of such a dialogue are not those of 'philosophical history' nor of that kind of research characterized as 'history of philosophy'. What these laws might be Heidegger does not tell us but limits himself to affirming that they are 'more vulnerable' (*verletzlicher*): 'das Verfehlende ist in der Zwiesprache drohender, das Fehlende häufiger'.

Throughout his life, Heidegger pursued a 'thinking dialogue' with Hegel. From the time of his thesis on Duns Scotus, he saluted in Hegelianism 'the most powerfully systematic vision of the world, both in breadth as in depth, in living richness as in conceptual articulation', and, in *Zeit und Sein*, one of the latest of his writings, he saw in the speculative dialectic of Hegel, 'the most powerful thinking of the modern epoch [*gewaltigstes Denken*]'.¹

In addition to the texts which directly bear upon Hegel, Hegel is constantly present throughout his reading of Kant, of Nietzsche, of Heraclitus, of Hölderlin or of Schelling . . . and the reference to his thinking is always decisive.

Faced with the extent of the material which relates to Hegel in the Heideggerian corpus, I have decided here to concentrate upon the most important moments of the Heideggerian reading, and as follows:

- 1 The critique of the Hegelian theory of time in the Marburg lectures of 1925–6 and in paragraph 82 of *Sein und Zeit*.
- 2 The Commentary, dating from 1942–3, on the Introduction to the

Phenomenology of Spirit, to which has to be added the lecture of 1930–1, devoted to the beginning of the work.²

- 3 The lecture, given on 24 February 1957: 'Die ontotheologische Verfassung der Metaphysik' which follows the seminar devoted to the 'Wissenschaft der Logik' and to which a text from June 1957 on the Principle of Identity (*der Satz der Identität*) is attached.

These three moments can on the face of it be characterized in the following manner: the first, as a pure and simple refusal of the Hegelian problematic; the second, as an attempt, by Heidegger, to assimilate Hegel's thinking, or rather to render it assimilable to his own; the third, which is more complicated, consists in a setting at a distance which wants to be an appropriation. One may infer that, by 1957, the explicit relationship between Heidegger and Hegel had assumed its final form.

Heidegger's reading of paragraphs 257–9 of the *Encyclopedia*, devoted to time, and that of paragraph 254, devoted to space, as also that of those pages of the *Jena Philosophy of Nature* which deal with time, space and of their unity³ form the basis of the critical exposition of the Hegelian conception of time.⁴ The reproduction of his exposition will be very brief here;⁵ we shall be mostly concerned with determining what is at stake.

Heidegger underlines the fact that, in accordance with a tradition which goes back to Aristotle and which Hegel had recuperated, notably in Kant, the elucidation of time and that of space are for him bound up with one another; at times, for instance at Jena, he deals with time first and then space, at other times, for instance in the *Encyclopedia*, he follows the reverse order. But, Heidegger thinks, at bottom this difference changes nothing ('*sachlich . . . ist es dasselbe*'⁶). For what is in question here is time understood as belonging to nature. In the *Jena* version, the elucidation of time is inserted into the exposition of the 'System of the sun'; in the *Encyclopedia*, time is referred to 'Mechanics', the first section of the *Philosophy of Nature*. Here as there, the thinking about time is at the service of the understanding of the essence of movement and of matter. Thus the thinking is engaged in the project of a kind of knowing whose right to the title of philosophy is implicitly disputed by Heidegger. If the truth of space is time, according to a formula borrowed from a Zusatz to paragraph 257, this means, for Heidegger, that what has to be understood is the passage from one to the other. On the side of space, one finds the representation, which is nourished by fixed distinctions; on the side of time, it is 'absolute' thought which is at stake and in which no difference can subsist. The exposition in the *Encyclopedia* shows, according to Heidegger, that space is 'unmediated indifference' (*die vermittlungslose Gleichgültigkeit*), being-extrinsic to itself, the plurality of abstract points which can be distinguished within it. On the other hand, when the determination is thought and not simply

represented, this punctuality is 'surpassed', the point is no longer this one or that one. It no longer subsists in the calm juxtaposition of indifference. In other words, the negativity which was 'simple' negativity in space has become, as time, a negativity which stands in relation to itself, that is, a negation of negation. Heidegger comments upon paragraph 258 and its *Zusatz* as follows: 'die Bedingung der *Möglichkeit* des Sich-für-sich-setzens des Punktes ist das Jetzt.'⁷ This condition of the possibility is Being and Being is its thinkability (*Gedachtheit*) or, in other words, the truth of the matter. Such, in any case, is the meaning of the *is* in the formula: 'Space is time.'

In characterizing time on the basis of the now, Hegel, according to Heidegger, subscribes to the 'vulgar' understanding of time which contrasts with the existential analytic developed in *Sein und Zeit*. This vulgar understanding is the linear conception of time, a conception which reduces time to the external possibility of its measurability. Identified with the series of nows, it has become an oriented flux. What is the nature of this orientation? Heidegger replies: 'It is that which tends toward an annihilation of what is, which sinks into the no-longer of the past. Time is the consummation (*Verzehrung*) of what is. The future destroys the now-present and the latter is then swallowed up in the no-longer; a repetitive gesture which extends indistinctly throughout the entire series of nows. Hegel, Heidegger says, recognizes moreover that time is 'abstract'.⁸

This analysis is destined to render intelligible the link established by Hegel between time and Spirit, since the latter, according to Heidegger, 'falls' in time. An 'ontological' link but one which in Heidegger's eyes possesses a strictly formal character. Spirit and time are both thought as the 'negation of the negation' in a 'dialectico-formal' construction. Hegelian spirit, which Heidegger interprets as 'das sich Begreifen' is also the act of apprehending the not-self, and, as such, consists in the reduplication of a difference whose formula runs: '*cogito me cogitare rem*'. By borrowing a Cartesian and Fichtean terminology Heidegger is able to affirm that Hegel missed the concretion of Spirit and that he dangerously surpassed the Kantian lesson concerning the subjectivity of time in the supposed affinity of time and Spirit.

These Heideggerian glosses can only disappoint the reader of Hegel. Admittedly, Heidegger concedes that for certain of the texts cited here, notably the Jena *Philosophy of Nature* he did no more than run through it quickly.⁹ But the distance assumed by the commentary with regard to the texts is so great that one can only ask what exactly Heidegger has in mind with his polemic. Neither the texts from the *Encyclopedia* nor those from the Jena *Philosophy of Nature* rely upon the kind of 'transition' from representation to 'thought' which he finds there. For the *Encyclopedia* is plunged into the element of thought from the very outset

of the *Logic*. The *Philosophy of Nature* certainly does not constitute a slide back into representation, even if the Idea is taken there in its externality, or as intuited in and through its other. Furthermore, there is nothing like a progress from space to time to be found in either of these texts since, as Heidegger notes, the exposition of the Jena text also goes from time to space while the subject matter of thought (*die Sache des Denkens*) is the same there as in the *Encyclopedia*.¹⁰ Rather the contrary, to the extent that it is necessary to come to terms with the idea of movement, the elucidation of space and that of time complement one another in the sense that there is a reversal of the outcome of the dialectic of time (infinity assuming the form of self-equality) and the dialectic of space (self-equality becoming infinity). Even if the terms employed by Hegel in the *Encyclopedia* differ from those of the Jena text, it nevertheless remains the case that space and time both depend upon *being-outside itself* (*Aussersichsein*). But space exhibits a difference which is its own negation, and which, in developing itself and positing itself, becomes time. Space is the 'positive' unity of being-outside-itself. Time is its 'negative' unity. It is in virtue of its placement in the realm of the exterior that the latter is abstract, ideal and so cannot be identified with Spirit. It is nothing but the 'pure form of sensibility', the principle of abstract subjectivity whose formula is, for Hegel, the $I = I$ of Fichte. Furthermore, there is nothing like a 'fall' of Spirit into time, which would mean that Spirit descends from an eternity situated out of time. Eternity is for Hegel in its immanent totalization which is its true infinity. The present (*Gegenwart*) which is responsible for presenting this absolute unification indicates clearly that time is not in truth the indefinite and formal series of here-nows, cancelling themselves in the etc., etc., of indefiniteness.

The blindness of Heidegger towards the real meaning of Hegel's texts is echoed in the aggressivity of his style. In the lecture of 1925-6, he writes for example: 'Hegel kann alles sagen über jedes. Und es gibt Leute, die in einer solchen Konfusion einen Tiefsinn entdecken.'¹¹ At the beginning of paragraph 82 of *Sein und Zeit*, he affirms that he is not attempting to 'criticize' Hegel (*kritisieren*); but to the extent that the entire thrust of the text consists in attributing to Hegel the 'vulgar' interpretation of time which resists any existential analytic (as is indicated unambiguously by the title of the paragraph itself¹²), his intention is certainly that of overthrowing one (perhaps the most prestigious), of the philosophical theories of time in which he cannot find his own proposal. For the 'vulgar' time from which Heidegger withdraws is not retained in any way, even as suppressed, at the heart of the existential analytic. The treatment reserved for Kant at the end of paragraph 81 is much less abrupt;¹³ it is Hegel who is for Heidegger the theoretician of a 'levelled-down' time, of a time which originates in the now and which finds its

essence exclusively in the now. He is of course talking of 'vorhanden' time, a time possessing the characteristics needed to accommodate Spirit just as soon as the latter is, for its part, reduced to an abstract structure. At this point in his intellectual itinerary, Heidegger seems unable to find his own way save by turning away from Hegel. Even the apparent eulogy cited previously and formulated at the end of the book on Duns Scotus is not free from serious reservations. The terms which are now employed to characterize the Hegelian 'system' – 'world vision', 'historical vision of the world' become suspect from this period on with regard to the task Heidegger has assigned to thinking.

I propose to account for this refusal in two different ways, the first more historical and therefore more superficial, the second more internal and, for this reason, more risky, perhaps.

In the first instance I am indebted to the report made by O. Pöggeler of the lectures of 1925–6.¹⁴ O. Pöggeler points out that Heidegger came to Hegel not by way of neo-Kantianism (which might have led him to neo-Hegelianism) but rather by way of the teaching of the Catholic theologians of Tübingen for whom a decided opposition to Hegel's Lutheranism was an essential pre-requisite. In his view, Heidegger is particularly suspicious of the Hegelian conception of history (and therefore of time), the dialectic for him being incapable of thinking life and the contingencies of experience. One might add, without either leaving the plane or the tenor of O. Pöggeler's analyses, that Hegelianism is challenged in the same Catholic circles on account of Hegel's affiliation with the Enlightenment.

In this way one can put one's finger upon circumstances surrounding the Heideggerian reading of Hegel which are certainly not to be overlooked. But one is entitled to doubt whether what is philosophically at stake in this reading is adequately broached in such a reading.

The critical issue seems to us to be brought to light by way of Heidegger's evocation of the tradition to which the 'vulgar' conception of time belongs. The latter is marked out by Aristotle, then by Kant and Bergson, the latter arguing that time 'is' space (the reverse of Hegel). If one bears in mind that in 1928 Heidegger edited the *Lessons* professed by E. Husserl in 1905, opening the way to a phenomenology of inner-time consciousness, a task assigned to him some years previously in succession to E. Stein, one may be surprised to find that Husserl's name is not even mentioned here. It seems to me that this silence has to be interpreted. In Husserl, Heidegger finds a conception of time which is fundamentally at odds with his own. Engaged in representation, it furnishes a formulation of the experience of time understood as indefinite, starting out from a 'here and now' which is always suppressed and yet which is always renewed in the etc. . . . of a homogeneous series. The description of an 'inner' consciousness of time is moreover constantly recovered in Husserl

through the bringing to light of its objectifying function, 'longitudinal' intentionality functioning at the behest of 'transversal' intentionality, that is, of transcendence. In addition, he is convinced that these Husserlian descriptions contribute more to the consciousness of the past, on the basis of retention, than they do to that of the future, treated as the symmetrical equivalent of the past. In this way one can quite easily disentangle in Husserl's text the most important elements of the critique addressed by Heidegger against Hegel's concept of time. It is also noteworthy that the text of the Foreword written by him for his edition of the Husserlian *Lessons* is not only very brief but also, and more especially, that he insists on their importance from the standpoint of an elucidation of intentionality, that is, of representative thinking. This very fact puts these analyses at a great distance from the kind of temporality which the existential analytic has in mind.¹⁵ Does this mean that 'Hegel' is a pseudonym, the young Heidegger having withdrawn from an explicit critique of the master of Freiburg (to which *Sein und Zeit* is dedicated) as before a sort of philosophical parricide? It will suffice to suggest here that the general critique of representation came to cover for Heidegger from 1925 on his debate with any thinker whatsoever and that the reading of a philosophy, especially if it can in addition be considered 'rationalist', is dominated by a purely negative and critical ambition.

In 1930-1 one finds, in the lecture devoted to the beginning of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (the chapter 'Consciousness and self-consciousness'), a resumption of the critique of Hegelian time,¹⁶ identical in spirit with that of the years 1925-7 but more definitely oriented in an ontological direction. Heidegger presents the problematic of *Sein und Zeit* as the exact contrary (*das gerade Gegenteil*) of what Hegel attempted to establish concerning time throughout his philosophy. Heidegger contrasts his 'das Wesen des Seins ist die Zeit' explicitly with Hegel's 'das Sein ist das Wesen des Zeit', *Sein* being of course, in this Hegelian context, the formula for abstract Being, *vorhanden*. Even if Hegel calls time 'infinite', its assimilation to space is, according to Heidegger, the basis upon which Hegel is able to uphold the identification of Being with the essence of time. Henceforward, the entire weight of the Heideggerian reading is going to bear upon the meaning of the Hegelian ontology.

In 1942-3, Heidegger gave a number of seminars on the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (Books IV and X). A text entitled *Hegel's Concept of Experience* published in *Holzwege* in 1950 and reprinted in volume 5 of the *Gesamtausgabe* resulted from these seminars. Employing a deliberately didactic style, Heidegger pursues the text of the Introduction line by line in a dense commentary about five times as long as the Hegelian text.

What is at work here is an enveloping of Hegel's thought designed to render it consistent with that of Heidegger whose key words (*Sein-*

Seiendes) are imposed upon the Hegelian text in such a way as to determine its meaning.

Since, according to Heidegger, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in its entirety points towards self-consciousness, he situates the latter with reference to consciousness as a 'presentation' distinct from a 'representation'. 'Das Vorstellen präsentiert das Objekt, indem es dieses dem Subjekt repräsentiert. Die Präsentation ist der Grundzug des Wissens im Sinne des Selbstbewusstseins des Subjekts.'¹⁷ Here we find once again the same Cartesian-Fichtean interpretation of consciousness as in the text of *Sein und Zeit*, and the same insistence upon a reflective reversal of consciousness into self-consciousness, this latter featuring as the essence of Spirit.¹⁸

Since Hegel employs the word *Darstellung*¹⁹ to designate the central task of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Heidegger superimposes *Präsentation* and *Darstellung* one upon the other and writes: 'Darum ist die Darstellung, die dieses Seiende als das Seiende vorstellt, die Philosophie, selbst die Wissenschaft.'²⁰ The being in question here is subjectivity understood as absolute certainty of self. 'Presentation' is therefore nothing other than 'absolute knowledge',²¹ since the certainty of self-consciousness results from the ab-solution, in it and through it, of all relativity attaching to intentional representation.

The result is that if one considers the 'presentation of appearing knowledge', that is phenomenology, as a journey undertaken by consciousness in the direction of a goal which would be its other and which would initially be concealed from it, we have to do here with an appearance which, according to Heidegger, is cleared up in the very first paragraph of the Introduction.

At this point it would be appropriate to take the measure of the work accomplished by Heidegger on Hegel's text. It is well known that this text begins with a dismissal of the critical procedures which call in question the fallibility of knowledge on the basis of the fallibility of its instruments. Hegel challenges steps such as these, steps which, supposedly inspired by the fear of error, attest more readily to a certain fear of truth. Heidegger's proposal consists therefore in bringing to light Hegel's confidence in the presence of the absolute 'close by us',²² a confidence which is expressed in the detour accomplished by a subordinate proposition. So one sees him annexing to this end the ironic phrase by means of which Hegel condemns the efforts of those who think that the instrument of knowledge would be able to bring the Absolute close to us without changing anything in it (*an ihm*): 'wie etwa durch die Limrute der Vogel, so wurde es wohl, *wenn es nicht an und für sich schon bei uns wäre und sein wollte*, dieser List spotten',²³ thereby making it the pivotal point of his whole reading of the Introduction since,

according to him, 'in der Vollendung des Werkes ist der Nebensatz zum einzigen Hauptsatz geworden'.²⁴

What might be called the monolithic character of Heidegger's commentary follows from the above. In fact, once *Darstellung*, presentation, has been identified with absolute knowledge, its movement, the dynamic of presentifying representation 'sets out from the appearing consciousness as such, that is, from real knowledge which is the truth of natural knowledge'.²⁵ Henceforward, the presentation in question is certainly, if you like, a path, but not a reach (*Strecke*) which is supposed to stretch from pre-philosophical representation to philosophy. When Hegel says that presentation is a presentation of appearing knowledge,²⁶ Heidegger tries to understand the 'appearing' character of knowledge on the basis of what Hegel says about the phenomenal character of science, that is of philosophy: to wit, that when it enters on the scene it is in itself a phenomenon since it has to be juxtaposed to another knowledge which could be regarded as its phenomenon in a weak sense of that world, that is, a little like its shadow. To accomplish this he makes use of a gloss of *Erscheinung* which he had already offered in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*. While *Erscheinung* is credited, in paragraph 7 of *Sein und Zeit*, with an ambiguous meaning (in that it announces what is most often hidden and in that it can always lapse into an illusory appearance (*Schein*), *Phänomen* being, on the contrary, the showing-itself-from-itself, in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, the appearing (*Œscheinen-Erscheinen*) is understood as *lighting*, as *presenting itself* and, in the end, as *Being*: 'Sein west als Erscheinen.'²⁷ Such is the non-latency of ἀλήθεια. Thus, by means of the substitution of one text for another, of *Erscheinen* (*Erscheinung*) for *Phänomen*, we find an affirmation of both the unity and the antipathy (with unity taking the lead) of Being and Appearing (*Sein-Schein*).²⁸ When he wrote the commentary to the *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit*, Heidegger reinforced the strength of this unity, *Erscheinen* having definitively gathered within itself the positive aspect initially accorded to *Phänomen*. This is why knowledge, in its appearing, can be called 'real knowledge' or, 'the truth of natural knowledge'.²⁹

In this way Heidegger seeks to discredit an interpretation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* which treats this work as a sort of *Bildungsroman*, an initiatory journey which sets out from knowledge or from a consciousness entitled 'natural' and which ends up with Absolute Knowledge. This interpretation is dismantled by him with the aid of semantic shifts from *Erscheinung* to *Sein*, the first understood as revelation and finally as the absolute of manifestation. If the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the presentation of Knowledge and if this presentation is the Knowledge itself, it certainly involves a journey, but a journey which does not finish up anywhere but the place where presentation is itself unfolded.

This is how he establishes the belonging together of representation (which is the work of consciousness in as much as its essence is intentionality) and presentation – the work of self-consciousness which is the ab-solution of objectification: an interiorization (*Er-innerung*) and an appropriation (*Zu-eignung*).

If therefore, in a phenomenology, the presentation of the appearing is not to be distinguished from the Being of what appears (since Hegel has given the name *Spirit* to this very Being), the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has to be understood as a subjective genitive. The theme is Spirit in its appearing, that is, in its self-unfolding. And the consciousness (entitled natural) through which this presentation is inaugurated is always already the absolute consciousness which is presented through this very presentation. This is what gives the work the structure of a ring (*Ring*).³⁰ It is his refusal to consider the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as describing a pathway-towards which explains Heidegger's refusal to consider the Introduction to the work as a true introduction, separable from the main body of the work. The sixteen paragraphs of which it consists make up for him an integral part of the work.

What might be called the 'monolithic' character of the Heideggerian reading breaks out in his commentary on paragraph 6, where he effects a reciprocal reversal of the two figures distinguished by Hegel: natural consciousness, on the one hand, and real knowledge, on the other. Heidegger supposes that the two nominations are employed in the same way (*für das Selbe*).³¹ To show this, he analyses *Bewußtsein* out into: *bewußt* (alias *wissen*) and *sein*. The first term, knowledge, is a seeing, or rather a having-seen. It holds together the known and the knowing. 'Sehen wird hier als Vor-sich-haben im Vorstellen gedacht.' The *Sein*, according to him, insists upon presence (*Anwesen*) in the guise of a gathering together of what is in view.³² But the subject is caught up with what confronts him. Subjectivity is what accompanies all consciousness in general. It is presence (*Präsenz*) in the mode of representation (*Re-präsentation*). Consciousness being, as such, the appearing, one sees that the omni-presence of presentation (*Darstellung*) blocks, so to speak, appearing knowledge, both ontologically and methodologically. The 'presentation of appearing knowledge' which Hegel assigns to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is only the presentation of appearing knowledge in its appearing.³³ Such is the bi-polarity of consciousness, engaged on the one hand in its relation to the object, and, on the other, oriented towards its concept, that is, in the words of paragraph 82 of *Sein und Zeit*, towards the re-apprehension of its apprehension of the object. Heidegger writes: 'Hegel gebraucht die Unterscheidung von natürlich und real in Bezug auf das Wissen oder das Bewußtsein, das in sich das Erscheinende ist.'³⁴ Natural consciousness, constantly attached to beings, only succeeds in explaining one by way of others and this in the sense

in which its knowledge is 'natural'. But 'real' knowledge, knowledge of what being truly is, is not the complement of natural consciousness. To be sure, Hegel does oppose them, but they are intimately linked with each other since natural consciousness is the 'concept' of real knowledge.³⁵ It is in this way that Heidegger accounts for their connection: '(das natürliche Bewußtsein) kann nicht umhin, das Sein des Seienden im allgemeinen mitvorstellen, weil es ohne das Licht des Seins sich an das Seiende nicht einmal verlieren könnte.'³⁶

So the interpretation finishes up with the ontological difference. The latter can alone make it possible to think the opposition designated by Hegel, and it does so by referring this opposition to that belonging together which inseparably joins Being and beings. If natural consciousness is *only* the concept of real knowledge, it is so because the representative capacity which is its essence does not properly apprehend what is represented. It turns away from it, that is, it turns away from the light in which its representative capacity is fulfilled to consider only the being with which it is, in each instance, concerned. Historically, Heidegger sees lurking behind Hegel's 'natural consciousness' the entire metaphysics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a metaphysics which is anticipated in the Hegelian text under the name of a 'doxic system'.³⁷ If, on the other hand, the appearing of appearing knowledge (i.e., natural consciousness) is installed in the light which belongs to it then real knowledge (the 'ontological' in its opposition to the 'ontic') is revealed as *the same* as natural consciousness and its opinions but not, for all that, as being its 'equivalent'.³⁸

This is the decisive moment in Heidegger's appropriative reading. One can see that the whole effort of this reading aims at assimilating the Hegelian thesis with regard to the Absolute to the ontological difference as it functions in the thinking of Heidegger. In this way, Hegel is in a certain sense freed by Heidegger from that yoke which is 'metaphysics' in the eyes of the latter. But, by the same token, he is also subjected to it. With a view to opening up the way to a description of this paradoxical description of the locus of Hegelianism, I shall examine Heidegger's treatment of the Hegelian themes of doubt and scepticism.

When Hegel says that the path followed by natural consciousness towards its truth is that of doubt and even of despair,³⁹ Heidegger takes this as an opportunity to appeal to Descartes who had already been evoked when the real (i.e., the true) had been designated as 'the certain'.⁴⁰ But doubt contains a new reason for recalling Descartes, whose *Metaphysical Meditations* show that the path of doubt is pursued at the heart of a certainty which assumes the role of *fundamentum absolutum*.⁴¹ In other words: the absoluteness of this absolute is with Descartes, according to Heidegger, neither doubted, nor questioned nor even referred to in its proper essence. And the same is the case for him with

the course of Hegel's thinking, as we have seen. But the latter has the advantage over Cartesianism that it is enlightened by the knowledge that it has to *begin with* absoluteness – the very thing Heidegger read into the famous subordinate clause from the first paragraph. Contrary to Descartes, who only sketched out the country (*Land*) of modern philosophy, Hegel situates natural consciousness in its proper countryside (*Landschaft*), that of the representation of beings.⁴² Natural consciousness not being able to turn back towards its truth (since it is preceded by the latter) is therefore condemned to lose, one after the other, the evidence upon which it is based, and this is the ineluctable fate of presentation, that is, of absolute knowledge.⁴³ 'Je vollständiger die Darstellung den Weg der Verzweiflung durchgeht, um so eher vollendet die Wissenschaft ihr eigenes Erscheinen.'⁴⁴

Henceforward that scepticism whose exclusive right to pave the way for science Hegel will challenge in the *Encyclopedia* (cf. paras 78–81) but which, in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* benefits from a positive appreciation on condition that it is extended to cover the entire domain of appearing consciousness, is thought by Heidegger as a function of its Greek root: σκέψις, and referred by him to *seeing*, to seeing the Being of beings: 'ihr Zusehen [sc. der Skepsis] hat im vorhinein das Sein des Seienden gesehen.'⁴⁵ In as much as it is an already having seen, seeing is a knowing. In the course of this working out of knowledge there is certainly for natural consciousness a movement from one figure to another. But this movement designates the unity which it is in itself, namely, the unity of natural knowledge and of 'real' knowledge. In this way, scepticism turns out to be nothing other than the historicity of history.

But if in general, for Hegel, *Being* means a reality which is still untrue, that is, which still exists for a subjectivity which has not yet come to itself,⁴⁶ *being* cannot be employed to characterize the essence of spirit, self-consciousness (*Selbstbewußt sein*).⁴⁷ Consequently, without his even knowing it, and certainly not by virtue of some circumstance or contingent oversight, the Hegelian text reflects the secret game by means of which Being discloses itself and closes itself off. This game governs and dominates metaphysics in its entirety *but as its unthought*.

In this way Heidegger furnishes himself with the means of understanding what Hegel calls the 'contradiction' of consciousness: to wit, the fact that it is, in its entirety, a knowledge of something and an examination of this knowledge without, for all that, standing in need of going beyond itself to examine this practice.⁴⁸ This is because, according to Heidegger, consciousness is a difference which is not really such, for the two determinations of knowledge (that it is *for itself* and that, as true, it is also *in itself*) emerge here in their immediate ambiguity,⁴⁹ an ambiguity which defines the Being of consciousness. The appearing knowledge of what

appears has always already acceded to the true light of Being because it has already been installed therein. But the difference which inhabits consciousness is 'levelled down' by Hegel in that he does not permit it to be deployed as the difference of Being and of beings. This 'levelling down' consists in its being called 'negation of the negation',⁵⁰ and that in this way it possesses a purely 'logical' meaning, a meaning of such a kind that it can be recovered in what Hegel calls 'experience' but also *Erscheinen*, since it is a structure which is identical through and through. This is why when Hegel designates as 'experience' the dialectical movement which consciousness effects upon itself (*an ihm selbst*),⁵¹ this 'experience' is valid of the apprehension of beings, singly and individually. But what appears in appearing knowledge, that is, the reciprocal movement of natural consciousness and of real knowledge, is Being thought from the standpoint of its beingness: ὅν ἢ ὅν. If experience is this movement, the dialectic by means of which it is defined by Hegel is thought by him out of the essence of experience, which means: out of the essence of consciousness. 'Diese [i.e., die Erfahrung] ist die Seiendheit des Seienden, das als subjectum sich aus der Subjektivität bestimmt.'⁵²

Eliminating from the Hegelian clarification of the 'dialectic' the triplicity thesis/antithesis/synthesis as well as the 'negation of the negation', Heidegger would like to think into it a movement which is consciousness, or in other words, a comparison which is operated by consciousness between an ontic-pre-ontological knowledge and an ontological knowledge.⁵³ But since this dialogue (*Gespräch*) moves across all the figures of consciousness it draws them together and draws itself together in them. The διαλέγειν is a διαλέγεσθαι by means of which the drawing together which Heidegger assigns to λέγειν is itself recovered. In this way, by disclosing within the Hegelian text and in order to illuminate it, this structure of an ontological difference and of its history as λόγος, Heidegger wants us to note that the progression of meaning which constitutes his own method remains unthought by Hegel. At the same time, by eliminating any genuine opposition from *Gespräch* and from διαλέγειν and so a fortiori avoiding all contradiction (in accordance with the generally professed unity of natural consciousness and real knowledge in the enclosing presence of the Absolute), Heidegger is able to refer the dialectic to Being, now understood as the beingness of beings operative exclusively as *Anwesen*.

In fact, that presentation of appearing knowledge which is phenomenology now finds its limit in presence. Heidegger prefers to write presence in Greek: παρουσία, often transposed into *Parousia* (there are forty-four instances of this usage in the text). It is in the light of the latter that beings are exposed to presence. It is in the light of presence that subjectivity is 'at home' with itself.⁵⁴

Weil die Phänomenologie die Erfahrung ist, die Seiendheit des Seienden, deshalb ist sie die Versammlung des Sicherscheinens auf das Erscheinen aus dem Scheinen des Absoluten. . . . 'Die Phänomenologie' ist selbst das Sein, nach dessen Weise das Absolute an und für sich bei uns ist.

These conclusive affirmations from the Commentary have to be read in a perspective prepared by the word *Parousia*, which comes to us out of Christology. Heidegger evokes here the 'dialectico-speculative Saint Friday', thereby echoing the last lines of *Glauben und Wissen*.⁵⁵ In this way he feels himself justified in characterizing the science of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a theology of the Absolute, more exactly, as a theology of the death of God, the Science of Logic constituting for its part the theology of the absoluteness of the Absolute before the creation.⁵⁶ Both of these (the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Logic*) are ontologies, which means that they think the mundanity of the *world* in as much as *world* designates being in its totality, which kind of being is founded in subjectivity. This mixture of ontology and of theology, a mixture in which the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is itself situated, begins to be thought metaphysically by Hegel on the basis of the will, a theme Heidegger accentuates repeatedly by relying on the formula of the third paragraph in which Hegel writes that Science wants to know the Absolute (there are twenty-nine uses of *willen* and its derivatives in this text by Heidegger).

Has Heidegger brought forth the truth of the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and thereby brought forth the truth of the entire work, or has he not rather simply covered it over with glosses borrowed from his own way of thinking? Posed in this way, the question might appear rather uninteresting, more particularly if one believes with him that

the language of a thinking which has grown up out of destinal roots invokes the thinking of another thinking in the clarity of its thinking, simply in order to refer the other to its own proper essence [die aus ihrem Geschick gewachsene Sprache des Denkens ruft . . . das Gedachte eines anderen Denkens in die Halle ihres Denkens, um das andere in sein eigenes Wesen frei zu geben].⁵⁷

The (deliberate?) ambiguity of *frei-geben* which is the concession of liberty, but which ordinarily means relinquishing, is full of meaning. At one and the same time Heidegger both invokes Hegelian thinking in the light of its own language, which latter was formed in accordance with its own specific destiny, and leaves this thinking to its destiny, thereby holding it at a distance from himself. The treatment he metes out to the

Hegelian text here is therefore very different from the one which, earlier, found expression in paragraph 82 of *Sein und Zeit*. What has been called the 'envelopment' of the Hegelian thinking finishes up granting to it, deliberately and explicitly and through a kind of mimetic effect, the language of destinal thinking, that is, for Heidegger, the language of that very thinking which seeks to measure the gap that opens up between these two thinkers. For this reason one is entitled to hope that, avoiding a paraphrase of Hegel in his own language, the Heideggerian commentary is able to situate the phenomenological enterprise in a realm beyond conclusive exactitude and so in a light which brings out its truth.

The decisive feature of the Heideggerian reading is clearly his affirmation of the 'presence' of the absolute, of his 'will' to establish it 'close to us'. According to Heidegger, the absolute is, with Hegel, consciousness of self, a knowledge which returns to itself rather than losing itself in its other, a knowledge which is adjusted to Being, understood as the beingness of being, therefore as subjectivity.

One only has to re-read the celebrated last lines of the Introduction to recognize the well-foundedness of this point of view. One knows that all the figures of consciousness are, so to speak, anticipated in 'the point where [consciousness] abandons its illusion of being affected by something alien which is only for it but which is something other than it', the point where 'the phenomenon measures up to the essence'.⁵⁸ What Heidegger calls an ab-solution of intentional and representative consciousness is certainly what is at issue there. But since this point is only 'attained' to the extent that consciousness drives itself (*sich forttreibt*) continually forward towards its true existence, one can ask whether Hegel would in fact have multiplied the metaphors of journeying and of labouring with oneself if this point were, as Heidegger claims, the point of departure for a science of the experience of consciousness. In this respect it is highly significant that when Heidegger invokes the text which has just been cited,⁵⁹ he empties the verb *sich forttreiben* of its reflective character and gives it as its subject 'the power of the absolute': 'die in der Erfahrung waltende Gewalt des Absoluten "treibt das Bewußtsein zu seiner wahren Existenz fort".' The apparent literalness of this quote masks a real perversion of its meaning. A passage from the Introduction confirms this explicitly. To make the point that consciousness, as opposed to natural being, is ceaselessly carried beyond its immediate being-there, Hegel writes: 'das Bewußtsein leidet . . . diese Gewalt, sich die beschränkte Befriedigung zu verderben, von ihm selbst.'⁶⁰ If, moreover, one accepted the Heideggerian reading (the transgression of consciousness beyond its limits coming from the Absolute which is close to it, as self-consciousness) it would imply that the second part of the work at least is superfluous, since the *Phenomenology of Spirit* would thereby become a history which was not one in fact, with Hegel invoking a

journey, even an adventure when, in reality, everything has already been consummated.

As for the harmony between self-consciousness and *being*, it is clearly underlined in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but it only makes its appearance in the chapter on 'Reason', where Hegel seeks to distinguish himself from any Kantianism for which the consciousness of self and Being stand in a relation of 'simple' unity.⁶¹ The chapter in question is intended precisely to demonstrate the ontological inadequacy of subjective idealism (Kantian and Fichtean) which defines the true by means of an abstract concept of reason. The latter is for Hegel directed towards the truth of its initial certainty (the certainty of being on a par with Being) and raises itself up to the level of Spirit 'by giving content to the empty mine'.⁶² In this way, avoidance of representation assumes, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, a very different form from any theoretical reflection of the Fichtean kind, for Hegelian reflection is reflection of, and in, the object just as well as being a reflection of the subject; and this is the sense in which it is called 'absolute'.

This is the reason why the disappearance of the object initially in view can engender a new object which is its *determinate negation*. Far from possessing the formal structure of the negation of the negation, Hegelian negativity makes it possible to think history as the effort undertaken by consciousness to obtain access to its true existence, which is no longer that of a solitary consciousness but of a purely theoretical consciousness.

If one concentrates on the presence of the Absolute, its very nomination as *parousia* tends to align it with a non-temporal, liturgical presence, and on the basis of a frontal (*vor-liegen*) expansion. No longer reproaching Hegel with having privileged the past, among the dimensions of time, as he did in paragraph 82 of *Sein und Zeit*, but, in virtue of his attachment to metaphysics, with having identified Being and presence, Heidegger finds himself in a position to point out a relatively uncontroversial aspect of Hegel's systematization, namely its circularity. But, according to him, the latter introduces an element of a-temporality into the thinking of Hegel (that of having-always-already-seen) which would be the condition of the possibility of history, now called 'historicity'. Here we undoubtedly find a decision to read and interpret Hegelianism which is not entirely peculiar to Heidegger.⁶³ But with him it nevertheless takes on a quite special emphasis through the importance placed upon the structural duality of representation and of presentation or of consciousness *vis-à-vis* self-consciousness to which, in his view, the entirely phenomenological discourse would be reduced in a purely schematic fashion.

In fact the latter, as the 'presentation of appearing knowledge' is limited to pointing towards (*bezeichnen*)⁶⁴ the nature of absolute Knowledge. Hegel refuses the confusion of that 'becoming of Science in general'

which is presented in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* with 'the enthusiasm which begins immediately with absolute Knowledge, as with a starting pistol'.⁶⁵ Moreover, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is not foundational with regard to the Science; it simply demonstrates the necessity of the 'point' at which the concept is identified with the object. By virtue of the fact that it shows the way that consciousness has to take to accomplish its liberation it becomes entitled to announce the Science of the Absolute.

When Heidegger interprets the famous footnote to the first paragraph as the affirmation of a presence of the Absolute which was always already there, he takes away from it its speculative character which, with Hegel, implies the refusal of any assimilation of knowledge to a trick, that is, to any subjective manoeuvre opposed to what it knows and which is always to be distinguished from the latter. Understood in this fashion, a knowledge of the Absolute would certainly be impossible, for it would represent an imposition which would make the Absolute fall into the realm of the relative. So, in this context, what is at issue is not the presence or the non-presence of the Absolute by which we are surrounded but a reversal of a gnosticism which stems from Kant. As soon as knowing is no longer subjected to the illusion of its alienation from its object, it is the Absolute itself manifesting itself in and through the relativity of the appearing, rather than being separated from it. To this extent, one might be tempted, as was Heidegger, to identify the presentation of appearing knowledge with absolute Knowledge.⁶⁶ But in fact, if the Absolute is what phenomenizes itself, or if the phenomenon itself becomes the Absolute, that of itself indicates that the Absolute does not 'surround us', that it is not 'present'. It is not present in the mode of worldly presence, nor even in the mode of a mystical presence to the fervent soul. It is because it is informed by the truth, which is identical with freedom, therefore by its own self-formation (*Selbstbildung*), that consciousness 'tends' towards the Absolute just as soon as the doubt and despair by which it is assailed in the course of its experience are not considered as the abstract echo of a metaphysical tradition. This means that the finitude and the relativity of consciousness is brought to an end of its own accord. This is the sense in which consciousness brings with it its own yardstick, its own 'concept'. In this way Hegel breaks with the metaphysical theory of the Absolute in accordance with which the infinite is exterior to the finite even if it remains in close proximity to it. For him, if it is true that all determination is a negation, this negation is also the origin of determination. As for the ontological difference, it should be said that Science attests to its continual resolution, not in the fixed and unilateral form of a belonging-together but in the admitted *contradiction* of concealing and revealing.

In the final analysis, the relegation of Hegelianism to onto-theology goes back much further than the Commentary of 1942-3 since it is

already to be found in the lectures of 1930–1.⁶⁷ We shall consider it here in the light of the lecture of 1957 where the strategy of assimilating Hegel and setting Hegel at a distance is confirmed and becomes yet more acute.

‘Die ontotheologische Verfassung der Metaphysik’ is not limited, as are the writings cited earlier, to the elucidation of a specific text of Hegel; Heidegger talks here of Hegelianism on the basis of its directing principle and wants to arrive at a decision about its status within the totality of the thinking through a meditation upon its ‘historical’ destiny at the heart of metaphysics. With a view to accomplishing this, he begins by situating it in the tradition of transcendentalism, a point of view frequently expressed by him. Hegel would like to think the transcendental ‘absolutely’, and Heidegger names this Hegelian absolute *der Gedanke*, a formula which is equivalent for him to the absolute Idea which figures at the end of the *Wissenschaft der Logik*.⁶⁸ He underlines the fact that Hegel, having arrived at the conclusion of this Science (the name of Science, since Fichte, being that of philosophy itself) identifies the absolute Idea with Being, that is, with that which designates the Subject Matter, or the Concern of Western thinking in its entirety. At this terminal point, the thinking-itself absolutely of thinking is the truth of that Being which was presented at first as indeterminate immediacy, then as absolute reflection, that is, as Essence. ‘Die Sache des Denkens ist für Hegel das Sein als das sich selbst denkende Denken, welches Denken erst im Prozess seiner spekulativen Entwicklung zu sich selbst kommt.’⁶⁹ Such is the mark of a ‘historical’ (*geschichtlich*) thinking.⁷⁰

It is this disposition of Hegelian thinking which makes it be that the beginning and the end of the Science are the ‘same’, that is, Being, considered first in its emptiness and, at the end of its development, as its own fullness. ‘Anfang und Ende der Bewegung . . . bleibt überall das Sein. Es west als die in sich kreisende Bewegung von der Fülle in die äusserste Entäusserung und von dieser in die sich vollendende Fülle.’⁷¹ This circular journey by way of Being, of that totality of what is which makes it present at the beginning and at the end of its movement is elucidated by Heidegger both as *totality* and as *ground*. ‘Die Ganzheit dieses Ganzen ist die Einheit des Seienden, die als der hervorbringende Grund einigt.’⁷²

Let us look first at its unitary and total character. Heidegger asks: why does Hegel call what is in truth a Treatise on Metaphysics a *Logic*? It is because, he answers, the original meaning of *Logos* is the gathering of what is there, but at the expense of this originality in the sense of Discourse in that it becomes *Ratio* in its latinate transposition. Hegel is the inheritor of this degradation initiated by the first Church Fathers. When the *Logos* was identified with Christ that thinking which attempts to break out in certain decisive passages of Heraclitus is betrayed.⁷³

Calling a book which deals with Being in its totality and with the entire movement which leads to its developed fullness a *Logic* must therefore be regarded as one of the major ambiguities of the metaphysical tradition to which Hegel himself owes allegiance. In such a *Logos*, the Heraclitian meaning of the totality of what is can only be guessed at.

The second thread woven into the metaphysical thinking of *Sein* arises from the first. Heidegger always underlined the close connection between the theme of foundation and that of the *Logos*, understood as *Ratio*, as one of, if not the, decisive feature of the metaphysics of Leibniz and Schopenhauer right up to the contemporary epoch dominated by technology.⁷⁴ By translating *Grund* into his own language, his proposal is here to bring to light the derivatives of its original meaning. The latter splits into two: Heidegger distinguishes the (*der*) 'ergründende' (or simply 'gründende') and (*der*) 'begründende' *Grund*.⁷⁵ This distinction for which it is difficult to find an equivalent in other languages is operative,⁷⁶ and to some extent runs parallel with that between *Überkomnis* (valid both for *gründen* and *ergründen*) – Being founding beings – and *Ankunft* (*begründen*), one being taken to be the supreme being and so founding the Being of beings. Being and beings are therefore to be found in a relation of reflection (*Widerschein*) or mutually referring and reciprocal appearance. They form a circle. The circulation of one around the other, of one to the other, is called by Heidegger *Umeinanderkreisen*. If the supreme being is regarded as founding the totality of beings, it then receives the name of God, and philosophy becomes a non-ecclesiastical theology. This is what Heidegger imputes to Hegel, no doubt recalling the famous text from the Introduction to the *Science of Logic* cited earlier,⁷⁷ but also citing in this instance the passage in which Hegel evokes the possibility of making of God the beginning of the *Science*.⁷⁸

These different glosses have prepared the way for the *Science of Logic* as 'onto-theology'. The suffix *-logy*, common to the most varied bodies of knowledge, indicates that it is a matter of a 'science' in accordance with the conventional meaning of the *Logos* (as, according to Heidegger, are those other bodies of knowledge which deal with the living, the cosmos, or antiquity). 'Die -Logia ist jeweils das Ganze eines Begründungszusammenhangs, worin die Gegenstände der Wissenschaften im Hinblick auf ihren Grund vorgestellt, d.h. begriffen werden.'⁷⁹ By virtue of the identification of *Logos* and of *Sein*, this science is an ontology, *Logos* holding for the gathering of the whole of being. Hegelian Being certainly has this totalizing function. Its realization does indeed meet all the requirements of the different bodies of knowledge. In the end therefore it is an onto-*theo*-logy since Being as the *Logos*, understood as the ground, is granted the title of God in the Judaeo-Christian tradition where the creator, as the Author of the world in totality, is the One who lets the world unfold (*vor-liegen*) before him.

But in connecting Hegelianism with metaphysics in this way Heidegger detaches himself at the same time from the latter through the 'step back' (*Schritt zurück*) which allows him to take account of the sameness (*Selbigkeit*), though certainly not the similarity (*Gleichheit*), that the Matter of Thinking has for Hegel and for himself, that is, for metaphysics and for himself. In this way he hopes to bring Hegelianism, as fulfilling (*vollendend*) the destiny of metaphysics, closer to his own thinking, which wants to 'overcome' (*Überwinden*) metaphysics. This means that the diversity (*Verscheidenheit*) of the two kinds of thinking demands that they should each of them be thought in a quite determinate fashion, or again that the 'thinking dialogue', carried out in the element of sameness, should also be a setting at a distance, as if the metaphysics and the step back through which Heidegger gains access to the un-thought of this metaphysics were one and the same.⁸⁰

The ontological difference both sums up and presents this situation. We have already taken note of the way in which the relation of Being to beings intersects in a manner which unites them within the field of metaphysics. If this is the case it is because the difference is that which thinking opens up to, or else that from which it withdraws itself in self-forgetfulness. Metaphysics establishes its reign in the forgetfulness of the Difference, thinking in its commemoration (*Andenken*), *but this only in so far as the forgetfulness and the commemoration, the retreat and the openness, are regarded as belonging to the same characteristic of Being.* 'Die Vergessenheit gehört zur Differenz, weil diese jener zugehört.'⁸¹ The reconciliation of Being and beings, their intersection as *Austrag*, that is the very Play of the Difference, responds in this way to the destinal Play of meditating Thinking, together with everything that the latter supersedes, and notably Hegelianism.

Should we therefore consider the gap which opens up between these two bodies of thought as the highest fidelity to Hegel's own fidelity to the tradition? By bringing out the hidden meaning of what lies concealed, Heidegger discloses the concealment and thus makes of the Play of Difference what governs the destination of Being in its entirety. By throwing light upon the place (*Ort*) of Hegelianism and by allowing it to be comprehended, he both comprehends and makes room for meditative Thinking. In this way, Hegel's fervent struggle to understand the thinkers who preceded him is completed by Heidegger thinking metaphysics as opening up upon its own supersession. If things are indeed like this, it means that the violence apparent in the earlier texts would disappear, even that Heidegger has managed, thanks to the 'step back' effected relative to metaphysics, to come to terms with Hegelianism since his elucidation (*Erörterung*) of the latter situates it in a space that meditating Thinking is able to dominate. Carrying off (*Verwindung*) the victory would then assume the meaning of an appropriation, that of making

something his own by entering profoundly into it and transposing it upon a superior (*Überwindung*) plane. In this way the Hegelian promise of an *Aufhebung* would be fulfilled.

One has to bear in mind that the gloss on *Logos*, a gloss which regulates the interpretation of the Hegelian *Logic* certainly seems to be at the service of an appreciation of the originality of the work. By emphasizing that it is not a formal logic, Heidegger places it in the framework of transcendental logic, in order to mark the fact that it is engaged in the identification of Being and Thinking. It is true nevertheless that the elucidation of what thinking is according to Hegel is attempted nowhere, and everything takes place as if, for Heidegger, the equivalence of thinking and representing, which is implicitly admitted, continues to be valid in his reading of Hegel. As a result, the thematic difference between the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic* is no more recognized in 1957 than it was in 1930–1 or 1942–3,⁸² when Heidegger took this difference to consist in their localization in the 'system', without furnishing any explanation for the rejection of the first system (the one he called 'the phenomenological') in favour of the second (the 'logical'). We find here a scholarly effort at classifying and ordering which assumes a purely external point of view and which leads to the result that the two works are both assigned in the same way to 'subjectivity'. The latter attains an unconditional status (that is, is brought to light as a *Logic*) only when the categories which function as the condition of any appearing are represented as the *Logos* in the visibility of the absolute Idea.

Hegels 'Logik' gehört in die Phänomenologie, weil in ihr das Erscheinen der unbedingten Subjektivität erst unbedingt wird, sofern auch noch die Bedingungen alle Erscheinens, die 'Kategorien', in ihrem eigensten Sichvorstellen und Erschliessen als 'Logos' in die Sichtbarkeit der absoluten Idee gebracht werden.⁸³

It is precisely this presupposition with regard to the permanence of representation throughout the entire Hegelian system which furnishes Heidegger with an argument in favour of the assimilation of the Hegelian *Logic* to a speculative theology. The text from which he draws support in 1957 (once again a conditional subordination!) is very clear: if it is not the 'Absolute', the 'Eternal' or 'God' ('and "God" would have the most indisputable right to the point of departure'⁸⁴) which are taken as the starting point for the *Logic*, this is because there is in pure Being more than there is in the intuition or the thought which these terms arouse in our minds. It is in what is simple that there is nothing more than a pure beginning, for in the *Science of Logic* knowledge is thinking, not representing, knowledge. The conditional of the parenthesis obviously

refers to the ordinary representation of a creator God. But Hegel deliberately and explicitly distances himself from such a representation by beginning the *Logic* with the indeterminate immediacy of Being alone. Heidegger, on the other hand, suggests that, as a result of the confusion of *thinking* and *representing* which, in his view, dominates metaphysics in its entirety, Hegel thinks it does not matter whether he writes 'God' or 'Being' and that consequently *Being* is *God* for him.

In the same way, one has to be doubtful about the assimilation of *Being* and the *ground*. We will consider this matter here from the side of Being. Certainly, in the opening text entitled: 'With what does the science begin?' Hegel does bring *Being* and the *ground* back upon one another in a certain way. 'Man muss zugeben . . . dass Vorwärtsgen ein *Rückgang* in den *Grund* und zu dem *Ursprünglichen* [und *Wahrhaften*: 2nd edition] ist, von dem das, womit der Anfang gemacht wurde, abhängt [und in der *Tat* hervorgebracht wird: 2nd edition⁸⁵].' By bringing out the circularity of knowledge in this way, Hegel does not make of Being what is 'always-already-present'. It may even be assumed that by bringing the movement of Science back to its 'ground', that is to say to its truth, the very opposite of such a presencing makes itself known, indeed, that the truth is its own self-mediation, and in such a way that Being is only true to the extent that, from its initial immediacy, it is unfolded right up to its own outcome which, from the standpoint of the Concept, is just as much its foundation, a non-substantial foundation.

By putting the bifurcation of *grounding* (*er-gründen* and *begründen*) to work, Heidegger seeks to impose a doubly foundational conception of Being – a logically and a theologically foundational conception. He writes: 'die Metaphysik denkt das Sein des Seinenden sowohl in der er-gründenden Einheit des Allgemeinen, d.h. des überall Gleich-Gültigen, als auch in der begründenden Einheit der Allheit, d.h. des Höchsten über allem.'⁸⁶ According to the first conception which makes of Being 'the most universal', the formula 'Being of beings' assumes the form of an objective genitive. According to the second, beings are the beings 'of Being', and then it is a matter of a subjective genitive.⁸⁷ Furthermore, by distinguishing in Hegel an abstract God (according to Heidegger, all conceptual universality is abstract) and a creator God, it could be that Heidegger is suggesting that, in pointing to the former (and we shall see that he does this in the first pages of the *Logic*), Hegel is in reality thinking the latter. The most abstract, modelled on the causal relation, would then be taken as the origin of all the others, that is, with the difference of Being and beings remaining in the shadow of forgetfulness, even if it is in fact the chasm of the belonging-together of these two terms which is transposed into the unilateral determination of 'creation'. According to Heidegger in fact, Hegel thinks Being twice over: 'Hegel denkt das Sein in seiner leersten Leere, also in Allgemeinen. Er denkt

das Sein zugleich in seiner vollendet vollkommenen Fülle.’⁸⁸ From its first conception, that is to say as the most empty universality, it is already thought improperly (*ungemäss*),⁸⁹ according to Heidegger. He looks for a confirmation of this impropriety in paragraph 13 of the *Encyclopedia* where Hegel seeks to show that the universal is no more separated from the particular than ‘philosophy’ is separated from each particular philosophy. In the ‘Remark’, to which Heidegger attaches particular attention, the fable of the fruits illustrates the immanence of the universal in the particular. He who refuses cherries, pears, etc., one after the other, on the grounds that he wants ‘fruit’ is pretty stupid, says Hegel. So, while Heidegger seeks to read into Hegel the recognition, for Being, of a unique (*einzigartig*) mode of givenness in the invisibility of its presentation, in reality, Hegel is calling in question the formal and external conception of subsumption by virtue of which the genus, separated from its species, would be undetermined. On the contrary however, it is the Being with which the *Logic* begins which is undetermined and *this is precisely what, for Hegel, makes it impossible to treat it as a universal*. Correlatively, when Heidegger restores Being to the absolute idea which is its developed concretion, he thinks the movement of the *Logic* as one vast subsumption.⁹⁰

But we have to go further still and address yet again the question of the Heideggerian interpretation of the ‘dialectic’ across the understanding of the history of philosophy in its relation to philosophy itself. Hegel is supposed to have succeeded in undermining any separation of the ‘system’ and of history. Citing paragraph 14 of the *Encyclopedia*, Heidegger comments in these terms: ‘die erläuterte Ausserlichkeit der Geschichte im Verhältnis zur Idee ergibt sich als Folge der Selbstentäusserung der Idee. Die Ausserlichkeit ist selbst eine dialektische Bestimmung.’⁹¹ Hegel is commended for having replaced the gross (*grob*) exteriority which separates a history (*Historie*) (understood as the ‘scientific’ assessment of the succession of philosophies) and the system (understood as a doctrinal construction) with an exteriority understood as the element in which the historical (*Geschichte*) future takes up its abode – together with the effective course of each philosophy in the face of the movement of the absolute Idea.

It is therefore no longer on the basis of the experience of consciousness that the Hegelian dialectic is supposed to originate for Heidegger but rather on the basis of history, as the history of thought itself. The dialectic is therefore valid of that coming to self, or rather of that return to self, which is the movement of thought thinking itself in the very process of its speculative development. In the lecture ‘Hegel and the Greeks’, one year later than the text we have just studied, one finds a clarification of the ‘speculative’, itself linked to a clarification of the dialectic. This time Heidegger identifies the dialectic with a synthesis

between a thesis (the immediate relation of the subject to its objects, called by Hegel Being, the universal, the abstract) and an antithesis, which is the moment of reflection in which subject and object are differentiated. And so one is brought back to the point of departure in a journey (*Gang*) which gathers subjectivity together in its developed unity. This journey comprises a starting point (*Ausgang*) from the thesis, a progression (*Fortgang*) right to the antithesis, a transition (*Übergang*) over to the synthesis and a return (*Rückgang*) to self. In this way, subjectivity grows by gathering together and so becomes concrete. The 'speculative' is 'comprehension' (*begreifen*) understood in its Latin etymology: *speculari*: to look into, spy on. . . . It unifies opposites by grasping them in their reciprocal reflection. Hence, the dialectic is speculative in that it is a game of mirroring as between the subject and the object, a game which is the very process by which Spirit itself is produced.

This is the way in which the destructive work of the Hegelian dialectic is presented.⁹² Once again Heidegger overlooks negativity in favour of the positivity of the 'negation of the negation' and thanks to an all-embracing ('comprehensive' in this sense) function of the *Logos*.

If one now asks oneself what is the point of enlisting the *Science of Logic* (in fact the Hegelian system in its entirety) under the banner of metaphysics, it is worth pointing out that this assimilation could have taken a different form in Heidegger's other writings than that which it took in the lecture of 1957, but that the same decision is to be found everywhere, the decision namely to find in Hegel the ultimate symbol of the absolutization of subjectivity on the basis of its commitment to representation. 'Die ontotheologische Verfassung der Metaphysik' deserves, in this respect, to be regarded as a sort of *compte rendu* of Heidegger's entire reading of Hegelianism. The assimilation in question will be examined here according to the letter and the spirit of its accomplishment. It will all come down to a distinction which Heidegger will object to as 'facile' (*leicht handlich*⁹³) and which Hegel will denounce as 'abstract'. For all that it seems to us to offer an effective way of presenting the dialectical process.

Nominally, classing Hegelianism under metaphysics is supported explicitly by Hegel when he says of his *Logic* 'that it constitutes metaphysics in the proper sense of that word, or pure speculative philosophy'.⁹⁴ In the same Preface to the 1st edition of the *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Hegel had earlier complained that contemporary thought, obviously under the pressure of criticism, had thrown metaphysics and its traditional investigations overboard; for example, the proofs of the existence of God. In his eyes, a cultivated people who lack a metaphysics presents an almost monstrous prospect, 'like a temple . . . without a sanctuary'.⁹⁵ The Introduction, for its part, also specifies that the usual

representation of the *Logic* contains no reference to anything like a metaphysical signification. It is of course suggested that this lack is made up in the *Logic* which follows. Certainly, the texts which correspond to the latter in the 2nd edition, composed in 1831, are less nostalgic. Metaphysics meant no more to Hegel than an external material and in this respect it is placed on the same plane as the logic of history. But it continues to benefit from an evident superiority over the thought of the present age⁹⁶ in that it attests to an agreement (*Übereinstimmen*) in and of itself between things and the thinking about things. The reflective thinking of modern times rejected all this. At one and the same time, Hegel holds Kant responsible for this depreciation of metaphysics while welcoming the Kantian proposal which, though engulfed in subjectivism, does finish up by transforming metaphysics into a logic and to such a point that, according to Heidegger, Hegel himself situates the *Science of Logic* in the tradition of *transcendental Logic*. This tradition makes it possible to throw light upon the entire design of the *Science of Logic*. With regard to its specific content, the nominally 'objective' Logic takes the place of ontology, for its object is the 'ens', declined as *Being* and *Essence*.⁹⁷ Moreover, the *Science of Logic* deals with particular substrata: soul, world, God. But it does this quite independently of representation, and in such a way that these substrata become in themselves determinations of thought, as paragraph 85 of the *Encyclopedia* indicates. Fixing his eyes upon the triumphant period of metaphysics (Spinoza–Leibniz), Hegel regrets that the historical context in which he himself writes, that of post-Kantianism, should no longer be capable of receiving the language of the Absolute. But in reality, if the Kantian mutation consists not in abolishing metaphysics but in transposing it, it falls to the *Science of Logic* to retie the broken threads, to reconcile the tradition with modernity.

As for the spirit of the Heideggerian affirmation in accordance with which the Hegelian *Logic* arises out of 'metaphysics', one is tempted right away to object to it by remarking that, when Hegel claims for it an affiliation with ontology, he only invokes objective Logic, leaving to one side the Doctrine of the Concept. With reference to the latter, the Doctrine of Being and the Doctrine of Essence, *qua* sublated (*aufgehoben*), are only conserved to the extent that they are negated. The task set for the third part of the *Logic* is that of thinking freedom, that is, thinking the unity of the theoretical and the practical, accomplishing thereby the speculative design of both the Kantian and the Fichtean philosophy. Heidegger cites⁹⁸ the passage in which the absolute Idea is called 'being, imperishable life, truth knowing itself, the whole truth'. This is where the metaphysical oppositions (those of idealism) are thought, that is, thought in their unity, which is their truth.

Furthermore, it is worth returning to the supposed identification of

Being with the ground. For Hegel, the ground being a determination of reflection, the relation of the ground to the grounded undergoes a self-mediation across its own negation. From a formal ground, it becomes a real and complete ground. Being in addition the last of the determinations of reflection, the ground opens up on the immediacy not of Being but of Existence. We find here a situation which is to be confused neither with that of the foundation understood abstractly (which Heidegger calls *gründen* or *ergründen*) nor with the foundation understood on the creationist model (*begründen*). In the Doctrine of Essence, Hegelian ontology takes on the characteristics of a hermeneutics, in as much as the *Logic* seeks to respond to the question how thinking is, through language, able to accede to the unity of Being (1st book) and Thinking (3rd book). This outcome of the Doctrine of Essence makes of it a text so unprecedented in the metaphysical tradition that his reference of it to ontology certainly does not make it possible to appreciate its novelty.

And yet, is it not possible to find in the metaphysical reading of Hegelianism, proposed by Heidegger, an echo of the original intention of the Hegelian discourse? If in fact the unity of Being and Thinking is what the Hegelian Logic seeks to present, surely Heidegger rejoins Hegel in his insistence upon the fact that the Parmenidean 'enigma' forms the point of departure for all thinking? In sum, we should give Heidegger the benefit of having recognized the Hegelian design in spite of the errors which surround his grasp of the Hegelian method, and even of the results of this method, always understood as 'absolute subjectivity.'

The difference of Being and of Thinking in the Hegelian dialectic cannot be resolved into that identity of the same (whether that of Fichte or Schelling) to which Heidegger has recourse. Certainly, Hegel also says that Being and the Concept are 'the Same', but it is the reversion of the one into the other or, in other words, the self-mediation of Being as the Concept which, for him, makes up the history of Being, that is, history pure and simple. To this extent, the Hegelian *Logic* is certainly an ontology but as such it is, at bottom, and through the destruction of the determinations of reflection, the resolution of the phenomenon into effectivity.

Heidegger radically misunderstands this disposition. For when he places the Hegelian *Logic* in the perspective of Parmenides' judgment it is with a view to connecting it with Berkeley's *esse est percipi* which is the 'modern' translation of the Greek text.⁹⁹ In this way the privilege which Reason enjoys over sensibility is, in his eyes, confirmed throughout the entirety of metaphysics.¹⁰⁰ The latter devotes itself to the essence of being within the horizon (*Gesichtskreis*) of thinking and so fails to think together and in their unity, not just the sensible and the non-sensible but also thinking and Being.¹⁰¹ This failure had already been anticipated in a certain sense by Heidegger in his reading of Kant where he sees it,

on the subjective plane, as the underlying though un-thought layer of the schematism.

For him, higher and further off than their supposedly 'metaphysical' unity, there is the belonging together (*Zusammengehören*) of Being and Thinking which he interprets as harkening and as compliance. Reciprocal en-ownment (*Er-eignis*) governs the drawing together of the two into the same. The framework of Heidegger's thinking is therefore marked by a considerable consistency. It is in every instance a matter of going beyond Being and its presence towards a privileged place which lies beyond every presence and any *objectified conception of Being*. Language is this place. 'Im Ereignis schwingt das Wesen dessen, was als Sprache spricht, die einmal das Haus des Seins genannt wurde.'¹⁰²

Should one consider that at this point the two ways of thinking, that of Hegel and that of Heidegger, come together? At best they only brush up against each other. Their common effort to determine the Parmenidean unity leads the one (who shows how substance accedes to freedom) to invent a semantics of auto-reflection; it leads the other, by way of a poetic recuperation of the gift of Being, to a language-oriented ontology which runs the risk of subjecting meditative thinking to the rigidity of repetition and incantation.¹⁰³

The deficiencies which he himself pointed out were not absent from the 'thinking dialogue' that Heidegger claimed to have conducted with Hegel. As for Hegel himself, in a text cited elsewhere by Heidegger,¹⁰⁴ Hegel soberly looked forward to the kind of spiritual affinity which would make possible the task of unveiling the living spirit which inhabits a philosophy. It demanded of the interpreter a speculative generosity of a kind which is not to be found in Heidegger's reading of Hegel. His metaphysics, he writes in 1969,¹⁰⁵ is a 'mill which turns in a vacuum'. For its basis, its element and its dwelling place, is Christian theology, a theology which has been abandoned in our day. And this explains the powerlessness of the dialectic (when it is revived by Marx) to think the essence of modern technology.

In lines such as these, it would be foolish to look for a spiritual 'affinity'. Behind the dismissal of Christian theology we find an implicit restoration of paganism; behind the rejection of the Hegelian dialectic we find outlined that of Marx, together with the ambition to be the exclusive thinker of modernity. This is undoubtedly what is ultimately in question in the Heideggerian reading of Hegel.

Translated by Christopher Macann

Notes

1 Heidegger's texts are cited, as far as possible, on the basis of the *Gesamtausgabe* which is being published by V. Klostermann, cited as: *GA* . . . *GA* 1, SS. 410–11; *Zeit und Sein*, tr. Joan Stambaugh as *On Time and Being* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 6.

2 Commentary from *Holzwege* (*GA* 5).

3 *Gesamte Werke*, Bd. 7 SS. 193–205.

4 *GA* 21, SS. 251–69 and *GA* 2.

5 cf. *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* (1979), pp. 101–20.

6 *GA* 21, S. 164.

7 *GA* 2, S. 568.

8 *GA* 2, S. 570.

9 *GA* 21, S. 263.

10 The very term employed for the process of *passage* (*Übergang–Übergehen*) describes, in the *Encyclopedia*, the movement of the determinate in the sphere of Being, while *appearing in the other* characterizes progress in the sphere of the essence and development (*Entwicklung*) that of the Concept (cf. *Enzyklopädie*, para. 161). Since the Philosophy of Nature is not the repetition, pure and simple, of the *Being* of the *Logic*, it is not possible to regard the determinations which it brings to light successively as limited to the 'passage' of one into the other.

11 *GA* 21, S. 260.

12 *Abhebung*, the fact of *standing out* is rendered here by *gegen* (against).

13 It is also worth noting that, in his lectures of 1936, Heidegger pays homage to Schelling for thinking eternity in a manner very close to that which we could have found in Hegel (cf. *GA* 12, SS. 219–22).

14 In *Hegel-Studien* 12, SS. 219–22. I would also like to point out here that O. Pöggeler is studying Heidegger's commentary to the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, to which he adds the Lessons edited in *GA* 32, in *Hegel-Studien* (16, SS. 189–217) under the title: 'Selbstbewusstsein und Identität'.

15 In a lecture given in 1969 on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the death of Husserl, Heidegger emphasizes that his own meditation on the question of time proceeded in a direction which always remained alien to that of Husserl's researches into inner time consciousness. Husserl himself does not appear to have been impressed by this, if one takes seriously the remarks he made in the margin of his personal copy of *Sein und Zeit*.

16 *GA* 32 – esp. S. 209.

17 *GA* 5, S. 133.

18 *GA* 5, S. 128.

19 *Gesamte Werke*, Bd. 9, S. 55.

20 *GA* 5, S. 133.

21 *GA* 5, S. 151.

22 *GA* 5, S. 130: 'das Absolute ist schon an und für sich bei uns, und will bei uns sein'.

23 *Ges. W.* Bd. 9, S. 53 (the subordinate clause is emphasized by us). That an ironic formula is in question is confirmed by the way in which Hegel constantly characterizes the present situation of Spirit: cf. notably in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* alinea 7 – (*Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 9, S. 12):

[der selbstbewusste Geist] ist . . . über das substantielle Leben, das er *sonst* im Elemente des Gedankens führte, hinaus, – über diese Unmittelbarkeit seines Glaubens, über die Befriedigung und Sicherheit der Gewissheit, welche

das Bewusstsein von seiner Versöhnung mit dem Wesen und dessen allgemeiner, der innern und äussern, Gegenwart *bessass* [italics added].

24 GA 5, S. 204.

25 GA 5, S. 146.

26 *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 9, S. 55 – cf. Bd. 4, SS. 9–10.

27 GA 40, SS. 105ff. (esp. S. 108). The abandonment of the *Phänomen* for the emphatic sense coincides with the abandonment of Husserlian phenomenology.

28 GA 40, S. 113 (Heidegger evokes ‘das Gegenspiel der Mächte’: *Sein/Schein*).

29 GA 5, S. 146 (text cited: cf. n. 25).

30 GA 5, S. 205: ‘der Ruig hat sich geschlossen. Das letzte Wort des Werkes verhält in seinen Beginn. . . .’

31 GA 5, S. 144 – ‘Beide erläutern sich wechselweise’.

32 GA 5, S. 145.

33 *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 9, S. 56 and GA 5, S. 143.

34 GA 5, S. 147.

35 *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 9, S. 56.

36 GA 5, S. 148.

37 *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 9, S. 56.

38 GA 5, S. 150 (‘beide sind . . . nicht das Gleiche’).

39 *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 9, S. 56.

40 GA 5, SS. 147–8.

41 GA 5, S. 151.

42 *ibid.*

43 GA 5, S. 151: ‘die Sache der Darstellung d.h. des absoluten Erkennens’, cf. n. 21: ‘*that is*’ is emphasized by us.

44 GA 5, S. 152.

45 *ibid.*

46 GA 5, S. 154.

47 GA 5, S. 155.

48 *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 9, SS. 58–60 (paras 9–13).

49 GA 5, S. 167.

50 GA 5, S. 175.

51 *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 9, SS. 29 and 60.

52 GA 5, S. 184. In the lectures of 1930–1, Heidegger said: ‘die Erfahrung – das ist das absolute Sicheinlassen auf das was im Lichte des absoluten Wissens erscheint’ (GA 32, S. 95).

53 GA 5, SS. 183–4.

54 GA 5, SS. 202–4.

55 Does Heidegger himself remember having commented on the 1st Epistle to the Thessalonians in his lectures of 1920–1: *Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Religion*? Here he utilizes the language of the Passion of Christ to evoke the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

56 It is clear that Heidegger is thinking here of the famous text from the Introduction to the *Science of Logic* (cf. *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 11, S. 21 and Bd. 21, S. 34) which presents the contents of the Logic as ‘God as He is in His eternal essence prior to the creation of Nature and of a finite spirit’. He had already cited this passage in his Kant book (cf. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951), S. 220).

57 GA 5, S. 155.

58 *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 9, S. 62.

59 GA 5, SS. 196–7.

60 *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 9, S. 57 (emphasis added).

61 *ibid.*, Bd. 9, S. 134.

62 *ibid.*, Bd. 9, S. 137.

63 One finds this particularly with H. G. Gadamer who writes: ‘das Wesen der Erfahrung wird hier [sc. bei Hegel] von vornherein von dem her gedacht, worin Erfahrung überschritten ist’ (*Wahrheit und Methode* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1965), S. 338; emphasis added). Gadamer also speaks of the ‘application’ (*Anwendung*) made by Hegel to the history of the overcoming (*Überwindung*) of all experience, that is, of the identity of consciousness and the object.

64 *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 9, S. 62 (text cited earlier).

65 *ibid.*, Bd. 9, S. 24.

66 GA 5, S. 202: ‘das absolute Wissen . . . ist die Darstellung des Erscheinens des daseienden Geistes.’

67 GA 32, SS. 141–2.

68 ‘Die ontotheologische Verfassung der Metaphysik’ was published (preceded by ‘Der Satz der Identität’, under the title *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), hereafter *ID*, S. . . . The text of the seminar by Heidegger devoted to the ‘Wissenschaft der Logik’ has not yet been published at this time.

ID, S. 32. One might be surprised by Heidegger’s choice of ‘der Gedanken’ for what Hegel calls, in paragraph 14 of the *Encyclopedia* cited here by Heidegger and in paragraph 19 cited in *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (GA 40), *das Denken*; with Hegel, *der Gedanke* leans towards thought understood subjectively (cf. para. 465 *Enzyklopädie*: (die Gedanken) sind . . . Inhalt und Gegenstand (der Intelligenz)). Undoubtedly, Heidegger finds in ‘Gedanke’ the ‘Dank’ which, for him, is the meaning of *Denken*.

69 *ID*, S. 34.

70 *ID*, S. 35 – *geschichtlich* is distinguished from *historisch*.

71 *ID*, SS. 43–4.

72 *ID*, S. 45.

73 cf. his Commentary to fragment 50 of Heraclitus – and *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (GA 40, SS. 130–5).

74 cf. *Der Satz vom Grund* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), hereafter *SG*.

75 *ID*, S. 48: ‘Das Sein des Seienden entbirgt sich als der sich selbst ergründende und begründende Grund’ and S. 49 (ll. 1–4).

76 *ID*, SS. 48, 49, 50, 61, 62.

77 cf. above n. 56.

78 *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 21, S. 65 and *ID*, S. 44. One thinks here of the text *Nietzsche II* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), S. 347, where ‘metaphysics’ (Hegel is not named) is presented as accommodating three senses in which beings takes the place of Being (to wit: the supreme being – *das höchste Seiende*, the distinctive being – *das ausgezeichnete Seiende* (the transcendental subject) and the Absolute in the sense of unconditional subjectivity. In what follows Heidegger writes: ‘Die Ontologie stellt die Transzendenz als das Transzendente vor. Die Theologie stellt die Transzendenz als das Transzendente vor’ (S. 349). In the lecture of 1957, the Hegelian Absolute has the function of assuming the different acceptations of metaphysical transcendence.

79 *ID*, S. 50.

80 *ID*, SS. 34–5.

81 *ID*, S. 41.

82 GA 32, SS. 1–13; GA 5, S. 195.

83 *Nietzsche II*, S. 299 (text dates from 1940).

84 *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 21, S. 57 (the parenthesis is emphasized by us). It is always possible that the parenthesis which evokes a 'right' of God to be taken as the beginning of the Science, is charged with irony.

85 *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 11, S. 34; Bd. 21, S. 57.

86 *ID*, S. 49.

87 *ID*, S. 53.

88 *ID*, S. 47.

89 *ID*, SS. 57–8.

90 This interpretation is contained in germ in the text from 1946 devoted to the 'Sayings of Anaximander', where Heidegger wrote:

die Logik, der Metaphysik entsprungen, und sie beherrschend, [hat] dahin geführt, dass der in den frühen Grundworten geborgene Wesensreichtum des Seins verschüttet blieb. So konnte das Sein in den fatalen Rang des leersten und allgemeinsten Begriffes hinaufgelangen.

(GA 5, S. 352)

91 *ID*, S. 34.

92 Paragraphs 79 and on from the *Encyclopedia*, which Heidegger is evidently thinking of when he connects the dialectic with the speculative (cf. his 1966–7 course on Heraclitus) make of the speculative the 'positively rational' aspect, the dialectic making up the 'negatively rational' side. One can note that, when Heidegger tries to think Hegelian negativity in a real way, it is in the shadow of Schelling's problematic of evil, that is to say, of a typically onto-theological problematic (cf. *Nietzsche I*, SS. 73–4).

93 *SZ*, para. 17.

94 *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 11, S. 7.

95 *ibid.*, Bd. 11, SS. 5–6.

96 *ibid.*, Bd. 21, SS. 29–35.

97 *ibid.*, Bd. 11, S. 31 and Bd. 21, SS. 48–9.

98 In *ID*, S. 32.

99 cf. Moira, a part of the lecture 'Was heisst Denken?' of 1952 (GA 8).

100 'Sofern die Aufhellung und Bestimmung der Vernunft "Logik" genannt werden darf und muss, lässt sich auch sagen: die abendländische "Metaphysik" ist "Logik"; das Wesen des Seienden als solchen wird im Gesichtskreis des Denkens ausgemacht' (*Nietzsche I*, S. 530). It is worth noting that in the text devoted to 'The end of philosophy and the task of thinking', one of the latest of Heidegger's writings, Hegel is cited and thought through along with Husserl, the two sharing in common the characteristic of identifying the Business of Thinking with the subjectivity of consciousness. From para. 82 of *SZ* therefore, the buckle is buckled!

101 *SG*, SS. 88–9:

die Aufstellung [der] Scheidung des Sinnlichen und Nichtsinnlichen, es Physischen und des Nichtphysischen ist ein Grundzug dessen, was Metaphysik heisst und das abendländische Denken massgebend bestimmt. Mit der Einsicht, dass die genannte Unterscheidung des Sinnlichen und Nichtsinnlichen unzureichend bleibt, verliert die Metaphysik den Rang der massgebenden Denkweise.

102 *ID*, S. 28.

103 *SG*, SS. 146–7:

[der Mensch steht] seinem Wesen nach im Offenen des Entwurfes des Seins. . . . Durch das so erfahrene und gedachte Seinsverständnis ist die Vorstellung des Menschen als eines Subjektes, um mit Hegel zu sprechen, auf die Seite gebracht. Nur insofern der Mensch seinem Wesen nach in einer Lichtung des Seins steht, ist er ein denkendes Wesen. Denn im altersher besagt in unserer Geschichte Denken so viel wie: dem Geheiss des Seins entsprechen und aus dieser Entsprechung das Seiende in dessen Sein durchsprechen. Dieses Durchsprechen (*διαλεγεσθαι*) entfaltet sich in der Geschichte des abendländischen Denkens zur Dialektik.

This text throws a remarkable light upon the confrontation of Heidegger with Hegel. Without even underlining the insolence which consists in utilizing an expression which is relatively frequently employed by Hegel (*auf die Seite bringen*) to dismiss Hegelianism, one has to note that, in placing the essence of Man in the open or in the clearing of Being, Heidegger thinks he is being faithful to an acceptation of *διαλεγεσθαι* which 'metaphysics' (principally that of Hegel) is supposed to have distorted into 'dialectics'.

104 GA 32, S. 44 and *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 4, S. 9.

105 In *Denkerfahrten* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1983), S. 152.

The last thinker of the West

David Farrell Krell

For Al Lingis

'The thesis of Heidegger's *grand livre* [that is, his *Nietzsche*, published in two volumes in 1961] is much less simple than people have generally tended to say', writes Jacques Derrida, quite justly.¹ In fact, his remark applies to *all* of Heidegger's texts on Nietzsche. Sufficient warning that any effort to explicate in a dozen pages *die Sache* of Heidegger's prolonged and intense confrontation with Nietzsche remains futile. Let this brief chapter invite and incite efforts that will demand more time and greater solicitude.

It is tempting to compare Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche to his companionship with Hölderlin. Heidegger himself would picture the latter as the proximity and intimacy of two pines rooted in the silent forest earth; the 'neighborhood of the chanting poet' constitutes a 'wholesome danger' to the thinker. Hölderlin and Heidegger: no cloud ever darkens their sky, a sky that stretches across the expanse of the clearing that is held open by the very distance that separates thinker from poet.

In contrast, Nietzsche, whom Heidegger from the outset acknowledges as *Denker* rather than *Dichter*, encroaches on Heidegger's own space. Nietzsche does not declaim from one distant mountain peak to Heidegger perched on another – an image one might fashion to characterize the conversation between great thinkers – but infiltrates and crowds close, implants doubts and eradicates convictions, whispers Heidegger's own second thoughts to him, illuminates and confounds at once. Their confrontation is stormy. Late in that *Auseinandersetzung* Heidegger confesses that he has had to take with utmost seriousness Nietzsche's message to Georg Brandes: that it is no great trick to *find* Nietzsche, the challenge being rather to learn how to *lose* him, that is, to release Nietzsche to his own place in the history of metaphysics. Yet Heidegger

never really loses Nietzsche, never 'locates' him, never shakes free of him, because Nietzsche never releases his grip on Heidegger. That is fortunate. The tempestuous encounter with Nietzsche prevents Heidegger from becoming what we have only now accused him of being – a bloodless shade of Hegel. The piety of Heidegger's questioning and the apparent quietism of *Gelassenheit* are everywhere undercut by the passion of Nietzschean suspicion and the rage of a descensional reflection without cease. To repeat: history of Being is not history of spirit. That is Nietzsche's primary, decisive incision; that is his deepest cut. And there is no poetic annealing, no restoration of the Absolute in hymns –

if Mozart is (as Heidegger says) 'God's lute-play';
 if Hölderlin plucks the lyre while God withdraws in irreversible retreat;
 if Trakl, as we shall see, rescues the lyre as it slips from Hölderlin's hands and with it sings the palsied deity, the progenitor of a ruined race;

it is nonetheless Nietzsche the thinker who must inter the defunct and toneless divinity with all his instruments, Nietzsche the thinker who must fashion for the philosopher a new lyre. Less companionable than the men of music and hymn, Nietzsche nonetheless accompanies Heidegger early on and to the end.

Precisely when Heidegger first read Nietzsche we do not know.² But he studied the philosopher's works during his student years at Freiburg, 1909–14, especially the second, expanded edition of the *Nachlass* material published as *The Will to Power* (1906). Two decades later that text served as the source for the topics of Heidegger's lectures on Nietzsche: the will to power as art and as knowledge, from Book Three, sections I and IV; the eternal recurrence of the same, from Book Four, section III; and nihilism, from Book One. The volume also had an impact on Heidegger's early writings, not as an explicit theme for investigation, but as an incentive to philosophic inquiry in general. During his *venia legendi* lecture of 1915, 'The concept of time in the discipline of history', Heidegger alluded to philosophy's proper 'will to power' (*FS*, 357). By that he meant the need to advance beyond epistemology to metaphysics, that is to say, to interrogation of the goal and purpose of philosophy as such. In his Habilitation thesis (1915–16) Heidegger revealed the influence of Nietzsche when he stressed philosophy's function 'as a *value for life*' (*FS*, 137–8). Philosophy as such exists 'in tension with the living personality' of the philosopher, 'drawing its content and value from the depths and the abundance of life in that personality'. In this regard Heidegger cited Nietzsche's formula 'the drive to philosophize', and he praised that writer's 'relentlessly austere manner of thought', a manner enlivened, however, by a gift for 'flexible and apt depiction'.

During the decisive Marburg years, 1923–8, Nietzsche appears to have withdrawn completely from Heidegger's central concerns, making room for Aristotle, Kant, and Husserl. Heidegger apparently wished to distance himself from the Nietzsche adopted by *Lebensphilosophie* and by the philosophies of culture, worldview, and value. As I noted at the very outset, in chapter one [of *Intimations of Mortality*; *IM* hereafter], his rejection of the category 'life' and adoption of 'existence' for his nascent analyses of Dasein had come to light already in 1919–21, the years of his confrontation with Karl Jaspers' *Psychology of Worldviews*. His spurning of the neo-Kantian value-philosophy of Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert undoubtedly delayed Heidegger's public confrontation with the philosopher who sought the revaluation of all values. Yet throughout the 1920s Nietzsche's style of thought continued to captivate Heidegger. For example, in the midst of an otherwise dry-as-dust, utterly sober phenomenological account of Husserlian intentionality, categorial intuition, and the a priori, which Heidegger proffered in his 1925 lecture course on *The Concept of Time*, we find the following remarkable avowal:

Philosophical research is and remains atheism; for that reason it can afford 'the arrogance of thought'. Not only will it afford such arrogance, but this is the inner necessity and proper force of philosophy, and precisely in such atheism philosophy becomes – as one of the greats once said – 'the gay science' [*Fröhliche Wissenschaft*].

(20, 109–10)

Phenomenology as rigorous science, *but with gaiety*: neither Husserl nor even Scheler was equal to it!

Yet there is little gaiety in the masterwork that concludes Heidegger's Marburg period, *Being and Time*. Only three references to Nietzsche's thought appear in that text; and only one of them is a substantive reference.³ Nevertheless, as we have seen in chapter six [of *IM*], the 'fundamental experience' of *Being and Time* and Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche are intimately related. At the close of that chapter I cited Heidegger's essay 'Nietzsche's proclamation: "God is dead"', to this effect: 'The following commentary, in intention and scope, keeps to that one experience on the basis of which *Being and Time* was thought' (*H*, 195; cf. *N II*, 260). If that one experience be the oblivion of Being, which implies forgottenness of the nothing in which Dasein is ever suspended, then we may say that in *Being and Time* Heidegger brings the question of the death of God home by inquiring into the death of Dasein and the demise of metaphysical discourse. Among the principal motifs of *Being and Time* are: the finite, ecstatic horizon of the being that is Dasein; the interpretation of Dasein as care or possibility-being, structured temporally as existential, factual, and falling; and the being-a-

whole (*Ganzsein*) of Dasein as being-unto-death (*Sein zum Tode*). However rarely cited in *Being and Time*, Nietzsche may well be the regnant genius of that work – Nietzsche, who

exposes the anthropomorphic base of metaphysical projections and the evanescence of Being understood as permanence of presence;

supplies genealogical accounts of time and eternity in such a way that the latter appears as vengeance wreaked on the former;

confronts without subterfuge human existence as irredeemably mortal, bursting with possibility yet bound to fatality;

insists always and everywhere that on this earth thinkers as well as artists must (in Ezra Pound's words) 'make it new'.

In writing these things I approach the core of the Heidegger/Nietzsche confrontation and encounter which dominate the 1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s in Heidegger's career of thought.

Let me now try to formulate some of the principal themes of Heidegger's published works on Nietzsche and to state what I take to be the profound and enduring impact of these themes on Heidegger's own thought. Although my presentation will not be uncritical, I will at no point ask whether Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche is 'adequate' or whether Heidegger 'represents' Nietzsche fairly: in the first place, Heidegger does not purport to 'represent' Nietzsche, and in the second, no matter how 'inadequate' his reading of Nietzsche may be, Nietzsche himself, born posthumously, retains his own style and stylo, makes his own counterthrusts, dances his own defence. I offer my aid, he laughs. Nor, alas, do I have the requisite space to indicate the importance of Heidegger's reading for contemporary confrontations with Nietzsche, especially in France, from Bataille through Deleuze and Klossowski to Foucault and Derrida.

Nihilism and the end of metaphysics

With his announcement of the death of God and the collapse of all worlds 'beyond', Nietzsche becomes the historian and herald of nihilism. The history of nihilism comprises the rise and fall of the highest values hitherto, values such as 'purpose', 'unity', 'Being', and 'truth'. But thanks to his insight into the origins of nihilism in the very instauration of otherworldly values, that is, the identity of nihilism and moralistic metaphysics, Nietzsche also becomes the herald of 'perfect' or 'ecstatic' nihilism. Heidegger shares Nietzsche's suspicion that nihilism is not a recent, typically modern phenomenon; he accepts Nietzsche's judgment that the reign of nihilism is coterminous with that of Platonistic metaphysics. This epochal reign reaches its apotheosis when the horizon that once demarcated the 'true' from the 'merely apparent' world fades, when the

true world 'becomes a fable'. When he pierces the horizon of 'the true' – not satisfied merely to invert the Platonistic hierarchy of the sensuous and supersensuous, Becoming and Being – Nietzsche precipitates the crisis of metaphysics.

At the same time, however, by insisting on a revaluation of values, as though there might be some absolute standard (such as 'life' or 'will to power') by which values might be gauged and promulgated, and by treating nihilism ultimately as an affliction of which Occidental history might be cured, Nietzsche remains caught in the orbit of metaphysical thinking, trapped in passive-reactive nihilism. Samson indeed brings down the temple, but on his own head. Thus we attain a first glimpse of the irresolvable ambiguity and even ambivalence of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche: pursuing the question of the horizon of 'the true', Nietzsche nonetheless fails to pose the question of the essence of truth, *das Wesen der Wahrheit*, and fails to see that his own critique of 'the true' presupposes the traditional notion of truth as *adaequatio*, *homoiōsis*; conceiving of his philosophy early on as the overcoming of Platonism, Nietzsche nonetheless fails to recognize the fatal kinship of revaluation with the *idea tou agathou* and thus fails to recover the tradition by means of an originary reading of the early Greek thinkers; subjecting Cartesian subjectivism and intellectualism to a scathing critique, Nietzsche nonetheless fails to draw the full consequences of his discovery that *ego volo* is but a brainchild of *ego cogito* and fails to recognize that the mere substitution of 'body' for 'spirit' cannot overcome representational thought; desecrating the origin of nihilism in the pristine establishment of transcendent values, Nietzsche nonetheless believes that some values can be rescued from nihilism; advocating a fully developed, ecstatic nihilism, sprung from the depths of tragic wisdom, Nietzsche nonetheless fails to confront the question of the essence of the *nihil* and fails to experience the source of nihilism in the happenstance that in Western history *Being itself comes to nothing*.

The ambiguity – and ambivalence – in Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche may best be expressed in two questions. How is it possible that Nietzsche's philosophy implies nothing less than the *end* of metaphysics, and yet *is itself* a metaphysics? How can Nietzsche be called *the last* metaphysician and yet still be considered *one* metaphysician among others?

The metaphysics of will to power and eternal recurrence

Will to power and eternal recurrence of the same are the crucial poles of Nietzsche's metaphysics, the other key words – nihilism, revaluation, 'justice', and overman – revolving about them. Heidegger insists that these two thoughts constitute a unity, that they designate what scholastic

philosophy called the *essentia* and *existentia* of entities. This implies that will to power and eternal recurrence are responses to the ancient ontological question *ti to on*, in the metaphysical form, 'Was ist das Seiende?', 'What is the being?'. They are replies to the guiding question within metaphysics (*die Leitfrage*) but not to the grounding question concerning metaphysics as such (*die Grundfrage*). The putative unity of will to power and eternal recurrence, as the essence and existence respectively of all beings, at times assumes a merely schematic, almost syllogistic form in Heidegger's lectures and treatises: If will to power is a self-willing that brooks no obstacles, then its unconditioned willing can only be a perpetual self-overcoming; any being that is essentially will to power can exist solely as eternal recurrence of the same. This schematic interpretation tends to understand will to power cosmologically (and thus metaphysically) rather than to employ it genealogically; it woefully underestimates the exhilarating and devastating import of Nietzsche's supreme and most burdensome thought – *die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen*. In his haste to refute Alfred Baeumler – who embraced a politicized will to power while spurning the 'Egypticism' of eternal recurrence, thus proclaiming the lamentable *disunity* of Nietzsche's thought – Heidegger at times neglects the multiple perspectives of will to power and the tragic pathos of eternal return. Yet Heidegger shares Jaspers' conviction that recurrence is Nietzsche's central thought and he devotes his best interpretive efforts to it, not only during the summer semester of 1937 but also in lectures delivered in the early 1950s. However, before taking up discussion of eternal recurrence, I must elaborate somewhat on Heidegger's criticism of Nietzsche's metaphysics.

Will to power and valiative thought

According to Nietzsche, will to power is 'the ultimate fact we come down to'. To Heidegger's ear *das letzte Faktum* has an unmistakably metaphysical ring. Just as Heidegger's own asseverations on the metaphysical *Urfaktum* of temporality become increasingly suspect to him after the publication of *Being and Time*, as we saw earlier in the second and third chapters of this volume [cf. *IM*], so too Nietzsche's desire to define the very essence of beings seems futile to Heidegger. (Of course, it is Nietzsche, with his genealogy of the *causa prima* – the 'first cause' originating in 'laziness', 'weariness' – who helps to make such tendencies suspect!) Nevertheless, Heidegger eschews the genealogical employment of will to power and rejects its cosmological-biological usage. There is little left to be said, other than that will to power seems to derive from Leibnizian *vis* and *appetitus* and from the interpretations of 'will' in Kant, German Idealism, and Schopenhauer. Heidegger does say all this, in

spite of his warning that to trace probable dependencies and influences among thinkers is to forget their universal dependence on Being and its destiny. Only in his first lecture course, *Will to Power as Art*, does will to power receive sympathetic and thought-provoking treatment. There it is seen as nothing less than an ecstatic being-beyond-oneself in the manner of human existentiality or finite transcendence. As perpetual self-overcoming, will to power is another word for *epimeleia*, *Sorge*, 'care'. As I indicated in chapter six [of *IM*], Hannah Arendt is right when she notes that the later lectures and essays (in volume II of *Nietzsche*) abandon this positive interpretation of will to power and equate Nietzsche's doctrine with the will-to-will that inaugurates the reign of planetary technology.⁴ Whether Heidegger ever truly overcomes the schematic 'cosmological' interpretation of will to power – as the *essentia* of entities – may be doubted; certainly there is no breakthrough here to fundamental problems, as there is in Heidegger's thinking of eternal recurrence.

The negative balance in Heidegger's account of the metaphysics of will to power is chiefly due to the role of value thinking (*Wertdenken*) there. Heidegger's allergic reaction to Nietzschean 'revaluation of all values' derives partly, as I have noted, from his own rebellion as a student and young teacher against the influential neo-Kantian *Wertphilosophie* of his mentor, Heinrich Rickert. Throughout his career, Heidegger inveighed against the philosophy of value as a debasement of Kant's philosophy. Although Nietzsche seems to have recognized the necessity of overcoming Platonistic valuation as such, Heidegger faults him for retaining confidence in 'values' themselves, indicts him for the unfounded hope that this lame duck of Kantian–Cartesian subjectivism, this insipid residue of secularized Christianized *aretē*, could rescue Occidental humanity from its own essential history – nihilism. In value thinking Heidegger sees the major obstacle to Nietzsche's advance beyond metaphysical modes of thought. The project of revaluation deflects and distracts Nietzsche from the questions of Being, truth, and the nothing. Nietzsche comes closest to those questions in his thought of eternal recurrence.

Eternal recurrence, time, and downgoing

Nietzsche's sundry communications of eternal recurrence, in *The Gay Science*, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, and various unpublished sketches, convince Heidegger that eternal recurrence is not so much a dogma as an experience in and of *thinking*. It has to do, not so much with the *existentia* of beings (as the treatises published in volume II of *Nietzsche* tend to assume), as with 'existence' in both Jaspers' and Heidegger's senses. In the summer semester of 1937 Heidegger struggles

to confront the full import of Nietzsche's tragic insight into Becoming and his Dionysian affirmation of it.

The previous semester's course on will to power as art had focused on the opposition – indeed, the 'raging discordance' – between art and truth. Art, the creation of transfigurative semblance, proved to be worth more than truth for the enhancement of life. Such enhancement occurred in what Nietzsche called 'the grand style', the enraptured style that conjoined under one yoke the rule of form-giving law and the anarchy of originary chaos. Nietzsche's discovery of the yoke, the most life-enhancing thought and most powerful dissemblance, fashioned in the raging discord between art and truth, was given the title 'eternal recurrence of the same'. Heidegger insisted that this thought had something – perhaps everything – to do with the question of Being and Time, Time and Being.

Standing in the 'gateway of the Moment' – not simply observing the gateway from the side, as does the dwarf, who makes everything too easy for himself – Zarathustra is cast into *time*. The figure of Zarathustra thus serves as an image of perspicuous, resolutely open Dasein. The 'eternity' of eternal recurrence is not that inappropriate nonfinite time which, according to *Being and Time* section 65, is derived from finite time proper, but the moment (*der Augenblick*) of insight and decision. On the threshold of the moment of time Zarathustra affirms that all transition (*Ubergang*) toward the overman (*Übermensch*) ineluctably requires downgoing (*Untergang*).⁵ Zarathustra's contempt for the 'last man' and his disgust with humanity in general, his nausea, are confronted and overcome in the thought of recurrence – although what 'overcoming' now may mean becomes a capital question, one that cannot be resolved by a polite reference to 'self-overcoming'. Zarathustra's convalescence consists solely in thinking this thought – although the thought itself, as the most powerful dissemblance, at times seems to be a ditty cranked out on a barrel-organ, a child's entertainment offering sheer distraction from the harsh realities of historical existence. In Heidegger's view, all depends on the actual work, *die Wirk-lichkeit*, of the thinking itself. All depends on fashioning the lyre that will sustain the tension of discord, the tension of the Heraclitean bow (Yeats calls it life-in-death, death-in-life), the tension that will hold the melody of mortality.

Neither Nietzsche nor Heidegger is unduly optimistic about the success of such work. Nietzsche has Zarathustra describe himself as a cripple on the hither-side of the bridge that leads to redemption from revenge. In his final lectures and essays on Nietzsche, Heidegger persists in posing the crucial question of such redemption. All his earlier preoccupations culminate in the question, 'Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?' With a view to the thought of eternal recurrence, this question translates to the query, 'What is called – and what calls for – thinking?'

The decisive work – thinking recurrence – takes place, according to Heidegger, in the section of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* entitled 'On redemption'. There the spirits of vengeance, gravity, and resentment, themselves the propitiating spirits of otherworldly metaphysics and morals, are perceived as arising from the frustration of man's will in the face of time's irreversibility. Before the facticity of the 'it was' the will stands helpless. It is not merely that the ephemeral character of Becoming paralyzes the will, nor that transience gives rise to the castrating nostalgia for the *ewige Weibliche*. What is truly crippling is

the sheer intransigence of the past,
the intractability of the *fait accompli*,
the lapidary impassivity of what used to be.

Rather than will nothing at all, the harried will wills the nothing: hence the enervating delirium of passive nihilism. Rather than affirm the ordinance of time, the will conjures a counterwill to fulminate against time and its '*Es war*': hence the movable feast of rancor and revenge.

Redemption from the spirit of vengeance, the transformation of reactive nihilism into ecstatic nihilism, and the transfer of allegiance from the Crucified to Dionysos require that the will declare of the past, 'Thus I willed it, I will it so now, and thus shall I will it forever!' Willing the eternal recurrence of the same reconstitutes the 'it was' as a 'so be it', dissolves the impassivity of the past in the potent solution of its present willful act. Thus man 'administers the proof' that the contingencies of the past conform to what will to power itself wills; thus humanity earns 'the right to claim' that the happenstances and hazards of the past are its own doing; thus the past is transmuted into perpetual future by a will that 'continually remains presence-to-self'.⁶

Heidegger doubts the efficacy of such willing to perform the redemptive work of eternal recurrence. 'Thus I willed it!' declares the will. What is the source of such a declaration? It asseverates something of the past in the present. Can what it avers of the past be affirmed in the gateway of the Moment, where time looms before me and then recedes over my shoulder to a remote eternity? Or must such a declaration proceed from the side, in the dwarf's perspective, as a (now) transparent ruse? Reconstituting the 'it was' as a 'so be it' – is that not to subordinate *Sein* to *Sollen*, and not to *Wollen*, in the manner of the most supine Platonism? To dissolve the impassivity of the past in the activity of a willful present – is that not to embrace the traditional metaphysical preference for activity over passivity? What sort of 'proof' would convince the genealogist that contingency has been successfully converted into will? Has not the ditty of proofs been played out? What sort of

droit de prétendre will transform the victim of chances into the demiurge of destinies? And when the past is transformed into perpetual future by a will that remains perpetually present to itself, is not the metaphysics of presence, that is to say, the ontology based on the understanding of Being as permanence of presencing (*Beständigkeit des Anwesens*), merely confirmed in its dominion? The paradoxical assurance that the will's perpetual presence to self is a perpetual sacrifice of self, an infinite self-overcoming, does not convince: 'perpetual sacrifice' offers up the same old lamb over and over again, and it no longer fools gods or men.

All these doubts about 'redemption' – about what one might call the *decadence* of redemption – trouble Heidegger. They culminate in his charge that Zarathustra's teaching on redemption fails to liberate metaphysical man from the spirit of vengeance:

Does such thinking overcome prior reflection, overcome the spirit of revenge? Or does there not lie concealed in this very *stamping* [cf. *The Will to Power*, no. 617] – which takes all Becoming into the protection of eternal recurrence of the same – a form of ill will *against* sheer transiency and thereby a highly spiritualized spirit of revenge? . . . What is left for us to say, if not this: Zarathustra's doctrine does not bring redemption from revenge? We do say it. Yet we say it by no means as a misconceived refutation of Nietzsche's philosophy. We do not even utter it as an objection against Nietzsche's thinking. But we say it in order to turn our attention to the fact that – and the extent to which – Nietzsche's thought too is animated by the spirit of prior reflection.

(VA, 121–2; Ni 2, 228–9)

Thus Heidegger does not close the question of Nietzsche's place in the history of metaphysics. Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra? Zarathustra is the advocate of the circle of life and suffering; redemption from the circle is not his proper brief. Zarathustra espouses the goal of overman; he dare not confuse himself with the goal. Zarathustra recognizes all transition to be a downgoing; he dare not quit the doorway of the moment of time. In short, the work of eternal recurrence, as the work of *thinking*, remains to be done.

The last thinker of the West

How can Nietzsche be called the *last* metaphysician and yet still be considered one metaphysician among others? If Nietzsche were wholly absorbed by the 'guiding question' of metaphysics, completely oblivious

to its 'grounding question'; if he had thought purely and simply in terms of values, merely inverting the 'above' and 'below' of the Platonic hierarchy; if his analysis of nihilism had remained but a phase in the history of nihilistic metaphysics; how then could Nietzsche have exhausted the possibilities of metaphysical inquiry, of representational and valuative thought, and how could he have envisaged the event of metaphysics as nihilism? If the 'last name' in the history of metaphysics 'is not Kant, and not Hegel, but Nietzsche',⁷ then *how* is Nietzsche able to draw a line under his own name and so call an entire tradition to account?

From the outset of his confrontation with Nietzsche, Heidegger accords him the status of a thinker; that is, one who ponders the essence of metaphysics itself. In 'What calls for thinking?' Heidegger designates him, not the last metaphysician, but 'the last thinker of the West', *der letzte Denker des Abendlandes* (WhD? 61; cf. H, 94). The word *letzt* could mean several things:

Nietzsche the *most recent* thinker, *le dernier cri*?

Nietzsche the *ultimate*, that is, the supreme and superlative thinker?

Nietzsche the *final* thinker, that is, the thinker of finality, after whom no one is to be expected, after whom the West as such, or thinking itself, or both of these together, can no longer be what they once were?

This third understanding of the word *letzt* would of course place in jeopardy the claim of any contemporary *to be* a thinker. . . .

Nietzsche's impact on Heidegger's thought is second to none. In 'What calls for thinking?' Heidegger deliberately couples Nietzsche's name with that of Aristotle, a telling conjunction when one remembers the cardinal position of Aristotle in awakening the question of Being. The Heidegger/Nietzsche encounter occurs across a long series of shared sites – junctions, crossroads, intersections and interceptions, underpasses and ambushes. To cite a few:

Nietzsche's definition of a strong will as one that knows how *not* to will (*S II*, 987–9) is an unsung precursor of Heidegger's *Gelassenheit* and 'commemorative thinking';

Zarathustra's cry, 'Be true to the earth!' is heard again in Heidegger's pledge to the earth of the Fourfold and in his initiation of mortals to their mortality;

Nietzsche's role, assisting Kant, Schiller, Schelling, and Hölderlin in awakening in Heidegger a sense of the primacy of art and the artwork in the question of Being, becomes clearly visible when will to power as art is proclaimed the 'necessary point of departure' for Heidegger's inquiry into Nietzschean thought;

Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics helps to propel Heidegger beyond the incipient 'meta-ontological turn' of his own thought – from 'ontology of Dasein' to 'the metaphysics of truth' – in the years immediately following the publication of *Being and Time*; and, most generally,

Nietzsche implants the suspicion that an entire epoch of thought and belief has inevitably succumbed, that what we piously call 'tradition' is for the most part a product of anxiety in the face of thinking.

Beyond piety, yet still within anxiety, I ask again what Heidegger means when he calls Nietzsche *den letzten Denker des Abendlandes*. Is Nietzsche (1) the most recent, current, and topical of thinkers; is he (2) the ultimate and superlative thinker; or is he (3) the final thinker of the evening land? The first is too innocent for Heidegger, the second too edifying. Both in any case would actually be said otherwise in German. Only the third (and *last*) is risky enough, outrageous enough, literal enough, to suit Heidegger's estimation of Nietzsche. If at times nothing seems new under the sun of Heidegger's history of Being, it is because he too needs to protect himself from Nietzsche's newness. Thus Heidegger's thinking *counter* to Nietzsche remains always in service to a thinking to *encounter* him. *Auseinandersetzung* remains subtended by an *Entgegend-enken*, confrontation by an encounter.

On the eve of his lecture series on Nietzsche, Heidegger defined the task of his own thought as one of bringing Nietzsche's thought 'to a full enfolding' (*EM*, 28). The confrontation and encounter with Nietzsche, nascent in Heidegger's student days and still vital in the conversations of his last years, remained crucial for Heidegger – for knowing who he was and what he was to do.

All of which brings us now to the question of the *results* of Heidegger's history of Being. Can descensional reflection transcend mere intimations to hard and fast results that would be relevant for the technological age in which we live?

Notes

1 *Eperons: les styles de Nietzsche* (Paris: Flammarion, 1978), p. 60. Derrida's discussion of Heidegger/Nietzsche on pp. 59–102 of *Eperons* is more subtle and suggestive than his earlier remarks in, for example, *De la grammatologie* (Ed. de Minuit, 1967), pp. 31–3, 'La structure, le signe et le jeu', in *L'écriture et la différence* (Ed. du Seuil, 1967), pp. 412–13, or 'Les fins de l'homme', in *Marges de la philosophie* (Ed. de Minuit, 1972), pp. 161–4.

2 For the following see my 'Analysis' to *Ni* 1, 245–7.

3 See *SZ*, 264, lines 15–16; 272 n. 1; and, the key reference, to Nietzsche's 'On the advantage and disadvantage of history for life', 396, lines 16ff.

4 Her attempt to explain the change in terms of some sort of personal remorse is highly dubious, however. See Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, II, 172–8, and chapter six, above [cf. *IM*].

5 The word *Übergang*, we recall, united the metabolic 'now' in Aristotle's treatise on time and the *metabolē* of fundamental ontology itself. See chapter three, above [cf. *IM*], and my 'Analysis' in *Ni* 2, 276–8.

6 The quoted phrases in this last sentence – indeed, the entire paragraph –

are from Jean Granier, *Problème de la Vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche*, pp. 572–3.

⁷ Eckhard Heftrich, 'Nietzsche im Denken Heideggers', in *Durchblicke*, ed. Vittorio Klostermann (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1970), p. 349.

Critical remarks on the Heideggerian reading of Nietzsche

Michel Haar

In a short and surprising marginal note to the 1936–7 lecture on ‘The will to power as art’, Heidegger writes: ‘The bitterness of the strife [*Auseinandersetzung*] is possible here only because it is supported by the most intimate kinship, by the Yes to the essential.’¹ What kinship? What is this ‘essential’ he admits he shares with Nietzsche? There is no further explanation here, nor in the later works, about the nature of this secret agreement, which is indeed very rarely acknowledged, and nevertheless must underlie the manifest, long and harsh *Auseinandersetzung*. Is the affinity with Nietzsche perhaps much older than the strife, in the early admiration for the radicality of Nietzsche’s philosophical solitude and atheistic way of philosophizing? In *Being and Time*, whereas the Hegelian concept of time is harshly deconstructed, the Nietzschean concept of historicity is highly praised, and we find for the first time an explicit allusion to something ‘essential’: ‘In his *Second Untimely Consideration* (1874), Nietzsche recognized *the essential* and expressed it in a penetrating and unequivocal way.’² In the analysis of the three dimensions of historical culture, the Antiquarian, the Critical and the Monumental, Nietzsche had understood that the unity of the three ekstases of historical time comes essentially from the future.

But isn’t there an even more original affinity? Heidegger often quotes and comments on Nietzsche’s famous sentences: ‘Man is the not yet determined animal’, or ‘Man is something that must be overcome’. Both question radically and from the outset traditional *anthropocentrism* and *humanism*. As early as *Being and Time*, Heidegger seeks to overcome the metaphysical definitions of man as *subjectum*, *ego*, reasonable animal, and thinks that Nietzsche’s critique of the ‘fictions’ of substance and subject, and in particular his attacks on the overestimation of consciousness, conscience and interiority have led the way towards a *decentring of man*.

Another important and fundamental kinship is the rediscovery of the Greeks and the primacy given to the pre-Socratics, which goes hand in hand with an anti-Platonism often violent on Nietzsche's side and which Heidegger shares, up to a certain point. This kinship is deeper than all the reservations expressed about Nietzsche's readings of the Greeks. His penetrating insight into the first Greeks 'is transcended only by Hölderlin'.³ Contrary to Hegel who looks back, Nietzsche, like Hölderlin, 'sees ahead and opens the way'.⁴ This praise is without doubt the highest that Heidegger can bestow. 'All the great problems have been raised before Socrates.'⁵ Nietzsche had said this, but he had been the victim of more than one illusion or error: the Romantic illusion of a 'physical' return to the Greeks in the sense of a resurrection of Greece ('One day, let us hope, we will become *physically* Greeks'⁶); and the error principally of transcribing the thinking of the first Greeks in the categories of Plato and Aristotle, taken as evident and normative, even when they are inverted.

It is certain that Nietzsche has been a victim of the opposition currently and wrongly established between Parmenides and Heraclitus. Here lies one of the essential reasons why his metaphysics absolutely never reached the decisive questioning, though in another sense Nietzsche did understand the great beginning of the whole Greek *Dasein* in a way which is transcended only by Hölderlin.⁷

Nietzsche stayed entangled inside the Platonic opposition between being and becoming that plays a fundamental role in the very definition of the Eternal Return, as well as inside the opposition between truth and appearance, entangled in such a way that he could never reach 'the true medium [*Mitte*] of philosophy' and think the Greek *Anfang* at its true depth. Neither Hegel nor Nietzsche was able to think the Beginning in an original and initial way; they see it only 'in the light of platonic philosophy'.⁸ In other words, Nietzsche stays prisoner of tradition: he confirms and maintains the essence of truth as *homoïōsis*, *adequatio*. He reveals this when he finally affirms that we should imitate not the Greeks, but the Romans.

As astonishing as the initial affinities is the way in which Heidegger, in spite of his main project to contain Nietzsche within the mould of traditional metaphysics, discovers an unexpected *justification* of certain Nietzschean positions. Indeed in his lectures, he is often inclined to transpose several Nietzschean concepts into the categories and the problematics of *Being and Time*. Thus art as the will to transfigure life is interpreted, in phenomenological terms, as 'radiant appearing'; the Nietzschean *Scheinen* as perspectivist illusion is transposed into appearing as a manifestation of being conceived as life showing itself in a higher

degree in the artistic phenomenon. The intensification of strength through intoxication in artistic creation is understood in terms of *Stimmung*, i.e. of transcendence. Thus also Eternal Return is fundamentally interpreted through the concept of *instant* (*Augenblick*), a sudden and complete unification of present, past and future with an ekstatic character which cannot be deduced of any 'now' (*Jetzt*). The authentic resoluteness which keeps *Dasein* in the 'repetition' (*Wiederholung*), not of facts, or concrete events with all their small details, but of basic possibilities, seems to be an echo, not of Kierkegaard, but rather of Nietzsche's most abysmal thought.

Such a justification is possible only from the 'yes to the essential'. But what finally constitutes this *essential* which would be held in common? Beyond the spontaneous or chosen affinities, beyond the *Wahlverwandschaften*, beyond the struggle with nihilism and metaphysics, beyond the rejection of anthropocentrism, beyond even the criticism of the primacy of theory and logic, the essential agreement for Heidegger seems to situate himself with Nietzsche in a *passage* (*Ubergang*). This word defines for Nietzsche the very essence of man: a 'transition', a 'bridge' (between animality and the Overman, but also between the reactive forces, the resentment and the new future affirmation). For Heidegger *passage* is a name for the present epoch, as a transition between the endless end of metaphysics and a 'new beginning' of thinking and of history. When Heidegger describes the historical situation of Nietzsche, he describes his own, taking up the Nietzschean expression: 'a precarious passage that points forwards and backwards and that for this reason is ambiguous for everyone even as far as its very nature and meaning as passage'.⁹ But why did Heidegger, instead of proposing as he does in this passage a 'dialogue of thinking' with Nietzsche, try, at least at a certain period, to reduce him to the traditional essence of metaphysics, and keep him only within the past and its dead-ends? Is it perhaps – a hypothesis which would need to be verified – in order to set outside of himself the nihilism of absolute subjectivity, the voluntarism, almost the pure will to will that he has been very near to sharing (e.g. in the *Rectorats Rede*), in order to concentrate upon this adversary the failure of this absolute subjectivity and the potentially catastrophic end of the History of Being that it is supposed to prepare?

The central part of the Heideggerian reading of Nietzsche is an attempt to demonstrate that Nietzsche's philosophy remains caught and enclosed within the traditional essence of metaphysics. In chapter VI of the *Nietzsche II*, Nietzsche's philosophy is reduced to five fundamental metaphysical terms.

Will to Power gives the name for the Being of beings as such, the *essentia* of beings. *Nihilism* is the name for the History of the truth

of beings thus determined. The *Eternal Return of the Same* means the mode [*Weise*] in which Being in totality is, the *existentia* of beings. The *Overman* characterizes the type of mankind [*humanitas*] which is demanded by such a totality. *Justice* is the essence of the truth of beings as Will to Power.¹⁰

Leaving aside the more complex question of Nihilism and of the essence of truth which would require a longer analysis, I propose to discuss to what extent and at the price of what distortions Will to Power, Eternal Return and the Overman are violently reduced to the traditional concepts of *essentia*, *existentia* and *humanitas*. I do not intend to show that the Heideggerian reading is wrong or arbitrary, or that Nietzsche totally escapes metaphysics, but rather to make more explicit some of the presuppositions upon which that reading is built.

Will to Power as essence

There can be no doubt that Will to Power is the name for the Being of beings since Nietzsche calls it 'the most interior essence of Being' (*das innerste Wesen des Seins*). But is it, as Heidegger claims, the same absolute Will as that asserted by Hegel or Schelling, or 'the Absolute that wills itself'? Is it a *Grund*, a *substantia* and *subjectum*, a metaphysical basis in which all representations are rooted? And can the values instituted by the Will to Power, according to its 'various points of view', be understood as its representations and, so to speak, as the *cogitata* of the Will? What does the perspectivistic character of the Will to Power imply? In short, what does the Nietzschean Will to Power mean for Heidegger?

In fact, we find in the Nietzsche lectures as well as in the *Holzwege*, three rather different and successive definitions:

(1) In the 1936–7 lecture on 'The will to power as art', Heidegger underlines the *transcendence* of the Will to Power. It is both self-affectation, emotion or passion of the will commanding itself (*Affekt des Kommandos*), and movement aiming beyond itself. But as much as it is neither the mere passivity of self-affectation, nor the activity of the objectifying will, it is ekstasis, as it is first of all to be lifted up beyond oneself towards Being. This analysis of the Will serves Heidegger to show next that the creative artistic state of intoxication (*Rausch*) as *Stimmung*, is transcendence, movement towards figures, forms, hyperlucidity, ecstatic opening and not self-complacency of the subject. 'Intoxication', writes Heidegger, 'explodes the subjectivity of the subject.'¹¹

(2) In chapter VI of *Nietzsche II*, 'Nietzsche's metaphysics' (1940), the Will to Power is defined as the *existence* of every being, but mainly as

the *will to will*; power is nothing exterior to will, it is not something the will strives for, as if it did not possess it, but its very essence. Power means the inner necessity of the ever widening self-affirmation of the will. The expression 'Will to Power' makes manifest 'the unconditional essence of the will, that as pure will, wills itself'.¹² It is pure self-positing, detached from every grounding and with no goal other than its own conservation and augmentation. It must will to will, in emptiness – and finally will nothingness rather than not will. Moreover, Will to Power is the principle of the '*calculation of values*': the word calculation is repeated seven times in four pages. Will to Power is the subjectivity that counts only on itself, and that posits the values that can support it, while it reckons the quantity of forces necessary to maintain and increase itself. (3) In the *Holzwege* essay, 'Nietzsche's word "God is Dead"', Heidegger exposes again the ontological meaning of the Will to Power as the Being of beings and the definition of power as the essence of the will that knows and wants itself. But he underlines and develops mainly the theme of the establishment of values, which constitute a *stock of presence* that prefigures the technological stock. As it pretends to grasp Being, to lay hands on it, Heidegger calls the very thinking in terms of values a blasphemy and even a 'murder of Being'.¹³

The boldest and the most convincing of these three definitions is certainly the second, which shows the circular structure of the Will to Power as will that wills itself. This circularity allows the establishment of the parallel with the Hegelian Absolute Knowledge as 'circle of circles': it shows the supposedly total nihilism of the will that constantly comes back to itself and whose power lies in the constant overpowering of its own power over itself. It explains the essential link between Will to Power and Eternal Return; the latter is understood as the ultimate consequence or exigency of this eternally repeated return of the will to itself. This circularity finally anticipates the techno-economical circles of consumerism and the techno-political ones of directivism.

Some aspects of these definitions are highly problematic. *First*, when Heidegger interprets the Will to Power in a phenomenological fashion as transcendence, he seems to want to hide its truly metaphysical dimension. His reading underestimates the physical and metaphysical realism of forces, forgetting his own idea that all metaphysics is basically physics. Heidegger interprets the Nietzschean phrase about '*plus von Macht*' as the simple widening of the horizon open to intentionality; whereas Nietzsche, in his 'Physiology of art' insists that the Will to Power as art depends upon a 'real increase' of strength, the intensification of the powers of the body, a feeling of nervous and muscular quickness, a swiftness and lightness of movements, and so on.¹⁴ *Second*, the reduction of the Will to Power to essence neglects and keeps silent about the

Nietzschean critique of the traditional concepts of essence, substance, subject and identity. For Nietzsche, there is no essence in the Platonic sense of *eidos*, that is in the sense of a constant unity which would precede every multiplicity. There is no substantial essence either within or deriving from the Will to Power. 'The question, "what is it?" amounts to imposing a meaning from a certain point of view. Essence is something perspectivistic that already presupposes a multiplicity.'¹⁵ Will to Power should, in fact, always be said in the plural: the Wills to Power; a plurality which cannot be totalized or substantially unified, of forces engaged in complex and variable relations of struggle, commandment and obedience.

Every centre, every focus of meaning is fictitious, or the momentary expression of a balance of forces which is constantly changing. If this is the case, the metaphysical notions of *Grund* and *subjectum* are shattered and relativized. There is neither a grounding nor an absolute subject in Nietzsche, no *Grund*, but *Abgrund*, chaos. And finally the principle of the *calculation of values*, the key or core of the Heideggerian demonstration (especially as the stock of values prefigures the *Bestand*) raises the difficult question of the meaning of perspectivistic evaluation in Nietzsche. For Heidegger, evaluation only continues the work of reason since Descartes: to measure, to calculate beings, to give account to the subject which is both the stage where everything appears so to speak in court, or stands before the supreme judge. The thought in terms of values would not question the traditional stage of reason and representation: Heidegger calls values 'representing productions' (*Vorstellende Hervorbringungen*). Values are calculated to be adequate to the will ('you will only have the values that suit your degree of strength', says Nietzsche). The rationalism of the calculating Will to Power in art and science would be the prefiguration of the perfect oblivion of Being in the will to will. The perfection of calculation would hide the sombre emptiness and the absence of the goal of power exerted for the sake of power. But, can the Nietzschean idea of value as interpretation be reduced to the concept of rational representation? Nietzsche is clearly struggling with the tradition of reason as accountable to a normative and law-making authority. But when he writes, 'We cannot refuse the world the possibility of yielding to an infinity of interpretations', he states that the Will to Power is an indefinite process of interpretation which never arrives at a final and adequate representation, at a 'seventh day's rest' or 'sabbath of all sabbaths'. He breaks with the principle of reason. For every reason, whether Leibnizian, Hegelian or technological, does not pretend to achieve an infinity of *possible* calculations, but the only calculations which are the truest, that is the most correct, adequate . . . the best. Reason has to exclude the false, whereas interpretation imposes neither the application of the principle of contradiction, nor even that of the principle

of reality. A fictitious interpretation can have immense strength – such is the case with Eternal Return. The phrase ‘calculation of Values’ is metaphysical, and it is made up by Heidegger, as it cannot be found expressed *verbatim* in Nietzsche. Will to Power can never place values in front of itself and compare them objectively. All values are necessary. But because they are answers to constraints, or rather to situations of constraint in which the interpretative forces are themselves caught. An interpretation is not a theory. It is not calculated in the sense that it would constitute a detached representation, a scene. It has the spontaneous, ambiguous, unstable character of the attempt, the essay. Values are transitory. They cannot be seized or secured as can be the objects of science and technology. The models which Nietzsche uses to characterize interpretation (deciphering medical symptoms, or philological readings) simply cannot be applied to the non-ambiguous rationality of Technology.

Eternal Return and the theology of existence

The simplifying identification of the Eternal Return with the traditional category of existence is surprising, especially if we consider the multiple versions that Nietzsche gives of his doctrine. Indeed, Eternal Return apparently does not refer to the given-ness of being in totality, or to the mere fact that it is, but rather in its first formulation in the *Joyful Science* (§341), ‘The heaviest weight’, to the *hypothesis* of an infinite reaffirmation by the singular will of a singular moment, according to a question: ‘Would you want *this* once more and an innumerable number of times?’ This question also supposes a thought suggested by a demon: ‘This life as you live it now, you will have to live it again.’ The *demonic* and terrifying thought is the idea that whatever the attitude of the will in the face of this revelation may be, acceptance or refusal, the factual necessity of the eternal repetition will prevail. But this factual necessity is itself inscribed in the equally hypothetical ‘pre-’ question that opens the text: ‘What would you say if one day a demon . . . ?’ Therefore, the twofold hypothetical or twofold fictitious character of the Eternal Return seems to set it far apart from the traditional category of existence and make it participate simultaneously in the three categories of modality distinguished by Kant: *possibility*, *existence* and *necessity*. Among these categories, the category of possibility in a broader sense than the logical possibility considered by Kant (something whose contrary is contradictory) seems to prevail. Heidegger is ready to admit that Eternal Return is the thought of a possibility; ‘the possibility which is asked is, as a possibility, more powerful than any factual reality would be’.¹⁶ One should add that if Eternal Return is presented as an interpretation, it is also strongly characterized as a *belief*, or as Heidegger says, an *anti-*

belief,¹⁷ a sort of secret religion which is meant to make a selection among men and which constitutes, therefore, the ultimate trial in the process of overcoming nihilism. But the Return is also indissolubly linked to the experience of the ecstatic *instant*, the supremely affirmative instant of joy. It is equally attached to the experience of the *amor fati*, the experience of the supreme affirmation of the universal bond, of the ring encircling and uniting all things in a circle which is imperfect, 'vicious', because it includes evil, and is nevertheless divine: the *circulus vitiosus deus*.¹⁸ Finally, but it is not the last possible meaning, there is a cosmological sense of the Return, as an attempt to give a scientific explanation of the relation between the finitude of the totality of the forces constituting the universe and the infinity of time. Heidegger knows this plurality of aspects, which he mentions in his lecture, but he reduces all of them to the modality of *existence*. Why?

Because of a structural necessity inherent to the essence of metaphysics, so it seems. The Will to Power as *essence* of the world, as a *what*, must also have its *existentia*, its *how*. The circular or the cyclical movement is its most perfect replica or its closest image: the circle is, according to Heidegger, 'the most constant stabilization of the unstable',¹⁹ of the becoming, or of the chaos of forces and perspectives. It is the greatest fixity for mobility, or as Nietzsche says, 'the most extreme closeness of a world of becoming to the world of Being'.²⁰ At this point, which is called the 'summit of contemplation', the Eternal Return is indeed conceived as the 'widest actualization of the Will to Power'. Conversely, according to Heidegger, it is only from this doctrine of the Eternal Return that the Will to Power can be understood. The Return is the epitome of Nietzsche's philosophy. Nevertheless, Heidegger mentions that whereas the Will to Power is constitutive of the Being of beings, Eternal Return is only a modality. Will to Power 'exists' as Eternal Return. But how can that be the case? How can a thought, and moreover the thought of a possibility, be the modality of the existence, be the 'facticity' and the effectivity of the world. Must men not, as in Pascal's *Wager*, decide in favour of the Return? The Heideggerian reading underestimates the dimension of virtuality, of attempt, of fiction, but also of *choice* which is at work in the idea of the Eternal Return.

Moreover, it raises the difficult question of the passage from the ontological character of the *existentia* to its theological character. By a kind of levelling of differences, the 'katholou' or the *koīnotaton* (that is according to Aristotle the most common character of being) and its highest, noblest, most divine character (*theïon*) melt into one another, so to speak. Ontology is theologized, in as much as the Return as modality of the essence of the world receives the attributes of divinity. Nietzsche's God would be both 'a state of maximum', the maximum of strength of the Will to Power, its highest concentration, and the habitual,

current state of the world. In any case, God or the divine can no longer be submitted to the traditional determinations of the metaphysical God: Nietzsche's God is neither the first being (is he even a being?), nor the *causa sui*, nor the prime mover, nor the *demiourgos*, nor the creator. Heidegger notes that to speak of 'pantheism' ('God' in this case would be understood as the dionysian world itself considered as the supreme being), is not very illuminating, since the 'pan' and the 'theos' are both unknown, or undefinable, or impossible to reduce to concepts. We could add the fact that Nietzsche criticizes the very idea of totality when he writes for instance: 'We must make the Universe crumble into pieces, lose the awe before the All. . . . There is no All. Profound aversion to reposing, once and for all in any one total view of the world.'²¹

Heidegger characterizes Nietzsche's theology in two ways:

(1) The divine as such is not dead. Only the 'moral God', that is, God reduced to a supreme judge who rewards and punishes, the God of the weak and the suffering, is dead. God survives beyond good and evil.

(2) The Nietzschean thought of the Return constitutes 'a negative theology from which the Christian God is absent'.²² The phrase, 'negative theology' sounds strange but it can be defended in many ways. The most abysmal thinking is, if not unsayable at all, at least the object of a silence, a reservation. *Zarathustra* hesitates to communicate it and Nietzsche himself expresses it only in three passages of his published works. On the other hand, the Return implies the concept of world as chaos, i.e. with the negation of all its positive, anthropomorphic determinations, especially order, beauty and finality. This negative theology, in dehumanizing totality, saves the possible coming of a new god that Heidegger calls a 'more divine god'.

But is not this reading too one-sided? For if the 'too human' concepts of order, finality and beauty are negated, other attributes, absolutely positive attributes, are conferred upon totality – namely permanence and necessity. 'The overall character of the world is . . . chaos *not* because of the absence of necessity, but *because of the absence of order*'.²³ There is, therefore, a necessity of totality, and so a *positive theology* in Nietzsche, who calls many things divine. Heidegger seems to avoid discussing Nietzsche's positive thinking about divinity.

The Janus-head of the Overman

The analyses concerning the Overman show a striking contrast between the manifest content of Nietzsche's texts and their unthought. Heidegger's changing of his interpretation of the Overman is particularly radical. In 1940, he defines him both as the penultimate figure of the *animal*

rationale and as the *Master of the Earth* who would anticipate a calculating domination under the veil of the artistic will in the 'grand style'. The type of the Master of the Earth is interpreted as the future planetary ruler, later called the 'civil servant of technology'. On the contrary, in *What is called Thinking?* in 1951/2, the Overman no longer possesses any nihilistic qualities. He is nearly the prefiguration of the Shepherd of Being: 'The Overman is poorer, simpler, more tender, harder, calmer, more generous, slower in his decisions and more sparing in his speech.'²⁴ He stays away from the masses and from the techno-economical and political power. He represents 'a higher man',²⁵ who is 'qualitatively different from traditional man',²⁶ far from being his mere 'enlargement'.²⁷ How can we understand this Turn?

The first definition tries to show that the Overman belongs totally to the general essence of metaphysics. His meaning is *deduced* from the inner necessity that governs this essence and its realization in technology. The repetition of the word *must* (*müssen*) underlines this essential necessity (*Wesens-notwendigkeit*).²⁸ The Hegelian subjectivity of the Spirit, Heidegger remarks, *must* still be inverted in the subjectivity of the body conceived as 'great reason';²⁹ the absolute subjectivity *must* be embodied in the highest type of man, the Overman. Heidegger insists on the continuity between mankind and the Overman (understood as the perfection of mankind), whereas Nietzsche speaks of a rupture and outright juxtaposition of the two. 'Not mankind, but the Overman is the goal', says *Zarathustra*. The Last Man and the Overman, Nietzsche states, 'will live side by side (in the distant future) separated as much as possible, the latter similar to the Epicurean gods who have no preoccupation with men'.³⁰ The Last Man, as stated in *Zarathustra*, is needed in order to let the Overman appear as his strongest opposite. Eternal Return does not *eliminate* the Last Man, even if it always selects the more 'super-human' types who can bear such a thought.

There is another contradiction with the manifest meaning of Nietzsche's text: for him, the Overman cannot exist in the singular, but only as the plurality of exceptional individualities.³¹ For Heidegger, on the contrary, the Overman is interpreted as 'the supreme and unique subject'³² that embodies the most affirmative Will to Power.

'The Overman', he writes, 'does not know the barren isolation of the simple exception',³³ but constitutes for him the collective will of a mankind that knows how to *calculate* the mastery of the earth.

Finally, there is a contradiction between the Overman as the prefiguration of the technocratic ruler and the Nietzschean idea of a secret, non-violent, non-dominating reign of the future 'Masters of the Earth', who would reign in their own creative sphere apart from the masses. Indeed the whole technological unthought of the Overman is linked to the unthought of the notion of 'grand style'. Why does the 'grand style',

which Nietzsche does not associate with the Overman, but with 'classical art' (that is, every art with an economy of means, with clarity, with laws, with mathematical sobriety, with the strongest concentration), why does grand style reveal the future essence of technological power? Precisely because of the artistic *reign* attributed to the Overmen. But for Nietzsche, they will reign, however secretly, invisibly, over men, without governing, as 'artistic tyrants'. They will be artists in the largest sense, by their power of seduction. Nietzsche does not say that they will necessarily practise the 'grand style'. But the real hermeneutic violence in Heidegger's reading is the link he establishes between the grand style and the essence of technology. 'The grand style which includes, in advance, universal domination, includes the gigantic.'³⁴ Here there is another break with the literal sense: the grand style, according to Nietzsche, is turned towards what is 'pretty, short, light, delicate',³⁵ whereas the giganticism of technology supposes exaggeration of effects, accumulation of power, constant overpowering.

Is there any analogy between the autonomy of aristocratic artists and the planetary domination of technology? In Nietzsche's texts, the allusions to industrial production are very rare, and he hardly speaks of industrialization as a means of levelment. But the presupposition of the Heideggerian analysis is that the unthought of the Will to Power is calculation. It is true that Nietzsche speaks of a surplus of force, of the 'quantity of power', of 'scales', of 'measures of force', but the Overmen are presented as personalities with a spiritual or affective radiance: 'it would be a Caesar with the soul of Christ', or the 'unity of the thinker, the creator, and the lover', or the 'gathering of the poet, the lawmaker, the scientist, and the hero, capable of deciphering enigmas'.³⁶ In any case, the Overman according to Nietzsche is radically detached both from political action and economic production. He does not calculate. Calculation can only be general, that is to say, applicable to the masses. How can a totally solitary type, whom Nietzsche compares to the gods of Epicure, be the prefiguration of managers and planners? The Overman is clearly an anti-universalistic figure. Why would the Overman have to select men? Men, for Nietzsche, select themselves according to their attitude towards the Eternal Return.

This is why the image and the definition given by the 1952 lecture seem nearer to the Nietzschean texts. According to the second version, the Overman is totally disinterested towards government and planification. He wisely steps aside from the political world. One must not look for him 'in the marketplaces of a manufactured public opinion'.³⁷ He has given up intervening in the affairs of the world, acting *in* or *on* the technological world. 'The Overman never shows up in the clamorous escorts of the so-called powerful men, nor in the prearranged meetings of the heads of State.'³⁸ Heidegger does not describe the non-technological

activity of the Overman, but evidently, since he is 'sparing in his speech', this activity could be related to poetry and thought.

In spite of this change, Heidegger hesitates to acknowledge – even in the second version – the radical novelty of the Overman versus man. Though he constitutes a 'rejection of traditional mankind', he leads traditional mankind to its perfection and full accomplishment.³⁹ It seems that the ultimate figure of the Overman remains ambiguous. Nevertheless, the change is not arbitrary and is not due to the political changes. National socialism is gone, but technology stays. On the level of the unthought, the double face of the Overman corresponds to the Janus face of technology, to the link between *Gestell* and *Ereignis*. Is it pure chance that the *Blitz* (flash of lightning) is both the symbol in the Nietzschean text of the apparition of the Overman and in the Heideggerian text of the coming, invisible to most men, of the *Ereignis*? But can the same men be the servants of unbridled rationality and the preservers of the enigma of Being? The actual use of power and the powerlessness of thought seems incompatible. The Heideggerian opposition between the 'civil servant of technology', and the 'Shepherd of Being' seems to repeat the Nietzschean cleavage between the Overman and the Last Man.

Again Heidegger seems to hesitate between two interpretations. On the one hand, in a Nietzschean, 'pessimistic' way, he presents the theme of a *co-existence* between two ontological types of humanity which are destined to incommunicability. On the other hand, looking for a reconciliation in the name of the unity of Being, he refuses any analogy with the extreme dualism of the herd type and the affirmative type. Nevertheless, the complete cleavage reappears when Heidegger foresees an 'extreme danger'⁴⁰ which would be tantamount to the 'death of human essence': that those who are imprisoned by calculative thinking and those who are still open to the secret and to the withdrawal of things, would no longer meet, no longer communicate, would move away from each other at an ever faster rate. The two dimensions would be then, according to Heidegger, like two completely foreign constellations.

But in a less dramatic interpretation, the co-existence of the two Nietzschean types would only mean that two possibilities are simultaneously offered to man in his relation to technology. It is the same man who should be calculative and meditative, capable of planning and of letting be, able to say yes *and* no to technical objects. In spite of the Nietzschean temptation of a cleavage, Heidegger maintains the unity of the essence of man because of the unity of the essence of Being.

In building up deliberately Nietzsche's philosophy into a metaphysical system, Heidegger does violence to his text; in trying to reject it totally

in the past, in transforming the main themes into rigid theses, he covers up the novelty of Nietzsche's method of interpretation.

Nevertheless, the very resistance of Nietzsche's text to this unilateral reading makes it all the more powerful and enigmatic. Its irreducible character puts in question the very notion of a transhistorical 'essence of metaphysics' and its all too simple continuity.

Notes

- 1 *Gesamtausgabe (GA)* 43, p. 277.
- 2 *Sein und Zeit*, p. 396.
- 3 *Einführung in die Metaphysik (EM)*, p. 97.
- 4 *ibid.*
- 5 *Groß Oktav Ausgabe*, Leipzig (*GOA*), XIII, p. 4.
- 6 *GOA*, XV, p. 445.
- 7 *EM*, pp. 96–7.
- 8 *Nietzsche I (N I)*, p. 469.
- 9 *Was heißt Denken? (WD)*, p. 21.
- 10 *Nietzsche II (N II)*, p. 260.
- 11 *N I*, p. 145.
- 12 *N II*, p. 266.
- 13 *Holzwege*, p. 246.
- 14 See e.g., *Wille zur Macht (WM)*, §800.
- 15 *WM*, §556.
- 16 *N I*, p. 393.
- 17 *N I*, p. 434.
- 18 *Beyond Good and Evil*, §56.
- 19 *N II*, p. 287.
- 20 *WM*, §617.
- 21 *WM*, §470.
- 22 *N I*, p. 353.
- 23 *Joyful Wisdom*, §109.
- 24 *WD*, p. 67.
- 25 *ibid.*, p. 33.
- 26 *ibid.*, p. 67.
- 27 *ibid.*
- 28 *N II*, p. 302.
- 29 *ibid.*, pp. 306–7.
- 30 *GOA*, XVI, §901.
- 31 'One Overman would not be a god, but a devil.'
- 32 *N II*, p. 302.
- 33 *N II*, p. 312.
- 34 *ibid.*, p. 310.
- 35 *ibid.* Heidegger quotes here *WM*, §849.
- 36 *GOA*, XIV, §16.
- 37 *WD*, p. 69.
- 38 *ibid.*
- 39 *ibid.*, p. 26; p. 67.
- 40 *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, p. 34.

Heidegger and the principle of phenomenology

Klaus Held

According to Husserl's¹ programmatic explanation in *Ideas I*,² phenomenology rests on the principle of self-given intuition or evidence. 'Evidence' thereby acquires the broad meaning of original givenness. In his later period, Heidegger frequently emphasized that he had preserved the principle of phenomenology in a more substantively correct and original manner than its founder.³ I would like to take this claim as a guiding thread, with a view to investigating how far, and to what an extent, Heidegger, in the course of his development, actually thought in a phenomenologically consequential manner.

It was in his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* that Husserl explained most clearly the import of the evidence principle for phenomenology.⁴ The basic theme of his phenomenology is the intentionality of consciousness. Intentionality however rests upon evidence; for every consciousness stands in an intentional relation to objects only because it disposes of the possibility of bringing the objects in question to original givenness. So, in its essentials, intentionality is evidence-related.⁵

The phenomenological research into intentionality is itself a form of intentional consciousness and stands accordingly under the obligation of substantiating its discoveries through self-given evidence. In this way, both the object and the method of phenomenological research are equally determined through evidence. It is then possible to ask: does evidence in both these functions share a common basic trait? In the lecture 'Prolegomena to the history of the concept of time', from 1925, which contains Heidegger's most impartial and most complete confrontation with Husserl's phenomenology, he also allowed himself to be guided implicitly by this question and found, in the concept of categorial intuition, the basic trait of evidence in Husserl.⁶

The possibility of self-giving intuition is presupposed by Husserl's principle of evidence, and the former is in turn only possible in so far as it

is assumed that intuitable material is already available for it prior to its concrete fulfilment in individual instances. This pre-given intuitable material is provided by universal formal and eidetic determinations, in whose light alone – or so Heidegger understands Husserl – perceptual objects can appear with evidence to intentional consciousness. These determinations are described by Husserl in the sixth *Logical Investigation* with his broad concept of the categorial.⁷ To be sure, the categorial is not apparent to the philosophically untrained vision; but as what makes the appearing of perceptual objects possible it is – in any case, according to Heidegger's understanding of Husserl – that which really makes its appearance in its appearing.⁸ What is for Heidegger decisive with regard to Husserl is that the categorial universal is nothing subjective, that is, neither read off the internal constitution of consciousness through reflection nor attested in subjective acts of intellectual derivation.⁹ According to the principle of evidence, we should not quibble about that characteristic which yields the categorial in its originary apprehension. This originary apprehension is however the categorial intuition, and in it there appears – as the concept 'intuition' already shows – the categorial universal as something given.

This discovery, that the categorial is nothing subjective but possesses the character of something trans-subjectively pre-given, Heidegger considers to be Husserl's path-breaking insight in the 'Prolegomena'. In his eyes, this is at the same time the focal point of his phenomenology,¹⁰ because the categorial intuition not only makes possible the intentional appearing of the perceptual object¹¹ but also the phenomenological analysis of this appearing; for this analysis rests upon ideation or an intuition of essences whose object is the categorial universal.¹² As the later writings of the sixties show, this picture of Husserlian phenomenology, at which Heidegger arrived in the twenties did not undergo any further alteration over the decades.

The discovery of categorial intuition has, in Heidegger's eyes, an epochal significance which reaches beyond Husserl. This is indicated in a particularly noteworthy passage in the 'Prolegomena': Heidegger claims there that with the insight into the trans-subjective status of the categorial the nominalistic position in the dispute about universals is overcome.¹³ At this point, Heidegger's view of phenomenology acquires a new relevance for us. For the debate about the real basis for linguistic philosophy points more and more today towards the pros and cons of nominalism – as the former pupil of Heidegger, Ernst Tugendhat, has shown.¹⁴

Heidegger's anti-nominalist interpretation of categorial intuition is unambiguously confirmed in the later writings of the sixties. According to Heidegger, in as much as the categorial universal makes possible the evident appearing of the perceptual object and, in this way, intentional appearing in general, it prefigures the dimension of openness in whose

light beings first become knowable or intelligible.¹⁵ The categorial dimension of openness for beings has the function of a *ratio cognoscendi*. It is at the same time also a *ratio essendi*; it vouches for the objectivity of objects.¹⁶ For Husserlian phenomenology, the object possesses no being in itself over and above its intentional appearing. In so far as the categorial, in the double role of *ratio cognoscendi* and *ratio essendi*, builds a bridge between knowledge and being, it fulfils the same function as the Platonic idea or the forms of the pre-nominalistic scholastics. It should not therefore come as a surprise that, in the last of the *Four Seminars*, Heidegger aligns categorial intuition with the Platonic intuition of Ideas.¹⁷ Because categorial intuition itself opens up access to the concreteness of beings Heidegger could in the 'Prolegomena' say already that through its discovery it became possible to 'restore a comprehensible meaning' to the scholastic, or pre-nominalistic¹⁸ definition of truth (one which goes back to the Greeks) as adequation.

Admittedly, one must take care to avoid a misunderstanding. All this does not mean that Heidegger took the return to a naive, pre-nominalistic concept of the *eidos* to be the fundamental achievement of phenomenology.¹⁹ He regards the lasting philosophical outcome of the discovery of categorial intuition to consist solely in this, that in such an intuition the trans-subjective pre-giveness of a dimension of openness²⁰ announces itself which, as the ground of the possibility of being and true knowledge, links the two together in an a priori²¹ manner. Thus the phenomenological evidence principle leads philosophy out of the bottleneck in which it had fallen through late medieval nominalism and secures for it, as Heidegger says in *Zur Sache des Denkens*,²² a new access to Greek, that is, original pre-nominalistic openness to unhiddenness, the *aletheia* of the appearing being.²³ In what concerns the concrete determination of the pre-given dimension of openness however, Heidegger takes neither Husserl's categorial nor the *eidos* or forms of the pre-nominalist tradition for the last word.

When Heidegger compares the categorial with the eidetic, a limitation has to be noted from the very outset, a limitation which Heidegger certainly does not observe in the 'Zähringer seminar' but which cannot be overlooked in the light of his own review of Husserl's 'Prolegomena'.²⁴ The categorial universal of the *Logical Investigations* falls into two radically different groups: the synthetic-formal universal, which – in accordance with the later distinction in *Ideas I* – conducts consciousness in the direction of the universalization process of 'formalization', and the eidetic universal, given through Ideation, which arises in the universalization process of 'generalization'.²⁵ A similarity with the *eidos* or forms of the pre-nominalistic tradition can only be established for the categorial in the second sense. For this reason, Heidegger emphasizes, in his 'Zähringer seminar', that the categorial in Husserl's sense, is 'more than a form'.²⁶

With his own new determination of the pre-given dimension of openness since *Being and Time* which I shall trace in what follows, Heidegger leaves the path of generalization and strikes out – without ever methodically articulating the matter in this way – down the path of formalization, as will be shown in what follows.

I am now going to follow Heidegger in thinking that, with regard to a trans-subjective, pre-given dimension of openness, it is possible to abstract from its pre-nominalistic concretization in a philosophy of the *Eidos* or of the Forms. Certainly, this abstraction does not suffice to render acceptable the supposition of such a dimension for post-nominalistic, modern thought which is grounded in consciousness along Cartesian lines. As philosophy first became aware of the full extent of the uncertainty into which it had fallen through late medieval voluntarism, there remained, in the first instance, only the radical nominalistic scepticism to which Descartes gave expression in the deceitful God argument of the First Meditation. When the general determinations which confer upon being its content, its reality, depend upon the whim of a *deus absconditus* which is in principle impenetrable to human thought it appears a *limine* inadmissible to accept a pre-given dimension of openness in whose light the reality of being would be open to us.

Thus philosophy is only able to take refuge in the immanence of a consciousness which is, in the first instance, cut off from the world. And then there arises the classical problem of modern epistemology, how such a world-less consciousness is able to transcend itself toward the world. From the very outset it is clear that the condition of any such transcendence and therefore for any genuine knowledge can only be found in itself and not in a trans-subjective, pre-given dimension of openness which would connect knowledge and being together a priori.

Husserl was only too aware of this sceptical starting point for modern philosophy.²⁷ For this reason he had to accept the Cartesian immanence of consciousness. He does however try to link it with the phenomenological discovery or rediscovery of a given dimension of openness. This is supposed to take place through the concept of intentionality. If it belongs to the essence of consciousness to be a consciousness of something, then consciousness is in fact, and from the very outset, beyond itself 'outside' and alongside the world. In this way, the classical epistemological problem of the external world is disposed of. At the same time Husserl holds on to immanentism. The transcendence of the world remains included in the immanence of consciousness. It is – in accordance with Husserl's paradoxical and often varied, formula – 'transcendence in immanence'.²⁸ Through this transcendence in immanence of intentionality, consciousness is supposed to furnish from itself the dimension of openness, the locus of the appearing of being.

In the sixties, Heidegger had, quite rightly and repeatedly, drawn

attention to the fact that, with this Cartesian immanentalism, Husserl waters down his basic phenomenological discovery of the dimension of openness.²⁹ On the other hand, Husserl has good reason for his Cartesianism. It seemed as though phenomenology could only defend itself against nominalistic scepticism in this way.

Thus, in Heidegger's critique of Husserl, there comes to light the fundamentally ambivalent point of departure for phenomenology. In pursuit of the principle of evidence, Husserl discovers the pre-giveness of a trans-subjective dimension of openness and so offers the philosophy of the twentieth century the epochal opportunity of overcoming modern Cartesian worldlessness. On the other hand, he feels obliged to secure this discovery against nominalistic scepticism with an immanence of consciousness through which that opportunity is once again jeopardized.

Although Heidegger never expresses the configuration which determines the point of departure for phenomenology at any point in his critique of Husserl, I nevertheless get the impression that the struggle to avoid the dilemma outlined here gave his thinking a distinctive orientation from the twenties on. As a result, it seems to me legitimate to claim that even in the decades after the *Kehre* Heidegger's thinking remains phenomenological, despite the fact that he hardly referred to Husserl. At the very least, a few basic ideas from this time can be interpreted as a result of the attempt to think the principle of evidence through to its conclusion. I would now like to develop the basic steps in this attempt.

To begin with, Heidegger had to pose the question of how the pre-given dimension of openness was to be determined if it could no longer be grasped in the light of the *Eidos* or of the Forms. Basically, the answer proceeded from the structure of intentionality as evidence-related. Because intentional consciousness is referred from non-original to original modes of givenness, its entire experience is carried out in perspectival modes of givenness. In as much as we are confronted by beings of any kind whatsoever, this can only take place in corresponding modes of givenness. We cannot apprehend the object directly by, so to speak, circumventing the latter. This 'universal correlational a priori' is the operational basis of any phenomenology. For this reason, in *Crisis*, Husserl quite rightly characterized the latter in retrospect as the basic theme of his life's work.³⁰

If Husserl located the modes of givenness, in a Cartesian manner, as constituent elements of intentionality in the immanence of consciousness, this step was appropriate, at least to this extent; that these modes of givenness are the forms which determine how consciousness carries through the intentional appearing of objects. But this characteristic only covers one side of the modes of givenness. For they are also the forms in which the entity offers itself from itself. There are no grounds for

according the priority to the side of the consciousness-related effectuation of the appearance over the side of the self-showing of the entity. The modes of givenness cannot therefore be assimilated one-sidedly either to the appearing of the entity or to the lived experience directed toward the entity. They make up a dimension of subject-object indifference or better, a dimension of the between³¹ which first makes possible the falling apart of the subject, as 'executor' of the appearing and the object as what manifests itself in the appearing. This means: we have to look for the pre-given dimension of openness in the realm of the modes of givenness.

Now the modes of givenness never arise in an isolated fashion. For every mode of givenness is a reference in a referential complex of modes of givenness. The referential complexes are the visual circuits, the horizons for our intentional life and in connection therewith, the field of play in which alone objects are ever able to appear at all. The horizons have for this reason the same character of the 'between' as the modes of givenness. As visual circuits they stand on the side of consciousness and as the fields of play of what shows itself, on the side of the object. All horizontal referential complexes also refer amongst themselves to one another and belong in this way in a universal horizon which encompasses all horizons. Thus the world, understood as universal horizon, turns out to be the original between, and that means: the dimension of openness in question. Only because, with Husserl, intentionality is grounded in the between-character of this dimension of openness, was it possible to place the contemporary epistemological problem of the external world upon a new basis through his intentional analyses.

From what has been said, it follows that, by pursuing the principle of evidence in a consequential manner, only *one* basic theme should remain over for phenomenology: the universal *world* horizon. It is not the categorial universal which makes up the dimension of openness but the world. And any revival of the phenomenological theory of categorial intuition, as, for example, that which is recommended in the context of the nominalist, linguistic philosophical critique,³² has to come to grips with the task of elucidating the categorial universal as the manifestation of the world horizon. In distinction from the Ideas of the pre-nominalist tradition and to the eidetic categories, the world horizon, as the totality of reference relations, has a formal character.³³ It is only to be expected that the formal categorial should be elucidated on the basis of the foregoing. But even the experience of eidetic variation whereby, according to Husserl's later theory,³⁴ the material-eidetic contents of the earlier so-called 'intuition of essences' was brought to light, presumably presupposes this horizontal consciousness. For only through the regulative structures of this consciousness is it possible to determine, in advance, the limits which

phantasizing consciousness runs up against in the free 'pre-figuring' of the material determinations of any noetic or noematic contents whatsoever.³⁵

In his controversy with Husserl, Heidegger frequently employed the phenomenological maxim: 'To the things themselves', a maxim by means of which the principle of evidence was formulated as a challenge, in the singular: 'To the thing itself.'³⁶ This modification is in fact justified. For, at bottom, what is in question in phenomenology, as Eugen Fink saw most clearly, is only one thing, the world as the dimension of openness. The phenomenological analysis of 'objects in their modes of appearance' reaches out to the analysis of the 'how of the appearance' itself,³⁷ that is, in the final analysis, to the appeariential dimension 'world'.

Husserl came ever closer to this insight as the concept of the horizon was for him brought ever more into the centre of his attention with the development of his genetic phenomenology from the twenties on. In 1933, he authorized a paper by Fink,³⁸ a paper which adopted the problem of the world as the basic theme of phenomenology, as the authentic representation of his position. This tendency was continued in the life-world thinking of the *Crisis* material. Husserl now more clearly than ever acknowledges the historical task of phenomenology. The world-loss of modern thinking is to be traced back to this, that objectifying science radically abstracts from the perspectively situated appearing of the entity, that is, from its incorporation in modes of givenness and horizons. The world totality is now only taken up as the essence of objects, not however as the universal horizon which Husserl now calls the life-world.³⁹

It is possible for this impoverished world experience to become in turn the basic trait of intentional consciousness through evidence-relatedness. This consciousness is not static but dynamic. In the intentional striving towards evidence there reigns a will which fixes consciousness on objects, which seeks to apprehend it in original modes of givenness. This fixation upon objects prevents consciousness from becoming aware of the horizontal 'how' of its appearing, that is, of its modes of givenness and of its life-world.

With this wilfulness of intentionality,⁴⁰ a wilfulness which is not always brought out clearly by Husserl, something of the derivation of the modern world-loss out of voluntarism becomes visible – even though he himself never noticed it. The human will, rendered profoundly uncertain by the voluntaristic overstepping of the divine will, achieves self-affirmation solely through the Cartesian withdrawal to immanent consciousness. And from this 'Archimedean point' it reaches out resolutely to the objects. On this basis, it becomes clear why with Husserl it requires an act of will to free consciousness from its enslavement to objects. The epoché which first makes possible a phenomenological analysis of modes of givenness is – already from its descent from the Stoa – a wilful change of attitude.⁴¹ Through it consciousness wins the unconstrained composure

– Husserl speaks of ‘disinterest’ – in which the world can become thematized as universal horizon.

Although, in Husserl’s late philosophy, everything turns on the universal horizon ‘world’ or ‘life-world’, nevertheless another theme takes precedence in his programme: consciousness as transcendental subjectivity. Husserl transfers the pre-given dimension of openness or ‘world’ into the immanence of consciousness in as much as he accounts for the former as the constitutional product of the latter. In so doing, he fails to appreciate that the world, as the referential field of play of all modes of givenness makes up, as it were, ‘the element’⁴² in which consciousness and being form an original unity. Only because there is this prior unity can they later also be taken apart. That transcendental consciousness which posits the world over against itself through its constitutional operations, already presupposes the dimension of openness of the ‘world’. Husserl stands this grounding connection on its head.

Heidegger saw through Husserl’s failing from the very outset. For his own part however, he did not, as was called for, replace world-constituting consciousness, as the dimension of openness, with the world, but rather with being. In the ‘Prolegomena’, and with the aid of an ostensibly strictly immanent critique of the Husserlian doctrine, he makes being the ‘matter of phenomenology’. His thesis runs: Husserl has to determine the being of intentional consciousness and he does not fulfil this task or at least does not fulfil it adequately.

Whether this critique actually possesses the immanent character which Heidegger claims for it seems to me of decisive importance for the issue concerning the phenomenological or non-phenomenological character of Heidegger’s being-question, as well as for a proper judgment of his interpretation of phenomenology as the method of ontology.⁴³ The question is as follows: can Heidegger really show that Husserl had to pose and to answer a question concerning the being of consciousness in order to carry through his phenomenology in a satisfactory manner? And can he show that Husserl either did not pose this question or did not answer it satisfactorily? I am going to pick a few significant points out of the Heidegger critique, points which bear upon the *being* of intentional consciousness.

The first and weighty reproach runs: Husserl characterized the being of intentionality as absolute consciousness not with regard to itself but only with regard to a fourfold reference to the relations which obtain between such a consciousness and the other.⁴⁴ However, it is difficult to see which positive determinations of the being of intentional consciousness still remain possible over and above the four bearing upon Heidegger’s reconstruction of the Husserlian determinations. For the being of something cannot be determined other than with reference to something else (*determinatio est negatio*). When Heidegger, in *Being and Time*,

replaces absolute consciousness with Dasein and marks off its existential mode of being from that of being-ready-to-hand and being-present-at-hand, formally speaking, he does not proceed any differently.

What is particularly remarkable in this connection is the nature of Heidegger's critique of the first Husserlian determination, that consciousness is immanent being.⁴⁵ 'Immanence' means here that, with an act of conscious reflection upon a lived experience, this very lived experience is 'actually (*reel*) included' in the act as the object of such an act – in distinction from an object of external perception. Heidegger now claims that with the establishment of an immanence of this kind all that is determined is a relationship within the region 'consciousness', not however the being, that is, the mode of being of this region itself.

Such a critique would only be relevant if it made phenomenological sense to talk about a being of consciousness regardless of how it is itself given. According to the already mentioned phenomenological principle of correlation however the being of any object – therefore also of consciousness as an object for itself – manifests itself exclusively in the how of its originary appearing. If therefore consciousness itself appears originally in acts of reflection (a) and if the how of this appearing possesses the character of the said immanence (b) then it follows (c) that immanence is a determination of the being of consciousness. There might be good reasons why Heidegger would call in question the presuppositions (a) and (b). Care, as the preoccupation of mortal man with regard to his being, is a more original 'self-relation' than the lived experience of objectifying reflection (a), and whether my lived experience is really immanent in an act of reflection directed toward it and is not rather already transcendent (b) is something which remains questionable for Husserl in his later analyses of time. Characteristically enough however, Heidegger's critique is not directed towards these two points but towards the conclusion drawn therefrom (c), in order to demonstrate that Husserl has not answered the question concerning the being of consciousness. And it is this claim which misses the mark.

The critique of Husserl in the 'Prolegomena' then culminates in the following line of argument. In order to distinguish the absolute being of world constituting consciousness from the consciousness-relative being of the world, Husserl needs being as a point of comparison; but he omitted to enquire into the meaning of this presupposed being.⁴⁶ According to this line of argument, being would be the genus within which Husserl distinguishes the two species 'absolute' and 'relative' being. But since Aristotle it has been recognized that 'being' is not a genus concept, and nobody knows that better than Heidegger. So, in the context of his phenomenologically immanent critique of Husserl, he makes use of an unsustainable concept of being. Therewith his critique finally loses its conviction and at the decisive point.

This still leaves it open that Heidegger's use of the concept of being could be justified with the aid of extra-phenomenological arguments. At this point I am only concerned to show that the introduction of this concept along the way to a phenomenologically immanent critique does not succeed. All the indications are that Heidegger's being question is itself set up on extra-phenomenological grounds, in the first instance by means of an attachment to Aristotle. Just as Husserl establishes his claim by appealing to the consciousness of the *post*-nominalistic situation and therefore recurs to the Cartesian idea of philosophy, so Heidegger, motivated by the *pre*-nominalistic basic experience of the givenness of the dimension of openness, takes up again the reigning pre-Cartesian idea of philosophy: the Aristotelian question concerning beings in their being.⁴⁷

In both cases phenomenology is committed to another topic than the one which arises naturally out of its principle of evidence, the world.⁴⁸ Even this theme however allows in addition for an attachment to a traditional idea of philosophy. Contrary to the claim of Heidegger's pilot Aristotle that the enquiry was always directed to the *on* from the beginning,⁴⁹ in early Greek thinking it was not a matter of being – this only first emerges with Parmenides⁵⁰ – but of the whole pure and simple, the totality, the *panta*, the *cosmos*. The world was the most 'original' 'subject matter of philosophy', and this is the sense in which phenomenology counts as a renewal of the oldest idea of philosophy.

Although Heidegger would not have given his assent to this thesis, the world keeps on breaking through as the genuine theme of phenomenology, from the being-in-the-world of *Being and Time* to the later problematics of the fourfold and the enframing.⁵¹ In what follows I would like to take Heidegger to task on this score, since it seems to me that 'being' has not proved to be the 'subject matter of phenomenology'.⁵²

Husserl thinks world constitution along the following lines: in the intentional experience of objects, consciousness builds up corresponding horizons and, on the basis of these horizons the universal horizon is 'built up'. That is to say, he starts out from the object relation of consciousness and on that basis first reaches an openness to the world horizon. With this construction however, his phenomenology falls prey to the forgetfulness of the life-world. For in this fashion the world has to be understood as something like an all-embracing object. This is not however possible for, as the dimension of openness, it first makes possible the appearing of objects. For this reason Heidegger's phenomenology in *Being and Time* begins with the thesis: the first determination of consciousness must be the relation to the world. But since 'consciousness' is defined through its object-relation, this latter concept must also be given up. The contemporary subject is in *Being and Time* radically re-defined by its fundamental openness to the world as the dimension of openness. It is nothing other than the 'there' for the appearing of this

dimension,⁵³ that is, 'Dasein' as 'being-in-the-world'. The relationship of Dasein to the world is now no longer, as with Husserl's intentionality, trapped in immanence, because self-surpassing toward a trans-subjective 'outside' of the world has become constitutive for Dasein. The intentional relation to objects is itself grounded in the transcendence of the world.⁵⁴

In the writings and lectures of the years immediately succeeding *Being and Time* this transcendence emerges ever more decisively as the basic feature of Dasein.⁵⁵ At the same time, it becomes ever clearer that the transcendence idea is still being played off voluntaristically against the spirit of the principle of evidence. In the original movement of transcendence toward the world, Dasein strips away from the self-enclosed, obscure realm of beings⁵⁶ that very bright dimension of the appearing, of the world horizon, in whose light alone beings can manifest themselves. Just as in Husserl's object-oriented intentional consciousness the will to evidence is operative, so Dasein, in the freedom of its existence, gives vent to a militant will which, as its 'for-the-sake-of-which',⁵⁷ gives the world in advance as the field of play for this freedom. With this idea Heidegger forces the sovereignty of the will and the modern voluntaristic world-relation to its extreme and outbids even Husserl's immanent theory of world constitution. The world is now fully integrated under the sway of the will.

If the dimension of openness is to be thought through anti-voluntaristically as something pre-given, as a genuinely trans-subjective 'outside', then it has to lie outside the sway of the will. It cannot be encountered by Dasein as something that arises out of its freedom but as something from which it receives its freedom. Such receptivity on the part of Dasein for the dimension of openness presupposes that this dimension is withdrawn from its control. In this way, thinking through the anti-nominalist, anti-voluntarist implications of Heidegger's principle of evidence leads to the *Kehre*. In the appearing of the dimension of openness 'world', a self-withdrawal, that is, a self-concealing, has to be brought into play as a counter-movement to any 'bringing to light'. This is the point at which Heidegger's phenomenology first makes the decisive step beyond Husserl according to his own later self-interpretation.⁵⁸

It is even possible to read this thinking about concealment into the research maxim 'To the things themselves', the imperative formulation of the principle of evidence. For the call to bring to light the things themselves, the phenomena, was only meaningful under the assumption that precisely these things normally remain concealed.⁵⁹ Husserl however attributed this concealment to the objective fixation of consciousness in the natural attitude. And even Heidegger in *Being and Time* still located concealment in the constitution of a Dasein which takes the place of consciousness, in Fallenness.⁶⁰ Only with the *Kehre* does Heidegger realize that concealment belongs to the 'things themselves'. Henceforward it

becomes determinative of the essence of that dimension of openness which the principle of evidence presupposes as pre-given.

Although with this step phenomenology takes on a character which is very different from Husserl's, still, in the late work *Crisis* one finds an intellectual configuration which places beyond doubt that an original tendency of Husserl's phenomenology is also to be found in the thinking about concealment. The world as a horizontal totality of referential modes of givenness has to remain hidden from the naturally instituted consciousness because it makes what appears in it its object, its theme. The world which is the medium for all such objectifications is withheld from the procedure of thematization. Only with the emergence of philosophy and science, that is, with the historical transition from the natural to the philosophical attitude, does the world arise out of its unthematized state under such auspices as *kosmos* or *ta panta*. With its thematization however it unavoidably becomes the object of philosophico-scientific thinking, and that means: it loses precisely that character through which, as horizon, it can be distinguished from the objects of the natural attitude. In this way, philosophico-scientific thinking falls back, from the very beginning, into that natural attitude from which it would like to be marked off through the thematization of the world. Through the objectification of the world it falls a prey to that very misunderstanding of 'objectivism', which is pushed to the extreme with the modern mathematization of the natural sciences.⁶¹ But how can the suspension of objectivism be thought? Obviously only in this way – even though with Husserl one can only catch traces of the refinement of this line of thought to full recognition – that philosophy succeeds in thematizing the world in its unthematic character, in that character through which it remains withdrawn from the objectifying tendencies of the natural attitude and remains hidden from it in this sense. Thus, if one takes Husserl's critique of objectivism seriously, there remains no other task than that which is carried through by Heidegger: to think the concealment character of the dimension of openness implied by 'world'.⁶²

That philosophico-scientific thinking was from the very beginning on the track of this concealment character – however deeply buried and hardly conceptualized – was, for Heidegger, proved by the *aletheia* concept of the Greeks. The word construction 'un-concealment' contains for him the first indication that the becoming-manifest of the world horizon is constrained by a self-withdrawal or self-withholding.⁶³ The emergence of world, the becoming open of the dimension of openness itself has the character of a counter-movement to an original concealment. In the period immediately after *Being and Time* Heidegger still assumed that this counter-movement has its basis in the free will of Dasein, a freedom forcefully acquired through the self-affirmation of modern man. From around 1930, he sees that the most radical consequence of the principle

of evidence can only consist in this, that the emergence of the world arises out of a prior holding to self, that the light of the world is not contained in Man's original freedom and is not freely given to Dasein.⁶⁴

With this line of thought the trans-subjective pre-giveness of the dimension of openness is at last protected and indeed in a way which is basically closed off from pre-nominalistic thinking which already had an awareness of this pre-giveness. For the light of the Ideas or forms was not regarded as a gift springing from an original darkness. The appearing of this light was not troubled by any obscurity. For this very reason Heidegger characterizes the release of the world-emergence out of withholding as 'clearing', in contrast to the light metaphor of the tradition.⁶⁵ At the same time he preserves – without ever giving direct expression to it – the moment of truth in voluntarism with the supposition of a foundational concealment formulated in non-theological terms.

When Heidegger re-evaluates the pre-voluntaristic–pre-nominalistic consciousness of the pre-giveness of the dimension of openness he therefore in no way reinstates a residual form of metaphysics but remains upon post-voluntaristic, modern terrain. Heidegger is not a neo-Thomist in disguise. This is also evident from the fact that in one decisive respect he does not give up the modern standpoint of subjectivity.⁶⁶ To be sure, the 'subject' itself is no longer thought as consciousness but out of the world-relation as Dasein, and the modern freedom of the will, through which the subject is set against the voluntarist, nominalist uncertainty, is first made possible out of the release of the world-horizon from concealment. But – and this is the point – the openness which comes to man out of the clearing is sent to him as its recipient.⁶⁷ Clearing 'needs' Dasein as the place where world-emergence can alone come to be.⁶⁸ Only that does not mean that clearing is a constitutional product of Dasein itself.⁶⁹

Heidegger's position here may be compared with that of Hegel. Like Hegel, but in a completely different way, he sets himself the task of re-establishing, for modern subjectivism, certain fundamental insights from the pre-voluntaristic, pre-nominalistic tradition, without falling back into those prejudices or naiveties which have been overcome.

In as much as the pre-giveness of the world as the dimension of openness is recognized, the chances of suspending the modern world-loss⁷⁰ (that very worldlessness which Husserl already addressed with his critique of the forgetfulness of the life-world) are improved. Heidegger describes the referential character of the world (which Husserl had determined with the aid of the concept of horizon), in a completely new way by means of his phenomenology of uncovering concealment. First of all, and in view of the pre-giveness of the world from out of which it arises as Dasein, Man belongs, together with things, in the world. Second, he exists in the world as a being in whose 'there' the world appears as

world, that is, in its emergence out of fundamental concealment. This origin in concealment pervades human existence itself in the unavoidable mystery of death. For this reason humans are mortals, that is, the only beings who are able to 'die'. The basic experience of mortality in turn is not possible without the complementary relation to the immortality of the divinities as the reverse side of mortality.⁷¹ Even divinities are beings who are open to the clearing, therefore who live in the world and experience the world as world.⁷² The distinction between mortals and divinities overlaps with a second distinction. World is encountered by that being who experiences the world as world primarily as the all-embracing place wherein it resides, that is, as region. The distinction between luminous openness and dark concealment stamps the world as region in this fashion, that there are two regions for mortals and divinities/heaven and earth, with respect to which however one of the two predominates.

In this way the referential totality of the 'life-world', that is, the world in the 'how' of its original being-lived-by-the-living, is determined anew as 'the fourfold' of mortals and divinities, heaven and earth.⁷³ When Husserl embeds the individual perceptual thing in the horizontal referential totality of the life-world one can already sense the supplementary intention of saving it in this way from any objectivist reduction to a substitutable component of the 'world', which, as fundamental to all objects, becomes something like a vast container in which everything is disposed of. Heidegger was the first to appreciate the full drama of a situation which, in the guise of the ecological world crisis, has today become a matter of common concern. For him, the individual thing re-acquires the value that it lost through its enframing as the exchangeable object of research, as technologically available material, and as an article of consumption in a waste society, in that it becomes the gathering place for the references of the fourfold.

Whether or not one thinks that this analysis carries conviction, it seems to be noteworthy that at this point, where, after the *Kehre*, Heidegger's thinking becomes phenomenologically concrete again, it finally gets to grips with the real 'subject matter of phenomenology': the world as a referential totality and with it the embedding of the individual thing in this totality. Already with Husserl, the perceptual thing was no longer really a substance but a collection of worldly relationships in the guise of a noematic pole for syntheses of horizontally referred relations. That the thing, experienced in an original way, is, in the strict sense, a collection of world relations first gets thought out by Heidegger, in that he lets the originary polarity of thing and fourfold take the place of the Husserlian polarity of perceptual object and horizon.

The hidden continuity of the phenomenological thinking about the life-world in the transition from Husserl to Heidegger can also be noted

from the fact that Heidegger holds to the primacy accorded by Husserl to the individual entity in the world, the 'thing', over what Husserl and the path-breakers of the linguistic turn called the 'state of affairs'. The fact that Husserl's analyses were primarily oriented toward the individual perceptual object, rather than starting out from the totality made up of propositions related to states of affairs, made them appear outdated, at least in the eyes of the nominalistically oriented linguistic philosophers.⁷⁴ To my knowledge, linguistic philosophers did not however realize and recognize that the primacy of the individual object over the state of affairs could be better supported through Heidegger's phenomenology of the thing than through Husserl's phenomenology of perception. Heidegger would have agreed with linguistic philosophers on the primacy of speaking over perception. But for him the 'genuine linguistic unity is not the sentence but the word';⁷⁵ the original speech act is not the propositional connection (in the case of the assertion, the semantic form *ti kata timos*), but the purely poetic nomination, the *onomazein*.⁷⁶ Out of the hiddenness of the clearing into the referential connection of the fourfold, everything that man in general wants to be confronted with is called forth by its name. If individual things could not be brought forth through the singular linguistic comportment designed to serve this purpose, there would be nothing at all for propositional language to connect.⁷⁷

The Heideggerian *Kehre*, the introduction of a reversal in the movement between the dimension of openness and Dasein, is, in contemporary philosophy, accompanied by a suspicion which can be voiced in the following question: is that hiddenness which is supposed to preserve the autonomy of the world horizon not something which has simply been thought up; does not the supposition of a ground of truth transcendent to consciousness simply continue the style of thought of a superseded metaphysics; and does it not for this reason fall under Occam's razor? What proof is there that in the appearing of 'world' a withdrawal really prevails?

In the light of the proposed Heidegger interpretation, the thinking about the *Kehre* gets its coherence from the anti-nominalistic tendency of the principle of evidence. What is decisive, as Heidegger himself has stressed, is that the *Kehre* only represents a re-direction of the course of his thinking on the surface.⁷⁸ This re-direction should be understood as the precursor of a world historical renunciation of the principle of the will. The consequence of this principle of the will was a world-loss intensified to the point of a forgetfulness of the life-world. This world-loss proves already that we are not 'master' of the dimension of openness 'world' and that our freedom is therefore dependent upon a hiddenness which prevails therein. The nominalistic scepticism with regard to the pre-giveness of a trans-subjective dimension of openness is itself the

philosophical expression of a world-loss. In as much as this scepticism betrays the fact that we are caught up in a dimension of openness which we do not ourselves create, it is the mouthpiece of a forgetfulness of world which, for its part, is not due to man but to which man is destinally exposed through a withholding in clearedness. Nominalistic scepticism with regard to the supposition that openness is granted to man from an obscure 'outside' lying beyond his control therefore only confirms, contrary to its own intention, what it disputes.

How the *Kehre* is made possible as a world-historical breakthrough is well known. With the extreme intensification of the 'danger' of world-loss in the 'enframing', the chances of experiencing this loss as a loss, and therefore the chances of experiencing the hiddenness out of which this loss is historically assigned as belonging to the essence of clearedness, increases. There remains however one last question. How can this opportunity be realized? How can that principle of the will which functions as the basis of world-loss be overcome?

Husserl proposed the epoché as the way, that is, a laying to rest of intentional wilfulness. This laying to rest was however itself something about which we decide and therefore an act of will. The phenomenologist carries through this act because the imperative conception of the principle of evidence, the maxim 'To the things themselves', represents an appeal to the responsibility of the scientist. In the principle of evidence there resides the demand to account responsibly for the appearing of the world. This responsibility was quite rightly emphasized repeatedly by Husserl.⁷⁹ Phenomenology was for him at its best nothing other than the explicit taking over of ultimate responsibility.

At this point Heidegger throws out the baby with the bath water. He underlines the fact that, because it is destinally assigned to man out of that withholding which takes place in clearedness, the modern forgetfulness of world represents a kind of tragic delusion to which not even the philosopher is immune.⁸⁰ If Husserl thinks he is going to overcome the modern principle of the will through a wilful decision on the part of the philosopher then – this is what Heidegger would have said – with this faith in the will of the philosopher he only underscores yet again the sovereignty of the principle of the will.⁸¹ The hope for an end to world-forgetfulness demands, according to Heidegger, an attitude in which even the will to assume such an attitude disappears.

The conception of human being which is instated through such a radical abdication of the will Heidegger calls 'relinquishment' (*Gelassenheit*). *Gelassenheit* is no longer an ethical attitude in the sense of the tradition; for such attitudes are wilfully practised. They rest upon decisions for which men have to take responsibility. By contrast, in the realm of relinquishment, there is, as Heidegger puts it literally in the *Feldweggespräch*: 'On the elucidation of "*Gelassenheit*"' nothing to take responsibility

for.⁸² Thus he radicalizes the thinking about the trans-subjective pre-giveness of the dimension of openness in so very extreme a fashion that the moment of responsibility which is prominent in the imperative concept of the principle of evidence finally comes to grief.⁸³

In my opinion the thinking about *Gelassenheit* is overdone. I won't appeal to the *argumentum ad hominem* that Heidegger's entire intellectual endeavour is, as a matter of fact, wilfully inspired, inspired by an energetic determination to account for our time and what might proceed therefrom, and that with this wilfulness he gives the lie to his own renunciation of the will. Above all it seems to me that he confuses the will to responsible accounting (a will which is *always* presupposed whenever serious philosophizing occurs) with a voluntaristically overemphasized will (a will which first comes to prominence in a particular historical epoch and which, for this very reason, can also disappear). Characteristically enough, Heidegger translates the word *logos*, a word which is included in the very concept of 'phenomenology' and which he thought about so much, with every possible circumlocution but never with the most adequate German concept 'accountability' (*Rechenschaft*). He expressly refused the correct rendering of the basic Socratic formula for philosophizing: *logon didonai* as 'accounting for'.⁸⁴ One has to suppose that with this refusal he also wanted to keep his phenomenology clear of the overtones of wilful responsibility which one hears, in this translation.

One could ignore Heidegger's lack of understanding for the ethical dimension of responsible accountability if this deficiency did not have a very noteworthy consequence. Out of the will to reciprocal accountability there arose, with the Greeks, a historically new form of public life in a community of citizens who are alike in the freedom of their capacity for being accountable. It was not an accident that philosophy, as the most radical form of the *logon didonai*, arose at the same time as citizenship in the true sense of political community.⁸⁵ And Aristotle (a man so much admired by Heidegger) took it to be a not unimportant task of philosophy to think about the best form which a community of mutually accountable citizens might assume.

Heidegger was certainly inspired by the concept of praxis to be found in the *Nichomachean Ethics*. But because he played down the moment of responsibility he did not take much interest in the tradition of political philosophy founded therein. And so he was able to take Hitler's nihilistic imposition upon the political community – even if only briefly – for the breakthrough into that new era which he hoped for and to commit himself at the requisite point to national socialism. This should not be glossed over. But the continuing controversy over Heidegger's political abdication should not blind those who really want to get to the root of the matter to the fact that he thought the principle of evidence through to the end in an exemplary fashion and thereby actually opened the door

to an overcoming of modern worldlessness. It is my impression that the conclusive significance of Heidegger's views on phenomenology, views developed in a retrospective perspective and through which his thinking pointed the way forward for philosophy, is to be sought not in his fundamental contribution to existential philosophy⁸⁶ nor even in his reproduction and transformation of the Aristotelian question of being but in his radicalization of the original idea of phenomenology.

Translated by Christopher Macann

Notes

1 The titles of the following works of Husserl and Heidegger will be cited with the following abbreviations:

Husserl

Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchung zur Genealogie der Logik, 5th edn, ed. L. Landgrebe (Hamburg, 1976) tr. as *Experience and Judgment (Erf. u. Urteil)*; *Formale und transzendente Logik*, ed. P. Janssen (Den Haag, 1974), *Husserliana* Bd. xvii, tr. as *Formal and Transcendental Logic (F. u. tr. Logik)*; *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Bd. 1, ed. K. Schuhmann (Den Haag, 1976), *Husserliana*, Bd. III/1, tr. as *Ideas I (Ideen I)*; *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*, ed. W. Biemel (Den Haag, 1954), *Husserliana*, Bd. VI, tr. as *Crisis (Krisis)*; *Logische Untersuchungen*, Bd. II, ed. U. Panzer (Den Haag, 1984), *Husserliana* Bd. XIX, tr. as *Logical Investigations (Log. Unters.)*; *Erste Philosophie*, 2nd edn, ed. R. Boehm (Den Haag, 1959), *Husserliana*, Bd. VIII (*I. Philosophie II*).

Heidegger

Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, ed. K. Held (Frankfurt a. M., 1978), *Heidegger Gesamtausgabe (GA)* 26 (*Anfangsgründe*); *Phänomenologische Interpretation zu Aristoteles*, ed. W. Brücker and K. Brücker-Oltmanns (Frankfurt a. M., 1985), *GA* 61 (*Aristoteles*); 'Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit. Aus einem Feldweggespräch über das Denken', in: *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*, 1910–76, ed. H. Heidegger (Frankfurt a. M., 1983), pp. 37–74, *GA* 13 (*Gelassenheit*); 'Hegel und die Griechen', in *Wegmarken*, ed. Fr.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt a. M., 1976), pp. 427–44, *GA* 9 (Hegel u. d. Gr.); *Brief über den Humanismus in Wegmarken*, ed. Fr.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt a. M., 1976), pp. 313–64, *GA* 9 (*Humanismusbrief*); 'Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs', ed. P. Jaeger (Frankfurt a. M., 1979), *GA* 20 (*Prolegomena*); 'Brief an P. Richardson', in W. J. Richardson, *Through Phenomenology to Thought* (Den Haag, 1974), *Phaenomenologica*, vol. 13 (*Richardsonbrief*); *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 2nd edn (Tübingen, 1976), (*ZSD*); *Der Satz vom Grund*, 6th edn (Pfullingen, 1986), (*SG*); *Sein und Zeit*, 15th edn (Tübingen 1979) (*SZ*); *Vier Seminare* (Frankfurt a. M., 1977) (*VS*); *Die Technik und die Kehre*, 6th edn (Pfullingen, 1985) (*TK*); *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, 8th edn (Pfullingen, 1986) (*US*); *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, in *Wegmarken*, ed. Fr.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt a. M., 1976), pp. 123–75, *GA* 9 (*WG*); 'Vom Wesen der Wahrheit'

in *Wegmarken*, pp. 177–202, GA 9 (WW); *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, 5th edn (Pfuldingen, 1985) (VA); 'Einleitung zu: Was ist Metaphysik?' in *Wegmarken*, pp. 365–83, GA 9 (Einl. WM).

2 Cf. *Ideen I*, S. 51.

3 Cf. 'Richardson letter', p. xv.

4 Cf. *F. u. tr. Logic*, SS. 176ff.

5 Heidegger tells us pointedly that evidence has a 'universal function' for intentionality in 'Prolegomena', S. 68.

6 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 130; what categorial intuition is, is developed on pp. 64ff., in connection with Husserl.

7 Cf. *Log. Unters.*, pp. 657ff.; thereto E. Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, 2nd edn (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1970), SS. 107ff.

8 Cf. *VS*, p. 115.

9 Cf. 'Prolegomena', pp. 78ff., 97, 101; also *VS*, pp. 113ff. and 116.

10 Cf. *VS*, p. 111.

11 Cf. 'Prolegomena', p. 64; also *VS*, pp. 112ff.

12 Cf. 'Prolegomena', pp. 90ff., 109, 130.

13 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 98.

14 Cf. E. Tugendhat, *Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976), pp. 184ff.

15 Cf. *VS*, pp. 112ff.

16 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 112.

17 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 114.

18 'Prolegomena', p. 734, cf. p. 69.

19 Characteristically he says at the place indicated ('Prolegomena', p. 98) that this conflict was *provisionally* resolved with the discovery of categorial intuition (author's italics).

20 The concept 'dimension' in connection with 'openness' is to be found in Heidegger, *Einl. WM*, p. 375; for 'dimension' see also *ZSD*, p. 15.

21 Cf. 'Prolegomena', p. 99.

22 Cf. *SD*, p. 87.

23 I have tried to set out the original basis of the pre-nominalistic world-relation in early Greek thinking, in contrast to the point of departure of the scholastics with Anselm, in my article 'Zur Vorgeschichte des ontologischen Gottesbeweis. Anselm und Parmenides' in *Perspektiven der Philosophie*, 9 (1983), pp. 217ff.

24 Cf. 'Prolegomena', pp. 85ff.: Following Husserl, Heidegger refers to the following difference as one between 'synthetic acts' (§6c) and 'ideational acts' (§6d).

25 Cf. *Log. Unters.* §48 and §§50–1 of the 6th Investigation deal with the intuition of the formal categorial and §52 has the eidetic categorial as its theme. The distinction between formalizing and generalizing in *Ideen I*, §13 refers to substantially the same difference.

26 *VS*, p. 113.

27 A. Aguirre has most impressively made us aware of the too easily underestimated significance of scepticism in Husserl with his *Genetische Phänomenologie und Reduktion. Zur Letzbegründung der Wissenschaft aus der radicalen Skepsis im Denken E. Husserls* (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1970), *Phaenomenologica*, Bd. 38, pp. 65ff.

28 I have given a detailed presentation of my phenomenological critique of this paradox in a paper entitled 'Husserls Rückgang auf das Phänomenon und die geschichtliche Stellung der Phänomenologie', in *Dialektik und Genesis in*

der *Phänomenologie*, ed. W. Orth (Freiburg, 1980), *Phänomenologische Forschung*, Bd. 10, pp. 89ff.

29 Cf. *SD*, pp. 47 and 69ff.; *US*, pp. 119ff. and 123.

30 Cf. *Krisis*, p. 48.

31 Cf. Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, pp. 172 and 184. On the 'between' see also my paper 'Husserls Rückgang auf das Phänomenon', pp. 90ff., and my article 'Phänomenologie der Zeit nach Husserl' in *Perspektiven der Philosophie*, 7 (1981), pp. 185ff.

32 Cf. Tugendhat, *Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie*, pp. 150ff. and 164ff., after he had previously analysed categorical intuition with approval in *Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, pp. 126ff.

33 It is in this light that Tugendhat justifies his thesis (in *Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie*, pp. 38ff.) that the basic theme of philosophy can only be determined through formalization and not through generalization. But what is attempted along the proposed lines is not the semantic form of everyday understanding but the world in the sense of the universal horizon as a philosophical theme.

34 Cf. *Erf. u. Urteil*, p. 410.

35 This suggestion I owe to U. Claesges' *Edmund Husserls Theorien der Raumkonstitution* (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1964), *Phaenomenologica*, vol. 19, pp. 29ff.

36 Cf. with regard to its meaning 'Prolegomena', pp. 104ff., then later the 'Richardson letter', p. xiii; *SD*, pp. 69ff., 73 and 87; on the concept of the 'thing' in this connection, see also *SD*, pp. 41 and 67.

37 Cf. Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, p. 270.

38 Cf. E. Fink, 'Die phänomenologische Philosophie Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik,' in *Kantstudien*, 38 (1933), pp. 319ff., republished in *Studien zur Phänomenologie* (1930-9) (Den Haag, 1966), *Phaenomenologica*, vol. 21, p. 79. Thereto the instructive remark of S. Strasser, 'Der Begriff der Welt in der phänomenologischen Philosophie', in *Phänomenologische Forschungen*, vol. 3: *Phänomenologie und Praxis*, ed. W. Orth (Freiburg, 1976), pp. 174ff.

39 On the distinction between world as an essential concept and horizon, cf. U. Claesges, 'Zweideutigkeit in Husserls Lebenswelt', in *Perspektiven phänomenologischer Forschung. Für L. Landgrebe zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. U. Claesges and K. Held (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1972), *Phaenomenologica*, vol. 47, p. 85; I have developed this line of thought in my investigation 'Husserls neue Einführung in die Philosophie: Der Begriff der Lebenswelt', in *Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft*, ed. C. F. Gethmann (Bonn, 1988) (in preparation).

40 On the wilful character of intentionality, cf. *Erf. u. Urteil*, pp. 81-92 and 231, also *1. Philosophie II*, pp. 98ff. and 152ff.

41 On this connection see my cited paper 'Husserls Rückgang auf das Phänomenon', pp. 100ff.

42 With this formula I am citing the turn of phrase with which Heidegger in *SD* frequently characterizes uncoveredness, i.e., clearedness.

43 Cf. 'Prolegomena', pp. 124, 158 and 178.

44 Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 146ff.

45 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 142.

46 Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 158 and 178.

47 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysik* 1 003a 21.

48 What he rightly reproaches Husserl with in 'Prolegomena' (p. 147) also holds for Heidegger: he opened up the 'thematic field of

phenomenology' . . . 'not by going back phenomenologically to the things themselves but by going back to the traditional idea of philosophy'.

49 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysik* 102b 2ff.

50 I have furnished a justification for this thesis in my book *Heraklit, Parmenides und der Anfang von Philosophie und Wissenschaft. Eine phänomenologische Besinnung* (Berlin, 1980), pp. 122 and 576ff.

51 For the decisive proof I refer to the summary by W. Marx, *Heidegger und die Tradition* (Stuttgart, 1961), pp. 183ff. One can already find this use of the concept of world in the earlier Freiburg lectures on Aristotle, pp. 85ff. On the central significance of the concept of world as the dimension of openness see also Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, pp. 272ff.

52 I could accept the expression 'being' as 'the subject matter of phenomenology' if this concept had been employed by Heidegger in that thoroughgoing and unambiguous sense formulated by Fr.-W. von Herrmann, namely, that 'disclosure and openness makes up the simple essence of being' (Fr.-W. von Herrmann, *Subjekt und Dasein. Interpretation zu 'Sein und Zeit'* (Frankfurt a. M., 1974), p. 80). I also share von Herrmann's view 'that it is Heidegger's deepest and most basic thought, a thought which carries in its train all his later intellectual insights, that, before all else, we have to think the essence of disclosure and the emergence of openness'. As a result of this basic thought, Heidegger is in my eyes the phenomenologist who has thought the principle of evidence through to its conclusion.

53 Cf. *SZ*, p. 132; thereto the pregnant commentary of Fr.-W. von Herrmann, *Subjekt und Dasein*, pp. 30ff.

54 On this whole connection see above all *Anfangsgründe*, pp. 212ff. and the corresponding text in *WG*, pp. 157ff.

55 Cf. *WG*, pp. 157ff.

56 Cf. *Anfangsgründe*, p. 281.

57 Cf. *Anfangsgründe*, pp. 246ff. and correspondingly *WG*, pp. 157ff.

58 Cf. *SD*, pp. 70ff.; *VS*, pp. 123ff.

59 Cf. already 'Prolegomena', p. 119.

60 This first determination of covering over was later transformed by Heidegger after the *Kehre*, cf. *Humanismusbrief*, pp. 332ff.

61 The historico-systematic problematic of objectivism as a 'natural attitude of the second rank'; has been analysed by me in 'Husserl's neue Einführung in die Philosophie: Der Begriff der Lebenswelt'.

62 I have gone into the parallel between the delimitation of the thematization of the life-world with Husserl and the delimitation of the uncovering of being with Heidegger more carefully in the article 'La diagnosi fenomenologica dell' epoca presente in Husserl e Heidegger' in *E. Husserl, la 'crisi delle scienze europee' e la responsabilità storica dell' Europa*, ed. M. Signore (Mailand, 1985), pp. 125ff.

63 For the decisive proofs up to 1961 I refer to the condensed summary by W. Marx, *Heidegger und die Tradition*, pp. 148ff.

64 The most important document concerning this turn is of course the lecture 'Vom Wesen der Wahrheit' (*VW*, pp. 187ff.).

65 Cf. above all *SD*, pp. 72ff.

66 Cf. Tugendhat: 'Rightly understood these new positions will not carry the Philosophy of Subjectivity backwards but will rather enable it to advance in a consequential manner' (*Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, p. 276). In principle a similar line of interpretation is pursued by C. F. Gethman in his

investigation *Verstehen und Auslegung. Das Methodenproblem in der Philosophie Martin Heideggers* (Bonn, 1974).

67 Cf. W. Marx, *Heidegger und die Tradition*, p. 224.

68 A similar expression is to be found in *VS*, p. 106.

69 Cf. Einl. WM, p. 375; *Humanismusbrief*, p. 336; Hegel u. d. Gr., p. 442; *VS*, p. 124.

70 In *Technik und die Kehre* Heidegger himself has this to say on this new situation: 'World occurs' (*TK*, p. 42).

71 In my book *Heraklit, Parmenides*, pp. 434ff., I have tried to show how, at the beginning of philosophy, Heraclitus' thinking about the *logos* is quite consequential and free from that mythical resonance with which Heidegger's thinking about the fourfold has been reproached (the thinking about the complementarity of divinities and mortals). And, on a Heraclitean basis, the Greek polarity of heaven and earth can be explained in just as rational a fashion – as I have tried to show in my 'Life-worldly interpretation of Heraclitean cosmology', p. 342.

72 Cf. *VA*, pp. 278ff.

73 Cf. above all Heidegger's convincing paper in Part II of *VA*, pp. 145ff.

74 Cf. Tugendhat, *Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie*, p. 105; thereto note the preparation of this conception in: *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, pp. 399ff.

75 Also p. 402.

76 Cf. *US*, pp. 18ff.; *VS*, pp. 66ff.

77 A question which leads further admittedly, and on which little has been said in Heidegger's hitherto published work, is the following: if the original disclosedness of the world-whole as a whole (as Heidegger already lays it out in those paragraphs of *Sein und Zeit* devoted to state of mind), takes place in mood, must it not then be the case that the original speech act consists in the articulation of mood? An expression of state of mind as disclosedness of the whole, wherein nothing like a distinction between subject and object or even a discrimination of individual objects from one another is to be found can only be contained in so-called 'subject-less' sentences such as 'it is bright,' or 'it is strange,' etc. If human being (as *Dasein* in Heidegger's sense) becomes human through world-openness and this world-openness, as such, is articulated in impersonal speech, then it can be surmised that both the *onomaxein*, as also later the propositional sentence construction, are founded in an original speech act which leaves an echo in subject-less sentences. The 'real linguistic unity' would be the one-word sentence with which the world-whole would be called forth in its ongoing mood-qualified disclosiveness, therefore an *onomaxein* of the world before an *onomaxein* of things. On this theme cf. my study *Heraklit und Parmenides*, pp. 82, 216, 352, 371, 415, 513.

78 Cf. the 'Richardson Letter', p. xix.

79 Cf. in *Krisis*, pp. 15 and 272.

80 I have looked into this problem in my paper 'Heidegger's These vom Ende der Philosophie', in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 34 (1980), pp. 535ff.

81 Cf. 'Gelassenheit', p. 38ff.

82 Cf. 'Gelassenheit', p. 53.

83 Cf. Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, pp. 372ff.

84 Cf. *SG*, p. 118 and also the remark by Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, p. 368.

85 I have tried to reconstruct phenomenologically the way in which the philosophical *logon didonai* stands in relation to the *Polis* through the middle term

of the doxa, of the 'it seems to me so' (*docei moi*), as political opinion in my article, 'Die Zweideutigkeit der Doxa und die Verwirklichung des modernen Rechtsstaats', in *Meinungsfreiheit – Grundgedanken und Geschichte in Europa und USA*, ed. J. Schwartländer and D. Willoweit (Kehl/Straßburg, 1986), Tübinger Forschungsprojekt Menschenrechte, vol. 6, p. 9.

86 W. Janke has amply established how this contribution has been developed in the path of thought from *Being and Time* to the late work: *Existenzphilosophie* (Berlin/New York, 1982), pp. 172ff.

The question of being and transcendental phenomenology: reflections on Heidegger's relationship to Husserl

John D. Caputo

The recent appearance of the first volumes of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*, commencing with the publication of the Marburg lectures (1923–8), has already begun to illuminate one of the cloudier issues in Heidegger's thought.¹ I refer to the problem of how Heidegger, at least the Heidegger of *Being and Time*, is a 'phenomenologist', and *a fortiori*, to the puzzling relationship of Heidegger to Husserl. We have always, it is true, been able to point to a number of brilliant phenomenological analyses in *Being and Time* – of the tool, the world, the givenness of others, anxiety, death, primordial temporality and the like. We have always been able to refer to the definition of phenomenology in §7 of *Being and Time* and to compare it with the principle of principles in §24 of *Ideas I*; we have always recognized Heidegger's concern with first-hand seeing and getting back to the things themselves. Yet with all of this, there remains something deeply unsettling about Heidegger's relationship to phenomenology, so long as least as we take Husserl, to whom *Being and Time* is dedicated, as the paradigm of the phenomenologist. For where does Heidegger stand on the critical and central steps of the phenomenological method, the *epoche* and the phenomenological reduction? And what does Heidegger have to say about intentionality, the refutation of psychologism, or transcendental constitution?² And how can there be a phenomenology when the whole idea of 'consciousness' has been superseded?

Heidegger's published works to date have not so much taken issue with Husserl on these points as they have totally ignored them. Heidegger makes virtually no reference to these matters in *Being and Time*. Yet he says this work would not have been possible without Husserl. The incontestable virtue of the publication of the Marburg lectures will be, I think, to illuminate these dark corners of Heidegger interpretation. As a contribution in this direction I would like to discuss the knotted problem of Heidegger's relationship to transcendental phenomenology, i.e.,

to Husserl's view that the objects of experience are constituted in and through transcendental consciousness. This will involve making a determination of where Heidegger stands on the question of the phenomenological reduction and the constitution of objects in consciousness. My point of departure for this discussion is provided by a section of *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology* (§5), in which Heidegger makes his own determination of the basic elements of the phenomenological method, and in which – *mirabile dictu* – Heidegger speaks of his own 'phenomenological reduction'.

To be sure, no matter is closer to Husserl's heart, no procedure more indispensable to Husserl's method, than the phenomenological reduction. Moreover it was this very question of the reduction that led Husserl to reject Heidegger's interpretation of phenomenology. In an important letter to Roman Ingarden on December 26, 1927 Husserl writes:³

I allow myself to become depressed by the kind of impact that my publications have and by the fact that my better students overlook the depth dimension that I point to and instead of finishing what I have started, time and again prefer to go their own way. So also Heidegger, this natural power of a genius, who carries all the youth away with him, so that they now consider (which is not at all his opinion) my methodic style to be out of date and my results to be part of a passing era. And this from one of the closest of my personal friends.

... the new article for the *Encyclopedia Britannica* has cost me a great deal of effort, chiefly because I again thought through from the ground up my basic direction and took into account the fact that Heidegger, as I now must believe, has not understood this direction and thus the entire sense of the method of the phenomenological reduction.

By the reduction the phenomenological investigator is, according to Husserl, carried back (re-reduction) from the hitherto naively accepted world of objects, values and other men, to the transcendental subjectivity which 'constitutes' them. Without the reduction and without the operation of transcendental constitution which it uncovers, philosophy is cut off from achieving radical science. Philosophy would be, in Husserl's view, confined at best to the empirical-psychological level, to the level of 'philosophical anthropology', which deals with the real experience of real men in the world, with what Husserl calls 'mundane subjectivity'. It is evidently in this way that Husserl understands Heidegger's talk of 'existence' and 'being-in-the-world'. For in the '*Nachwort zu meinen "Ideen"*', in

a thinly disguised reference to Heidegger, Husserl characterizes the objections that have been raised against this work in the following way:⁴

They all rest on misunderstandings and ultimately on this, that one wishes to push my phenomenology back to the level [anthropology, mundane subjectivity] the overcoming of which constitutes the whole meaning of the phenomenological reduction.

In Heidegger 'consciousness' is superseded by being-in-the-world. The world is that in which Dasein always already (*immer schon*) is, and anything like an '*epoche*' or reduction which would free Dasein from the world is ruled out from the start. Heidegger-interpretation has always proceeded then with the understanding that in Heidegger there is neither *epoche* nor reduction. As Walter Biemel said in 1950:⁵

Since Husserl's questioning leads back to the ego, his method stands under the stamp of the reduction, through which the totality of beings is bracketed, in order to retain the pure ego. In Heidegger the reduction is totally absent.

We are faced then with a remarkable state of affairs. Heidegger is an important phenomenologist – yet he has not, in the opinion of Husserl himself, understood the basic sense of the central methodological step in phenomenology, the reduction. In Biemel's view, Heidegger has abandoned the reduction altogether. Yet, as if to intentionally complicate the entire matter, Merleau-Ponty claims in his admirable 'Preface' to the *Phenomenology of Perception* that the entire discussion of being-in-the-world in Heidegger is possible only against the background of the phenomenological reduction.⁶ Finally, in the midst of this confusion, Heidegger himself has, in his published writings thus far, said nothing whatever about the reduction.

Heidegger's interpretation of the phenomenological method

It is then of no little interest to find that Heidegger himself, in the hitherto unpublished Marburg lectures, did once address himself to the question of the meaning of the phenomenological reduction for his interpretation of phenomenology. What can the 'phenomenological reduction' mean to Heidegger? Let us listen to his words:

We characterize that element of the phenomenological method which has the sense of a leading back of the investigative look

from the naively grasped being to Being as the *phenomenological reduction*.

(Gp, 29)

This is a strange saying. Every reduction is, in one way or another, a 'leading back' (*zürück-führen*, *re-ducere*). In Heidegger's reduction the look of the phenomenological investigator is led back from beings to Being. Thus, by the reduction, we open up what is elsewhere in these lectures called the 'ontological difference'. Obviously, Heidegger is here adopting Husserl's vocabulary, but he is hardly saying the same thing as Husserl. Thus he adds:

For Husserl the phenomenological reduction . . . is the method of leading back the phenomenological look from the natural attitude of the man who lives in the world of things and persons to the transcendental life of consciousness and to the noetic-noematic experiences in which objects constitute themselves as correlates of consciousness. For us the phenomenological reduction signifies the leading back of the phenomenological look from the grasp of the being, which is always something definite and determinate, to the understanding of the Being (projecting upon the manner of its unconcealment) of this being.

(Gp, 29)

For Husserl the reduction means a 'leading back' from a naive consciousness, which takes the being as something 'there', as an autonomous thing in itself, to a critical consciousness which understands the hitherto anonymous life of consciousness which 'constitutes' the object. It is the passage from the naive givenness of the being to the giving life of consciousness, from a world which is ready made to the creativity of transcendental consciousness. For Heidegger the reduction means the movement by which we no longer take the being naively, as something simply 'there', but discover the being *in its Being*. It is the revelation that the being, which naive common sense takes to be 'given', depends upon a more original 'giving'. For Heidegger, the reduction discloses the hitherto anonymous operation of Being by which the being emerges as a being. The being becomes a phenomenon for Heidegger only when we grasp it in its Being. The simple and determinate grasp of a particular being is nothing phenomenological, but a mere naiveté of natural common sense.

Unfortunately, Heidegger devotes no more space to this phenomenological reduction than the paragraph that we have just quoted. For his comments occur in the 'Introduction' to *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology*, in which he merely outlines the three parts of this lecture course. Unhappily, the whole of Part III, which was to concern

itself with methodological reflections on the nature of phenomenology, was never completed. We are once again left with a Heideggerian 'fragment'. And our confusion is just as great as before, for this text raises more questions than it answers. The whole passage has the appearance of a rather arbitrary reinterpretation of Husserl's words which has nothing to do with the substance of the Husserlian reduction. What are we to make of this reduction? How seriously can we take it? How does it in any way illuminate the essence of Heidegger's phenomenological method? Let us reflect upon it further.

The mention of this phenomenological reduction occurs, as we said, in §5, in which Heidegger is discussing the basic elements in the phenomenological method. He identifies three such elements: reduction, construction and destruction. This position is developed as follows. Phenomenology is radical science (*Wissenschaft*), i.e., philosophy in its most radical sense (*Gp*, 3). But a truly scientific philosophy is possible only as a philosophy – phenomenology – of Being. For the understanding of Being is necessarily prior to the experience of any particular being, and therefore to every particular science (*Gp*, 14). 'Being is the genuine and only theme of phenomenology' (*Gp*, 15). But this demand upon phenomenology to be a science of Being raises the methodological question of how Being is accessible to us. Now Being is given to us only in beings.⁷ Thus the look of the phenomenological investigator must be directed at beings in such a way as to disclose them in their Being, i.e., to 'thematize' Being. The task of thematizing Being is to be carried out in three methodic steps, the first two of which – reduction and construction – we shall treat together. (1) *Reduction*: in this step the phenomenological look is directed negatively 'away from' beings to their Being. It is, Heidegger says, a 'pure turning away', a negative movement which looks away from beings. But this essentially negative element of the method must be perfected in a second and more central element: (2) *construction*: in this second step the phenomenological look is directed 'towards' the Being of beings; it 'leads into' Being (*Hinführung*). Being is not, Heidegger says, simply lying about like a being so that, were we to look away from beings, we would just naturally 'come across' (*vorfinden*) Being. On the contrary, we must actively 'project' (*entwerfen*) Being; we must actively bring it into view. This projecting of the being upon its Being is what Heidegger calls phenomenological 'construction'.

In *Being and Time* the term 'construction' is used in quite a different sense. There it referred to a dogmatic presupposition introduced from outside the *Sache* in such a way as to be imposed upon the *Sache* and to do it violence. A 'construction' there is an *a priori* presupposition which, far from releasing the being and freeing it to be the thing which it is, actually does quite the opposite. It imposes determinations upon

the things themselves whose effect is precisely to prevent us from seeing things as they are. Thus phenomenology is described as the opposite of all 'free-floating constructions'.⁸ A case in point is the Cartesian projection of the things of the life-world in terms of the mathematical construction of extension and velocity and the consequent covering over of life-world phenomena, such as 'hardness' (*SZ*, 97/130). The construction described in *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology* is precisely the opposite kind of projection, one which releases the being to be what it is, which puts the right presupposition upon the being. It is somewhat like Merleau-Ponty's example of 'gearing' ourselves up in the appropriate way so that we can experience the thing as it is, finding, e.g., the right position from which to view the painting.⁹ We find the right angle, the right distance, the right lighting in which the painting can show itself. The task of the phenomenologist is to find the right horizon, the right framework of conditions, the right structure of Being (*Seinsverfassung*, *Seinsart*) in which the being can be what it is. Thus the things of the *Umwelt* should be projected not in terms of extension (*Vorhandensein*) but of 'instrumentality' (*Zuhandensein*) if they are to be seen for what they are.

Actually, this process of construction or projection is to be carried out for Heidegger on a two-fold level. In the first place, the being is to be projected in its Being. That process we have already briefly characterized. But secondly, and more radically, Being itself can and must be projected in terms of that which lets it be what it 'is' (*west*). Here we are referring to the process by which Being itself is projected upon temporality, which Heidegger discusses in §20b of *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology* (*Gp*, 395ff.). It is also clear that what Heidegger means by construction here is identical with the projection upon 'meaning' (*Sinn*) in *Being and Time* (*SZ*, 151/193; 324/370-1): the meaning of a thing is that upon which it must be projected in order to be understood as what it is. To understand the meaning of a thing is to put the right construction upon it. More precisely we do not 'put' a construction 'on' the *Sache* – for that is precisely the procedure of construction in the bad sense. Rather, we set forth the Being-structure which the being itself suggests and evokes, and which we have learned from the being and through the being itself. The genuinely phenomenological construction is not *impressed* from the outside, but is *prompted* from within by the things themselves.

(3) The third step involved in thematizing Being phenomenologically is called by Heidegger 'destruction' (*Gp*, 30-2). In making the regress from beings to being, Dasein must perforce begin with the actual experience of Being which is offered to it by its current historical situation. Beings are not homogeneously accessible in all ages. Indeed there is to be found in the history of Western philosophy from Plato to Hegel a tendency to level off all beings in terms of a single kind of being,

particularly accessible to that particular thinker, which is then made to do service for all the differing modes and areas of beings (*Seinsarten, Seinsgebiete*). We today have inherited this vast fund of fundamental concepts which purport to disclose the Being of each of the differing regions of beings. In a radical science, which starts from the beginning, that claim cannot be accepted without further ado. Hence the reductive-constructive regress (*Rück- und Hinführung*) to Being must be at the same time an historical regress, an historical 'destruction'. It must in Husserl's terms be an historical-genetic phenomenology, in the manner of the *Krisis*, which re-traces the steps which the history of Western philosophy has taken and which uncovers the original and founding experiences (Husserl's *Urstiftungen*) from out of which beings first received their determination. Thus, while the first two steps of Heidegger's phenomenological method have more the appearance of the ahistorical reductions characteristic of *Ideas*, the third compares to the historical way of Husserl's later period. In *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology*, however, Heidegger insists that all three methodic steps must be applied together, that all three steps belong together.

Nonetheless, there remains something profoundly unsettling about the 'phenomenological method' which Heidegger sketches in these pages, unsettling in the sense of how it relates to Husserl's phenomenology. For Heidegger has radically altered the terms of Husserl's reduction and recast it in the likeness of his own 'ontological difference'. The *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of Heidegger's reduction are beings and Being, respectively. These categories supersede for him the terms of the Husserlian reduction: objects and consciousness, objectivity and subjectivity. Heidegger has thus replaced Husserl's 'epistemological difference' with his own ontological-phenomenological reduction. For in Heidegger's view both objects and subjectivity remain within the sphere of beings and cannot claim to be ultimate categories. Indeed they themselves need to be interpreted in terms of their Being. Thus Heidegger's reduction claims to be more radical.

From Husserl's point of view, however, Heidegger appears to have emasculated the reduction by stripping from it the whole idea of a reduction to 'transcendental subjectivity'. Thus, while Husserl may concede that Heidegger possesses the 'natural power of a genius,' he believes him to have struck out so thoroughly on his own path that it can no longer be called phenomenology. For what does Heidegger's reduction have to do with the constitution of objects in transcendental subjectivity? In §59 of the *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl protested against those pretended phenomenologists who lack this most radical element of the phenomenological method. Husserl would certainly regard Heidegger's talk of his own phenomenological reduction as a bit of terminological tokenism which has nothing of substance to do with his phenomenology.

Dasein, subjectivity and transcendental phenomenology

The question to which we must next turn then in this essay is what Heidegger's reduction of Being has to do with the reduction to transcendental subjectivity. My aim in pursuing this question is not, I hasten to add, to attempt to bring Heidegger into conformity with Husserl, for there is no merit in that, nor to justify his credentials to the Husserlians of the strict observance. I am concerned simply to *understand* Heidegger's relationship to Husserl, for *Being and Time* would not have been possible 'if the ground had not been prepared by Edmund Husserl' (SZ, 38/62). Heidegger and Husserl are two great and ultimately independent philosophical geniuses. I do not wish to absorb Heidegger into Husserl, nor to say that everything of worth in Husserl's thought is to be found *eminentiore modo* in Heidegger's thought. I simply want to understand better the enigmatic relationship which existed between these thinkers during Heidegger's Marburg period. This will, among other things, serve to clarify Heidegger's later development when his divergence from Husserl is even more pronounced.

I believe that the best point of departure for this question is to be found in an investigation of Heidegger's view of the relationship between Dasein and 'subjectivity' during this time. Such an investigation reveals that a central idea in Heidegger's concept of phenomenology in those days lay in what he called the 'regress to the subject' (*Rückgang auf das Subjekt*). Thus, in a discussion of Kant's determination of 'reality' in terms of what is given to 'perception',¹⁰ Heidegger says:

Yet the direction of the way upon which Kant enters, through the regress to the subject, is in the widest sense the only possible and correct one.

(Gp, 103)

This expression, 'the regress to the subject', or its like, occurs frequently in *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology* (cf. pp. 156, 172, 220, 308-9, 318-19). In another important text Heidegger says:

Accordingly, if the philosophical problematic has from the beginning of ancient philosophy . . . been oriented towards reason, soul, spirit, consciousness, self-consciousness, subjectivity, this is no accident. . . . The bent [*Zug*] towards the 'subject', which is not always equally clear and unambiguous, is grounded in the fact that philosophical inquiry somehow understood that the basis for every substantive [*sachlich*] philosophical problem could and must be drawn out of an adequate elucidation of the 'subject'.

(Gp, 444)

This text substantially repeats the opening section of Heidegger's version of the *Encyclopedia* article in which Heidegger says:

Phenomenology means: the fundamental clarification of the necessity of the regress to consciousness, the radical and expressed determination of the way of, and of the laws governing the steps of, this regress. [It means] the delimitations of principles and the systematic searching through of this field of pure subjectivity which is disclosed in this regress.¹¹

There can be no doubt that Heidegger saw his fundamental ontology of Dasein, his return of the problem of Being to the being which raises the question of Being, in terms of Husserl's return to subjectivity. This regress was in keeping with the basic tendency of modern philosophy from Locke through Kant, a tradition with which at this stage Heidegger willingly aligns himself. It is furthermore, Heidegger argued, in keeping with the basic, though less easily identifiable tendency of classical thought: with Parmenides (*noein*), Heraclitus (*logos*), Plato and Aristotle (*psyche*), and the middle ages (*intellectus*, transcendental *verum*). The return to subjectivity is for the Heidegger of those days an age-old, necessary and fundamental philosophical step which, properly carried out, secures for philosophy a truly scientific status.

Nevertheless, this characterization of Heidegger's orientation in the '20s must not be left unqualified. Indeed Heidegger himself is quite careful to refine his stand. He says:

in the emphasis on the subject, which has been a vital force in philosophy ever since Descartes, there does indeed lie a genuine impulse for philosophical questioning. It only sharpens what the ancients sought. Yet, on the other hand, it is just as necessary not simply to proceed from the subject, but rather also to question whether and how the Being of the subject, as the point of departure for the philosophical problematic, must be determined, [to question the subject] in such a way that the orientation to it is not *one-sidedly subjectivistic*. Philosophy must perhaps proceed from the 'subject' and with its ultimate questions go back to the 'subject', but it may not pose its questions in a one-sidedly subjectivistic way.

(Gp, 220)

Here Heidegger introduces a critical and decisive qualification upon his conception of the phenomenological return to subjectivity. The Being of the subject must not be determined subjectivistically but rather in such a way as to exhibit its Being as radically turned towards the world.

Heidegger's subject is nothing subjective because its Being consists in

the concerned use of tools (*Besorgen*) and the solicitous sharing of the world with others (*Fürsorge*) and because it is itself ultimately a care for its own Being (*Sorge*). Dasein is a self not because it is self-consciousness (*Selbstbewusstsein*) but because it must *be* itself (*Selbstsein*), because it must decide to be its own or not its own self (*Eigentlichkeit*, *Uneigentlichkeit*). One can see in Heidegger's conception of a non-subjectivistic subject both a residual 'Cartesianism', a Cartesianism which is in truth inseparable from transcendental phenomenology, and yet also the makings of what Landgrebe calls the 'departure from Cartesianism'.¹² Dasein is in no sense a worldless ego, but an openness towards the world, yet is a 'self', an 'I myself'.

It is no wonder then that even in these early texts from the 1920s Heidegger puts single quotation marks around the word 'subject'. In connection with the supposedly Aristotelian thesis that truth belongs in the subject, not in things, Heidegger comments:

Being-true is revealing. Revealing is an activity of the ego. Thus they say being-true is something subjective. We rejoin: 'subjective' to be sure, but in the sense of a properly understood concept of the 'subject' as existing Dasein, i.e., as being-in-the-world (*als des existierenden, d.h., in der Welt seienden Dasein*).

(Gp, 308)

There is a fundamental tension in these early texts, and in *Being and Time* itself, between Dasein as 'subject' and its unsubjectivistic character, which is finally resolved only in the later works, in which Descartes and Husserl, the whole philosophy of transcendental subjectivity, and finally the entire history of Western 'metaphysics' are ultimately overcome. One can already find here the makings of the later Heidegger out of the early.

But while this overcoming is already underway in the early works it has not yet been carried out. If there is a tension here which needs resolving, it is because Heidegger's work still stands within the framework of a now more broadly conceived 'transcendental phenomenology'. That is why Heidegger could say in his important letter to Husserl of Oct. 22, 1927:¹³

There is agreement between us that the being which you call 'world' cannot be explained, in terms of its transcendental constitution, by a regress to a being with the same mode of Being.

For both Heidegger and Husserl the 'world' is not constituted by something mundane (Husserl), by something innerworldly (Heidegger), but by a being with a radically different mode of Being (*Seinsart*), by pure

transcendental subjectivity (Husserl), by Dasein (Heidegger). The letter continues:

We have not thereby said, however, that that which makes up the place of the transcendental is not a being at all.

This is not to say, Heidegger adds, that this being is in no sense something really existing. Here Heidegger begins to formulate his break with Husserl, for whom the pure or absolute Being of consciousness is opposed to the real being of the world. Husserl's brackets include both the world and the ego. Heidegger does not wish to *bracket* the Being of the 'subject' but to penetrate to a deeper *understanding* of its *Being*. Husserl moves from a real-empirical to an irreal-transcendental ego. Heidegger moves from the superficial grasp of Dasein as something *Vorhanden* to the Being of man as *Existenz* and Dasein. Husserl's subject is irreal; Heidegger's 'subject' ex-ists.

Rather the problem precisely arises: what is the mode of Being of the being in which the 'world' is constituted? This is the central problem of *Being and Time*, that is, a fundamental ontology of Dasein. It must be shown that the mode of Being of human Dasein is totally different from that of every other being, and that, being what it is, it harbors within itself the possibility of transcendental constitution.

Here *Being and Time* is cast in a startling light: it is an inquiry into the Being of the being which constitutes the world. Fundamental Ontology is, in its own way, transcendental constitutive phenomenology. *Being and Time* determines the Being of the 'subject' in which innerworldly beings, and other persons, are 'constituted'. It determines these 'subjective' processes (*Verhaltungen*) as concern and solicitude and it determines the Being of the 'subject' as care and ultimately as temporality.

Transcendental constitution is a central possibility of the existence of the factual self. For this [= a factual self] is what concrete man is as such. Concrete man is, as a being, never a 'mundane real fact' because man is never merely something present at hand. Rather he exists. And the element of 'wonder' lies in the fact that the existence-structure of Dasein renders possible the transcendental constitution of every posited entity.

This is a remarkable passage in which the break with Husserl is given its sharpest formulation of all. It states what for Husserl must be a blazing paradox: transcendental constitution takes place in and through the 'factual self'. Whereas in Husserl the transcendental subject was

separated by an 'abyss' from everything factual (*Ideen I*, §49), in Heidegger transcendental subjectivity is located in the 'facticity' of existing Dasein. The being which constitutes the world is thrown into the world and will be wrenched from it. The being which constitutes others is from the very start there, along with them, one with them, dominated by them. The being which transcends being and so is free is ever prone to be untrue to itself, to fail to be itself. This transcendental subject is radically finite and factual, and is itself separated by an abyss from the 'absolute Being' of Husserl's 'pure subjectivity'. Still Dasein does in a meaningful sense 'constitute' its world: through its moods the world is constituted as that into which Dasein is thrown. Without solicitude the 'they' could never appear and dominate Dasein. Without anticipation my death would not 'be' for me. And in a word, without temporality nothing at all would be for Dasein. Temporality is the deep-structure which 'gives' Dasein a world (*Logik*, §19–20), which in Husserl's language, which Heidegger is willing to employ in this letter, 'constitutes' the world. While Dasein is 'factual' it is not factual and constituted. Rather, Heidegger claims, the process of factual ex-isting, the unitary process of existence-facticity-and-fallenness (ahead-of-itself-being-already-in-along-side-others) is itself the constituting process which gives Dasein its world. Husserl thought that whatever is in any way *real* is constituted. Heidegger rejoins that Husserl is being dogmatic about what Being means (if something is real it is constituted), and that a distinction needs to be made between what is real as a *Vorhandenes* and what is 'real' because it 'exists'. The latter is in no way constituted, but rather discloses the Being of itself (*Selbstsein*), others (*Mitsein*) and innerworldly things (*Vorhandensein*, *Zuhandensein*).

Walter Biemel says that in this passage Heidegger's use of the word constitution arises from an attempt to be accommodating to Husserl, to cast his thought in the language of Husserl, but that the expression 'constitution' is avoided in *Being and Time* because of its idealistic overtones.¹⁴ I endorse Biemel's observation quite fully. However I would point out that the importance of the passage lies in the fact that Heidegger can put the problematic of *Being and Time* in the language of 'constitution'. This is possible I believe because Heidegger has in mind a *non-idealistic notion of constitution*, one very much like Merleau-Ponty's example of finding the right standpoint from which the painting can then 'show itself from itself'. If the 'subject' does not for its part do what is required of it, if it does not bring its own mode of Being to beings, then they cannot appear as what they are. Thus Heidegger, speaking of Kant's theses about reality and perception, observes:

Perception uncovers the present-at-hand and lets it be encountered in the manner of a definite *uncovering*. Perception takes away its

coveredness from the being and makes it free to show itself from itself.

(Gp, 98)

Or again, in discussing the 'assertion' as a mode of uncovering:

The appropriation of the being in the true assertion about it is no ontic taking in of the present-at-hand into the subject, as if things were transported into the ego. . . . The assertion is a letting be seen of the being, one which exhibits it.

(Gp, 213)

In Heidegger, constituting means an uncovering, a letting be seen, which is absolutely requisite if the being is to show itself from itself. If Dasein does not build, and so hammer, then the hammer cannot be too heavy or indeed be a hammer at all. *Besorgen* constitutes the hammer as a hammer, in as much as it opens up the horizon within which it can show itself as a hammer. 'Letting be seen' in Heidegger is no mere passive opening of our eyes so that things may just pour in upon us. It is a matter of actively projecting the being in its proper mode of Being, so as to make it accessible to us. It is letting be in the active sense of freeing the thing to show itself as what it is. Dasein constitutes the world by releasing it.

Being and phenomenology

One might protest that our essay up to this point is disjointed and that it has made two essentially different and independent claims which do not all coincide: (1) in Heidegger's early work we find a genuine phenomenology of Being because in Heidegger there is an analogue to the phenomenological reduction, viz., the constructive-reduction to Being; (2) in *Being and Time* there is a genuine phenomenology of Being because *Being and Time* is an essay in transcendental phenomenology; it inquires into the Being of the being which constitutes the world, and so there is a reduction to (Heidegger's version of) transcendental 'subjectivity.' In the first place there is a reduction (regress) to Being (ontological reduction), in the second to the 'subject' (transcendental phenomenological reduction), Which is it? Or are these the same thing? In the first thesis there seems to be a tokenism which uses only Husserl's words, not his meaning; the second is more substantive (*sachlich*), but how is it related to the first?

The answer to this question is and must be that the two kinds of reduction – ontological and transcendental-phenomenological – belong

together and are, for the Heidegger of the Marburg period, inseparable. The unity of the two claims can be expressed simply: the reduction to Being is a reduction to Dasein conceived as the 'subject' which harbors within itself the possibility of transcendental constitution. This is because Being for Heidegger at this point is to be interpreted in terms of Dasein's *understanding* of Being. The reduction is made not simply to Being, Heidegger says, but to the understanding of Being possessed by Dasein. Let us listen again to the important text from *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology*:

For us the phenomenological reduction signified the leading back of the phenomenological look from the grasp of the being, which is always something definite and determinate, to the understanding of the Being [these italics mine] (projecting upon the manner of its unconcealment) of this being.

(Gp, 29)

It is in and through Dasein's understanding of Being that it is able to 'constitute' (uncover) the world, i.e., to free beings, to release them into being what they are. Being at this stage of Heidegger's thought is conceived after the model of an intentional phenomenology, a phenomenology of *noesis* and *noema*, in which Being is the correlate of and is accessible only through Dasein's understanding of Being.¹⁵

If we have conceived the fundamental problem of philosophy to be the question into the meaning and ground of Being, then we must, if we do not wish to engage in phantasy, methodically stay with that which makes something like Being accessible to us, i.e., with the understanding of Being which belongs to Dasein.

(Gp, 319)

The regress to Being (the ontological reduction) is made possible by a regress to Dasein's understanding of Being (the transcendental-phenomenological reduction). In another text Heidegger says that the uncoveredness of beings depends upon the disclosedness of Being, but that the Being of beings is disclosed only 'if I understand it' (Gp, 102). And again in the 'Introduction' to *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology*:

The Being of a being is met with by us in the understanding of Being. Understanding is that which first of all opens up or, as we say, discloses something like Being. 'There is' Being only in the specific disclosedness which characterizes the understanding of Being.

(Gp, 24)

Now the disclosedness of Being is that which has been called from antiquity 'truth':

But there is truth only if a being exists which opens up, which discloses, and indeed in such a way that disclosing itself belongs to the very manner of Being of this being. We ourselves are such a being.
(Gp, 25)

And so accordingly:

There is Being, only if truth, that is, if Dasein exists.
(Gp, 25)

These texts can also be compared with a number of similar passages in *Being and Time* (SZ, 212/255, 230/272, 316/364).

Dasein is the being which harbors within itself the possibility of transcendental constitution *because* it is the being which is characterized by an understanding of Being. The deepest and most fundamental reason why beings are manifest as beings, why they show themselves as phenomena, is Dasein's understanding of Being. Dasein discloses the being *as* a being. To be a phenomenon is to stand forth, to emerge into presence, to show itself from itself. But it is only if presence itself, if emerging into presence (*Anwesen, Sein*), is itself first understood that the being *can* emerge and be present. Heidegger carries out Husserl's demand that the phenomenon be led back into the act which discloses and constitutes it as a phenomenon, but he identifies that act as the pre-ontological understanding of Being. That which discloses the being as such, which makes it possible for being to be met with and experienced at all, is the *a priori* which discloses every being as such: Being. Thus Heidegger planned a section of *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology* which was to bear the title 'The *a priori* of being and the possibility and structure of *a priori* knowledge'. Heidegger rejects the idea that the *a priori* refers to some innate or inborn structure in the mind (Gp, §22c). Rather the *a priori* means for him the 'towards which' (*das Worauf*), the horizon, upon which a thing is projected if it is to appear as such, that 'in respect to which' (*in Hinblick auf, das Worauf eines Hinblicks*) a thing must be seen in order to be what it is. Being is the *a priori* in this sense: it is that in reference to which beings are manifest as beings and which must be *first understood* if beings are to be accessible. Being is prior to beings and only the prior understanding of Being (not in chronological time) makes the experience of beings possible. In this understanding the being is 'constituted' in its Being, i.e., uncovered as a being.

Dasein's understanding of Being is the sole condition under which

both ontology and phenomenology are possible. Not only is ontology possible only as phenomenology, but phenomenology is possible only as ontology. The regress from beings to Being and the regress from the world to the being which constitutes the world merge into one and the same regression (*Rückführung, Rückgang*): the way back into Dasein's understanding of Being. It is only under the condition that Dasein understands Being that beings can be experienced as beings (phenomenology) and that they can be understood to be (ontology). The reduction to Being and the reduction to the 'subject' (Dasein) are in this sense one and the same.

Conclusion: Heidegger and Husserl

How then does Heidegger of the Marburg period stand in relationship to Husserl's 'transcendental phenomenology'? Is he a revisionist whose breach with Husserl is too enormous to gap, with whom there are only incidental similarities? I think not. I see Heidegger's work in this period as an attempt to further radicalize that which Husserl had described as radical, strict, scientific philosophy. For as the world depends in Husserl upon the disclosive activity of transcendental subjectivity, so in Heidegger does it depend upon Dasein's radically temporal understanding of Being. There can be no naive acceptance of the world for either thinker. Husserl recovers the up-to-now anonymous and forgotten life of transcendental consciousness; Heidegger makes explicit the up-to-now hidden pre-ontological understanding of Being. The 'anonymous' life of the ego in Husserl is paralleled in Heidegger by the 'forgotten' understanding of Being. Prior to all 'reflection' (Husserl), to all 'listening in' (*SZ* 139/179), there unfolds an activity which, wholly unknown to our natural life in the world, renders that world possible. There is for both a natural attitude which takes the world as ready-made, autonomous, objective, and there is for both a breach with this attitude which discovers the constitutive life which renders the world manifest. The breach is a breach with the world, though in quite different senses for each thinker. In Husserl the breach takes the form of an *epoche* which brackets the contingent world in order to find the necessary sphere of pure consciousness, a sphere which could survive even the destruction of the world (hardly a possibility for being-in-the-world). In Heidegger the breach consists in raising the question of Being, in questioning the being in its Being. This questioning – something of a Heideggerian *epoche* – discovers not a pure ego but the radically worldly Being of being-in-the-world – in whose temporal understanding of Being the world is disclosed. Heidegger's breach is perfectly described by Merleau-Ponty: it consists in slackening the bonds which tie it to the world – the broken hammer – just long enough to

bring the world as such into view; it consists in attempting the *epoche* just long enough to discover the impossibility of carrying it out.¹⁶

What then can we say of Husserl's judgment of Heidegger – that he has not understood the basic sense of the reduction, and that he leads phenomenology back to the level of anthropology? I believe this judgment is too harsh, though it is perhaps the only judgment the author of the method could render upon such an independent appropriation of his work. Heidegger has indeed understood the reduction, but he has understood it – as he understands everything – in his own way. His version of the reduction does not lead phenomenology back to the level of natural, mundane subjectivity, but, on the contrary, to the disclosive activity in which everything natural and mundane comes to be 'there' (*da*). *Being and Time* represents a brilliant appropriation of Husserl's thought which, while it clearly depends upon the preparation made by Husserl, also has an inspiration of its own.

The whole discussion of the early Heidegger's relationship to Husserl and so to the phenomenological movement illuminates the problem of Heidegger's path of thought. Heidegger was throughout his life moved by Husserl's call to the things themselves, to the *Sache* of all philosophical thought, and he has always adhered in his own way to the principle of direct seeing. To that extent he has always been in Husserl's debt. But in the Marburg period, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger was still profoundly affected by the transcendental motif in Husserl's phenomenology, as the numerous texts we have cited amply document. In this light his *Kehre* consists in overcoming that very 'orientation towards the subject' which seemed to Heidegger in the '20s to be the very life-line of philosophy. Thus we can find something like the first reduction (to Being) which we discussed in this essay in the later Heidegger's writings but not the second (to the subject). For in the later works the regress to Being would become the 'step back' (*Schritt zurück*) into Being, the regress into the ground of metaphysics (*Rückgang in den Grund der Metaphysik*). But the regress into the subject was to be overcome and identified with the history of metaphysics. We saw that even in *The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology* Heidegger thinks that the history of Western philosophy was characterized by a return to the subject, the difference being that he was willing to associate himself with that tradition in those days. In the later works Heidegger would still conceive Dasein as 'releasing' beings in their Being, but that would mean not the horizontal projection of them in their Being, but pure *Gelassenheit*. Dasein would still have an 'understanding' of Being (or rather it would have Dasein!), but that would have to do not with any transcendental 'subject' but with 'standing under' Being's address. The makings of the later Heidegger out of the early can be seen in these lectures by those who have the eyes to see, and who have the advantage of the hindsight afforded by the intervening

years. But the special contribution of the publication of the Marburg lectures is, I believe, to throw into relief what *Being and Time* meant to and for Heidegger and his generation a half-century ago.

Notes

1 Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1923–44, B. 21, *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), hereafter 'Logik'; B. 24, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975), hereafter 'Gp'. I will refer to the later title in the body of this article by its English translation. *Logik* represents the 1925–6 lectures, *Gp* the lectures of the Summer semester, 1927.

2 'Intentionality' is discussed in *Gp*, §§9b–c, 12a, 15c, 18b. The refutation of psychologism is discussed and subjected to an anti-critique in *Logik*, §§6–10. See also F. Olafson, 'Consciousness and intentionality in Heidegger's thought', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 12, No. 2 (April, 1975), 91–103.

3 Edmund Husserl, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968), p. 43. Cited and translated by T. Kiesel, 'On the dimensions of a phenomenology of science in Husserl and the young Dr. Heidegger', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 4, no. 3 (October, 1973), p. 228, n. 48. See also Spiegelberg's account of Heidegger's relation to Husserl during the Marburg years in *The Phenomenological Movement* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965), Vol. 1, pp. 279–81.

4 Edmund Husserl, *Ideen III, Husserliana V* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), p. 140. See also Edmund Husserl 'Phenomenology and anthropology', trans. R. Schmitt in *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology*, ed. R. Chisholm (New York: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 129ff. Cf. Heidegger's allusion to this criticism in *On the Essence of Reasons*, A Bilingual Edition Incorporating the German Text of *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, trans. T. Malick (Evanston: Northwestern, 1969), pp. 96–9, n. 59; See Malick's n. 40, pp. 140–1.

5 Walter Biemel, 'Husserls Encyclopaedia-Britannica Artikel und Heideggers Ammerkungen Dazu', *Tijdschrift Voor Philosophie*, 12 (1950), p. 276.

6 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. C. Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. xiv.

7 The balance of this paragraph is an exposition of *Gp*, 228–30.

8 Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* 10. Aufl. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1963), p. 28. Engl. transl. *Being and Time*, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 50. Hereafter 'SZ' with the German pagination followed by a slash and the English pagination. See also *SZ*, 16/37; 50, n. 1/490, n. x.; notice the shift of meaning though in *SZ*, 197/242. 'Construction' in the positive sense used in *Gp* is discussed in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* 3. Aufl. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1965), §42, pp. 210–11. See J. L. Mehta, *Martin Heidegger: The Way and the Vision* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976), p. 198, n. 8.

9 Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 313.

10 This is the second of Kant's 'Postulates of empirical thought'. Heidegger discusses it in *Gp*, §8b and again in *Logik*, §33.

11 Heidegger's draft of the article appears in *Husserliana IX: Phänomenologische Psychologie* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 256ff. An English translation is to be found in *The New Scholasticism* XLIV (Summer, 1970), 325–44.

12 Ludwig Landgrebe, 'Husserl's departure from Cartesianism', in *The*

Phenomenology of Husserl: Selected Critical Readings, ed. R. O. Elveton (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 259ff.

13 Heidegger's letter to Husserl appears in *Husserliana IX*, pp. 600–3. See Anlage I. For a comment on this letter in English, see Mehta, *Way and the Vision*, p. 146, n. 4.

14 Biemel, 'Husserls Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikel', p. 276, n. 8.

15 It was a failure to appreciate the intentional relationship between Dasein's understanding and the Being which was therein understood which led in the 1930s and '40s to the popular confusion of *Sein* and Dasein (mentioned by Biemel, p. 276).

16 Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, pp. xiii–xiv.

Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty: Being-in-the-world with others?

Christina Schües

If the balance of processes is destroyed,
then the underlying
unity of the cosmos will cease.

G. S. Kirk

Es ist mehr Vernunft in deinem
Leibe, als in deiner besten
Weisheit. Und wer weiß denn, wozu
dein Leib gerade deine beste
Weisheit nötig hat?

Nietzsche

Heidegger's 'hermeneutic of facticity' and Merleau-Ponty's 'existential phenomenology' both take shape as *philosophies of interrogation* and as *movements of thinking* in the everyday world. The former enquires into the possibility of an *understanding* of Being through *Da-sein*, the latter 'engages' philosophy in a *questioning* process which takes as its theme the relation between the sensual world and the world of expression. It inquires into the fundamental pre-conceptual structures of our relation to the world.

The words 'Being-in-the-world' are used by both authors, and at first sight it seems as if Merleau-Ponty took over the notion of 'Being-in-the-world' from Heidegger. I would like to begin by pointing out that the English expression 'Being-in-the-world' can be translated in more than one way. Even though Merleau-Ponty's use of the expression '*être-au-monde*' was certainly influenced by the Heideggerian notion 'Being-in-the-world', it should be noted that '*au monde*' is a dative which means 'giving oneself to', 'directing oneself to', i.e., a movement, of the subject to the world. So the French make use of two expressions: '*être-dans-le-monde*' which means Being-in-the-world and which carries a more spatial

meaning; and 'être-au-monde'; literally, Being *to* or *at* the world, with its customary connotation of 'being born'. 'Être-au-monde' is utilized in order to enlarge the former, somewhat spatial, conception into a lived contact with the world.¹ Therefore, 'être-au-monde' should be translated as 'being-to-the-world', an expression which comes closer to the Heideggerian notion of 'Falling', itself a mode of Being-in-the-world but clearly differentiated from it.²

The question whether Merleau-Ponty merely took over Heidegger's notion of 'Being-in-the-world' is the guiding theme of the following paper, and will be considered with regard to their respective attitudes towards the world, as also toward the possibility of co-existence and of a concrete encounter with others. Finally, in the last part, and based on a comparison of the earlier work of the two authors, I will look at the later development of their thinking – Heidegger's so-called 'turn' and Merleau-Ponty's 'deepening' thinking into the region of 'wild being' (*l'être sauvage*).

Husserl, the predecessor of both and the representative of 'transcendental phenomenology', envisaged the possibility of a meeting with the other in my world through his bodily givenness. Thus the problem of understanding the other becomes a problem of reflecting on the type of consciousness involved in the constituting procedure. Husserl employs for this purpose a special kind of apprehension which he calls 'appresentation', i.e., empathy. He finds the resources for such an apprehension in the subjective structures of transcendental consciousness. Thus, his attempt to constitute the other proceeds from an *egocentric* standpoint. Heidegger tries explicitly to overcome the philosophy of consciousness by radicalizing the Husserlian programme into a 'hermeneutic of facticity', with the requirement that the transcendental ego be comprehended as a factual, concrete self which understands itself in any self-interpretation as historical. Heidegger investigates a human understanding which grounds its questions in a being whose Being is ontologically privileged, in as much as it is able to thematize its own mode of Being: Dasein as the mode of Being of the human. Life is a structure of meaning for Heidegger as well as for Merleau-Ponty; but it is constituted as a factual structure and not as a structure of consciousness. For Heidegger, facticity is supposed to be the fundamental characteristic of Dasein; therefore, any question of Being has to be developed from the standpoint of the ontological constitution (*Seinsverfassung*) of Being, i.e., through the factual constitution of Dasein. Thus, the notion of 'facticity' assumes a philosophical status which points to the essential difference between Husserl and Heidegger.

And so the question arises whether the procedure adopted by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty leads to an *inter-facticity* or rather to a *method of isolation*. 'Inter-facticity' would name the concrete encounter between

human beings. The idea behind a 'method of isolation' is motivated by the suspicion that, although Heidegger does suppose a fundamental unity of Dasein and world, the demand for a reference of Dasein to itself presupposes that Dasein only understands itself in terms of its *own* existence and therefore in such a way as to be *isolated* from the world. Dasein is introduced as that being which we ourselves are, one of whose possibilities of Being is that of questioning and which must consequently comport itself with respect to its Being (existence) in certain essential ways: (1) as questioning about Being; (2) as having a relation to Being. 'Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being – a relationship which itself is one of Being.'³ Thus, any questioning about the Being of Dasein presupposes that comportment which Dasein always already assumes with respect to its own Being.⁴

This is the place where Heidegger's inquiry begins; a place where we already stand, the place of the questioning, relating, understanding and disclosing of Being. And Heidegger says that to such a Dasein 'there necessarily belongs: Being in a world'.⁵ But one might well ask whether the introduction of 'world' is to be taken seriously. For if the suspicion of 'isolation' can be confirmed with reference to the concept of Being-in-the-world, then *either* Dasein takes a world along with itself, but it is always its *own* world; *or* Heidegger puts forward an acosmism in which he *escapes totally* from the world. In either case, we would be faced with a *movement of monocentric thinking*. One might wonder whether such a method of isolation would require that we fall back on Husserl's transcendental reduction, thereby engendering an 'absolute aloneness' based upon the distinction between the transcendental and the natural ego. However, Heidegger's isolationist move only *appears* to resemble the transcendental reduction. Whereas Husserl strenuously seeks to bring to light a 'disinterested observer' who undergoes a 'complete personal change',⁶ Heidegger's interpretative 'isolation' is not a reduction; rather, it is an 'existential performance'⁷ which has as its methodological presupposition a determinate 'conception of authentic existence', one which leads the ontological interpretation from the outset as a 'factual ideal of Dasein' (SZ, p. 310/BT, p. 358).⁸ Hence the question: is authentic Dasein concerned with itself alone in a centrifugal movement of thinking?

In other words, does Heidegger ever actually propose a hermeneutic of inter-facticity?⁹ To put the question along the lines of Heidegger's characterization of philosophy:

Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of *existence*, has made fast the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it *arises* and to which it *returns*.¹⁰

Phenomenology and hermeneutics are to be linked to a hermeneutical ontology. In addition to the task of establishing the structure of that postulate, it is interesting to observe that Heidegger has no difficulty in showing how philosophical questions arise out of (*entspringen*) the concrete existence of worldly relations; but is he also able to do justice to the further move of return (*zurückschlagen*)?

Since Merleau-Ponty radicalizes his predecessor Husserl (as also Heidegger), I would, with regard to my question concerning 'Being-in-the-world with the other', like to argue for an 'existential phenomenology'.

Merleau-Ponty's 'existential phenomenology' is based upon a phenomenology of the body which is important for the thematization of the relation between the sensual world and the world of expression – as also for a 'reversal' of this relation. That is, he tries to thematize the fundamental pre-conceptual structures of our relation to the world by a *zurück-versetzen* of all essences in the factual existence and understanding of human being and world.

Looking for the world's essence is not looking for what it is as an idea once it has been reduced to a theme of discourse; it is looking for what it is as a fact for us, before any thematization.¹¹

'*Zurückgehen*' (*chercher*) here means using a phenomenological reduction but not in the sense of Husserl's transcendental reduction because it is never possible to achieve a total reduction, that is, a total neutralization of the body and of worldly embeddedness. A phenomenological reduction which does not assume the form of a philosophical idealism, but rather that of a philosophy of existence and of finality, is one which puts us right in the middle of perceptual happenings. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, perception becomes exemplary and primary since it takes place in all modes of human existence and since it provides access to that which can appear. Thus, the notion of perception is overdetermined, yet still important from the standpoint of throwing light upon the structure of human experience. In the light of this phenomenological reduction, and by an application of that very method, we are able to realize our relation to the world and to discover ourselves as Being-to-the-world because the possibility of a total *detachment* from the world is in principle never fully possible. Therefore, philosophical interrogation is not necessarily a state of beginning, but a *movement of thinking* which enters into that which 'is given to be thought' by nature, history, time and world. In line with our theme and with reference to Heidegger, the questions for Merleau-Ponty are the following: if it can be shown that the assertion of Being-to-the-world is indeed an ingenious epistemological bridge between subject and object, inner and outer, then is it not the case that the subject¹² simply collapses into the world? Does his conception not

result in a downgrading of the world to something 'which is nothing apart from our Being inserted into it?'¹³

I Heidegger's Being-in-the-world

Heidegger's 'hermeneutic of facticity', confronted with the reproach of a *method of isolation*, will be investigated by way of his *movement of thinking* (particularly in *Being and Time*) and with reference to the disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) of Dasein (the Da) and its basic constitution (*Grundverfassung*): Being-in-the-world. The latter is to be taken methodically as the first discovery in his philosophical interrogation of Being, and will be used to bring out the implications and questions concerning his method, particularly in respect to the relation with others, its existential constituents and the modification of *Falling*. The total phenomenon of Being-in-the-world is explored in terms of its three basic aspects: world, Being-with and Being-in. We shall take each of these in turn.

1 World

'World' understood as surrounding world (*Umwelt*) is ontologically 'not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein essentially is not; it is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself'.¹⁴ Essential to Heidegger's description of the 'world' is his analysis of *Zeug* (tool) in its serviceability (*Dienlichkeit*), which turns into the notion of concern (*Besorgen*). 'That wherein Dasein understands itself' is 'that for which it has let entities be encountered beforehand'. Heidegger continues: 'And the structure of that to which Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world.'¹⁵ The purpose of this analysis is to show that we always have a pre-understanding of the referential totality (*Verweisungszusammenhang*) included under the head of doing something 'in order to' (*um-zu*) in our dealing with tools. The worldliness of the world is that which enables Dasein to experience beings as a kind of tool located within a certain context of action. In daily experience, i.e. in the world of what is ready-to-hand within the world, the tool is perceived as a 'thing' to do something with, e.g. I perceive a pencil as a tool to write with. A *tool* is an entity of such kind that it always refers to others, because it is useful for others as well as myself and because it is made by others. Hence, Heidegger tries to avoid any mentalistic implications by using terms modelled on notions of dealing, e.g. doing-something-with.

2 Being-with

Heidegger starts neither with a pure ego who posits a world, nor with an isolated ego who constitutes the relation to the other. The others are always already there with me when I refer to the surrounding world.

Dasein understands itself proximally and for the most part in terms of its world; and the Dasein-with of Others is often encountered in terms of what is ready-to-hand within-the-world. But even if Others become themes for study, as it were, in their own Dasein, they are not encountered as person-Things present at hand: we meet them 'at work', that is, primarily in their Being-in-the-world.¹⁶

But *who* are the others? Heidegger's answer can be restated in the following way: they are not aliens; they are with us in their similarity. I am with the others in our common dealings. I never need to question or worry about my relation with others because we exist as dealing concretely with one another and as directed towards each other by our common work. However, Heidegger opposes the idea that the 'who' of our everyday practical dealings might be identified with these dealings. Furthermore, he also rules out Husserl's empathic constitution of the other as a 'Double of the self'.¹⁷

'The world of Dasein is a with-world [*Mitwelt*]. Being-in is Being-with Others [*Mitsein mit Anderen*]. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [*Mitdasein*].'¹⁸ Thus, the relation to the other is an irreducible Being-relation (*Seinsbezug*) of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Heidegger uses the analogy between a concerned dealing with tools and a solicitous dealing with others in his description of the alien experience. The problem consists in (1) the danger that this analogy could lead to an objectification of the relation with the other. The similarity between the 'tool' and the 'other' consists in the idea that they are both integrated (*eingefangen*), in my world-projection (*Weltentwurf*).¹⁹ (2) The difficulties and misunderstandings connected with the experience of others are not addressed. For Heidegger chooses examples which, for the most part, do not show the *otherness* of the others: in his historically constituted 'Handwerker- und Schusterperspektive',²⁰ I always meet them 'at work' . . . which limits the analysis of the notion of the tool as well as that of the analysis of Being-with. The limits and differences in my understanding of others are never thought through, even though they appear quickly enough when I 'meet' others who 'disturb' me in *their* way of being-in-the-world.

The idea that Dasein is equi-primordially Being-in-the-world means that the world is always shared with others. But, in the end, it turns out that the otherness of the others is reduced to structures of equivalence. 'The violence of the encounter with the non-I is deadened by the equivalence of this otherness.'²¹ A first answer to the question 'who is the other?' can now be risked: *the other is the one who is just like me in all essential respects*.

But there is a more positive side to Heidegger's understanding of Being-with, a side which is brought out by Waldenfels when he says:

Während der Andere auf diese Weise im Mitvollzug meines Weltlebens ebenso mit da ist, wie ich selbst mit da bin, frage ich zunächst nicht, mit *wem* ich es zu tun habe, sondern *was* ich mit ihm zu tun habe. (Since, in the course of my interaction with the Other, the latter is there with me in just the same sense as I am there with it, it is more pertinent for me to ask, not with *whom* I have to do, but *what* I have to do with the Other.)²²

In addition to the direct, frontal and so personal relation to the other (*mit wem*), Waldenfels sees here the basis for an indirect, lateral and so situational relation to the other, a relation founded in a common task (*was ich mit ihm zu tun habe*), in work done together. If this 'situational' experience of the other were to be regarded as the only basis for an understanding of the other, it might then be possible to object, with Theunissen, that the relation to the other has not been properly accounted for since, in *Being and Time*, 'encounter' means that 'inner-worldly beings encounter a Dasein that lets itself be encountered'.²³ But if this situational 'what' is interpreted as just one aspect of the inter-human relation then this extension would make it possible to introduce intentional structures founded on an 'in-between' which bears upon the fact that I have something to do with the other.

For Heidegger, dealings with the other are characterized by the notion of *care* which is described in its twofold modification: there is a negative care which takes away the care of the other in order to control him. But there is also a positive side to care, essentially to authentic care, which lets the other be *free for himself*.²⁴ Thus, Heidegger uses a strictly twofold *evaluation* for the comportment of Dasein which parallels the distinction of inauthenticity and authenticity. This way of talking disperses the authentic and inauthentic modes of Being on the ground of a normative accentuation of ontological modalities. This description can at most show us that Being-with the other does not necessarily consist in a good or bad understanding of the relation with the other but of a '*right* kind of objectivity which frees the Other in his freedom for himself';²⁵ which in turn leaves Dasein free to focus undisturbed upon the purity of its own destiny. Certainly, both modes of existence function in concrete daily practice. So Heidegger's normative privileging of the *own* Dasein gives it an idealist-constructive status which sees the other as someone who can drag Dasein down into the, pejoratively described, modus of the They: through distancing, averageness and levelling down (*Abständigkeit, Durchschnittlichkeit, Einebenung*). The others are unindividuated others who can be summarized under the title of 'They'. Thus, the next answer to the question of 'who is the other?' is the following: *the other is the 'They', the One, people in general*.

The 'They' is that which anonymously reduces public life and dealings

between people down to averageness. There are rules which one follows; we do certain things because 'one' does them; in this sense it does look as though we can find here some viable descriptions of our general experience of daily life. However, despite Heidegger's valuable description of some aspects of our co-existence with the other in daily life,²⁶ it seems that although the two modi of the comportment of Dasein may well be equi-primordial (*gleichursprünglich*) they cannot be equi-valent (*gleichwertig*). If the self-reference of Dasein is supposed to lead to a disclosedness of Dasein, i.e. a Being-in-the-truth, the structure of the 'They' in its average everydayness appears as a 'Being-in-untruth'.²⁷ Who is the other? 'The *Who* is the neutral "They" '28 who may *drag me down* into everydayness, averageness and Falling – and so into *un-truth*.

3 *Being-in*

The analysis of Being-in the world focuses on the role of the others as belonging to a 'They' which runs the risk of dragging Dasein down into the Falling of inauthentic existence. However, the Being-in of Being-in-the-world is characterized by a description which runs into a contradiction in as much as Heidegger's move away from the world generates a problem with regard to the possibility of a corresponding (centrifugal) movement of return.

Heidegger's description concerns the existential constituents of the *Da*, the everyday Being of the *Da* and the Falling of Dasein. It seeks to grasp the concept of Dasein as a whole and in relation to time, and so to prepare the way for authenticity. It has the task of rescuing Dasein from the dangers of averageness and indifference, dangers which follow from living with people. A description of the existential constituents and of the concept of temporality shows Falling to be a contradictory concept, only 'one side' of which can therefore be used to establish a parallel with Merleau-Ponty's Being-to-the-world.

Heidegger's existential constitution of the 'Da' consists in State-of-mind (*Befindlichkeit*) and Understanding (*Verstehen*).²⁹ This twofold structure can also be found under the name of facticity/existence, and thrownness/projection.

The term State-of-mind is characterized by its relation to the world: 'Existentially, a State-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us.'³⁰ In contrast, Understanding is employed whenever Heidegger wishes to talk of Dasein's potentiality for Being: Understanding is a 'disclosive potentiality-for-Being' in which Dasein can come to the 'possibilities of its own Being' and in which it can project that 'ownmost potentiality-for-Being' embedded in the 'Worldhood of its actual world'.³¹ Thus, State-of-mind and Understanding are two of Dasein's *existentialia* (*Existenzialien*), *existentialia* which characterize the 'primordial disclosedness

of Being-in-the-world'.³² And, in addition to the characterization of that twofold structure, Heidegger also exposes the everyday Being of Dasein: 'In addition to characterizing the primary constitution of the Being of disclosedness, we will require . . . an interpretation of the kind of Being in which this entity is its "there" '. This basic mode of Being of average everydayness is named 'Falling'.³³ It is a specific 'disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, in so far as the latter, as something which is everyday, maintains itself in the kind of Being of the "They" '.³⁴ In this context, Falling is not another *existentialia*, next to the former two, but rather an 'everyday modification of that disclosedness which Dasein is',³⁵ an '*existential modus* of Being-in-the-world'.³⁶ In this sense, Falling, understood as idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity, would be a specific form of State-of-mind and Understanding; it would be its everyday form (and so not to be understood as equi-primordial). In other words, it could be said that Falling is a modification of the fundamental movement of Dasein, a modification which takes Dasein away from itself in accordance with 'its ownmost inertia [*Zug*] of falling'³⁷ and towards the alienation of inauthentic Dasein, that is, towards the 'dictatorship of the Public'.³⁸

That Falling is a modification of the two basic constituents becomes apparent through the description of 'being-alongside inner-worldly beings', i.e., in the mode of everyday and average Being-with. Heidegger, in contrast to Merleau-Ponty, does not give Falling, i.e., the *modus* of the 'They', any (re-)productive possibilities, that is, certain regularities, or a set of inter-factual rules which would not have to be newly constituted each time Dasein was investigated. This is rather unfortunate because if such (re-)productive possibilities were to be conferred upon Dasein then Heidegger could not simply assume that we necessarily have to start from scratch each time. At this point I simply want to insist (and with Merleau-Ponty it will become much clearer), that we do need inter-subjective regularities, a 'background' of some kind to function as a 'spring-board' for spontaneous acts.

However, implicitly built into the structure of Dasein is the idea that it can turn away from itself and that it can think itself in the wholeness of itself. The wholeness of Dasein is construed in the following tension: in Thrownness and State-of-mind, Dasein is 'always already thrown into a world'; and the wholeness of Dasein consists in the 'ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)'. As such it fulfils the meaning of the title '*Care*'.³⁹ 'Dasein's factual existence . . . is always already absorbed in the world of its concern', i.e. in Falling. Hence, Dasein is essentially characterized by the twofold structures of existence and facticity, projection and thrownness. The reason for the fact that Falling is not constructed on a parallel with State-of-mind and Understanding in this 'essentially indivisible wholeness'⁴⁰ remains unfortunately opaque.⁴¹

To sum up, Falling as a modification of State-of-mind and Understanding, of facticity and existence, transforms Heideggerian Dasein into Being-in-the-world in its everydayness and averageness, i.e., in the structure of untruth. Having discussed the formal structure of care in its relation to the description of Dasein in its everydayness, I would now like to contrast this account with the description of Falling in relation to the temporality of Dasein.

Later in the Heideggerian analysis, i.e., when he discusses *the temporality of Dasein*, Falling slips into an ambiguous role because it then changes into the third constituent of the totality of the structure of Care: the three in question being 'existentiality, facticity and Falling'⁴² which are united through 'temporality'. Up to now, the analysis was oriented on the inauthentic understanding of Dasein because the unitary ground for the complex formula: 'ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in(the world)' as 'being-alongside' had not yet been developed. Heidegger hopes to show that if Dasein finds its original unity, that is, its authentic sense as temporality, then each element of Care must show itself as an authentic form within this temporal unity. Heidegger introduces this 'second characterization' of Falling as equi-primordial (*gleichursprünglich*) with existence and facticity, i.e., understanding and state-of-mind, both now being interpreted both in terms of authenticity and inauthenticity.

(a) Understanding

Understanding is 'ahead-of itself' (*sich-vorweg*) and it is *primarily* the future toward whose 'existential possibilities'⁴³ Dasein can project itself. The future comes forward as 'anticipation' (*Vorlaufen*) in its authentic form and as 'awaiting' (*Gewärtigen*)⁴⁴ in its inauthentic form (by making it dependent upon what is indispensable in our everyday business).⁴⁵ According to the alternatives of authenticity and inauthenticity, the whole temporality of Dasein is unfolded out of the future. Thus, Dasein can return from the authentic future to its past, while its own 'having-been' (*Gewesen*)⁴⁶ is closed off from the inauthentic future.

(b) State-of-mind

The temporal 'ekstasis' of State-of-mind is characterized by 'always-already-Being'. This 'ekstasis' means always 'finding oneself in some state-of-mind or other'.⁴⁷ State-of-mind is developed *primarily* in the 'having-been' (*Gewesenheit*),⁴⁸ and is expressed in Dasein's having a mood (*Gestimmtheit*), a mood (*Stimmungen*) in which it can encounter its authentic (anxiety) and inauthentic (fear) modes of pastness. In fear, which is always a fear about oneself, Dasein holds on to the past. The inauthentic past which Heidegger determines as 'forgetting'⁴⁹ forces 'Dasein back upon its Thrownness, but in such a way that this Thrownness gets quite closed off'.⁵⁰ In contrast, Dasein is authentically

brought back to itself in anxiety which brings Dasein back before its own Thrownness and reveals the uncanniness of everyday being-in-the-world. 'This bringing-back has neither the character of an evasive forgetting nor that of a remembering. Rather anxiety brings Dasein back to its own Thrownness as something possible which can be repeated.'⁵¹ 'And bringing one face to face with repeatability is the specific ecstatic mode of that pastness which is constitutive of the State-of-mind of anxiety.'⁵² So the past as well as the future both allow for that temporalizing of Dasein in which Heidegger already envisages an *escape* from everydayness, i.e. an escape from imprisonment in the uncanniness of Dasein.

(c) Falling

'Just as understanding is made possible primarily by the future and moods are made possible by having been, the third constitutive item in the structure of care – namely, falling – has its existential meaning in the *Present*.'⁵³ Accordingly, the structure of care associates the present with Being-alongside (*Sein-bei*). However, the description of Falling is different from that of the other two: for there is no *convincing* opposition between authentic and inauthentic presence. Heidegger is more or less only concerned with the mode of inauthenticity which consists of self-entanglement and alienation. If the present only made its appearance in the mode of inauthenticity then the potentiality for the unification of temporality would be obstructed and potentiality-for-Being would be forced back upon that facticity of Thrownness to which Dasein is delivered over. As a systematic rescue operation, Heidegger rather awkwardly introduces an authentic mode of the present. He calls the inauthentic present a 'making-present' (*Gegenwärtigen*), in contrast to the *authentic* present, which is called the 'moment of vision' (*Augenblick*).⁵⁴ And, strangely enough, the 'moment of vision' is derived from the authentic future which is gathered together in the anticipation which goes along with resoluteness. In this way, he avoids having to speak directly of an 'authentic Falling' – even though the logic of temporality demands it. With regard to Care, the concrete foundation for an authentic present is missing, even though such a foundation was provided for State-of-mind and Understanding. Thus, the authentic present, *qua* 'moment of vision', remains a dubious dilemma.⁵⁵

The problem seems to be the following: Falling furnishes a 'stage' which must be overcome in one respect and which is authentically required: 'To understand in an existential manner implies projecting oneself in each case upon one's ownmost factual possibility of having the potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world.'⁵⁶ Thus, there is an ambiguity between everydayness and inauthenticity: with respect to everydayness, Falling must be overcome in the temporality of authenticity and yet it must be excluded from it as authentic. In the course of his investigation,

Heidegger oscillates between an evaluation of the They as a grounding category and as a personal state of mind.⁵⁷ And in so far as Falling is regarded as that present which is needed for authentic, totalizing time, Falling (in everydayness) remains within the field of authenticity. A radicalization of Being-with would have to balance the modalities of authenticity and inauthenticity and it would have to renounce the proclamation of the projection of Dasein 'upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being'⁵⁸ as the authentic mode of existence.⁵⁹

The problem is that the authentic present (the *Augenblick*) is officially and formally grounded in Falling, but thematically it has another much less official origin.

4 Resolution (Entschluss)

Falling remains included in the temporal interpretation of care, even with regard to authenticity. But it no longer assumes a fundamental role. Dasein can 'choose' to be-itself or not-to-be-itself through the anticipation that goes along with resoluteness. Both an active encounter and a resolute withdrawal from such an encounter are to be found in the present in which a decision is made.⁶⁰ The result is that the 'situation' of the present is opened up through choice. Resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) is however a mode of disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*), and not of Falling. Falling (as the ir-resoluteness of the They) becomes that element of opposition in the 'moment of vision' which would have to be named 'authentic Falling', according to the second interpretation. The resolution which lies in the 'moment of vision' belongs to the future as the transposition of futural resoluteness.⁶¹ Thus, Dasein gives itself from the future. Resoluteness is thought out of the future. The world as a 'meaningful whole' furnishes the 'field of play for a resoluteness [*Entschlossenheitsspielraum*]' which opens Dasein up but which, at the same time, returns Dasein to an individualization founded in temporality'.⁶²

So, the notions which are used to construe the authentic present stand opposed to Falling. 'In as much as Dasein gives itself its own situation it disposes – out of the future – of that which it encounters in this situation.'⁶³ Thus, Heidegger's Dasein remains in the tradition of a Reason 'which only has insight into that which it produces in accordance with its own project'.⁶⁴

With that move, a *movement of thought* which could be called a 'centrifugal movement of the self towards Being',⁶⁵ isolated Dasein escapes from the 'uncanniness' (*Unheimlichkeit*) of Falling, and it finds its salvation in its own self, a self which resolves to determine itself from itself and which, therefore, loses, in isolation, its own essential structure: its Being-in-the-world. Thus, Heidegger's thinking remains in the grip of a subtle acosmism which leads on to the problem that the 'facticity of Dasein' actually misses both its historical Being and that 'starting-place'

(Being-in-the-world) definitive of its very Being. For this reason, his project should be regarded as a '*hermeneutics of isolation*' rather than a '*hermeneutics of facticity*'.

The Selfhood of the self, i.e., its isolation and acosmism, is attested in Being-toward-death, which is both personal and solitary, and with regard to which nobody can replace me; however, it cannot be held against Heidegger that his thesis is guided by the anonymity of mortality in general. Thus, the structure of Being-with is one which holds the others in a certain relation to the structures of *my* Being; that is, they are there, yet not to interfere in my *monocentric* freedom.

The implication behind this acosmism is that Heidegger prefers the monocentric, authentic Dasein, which exists beyond any involvement in the daily world, to the concrete-factual self who would be characterized by an inter-connection of personal and anonymous traits and by an involvement in the world. Therefore, Heidegger basically *fails* to provide a theory of a decentralized subjectivity and he fails in his undertaking to show how we get back from this authentic mode to the concrete-factual existence of intersubjectively construed Being-in-the-world. The idea that Heidegger does not place any especial value on human reality, is also evident from the *Letter on Humanism* in which he writes that the essence of man is essential for the truth of Being, and that apart from the truth of Being man himself does not matter.⁶⁶ Heidegger stressed that the essence of man rests in Being-in-the-world; but by 'world' he later came to mean the clearing of Being, wherein man stands out from his thrown essence.⁶⁷

Much of this will be called in question by Merleau-Ponty. But before I turn to Merleau-Ponty I would like to make one further remark about Heidegger's preference for temporal over spatial structures. For he does speak of the spatiality of Dasein and the spatiality of Being-in-the-world. Innerworldly ready-to-hand (*Zuhandene*) tools belong in a region, along with other human beings, and are there for Dasein through Dasein's daily dealings both with the former and the latter. The encounter with the ready-to-hand (including therein the others) is made possible on the basis of the spatiality of Dasein with regard to its Being-in-the-world. The spatiality of Being-in-the-world consists of an abolishing of the distance (*Ent-fernung*), i.e., an approximation based upon the 'subjective' a priori of Being-in-the-world.⁶⁸ De-severance or approximation is complemented by directionality or orientation. And both have to be regarded as modes of Being of Being-in-the-world. One constitutive moment of Being-in-the-world is Dasein's taking up space (*Einräumen*) through the circumspective concern and solicitude with which it discovers a region. Taking up space (*Einräumen*) also means making up space – *Raumgeben*. Hence Heidegger concludes: 'Space is not in the subject, nor is the world in space. Rather, space is "in" the world in so far as space

has been disclosed by the Being-in-the-world which is constitutive for Dasein.⁶⁹ The notion of disclosedness, which is based on anticipation in the future, shows that the temporality of Being-in-the-world is the fundament of the specific spatiality of Dasein. The spatiality of Dasein, constituted by directionality and de-severance, can only be 'spiritual' (*geistig*), because the extended (physical) body would not be capable of taking up space in that quite specific sense. Thus, 'in existing, it has already "made room for" its own "field of play" (*Spielraum eingeräumt*)'⁷⁰ which latter is neither an extended physical space nor a space which can be opened up without the necessary modes of Being of Dasein which are themselves based on temporality, in the sense of an existential foundation. Thus, for reasons of normative preference, Heidegger gives the temporal structure preference over a spatial structure which could actually have been developed further with a view to a basic description of inter-facticity. But so far from attempting to draw the consequences which follow from any such introduction of the body as that which could alone be the medium of a 'taking up space', he does not even try to explain the ontological reasons for the preference accorded by him to time.⁷¹ Had he paid more attention to the phenomenon of 'taking up space', he could not have neglected the body, i.e., the own body as well as the body of the other (see chap. 5, vol. I of the present work). The rationale behind this criticism and the re-evaluation of the significance of the body can only adequately be addressed with reference to the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

II Some remarks by Merleau-Ponty directed at Heidegger

In texts by Merleau-Ponty we find scattered remarks and a few criticisms directed at Heidegger, which we shall take up in order to develop a few comments which might have led to a dialogue between the two philosophers; witnesses of such an event could at least have tried to comprehend *what* one learnt from the other and *how* the one understood the other.⁷²

For Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger is a philosopher who has managed to regain possession of the self and, consequently, to free the self from any external, worldly determination. However, whereas Husserl's radical reflection focuses on the privileged domain of consciousness in terms of its reflective power, Heidegger is obliged to introduce unfounded elements into his philosophy. That is, according to Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger does not focus on a privileged domain of knowledge as did Husserl; rather, he incorporates much more primordial and 'irrational elements'⁷³ into his philosophy. Therefore, it was only to be expected that he would bring his philosophy back to the domain of 'facticity'.

But actually, and this is probably Merleau-Ponty's strongest criticism of Heidegger, he simply uses 'dogmatic formula'⁷⁴ for the definition of the philosophical attitude and knowledge. He 'seems to see no difficulties in assuming an unconditional philosophic intuition'.⁷⁵

The point is not that an unconsciousness is built into philosophical knowledge: for instance, even Husserl was prepared to admit a 'certain degree of naivety'.⁷⁶ But he did so by using the method of 'bracketing' and carefully describing its status and role. Heidegger, however, takes his stand in the Being-in-the-world of Dasein which, for Merleau-Ponty, means that the philosopher who is 'thrown' into the world would, for this very reason, have difficulty in arriving at a state of adequate knowledge. For example, the *natürliche Weltbegriff*, the natural concept of the world, has to be understood, according to Heidegger, independently of the sciences.⁷⁷ Thus, Merleau-Ponty criticizes Heidegger for presupposing an understanding of, and a thinking about, the world which dispenses with human experiences and the empirical sciences. Heidegger's descriptions already assume that the everyday subject is capable of raising its arm in order to drive a nail into the wall, that it is capable of looking around, communicating with others and so on. The reader notices too late that the author's very detailed and exact descriptions of Dasein's being-in-the-world are matched by an equally complete negligence of the world. This is the ground on which it has been claimed that the basis of Merleau-Ponty's understanding of experience is laid out 'deeper' than Heidegger's.⁷⁸

The difference between the empirical sciences and philosophy, or even stronger, between the former and the prerogatives accorded by Heidegger to a philosophy which overlooks the contextual features of the world is not itself the only problem. To be sure, the human sciences and our ordinary human understanding already presuppose the philosophical knowledge of the world and its principles. The empirical investigator simply assumes such principles as that of induction in order to understand the facts. Even Husserl has his a priori assumptions. However, Husserl addressed the question of the reciprocal relation between philosophy and the natural attitude by his method of 'bracketing', i.e., his phenomenological reduction. For Merleau-Ponty, philosophical reflection is only truly radical if it understands itself as a 'reflection upon the pre-reflective'; that is, if it does not forget its dependence upon the pre-objective functions of life from whence it arises, if it does not forget itself as event, and if it does not forget to comprehend itself as a situated and contingent movement of thinking. A phenomenological reduction which responds to these requirements leads on to an existential phenomenology: 'Heidegger's "being-in-the-world" appears only against the background of the phenomenological reduction.'⁷⁹

Heidegger, by contrast, or so Merleau-Ponty argues, remains fixed on

the opposition between the ontological and the ontic and tries to investigate Being-in-the-world through his preoccupation with a thinking about wholeness. Hence, Merleau-Ponty's criticism focuses on Heidegger's two drastic distinctions between the ontological and the ontic, on the one hand, and between authenticity and inauthenticity, on the other.

Quite rightly, Merleau-Ponty points out that Heidegger is not concerned with a description of Dasein as an autonomous and fundamental sphere but that he tries to get 'through Da-sein', to Being, and that therefore, the analysis of human attitudes is 'undertaken only because man is the interrogation of Being'.⁸⁰ Merleau-Ponty notices that Heidegger's analysis of truth and our openness to truth, as required by 'Being and Time', overshadows his description of anxiety, freedom and concern. In Heidegger's later writing, which we shall briefly consider at the end of the paper, the relation between human beings and Being is no longer regarded as an *ekstasis* or in terms of a centrifugal movement of the self towards Being. Which prompts Merleau-Ponty to ask the following question: 'If we call philosophy the quest for Being or for the *ineinander*, is not philosophy quickly brought to silence – that very silence which Heidegger's essays break from time to time?'⁸¹

Heidegger's *abstract worldless existence* is replaced, in Merleau-Ponty's thinking, with an investigation of the body, a body which consists essentially of Being-to-the-world, and which is, or so I would argue, construed rather differently from the Heideggerian notion of Being-in-the-world. For Merleau-Ponty, the world is the field of our experiences, and we are a certain modification of it. Therefore, he can open a third dimension on this side (*en deçà*) of the inner and outer, self and world by means of the 'body', and later by way of a 'deepening' thinking which leads into the concept of a 'wild being'.

III Merleau-Ponty's 'bodily existence'

To disentangle the ambiguous way in which the notion of the body is brought out, we need to look at its particular usages. We⁸² observe the body in the empirical worldly natural context as a physical body among other things. It has its spatial relations, a form, and it affects, and is affected by, the world. 'Far from my body's being for me no more than a fragment of space, there would be no space at all for me if I had no body.'⁸³ For Merleau-Ponty, it makes little sense to say: my arm rises to greet a friend, my hand drives a nail in the wall, a car hits my body in the city. For only the actor would distance himself from the body in that way.⁸⁴ Rather, at this point, and in agreement with Heidegger's notion of *Einräumen*, I raise my arm to greet a friend, I drive a nail in the wall and I hit myself with the hammer. In these cases we deal with the body

as a body in which we live; it is an affected object which has pain and kinaesthetic sensations, which I feel internally, and which I do not ascribe to myself from the outside. Therefore, my physical body is not the same as my living body. When 'I regard my body, which is my point of view upon the world, as one of the objects of that world',⁸⁵ I falsify the sense of what it is to be a body. For body and object are not binary poles on the same level of abstraction, since only through the functioning of my body do I recognize my body as a part of the world. In this sense, the body stands in a relation to the 'I' and so 'I cannot understand the function of the living body except by enacting it myself, and except in so far as I am a body which rises towards the world'.⁸⁶ In other words, I can only understand the (own) body from the point of view of the functions of the body, since all 'possession' of the world, that is all cognition, action and expression presuppose the body. Therefore, the body is the relation between the world and myself, a relation which is itself directed towards the world. 'The world is not what I think, but what I live through. I am open to the world, I have no doubt that I am in communication with it but I do not possess it; it is inexhaustible.'⁸⁷ The body '“understands” in the cultivation of habits'⁸⁸ because the body inhabits space and time.⁸⁹ Habitual body means habituated body as well as habituating body. Since I perceive through my body (i.e., the body is the medium through which I relate to the world), and since I therefore inhabit the world through my body, my perceptions and actions are habituated and habituating.

It is peculiar, however, that, on the one hand, the body fulfils its mediating role more adequately the less its materiality is felt. A heavy body does not run well, a mentally ill patient needs to 'find' his arm before he can draw an abstract figure.⁹⁰ In all these cases, malfunctions, or the condition of the environment, point to the materiality of the body which stands back in 'normal' situations, e.g., I write 'better' when I am not conscious of my fingers moving along the keyboard. On the other hand, the body does have its materiality in the sense of its situatedness in the world. Our body is not only a medium of communication but is also 'our anchorage in a world'.⁹¹ If the body is the medium between the I and the physical body, the I and the world, then we can infer that *through* the body I *have* the world and have my *anchorage* in the world.

A further sense of the body is that it is a body-subject, 'a natural self and, as it were, the subject of perception'.⁹² This idea, which radicalizes the thought that the body is on this side (*en deçà*) of the alternatives of consciousness and the thing, can now be formulated in a positive way: the body through which we perceive and which is the subject of perception is itself the 'natural ego', that is, the 'expression of a concrete Ego'⁹³ which belongs neither to the determinate sphere of nature nor to the (indeterminate) sphere of free will. Rather, I am conscious of the world

through my body and I am conscious of my body through the world. We are body-subjects and we have a (bodily) space because of our body. A bodily being is presupposed by all actions and cognitions. The embodiment of the world, or bodily spatialization (*Einräumen*), is determined in accordance with the borders of my (living) bodily space, a space which makes up my existence and my 'being alive' (the concept of which is broader than Heidegger's because, in addition to its spatial connotations, it includes that of 'being born'). Thus, the directedness towards the world, and the unity of the world, is realized through the schema of the body. Hence the subject of synthesis is not the 'I' (as with Husserl), but the body.

Merleau-Ponty certainly does not think that the body is pure passivity; rather it is the rising and falling off of an activity, which is not in the sphere of the pre-ego.⁹⁴ The crucial difference between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl seems to be the following: Merleau-Ponty follows Husserl in some respects. However, he does not subscribe to the Husserlian transcendental reduction which, despite its insights into the genesis of consciousness, remains within the privileged realm of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty's conception does go beyond the limits of a philosophy of consciousness because the body is not a reality for *consciousness*, as it is for Husserl, but rather for *existence* – life and the natural I. So, if the bodily subject is the basis or pre-supposition of a reflective, projective, constituting and expressive, consciousness, corporality cannot be made into a constituted object for a constituting consciousness which would then have to place itself prior to 'corporality'. Thus, in his articulation of the primordial structures of existence, Merleau-Ponty locates subjectivity not in the mind or consciousness, but in the body, which is, therefore, the locus of intentionality, as presence to the world and openness upon its possibilities.

Thus, the intentionality which, in connection with Heidegger's description of being-with, would have to be located *in-between* the others, can find its application here: since we perceive through the body, the body must have understood the world already. Consequently, Merleau-Ponty can bring out a moment of perception which happens in myself without being merely initiated by my mind nor strictly caused by the physical body. Perception takes place somewhat in anonymity. 'Every perception takes place in an atmosphere of generality and is presented to us anonymously. . . . Every sensation carries within it the germ of a dream or depersonalization.'⁹⁵ Therefore, sensitivity or perception is neither an objective nor a subjective state of consciousness. This anonymous existence reveals the non-egological sense of the field of experience, a sense which can be taken up into the personal ego. This becomes particularly apparent with the notion of 'perspective', a notion which corresponds to the subjective side of an inter-subjective constitution of sense. Thus, the

body is embedded in the concrete ego (whose expression it is) as a pre-personal, anonymous, natural and cultural existence. It is that which my personal existence always was from my birth (which is an anonymous natality) and so on towards my death (which is an anonymous mortality).⁹⁶ And it is that which it has become through life. It is my primary and my secondary nature, both natural and cultural at once.⁹⁷ In other words, I am my body.

Temporality also has a role as a dimension of existence. His analysis of time relies heavily on Husserl and Heidegger in distinguishing a lived time from an objective time. Time is understood as subject, the subject as time.⁹⁸ Yet by contrast with Heidegger, who contrasts an authentic with an inauthentic time, Merleau-Ponty locates us in a present which expands into the past and future as 'presence-to-the-world'. In other words, time, for Merleau-Ponty, is a time of existence. However, neither the body nor existence can be taken as original because they presuppose each other in the *drame existentiel*⁹⁹ of life: the body is a fixed and general existence, and existence means undergoing embodiment.

I am my body, at least wholly to the extent that I possess experience, and yet, at the same time, my body is, as it were, a 'natural' subject, a 'provisional sketch of my total being.'¹⁰⁰ It is my mode of being in the world. Thus it represents the facticity, concrete quality and personal style of my intentions and actions which become recognizable by other individuals, at least in theory, as my way of being and acting. Thus, according to Merleau-Ponty, my body is my way, and my style, of projecting myself towards the realm of things. The object '*is already in front of us as an other, thereby helping us to understand how there might be perception of other people.*'¹⁰¹ In some sense, I always know of the existence of others by looking at any cultural object since they are always experienced, if not explicitly, at least implicitly, under the 'veil of anonymity'.¹⁰² The others belong to the world and, therefore, co-exist with each other; however, they co-exist in a condition of (relative) indifference, i.e. as an anonymous generality in an undifferentiated social field.

The undifferentiated social field is one side of the notion of inter-facticity; the other side, belongs to the actual encounter with the others. If perception takes place in a sphere of anonymity, and if the perspectival character of perception is due to the concreteness of my incarnate consciousness, then it seems as if the perception of the other is established through a notion of *inter-corporality*¹⁰³ as well as through a process of *de-differentiation*. Inter-corporality (something like an anonymous bodiliness which I share with other organisms – a common language),¹⁰⁴ can be taken as a fundamental structure of our bodily being-to-the-world, one which not only encompasses our pre-personal, anonymous articulation of concrete co-existence, but which also points to the ontological relevance

of a 'third dimension', i.e., a contexture of embodiment into which ego and world do not collapse because our concrete bodily co-existence with the other shows itself through our sensibility regarding the other. This sensibility is not meant in the form of physical violence but in the form of a 'violence' in which the other's look can affect me. The look of the other (without my necessarily seeing her) can be felt as a burning in my neck;¹⁰⁵ it can make me uncomfortable or flatter my vanity. The 'violence' of the other's look shows the power of a certain dialectic between me and the concretely undifferentiated other. Thus, the de-anonymization of the other is a process of de-differentiation which takes place on the basis of anonymous, pre-personal inter-corporality. In as much as the sphere of inter-corporality prevents anything like a proper distinction between ownness and otherness, the sense of the own can only arise from the *differentiation of the own from the alien*.¹⁰⁶

What is important in inter-personal perception is that I experience *how* the others look, *how* the others smile, i.e., I see *how* the others 'carry' their personal style in a process of *diminishing* otherness and anonymity. The encounter with others and the world is established through a primordial anonymous socialization, as the element of de-personalization within inter-personal experience. Hence, there remains a *drama* of de-differentiation played out in terms of a de-anonymization which brings with it a certain de-personalization. Moreover, a total personalization would not, in Merleau-Ponty's view, be desirable since it would result in a total detachment from the world; hence, it would result in the loss of myself, as body-subject; which in turn would produce the very opposite of what was sought, namely total de-personalization.

Moreover, any theories which try to explain the relation to the other in terms of an analogy or in terms of an oscillating between inner and outer, introjection and projection forget that the problem of the other is only a special case of the relation to the *others* and that this entire relation is transformed in the light of Merleau-Ponty's resetting of the analysis.

Others are not situated at a distance from me. They are to be found in my experience, lodged in the crevices which indicate what I do not see and what they see. Our experiences are therefore truthfully interrelated. Together, each clearly possesses what is unknown to the others. Through our conjoined functioning, we form a totality which progresses towards enlightenment and fulfilment. Our opening upon the others is sufficient to put us in their perspective, both intellectually and imaginatively. We are never shut up in ourselves.¹⁰⁷

Recapitulating the emergence of the three basic determinations of the body which are all closely related: (1) the body is the medium of being

towards the world, (2) it provides an anchorage in the world and (3) it appears as a natural Ego. The manifest 'ambiguity' consists in the fact that none of these usages can be developed univocally; rather there remains a 'tension' among them which keeps them as a '*drama*', as *bodily existence*, as being-to-the-world. Our experiences of movement, sexuality, sensitivity, cognition, etc. open up for us a mode of access to the world but only on the basis of the factum that we already are *to* the world. So we are held in a tension of engagement in, and detachment from, the world. In other words, we are always caught up in a *movement* to-the-world. The subject cannot be without being-to-the-world; to exist is to be to the world ('exister, c'est être au monde'¹⁰⁸). And, in contrast to Heidegger, being-in-the-truth is not to be distinguished from being-in-the-world.¹⁰⁹

IV From 'Escape' and 'drama' to 'leap' and 'dramatic depth'

The central notion of 'bodily existence' makes it possible to draw the lines between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, on the one side, and between Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, on the other. The Husserlian transcendental subject is given up in the name of a return to an existential, incarnate subject which opens up a finite, factual and fully concrete existence towards the world, and which holds us in a tension between the modes of engagement and detachment. The *existential drama* marks a movement of thinking which is not (as is Heidegger's) centrifugal, but which is both *centrifugal* and *centripetal*. More specifically, the abstract movement is centrifugal, the concrete movement is centripetal; the former takes place in the realm of possibility or of non-being (non-ontic), the latter takes place in the realm of reality (world) or being; the former unfolds its background, the latter is attached to the background. In distinction to Husserl and Heidegger therefore, Merleau-Ponty's thinking can be considered neither as egocentric nor as monocentric.

With regard to our principal question concerning Being-in-the-world *with* others, it turns out that Merleau-Ponty did not just take over this notion. He does not follow Heidegger in the normative accentuation of authenticity and inauthenticity, nor does his description of Being-to-the-world follow the itinerary of Heidegger's pejorative description of inauthenticity and everydayness. Since I diagnosed Heidegger's *Daseins analytik* in terms of an acosmism, it is obvious that he does not give us a developed theory of inter-facticity. A social theory, or a theme of inter-subjectivity, was not his main interest. Nevertheless, his descriptions of alienation and co-existence are of interest, especially with regard to his conception of Being-in-the-world and the difficulty he encounters in addressing the regression back to a worldly context. It is for this reason

that I have called his thinking *monocentric*. Any thinking which detaches itself from its pre-objective modes, from a reflection upon itself and its relation to the world can be considered a transmundane thinking, or, to name it with a notion from Merleau-Ponty's later text: a '*pensée de survol* [qui diment] l'inhérence de l'être au néant et du néant à l'être'.¹¹⁰

This thinking 'surveys' (literally, flies over), because it searches for an absolute evidence which will surmount the historicity of our existence and world by way of a transmundane isolation which is detached from its pre-objective, pre-reflective fundaments. Thus, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy radicalizes Heidegger's work in so far as it searches for interfactivity *in and through* the concrete, dramatic play of life. However, Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* does still retain a vestigial link with the trans-mundane and trans-social thinking of a philosophy of consciousness. Thus, in his last work, *The Visible and Invisible*, he notes that the problems posed in the earlier works were insoluble because 'I [Merleau-Ponty] start out there from the "consciousness"-"object" distinction.'¹¹¹ Whether this self-criticism is too harsh does not matter. Much more interesting is his attempt to 'deepen' his thinking with notions of the 'between' (of detachment and engagement) and with a transformation of 'bodily existence' into a concept of 'wild [*sauvage*] Being', a 'there is' (*il y a*) or a concept of 'flesh' (*chair*) which takes him away from any philosophy of consciousness.

From now on the body names the visibility of the self and its becoming visible (*natura naturata* and *natura naturans*), a process in which we and the others participate since we belong to the same texture of the world. The third dimension is now described as the field of the 'inter-', the chasm (*chiasme*), in which the reversal between the visible and invisible takes place. Inter-corporality, which shows itself as a fundamental structure of our bodily Being-to-the-world, not only concerns the pre-personal and pre-objective functions of meaning constitution, but also the ontological relevance of a social field in which I and others are intertwined. A movement of thinking which comprehends a philosophy of the chasm is contrary to a *pensée survolante* which escapes from the world in an acosmism.

For Heidegger, the world in its transcendental structure is not an ordered world in the sense of a cosmos with articulated phenomena. For Merleau-Ponty, the world is certainly not reducible to the field of all Beings, i.e., the clearing of the Being through the disclosedness of the Da of Dasein. Rather world is a 'polymorphous matrix' (*matrice polymorphe*)¹¹² i.e., nature as the other side of the human (as flesh, not as matter), as texture, as vertical and carnal universe, as barbaric principle.¹¹³ The flesh is a cosmological dimension in the form of a 'wild' Being constituting nature and affecting the place of the intertwining chasm. The reversibility of the visible and the tangible opens us up to

an intercorporality which is expanded further than the things which I see momentarily.¹¹⁴ Thus, his ontology is one of 'depth' in the sense of an 'amorphous' world of perception which, in its autonomy and simultaneity, also furnishes an inspirational source for painters like Cézanne.¹¹⁵ Thus, Merleau-Ponty's new style of thinking will make good use of a painterly notion like *chiaroscuro*. For *chiaroscuro* describes a certain way in which the phenomena of light and shade can be treated in a painting so as to produce the *impression* of depth.

If the result of our analysis concerning Heidegger's earlier work *Being and Time* is the diagnosis of a monocentric, centrifugal, i.e., abstract, movement of thinking, then it seems highly unlikely that he can address the depth of the reversal effected by Merleau-Ponty as between the visible and visibility, that is, the flesh, or the amorphous world of perception – which brings with it an ontological rehabilitation of the sensible. Consequently, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Heidegger's thinking can also be regarded as one which deserves the title *pensée survolante*. For the 'turn' in Heidegger's thinking moves from a dimension in which the human is primary (even though the thinking forces human reality into a condition of isolation) to a dimension in which Being is primary.¹¹⁶ The work in which Heidegger prepares the way for an overcoming of metaphysics is his later essay 'Zeit und Sein' which is, at least for him, a thematical continuation of his earlier work dating back to 1927. 'To think Being explicitly,' he writes, 'requires us to relinquish Being as the ground of beings in favour of the giving which prevails concealed in unconcealment, that is, in favour of the *It gives* [*Es gibt*].'¹¹⁷ However, it is very doubtful whether this *Es gibt* can be thought of as an ontological rehabilitation of the sensible, or as a 'wild Being', in Merleau-Ponty's sense.

If this interpretation of Dasein's isolation (solipsism) and escape from the world (acosmism) is correct, then the Heideggerian 'turn' could not be thought as a continuation of his earlier work, but would have to be regarded as a 'leap', a *salto mortale*, a leap out of metaphysics and into . . . what? The collectivity? New paths of thought? A new consideration of art and technology?

Notes

1 Compare also Spiegelberg (1984), p. 581 who speaks of the notion of 'being alive'.

2 See the remark by the translator, R. Boehm, of the German edition of Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 7.

3 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (SZ), p. 12.

4 Sallis, p. 39.

5 SZ, p. 13.

6 Husserl, p. 151.

7 Theunissen, p. 188.

8 Theunissen, p. 188.

9 The term inter-facticity is chosen over the term inter-subjectivity because Heidegger, as well as Merleau-Ponty, takes issue against philosophies of subjectivity, especially Cartesian subjectivity. Both have, though in different ways, reworked the notion of the subject; therefore, it seems to be inappropriate to ask for a notion of inter-subjectivity in the case of Heidegger.

10 SZ, p. 38.

11 Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, tr. Colin Smith as *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. xv.

12 Perhaps some readers wonder that Merleau-Ponty uses the term *sujet* (subject) frequently and without hesitation. The term 'subject' does not carry the connotations of a Kantian substance but should be linked to Thomas Aquinas' notions of 'pati, recipere, subjectum esse'.

13 Spiegelberg (1984), p. 566.

14 SZ, p. 64.

15 SZ, p. 86.

16 SZ, p. 120.

17 SZ, p. 124.

18 SZ, p. 118.

19 See Meyer-Drawe, p. 105, or Theunissen, p. 168.

20 Pöggeler, p. 63.

21 Lévinas, p. 49.

22 Waldenfels (1971), p. 54.

23 Theunissen, p. 181.

24 Compare SZ, p. 122.

25 SZ, p. 122, my emphasis.

26 His descriptions even influenced some psychologists, e.g. Binswanger, who in turn was read by Merleau-Ponty. See Spiegelberg (1972).

27 Meyer-Drawe, p. 107.

28 SZ, p. 126.

29 I shall exclude the thematization of *Rede*, which essentially means the articulation of the disclosedness of the *Da*, because an analysis of its constituents would expand the line of thought unnecessarily in regard to the purpose of this paper.

30 SZ, p. 137.

31 SZ, p. 144.

32 SZ, p. 148.

33 SZ, pp. 133, 175.

34 SZ, p. 167.

35 SZ, p. 133.

36 SZ, p. 176.

37 SZ, p. 184.

38 Heidegger, *Humanismusbrief*, p. 315.

39 SZ, p. 192.

40 SZ, p. 193.

41 Also see Thomä, chap. D, sect. 3.

42 Again, I exclude the description of 'speech', see end n. 29.

43 SZ, p. 336.

44 SZ, p. 336.

45 SZ, p. 336.

46 SZ, p. 339.

47 SZ, p. 340.

48 SZ, p. 340.

49 SZ, p. 341.

50 SZ, p. 342.

51 SZ, p. 343.

52 SZ, p. 343.

53 SZ, p. 346.

54 SZ, p. 338.

55 This problem has been discussed extensively in the secondary literature by e.g. Jamme, Tugendhat, Thomä, Wohlfahrt.

56 SZ, p. 295.

57 Theunissen believes that 'everydayness melts more and more into inauthenticity' (Theunissen, p. 193). However, I think that this description begs the question whether *Verfallen* can be considered as an equivalent of existence and facticity. Further, 'equivalent' can be interpreted in terms of value and in terms of originality. Heidegger speaks of the latter explicitly and is in any case not entitled to suppose the former.

58 SZ, p. 277.

59 See Meyer-Drawe, p. 115.

60 SZ, p. 338.

61 SZ, p. 303.

62 SZ, p. 365.

63 Thomä, p. 304.

64 Kant, p. xiii.

65 Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy and other essays (Praise)*, p. 178, corrected tr., 'du soi vers l'Etre', *Résumés de cours*, p. 154.

66 See Heidegger, *Humanismusbrief*.

67 *ibid*.

68 SZ, p. 110.

69 SZ, p. 111.

70 SZ, p. 368.

71 Actually in his later essay 'Zeit und Sein' he says in reference to SZ, §70, that the spatiality of Dasein cannot be reconnected with temporality.

72 Since a real confrontation between the two philosophers would have undoubtedly led to misunderstanding, Boehm confronted the two by showing *how* they might have encountered each other in the subject-matter (*Sache*) without judging how in fact they did understand and misunderstand each other.

73 Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception (Primacy)*, p. 93.

74 *Primacy*, p. 93.

75 *Primacy*, p. 92.

76 *Primacy*, p. 94.

77 Compare e.g. SZ, p. 52.

78 See Müller, pp. 226/7 who also refers to Waehlens, p. 2, in this passage.

79 *PP*, p. xiv.

80 Merleau-Ponty, *Praise*, p. 177-8.

81 *Praise*, p. 179. Unfortunately the translation by J. Wild and J. Edie is misleading here. Compare *Résumés de cours*, p. 156, 'la recherche de l'Etre ou celle de l'Ineinander . . . ce silence justement que rompent de temps en temps les petits écrits de Heidegger?'

82 Merleau-Ponty prefers the 'we' to the 'I' in order to express his move away from any egological conception of the relation to the world.

83 *PP*, p. 102.

84 *PP*, p. 104.

85 *PP*, p. 70.

86 *PP*, p. 75.

87 *PP*, p. xvii.

88 *PP*, p. 144.

89 The notions 'space' and 'time' are meant to be taken as *lived* space and *lived* time, and not as physical space and time.

90 *PP*, p. 109; also see other cases of abnormalities which are used by Merleau-Ponty to show the body functions in relation to the I and the world.

91 *PP*, p. 144.

92 *PP*, p. 206.

93 *PP*, p. 55.

94 Compare this account with Husserl's notions of 'passive Synthese' and 'fungierende Intentionalität'. Only by way of transcendental consciousness can the Husserlian phenomenologist discover the passive achievements of a consciousness which goes beyond myself and which is disclosed to the natural attitude.

95 *PP*, p. 215.

96 See *PP*, p. 215.

97 Merleau-Ponty, *La structure du comportement*, p. 227, footnote:

Il y aurait lieu cependant d'approfondir la distinction de notre 'corps naturel', qui est toujours déjà là, déjà constitué pour la conscience, et de notre corps 'culturel' qui est la sédimentation de ses actes spontanés. Le problème est posé par Husserl quand il distingue 'passivité originaire' et 'passivité secondaire'.

98 Cf. the chap. on temporality in *PP*.

99 *PP*, p. 194.

100 *PP*, p. 198.

101 Merleau-Ponty, 'The experience of the other', p. 37.

102 *PP*, p. 399.

103 See the notion of 'intercorporéité in Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible* (VI), pp. 186, 188.

104 See Merleau-Ponty, 'La perception de l'autre et le dialogue'.

105 See e.g. Merleau-Ponty, VI, p. 102.

106 See Waldenfels (1987), p. 132.

107 Merleau-Ponty, *Les Aventures de la Dialectique*, pp. 186/7; compare also Meyer-Drawe, p. 155.

108 *PP*, p. 361.

109 *PP*, p. 395.

110 VI, p. 104.

111 VI, p. 253.

112 VI, p. 274.

113 See VI, p. 321.

114 See VI, p. 188.

115 See Merleau-Ponty's essay 'Cézanne's doubt'.

116 See, for instance, Heidegger's *Humanismusbrief*.

117 Heidegger, *Zeit und Sein*, p. 6. Note the difference between the German *es gibt* and the French *il y a* which does not carry the connotation of a 'giving'.

Bibliography

- Boehm, R., 'CIASMA, Merleau-Ponty und Heidegger', in V. Klostermann (ed.), *Durchblicke, Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1970).
- Heidegger, M., *Humanismusbrief*, in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978).
- *Sein und Zeit* (SZ) 15th edn (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1979), tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson as *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).
- 'Überwindung der Metaphysik', in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1985).
- 'Vom Wesen der Technik', in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1985).
- 'Zeit und Sein', in *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1988).
- Husserl, E., *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*, Husserliana VI, ed. W. Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).
- Kant, I., *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, 2. Auflage 1787 (Berlin: Akademie-Textausgabe, 1968).
- Lévinas, E., 'Philosophy and the idea of infinity', in *Collected Philosophical Papers*, E. Lévinas, tr. A. Lingis (Dordrecht: Nijhoff Publishers, 1987).
- Merleau-Ponty, M., *La structure du comportement* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1942).
- *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945) (PP), tr. Colin Smith as *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962).
- *In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays*, tr. J. Wild, J. Edie and J. O'Neill (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988).
- 'Phenomenology and the sciences of man', tr. J. Wild, in *The Primacy of Perception*, ed. J. M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964).
- 'La perception de l'autre et le dialogue', in *La prose du monde*, ed. C. Lefort (Paris: Gallimard, 1969).
- *Les Aventure de la Dialectique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1955).
- *Résumés de cours, Collège de France, 1952-1960* (Paris: Gallimard, 1968).
- 'Cézanne's doubt', in *Sense and Non-Sense*, tr. H. L. Dreyfus and P. A. Dreyfus (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964).
- 'The experience of the other', tr. A. L. Fisher and H. J. Silverman, in *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, xviii (2, 3) (1982-3).
- *Le visible et l'invisible* (VI) (Paris: Gallimard, 1964).
- Müller, W., *Etre-au-monde, Grundlinien einer philosophischen Anthropologie bei Maurice Merleau-Ponty* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1975).
- Meyer-Drawe, K., *Leiblichkeit und Sozialität* (München: Fink Verlag, 1984).
- Pöggeler, O., *Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger* (Freiburg/München, 1974).
- Richir, M., 'Le sens de la phénoménologie', in *Esprit* (June 1982).
- Sallis, J., 'Where does "Being and Time" begin?', in Frederick Essiston (ed.), *Heidegger's Existential Analysis* (New York: Mouton Publishers, 1978).
- Spiegelberg, H., *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972).
- *The Phenomenological Movement*, 3rd edn (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984).

- Theunissen, M., *The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber*, tr. C. Macann (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1984).
- Thomä, D., *Die Zeit des Selbst und die Zeit danach. Zur Kritik der Textgeschichte Martins Heideggers, 1910–1976* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1990).
- Waelhens, A., *Une Philosophie de l'Ambiguïté* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1978).
- Waldenfels, B., *Im Zwischenreich des Dialogs. Sozialphilosophische Untersuchungen in Anschluß an Edmund Husserl* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971).
- *Ordnung im Zwielficht* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987).

Lask, Lukács, Heidegger: the problem of irrationality and the theory of categories

István M. Fehér

Emil Lask scarcely ranks among the widely known philosophers of our century. His work, H. Sommerhäuser wrote on the occasion of his ninetyeth birthday, 'has remained practically without any aftermath'.¹ The number of studies dedicated to his thought has remained relatively small up to our own time. This claim about the lack of influence, however, may also be understood in terms of the lack of an *explicit* or *direct* influence, and it may admit some kind of an indirect, more subtle and hidden impact.

Indeed, it is not insignificant that we find appreciation and acknowledgement of Lask's work in Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness* and in Heidegger's *Being and Time* – two of the most influential philosophical works of our century. Lukács praised Lask for having perceived 'most clearly and uncompromisingly' what he came to regard as one of the ultimate problems of philosophical system-building (namely that 'irrational' matter reaches into the form and thus into the structure of the system), and called him, therefore, 'the most ingenious and coherent among the modern neo-Kantians'.² Lask was the only one outside the phenomenological school, Heidegger claimed in his turn, who took up Husserl's *Logical Investigations* in a positive sense and did not limit himself, in critically rethinking Husserl's theory of truth, to what was said in the first volume of Husserl's work.³

What *History and Class Consciousness* and *Being and Time* have in common is their attempt to overcome the dominating epistemological tradition of the day, i.e., they attempt to transcend it within the framework of a historical (Lukács) or an ontological (Heidegger) perspective. Their positive references to Lask are thus significant on their own account. But the significance of such references increases if we realize that, precisely in virtue of their attempt at a break, Heidegger and Lukács display little generosity or acknowledgement toward their spiritual

ancestors (those whose 'bourgeois' thinking makes them unable to grasp the 'totality', or the metaphysical tradition sunk into oblivion of Being). The fact that in two of the most influential philosophical works of our century, both extremely critical of their contemporaries, the work of Lask is positively referred to allows us to view the claim concerning Lask's lack of influence in new light. Since apart from Lask there is, as far as I can see, no other philosopher *both* Lukács and Heidegger quote with acknowledgement, and, further, in works of theirs preceding their *magnum opus* the name of Lask turns up with a certain frequency – so much so that we even find one Laskian passage quoted significantly by both (II, 333). This fact occasions a comparative study of Lukács and Heidegger with an eye to the way they confronted – adopted, criticized or developed – Laskian themes. In what follows I wish to offer a contribution to such a study. An attempt will be made to show Laskian influences and parallels (1) in Lukács' development up to and including *History and Class Consciousness*, and (2) in Heidegger's development up to and including *Being and Time*. The discussion of the Laskian influences and parallels will be preceded in both cases by a short sketch of the development of the philosopher in question (Lukács, viz. Heidegger) in order to make visible the philosophical perspective in which the confrontation with Lask took place, and to better situate the respective convergences or divergences. I will conclude the paper by comparing more directly Lukács and Heidegger with regard to (and also beyond) their relation to Lask.⁴

I Lukács and Lask

1.1 *Lukács and the quest for system*

'The system is a structure of mastering the totality [*Gesamtbewältigungsgefüge*], an all-encompassing unity', writes Lask in one of his unpublished fragments bearing the title of 'Die philosophische systematik' (III, 253). Roughly at the same time, during World War I, in his similarly unpublished fragmentary *Heidelberg Aesthetics* Lukács complained about the 'inevitable difficulty' of having to centre his discussion of strictly aesthetic problems around questions pertaining to philosophical systematization (*Systematization*), without having a chance to pose, let alone to answer, the problem of the system itself. The difficulty springs from the fact that it is equally impossible to clarify any one philosophical problem without assigning it the systematic connection within the whole, and, conversely, to treat the problem of the philosophical system prior to posing particular philosophical problems.⁵ Any one question, however, once formulated, already anticipates or points to some sort of a system, within which alone it finds its proper 'methodic home'.⁶

Lukács' development from the essays of the early 1910s up to *History and Class Consciousness* can, I think, be aptly characterized by his quest for the system. The sort of all-encompassing unity Lask speaks of, the horizon of the system, was provided for him in *History and Class Consciousness*, within the frame of a Hegelian systematics, by the concept of history. Until this solution was found Lukács had a long way to go. He began as a literary critic, interested in the 'axiology and philosophy of history of the works of art' rather than in their precise critical appraisal.⁷ One of the main themes of Lukács' first collection of essays, *Soul and Form* (1910), is the relation between art and life; more precisely, life as it appears in works of art, and works of art in so far as they are destined to embrace an a priori limited material or content. A basic dilemma which Lukács faces at this point is this. Works of art are of utmost importance in man's life; they have, however, no 'life'. This must be so, for the approach of the work of art to life is to deprive it of its distinctive character, i.e., form. The concept of form provides the criterion to split reality into two distinct spheres. On the one hand, there is the domain of works of art – a world of lucid forms, endowed with absolute validity and meaning; and on the other, there is common, everyday life – a world completely opaque and confused, without any proper intelligibility. Within this distinction, history is, of course, situated in the sphere of everyday life. Indeed, Lukács has only contemptuous and scornful words for it. In what is generally called 'history', he writes, 'something is because it is, and as it is'. History is a domain characterized by 'the unselective power of that which exists just because it exists'.⁸ 'Yet there is an order concealed in the world of history', but it is 'the undefinable order of a carpet or a dance; to interpret its meaning seems impossible, and it is still less possible to give up trying to interpret it'.⁹

Whether possible or not, Lukács in any case did *not* give up trying to interpret it. He did so until he thought he found the longed-for interpretation and meaning in a historicist reading of Hegel, elaborated in *History and Class Consciousness*. Before coming to this point, it is important to see that there is concealed in Lukács' above dilemma a methodological problem. Indeed, once the essential sources of our knowledge of history (and of the world, in general) are provided by different cultural products – works of philosophy, literature, religion, arts – to speak of the 'historicity' of such products comes menacingly close to relativism or scepticism. What is valid should be eternally valid, Lukács seems to suggest in a way similar to Husserl,¹⁰ for to speak of temporary validity, apart from its logical absurdity, would imply a falling back into the chaotic, formless domain of everyday life, characterized by the lack of any norms whatsoever. Still, the way in which change – a succession or perhaps even a development – is possible in the eternal sphere of forms calls for an explanation; for that there *is*, empirically, such a change can hardly be

denied. Or, put in Hegelian terms, how is 'the historicity of timeless Absolute Spirit' possible? 'How is it possible that the arts, religion and philosophy have a history at all?'¹¹ This question, and the perspective connected to it, is likely to have been suggested to Lukács by Lask, who some years before, in his *Antrittsvorlesung* on Hegel, had formulated the question: 'How does it come about that the eternal, that which is not susceptible to change, the timeless world of thought, has a history?' (I, 344f.).

Parallel to and in addition to the Platonic vision of forms indicated here, there was in Lukács, however, from the very beginning, another way to face the same problems – an approach that may be called socio-logical-historical, and was represented by works such as the *History of the Development of Modern Drama* and *The Theory of the Novel*. The latter work is based on the assumption that the novel as a genre, with its characteristically unhappy heroes in its centre, does not belong in the domain of the eternal forms, but is rather to be explained *geschichtsphilosophisch*, that is, as a product of a certain historical period.

Lukács' sensitivity to the problematic suggested by the early twentieth-century cultural crisis, as well as the very form of his early production (the essay-character), may well be seen as parallel to contemporary developments in German philosophy, especially in *Lebensphilosophie*. These developments challenged the systematic character of philosophy by opposing the 'irrationality' of life to philosophy itself. The clearest and sharpest formulation of the fact that scientific questions and problems of life belong to quite different domains was provided by Wittgenstein somewhat later.¹² But in any case, a major dilemma presented itself to early twentieth-century German philosophy in terms of an either-or: philosophers could either insist upon the systematic (or 'scientific') character of philosophy, its claim to universal validity, as it was handed down by predominantly epistemology-oriented neo-Kantianism, thereby running the risk of making philosophy, in the face of urgent problems, ever more irrelevant for life – of making it a sterile academic activity.¹³ Or philosophers could choose to dramatically enunciate the 'irrationality of life', thereby vehemently rejecting systematic (or 'scientific') philosophy with its claim to eternal validity.¹⁴ The alternative is quite clearly articulated by Husserl, who joins in the defence of 'philosophy as strict science' with a sharp criticism of both historicism and the philosophy striving to enunciate a world view (*Weltanschauungsphilosophie*).¹⁵

Lukács, however, for all his susceptibility to the tragic or irrational character of life, did not give up the quest for a 'system'. The posthumously published Heidelberg manuscripts, written during the war, show him engaged in an attempt to embed his aesthetic investigations into the frame of a larger philosophical system. Lukács distinguished here between two kinds of systematization. The first is characterized, in the

Kantian, or rather neo-Kantian fashion, by the total autonomy of the different spheres of theory, ethics, metaphysics and aesthetics. The other, by contrast, although not blind to the specific differences of the different spheres, tries to find a common ground or substratum which can comprehend the various spheres as a whole. This may be 'culture', or even Hegel's 'Spirit'.¹⁶ It is significant that Lukács, from a typically neo-Kantian perspective, rejects the Hegelian view of systematization. For Lukács, the homogenization of the different spheres seems to abolish the autonomy and the specific form of objectuality (*Gegenständlichkeitsform*) of the different spheres – a result which is incompatible with his attempt to lay the foundation for an autonomous aesthetics.

In *History and Class Consciousness* Lukács moves to the Hegelian form of systematization. His appropriation of Hegel's perspective is based upon a reinterpretation of German Idealism and Hegel's dialectics – a reinterpretation in which 'history' emerges as the central interpretive category. This, as Lukács understands it, is not equivalent to a kind of development, change or progress, coming about within the frame of previously established or posited (and as such timeless and ahistorical) values or norms – as the neo-Kantians conceive it. 'History' – he writes – 'does not merely unfold *within* the terrain of validity mapped out by these forms . . . it does not resolve itself into the evolution of *contents*. . . . On the contrary, history is precisely *the history of these forms*.'¹⁷ Or, as he puts this point later, history is '*the history of the unceasing overthrow of the forms of objectuality that shape the life of man*'.¹⁸ The concept of history so interpreted constitutes the axis of Lukács' analyses – it is the all-encompassing horizon destined to function as the organizing principle of the system he was striving for. It is important to see that Lukács attempts to show the emergence of this concept in the midst of the evolution of modern philosophy and of German Idealism in particular. He suggests that it is just such a concept of history that the unsolved difficulties and contradictions of German Idealism point to or call for. When, in his reconstruction of modern philosophy, he claims that it is the distinct feature of Classical German philosophy to have given conceptual elaboration to the new substance, now appearing for the first time, in which the basic order and connection of things are to be found, namely history,¹⁹ it is precisely this concept of history that he has in mind. Indeed, he identifies 'the problem of history' with the 'change [*Werden*] of the real contents'.²⁰ And Lukács views this as a problem with which modern rationalistic thought could not cope.

More particularly, Lukács' reading of modern philosophy and of German Idealism is articulated along the lines of two antinomies. What is at stake is the possibility of an all-encompassing rationalistic philosophical system. Earlier forms of rationalism, Lukács claims, had all been just partial systems: they explored a sector of reality with rational means and

left the others in their intangible irrationality. What is unprecedented in modern rationalism is its endeavour to permeate the totality of being – to construct an all-encompassing philosophical system. Whereas the correlation with the principle of irrationality created no special problem for forms of rationalism conceived as partial systems, it becomes crucial for modern rationalism in virtue of its tendency to grasp the totality: ‘it erodes and dissolves the whole system.’²¹ What erodes and dissolves the system are essentially the two antinomies. The first is ‘the problem of matter (in a logical–methodological sense), the problem of the *content* of those forms with the aid of which “we” know . . . the world’; in other words, this problem leads to the impossibility of penetrating any datum with the aid of rational concepts or of deriving them from such concepts. The second antinomy concerns ‘the question of totality’, i.e., it concerns ‘those ultimate objects of knowledge which are needed to round off the partial systems into a totality’ – problems treated by Kant in his transcendental dialectic (the soul, the world and God).²² Although it appears that we have to do here with two quite different problems, two different aspects of Kant’s concept of the thing-in-itself, upon closer examination we see

that the two quite distinct delimiting functions of the thing-in-itself [viz., the impossibility of grasping the totality with the aid of the conceptual framework provided by partial systems of rationalism, and the irrationality of individual concept-contents (*einzelne Begriffsinhalte*)] are but two sides of the same problem.²³

Now since modern philosophy, in conformity with Kant’s Copernican turn, no longer tends to consider the world in terms of something that has arisen independently of the knowing subject (e.g., as a creation of God), but rather as its own product,²⁴ there arises the demand for a system established by means of a deduction of the world from the subject – a demand compromised in its fulfilment by ‘the irrational character of the givenness of concept-contents.’²⁵ The greatness of German Idealism consists in taking up this challenge: Hegel’s dialectic, in particular, represents a response to this problem situation. His concept of an identical subject–object is destined to come to grips with the problem of the irrationality of the given. Such a unity is assumed in order to make intelligible – i.e., to deduce, to elucidate – the impenetrability of the given, as a product of its creative activity. To fulfil this requirement it is necessary to develop ‘a conception of form oriented towards the concrete content of its material substratum’.²⁶ The unfolding of the activity of the identical subject–object conceived in terms of a material-oriented form must finally be understood as history – history as the change of the forms of objectuality. Under such a perspective, both antinomies are

transcended, the whole of reality (viz., the totality) becomes transparent, and the impenetrable givenness (the irrationality of matter, viz., the concept-contents) simply disappears.²⁷

1.2 Laskian influences

This short sketch of the philosophical development of the young Lukács, together with a survey of some of the major themes of *History and Class Consciousness*, puts us in a position to focus upon Laskian influences.²⁸ Lukács' Hegelian perspective seems to be contrary to Lask's; however, if we understand 'influence' in a broader sense, namely in the sense that a philosopher may take over certain conceptual schemes, analytic tools, etc., from another philosopher, without necessarily retaining their original context, then it may be justified to speak of Lask's influence upon Lukács. The following discussion will begin with and focus upon the concept of irrationality.

If we search for the origins of some of the central concepts Lukács applies in his exposition and analysis of what he considers to be the basic antinomies of modern philosophy, we should realize that Lukács derives his central concept of irrationality from neo-Kantian philosophy and, in particular, from Lask. Indeed, irrationality as a distinct philosophical problem emerged in late nineteenth-century German philosophy.²⁹ In Rickert the term serves to denote individual or empirical reality (in contradistinction to rational and general concepts), and further, since history falls for him under the concept of individuality, it also denotes history.³⁰ Lask takes up the concept in Rickert's sense³¹ and gives it a thorough elaboration.

Among the variety of meanings it assumes in his logical theory, two are particularly important. 'Irrationality' denotes, first, that which is simply non-rational, a-logical, alien to *logos* – just any non-logical content in contradistinction to logical content. 'Irrationality', in a second and more important respect, means the impenetrability of the material – the impossibility for it to be totally permeated by logical forms. On Lask's view, what characterizes the relation between form and material is that logical form encompasses, as it were, the material and lends it theoretical lucidity, meaning – without, however, wholly penetrating it, let alone, creating it. Irrationality in this sense means the impossibility of total rationalization. The 'irrational', in the first sense, is everything except the logical component (*Gehalt*); in the second, however, it is everything, including the logical component in so far as this also may be in the position of 'material' (cf. II, 74–7).

Given the second (and for him characteristic) sense of irrationality, Lask departs from Rickert in an important respect, and indeed criticizes him. Irrationality, he argues, cannot be understood in terms of individuality, just as rationality is not equivalent to generality or universality.

Individual reality is also enclosed and clothed by rational form and is, therefore, in a sense 'rational'. And conversely, the general is 'irrational', in so far as it is itself impenetrable when in the position of the material. What is irrational is *not* the individual sensuous-intuitive component of reality, but the sensuous-intuitive component as such (II, 78). Everything and anything may be enclosed by rational forms (even rational forms themselves), but nothing can be wholly permeated by them (II, 221).

Lask's doctrine of form and material springs from, and is a conceptual development of, his earlier distinction between 'analytic' and 'emanative' logic. For the former, reality proper is always empirical; the concept is only an artificial product of thinking from which the particular existence can never be deduced, but is, in relation to it, 'accidental' or 'irrational'. The second, by contrast, attributes higher reality to the concept, and pretends to deduce particular reality from it (cf. I, 30, 41ff., 61ff.). The main representatives of the two logics are Kant and Hegel. It is evident that Lask's own logical theory of form and matter, as well as of irrationality, has been conceived with an eye to 'analytic logic'. But Lask concedes significantly that if there were a solution of the problem of irrationality it could only be provided by Hegel. 'Irrationality' – he writes – 'can be overcome, if and only if one may admit the possibility of dialectically changing concepts' (I, 72). However, he adds that he does not believe in the possibility of concepts of this sort.

Lukács, by contrast, came to believe in such concepts. It was apropos the above passage that he called Lask 'the most ingenious and coherent among the modern neo-Kantians'. That the neo-Kantians more or less rejected Hegel, whereas Lukács opted for him, is relatively unimportant at this point; more important are the following two points.

First, Lukács perceived what he came to consider as the 'antinomies' of modern philosophical thought through Lask's doctrines of irrationality and of form/material. His interpretation of modern philosophy relies for its central conceptual means – but not, of course, for its consequences – upon (partly re-interpreted) Laskian doctrines.

Second, the way Lukács came to interpret Hegel's meaning in the development of modern philosophy was clearly suggested to him by the perspective elaborated by Lask. Lukács' reading of Hegel is neo-Kantian precisely to the extent to which, hermeneutically viewed, he derived from neo-Kantianism his pre-ontological understanding of Hegel's meaning and achievement. Let us examine each of these points in more detail.

(1) Lukács takes over and uses Lask's concept of irrationality primarily in the sense of the impenetrability of the material. Although he occasionally uses the term 'contingency', what he means by it is the contingency of the way in which forms relate to their contents, rather than the contingency of the individual.³² He came to be concerned with this aspect

of Lask's concept of irrationality some time before: he applied it in his *Heidelberg Aesthetics*³³ and in his obituary on Lask he treated it at length.³⁴ But Lukács is indebted to Lask not only for his detection of the 'antinomies' of philosophical thinking, but in part also for his concept of reification. 'Modern critical philosophy springs from the reified structure of consciousness,' Lukács says at the beginning of his interpretation of modern philosophy, suggesting that the antinomies of philosophy are but secondary appearances of the all-encompassing social phenomenon of reification. However, in so far as he characterizes reification by the rationality of the forms, i.e., of the organizing principle, and the irrationality of the material, i.e., of that which is the substratum of rationalization, or by the rationality of the parts and the irrationality of the whole, it is clear that to a considerable extent he describes reification with an eye to what he will call the antinomies of philosophical thinking. In other words, though Lukács derives the antinomies of philosophical thinking from the social phenomenon of reification, he nevertheless *perceives* or *diagnoses* reification with the aid of the conceptual schemes provided by contemporary neo-Kantians.

(2) That dialectical logic was necessary to overcome the problem of irrationality is a recognition which, prior to Lukács, appears unambiguously in Lask (cf. I, 63, 201). It was also Lask who showed the strict connection between dialectics and absolute rationalism (cf. I, 66), although, of course, he rejected both. Lask and Lukács also both pointed out that 'intuitive understanding' is the main interpretive concept with the aid of which German Idealism can be explained in its development from Kant to Hegel.³⁵ In his *Fichte's Idealism and History*, Lask claims that his intention is to follow up the problem of irrationality in the development of German Idealism (I, 79); and Lukács interprets German Idealism in terms of the same problem. Lask ascribes an intermediate position to Fichte in the evolution of German Idealism (I, 83f.), and Lukács approvingly quotes this point in his obituary.³⁷ In *History and Class Consciousness* he then proceeds to give an interpretation of Fichte in much the same terms, quoting a passage of Fichte's he had likely come across in Lask (I, 173).³⁸

If Lask firmly rejected 'intuitive understanding' from the very beginning (in spite of admitting its high methodological value), Lukács had reasons of his own, long before adopting the Hegelian standpoint, to be predisposed in favour of it. Indeed, being concerned with problems of aesthetics, Lukács was particularly attentive to a concept of form no longer indifferent in relation to matter. It is in terms of this *materialechte* form that he had already interpreted Hegel's concept of form in his *Heidelberg Aesthetics*,³⁹ and the term '*materialecht*' recurs in his obituary on Lask.⁴⁰ Here he argues that Lask's concept of form as 'validity-directed-toward' (*Hingelten*) must be a kind of *materialechte* form in

order to fulfil the task assigned to it. In view of his interests, Lukács was likely to find the Laskian perspective, with regard to the concept of form, as an intermediate position (similar to that of Fichte) between Kant and Hegel.

Lukács, however, pursues the issue of 'intuitive understanding' a bit further and makes it a point of confrontation with Lask. This is worthy of particular attention for two reasons. First, because this is, as far as I can see, the only point where Lukács not only exposes or summarizes Lask's thoughts (as is customary in an obituary, which is what, in any case, he intends to do), or implicitly applies and builds them into the frame of his own perspective (as is the case with *History and Class Consciousness*), but openly discusses and, although in a very subtle form, attempts to criticize them. Second, because the implicit direction of Lukács' criticism, whether tenable or not, is characteristic of his later development. Indeed one might say that with regard to his attitude towards 'intuitive understanding', his obituary on Lask is an important intermediate stage between the *Heidelberg Aesthetics* and *History and Class Consciousness*.

The objection Lukács develops in detail at the end of his obituary concerns the knowability of Lask's original objectuality (*Gegenständlichkeit*). The objection seems, at first sight, completely out of place, for it seems to wholly ignore Lask's logic of the categories, especially his distinction between constitutive and reflexive categories. In fact, the latter are for Lask by no means original, but only secondary, artificial (*künstlich*), exempt from specific object-relatedness, parasitic (see II, 140, 150, 158, 162). The same holds true of the region of judgment in relation to that of objects. Hence it seems improper to claim that reflective categories (or the judgment) reach into the original region. Although objects are not beyond logic, Lask says explicitly, they are in any case beyond judgment (*urteilsjenseitig*) (II, 353). The region of judgment is erected upon a breaking-up (*Zerstörung*) of the original objectual region (II, 364). Lukács' objection seems, therefore, to contain an impossible demand, if not, indeed, a rudimentary misunderstanding of Lask's basic tenets – a somewhat surprising misunderstanding, for in his previous exposition Lukács showed a fairly good familiarity with Lask's views.

Upon closer examination, however, the problem turns out not to be that simple. To claim the knowability of the original region, writes Lukács, amounts to claiming the possibility of 'intuitive understanding' as its subject-correlate. This much, he adds, is also admitted by Lask, if not literally, still with regard to what he meant (*dem Sinne nach*). Now, if I am not mistaken, there is a passage towards the end of *Die Logik der Philosophie*, in which Lask comes very close to also admitting this literally: 'That the intelligible object "belongs" "to" an intuitive understanding' – he writes – 'that to the thing-in-itself the intellectual

intuition . . . "corresponds" . . . has never become a problem for Kant' (II, 245f.). Since Lask's own logical position is admittedly Kantian, 'analytic', this statement may be regarded as his own view on the conditions of the knowability of the original objectual region. A further implication of this statement is that in overcoming Kant, Hegel basically remained a good Kantian, in that he fully subscribed to the Kantian correlation of thing-in-itself and intuitive understanding,⁴¹ and only proceeded to fill in what Kant himself left empty. Lukács' overcoming of Lask may be interpreted in the same terms.⁴² The possibility of moving beyond Lask, together with its direction, may thus be said to have been prepared and anticipated by Lask himself, although, of course, this development could not be fulfilled in Lask's own terms. In any case, Lukács' confrontation with Lask shows him moving from Kant to Hegel. His major concern is the possibility of a form of knowledge that can be applied to Lask's original region over and above subjectivity – a concern that may help understand his later predisposition in favour of Hegel.

1.3 The development of 'irrationality' in Lukács

In order to complete our treatment of Lukács' adoption and application of Lask's concept of irrationality, I will briefly discuss the shifts of meaning it undergoes in Lukács. For Lukács irrationality has a totally negative meaning, whereas in Lask (and in neo-Kantianism in general) it has important positive aspects. It is precisely such positive aspects that Lukács not only does not adopt, but overlooks or even ignores. As mentioned above, he takes up the concept in its meaning as the impenetrability of the material,⁴³ and even where he speaks of 'contingency' he does so with regard to the relation of form to matter, in terms of 'intelligible contingency'. But for Rickert and Lask 'contingency', as well as 'irrationality', primarily referred to the individual; 'irrationality' denoted above all empirical, individual and (last but not least) historical reality, which resists being completely dissolved in general concepts. This dimension of the term 'irrationality' is lost in Lukács. Even before his adoption of the Hegelian standpoint of totality, there were other reasons why he defended Kantianism. He was primarily concerned with the autonomy of the different spheres of positing (*Setzung*) (of theory, ethics, etc.). It was the suppression of these, rather than of individual reality, that made him reluctant to adopt the Hegelian systematization of philosophy.

However, this does not mean that he was not concerned with the problem of subjectivity or individuality; in a sense the contrary is true. But what he was concerned with was not so much the defence of subjectivity, but rather, so to speak, its trans-substantiation. In several important respects the reasons are historical. Germany had a long cultural tradition to look back upon which the rapidly growing industrial

civilization, together with the increasing influence of the natural sciences, threatened to destroy. In this context the neo-Kantian doctrine of irrationality may be interpreted as a defence of subjectivity – i.e., as a defence of irreducible historical individuality in the face of the generalizing conceptual schemes characteristic of the natural sciences which look upon particular reality as an exemplar of a general concept rather than a unique, irreplaceable individual. Hungary, however, was underdeveloped from both social and cultural points of view. Life, as Lukács perceived it, is ‘an anarchy of light and dark’;⁴⁴ empirical individuality is but a bunch of obscure and confused inclinations, the domain of arbitrariness. Lukács’ characterization of it anticipates in some important respects Heidegger’s description of *das Man*.⁴⁵ These considerations may contribute to explaining why Lukács’ concern for subjectivity predominantly took the form of a concern for its redemption or trans-substantiation rather than for its defence with regard to how it simply is – and why he overlooked, or remained insensitive to, an important aspect of the neo-Kantian doctrine of irrationality, i.e., ‘the doctrine of the logical irrationality of the individual’ (I, 27).⁴⁶

For Lask, the irrationality of the individual stands in strict connection to his value; indeed irrationality alone permits one to view the individual as a value in itself (see I, 192ff., 226). Lask speaks of a ‘pathos of irrationality’ (I, 227). Irrationality is, in this sense, a necessary precondition of practical, historical activity (I, 154).⁴⁷ This element in Lask’s doctrine (as well as in neo-Kantianism in general) may also supply a reason for the rejection of Hegel. ‘Emanative’ logic tends to overlook the individual, Lask says (I, 97), and the extent to which a Hegelian sort of system implies this consequence appears unambiguously in the following passage of *History and Class Consciousness*: ‘The conscious desire for the realm of freedom . . . must entail the renunciation of individual freedom. It implies the conscious subordination of the self to the collective will.’⁴⁸

Further, whereas Lask sees in the Kantian perspective of ‘analytic logic’ important positive features (though he occasionally admits negative ones too), Lukács shifts the accent to a negative aspect, suggested to him by Lask – namely, that ‘analytic logic’, and its abstract consideration of values, implies an atomization of social institutions (I, 19, 68; see also I, 343 and II, 418). In this respect, Lask readily grants Hegel the merit of having made this point, but at the same time he suggests that Hegel erred by immediately transforming his reflection on the philosophy of culture into a purely logical theory. Lask’s main argument is that while one can reasonably speak of the scission of a cultural totality, one cannot speak of an atomization of the logical sphere unless one hypostatizes the notion – as Hegel does (I, 68).⁴⁹ In this respect, Lukács joins Hegel and thereby exposes himself to Lask’s critique. His devastating criticism of

capitalist 'atomization', 'isolation', etc., in *History and Class Consciousness*, became directly connected to, and expresses itself in, a criticism of what Lask calls 'analytic logic'. In this way Lukács anticipated a dubious tradition, later to assume extreme aspects (e.g., the fight against capitalism by suppressing formal logic).

II Heidegger and Lask

2.1 Introduction

In some of its basic intentions the young Heidegger's itinerary can be viewed as running parallel to that of Lukács. In addition to his perception of the ever more aggravating cultural crisis, the sense of the 'irrationality of life',⁵⁰ we find in him just as strongly as in Lukács, if not more strongly indeed, the quest for systematic philosophy. I will briefly characterize his fundamental philosophical efforts leading up to *Being and Time* in 1927, by viewing him as attempting to unify the so-called 'irrationalistic' or 'existentialist' or 'historicist' problematic (which permeated European culture at that time and was represented by thinkers like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, Spengler and Simmel), with the Husserlian ideal of 'philosophy as strict science'. Finally, in Heidegger we also find a sense of dissatisfaction with the epistemological mode of philosophizing, and an early orientation towards, and confrontation with, Hegel.⁵¹

Brought up in the scholastic tradition, but highly attentive to the contemporary transcendental-logical trends in philosophy represented by neo-Kantianism and phenomenology, Heidegger had as early as his doctoral dissertation and his *Habilitationsschrift* (published in 1914 and 1916 respectively) outlined the programme of renewing the metaphysical tradition within the framework of an explicit elaboration of the Being-question. His appropriation of the modern epistemological-logical tradition was conditioned from the very beginning by his endeavour to arrive at metaphysical conclusions; doing pure logic, or epistemology, indispensable as it might be as a preparatory step, was seen by him as futile when conceived as an aim in itself.⁵²

The systematic exposition and elaboration of the Being-question which Heidegger offered in *Being and Time* in terms of a fundamental ontology conceived as existential analytic, relies for its basic project upon insights derived from Heidegger's more than ten-year-long confrontation with the history of Western philosophy. This may be characterized as insights into (1) the correlation of Being and *logos* throughout Western philosophy (viz., the metaphysical orientation of the logical-epistemological tradition, and the logical orientation of traditional ontology), (2) the functioning of the *logos* of the 'subject' as the 'ground' or 'place' of the ontological problematic properly so-called and (3) logic as the theoretical

comportment *par excellence*. Given these three recognitions, a thematization of the *being* of the subject in a deeper way than that provided by the tradition – one capable of showing epistemological comportment as a derived mode of being – offered a possible operative basis for posing and working-out the Being-question.

The metaphysical tradition from Aristotle on had developed theories of being in terms of objective presence; for Heidegger, this was a result of the fact that the tradition had gained access to Being from within the conceptual horizon provided by the theoretical attitude. Recognizing that this comportment was far from being *the* original mode of being of human existence was, however, an insight which required the prior unification of the Husserlian perspective of philosophy as 'strict science' with the anti-metaphysical, existentialist tradition.⁵³ Contrary however to the tendency of thinkers like, e.g., Pascal, Kierkegaard, Dilthey or Nietzsche, to combine turning toward factual-historical human existence with turning away from metaphysics, and thus totally rejecting systematic thinking, Heidegger's appropriation of the problematic of factual-historical life was conceived from the very beginning as a point of departure for the renewal of metaphysics. The posing and working-out of the Being-question belongs to what Heidegger calls 'fundamental ontology'. This, according to the above considerations, takes its point of departure from a thematization of the being of the subject – a discipline named 'existential analytic'. The appropriation of, and the confrontation with, epistemology and Husserlian phenomenology, and the attempt to radically re-examine the whole metaphysical tradition through the assimilation of the 'irrationalistic' problematic, are fused in Heidegger's efforts to gain a new ground for a renewal of metaphysics.⁵⁴

2.2 Lask and Heidegger

In the formation of his ontological perspective Heidegger repeatedly confronted Lask's works beginning with the early essay 'Neuere Forschungen über Logik' (1912).⁵⁵ My discussion of their relation will focus upon some basic themes: the theory of categories, the nature of truth, meaning (*Sinn*), the ontological difference, philosophy and the sciences, Lask's original region and Heidegger's Being, and, finally, the conception of man.

(1) *The Theory of Categories*. Heidegger's early quest for an ontological problematic proper centres, understandably enough, around what has been handed down by the tradition under the heading of the 'doctrine of categories' (*Kategorienlehre*). The history of philosophy may, in a sense, Heidegger approvingly quotes Eduard von Hartmann in his *Habilitationsschrift*, be understood as the history of the doctrine of categories.⁵⁶ Heidegger, however, is dissatisfied with the traditional doctrine of cat-

egories. This theory, in fact, centres around the ten Aristotelian categories. One of the main points his whole investigation wishes to make, Heidegger says explicitly in his *Habilitationsschrift*, is that the Aristotelian categories are not equivalent to the categories as such; they refer to no more than a certain class of a certain domain of reality.⁵⁷ Far from applying to every and any object of knowledge, traditional categories denote only 'natural' reality – a recognition which Duns Scotus was already aware of.⁵⁸ The point Heidegger suggests here is that the traditional theory of categories is 'blind' to spheres of reality other than the natural – first of all to the sphere of 'logic' which Heidegger (following the neo-Kantians and Husserl) would like to mark off as sharply as possible from both 'natural' and 'psychological' realities. The task Heidegger outlines is, then, an expansion, i.e., a radical re-elaboration of the doctrine of categories – one capable of doing justice to all the different domains of reality in their own right (even to history), without suppressing any of them or reducing some to others (as contemporary 'naturalism' and 'psychologism' threatened to do). In light of Heidegger's later development we may say that this is exactly what *Being and Time* will attempt to do under the name of 'existential analytic'. 'What is logic?' – this is one of the young Heidegger's first questions in 1912, and the *Habilitationsschrift* makes an important further step by claiming that it is not possible to see logic and its problems in the right perspective unless one seeks a 'translogical', i.e., metaphysical context for its understanding. In *Being and Time* we read, finally: 'the "logic" of the *logos* has its roots in the existential analytic of *Dasein*'.⁵⁹

Now it is important to realize that Heidegger's quest for a new foundation for the doctrine of categories takes shape in constant confrontation with Lask's works. For Lask, Kant provided the categories for the knowledge of natural reality. Indeed, logic and the theory of science have confined themselves up to our own time to doing justice to the natural sciences, i.e., to an elaboration and explanation of the way we come to know natural reality. When, however, contemporary anti-psychologism (neo-Kantianism and phenomenology) comes to hold complete autonomy in the sphere of 'validity' (over against the realm of natural reality), it is time logic, or the doctrine of categories, justifies this development by exploring the categories of philosophical knowledge itself. Lask explicitly suggests an 'expansion [*Erweiterung*] of the concept of the categories' (II, 22f.; see also II, 88, 237) – which he regards as a question of 'life and death' for philosophy (II, 89). In his review article, Heidegger pays special attention to Lask's search for a doctrine of categories able to embrace the whole of what can be thought.⁶⁰

In his historical sketch Lask significantly anticipates Heidegger's judgment concerning Aristotle's categories – namely, that they were conceived with a view toward empirical reality and then transposed to the

sphere of the non-empirical (II, 225; see also II, 178). From the point of view of a new metaphysics, Lask understands his own efforts as a kind of preparatory work: if beyond the sensible or empirical reality there is a non-sensible or metaphysical domain, then we should develop adequate categories in order to have proper access to it. The delimitation of the different spheres can only be carried out by metaphysics (II, 270) – a point with which Heidegger fully agrees.⁶¹

Lask understands Kant's Copernican achievement to the effect that 'being' has ceased to be a trans-logical concept and has entered the domain of transcendental logic (II, 27ff.).⁶² For Heidegger, too, being and logic are in strict correlation: being pertains to the sphere of logic. However, for reasons shown above, he came to understand logic in terms of existential analytic. This may then be seen as a polemical radicalization of Kant's replacement of traditional ontology, namely the transcendental analytic of pure intellect.⁶³ In the light of *Being and Time*, we can say that Heidegger radicalizes Lask's critique of the traditional doctrine of categories. Lask's main objection to it was that it was a logic of the 'lower tier' – that is, it was dominated by the logic of the sensible domain of reality (II, 178), or by a naive transposition of the latter onto the domain of non-empirical reality (II, 225, 237).⁶⁴ Heidegger radicalizes Lask in that through the assimilation of the 'irrationalistic' problematic he proceeds to undermine the bases of Lask's 'two world theory', i.e., of the Platonic distinction between sensible and non-sensible reality. For Heidegger, this distinction springs from man's theoretical relation to the world – a major reason why his analytic offers 'existentials' rather than 'categories'. An all-encompassing doctrine of *categories* becomes for Heidegger impossible precisely in so far as he comes to interpret 'categories' as determinations of beings other than man. The fact that 'categories' had an all-encompassing meaning in traditional ontology may be explained by the tendency of Greek ontology to gain access to Being on the level of (and in terms of) what turns up *within* the world.⁶⁵ Although Heidegger came to drop the term, he nevertheless took up Lask's attempt to give an all-encompassing theory of categories. He did so by transforming it into his project of fundamental ontology.

Heidegger's strategy of dismissing the foundation of traditional metaphysics, i.e., of the 'two world theory', parallels his reading of the history of metaphysics, and exhibits the adoption of some important Laskian themes – themes which Lask derived from Fichte's distinction between philosophy and life (see, e.g., II, 194, 201). Our way of thinking and speaking, Lask remarks significantly, is considerably conditioned by Greek intellectualism, according to which the non-sensible domain is accessible only to the intellect – or even appears as an intelligible realm in itself. The proper relation to transcendent reality was accordingly held to be a knowing attitude. 'The intellectualism of the Greeks' significantly

influenced Christian thinking. This, in its turn, did not remain unaffected by 'the theoretization of the transcendent sphere' (II, 203). 'All the terms which antiquity coined to denote the non-sensible and supra-sensible domain bear witness to their origin from the theoretical sphere' (II, 203). The 'intellectualistic prejudice' gives preference to 'thinking' in gaining access to the non-sensible; 'faith' is understood in a negative sense mainly owing to the intellectualistic distinction between 'knowledge' and 'faith' (II, 204f.). The 'theoretization of a-theoretical comportment' also further affects all those distinctions we usually make between, e.g., 'theoretical and practical', 'logical and intuitive', 'theoretical and aesthetic', and 'scientific and religious' knowledge (II, 208; see also III, 235).

These considerations are significant not only on their own account, but because they are important anticipations of some essential features of Heidegger's perspective. First, Heidegger's way of tracing the development of Western metaphysics shows considerable parallels with the considerations of Lask noted above. Heidegger, too, maintains that Christian thinking took over the conceptual apparatus of Greek metaphysics in order to obtain a systematic character, and that this appropriation was fatal from both philosophical and religious points of view: Greek ontology was given a one-sided and superficial interpretation, and religious comportment was constrained into a conceptual scheme incompatible with the lively Christian experience of life.⁶⁶ Modern philosophy, then, from Descartes on, offers no new development.⁶⁷ Second, the basic contention that underlies Heidegger's whole undertaking in *Being and Time* is that, parallel to the Greeks' access to Being in terms of presence, runs the theory of man in terms of *animal rationale*. His attempt, then, consists in inquiring into the horizon of the traditional philosophies' access to Being and in showing this access to be rooted in, and dependent upon, man's theoretical comportment. The existential analytic disengages itself from the traditional view of man as a rational animal,⁶⁸ and together with the rational-irrational distinction, explores dimensions of man's being underlying theoretical comportment, in order to thus gain a new ground for the Being-question. From this point of view, *Being and Time* may be said to carry out the programme suggested by Lask. The categories (the 'existentials') Heidegger develops (e.g., *Befindlichkeit*, *Verstehen*, *Gewissen*, etc.), do not rely upon traditional metaphysical or intellectualistic distinctions.⁶⁹

(2) *Truth*. Throughout his philosophical itinerary Heidegger considered Being and truth to be in reciprocal connection. 'Philosophy has always connected truth to Being', he wrote in *Being and Time*,⁷⁰ and he strengthened the link so much as to come later to speak of truth rather than the meaning of Being. Among the manifold sources in which he may have come across this connection, Aristotle and Husserl likely played the

primary role.⁷¹ However, we should also point out that this connection occurs in Lask: in his evaluation of Kant's Copernican achievement, Lask comes to interpret 'Being' with 'in truth' (II, 69; see II, 29).

Parallel to Heidegger's attempt to connect truth and Being, is his claim that the judgment (proposition) is not the original 'place' of truth,⁷² but is a derivative, secondary phenomenon. This claim fits well into the general perspective of *Being and Time*, in so far as it proposes to penetrate behind theoretical comportment and show it as a non-original relation one may have to the world. In his *Doctrine of Judgment*, Lask's main thesis is that 'in the comprehensive structure of logical phenomena the judgment belongs to the secondary, non-objectual region' (II, 288). In fact 'judgment is to be driven out of the domain of transcendental logic' (II, 289). The theory of judgment Lask wishes to elaborate will show the derivation of judgment from more original phenomena (II, 295) – from an original objectual region which is over and above any opposition. This conception implies that truth loses its primary meaning of 'correspondence with', i.e., it obtains this meaning only in a derivative sense (see, e.g., II, 388ff., 395, 399).⁷³ Lask's conception attracted Heidegger's attention in his *Habilitationsschrift*; on the one hand, Heidegger thought it could provide a context within which to pose metaphysical problems, and, on the other hand, he thought that this conception made the problem of the 'application of the categories' meaningless.⁷⁴ Immediately after stating this, Heidegger drew a conclusion which clearly indicated the path he was to take in the following decade: 'The theoretical [*erkenntnistheoretische*] subject does not grasp either the metaphysically most relevant meaning of Spirit, or – still less – its full content.'⁷⁵

This point may also explain Heidegger's positive reference to Lask in *Being and Time*. In his treatment of the concept of truth, Heidegger was well on the way to discarding the epistemological, viz., subjectivistic, perspective. What he was concerned with were the presuppositions of the traditional conception of truth as 'correspondence' between judgment and thing – a conception which Husserl reformulated in terms of the adequacy between intentional acts and their fulfilment.⁷⁶ The point Heidegger next makes and elaborates in detail is that in order for Husserl's 'identification' to be possible certain ontological presuppositions must come into play – namely, the Being-in-the-world of *Dasein*, its disclosedness. What Heidegger probably meant by saying that Lask was the only one outside the phenomenological school who 'positively took up' Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (with special regard for those investigations concerning 'evidence and truth') was that in a similar way to his own endeavour, Lask too was attempting to transcend the subjective-epistemological region. Heidegger, however, noted that Lask's *Logic of Philosophy* was influenced by Husserl's distinction between sensuous and categorial intuition. Though cryptic in many ways, this remark may be

interpreted (especially after the publication of some of Heidegger's Marburg lecture courses) in the following way. In enunciating the programme of a *logic of philosophy* (see II, 23), Lask productively developed and applied Husserl's conception of a categorial intuition. The latter was interpreted by Heidegger as providing access to the categorial sphere and as underlying all kinds of everyday perception and experience.⁷⁷ Now, what Lask proposed to undertake – namely, to bring philosophy to self-awareness (II, 23) – may well have been understood by Heidegger as a significant development of Husserl's discovery of categorial intuition, precisely to the same extent to which he himself fully subscribed to the latter in his programme of philosophy's gaining awareness of itself. Existential analytic, for example, is to centre around *Dasein* because it is 'the condition of possibility of all ontologies'.⁷⁸ It is, further, due to the discovery of categorial intuition that Heidegger proceeded to identify phenomenology and ontology.⁷⁹ Ultimately, Heidegger came to understand Husserl's categorial intuition not only as an adequate method for penetrating the region of categories, but also as a vague, pre-conceptual understanding of Being.

(3) *Meaning (Sinn)*. In addition to the correlation Being-truth, Lask anticipates Heidegger's understanding of the relation between meaning and Being. 'The representative [*nachbildliche*] region', writes Lask, 'is not *the* region of meaning, but only *one* region of it. The simple original structure of the authentic structural elements . . . appears as the original image of meaning' (II, 393).⁸⁰ 'Every logic of meaning has so far been a logic of non-objectual meaning, whereby "meaning" – e.g., of the judgment – is usually conceived as being in opposition to the "object" ' (II, 292). Similarly, for Heidegger Being and meaning, viz., Being and the meaning of Being, are not to be separated. When we understand something, he argues, what we understand is not 'meaning' but the being, viz., Being. Thus, when we search for the meaning of Being we do not seek something 'behind' Being, but Being itself, in so far as it enters into the scope of understanding proper to *Dasein*.⁸¹

(4) *Ontological difference*. In the distinction between the sensible and the non-sensible spheres, i.e., the spheres of being and validity, it is important to realize, Lask writes, that the very predicates which serve to designate the sensible sphere – e.g., Being – lie outside the sensible sphere. It is not the domain of Being (*Seinsgebiet*) but beings alone (*das Seiende*) – i.e., that which falls under the category of Being (*Sein*) – that constitutes the domain of what lies outside the sphere of validity. 'The being of beings belongs already to that which is valid, to that which is non-being' (*Das Sein des Seienden gehört schon zum Geltenden, somit zum Nicht-Seienden*) (II, 46; see also II, 393).

The way Heidegger came to understand what he called 'ontological

difference' shows significant similarities to Lask's preceding considerations. For Heidegger Being is, on the one hand, Being of a being (*Sein vom Seienden*) – i.e., it does not lie in a domain over and above beings, it is not a kind of highest being. Though strictly linked to beings, Being is, on the other hand, not a being: 'the Being of beings "is" not itself a being'.⁸² To overlook this difference is for Heidegger to overlook the ontological problematic proper; and conversely, to recognize it is to identify the theme of ontology.⁸³ If one approaches Being in the dimension of beings it can only appear as a non-being, i.e., no-thing – a major reason Heidegger discussed the problem of Being in terms of 'nothing' in his *What is Metaphysics?*⁸⁴

Heidegger's stress upon the importance of the ontological difference in identifying the ontological problematic proper allows us to bring to light a further parallel with Lask with regard to their understanding of the relation between philosophy and the sciences.

(5) *Philosophy and the sciences.* For Heidegger, ontology is concerned with Being; it is, as he puts it in the twenties, the science of Being.⁸⁵ The sciences, by contrast, address themselves to particular beings; they completely ignore the ontological difference. There are, however, no beings without Being. With regard to them, Being is the '*Apriori*'.⁸⁶ In order to understand beings we must always already have understood Being – possess what Heidegger calls a vague pre-ontological understanding of Being. Philosophy or ontology is in this sense a necessary foundation of sciences; these obtain their sense only in becoming rooted in philosophy.⁸⁷ The discipline called to fulfil this task is fundamental ontology, but the young Heidegger also uses the terms 'productive logic' or 'original logic'.⁸⁸

For Lask, philosophy is *Urwissenschaft* (III, 240; see III, 31).⁸⁹ The empirical sciences are 'half-sciences'; their knowledge is incomplete, 'without foundation' (III, 240). The sensible data which the natural sciences treat is a residuum alien to meaning (*bedeutungsfremder Rest*). In life, however, no 'pure nature' is given (III, 242). For Heidegger also 'nature' is an 'innerworldly' being, which emerges due to a shift in attitude.⁹⁰ Lask maintains that 'nature' does not spring simply from the 'generalizing' method characteristic of the natural sciences – as Rickert claims it does – but it springs rather from 'a certain way of consideration' (*Betrachtungsweise*). Nature is the unintelligible (*Undeutbare*) plus pure theoretical objectivity (III, 243). This characterization anticipates Heidegger's claim that understanding and interpretation are not to be modelled upon a particular kind of understanding – one which consists in 'grasping the present-at-hand in its essential unintelligibility [*Unverständlichkeit*]'.⁹¹ Lask's observations about the essential tendency of the natural sciences

to master the world (III, 246) also point to some characteristic features of the perspective of the late Heidegger.

(6) *Lask's original region and Heidegger's Being*. Given Lask's theses that the object is in itself meaning (II, 43), and that the original objectual region is over and above opposition and judgment (II, 374), it is clear enough that human understanding cannot know the original region, or formulate or say what that meaning is. The 'truths in themselves' discovered by Bolzano and Husserl are for Lask still laden with subjectivity, i.e., unable to reach up into the genuinely transcendent sphere. Although they are independent of subjectivity, they nevertheless appear only in and by the subject's efforts to attain something independent of itself – and in this sense they are dependent on it. 'Genuine transcendence is however a state of meaning prior to any contact with subjectivity' (II, 425). If meaning, in common usage, is understood as 'meaning of', then we should limit its application to the secondary region (II, 394). For with regard to the original region, the designation 'meaning of' is completely out of place (II, 394; see II, 34).

Analogous considerations may provide an explanation for the incompleteness of *Being and Time*, i.e., Heidegger's full project to elaborate the meaning of Being. Following the passage cited above concerning the correlation between Being and the meaning of Being, Heidegger significantly added: 'The meaning of Being can never be brought into opposition with beings, or with Being as "ground" of beings, for "ground" in its turn becomes accessible only as meaning, be it the abyss [*Abgrund*] of meaninglessness'.⁹² The meaning of Being emerging from the abyss of meaninglessness must evidently be – to use Lask's term – beyond opposition. It should, if it is to be all-encompassing, somehow indicate its own origin, i.e., the abyss it emerges from (the *lethe*-dimension of *aletheia*). This, however, far from being said, can only be pointed towards.⁹³

(7) *The conception of man*. In Lask and Heidegger (especially the late Heidegger) we find conceptions of man which show significant parallels. Their conceptions contain a double image and a double evaluation of man. Both conceptions hold up a kind of passivity as a paradigm, while human activity, if not condemned, is still regarded as negative or futile. Lask's interpretation of Kant's Copernican achievement clearly displays this feature. Since for Lask the sphere of logic is far wider than that of subjectivity, the transcendental-objectual sphere transcends subjectivity. Hence, knowledge becomes 'plain dedication' (*Hingabe*) to the object (cf. II, 85, 396).⁹⁴ *Hingabe* as a positive and emphatic characterization of human activity points in the same direction as Heidegger's term *Gelassenheit*. (A term Lask also uses is *Realisierungsstätte* (III, 96; see also III, 156) – one which might well turn up in Heidegger's vocabulary.)

In contrast, when man is active he simply intervenes in a destructive manner in the structure of meaning (cf. II, 416), brings about its artificial complication. The questions man copes with cannot be solved simply because they are not genuine problems. The subject is striving for solutions to problems which owe their existence to nothing else than its own destructive activity. Its activity and knowledge are based upon a forgetting of not only the original but also of the secondary region (cf. II, 427, 447). With regard to Heidegger, it is enough to call to mind such 'positive' determinations, his characterization of man in terms of being the 'shepherd' or 'neighbour' of Being.⁹⁵ As to the 'active', i.e., negative sense, we might recall some passages from 'The essence of truth'. Rather than turning to Being man mostly turns to beings (a breaking-up of Lask's original region, we might be tempted to say), and since man is forgetful of Being and, particularly, the element of hiddenness contained in the essence of truth, he fills up his everyday activity with wandering from one being to another, arranging and re-arranging them, vainly looking for satisfaction.⁹⁶

III Lask, Lukács, Heidegger

We undertook the confrontation of Lukács and Lask, as well as Heidegger and Lask, with the intention of not only finding similarities or parallels between their thought, but also in an attempt to show how Lukács' and Heidegger's confrontation with Lask influenced their philosophical development, helping them enter into full possession of their specific philosophical problematics. Are there, we may ask now, any conclusions to be drawn from Lask's influences upon both thinkers with regard to parallels between Lukács' and Heidegger's *Denkwege*? Why did both Lukács and Heidegger, in the midst of devastating criticisms of their contemporaries, give positive acknowledgement to Lask?

Both Lukács and Heidegger were, as has been seen, striving for a 'system'. Deeply affected by the crisis of early twentieth-century European culture and highly critical of the epistemology-centred philosophy of the day, both turned to the 'concrete', to 'life', and were proceeding towards a refoundation of philosophy – one accompanied for them by the hope in a cultural revival. Accordingly, both became engaged, although Heidegger only for a short time,⁹⁷ in politics. Though in different ways, both of them could rightly view upon Lask's achievement as an anticipation of what they were searching for.

For Lukács, Lask's significance consisted in clearly bringing to light, and uncompromisingly spelling out the ultimate difficulties which philosophical system-building had to face if it were ever to construct a 'system'. These difficulties, together with the set of problems common

to the epistemological tradition, Lukács came to understand in terms of 'antinomies' to be explained, in their turn, as reflections of a historical process of reification culminating in, but not restricted to, the age of capitalism. The overcoming of these antinomies, as well as the development of the 'system', could not, therefore, pertain solely to the domain of philosophy – indeed, philosophy itself had to be transcended.

Heidegger understood Lask's logical works as a preparation of a new metaphysics, as paving the way for posing metaphysical problems – an understanding not wholly alien to Lask himself (cf. II, 270). The task of the logician was, for Lask, to engage in a critique of pure *logos*, rather than of reason (III, 141) – and that is what Heidegger was doing all his life. Heidegger's recognition of the forgetting of the Being-question by European metaphysics, and his subsequent efforts to elaborate and answer it within the frame of systematic philosophy, led him ultimately to the insight that this task was not to be met by the conceptual means provided by European metaphysics. Indeed, metaphysics is indebted for its existence and development to the oblivion of Being. This is, then, an epoch of Being, a *Geschick*. To set aside this oblivion cannot, for good reasons, be the task of thinking. The late Heidegger, accordingly, no longer calls his thinking philosophy.

The context in which the following passage from Lask turns up in Lukács and Heidegger shows each of them engaged with their own problematic. The passage is this: 'The real "subject" is'. . . the material, the real "predicate" is the "category"!' (II, 333). Lukács found this significant for he thought he could perceive in it a radical abandonment or reversal of the formal logical treatment of judgment. He was also attentive to the fact that Lask found his *principium individuationis* in the material. In *History and Class Consciousness*, however, he came to view the same state of affairs – namely that the material penetrates into the realm of forms⁹⁸ – in a negative sense, as a sign of the impossibility of an all-encompassing system, and came, therefore, to defend the Hegelian logic of concepts in motion.

Heidegger quoted the above passage in order to show how Duns Scotus anticipated the modern theory of judgment. The reason he repeatedly laid stress on this aspect of Lask's theory (he had already discussed it in his review of new developments in logic)⁹⁹ may be seen in his predisposition in favour of an object-oriented interpretation of knowledge and judgment – an anticipation of his endeavour to connect *logos* and Being, logic and ontology. 'One must unite objectivism and Copernicanism', wrote Lask in an appendix to *The Logic of Philosophy* (II, 277), and Heidegger attempted to do the same by consciously applying, rather than merely ignoring (as did contemporary neo-Scholastics), the 'subjectivistic', epistemological tradition of modern philosophy in his re-appraisal of the ontological problematic.¹⁰⁰ It is against the background of his

endeavour to derive ontological conclusions from Husserlian phenomenology, and ultimately to connect Husserl to Aristotle that Lask's work assumed importance for the young Heidegger.¹⁰¹

Given their anti-epistemological attitude, both Lukács and Heidegger viewed some typically neo-Kantian epistemological problems (such as the problem of the 'application of the categories')¹⁰² with suspicion – as problems to be dissolved rather than to be met on their own terms. But Lukács did so with an eye to Hegel, whereas for Heidegger the Hegelian identification of thinking with Being, the conception of 'absolute knowledge', was untenable with regard to the basic ontological constitution of *Dasein*.¹⁰³ This is also the point where the two depart. It is, interestingly enough, in the midst of a further parallel that they do so – namely, the fact that moving away from the epistemological tradition both came across, and highly appreciated, the problem of *history*.¹⁰⁴ But for Lukács' Hegelian perspective, history had a subject (if not Hegel's *Weltgeist*, then class consciousness) – a subject which, once revealed, was to consummate history. In a sense history constitutes the horizon of Heidegger's system too. But it does so in terms of the historicity of finite *Dasein*, the historicity of the Being-question, as well as of the questioner. It is precisely in this sense that history makes 'absolute knowledge', i.e., an ultimate philosophical system, impossible. It is a horizon – or better, a background – which remains forever in the background.¹⁰⁵

Lukács thought he had found a solution to the problem of irrationality in the Hegelian sort of rationality – rationality and full transparency of the identical subject-object conceived as history. He came to view Hegel's dialectical logic as the paradigm of rationality. In his *The Destruction of Reason* he considered, therefore, all contrary positions, inclusive of that of Heidegger, as irrationalistic. His attempt to trace the development of contemporary philosophy in terms of his distinction between rationalism and irrationalism became oblivious of the origin of this distinction. While well aware, in *History and Class Consciousness*, of the historical problem situation, i.e., the historicity, of the concept of rationalism ('the concept of "rationalism" must not be employed as an ahistorical abstraction',¹⁰⁶ he wrote), this awareness gradually disappeared later. The thesis of an absolute, viz. dialectical-historical rationality had come to lose its own historical conditionality.

Heidegger did not reply to Lukács' classification of his thought in terms of irrationalism. For what might have been an answer of his, the following passages may provide some hints. By the separation of *logos* and *physis* in Greek philosophy 'begins the reciprocal correlation of "rationalism and irrationalism". . . . Irrationalism is but the evident weakness and complete failure of rationalism, and, therefore, itself a kind of rationalism.'¹⁰⁷ 'There is no such thing as "dialectics". . . . Dialectics is wholly dependent on the matter itself. . . . One cannot . . . pursue the

renewal of Hegel's philosophy and at the same time push aside . . . his christology and doctrine of the trinity.'¹⁰⁸ 'As long as the ratio and the rational . . . are still to be questioned the talk about irrationalism remains rootless.'¹⁰⁹

Notes

Bibliographical remark: bibliographical references to Lask's works occur in the text itself with parentheses; first the volume number and then the page number(s) of the *Gesammelte Schriften* edition of his works, 3 vols, ed. E. Herrigel (Tübingen: Mohr, 1923) are referred to.

1 H. Sommerhäuser, 'Emil Lask 1875–1915. Zum neunzigsten Geburtstag des Denkers', *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 21 (1967), p. 144.

2 G. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, tr. R. Livingstone (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 211, 215 (tr. slightly revised; cf. G. Lukács, *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. Studien über marxistische Dialektik*, Sonderausgabe der Sammlung Luchterhand (Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand, 1970), pp. 220, 257; references to this edition hereafter will occur in parentheses following the citation to the English translation).

3 M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit (SZ)*, 15th edn (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1979); p. 218. In a lecture course held in the Summer semester of 1919, the text of which has recently been published, Heidegger claimed that Lask was 'one of the most powerful [*stärksten*] philosophical personalities of the time', adding how much he owed to him (M. Heidegger, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, Gesamtausgabe (GA)* 56–7, ed. B. Heimbüchel (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1987), p. 180). Lask was the only one, he specified the following Winter semester (1919/20) in terms anticipating the previously cited formulation of *Being and Time*, to have grasped Husserl's idea of pure logic. (I have drawn on Franz Joseph Brecht's *Nachschrift* of this course, with the title: *Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology*. I am grateful to Friedrich Hogemann of the Hegel archives of Bochum, who allowed me to use his transcription of the Brecht *Nachschrift*.)

4 For observations concerning the relation of Lukács and Heidegger, cf. L. Goldmann, *Mensch, Gemeinschaft und Welt in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants. Studien zur Geschichte der Dialektik* (Zurich, New York: Europa Verlag, 1945), pp. 241ff, and his posthumous book *Lukács and Heidegger, Towards a New Philosophy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977; French edn, 1973). See also my 'Attack against the absolute: Lukács and Heidegger', *Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eotvos Nominatae, Sectio Phil. et Soc.*, xvi (1982), pp. 185–90 and 'Heidegger und Lukács, überlegungen zu L. Goldmanns Untersuchungen aus der Sicht der heutigen Forschung', *Mesotes. Zeitschrift für philosophischen Ost-West-Dialog* 1 (1991), pp. 25–38.

5 Cf. G. Lukács, *Heidelberger Ästhetik (1916–1918)*, Werke, vol. 17, ed. Gy. Markus and F. Benseler (Darmstadt, Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1974), p. 70.

6 *ibid.*, p. 71.

7 Cf. G. Lukács, 'Kiknek nem kell és miért a Balázs Béla költészete', G. Lukács, *Ifjúkori művek*, ed. A. Timár (Budapest: Magvető, 1977), p. 709.

8 G. Lukács, *Soul and Form*, tr. A. Bostock (London: Merlin Press, 1974), pp. 167f.

9 *ibid.*, p. 167.

10 See, e.g., E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. 1, para. 36 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1980), pp. 116ff.

11 G. Lukács, 'Benedetto Croce: A történetírás elméletéről és történetéről', *Ifjúkori művek*, p. 627 (G. Lukács, 'Croce, Benedetto: Zur Theorie und Geschichte der Historiographie,' *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, 39 (1915) pp. 878ff.).

12 L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), 6.52.

13 See, e.g., Rickert's *Die Philosophie des Lebens, Darstellung und Kritik der philosophischen Modeströmungen unserer Zeit* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1920), the second edition of which he dedicated, significantly, to the 'life of philosophy'. Rickert understands his critique of *Lebensphilosophie* as a defence of the systematic, conceptual character of philosophy.

14 On the intellectual climate of pre- and post-war Germany see H.-G. Gadamer, 'Heidegger's later philosophy', in *idem*, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, tr. and ed. by D. E. Linge (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 213ff. System-philosophy was considerably discredited already by Nietzsche (see M. Heidegger, *Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*, ed. H. Feick (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1971), pp. 28f.).

Dilthey, in much more cautious terms and in a slightly modified perspective (i.e., putting the accent on the historical character of philosophy), also expressed fundamental doubts about the possibility of metaphysics conceived of in terms of a universally valid philosophical system. See his *Das Wesen der Philosophie*, ed. O. Pöggeler (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), pp. 86ff. The Kierkegaard revival, with special regard to his devastating critique of the philosophical system (i.e., Hegel) also contributed to stressing the alternative. In his essay on Kierkegaard, Lukács himself wrote that 'Kierkegaard's honesty' was 'to see everything as being sharply distinct from everything else, system from life' (*Soul and Form*, p. 32).

15 See E. Husserl, *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*, ed. W. Szilasi (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1965), pp. 49ff.

16 Cf. Lukács, *Heidelberger Ästhetik*, pp. 14f., 212ff.

17 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, pp. 47f. (tr. modified) (p. 121).

18 *ibid.*, p. 186 (p. 321).

19 See *ibid.*, p. 143 (p. 258).

20 *ibid.*, p. 144 (p. 259).

21 *ibid.*, p. 114 (pp. 214f.). That the idea of a 'philosophical system' is the product of modern philosophy is a thesis held later by Heidegger too: see *Schellings Abhandlung*, pp. 32ff.

22 Cf. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, pp. 115f. (pp. 215f.).

23 *ibid.*, p. 116 (p. 218).

24 *ibid.*, p. 111 (p. 210).

25 *ibid.*, p. 117 (p. 220).

26 *ibid.*, p. 137 (p. 249).

27 For a more detailed discussion of the interpretation of German Idealism in *History and Class Consciousness* see my article 'L'interpretazione della filosofia classica tedesca in "Storia e coscienza di classe",' *Discorsi, Ricerche di storia della filosofia*, 9 (1989), pp. 41-60. For an attempt to connect the perspective of *History and Class Consciousness* to Lukács' later work I may refer to my paper 'Lukács e la filosofia contemporanea: Il problema della ragione', *Giornale di Metafisica*, 10 (1988), pp. 269-98.

28 Biographically, the Lukács-Lask relation is rather unexplored, but it seems that there was a rather strict and friendly connection between them during

Lukács' Heidelberg stay, and that Lask appreciated fairly well Lukács' thought. On 16 November 1912, Lask wrote in a letter to his sister:

The newest star that has come up in Heidelberg is still Georg von Lukács . . . from essayism he has completely passed over to systematic philosophy, and certainly much is to be expected of him. [Der neueste in Heidelberg jetzt aufgegangene Stern ist immer noch Georg von Lukács. . . Er ist jetzt vom Essayisten ganz zum systematischen Philosophen übergegangen, und es ist wohl sehr viel von ihm zu erwarten.]

See Eva Karádi, 'Ernst Bloch und Georg Lukács im Max Weber-Kreis', in *Max Weber und seine Zeitgenossen*, ed. W. J. Mommsen and W. Schwentker (Göttingen, Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), pp. 692, 690.

29 'As far as I know' – Lukács wrote later – '[the term "irrationalism"]' first crops up in Kuno Fischer's *Fichte*. Windelband, in his *History of Philosophy*, already deals with Schelling and Schopenhauer in a section headed "Metaphysics of irrationalism". This terminology is even more predominate in Lask' (*The Destruction of Reason*, tr. P. Palmer (London: Merlin Press, 1980), pp. 95f.).

30 Cf. H. Rickert, *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung. Eine logische Einleitung in die historischen Wissenschaften*, 2nd edn (Tübingen: Mohr, 1913), pp. 222f., 229, 579. Rickert also stresses that 'irrational' means not so much anti-rational, but rather an indifference of beings with respect to concepts (p. 579).

31 Other thinkers to whom Lask refers are Windelband and Simmel (I, 29).

32 See Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 138 (pp. 250f.).

33 See Lukács, *Heidelberger Ästhetik*, p. 16.

34 See G. Lukács, 'Emil Lask. Ein Nachruf', *Kant-Studien*, 22 (1918), pp. 355, 358, and *passim*.

35 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, pp. 110f. (p. 209).

36 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 138 (p. 251), and Lask I, 56ff.

37 Cf. p. 356.

38 See Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 119 (p. 222). The passage refers to the 'hiatus'. In notes Lask gives several further references to the occurrence of the same term in Fichte, but Lukács cites the one quoted by Lask.

39 See Lukács, *Heidelberger Ästhetik*, p. 172.

40 See 'Emil Lask', p. 357.

41 See also in Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 138 (p. 251):

If, in the case of Kant himself, this only indicates the point from which it *would be possible* to complete and perfect the system, in the works of his successors this principle and the postulate of an intuitive understanding and an intellectual intuition becomes the cornerstone of philosophical systematic.

42 'It may be asked' – wrote Lukács in his obituary – 'whether there is in the . . . theoretical sphere really no place for an intuitive understanding, for a non-judgment-like [*nicht urteilsartiges*] . . . knowledge?' (p. 367). In II, 396, without mentioning the concept of intuitive understanding, Lask seems to suggest a positive answer: 'in so far as knowing is the subject-correlate of meaning . . . there must be a . . . knowing which is over and beyond judgment [*überurteilsartiges*]'. This remains, of course, a postulate for him. Lukács especially claimed an intuitive knowledge of Lask's '*schlichtes Ineinander*'

(p. 369); the term turned up in his *Heidelberg Aesthetics* (p. 120), even though such knowledge significantly remained for Lask a 'paradise lost' (II, 426).

43 In his obituary Lukács gave much prominence to this point – see 'Emil Lask', p. 355.

44 Lukács, *Soul and Form*, p. 153.

45 See note 4 above. Heidegger's concern for individuality is here closer to the Lukácsian sort. He too seems to urge a transsubstantiation (if we may use this term) of the individual (see, e.g., *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, in *Wegmarken*, GA 9, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann), 1976, p. 162, and *Schellings Abhandlung*, p. 198), rather than a defence of it (this would be for him a defence of *das Man* (see, e.g., *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, GA 26, ed. K. Held (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), p. 21; *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit*, GA 29/30, ed. F. W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1983), pp. 243ff., 254ff.). Due to the deepening of the European cultural crisis, and his negative appraisal of the Weimar Republic, Heidegger probably saw nothing worthy of being defended any longer. Rather, a new beginning was required (an 'anderer Anfang', as he came to call it in the 1930s). The parallel with Lukács, however, does not hold in an important respect. Heidegger's conception of *Dasein*, in virtue of its basic constitution (especially *Jemeinigkeit*), is still closer to a 'defence of subjectivity' than Lukács' Hegelian sort of class consciousness. And *Dasein* can never arrive at a fully transparent knowledge or a complete mastery of Being.

46 We should remark, however, that by adopting a theory of knowledge as *Hingabe* or plain dedication, Lask seems later to have in part abandoned the standpoint in terms of which we contrast him here with Lukács.

47 See also Rickert, *Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*, p. 464: 'If the future were object of our knowledge it would never be object of our will. In a world which had become entirely rational, nobody would be able to act'. He observes later that 'only as long as we fail to grasp the world metaphysically . . . is history possible' (ibid., p. 579).

48 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 315 (p. 480); see also p. 193 (p. 332).

49 Later, however, Lask came to speak of a breaking up of the original objectual region (see, e.g., II, 363f.). To this extent his earlier criticism of Hegel may also, in part, be brought to bear upon his own position.

50 See, e.g., 'Abraham a Sankta Clara', M. Heidegger, *Denkerfahrungen*, ed. H. Heidegger (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1983), p. 3; *Frühe Schriften*, GA 1, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), p. 409, as well as Gadamer's study quoted in note 14 above.

51 Cf. *Frühe Schriften*, pp. 410f.: 'Die Philosophie des lebendigen Geistes . . . steht von der grossen Aufgabe einer prinzipiellen Auseinandersetzung . . . mit Hegel.' In this context see also *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, p. 97, where much the same terms occur: 'Dann stehen wir mit der Front gegen Hegel, d.h. von einer der schwierigsten Auseinandersetzungen', and ibid., p. 135. Finally, see Heidegger, *Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)*, GA 63, ed. K. Bröcker-Oltmanns (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1988), p. 59.

52 See Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, pp. 186f., 200, 403, 415.

53 For the term 'anti-metaphysical' see O. Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1963), p. 28.

54 In the above summary I have drawn on some passages of my article 'Fundamental ontology and political interlude: Heidegger as Rector of the

University of Freiburg' (in *Knowledge and Politics. Case Studies on the Relationship Between Epistemology and Political Philosophy*, ed. M. Dascal and O. Gruengard (Boulder, San Francisco and London: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 317ff.). For a more detailed delineation of Heidegger's way to *Being and Time* I may refer to my papers 'Zum Denkweg des jungen Heidegger. I. Die ersten Veröffentlichungen', 'Zum Denkweg des jungen Heidegger. II. Unterwegs zu "Sein und Zeit": Die Auseinandersetzung mit Husserl' (*Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae*, Sectio Phil. et Soc., 20 (1986), pp. 163–84, 22–3; (1990), pp. 127–53), as well as to my book *Martin Heidegger* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1984), chaps I–II.

55 See *Frühe Schriften*, pp. 24ff., 32ff. On Lask's significance see also *ibid.*, pp. 56, 191, 407.

56 *ibid.*, p. 202.

57 *ibid.*, p. 211. See also pp. 286ff.

58 *ibid.*, pp. 287f.

59 *ibid.*, pp. 18, 405f.; SZ, p. 160.

60 See *Frühe Schriften*, p. 24.

61 *ibid.*, p. 406.

62 See also Heidegger, *ibid.*, p. 24.

63 See *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 304 (B 247). Cf. also William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 3rd edn (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974), p. 31.

64 Cf. Heidegger's discussion of the emergence of the concept of metaphysics in *Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, pp. 56ff., especially p. 66.

65 Cf. SZ, pp. 44f.; p. 100. See also *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, 4th edn (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976), pp. 142f. A general reason for Heidegger's rejection of an all-encompassing theory of categories might be seen in his tendency to approach the Being-problem along its fourfold Aristotelian articulation, i.e., his reluctance to reduce the meaning of Being to categorial meaning, which is just one of the four Aristotelian meanings. See, e.g., M. Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*, GA 31, ed. H. Tietjen (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982), pp. 77ff.; *Aristoteles, Metaphysik 1–3. Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft*, GA 33, ed. H. Hüni (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1981), pp. 6ff. 11ff., 16f., 45ff. See also Jean Beaufret, *Dialogue avec Heidegger. Philosophie grecque* (Paris: Editions de minuit, 1973), p. 116; and, concerning the problem in general, Franco Volpi, *Heidegger e Aristotele* (Padova: Daphne, 1984). In his 1926 lectures, Heidegger explicitly protested against the reduction of ontology to a doctrine of categories or to a doctrine of substance (cf. Franco Volpi, 'Figure e problemi del corso del semestre estivo 1926 sui "Concetti fondamentali della filosofia antica"', *Itinerari*, 1–2 (1986) p. 253). The expression 'Existenzialien' turns up already in 1923 (cf. *Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)*, p. 19).

66 Cf. *Phänomenologie und Theologie*, in *Wegmarken*, p. 59; *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, GA 20, ed. P. Jaeger (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979), p. 6; *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, GA 24, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975), p. 140; *Sein und Zeit*, p. 10; *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik*, p. 211; *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, pp. 64, 75ff.; *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 147; 'Die Zeit des Weltbildes', *Holzwege*, GA 5, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977), p. 76; *Nietzsche* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), vol. II, pp. 131, 413ff.; *Hölderlins Hymne 'Andenken'*, GA 52, ed. C. Ochwaldt (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982), p. 133; *Parmenides*, GA 54, ed. M. S. Frings (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982), p. 248.

67 Cf. SZ, pp. 21f.; *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, p. 175; *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, p. 64; *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 143.

68 See SZ, pp. 25, 48.

69 For Heidegger's understanding of 'Sorge' and for his undermining of the 'theoretical-practical' distinction see SZ, pp. 57, 59, 69, 193, and later, e.g., *Brief über den Humanismus*, *Wegmarken*, p. 358. Lask had already written that, 'The completely atheoretical attitude is an abstraction' (II, 186), and moreover, in 1919, Heidegger said: 'The predominance of the theoretical must be broken, but not in such a way that one proclaims [now] a primacy of the practical.' In this attempt Heidegger referred to Lask in highly positive terms in his lectures held that year, which have now become accessible within his complete works (after the original version of this essay was finished). Lask was the first in the history of human culture to see the problem of the theoretical, Heidegger said at one point (cf. M. Heidegger, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, pp. 59, 87f.; see on this point also T. Kiesel, 'Das Entstehen des Begriffsfeldes "Faktizität" im Frühwerk Heideggers', *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften*, 4 (1986/7), p. 98). See also Heidegger's considerations of 'the unjustified predominance of the theoretical exactly within the essentially atheoretical sphere', in *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, p. 89.

Following a suggestion of Lucien Goldmann's, Gadamer has recently claimed that certain passages of Lukács' Heidelberg manuscripts, possibly under the impact of Lask's anti-idealistic turn and his reception of American pragmatism, show the influence of the latter (even with regard to terminology), and come close to Heidegger's analysis of the envioning world in *Being and Time* (cf. Gadamer, 'Erinnerungen an Heideggers Anfänge', *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften*, 4 (1986/7), p. 24). Following up on Gadamer's hints we see that Lukács does in fact characterize what he calls *Erlebnismwirklichkeit* as a 'world of pragmatism', and if we search for Heideggerian parallels or anticipations, the following passage might prove useful: 'Das "Denken" der Erlebnismwirklichkeit ist . . . nichts anderes, als der Versuch, sich der Wirklichkeit der dem handelnden "ganzen Menschen" gegenüberstehenden, hemmenden oder fördernden Gebilde zu bemächtigen' (Lukács, *Heidelberger Ästhetik*, pp. 29, 31). The "Denken" der Erlebnismwirklichkeit', so characterized (and not terminologically emphasized), shows obvious parallels to Heidegger's *Umsicht*, namely in so far as 'der gebrauchend-hantierende Umgang ist . . . nicht blind, er hat seine eigene Sichtart, die das Hantieren führt und ihm seine spezifische Sicherheit verleiht . . . die *Umsicht*' (SZ, p. 69). What the "Denken" der Erlebnismwirklichkeit' and 'Umsicht' have in common is, characteristically, that neither of them is the application of already existing theoretical knowledge (Lukács, *Heidelberger Ästhetik*, p. 31):

Ein kontemplatives 'Denken' ist auf dem Niveau der Erlebnismwirklichkeit per definitionem unmöglich, denn durch den Akt des simpelsten Meinens ist die Erlebnismwirklichkeit aufgehoben. . . . Daneben bleibt aber zweifellos die Tatsache bestehen, dass aus der Erlebnistotalität des 'ganzen Menschen' das Denken doch nicht ausgeschaltet werden kann.

And Heidegger, SZ, p. 69:

Das 'praktische' Verhalten ist nicht 'atheoretisch' im Sinne der Sichtlosigkeit, und sein Unterschied gegen das theoretische Verhalten liegt nicht nur darin,

dass hier betrachtet und dort gehandelt wird, und dass das Handeln, um nicht blind zu bleiben, theoretisches Erkennen anwendet.

70 SZ, p. 212.

71 See Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. I, para. 36, 39 (esp. pp. 121, 131ff.); vol. II/2, para. 39, 43–4. See also Heidegger, *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, GA 21, ed. W. Biemel (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), pp. 170ff.

72 Cf. SZ, pp. 214ff.

73 Cf. H. Sommerhäuser, 'Emil Lask 1875–1915', p. 143. In his *Gutachten* on Heidegger's *Habilitationsschrift*, Rickert observed Heidegger's inner connections to contemporary authors, in particular to the 'bedeutsamen "metagrammatischen Subjekts-Prädikats-Theorie" von Lask, dessen Schriften der Verfasser [sc. Heidegger] für seine philosophische Orientierung und auch für seine Terminologie ganz besonders viel verdankt, vielleicht mehr als ihm selbst zu Bewußtsein gekommen ist' (see. Th. Sheehan, 'Heidegger's *Lehrjahre*', *The Collegium Phaenomenologicum*, ed. J. C. Sallis, G. Moneta and J. Taminiaux (The Hague: Kluwer Publishers, 1988), p. 118).

74 Cf. *Frühe Schriften*, pp. 406f.

75 *ibid.*, p. 407.

76 See Heidegger's reference to chap. V of Husserl's Sixth Investigation (SZ, p. 218).

77 Cf. *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, pp. 64, 97.

78 SZ, p. 13. Deriving the concept of *Vorhandenheit* from *Dasein*'s relating itself to the world, Heidegger actually shows the origin of a basic category traditional ontology applied in its description of the world (see §16).

79 Cf. *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, p. 98.

80 The object 'is always already meaning' (K. Hobe, 'Zwischen Rickert und Heidegger. Versuch über eine Perspektive des Denkens von Emil Lask', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, 73 (1971), p. 364.

81 Cf. SZ, pp. 151f.

82 SZ, p. 6. See also pp. 4, 9, and *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, p. 22.

83 See *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, pp. 22f., 454; *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik*, p. 193.

84 Cf. 'Zur Seinsfrage', *Wegmarken*, p. 418. Furthermore, Heidegger sharply distinguishes between what he understands by *Sein* from an abstract generality which the tradition has come to interpret as *Sein*. This he names *Seiendheit* – that which is common to all beings (house, man, horse, stone, God), in so far as they *are* (cf. *Nietzsche*, vol. II, p. 211). In an interesting consideration Lask seems to anticipate this concept of Heidegger's too. He argues that the highest generality is the most abstract, for it denotes a pure content – that which is common to all beings. It designates therefore beings (*das Seiende*) rather than the category of Being (*Kategorie des Seins*) (III, 152).

85 Cf. *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, p. 22.

86 *ibid.*, p. 27.

87 Cf. SZ, para. 3, his remarks in the Summer semester of 1926 (quoted by F. Volpi, 'Heidegger e la storia del pensiero greco: Figure e problemi del corso del semestre estivo 1926 sui "Concetti fondamentali della filosofia antica"', *Itinerari*, 1–2 (1986), p. 229), and *Nietzsche*, vol. I, pp. 372f.

88 Cf. *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, pp. 2f.; SZ, p. 10. An early variant of this, turning up in 1921/2, and delimited against formal logic, is *eigentliche Logik, echte 'Logik'* (cf. M. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*).

tationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung, GA 61, ed. W. Bröcker and K. Bröcker-Oltmanns (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1985), pp. 21, 38).

89 In 1919 Heidegger treats at length the concept of philosophy in terms of *Urwissenschaft*. Cf. *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, pp. 13ff. and *passim*.

90 Cf. SZ, pp. 63, 100. 'The botanist's plants are not the flowers of the hedgerow; the "source" which the geographer establishes is not the "springhead in the dale"' (ibid., p. 70).

91 ibid., p. 153.

92 ibid., p. 152.

93 See Heidegger's positive reference to Lask's concept of *Übergegensatzlichkeit* in his *Habilitationsschrift (Frühe Schriften)*, p. 406). On the 'lethe or unintelligibility' as the basis of 'aletheia or intelligibility' see T. Sheehan, 'Time and Being', 1925-7', R. W. Shahan and J. N. Mohanty (eds), *Thinking About Being: Aspects of Heidegger's Thought* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984), p. 197.

94 Therefore, it may reasonably be argued that by the stress laid on the objective Lask completely reversed Kant's teaching – particularly his theory of the spontaneity of human intellect (see H. Sommerhäuser, 'Emil Lask 1875-1915', pp. 139f.; R. Malter, 'Heinrich Rickert und Emil Lask. Vom Primat der transzendentalen Subjektivität zum Primat des gegebenen Gegenstandes in der Konstitution der Erkenntnis', *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 23 (1969), Heft 1, pp. 93, 97).

95 *Brief über den Humanismus, Wegmarken*, p. 342.

96 *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Wegmarken*, pp. 195ff.

97 See my articles 'Fundamental ontology and political interlude: Heidegger as Rector of the University of Freiburg' in *Knowledge and Politics: Case Studies on the Relationship Between Epistemology and Political Philosophy*, ed. M. Dascal and O. Gruengard (Boulder, San Francisco and London: Westview Press 1989), pp. 316-51, and 'Fakten und Apriori in der neueren Beschäftigung mit Heideggers politischem Engagement', in *Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers*, ed. D. Papenfuß and O. Pöggeler, vol. 1, *Philosophie und Politik* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1991), pp. 380-408.

98 See Lukács, 'Emil Lask', p. 357, and *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 118 (p. 220).

99 Cf. Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, p. 33.

100 See on this point John D. Caputo, *Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), pp. 26ff.

101 On the connection of Aristotle and Husserl in Heidegger's thought, see T. Sheehan, 'Heidegger, Aristotle and phenomenology', *Philosophy Today*, Summer 1975, pp. 87-94.

102 Cf. Lukács, 'Emil Lask', p. 367, and Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, p. 407; SZ, p. 61.

103 See *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, p. 217: 'The being of the subject consists not only in its knowing itself [*Sichwissen*].'

104 While this is evident in Lukács, in Heidegger this orientation appears for the first time in the concluding chapter of his *Habilitationsschrift* (cf. *Frühe Schriften*, p. 408). For a more detailed discussion of the parallel concerning history, viz. historicity in Heidegger and Lukács, see my paper 'Heidegger und Lukács. Eine Hundertjahresbilanz', in *Wege und Irrwege des neueren Umgangs mit Heideggers Werk. Ein deutsch-ungarisches Symposium*, ed. I. M. Fehér (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1991).

105 I borrow this way of speaking from Thomas Sheehan, who applies it in a different context: see, 'Introduction: Heidegger, the project and the fulfillment', *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. T. Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent, 1981), p. xvii. I think, however, that it perfectly applies with regard to history too, not only for the project of *Being and Time*, but also for the thought of the 'second' Heidegger, who even comes to reflect upon it in terms of *Seinsgeschichte*, *Geschick Ereignis*. On the problem of Historicity in Heidegger's thought see O. Pöggeler, ' "Geschichtlichkeit" im Spätwerk Heideggers', O. Pöggeler, *Heidegger und die hermeneutische Philosophie* (Freiburg-München: Alber, 1983), pp. 139-70.

106 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 211 (see also p. 114 (pp. 213f.)).

107 *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 136.

108 *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*, GA 32, ed. I. Görland (Frankfurt: Klostermann), 1980, p. 162.

109 'Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens', Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 2nd edn (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976), p. 79. For a fuller discussion of the problem of rationality and irrationality in Lukács and Heidegger see my paper quoted above in note 104.

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Critical Assessments

Edited by Christopher Macann

VOLUME III: LANGUAGE

First published 1992
by Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
a division of Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc.
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Selection and editorial material © 1992 Routledge
Individual chapters © 1992 the respective authors

Phototypeset in 10/12pt Times by
Intype, London
Printed in Great Britain by
TJ Press (Padstow) Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Martin Heidegger: critical assessments.
I. Macann, Christopher
193

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Martin Heidegger: critical assessments/edited by Christopher
Macann.
p. cm. — (Routledge critical assessments of leading philosophers)
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Heidegger, Martin, 1889–1976. I. Macann, Christopher E.
II. Series.
B3279.H49M2854 1992
193—dc20 91—46751

ISBN 0-415-04982-2

Contents

VOLUME III: LANGUAGE

| | |
|---|-----|
| Acknowledgements | ix |
| Introduction | 1 |
| <i>Christopher Macann</i> | |
| 32 Heidegger's conception of language in <i>Being and Time</i> | 14 |
| <i>Jan Aler</i> | |
| 33 Language and silence: self-inquiry in Heidegger and Zen | 39 |
| <i>Tetsuaki Kotoh</i> | |
| 34 Heidegger's language and the problems of translation | 50 |
| <i>John Macquarrie</i> | |
| 35 Thinking more deeply into the question of translation: essential translation and the unfolding of language | 58 |
| <i>Parvis Emad</i> | |
| 36 Heidegger's idea of truth | 79 |
| <i>Ernst Tugendhat</i> | |
| 37 Heidegger on logic | 93 |
| <i>J. N. Mohanty</i> | |
| 38 The essence of transcendence | 121 |
| <i>Christopher Macann</i> | |
| 39 The language of the event: the event of language | 151 |
| <i>Theodore Kisiel</i> | |
| 40 The transformation of language at another beginning | 168 |
| <i>Robert Bernasconi</i> | |
| 41 Language and reversal | 190 |
| <i>John Sallis</i> | |
| 42 Meaning adrift | 212 |
| <i>John Sallis</i> | |

| | | |
|----|--|-----|
| 43 | Poetry and language in Heidegger <i>Walter Biemel</i> | 222 |
| 44 | Heidegger and Hölderlin: the over-usage of 'Poets in an impoverished time' <i>Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert</i> | 247 |
| 45 | 'The flower of the mouth': Hölderlin's hint for Heidegger's thinking of the essence of language <i>Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann</i> | 277 |
| 46 | Heidegger on metaphor and metaphysics <i>Joseph J. Kockelmans</i> | 293 |
| 47 | Heidegger and Ryle: two versions of phenomenology <i>Michael Murray</i> | 321 |
| 48 | Wittgenstein and Heidegger: language games and life forms <i>Karl-Otto Apel</i> | 341 |

Acknowledgements

Jan Aler 'Heidegger's conception of language in *Being and Time*'. First published by Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, in *On Heidegger and Language* (ed. J. Kockelmans), 1972. Reprinted by kind permission of the author and editor.

Tetsuaki Kotoh 'Language and silence: self-inquiry in Heidegger and Zen'. First published in an English translation in *Heidegger and Asian Thought* (ed. G. Parkes), 1987 and reprinted by kind permission of the editor and of the University of Hawaii Press.

John Macquarrie 'Heidegger's language and the problems of translation'. Hitherto unpublished paper made available by kind permission of the author.

Parvis Emad 'Thinking more deeply into the question of translation: essential translation and the unfolding of language'. First published by Indiana University Press and reprinted by kind permission of the author and editor of the Press.

Ernst Tugendhat 'Heidegger's idea of truth'. Originally published as 'Heideggers Idee von Wahrheit' in *Heidegger* (ed. O. Pöggeler), Berlin, 1969. Translated from the German by Christopher Macann and published by kind permission of the author.

J. N. Mohanty 'Heidegger on logic'. First published in the *Journal of the History of Philosophy* vol. 26, no. 1, 1988 and reprinted by kind permission of the author and editor.

Christopher Macann 'The essence of transcendence'. Original piece written for this collection.

Theodore Kisiel 'The language of the event: the event of language'. First

published in *Heidegger and the Path of Thinking* (ed. J. Sallis) by Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1970 and reprinted by kind permission of the author, the editor and Duquesne University Press.

Robert Bernasconi 'The transformation of language at another beginning'. First published in *Research in Phenomenology*, then reprinted in *Radical Phenomenology* (ed. J. Sallis), Humanities Press, 1978. Reprinted in this collection by kind permission of the author, the editor and Humanities Press.

John Sallis 'Language and reversal'. First published in the *Southern Journal of Philosophy* vol. 8, 1970, then reprinted in *Heidegger* (ed. C. Scott) and reprinted in this collection by kind permission of the author and the editor.

John Sallis 'Meaning adrift'. First published in *Delimitations*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1986 and reprinted by kind permission of the author and Indiana University Press.

Walter Biemel 'Poetry and language in Heidegger'. First published in *On Heidegger and Language* (ed. J. Kockelmans) Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 1972 and reprinted by kind permission of the author, the editor and Northwestern University Press.

Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert 'Heidegger and Hölderlin: the over-usage of "Poets in an impoverished time"'. First published in *Research in Phenomenology* (ed. J. Sallis), Humanities Press, 1989 and reprinted by kind permission of the author and the editor.

Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann 'The flower of the mouth: Hölderlin's hint for Heidegger's thinking of the essence of language'. First published in *Research in Phenomenology* (ed. J. Sallis) vol. 19, Humanities Press and reprinted by kind permission of the author and the editor.

Joseph J. Kockelmans 'Heidegger on metaphor and metaphysics'. First published in *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, 47e, Jaargang – Nummer 3 – September 1985 and reprinted by kind permission of the author.

Michael Murray 'Heidegger and Ryle: two versions of phenomenology'. First published by Yale University Press in *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy* (ed. M. Murray), 1978 and reprinted by kind permission of the author and the Press.

Karl-Otto Apel 'Wittgenstein and Heidegger: language games and life forms'. Originally published in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* (Freiburg), vol. 75, 1, Halbband, 1967, then reprinted in *Heidegger* (ed. O. Pöggeler), Berlin, 1969. Translated from the German by Christopher Macann and reprinted by kind permission of the author.

Introduction

Christopher Macann

So lernt ich traurig den Verzicht.
Kein Ding sei wo das Wort gebricht

(Stefan Georg, 'The word')

Language is the House of Being.

(Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*)

This third volume of the four-volume set is devoted to what might be called 'meta-theoretical' issues. As the medium through which philosophy is articulated and communicated, language and therefore any discussion of the use made of language is, by its very nature, meta-theoretical. But I have also grouped under this head other issues of a meta-theoretical character, for instance, truth and logic (in the Heideggerian sense), as well as transcendence. So this third volume might have been given the same title as Professor Ayer's most famous work – language, truth and logic.

There can be no doubt that one of the most remarkable shifts in the focus of philosophical attention through this century has been the shift from reality (whatever one might choose to mean by this rather ephemeral term) to language, from things to words, from the *subject-matter* which is addressed in philosophical inquiry to the *medium* through which it finds expression. In so far as philosophy may be regarded as a characteristically 'reflective' discipline, it would seem that philosophy has of late become doubly reflective, a reflection upon that (language) which has itself often been presented by philosophers as a reflection of something else – experience, consciousness, being, world (one is reminded here of Wittgenstein's 'picture' theory of meaning).

This shift probably took effect in the English-speaking world earlier than it did on the Continent. While, on the Continent, philosophers were still inspired by the Husserlian and Heideggerian injunction to get 'back

to the things themselves', in the English-speaking world, and especially in Britain, ordinary language had become not just the acknowledged *focus* of philosophical attention but also the identifiable *locus* of all so-called pseudo-philosophical problems.

When I was being introduced to philosophy at Oxford, in the early 1960s, the linguistic revolution then in progress was so far identified with the work being done at that time in Oxford that the new way of doing philosophy was often simply called 'Oxford' philosophy, even though the dominant inspiration was still the work of a German, Ludwig Wittgenstein, who, through the good offices of Bertrand Russell, had been adopted by Cambridge. Thirty years on little is heard of 'Oxford' philosophy, or the linguistic way of doing philosophy, though the broader title 'analytic' philosophy still applies to mainstream philosophy in the English-speaking world.

Initially, the self-destructive implications of linguistic philosophy were by no means as apparent as they became later on. The linguistic philosophy to which I was initially exposed possessed, and has indeed always retained, a spirit of direct confrontation with the problems. Thinking, in a sense defined by the analytical parameters of 'Oxford' philosophy, was so conceived that the humblest student could challenge the conclusions of Oxford's most exalted philosophical stars, and his or her position or objection would be considered at its face value, and in accordance with criteria of truth and validity assumed to be universal and therefore binding upon all and sundry.

Furthermore, from the very beginning, the 'revolution in philosophy' went along with a certain disinterest in the niceties of historical scholarship. A glance at the four books which constituted the classics of the linguistic philosophy of my day at Oxford, Gilbert Ryle's *Concept of Mind*, Peter Strawson's *Individuals*, Stuart Hampshire's *Thought and Action* and A. J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* suffices to confirm that it was indeed then possible to make major contributions to philosophy without an extensive critical apparatus. *The Concept of Mind* has no notes at all and nor does *Thought and Action*. *Individuals* has virtually no notes and *Language, Truth and Logic* sports only a modest sprinkling. Going back a little further, it goes without saying that Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* contains no supplementary notes since it itself consists of nothing but notes.

But there was another and much less positive side to the linguistic revolution. Every attempt by the analytical philosophers of that day to establish some kind of (ultimate) foundation for philosophical thinking was quickly met with a devastating critique which proved precisely what was in question, namely, the non-foundational character of analytical epistemology. Following in the footsteps of his mentor, H. H. Price, Ayer attempted to develop an empirical phenomenalism only to be con-

fronted with a savage critique by John Austin who showed convincingly that Ayer had simply presupposed the very reality for which he was attempting to provide a phenomenal foundation. The upshot of *Sens and Sensibilia* (disregarding the barely concealed infighting) was that if you are going to be an empiricist (and most British philosophers are empiricists of one variety or another) you might as well be a realist since you are effectively appealing to the very same world view as that which realism relies upon and since realism offers much the simpler and more straightforward account of this world view and one which, moreover, is already enshrined in ordinary language.

The non-foundational character of linguistic philosophy brought with it a sweeping critique of the history of philosophy in so far as this history attests to the manifold attempts of philosophers to establish some such foundation. The then fashionable representatives of 'linguistic philosophy' were apt to contend that the history of philosophy was the history of the grammatical errors committed by the great philosophers of the past, errors which would be resolved (not solved) just as soon as the necessary philosophical therapy had been carried through, just as soon to employ the peculiar, and peculiarly Wittgensteinian, expression, a 'fly had been shown the way out of the fly-bottle'. Ordinary language it was assumed, was devised for the ordinary purposes of everyday life and had been perverted by philosophers who, having drawn their concepts from the available stock, then twisted and deformed the term in question to meet demands entirely foreign to their native function. Doing philosophy therefore meant un-doing this misplaced perversion of language.

The 'revolution in philosophy' which owed its origins to the informal researches of Ludwig Wittgenstein soon demonstrated a marked tendency to esoteric insularity. Metaphysical philosophy, including not merely phenomenology in all its shapes and forms but the then fashionable existentialism of the Sartrian variety, became highly suspect. At the famous (or infamous) Royaumont conference, held in France in the early 1960s, the abyss that had opened up between British and European philosophy became amply apparent as philosophers from the two sides of the Channel talked past each other with little or no basis for communication.

But no matter how convincingly the new revolution in philosophy was portrayed, it was difficult not to notice that an element of frivolity seemed to have crept into the discipline. In compliance with the then fashionable dictum: 'ask not for the meaning of a word, ask for its use' seminars were devoted to debating the question whether or not it might be possible to 'want a cup of mud', that is, to construct a context in which it would make sense to *use* the word 'want' in this way. And this kind of discussion passed for a final resolution of the time-honoured

problem of the will. The conceptual connections between such key concepts as conditionality and possibility were examined by asking whether 'cans' were 'iffy' or, conversely, whether 'ifs' were 'canny'. Oxford philosophers modestly disclaimed the possibility of solving the problems of the universe in an armchair of an afternoon. But one was left with the disquieting suspicion that the modesty of linguistic philosophy might have something to do with the fact that linguistic philosophers had much to be modest about.

An implication of this programme was the self-effacing, if not the bleakly self-destroying, character of philosophy. In time, as one pseudo-problem after the other was unmasked, the scope of philosophy would be progressively reduced until, effectively, there would be no more 'problems' for philosophers to resolve. From 'under-labourers', philosophers would eventually be reduced to the ranks of the unemployed, or rather, the unemployable. For, having successfully applied the 'therapy', philosophers would be cured of the very linguistic disease which their discipline was defined as being. Having used the ladder to climb the wall, the ladder would then have to be thrown away, leaving the few surviving representatives of the discipline peering nervously down from heights which could never again be scaled and from which they themselves could no longer descend. *Après moi, le déluge!*

Even while I was still mastering the techniques of linguistic analysis it struck me that this dismissal of the history of philosophy was highly premature. The aims and objectives of philosophy, it struck me then, were not the ordinary aims and objectives of everyday life and communication. They were, by the very nature of things, *extra-ordinary*. He for whom common sense (enshrined in ordinary language) is already a philosophy needs no philosophy; and he who needs philosophy can surely not be satisfied with the common sense enshrined in ordinary language.

When I went to Paris to do my graduate work under Paul Ricoeur, I was happy to find in phenomenology a foundational thinking that seemed capable of getting to the bottom of things and of arriving at conclusions which were relevant to life as well as merely to knowledge and the possibility of knowledge. Indeed, I was doubly impressed, not merely by the persistence of what seemed to me a legitimate commitment to the things themselves but also by a masterly command of bodies of knowledge only indirectly connected to philosophy. The Oxford philosophers under whom I had studied 'linguistic' philosophy appeared, at that time, to know little or nothing (or to show little sign of knowing anything) about the science of linguistics, an area of inquiry which formed the centre of Professor Ricoeur's attention in the late 1960s (after his massive exploration of psychoanalysis), and which is reproduced in his book *La métaphor vive*. Indeed, a glance at Ricoeur's list of publications suffices to establish that his intellectual mastery extends to almost every branch

of the humanities – psychology, theology, sociology, anthropology, mythology, linguistics and so on.

As I was finishing my doctoral thesis a young man, named Jacques Derrida, was just beginning to come to prominence with a series of short works in which he displayed outstanding critical acumen, particularly with respect to the writings of Edmund Husserl and who, at that time appeared to belong to the new school of structuralist thinking. The specifically French structuralism of that time traced its ancestry back to the science of linguistics and in particular to the lectures of Ferdinand de Saussure, whose basic distinction between *langue* and *parole* made it possible to consider the more exactly constituted structure of *langue* independently of its more variable and ephemeral expression and communication in *parole*. This isolation of the text from its expression in discourse made possible a peculiar synthesis of Heideggerian 'destructive hermeneutics' with a structuralist examination of the text. And before very long we had 'de-constructivism'.

Once again philosophy had taken up residence in language – this time not so much in an analysis of the practice of language in everyday speech contexts as in a critical assessment of the inscription of language in texts. Writing could no longer be regarded as the shadow of the spoken word but had to be treated in its own right, and in accordance with its own intrinsic structures. Philosophical texts which relied upon what has now become known as the 'doctrine of presence' had to be examined with a view to disengaging the concealed premises upon which they relied and which were actually contrary, or even contradictory, to the avowed intentions of their author. Once again, language had become both the acknowledged *focus* of philosophical attention and the identifiable *locus* of misconceptions which it was the task of philosophy to uncover. Derrida's later interest in, for example, the work of John Austin, showed that this conjunction was by no means accidental.

I happen to find these developments disquieting. And perhaps the best way to bring out my sense of concern is to draw a brief analogy with contemporary developments in the arts, particularly the plastic and the musical arts. It seems to be the case that when the medium through which an art form finds expression becomes the central theme of that same cultural form we witness a peculiar deterioration in the character of the work produced in that field, a deterioration which is perhaps more noticeable in the arts precisely because this reflective turn inevitably brings with it an intellectual focus which cuts the moment of artistic expression off from its creative source, feeling or imagination or the unconscious or, as Bergson would have it, the *moi profond*. Music, as the most structured art, is particularly sensitive to this kind of intellectual self-cancellation. From modal tones music took a great leap forward with a harmonic theory based upon the eight-note scale. The eight-note scale

was in due course superseded by the twelve-tone scale, from where the only possible theoretical advance could be in the atonal direction of pure and simple sounds. Or even silence. But 'three minutes of silence' is not so much a musical statement as an intellectual statement about the development of musical theory and the same goes for blank canvases or canvases which go by the name of the one colour with which they are covered. In turn, the vacuum created by this excessive intellectualization of the arts has been filled by the emergence of simpler and more directly appealing 'pop' forms. Artists with the talent to work productively in the classical tradition are tempted to slip into the popular mode by the potentially vast sums of money which 'pop art' is capable of generating for its practitioners. 'Art', said Andy Warhol, in one of his more infamous pronouncements, 'is whatever sells.' And 'artists' have been laughing all the way to the bank ever since.

The medium of philosophy is language. If the analogy holds good, excessive emphasis upon the medium is likely to lead in the same direction as that briefly mentioned above; on the one hand, an ever-increasing sterilization of the officially (which means institutionally) sanctioned discipline complemented, on the other, by pop forms which take up again, in a more readily assimilable, and for this reason often miserably inadequate, fashion the vital themes that have been abandoned by the classical exponents of the discipline. Nothing could illustrate better the consequences of an abandonment of traditional themes by official philosophy than the proliferation of cult movements (often headed by leaders whose motives are utterly exploitative) which has grown up in the vacuum created by the withdrawal of philosophical thought from an area which once constituted its central concern.

Almost inevitably therefore, one volume of this four-volume collection has had to be given over to the topic of language. However it should be noted from the outset that Heidegger's approach to language does not fit into any readily available category or school. Though de-constructivism is apt to trace its roots to the Heideggerian programme of a 'phenomenological destruction of the history of philosophy', in a very real sense, Heidegger's approach to language was highly idiosyncratic and so has not furnished the basis for a distinctive conception of philosophy or of a distinctively philosophical conception of language. Neither ordinary language nor the science of linguistics was of much concern to Heidegger – which is not to say that Heidegger was not acutely aware of the way ordinary language works in discourse or of the advances that have been made in the scientific understanding of language. His interest in language was of another kind altogether. Summarily, Heidegger's interest in language can be brought under three heads, logical (in the distinctively Heideggerian sense of *logik*), etymological and poetic. At the same time

these, so to speak 'horizontal' demarcations are subject to a 'vertical' transformation which goes by the name of the *Kehre* or 'reversal'.

In accordance with the phenomenological slogan (to which Heidegger himself initially adhered): To the things themselves!, language plays a relatively subordinate role in Heidegger's first philosophy, that of the articulation of intelligibility. The term Heidegger adopts in *Being and Time* to talk about language is *Rede* (discourse), a term which belongs within the priority Heidegger accords to *praxis* over theory (*parole* before *langue*). Even the more theoretically appropriate term assertion (*Aussage*) is still connected with the communication of meaning through language and is directed toward a pointing out (*aufzeigen*) which is itself linked to the term employed to characterize the manifestation of being: *sich zeigen* – to show itself. 'To significations, words accrue' (SZ, p. 161). The pre-lingual character of language as *Rede* (discourse) is moreover linked to the extra-lingual character of *Rede* as *logos* in this respect; Heidegger is still thoroughly Husserlian, assuming an essential meaning core with reference to which language becomes an incidental or even an accidental overlay, a tool employed for a given purpose, that of speaking forth (*Heraussage*) and communicating (*Mitteilung*) – language as the overt expressedness of *logos*.

Indeed, so radically decisive is the pre-lingual and extra-lingual character of *Rede* in *Being and Time* that its inauthentic derivative 'small talk' (*Gerede*) can almost be defined in terms of the collapse of this pre- and extra-lingual character, a collapse by virtue of which the words themselves become all-important, the word for the sake of the word rather than the word for the sake of what can be signified thereby. And what calls Dasein away from the inauthenticity of the They? Conscience as a call, that is, as a voice which calls Dasein to itself – in silence. In silence, not in expression, let alone communication. Hence the significance of the emphasis placed upon the phenomenon of silence by Kotoh in his piece on 'Language and silence'.

In the context of a phenomenology defined, as Heidegger does define it in *Being and Time*, as the *logos* of the *phenomenon*, questions of truth and validity not only arise but form an integral part of the programme. Nobody is better qualified to talk on this subject than Tugendhat, whose *Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* not only demonstrated an impressive command of the thinking of these two major phenomenological figures but already pointed in the analytic direction which Tugendhat adopted later. Tugendhat assumes as his task the need to critically assess the value of Heidegger's identification of truth with disclosedness. He goes about his business in a characteristically roundabout way, first exhibiting the Husserlian transformation of propositional truth into self-evidence and then using this phenomenological transformation of the problematic as the bridge between the ordinary conception of truth (as

correspondence) and the conception at which Heidegger himself *ultimately* arrives through a kind of suppression, or elimination, of certain key elements in the Husserlian conception.

The strength of Tugendhat's procedure surely lies in this, that he uncovers the surreptitious reasoning which leads Heidegger to his conclusions, but in such a way that the weakness of this reasoning is itself concealed, so that the reader is left in the dark as to what has actually taken place. Once this surreptitious reasoning is uncovered, the seeming validity of 'truth as uncovering' itself gets uncovered as something which relies upon a certain ambiguity and which has, in consequence, already covered over its own weakness and so is allowed to appear more reasonable than in fact is the case.

What is so interesting about Tugendhat's account is not that he dismisses Heidegger's extension of the concept of truth to mean disclosedness but that he criticizes Heidegger for doing so in such a way as to deny himself the fruits of his own labour. Such an extension could have been made in an ontologically profitable manner provided only that a clear distinction were drawn between what Tugendhat calls the 'broader' and the 'narrower' concept of truth, a distinction which would still permit Heidegger to claim that the narrower concept finds its ultimate foundation in the broader. But by failing to draw the necessary distinctions and leaving things in a state of deliberately unresolved ambiguity he either opens himself to a critique capable of calling in question the validity of the theory or is only able to defend the validity of the theory at the cost of trivializing its significance as a contribution to the theory of truth.

Tugendhat's paper seems to me a superb example of the sort of critical assessment of Heidegger's contribution to philosophy which is eminently *fruitful*, in the sense that it is capable of distinguishing what is positive and what is negative in a given Heideggerian position and, moreover, in such a way, that a revision is implied which would be capable of preserving the positive while eliminating the negative. He not merely exposes the weakness of unresolved ambiguities but suggests an alternative line of approach, based upon a clarification of these same ambiguities, which would preserve most of what Heidegger sought to accomplish while at the same time eliminating those very elements to which he (Tugendhat) takes exception – thereby advancing the very same cause as that to which Heidegger himself was committed.

Professor Mohanty undertakes the task of explaining what Heidegger meant by *Logik*, a particularly unusual task in that, although Heidegger did talk about logic in his own sense of *Logik* and although a volume of his *Gesamtausgabe* is entitled *Logik*, nothing that is done in the name of logic has much to do with what is ordinarily understood by the term, not even when the term is extended to include Hegel's *Logic* or Husserl's

Logical Researches. In effect by *Logik* Heidegger really means that by virtue of which it becomes possible to call ontology 'onto-logic', in the strictly etymological sense of the word – the logic of being. The importance of Heidegger's work, as Mohanty points out, is that, on the one hand, he should, while recognizing the relative validity of formal logic, have seen that this validity is dependent upon a derivative world view that, namely, of the present-at-hand conception of entities while, on the other, and because of his recognition of the merely relative validity of formal logic, he called for a more primordial investigation of the essence of truth, the significance of the copula, interpretative understanding, disclosedness and so on which, in some other sense, also deserves to be called 'logic'.

My own contribution to the general problematic of truth focuses upon the theme of transcendence. The connection between the theme of truth and that of transcendence is particularly apparent in the Kant book, no doubt because the theme of transcendence arises in its most acute form within the context of transcendental philosophy, and especially the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. That the theme is still vital to the development of phenomenological philosophy in general is evidenced by the fact that two of the most creative of contemporary philosophers, Michel Henry and Emmanuel Lévinas, take their stand in a certain conception of, or reaction to, the problematic of transcendence. While Michel Henry's *Essence of Manifestation* takes its start in the ambition to develop what might be called an ontology of immanence (against Heidegger's ontology of transcendence), Lévinas' work might be summarily presented as an attempt to accentuate, to the limit, the structure of transcendence – the absolute and unqualified alterity of the other.

Because Heidegger resisted the tendency to abstract language from the context of thinking there are relatively few texts in which he focuses specifically upon the issue of language. One of these few is *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, a text from the later period the importance of which is carefully analysed by Robert Bernasconi. In a crucial passage from 'The transformation of language at another beginning', Bernasconi makes a remark which links his paper to that of Theodore Kisiel. In his 'The language of the event: the event of language', Kisiel uses the 'reversal', made explicit in *Time and Being* and formally instated in the concept of *Ereignis*, as the key to his understanding of the transformation of Heidegger's conception of language, thereby confirming the position assumed by Bernasconi when he writes:

What looked like a task we set ourselves – to bring language to language as language – becomes the way-making [*Be-wegung*] which is *Ereignis* itself. The transformation of the formula about bringing

language as language to language is the passage from Being to *Ereignis*.

John Sallis' double contribution (in adjacent papers) is specifically intended to highlight a reversal effective in the writing of a philosopher who has been working with Heidegger over an extended period of time. In 'Language and reversal' Sallis talks about the reversal in Heidegger's treatment of language. In 'Meaning adrift', a paper taken from a new book *Delimitations*, Sallis addresses Heideggerian themes in accordance with the rubric of 'reversal'. The 'reversal' about which he wrote now becomes a reversal operative in the act of writing itself.

The use Heidegger makes of etymology (and this is the second main category) to bring out the basic significance of words is so sweeping that it almost constitutes a stylistic signature. Jean Aler gives us an excellent example of a new word created by Heidegger which is immediately recognizable on etymological grounds alone – *Entfernung*: meaning, for Heidegger and in conjunction with a strictly etymological semantics, removing the distance, or getting close, but through a double negative which dramatizes the significance of this word in his theory of space. But in generating this compound Heidegger actually succeeded in creating a word whose philosophical meaning is the very opposite of what the word ordinarily means in German, namely 'distance' as opposed to proximity or, as I have rendered it in my own account of space, 'approximation'.

Etymological novelty is never, with Heidegger, a matter of the new for the sake of the new but the new for the sake of a renewal of the old. Hence the link with the history of philosophy. Heidegger's etymological creations are by and large directed against the philosophical language of his day and intended to revive older conceptions which, he thinks, are needed 'to preserve the force of the most elemental words in which *Dasein* expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from levelling them off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of pseudo-problems'. Here we find the connection with both linguistic philosophy and de-constructivism clearly expressed in terms of the phrase 'pseudo-problems'. Ontological 'destruction' follows naturally from this countermovement directed against the levelling off into unintelligibility and is directed to re-awakening the primordial force of philosophical words.

Heidegger's use of Greek terms is critical in this respect. For, as terms drawn from what Heidegger takes to be the origin of Western philosophy, they already possess that 'primordial force' which only original conceptions can express. This reference back to supposedly original conceptions enshrined in Greek etymology leads to constructions which are, in a certain sense, untranslatable. However, once the basic, primordial conception has been understood, terms can be coined which more or less

satisfactorily reproduce the original force of the word. Thus, *Alethia* is not only taken over from the Greek to confirm Heidegger's conception of what truth is as an *existential*, the stress laid upon the negative prefix (*a-lethia*) is then reproduced in its German equivalents which finally have to be translated over into the English through the use of such strange terms as un-concealedness or un-covering.

But especially in the later work, etymological plays of this kind can lead to lines of thought which have no equivalent in many other languages and which, in this sense, are literally untranslatable – even though the basic drift can be conveyed by circumlocutions of one kind or another. The 'es gibt' which plays so prominent a role in *Time and Being* and which leads to conceptual resonances which play upon the term 'give'–gift (*Geschenk* therefore *Geschick*, or even *Geschichte*) cannot be reproduced in English, which follows the French in saying 'there is' (*il y a*, literally, it has there). This might, in English, lead to other equivalent kinds of reflection upon, for example, the 'there' of 'there is' (the *Da* to which Heidegger repeatedly recurs as an element in *Da-sein*), though such reflections would necessarily lead off in a completely different direction. One of the implications of this way of doing philosophy would be that *each* language locks its philosophy into a semantically sealed system with only indirect translational possibilities. Hence the relevance of Emad's piece on 'The question of translation'.

Finally, no discussion of Heidegger's approach to language would be complete without a consideration of his later reflections upon the nature of the relation of poetry to philosophy – or thinking, to give the proper name to that which, according to Heidegger, transpires after the end of philosophy. Although, as has been mentioned, Heidegger has no philosophy of language in the ordinary sense, it could be said that he takes language more seriously than any philosopher before him, and precisely because of the ever-increasing importance accorded to poetry. Biemel's paper furnishes an excellent guide to the theme of the relation of poetry and language in Heidegger's thinking and can perhaps be summarized in three steps. (1) Poetry brings beings into being through language. 'The aboriginal language is poetry as establishment of Being'. (2) As the element in which openness happens, poetry is also the advent of the truth of beings. The Work of Art is 'the letting come to pass of the advent of the truth of beings as such'. (3) As the art of language, poetry is also the paradigm case with reference to which it becomes possible to assess the language of art. 'The arts which do not realize themselves in the realm of language presuppose the disclosure of being through language.'

Thus, in the end, the essence of language is the language of the essence whereby, as Biemel is careful to point out, a radical shift of meaning takes place in the term 'essence'. In the first instance, it retains its

metaphysical significance as the *essentia* of a subject-matter, in this case, language. In the second instance, it is better translated as *Being*, since it refers to a thinking about Being which is only possible in so far as man dwells poetically in language. As that which takes place in saying (*Sagen* – Heidegger's later term for language), poetic thinking is itself a happening (*Ereignis*). It is not so much a matter of the locus of the 'event' being displaced (from being to language) as rather a matter of language being replaced at the very heart of being – so that 'thinking' ultimately assumes the role originally accorded to the *logos*. The *logos* of *Sprache* thereby in the end becomes, through the poetizing of thinking, the *Ereignis* of *Sagen*. Tracing the progress of this full circle makes it possible both to preserve the *identity* (or continuity) of Heidegger's thinking and also to let the *difference* become manifest, that difference which emerges in the course of Heidegger's philosophical itinerary.

Starting from two commonplace observations, that Heidegger, more than almost any other philosopher, makes use of metaphor, and that poetry is concerned with, or has always been regarded as concerning itself with, metaphor, Kockelmans makes a connection between metaphor, as a figure of speech, and metaphysics. The metaphysical distinction between the sensible and the non-sensible finds its linguistic equivalent in the distinction (conventionally taken to explain metaphor) between the literal and the figurative use of a word. The key term in Heidegger's dismissal of this conception of the role of metaphor in poetry is that of 'image', where by 'image' Heidegger means something that can be aligned with the figurative and non-sensible side of the equation. Because Heidegger wants to call in question the metaphysical distinction between the sensible and the non-sensible, he is able to deny that his response to the address of Being is metaphorical. Here we find Kockelmans defending Heidegger's conception of the place of metaphor in philosophy against the criticism brought by such philosophers as Ricoeur, Derrida and Greisch.

It is impossible to discuss Heidegger's conception of the relation of philosophy to poetry without discussing his engagement with the German poet Hölderlin. In this regard, we are fortunate to have two pieces specifically devoted to this topic, one by von Herrmann and one by Gethmann-Siebert. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann presses poetry to its source in the sounding of the word and so is able to connect Heidegger's concern with sounding (and its relation to saying) with the emergence of the two regions of earth and world – a notable theme of his later philosophy: This beautiful and evocative piece attests to the blossoming of language as 'the flower of the mouth'.

Annemarie Gethmann-Siebert's paper on 'Heidegger and Hölderlin' leaps into a completely different domain altogether. By explicitly connecting Heidegger's devotion to Hölderlin with his own attempt at a

coming to terms with his political mistake, she is able to raise the question whether in fact the new kind of thinking which emerges, in large part in response to Heidegger's later concern with poetry (and in particular the poetry of Hölderlin), actually offers a corrective and redeeming vision, a pathway from insight to discerning action. Gethmann-Siefert's conclusions are, on the whole, negative. While admitting the possibility that such a pathway leading from *Being and Time* through poetic thinking to discerning action might indeed have been opened up (along other lines) she feels that Heidegger himself obstructed this path. Neither his earlier 'unthinking' political commitment nor his later, poetic consideration of the relation of poetry and *praxis* actually served the cause of philosophically enlightened action.

I have chosen to close this volume with two comparative studies connecting Heidegger's conception of language with the findings of linguistic philosophy, represented by two of its most notable figures, Wittgenstein and Ryle, both of whom were at least acquainted with Heidegger's major work *Being and Time*. The two papers are strongly contrasted. Michael Murray manages to bring out the underlying affinities between two thinkers who, on the surface, appear poles apart. The linguistically oriented, but behaviouristically inclined, thinking of a Ryle finds its match in the ontologically oriented, but practically inclined, thinking of a Heidegger.

Karl-Otto Apel, on the other hand, though admittedly from the loftier standpoint of a comparison between Heidegger and Wittgenstein, brings out certain negative implications which, he thinks, follow from the underlying agreement which he notes between two of the most influential philosophers of the century. As different as Wittgenstein and Heidegger might appear to be, they both represent, according to Apel, a detrimental encroachment upon the time-honoured ideal of philosophical rationality.

Briefly, the reduction of philosophy to self-therapy, a reduction which Wittgenstein's critique of language and meaning linked with the pseudo-problems of traditional metaphysics, was paradoxical from the very beginning; for it represented a negation of critical philosophy's own claims to meaning and truth. Precisely this tendency created its own disciples. Moreover, in Heidegger's ever more radical 'Destruction' of Western metaphysics (and more completely in Derrida's 'Deconstructivism' and in Lyotard's 'Post Modernism', which refer back to Heidegger and Wittgenstein) this tendency is strengthened to the point of attesting to something like the *self-destruction of philosophical reason* [editor's italics].

Indeed!

Heidegger's conception of language in *Being and Time*

Jan Aler

Reflections on language occupy an important place in twentieth-century philosophy due to the situation in which philosophy finds itself today. This is particularly true for Heidegger's work. Not only do Heidegger's reflections on language stand out, but also his use of language is especially remarkable. Two aspects of his use of language must be considered: his mode of expression and the manner in which he presents his argumentation using linguistic (or also literary) data.

It is worthwhile to analyze this complex issue in detail. Many of Heidegger's admirers, as well as some of his adversaries, fascinated by the Heidegger publications that have appeared since 1936 (written when Heidegger was almost fifty years old) are inclined to deal with *Being and Time* as if the work were only of minor importance. Such neglect is unjustifiable and, furthermore, constitutes a serious obstacle if one wishes to concentrate fruitfully on the later publications. There is no doubt that the idiomatic peculiarities as well as the conception of language found in *Being and Time* offer ample material for reflection. This essay will therefore be limited to an analysis of Heidegger's work from this perspective. It will deal with Heidegger's style, his attitude toward the history of language and toward literature, and his conception of language. It will become apparent how the relationship between language and understanding in Heidegger's conception of language becomes more complicated because of the role played by *logos* (*Rede*). By taking these considerations as a unity and reflecting on them from the viewpoint of Heidegger's analysis of temporality, it will be possible to get a sharper picture of their genuine meaning.

Heidegger's style

When one is first confronted with Heidegger's analysis of man's Being, the linguistic peculiarities used in the explanations are among the most conspicuous aspects of the work. Not only are they found in some places in the book, but they pervade the work as a whole. However, the peculiarity of his mode of expression is most striking in one determinate sector of his language usage: in his effort to grasp the Being of man Heidegger's philosophical terminology particularly attracts our attention. A peculiar tension in the choice of words strikes the reader immediately. The formal connection of concepts in particular is indicated through the use of a Latin, or at least a Latinized, technical terminology; this underlines the strictly theoretical character of the exposition, which is intended to be a contribution to ontology. For example, Heidegger frequently uses common terms, such as *structure*, *mode*, *character*, and *constitutive*, and also words now more or less obsolete, such as *derivative*, *explicate*, *privatio*, and *deficient*, to structure his argument.

These technical expressions constitute the skeleton which Heidegger clothes with the fundamental concepts of man's Being. The latter concepts are indicated, however, if we disregard a very few exceptions, by words that have their origin in ordinary language or at least could have easily occurred there. One would expect such words to appear in lyric poetry or in edifying prose rather than in explanations of an intellectual nature in which the words are used in such a technical manner. Here we think immediately of *Dasein*, and then of *Zeug*, *Bewandtnis*, *Befindlichkeit*, *Entwurf*, *Sorge*, *Schuld*, and *Gewissen* and finally of *gewärtigen*, *gegenwärtigen*, *geschichtlich*, and *Wiederholung*, to mention just a few. The key word *Existenz*, which delineates the context of this anthropological concept formation, still belongs to the formalizing terminology that (not by accident) is strongly reminiscent of Scholastic philosophy. But the titles of the concepts employed within this context – that is, the titles of the 'existentials' (which, in contradistinction to the 'categories', are immediately related to man's Being) – are remarkably German. Heidegger prefers to use complicated German expressions rather than the very common technical terms such as *functionality* or *instrument* (although, on the other hand, he deals with the formal structure of the concepts in a manner that is certainly not puristic). The term *facticity* seems to be an exception; but this term, via the adjective *factual*, has a closer relationship to the everyday German language than one would be inclined to think at first sight (for *faktisch* is as German as *success* is English).

No doubt this choice of words surprises the reader, especially in contrast with the technical language that naturally accompanies it throughout *Being and Time*. Within the terminology this opposition of abstractness and a closeness to everyday life marks Heidegger's explanation.

However, in this contrasting phenomenon a basic unity of purpose manifests itself, saving the whole from ambiguity. This must occupy our attention next.

In the technical idiom previously mentioned, which is bound so strongly to a very old tradition, a certain freedom in regard to that tradition is manifested. The most obvious illustration of this freedom is found in the fact that Heidegger complements the existing vocabulary with a new term whenever it seems desirable for the clarity of his formulation. In addition to the adjective *existentiell* one finds *existential*, which plays an important role as a noun. In opposition to the immediacy of a concrete, individually lived existence, it refers to the concept of man's existence which has been formalized to abstract generality.¹

Such an addition, although not always completely new, is incorporated into the technical language and used throughout Heidegger's work – for example, *ontic* in addition to *ontologic*. Anyone who reflects on these additions will note that such renewals adhere to the idiom: the differentiation of *existentiell* and *existential* completely corresponds to a tendency in this direction that is common in German. Such an addition is a taking of liberty but not a sign of arbitrariness.

The regauging of an existing term such as *existence* goes even further, and yet this, too, is not arbitrary; it closely follows the word form itself, which indicates a 'going out towards'. This attention to the suggestion contained in the parts of words accordingly becomes manifest in the syllabized spellings *ek-sist* and *ek-stasis*, which recall the Greek origin of these words. Such a splitting up of the unity of the word intensifies the plasticity of the idiom. Although in this case the word form does not become absolutely meaningful, the word nonetheless gains signification; it no longer appears as a completely contingent label for the concept but, to a certain degree, shows a natural relationship with the concept. Once the spelling of a word is made conspicuous, one experiences himself as grasping an original connection between term and concept. Furthermore, the syllabizing process increases the emphatic character of the linguistic usage; an idea is hammered home with the aid of words that have been made more plastic. Such a usage of technical terminology searches for accuracy of language as the instrument of thought and, at the same time, enlivens the use of language by closely connecting itself with the 'spirit' of the language.

The possibilities of using such a procedure are naturally still greater in the author's living native language, and Heidegger has grasped every opportunity his language has to offer him in this regard. He lets himself be led by the language and is as frank as he is cautious in so doing. Concretely, one may point to the following:

First, in his terminology Heidegger systematically avoids expressions which are current in these kinds of considerations. At the very beginning

of *Being and Time*, *man* is replaced by *Dasein*, and the book only incidentally employs such expressions as *consciousness*, *spirit*, *mind*, and *soul*.

Second, Heidegger often strictly sets apart – and thus distinguishes between – synonyms of the everyday language, specializing them by means of definitions. In this way he distinguishes between *fear* (*Furcht*) and *anxiety* (*Angst*), disregarding the less strict, common usage.² By *Mitsein* he means something different from *Mitdasein*.

Third, Heidegger expands his well-considered stock of words by specifying and varying them with prefixes and suffixes, which he uses in a very strict sense. In this way he can create new words that are nonetheless wholly German, such as *Zuhandenheit*. In other cases an ancient word comes into play again – for instance, *Befindlichkeit*, which was used in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. When the author combines such variants in one determinate context, the radical word is uncommonly accentuated; this is particularly the case when the variants are accumulated. (The type which is found very often is ‘Das sich überhörende Hinhören’.)

Fourth, notwithstanding the fact that in this way it is possible to originate linguistic forms that are as much like current words as possible, in Heidegger’s terminology the systematic signification of such derivations sometimes differs completely from the one commonly used. For instance, *zeitigen* is perfectly good German, but in common usage it never signifies ‘to create time structures’. It indicates, rather, that *in* time certain processes bring something about. It pertains specifically to a vegetative development (‘to ripen’, ‘to make something become ripe’) or to a causal connection analogously associated with such development. It suggests that something is propelled to completion by the stream of time and reaches this completion when the time is ripe. All of this is intratemporal (*innerzeitlich*), whereas, in Heidegger, time (chronological time) is itself a temporalization (*Zeitigung*) – that is to say, one among others. The existential-aprioric structure of temporality temporalizes itself (*zeitigt sich*) in this way (or in another). Heidegger’s term penetrates much more deeply into all of this. It makes us become aware of that which constitutes the foundation of the *Zeitigung* in the common sense of the term and nonetheless somehow gives it the emotional value that the current signification possesses.

A striking example of such a creation of language, one that completely adheres to the rules of word derivations (etymology) and yet offers us a new word that can be recognized at first sight, is *Entfernung*. Heidegger uses it in the most literal sense conceivable – namely, as ‘making distance disappear’. Prefix and radical are employed correctly; and yet the result is a word signification that is the exact opposite of what one customarily understands by this word – namely, ‘distance’.

In all of these cases, Heidegger enlivens the use of language by means of etymology. But this linguistic virtuoso achieves the same effect by following the opposite road also – by isolating the simple form from its compounds. *Zeug*, for example, in itself, rarely has the signification that it often possesses in compounds – namely, ‘tool’ or ‘piece of equipment’.

The result of these and similar manipulations is a style of writing that is especially accurate, plastic, lively, emphatic, and original. There is seldom a case as paradoxical as that of *Entfernung*. Heidegger openly violates the rules of the language only once; namely, at a most central point in the explanation he departs, in his linguistic renovation, from the grammatical system of the German language by using the form *gewesende*. The gigantic battle over Being really leads here to disruption: *gewesen* is a perfect participle; with this ending, however, it is used as a present participle and is made active.

Heidegger surrounds this bold venture with excuses – which are found elsewhere in connection with a number of more common changes in signification. Such excuses are not as superfluous as the almost coquettishly emphasized introductory apology for the awkwardness of his explanation. For, next to Scheler, Heidegger is certainly the best stylist in modern German philosophy. He handles the most variegated figures of speech with greatest ease. Sometimes one suspects a kind of professional pleasure on his part – for instance, in his preference for the paradoxical connection of opposites in the oxymoron. The deliberate weightiness of many of his formulations can serve not only to clarify thought but to hinder it also. When the latter occurs, a laboriously controlled pathos breaks through, placing the reader under the pressure of its expressive force. The summaries following the careful and detailed descriptions are, in a sense, crushing. When one reads how the ‘there of the there-is stares man in the face with inexorable mysteriousness’, and how man ‘is shipwrecked on that mystery’, then one is prepared to experience as an oppression the concatenation (*Verklammerung*) of the existentials, to which Heidegger has rightly given the greatest possible attention.

Without anticipating Heidegger’s reflection on language, it is possible to understand the tendencies mentioned from the perspective of the range of ideas found in *Being and Time*. First of all, in the introduction Heidegger explains his plan to develop a scientific philosophy that would fulfill an old desideratum – namely, the development of the idea of the natural world – and to do this with the assistance of phenomenology. Phenomenology describes phenomena, that is, those things that show themselves the way in which they themselves are. Now the combination of a scientific philosophy and a philosophy that remains close to life is what is so striking in his choice of words. And the philosophy is close to life, also, in the sense that its formulation forcefully influences life itself.

Second, in his analysis of man's Being Heidegger always distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic Being. The latter is characterized by, among other things, a conventionality that never comes to self-activity. This is why Heidegger's close affiliation with the German idiom reserves for itself a language-creating freedom in opposition to the conventional.

Literature and the history of language

Upon reaching this point one is able also to account for Heidegger's position regarding the history of language and for his usage of linguistico-historical data. The inauthentic way of living, which does not appropriate the possibility of self-realization, similarly does not obtain that which, in the handing down of a cultural tradition, could serve that purpose. The possibility of self-realization is not even recognized in its authentic meaning. However, for a living tradition such a testing self-activity is a necessary condition. Heidegger's critical attitude toward the current use of language, which he sees as an eminent factor in the governing conventions, is thus complemented by his selective openness with respect to the history of language, which he sees as a branch of utmost importance of the history of the mind.

Heidegger's bold but by no means arbitrary use of the German language certainly seems to 'make' new expressions, but upon closer inspection all of these appear to be not so 'new'. It is, rather, a renewal of the 'old'. This 'old', the original, is therefore essential to the quest for a natural conception of world, a conception which is directed against the conventional. In the course of the mind's history the becoming aware, insofar as man himself is concerned, has obviously not become more 'natural' in the conceptual elaboration of reflection. That natural conception of world has become sedimented in language. It is still there, at one's disposal, but one must uncover it.

Let us suppose that someone wishes to clarify the fact that in the structure of *Being-in-the-world* the existential *Being-in* is not identical with the categorial *Being-in*. In clarifying this one can appeal to data of the history of language – for instance, to the origin of *in* as a prefix and to the etymology of *I am*.³ These data suggest that originally *Being-in* was understood, or at least was conceived of, as a 'Being-with', a 'Being familiar with'. These data obviously do not 'prove' that 'indeed' the Being of man is to be characterized by this relationship toward reality. At the most they provide a hint of the original awareness of this relationship within a determinate linguistic community – and this awareness, given the line of development of the mind's history, is important enough in itself. But the ancient usages of words obviously do not possess the value of an argument (because . . . therefore . . .) and are not employed

in that way in Heidegger's explanation. Rather, they serve the purpose of orientation; they constitute a valuable indication of the direction to take in uncovering a structure⁴ which one sees oneself and to which one wishes to draw the attention of others ('See what I mean there').

It is possible that the attention one pays to a certain state of affairs was aroused by these or similar data from the history of language. To this extent the explanation is circular, and this is by no means kept secret. Heidegger conceives of *alētheia*, for instance, as 'unconcealment' and then uses this conception to confirm his explanation of what truth taken as an existential is – namely, 'Being discovering'. This confirmation plays a part in the framework of the detailed explanation of this existential.⁵

Much earlier, in Heidegger's introductory remarks concerning his method, his use of the Greek word hints in this direction.⁶ The initial explanation is not much more than an assertion ('dogmatic interpretation') concerning the Greek idiom.⁷ But the later phenomenological descriptions focus attention on relationships which constitute support for these 'assertions' concerning the Greek idiom. The explanation of the Greek terms suggested earlier is now clarified insofar as their content is concerned. In this regard the explanation can be objectively justified. But is this sufficient for a historical proof? Certainly not; but, on the other hand, it at least justifies searching for a solution in this particular direction – that is, such an explanation is phenomenally justified. If the explanation can be deepened in this context, and if, furthermore, by taking a special view of the mind's history it is possible to clarify how it could ever happen that this original intention gradually came to be forgotten, then one's explanation of the Greek idiom is in turn reinforced.⁸

Such a striking case shows not only the illustrative but also the inspirational value of a word's history. However, one can experience at the same time the limitations which, in such an argument, are to be placed on the value of such an inspiration. Yet there is a third important aspect for delineating the limits of the function of linguistico-historical data. This aspect is connected with the whole nature of the transcendental-phenomenological argumentation. In each case such an argumentation, along very general lines, develops a structure in its constitutive moments. Then it proceeds from this most general horizon to more detailed explanations within the projected context. In this way the context becomes clarified at the same time. This road from the general via the particular back to the general does not have the character of a deductive foundation; if it did, this particular way of proceeding would be absurd. The phenomenologist does not want to deduce but rather wants to bring to light and make manifest.⁹

This relationship between the general and the particular is found in

each case to be the relationship between transcendental structure and concrete mode. After the structure is described initially, the connection that was so developed is put to the test with the help of a concrete mode (*Bewährung*). Will one succeed, for instance, in using the structure of the mood of finding oneself in (*Befindlichkeit*) as a guiding clue in analyzing a concrete mood – namely, that of fear?¹⁰ If this is the case, then the analysis has confirmed the general scheme: the scheme itself is tenable. Can the structure of original understanding (*Verstehen*) be applied generally to concrete assertions?¹¹ If so, one has shown that this construction is not merely a figment of the imagination; for it has proved its usefulness in the clarification of our experience. This experience, this concrete mode, is then a variation of the theme of the transcendental structure; and this structure in turn becomes more richly developed in such variations. This principle of verification is found in no other way in the further course of these trains of thought. Concrete verification (*konkrete Bewährung*)¹² is desirable after the proof (*Nachweis*) of an ontological fundament is given. An existential project is in need of an attestation to be given by the analytic of Dasein (*daseinsmässige Bezeugung*).¹³ A thesis that can be tested in this way, on concrete facts of life,¹⁴ and can stand the test has become phenomenally accessible. It is in this way, also, that the analysis of the traditional concept of truth develops the relationship between assertion and phenomenon.¹⁵

The linguistico-historical data can in their own way very well serve a purpose in verifying a general theory on the basis of the phenomena. That is why the data also appear to confirm the phenomenological results. Confirmation by means of the sources cited means that the results are not arbitrary constructions, that they did not come about forcibly. The analogy between this linguistico-historical argumentation and Heidegger's use of language is, within the perspective of the phenomenological method, self-evident: in both cases Heidegger tries to unveil original meanings, to bring the past to life again, and to free once more the forces that have produced the past. The quest for the natural conception of the world is set in motion by suggestions from language. The results of this search in turn confirm and clarify these suggestions. Because of the value that is necessarily attached to the elementary original, such a confirmation is not without meaning for the tenability of the structure that was developed in this way.

Heidegger announces his use of *alētheia* as follows:

The ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the force of the *most elemental words* in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from levelling them off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of pseudo-problems.¹⁶

His warning against 'uninhibited word-mysticism' means in this connection that, on the basis of the results of his investigation concerning the content (*Sache*), he sees through the word in its signification. He concludes: 'When Dasein so expresses itself, does not a primordial understanding of its own Being thus make itself known?'¹⁷ Heidegger thus recognizes in linguistico-historical data what he has found in the analyses in *Being and Time*. 'What is ontologically "new" in this interpretation is ontically quite old. . . . We are conceptualizing existentially what has already been disclosed in an ontico-existential manner.'¹⁸ With the help of the insight thus acquired, Heidegger tests the vocabulary and distinguishes the irrelevant data from the relevant in a manner such as we have dealt with here. This explains why he calls *validity*, as it is used in the terminology of logic, an 'idolized word'.¹⁹ Yet with the help of the etymological data for this word, it would have been easy enough to accentuate the ancient religious-ethical nuances in its signification. If one were offended by the development of the signification of *Geld* ('money'), he could still turn to the ennobling term *Gilde* ('guild'). But logical validity (as a further characterization of the truth of a judgment) does not fit at all in this conception. The concept does not speak; in this case the history of the word does not come into action. Thus *Being and Time* does not mention the data that are available here but are not actual.²⁰

Heidegger also finds fruitful points of departure in the history of ontology. But for that purpose ontology, too, must first be judged in regard to its tenability on the basis of the phenomenal structure. This leads to a revision, the ontological 'destruction'. The genuine experiences that gave rise to the concepts handed down become then rediscovered: namely, as the existential starting point of the existential-ontological theory.

But it is not only the vocabulary in general that can mediate this starting point; Heidegger incidentally taps yet another source of preontological becoming aware of man's Being. This source comprises literary documents that can confirm his existentials such as 'care', 'death', 'authentic Being': the ancient *Cura* ('Care') fable, Pindar's as well as Goethe's 'Become what you are', the enactment of the experience of death in a Renaissance poem, and a work by Tolstoi. While Heidegger conceives of the question of Being as the radicalization of a tendency that essentially belongs to man's Being taken as *ek-sistence* – that is, as the radicalization of man's preontological understanding of Being – at the same time he shuns conventions and searches for original experiences. His confrontations with poets thus have a function analogous to that found in linguistic foundations: they confirm what was already established.²¹ In both cases the phenomenologist apparently feels a need to legitimate the results as being already predelineated in order to show that they are not merely constructions and figments of the imagination.

The explanation given in connection with the *Cura* fable calls such a conclusive force 'merely historical' (*nur geschichtlich*).²² The expression, which Heidegger purposely puts within quotation marks, is a fine example of irony in a thinker who, at the moment he first delineates his investigation, posits that man's Being is essentially like time, and thus necessarily possesses historicity, so therefore each concrete mode of Being – including the ontologically questioning mode – is characterized by this fact. With this 'merely historical' (*nur historisch*) the full weight of Heidegger's theory is thrown behind the *Cura* fable as well as behind the literary documentation that follows.

Language and understanding

Once Heidegger's appeal to language and literature is recognized and the quality of his command of the language is known, it is to be expected that his theory will attach an especially important significance to language as existential and in so doing will pay particular attention to the word in its meaning with regard to thought. Let us therefore examine this aspect in greater detail.

It is well known that *Being and Time* is mainly concerned with man's Being in order to lay the foundation for a general ontology. This preparatory reflection is performed in two phases. First, a number of structures of man's Being are developed in an 'analytic', which in itself is again 'preparatory'; second, these structures are explained as modes of temporality. Temporality is the essence of man's Being; thus, time is comprehended as the horizon of that understanding of Being which is characteristic of man.

In the preparatory analytic of man's Being, one obviously expects also to find an explanation of language. Heidegger realizes who this man is who, in his Being, always comports himself with this Being in one way or another. The essence of man consists in this peculiarity, in the mode of Being as Being towards, in his ek-sistence. In man's ek-sistence his Being is disclosed to him; he himself discloses to himself the there of his Being-there. Two different things are found in this disclosedness. The fact that I know that I am there implies that in being-there I have to be thrown into a Being in which I always already find myself. But ek-sistence also means, on the other hand, that in being-there it is left to my own ek-sistence to decide what I will make out of it: this is the project of self-realization in which, anticipating the goals and returning from the goals to the means with which they could be achieved, I will never be able to escape from this thrownness. The chasm of such a conflicting twofoldness is the heart that Heidegger's analytic tries to make explicit in a way as tenacious as it is cautious. Its point of departure is

man's ek-sistence as concernfully being in the world together with others, and from this it develops this structure as a coherence of existentials.

But there is still another, equally essential dualism that determines the train of thought, and, at least for the time being, it must be distinguished from the first. This duality involves an opposition that we have already mentioned – namely, that of authentic and inauthentic being. Again, this distinction cannot be carried through as an absolute separation in the factual existence of man, but on the other hand it is necessary for clarifying the structure of this existence. It is true that in principle this distinction rests on an ontological structure which is neutral in regard to this contrast and which gives to both of these modes of Being as such their foundation. In fact, however, this neutral structure is practically identical with the inauthentic one. The thinker who, as we have seen, at all costs wishes to avoid the semblance of finally coming out with 'an idea of [his] own contriving', does not wish to deduce this anthropological structure from an 'Idea', either.²³ His phenomenological clarification is oriented toward man in his everyday doing, toward the most ordinary data concerning man. With this attention to this first and for the most part (*zunächst und zumeist*), to the everyday indifference (*alltägliche Indifferenz*), the difference between the neutral structure and its inauthentic variant is blurred; they sometimes blend imperceptibly into one another, and the inauthenticity, the fallenness, is an extreme form of appearance with regard to the indifferent point of departure.

Only relatively late – in the next to the last chapter of the preparatory analytic – is language even mentioned. The analytic concentrates least of all on this anthropological, pre-eminently fundamental phenomenon. It does not deal with language as the range of systematized possibilities of expression by means of symbols which appear in the possible combinations of vocal sounds; it is concerned, rather, with speech as that form of human behavior in which these possibilities become materialized. In this analytic, linguistic phenomena are dealt with in the same way as other basic forms and principles of man's Being – for instance, consciousness, intuition, thinking,²⁴ and even experience (*Erlebnis*), that key word in the philosophy of life.²⁵ Heidegger's investigation goes 'behind' such phenomena in search of some primary mode of man's Being as their ontico-ontological condition. This mode is reached here not via the basic forms mentioned but from the phenomenological characteristic of man's Being-in-the-world, which is to be developed with the help of the average everydayness of man's ek-sisting and is guided by the idea of a transcendental foundation of the immediate living reality.

In the introductory description of the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world Heidegger mentions language, among other things, as one manifestation of an existential called *logos* (*Rede*). Earlier, he briefly touches on this theme in mentioning the relationship between observation of

objects. (*Vernehmen des Vorhandenen*) and language.²⁶ Corresponding to this cursory indication in the investigation of ek-sistence is a passage in the methodological prelude to the investigation: in characterizing the *logos* of phenomenology, Heidegger also considers the relationship between *logos* and *phōnē*.²⁷

Both of these earlier passages give rise to the supposition that language will come to the fore only in a much later phase of the transcendental derivation and, as the first passage confirms, as an ontological derivative of *logos*. However, when in *Being and Time* the structure of man's disclosedness is brought to light in greater detail, it appears that in the final analysis language is reached in the continuing explicitation of man's understanding. We must dwell on this subject somewhat longer.

Language as found in words and sentences appears as a communicating speaking forth and constitutes the third and most accidental²⁸ moment in the structure of the assertion – namely, a mode of the predication in our judgment. This predication is, at this point, by no means thought of explicitly as a linguistic phenomenon. It is true, however, that in the predication there comes about the transition from being occupied with something to speaking to others about something, about something which merely occurs. Such a determination presupposes the indication of the this-here about which one wishes to speak. From such an indication the members of the predication grow forth;²⁹ for, in order for one to be able to indicate the this-here and point it out, he must dwell with it. On the other hand, the pointing out of something that is to be further determined presupposes some meaning or signification which, in the judgment, is formally attributed to what has been pointed out; but this signification must also belong to what was pointed out. These conditions for the possibility of a pointing out as the origin of a speaking out are fulfilled by the interpretative explanation (*Auslegung*).

With this existential we have penetrated one layer deeper into our derivation of language from the disclosedness of man's ek-sistence. The meaning which, in our concerned dealing with (characteristic of our concern for our own Being), is to be attributed to a thing is laid out in interpretative explanation. This explanation comes about in such a dealing with. It does not consider, but instead it handles. When someone gets something ready in order to use it later, he lingers with that piece of equipment. The tool becomes conspicuous to him *as such*, delineates itself in its meaning. In all other cases one keeps moving within the routine of the mutual relationships, a routine in which the things used refer to one another and in this way acquire and grant meanings. Signs are not the only bearers of meanings. They refer explicitly; namely, their usefulness is in referring to a context of usages as to a world in which one lives. Signs make us aware of their use and of the course of action

we have to take in their regard; but all tools refer in their serviceability for to this for-what.

This functional referential context always reaches finally beyond the tool to man himself. He ek-sists. In the world his own Being-in-the-world is at stake for him. The tools are therein at his service and constitute the realm of his possibilities. Man does not just encounter them; he does not just passively run into them. He discovers these possibilities in bringing them to the fore. In this way his meaning-giving behavior, his project of his own Being-in-the-world, co-constitutes the world of his labor, this equipmental totality. Within this project the things present themselves in their meanings. Interpretative explanation develops these possibilities projected by man's understanding; it unfolds these meanings. Explanation grasps the meanings that understanding has established. This totality of references, this whole that has been articulated before all explanation, this multifarious unity of meanings, is disclosed primarily by understanding. It is only on this third layer that the foundation, the ontological ground, of language is reached in the structure of man's ek-sistence. Then the long road from assertion to understanding comes to an end. But was it not said that language is a derivative of the existential *logos*? Yet *Being and Time* develops the context that has been briefly outlined here in minute detail in order to be able finally to dwell on language as a late derivative mode of the speaking forth of *logos*.

The role of *logos*

Within the framework of the analytic this way of dealing with language is an intended consequence of the phenomenological method and is by no means a 'jumbled' explanation to be straightened out afterward. The description repeatedly distinguishes a multiplicity of ontological determinations as the moments of a correlativity which, forced to its extremes, underlines the equivalence of the moments as well as their mutual determinateness. Heidegger's explanation describes the structural unity in which the ontological determinations are to be understood, beginning with a nucleus which is always carefully adhered to. Again in a circular movement such a description passes through the moments of the structure almost with desperate tenacity, guarding against its splintering.³⁰

But what is the case here with disclosedness? It consists of the basic mood of finding oneself in (the realization and emotional experience of the thrownness), understanding (the capacity to project), and *logos*. The first two in this sequence are dealt with separately, but they are understood together and through one another. Moodness has its understanding, and understanding always has its mood.³¹ In this way the threads are

knit to and fro, back and forth. This procedure is repeated for these two moments in regard to *logos*, although there is some difference insofar as this strict interdependence is established explicitly only at the very end and not, as it unambiguously appears, as the guiding clue throughout the train of thought.³²

In the meantime, however, the activity of *logos* is co-thought in the whole series of existentials derived from understanding and extending to assertion. For our discussion it is important that this occurs as well in regard to aspects characteristic of language: the understandability, although it is in principle wordless, is nonetheless articulated, comprising a context of significations; the disclosedness of ek-sistence is articulated by *logos* in the original sense of the word. This, in turn, constitutes the ground for the possibility of the derivative modes of understanding with which Heidegger deals. Parallel to this, it is always shown how fundamental moodness is articulated – for instance, in the coherence of the relating elements in a concrete mood³³ or as a sequence of distinguishable nuances in our being tuned (disposition)³⁴ – and thus how *logos* plays its part here also.

Language came to the fore as an accidental moment in the structure of assertion – namely, ‘speaking forth’ (*Heraussage*), ‘statement’ (*Aussagesatz*).³⁵ *Logos*, however, is a constituent of assertion as prelingual but articulated explanation. Thus it is consistent that this same moment appears accordingly as expressedness (*Hinausgesprochenheit*).³⁶ In this way language approaches, functions (in both aspects of foundation) in our Being with others in the world with things. Language is thus in every respect constitutive of our ek-sistence. That it is an ontologically derivative phenomenon by no means excludes this fact. But the mode of ek-sistence in which Heidegger’s exposition reveals the constitutive character of language is, within the general perspective of the preparatory analytic, the average everydayness: language is a tool to be used in social intercourse.

We employ this instrument because we are essentially in the world and committed to it: language is a consequence of man’s thrownness. Understanding, of which language is an ontological offshoot, was fundamentally explained, however, in its meaning-giving project character as the counterpart of original moodness, representing the thrownness in the structure dealt with. This understanding is prelinguistic. With the significations, it lays the existential-ontological foundation for language. However, as soon as understanding manifests itself as a phonetic expression of significations – as an expression in words – one can observe that the project appears in its being thrown. Looking back one notes how, with the introduction of the speaking forth (*Heraussage*), a transition is completed – one that could not be sufficiently elucidated earlier. Is this why the transition took place so incidentally and almost reluctantly?

Although one believes that he is dealing with linguistic phenomena, the issue remains one of ontological foundation. This is why Heidegger needs a distinction such as that between *assertion* (*Aussage*) and *speaking forth* (*Heraussage*), a distinction between words that at first sight appear to mean the same thing. A corresponding reservation, although expressed in another way, characterizes the mention of language in connection with the observation of objects.³⁷ However, is it perhaps possible that, when the transition from *logos* to language expressly constitutes the theme of the exposition, the precision of the analytic increases?

Meanwhile, this can scarcely be contended in regard to the formula that introduces such an analysis: 'To significations, words accrue.'³⁸ This is metaphorical language. However, in view of Heidegger's subtle use of language, this figurative representation of the phenomenal context should not be taken merely as a 'flower of speech'. There is still another reason to take this metaphor seriously. As we have seen, it appears earlier,³⁹ and there is objectively the closest possible connection between these passages. In the first reference the issue is the appearance of significations within the indication when interpretative explanation discloses the equipmental context in its meaningful articulation; in the later reference the issue is the manner in which these significations become word significations.

The presupposition common to both these indications is a process of growth, a thought-less (unpremeditated), and yet teleological, 'organic' occurrence of immanent lawfulness. But this presupposition is not approached both times in the same way. In the genesis of the significations, indication unfolds itself, as if it were to differentiate itself and begin to flourish (*erwachsen*). The process of the growth of the words, on the other hand, adds these words to the significations (*zuwachsen*), and at the same time the significations are on their way to the words (*zu Worte kommen*). The organic lawfulness comprises a wider occurrence within which this process of enrichment (*Zuwachs*) comes about. But the reader remains uncertain as to the nature of this organic compass. *Being and Time* is silent about the origin of this enrichment.

The reader is puzzled not only by the incompleteness of the metaphor but also by its organicistic character. How can this metaphor be applied to an instrument, to a factor in the equipmental context? On the other hand, in his preparatory reflection on the analysis of man's ek-sistence Heidegger has clearly spoken against a vitalistic easygoingness in philosophical anthropology.⁴⁰ His existentials certainly cannot be interpreted in that sense. At a decisive moment in the analytic this becomes fully clear: In his analysis of man's finitude Heidegger rejects among other things the conception of life as a kind of 'ripening process', 'completed' by death.⁴¹ By applying the organicistic metaphor to language, its genesis and relationship with man's Being become problematic.

The perspective that is opened here is surprising within the framework of the analysis. Would it be better still – keeping in mind the peculiar ‘coloring’ of what is perhaps the most fundamental existential, namely, ‘temporalization’ (*Zeitigung*) – to take such metaphoric suggestions as incidental and strictly accidental? This is forbidden, however, by the accurate rebuttal of the passage with which we have just dealt, which certainly excludes all accidentalness. For, in the same way that *Being and Time* introduces the analysis of language, it also drops the subject again. A number of questions that present genuine challenges to linguistics and philosophy of language keep the horizon open. Heidegger reminds us of three phrases about language in which language is conceived of as a living being.⁴² The applicability of such metaphors illustrates the basic problem formulated therein: Does language have the character of a tool, does it have an anthropological character, or is there a third possibility? In the light of our foregoing reflections, the direction in which Heidegger searches for the answer is clear.

This interpretation, however, concerns merely the ‘marginal phenomena’ that surround Heidegger’s analysis. In more direct descriptions his analysis develops a structural connection between *logos* and language that better harmonizes with the main lines of the exposition. In a certain respect, however, this connection offers a remarkable contrast to the characterization of the nexus between understanding and language. For, as far as the word *assertion* (*Aussage*) is concerned, one is dealing with an ontological fundament of the wording, although one believes that the issue is the wording itself. Conversely, the term *logos* (*Rede*) refers repeatedly to speech phenomena and linguistic phenomena although, on the basis of the meaning introduced, one expects to hear more about the prelingual existential. German promotes this obscuring even more strongly than English.⁴³ Heidegger’s terminology is guided by this tendency, although his exposition precisely underlines the distinction.⁴⁴

Such an obscuring contrasts with the foregoing pertinacity but nevertheless is also a symptom of the same intrinsic difficulty: the construction of the transition from existential to linguistic phenomena remains a point of concern. If this explanation is correct, the ontological description must confirm it.

In the description found in *Being and Time* Heidegger devotes his attention to the aprioric structure of *logos*. In the complex of phenomena to which this structure is related, one can distinguish four moments. In a conversation: (1) I say (2) something (3) to some one (4) concerning certain events that happened. These moments constitute the structure if all four of them are indispensable and irreducible. In this, ‘neo-realism’ (4) obviously fulfills these requirements. Since *Bekundung* (1) and *Mitteilung* (3) cannot be reduced to wording, they likewise fulfill these requirements. Heidegger even calls attention to the fact that their essential

realization is at stake in such an independence. Genuine understanding is something completely different from giving information.⁴⁵ When listening attentively, one does not concentrate on the acoustic phenomenon (*Verlautbarung*) but on what the other intends to say; one is not 'with' the linguistic phenomenon but 'with' the thing. Insight into the thing does not follow from but forms the foundation of our attention. What is genuinely expressive in language is precisely that which strikes us in the wording but nonetheless does not possess a word character. How meaningful silence can be! Such reflections all point in the same direction: these two constitutive moments of *logos* – namely, (1) and (3) – come to the fore most conspicuously extralingually and prelingually and in doing so possess the same relationship to language as the situation or event, the 'subject matter' (4). They found the possibility of language usage; but they do not form the correlate of language and certainly not its result.

Developing the irreducible character of these necessarily presupposed moments with the help of such experiences is obviously performed at the cost of the wording factor. The indispensability of this factor then becomes positively doubtful; the lingual element in speech seems to become ontologically irrelevant. Another reflection also leads to this conclusion. The correlation between moodness and understanding is constitutive of the structure of disclosedness. Both existentials find full expression in the structure of *logos* through expressing and understanding.⁴⁶ But in this way the latter is completely present in *logos* (as the articulation of disclosedness), and there is no need to appeal to a lingual moment (*das Geredete* (2)).

The opposite procedure, however, is found in Heidegger's dealing with *logos* in the mode of inauthenticity, where the wording is of prime importance and places its mark on speech. In a very colorful way Heidegger describes manifold variants of small talk (*Gerede*), in which the objective fundament (4) is lacking and where, without understanding (3) and without personal involvement (1), the word (2) dominates.⁴⁷ In '*Gerede*' the structural moment of '*das Geredete*' has made itself independent and absolute at the cost of what is ontologically constitutive in *Rede*.⁴⁸

Within the framework of this analysis we may note that (1) *logos* founds language, (2) that in the neutral structure of *logos* language is mentioned as a constitutive moment, (3) that the description of the structure disqualifies this moment, and (4) that language, however, dominates in one particular mode of *logos*. This complexity is a result of the modal variability that characterizes the structure of man's Being-in-the-world. In their variation and transition the different modes show a dynamic orientation. Thrownness tends toward fallenness. Man's Being-in as a Being-with is inclined toward Being away from. The neutral

ontological structure is fundamental in regard to this event but is also abstract. Viewed from the standpoint of *logos*, it suffices to distinguish three constitutive moments within the ontological structure. *Logos* then is not language, and consequently there is no language *in logos*. But, when we are in the world with others and with things, we express our insights in mutual understanding. Language then appears as the expressedness of *logos*, and in this way *logos* is existentially language. Language as 'the totality of words'⁴⁹ is a means toward mutual understanding and is at one's disposal as an element in the equipmental context. This phenomenon, with which we were concerned earlier in connection with the relationship between understanding and language, compels us to suppose a constitutive moment in *logos* which enables *logos* to manifest itself as speech (and therefore as language). The structure of *logos* then becomes (reluctantly on the part of Heidegger) enlarged.

If such a moment is lacking in the neutral aprioric structure, then the transition from *logos* to language cannot be accomplished. However, when one introduces that fourth element, the structure that is so constituted is no longer purely neutral, and one prepares in it the mode of inauthenticity. In this way an essential determination is introduced into the structure of disclosedness, giving us an opportunity to consistently develop from this structure the fallenness. Man employs equipment within a system of references and is thus committed to this equipment also. In-the-world he is permanently exposed to the temptation of being taken up by the world, of losing himself in it – of losing himself in, among other things, language as the mundane mode of Being of *logos*.⁵⁰ When *logos*, which is already exteriorized in speech, is furthermore taken up with language, then it *is* language.⁵¹ *Logos* taken in this verbal form of fallenness is mere banter, small talk.

It is in this manner that, in the changing determination of the relation between *logos* and language, the mode of Being of man decides the ontological character of language. Then one may posit that the mode of authenticity implies a characteristic of language that is fundamentally different from all of this. From the discussion of the phenomenon of language, what has been stated generally in the introduction to this investigation is manifested in detail: the neutral ontological structure is concretely never so neutral that it can keep itself outside the alternative of inauthenticity and its counterpart. If one approaches a structure in its everydayness, the everydayness determines its concretization. The disqualification of the moment of wording cannot remedy this; the structure of *logos* is merely made ambiguous by this disqualification.⁵² Furthermore, the transition to the fourth element does not solve the puzzle that occupied us in the organicistic metaphors. Just the opposite is the case: the fourth factor rests on this puzzle. Without words it is impossible to get to linguistic phenomena. Such phenomena cannot be derived from

the significations and thus not from understanding as *logos* articulates it. *Logos* taken in its fundamental function in the structure of disclosedness is therefore not a sufficient foundation for the significations of the words. There are words, and this phenomenon must be recognized; that is why *Being and Time* mentions them. But at the same time the hint concerning their origin transcends the horizon of the transcendental analysis of man's Being. Word and language transcend man's ek-sistence. In the constitution of *logos* as speech this phenomenon is taken into consideration. But does not *logos* equally transcend this ek-sistence?

Care, temporality, and language

In conclusion I wish to call attention to the way in which the continued investigation in *Being and Time* confirms the characterization that has been developed here. The general scope of *Being and Time* implies, as we have seen, that the same phenomena will be discussed again with greater clarification and that language, too, will again be dealt with. This occurs first in the conclusion of the preparatory analytic and, much later, in connection with the temporality of disclosedness.

In the concluding part of the preparatory analytic the various series of constituents are integrated into the structure of care (*Sorge*). This structure is finally clarified – naturally in the mode of inauthenticity – with the help of the problematic of the current reality and truth conceptions.⁵³ Truth as *adaequatio* is just as equally a third-rate phenomenon in regard to the fundamental existential of revealment (*Entbergung*) via discoveredness (*Entdeckt-sein*) as was language in regard to the existential principles of understanding via interpretative explanation and of *logos* via speech. Like understanding and *logos*, truth is found in the realm of assertion and small talk – that is, in the realm of man's inauthenticity. The fact that in characterizing language we have focused our investigation in this direction begins to bear fruit. After the recapitulating description of disclosedness,⁵⁴ the exposition mentions fallenness as being essential but says nothing about *logos*! When *logos* is finally mentioned,⁵⁵ one comes to know it on this basis, consistently and one-sidedly, as small talk (*Gerede*). The recapitulation thus does not completely parallel the preparatory analysis, in which the fallenness of disclosedness was thematized only after the structure of language and was illustrated with the help of an extremely deficient mode. This narrowing of the theme is taken for granted in advance in the concluding part of the preparatory analytic.

The same process occurs with regard to disclosedness and *logos* in the explanation of the temporality of the structure of care. What until this point was included in disclosedness as a constitutive moment because of the mode of 'everydayness',⁵⁶ is now mentioned as an integral part of its

'completeness'.⁵⁷ In addition to understanding and moodness there is fallenness. This is why the temporal structure employed in the explanation of the phenomenon of '*logos*' is that of fallenness (*gegenwärtigen*).⁵⁸ In the latter, man alienates himself from his genuine life-possibilities.⁵⁹ Immediately before this passage, small talk was again central in the temporalization of fallenness – namely, when it became clear that this phenomenon could not yet be temporalized because of the anticipation (in the reversed order of the exposition).⁶⁰ It appears that in a more general sense, too, the *logos* structure cannot be made visible in its own temporality within the context of an interpretation of man's ek-sistence precisely set up for that purpose.⁶¹ The extremely careful formulation of the relationship between disclosedness and *logos* as found in the preparatory analysis clearly gives its tone away.

In addition to the direct confirmation of the interpretation developed in this paper, an indirect confirmation is equally important. In *Being and Time* linguistic phenomena are brought up a third time – and in this case for the first time in the mode of authenticity. The authentic ek-sistence does not hover above everydayness but is a special mode of rooting therein, of appropriating Being to oneself. Thrownness inevitably tends toward inauthenticity and fallenness. Thrownness and fallenness both express an ontological conception of motion, a continuous and oriented course of motion. He who finds himself again, retrieving himself from this fallenness, radically changes the character of the motion. In the mode of authenticity one is indeed concerned with a movement against the grain. This is successfully suggested by such terms as *pull*, *push*, *plunder*, and *violation*, which help Heidegger to characterize the authentic mood.⁶²

Accordingly, all attention is drawn (as far as *logos* is concerned) to the 'call' (*Ruf*), a phenomenon that stands in sharp contrast to the endlessly babbling chatter of everyday talkativeness. The call is a way of speaking that possesses a concentrated intensity. The existential possibility of Being-one's-Self comes to the fore in Heidegger's analysis and is furthered by an explanation of the phenomenon of 'conscience'. The 'voice of conscience', which makes us understand something, presupposes language. But this *logos*, the genuine *logos*, is wordless.⁶³ The response to the call of conscience obviously is merely small talk. Such a response is an attitude within the world: man projects himself resolutely and silently toward the most proper possibilities of Being.⁶⁴

The authentic mode of *logos* thus does not properly belong to language, just as was the case with its counterpart, the effective dealing with equipment. The reflection on language becomes caught and pressed between the characterization of speechless dealing with and the picture of a speechless Being-one's-Self. Conversely, where *Being and Time* deals with language more fully, for the most part it depicts the empty talk of fallenness.⁶⁵ The authentic Being of man (*das eigenste Seinkönnen*) is

brought up only once in connection with language and *logos*. There, in the midst of an exposition that is extremely objective and abstract, the intimate and sensitive indication concerning 'the voice of the friend whom [den] every man carries with him' surprises us.⁶⁶ In using these metaphors the author sometimes gives only half a word 'to the wise'. If the reader strains his ears, he accomplishes exactly what the passage wished to teach him and illustrates the point that listening is constitutive of speaking. After one finishes reading *Being and Time*, he no longer needs to be a 'wise one' to recognize the presence of the voice of conscience as early as on page 163.⁶⁷ The subject was touched on there in order to shed light on the prelingual and extralingual aspects of man's understanding in the ontological characterization of speech. The entire terminology, from *logos* via interpretative explanation to speaking forth, tends directly toward language and speech; but in so doing Heidegger expresses for one series of derivatives a thesis which he then posits as a general rule: namely, that, ontologically viewed, all origination is degeneration. The series from *logos* as articulation to language as expression in sounds illustrates this.

The cause of this remarkable twist in the reflection on language is obvious. If in methodically striving for phenomenal accessibility one concentrates so attentively on that which 'in the first place and in general' is the case, then phenomenology substantially examines man's Being in the mode of appearing of everydayness. If in addition 'a factual ideal of Dasein'⁶⁸ promotes the one-sided focusing on the criticism of culture in the description, then one gives a strong voice to the inauthenticity found in everydayness. In this way method and tendency converge. If one still adds to all of this the fact that, with respect to a number of statements, the reflection on language has to remain within the framework of the substance of fundamental ontology, then the exposition of language as found in *Being and Time* is being considered with some understanding of the relativity of these statements, just as their functional determination implies.

A certain discrepancy between the reflection on language and Heidegger's actual practice is thus explained. His characterization of language usage cannot be applied without adaptation to his own style of writing. It also seems difficult to combine the role given to language and literature in the method of *Bewährung* with the disqualification of the word which we have discussed earlier. Yet one must also learn to notice the discord with respect to the governing language convention, a discord which manifests itself in Heidegger's choice of words. This is positively in accordance with the reservation in regard to language that appears in section 34 and the sarcasm of section 35. Such a style goes against the grain. Heidegger's linguistico-historical documentation travels upstream, back to the source. It undoes that degeneration in the same way as was

done in the struggle with the use of language. Heidegger obviously does not resign himself to the available language tool. In the process of gradually becoming aware of things, he does not let himself be guided by that tool; he does not understand man from his equipment but forges linguistic means in order to make a new insight communicable. Viewed in this way – that is, from the creativity of an original writer – the assertion that words accrue to significations receives a new emphasis from within. What is at stake here, just as in the case of silent self-realization, is the undoing of fallenness; what is at stake is thus an aboriginal experience that forces itself on us in dealing with our familiar equipment.

If one considers the restrictions which are placed on this reflection on language by the function that this reflection has in *Being and Time*, then such an assertion receives a meaning that transcends its immediate contribution to the exposition. In conjunction with cognate indications, such a remark moves away from the periphery to which these indications were pushed by the plan of the book to a somewhat more central position. It is true, however, that even then the vegetative suggestion of the formulation (*zuwachsen*) does not match the grandeur suggested by the style of writing. But is it not a question of whether or not both of these aspects are characteristic of creativity? Does this vegetative suggestion not have much in common with the 'struggle for a gift'?

In light of the functional determinateness of the exposition of *Being and Time*, another remark from section 34, this one concerning literature, is of special importance for an adequate explanation of Heidegger's conception of language. Precisely how literature appears as a linguistic work of art is not explained.⁶⁹ This is quite consistent; for otherwise Heidegger would be dwelling on the linguistic tool (albeit as plaything). What literature is able to accomplish is what Heidegger is concerned with: literature discloses ek-sistence; it communicates possibilities of moodness. It brings man to the there of his Being-there. The ontological rank of such language usage then becomes evident. One must take into account the epistemological valuation of moodness, which in its unveiling capacity reaches much further than theoretical knowledge.⁷⁰ The primary discovery of the world takes place in moods.⁷¹ From this point of view the essential significance of literature is already delineated in the explanation found in *Being and Time*. This again throws light on language and word. In linguistic art the sensitive (by no means to be taken yet as 'filled with feeling') explanation of our Being-in-the-world takes place in such a way that it also speaks to others. If this had not been touched on in principle, it would then have been impossible in *Being and Time* to develop the phenomenon of being united by a common fate within the framework of man's historicity.⁷²

In such cases the harmony between Heidegger's reflection on language

and his style of writing stands out. The author not only repeatedly demonstrates his ability to create such a harmony but also deals with the harmony explicitly in its own nature. *Being and Time* concentrates on a very special series of moods: fear, anxiety, concern, guilt. But, in reading the passages that follow the discussion of these moods, we are urged to distinguish in this respect the restriction imposed by the function of the book and therefore, to understand not only Heidegger's conception of language in a broader perspective but also the living reality he wishes to disclose. In the development of the instrumental perspective in regard to reality, all attention is focused on nature as equipment. This is obviously something other than nature in its pure being-present-at-hand but also different from nature as power of life: 'it is Nature as that which "stirs and strives", which assails us and enthralls us as landscape.'⁷³ Here the reader is again confronted – in passing, but nonetheless unmistakably – with a third possibility, the possibility of linguistic interpretation.

Notes

1 Heidegger is applying here a differentiation commonly used in German to a new case; in German one finds *rationell* and *rational*, *funktionell* and *funktional*.

2 In the common and current distinction between *Furcht* and *Angst*, among other things the more bodily concentrated tendency of *Angst* (oppression, tightness of the chest) plays an important role; in the case of *Furcht*, in addition to the objective relationship underlined by Heidegger, one can establish, on the other hand, a more transcendental nuance due to the indeterminateness of the word. For example, the following differentiation occurs in common language usage: 'Man ängstigt sich vor dem Kettenhund, und man hat Furcht vor dem Schicksal.'

3 SZ, 54.

4 SZ, 53–4.

5 SZ, 219–26.

6 SZ, 32–4.

7 SZ, 220.

8 SZ, 220ff.

9 SZ, 8.

10 SZ, 140–2.

11 SZ, 148–53.

12 SZ, 234.

13 SZ, 301.

14 SZ, 331ff.

15 SZ, 214–19.

16 SZ, 220.

17 SZ, 222.

18 SZ, 196.

19 SZ, 155–6.

20 See note 2 above. In this connection it may be pointed out that, according to German philology, *Angst* might very well be a relatively young derivative

from Latin (*angustus, angor*). In judging the method outlined, one must take into consideration this kind of complication also.

21 SZ, 183.

22 SZ, 197.

23 SZ, 196, 43.

24 SZ, 142–8.

25 SZ, 134–40.

26 SZ, 59–62, 130–4.

27 SZ, 32–4.

28 'Aussage ist mitteilend bestimmende Aufzeigung' (SZ, 156). The adverbial (undeclined) form makes 'communication' strongly peripheral in the definition.

29 SZ, 155.

30 SZ, 180, 351.

31 SZ, 142.

32 *Logos* is indeed as primordial as moodiness and understanding (SZ, 161), but it is not always mentioned together with them in the same breath as a mode of Being-there. Therefore, it so happens that *logos* is lacking altogether in the encompassing, repetitive formula for resoluteness (SZ, 182).

33 SZ, 134–42.

34 SZ, 136.

35 SZ, 155, 157.

36 SZ, 161.

37 SZ, 59–62.

38 'Den Bedeutungen wachsen Worte zu' (SZ, 161).

39 SZ, 155.

40 SZ, 45–50.

41 SZ, 244.

42 SZ, 166.

43 The German word *Rede* does not mean 'ratio' (*Vernunft*) but 'oratio', 'speech', 'conversation', or 'discourse', 'that which is said', 'oration' or 'address', 'phrase' or 'expression', 'rumor'. Heidegger uses the term in this context (1) to indicate the founding existential ('Rede liegt der Auslegung und Aussage schon zugrunde.' 'Die Hinausgesprochenheit der Rede ist die Sprache') and (2) as *nomen actionis* in addition to the infinitive made into a noun ('Reden ist Rede über'). Even when (2) is introduced (SZ, 161), (1) nonetheless keeps resounding in the phrases. That is why the conception of 'Rede als Aussage' (SZ, 165) can be rejected. Otherwise Heidegger very often, although never in section 34, uses *Rede-Redewendung* to mean 'phrase' or 'expression' (for example, SZ, 180, 186, 189).

44 SZ, 153–60.

45 SZ, 162.

46 SZ, 162, 164.

47 SZ, 167–70.

48 Here the quality of Heidegger's usage of language is particularly outstanding. The terminology expresses uncommonly well the exact results of the structural analysis. On the other hand, this analysis is a fine example of Heidegger's capacity to clarify implications of the German idiom.

49 SZ, 161.

50 SZ, 161.

51 SZ, 167.

52 To illustrate this once more with another example: the term *communication* (*Mitteilung*) changes, as far as content is concerned, depending on the phase of

the exposition in which it occurs. (1) In the foundation of assertion in understanding, 'communication' is synonymous with 'speaking forth' (SZ, 155). (2) In the structural analysis of *logos*, 'communication' is the aprioric foundation of the possibility of such a speaking forth, which, as 'communication' is a special case (*Sonderfall*; SZ, 162). (3) In the characterization of small talk, 'communication' is again *logos* which speaks itself forth (SZ, 168). It becomes clear that, as early as in section 33, the last derivative of understanding constitutes the mode of inauthenticity, even though it is not mentioned.

53 SZ, 212–30.

54 SZ, 220.

55 SZ, 223.

56 See, for example, SZ, 167.

57 SZ, 249; see also SZ, 350.

58 SZ, 349–50.

59 SZ, 348.

60 SZ, 346.

61 SZ, 349.

62 These terms clearly suggest the fact that this mood has a discontinuous character, that of the leap. Just as genuine knowledge leaps into the circle of understanding (SZ, 310–16), so man leaps into authentic being.

63 The silent call of conscience (SZ, 296) alarms man, pushes him into anxiety, confronts him with his fallenness (SZ, 276). Conscience summons us to be quiet and to listen.

64 In this connection *Verschwiegenheit* is persistently brought to our attention. See SZ, 297, 301, 305, 382.

65 SZ, 167–70.

66 SZ, 163.

67 That is why *Verschwiegenheit* (belonging to resoluteness) appears familiar to us when we look back at section 34.

68 SZ, 310.

69 However, the context focuses all attention upon tone, modulation, speech tempo, thus upon those kinds of nuances which linguistics knows how to suggest so compellingly.

70 SZ, 134.

71 SZ, 138.

72 SZ, 382–7.

73 SZ, 70.

Language and silence: self-inquiry in Heidegger and Zen

Tetsuaki Kotoh

I The question of the existence of the self

Our existence is thrown into total darkness. No matter how much our insights may illuminate it, darkness not only obscures the path we have come along and where we are heading for, but also casts shadows over our everyday life. If we are thrown into this world and are to be taken away from it without knowing why, this means that we exist as merely ephemeral and lack an ultimate goal. It is impossible to think that there are necessary reasons for human existence, which happens to be born on a small planet in the dark universe for such a short period of time in the vast history of the planet. Such a circumstance is not different at all from that of ants in the field. This absolute lack of ground constitutes the abysmal darkness of human existence. At the bottom of our existence is total nothingness which repels any kind of reasoning from the human perspective.

However, awareness of the darkness of existence is extremely rare. We are busy in everyday life, and if we instinctively sense anxiety in facing the darkness of existence we nevertheless usually manage to forget or avoid the abysmal aspect of our being. The structure of our everyday lives is informed by a double concealment: oblivion of the darkness of existence and escape from one's self. We ground our existence in numerous purposes which we think necessary for carrying out actual life. 'Customs' or 'habit' would be a name for this. Thus, the everyday self dozes comfortably in the peacefulness of existence, of which only the surface is comprehended.

There would be no problem if one could go through life in such pleasant somnolence without ever realizing its darkness. However, it is possible to share the tragic astonishment expressed by Kūkai in *Hizō Hōyaku*: 'It is dark at the very beginning of one's birth and is still dark

at the very end of one's death.' Human beings do not only exist but are also capable of conscious rumination about existence – which constitutes both our dignity and misery. Once a crack starts to open up in a life which runs along the tracks of custom, the dark abyss begins to threaten our existence. Human beings are not sufficiently cunning to be able to conceal their true selves to the end; nor are they strong enough to endure such darkness.

This is the very reason why, from the beginning, philosophy and religion have sought a way of being in which one interrupts the somnolence of everyday life, becomes aware of its darkness, acknowledges and illuminates this darkness, and rests with a peaceful mind. Illuminating and acknowledging life and death is the ultimate concern for Buddhism. Such inquiry into the self is what is urged by the 'Know yourself!' of Socrates, and is the essence of conversion in Christianity whereby one reaches the state spoken of in Galatians in which 'it is not I who lives, but Jesus Christ who lives in me'. There is no more urgent or basic concern for a human being than the conversion by which the everyday self becomes aware of its self-concealment, returns to the dark bottom of life and seeks a solid place in which to reside peacefully. However, self-transformation does not mean that the self changes to another self, but that the self whose true existence is concealed returns to the non-vacillating self, and in this sense means the birth of the true self.

There is a variety of ways of self-inquiry. It is possible to look at it as a change in the way one relates to others or to society, or as a change in total world-view. This could even be studied from a psychological or neurophysiological perspective. In this paper I shall treat the problem from the perspective of language. To explain why I take this perspective, I must touch upon 'the linguisticity of human experience of the world', as discussed by Heidegger and his successor Gadamer. Since the idea of the primacy of language is more prominent in Gadamer's thought, I shall present it with reference to his work, though I shall end by suggesting that he ultimately misunderstands Heidegger's thoughts on language.

II The linguisticity of human experience

In response to Heidegger's later thought, in which the emphasis on language is expressed in the famous dicta, 'Language is the house of Being' and 'Language speaks',¹ Gadamer develops his theory of the 'linguisticity of human experience of the world'. 'The linguisticity of human experience' means that 'the human relationship to the world is absolutely and fundamentally linguistic' (*WM* 45; *TM* 432–3). The question whether or not pre-linguistic experience can be described is not the issue; it is rather that the existence of any pre-linguistic state is denied.

Gadamer's contention is that 'coming to language' (*Zur-Sprache-Kommen*) constitutes a universal ontological structure and, therefore, all that can be understood is language (WM 450; TM 431-2). Normally, the propositional statement is considered to be the level at which language first emerges; but, according to Gadamer, possible objects of propositional expressions, preceding propositions, are included in the horizon of the world (WM 426; TM 408). This means that even a perspective independent of language, such as the 'pure transcendental subjectivity of the self' in Kant and Husserl, cannot escape involvement with a linguistic community and so cannot be posited at the ground of language as the subjective restriction which makes language possible and valid (WM 330; TM 311). In other words, language has invaded the transcendental domain as an *a priori* restriction that enables the world to emerge. Language in this sense has to be distinguished from linguistic phenomena (phonetic letters and forms of their representation) which are found alongside other beings within the world already constructed by language. Further, this function of language pervades not only linguistic phenomena but also the structure of all possible objects. An abysmal unconsciousness or self-oblivion which 'presents the world and itself disappears' envelops language perceived as 'a particular and unique process of life' (*Lebensvorgang*) (WM 422; TM 404), which enables the objectification of everything without itself becoming an object.

How does the linguisticity of experience gain its foundation? Gadamer argues that experience is essentially understanding, and that understanding and interpretation (*Auslegung*) are essentially intertwined (WM 377; TM 361). 'The internal twining' means that 'conceptualization is internally woven into all possible understanding', in other words, 'linguistic formulation' resides tacitly as the 'historical sediment of meanings' (WM 380f; TM 364f). Behind this is the claim that 'language is the universal medium in which understanding itself realizes itself. Its mode of realization is interpretation' (WM 367; TM 350). What constitutes the basis of Gadamer's thought is the thorough study of the historicity of human beings, and he connects this 'belonging-to-history' with Heidegger's elucidation of 'the structure of pre-predicative understanding'.

Human beings are constantly thrown into finite circumstances formed by historical conditions, and these historical circumstances delimit their cognition and experiences. Historical tradition is formed by the interaction of 'my past and not-my-past' and it involves 'pre-concepts or pre-judgements' which have become an historically active reality in our existence beyond our will and actions. Understanding does not follow tradition blindly. It includes existential possibilities of the future which apply to and vitalize the past (tradition), and it integrates these into the present circumstances (WM 290; TM 274). Therefore, tradition does not wither but continues to live as a determinant which opens up new

understanding. Though restricted by tradition, understanding is a creative process which vitalizes it. As in Heidegger, understanding becomes further articulated in linguistic interpretation.

Gadamer claims that the linguisticity of experience exhausts all possible experience. His argument for this rests on a combination of Heidegger's articulation of the 'as-structure' of experience with the historicity of experience. An extensive network of linguistic meaning-associations, which, sedimented historically, is the linguistic community in which we were raised through acquiring a language, forms the tacit perspective (world horizon) or ground for beliefs which have not yet been thematized. This network serves as the source of fore-seeing and of the as-structure of experience. Language constitutes a 'medium' (*Mitte* – WM 432; TM 414) between people and the world through representing (*darstellen*) the world for human beings. Human being as being-in-the-world is a being *in* language.

Why language is a guide to self-inquiry has become clear: it provides the encompassing perspective for all inquiry into the self. However, the question is whether this means that everything can be reduced to language. Can the entire reality of our being be grasped from the level of language? I shall not for the time being attempt to answer this interesting question in contemporary philosophy that has experienced 'the linguistic turn'. What I do want to say is that until one situates the approach to the question of self-transformation within the realm of linguistic phenomena it will not be possible adequately to illuminate the internal relationship between the reality of the self and language. Self-transformation can then be described as a process in which the normal relationship between language and reality breaks down into silence, and language then revives through such silence. It is only at the level of the everyday self that language as self-evident presupposition restricts our experience of the world. The true relationship between self and language is restored when the framework of everyday language breaks down to let silence emerge and give rise to creative language. This intimate relationship between language and the ground of self (silence), which is central to Heidegger's thinking about language, is something Gadamer fails to recognize. Furthermore, this emphasis on silence distinguishes Heidegger from the mainstream Western tradition, which makes *logos* central, and also brings him close to oriental thinking based on silence.

III The collapse of everyday language

A major theme in *Being and Time* is that everyday *Dasein* suffers from 'loss of self' (*Selbstverlorenheit*) through 'evaporating' (*Aufgehen*) into the world of its concern. *Dasein* allows itself to be absorbed into *das*

Man, the impersonal, collective 'one' – and a major factor here is language in its aspect of *Gerede*, 'idle talk' or 'chatter'. As *Gerede* language, rather than functioning as a medium, closes *Dasein* off from the world and from itself, and provides comfort and security by giving everything out as unmysterious and self-evident. In this capacity, language is, admittedly, necessary for carrying out the business of everyday life, but one should not be misled into thinking that it thereby discloses the world as it is. This becomes clear when language as *Gerede* collapses and is no longer viable.

Various things can trigger the awakening from the everyday self – incurable disease, the death of a loved one, the realization of one's own death, and so on. What is common to these triggers is a negative understanding such as loss of perspective or collapse of a value system, and the resulting feeling of insecurity and despair. In Nietzsche's words, 'We lose the center of gravity which has enabled us to live. For a while we lose all sense of direction.' (*Will to Power*, sec. 30) Existential questions like Kierkegaard's – 'Where am I? Who am I? How have I come here? What is this world called "the world"? Who has brought me here and left me here?' – surge forcefully forth.

These are not the ephemeral questions of a weak soul, but derive from the very structure of human beings, who are able to reflect upon their own existence and to try to seek reasons and meaning for it. In everyday life, the purposes of practical life have been substituted for the reasons for human existence. When the meaning-relations of everyday language collapse as a whole, one is thrown into an incomprehensible chaos of phenomena without meaning. When the ultimate meaning of life fails, what one sees is mere nothingness which repels any attempt at rationalization. Language is unable to grasp such a bare reality. The world becomes disconnected from language and floats by itself. 'Our entire foundation cracks and the earth opens up into abysses' (Pascal, *Pensées* 72). The experience of *Angst* is so oppressively heavy that one is unable to speak.

IV The authentic self and the creation of language

The experience of the abysmal nature of our being, of the nothingness at its ground, is not necessarily terrifying, as long as one has the appropriate attitude. From the perspective of Zen (and something similar is true for Heidegger) the experience of the abysmal nothingness of the self and the world is the starting point for 'salvation'. In Dōgen's words: 'One who falls to the ground gets up with the help of it' (*Shōbōgenzō*). For Zen, one who realizes the 'suchness' (*tathāta*) or 'Buddha-nature' of all things may be called 'the true person who exists everywhere and

nowhere'. In the 'Birth and death' fascicle of the *Shōbōgenzō*, Dōgen writes: 'When one lets go and forgets both body and mind, throws them into the Buddha's house, lets things happen from the side of the Buddha, following along with them, one would not force things or strive to expend one's mind – and thus one leaves behind the world of birth and death and becomes a Buddha.' Here, beyond the concerns of life and death, there opens up a condition in which one's true self is freely based on no-ground.

In such a condition there is no split between the world and the one who observes it. 'The mountains and waters of this very moment' (*nikon no sansui*) are at the same time 'the presence of the Way of the ancient enlightened ones' (*kobutsu no dō genjō*). The true self is not separated from the world but has become one with it; there is neither subject nor object. What opens up within the horizon where subject and object are not yet separated is the state where experiences remain as they are without being judged (Nishida's 'pure experience'). There the world, which had hitherto been rigidified by linguistic segmentation, gradually becomes fluid, thereby dissolving the boundaries created by segmentation. The shapes of things which have been sharply distinguished from each other subtly lose their sharp definition, and with the elimination of distinct boundaries things come mutually to interpenetrate each other. What now comes to the fore is 'spontaneous arising' (*jinen shōki*), in which things inherently arise and open up the field of cosmic mutual interpenetration, and which is itself Nothing, without segmentation, and one with itself. This entire *Ekstase* is 'pure experience'.

The Zen tradition offers many examples of such 'pure experience': 'samadhi in perception' (*chikaku zammai*), 'seeing color/forms, the self is enlightened' (*ken shiki myō shin*), 'hearing sound the Way is realized' (*mon shō go dō*). These expressions come from Zen masters' attaining enlightenment through seeing a flower, hearing a pebble strike bamboo, and so on. This state is also described in Dōgen's poem: 'Since there is no mind in me, when I hear the sound of raindrops from the eave, the raindrop is myself.' The raindrop is me because at bottom there opens up another dimension – spontaneous arising – in which we are of the same 'element'. There is no mystery in this state; it is rather that we are facing reality as it is. However, this reality is totally different from reality as ordinarily experienced, since it is perceived without the overlay of everyday language. In the former state, life is experienced as transparently condensed combustion. The moment of combustion is pure silence beyond where language is exhausted. There the primordial reality of the world, which cannot be reached by language, keeps silently boiling up.

The language of the true self emerges from this silence. It arises from and is nourished by silence to become something which expresses this

silence. Silence is also a feature of the experience of nihilism, in which one realizes the inadequacy and unreliability of ordinary language in describing the reality that is beyond it. In the case of nihilism silence is experienced 'negatively' in the severing of the thread connecting language with reality. Such silence is a dead silence which rejects linguistic articulation. However, for the true self silence is an echo of true reality, and it becomes the positive ground for the production of a language to describe the world. Kūkai calls this level of true reality 'esoteric language' or 'esoteric mantra', which Mahāvairocana (*dainichi nyorai* in Japanese – a *mana*-like life-energy which pervades the totality of nature) speaks in the silence of nothingness. Mahāvairocana is the working of spontaneous arising (which one might compare with Heidegger's *Ereignis*) which is the ground of the world without aspects or segmentations and makes possible the arising of all phenomena. Spontaneous arising, the genuine state without segmentation or differentiation, the source of all existence, is entirely hidden by ordinary language with its definitions of reality and its segmentation by means of standard constants.

Kūkai says: 'With ordinary people the true perception of true nature is prevented by "obscuring fantasies"' (*mumei mōsō*). What he means by 'obscuring fantasies' must be this ordinary language as a network of standardized invariables. The very language which was acquired to describe the world has concealed it and has confined the everyday self into a life run by habit and inertia. However, the true self, by returning to silence as the pure manifestation of reality, joins with the flow of spontaneous arising's silent segmentation, and for the first time encounters the original segmentation which begins to create the worlds of individual things. The pulse in the silence of the original segmentation, which is audible in the world's beginning to produce its original meaning, is Kūkai's 'esoteric language'. This is not of course a physical sound that can be acoustically perceived, but is rather what Dōgen calls the 'expounding of impermanence' (*mujō seppō*), which should be heard 'through the entire embodied self' (*tsū shin sho*), or what Kūkai calls 'the expounding of *dharmakāya*' (*hosshin seppō*) or 'the conversation language of *dharmakāya*' (*hosshin dango*). This can be considered as the original phenomenon (original segmentation of beings) which transcends language – corresponding to Heidegger's 'echo of silence' (*Geläut der Stille*). The original segmentation of beings that is esoteric language wells up within the silence of the true self. As Kūkai says in *The Meanings of Sound, Word and Reality* (*Shōji Jissō Gi*): 'Sound resounds through the five great things, there is language throughout the ten realms, everything in the six dusts is text.' This echo of the silence of the original segmentation of beings, which can be called 'cosmic language', flows out wondrously into the arena in which people live. This silence cuts into and explodes the network of ordinary language which has degenerated into

mannerism. At the same time it restructures and modifies previous meanings in such a way as to create a new form of language. Ordinary language can thus be constantly questioned and nourished by silence and be reborn as a language capable of describing the life-breath of silence. The thread which was cut between reality and language is then retied through this silence. Silence is the source of language.

V Heidegger and the echo of silence

It is possible to gain a better sense of Heidegger's thinking about language, which has not been fully understood so far, if we consider it in the light of the Eastern ideas about language, silence, and esoteric language discussed earlier. Furthermore, Heidegger's philosophical analysis, being relatively systematic and quite rigorous, can help to clarify the idea of the realm of silence, the Eastern descriptions of which have been primordially mystical in nature. Heidegger has clearly affirmed the fundamental role of language in constituting the world and our experience. Language is not 'the means to portray what already lies before one', but rather it 'grants presence – that is Being – wherein something appears as existent' (*US* 227; *WL* 146). Since language is 'the house of Being', one reaches Being by constantly going through this house. 'Whenever we go to the well, or walk through the wood, we are always already going through the word "fountain" and the word "wood", even though we are not saying these words or thinking of anything linguistic' (*Hw* 286; *PLT* 132). In saying this, Heidegger means that language is correlative with experience of the world. 'Phenomena in the world occur simultaneously with the occurrence of language'; and 'the world exists only where words exist' (*EH* 35ff). It is obvious that such a view, which could be misunderstood as a theory of the absolute primacy of language, has influenced Gadamer's view of language (*WM* 461; *TM* 443).

However, the central perspective in Heidegger's thought is that of viewing language in relation to Being – that is, questioning why language can be 'the presencing of Being' through returning to the truth of Being which constitutes the origin of language. Regarding the unhiddenness of Being, he says: 'This does not mean that we depend on what unhiddenness says, but that everything that is said already requires the domain of unhiddenness. Only where unhiddenness reigns can something be said, be seen, be indicated and be heard.' In other words, we stand in between Being and language, 'two principles which attract each other at the same time repel each other' (*EH* 43), and we try to find the way to the true nature of language where Being 'itself comes to language' (*EH* 74). What stands in between language and the truth of Being (the source of language) 'what has not yet attained birth (Old High German *giberan*)' is

not language but silence (US 55) – ‘blazing insight’ trembling in ‘the incandescence of sacred lightning’ (EH 67; WL 186). This means that the basic phenomenon which Heidegger attempted to reveal is the movement whereby language issues from and is supported by ‘the echo of silence’ which is heard and followed within ‘the silence of stillness’ (*Schweigen der Stille* – US 67), and that this movement is a basic current which flows through not only his theory of language but also through his thinking in general. The extent to which Heidegger’s thinking on this topic is consonant with the Eastern ideas discussed in the previous section should now be obvious.

Section 34 of *Being and Time*, which Heidegger later called ‘quite sparse . . . too short’ (US 137; WL 41–2), already suggests the origin of language. In these chapters the way of being of language is defined as *Rede* (discourse). *Rede* is ‘the articulation of the disposed (*befindlich*) intelligibility (*Verständlichkeit*) of being-in-the-world according to its significance’ (SZ 162). Heidegger’s early theory of language, developed through *Rede*, comprises the following three points: (1) the function of *Rede* is to articulate in terms of linguistic meaning our understanding of being-in-the-world and to make it possible to see it. *Rede* is the basic factor in disclosing the present ‘there’ (*Da*) of being-in-the-world. (2) However, both disposition (*Befindlichkeit*) and understanding (*Verstehen*) participate in the structuring of disclosedness. (3) What is essential in Heidegger’s theory of *Rede* is the fact that language is grounded in *Dasein*. Heidegger distinguishes meaning (*Sinn*) and significance (*Bedeutung*). *Bedeutung* (what is articulated by *Rede*) is preceded by already-projected meaning as something which is possible prior to linguistic articulation; that is, *Rede* is post-articulation of *Dasein*. This does not mean that *Dasein* is dependent on language but that language has its roots within *Dasein*. In other words, language appears based on being-in-the-world as historical existence and is cultivated and defined there. After the so-called turning (*Kehre*), corresponding to *Dasein*’s being seen from the perspective of the destiny of Being as the *Da des Seins*, the true being of language is vividly characterized as an echo or response to ‘the soundless voice of Being’. Language, which functions in the disclosing of world, considers the world (and the clearing of Being – *Lichtung des Seins*) as its own hidden source for appearing. It can be born for the first time only by responding to (*Entsprechen*) the calling (*Anspruch*) of the soundless voice of Being. Even though the openness of Being eventually manifests as language, it is itself the source of language and as such is not under our control. Language makes sense because it has its origin in the ‘soundless voice of Being’, which precedes and continues to accompany language, and without which language cannot say a word. Therefore, Heidegger says that ‘according to the essence of the history of Being, language is the house of Being which arises from and is

structured by Being' (US 79). Just as a wave is always a sway of the ocean, language is 'language of Being' (US 119).

However, this does not mean that the truth of Being quickly and at once becomes language. Being disappears the minute we thought it appeared (*An-und-Abwesen*). The truth of Being is not like 'a fixed stage where the curtain is left open' but appears from within in active tension where it constantly breaks out into openness. In order to correspond accurately to our original reality which appears as a duality of revelation and concealment, what is needed is a sharpened 'preparedness' which becomes aware of the hiding of the constantly escaping Being and which looks from the 'mystery' (*Geheimnis*) to the 'hidden source'. This awakened readiness is silence – a place of no language – and is a place of stillness (ZSD 75). Heidegger spoke earlier of the way in which anxiety silences speech and is 'one of the essential places of speechlessness in the sense of the terror that attunes man into the abyss of nothingness' (WM? 32 and 51). And later, in a different metaphor, he spoke later of 'looking at aspects of the invisible' (US 73).

It will lead to the mistake of focusing too much on language, as Gadamer did, if one fails to place the 'stillness of silence' (EH 66) at the center of Heidegger's theory of the relationship between language and Being. It is silence that hears the echo of stillness which constitutes the essence and origin of language. It is not *logos* but silence as 'basic mood/voice' (*Grundstimme*) that encounters the wonder of the presencing of Being, being attuned (*gestimmt*) by the silent voice (*lautlose Stimme*) of Being and responding (*abstimmen*) from it (EH 74). Therefore, the echo of stillness which can be heard within this silence, even though it is the source of language (*Ursprache* – EH 40) which moves language from its ground and supports it, is not in itself 'something linguistic'. The echo of stillness is the silent *logos* of the ancient origin beyond the particular features of everyday-level language, such as history, society, or communication, and is 'an original announcement' (*Urkunde* – US 267; WL 135) of the world-reality which can exist purely only inside the silence which does not yet allow the invasion of linguistic articulation. The echo of stillness should be distinguished from the articulation by 'the language of historical human being' (IM 50) which resulted from it. And, therefore, no matter how genuine a word may be, generated as the echo of stillness, it is not itself linguistic, and it is impossible to articulate exhaustively the echo of stillness, which can live purely only in silence. Silence which belongs and listens to the echo of stillness clings endlessly to the language which corresponds to the truth of Being both at the beginning and in its phenomenological process. In this sense, the true nature of language is characterized as 'not saying and at the same time saying' or 'silent indication' (*Erschweigen*) (N 471f).

If philosophy is to grasp the phenomenon itself, if it is to crystallize

into living language the primordial phenomenon by 'exploding already existing meaning', rather than by organizing 'a chaotic world' into an 'already acquired system of meaning', then it does not follow that philosophical thinking must necessarily consider language as ultimate and regulate everything in accordance with language. Rather, one should step into the circle of language and experience which are vitally and intensely tied together, and listen belongingly (*gehören*) to the sound of silence which constantly emanates from the depths of the indescribable, and continue to let this be the source of one's own language.

Translated by Setsuko Aihara and Graham Parkes

Note

1 Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, p. 193, and *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 190.

Subsequent references will be cited in the body of the text by means of the following abbreviations followed by the page number:

- BW* Martin Heidegger: *Basic Writings*, ed. David F. Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977)
- EH* Heidegger, *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951)
- Hw* Heidegger, *Holzwege* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1972)
- IM* Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959)
- N* Heidegger, *Nietzsche I* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961)
- PLT* Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1975)
- ZSD* Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969)
- SZ* Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1967)
- TM* Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Seabury, 1975)
- US* Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959)
- WL* Heidegger, *On the Way to Language* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971)
- WM* Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1960)
- WM?* Heidegger, *Was Ist Metaphysik?* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1981)

Heidegger's language and the problems of translation

John Macquarrie

Martin Heidegger's principal work, *Sein und Zeit*, appeared in 1927. Although the book is incomplete as it stands, it has nevertheless become recognized as one of the most important German philosophical writings of the twentieth century, and it has exercised a very wide influence. For a long time it was neglected in Britain, and several attempts at translation proved abortive. There even grew up the opinion that the book was untranslatable.¹ 'The genius – or rather, the demon – of the German language' was blamed for this by Paul Tillich.² But as well as the peculiarities of the German language, one has also to take account of Heidegger's own remarkable way of exploiting the possibilities of that language.

In collaboration with the late Edward S. Robinson, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Kansas, the present writer spent seven years in the endeavour to make an English translation of *Sein und Zeit*. That translation was published in 1962. Although at times we came near to despair, and although we freely acknowledged that our translation, like all translations, could be improved and made more faithful, we nevertheless came to believe that, within limits and in spite of Heidegger's linguistic idiosyncrasies, a presentable English translation can be made, and our belief has been confirmed by the fact that the translation has been widely used on both sides of the Atlantic for nearly thirty years. The purpose of this article is to give some account of Heidegger's use of language, to illustrate some of the difficulties for the translator, to show that, with certain qualifications, translation is possible, and finally, to point out some of the wider problems raised by such a use of language as we find in *Sein und Zeit*.

We shall not pause to consider the difficulties which are attendant on any translation – for instance, that of finding for a foreign word an exact English equivalent which will not bring with it unwanted connotations. These difficulties are present in full force in translating Heidegger, but

they are not peculiar to this field. We shall confine ourselves to those difficulties which arise from Heidegger's own linguistic idiosyncrasies, and further, we shall confine our view to *Sein und Zeit*, though the peculiarities found there are, if anything, intensified in the later writings.

Heidegger's language is a complex and formidable structure, but there is nothing woolly about it. He is remarkably consistent in the use of his vocabulary. One may be pretty certain that anything which seems unintelligible when first encountered will soon click into place as one reads a little further. The difficulties arise largely from Heidegger's conscious rejection of much traditional philosophical terminology. Thus, for instance, where traditional philosophy would speak of *Existenz*, 'existence', Heidegger speaks of *Vorhandenheit*, 'presence-at-hand', and reserves the term *Existenz* for the being of man.³ But again, he does not speak of *der Mensch*, 'man', but of *Dasein*, a verbal noun which literally means 'being-there', and the reason for the choice of which only becomes clear as Heidegger's analysis of human existence develops.⁴ A powerful reason for his rejection of the traditional terminology is his belief that it represented the self as substance, and in Heidegger's view, this is an inappropriate way of conceiving human existence. Here we might venture to suggest a comparison with Professor Gilbert Ryle's critique of 'mind-talk'. Heidegger's novel terminology is not an arbitrary invention, but an attempt to get away from ways of speaking which he believes to have been misleading.

A convenient way of outlining the peculiarities of Heidegger's use of language will be to divide these under three headings. First, we shall consider his terminological innovations; next, we shall look at his interest in etymology, and his way of using words in their supposedly original senses; and thirdly, we shall consider his habit of playing upon words of similar form, or upon two meanings of a single term.

I

Heidegger presents us with a large number of new words, which will not be found in any German dictionary. Of course, philosophers have a habit of coining new terms, but they rarely do so on the scale which Heidegger finds necessary. His new words fall into three main groups.

The first group comprises artificial neologisms, but of these there are relatively few. A frequently recurring example is the adjective *existenziell*, for which we may coin as an English equivalent, 'existentiell'. This artificial adjective, in conjunction with the more orthodox form, *existenzial*, 'existential', provides Heidegger with the convenient pair of terms, '*existenziell-existenzial*'. The first refers to the raw material, as it were, of concrete existing, the second to the structures of existence as conceptually

grasped in philosophical analysis.⁵ There are several similar pairs in Heidegger, for instance, 'ontisch-ontologisch', 'ontical-ontological', 'phänomenal-phänomenologisch', 'phenomenal-phenomenological', 'geschichtlich-historisch', 'historical-historiological', but in these cases Heidegger has not found it necessary to invent artificial words, but has assigned his special meanings to words already more or less current.

The second group consists of new words which are formed naturally in accordance with the conventions of word-building in German. 'Geworfenheit', 'thrownness', for instance, is a perfectly natural word-formation, but it is just as remote from ordinary German usage as its English equivalent is from our usage. It denotes the character of *Dasein* as already 'thrown' into a situation which limits the range of possible choices.⁶ The example given is a relatively mild one. Perhaps the most extraordinary instance of a strange word-formation in the whole of *Sein und Zeit* is a term which Heidegger constructs by adding the suffix of the present participle to the stem of the past participle. He has been stressing the point that *Dasein* is what it has been. The past participle of the German verb, 'sein', 'to be', is 'gewesen', 'been', and the ending of the present participle is '-end'. To reinforce his point, Heidegger constructs the astonishing form, 'gewesend'.⁷ Quite literally, the corresponding English formation would be the impossible 'beening'; and if we express this by the more intelligible 'being what it has been', then Heidegger's linguistic *tour de force* is lost in the translation.

Within the same group, we may note the many new compound words which Heidegger uses, some of them cumbrous enough, like 'Gewissen-haben-wollen', 'the will to have a conscience'. A large number of these new compounds include the verb, 'sein', 'to be', as one of the components. Thus we have 'Insein', 'being in'; 'Mitsein', 'being with'; 'In-der-Welt-sein', 'being in the world'; 'Seinkönnen', 'potentiality for being'; and many others.

In the third group of new terms, words are transferred in their function from one part of speech to another. Thus Heidegger can use adverbs, pronouns and relative expressions as nouns, and he frequently does so. We shall give one example of each. Heidegger has a good deal to say about *das Da*, 'the "there"'. It is common English usage to speak of the 'here and now', but it needs a little practice to become accustomed to the 'there'. The German indefinite pronoun corresponding to the English 'one' is '*man*'. Heidegger has much to say also about '*das Man*', 'the "they"', that is to say, man in the mass, undifferentiated collective humanity. '*Das Wofür*', the 'for-which' or the 'wherefor', is only one of many relative expressions which Heidegger makes into nouns.

On the whole, Heidegger's new words do not occasion too much difficulty for the translator. Sometimes the latter must coin new English

words, such as 'thrownness', on the analogy of Heidegger's – and it must be remembered that these words sound no more strange in English than Heidegger's equivalents do in German. Sometimes – as often with Heidegger's relative expressions used as nouns – it seems best to alter the structure of the sentence so as to avoid the awkwardness of a strictly literal equivalent. It must be pointed out, however, that when Heidegger does introduce a new word, he is usually careful to draw attention to it, and to say how he proposes to use it, and thereafter he sticks to the meaning that he has laid down.

II

We turn now to Heidegger's interest in the history of words, and his habit of using words in what he considers to have been their original senses. Simple archaisms are not uncommon. The rare German verb, *heischen*, 'to request', is now used only in poetry, but Heidegger employs it several times in *Sein und Zeit*. Sometimes he uses an obsolete form of a current verb, as *stünden* for the modern '*stünden*', the imperfect subjunctive of *stehen*, 'to stand'. It is impossible to reproduce these archaisms in English. Fortunately, that makes no difference to the argument, though it does sacrifice the literary atmosphere of the work – if it is permissible to use the expression. Heidegger's archaisms are probably not just an affectation on his part, but are a way of suggesting to us his intention, in *Sein und Zeit*, of going back to the original sources of philosophizing.

More important, however, is Heidegger's use of words in their etymological meanings. '*Insein*', 'being in', is a clear example. Heidegger explicitly tells us that in his usage this expression does not have its usual spatial sense but means rather something like 'being bound up with', and he cites the philologist, Jakob Grimm, for evidence that originally the preposition 'in' did not have spatial significance.⁸ Another interesting example is the verb, *entfernen*, which in German ordinarily means, 'to remove to a distance'. Heidegger can use it in that sense, but sometimes he writes it in the hyphenated form, *ent-fernen*, which draws attention to the structure of the word, and in particular to the privative prefix *ent-* (Latin: *de*). When thus written, the word has its supposedly original sense of something like 'to de-distance', that is to say, to take the distance away from, to bring near, the very opposite of its normal meaning.⁹ One further example may be added. The German verb, *geschehen*, normally means, 'to happen'. But for any event which happens within the world, Heidegger prefers to use the verb, *vor-kommen*, 'to occur', and reserves *geschehen* for *Dasein*. *Dasein*, however, does not just happen – *Dasein* exists and chooses its possibilities. But Heidegger

lays stress on the fact that *Dasein* exists in history. Now 'history' is, in German, *Geschichte*. Heidegger has fastened on the etymological connection of *geschehen* and *Geschichte*, and he uses the former as the verbal form of the latter. Thus the force of *geschehen*, when applied to *Dasein*, only becomes apparent in English when we translate it as 'to historize'.¹⁰

III

In the third place, we come to Heidegger's playing upon words – though the playing may be very seriously intended. This is probably the feature of Heidegger's language which causes most trouble for the translator, and it may, in some cases, defeat him altogether. Again we may subdivide this heading into three topics.

First, we may notice how Heidegger sometimes groups together in constellations, as it were, words of similar structure. In discussing the nature of interpretation, he points out that every interpretation is made with certain presuppositions in mind. These presuppositions are listed as *Vorhabe*, *Vorsicht*, and *Vorgriff*¹¹ – 'what we "have" in advance', 'what we see in advance', and 'what we grasp in advance'. Here it is possible to preserve something of the parallelism in English. In other cases, however, this is not possible. Thus, in describing how the structure of the instrumental world, normally taken for granted, may be lit up by something going wrong, Heidegger makes use of another trio of terms – *Auffälligkeit*, *Aufdringlichkeit*, and *Aufsässigkeit*¹² – 'conspicuousness', 'urgency', and 'obduracy'. Here there is no trio of English terms which would at once be faithful to the sense and similar to each other in form. This, however, would appear to be unimportant. There is a certain artificiality about these constellations in Heidegger. Their only advantage would seem to be that they help to throw into relief the structure of his argument.

A second way of playing upon words is of much greater importance. Here the words involved have a common derivation, and again Heidegger's interest in etymology comes to the fore. For instance, the German word '*Lichtung*' means a 'clearing' in a forest. It is applied to *Dasein*, because *Dasein* not only has being but also has some understanding of its being. *Dasein* is therefore like a clearing in a forest because it is the *locus* in which being becomes transparent to itself. But Heidegger links up this thought of *Dasein* as *Lichtung* with the word *Licht*, 'light', and with the traditional doctrine of the *lumen naturale*.¹³ Heidegger's use of language here cannot be properly rendered in English, but only indicated in a note. The question, however, may be asked, 'What value is to be attached to a line of argument which appears to depend on the fact that in a particular language two words happen to have a common root?'

Before we try to answer that question, let us look at another example. Heidegger discusses the problem of the self which endures through its changing experiences, and he designates this phenomenon as *die Ständigkeit des Selbst*, which we may translate as 'the constancy of the self'. We have noted already, however, that he rejects the notion of self as substance. For him, the self gets its unity from resolvedness, and *die Ständigkeit des Selbst* is identified with *Selbst-ständigkeit*,¹⁴ a word which, without the hyphen, is the usual German expression for 'independence', and which may be rendered here as 'standing by itself'. Here English, by using cognate words, can give at least some hint of what is happening in the German. But again, what of the argument itself? Is being not made to rest on a peculiarity of Heidegger's German? Kant, for instance, in his discussion of the self, uses the term *Beharrlichkeit*, 'permanence', where Heidegger has *Ständigkeit*. If Heidegger had used Kant's term, his remarks would lose their force. Does he then lend plausibility to his position – here, and in similar passages – by an arbitrary choice of terminology? We simply point out the problem. But it may be added that Heidegger would probably reply that his choice of language is not arbitrary. The very fact that *Dasein* can use such language points to something in *Dasein*'s understanding of itself, which it is the business of Heidegger's existential analytic to elucidate.

This last point is made explicitly by Heidegger in the course of his discussion of truth. In his view, the essence of truth 'lies not in any 'agreement' of a judgment with an entity, but in the 'unconcealedness' of the entity itself. But this view, he argues, is a return to the most ancient tradition in philosophy – indeed, it represents *Dasein*'s pre-philosophical grasp of truth. He supports this contention with an etymological consideration. The Greek word for 'true' is ἀληθής. 'Is it', he asks, 'an accident that the Greeks expressed themselves in a *privative* manner about the essence of truth?' Truth is ἀ-λήθεια, 'unconcealedness'. 'Do we not find proclaiming itself, in this way in which *Dasein* expresses itself, *Dasein*'s own primordial understanding of being?'¹⁵

In this same passage, he acknowledges that we have to guard against what he calls a 'word-mysticism'. But he adds: 'Nevertheless, in the end it is the business of philosophy to preserve *the power of those most elemental words* in which *Dasein* expresses itself, and to prevent them from being levelled down to unintelligibility through the ordinary understanding of them.' It may be that something of the 'word-mysticism' against which we are warned appears in Heidegger's own later works, but in *Sein und Zeit* his aim is to free words from popular glosses and distortions which conceal their elemental meanings.

A third way in which Heidegger plays upon words is to use a single term with two well-defined meanings. A good example is the verb *überliefern*. If we translate this as 'to hand over', we preserve the double

meaning in English, for we can think of the handing over either as surrender or tradition. In a complex passage,¹⁶ Heidegger allows these two senses of the verb to ring together. *Dasein* hands itself over to the situation into which it is thrown, and at the same time accepts the heritage of possibility which is handed over to it.

We are far from having set out an exhaustive list of the peculiarities of Heidegger's language, but perhaps the samples given are enough to give a fair idea of what some of the most distinctive peculiarities are. In the main, an English translation can show, with reasonable fidelity, most of what is happening in Heidegger's German. But, as we have seen, there are limits to Heidegger's translatability, and in some passages only notes on the German text can give a clear idea of what he is doing.

What are we to say of a philosophy which is so closely bound up with a particular language – and, indeed, with a highly individual exploitation of that language – that it scarcely allows itself to be expressed in any other? Here again we must be content with pointing out the problem, as when we raised the question of whether Heidegger sometimes engages in a kind of verbal sleight of hand. But it may be asserted that much of the criticism of Heidegger's language, which has been made from time to time, has been quite unjustified. When carefully studied, his language is seen to be an impressive and consistent structure. With all its difficulties, *Sein und Zeit* makes sense – though one would hasten to add that no claim is being made to understand this work in all its details. But the claim may fairly be made that *Sein und Zeit* is not the morass of verbal mystification that it is sometimes said to be. On the contrary, it is a work of quite extraordinary power and originality, expressed in a language which is never lacking in precision, though it may be complex. Heidegger is neither a pedant nor an obscurantist, but a careful and penetrating thinker whose work deserves to be studied with the greatest respect.

The reader of this article, however, should not be left with the idea that we have come too easily to the conclusion that Heidegger is translatable. Whether it be genius or demon, the spirit of the German language is too closely bound up with Heidegger's thought for any translation to represent that thought more than partially. Yet even to do that would be worthwhile, if Heidegger has the stature that we have claimed for him. The ideal solution would doubtless be, not to try to translate Heidegger, but to rethink his philosophy in English, and to exploit the resources of that language in accordance with its peculiar characteristics, as Heidegger has exploited the resources of German. But that could only be done by an English-speaking Heidegger – and so we are driven back to the question, 'Could there be anything but a German-speaking Heidegger?'

Notes

- 1 For a long time, there have been Spanish and Japanese translations.
- 2 In an Auburn Lecture, delivered in New York.
- 3 *Sein und Zeit*, p. 42.
- 4 *ibid.*, p. 7.
- 5 *ibid.*, pp. 12–13.
- 6 *ibid.*, p. 135.
- 7 *ibid.*, p. 326.
- 8 *ibid.*, pp. 53–4.
- 9 *ibid.*, p. 105.
- 10 *ibid.*, pp. 378ff.
- 11 *ibid.*, p. 150.
- 12 *ibid.*, pp. 73–4.
- 13 *ibid.*, p. 133.
- 14 *ibid.*, p. 322.
- 15 *ibid.*, p. 222.
- 16 *ibid.*, pp. 383–4.

Thinking more deeply into the question of translation: essential translation and the unfolding of language

Parvis Emad

the difficulty of a translation is never merely a technical one, but pertains to the relation of man to the root unfolding of the word and to the dignity of language.

Heidegger, *Hölderlins Hymne 'Der Ister'* (GA 53, p. 76)¹

Heidegger's thinking comes into contact with the question of translation in at least five significant ways:

- (1) As a thinker Heidegger is involved in the activity of actual translation of texts in many places in his work. Not counting translations that appear in the lecture courses prior to *Being and Time*, we can say that Heidegger is engaged in actual translation of texts at least as early as the Foreword to *Being and Time*.
- (2) Heidegger's translations differ significantly from existing versions of those texts – an obvious and often misconstrued fact. For example, his rendition of part of the *Antigone* differs significantly from any existing translation; and his translation of certain portions of Plato's work differs from that of Schleiermacher.
- (3) Unlike many philosophers who translate without stating their own viewpoints on translation, Heidegger does not take the process of translation for granted. In Heidegger's works there are sporadic and brief inquiries into the process itself. As he comes to grips with the essential character of language, he also comes to grips with the question of translation. Translation itself becomes philosophically significant.
- (4) For Heidegger translation is a form of interpretation. From very early in his work he abandons the naive assumption that translation is a detached and objective reproduction of immutable 'facts' that appear in interlingual space.
- (5) Finally, there is Heidegger's well-known practice of hyphenating the

German word *übersetzen* and emphasizing either the prefix *über* or the suffix *setzen*, thus indicating that translation implies a process of crossing over and transposition. Adopted in the 1940s, this practice allows Heidegger to point out a process which the English word *translation* cannot easily say.

Reflecting on these five dimensions of the issue, we come to realize that Heidegger carefully, concisely and specifically thinks through the question of translation at various junctures in his work. These various turns towards the question of translation have one important thing in common: they all explicate translation in terms of the root unfolding of language (*das Wesen der Sprache*).² Heidegger is fully aware that translation is a commerce and an exchange between different languages. But it is not in this exchange *per se* that he finds the essential character of translation. Translation shows its essential character when it becomes an occasion for language to unfold in its core. (It goes without saying that translation of a business letter or legal document does not deal with essential translation.) Heidegger is not concerned with problems that dominate the discussion of translation in the 'sciences' of language. Rather he takes translation as a unique opportunity for the root unfolding of language. And this opportunity presents itself in the way in which translation responds to the very foreignness or strangeness which calls for a deeper translation in the root unfolding of language.

In Heidegger the question of translation has two poles. At one pole there are translation's undeniable attachments to the foreignness which rules between languages. At the other pole is the root unfolding of language as a response to that foreignness. Our co-enactment with Heidegger's thinking on translation requires that we consider what gathers in each of these poles.

Thus we lay out the course of the following reflections in terms of these two poles. First, we must grasp Heidegger's appraisal of the foreignness which rules between languages in translation. We grasp this best by looking at how Heidegger views the problem of semantic equivalency of translated terms. Heidegger's opening up of this problem (which plays an important role in the conventional approach to translation) helps to understand his thinking on translation as such. Second, we must consider how this foreignness can elicit a response from language by holding it (the foreignness) to its (language's) root unfolding in and through translation. Here we must consider Heidegger's characterization of translation as 'essential or originary translation' (*wesentliche oder ursprüngliche Übersetzung*) and examine some instances of his work as a translator.

I The problem of validity in translation

The problem that occupies a central place in the long and interesting history of reflection on translation is the problem of validity – the problem of semantic equivalency of translated terms. The conventional approach to translation takes this problem so seriously that it is preoccupied solely with the equivalency of translated terms. Are chosen terms fully representative of the original, or do they cover the original terms only partially? Is translation an accurate and reliable version of the original? Does translation replace the original relatively or absolutely?

From Cicero to Goethe to Walter Benjamin and beyond, conventional 'wisdom' about translation is plagued with the desire to have the words of one language cover fully those of the other language. This desire has given rise to at least three distinct positions: (1) that translations are nothing but distorted versions of the original and that all translations are to be rejected; (2) that it is possible to produce a translation that is absolutely identical with the original, i.e., that absolute identity with the original is a goal worth striving for; and (3) that translations are to be neither rejected off-hand nor accepted absolutely, for they take their place next to the original and do not replace it.³

Heidegger neither rejects translation as a distorted version of the original, nor does he take the translation to be absolutely identical with the original. He prefers to preserve to the fullest degree the difference between languages as this difference erupts within the problem of semantic equivalency in translation. When taken as they are, the differences between languages and the problem of semantic equivalency must be retained as a difference and must be seen for the problem that it is. The recourse to the dictionary, by which we try to alleviate or resolve the problem of semantic equivalency, is a recourse made in the hope that at some point we may do away with this problem and with the difference between languages. But a dictionary is not the ultimate authority, and it cannot resolve the problem of semantic equivalency and thus eliminate the differences between languages.

To consider a dictionary as an undisputed arbiter is to overburden the dictionary with expectations that it cannot fulfil: 'A dictionary can provide an indication for understanding a word . . . [but] it is never a simple [*schlechthin*] authority that would be binding a priori' (GA 53, p. 75). A dictionary cannot be the ultimate authority because it is the product of a particular way of looking at language and of interpreting it. No dictionary has descended from heaven; rather it results from a certain style of reflecting and interpreting language: 'The appeal to a dictionary is always an appeal to an interpretation of language which is often not grasped at all in its style [*Art*] and limits' (GA 53, p. 75).

Certainly dictionaries have an important function to fulfil. But this

function takes place only when there is traffic (*Verkehr*) between languages and when they are turned into means of transportation (*Verkehrsmittel*) (cf. *GA* 53, p. 75). But before languages enter this traffic, they have a historical spirit that dictionaries cannot grasp: 'Considered in view of the historical spirit of language as a whole, no dictionary provides an immediate standard; and none is binding' (*GA* 53, p. 75). To expect dictionaries to resolve the problem of semantic equivalency ignores the historical spirit of a language. Rather than attempting to 'resolve' this problem, we must see the semantic non-equivalency of translated terms for what it is, namely a confirmation of the ineradicable difference between languages. Translation is precisely where this difference shows itself to be ineradicable. For no translation can be perfect enough to minimize this difference: 'There is no translation at all in which the words of one language could or should fully cover the words of another language' (*GA* 53, p. 75). The difficulty of attaining a total identity between translated terms, along with the existing differences between languages, provides translation with a unique revealing power. The difficulty of attaining total identity between languages and the irresolvable difference between them are not entirely negative: they bring to the fore 'interrelations/interconnections [*Zusammenhänge*] which lie in the translated language but are not brought out' (*GA* 53, p. 75). These difficulties and differences reveal translation as a way of dealing with language in which we not only see interrelations in the translated language, but also come to terms with our own language. As Heidegger puts it: 'Translation is an awakening, clarifying, and unfolding of one's own language by coming to grips [*Auseinandersetzung*] with the foreign language' (*GA* 53, p. 80). This means that there is more to translation than just a transfer of words from one language to another. To initiate the move in such a transfer is to face the difference between languages as the foreignness that rules between them. By forcing us to see the foreignness and unfamiliarity of the languages under translation, the activity of translation clarifies our relationship to our own language. Thus, rather than serving as a means for transporting 'meanings' across the so-called 'language barrier', translation invites us to return to our own language. When we, in translation, turn back from the foreignness of another language, we discover another *translation*, one that occurs *within our own language*.

II Translation at the core of language

In the general context of translation between languages and *in the very process* of translation between languages, this 'other' translation shows that language unfolds in an even deeper way than translation between

languages. The fact that translation between languages is at all possible – regardless of its validity – points to a translation which occurs at the core of language itself. To see this ‘other’ translation properly, we must stop thinking of *interlingual* translation as the only form of translation. For, before translation takes the direction between two languages, it already occurs within our own language.

Initially we grasp the process [of translation] from the outside as a technical-philological procedure. We believe that translation is the transfer of a foreign language into another tongue or, conversely, transfer of a mother tongue into another language. However, we fail to see that we constantly translate our own language, the mother tongue, into its own words.

(GA 54, p. 17)

Thus, in contrast to the conventional approach to translation, which considers it solely as interlingual, Heidegger sees translation as occurring *first* within our own language. As interlingual, translation does not manifest itself in its deepest sense, even though the occasion for such a manifestation is made possible when thinking confronts the problem of the validity of interlingual translation.

Having observed what is gathered around that pole which is marked by the foreignness of languages and by translation’s validity, we are then led to see what transpires in or around the other pole, which shows that language unfolds in its core in the process of translation. When we speak with ourselves or with others, we are always involved in translation:

Speaking and saying are in themselves a translation whose essential unfolding is by no means exhausted by the fact that translated words and the words to be translated belong to different languages. An originary translation prevails [*waltet*] in every dialogue and monologue.

(GA 54, p. 17)

It goes without saying that, in order to gain access to this ‘other’ – which we call ‘innerlingual’ – translation, we cannot be guided by the questions that are concerned with validity of interlingual translation and semantic equivalency of translated terms. Rather we are guided by what Heidegger calls *reformulation*. Originary or ‘innerlingual’ translation includes the process of ‘replacing one expression with another one of the same language and so using a “reformulation” [*Umschreibung*]

(GA 54, pp. 17–18). Originary translation which occurs within language and is innerlingual occurs in the closest proximity to reformulation. This involves changing the chosen words, sometimes even choosing a more appropriate word-context. This change indicates that thinking is already

moved, crossed over (is 'translated') into 'another truth, another clarity, or even another matter calling for questioning' (GA 54, p. 18). How else could reformulation be possible? In and of itself reformulation shows a proximity to and a connection with the 'words' that make up the reformulation. Thinking must *be* with those words if reformulation is to occur. To *be* with those words means that thinking crosses over to those words, translates itself into them. Thus reformulation indicates an originary or innerlingual translation.

In addition to reformulation, poetizing and thinking offer other possibilities for grasping the process of crossing over which is essential to *innerlingual* translation. To take thinking and poetizing as they occur in our own language in a manner that is appropriate to them, we must cross over and get translated into the word which originally harbours a work of poetizing or thinking. Understanding poetry or following along in thinking requires innerlingual translation: 'The poetry of a poet and the treatise of a thinker reside in their own unique and singular [*einzig*] word. They force us to hear this word again and again, as if we hear it for the first time' (GA 54, p. 17). In order to read a poem or a work of thinking, we must be 'translated' innerlingually into their essential word.

What distinguishes the word in a work of poetizing is that it requires our being 'translated' into this word. What is called reformulation is also marked by a crossing/translating. Both movements occur when we cross over to the essential word of poetizing and to the word which is essential to reformulation; and both of these movements are movements of innerlingual translation which occurs *prior to* interlingual translation. Long before language enters the arena of interlingual translation, it must be heard in innerlingual translation. This is a translation which occurs independently of interlingual translation, whose validity is questioned by the problem of semantic equivalency. Occurring within language itself, this translation directs us to the root unfolding of language.

What is this root unfolding of language all about? Before we respond to this question, we must take another look at reformulation and what it reveals – for two reasons: (1) Reformulation could be taken as a 'doubling' of language which shows that language is not co-extensive with itself.⁴ (2) Reformulation could also be taken as an essential indicator of what happens in the experience of being *and* language. Reflecting on this second point helps to put the first point into proper focus.

If reformulation indicates the occurrence of an originary translation within language, then it is incumbent upon us to take the phrase 'truth of being, *die Wahrheit des Seins*' as a reformulation of the phrase 'meaning of being, *der Sinn von Sein*'. The change that occurs in the movement in language from 'meaning of being' to 'truth of being' indicates an originary translation within the language of thinking. (It goes without

saying that this occurrence of originary translation is appropriately thought only when reformulation is placed in the context of the experience of being and language, i.e., as an indicator of originary translation within language. If we take reformulation as a mere 'rewording', then of course thinking ceases to address this significant aspect of Heidegger's thinking.) If we consider the proximity of Heidegger's thinking to the 'truth of being' as he is coming to grips with the question of the 'meaning of being', then we have to say that the first phrase is a reformulation of the second. This presupposes that Heidegger considers the question concerning the 'truth of being' as already within the perimeter of the work which deals with the 'meaning of being'. As we gather from *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, this is indeed and precisely the case: truth of being already falls within the perimeter of *Being and Time* (cf. GA 65, p. 182).⁵ If the intention of this work is 'the concrete elaboration of the question of the meaning of being' (GA 2, p. 1) and if 'truth of being' already falls within the perimeter of this work, then 'truth of being' presents a reformulation of the 'meaning of being'. Originary translation as a translation that occurs within language already translates thinking of the question of the 'meaning of being' into a thinking of the 'truth of being' and thus reformulates it.

Seen in this light, reformulation does not present a 'doubling' of language, but rather testifies to its showing power. To take reformulation as a 'doubling' amounts to blocking access to the originary translation that makes reformulation possible. If one insists on seeing reformulation as a 'doubling' – as an indication that language is not co-extensive with itself – then one runs the risk of missing entirely what Heidegger says about translation, what he means by originary translation, and what his thinking shows us about translation and the root unfolding of language, *das Wesen der Sprache*⁶ in its relation to *ursprüngliche Übersetzung*, originary translation. Occurring within language itself, this translation directs us to the root unfolding of language.

III Root unfolding of language and originary translation

In order fully to understand originary or innerlingual translation as one which occurs in response to the foreignness of another language, takes place in every dialogue and monologue, sustains reformulation and upholds an appropriate entry into works of poetizing and thinking, we must determine the way in which this translation reflects the root unfolding of language. This determination is necessary because it prevents misconstruing originary translation as a 'linguistic' episode isolated from the root unfolding of language. This determination allows originary translation to be seen as an innerlingual event which is sustained by the

root unfolding of language and is one of its most accessible indicators. Considering Heidegger's work on language as a whole, we can say that what distinguishes originary translation and reveals it to be an intricate and relatively accessible indicator of the root unfolding of language is the occurrence of 'way-making' that initiates and guides this translation. Thus to grasp originary translation broadly and essentially, we must focus on this occurrence of 'way-making'. This requires nothing less than outlining the fundamental way of Heidegger's thinking about language.

First, we must note that for Heidegger language is not adequately and appropriately grasped when it is construed merely in anthropological and instrumental terms. For Heidegger language has a unique showing power that goes deeper than that. When language unfolds essentially, it allows things to show themselves and be manifest. Second, the root unfolding of language occurs as a 'way-making' (*be-wëgen*) so that things may appear and show themselves. What Heidegger means by the word *way/Weg* is captured by the word 'way-making'. When the word *way/Weg* appears at various junctures in Heidegger's work (for example, in the last lines of *Being and Time*) or when it appears as an adjunct to thinking (such as in *Denkweg*, pathway of thinking) or when it, finally, is used in designating the *Gesamtausgabe* as *Wege, nicht Werke* (pathways, not works) – these various uses of the word *way/Weg* receive their ultimate justification and meaning from 'way-making' as an occurrence which is central to the root unfolding of language. In its simple construction the word 'way-making' refers to the word *way*. For Heidegger this is not a metaphor that alludes to the task of thinking and to the incomplete and provisional character of its 'results' – thus implying relativism and perspectivism. Rather – third, and in view of what we have just said about this word – the word *way/Weg* perhaps as no other word in Heidegger's language directs us to what transpires in the thinking of the question of being as a thinking of *both* being *and* language. This thinking is a thinking of being and language in so far as being is thought in stretches of the way that is laid out in language's 'way-making' movement. The word *way* and what it indicates requires that we think of being and language, not as two separate and independent entities, but as always connected and in accord. They are distinct from each other but are not separate and independent of each other. It is language's way-making movement that takes us underneath language as an ontologically neutral and independent tool of communication. It is also the manifesting/showing/appearing of the being of things that keeps us from thinking that being occurs in a language-free zone. To think of language as an ontologically neutral tool and to think of being as appearing in a language-free zone is to overlook that, as von Herrmann puts it: 'Heidegger thinks being as being in the horizon of the root unfolding of language; and, conversely, he thinks the root unfolding of language in the horizon of being as being.' This means that to think of language,

we must think of its words' showing power, which is always a showing power that shows things in their being. When we state something in words, we always show something in its being. In short, every statement in language is stated in the horizon of the root unfolding of being; and being appears within the horizon of the root unfolding of language. Language's stating/showing/manifesting of things is a way-making. Heidegger captures 'way-making'/showing/stating in one word: *Sagelsaying*.

We must recall – and this is our fourth point – that the word *saying/Sage* is appropriate for showing what transpires when language unfolds in its core because *Sage* in its original form, *sagan*, maintains close ties with the word *zeigen/showing*. As it unfolds in its core, language shows things and makes them manifest. Unfolding in its core, language is a *saying/Sage* which lets things be manifest for what they are. When it unfolds as *saying/showing*, language makes way for things to be manifest. Thus: 'language . . . receives its determination from saying as from that which makes way for everything [*Sprache . . . empfängt seine Bestimmung aus der Sage als dem alles Be-wëgenden*]' (GA 12, p. 191; *ET*, p. 95). This suggests that 'way-making' occurs as *saying* in the realm of showing/manifesting, which is always the realm of being.

Having outlined – albeit briefly, as is required here – the essential issues that are involved in the root unfolding of language, we can now turn to the question which prompted the outline in the first place: to what extent and in what manner is the 'way-making'/saying/showing of language involved in originary translation? And to what extent is originary translation involved in the 'way-making'/saying/showing of language? Our response is simply: originary translation occurs as 'way-making'/saying/showing. Further, since this translation precedes interlingual translation, translating for Heidegger *in its core* implies, manifests, and is sustained by 'way-making'/saying/showing. We can see the fittingness of this response in two ways: (1) by returning once again to what reformulation reveals and (2) by considering translation of a work of thinking into its own language.

(1) Reformulation occurs when the matter that appears in the initial formulation (say as the 'meaning of being') reappears differently (say as the 'truth of being'). The mutual unfolding of being and language in their respective horizons 'makes a way' which requires a different *saying*. Heidegger's choice of word and its special spelling corroborates this essential occurrence of way-making. He chooses the word *bewegen*, which he hyphenates and to which he adds an umlaut, showing that he is concerned with a movement in language that is more than ordinary movement. This spelling is intended to stress the movement as a 'way-making' movement. Hyphenated and with an umlaut, *be-wëgen* indicates *Wege allererst ergeben und stiften*: yielding and bringing about ways in

an originary way (GA 12, p. 186; ET, p. 92). Reformulation depends on and represents one such yielding and bringing about of ways. In reformulation saying is not something that is added to the matter that reappears differently and needs reformulation. Rather, saying is just this appearing/showing itself. Thus reformulating or re-saying the question of being in terms of the 'truth of being' indicates that thinking moves along a path in language which opens unto the 'truth of being'. The path that thinking takes in reformulation points out an altered appearing and a translating into this appearing. Reformulation is called for, becomes necessary, and can be accomplished only because language 'makes ways' in this deep sense.

(2) Besides reformulation, the special circumstance of translating a work of thinking into its native language involves originary translation (language's 'way-making'/showing/saying). We can see this involvement by considering what transpires in such a translation. Translation of a work of thinking into its native language involves originary translation because it requires translating the language of this work into words that belong to its own language. And this is a task that is quite different from translating this work into another language. This task is different because

to translate one's own language into its ownmost [*eigenstes*] words is always more difficult. For instance, translation of the words of a German thinker into the German language is particularly difficult because here the obstinate prejudice holds sway that we are supposed to understand the German word automatically [*von selbst*], since it belongs to 'our' own language.

(GA 54, p. 18)

This difficulty is directly proportional to the 'way' which the thinker's language of thinking 'makes' in the thinker's own native language, i.e., is proportional to the extent that language is unfolded essentially and in its core. In so far as his work shows/manifests things in a special manner, his language of thinking 'makes' special 'ways' in his own native language. The difficulty of translating/interpreting the work of a thinker into his own native language consists in the fact that the translator/interpreter must translate himself (here the German *über-setzen*, with emphasis on the prefix *über*, works much better than the English word *translate*) into the saying, i.e., into the 'ways made' by the work of thinking in his native language.

Here the success of the translator/interpreter depends largely on his grasping that a work of thinking presupposes the mutual and horizontal root unfolding of being and language. A work of thinking represents such an unfolding, and its language is a measure of that. A translation of a work of thinking into its own native tongue requires as its first step

that the translator/interpreter gain access to the 'ways made' by that work in its own native tongue. Once these 'ways' are ascertained, then the language of the interpreter unfolds essentially and in its core. In this root unfolding, the originary translation of a work of thinking takes place as a translation into the 'ways made' by a work of thinking in its native tongue. Thus the difficulty of translating a work of thinking into its own language consists in gaining access to the 'ways made' in that language and in unfolding the interpreter's language in accordance with those 'ways'.

Here is the place to offer a brief criticism – proceeding from this understanding of originary translation – of the contemporary hermeneutic and structuralist theories of interpretation. Contemporary hermeneutic and structuralist theories of interpretation struggle with that distance which separates the interpreter from the work to be interpreted.⁸ But they do not seem to succeed in overcoming that distance. On one level the interpreter is certainly separated and thus distanced from the work that he wishes to interpret. However, if we understand the interpreter's response to the 'ways made' in the language of the work to be interpreted as a response within the root unfolding of language, then we find that the distance which separates the work from its interpreter is already overcome in and through originary translation. Originary translation overcomes this distance in its character as a translation into 'way-making'/showing/saying that occurs when the 'foreign-sounding' character of the language of the work of thinking elicits a response from its own native language. The distance between translator/interpreter and the work to be interpreted is already bridged by the originary translation as a response to the language of the work of thinking – a response which lets language unfold in its core.

This means that it is language – and *not* the interpreter – that initiates, carries through, and completes originary translation. Thus originary translation confirms Heidegger's basic position: 'It is not man who speaks, but language. Man speaks only by resonating with language within the root unfolding of being [*geschicklich*].'⁹ This way of saying originary translation confirms Heidegger's stance on the priority of language, in that this translation reveals a level of 'linguistic activity' that lies deeper than what usually happens in speaking and writing within a multiplicity of meanings. We tend to think of this multiplicity as something that is at our disposal as we speak. But considering the deeper 'linguistic activity' (as revealed in originary translation), we realize that the opposite is actually the case:

Multiplicity of meanings of a term does not originate in the fact that, in speaking and writing, we humans occasionally mean different things with the same word. The multiplicity of meanings is in each case an

historical [*geschichtlich*] multiplicity. It emerges from the fact that, when we speak the language, we are addressed and claimed by the being of beings in different ways, depending upon the root unfolding of being.¹⁰

Thus originary translation of a work of thinking into the words of its own language reveals the language of this work as one which 'makes ways' in its native tongue in accord with the root unfolding (*Geschick*) of being. Accordingly, this originary translation reveals being's most intimate involvement with language. This way of saying originary translation reveals that the language of a work of thinking is moulded in closest proximity to how language essentially unfolds in a work of thinking.

Let us show how this happens with an example from Kant. We can say that this unfolding takes place when Kant interprets *ratio* as both *Vernunft* and *Grund* and translates *principium reddendae rationis sufficientis* as *der Satz vom Grund*. But stepping over to the 'way made' by the Latin *ratio* – first in Latin and then in German, with *Vernunft* and *Grund* – is moving into a 'way' wherein interlingual translation (i.e., the translation of the Latin *ratio* into German) and innerlingual translation (i.e., the translation within Latin and within German) intersect. This means that translation of a work of thinking into its native tongue sometimes requires stepping over to the 'way made' by a word which is not a native word in a thinker's native tongue, but is none the less an essential word and gets translated into a thinker's native tongue. (In Kant's case this occurs when the word *ratio* is translated into German both as *Vernunft* and as *Grund*.) Heidegger regards this latter kind of translation – the one in which a foreign and essential word gets translated into another language, the one in which interlingual and innerlingual translations meet – as an instance of essential translation (*wesentliche Übersetzung*). In order to understand more fully what translation is all about, we must take a quick look at essential translation.

IV Translation as essential translation

The linguistic event which we pursued up to this point and which Heidegger calls 'originary translation' – which we call 'innerlingual translation' – takes place in reading a work of thinking or a work of poetizing, in essential reformulation, and particularly in that translation which occurs when a work of thinking is translated into the words of its own native language. However, sometimes translation of a work of thinking into the words of its own language unexpectedly brings us face to face with interlingual translation, in so far as the originary translation of that work

comes upon a translation which takes place within the language of that work but involves another language – as is the case in Kant's rendition of the Latin *ratio* into German. What happens *in* and *as* translation, when translation is interlingual and hands over to an historical epoch a 'way' of showing/manifesting that is 'made' by essential words of another language? In short, what sort of interlingual translation is essential translation? In order to respond to these questions, we must draw attention to a naive assumption that often plays a quiet and persistent role in the debate on interlingual translation. (When this assumption is rightly understood, then we can see interlingual translation as a particular occasion for language to unfold essentially and in its core.) Debate on the interlingual translation of a work of thinking sometimes naively assumes that essential words and concepts of a work of thinking are clearly circumscribed and reside without ambiguity on the other side of the so-called 'language barrier', simply waiting to be transmitted to this side of the 'language barrier' with equal clarity and unambiguously. But this assumption overlooks the fact that essential words of a work of thinking are not instances of clear and unambiguous circumscription: they are cases of 'way-making'/saying/showing power. These cases of 'way-making'/saying/showing power emerge from 'being's root unfolding within the horizon of language and from language's root unfolding within the horizon of being'.

Seen within the context of this mutual and horizontal root unfolding, interlingual translation of basic words of thinking is not primarily a matter of transmission of 'well-defined meanings' from one language into another. Interlingual translation as essential translation involves primarily being's root unfolding along with language's root unfolding. In view of this involvement, we can say that, strictly speaking, no wholesale transmission takes place in essential translations of *works* of thinking because 'way-making'/saying/showing power of elemental *words* of thinking cannot be transmitted intact. The most that essential translation can achieve is to convey a sense of what the 'way-making'/saying/showing is – that way-making that occurs in strict correspondence with the unfolding of the language which is to be translated. Essential or interlingual translation deals with being's unfolding within a given language as this unfolding shines through its words. Essential translation indicates that being's unfolding (*das Geschick des Seins*) corresponds to a certain way of speaking and that a certain way of speaking corresponds to being's manner of involvement in language. In Heidegger's words: 'An essential translation corresponds [*entspricht*] in each case to the manner in which language speaks within an epoch of unfolding of being and, in so doing, corresponds to the root unfolding of being.'¹¹ The word *entsprechen* (correspondence) that appears in this characterization of essential translation marks the unfolding of language within the horizon of being. As a

language, German corresponds to being's unfolding when this language puts forth *Vernunft* and *Grund* as translation/reception of the Latin *ratio*. If this unfolding/corresponding would not take place, then the 'way' of showing/manifesting things that is peculiar to *ratio* – i.e., the 'calculative way' – would not be conveyed into modern German thought. Deliberately exaggerating, Heidegger says that there would then be no critique of pure reason. 'If in modern [German] thought *ratio* would not speak in translation equivocally as *Vernunft* and as *Grund*, then there would be no critique of pure reason as delimitation of the possibility of the object of experience.'¹² In order that the 'way-making'/saying/showing peculiar to *ratio* be received by German thought, two words are utilized, a utilization whose philosophical justification may be found in Kant's work. By undertaking the project of a critique of pure reason, Kant lays out the principles and rules that heighten and intensify the 'calculative way' that was originally displayed in the word *ratio*. Critique of pure reason (the process, not the book) heightens the calculative way and thus sets the stage for the maximization of calculation as it occurs in modern technology.

As a language Latin unfolds within the horizon of being; thus it is in correspondence with the unfolding of being when this language puts forth *actualitas* as a translation of ἐνέργεια. But the Latin word is not and cannot be the exact replica of the Greek term because the mutual and horizontal root unfolding of being and language is not a selfsame and repetitive process. Being's unfolding as it gives rise to ἐνέργεια occurs in Greek as a language which unfolds within the horizon of being. Being's unfolding as it gives rise to *actualitas* occurs in Latin as a language which unfolds within the horizon of being. Being's unfolding within the horizon of Latin as a language in the unfolding of a withdrawal that marks the end of the First Beginning, the Beginning which initiates philosophy. This means that translation of the Greek ἐνέργεια into *actualitas* mirrors the unfolding of being which is distinguished by this withdrawal. We can see this by contrasting the 'way' made in Greek by ἐνέργεια – for showing/manifesting things – with the 'way' made in Latin by *actualitas*. The Greek ἐνέργεια makes a 'way' of showing/manifesting of 'the this' and 'the that' 'as presencing in work as work [*das im Werk als Werk-Wesen*]'.¹³ The Latin *actualitas* also makes a 'way' of showing/manifesting things as work, but *actualitas* accentuates the work aspect only in terms of 'what is effected in effecting, what is accomplished in accomplishing'.¹⁴ Thus *actualitas* covers over the work aspect as presencing by stressing the 'opus of operari' and the 'actus of agere'.¹⁵

Although *actualitas* covers over the showing/manifesting of ἐνέργεια (presencing in work as work), the Latin word is not entirely devoid of the original root unfolding of being: 'Beyond the indefinite relation to work, *actualitas* no longer preserves anything of the root unfolding of ἐνέργεια. And yet in *actualitas*, too, the initiatory root unfolding of

being holds sway.’¹⁶ The initiatory root unfolding of being holds sway in *actualitas* because, originating in a language which unfolds within the horizon of being, this word too ‘makes a way’ and has showing power.

When Heidegger focuses on the translation of these two words, he demonstrates that the root unfolding of language extends into actual cases of interlingual translation. This extension is not an artificial imposition of a ‘new’ meaning into an already existing word. Rather it involves forming a word which conveys (does not duplicate) the ‘way-making’/saying/showing power of the original word. This extension tells us that, when a word of thinking is a foreign word, language of thinking unfolds in its core by corresponding to being’s unfolding and by putting forth a word that evokes the original word’s ‘way-making’/saying/showing power. Since this unfolding occurs as language’s ‘way-making’/saying/showing, the very notion of an interlingual translation of the words of thinking no longer implies transportation of a word from one language into another. Rather interlingual translation of words of thinking is a response which for example, Latin provides in accordance with being’s unfolding to the ‘way-making’/saying/showing that is Greek. Thus we can now respond to our earlier question, namely ‘What happens *in* and *as* translation when translation of the words of thinking is interlingual?’ The response is: when it is essential, interlingual translation of the words of thinking is a translation into ‘way-making’/saying/showing. We come upon a specific case of this translation when we consider Heidegger’s rendition into German of a segment of the *Theaetetus* which differs sharply from Schleiermacher’s rendition.

We begin by putting together a chart which enables us to survey at a glance a number of central Platonic concepts and their renditions into German by Schleiermacher and then by Heidegger (for details cf. *GA* 34, pp. 149–240).

| <i>Plato</i> | <i>Schleiermacher</i> | <i>Heidegger</i> |
|---------------|-------------------------|---|
| διανοεῖν | Denken | Vernehmen |
| ἐπισκέψασθαι | Erforschen | Im Hinsehen etwas einer Sache ansehen |
| λέγειν | Reden, Sprechen | Sammeln, gesammelt etwas darstellen und offenbar machen |
| ἀγαθος | gut | tauglich |
| ἐπολέγεσθαι | aufsuchen ¹⁷ | auf etwas zustreben |
| ἔρω | Liebe | Erstrebnis |
| ἀναλογίζεσθαι | zu Schlüssen gelangen | hin und her überrechnen |
| ἀλήθεια | Wahrheit | Unverborgenheit |
| οὐσία | Dasein | Seiendes |

Just as the translation of the Greek ἐνέργεια into *actualitas* mirrors the unfolding of being which marks the end of the First Beginning, so also translation of Platonic concepts into German must occur in such a way as to mirror the unfolding of being *as* (not *at*) the end of the First Beginning and the beginning of philosophy proper in Plato. Just as in '*actualitas* the initiatory root unfolding of being holds sway', so also these central Platonic concepts must be translated by an unfolding of language which mirrors the initiatory root unfolding of being in the First Beginning, as this unfolding still holds sway in Plato. What is striking about Schleiermacher's translation of Plato's words of thinking (gathered in the above chart) is that his renditions of these words fail to mirror the initiatory root unfolding of being which still holds sway and is sheltered in Platonic words. True to the language that dominates the tradition that he inherits, Schleiermacher translates (to consider just a few) δianoεῖν with *Denken* (intellection), λέγειν with *Reden* (speaking) and ἀλήθεια with *Wahrheit* (truth). Despite the unmistakable 'accuracy' of his renditions, Schleiermacher's language is essentially repetitive and traditional. He does not seem to be shaken by the 'foreignness' of Plato's Greek to the extent that is needed in order to come to terms with the root unfolding of his own language. His renditions are 'good and accurate' interlingual translations, but they are not essential ones. Perhaps we can shed some light on this difficult and intricate issue by briefly examining Schleiermacher's and Heidegger's choice of terms for δianoεῖν.

Schleiermacher follows the prevalent practice of translating δianoεῖν with *Denken* (intellection). In Heidegger's words that is 'not only ungreek, but also fails to see all the issues that we face here . . . such a harmless rendition, though correct according to the dictionary, undermines the poignancy and ground of the whole question' (GA 34, p. 181). For Schleiermacher the word δianoεῖν is not primarily a 'way-made' for saying/showing/manifesting things, but denotes an 'activity' by which things are intellectually grasped. For Heidegger δianoεῖν is primarily a 'way-made' for showing/saying/manifesting things. He translates δianoεῖν as *Vernehmen*, i.e. taking in, interrogating and hearing. Heidegger keenly attends to the ambivalence (*Zweideutigkeit*) of the word δianoεῖν, which on the one hand indicates 'receiving' as 'taking in' (*Hinnenehmen*) and on the other hand stresses interrogating (as in *Vernehmung von Zeugen im Gericht*, 'interrogating witnesses in court'):

In δianoεῖν we come upon [the occurrence of] 'receiving/taking in' of what *shows itself* as a receiving that interrogates. This interrogating takes something in and receives it in that this interrogating takes up something in view of something [else]. [*Im δianoεῖν liegt dieses*

vor-nehmende, eine Sache auf etwas hin durchnehmende Hinnehmen dessen, was sich dabei zeigt.]

(GA 34, p. 181)

There is a world of difference between translating *διδασκω* with *Denken* and with *Vernehmen*. If we translate *διδασκω* with *Denken*, then we lose sight of the initiatory character of this word which places it at the end of the First Beginning. That this word shelters such an initiatory character is borne out by the fact that, when *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* offers a series of hints and indications for understanding how the First Beginning ‘plays forth’ (*zuspielen*) into the ‘Other Beginning’, this work mentions *Vernehmen* and *Vernehmung* as words that still reverberate with the initiatory root unfolding of being (as *Ereignis*) (cf. GA 65, p. 198 and *passim*).

Thus the question that emerges from the above chart is not whether Schleiermacher’s renditions are accurate – they obviously are – but rather this: are Schleiermacher’s renditions into German ‘an essential translation which hands over to an historical epoch a “way” of saying/showing/manifesting, or are his renditions repetitive and traditional’? Schleiermacher’s translation does not unfold the German language in accordance with the root unfolding of being which occurs as the Other Beginning. His translation is accurate and takes over the existing and circulating reserve of words of the German language, and by that very token his translation is not an essential translation.

By contrast Heidegger’s renditions of Platonic terms are the unfolding of the German language in such a way as to correspond to the root unfolding of being which marks the Other Beginning. Because the First Beginning ‘plays forth’ into the Other Beginning – and this means that the end of this Beginning which occurs in Plato also ‘plays forth’ into the Other Beginning – Heidegger’s renditions of Platonic terms unfold the German language in such a way as to allow the initiatory character of these terms to emerge and reverberate. That is, the very words *Vernehmen*, *Sammeln*, *Erstrebnis*, *Unverborgenheit*, etc. are in each instance essential translation, i.e., move within the root unfolding of language within the horizon of the root unfolding of being (*das Wesen der Sprache im Geschick des Seins*).

If essential translation is a translation into ‘way-making’/saying/showing within an historical epoch, then language’s unfolding as saying could be viewed as a formative power in that epoch. But how formative is saying that occurs in essential translation? We see the formative character of saying appropriately when we recall that saying occurs as soundless showing and as stillness (GA 12, pp. 243ff.). Thinking deeper into the question of translation, we realize that innerlingual translation turns us away from the differences between languages and leads us to a saying which is

soundless showing and occurs right at the core of language. Thinking deeper into the question of translation, we get a glimpse of this soundless and still showing. Gathering all of this, we can say: the unresolvable foreignness that always remains in interlingual translation is the occasion for experiencing the root unfolding of language as a soundless saying/showing within the horizon of being.

Notes

1 Throughout this essay the volumes of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* will be referenced within the text by using GA followed by the volume and then the page number (e.g., GA 2, p. 56). All of these volumes have been published by Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, beginning with the year 1975.

2 Obviously the word *Wesen* presents great difficulties for translation. Rendition of this term with 'essence' does not reflect the movement of emerging in its ongoing character which is crucial for this word. In *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* Heidegger points out that *essentia* (hence also the English word *essence*) is a word that belongs to metaphysical thinking as a thinking that is concerned with 'beingness of beings' (GA 65, p. 270). Speaking of $\tau\acute{\iota}$ ἔστιν and $\delta\tau\iota$ ἔστιν, he says that the distinction between *essentia* and *existentia* 'springs from the beingness of beings and thus pertains to the *Wesung* of being'. Then he adds: '*Essentia* and *existentia* are not richer and do not originate from something simple. On the contrary [this distinction] is a definite impoverishment of the richer *Wesen* of being and its truth.' These remarks of Heidegger make it quite clear that, although the word *essence* pertains to the *Wesung* of being, there is a vast difference between *Wesen* and 'essence', which difference translation must not overlook.

Several approaches to the translation of *Wesen* point out the difficulty that this word presents for translation: (1) Gail Stenstad proposes that this word be left untranslated (cf. her unpublished dissertation *Heidegger's Question of Language: From Being to Dwelling*). The disadvantage of retaining the German word is that, by keeping it intact, no translation actually takes place. (2) Wilson Brown translates the word *Wesen* with 'issuance and abidance'. This comes somewhat close to the movement of emerging and unfolding that the word displays. But by using two nouns instead of a verb, this translation stifles the movement character of *Wesen* (cf. Wilson Brown, 'The selfsame and the differing of the difference', *Research in Phenomenology*, xiv (1984), p. 225). (3) Kenneth Maly suggests the use of the expression 'root unfolding', which preserves the movement of emerging in its ongoing character (cf. his 'Imaging hinting showing: placing the work of art', in F.-W. von Herrmann and W. Biemel (eds), *Kunst und Technik: Gedächtnisschrift zum 100. Geburtstag von Martin Heidegger* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann Verlag, 1989), p. 195). In this essay we shall follow Maly's practice and refer to *Wesen* throughout as 'root unfolding'. Although the word *root* runs the risk of indicating some lower/deeper place/thing 'from out of which' the *Wesen* takes place – thus intimating a stability that runs counter to *Wesen* – nevertheless the expression 'root unfolding', when heard in the resonance of the phrase taken as a whole, comes closest to indicating the significant movement which occurs in *Wesen*.

3 Miguel de Cervantes, among others, articulates the first position; Jorge Luis

Borges, the second; and Goethe, the third. Cervantes advocates the first view when he suggests that reading a work in translation is like 'viewing a piece of Flemish tapestry on the wrong side' (*Don Quixote* (Modern Library Edition), p. 869). For Cervantes reading translation is equal to reading a distorted view of the original.

On the other hand Borges suggests that translation is possible without distortion. His fictional Pier Menard envisions such a perfect translation in terms of actual writing, *not* rewriting the original. Three hundred years after Cervantes, Pier Menard plans to write *Don Quixote* in French. He knows 'Spanish well, "recovers" the Catholic faith, "fights" against the Moors and the Turks, and "forgets" the history of Europe between the years 1602 and 1918'; in short, he plans to be Miguel de Cervantes. This is a project which he 'should only have to be immortal' in order 'to carry out' (*Ficciones* (New York: Grove Press, 1962) pp. 49f.).

Goethe's position is somewhere between the two extremes just mentioned. He assesses the status of translation and equivalency in different terms, in that he sets a different goal for translation. In *Der West-Osterliche Divan* he designates as the last and third period in the history of translation one in which 'we would want to make translation identical with the original in such a way that the new text does not exist instead of the original [*anstatt*], but in its place [*an der Stelle*]' (DTV Edition), p. 244. Goethe's view on translation touches the crucial points in Cervantes as well as in Borges. Unlike Cervantes, Goethe considers translation to be reliable and strong enough to be identical with the original. Unlike Borges, Goethe sees this identity, not as an absolute, but only a partial and functional identity. In so far as Goethe does not envision the possibility of an absolute identity of translation with the original – as Borges seems to do – (translation, he says, does not exist instead of the original, but in its place) Goethe's identity of translation and original is partial and functional. He leaves open the access to and the need for a return to the original.

4 Cf. 'Ontology of language, ontology of translation in Heidegger' by Eliane Escoubas.

5 To say that the 'truth of being' is a 'reformulation' of the 'meaning of being' is to heed the occurrence of originary translation (which indicates language's 'way-making') and to heed what Heidegger says about *Being and Time* in Sections 42 and 91 of *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. In Section 42 we are told that in the field of the question of being there 'are no straightforward "developments."' There is much less *that* relationship between what comes later [*das Spätere*] to what comes earlier [*das Frühere*], according to which relationship the former is contained in the latter' (GA 65, p. 85). In the light of this statement we can say that the 'truth of being' is not contained in the 'meaning of being' in *Being and Time*. However, this does not exclude taking 'truth of being' as a reformulation of the 'meaning of being'. That *Being and Time* falls within the perimeter of the 'truth of being' emerges clearly from Section 91 of *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, where Heidegger characterizes *Being and Time* as 'the first step toward creatively overcoming metaphysics' and adds that this step 'had to be undertaken by holding firm, in one respect, to the posture of thinking [*Denkhaltung*] while at the same time, in another respect, basically overcoming this posture'. Both happen in *Being and Time* in so far as this work 'holds to the posture of thinking by inquiring into the *being of a being* and overcomes metaphysics in so far as [this work] inquires in advance into the truth of being' (GA 65, p. 182). Inquiring in advance into the 'truth of being' manifests a

proximity to this truth in language which allows an originary translation into it, in the reformulation of the 'meaning of being'.

6 See note 2 above.

7 F.-W. von Herrmann, *Subjekt und Dasein*, 2nd edn (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Kostermann Verlag, 1985), p. 169.

8 Only when thinking fails to experience originary translation – whose very occurrence denies the distance between interpreter and work – as translation into 'ways made' by the work, only then can thinking propose a 'fusion of horizons' (*Verschmelzung der Horizonte*), as Gadamer does, or utilize a 'deconstructive strategy', as Derrida is doing (cf. H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, 2nd edn, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1965), pp. 289ff.; *ET*, pp. 269ff. and J. Derrida, 'Plato's pharmacy', in *Dissemination*, tr. B. Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). We can go one step further and suggest that, when originary translation does *not* take place, the distance which operates prior to this translation manifests itself by the demand for a 'fusion of horizons' or for Derrida's concern for detecting 'binary oppositions' – manifesting a certain insecurity of thinking that grows out of the very distance from the matter to be thought. For, in order for the interpreter's 'horizon' to be 'fused' with the 'horizon' of the work, the two must be separated from each other by this distance. Likewise, identification and detection of 'binary oppositions' in the text – as well as other elements of the 'deconstructive strategy' – presuppose a distance and an *assessive* posture, which weigh and value one thing against another. (Is not this assessive posture what enables Derrida to detect 'binary oppositions' in every work that he reads?) However, originary translation is not assessive because it is simply this: moving/stepping into 'ways made' by a work of thinking.

9 Martin Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund* (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1957), p. 161. The German words *das Geschick* and *geschicklich*, as used by Heidegger, present significant trouble for translation. The usual way of translating the words into English, i.e. as 'destiny', is inadequate – for it covers over the *movement* character of the word. Moreover the dimension of the unfolding in any given epoch gets hidden and covered over.

In this essay I have opted for the translation of *Wesen* as 'root unfolding'. In view of the immense light that *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* sheds on Heidegger's work, I find it necessary to use the word 'unfolding' also for translating the word *Geschick*. For, throughout *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* Heidegger's use of the terms *Wesen* and *Wesung* suggests that *Geschick* too is a way of *Wesen* and *Wesung*, i.e., is a way of unfolding. This means that the movement named in *Geschick* emerges in the same place as the movement named *Wesung*, as this word is used in *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. The possibility of originary translation requires that interlingual translation focus precisely *not* on terms that are semantically equivalent, but rather simply heed that way of originary translation that takes place innerlingually, as the root unfolding of language. On this point see my discussion and translation of the term *Betroffenheit* (a term that appears in Heidegger's *Nietzsche*, volume II) as presented in my paper 'The question of technology and will to power', in von Herrmann and Biemel (eds), *Kunst und Technik*, pp. 137ff. See also by contrast translation of this term by David F. Krell in Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, vol. III. (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), pp. 189ff.

10 *Der Satz vom Grund*, p. 161.

11 *ibid.*, p. 164.

12 *ibid.*

13 Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, vol. II (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1961), p. 404.

14 *ibid.*, p. 412.

15 *ibid.*

16 *ibid.*, p. 413.

17 In this text Heidegger uses the word *erfassen*, using an earlier edition of Schleiermacher's translation. The Rowohlt edition of the Schleiermacher translation replaces *erfassen* with *aufsuchen* (cf. *GA* 34, pp. 30, 203 and 337).

Heidegger's idea of truth

Ernst Tugendhat

Heidegger is perhaps the only philosopher of our time who has tried to advance the classical tradition of ontologico-transcendental philosophy in a productive way. That this advance is presented as an overcoming and one in which philosophy is finally brought to a close, has of course made it suspect. The critique of Heidegger's thought is mostly carried out upon a plane which, for its part, is no longer that of the ontologico-transcendental tradition. Assuming that it still makes sense today to hold on to the formal idea of an ontological or transcendental philosophy as a desirable ideal, Heidegger's attempt must be examined specifically with regard to this guiding idea, if we are to arrive at an assessment of our own possibilities.

In this connection, a particular significance can be attributed to the concept of truth. Crudely expressed, one can say that it is a characteristic of the philosophy of the classical tradition that, on the one hand, it is universal (questioning into being in general) while, on the other hand, it starts out from some first, or most original, principle. For ancient metaphysics, this first principle was an absolute being. In modern, transcendental philosophy, the standpoint of knowledge and therewith that of truth comes to the fore, and this from two sides. All beings are questioned with regard to the condition of their possibility in so far as this condition can be known to be true, and the first and most original principle to which this question leads back is not so much an absolute being as rather something which is given with absolute certainty. Thus, Husserl understands his transcendental philosophy as a phenomenological clarification of everything posited as true, with reference to a transcendental subjectivity whose distinctive characteristic lies in its absolute self-givenness, that is, in its character as the sphere of the absolutely evident and therefore of a conclusive truthfulness. Heidegger holds on to the idea of a first and most original principle and, in so far as he does so he

remains, formally speaking, in the tradition of transcendental philosophy. However, the self-givenness of subjectivity is for him no longer an absolute principle but rather one that has already been mediated by the ecstatic temporality of Dasein through a precursory openness – its world as history. To this extent the transcendental (thesis) is surpassed. In order to have a word which describes both the continuity and the break, let us call this position ‘meta-transcendental’. What is most originally given is no longer characterized by the evidence of an absolute subjectivity but by the disclosure of the finitude of Dasein and – in so far as this disclosure stands out in an open field of play – through the clearing of this very field itself.

I do not want to offer an interpretation of this basic position of Heidegger’s but only to ask what it means that Heidegger, for his part, also understands this transformed transcendental ‘reference back’ in terms of a first and most original truth, even though he abandons the standpoint of certainty and evidence. In *Being and Time* he describes the disclosure of Dasein as the first and most original phenomenon of Truth (SZ, 221) and correspondingly, in his later writings, he describes the clearing of the world as the ‘Truth of Being’. This is not obviously in line with our normal understanding of truth and actually presupposes Heidegger’s own theory of truth, a theory for which truth is determined as ‘disclosure’ and ‘un-concealment’. One therefore has to subject this theory to an interpretation if one wants to understand with what right and with what meaning Heidegger chooses the word ‘truth’ to characterize his meta-transcendental reference back.

In order to keep the interpretation within a controllable frame, I propose to limit myself to a particular text, section 44 of *Being and Time*. Here Heidegger develops his concept of truth for the first time. To be sure, all the various aspects of his position have not yet been developed and the conception as a whole experiences a characteristic modification later through the so-called *Kehre*. But the essential decisions, those which remain fundamental for everything that follows, are already taken here and can therefore best be grasped here.

The treatment of the concept of truth is carried out in two steps. In a first section (a) Heidegger handles propositional truth and comes to the conclusion that it must be understood as ‘uncovering’ (or – as Heidegger says later – unconcealing). This finding then allows him in section (b) to extend the concept of truth to all that can be uncovered and to any disclosure. And since it has already been shown, in *Being and Time*, that all uncovering of inner-worldly beings is grounded in the disclosure of world, this latter proves, in the end, to be the ‘most original phenomenon of truth’. Section (b) therefore brings us back to our initial question, how, for Heidegger, the concept of truth can be the fundamental philosophical concept. But the decisive step in the argument of §44

is certainly the thesis of section (a) that the truth of an assertion lies in its disclosiveness. Once this has been conceded, everything else follows almost deductively. So first, we have to carefully interpret this analysis of propositional truth.

It is a methodological necessity that Heidegger takes propositional truth as his point of departure here, as also in the only detailed development of the concept of truth to be found later in 'On the essence of truth' (Wegmarken, GA 9). To be sure, the philosophical determination of a basic word does not have to be restricted to any natural understanding of this word but it has to start out from such an understanding all the same. From the standpoint of ordinary understanding, propositional truth is certainly not the only meaning of the word 'truth' but it is the most familiar. That a concept of truth agrees with the propositional concept does not perhaps accomplish much. But it does at least furnish the minimal condition that must be met if it is to feature at all as a concept of truth: Heidegger certainly did not recognize this requirement as clearly as this because he was of the opinion that propositional truth was first brought to the fore by Plato and Aristotle (probably the opposite lies nearer to the truth: it is precisely Homer who in general only speaks of truth in connection with an assertion and Heidegger could only arrive at his position because, in his own conception of the Greek pre-philosophical understanding of truth, he let himself be guided less by actual word usage than by a free interpretation of the etymology). Still, this much can be said: Heidegger does in any case take propositional truth to be primary for us, which places us in need of a new concept of truth. And so we do not run contrary to his intentions if we take him at his word in this respect.

He follows another hermeneutical maxim in that he not only starts out from our natural understanding of language but also holds to the traditional philosophical conception, that is to say, to the well-known formula: *veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus*. How, asks Heidegger, is this correspondence really to be understood?

He prepares an answer by way of a critique of various contemporary conceptions, in particular, the so-called theory of ideas: if we ask about the truth of a statement, it is a question not of a correspondence between an immanent representation and a transcendent being; rather, in the statement itself, we are already directed to the state of affairs. And the statement or assertion is now true when it shows the state of affairs 'as it is in itself', when the state of affairs is discovered to be 'in itself just as it is pointed out in the assertion' (SZ, 218).

In a remark, Heidegger refers at this point to the phenomenological theory of truth developed by Husserl in his sixth *Logical Investigation*, and quite rightly so. Just as Heidegger's critique of the theory of ideas only reproduces Husserl's line of argument, so does his positive

determination of the concept of truth seem at first only to take up again that of Husserl. Through his specifically phenomenological thematic, through his new distinction between the objective content and its intentional mode of givenness, Husserl arrived not only at a rejection of the theory of ideas but also at a comprehensive interpretation of the adequation formula. The distinction of different modes of givenness of the same object led to the knowledge that, according to the adequation formula, that which had to correspond with the facts is neither the subject (as this formula would wrongly have it) nor something else – for instance, the statement as a physical occurrence – but precisely the same thing, only in other modes of givenness. On the one side, we find the state of affairs as it is intended in so-called signifying givenness, on the other precisely this state of affairs, as it is itself. This ‘being itself’ of the state of affairs is not something transcendent to experience, but is only the correlate of a distinctive mode of givenness. The state of affairs as it is itself is the state of affairs as it manifests itself when it is itself given to us.

So when Heidegger says that the truth of an assertion consists in this, that it points out or discloses the entity ‘just as it is in itself’, one might at first suppose that he had simply repeated Husserl’s thesis. In which case one would only be in a position to appreciate the specificity of his concept of truth if one asked how and why he still distinguishes his own from Husserl’s position. Heidegger himself does not explicitly address the subject. Here we run up against an, at first purely incidental, peculiarity of Heidegger’s exposition. He develops his own concept of truth in opposition to that of other contemporary theories but only to those Husserl had himself rejected a quarter of a century earlier. What Heidegger arrives at with his own *line of reasoning* is therefore only the position assumed by Husserl. And the decisive step beyond Husserl is not subject to further justification, indeed, is not even presented as his own step.

In what respects Heidegger’s conception differs from that of Husserl can only be extrapolated from the different variations which he presents on the side as equivalent formulations to the former. The first specification runs: the assertion is true when it so indicates or discloses the state of affairs as it is in itself. The ‘so-as’ is here bracketed by Heidegger. Obviously, this ‘so-as’ is essential to the truth-relation since it describes the correspondence of the state of affairs just as it is disclosed by the assertion with precisely this state of affairs ‘as it is in itself’. It is all the more surprising that Heidegger now introduces without justification a formulation in which the ‘so-as’ is missing. He says: ‘The assertion is true, means: it discloses the state of affairs in itself’ (SZ, 218). Nevertheless, this revised formulation is still entirely legitimate, for it still entirely corresponds to Husserl’s conception. For, since the correspondence, when it proves correct, is an identity, one can, when the assertion points

out the state of affairs in the same way as it is itself, also simply say: it captures the state of affairs in itself. The 'so-as' is implied in the 'in itself'. In a third formulation however, Heidegger carries the simplification one step further. He cancels, again without justification, even the 'in itself'. The assertion is true now means quite straightforwardly: it uncovers the state of affairs. In this way he arrives at the thesis: 'The truthfulness (truth) of the assertion must be understood as its disclosedness' (SZ, 218). Only with this shift does Heidegger explicitly distance himself from Husserl and reach his own concept of truth which, from now on, he upholds in this formulation alone. So it is all the more remarkable that he does not elucidate further precisely this small, but yet decisive, step. How is this to be explained?

Initially, the claim that an assertion is true if and only if the intended entity is 'in itself just as it is pointed out or discovered to be in the assertion' did not seem to place any special weight on the word 'discovered'. For in general Heidegger does understand the assertion in terms of pointing out and discovering (cf. *Being and Time*, §33). And what the truth of the assertion brought out seemed not to be the fact that the entity should be uncovered by it but rather how it is uncovered by it, namely, just as it is in itself. In the latter formulation however it becomes clear that precisely this qualification, which appeared to bring out what is essentially at issue, has become dispensable for Heidegger; with the result that the truth consists in the pointing out and the uncovering as such.

In fact, Heidegger's characterization of the assertion as a pointing out and an uncovering makes an essential advance over Husserl's position. The question is only whether this new conception of the assertion also renders redundant any further qualification with regard to the determination of the truth of an assertion. With Husserl, the act of expression is understood statically, as it were, as a mode of intentionality, as the holding before oneself of a specific objectivity, as representation. Just as Heidegger leaps over Husserl's intentionality in general with the concept of 'disclosure', so he also understands assertion dynamically as a mode of disclosure, as an uncovering and specifically as a pointing out (*apophansis*). With the concept of disclosure, Heidegger seeks to thematize the 'clearedness' of human being, a clearedness which is only implicit in Husserl's intentionality and the corresponding concepts of the tradition. Clearedness is not adopted as a ready-made state; rather, the question arises, how it is brought about. Hence, disclosure is to be understood as an occurrence which is actively related to its opposite - closedness or concealment. In the special case of the assertion, it becomes clear that wherever it arises in a concrete connection with life and with science it is not to be understood in a functionless fashion as the rigid positing of an objectivity, but dynamically as a letting be seen in which we point

out something as something, in which we lift it out of concealment, both for ourselves and for others so that, as Heidegger says, it is 'unconcealed'.

And now it is also possible to understand the reason why, with regard to the determination of the truth of the assertion, Heidegger omits the supplement 'as it is itself'. As long as one understands the assertion statically, as a representation or meaning, one is, of course, not entitled to say: an assertion is true if and only if it means the entity in question; for the way in which it means the entity can also be false. One is therefore already obliged to say: it is true if and only if it means the entity as it is itself. If, on the other hand, we understand the assertion as a pointing out and an uncovering, it then seems to be sufficient if we say without further qualification: the assertion is true if it uncovers the entity, for, if it is false, it does not uncover the entity at all but 'covers it up' or 'conceals' it. It therefore already lies in the nature of uncovering as such that it must be true if it really is an uncovering.

Heidegger must certainly have reasoned along these lines when he made the attempt to give grounds for thinking why, for him, the supplement 'as it is itself' was redundant. As soon however as one lays out in clear steps the reflection which surreptitiously lies at the root of Heidegger's thesis, its weak point already manifests itself. It lies in the ambiguity with which Heidegger employs the word 'uncover'.

In the first instance, it stands for pointing out, the ἀποφαίνεσθαι in general. In this sense every assertion uncovers, the false just as well as the true. At the same time however, Heidegger employs the word in a narrow and pregnant sense, in accordance with which the false assertion is not so much an uncovering as a covering over. Here, it goes without saying that truth lies in uncoveredness. But what does uncovering mean when it no longer signifies a pointing out in general? How is ἀληθεύειν to be differentiated from ἀποφαίνεσθαι?

Heidegger gives us no answer to this question because he, in distinction from Aristotle on whom he relies (SZ, 219), does not explicitly distinguish the broad from the narrow meaning of uncovering. Hence, even after he first arrived at the conclusion that truth consists in uncoveredness, he can then still speak of an 'uncoveredness in the mode of the appearing' (SZ, 222). In this way, the thesis about truth as uncovering only becomes enlightening if one maintains that the false assertion does not uncover. Instead of this Heidegger now says that, in the false assertion, the entity is 'in a certain sense already uncovered and still not represented' (SZ, 222). The covering up of the false assertion does not exclude a certain uncovering. But then, in what sense does the false assertion uncover and in what sense does it cover up? Since Heidegger does not qualify more closely either the uncovering of the true assertion

or the covering over of the false, the only way out remains a quantitative determination. In the false assertion, the entity is 'not fully hidden' (SZ, 222). Should we therefore say: in the false assertion the entity is partly uncovered and partly hidden? In that case, the false assertion would be put together in part out of truth and in part out of ignorance. Of course, Heidegger never meant to say this. But then, if one limits oneself to the two concepts un-concealment and concealment, there remains absolutely no possibility of determining the specific sense of falsehood, and therefore also of truth.

The characterization of falsehood as a covering up is undoubtedly a step forward. But this covering up is neither a simple subspecies of that concealment from which the *apophansis* receives its pointing out nor a mixture of just such a concealment with un-concealment. The false assertion does indeed conceal but what and how? One has to say: it covers up the entity as it is itself and indeed in such a way that it uncovers it in another way, namely not in the way in which it is itself. For this reason there is no possibility of distinguishing the uncovering in the narrower sense which makes up the truth of an assertion from uncovering in the broader sense of *apophansis*, save by saying that it uncovers the entity just as it is itself. It is simply not possible to get around the supplement 'as it is itself' in the course of characterizing the true assertion. And the determination 'uncoveredness', which is supposed to make this point of view superfluous, does, for its part, actually have to make use of it, if it is going to be a determination of truth.

Even in the smaller writings which follow upon *Being and Time* however, Heidegger, in his attempt to trace the truth of an assertion back to un-concealment, continually passes over the very respect which is at issue in the question of truth. In 'On the essence of truth' (*Wegmarken*, GA 9), 'On the essence of grounds' (*Wegmarken*, GA 9) and 'On the origin of the work of art' (*Holzwege*, S. 40) the thesis is advanced that, in order that the assertion should be in accord with the entity, the entity in question must show itself, must be uncovered. Thus the truth of the assertion as adequation is grounded in the truth of the entity as un-concealment. That one should call that in the entity which the true assertion is directed toward 'the truth' is meaningful and also corresponds to normal word usage. When, for example, we say: 'we are inquiring into the truth', then clearly we are not asking about the correctness of the assertion. Rather, we are asking how the entity is itself. For Husserl too, the primary sense of truth lay in the truth of the entity. But one simply cannot see that towards which the true assertion is directed as merely consisting in the self-showing, in un-concealment as such. For the false assertion is also directed towards something that shows itself. Even semblance (*Schein*) is an unconcealing.

To be sure, one might object, semblance is not a genuine un-concealment.

But then we only run up again against the same ambiguity that made its appearance in *Being and Time* with the concept of 'uncovering', an ambiguity which Heidegger nowhere clarifies. We then have to say that the true assertion is precisely not directed toward the entity as it manifests itself immediately but toward the entity as it is itself. This difference, within the self-showing, between an immediate and, as it were, obtrusive givenness and the thing itself is never taken into consideration by Heidegger. So although, with his concepts of uncovering and un-concealment, he deepens Husserl's intentionality and givenness, the difference between givenness in general and self-givenness escapes him. Heidegger has quite rightly seen that the distinguishing characteristic of Husserl's concept of truth as well as, in another sense, that of Plato and Aristotle lay in this, that truth must here be understood in a circuit of self-manifestation and givenness. He then went straight on to broaden this givenness in and for itself by inquiring into the condition of its possibility, without noticing that truth, for Husserl as well as for Greek philosophy, in no way resided in givenness as such but in the possibility of a distinctive mode of givenness.

Perhaps Heidegger wanted to say that, in Husserl's talk about self-givenness, there still lurks a surreptitious relation to an absolute being in itself transcending experience. That is nevertheless not the case. Self-givenness, 'evidence', is for Husserl nothing but the – in the final analysis only partial – fulfilment of a significative intention and therefore still remains relative to the latter. The given possesses in itself a depth dimension, the so to speak obtrusively given points beyond itself.

On the other hand, if instead of explaining it as experientially immanent, one avoids the reference to self-givenness altogether, then, in the interests of consistency, one also has to drop the concept of truth. Only in so far as the ambiguity in the talk about uncovering is not made explicit can one be misled about this. If the meaning of unconcealing were exhausted in this, that it lifted the entity out of concealment into the light, then we would have no occasion to talk about truth and untruth. Rather, such talk is called for only because our relation to beings is a specifically mediate one, a relation of such a kind that ordinarily it is not given in itself, though we can nevertheless refer to it and *for this reason* also refer to it as being other than in fact it is. If, as Heidegger has shown, assertion is dynamically directed from concealment to un-concealment then it is, at the same time (if its *telos* is not merely *apophansis* but truth), directed from the subject-matter, as it actually manifests itself, to its self-manifestation. And this second direction is in a certain sense the opposite of the first, in that it is here a question not of bringing the subject-matter to givenness but of validating the givenness with reference to the subject-matter. Only through this second direction does the first acquire a validity, so that the revealing, which would

otherwise be arbitrary, is directed toward the entity as it is itself. If, on the other hand, one lets the revealing get directed in accordance with the givenness of the entity, as it shows itself, then this arbitrariness is immediately sanctioned. Being itself is the critical instance of revealing. Only when this second direction is recognized as self-sufficient can it be fruitfully explained with the help of the first, so that one can now say that the false assertion covers up the entity, namely in its being itself and that the true assertion alone really does reveal the entity, namely, as being itself.

Heidegger's new conception of the assertion as an uncovering and a revealing seems, on the one hand, and if it is suitably completed, entirely accommodated to a deepening of our understanding of the truth of an assertion. The functional-apophantic conception of the assertion is an advance upon the static intentional. In particular, this dynamic conception makes it possible to understand not merely the conclusive true assertion but the assertion along the way to the truth as an unconcealing of the thing itself and, in this sense, as a truth-relation (not as truth). On the other hand, this conception leaves out what is specific to the phenomenon of truth, at least in the form in which Heidegger actually worked it out. To be sure, it is implied even if only ambiguously, but for this very reason not conceptually articulated. The specific sense of truth is, as it were, submerged in the notion of uncovering as *apophansis*. And even the specific sense of untruth is, if not simply left out of account, then at least only subsequently taken into consideration, not only in *Being and Time* but also in 'On the essence of truth', so that its antithesis can no longer be essential to the meaning of truth but is instead taken up with it into the truth – which is of course only logical when truth is entitled *apophansis*. The specific problem of truth is overlooked but not in such a way that it is simply set aside and so still remains open. Rather, in as much as Heidegger holds on to the word truth but then deforms its meaning and this again in such a way that we still catch a glimpse of its true meaning, it is no longer possible to see what has been overlooked here.

What Heidegger accomplishes with his new determination of the truth of an assertion first becomes clear in section (b) of §44 of *Being and Time*. Here Heidegger arrives at an unusual extension of the concept of truth over and beyond the domain of assertion. This takes place in two steps.

In order to understand the first step, it is necessary to bear in mind that, in *Being and Time*, the word 'uncover' stands terminologically for any disclosure of inner worldly beings and so not merely for that disclosive assertion which points out but also for the circumspective disclosure of concern (cf. §18). It is on this point that Heidegger now rests his case. If the truth of the assertion according to section (a) lies

in uncovering, then it follows (or so he reasons), that in fact all letting be encountered of inner worldly beings is 'true' (SZ, 220). One sees that the thesis at which Heidegger had arrived in section (a), a thesis with regard to truth as uncovering which is only insightful in so far as one takes the term in the narrow sense, has actually been understood in the broad sense. Had it not been so understood, he would not have been able to reason in this fashion. Only because, for Heidegger, the truth of an assertion does not lie in the way in which it uncovers but only in that it uncovers is he then able to carry truth over to all disclosure in general without further justification. The question is no longer one of determining whether it is possible to find, in the realm of circumspective concern, a difference corresponding to that between the true and the false assertion. Rather, simply because it uncovers, concern is in general characterized as a mode of truth.

That Heidegger should have extended disclosure beyond intentionality, beyond objective representation, is a significant and decisive step. What has thereby been gained for the problem of truth now has to be considered in detail, whether it be that it has proved worthwhile to draw a distinction between truth and falsehood even in modes of disclosure which lie outside the theoretical realm, or whether it be that, in contrast to other modes of disclosure, those which are truth-related acquire a new emphasis. But it is precisely these questions, questions which it has now become possible to raise as a result of the plane upon which he poses the problem, which are cut off by Heidegger in virtue of his simple equation of disclosure and truth. By comparison with the genuine gain in insight which the concepts of uncovering, disclosure and un-concealment bring with them, their equation with the concept of truth only implies a loss. Not only is what has already been discovered in connection with the truth of assertion left in obscurity again, the new possibilities of broadening the truth-relation which were opened up from the point of view of disclosure, are not made use of. Instead of broadening the specific concept of truth, Heidegger simply gave the word truth another meaning. The broadening of the concept of truth, from the truth of assertion to all modes of disclosing, becomes trivial if one sees the truth of assertion as consisting simply in the fact that it is in general disclosive.

Where this all leads only becomes clear with the second step, which now follows. All uncovering of inner worldly beings is grounded, as was shown earlier (§18), in the disclosure of world. Hence, or so Heidegger is now able to conclude, disclosure of Dasein itself as being-in-the-world, the disclosure of its world (SZ, 220f.), is the 'most original truth'. We are now provided with an answer to our initial question, how Heidegger is able to describe as the 'most original truth' what is for him the most originally given, even though it is not characterized by evidence. This determination follows from Heidegger's peculiar conception of the truth

of assertion. But it also follows therefrom that, just as what Heidegger earlier called truth had nothing to do with the specific phenomenon of truth, so the same applies here too. In fact, this original disclosure or clearing is, for Heidegger, the product of a temporal field which first makes possible any self-manifestation of beings; *any* self-manifestation and not just the specifically true. That Heidegger speaks here of truth is due simply to the fact that he already calls self-manifestation itself truth.

To the above, one might respond with the question: doesn't it all come down to a matter of terminology? Heidegger's question is in any case the more comprehensive. And in as much as it is questionable to what extent one can distinguish between truth and untruth in what pertains to the disclosure of world, to the understanding of our historical horizon of meaning, as well as in the assertion of matters of fact, is it not then legitimate to understand the opening up of a world as the event of truth? No! – and for precisely this reason: because then the question whether and how the disclosure of world can also be related to the issue of truth in its specific sense, would be covered up.

This can no longer be regarded as a special omission but concerns the problem of truth as a whole. If, for instance, any truth-assertion about inner worldly beings is relative to the historical horizon of our understanding, then the entire truth problem is now concentrated upon this horizon and the decisive question now has to be: in what manner can one inquire into the truth of this horizon, or is it not rather the case that the question of truth can no longer be applied to the horizon itself? This question becomes untenable for Heidegger, in as much as he already calls any disclosive understanding a truth in and for itself. On the one hand, this makes it possible for us to still talk of truth in connection with understanding and its horizons. On the other hand however, it becomes pointless to inquire into the truth of this horizon since that would only mean inquiring into the truth of a truth.

To be sure, we find here the same ambiguity as previously with the assertion. But the distinction between ἀποφαίνεσθαι and ἀληθεύειν is in reality so clear that no one would waive the right to inquire into the truth of an assertion simply because he was already prepared to attribute truth to *apophansis* as such. With regard to the meaning horizons of understanding, on the other hand, it would be necessary to first consider in what respects a question of truth was at issue here. In so far as our horizons are continually given in an opaque fashion, the immediately given refers beyond itself even here to the thing itself but obviously, in a manner other than the assertion. We could say: when we inquire into the matter at issue with a pre-given assertion, we are trying to verify it. When, on the other hand, we inquire into the matter at issue with a pre-given meaning, we are trying to clarify it. An untrue assertion is false, whereas an untrue meaning is confused or one-sided. The truth of

an elementary assertion is decidable. It consists in a correctly comprehended 'in itself'. For the clarification of meaning, on the other hand, the in itself of truth, the 'as it is itself' which emerges in the evidence of complete transparency, is only a regulative idea of the process of critical questioning.

These crude indications suffice to show that in the realm in which Heidegger quite rightly grounds all truth, the explanation of what is specific to the truth-relation brought with it new difficulties and the question concerning the truth did in fact prove unsatisfactory in that a plain evidence and certainty, and therefore a positive hold on the truth, becomes unattainable, with the result that the meaning of the truth-relation comes to consist in something negative and critical. Hence the temptation to solve the problem, like the Gordian knot, by simply understanding truth as disclosure itself. Now, in the name of truth, even the challenge of the critique can be resisted, indeed, understood as the result of a subsequent historical restriction which, in its original meaning, was not contained in the truth-relation at all. If truth means un-concealment, in the Heideggerian sense, then it follows that an understanding of world in general is opened up but not that it is put to the test. What must have seemed so liberating about this conception is that, without denying the relativity and the opaqueness of our historical world, it made possible an immediate and positive truth-relation, an explicit truth-relation which no longer made any claim to certainty and so could not be disturbed by uncertainty either.

Therewith however, what is specific to the truth-relation is not only overlooked but is converted into its opposite. In what way this renunciation of the idea of a critical consciousness made itself known and worked itself out in detail can be shown with reference to the later writings, in particular, the paper 'On the essence of truth'. But the interpretation of Heidegger's analysis of the concept of truth in *Being and Time* already made it possible to advance the thesis that Heidegger overlooks the problem of truth precisely because of the way in which he makes the truth into his foundational concept. That he already calls disclosure in and of itself truth leads to the result that it is precisely not related to the truth but is protected from the question of truth.

This result is however not purely negative. It leaves unaffected the essentials of the position through which Heidegger distances himself from Husserl's transcendental position. And the question remains open whether, through his refusal of the critical approach, Heidegger did not give his own view an orientation which was not necessarily contained in it and, to this extent, left other possibilities open. Heidegger's thought is not so homogeneous as it makes itself out to be and we seem today to have gradually achieved that remove from him which permits us,

instead of taking sides for or against, to critically differentiate what does not appear to lead further from what should not be abandoned.

Since Heidegger uses the term truth for what is for him the most originally given – the disclosedness of Dasein (i.e., the clearing of being) but then takes truth in a sense other than the specific one, it becomes all the more pressing to try to place what is most originally given in relation to truth. What is most originally given, 'world' in the sense of the clearing of being is, of course, not the world of the moment, in the sense of whatever is contained within the horizon but rather the open field of play – not in the first instance of beings but of this horizon itself. Correspondingly, disclosure is not taken up in any actual world project. If one now takes account of the specific meaning of truth then certainly one could no longer call disclosure itself, i.e., clearing 'truth'. But one could say that disclosure is essentially directed towards the truth (even though it can also prohibit the question of truth) and that clearing is a field of play whose depth dimension refers to truth and that therefore whoever is preoccupied with the latter is called upon to raise questions concerning the truth and concerning the truth not merely of beings but also of the horizon.

In this way, Heidegger's radicalization of Husserl's transcendental position would be retained. The claim to a self-conscious subjectivity which finds itself in possession of an a-historical, absolute evidence would be discarded, without however giving up Husserl's concept of evidence as the idea of a specific givenness of truth. At the level at which Heidegger poses the problem, evidence does not lose its meaning but has simply to be understood (as in part it is already with Husserl) as a regulative idea, and the same naturally also holds of truth. The immediacy of the hold on evidence would be overcome but, instead of making way for a new but now pre-critical immediacy of truth, the critical consciousness would be retained, though held in that suspense which belongs to its essence. Precisely with regard to Heidegger's meta-transcendental position, for which the most originally given is neither substance nor subject but an open field of play, the critical consciousness would have been able to locate its own non-representative suspense. Here, when transcendental philosophy not merely takes in a historical dimension but where it opens itself up to it and gives up the idea of anchoring itself upon a last ground, it became possible to radicalize and to build up anew the idea of a critical consciousness. But, by the same token, it also became possible to give it up in preference for a new immediacy. In fact, the open field of play could not be held in suspense because, without the depth dimension of truth it was only thought as immediate, whether the immediacy in question was that of the project or of the destiny of un-concealment. And the step from the uncanniness of *Being and Time* to the belonging of the *Letter on Humanism* is only a small one because, what is for the

truth question the constitutive moment of reflection, is left out from the very outset. For this reason, Heidegger had to develop his position as an overcoming of the modern philosophy of reflection even though it could just as well have become the radicalization of the latter. Heidegger tied the philosophy of subjectivity down to the dogmatism of self-certainty. But it would be more correct to say that, with the idea of certainty, if only it remains a regulative idea, modern philosophy has radicalized the Socratic challenge of a critical justification and that means the challenge of a theoretical responsibility. In this way, there arose the task of developing the concept of truth in its full scope, a scope which had already been indicated with disclosiveness, but without giving up the regulative idea of certainty and the postulate of a critical foundation.

Translated by Christopher Macann

Heidegger on logic

J. N. Mohanty

Why should one write on Heidegger's understanding of logic? After all, Heidegger was not a logician, nor did he do philosophy of logic. Indeed, there is no justification for expecting of any great philosopher whatsoever that he should have views, and reasonably plausible views, about the nature of logic or on specific themes belonging to the domain of logic. A moral philosopher may totally bypass any concern with logic, without detriment to his thinking. As an existentialist philosopher, Heidegger could have done that, and much of his *Dasein*-analytic would yet have retained its value. But Heidegger was also an ontologist, and was deeply concerned, all his philosophical career, with metaphysics and with the various questions about the nature of thought and of being. These concerns, to say the least, bring him to the proximity of logic as it had been understood in the tradition going back to Aristotle. And, as a matter of fact, Heidegger's own access to the problems of ontology and metaphysics has been determined by his reflection on logic. Two claims may therefore be advanced. First, it is not unreasonable, and what is more important, not unfair to Heidegger, to enquire into his understanding of logic. Secondly, his reflections on logic may help us to gain a better understanding of his overall philosophical interests than would be possible otherwise. Even if he was not a logician he was concerned with the nature of logic, and with some central problems belonging to the domain of logic. This concern begins with his doctoral work on the problem of psychologism in theory of judgment,¹ continues in the habilitation work on the semantic categories in Duns Scotus,² and reaches its maturity in the Marburg lectures of 1925–8.³

In this essay, I will deal with three topics. In the first section, I will try to determine how Heidegger understood the nature of logic. In the second section, I will consider the one problem of logic to which he devoted a great deal of attention: the theory of judgment. In the third

section, I will look into how his concern with logic opens up for him several paths to go beyond logic. At the end, I will reflect on this entire account, not so much to find faults with Heidegger's understanding of logic, as to determine its precise nature and limitations.

1 Nature of logic

A A preliminary definition

One commonly held view of the nature of logic, in the traditional accounts, is that logic is a normative science of thought, whose aim is to lay down those *rules* which one *ought* to follow if one aims at truth. This account may be faulted on various grounds. First of all, 'thought' is ambiguous, referring both to the process of thinking and the content of thinking. Of these two, the former belongs to the field of psychology. If the content of thinking is understood in the sense of objective meanings or structures of meaning, propositions or configurations of them, then only logic may be said to be concerned with them. Why then is logic to be still regarded as a normative science? Of course, once there is a logical law to the effect 'If p implies q , and p , then q ' (where p and q are propositional variables), then it does follow that if a person believes in a proposition 'A implies B' and also believes that A (where 'A' and 'B' are names of propositions), then he also ought to believe that B. But such a normative demand on the person's rationality is no part of the business of logic. Finally, the term 'truth' is ambiguous, referring both to material truth (the sense in which the statement 'it is raining now in Norman' is true if and only if it in fact is raining in Norman) and formal truth or validity (the sense in which the inference 'All men are immortal, all Greeks are men, therefore, all Greeks are immortal' is valid, being a substitution instance of a logical law, even if one of its premises as well as its conclusion are materially false). It may appear as though logic is concerned with validity, rather than with truth understood, as it usually is, in the first of the two senses. If we accept these three emendations, then we can transform the initial account of logic into some such as this: logic is a science of meaning-structures in so far as they are valid. On this account, the task of logic is to lay down the laws of validity of meaning-structures.

Heidegger, under the influence of Husserl's idea of a pure logic of meaning, concludes his dissertation with a formulation of the task of logic that is very much like the one we have just arrived at. The logician, he concludes, must aim at bringing out the precise meanings of sentences and then proceed to determine the forms of judgments according to objective differences of meanings and their simple or compound structures, and bring such forms into a system.⁴ Although the notion of

validity does not figure in this account, the way forms of simple meanings and compound meanings can be brought into a system must be by showing the relations of implication amongst them, and the laws of their implication should be able to yield laws of validity of meaning-structures. But Heidegger has no doubt, in those early works, that the proper logical object is neither the mental process of thinking nor the reality (whether physical or metaphysical) about which one thinks, but the *Sinn*, understood both as the meaning of a sentence and as the identical content of judgment.

B Critique of psychologism

Such a preliminary account of logic already implies a rejection of psychologism. Heidegger is aware of Frege's rejection of psychologism, but it is Husserl who, he writes, 'has systematically and comprehensively laid bare the essence, the relativistic consequences and the theoretical disadvantages of psychologism'.⁵ Basic to the overcoming of psychologism is the distinction between psychic act and its logical content, the latter alone being the 'in itself subsisting sense' ('in sich Bestand habende Sinn'). But can psychologism, which seeks to ground logic in psychology, be logically refuted? Perhaps not, Heidegger concedes in his dissertation, but that does not matter a great deal, he answers us: 'the actual . . . (also the non-actual) cannot as such be proved [*bewiesen*], but in any case can only be shown [*aufgewiesen*].'⁶ While psychologism, according to Heidegger, as it is for Husserl, must be rejected, one needs nevertheless (i) to be clear about the real point of Husserl's critique of psychologism, and (ii) to decide where one should go after the error of psychologism has been discarded. For purposes of (ii), it is necessary (iii) to think about what is to be understood by 'Sinn', a concept which up until now has been used to define the domain of logic.

Part of Husserl's critique of psychologism in the *Prolegomena* relies upon a distinction between two modes of being, the real and the ideal. Thinking as a mental process is *real* being; the logical content of thinking has an ideal being. Psychologism confuses the two. The confusion does not lie in mistaking one given thing (the ideal content) for another given thing (the real mental process). It is rather based on the fact that the philosophers concerned were blind to, and prejudiced against, certain modes of being. So far Husserl's point was well taken. But Husserl's concept of 'ideal being' is far from being univocal. In fact, Husserl appears to have brought under this concept things that are very different from each other, such as universals, essences that are not universals, truths as well as the idea of truth. We shall look into some of these equivocations a little later. For the present, what is important in Husserl's critique, according to Heidegger, is not that ontological distinction which, however provisionally useful, could not be the final truth, but rather the

implied critique of a naturalistic psychology. Hans Sluga has recently shown that when Frege rejected psychologism, he was, in fact fighting against a more comprehensive philosophical naturalism of which psychologism was a consequence.⁷ This reading is corroborated by Heidegger's understanding of Husserl's anti-psychologistic critique.

For Heidegger, it is a misunderstanding of Husserl's deeper intentions to read him as though he was improving upon Bolzano's platonism,⁸ or even as though his critique was rooted in Lotze's *Geltungs-* and value-logic. These 'platonistic' readings of the *Prolegomena* have led to the standard complaint that in the second volume of the *Logical Investigations* Husserl relapsed into psychologism. If we are to make room for the charitable interpretation that Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, even the *Ideas*, constitute a progressive unfolding of the thoughts that were already anticipated in the early works, we have to say with Heidegger that Husserl rejected psychologism because it applied to logical theory a psychology which was not only poor as a psychology of the experience of thinking, but which was confused regarding its very project, which, in other words, did not understand its theme, i.e., the logical. The critique of psychologism therefore is a critique of psychology, and an implied plea for an intentional, descriptive, and eidetic psychology to replace the prevailing naturalistic psychology.⁹ Such a reading of Husserl's intention makes it possible for Heidegger to go beyond the provisional distinction between the real and the ideal, and to ask how the logical contents or *Sinne* are related to the acts of thinking, and eventually to the thinking being that man is.

It is well known that Lotze's ideas of *Geltung* or validity as the mode of being of propositions and truths influenced, in different measures, both Frege and Husserl. In his logic lectures of the twenties, Heidegger concerns himself at some length with Lotze. It is interesting to note that his assessment of Lotze underwent considerable change along the years. In 1912, Heidegger writes that Lotze's logic should be regarded as the basic book of modern logic.¹⁰ In the Marburg lectures of 1925/6 we find him, in the course of a critical examination of Husserl's notion of 'ideal being', tracing Husserl's equivocations to the confusions that characterized Lotze's concept of *Geltung*.¹¹ I will return to Lotze's concept of *Geltung* when we turn to the theory of truth. For the present it should suffice to note that amongst the entities whose mode of being is characterized by *Geltung*, Lotze includes: propositional contents or sentential meanings (= Frege's Thoughts), truths, the mode of being of a truth and the Essence of Truth. *Geltung* also means: *objective* validity (being true of objects) as well as universality with respect to all knowers. No wonder, then, that Heidegger severely criticizes those who find in this term 'a magic band' capable of solving all problems.¹²

Heidegger was no more enthusiastic about Bolzano, the other major

influence on Husserl. He cautions against regarding Husserl's *Logical Investigations* as nothing but attempts to improve upon Bolzano. It is, for him, more true to say that both Bolzano and Husserl were influenced by Leibniz. In any case, anti-psychologism does not lead Heidegger to the opposite camp of platonism. The goal is to be able to avoid platonism, without relapsing into psychologism.

C Remarks on mathematical logic

For one who was so deeply concerned with traditional logic as Heidegger, the rise of mathematical logic could not but be a challenge. We know that Heidegger was enthusiastic about Frege's papers on concept and object, and on sense and reference.¹³ Of these he wrote: 'G. Frege's logisch-mathematische Forschungen sind meines Erachtens in ihrer wahren Bedeutung noch nicht gewürdigt, geschweige denn ausgeschöpft. Was er in seinen Arbeiten . . . niedergelegt hat, darf keine Philosophie der Mathematik übersehen; es ist aber auch im gleichen Maße wertvoll für eine allgemeine Theorie des Begriffs.'¹⁴ But the appreciation of Frege did not carry over into an appreciation of mathematical logic. In the same paper of 1912, he argues that logistic – as mathematical logic was alternately called – does not liberate itself from mathematics and so is not able to penetrate into the proper problems of logic. Its chief limitations derive, in Heidegger's view, from an application of mathematical symbols and concepts (above all, of the concept of function) to logic – as a result of which the deeper significance of the logical principles remains in the dark. As a calculus of propositions, it is unaware of the problems of the theory of judgment. Furthermore, the conditions of the possibility of mathematics, as well as of mathematical logic, lie in a domain which those two disciplines cannot reach.¹⁵ In the Dissertation, a new objection is raised against mathematical logic: it is formal, and so is unable to deal with 'the living problems of judgmental-meaning, its structure and its cognitive significance'.¹⁶ Similar complaints surface in later writings as well. In *Sein und Zeit*, logistic is said to 'dissolve' judgment into a system of 'Zuordnungen'; judgment becomes an object of 'calculation', and so cannot be the theme for ontological interpretation.¹⁷ Since judgment has always a relatedness to objects and a claim to be objectively valid, logistic cannot reach the essence of judgment.

Of what worth are these remarks? There is no doubt that Heidegger's acquaintance with the logic that Frege laid the foundation of, and that by the time Heidegger was writing his dissertation had found its epoch-making systematization in Russell and Whitehead's *Principia*, was superficial and casual. Nevertheless, there may be some substance in his remarks.

That mathematical logic may well be so much of mathematics that it therefore becomes poorer as logic, is already implicit in Frege's criticism

of Boole and Schröder. The point of that criticism is that Boole and Schröder used mathematical concepts ('sum', 'product', for example) and often mathematical signs to develop their logics, which is unjustified inasmuch as logic, being more fundamental, cannot and should not borrow its concepts from any other discipline.¹⁸ Consequently, instead of reducing logic to mathematics, Frege reduced arithmetic to logic. He sought to make a fragment of mathematics logical, rather than make logic mathematical. It is true that Frege used at least two important notions in his logic which might be regarded as having been borrowed from mathematics. In fact, however, that is not so. Although the ideas of quantification and function are seemingly mathematical, they are not in reality. The mathematical notion of function Frege found confused and unhelpful. The logical notion that he introduced is that of any entity that is 'unsaturated', i.e., has empty places within its structure. Thus a concept is a function inasmuch as its true form, on Frege's theory, is (for example) '____ is wise', and this is an incomplete entity. The same may be said of the quantifiers; they are, for Frege, properly logical notions, and not mathematical ones. Thus we must recognize that Heidegger's anxiety is genuine, but, as against the original Fregean logic, unfounded.

Heidegger's next complaint is that mathematical logic being a calculus of propositions, cannot raise the problems of judgment as discussed in traditional logic and metaphysics. What are these latter problems? As far as I can see, these problems are: (a) the nature of assertion/denial; (b) the nature of the copula and the predication; and (c) the problem of truth. Limiting our view for the present only to Frege (and the logic of the *Principia Mathematica*, which is basically Fregean), we may say that Heidegger's critique is not justified if it means that Frege and the *Principia Mathematica* did not know of these problems. The only substance of the critique may be that the solutions offered by these new logicians were hardly satisfactory. Consistently with his critique of psychologism, Frege distinguished between assertion and the thought (or, in the *Begriffsschrift*, the judgable content, *beurteilbare Inhalt*) that is asserted. Thinking is grasping of the thought; judging is recognition of the truth value of the thought so grasped; and asserting is expressing that recognition. There is no doubt that the concept of assertion as a psychological (and linguistic) act and its relation (as well as that of grasping) to the thought (which on Frege's theory has an objective being) remains, in that theory, a 'mystery' – no less difficult to clarify than the role Frege assigned to 'assertion' in his logic, despite his anti-psychologism. These difficulties show that Frege's solution to the problem of assertion was not satisfactory, but there is also no doubt that he did concern himself with this aspect of the problem of judgment. As regards the problem of predication, which has been one of the central concerns of traditional logic and philosophy of logic, Frege's answer would run

somewhat along the following lines: the problem of predication concerns the internal structure of the thought being asserted, and has nothing to do with judgment. Judging is recognizing the truth value of a total thought; the thought, or the judged content, contains a predicative structure, but even with regard to it one should note that what is the concept (or predicate) depends upon how one analyzes the thought and there is no one way of doing that. What about the copula? The copula as the connecting link between the subject and the predicate is no longer needed, for in 'Socrates is wise', the predicate is '_____ is wise' and not 'wise'. This new way of analyzing a proposition better explains its unity than the copula does, for if the subject and the predicate were to be linked by a copula one may want to know what links the copula to both the terms, whereas on Frege's theory a thought consists of an 'unsaturated' part (with a hole, as it were) and a 'saturated' part (which just fits into that hole), each made for the other, and so not in need of a link.

What then is the point of Heidegger's remark that in mathematical logic, judgment is reduced to a system of *Zuordnungen* and not made a theme of ontological interpretation? If he means that modern logic looks upon a proposition as an unanalyzable primitive, then he is wrong. First-order propositional logic does so, but predicate logic precisely analyzes the proposition into its constituents. If he means a proposition is, for modern logic, a mere connection of concepts (or representations), then also he is wrong, for as Frege taught, a thought consists of a concept (or a function) and an object. Further, the concept, for Frege, is not a subjective representation, but an objective entity. What then is the 'ontological interpretation'? It may mean either of four things: (i) interpretation of the fact that a judgment is about something, i.e., about a being; (ii) interpretation of the fact that a judgment is either true or false; (iii) interpretation of the mode of being of the judged content or proposition; and, finally, (iv) an answer to the question *how* something like a judgment is at all possible.

Of these four questions, Fregean logic has an account of (i) in terms of the object constituent of the referent of a thought; and an account of (iii) inasmuch as a sentence which expresses a thought also names a truth-value. Logicians such as Frege and Quine, to take two extreme examples, have ontologized about propositions or thoughts. The spectre of platonism has loomed large before them. It is not clear what is being asked by (iv). In any case, Heidegger's concern goes deeper than these answers. They are not radical enough both in their questioning and in their answers. With regard to (i), the Fregean answer does not succeed in locating the intentionality or object-relatedness of judgment in the more general structure of intentionality, and gets by only with locating an object constituent. As far as (iii) is concerned, considering a sentence

as a name of truth-value, in spite of the elegance it succeeds in bringing about in the semantics of first order propositional logic, does not question whether a sentence is after all a name,¹⁹ and it demands an unquestioning acceptance of the very obscure ontology of the true and the false. It also does not, and indeed cannot, raise the deep question, Why is it that a judgment alone is capable of being either true or false? Taken together with a deep understanding of the question (iv), all these foregoing issues constitute what Heidegger calls 'philosophical logic'.

D '*Philosophical logic*'

In his Marburg lectures, Heidegger develops the notion of a philosophical logic as contrasted with the traditional 'school' logic. The latter had its philosophical basis, no doubt, but now is 'der veräusserlichte entwurzelte und dabei verhärtete Gehalt' of an original philosophical question. Philosophical logic has been developing through the centuries – its high points are reached in Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel. Amongst his contemporaries, Heidegger appears to have rated Lask most; he is the one who consciously strives toward a philosophical understanding of logic and sought to extend the domain of philosophical logic.²⁰ Husserl, in spite of the possibilities that phenomenology contained for a philosophical development of logic, did not succeed, in Heidegger's view, in conceiving logic philosophically: 'he even intensified the tendency to develop logic into a separate science, as a formal discipline detached from philosophy.' Nor did any other amongst the phenomenologists succeed. Pfänder's *Logik* – widely regarded then as *the* phenomenological textbook on the subject – is dismissed as 'eine phänomenologisch gesäuberte traditionelle Logik'.²¹ Without pausing to evaluate these judgments on other philosophers (including those on Kant²² and Hegel,²³ Bolzano²⁴ and Lotze), I will proceed to determine the tasks and the problems which Heidegger assigns to philosophical logic.

First of all, philosophical logic, as Heidegger conceives of it, is not a new discipline²⁵ but rather actualizes a *telos* which has characterized historical logic since its inception. The idea of philosophical logic, Heidegger claims, will first render the history of logic meaningful.²⁶ Philosophical logic, one may contend, can be brought about first by determining what philosophy is, and then by applying philosophy to logic. But where and how do we find the idea of philosophy to begin with? Heidegger prefers to follow another route. Let us begin with traditional logic (Aristotle or Leibniz, for example) and develop the central problems in it in such a manner that they will lead us into philosophy. We have no doubt a certain historical understanding of philosophy. With that much in our mind, we can question logic for its philosophical potentialities.

What are the problems that lead us from within traditional logic towards philosophy? These are:

1. Judgment, with which logic has ever been concerned, is characterized by intentionality; it is about an object, an entity. How to understand this intentional structure?²⁷
2. What is the relation between the 'being' of the copula and the 'being' of ontology? How much ontological weight can we assign to the copula?²⁸
3. What is predication and what role does it play in judgment?²⁹
4. What is 'meaning', and what is its relevance for the possibility of judgment?³⁰
5. What is the structure of judgment such that both the possibilities – of truth as well as of falsity – belong to it?³¹
6. How is truth related to judgment? Is it a property of judgment?³²
7. Why is it that traditional logic has had two concepts of truth: propositional truth, and truth as self-evidence? How are these two concepts related? Are these legitimate concepts? What is their common presupposition, if there is any?³³
8. There is a theoretical truth, as well as practical truth. Which one of these is the primary sense of 'truth'?³⁴
9. How is human thinking related to human existence?³⁵
10. What is the metaphysical foundation of logic?³⁶

To some of these questions we turn in the next parts of this essay.

2 Theory of judgment

A Rejection of psychologistic theories of judgment

In his *Dissertation*, Heidegger considers, in considerable detail, four theories of judgment – those of Wundt, Maier, Lipps, and Brentano. Each of these theories is examined with regard to the general definition of judgment it gives; that definition is then tested by how it works in the cases of negative, impersonal, hypothetical, and existential judgments.

Of these four theories, Wundt's theory is concerned with the origin of judgment, Maier's with how a judgment consists of constituent act parts or *Teilakten*, and Lipps' with the completion of the process of judging. Brentano's comes closest to a purely logical theory, but still falls short of it.

(a) Wundt defines judgment as the analysis of a total representation (or thought) into its components. Judgment does not put together concepts, but rather analyzes a thought into concepts. Of the latter concepts, the variable component is called the predicate, the relatively constant one is the subject.³⁷ Heidegger shows that Wundt's theory has no satisfactory account of impersonal judgments (such as 'It rains'), existential judgments (the predicate 'existence' is not given in the total representation that is

analyzed), hypothetical judgments (a ground-consequent relation cannot be extracted by analysis) and of negative judgments (Wundt does not in any case regard negation to be of special logical significance).³⁸

(b) Maier rejects two common elements of the traditional theories of judgment: (i) the primacy accorded to the declarative sentence (*Aussagesatz*) as a grammatical entity (which, according to Maier, leads to the subject-predicate analysis that takes place under the misleading guidance of grammar), and (ii) the belief that 'true' and 'false' cannot be predicated of representations (*Vorstellungen*) themselves, but only of connections of representations. As against these, and in agreement with Brentano, Maier argues that judgment in its most basic form, is not a connection of representations. In 'The sun shines', the subject 'The sun' is already a judgment. I assert the sun to be actual on the basis of perception. Even in 'This is sun', the 'This' is a judgment, a simple 'naming-judgment'.³⁹

Judgments consist, according to Maier, of acts of presentation, which are then transformed into logical judgments by supervenient acts of objectification. An objectifying act is a positing of actuality, it is a sort of interpretive act. Besides these, there are two other component acts: an identification of the presently apprehended presentation with a reproduced one, and a *Wahrheitsbewusstsein*, which extends over all the three component acts.

Obviously such an account is a psychological, genetic account. The elementary partial acts are generally, according to Maier, involuntary processes.⁴⁰ Against it, Heidegger asks: Is the primitive judgment of Maier the same as an elementary judgment in the sense of logic? Above all, Maier is concerned with the *act* of judging, not with the content of judging, the judgment as such. Logic has nothing to do with the processes, be they what they may, that might be 'culminating' in the logical judgment. The logical judgment is not the completed final-state of the act; it is rather the objective content.

(c) Brentano, in common with Wundt and Maier, rejects the theory that judgment is a connection of representations. It would not do to say that the content of a judgment is complex, while the content of a representation is simple. The content of a judgment may be as simple as in 'A is' (where one is not connecting 'A' with 'existence'); the content of a representation may be complex (as in the case of a question). This implies that, for Brentano, predication is not an essential component of judgment. What distinguishes a judgment from a mere representation is the presence of either recognition or rejection as a new manner of relatedness of consciousness to its object. Consequently, every judgment is existential, its object is being affirmed as existent or as nonexistent. Thus 'Some one person is sick' translates, for Brentano, into 'A sick man exists' and 'No stone is living' into 'a living stone does not exist'.

Heidegger's criticisms of Brentano consist in showing in what sense Brentano's theory of judgment is psychologistic. Judgment is, for Brentano, a class of psychic phenomena. The *content* of judgment, that which is recognized or rejected, is of no interest to him. Thus while the distinction between the act and its content could have helped him to overcome psychologism, Brentano's interest remains with the psychic phenomena and he does not succeed in isolating anything specifically logical. It is true that his psychology being 'eidetic', Brentano does not deny the universal validity of knowledge. But, as Heidegger insists, it is not a definition of psychologism to say that it denies the universal validity of knowledge.⁴¹ The latter is at most a consequence of psychologism. What is important is that Brentano wants to ground logic in psychologism. The act of recognition as such is not of interest to logic. The recognition must be justified. And the justification must lie in what is recognized. When one judges $a > b$ (if $a = 5$ and $b = 3$), what is recognized is not the relation 'greater than', but that the relation 'holds good', its *Gelten*. This *Gelten*, 'holding good', subsists independently of anyone's recognition.⁴²

(d) Since Lipps' thinking underwent several major changes, he may be said to have held three different accounts of judgment. At first, he defines judgment as the consciousness of actuality (*Wirklichkeitsbewusstsein*), this consciousness being identified with a feeling of constraint (*Zwangsgefühl*). Next, he came to define judgment as consciousness of truth (*Wahrheitsbewusstsein*), where this consciousness is described as being constrained, in one's representation, by the represented objects (*im Vorstellen durch die vorgestellten Objekte genötigt zu sein*).⁴³ Finally, judgment comes to be defined as consciousness of an object (*Gegenstandsbewusstsein*), where 'object' is distinguished from 'content' in that a content is sensed or represented, while an object is thought or meant and *demand*s recognition. This demand or *Förderung* is a logical concept, as distinguished from the constraint or *Nötigung* (of the first two definitions) which is a psychological concept.

In Heidegger's view, Lipps' theory even in its final form remains psychological. Judgment is still an act, 'my' response to the experience of *Förderung*. The 'feeling of necessity' even in the alleged logical sense should be kept out of logic.

The dissertation concludes with certain general remarks which point to further reflections. First of all, psychologism cannot perhaps be logically refuted. One can at most exhibit the peculiar nature of logical entities. If a logical entity is a *Sinn*, a *thought* (as distinguished from the act of thinking), then the essence of this entity is to be found not in a *Vorstellung*, but rather in the fact that it *alone* can be *either* true or false. It is to this last theme that much of the Marburg lectures of the late twenties are devoted.

Of the other conclusions Heidegger arrives at, some are more viable than others. I have already referred to his insistence that even if the logical entity has to be sharply distinguished from the mental process, the two must be set in some satisfactory relation. This, I think, is important. Both Husserl and Heidegger recognize this need, but pursue it along different paths.

Besides these two general conclusions which suggest further enquiry, Heidegger also proceeds to establish some specific conclusions. He, in a way, reestablishes the subject, predicate and copula analysis, as against its critiques by Wundt, Maier, Lipps, and Brentano. A judgment such as 'a is equal to b' has to be construed as having 'a' and 'b' as subjects and 'being equal' as predicate (as against the grammatical analysis which suggests 'a' as the subject and 'is equal to b' as predicate). If the two-membered analysis holds good, then the copula is needed as a third component; it is just the relation between the two.⁴⁴ The copula, Heidegger admits, signifies not real existence, but mere validity (*Gelten*). It is in fact characterized as 'something eminently logical', the most essential and proper element in a judgment.⁴⁵

Logically more interesting is the next claim that the judgment relation has a certain irreversibility, a directionality, a *Richtungssinn*. Even in 'a = b', equality holds good of 'a' and 'b' (and not that 'a' and 'b' of equality). By this, Heidegger rules out the possibility of different analyses of the same proposition.

As to negative judgments, he expresses dissatisfaction with the view that negative judgments are to be understood as judgments with negative predicates and refuses to regard a negative copula as an *Unsinn*.⁴⁶ In fact, negation, he adds, belongs originally to the copula,⁴⁷ and the two judgments, affirmative and negative, should be logically placed side by side.⁴⁸

What about the impersonal judgment 'It rains'. The judgment, Heidegger insists, is not a naming judgment. It rather says, something *happens*, *takes place*, suddenly breaks in. The judgment, then, must be translated to 'Raining is actual', 'Of the raining, actuality holds good'. He adds that this translation is unable to capture what we mean. The true meaning rather is something like this: 'Of the raining, it holds good to take place now, the momentary existing.'⁴⁹

These are topics which have little influence on his subsequent concerns. So let me turn to his really continuing concern.

B Judgment as the locus of truth and falsity

(a) Preliminary determination. If judgment is not a representation or a connection of representations, if its logical essence does not lie in its being a mental act, then we have to look for its essence elsewhere. It is generally agreed upon that judgments alone can be true or false. Perhaps

it is here that we may be able to discern a clue to the nature of judgment, as also of logic. For logic alone deals with truth in general; the other sciences deal with truths.⁵⁰ And logic thinks about 'truth' only in connection with assertive sentences. Heidegger looks for some determination of the nature of such sentences, or of their meanings or propositions, which would account for *both* the possibility of being true *and* the possibility of being false.⁵¹ Contrast Heidegger's problem with Frege's. Frege's problem was such that he could solve it simply by positing two objects which assertive sentences could *name*: i.e., the True and the False. This strategy works for the limited purpose of providing a semantic interpretation of propositional logic, but it leaves the main issue untouched. Are sentences in fact names at all? If they are not,⁵² then what sort of structure must they (or their *senses*) have in order to be true *or* false?

The structure that Heidegger identifies is opposition: putting-together (*Zusammensetzen*) and separating (*Auseinandernehmen*). The former is the condition of the possibility of truth and the latter, the condition of the possibility of falsity. But this is only an initial answer, and not quite correct. Not all affirmative sentences – in which elements are put together – are true, just as not all negative sentences – in which elements are separated – are false. The structure that is to be the condition of the possibility of both truth and falsity should consist in both putting-together and separation, in both at once.⁵³ What we need is a structure that is not merely a thinking together of the two surface structures of synthesis and separation, but which, being a unitary structure, precedes both.⁵⁴ We cannot think of this structure – or even of putting-together and separation – as a purely linguistic structure of the sentence. In the false judgment 'The board is not black', the *words* are not more separated than in the true judgment 'The board is black'. Where then are we to look for this structure?

(b) 'Copula'. Perhaps it is in the 'is' of the copula. We have seen that Heidegger does not go all the way with many of his contemporary logicians of different persuasions in rejecting the copula from theory of judgment. On the other hand, the precise sense of the 'is' of the copula – as distinguished from the 'is' of assertion – deeply interests him. In fact, as late as *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger writes that the ontological significance of the copula has been lost to modern logic.⁵⁵ Logic since Aristotle has understood the copula as the sign for a combination of *ideas*, a combination that does not occur among things, but only in thinking. But at the same time, the 'is' of the copula also signifies existence, essence (whatness), and truth or validity, in different contexts. (This ambiguity, we are assured,⁵⁶ is not a defect, but rather an expression of the intrinsically manifold structure of the being of an entity. This is a suggestion we need not try to understand for our present

purpose.) What we need to focus upon is: what unitary structure of synthesis-cum-separation is to be discerned by reflecting upon the nature of the copula?

I do not think Heidegger's logic lectures lead to any definitive answer to this question. But taking up hints from his writings, the following points may be singled out:

(i) In 'S is P', what is asserted is not bare identity, which would make it a tautology; nor is, for that matter, P different from S, which would have rendered the proposition necessarily false. There is thus a relation of identity-cum-difference.⁵⁷

(ii) But what sort of things are S and P? They are not *Vorstellungen*, that was the point of the critique of psychologism. They are not words for obvious reasons. Are they Fregean senses or are they things? (Frege admitted both possibilities, but kept them apart. The sentence 'S is P' expresses a thought that is composed of the senses of 'S' and 'is P'; but the sentence also has a reference that is composed of the referents of the component terms.) I think Heidegger's answer to this is much more complicated, and, if intelligible, profound.⁵⁸ *Logos*, in its totality, is a complex structure of words, meanings, the referent (what is thought) and what *is*. It is only when one separates them, that one seeks to tie them together by such relations as that of a sign to the signified. Verbal sound is not a sign for a meaning. Nor is the meaning a pointer to what is thought or to what is. There is an identity between these components,⁵⁹ an identity which yet shows the differences.

(iii) This last mentioned relational structure may be described as a structure of identity-cum-difference between thinking and being (where 'thinking' includes speaking, meaning and the meant, and 'being' includes being-as-referred, i.e., object and being as it is in itself). In judgment, thinking and being enter into a relationship. This makes it unacceptable to construe a judgment simply as a mental act directed towards a thought-content. Such a construal would set thought (as a timeless, abstract entity) apart from the world, and the act of thinking and expressing (as real, temporal events) from that thought. Thinking is not, as Frege would have it, grasping a thought, but thinking *about* a real being. I think one of the deep concerns Heidegger expresses in the Logic lectures is, how to articulate this *aboutness*, or intentionality of judgment.

With these three points (i)–(iii), we have already gotten some glimpse into the structure of judgment as involving both synthesis (identity, totality, involvement) and separation (difference, distinction). Traditional logic has not seen this interinvolvement of identity and difference, of thought and being, and on the basis of their absolute distinction, distinguishes between verbal and real propositions (Mill) or analytic and synthetic propositions (Kant). This latter sort of distinction has been questioned by many logicians in more recent times: by Quine, because no

satisfactory criterion of synonymy is forthcoming, and by F. H. Bradley, earlier than Quine, because every judgment, in so far as it analyzes the totality of immediate experience, is analytic, and, in so far as it seeks to join together what analysis has torn asunder, is synthetic. Heidegger's reason is different from both. The distinction between 'the view of beings that makes itself manifest in common meaning and understanding, as it is already laid down in every language', and 'the explicit apprehension and investigation of beings, whether in practice or in scientific enquiry' can hardly be maintained; one passes over into the other. In fact, the so-called verbal propositions, Heidegger insists, are but 'abbreviations of real propositions'.⁶⁰

We still have to understand, how it is possible for a judgment to be about an entity. For Frege, it is so because the component name names an object (and the predicate refers to a concept under which that object falls). Heidegger's question is, how is that possible? Is he asking about the possibility of judgmental intentionality? To that, and some other related questions, we shall turn in the following part.

3 Grounding of logic

(a) Possible Moves. There are various ways philosophers and logicians have sought to provide a 'grounding' or foundation for logic. Starting with a logic, the most common move on the part of logicians, is to axiomatize it. This procedure will yield an axiomatic foundation. This is the most you can expect a logician qua logician to do. But in doing so, he is still doing logic, perfecting his logic, not 'grounding' it in a sense in which philosophers have understood that task. Another move is to provide a logic with an ontological interpretation. In this case one starts with an uninterpreted system, and then assigns to symbols of appropriate types suitable entities belonging to appropriate types: such objects as singular entities and concepts, individual concepts, and propositions. One may thus admit various sorts of entities into one's ontology, or if one distrusts abstract entities, then he can use the semantics of possible worlds.

A more radical, and strictly philosophical grounding is called for when one asks about 'the conditions of the possibility' of logic. How are logical entities such as judgments possible? How is it that formal logic is able to legislate the formal structure of any object whatsoever? Or, what are the conditions of the possibility of the objective validity and not merely formal validity of logic?

Faced with such questions, one may follow one of three possible paths. One may look for the transcendental foundation of logic in the structure of (human) consciousness; one may look for it in the structure of the

world; or, finally, one may want to ground logic in man's intentional relationship with his world. The first is the path of Kant and Husserl, however different their conceptions of transcendental subjectivity, transcendental logic, and formal logic may be; the second is the path of platonistic metaphysics. Heidegger's path is the last one.

(b) Logic and Intentionality. In his habilitation work, Heidegger characterizes the nature of the logical thus: 'The homogeneity of the domain of logic rests on intentionality, on the character of being-valid-of [*Hingeltungscharakter*].' Also: 'Intentionality is the "regional category" of the logical domain.' He proceeds to explicate 'intentionality' thus: There can be intentionality only in the case of what has meaning and significance, not in the case of what is just real.⁶¹

It would appear, then, that we can get at the roots of logic by following the guiding threads of this logical intentionality. This is what Husserl does in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. But intentionality, for Heidegger, is not self-explanatory. It needs a 'metaphysical' grounding, for which Heidegger argues throughout his writings. An intentional grounding of logic will show how the logical entities such as propositions, or the logical principles such as the principle of non-contradiction, are 'constituted' in appropriate intentional acts. It will also show, as Husserl does in *Experience and Judgment*, how higher order intentional acts and their objects are built up on more primitive intentionalities and their objects. It should be noted that all this will be carried out within the scope of the transcendental epoché. The classical Kantian way is different, but also shares the same overall orientation. Formal Logic has to be founded on transcendental logic, and transcendental logic lays bare the synthetic, world-constituting functions of the pure rational subject.

Once psychologism in philosophy of logic was rejected, two alternatives loomed large: the platonic hypostatization of the logical entities, and the Kantian-Husserlian thesis of 'constitution' which, for one thing, respects the ideality of those entities, and, for another, sharply distinguishes the transcendental subjectivity from the psychological. Heidegger looked for a third alternative. But, in fact, he tries two different paths, and all his life sought to bring them together. One of these I will call the *metaphysical*, the other may be called the *practical*. They are brought together in a *hermeneutic* thesis.

(c) Logic and Metaphysics. In the Logic lectures of 1928, called *The Metaphysical Foundations [Anfangsgründe] of Logic*, Heidegger forcefully argues for the thesis that logic must be grounded in metaphysics.⁶² Against such a thesis, there is a rather familiar objection which Heidegger considers at length. The objection is that since metaphysics involves thinking and since all thinking must conform to logic, indeed must presuppose logic, metaphysics must presuppose logic rather than the inverse thesis. Indeed, logic must precede all sciences.

According to Heidegger this argument has the advantage that it proceeds from quite general ideas of logic and metaphysics, without considering their specific problem – contents. There is also an ambiguity in the word ‘presupposition’. It is true that all thinking – prescientific, scientific as well as metaphysical – must make use of the formal rules of thinking. But *use* of the rules does not require a *science* of those rules, nor does it require a ‘founded’ knowledge of those rules. The fact of their use, as much as the unavoidability of their use for thinking, needs to be accounted for. For such an account, one has to think about the conditions of the possibility of science, about the relation of science to scientific thinking, and of such thinking to human existence; logic itself is a science, historically developed and so determined by a tradition. It therefore cannot be a presupposition of thinking.

The barely formal argument to the effect that every thinking grounding must involve thinking, cannot be formally refuted – Heidegger concedes.⁶³ But, he adds, it can be refuted only by showing how such an argument is possible and why, under certain presuppositions, it indeed is necessary. At this point Heidegger does not go on to show this. As far as I can see, his point would be something like this: pre-logical thinking which is in direct touch with being, thinking which, according to Heidegger’s later writings, is either practical wisdom or poetic, does not follow the rules of logic and so no question arises about logic being its presupposition. It is only propositional thinking that follows the rules of (propositional) logic. A putative metaphysical grounding may remain within the limits of propositional thinking; it then does appear to presuppose logic (allowing for the sort of equivocation of ‘presupposing’ which was hinted at earlier). Such a grounding then does not go to the roots of the matter. A metaphysical grounding which does go to the roots of the matter would think, but think in a different, more originary manner.

What is this more originary manner of thinking, and how could such thinking provide a grounding for logical thinking and for logic as well? To be able to understand Heidegger’s answers to these questions, we need to do some more spade work to prepare the ground.

(d) Logic as Metaphysics of Truth.⁶⁴ Judgments alone can be either true or false. This is because in judgment, thinking and being enter into a peculiar relation of identity-cum-difference. Judgment is ‘about’ a being, and of this being it asserts a true predicate. Let us look closer at this ‘being about’ and also at the copula, the sign of predication.

(i) The ‘being about’ or judgmental intentionality is possible, according to Heidegger, only because a being has already been disclosed prior to the judgment under consideration. A judgment does not first establish the relatedness to the entity-about-which. A judgment is first possible on the basis of an already available disclosure of the entity, and the disclosure of that entity takes place within the context of an already latent

relatedness to or *Schon-sein-bei* beings. A judgment is true if its content is in agreement with the already disclosed object-about-which. The metaphysical here is the disclosure of being as a being, a disclosure without which judgment cannot substantiate its truth claim and would not be, qua judgment, possible. Thus judgmental intentionality presupposes a prejudgmental manifestation of being. We need not have to understand this thesis in any weird and mystic sounding sense. The best way to understand Heidegger, at this point, is to take his thesis as exemplified in the familiar case of perceptual judgments. A perceptual judgment 'This pen is blue' is possible inasmuch as the object-about-which, this pen, is already disclosed in perceptual experience, as lying there before me. It is important that we do not construe this perceptual disclosure itself as a judgment. What this disclosure is like, I will briefly touch upon later, but only in so far as that is necessary for my present exposition.

(ii) Predication likewise is founded upon display.⁶⁵ In predicating, what is disclosed is analyzed into one of its constituent moments, and this separated moment is exhibited as *belonging to* the entity disclosed. Predication determines an entity as being such and such, but the determination is founded on exhibition and separation. This shows why every judgment is both analytic and synthetic at once. The copula signifies the 'togetherness', the 'belonging-together', that 'unifying gathering' which belongs to our very concept of being as the *world*.

(iii) If the foregoing makes sense, then it makes sense to say that although truth in the sense of adequacy or correspondence has its locus in judgment, truth in the sense of disclosedness of being is prior to judgment. If this latter sense of 'truth' be called ontological, then logic is grounded in ontology. Hence Heidegger's enigmatic statement: 'Der Satz ist nicht das, darin Wahrheit erst möglich wird, sondern umgekehrt, der Satz ist erst in der Wahrheit möglich. . . . Satz ist nicht der Ort der Wahrheit, sondern Wahrheit der Ort des Satzes.'⁶⁶

We thus find that when Heidegger claims to ground logic in metaphysics he should be understood in a sense that takes into account the above mentioned three points. He should not be construed as grounding logic either in the structure of the subject or in the structure of the world.

(d) Logic and Practical Wisdom. Logic, we have seen, deals with meanings. With the rejection of psychologism, one is tempted to look upon meanings as eternally subsistent entities. At no stage of his thinking was Heidegger satisfied with such a hypostatization of meanings. The habilitation work ends with the 'metaphysical' suggestion that the opposition between real mental life and ideal meanings, between *Sein* and *Sollen*, be overcome in a more fundamental concept of living *Geist*.⁶⁷ The Logic lecture of 1925/6 suggests that although the primacy of theoretical truth in logic is not accidental, it is possible to show that a more

radical stance of questioning may lead to a revision of this naive point of departure of logic.⁶⁸ In fact, not formal logic but philosophical logic has to settle the question, which truth – theoretical or practical – is primary. Heidegger opts for the primacy of the practical.

To demonstrate this thesis of the primacy of the practical is to argue successfully that the meanings logic is concerned with, propositional meanings and their constituents, are *not* the meanings originally experienced along with that disclosure of being which is presupposed by judgment. The word, as *fixed* and stabilized for purposes of logical thinking, presupposes a pre-logical experience of being as meaningful. This latter sort of meaningfulness is tied to the way we live in our world and concern ourselves – practically and affectively – with things and situations. Things acquire their original significance (*Bedeutung*) from what we have got to do with them, from *Zutunhaben*. A pencil is meant for writing, a hammer for driving nails, and so on and so forth. Original practical judgments express such a significance of things: they do not ascribe properties to a thing. They are about my (actual or possible) relations to a thing.⁶⁹

It may be objected that this sort of practical and affective significance belongs only to tools and artifacts: pens and pencils, houses and automobiles, hammers and clocks, but not to natural objects such as rocks and mountains, rivers and trees, and animals and other persons. I think Heidegger's point is that in so far as these and other natural objects inhabit my *Lebenswelt* and not the world of physics, they fall within the horizon of my interests, passions, and possible actions directed at them. They are not mere objects of cognition. The logic of judgment is founded upon the prelogical disclosure of things as having the sort of practical significance that they have within our *Lebenswelt*. To say this, however, is not to *show* how apophantic judgment arises out of the practical. It would be the task of hermeneutic logic to show that. Heidegger has not himself done hermeneutic logic; some others have, and we need to turn to them. But before doing that we need to be clear about how the practical wisdom which recognizes for each object and situation its practical significance could be characterized as being hermeneutic.

(e) Logic and Hermeneutics. It was said earlier that Heidegger tried, all his life, to bring together two different groundings of logic; the metaphysical and the practical, and that they were to be unified under the concept of hermeneutics. We now need to ascertain how this is done. The connecting link is provided by two theses: (i) that action is a mode of understanding the world and involves a certain self-understanding on the part of the agent; and (ii) that the originary disclosure of entities which must precede judgmental 'being about' is not disclosure to a cognitive subject, to an objectivating consciousness, but rather to a projecting, caring, and acting being whose mode of being is to be in the world and to-be-already-with-entities. Being-in-the-world is to be interpreted as a

certain comprehension or understanding of oneself and one's world. Thus both practice and disclosure of entities involve a certain pre-conceptual understanding of oneself and one's world. To articulate and explicate this understanding is hermeneutics. If logic is grounded in a disclosure of being, and if logical meanings refer back to pre-logical significance, one can as well say that logic is ultimately rooted in a certain understanding of the world as well as of oneself.

The same thesis may be supported in a slightly different manner. Judging is an intentional relation to a being. But every intentional relation carries within itself a *specific understanding* of the being of the entity to which the intentionality relates. If judging presupposes a prior disclosure of that entity, it also requires a specific interpretation of it *as* such and such.

With this we are in a position to briefly consider Heidegger's thesis on logic as laid down in §33 of *Sein und Zeit* bearing the title: 'Die Aussage als abkünftiger Modus der Auslegung.' In this paragraph, Heidegger first distinguishes between three meanings of 'Aussage'; all three together constitute the full structure of *Aussage*. First of all, 'Aussage' primarily means manifesting an entity as it is. In 'The hammer is too heavy', the hammer itself, but not its representation, is manifested in the manner it is at hand. Secondly, *Aussage* also means predication. This sense is grounded in the first. Both the terms of predication, the subject and the predicate, belong to what has been manifested. Predication itself does not uncover anything but rather limits what has been uncovered to the subject, i.e., the hammer. Finally, *Aussage* also means 'communication', to let the entity be seen together with an other. What is stated can be shared, can be stated again. Taking these three meanings together, an *Aussage* may be characterized as 'communicating and determining, making manifest'. But how then is it also a mode of interpretation? The making-manifest that takes place in and through an *Aussage*, is possible only on the basis of what is already disclosed to understanding. It is not a worldless, transcendental ego who performs an *Aussage*. It is rather a *Dasein* who is a being-in-the-world and as such always has a certain pre-understanding of the world, who makes a judgment. The existential fore-structures of understanding, which together constitute its anticipatory structure, form the horizon within which any judgment is possible. In this sense the judgment of logic is founded upon the hermeneutic of *Dasein*.

Heidegger has still to give an account of how the entity with which one is practically concerned (the hammer as a tool for driving a nail here and now) *becomes* an object about which one pronounces a theoretical judgment. Obviously, if Heidegger's thesis is correct, the *Zuhandene Womit des Zutunhabens* has to be transformed into the '*Worüber*' der *aufzeigenden Aussage*. What transpires in this transformation? Something

whose mode of being is to-be-ready-at-hand becomes an object that is present-at-hand, merely *vorhanden*. The original 'as', which was a hermeneutic 'as' (recognizing a hammer as what is just right for my purpose) for practical wisdom, becomes a mere apophantic 'as' (*judging* this object over there to be a hammer) which determines the object as possessing a certain property. The logic of *theoretical* judgments is committed to an ontology of objects present at hand.

In an important, but not much commented upon paragraph, Heidegger concedes that between these two extremes, there are many intermediate phases, represented by judgments about happenings in the surrounding world, accounts of situations, depictions of events, etc. These intermediate cases, though expressed in linguistic sentences, cannot be reduced to theoretical statements, but rather refer back to their origin in the pre-conceptual interpretation of the world.

What now has become of the concept of meaning or *Sinn* which was earlier used to define the domain of logic? This concept of *Sinn* is to be traced back to its origin in another, more ordinary concept of *Sinn* which Heidegger formulates with some precision in §65 of *Sein und Zeit*: 'Danach ist Sinn das, worin sich die Verstehbarkeit von etwas hält, ohne daß es selbst ausdrücklich und thematisch in den Blick kommt. Sinn bedeutet das Woraufhin des primären Entwurfs, aus dem her etwas als das, was es ist in seiner Möglichkeit begriffen werden kann.' *Sinn* is that towards which the ordinary project of being-in-the-world is directed. To understand the *Sinn* of a thing (not of a word, in this case) is to grasp, unthematically, the possibility that the thing presents in the context of the prevailing project.

(f) Hermeneutic Logic. It is one thing to claim that formal logic is rooted in a hermeneutic experience of being-in-the-world. It is quite another thing to work out in detail the idea of a hermeneutic logic. Without such a logic, the Heideggerian thesis would remain empty of content, for not only logic but all theoretical cognition, on that thesis, would have the same 'origin'. With such a logic, the thesis receives specific content, but loses some of its ontological grandeur, for now formal logic will be traced back to another kind of logic, but we would still be within the field of logic, which thereby would receive an extension beyond the formal-theoretical.

Even if Heidegger does not give us sketches of such a logic, luckily we have excellent attempts in that direction. This is not the place to review those attempts, but it surely is appropriate that we briefly recall the more noteworthy amongst them. First of all, Husserl himself, in *Experience and Judgment*, extended the domain of logic to pre-predicative experience, and showed how truth-functional operators such as negation, disjunction and implication have their origin in pre-predicative experience. Husserl's thesis may be regarded as still being cognitive in

nature, the pre-predicative experience is construed not as active or affective dealing with entities, but rather as modes of receptivity and various modes of responses to what is received. In this sense, Husserl's pre-predicative logic does not come under the rubric 'hermeneutic logic'.

The most striking development of hermeneutic logic, developed in close contact with both Husserl and Heidegger, is to be found in the works of Hans Lipps.⁷⁰ If formal logic deals with logical entities which claim to be self-subsistent essences, and appear to have no connection with the living situations of everyday life, what Lipps does is to comprehend precisely the entities and structures of logic as arising out of human life, i.e., to bring out how they originally have the function of accomplishing quite specific roles in quite specific linguistic situations of everyday life. Thus judgment (*Urteil*) in its origin is not a statement, but an action by which a yet-to-be-decided question is finally decided, as in legal judgment. The concepts of traditional logic, according to Lipps, are quite different from the concepts of originary, practical thinking. To comprehend things, in practical life, is to come to terms with things, to know what to do with them, as in overcoming an opposition. Concepts in this sense are not definable, they can only be illustrated by examples. The same sort of distinction is made in the case of inference. In practical life one infers, not from premises, but from circumstances, situations, facts. *Proof* becomes necessary in a situation of conversation, when something has to be demonstrated for the other. An interesting development of the idea of pre-logical conception is Lipps' distinction between 'practical' and 'intuitive' (*sichtenden*) conceptions. Neither needs language, but both may function in a linguistic medium. The practical conception operates in knowing *how*; the intuitive conception operates in one's mastery over a wide range of diverse material without yet subsuming it under a common logical concept.

Meanings of words are, for theoretical logic, precise and fixed entities. In practical life, meanings cannot be fixed with precision. (Lipps elaborates on the Wittgensteinian example: the word 'game'.) This imprecision is not a deficiency; it is rather a strength. The words derive their meanings not autonomously, but in connection with situations in which they are uttered. This leads Lipps to consider various kinds of words and the great variety of situations that call forth appropriate utterances.

Josef König studied with Husserl, but subsequently attended Heidegger's Marburg lectures, and sought to appropriate their methodologies into a basically Dilthey-oriented position. I would here mention only a few of his important distinctions: (i) In his *Sein und Denken*⁷¹ König distinguishes between the merely present (*vorhanden*) thing and the thing as so-working (*so-Wirkende*). The former is not an original subject of predication, but is rather a transformation of a judgment of the form 'X is present'. The true subject of a statement about something present is

not this something present, but rather the X of sentences of the sort 'X is present'. But the latter, i.e., the so-working, or an entity that is not the merely present, is the original entity. The subject of so-working is *nothing but* a so-working being (a pleasing smile is a smile that so works on us; a sublime mountain is one which so works on us). Its being (*Sein*) is to be so-working.

(ii) König also distinguishes between a practical 'this' and a theoretical 'this'.⁷² The theoretical *this* is a *this* of such and such kind: for example, 'under this circumstance' = 'under *such* circumstance'; this man = a man such as this. As contrasted with this, a practical *this* is a pure this. For example, What is *this* that lies there on the table? A practical this is the merely existing reality. The practical this belongs to someone's world; it is hardly compatible with the thought of a closed system or with a world-totality as *Vorhanden*.

(iii) Another of König's related distinctions is that between practical cause and theoretical cause.⁷³ The former answers a practical 'why' question and the latter a theoretical question. A practical 'why' question is: 'Why does this ball start moving?' A theoretical 'why' question is 'Why do balls that receive an impact start moving?' The former is answered by giving another event as the efficient cause. The latter requires a ground in a general theoretical implication.

(iv) All these lead him finally to a distinction that is of direct significance for logic: that between practical sentences and 'theoretical sentences'.⁷⁴ A theoretical sentence (or proposition) can be rightly seen as built out of a sentential (or, propositional) function 'x is F' either by replacing 'x' by a constant 'A', or by quantifying over x (Some x is F; All x is F). A practical sentence, according to König, cannot be so construed without doing violence to its meaning and its role. The subject of a practical sentence is a practical 'this' or 'that'. The sentence, 'That is my friend Karl' cannot be regarded as having been built out of a sentential function 'x is my friend Karl'.

König's valuable, carefully developed, but incomplete researches shall constitute a necessary part of any satisfactory hermeneutic logic.

Lastly, I should mention the more well known and more recent attempt of Paul Lorenzen.⁷⁵ Lorenzen develops a systematic constructive procedure for building up formal logical concepts and operations from simple practical situations (such as one in which one person gives an order which the other obeys or does not obey; or one in which two are engaged in a game; or dialogical situations in which there is a proponent and an opponent). Lorenzen, interestingly enough, sees his task as having been made possible only after Dilthey and Frege.⁷⁶

One may want to say that these attempts fulfill the intention implicit in Heidegger's thinking about formal logic, in a more constructive and fruitful manner.

4 Critical remarks

But what to say about Heidegger's own foundational thoughts? To recapitulate what has already been pointed out, these thoughts are mainly five:

First, formal logic, *historically*, was possible within a metaphysical system (the Platonic), and can be possible only within a metaphysics. *Secondly*, formal logic is committed to an ontology of objects whose mode of being is to be present at hand (*Vorhandensein*).

Thirdly, (in spite of the above) philosophical reflection on the copula yields an insight into the identity-cum-difference, and the togetherness of differentiated elements that belongs to the *meaning* of Being.

Fourthly, judgmental being-about presupposes a prior pre-judgmental disclosure of an entity, which disclosure takes place within the context of Dasein's already-being-with the others.

Fifthly, judgmental *Sinn*, as also logical-theoretical meaning of words, refers back to a practical understanding of the significance of things in relation to human projects, i.e., in the context of the totality of life situations.

The final evaluation of formal logic would be somewhat as follows: formal logic has its own range of validity, no doubt, but philosophy should replace its naiveté by reflecting on its sense and its 'origin'. This will require a philosophical logic which is double-pronged: at once ontological and hermeneutic. Modern mathematical logic is degenerate formal logic, for whatever hermeneutic and ontological glimpses the traditional formal logic permitted is, or at least appears to have been, totally lost to mathematical logic, whose main blunder consists in confusing between a science of quantity and a science of intentionality and which is, historically speaking, possible only in an epoch for which the meaning of Being is understood through technology.⁷⁷

With regard to these thoughts, I would like to submit the following critical and, certainly, tentative reflections.

1. The historical judgment appears to me to be sound, namely, that formal logic arose within the Platonic metaphysics. One needed, to begin with, a doctrine of objective ideas and propositions. But the history of logic shows that logic has tried to free itself from that Platonic origin. Propositions have been replaced by sentences (even if they are 'eternal sentences'), concepts by words (even if they are type words, not tokens), and so on and so forth. To what extent, then, must we say that formal logic unavoidably presupposes a metaphysics (i.e., a theory of Being) and an ontology (a position as to what sorts of entities to admit)? My own view is that although formal logicians have sought to court a nominalistic

ontology, that just has not worked. (See how sentences have become eternal sentences.) The logical relations and structures need abstract entities to hold good of, so some sort of Platonism is 'the original sin' of formal logic. But these Platonic entities are of the genre of meanings, Fregean *Sinne* or Husserlian *noemata*. A certain theory of meaning, and its attendant ontology may well be regarded as the minimum commitment of formal logic. No other ontology of *Vorhandensein* is presupposed. Events and happenings, situations and circumstances, tools and gadgets, can all be referents of 'objects-about-which' of *propositions* that are subjected to logical operations.

2. It is not clear how much ontological burden can be carried by the copula. Heidegger's multifarious attempts to extract out of it insights into the meaning of 'Being' have been far from successful. By saying that 'Being' involves identity-cum-difference or the togetherness of distincts, is not to say much that could not be divined by simple metaphysical speculation independently of the guidance of the copula.

3. The thesis of the pre-logical, pre-predicative disclosure is important, and its validity recognized. I should add that this thesis derives its strength from the case of perceptual judgments such as 'This pencil is blue'. But not all judgments are perceptual, and not all disclosure is prior to judgment. In a judgment about electrons, one does not have a pre-theoretical disclosure of the object-about-which: in verifying such a judgment, the disclosure comes *afterwards* as the 'fulfillment' of the meaning intention of an originally empty judgment. The thesis of *prior* disclosure, then, may be saved by liberalizing the sense of 'disclosure' and at the same time by relativizing it to the context of a judging.

4. With regard to perceptual judgments about persons and material objects, it is true that originary disclosure is not a theoretical-cognitive mode of givenness, but rather practical and affective.⁷⁸ This alone justifies Heidegger's basing apophansis on hermeneutics. However, even if one does work out a hermeneutic logic in the manner of Lipps, König, and Lorenzen, one still needs to show how apophantic logic develops out of hermeneutic logic. Lorenzen's is the best attempt to show this, but it works for elementary truth functions, and even there a certain *discontinuity* between the primitive hermeneutic situation and the formal-logical is either slurred over or eliminated by choosing the former at a level that is not originary-practical, but rather primitively theoretical.

5. Heidegger is right, to my mind, in looking upon Husserl's anti-psychologism critique as a provisional, though indispensable step. In fact, Husserl himself treated it likewise. The gap between real mental life and ideal meanings has to be bridged. Transcendental philosophy and hermeneutics are two ways of doing this. Their relative strength has to be measured, among other things, by the extent to which each is capable of accounting for the ideality of logical meanings. For hermeneutics, the

question is: How do the practical-hermeneutic meanings of things get 'transformed' into the theoretical-logical meanings of words and sentences?

Notes

1 *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik*. Dissertation, Freiburg in Br., 1913. Reprinted in Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. 1, *Frühe Schriften* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1978). Further citations to *Gesamtausgabe* are abbreviated as *GA*.

The reader is referred to the following secondary literature on this topic: Thomas A. Fay, *Heidegger: The Critique of Logic* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977). Reviewed by the present author in *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, XI (1980): 174-9; Walter Bröcker, 'Heidegger und die Logik', *Philosophisches Rundschau* I (1953-4): 48-56; Albert Borgmann, 'Heidegger and Symbolic Logic', in M. Murray, ed., *Heidegger & Modern Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 3-22.

2 *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1916). Reprinted in *Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. 1.

3 *Logik. Die Frage Nach der Wahrheit. Vorlesungen 1925-6*, herausgegeben von Walter Biemel. *Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. 21 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1976); *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik, Vorlesungen, 1928*, herausgegeben von Klaus Held, *Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. 26 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1978).

4 *GA*, 1: 186.

5 *GA*, 1: 20.

6 *GA*, 1: 165.

7 Hans Sluga, *Gottlob Frege* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980).

8 *GA*, 1: 87, fn 9.

9 *GA*, 1: 98.

10 *GA*, 1: 23 fn.

11 *GA*, 21: 62.

12 *GA*, 21: 79.

13 G. Frege, 'Begriff und Gegenstand', *Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, 16 (1892); 'Sinn und Bedeutung', *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, 100 (1892).

14 *GA*, 1: 20.

15 *GA*, 1: 42-3.

16 *GA*, 1: 174 fn.

17 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Seventh edition (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1953), 159.

18 Cf. Frege: 'Anyone demanding the closest possible agreement between the relations of the signs and the relations of the things themselves will always feel it to be back to front when logic, whose concern is also the foundation of arithmetic, borrows its signs from arithmetic. To such a person it will seem more appropriate to develop for logic its own signs, derived from the nature of logic itself.' *Posthumous Writings*, ed. by H. Hermes, F. Kambartel and F. Kaulbach (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 12.

19 cf. M. Dummett, *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1981), 371, 409.

20 M. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Marburg Lectures of 1927, ed. and trans. by Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 178. Henceforth to be cited as *BP*.

21 *GA*, 21: 28.

22 Kant, according to Heidegger, gave logic a central philosophical function but did not try to rescue academic logic from its 'philosophically alienated superficiality and vacuity'. (*BP*, p. 177).

23 Hegel, Heidegger holds, conceived of logic as philosophy, but did not attempt a radical reformulation of the problem of logic as such. (*BP*, pp. 177–8).

24 Bolzano, in Heidegger's view, was overrated by Husserl. (*GA*, 21, pp. 86–7).

25 *GA*, 26: 6.

26 *ibid.*, 7.

27 *GA*, 26: 158f.

28 *BP*, 177, 211f; *GA*, 26: 26f.

29 *BP*, 208ff.

30 *GA*, 26: 151f; *Sein und Zeit*, 148f, 216f.

31 *GA*, 21: 134–50.

32 *GA*, 26: 125–6.

33 *GA*, 21: 110–29.

34 *GA*, 21: 11–12.

35 *GA*, 26: 24.

36 *GA*, 26: 170, 128ff.

37 Contrast Frege who regarded the predicate part or the function as 'the stable component' and the sign for the object, i.e., the argument as replaceable by others. Cf. *Begriffsschrift*, §9.

38 Again compare Frege who regarded the distinction between affirmative and negative judgments as 'eine für Logik wenigstens ganz unnötige Unterscheidung, deren Grund außerhalb der Logik zu suchen ist' ('Verneinung', reprinted in Frege, *Logische Untersuchungen*, G. Patzig, ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhöck & Reprecht, 1966), 61).

39 Cf. Russell's thesis that 'this' is a proper name, together with Husserl's thesis that the naming act may be true or false.

40 Heidegger does not consider, in his critique of Meier's theory, a possibly transcendental-psychological interpretation of the theory in the sense of Kant's doctrine of three-fold synthesis.

41 *GA*, 1: 122.

42 *GA*, 1: 123f. Compare Frege's view that judgment is the recognition of the truth value of a thought.

43 Quoted by Heidegger in *GA*, 1: 135.

44 If only Heidegger had construed the predicate not as 'being equal', but as '_____ is equal to _____' then he would have realized Frege's point that the names of the so-called subject terms just fill these blanks, and so no third connecting link is needed.

45 *GA*, 1: 178–9.

46 *GA*, 1: 183.

47 *GA*, 1: 184.

48 *GA*, 1: 185.

49 *GA*, 1: 186.

50 *GA*, 21: 7. Compare Frege: 'The word "true" can be used to indicate such a goal for logic . . . of course all the sciences have truth as their goal, but logic

is concerned with the predicate "true" in a quite special way.' *Posthumous Writings*, 128.

51 *GA*, 21: 135f.

52 Dummett rejects this part of Frege's semantics.

53 *GA*, 21: 136f.

54 *GA*, 21: 140-1.

55 *Sein und Zeit*, 159-60. Also see 349.

56 *BP*, 204-5.

57 Many Hegelian logicians, such as F. H. Bradley, have used this so-called paradox of predication to imply that judgmental thinking cannot know reality. One may, contrariwise, regard the puzzle as signifying that structure which makes both truth and falsity possible.

58 *BP*, 207.

59 Husserl's sixth logical Investigation has texts which suggest such a view, cf. §§6-7.

60 *BP*, 197.

61 *GA*, 1: 283.

62 *GA*, 26: 128-32.

63 *ibid.*, 131.

64 *GA*, 26: 132.

65 *BP*, 209f.

66 *GA*, 21: 135.

67 *GA*, 1: 405.

68 *GA*, 21: 11.

69 *GA*, 21: 150-9.

70 Hans Lipps, *Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis*. Erster Teil, *Das Ding und seine Eigenschaften* (Bonn, 1927). Zweiter Teil, *Aussage und Urteil* (Bonn, 1928). But more specifically, see his *Untersuchungen zu einer hermeneutischen Logik*, Philosophische Abhandlungen, Bd. VII (Frankfurt am Main, 1933).

71 Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1937.

72 Josef König, 'Über einen neuen ontologischen Beweis des Satzes von der Notwendigkeit alles Geschehens', *Archiv für Philosophie*, 2 (1948): 5-43. Reprinted in Josef König, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, ed. G. Patzig (Freiburg/München: Verlag Alber, 1978).

73 Josef König, 'Bemerkungen über den Begriff der Ursache', originally in *Das Problem der Gesetzlichkeit*, Bd. I (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1949). Reprinted in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*.

74 König's Göttingen Lectures (1953-4) under the title 'Theoretische und praktische Sätze' are still unpublished. They are being edited by G. Patzig for publication.

75 Cf. Paul Lorenzen, *Konstruktive Wissenschaftstheorie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974) and *Methodisches Denken* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974).

76 *Konstruktive Wissenschaftstheorie*, 21. He also writes: 'Erst im Anschluß an Dilthey und Husserl haben Misch einerseits und Heidegger andererseits deutlich gemacht, was das heisst, daß Denken vom Leben, von der praktischen Lebenssituation des Menschen, auszugehen hat.' *Methodisches Denken*, 26.

77 For my present limited purpose, I desist from either expounding or commenting upon this last claim.

78 I have argued for this in my *Phenomenology and Ontology* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1970).

The essence of transcendence

Christopher Macann

The concept of transcendence plays a pivotal role in Heidegger's first philosophy. The text which addresses the issue of transcendence most directly is undoubtedly *Vom Wesen des Grundes*. But, in a footnote immediately preceding the third part of this text from 1930, Heidegger tells us that what has already been published from his investigation into *Being and Time* takes as its task 'nothing other than a concretely disclosive projection of transcendence' (§12–§83; esp. §69).¹ Not only in *Being and Time* but also in the Kant book and in a number of other publications written about the same time (*Was ist Metaphysik?*, *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*), the concept of transcendence figures largely and is developed in relation to the question of being. However, unlike such issues as that of Space, Time, Existence, World and so on, the concept of transcendence has something of a meta-theoretical character and this in a double sense. First, the concept of transcendence is as much a *methodological* as it is an *ontological* concept, in the sense that it deals with the *procedure* to be adopted to make possible a disclosure of ontological structures. Second, Heidegger's own concept of transcendence owes its historical origin to transcendental philosophy, in the sense that Heidegger sought to offer an ontological alternative to the transcendental theory of transcendence, and this again in a double sense, Kantian as well as Husserlian.

It will be our ultimate objective in this paper to distinguish, in Heidegger's thinking about transcendence, between what might be called a *progressive* and a *regressive* theory of transcendence. In a provisional way, the progressive theory can be defined as a transcending of *Dasein* toward the world or toward entities encountered in the world, the regressive as the transcending of beings toward their being. Strictly speaking, and particularly in the light of the historical sources of the theory of transcendence, these two sides to the theory of transcendence should stand in a complementary relation. But the tendency to disconnect the

two sides and, furthermore, to rely largely upon the regressive interpretation of transcendence takes Heidegger's thinking in a direction where it is no longer able to play a *foundational* role and so, indirectly, accounts for the disappearance of *Dasein* after the *Kehre*.

We will begin by considering the transcendental sources of Heidegger's idea of transcendence, go on to examine the connection between this concept of transcendence and that of being (section 2), the ground (section 3) and truth (section 4), before finally formulating our own conclusions on the subject.

The transcendental sources of Heidegger's theory of transcendence

Although references to the concept of transcendence are to be found throughout *Being and Time*, and although a specific section of the second part (§69) is devoted to 'the Temporality of being-in-the-world and the problem of the transcendence of the world', the references in question either rely upon an unclarified concept of transcendence or else they assume the form of a critique of the transcendental theory of transcendence. No doubt it was his own recognition of the need for further clarification which led Heidegger to his later, explicit, analysis of the concept of transcendence in *Vom Wesen des Grundes*. But precisely because there is nothing like an explicit theory of transcendence in *Being and Time*, his references stand in an essential dependence upon their historical source in transcendental philosophy. 'Being is the transcends pure and simple', he tells us in his Introduction, and then goes on to explain: 'Every disclosure of being as the *transcendens* is *transcendental* knowledge. *Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of being) is veritatis transcendentalis*.'²

In the next work to be published after *Being and Time*, Heidegger makes extensive use of the concept of transcendence. But his use of this concept is peculiar in that, in name at least, the concept of transcendence (as opposed to that of the transcendental, or the transcendent) is not to be found in Kant's Critical philosophy. In making the concept of transcendence central to his Kant interpretation, he therefore really first imports the Husserlian concept of transcendence into his understanding of Kant's transcendental philosophy and then gives the latter an ontological twist. Let us follow up this detour for a moment.

Husserl's theory of transcendence is most explicitly set out in the text *The Idea of Phenomenology*. For instance, in the third lecture we are told that 'transcendence is both the initial and the central problem of the critique of cognition'.³ But, as Husserl points out in his second lecture, the concept of transcendence is ambiguous. It is for this reason that Husserl comes up with two conceptions of transcendence and that

his analysis proceeds from a preliminary, pre-critical, and to this extent still naive, concept of transcendence to a conclusive, more comprehensive and therefore more developed, concept of the same structure.

The first and preliminary concept is based upon the (intentional) act-object distinction. 'The genuinely immanent [*reell Immanente*] is taken as the indubitable just on account of the fact that it presents nothing else, "points" to nothing "outside" itself, for what is here intended is fully and adequately given in itself.'⁴ This concept of the actually or, as it is translated genuinely⁵ (*reel*) immanent brings with it its own complementary concept of the transcendent. Whatever exists in some way other than that of being an actual item of consciousness is transcendent and is, as such, excluded from the sphere of immanence. It is this limitative concept of immanence which poses the *problem* of transcendence in the most acute form.

The cognition belonging to the objective sciences, the natural sciences and the sciences of culture [*Geisteswissenschaften*] and on closer inspection also the mathematical sciences, is transcendent. Involved in the objective sciences is the *doubtfulness of transcendence*, the question: How can cognition reach beyond itself? How can it reach a being that is not to be found within the confines of consciousness?⁶

Qua actual lived experiences (*reelle Erlebnisse*) the *cogitatio* are singular existences. In so far as they are individual, transitory, irrepeatable, they belong to the act side of consciousness and are, in consequence, resistant to analysis. But, with the sole exception of hyletic data, *Erlebnisse* are directed toward, and in this sense intend, an object. Admittedly, the object intended is not, and cannot be, a real (*real*) transcendent object. But, for all that, the relation to an object does belong to the cognitive act. Cognition is concerned not merely with the actually (*reell*) immanent but also with what is immanent in the intentional sense – and this in a twofold way. Not only must the analysis focus upon the intentionality of consciousness, it must also take account of the 'what' that is intended. For, as a direct result of the reduction, this 'what' can be seen to display an essential structure. *Erlebnisse* are singular existences. Essences, on the other hand, are general structures which, as such, already transcend the consciousness in which they present themselves. At the same time, essences can only be given as the objective correlates of *Erlebnisse*, and so are also characterized by immediate or absolute self-givenness. From which Husserl concludes that it can no longer be taken for granted that

the *absolutely given* and the *actually immanent* are one and the same. For that which is universal is absolutely given but is not actually

immanent. . . . *The universal itself* which is given in evidence [*Evidenz*] within the stream of consciousness is nothing singular but just a universal, and in the actual [*reellen*] sense it is transcendent.⁷

Consequently, the concept of the *reell Immanent* turns out to be only a limiting case of a much wider concept of immanence. 'It makes clear to us in the first place that *actual (reell) immanence* (and the same is true of transcendence) is but a special case of the *broader concept of immanence as such*.'⁸ From this it follows that absolute or immediate self-givenness is no longer an adequate criterion of immanence. Rather, absolute self-givenness has now to be supplemented by the more fruitful criterion of evidence. Second, this wider concept of immanence has now to include what Husserl himself is ready to call '*reell Transzendenz*'.

And so we are brought to acknowledge the ambiguity of the concept of transcendence. In the first sense, immanent refers to the mental process itself and excludes whatever does not belong to the act side of consciousness. Immanent here means the actually (*reell*) immanent in the cognitive process. Husserl goes on: 'But there is still another transcendence whose opposite is an altogether different immanence, namely, absolute and clear givenness, self-givenness in the absolute sense.'⁹ In relation to this concept of immanence only that cognition which is not evidently given has to be excluded as transcendent.

In *Ideas!* this broader concept of transcendence is further developed with reference to noetico-noematic structures. From the more comprehensive standpoint of transcendence as absolute self-givenness, the *noema* can be seen to belong within the sphere of immanence. In order to avoid the problem of a duplication of reality, Husserl introduces a notion of the transcendental object = *x* which, as it were, stands on the boundary between the immanent and the transcendent and so helps to solve the enigma of an independent reality which nevertheless must draw its very meaning from consciousness itself.

Thus it remains as a result that the Eidos True-Being is correlatively equivalent to the Eidos Adequately given-Being and Being that can be posited as self-evident; and this, moreover, in the sense either of finite givenness or of givenness in the form of an Idea. In the one case, Being is 'immanent' Being, Being as a completed experience or noematic correlate of experience; in the other case, it is transcendent Being, i.e., Being whose 'transcendence' rests precisely in the infinitude of the noematic correlate which it demands as ontical material.¹⁰

The ultimate objective of the Husserlian programme is then to recover the very transcendent reality with respect to which the reduction first effected its suspension but in such a way that the meaning 'objective

reality' is now no longer taken for granted but set out in terms of a priori rules, rules which sanction and sustain the reasonableness of the objective affirmations to which they attest. It is this phenomenological concept of transcendence which Heidegger has in mind when he undertakes his interpretation of Kant.

In the very first introductory section of his Kant book, Heidegger makes known the central importance of the concept of transcendence. 'If truth pertains to the essence of knowledge, the transcendental problem of the intrinsic possibility of *a priori* synthetic knowledge becomes the question of the essence of the truth of ontological transcendence.'¹¹ Here we see the double bias of Heidegger's interpretation clearly articulated; on the one hand, the identification of transcendental philosophy with ontology, on the other, the importation into the Critical philosophy of a structure drawn from Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. This latter bias is even more evident in a passage a few lines earlier where Heidegger seeks to interpret Kant's statement to the effect that transcendental knowledge is knowledge occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori. He comments:

Thus, transcendental knowledge does not investigate the essent itself but the possibility of the precursory comprehension of the being of the essent. It concerns reason's passing beyond (transcendence) to the essent so that experience can be rendered adequate to the latter as its possible object.¹²

This use of the term transcendence in connection with Kant is at first sight surprising. For, in name at least, that term does not occur in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and certainly not in the form in which Heidegger wants to understand it. In the *Critique* we do find several sets of oppositions which imply a reference to transcendence (or at least which contain the etymological stem 'trans'), the opposition of the *transcendental* and the *empirical*, the *transcendental* and the *formal*, the *transcendent* and the *immanent*. In fact however, none of these contrasts are at issue in those passages in which Heidegger talks quite explicitly of the concept of transcendence in connection with the Critical project. For example, in §16 entitled 'The explication of the transcendence of finite reason as the basic purpose of the transcendental deduction', perhaps the section in which the theme of transcendence is most obviously at issue, Heidegger's concern is with an investigation of the act of objectification in so far as it is proposed in advance of any actual experience. Hence in the next section (§17) he is able to say that 'the intrinsic possibility of ontological knowledge is nothing other than the revelation of transcendence'.¹³ Again, in §25, we are told: 'Ontological knowledge has proved to be

that which forms transcendence.¹⁴ And this affirmation is then confirmed by way of an interpretation of the transcendental object = x as the unthematic horizon which is held open in advance and in such a way that an object can be encountered in the first place.

Here the Husserlian influence is only too apparent, not merely in the concept of horizon, but also in the way in which the movement of transcendence is itself characterized. The empirical reception of the object implies a movement from the world to *Dasein*. But the precursory holding open of the horizon implies an opposite movement from *Dasein* to the world, i.e., transcendence in the sense of a precursory passing beyond toward. . . . Hence the conclusion:

ontological knowledge 'forms' transcendence, and this formation is nothing other than the holding open of the horizon within which the Being of the essence is perceptible in advance. Provided that truth means: the unconcealment of . . . then transcendence is original truth.¹⁵

This connection of truth and transcendence is then further specified: 'If ontological knowledge discloses the horizon, its truth lies in letting the essent be encountered within this horizon.'¹⁶

Though the concept of transcendence is not to be found, as such, in the *Critique*, we do find two sets of distinctions which make much the same point as that made by Heidegger's (Husserlian) conception of transcendence. These two sets of distinctions are: 'analytic' and 'synthetic' methods, on the one hand and, 'progressive' and 'regressive' procedures, on the other. It should also be noted that both these distinctions are also supported by a further distinction between an Objective (regressive-analytic) and a Subjective (progressive-synthetic) Deduction.¹⁷ As is well known, the *Subjective* Deduction is the one primarily relied upon in the A edition while the B edition makes more use of the *Objective* Deduction. So there are two points to note. First, the analytic method goes with the regressive and the synthetic with the progressive procedure. Second, the two sets of terms are entirely complementary. More specifically, Kant tells us that analysis (separation) presupposes synthesis (combination)¹⁸ even though the investigation of the synthetic operations in question might never be possible without a prior analysis, if only because the analytic regression takes its start in what is already familiar, as given, and inquires back into the conditions of its possibility, which conditions can then be hypothesized as principles from which the given can be deduced.

Despite the duality in the Kantian method, the use Heidegger makes of his concept of transcendence in the Kant book relies almost entirely upon the progressive, synthetic method. It is for this reason that he bases

his interpretation largely upon the A (Subjective) edition of the Deduction (which adopts the progressive procedure) rather than the B (Objective) edition (which adopts a regressive procedure), to the point indeed of talking about 'Kant's Recoil' (from the insights of the A edition). This Recoil is attributed primarily to Kant's inability to comprehend the fundamental role of the imagination which, of course, Heidegger interprets as the faculty primarily responsible for creating that free-space (*Spielraum*) within which alone something can take up a position 'over against'.

We shall take over from Kant this distinction between a progressive and a regressive procedure and we shall try to show that Heidegger's thinking about transcendence takes two distinct forms, according as to whether the regressive or the progressive side predominates. However, we shall see that Heidegger not only fails to maintain the essential complementarity of the two, he tends more and more to privilege the regressive at the expense of the progressive – with all the consequences that follow therefrom.

The progressive, and therefore foundational, concept of transcendence proves, in the end, too Husserlian for Heidegger. For, it leads on in the direction of a grounding analysis the purpose of which it is to show how objects arise on the basis of a more fundamental involvement of *Dasein* in the world. This is the kind of analysis attempted by Husserl in his so-called genetic phenomenology, and it is the same kind of analysis which is employed by Merleau-Ponty. But it is a kind of analysis from which Heidegger withdrew, on the grounds that it represented nothing more than an extension of that traditional metaphysics which had to be overcome.

In one sense, the progressive and the regressive employment of the concept of transcendence stand opposed to each other. The one takes its stand in the ontological realm and then, on this basis, seeks to show how ontic knowledge thereby becomes possible. The other takes its stand in the ontic realm and, then, on this basis, seeks to bring out the necessity for a regression to the ground. In *Being and Time* the two procedures still remain more or less complementary. But in *Wesen des Grundes* the emphasis is deliberately displaced – away from the progressive and toward the regressive procedure. This in turn leads eventually to the disappearance of *Dasein* as a fundamental concept and to the opening up of a new way of thinking which takes Being as its theme.

Thus the concept of transcendence (which really only features in the first philosophy) not only serves to tie up many of the elements of Heidegger's thinking in this first period of his intellectual development, it also provides a clue to the further development of his thinking.

Being and transcendence

In *Being and Time* Heidegger makes extensive use of the concept of transcendence, but without ever working out the explicit meaning of this critical concept. This is clear both from the ambiguity with which the concept is articulated and the persistent tendency to refer this concept back to its transcendental origin. For both these reasons however, the progressive and the regressive employment of the concept tend to be linked up with each other.

Where Heidegger does not merely take over the transcendental concept of transcendence he undertakes something in the way of a critique of the traditional concept. In §13, Heidegger points out the inadequacy of any theory of knowledge which tries to explain how the subject gets out of a self-enclosed sphere of immanence to achieve transcendence. The reference to a sphere of immanence is already enough to indicate that it is Husserl whom Heidegger has in mind since, in the Heideggerian framework, there is no place for a concept of immanence. 'The scandal of philosophy' he tells us in the section (§43) devoted to the problem of reality, this time with an implicit reference to Kant, 'is not that this proof (of the existence of an external world) has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again.'¹⁹ Obviously, if, as Heidegger insists, being-in-the-world is a fundamental way of being of *Dasein* then, in a certain sense, there can be no *problem* of transcendence, since the very constitution of *Dasein*, as self transcending, 'solves' the problem before it can even arise. *Dasein* always is already *there* where it is supposedly problematic that it should be, namely, alongside entities in the world.

It is really only in connection with time, in the second part of the work, and especially in §69, that Heidegger begins to develop a theory of his own. Having established Care as the unity of being in the world, Heidegger then goes on to explore the temporalization of Care and in so doing encounters the problem of transcendence. 'If the thematizing of the present at hand – the scientific projection of nature – is to become possible, *Dasein* must transcend the entities thematized. Transcendence does not consist in objectifying but is presupposed by it.'²⁰ Here the implication is regressive rather than progressive. The presupposition in question refers, of course, to the Kantian procedure whereby philosophical thinking starts from the objective to inquire into the conditions of its possibility. But Heidegger seems to forget that the analytic-regressive movement is complemented, in Kant, with a progressive-synthetic movement the object of which it is precisely to show how objectifying actually takes place.

The point of this section (§69) is to bring out the connection of temporalization and world. 'Insofar as *Dasein* temporalizes itself, a world

is too. In temporalizing itself with regard to its being as temporality, *Dasein* is essentially "in a world", by reason of the ecstatico-horizonal constitution of that temporality.²¹ The temporalizing function of time means that time is transcendence and that therefore whatever is temporalized manifests itself as transcendent. This holds first and foremost of the world. 'Having its ground [*gründend*] in the horizonal unity of ecstatical temporality, the world is transcendent.'²² This sentence is doubly significant in that it employs the concept of ground, later to be thematized in *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, and in that it ascribes not transcendence but the characteristic of being transcendent to the world. This might seem strange in that the latter characteristic would seem to hold the world at a greater distance from *Dasein* than the structure of being-in-the-world should allow. It is clarified by another rather peculiar remark a few sentences later. 'The world is, as it were, already "further outside" than any Object can ever be.' This cannot mean that, as a totality, the world presupposes an aggregate of objects as that with respect to which alone such a totalizing procedure can take place, because Heidegger explicitly refuses any such interpretation. Rather it must mean that world is first projected as that *within which* alone beings can be encountered. This is why Heidegger then goes on:

The 'problem of transcendence' cannot be brought round to the question of how a subject comes out to an object, where the aggregate of Objects is identified with the idea of the world. Rather we must ask: what makes it ontologically possible for entities to be encountered within-the-world and objectified as so encountered. This can be answered by recourse to the transcendence of the world – a transcendence with an ecstatico-horizonal foundation.²³

In other words, what was previously, and in the context of a critique of traditional conceptions, described as the being transcendent of the world is now, and in a more properly ontological perspective, regarded as a function of transcendence. Transcendence makes being-in-the-world possible and it is only on the basis of being in the world that entities can appear transcendent. Thus, to try to explain the being transcendent of objects on the basis of being-out-of-the-world and in terms of the question of how a subject transcends the sphere of immanence to reach what transcends that sphere is seen to be non-sensical in as much as this very same transcendent character can itself only be explained with reference to the being-in-the-world of *Dasein*.

The etymological connection of ground (*Grund*) and abyss (*Abgrund*) makes it possible for Heidegger to bring his reflections on the ground into connection with his reflections on the abyss and therefore with his reflections upon nothingness and the way in which nothingness reveals

being. The very first pages of his later text *Einführung in der Metaphysik* make quite clear this connection between the concepts of 'being', the 'ground' and 'nothingness'. 'The question (why is there something rather than nothing) aims at the ground of what is in so far as it is.'²⁴ Furthermore, we are told that the ground can be both a primal ground (*Urgrund*) or an abyss (*Ab-grund*). Indeed Heidegger deliberately directs his analyses away from any supposedly naive, because foundational, concept of the 'primal ground' and toward a supposedly more sophisticated, because non-foundational and therefore abysmal, concept of the ground. However, it is in the earlier text *Was ist Metaphysik?* that the concept of the nothingness of being is most fully explored.

The central theme of *Was ist Metaphysik?* is not actually the nature of metaphysics, as the title would lead one to believe, but rather the concept, or better the experience, of nothingness. The theme of nothingness is however only employed as a strategy to get at the idea of being as a whole, or being as such, being before it has been broken up into the various regions of being investigated by specific sciences. Refusing the logical primacy of the concept of nothingness, Heidegger asks wherein the experience of nothingness reveals itself. His answer takes us into the realm of mood, in the first instance, the mood of boredom, then, more fundamentally, the mood of anxiety. 'Anxiety discloses Nothingness' (*Die Angst offenbart das Nichts*).²⁵

The theme of transcendence is introduced through the possibility of holding oneself open to being in totality, which is itself revealed through the experience of nothingness. 'This being beyond [*Hinaussein*] is what we call Transcendence.'²⁶ A more elaborate formula brings out the connection between 'nothingness', 'anxiety', 'being in totality' and transcendence. '*Dasein's* projectedness [*Hineingehaltenheit*] into Nothing on the basis of hidden dread is the overcoming of what-is-in-totality: Transcendence.'²⁷ What is at issue here is not just the priority of being in totality over beings, nor even the experience through which this priority becomes manifest but rather the nature of that structure through which this relation to being in totality is made possible. It is a 'holding oneself in', a 'being outside', a 'going out of', and what makes it possible is the fact that human being is always already *in* being – i.e., the primacy of transcendence.

The fact that human being is always already in being brings with it a reversal of the traditional conception of transcendence (revived by Husserl) as an answer to the question how the self over-comes the limits of its self with a view to standing in relation to what is not itself and, in this sense, transcends its self. No such movement of transcendence is called for because it has always already been accomplished. From this standpoint, the critical question becomes the very opposite question, how human being falls away from this fundamental relation, this being held

in relation. Heidegger's answer is interesting. The very structure (of transcendence) which accounts for the 'being always already in' also accounts for the 'having always already fallen away from'. On the surface such a position would seem to be contradictory. One and the same structure is produced to account for opposite characteristics. From *Being and Time* however, this contradiction is one with which we are already familiar. Because human being is from the first in being, beings are constantly encountered in such a way that effectively we lose ourselves in this very absorption with beings. In other words, what has to be explained is not how we come out of ourselves, come to be beyond ourselves and so to stand in a relation to what is other than ourselves, but rather the reverse, how we fall away from being and in so doing let being fall away until it can only manifest itself in the superficial relation to beings of one kind or another.

This is the very procedure to which I would like later to give the name 'ontological delimitation of transcendence'. For the moment it will be enough to note that, quite characteristically, Heidegger describes this falling away in purely negative terms. The being out of oneself which first makes it possible for there to be something – and not nothing – carries with it the seeds of its own self-annihilation in as much as the positivity of being (which becomes the positivity of beings) takes over from that sense of being in totality which can only be sustained against the background of the experience of nothingness. It is in this sense that Heidegger approves Hegel's equation of being and nothingness. 'Being and Nothingness belong together . . . because Being itself is in essence finite and so only manifests itself in the transcendence of a *Dasein* which is exposed to Nothingness.'²⁸

Through this 'falling away from' and only through such a falling away can definite regions of being make themselves known and, on this basis, can a science of such a region arise. Science wants to know nothing about nothingness (*will from Nichts nichts wissen*) and in this sense can only establish a (superficially) positive relation to being. But this positivism (which is the death of the negativity needed to sustain nothingness and therefore the sense of being in totality) cannot so easily be dismissed as nothing. Whatever the consequences of the development of the scientific spirit might eventually turn out to be, there can be no question that it represents an accomplishment, one of the most gigantic intellectual enterprises upon which human kind has ever engaged, one which has become absolutely determinative for world-civilization at this particular moment in its development – as Heidegger himself later recognized. Perhaps his later fatalistic resignation before the seemingly illimitable conquests of science and technology is but the inverse of his earlier dismissal of the scientific spirit as something utterly alien to the discipline of ontology? Having been only too ready initially to dismiss the scientific

spirit as alien to metaphysics, he eventually came to regard technology as the final working out of Western metaphysics.

Transcendence as the ground

Vom Wesen des Grundes is the text in which Heidegger seeks to articulate explicitly his own conception of transcendence. From the very outset Heidegger makes it clear that he intends to think the essence of the ground in connection with the problem of transcendence. Transcendence is said to be the domain (*Bezirk*) in which the essence of the ground is encountered and determined.²⁹ The essence of truth is said to be connected with the essence of transcendence and so indirectly with the essence of the ground.³⁰ Further, the transcendence of *Dasein* is said to be the ground of the ontological difference. 'This ground of the ontological difference we shall call *Dasein's Transcendence*.'³¹ And yet what is at issue is by no means clear, if only because Heidegger repeatedly links the question concerning the ground with a number of other historical issues only indirectly related to that of transcendence – the Aristotelian inquiry into first principles and causes,³² the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason (*nihil est sine ratione*),³³ the Kantian highest principle of all synthetic judgments,³⁴ even Husserlian intentionality.³⁵

It is in the second part that he begins the work of analysis. Transcendence, we are told, means passing beyond or surpassing (*Überstieg*). In this movement of passing beyond three elements can be formally distinguished. (1) The relation 'from'–'to'. (2) That towards which (*woraufzu*) the movement takes place, which is generally called the transcendent. (3) That which is surpassed, or transcended, in the very movement of passing beyond (*was überstiegen wird*).

Heidegger's next step is to connect this threefold structure of transcendence with the being of that very being which we are ourselves as human beings. However initially, and for strategic reasons, Heidegger leaves it open whether this being is to be called *Dasein* or, more traditionally, the subject. But he leaves this question open only in order to be in a position to criticize the Husserlian theory of transcendence, in the context of which the above threefold formal description would assume the following concrete application. (1) That which passes beyond in the relation 'from'–'to' is the subject. (2) That toward which the subject transcends itself is the (intentional) object. (3) And that which is transcended in this movement of passing beyond toward is the sphere of immanence. It is this theory which Heidegger aims to refute when he states: 'Transcending *Dasein* neither passes beyond a "limit" stuck into the subject in advance and restricting it to an inherent immanence, nor a "gap" which separates it from the object.'³⁶

In place of such a Husserlian theory, Heidegger offers his own, three-fold specification of the structure of transcendence, which may be summarily represented in three points: (1) That which passes beyond in the relation 'from-to' is *Dasein* itself. Here the parallel with Husserl is sufficiently close for one to be able to say that we are dealing only with a terminological recommendation – *Dasein* instead of the subject. (2) That toward which the self passes beyond is not the object but the world, with the result that the structure of transcendence can be determined as being-in-the-world. (*Wir nennen das, woraufhin das Dasein als solches transzendiert, die Welt und bestimmen jetzt die Transzendenz als in-der-Welt-sein*).³⁷ Here the point is to replace the singularity of Husserl's intentional object with a totality, a totality the preparatory notions for which are however already to be found in Husserl with his concept of the 'world-horizon' or even the 'life-world'. So here again the difference is more nominal than real. (3) Finally, that which is transcended is neither a sphere of immanence nor a gap separating self and other but rather the whole realm of objectified beings – which are transcended towards their being.

It is this third point which furnishes the key to the radical difference separating Heidegger's theory from that of Husserl. The replacement of subject with *Dasein* can be accommodated within a broader concept of the self. The difference of object and world is one which is already allowed for within the Husserlian frame. It is the refusal of the ultimate distance of self and other (introduced with the Reduction and consolidated with the disclosure of a sphere of Immanence) in favour of the immediate proximity of being-in-the-world which marks the more radical break. There is no equivalent for the Husserlian reduction. Or, if you prefer, the Heideggerian 'step back' is a step back out of the objectified world view to a more primordial involvement. Which means that the 'step back' takes *Dasein* 'closer to' not 'further away from'.

And yet even here, a more Husserlian alternative might be proposed. For the 'step back' into the ground could have been formulated as a step into a sphere of being-in-the-world wherein *Dasein* transcends itself toward the world, *qua* own. In other words, the *ownness* of the world might have been regarded as an ontological immanence running parallel to the Husserlian transcendental immanence. In which case, the structure of transcendence could have been reformulated as a transcending of the ownness sphere toward *the* world, namely, toward that in which the ownness spheres of many selves join and interconnect.

Had Heidegger taken this route, his theory of transcendence would have been committed to a progressive procedure, or at least to an essential complementarity of the regressive and the progressive procedures. In his own concept of 'world', more precisely of 'being-in-the-world', we do find a subtle admixture of a progressive with a regressive

component. In as much as being-in-the-world is treated as an original structure constitutive of the very being of *Dasein* then *Dasein* must be regarded as always being already in the world and the world as that context in which, and in which alone, entities can be encountered and disclosed. Here the progressive procedure dominates. But Heidegger is only too well aware that by 'world' is generally meant a totality of objects amongst which *Dasein* itself simply figures as one among others. To be sure, we are told that 'world makes up the unitary structure of transcendence', and that 'with this term, everything that belongs to transcendence will be named'. But the false, because ontic, concept of world will still lead to a false conception of transcendence even when the latter is conceived as that 'toward which' the movement of transcendence takes place. 'The assertion: it belongs to the essence of *Dasein* that it should be in the world . . . proves to be false.'³⁸ On the other hand, 'The thesis: being-in-the-world belongs as such to the essence of *Dasein* contains the problem of transcendence.'³⁹

In sum, the ontological is to be distinguished from the ontic concept of world along three connected lines. (1) World does not so much mean a totality of objects as rather a certain way in which this totality is to be grasped as a totality. (2) This 'way in which' is a precursory determination. (3) The precursory determination of the world as a whole is a characteristic of the being of *Dasein* itself. The question then arises: how is the relation between the ontic and the ontological concept of world to be understood?

By and large, and largely because, as a methodological principle, Heidegger's phenomenological descriptions take their start upon the ontic plane, the relation between the ontic and the ontological concept of world is regarded as a regressive relation which requires that the phenomenologist work back to the ontological from the ontic. This means that the ontic concept of world (which includes objects in the aggregate) has itself to be transcended. So that the world as that toward which the movement of transcendence takes place calls for a transcending of beings toward their being or, if you prefer, a transcending of beings apprehended in the aggregate, and outside of any essential relation to *Dasein*, toward the being-in-the-world of such beings in so far as the latter is grounded in the being of *Dasein* itself. But another, progressive procedure might have been adopted as the model for the theory of transcendence because it often is adopted by Heidegger as an explanatory procedure in *Being and Time*. This procedure consists in showing how the fundamental relation of being-in-the-world gives way to a derivative relation by way of deficient characteristics (the ready-to-hand into the present-at-hand, ontological truth into a correspondence theory of truth, ontological space and time into the formal spatio-temporal framework). Here, there would be no need for a transcending of beings toward

their being, because the being-relation would be instated from the very beginning. The critical question would then be not: how the being-relation is to be restored? but the very opposite question: how was it originally lost? In one sense this latter question is obviously the more fundamental. For the being-relation can only be restored if it was once in place. And if it was once in place then a critical question necessarily arises as to *how* it was lost, a question to which the existential structure of *Fallenness* offers a poor answer because it seems to suggest that the being relation was lost *from the very beginning*.⁴⁰

And yet there are plenty of passages in *Vom Wesen des Grundes* where an original disclosure, prior to any representation of objects, is explicitly acknowledged. 'Disclosedness of Being [*Enthülltheit des Seins*] first makes possible the revelation of what is. As the truth about Being, this disclosedness will be called ontological truth.'⁴¹ Important here is the order of priority implied in the phrase 'first makes possible'. This kind of disclosure as a truth about being is called 'ontological' and is expressly contrasted with the more derivative, because 'ontic', truth. Much more interestingly, a little later on, we find a passage in which Heidegger makes an effort to articulate more explicitly the relation between the pre-ontological and the ontological, a relation which, in *Being and Time* is left vaguely indicated as a kind of enigma (SZ, S. 12). Not only does Heidegger distinguish a pre-ontological understanding of being from a fully developed concept of being and not only does he insist that the apprehension and comprehension of being consists in nothing other than the thematization of this pre-ontological understanding, he also confirms that between the original unfolding of the former and the conclusive development of the latter many stages are to be found. 'Many steps are to be found between the pre-ontological understanding of Being and the explicit problematic of an understanding of Being.'⁴² Unfortunately, he does not spend much time on the elaboration of these intermediary stages. But he says enough to indicate that these stages might include the working-out of the meaning of those pre-given regions of being which serve to demarcate the different branches of the sciences as well as the elaboration of an *apriori* description of regional ontologies – in other words, what might be called an objective as well as a transcendental or reflective stage in the understanding of being.

In this distinction between a pre-ontological and a fully ontological conception of being we find the root of the confusion between a progressive and a regressive conception of the structure of transcendence. From a pre-ontological standpoint, being-in-the-world is an original given. Transcendence is already operative as the structure that ensures that, from the very beginning, *Dasein* finds itself in a world. The movement to the ontic sphere can then only be explained negatively as a sort of loss or surrender of ontological truth. From the standpoint of a working-out

of the discipline of ontology however, the problem is how to get back to the origin, given that one finds oneself in a world which has already been levelled down to an aggregate of objects. It is for this reason that Heidegger will connect the problem of transcendence with the ontological difference. (*Diesen Grund der ontologischen Differenz nennen wir vorgreifend die Transzendenz des Daseins.*⁴³)

Although, for Heidegger, the question of the ontological difference is always presented as the question of how beings can be transcended toward their being, although in this sense therefore, the procedure adopted is always regressive, strictly speaking, the ontological difference could still be incorporated in a conception of transcendence which adopted the reverse direction, that is, which accounted for the difference as the emergence of the ontic out of the ontological rather than as a re-discovery of the ontological on the basis of the ontic. In a provisional way, we shall give the name 'ontological delimitation of transcendence' to just such a progressive account of the emergence of the ontological difference.⁴⁴ That some such structure is called for is indicated by the fact that the re-discovery of the ontological ground is only itself possible on two conditions; first, that it originally existed as a fundamental structure of the very being of *Dasein*, and second, that it was lost, or given up or covered over. Even the regressive conception of the ontological difference therefore presupposes the progressive, which is never actually identified by name, though many of Heidegger's descriptions do presuppose some such structure.

To bring out the peculiarity of the Heideggerian position, a reverse analogy with Husserl is in order. Had Husserl argued that what is transcended in the structure of transcendence is the natural attitude and that the natural attitude is transcended towards that transcendental consciousness from the standpoint of which the objectivities presupposed by the natural attitude can furnish the field for a transcendental investigation of constitutive processes, then we should have had the transcendental equivalent of Heidegger's regressive conception of transcendence. What Heidegger calls the 'ontological difference' would then have figured as the 'transcendental difference', i.e., the difference between objects and the subjective processes in and through which they can be constituted. For Husserl however, getting out of the natural attitude and back to transcendental consciousness could never have been an end in itself. In fact it was only a beginning, the beginning of a process of disclosing the subjective processes always already (though only implicitly) at work in the natural attitude; with the result that his transcendental concept of transcendence is *foundational* in the sense that it helps to explain how it is that objects come to possess the type of objectivity which is ordinarily ascribed to them.

Much more hangs on this difference than at first meets the eye. For

Husserl, the movement back (to transcendental subjectivity) is only the preliminary to a movement of return (to the world) as a result of which what was previously simply taken for granted in a naive and unfounded fashion can now be fully and properly comprehended. In other words, the movement back is not an end in itself but is only a means to effecting a transcendental clarification of the world (just as Kant's return from the empirically conditioned to the transcendental conditions of its possibility is only the prelude to a 'Deduction' of the conditioned from its transcendental conditions). For Heidegger, on the other hand, the regressive movement back (to being-in-the-world) tends to be an end in itself. I use the word 'tends' with the appropriate caution. There are many examples of the regressive step being undertaken with a view to investigating the emergence of the objectified world view.

On the whole however, and this tendency becomes ever more marked later on, the move back is undertaken with a view to bringing to light concepts and structures which have little or nothing to do with any clarification of the objective world view. And often, it may be objected, this disregard of the ontic seems to reduce the value of the analyses to which it leads. It is in this spirit that Tugendhat, in his paper on the concept of truth, complains that, in seeking to extend the concept of truth in the way he does, Heidegger not merely confuses matters but fails to throw light upon the naive and ungrounded character of the correspondence theory of truth. In so far as the regressive movement is not complemented by a progressive procedure, the return to the ground ceases to possess any foundational value. *Fundamental ontology ceases to be foundational.*

In arguing that what is transcended in the movement of transcendence is not *Dasein* itself or an ownness sphere and that therefore the latter is not transcended toward the world in which *Dasein* always finds itself (progressive conception), but rather that it is the entire realm of beings which are transcended towards their being (regressive conception), Heidegger gives an (unnecessarily) formalistic turn to his ontological investigation, a turn which, in the end, will so dis-connect the being-beings relation that, effectively, a transcending of beings towards their being ceases to throw any reciprocal light upon the realm of beings as such. The aim is to move back (regressive), and then not forward again (progressive) but further back, and then yet further back still. Historically, as Marlène Zarader has shown (see chap. 17, vol. II of the present work), this will mean a regression to the Greeks, then more specifically to the pre-Socratics, ending up with speculation about an origin more original still than beginning Greek philosophy. And when the aim seems to be the very reverse, for example in the papers on technology (where technology is seen as the culmination of a *telos* inherent in Western philosophy from the very first), what might be called his pessimism with

regard to the historical destiny of human thinking is surely nothing but the inverse of a refusal to provide ontological foundations in the sense of a progressive genesis. Because no attempt is made to offer an ontological grounding for formal thought (in a sense comparable to that in which Husserl offers a transcendental foundation for the same), the calculative-manipulative tendencies inherent in technology are simply taken to preempt the entire domain of theoretical inquiry, leaving nothing for the philosopher to do but to retreat into a marginal 'thinking' whose use of concepts is metaphorical (and poetic) rather than literal (and scientific).

Let us summarize what has been accomplished so far. We have distinguished a regressive from a progressive procedure in the articulation of the structure of transcendence and we have suggested that, with Heidegger, the two are often not held in a complementary relation each with the other, as they are with Husserl. Further, even when a complementary relation is established between the two procedures, the priority lies with the regressive rather than with the progressive. If there is something like a regression with a view to a complementary progression, it is only in order to ground the ontic sphere with reference to *deficient* characteristics. But before we attempt to follow up the implications of this way of working with the concept of transcendence, it would be advisable to first glance briefly at other texts in which the concept of transcendence plays a role, with a view to determining whether the theme of transcendence can be connected with other themes, such as the theme of freedom, the theme of nothingness, the theme of truth and so on.

Truth and transcendence

The central theme of *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, as its title implies, is that of truth. *Wesen der Wahrheit* begins with the conventional conception of truth as adequation in order to inquire back into the ground of the relation (between words and things, knowledge and its object) which makes such a conception possible. 'The essence of adequation [*Angleichung*] is rather determined by the kind of relationship prevailing between statement and thing.'⁴⁵ The object arises out of a letting stand opposed (*Entgegenstehenlassen*) and only so can it be posited (*Gestellt*) and represented (*Vorgestellt*). Thus the critical question now becomes one of determining the ground of the inner possibility of this letting stand over against and it is answered in a preliminary way by the introduction of a concept of freedom which can only be further determined through a further investigation of the way in which freedom lets being take up a stand over against. 'The overt character [*Offenständigkeit*] of comportment as the inner possibility of rightness [*Richtigkeit*] is grounded in freedom. *The essence of truth is freedom.*'⁴⁶

With a view to a further determination of the concept of freedom, the latter is now spelt out in terms of the possibility of letting-be. The freedom to reveal something overt lets whatever 'is' at the moment *be* what it is. Freedom is disclosed as the 'letting-be of what is'.⁴⁷ It is at this point that Heidegger accomplishes an absolutely characteristic reversal which finally, and for ever, makes it impossible for his concept of truth to throw any light upon the conventional concept, not even as a grounding of the latter. He draws a contrast between *Seinlassen* and *Sicheinlassen*. ' "Letting be" [*Seinlassen*] has here the negative meaning of disregarding something, renouncing something, indifference and even neglect.'⁴⁸ Against such a negative concept of 'letting-be', Heidegger opposes his own concept of 'getting involved with beings' (*Sicheinlassen auf das Seiende* – literally, letting oneself in for) which is presented not merely as different from the former but as its very opposite. *Sicheinlassen* is then further determined in terms of uncoveredness and disclosure.

The negative concept of *Seinlassen* might have been taken in the direction of a suspension of the original relation of being-in-the-world, a suspension which lets entities be what they are rather than seeking to interpret them in terms of the self. This would have allowed room for a progressive concept of transcendence which, admittedly, would have had to take the negative form of an ontological delimitation of transcendence. Instead Heidegger adopts the regressive route while still, nevertheless, making use of the essential complementarity of the two. The result is an inconsistency which is however exploited in terms of the equi-primordially of hiddenness and un-hiddenness, of truth and error (*Irre*).

To be sure, Heidegger is well aware of the inconsistency involved in equating being-in with letting be. In *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, he links the appropriative element of being-in with willing and resolve. The essence of resolve, he tells us, consists in an un-covering through which human being is brought into the clearedness of being, and he points to §§44 and 60 of *Being and Time* as places in which the disclosive character of resolve is presented. But, he continues, the relation to being is here one of letting-be, an idea which is never explicitly developed in *Being and Time*. 'The idea that all willing should be grounded in letting-be offends the understanding', he admits, referring the reader to *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* for a clarification of this apparent inconsistency.⁴⁹

This inconsistency can perhaps best be brought out in terms of a concept which does not make its appearance in *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, even though it plays a dominant role in *Being and Time*. It is the concept of projection and, more generally, of projective understanding. Projection is, in an obvious sense, the projection of self (*Dasein*) upon, the interpretation of being in terms of that being for which the question of being first arises, human being. Such a projection does not so much let-be as rather appropriate, in the more narrowly circumscribed sense of 'making

own'. 'Letting-be' can indeed be regarded as the very opposite of 'making own', in the sense that it lets beings be what they are rather than trying to make them over into what they can be projectively interpreted as. In as much as being-in is the fundamental condition, and in as much therefore as human being is, by its very nature, disposed to interpret projectively 'as', letting-be can only arise by way of a 'step back', a 'withholding' of projecting. It would then seem reasonable to see the being-in of *Sicheinlassen* as the ground of the possibility of that *Seinlassen* (letting-be) out of which beings become available for positing, representing and so on. Such a developmental possibility is indeed suggested by Heidegger in a passage where he states:

Participation [*Sicheinlassen*] in the unhiddenness of what is does not stop there but is developed into a stepping back before beings, so that the latter may be revealed as what and how it is, may indeed be revealed in such a way that representational adequation [*vorstellende Angleichung*] gets its rightness from it [*aus ihm das Richtmaß nehme*].⁵⁰

The key to this insight lies in the phrase 'is developed into a stepping back before beings'.

The theoretical possibility inherent in this insight is however never itself developed. Instead we are offered the more standard (from a Heideggerian perspective) prospect of an uncovering which is at the same time a covering over. (*Die Entbergung des Seienden als eines solchen ist in sich zugleich die Verbergung des Seienden im Ganzen*⁵¹) – though even here a developmental possibility lies concealed. The original uncovering is presumably an ek-static uncovering of being in totality. As soon as this original uncovering becomes an uncovering of beings as such, there is at the same time a covering over of being in totality. It is in this sense that letting-be is a covering over (*Das Seinlassen ist in sich zugleich ein Verbergen*), more precisely, the covering over of being in totality.⁵²

What is lost in this hypothesis of the equi-primordially of un-covering and covering over, of un-hiddenness and hiddenness, is the very possibility of recognizing the letting-be that first makes truth (in the conventional sense) possible as an accomplishment. The root of the difficulty lies in the absence of a developmental perspective. It is one thing to say that that very being-in which, as such, is disclosive at the same time makes impossible the letting-be without which beings cannot be understood as they are in themselves and that, with the development of just such a letting-be, on the other hand, the un-covering of an original openness to being is lost, another altogether to posit the two as equi-primordial, and therefore to account for contrary characteristics in terms of one and the same structure. What is common to the two conceptions is that, in both cases, where something is gained something else is lost.

But by staging the process it becomes possible to recognize the rationale behind the development. Instead, the equi-primordially of hiddenness and un-hiddenness is presented as the inevitability of a degeneration of being-in-the-truth, which goes along with the denigration of the represented world as philosophically insignificant, with the refusal to acknowledge, for example, the colossal achievement of Aristotle's invention of Logic (in the conventional, apophantic sense). Instead, the invention of logic becomes the colossal error through which Western metaphysics is set on the wrong track in so far as it loses the original sense of the *logos* as the unity of thinking and being.

It is not the one-sidedness of the Heideggerian view which bothers me so much as the fact that by insisting so one-sidedly upon a dismissal of presentification (and all that goes with it) as a merely 'ontic affair', he makes it impossible for metaphysics (in the sense in which he is still ready to admit metaphysics in the very terms of the treatise *What is Metaphysics?*) to perform the grounding role for which, in certain respects, his fundamental ontology had already prepared it. Had he, for instance, adopted the developmental perspective suggested earlier, he would have been able to give an account of what, from the standpoint of the conventional doctrine of truth as adequation remains, and must remain, unthought, namely, the nature of the relation that prevails between the assertion and what is asserted in and through the assertion. The letting-be which first makes it possible for objects to stand over against could then be understood as an existential modification of appropriative projection. At the same time, the *Sich-einlassen* of appropriative projection would assume its proper place as that primordial disclosure of being in totality which is covered over with the step-back into letting-be.

The grounds for this deliberate one-sidedness seem to me to lie in the regressive methodology which Heidegger habitually employs. Beginning typically upon the ontic plane, the entire thrust of his thinking is directed towards an opening up of what has already been closed down. But if the starting point which is assumed had been the 'beginning thinking' itself, then the closing down (from the standpoint of being) could have been understood as an opening up (from the standpoint of beings). And this, surely, is exactly how the transition was grasped by those very philosophers who helped to bring the presentified world view into being. Aristotle surely never imagined that he was doing philosophy a disservice with his invention of subject-predicate logic, nor could Descartes ever have suspected that his original insight into a new way of letting beings be would be condemned as a kind of commonsensical superficiality which stands in the way of any genuine philosophical progress. The superficial understanding against which Descartes struggled in his day was the medieval view of the world as God's creation.⁵³ In ridding the

world of the entelechies and teleologies which medieval philosophy had inherited from Aristotle but which had hardened and congealed into unquestionable assumptions, Descartes cleared the ground for a new scientific conception of the world which has only recently itself hardened into a dogmatic assumption, an assumption the grounds for which Heidegger quite rightly questions, though, to my mind, in the wrong way. Thus it is that with Heidegger we experience the strange phenomenon of progressing backward. The further back we go (historically), the more we progress (ontologically). And of course this 'progress into the past' also implies a 'regress into the future' which inevitably brings with it a tendency to denounce the last results of our intellectual development as the ultimate regression into a bottomless abyss.

Only by understanding how the scientific world-view came about will it ever be possible to arrive at a satisfactory evaluation of the motives which led to its occurrence. To suggest, as Heidegger does in his *Nachwort zu: Was ist Metaphysik?*, that the will to will (as the ground of the will to power) is what set philosophy on the fatal course towards science fails to do justice either to philosophy or to science. Is it really plausible to see in Newton or Einstein (both men of the utmost unworldliness, even, one might say, Godliness), for example, leading exponents of the will to power? Is Husserl's ideal of dis-interested inquiry really only a cunningly concealed disguise for a will-full desire to push the domineering tendencies of human subjectivity to the ultimate extreme? Or would it not be more reasonable to see in Heidegger's own regressive ontology the basis for a lapse into primitivity which goes some way to understanding his, at least partial, sympathy for the Nazi cause – without question the most wilful political philosophy of modern times?

And yet, whatever Heidegger's earlier inclinations, his later philosophy is largely devoted to the development of a new regressive initiative which will overcome the will-full implications of his first philosophy, a *Gelassenheit* which will make of human being an instrument of being and of the self-unfolding of being, rather than the other way around. So perhaps it is not so much the regression to the ground as the way in which this regression is accomplished which stands in the way of an ontological philosophy consistently devoted to an overcoming of tendencies the frightfulness of which Heidegger's own historical epoch makes abundantly clear and of which Heidegger himself became very well aware. Perhaps there is a way in which ontological progress, in the Hegelian sense, can be reconciled with ontological progress in the Heideggerian sense, in which the forward march of reason can be reconciled with a backward-looking recuperation of the origin? Perhaps the difficulty lies in the fact that Heidegger's regression is too linear (as was Hegel's progression) and this despite the circularity which features as an inherent part of his own hermeneutical procedure. Is there some way in which

the regression to the ground can be re-conceived in non-linear terms without, at the same time, leading to a pointless repetition; whereby, in other words, the movement back to the ground can, at the same time be conceived as a movement on?

This is the point at which it becomes pertinent to contrast the Heideggerian way back (what might be called an objective regression) with what I have elsewhere called the 'reflective detour'. If, as I maintain, ontological philosophy (in the Heideggerian sense of the discipline of ontology) only arises as a reaction to (and therefore on the basis of) transcendental philosophy, then the accomplishments of transcendental philosophy cannot be so easily set aside in the attempt to develop an ontology. Rather the contrary, it will be the reflective resources first made available by transcendental philosophy which orient and direct the movement of return. And perhaps that to which we need to return, and to which the resources of phenomenological reflection will make it possible for us to return, is something much older and therefore (in the Heideggerian sense) much *wiser* even than Greek philosophy, a way of thinking which first made its appearance over a thousand years before the 'beginning thinking' of the Greeks and which was itself already old by the time Greek philosophy began to make its mark, namely, the Vedantic philosophy.

Conclusion: a genetic theory of transcendence

In this final section I want to try and tie up a number of loose ends left hanging at various points in the course of my critical assessment of Heidegger's (and Husserl's) theory of transcendence. This will be done by opening up what might be called a developmental perspective, a perspective which requires that we not merely distinguish several different concepts of transcendence but order these concepts in a 'logical' succession.

We will begin with Heidegger's distinction between a pre-ontological way of being and the discipline of ontology. However, unlike Heidegger, we shall want to argue that the pre-ontological way of being does also call for an appropriate concept of transcendence which, in so far as it points towards and so grounds the objective order, must be integrated in a progressive theory of transcendence. The starting point is the being-in-the-world of human being which is disclosive of entities in a quite distinctive and non-ontic way. Heidegger's later distinction between the 'thing' and the object⁵⁴ may provide a clue as to just such a non-ontic disclosure. In his Kant book, he goes even further than this and suggests the concept of the 'image' as a sort of prototypical object.⁵⁵ We have also suggested that it might be possible to integrate the immanence-

transcendence distinction within such a primordial concept of the ground. Immanence would then refer to the ownness of the world first opened up on the basis of projective disclosure, while the term transcendence would be reserved not merely for the process whereby such a sphere of immanence is transcended toward, but also for that inter-connection of own worlds which might be called 'the world' in an ontologically full and complete sense, the sense in which, for example, Heidegger interpreted Heraclitus fragment 7. 'To the awake there belongs one, common world. Each sleeper, on the contrary, is oriented toward his own world.'⁵⁶

In order however, to allow for the emergence of the ontic order on the basis of just such a progressive theory of transcendence, something in the way of a 'step back' is called for, a step back out of the dimension of being-in and into the dimension of representative thinking. The holding before of *Vorstellung* is then to be understood out of a holding back of the self, a self-withholding which first lets beings be what they are. We shall give the name 'ontological delimitation of transcendence' to just such a restrictive self-withholding. Instead of letting itself be *in*, (*Sich-einlassen*) human being withholds itself in such a way that beings are allowed to be what they are (*Seinlassen*). Through such a self-withholding, there arises something like that holding before (*Vorstellen*) without which an objective conception of entities would not be possible. In this sense, self-withholding would imply a restriction of the sphere of inherence of human being in being.

Upon the objective plane, the structure of transcendence is lost. It is replaced either with a naive realism which simply takes for granted the transcendence of the world, and therefore never speaks of it in terms of the structure of transcendence, or, with a characterization of the world as transcendent. In this respect, Kant's transcendental philosophy forms an interesting transitional figure. By aligning the immanent-transcendent distinction with a distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal (or between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves), Kant opened the way to an analysis of the immanental sphere (the sphere of appearances) which, however, he is never able to understand as a sphere of immanence (in the Husserlian sense) and precisely because there is nothing like an explicit reduction to be found in the *Critique*.⁵⁷ For all that, as Heidegger has shown in his Kant interpretation (and in my Kant interpretation I have taken the immanental implications of the A edition of the Deduction even further than Heidegger), the A edition of the Deduction can fruitfully be interpreted as a major attempt to solve that problem of transcendence first opened up with the Cartesian method of hyperbolic doubt.

Strictly speaking however we need not one but two concepts of the 'step back' in order to accommodate the various stages of the emergence of beings out of, and on the basis of, their being, first, a step back which

prepares the way for an objective thinking about being and then a further step back which prepares the way for a critical reflection upon the latter. The latter step back is quite explicitly indicated by Husserl with his concept of the reduction, even though, in the Kantian philosophy, it remains implicit (evoked in the regression from what is, to an analysis of the conditions of its possibility).

In the Husserlian context of a transcendental philosophy based upon the disclosure of a sphere of immanence, a quite new theory of (transcendental) transcendence arises, and arises in response to the question of how the subject is ever able to transcend the limits of the sphere of immanence, come out of itself in such a way as to reach the object.

With the shift from the objective to the transcendental or reflective plane however, we seem to have lost the Heideggerian motif of a regression to the ground. That such a motif is still operative, even in the context of transcendental philosophy, is however evidenced by Husserl's own genetic phenomenology, which attempts its characteristic regression to the life-world on a transcendental basis. We shall give the name 'ontological transposition' to just such a 'transcendental' regression to the ground. Both in my Kant book and in my study of the Husserlian phenomenology, I have made extensive use of this concept of an 'ontological transposition' which I shall therefore make no further attempt to articulate in the context of this summary conclusion.

The structure of an 'ontological transposition' changes the very nature of the regressive movement back to the ground. Instead of assuming the form of a regression from the ontic to the ontological sphere, a transcending of beings toward their being, this conclusive regression now assumes the form of a leap from the transcendental back into the ontological, a leap which can leap over the ontic or objective order precisely because transcendental philosophy has always already taken account of the objective order and indeed is set up with a view to undertaking just such a critical assessment of the objective order. In more properly Heideggerian language, the 'ontological transposition' offers a new way of understanding the development of the discipline of ontology, a way which no longer ignores or circumvents the achievements of transcendental philosophy but precisely takes account of them, and has to take account of them, as the very condition for undertaking a regression to the ground. In the context of such a conclusive regression, many of the themes of Heidegger's own regressive understanding of transcendence can be picked up and further developed. For instance, letting-be (*Seinlassen*) no longer needs to be restricted to a species of self-withholding. Rather the contrary, it can now assume the form of a holding oneself into (*Sich-einlassen*), an involvement which is however non-appropriative, in the sense that by first completing the circuit of its own becoming human being overcomes the wilfulness of any primordial appropriation. Thus

appropriation, in the limited sense of 'making own', can now become the event of appropriation – *Ereignen* in the sense of *Ereignis*. The complementarity of the progressive and the regressive conception of transcendence is now no longer that of a regression to the ground making possible a grounding of what has been transcended, namely beings, but becomes a progression through the several stages of a genesis which finally turns around upon itself and leaps back into the ground, but only in so far as the recovery of the ground is now understood as the reflective re-appropriation of an original way of being of human being – the discipline of ontology as the articulation of a pre-ontological way of being.

But this paper was called the 'essence of transcendence'. Was this an incidental nomenclature in the sense that Heidegger sometimes seems to mean no more by the structure of the essence than an ambiguous linguistic gesture towards something profound and important (see Greider's paper in volume I of the present work)? With a view to furnishing the concept of the essence with a determinate content, I would now like to refer briefly to a conception of the essence (taken over from Hegel) which, in the context of *Being and Becoming*, has been employed to regulate the entire ontological genesis.⁵⁷

In the *Little Logic* (from the *Encyclopedia*), Hegel introduces his Doctrine of the Essence with a concept of the essence defined along the following lines.

The essence, as mediated through the very negativity of its own self-relation, stands in relation to itself only in so far as it stands in relation to the Other, and so ceases to be something immediately self-subsistent and becomes instead something posited or mediated. (*Das Wesen, als das durch die Negativität seiner selbst sich mit sich vermittelnde Sein, ist die Beziehung auf sich selbst, nur indem sie Beziehung auf Anderes ist, das aber unmittelbar nicht als Seiendes, sondern als ein Gesetztes und Vermitteltes ist.*)⁵⁸

Two things are to be noted. First, the structure of the essence mediates the immediacy of the concept of Being. Second, this mediating relation takes place as a relation whereby the self is only able to relate itself to itself by way of a relation to the Other. Of course, in the context of the Logic, the self in question is nothing less than the Fichtean Being-itself. But, in the alternative context of a Daseins analytik, this structure can be taken over and applied to the being of human being with the following result: the self only is *what* it is *through* that to which it relates itself as something other than itself.

In the context of the three principal stages of my genetic ontology, this structure of the essence can be differentiated with a view to accommodating what I have called the 'ontological delimitation of transcend-

ence'. First and most originally, that *to* which human being relates itself and *through* which therefore it comes to be what it is, is nothing other than Being. This is taken to mean that *Being* is the locus of the essence. Secondly, that *to* which human being relates itself and *through* which therefore it comes to be what it is, is the World. This is taken to mean that the *World* is now the locus of the essence. Third and last, that *to* which human being relates itself and *through* which therefore it comes to be what it is, is the self. This is taken to mean that the *self* is now the locus of the essence. This movement from a location of the structure of the essence in Being, in the World and in the Self is precisely what is meant, in general, by the ontological delimitation of transcendence.

But the general principle of an 'ontological delimitation of transcendence' has two instantiations. On the one hand, it regulates the internal movement of the first and most properly ontological stage in the overall genesis. That is, in Heideggerian terms, it explains the movement from the ontological to the ontic.⁵⁹ On the other hand, it also regulates the movement of the three stages which make up the genesis as a whole (originary, objective, reflective). That the movement out of the ab-original being-relation pre-figures a genesis which also includes within its compass the world of the natural attitude and the transcendently reduced sphere of consciousness means that the movement away from the ground never *really* leaves the ground but only *appears* to do so in order to make possible a conclusive regression to the ground (the discipline of ontology as the reflective re-appropriation of a pre-ontological way of being).

In as much as the overall genesis of human being is regulated by the structure of the essence, this same structure also suffices to locate all the relevant concepts of transcendence with which we have been concerned. First and originally, human being has its being *in* being. It is for this reason that *being-in* is a constitutive characteristic of the being of human being originally. Ontological transcendence (together with its own appropriate concept of immanence) emerges as a function of this original condition of being-in. From the standpoint of the secondary stage in the overall genesis however, the world to which the sphere of inherence is then reduced is the world of the natural attitude (the material universe). The philosophical positions which go by the name of 'realism', 'materialism' and so on result from just such an 'interpretation' of human reality in terms of categories derived not from human being itself but from beings whose mode of being is not that of being human. In the context of such a realist world view, the significance of transcendence is lost, since that in which human being now finds itself is simply *assumed* to be there quite distinct and independent of consciousness. Finally, the location of the essence in the self corresponds to that opening up of a sphere of immanence which results from the phenomenological reduction.

And which calls for its own correspondingly appropriate concept of transcendence – as the transcending of the sphere of immanence.

Furthermore, that the structure of the essence which regulates the overall genesis is itself pre-figured in a threefold movement within the ground, that therefore, and in the final analysis, the movement away from the ground can be seen to be one which merely brings human being back to the ground again, means that the structure of the essence also accounts for the 'ontological transposition' – and therefore for the possibility of the discipline of ontology *as* the reflective re-appropriation of an original way of being of human being. To speak in Heraclitean terms, the ontological ground (like the *logos*) has nothing to do with a beginning in time but remains that eternal source *from* which all takes its start, *through* which all is steered, and *to* which all must consequently return – in order to start all over again.

Seen in this light (summarily represented in these few concluding paragraphs), the structure of the essence can be seen to regulate the entire genesis of human being and therefore to exhaustively pre-determine the ontological relations which obtain between the several concepts of transcendence which we have sought to distinguish and to demarcate. To put it the other way around, the concept of transcendence is itself an expression of the structure of the essence. Hence: the essence of transcendence.

Notes

1 Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, from *Wegmarken*, GA 9 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann), S. 160.

2 Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, tr. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson as *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 62 (H. 38).

3 Edmund Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, hrsg Walter Biemel, *Gesammelte Werke* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), tr. William Alston and George Nakhnikian as *The Idea of Phenomenology* (Nijhoff, 1964), p. 28.

4 Husserl, *Idea*, p. 3.

5 The English translation uses the term 'genuine' to render *reel*. There is of course a difficulty in as much as the contrast *reel*-real is not reproducible in English. But I propose to use the term 'actual' which has the advantage of including the stem 'act' to connote the act side of the act-object structure of intentionality.

6 Husserl, *Idea*, p. 3.

7 *ibid.*, pp. 6–7.

8 *ibid.*, p. 6.

9 *ibid.*, p. 28.

10 Edmund Husserl, *Ideen I*, hrsg Walter Biemel, *Gesammelte Werke* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), tr. Boyce Gibson as *Ideas* (New York: Macmillan, 1931), p. 367.

11 Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, tr. James

Churchill as *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 22.

12 Heidegger, *Kant*, p. 20.

13 *ibid.*, p. 81.

14 *ibid.*, p. 124.

15 *ibid.*, p. 128.

16 *ibid.*

17 Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, tr. Norman Kemp-Smith as *Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Macmillan, 1929), p. 12.

18 Kant, *Critique*, p. 152.

19 Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 249 (H. 205).

20 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 415 (H. 363).

21 *ibid.*, p. 417 (H. 365).

22 *ibid.*, p. 417 (H. 366).

23 *ibid.*, pp. 417–18 (H. 366).

24 Martin Heidegger, *Einführung in der Metaphysik*, tr. Ralph Manheim as *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 2.

25 Martin Heidegger, *Wegmarken GA 9* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann), S. 111.

26 *ibid.*, S. 114.

27 *ibid.*, S. 117.

28 *ibid.*, S. 119.

29 Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen des Grundes (VWG)* from *Wegmarken*, S. 125, cf. S. 135.

30 VWG, S. 133.

31 *ibid.*

32 *ibid.*, S. 123.

33 *ibid.*, S. 126.

34 *ibid.*, S. 134.

35 *ibid.*, S. 133.

36 *ibid.*, S. 136.

37 *ibid.*, S. 137.

38 *ibid.*, S. 139.

39 *ibid.*

40 See my paper: 'Who is Dasein? Towards an ethics of authenticity', chap. 57, vol. IV of the present work.

41 VWG, S. 130.

42 *ibid.*, S. 131.

43 *ibid.*, S. 133.

44 This notion of an 'ontological delimitation of transcendence' is one which more properly belongs in the context of my ontological phenomenology. In the alternative context of an epochal interpretation of the history of modern philosophy, it assumes the parallel form of what I call a 'descendence of transcendence'. That is, the Rationalist epoch is interpreted as one which 'solves' the problem of transcendence with reference to a *transcendent* principle (God), the transcendental, with reference to a *transcendental* principle (transcendental subjectivity), while it is only in the ontological epoch that the problem gets solved, or better 'resolved' with reference to an *ontological* principle (embodiment). This shift from a transcendent, through a transcendental, and so on to an ontological resolution of the problem of transcendence finds its equivalent, in *Being and Becoming* (see vol. I, chap. 4, n. 46 of the present work for further details), in

the shift from the aboriginal stage of the Natural Soul, through that of the World Soul, to that of the Actual Soul.

45 VWG, S. 181.

46 *ibid.*, S. 183.

47 *ibid.*, S. 185.

48 *ibid.*

49 Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 17.

50 VWG, S. 186.

51 *ibid.*, S. 195.

52 *ibid.*, S. 190.

53 Of course, Descartes thought he was preserving this conception, indeed furnishing proofs of God's existence, continual creativity, etc.

54 This distinction forms the basis of Heidegger's later Kant study which goes by the name: *What is a Thing?* An equivalent distinction also forms the basis of Merleau-Ponty's reflections upon the 'concrete object'.

55 See esp. §20 'Image and schema'. In my Kant book I took Heidegger's analyses further than he would perhaps have been prepared to take them himself by talking about a 'world of images'; *Kant and the Foundations of Metaphysics*, Part Four, 4 e.

56 Cited in VWG, S. 141. This is also the thrust of Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity as presented, for instance, in *Cartesian Meditations V*, though in this latter text the task of linking distinctive 'own worlds' into one common world view is done by way of the concept of a Monadic Community.

57 The articulation of the relevant structure of the essence occurs in the Introduction to *Being and Becoming*. But a summary review of the position laid down in this Introduction is to be found in an edition of *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, II (1) (1988).

58 G. W. F. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, hrsg Nicolin und Pöggeler (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1969), S. 123.

59 I have adopted as my guide to the internal structure of the first and most original stage the threefold doctrine of the Soul as presented by Hegel in his *Anthropology*, the text in which he comes closest to what might be called a *Daseins analytik*. Thus it is the progression from the Natural, through the World (not the Feeling) to the Actual Soul which marks the movement from the ontological to the ontic sphere. But this 'ontological delimitation' within the ground also pre-figures a delimitation which occurs upon the more extensive plane of the overall genesis.

The language of the event: the event of language

Theodore Kisiel

With the recent publication of the already well-known lecture of January 31, 1962 entitled 'Time and being', Heidegger's thought seems to have at last officially come full circle, and appears to bring some degree of completion to all that Heidegger had announced he would undertake in his prospectus in *Being and Time* (SZ, 39), though not exactly as it was announced there. The second part of this prospectus, dealing with the 'phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology', has proliferated far beyond the announced three divisions, notably in the Nietzsche volumes and including some of the lectures and essays most recently collected in *Wegmarken*. The outstanding omission has always been the third division of the first part, entitled 'Time and being', which was to have completed the chain begun by the two divisions published as *Being and Time*: These two divisions, which concluded by showing that temporality was the Being of the being which understands Being, of Dasein, was to have been completed by 'the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of Being'. In the *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger explains that this division was withheld because the available language of metaphysics (presumably including such phrases as 'transcendental horizon') was inadequate to express the turn from 'Being and time' to 'Time and being' (PW, 72). This is not to say that no breakthrough to the articulation of this turn was made until the recent lecture on the issue. In the same letter, Heidegger indicates that the lecture 'On the essence of truth' (1930–43) already gained a measure of insight into this turn. And according to Heidegger, the pivotal 'concept' of this turn, *das Ereignis* (the appropriating event), was already at work in his thought during this period (US, 260), appearing thematically in the Hölderlin essays and in 'The origin of the artwork' (1936), although it received no sustained treatment in his publications until *Identity and Difference* (1957) and *Underway to Language* (1959).

The incubation period was evidently necessary in order to develop a language suitable to express the issues and relationships involved in the turn. Not that the long preparation and waiting period for the necessary transformation is over. Heidegger continues to reiterate that he is still 'underway to language'. The 1962 lecture still proceeds 'cautiously' and 'with foresight' (ZS, 20), without hindsight back to metaphysics and its readily available language, groping its way toward a remarkable realm that does not readily yield to articulation. Not that an entirely new language of neologisms must be invented to bring the domain of the appropriating event to the fore. Rather, what Heidegger seeks is 'a transformed relationship to the essence of the old language'.¹

Heidegger's use of language has long been a philosophical notoriety. Carnap's parody of Heidegger's 'propositions' on Nothing has become a stock in trade in the positivistic debunking of metaphysics. Heidegger's response to such critiques are characteristically comprehensive. For him, the linguistic standards of logical positivism are simply the natural conclusion of a long tradition of the metaphysical approach to language, and hence themselves metaphysical. The first step in transforming our attitude to language is then to 'destroy' the logical-grammatical interpretation of language, centered on the proposition and its subject-predicate relationship, that a metaphysics of substance and of subject has conveyed to us, in order to clear the way for orienting language to the pre-predicative realm which is its source. It is in this re-orientation that Heidegger looks for new possibilities of expression that would hold themselves closer to this source. It is to some of these linguistic strategies that at once turn from metaphysical ways of speaking and toward a more fundamental penetration of the origins of language that we wish to address ourselves here. The choice of possibilities are manifold, e.g., Heidegger's interest in poetry and in Oriental ways of speaking, but the focus of our attention will be on the language of the event. Since the appropriating event lies at the very center of Heidegger's thought, the most basic traits of the transmutation of language that he seeks are to be found here. A more detailed characterization of the background and the approaches to this domain will help point the way in our investigation. Special emphasis will be placed on the linguistic devices used in these approaches, the first of which is the vicarious role which the 'and' plays in Being 'and' Time.

On the 'and' in Being and Time

It is often said that Heidegger is a man of one thought: Being. To say this relates him to a long tradition of Western philosophy, but it does not truly indicate what his unique question is. What we must do is to

get a glimpse of his central concern, of that one thought which has troubled him from the beginning, that draws him over and over again to the effort of thinking and that gathers all of his reflections together. What we are after is what Heidegger himself calls *die Sache*, 'that which concerns thought, that which for thought never ceases to be a question, that which is the very point of the question' (FP, 183).

His answers to Fr. Richardson's questions concerning his *Denkweg* are particularly enlightening on this point. Referring to the Aristotelian statement that 'being is said in many ways', which opens Brentano's inquiry into the manifold sense of being in Aristotle, the book which led him from the gymnasium into philosophy, Heidegger tells us that 'latent in this phrase is the question which determined my *Denkweg*: what is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permeates all of its multiple meanings?'² But before the 'common origin' of the polyvalence of Being can be established, a prior question must first be answered, namely, 'whence does Being as such (not merely being as being) receive its determination?'³ The phenomenological character of the quest for the source of the *Sinngebung* implied in this question only came to the fore later when Heidegger came in contact with the phenomenological 'method', which he interprets for himself in terms of the basic Greek senses of *phainesthai* (to show itself) and *logos* (to make manifest). This he identifies as the first of three decisive insights that clarified the venture of considering the Being-question as a question which seeks the sense (*Sinn*) of Being. The second was the interpretation of *aletheia* as unconcealment, gleaned from reading Aristotle, and the third the recognition that presence is the fundamental trait of Being as *ousia*. And Being as presence develops into the question of Being in terms of its time character.

Such is the complex of questions and insights which sets the stage for the problematic of Dasein posed in 1927 under the title *Being and Time*, in which 'the "and" in this title holds within itself the central problem. Neither Being nor time have given up their hitherto constituted meanings, but a more original interpretation must establish their justification and their limits' (KM, 219). That Being is related to time is already contained in 'the possibilities prepared for us by the "ancients"' (SZ, 19) who conceived Being as permanence in presence (*aei on*, *ousia*, *parousia*) and the whatness of beings as 'that which has always been', which in turn was one form of *a priori* and hence 'earlier' (KM, 216-17). And time has long functioned as a criterion for distinguishing realms of Being into the temporal, atemporal and supratemporal, so that even eternity was interpreted as a *nunc stans*, a permanent now. And yet why Being should spontaneously be conceived in terms of time has never really been made an explicit theme of philosophical inquiry. In opposition to this obliviousness, Heidegger sets himself the task of showing 'that and how the central

problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time, when rightly seen and rightly explained' (SZ, 18). In order for metaphysics in its entire history to be properly founded, one must make explicit the hidden relations of Being and time, the terms in which the very first thinkers of the question spontaneously expressed the issue, in which terms present thinkers continue to express themselves, manifesting that 'the understanding of Being in Dasein' almost of itself projects Being upon time' (KM, 219). The most apparent juncture of Being and time, at least in 1927, is then *Dasein* itself.

The issue of Being and time seems to resemble the well-known metaphysical distinctions of Being and becoming, Being and appearance, and Being and thinking. But the 'and' of the metaphysical distinctions is disjunctive: Being *and not*. . . . It serves to introduce something other than Being, which delimits Being and still somehow belongs to it. But 'in the formula "Being and time", "Being" is not something other than "time" inasmuch as "time" is named as the forename for the truth of Being, where truth is the essencing of Being and therefore Being itself' (WM, 17). Therefore, the essence of time considered within the question of Being points toward a completely different realm of inquiry than the metaphysical distinctions (EM, 157). And yet the most consequential of these metaphysical distinctions, Being and thinking, can be turned in the very same direction by investigating thinking not as a power of men but as a power of aboriginal Being, as the first essay in *Identity and Difference* does.

All of Heidegger is then an attempt to read Being and time into one another. Being and time are 'convertible' terms, i.e., they 'turn together'. And the thrust of the later Heidegger converges on a focus of thought in which Being 'and' time are read into one another to such a degree that they become One in a simple center which is the source of both. This 'and', left unspecified by the early Heidegger, is now given the singular and proper name of *das Ereignis* and described as the e-vent that appropriates Being and time, the It that gives both, the third that has always been first, and as such, the secret power hidden in both Being and time and holding the two in a relationship of reserve. But the two terms being unified have also developed in the course of the *Denkweg*. Hence he now states that 'the task of thought better perceived now needs a more appropriate determination of the theme which had otherwise been indicated under the title *Being and Time*. The title ought now to read *Presence and Clearing* [*Anwesenheit und Lichtung*]' (FP, 173).

It is in these deepened terms that Heidegger finally understands his preliminary question. 'Whence does Being as such receive its determination?' and its answer: 'Being is determined by the reach of time'. And in reply to the first question, it appears that the simple unified 'determination' of Being, the 'common origin' which pervades all of its

multiple meanings is now the event out of which Being as presence and time as clearing become apropos to each other.

If instead of 'time' we substitute: clearing of the self-concealing of presenting [*Anwesen*], then Being is determined by the reach of time. This comes about, however, only insofar as the clearing of self-concealing assumes in its want a thought corresponding to it. Presenting (Being) belongs in the clearing of self-concealing (time). Clearing of self-concealing produces presenting (Being) . . . this belonging and producing rest in an appropriation and are called event.⁴

Presenting and clearing

Now that the direction of Heidegger's thrust into the 'and' has been pointed out, we must follow through with a brief development of the content of its two poles. As already indicated, the two terms cannot be considered different from one another. Both refer to the essence of time. Both describe the process of unconcealment, the truth of Being. Both accordingly bear a reference to the ultimate concealment. The presenting process (*Anwesen*) is at once an absenting process (*Abwesen*). Essence (*Wesen*) for Heidegger is accordingly understood verbally in terms of an interplay of presence and absence. And clearing is always understood in terms of the background of obfuscation from which it frees itself.

But each of the terms makes its appearance in the Heideggerian opus in a different way, from a different source, in different contexts, and therefore carrying differing nuances, which is precisely the source of the difficulties of bringing them together in the turn. Presence and its presenting process are the temporal terms for Being which Heidegger finds in the Western tradition and accepts as such, while constantly mulling the secret essence of time which lies hidden and unthought in these terms. Presence more often than not is used as a variant expression of the ontological difference of Being and being, viz., the presenting of what is present, which emphasizes its association with a long tradition of metaphysics concerned with beings to the neglect of Being. And the various missions of presence sent by the appropriating event constitute the history of metaphysics.

Clearing, on the other hand, is that within which beings can present themselves, the free and open space which grants us access to the beings which we are not and to the beings which we are, the leeway and playing field of the world. More basically, when verbally understood, clearing is the regioning of a region, the expansive opening which permits an outlet for free play and enables presenting to take place and thus lets being be. As the enabling element, the clearing is not only that within which

beings present themselves, but also that by which things appear. As the site of openness, it is the here of Being, Da-sein.

Dasein was the preliminary pivotal concept of the first part of Heidegger's original prospectus for executing the turn to the event, just as its second part was to 'destroy' the traditional conception of time in order to prepare the ancient conception of *Anwesen* for the turn. In *Being and Time*, Dasein as Being-in-the-world is identified with the clearing, in the introduction to the well-known sections which elaborate the constitution of the here as the thrown and projected linguistic realm of meaning which is man's understanding of Being (SZ, 133). Here, it is also pointed out that a long tradition of *Lichtmetaphysik* has described this understanding figuratively as a *lumen naturale*. But the light of reason interpreted as a reified power somehow implanted in us is precisely what Heidegger from the beginning strives to surpass, in order to establish the ontological ground for any act of illumination or intuitive seeing. Such a backtracking ultimately leads to a reading of the traditional definition of man, the living being possessing *logos*, instead as the being possessed by *logos*, where *logos* is now (among other things) the indigenous field of language in which he lives, moves and has his Being.

Furthermore, even though *Lichtung* suggests *Licht* and hence has been translated as 'lighting-up process', Heidegger strives to surpass the *Lichtmetaphysik* from Plato on and to backtrack into the ground that precedes as well as makes possible such an interpretation. The clearing as such is neutral with regard to its medium and mode of reception, and sets free sounds, for example, as well as sights. For Heidegger, even more basic than the *Licht* of *Lichtung* is its metaphorical reference to a clearing in the wood which is first cleared by a process of lightening rather than lighting, a thinning of the thicket (FP, 170–1, 190–1). Obstacles must first be cleared *away* before obscurities can be cleared *up*. The disencumbering disclosure is first necessary to release the clearing for illumination. Parenthetically, it may be noted how the spatial metaphor which permeates language through and through continues to crop up in any attempt to discuss time, where, for example, the clearing continues to be described as a 'temporal playing field' (*Zeit-Spiel-Raum*).

From the beginning, the clearing process was conceived as temporal through and through. *Being and Time* concludes that it is ecstatic temporality which originally clears the here of Dasein and which unifies its articulated structure in terms of the three dimensions of time (SZ, 351). As the *ekstatikon* pure and simple, temporality is the condition of the possibility of the ex-sistence that Dasein is. Time is the primordial 'ex' that extends Dasein in its scope and limits, which determines the kind of understanding of Being which man has, appropriate to his time. 'With the disclosure of the "here" grounded in ecstatically stretched temporality, a "time" is allotted to Dasein' (SZ, 410).

This tensile character of time and its tenses is maintained in the 1962 lecture 'Time and being' in the way time is given in the event, as an offer of presence that reaches (*Reichen*) and that thereby defines the reach (*Reichweite*) of a region (*Bereich*). The three time dimensions constitute three different modes of reaching and of offering presence. In reaching to one another, the three dimensions of time not only establish a play of presence and absence, but clear for themselves a temporal playing field. This reciprocal interplay is under the sway of a fourth dimension in which the unity of authentic time reposes, an incipient offering and reaching-extending which clears the three dimensions by holding them apart and together in proximity, a proximating proximity which at once denies what has been and restrains what is to come and so conceals as well as clears, and clears only when the time is 'ripe', appropriate (ZS, 46–9). For 'the proximity which proximates is itself the appropriating event' (US, 196).

And its last word is silence. For the event is not a permanent presence, but instead gives itself by withdrawing itself. It is this withdrawing mystery which provides the permanent origin of all clearing. Accordingly, the clearing itself is not a fixed stage with its curtain always raised where the play of beings runs its course, but a shifting scene that fades into the background only to emerge anew. Because the event withdraws, it is still the indeterminate 'There is' of the Ur-phenomena of Being and time, the *Lethe* at the very heart of *aletheia* that continues to draw thought forward.

To describe the indescribable

With its principle of *zu den Sachen selbst*, phenomenology has acclimated us to a movement of radical regression which strives to undercut the constructions of the natural attitude, science and metaphysics in order to manifest the fundamental experiential structures that found them. The most fundamental and all-pervasive structure is that of intentionality, at once constituting and intuitive, productive and revelatory, active and receptive, and variously described by Husserl as a transcendental life experiencing the world in a 'living present', by Heidegger as the event of unconcealment in which thinking and Being are the 'same' in a point of intimacy between Being and man which precedes all distinction, by Sartre as a pre-reflective action of revealing the world, by Merleau-Ponty in terms of the active human body perceiving a world of ambiguity. Not that these formulations exhaust the issue. As Heidegger puts it in his foreword to Husserl's lectures on time constitution, 'the term "intentionality" is no all-explanatory word but one which designates a central problem'. In Husserl's words, we are standing before 'the deepest

essential bonds between reason and being in general, the puzzle of all puzzles'.⁵

The regress takes us to the root of human experience itself, in a radical effort to get to the bottom of things which ultimately reaches a point where the bottom falls out and gives way to an abyss (*Abgrund*), an undifferentiated and indeterminate chaos, 'the chasm out of which the Open opens itself' (*HD*, 61). Chaos here is thus not to be taken in the static sense of sheer disorder and confusion, but as a 'drive, flow, and motion, whose order is *hidden* and whose law is not immediately known' (*NI*, 566), 'the hidden, self-overflowing, unmastered excess of life' (*NI*, 568). We are before a radical beginning that posits itself beyond all distinction, as the immediate, the simple, the element, the *Lethe* of *aletheia*.

The drive to grasp experience by its umbilical cord takes us back to the moment of incipient pregnancy where meaning first takes hold in human experience, the original upsurge of 'reason' in experience, a fullness of meaning to be found in the very immediacy of experience, the ultimate *Sinnggebung* whose immediacy and spontaneous genesis of meaning at once find their apt expression in the double-entendre of the German *Es gibt*. Following what he considered to be a more faithful adherence to the phenomenological prescription *zur Sache selbst*, it was Heidegger who radicalized Husserl's quest for the most original givenness of beings into the question of the origin of givenness pure and simple.⁶

And yet this region of absolute giving is itself not given. 'The immediate, therefore, is never and nowhere "given"; it must always be restructured; and to "ourselves", that is to our most intimate life, we have no access'.⁷ 'For the "primal experience", upon which our experiences are grounded, has always passed irrevocably away by the time our attention is directed to it.'⁸ Here is the essence of the finitude of man, to whom life poses 'the colossal aporia, the insoluble dilemma'⁹ of glimpsing an immediate which is never accessible immediately (*HD*, 59–61). For consciousness always arrives too late to seize that which seizes it, the immediate present. 'Consciousness is senescence and a quest of things past.'¹⁰

And yet the immediate in its withdrawal is precisely what draws thought by calling out to be thought. The draw of its unthought is the very food for thought. It 'wants' thought, and 'gives' thought its sustenance, and in this way 'uses' thought to reveal itself. The lure of the ineffable, the call of the wild and aboriginal is the very provocation of thought. It is what sets thought on its way, its very incipience. It evokes thought, appeals to be thought – and therefore 'speaks'! Though it always holds itself in reserve, its silence is infinitely suggestive. Its draw is like the gesture of a finger pointing the way to the secret of our Being, of our time, of what is most appropriate to us. Accordingly, in its gestation

of what is most timely and original for us, it guides the course of our thought and of our history. And yet all this goes on surreptitiously, behind the scenes, as it were, outside of the arena of earth-shaking historical occurrences. The inaugural event of Being is not newsworthy. For, as the most immediate and comprehensive of our experiences, it is always with us as the element and background of all of our particular experiences, and in this sense quite ordinary. 'Nothing' really happens in this event (*N II*, 485) – which is why it is the most extraordinary and potentially devastating of our experiences when it does come into the foreground. Consider, for example, this description of the poet's venture into the ineffable immediacy ('the holy'): 'The shock of chaos, that offers no support, the terror of the immediate, that frustrates all intrusion, the holy is transformed through the tranquillity of the shielded poet into the mildness of the mediate and mediatizing word' (*HD*, 68–9).

But how does this event of language come about, if the immediate itself is ineffable, and can never be apprehended immediately? Even though the immediate is inaccessible in its immediacy, as the comprehensive event which permeates all particular experiences, it is at once the mediation of all mediated beings, and so can be glimpsed in and through its mediations. It is the word which articulates these relations among everything actual, and so itself is the mediation which holds and retains beings in Being. 'Without the holding and relating word, the totality of things, the "world", sinks into darkness' (*US*, 177). Language accordingly institutes the network of relations which is our historical world in its particular differentiations and bounded by its particular horizon. Its welcome capacity to domesticate the aboriginal in the 'mildness' of the word can nevertheless tranquillize the elemental power of its mediating ground into oblivion, as the current technological modulation of language has done. But it is always possible to revive the relationship of the event, 'the relation of all relations, the hold of all holds' (*US*, 267), since the horizon of our linguistic world 'is not a wall that encloses man; on the contrary, the horizon is *transparent*, it points as such to the non-established, becoming, and capable of becoming, to the possible' (*N I*, 574). 'The horizon throughout its transparent permanence lets the chaos appear as chaos' (*N I*, 575). Accordingly, the existing languages in which we find ourselves 'thrown' are always open to orientation toward this aboriginal language which 'speaks' in silence. And it is to our creative poets and thinkers that we look to find the words which somehow intimate the ineffable, old and familiar words long in use made to speak anew their relationship with the very source of language. This process of listening for the unsaid to be said in what has already been said has long been called hermeneutics.

To summarize, 'the intangible experience in itself cannot be apprehended nor mastered, but it manifests something to us, an appearance: says

something, an utterance. The aim of science, therefore, is to understand this *logos*; essentially, science is hermeneutics.¹¹ The mediatizing immediate which itself is unmediated, the ground which itself is an ungrounded abyss, the differentiating, articulating, unconcealing process which itself is undifferentiated, ineffable and concealed, such is the ultimate character of Being in its most archaic sense. Its concealment (*Verbergung*) is the very shelter (*Bergung*) of the aboriginal language, which speaks in its own time and its own unexpected way, according to which the hermeneute must bide his time.

Hermeneutical language

The language which orients itself to the silent event thus warrants being called a hermeneutical language. *Being and Time* situated the hermeneutical 'as' in a pre-predicative involvement in the referential relations of the world of gear preceding the theoretical predications of the apophantic 'as'. Later, the 'as' structure of 'something as something' appears again in the history of the metaphysical interpretations from Being as idea to Being as will. But 'the hermeneutical does not first signify the explicit interpreting that lays out, for even before this there is the bringing of the message and tidings' (*US*, 122). The hermeneutical language most basically is oriented to the 'primal tidings' of the aboriginal event, which 'speaks' silently, by withholding itself. To be true to its ineffable source, such a language leaves more unsaid in what it actually says. Its seminal, germinal, suggestive probing calls for a *logos* oriented to silence, a 'sigetic' logic.¹² 'Every incipient and authentic naming utters the unspoken, and indeed in such a way that it remains unspoken' (*WD*, 119). The unsayable is somehow said!

Such a hermeneutical language necessarily reaches beyond the resources of the current logical and grammatical conception of language, whose final court of appeal is the judgment and whose basic structure is the subject-predicate relation. For that about which one speaks here is no longer the self-givenness of a subject, but the self-withdrawal of the event. We are no longer dealing with the *An sich* of things on hand, but the *Ansichhalten*, the holding-to-itself of the basic mystery. Whereas the apophantic language arrives at a predicate which bestows a definite character on a subject that already stands out, the hermeneutical language, groping in the most primordial pre-predicative realm, culminates in the 'saying that does not say' (*sagenden Nichtsagen*) (*ID*, 72). In it, purely declarative sentences are no longer possible, its assertions take on a peculiarly non-assertive character, its propositions amount to a leap¹³ to which the usual logic of the substantive does not apply. It is no wonder that Carnap found in Heidegger a particularly rich source of

what for logical positivism can only be meaningless assertions or pseudo-statements, like 'nothing itself nothings'. 'A sequence of words is meaningless if it does not, within a specified language, constitute a statement.'¹⁴ It is precisely such a closed system of language, with its strictly defined rules of formation and rigidly fixed vocabulary, that Heidegger seeks to 'destroy'. How he does this, what linguistic strategies he employs, is what we now wish to examine.

Generally speaking, it can be prefatorily stated that Heidegger's resorting to these peculiarly non-assertive assertions arises from his attempt to think Being *itself*, Being *as such*. The following quotation strikes the pervasive keynote: 'Yet Being – what is Being? It is itself. This is what future thinking must learn to experience and to say. "Being" – it is not God nor a world-ground. For being is further than any being, be it a rock or an animal, a work of art or a machine, an angel or God. Being is the nearest. Yet the near is what is farthest for man' (*PW*, 76). And later: 'The appropriating event is the most unpretentious of the unpretentious, the simplest of the simple, the nearest of the near and the farthest of the far, within which we mortals sojourn and live our temporal life' (*US*, 259). As the simplest of the simple which is nearest in immediacy and farthest in accessibility, Being as such signalizes a new principle of identity toward which all converges and out of which all emerges, the *self*-given in a strictly terminal sense, 'at once *self*-withdrawn. Thus, echoes of the old tautological *A is A* are constantly heard in Heidegger's meditations. These apparent tautologies serve as bases for a leap into a new dimension of identity which in its immediacy defies articulation. Accordingly, we are told that the sentence 'language is language, speech is speech', apparently 'a tautology which says nothing' (*US*, 12) and its verbal iterative, 'speech speaks', can lead us to an abyss which opens onto the place of the essence of speech and of the speaking being, man. Far from being a meaningless tautology, such an iterative sentence serves to turn us away from thinking about language in terms other than itself, as an externalization of inner feelings or as an activity of man, for example, in order that we may consider language as language, in terms proper to it as such. It thus turns our attention to the power of language itself to reveal, to let beings be, and more profoundly, to the silent source of this power, to whose 'air' we as speaking beings are called upon to listen, to whose elemental modulation we already find ourselves attuned.

Speech speaks in order to summon the world and things to their essence, whereby the world worlds and the thing things. In thinging, the thing draws the world near and gathers it. The world in turn worlds by granting the thing its nexus for gathering. In reciprocal intimacy and with the articulation of the difference between them, each comes into

its own. Issuing out of the e-vent of appropriation, each receives its unique essence.

Speech speaks – the world worlds – the thing things – why these verbally iterative sentences (to which others can easily be added from the Heideggerian opus)? For one thing, such iterations stress the verbal over the substantive, and develop a series of iterative verbs designed to overcome the static permanence which the 'is' has acquired. Moreover, we are in the proximity of a family of phenomena to which the 'is' is to a large extent not applicable, for Being 'is' not a being, nor 'is' time. Finally, such a linguistic strategy serves to emphasize the phenomenon itself (*die Sache selbst*), 'as such', in its unique essence and essential uniqueness. From his early interest in Scotus' notion of haecceity to his ultimate selection of *Er-eignis* as his theme-word, Heidegger's concern for a uniqueness which is at once universal is everywhere apparent, as in the concreteness of the 'here' and the temporal riddle of uniqueness. All of these iterative verbs therefore seek to express how the 'proper' nouns, speech, the world, the thing, etc., 'essence'. In opposition to a tradition of static and eternal essences, Heidegger seeks to develop a verbal conception of essence. The iterative sentence accordingly points to an identity and sameness which permits difference, to an essence which is self-changing and historical, appropriate to its time.

This transmutation in the conception of essence is especially expressed in the following two turning sentences:

The essence of truth is the truth of the essence (WW, 26).

The essence of speech: the speech of the essence (US, 200).

In each case, the first essence is understood traditionally as quiddity, while the second is taken verbally and refers to the enduring abiding that makes way, i.e., the appropriating event. The other terms follow their contextual suit in the turn of phrase. Accordingly, the turning sentences now read: what truth as knowledge is emerges from the unconcealment of the event that appropriates; speech as human activity finds its incipience in the silent saying of the event. Both turns terminate in the appropriating event. The colon which breaks the second sentence serves to symbolize the leap that is necessary to execute the turn.

The way leading to the direct articulation of the event itself also traverses a linguistic evolution. It centers on the attempt to find a suitable way of speaking of the It which gives the Being which is there when we say 'there is Being'. At first, the It is simply identified with Being itself in its self-giving, so that 'Being gives Being' (PW, 80–1). But this way of putting it still has the disadvantage of suggesting that Being somehow 'is', like a being. Later, the giving of Being is identified with the sending of the mission of presence in the history of Being, which must be considered together with the giving of time as the extending of a clearing.

The substantifying effect of the It, which is now identified as the appropriating event, must then give way to the verbal impact suggested by these two modes of giving. For the event is nothing but the giving itself. It is unacceptable to say that 'the event is', since it is not a being, or that 'it gives the event', since all giving issues from the event. Both expressions therefore reverse the proper direction in which the event is to be thought, which in its giving always retreats into its abyss. The best that can be said is: 'The appropriating event events by appropriating' (*Das Ereignis ereignet*), not as a mere sentence subject to the questioning of logic, but as a touchpoint of meditation on the mysterious comings and goings and abiding character of the central concern of thought. Even to speak of Being *as* the event, which certainly is true in its general intent, risks placing what is thought here on the same level as the metaphysical interpretations of Being as idea, as will, etc. But the event is not a kind of Being subordinated to the basic concept of Being. And the reverse is no less objectionable: Being is not a kind of event, for the event is not a generic concept to which Being and time are subordinate. Relations of a logical order say nothing to us here. Being and time disappear into the event out of which they are appropriated and thus come into their own. The 'as' here is simply the giving appropriation of Being and time, the eventing of the event itself. The event events. All comes back to saying the same, going from the same and returning to the same, which at once is always different, the principle of uniqueness itself (ZS, 54–66).

Summary: a 'linguistic analysis'

The iterative and circular 'syntax' of the hermeneutical language serves to de-emphasize the predicative structure of our inherited languages, and therefore tends to concentrate our attention on its keywords within a pre-predicative context. The hermeneutical process ultimately focuses on the most fundamental words of our language, in order to listen to their changing modulations and mutual resonance. By way of summary and conclusion, an attempt will be made to unravel the strands of meaning knotted into the notion of *Ereignis* from a somewhat different perspective. And the translation of *Ereignis* as 'appropriating event' has yet to be justified.

In officially introducing *Ereignis* as the very centerline of his endeavors, Heidegger rather grandiosely asserts that 'it can be translated with as little success as the Greek keyword *logos* and the Chinese *Tao* (ID, 29). If we bracket the Teutonic pomposity of this declaration, it does suggest that we can expect in this word the same manifold convergence of connotations that Heidegger himself has unraveled from the Greek *logos*.

In fact, he later specifies the *Ereignis* as the one and only, unique and simple subject matter of thought, inaccessible in its simplicity, approachable only through a manifold thought, and *ipso facto* through a manifold language.¹⁵ This accounts for the structure of the Heideggerian opus, aiming at a single center, approached along numerous 'forest trails', some of them perhaps dead-ends.

As a first approximation of this unique *Sache*, Heidegger takes the phenomenological path. Recall the great circle of Heidegger, that it is first necessary to anticipate and acknowledge what is to be explicated, namely, the total situation where emergent Being shows itself. Once in the circle comes the problem of finding a suitable language to describe this process of emergence, the relations within it between man and the Being of beings, and finally the enabling element which is the condition of the possibility for such emergence and such relations. This enabling element is ultimately termed the *Ereignis*. Difficulties to this project are soon encountered in a language rendered opaque by a long tradition of metaphysics. In the face of this, Heidegger does not suggest that we take to neologisms, but rather calls for 'a transformed relationship to the essence of the old language'.¹⁶ What sort of a conversion? A phenomenological one, and to the extent that phenomenology calls for complete honesty, an ethical one as well. And if phenomenology is a matter of letting 'things' speak for themselves, then its most refined phase, thought, is a matter of letting language speak for itself. Indeed, at the aboriginal level of the *Ereignis*, language and *Sache* are one for Heidegger.

In what ways then does this aboriginal language speak of itself? I submit that a manifold of major linguistic constellations can be distinguished in Heidegger's own descriptions of the *Ereignis*. If indeed *Ereignis* is the common source of emergence of the manifold senses of Being that Heidegger wants it to be, then one should expect all the heavy-duty stems of our most archaic language to tend to merge here. Heidegger's own reflections on the convergent senses of *logos*, *physis*, *aletheia*, and the other old Greek words which somehow named the unnameable prefigure our discussion here, and in some sense are to be repeated for the sake of a new beginning in the event. The process of instituting *Ereignis* as a 'guiding word in the service of thinking' (*ID*, 29) in fact continues the reflection on the most fundamental words of our language in an attempt to approximate the archaic simplicity of the aboriginal language. What follows then is a highly condensed 'linguistic analysis' of Heidegger's most basic language in terms of the main linguistic constellations that thread through his conception of *Ereignis*:

(1) The language of *coming and going*, used to express the dynamics between man and Being. On the basis of such descriptions, *Ereignis* becomes the event of the advent of Being overcoming man through

intervention in his ventures. Certainly no ordinary event, limited to a moment or period of time, but one that is momentous and periodic, or better, that which makes events momentous and periodizes them.

(2) The suggestions of intermittence in the comings and goings of the event are countered by a second linguistic group of *stasis* words, of standing and bringing to stand, posing and positing, setting and fixing, in which man stands out into Being in a holding attitude that holds himself and beings in ex-sistential place. This incipient state-of-affairs ultimately points back to the *Ereignis* as the 'holding that holds to itself, the relation of all relations, the hold of all holds'.

(3) Insofar as aboriginal Being holds to itself, it holds back, withdraws, and in so doing draws man with it. We are now approaching the language of *hide and seek*, and the chiaroscuro interplay of *hide and show*. This always appears as Heidegger's last word on *Ereignis*, as the concealment.

(4) Closely tied to but significantly distinct from the language of hide and show is the language of *closing and opening*. Opening as clearing constitutes a releasing, a freeing, permitting an out-let for free play. Thus appears that all important Heideggerian word, *lassen*, and *Ereignis* becomes the dimension enabling the emergence of beings and providing viability to man.

(5) But the last word in Heidegger is still the closure of disclosure. That which grants access is itself inaccessible. Confronted with the ineffable opaqueness of the abyss of aboriginal Being, all that can be said is that 'there IT is', or – and here English fails to keep pace with the German – *Es gibt*. *Ereignis* as the indeterminate 'there is' which gives and promotes a language of *give and receive*, or more vehemently, in keeping with the violence of man and Being that Heidegger finds expressed in the Antigone chorus, *give and take*.

(6) 'To appropriate' says both give and take, as well as the all important proprium (*eigen*) and adapting (*eignen*) of the *Ereignis*. Heidegger's persistent use of these cognates and their variants suggest that these connotations were uppermost in his choice of this 'guiding word in the service of thinking'. Evidently *Ereignis* is to be the mutually appropriating realm of the give and take of uniqueness.

Zygmunt Adamczewski¹⁷ has suggested 'bearing' as a translation for *Ereignis*, which helps to bring out some of its further ramifications. For one thing, it intuitively brings to the fore another linguistic constellation, the language of *genesis* so time-honored in religion, philosophy and phenomenology. It thus emphasizes the perpetual pregnancy and fruitfulness of the engendering phenomenal ground. Bearing as begetting, carrying and delivering accentuates the creative character of aboriginal being, which Heidegger himself develops in his reduction of causality to a bringing forth or pro-ducere. It also suggests the carry-over and

deliverance of the inheritance of tradition (*Überlieferung*). Hence no one can deny that 'bearing' is a very fertile term. It furthermore suggests not only originating but also sustaining power. But here it is on a par with the holding action and staying power already indicated as proper to aboriginal Being. Likewise, some of the other nuances of 'bearing' are present and perhaps better expressed in the other linguistic groups. For example: forbearance is also withstanding and the ability to 'take it'; bearing as an attitude is also a stance or posture, an approach (*Angang*) or the now-clichéd openness. On the debit side, bearing suggests the teleology of the originating process to such a degree that it also connotes meaning and direction (*Sinn*), so that it in fact obscures its archeological character and the concomitant concealment at the heart of the 'e-vent', as an occurrence that comes from afar. And where are the closure and withdrawal that leads to degeneration and the intermittent need for regeneration? Finally, even though bearing suggests relevance, and hence implies the pertinence that belongs to the appropriate, it nevertheless verbally interrupts the profound resonance between the 'ownness' or proprium of the appropriate and the owing of a debt to my own existence to which I ought to own up, so well brought out by Adamczewski in his paper.

Not that we should reject the suggestions of gestation that 'bearing', brings to the understanding of the *Ereignis*. It suggests for instance that heavy-duty English root stemming from the Latin verb for 'bearing', *ferre*, which gives us that all important Heideggerian term, difference. In closest harmony with the *Ereignis*, Heidegger places the *Austrag* (ID, 10) which he roughly interprets as a 'bearing out'. In *Identity and Difference*, *Austrag* is the differentiation between Being and beings. In *Underway to Language* (22–5), it is also the gestation of the gestures of language, especially in the primordial articulation between world and thing. We are now evoking the language of *identifying and differentiating*, which conjures the most difficult of Heidegger's problems, the modulation of uniqueness, involving at once the exclusivity of selfhood, the disjunction of temporal epochs, and the historical discursivity of language.

Such is the language of the event in terms of its most primeval linguistic groups, which attempt to sound the most primeval event of language. The language of the event: the event of language. If we recall the double play of the 'of' that Heidegger emphasizes in other contexts, these two turns of phrase should ultimately be one and the same, at least in the sense of belonging together and corresponding to each other. In the metaphysics of grammar, 'of' is the genitive of possession; for Heidegger, it is the genesis of the proper, once again the appropriating event itself. More than once, he refers to an *Eigentum des Er-eignisses* (ID, 31; N II, 484; US, 265, ZS, 62–4). And what we have just surveyed in terms

of linguistic groups are those very 'properties' of verbal essence, or better, the propia of aboriginal Being.

Notes

1 According to his letter published in the preface to William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963) p. xxiii.

2 *ibid.*, pp. x-xi.

3 *ibid.*

4 *ibid.*, pp. xx-xxi.

5 Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendente Phänomenologie*, Husserliana VI, ed. W. Biemel, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962) p. 12.

6 Ernst Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1967) p. 242.

7 G. Van Der Leeuw, *Religion in Essence and Manifestation: A Study in Phenomenology* (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1963) vol. II, p. 672. The chapter being cited is entitled 'Phenomenon and phenomenology'.

8 *ibid.*, p. 671.

9 *ibid.*, p. 672.

10 Emmanuel Levinas, 'Intentionalité et sensation', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* (1965) nos. 71-2, pp. 34-54. Cf. p. 47.

11 Van Der Leeuw, *op. cit.*, p. 676.

12 Otto Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1963) p. 276.

13 Heidegger often plays on the German *Satz*, which means both 'proposition' and 'leap'.

14 Rudolf Carnap, 'The elimination of metaphysics through logical analysis of language', tr. Arthur Pap, in *Logical Positivism* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959) pp. 60-81. Cf. p. 61.

15 Richardson, *op. cit.*, p. xxiii.

16 *ibid.*

17 'Martin Heidegger and man's way to be', *Man and World* (1968) vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 363-79. Cf. p. 369.

The transformation of language at another beginning

Robert Bernasconi

Derrida's starting-point is the end of philosophy, or, as he would prefer to say, 'the closure of metaphysics'. The two terms 'philosophy' and 'metaphysics' are for Derrida, as they became for Heidegger, equivalent ways of referring to the tradition. 'End' is not an equivalent for 'closure' (*G* 14/4). Derrida uses the term 'closure' because he refuses to speak of the 'end' of philosophy in the sense of a termination. That philosophy is, if not finished, at least *at an end* is something which Derrida does not see any need to establish; he points to Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche and Heidegger (*ED* 117/79). It is for him quite simply the context in which 'those who are still called philosophers . . . in remembrance at least' ask the one question left to them – the question of the closure, that is the question of the relation between belonging to philosophy and achieving an opening beyond philosophical discourse (*ED* 163/110). Derrida's word 'closure' states his fundamental concern that it is impossible for us simply to transgress metaphysics, to leave it unambiguously behind us and stand unequivocally outside it. But it does not bear only this negative sense.

Derrida's name has come to be associated with a number of strategies which govern his approach to a text and whose function is to impose the closure on it. His procedure is most apparent in those places where he goes into greatest detail as, for example, in his reading of Plato's *Phaedrus* in *Dissemination* and of Rousseau's *Essay on the Origin of Languages* in *Of Grammatology*. Metaphysics is, according to Derrida, marked by a certain series of oppositions, the most fundamental of which is that of presence versus absence. In each of the metaphysical oppositions (inside/outside; speaking/writing; remedy/poison etc.) one of the terms is privileged over the other and the privileging of presence governs all these others. So Derrida's first task is to render the metaphysical reading of the text in hand and this tends to be accomplished by drawing attention to these oppositions and priorities at work throughout the text.

This prepares for a reversal of the priorities whereby what was primary becomes secondary and vice-versa. Finally this gives way to a reading in which neither term is privileged and we are introduced to a sense in which the terms (which at first – and second – reading were opposed) are ‘at play’ one with the other; the play takes place according to a logic which we do not associate with metaphysics. This play which exceeds metaphysics is thus found inscribed in texts which we provisionally took to be metaphysical. The inscription of this excess is in Rousseau borne by the word *supplement* and in Plato by the word *pharmakon*.

These various stages (which I have described rather more schematically than they are practised by Derrida) take the form of a series of readings of a specific text. We pass from a reading which is referred to the author’s intentions or an influential interpretation or even a standard translation and arrive at a reading which displays working through the text a logic which is not that of traditional metaphysics. And yet this passage is not arbitrarily enforced on the text, but is attained, by and large, through the use of fairly conventional hermeneutical techniques. The difference between Derrida and, for example, Gadamerian hermeneutics lies more in the greater resolution with which Derrida applies these techniques than is generally realized. The sense in which Derrida’s readings are immanent is indicated by his claim that every metaphysical text carries within itself the resources that will be borrowed from the metaphysical system to criticize it (*M* 70/60). The justification for reversing the hierarchy of terms is found inscribed within the text itself; the means for surpassing metaphysics are to be found within metaphysics itself. But this surpassing is not to be understood as a Hegelian *Aufhebung*.

Derrida’s approach is clarified somewhat in a discussion at the close of the 1968 essay ‘The ends of man’ (*M* 162–4/134–6). The context of the discussion is the apparent dilemma of our relation to metaphysics: we find ourselves on the inside yet recognize that ‘a radical trembling can only come from the outside’. Two strategies present themselves. The first is ‘to attempt an exit and a deconstruction without changing terrain’, where the risk is that we would simply be confirming, consolidating or subsuming (*relever*, the French equivalent of *aufheben*) what we claim to be deconstructing. The second is ‘to decide to change terrain, in a discontinuous and irruptive manner, by brutally placing oneself outside, and by affirming an absolute break and difference’. The second can never be successful on its own because ‘the simple practise of language ceaselessly reinstates the “new” terrain on the oldest ground’. Thus the call is for ‘a new writing’ to ‘weave and interlace these two motifs of deconstruction’. The first strategy is said by Derrida to be the one which predominates in Heidegger, whereas the second was the dominant one

in France at the time of the essay. But Derrida is quite clear that both strategies can be found in Heidegger.

Derrida's debt to Heidegger is obvious. The identification of metaphysics with the privileging of presence is found already in Heidegger's *Being and Time* – *Sein as Anwesenheit*. The very term 'deconstruction' which Derrida sometimes uses to describe his procedure clearly echoes Heidegger's notion of a 'Destruction of the history of ontology'. Nevertheless some of Derrida's followers, by emphasizing those passages in which Derrida draws attention to the metaphysical within Heidegger's texts, have tried to find a straightforward answer to the complex question of whether Derrida represents in any way an advance on Heidegger. Of course, Derrida also finds the rupture within Heidegger's texts, but those same Derridians can give the credit for this to Derrida himself as if it could be isolated as 'his' contribution. And yet this is to forget the sense in which Derrida's reading, like any other good reading, disappears into the text and becomes interwoven with it. The ambiguity of the Heideggerian situation is well described by Derrida himself when in *Of Grammatology* he writes that it is contained within the metaphysics of presence and logocentrism and yet it transgresses that metaphysics (*G* 36/22). For Derrida, to impose the closure on a text does not only mean to draw back within metaphysics what has pretensions to transgress it; it is at least just as much to force outside metaphysics whatever seems to stand within it. Of course, and this is crucial, the inside-outside opposition which is being used here to situate the closure is itself metaphysical. The two strategies of drawing within and forcing outside are inseparable. They belong together in an ambiguity for which Derrida prefers the title 'play' (*G* 104/71).

The temptation to see Derrida as simply representing the impossibility of any transgression of metaphysics and thus only the first of the two strategies described in 'The ends of man' is easy to appreciate. It arises because the case against the possibility of transgressing the history of metaphysics can be so clearly stated: 'we have no language – no syntax and no lexicon – which is foreign to this history' (*ED* 412/280). On the other hand, Derrida is adamant that this is not the last word: 'no concept is by itself, and consequently in and of itself, metaphysical, outside all the textual work in which it is inscribed' (*P* 78/57). In the present essay, by means of a reading of Heidegger's lecture 'The way to language', I shall attempt to investigate this language which is not simply metaphysical and which lies at the heart of the play of the closure interweaving the twin strategies. In Heidegger's own terms, it is the question of how the overcoming of metaphysics can take place when it is 'within certain limits, compelled to speak the language of that which it helps to overcome' (*W* 99; *EB* 380–1). This last quotation shows clearly enough that Derrida's question about 'the conditions for a discourse exceeding metaphysics' (*M*

70/61) is also one of Heidegger's questions and is not brought to him from 'outside'.

II

It is not difficult to imagine Derrida himself setting about a reading of Heidegger's essay 'The way to language' by first emphasizing the tendency of its translators or its commentators to re-inscribe Heidegger's text within metaphysics. The standard English translation in particular could readily be singled out for this purpose. By itself this could not constitute a reading Derrida himself might give: it would be but the first step on the way to such a reading. What I am concerned with is what happens when this 'part of a reading' is taken as a result. The partial reading, which could never be Derrida's reading, can nevertheless be called 'Derridian' in a sense often heard today: Derridian as opposed to Heideggerian. What characterizes a Derridian reading in this sense is the almost ritualistic attention to certain metaphysical prejudices to which Derrida himself has in his writings frequently called our attention. But in this case the reader fixes the prejudices in the text so that they cannot be undone from within the text, save only by a virtuoso performance which remains outside the text.

In order to sketch such a 'Derridian' reading of Heidegger's essay I shall consider six of these metaphysical gestures, all of which seem to be operative there:

- (i) Reliance on experience
- (ii) The priority accorded to speech over writing
- (iii) The quest for origins
- (iv) Logocentrism
- (v) The privilege accorded to possession
- (vi) The tendency to unite or unify.

The list is not supposed to be exhaustive. Taken singly or together the items on it are directed to the question of the inside/outside of metaphysics. I shall consider them in turn always with two points in mind: first, to indicate how on a first reading Heidegger's essay 'The way to language' might appear to be under the sway of these metaphysical motifs and secondly to show that to read Heidegger as falling prey to them seems to be in conformity with certain remarks of Derrida himself. Because my concern here is not a reconstruction of Derrida's own reading of Heidegger, I shall not restore those remarks to their proper context and the strategy from which they can be detached only at the risk of distortion.

First, there is Heidegger's reliance on experience. Derrida has always

insisted that the notion of experience is 'fundamentally inscribed within onto-theology . . . by the value of presence' (G 400-1/283). And yet Heidegger in 'The way to language' clearly defines his task as that of 'experiencing the unbinding bond within the web of language' (US 243/113). Companion essays to that one, 'The word' and 'The essence of language', similarly insist on undergoing an experience with language.

Secondly, we find the charge of phonocentrism, which means to uphold the priority accorded to speech over writing, the voice over the line. Again what is at issue is the privilege of presence over absence, this time as it concerns the presence of the speaker. In the essay 'The ends of man' Derrida charges Heidegger with privileging spoken language (M 159/132). When we turn to 'The way to language' it seems that writing is scarcely referred to, that the discussion is about speaking, and that there is even a sentence, seemingly Heidegger's description of his own position, which says that 'here too language shows itself first as our way of speaking' (US 250/120).

Thirdly, the notion of origin is also inscribed with the metaphysics of presence. The major part of Derrida's *Of Grammatology* is occupied with a deconstruction of Rousseau's texts on the origin of languages by means of a reading which gives rise to the notion of a 'nonorigin' of language (G 343/241), an 'incessant supplementarity' (G 334/235). And yet in 'The way to language' Heidegger can be found ascribing the origin of the word to Appropriation (US 265/133).

Fourthly, Derrida charges Heidegger with logocentrism (G 33/20). In so far as the issue of the closure is that of metaphysical language it amounts to the question of how one stands in relation to the *logos*. Heidegger's essay 'The word' culminates in the word *logos* (US 237/155). It also seems to figure in 'The way to language' in Heidegger's adoption of the word 'monologue' from Novalis and the discussion of 'gathering', a notion Heidegger frequently appeals to when explicating *logos*.

Fifthly, Derrida draws attention to what he regards as the ethico-ontological ground of Heidegger's notion of *Verfallenheit* or fallenness, in spite of Heidegger's denials that they are relevant. Derrida's justification is that it is the language and not the intention which is decisive (M 50/45). The objection extends also to cover the notions of authenticity and inauthenticity and then to the whole family of words in Heidegger which bear the same root. It is in this way that Derrida in *Spurs* seeks to draw the fundamental word of Heidegger's later thinking *Ereignis* back into the orbit of onto-theology. The translation of *Ereignis* as 'appropriation' would, if correct, support Derrida's claim.

Finally, Heidegger's emphasis on the unifying unity of the essence of language seems to reflect the totalizing tendency of metaphysics and offers itself as a suitable target for dissemination.

Is one not forced to acknowledge in the light of this catalogue – which

could readily be extended – that Heidegger remains tied to the language of metaphysics? It would seem unnecessary to pursue the matter further, particularly as Heidegger himself seems to concede as much in the final pages of the essay where he describes the present era as one in which the old is completed and nothing new begins (*US* 265/133).

But, as I have explained, it would be entirely uncharacteristic of Derrida himself to decide the question of the inside/outside simply by drawing Heidegger's text back within metaphysics. He would only want to show the possibility of a metaphysical reading of Heidegger to place alongside it another reading, one which would show Heidegger transgressing metaphysics (*G* 36/22). Such a reading of Heidegger's text 'The way to language' is given by Derrida in the course of an important article published in 1978, 'Le Retrait de la métaphore'. It is accomplished particularly by concentrating on the two families of words, that of *Ziehen* and that of *Reissen*. I shall not give an account of Derrida's essay here, both because I have had to leave to one side the question of metaphor with which it is concerned (highly relevant though it is to the topic of metaphysics) and because I am for the moment more concerned with Derridian readings than reconstructing Derrida's own reading.

For my purpose the question which needs to be clarified is whether this second reading, which shows the transgressive gesture at work in the text, would simply replace the first and metaphysical reading or whether the point is to leave us undecided between the two readings so that the ambiguity of the text becomes a means of reflecting the sense in which at the closure we find ourselves unable to say what lies inside and what outside. The answer no doubt lies in the notion of a history of textuality, indicated but not developed in *Of Grammatology*. Was one of the results of such a history the recognition that what defined reading in our own epoch was that it found at work, structuring certain crucial texts, a logic other than the traditional one? Before they were given a 'new' reading it had seemed that texts like Plato's *Phaedrus* or Rousseau's *Essay* belonged unambiguously to the tradition; and yet the deconstructed reading did not simply replace previous readings. It only existed in relation to those readings which constituted the text in its historicity. Having dismissed the idea of the original meaning of a text, whether it was to be identified with the author's intentions or not, Derrida came to identify the text with the history of its readings. Nevertheless in the case of the text of a contemporary such as Heidegger or Levinas, the issue became more acute. Could we not have a text which is written and read only in accordance with this 'other' logic?

Sometimes Derrida addresses this question by suggesting that it is the contemporary readers of Heidegger whom he remains concerned with and not Heidegger himself. The contemporary reader draws the text back within metaphysics. But over and beyond that is the fact that we

have at our disposal only the traditional language. And yet how can that point be made without rendering any transgression of metaphysics impossible and Derrida has never left us in any doubt that he recognizes the possibility of such transgressions or ruptures. The questions remain: How can there be any transgression at all? And if metaphysical language can be transgressed, why is Derrida so insistent as part of his strategy in showing the metaphysical language operating where he will find the transgression? Or to put it another way, why does Derrida insist on both the strategies outlined at the end of the essay 'The ends of man' and how are they to be united? I shall look for answers to these questions in the reading of Heidegger's 'The way to language' which shall occupy the next three sections of my essay (corresponding to the three sections of Heidegger's own essay).

III

After an important introductory section to which I shall return later, 'The way to language' begins with a discussion of the way language has been thought in the tradition, concentrating on two of the most influential accounts – Aristotle's in *Peri Hermeneias* and Wilhelm von Humboldt's in *Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues*. Heidegger ended his 1957 lecture 'The principle of identity' by saying that 'only when we turn thoughtfully toward what has already been thought, will we be turned for what is yet to be thought' (ID 106/41). This is more than the customary warning that to remain ignorant of the tradition is to be in danger of repeating it. Heidegger is suggesting that there is a close relation between the dialogue with previous thinking and freeing oneself for what he elsewhere describes as 'the no-longer metaphysical'. The thinker attains the 'no-longer metaphysical' by the step back into the essence or ground of metaphysics (W 100/EB 382).

Heidegger has always insisted on a close link between what is transmitted by the tradition and what we regard as self-evident, what we take for granted (SZ 21). In outlining the traditional conception of language he also has in mind the 'ordinary' conception of language (US 255/125). Three common prejudices are highlighted in Heidegger's account. The first is that we tend to understand language in terms of speaking and not the other way round. The second is that we tend to conceive of speaking as an activity. The third is that we tend to take the activity of speaking for granted. At this juncture Heidegger reminds us that language is not a fixed possession and that sometimes we cannot speak through fear or because of some accident. But he is not thereby attempting to issue a direct challenge to the conception that man is the animal who 'has' the *logos*. The tradition was well aware that the capacity to speak is some-

times disrupted. The point would seem to be rather – and it has to be conceded that Heidegger in no way spells it out – that such cases of disruption came to provide the basis for the analysis of language, just as cases of hallucination or illusion tended to serve as the starting-point for the analysis of perception. The essential character of speaking came to be determined on the basis of those cases where speech fails us. One may have the intention to speak, but whoever does not make sounds does not speak; whoever has lost the capacity to activate the organs of speech has lost speech. Thus one of the primary ways in which speaking came to be regarded was in terms of the making of sounds.

To take the very clear, though relatively late, example of the Stoics, their treatment of language operates within the distinction between the word and what it signifies. This distinction is not given to the speaker or hearer deep in conversation, but arises only in the face of the barbarian, the outsider who addresses us but who fails to understand anything of what we say; he hears only noises. In this way the word is reduced to a word-thing or sign and the analysis of language concentrates on what the barbarian lacked, which the Stoics called *to lekton* – the sense of significant discourse (Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Math.* VIII, 11–12). Essentially the same procedure can still be found to provide the basis of Husserl's analysis in the *Logical Investigations*. In such analyses the Being of language always goes missing, not so much because the investigation takes as its basis the case where language fails, but because the Being of language is not one constituent among others.

This response to the analysis of language is at best only hinted at by Heidegger. He is more directly concerned to provide the broad outlines of a history of the philosophy of language. He concentrates on three stages. First, using the example of Aristotle he suggests that the Greeks of the classical age understood the relation between the various analytic constituents of language – letters, sounds, passions in the soul, that which strikes the passions – in terms of showing, letting appear, letting shine. Secondly, following the time of the Stoa, the relation of showing gives way to that of the sign understood as an instrument. The subsequent history of language is treated simply by reference to Humboldt, although later in the essay he will give some indication of how the conception of language as an instrument reaches its peak in the modern view of language in terms of information. Heidegger refers this history of language to the account of the change in the essence of truth which he had developed in the essay 'Plato's doctrine of truth'.

Thus the point is made that Aristotle's discussion of language is not to be read in terms of truth as correctness, but in terms of *aletheia* as unconcealment. Heidegger provides a somewhat unconventional translation of the well-known passage at the beginning of *Peri Hermeneias* which explicates both the relation between the making of vocal sounds

and the soul's passions and the relation between what is written and vocal sounds in terms of *sumbola*. William of Moerbeke in his translation had understood *sumbola* to mean *notae* (tokens). Heidegger understands it in terms of showing. The interpretation on which this translation is based goes back at least thirty years to the 1925/6 Marburg Course where the focus of his reading is the interpretation of *logos* as synthesis (*L* 166–8). In 'The way to language' Heidegger does not refer to earlier translations and more familiar interpretations of the passage. Nevertheless the companion essay 'The essence of language' (contrary to the impression given by the standard English translation) gives the more conventional translation in terms of 'signs' (*US* 203–4/97). There is concealed in the translation Heidegger offers in 'The way to language' what at an earlier time he might have called a 'destruction' of the tendency 'of all later considerations of language' to take the sign as their standard (*US* 204/97). These later considerations are regarded by Heidegger as derivative of the more fundamental conception of language which recognizes it as a showing. Heidegger says nothing at this point of the essay to suggest that he recognizes this passage from Aristotle as an example of phonocentrism, which is how Derrida refers to it in *Of Grammatology* (*G* 21–2/11). Indeed in general there is no indication at this stage that any attempt will be made to go beyond Aristotle, let alone a clue as to how this might be done.

By contrast, Heidegger's discussion of von Humboldt follows the assessment of him already to be found in *Being and Time* where 'the philosophical horizon' within which he made language a problem was put in question (*SZ* 166). A similar point is made here. Humboldt speaks the language of metaphysics, specifically that governed by Leibniz, as when he writes of language as an activity, *energeia*. Furthermore, Humboldt's account is inadequate because it grasps language in terms of a higher universal. Language is not experienced in its own terms, but is explicated with reference to the notion of a 'world view'. Nevertheless there are hints of a more sympathetic treatment of Humboldt. His treatise is described as 'astounding, obscure and yet continuously stimulating'. Indeed at the end of the essay, Humboldt is given that rare honour, usually only accorded to Hölderlin, of having the last word.

In general this first section of Heidegger's essay is a very broad survey of the approach to language taken by two of the most eminent representatives of the philosophical consideration of language, with only brief indications of what passed between. For the most part the survey is not very different from one Heidegger might have given thirty years earlier. Even the discussion of the transformation of the sign in terms of 'the change in the essence of truth' is striking for being out of line with other discussions at about this time. Both in 'Hegel and the Greeks' six months earlier and 'The end of philosophy and the task of thinking' five years

later, and in spite of what seem to be striking differences between those two accounts, Heidegger was especially cautious that the passage away from *aletheia* not be referred to 'truth' as if that notion encompassed both terms of the transformation. And yet one has to say that because Heidegger does not give the conventional reading of Aristotle, but only his own re-reading of Aristotle, this first part of the essay does not seem to be setting up a straightforward metaphysical account simply in order for it to be 'overcome' subsequently.

IV

The philosophical consideration of language has tended to take the form of an analysis whereby language has been broken into its components. In the face of this diversity it has tended to let one aspect of language predominate (US 251/121) or else it has grasped language in terms of something other than language, such as activity, spirit or world view (US 250/119). But this means that the attempt to find the unifying unity of language, that which we might call the 'essence of language', fails because the universal only succeeds in co-ordinating or synthesizing relative to the analysis (US 250/120). For Heidegger the failure to attain language as language defines the traditional approach; the 'ownmost' character of language has always eluded it. Indeed so long as we think *das Eigentümliche* not as the 'ownmost' character of language, but – and this is how the standard English translation renders it – as what is 'peculiar' to it in distinction from other things, language is still being referred to what is not language and, in Heidegger's terms, is being thought metaphysically.

In consequence, Heidegger in the second part of the essay sketches an alternative account of language to that of the tradition of Aristotle and Humboldt (US 250–1/120). He does not indicate a source for this view of language. Nevertheless in certain important respects it resembles the account of discourse given in the thirty-fourth section of *Being and Time*. Heidegger had already there dismissed previous attempts to grasp the essence of language not only as one-sided and partial, but also as inadequate in terms of their starting-point (SZ 163). Furthermore, *Being and Time* rejected one of the pillars of the analytic approach when it insisted that 'word-things do not get supplied with significations' (SZ 161). Language was not to be understood in terms of constituents revealed by analysis. Indeed Heidegger was careful not to individuate constitutive items, but emphasized instead what he called 'the structure of discourse'. The essence of language as the unifying unity of language is anticipated in this notion, but it is not experienced and is not named. Both the metaphysical attempt and that of *Being and Time* – whose relation to metaphysics is still an open question – fail in this. The

account of language offered in *Being and Time* may claim superiority over previous accounts on the basis that it alone attempts the task of working out the structure of discourse on the basis of the analytic of *Dasein*. A close reading of section thirty-four suggests that we are there already invited to understand the relation between *Dasein* and language in such a way that this task is nevertheless to think language in terms of itself, and not in terms of something other than language. But there is no indication – the discussion of ‘keeping silent’ notwithstanding – that to bring language as language to language means anything other than finding a name for it.

Indeed Heidegger in ‘The way to language’ evokes this earlier discussion of keeping silent, where hearing and keeping silent were presented as ‘possibilities belonging to discursive speech [*Sprechen*]’ (SZ 161). In *Being and Time* Heidegger had with the introduction of a distinction between discourse and speech addressed the question of the privilege accorded to speech in the traditional accounts of language. No doubt a certain kind of reading would latch onto the phrase used to describe keeping silent – ‘discursive speech’ – in order to suggest that the privilege is not addressed there resolutely enough. Certainly the relation in which silence stands to speech needs further clarification, leaving the possibility that the conventional subordination of silence to speech has here simply been reversed. In ‘The way to language’ Heidegger introduces a distinction between ‘saying’ and ‘speech’ (US 252/122) which runs parallel to that between ‘discourse’ and ‘speech’ in *Being and Time*. This distinction is no more successful in displacing the traditional hierarchical ordering in favour of speech, as is conceded when in the second part of ‘The way to language’ we read ‘here, too, language shows itself first as our way of speaking’ (US 250/120). It is only when later in the essay the task of naming the essence of language comes to be associated with silence that the traditional priority accorded to speaking is addressed radically.

At this point of ‘The way to language’ the issue of the essence of language remains, as in *Being and Time*, that of the failure to grasp it, to bring it to language. ‘That which must remain wholly unspoken is held back in the unsaid, abides in concealment as unshowable, is mystery’ (US 253/122). And this is the fate of the essence of language which remains hidden in mystery for us. Heidegger in ‘The way to language’ makes one more attempt and immediately concedes that it has failed according to the standard he has already recognized: ‘with regard to the manifold ties of saying [*Sagen*] we shall call the essence of language in its totality *die Sage* – and admit that even now we have not caught sight of what unifies those ties’ (US 253/122–3). I shall leave aside for the moment the question of what conception of language might make possible such an arbitrary act of naming, if that is indeed what it is. For the

moment it is enough to notice that this is not the first occurrence of the word *Sage* in Heidegger's writings: it arises both in the discussion of the projective saying of poetry (*H* 61/*PLT* 74) and in another place in reference to the thinking of Being (*W* 188/*BW* 236). *Sage* is Heidegger's word for that originary language through which the destiny of Being happens and to that extent goes beyond what in *Being and Time* was named as *Rede*.

In 'The way to language' the essential being of language as *Sage* is referred to showing (*US* 254/123). 'Showing' is not to be understood in the sense that is given to it in Part One of *Being and Time* where its understanding, as so often in that book, should be approached in terms of the repetition of Aristotle referred to above. Here showing is that 'realm' which already in *Being and Time* had been called 'Lichtung' (*SZ* 133). In the 1964 essay 'The end of philosophy and the task of thinking' Heidegger insists that *Lichtung* should be thought neither as a transcendental condition nor as a spatial metaphor. Indeed it has remained unthought by metaphysics and presumably cannot be thought from within it (*ZSD* 74/67).

In this way Heidegger in 'The way to language' attempts to guard us against thinking of showing and thus saying primarily as a human activity (*US* 254/123). Self-showing marks (and the word *Kennzeichen* here is Heidegger's warning to his reader that the matter is still not thought deeply enough) the presence and absence of what-comes-to-presence. It is not human saying which lets things appear. Rather human saying is preceded by a *Sichzeigenlassen* which takes place as the speaking of language itself. It is language itself which reaches into the regions of presencing and lets what-comes-to-presence appear and disappear. The notorious phrase 'language speaks' was first introduced nine years before this essay in 1950. The showing of saying takes place when language itself speaks. Human saying is only a *Nachsprechen*, literally a 'saying after', a reiteration (*US* 255/124-5).

At the end of Part II of the essay Heidegger makes this speaking of language the context for an attempt to displace the metaphysical account of speech as a human activity. In a conversation it is not the case that one person speaks while another listens. Still less, we can add, is it the case that a person speaks and listens to himself. When Heidegger refers to a simultaneity of speaking and listening he is referring to something very different from the pure auto-affection of the voice as heard by its speaker. The listening is a listening neither to oneself nor to another, but to language before we speak. The recognition that we belong to language was not absent from *Being and Time*; and reticence was there already referred to a potentiality for hearing. One may even wish to attribute to the Heidegger of *Being and Time* the view, more openly stated in lectures given in the mid-1930s, that language had its origin in

keeping silent (*HG* 218). But Heidegger addresses that view in the third part of the essay, where it is exposed as an inadequate basis for entering into the essence of language, or, as one might rather say, it is brought to the closure and deconstructed.

V

In his introductory remarks to the essay, Heidegger described 'The way to language' as an attempt to bring 'language as language to language'. The stages of the path which constitutes 'The way to language' may be measured by the transformations that phrase undergoes. What at first seems nothing more than a vague directive takes on a greater determinacy as the essay proceeds, so that along the way it comes to be understood to mean bringing the essence of language (in the sense of the unifying unity) into the sounded word (*Sage* as a name for the essence of language) (*US* 261/130). In the third part of Heidegger's essay, of which I shall give only a highly selective account here, the phrase comes to mean letting the essence of language resound in all human saying. There is no word for the essence of language according to the metaphysical way of naming; indeed the attempt to name this essence is itself only a metaphysical ambition if it means to crack open and divulge the mystery of the unsaid. What is at issue is not 'the procurement of newly formed words' (*US* 266-7/134), but the transformation of our relation to language. To bring the essence of language to language now comes to mean to hear the essence of language in every word, or one might say to enter into the essence of language to which in a sense we already belong. We can only take the step back into the essence of language in so far as we have stepped outside all attempts to grasp language. What thereby enters the sounded word is the silent speaking of language itself. Heidegger is at great pains to point out that this does not mean that the accounts of language discussed in the first and second part of the essay are now to be dismissed as invalid (*US* 261/130). And he adds that the way to language taken in the second part of the essay becomes 'possible and necessary' only through the way taken in the third part, just as Heidegger would later say in response to Father Richardson that although Heidegger I is the only access to Heidegger II, Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II (*BR* xxiii). On the present reading the second part of 'The way to language' corresponds to Heidegger I, in the same way as the third part corresponds to Heidegger II, and the manner of their presence together in this essay should serve as a confirmation that Heidegger II cannot be separated from, nor understood in simple opposition to, Heidegger I.

Although there is a sense in which the essence of language is always

brought to language whenever there is speaking, we are appropriated to it in our ownmost essence only when we hear the stillness speaking in language or correspond to it in our saying – as when we remain silent and renounce the attempt to name the essence of language metaphysically. The renunciation arises as a matter of destiny, specifically that our time as the time of *der Fehl des Gemeinsamen*, the lack of something common – a universal – which binds together and to which we may refer language. And it is through this lack that we enter into dwelling in *Ereignis*. What looked like a task we set ourselves – to bring language to language as language – becomes the way-making (*Be-wegung*) which is *Ereignis* itself (US 261/130). The transformation of the formula about bringing language as language to language is the passage from Being to *Ereignis*.

The essay 'The way to language' directs us to the special conditions which prevail in our epoch. 'That we cannot know the essence of language – know it according to the traditional concept of knowledge defined in terms of cognition as representation is not a defect, but rather an advantage by which we are favoured with a special realm' (US 266/134). Previous thinkers both did and yet did not know the essence of language in terms of the presencing of representation. They approached language in terms of *Vorstellung* but for that very reason did not enter into the essence of language which only becomes accessible once all attempts to 'know' it have failed and are renounced. The mystery of language only gives itself over to those who accept it as mystery; the essence of language is unconcealed only as concealed within the sounded word. The entry into *Ereignis* – whereby each is brought into his own – means that each is no longer mediated by the universal, by the governing representation. The universal acts as a binding relation between language as *Sage* and man. The lack of this universal turns us towards the insight which takes place as *Ereignis* – 'the unbinding bond' (US 243/113, 262/131) – whereby man does not seek to bind language, but is himself bound over to *Ereignis*, into his own, as he who belongs to language. And yet because Heidegger is describing the destiny of our epoch he can also call this lack 'the most binding relation' (US 265/134).

The nature of the transformation of language is indicated by the phrase, already introduced in 1950, *das Geläut der Stille*, 'the ringing of stillness' (US 215/108; 30/PLT 207). The phrase says that through the lack of a name for the essence of language – all language comes to be infused with silence. To bring the essence of language as *Sage* to the sounded word means to bring silence to the sounded word, to bring the unspeakable to the spoken. Indeed the directive 'to bring language as language to language' itself becomes 'a soundless echo' (US 243/113). That does not mean it comes to be negated, but that to experience language is to enter into the grant whereby the silence transforms

speaking. Heidegger's word for language – *die Sage* – says but does not say 'the essence of language' as the unnameable, the unsayable.

But what then is the place of *logos* in Heidegger's thinking on language? Does not *logos* enter into Heidegger's thinking as a word of Being? Both the companion essays to 'The way to language' – 'The essence of language' and 'The word' – point to the word *logos*, 'the oldest word for the rule of the word' (US 237/155). And they both recognize it as a name for Being and for saying (US 185/80). Does not that mean that *logos* is the word for the Being of saying? In which case how can we talk of the continuing failure to find a name for the Being of language? Of course, the Greeks did not hear the word *logos* as a word for Being, but if we accept Heidegger's reading of *logos* as a word of Being, does it not follow that it now stands for us as the word for the Being of language – *logos* as gathering?

Heidegger's answer would be that such questions ignore the very transformation of language which is at issue. This transformation does not mean that the word *logos* no longer imposes a claim on us; the recognition of a word as a word of Being takes place in its addressing us through the tradition which thereby shows how it still has a hold on us today. The word *logos* still determines thinking to this day (WHD 102/163); but like other archaic words it is no longer able to take up a place in the language and thinking of today (WHD 98–9/153). For the thinkers at the end of philosophy, at the closure, *logos* no longer speaks directly as it once did. It no longer asserts itself, but slips away into the abyss, *Abgrund*. Slipping into the abyss the word returns to where it came from – the silence of speaking language. *Logos* and the other words of Being still claim us, but we can no longer assert them nor read them without their undergoing this transformation. For metaphysics, the no-longer metaphysical is unsayable. For us, the metaphysical is no longer sayable. We read Plato and are introduced to a non-metaphysical Plato; we read Hegel and find a non-metaphysical Hegel, and so on. Or rather the metaphysical disappears as metaphysical for recollective thinking. For the rest, Heidegger leaves us in no doubt that where we do not in our questioning listen to language and entertain what it grants, the metaphysical is simply perpetuated.

For a word to be heard as a word of Being and for that word to transgress metaphysics are the same, for thereby it is no longer held back in the oblivion which marks the limits of metaphysics. And yet the word, heard or read, does not pass from oblivion into unconcealment in the sense of being brought to presence. Heidegger's essay 'The end of philosophy and the task of thinking' is particularly valuable for showing this transformation of language. *Lichtung* is *der Ort der Stille* – the place of stillness. *Lichtung* is named by Parmenides, but not thought by him as such, with the word *aletheia* (ZSD 76–7/69). What *aletheia* as *Lichtung*

grants is experienced and thought within metaphysics; what it is as such remains concealed (ZSD 78/71). Read by Heidegger as *a-letheia*, it announces in advance its own concealment within metaphysics. When we read *aletheia* as *a-letheia* we pass into the 'speaking of language'. When Aristotle's discussion of language is read not only in terms of *aletheia* but in terms of *a-letheia* his text is brought to the closure. When Heidegger in 'The way to language' introduces his word *Ereignis* calling it the earliest and oldest, he is also referring to *a-letheia* (US 258/127; cf. ZSD 25/24). It cannot be discussed or placed. There can be no *Erörterung* of it, for it is the *Ortschaft* or region of all places. The experience to which 'The way to language' is directed and from which it speaks is 'the plain, sudden, unforgettable and hence forever new look' not into a new dawn, but into that dawn from which the changing cycle of day and night first begins. The transformation of language was prepared for at the very beginning of philosophy – as a 'trace'.

What takes place with the transformation of language is that the old region of metaphysics is fitted with new ways by what Heidegger calls 'recollection' and 'way-making' (*Be-wegung*) and Derrida calls 'displacement' and 'transgression'. For Heidegger the preferred phrase is not 'a new beginning', but 'another beginning', an expression which occurs at least some eight times in his published writings. In this notion of 'another' the reference to what went before is maintained in its discontinuity with it. A similar language is found in Derrida, though perhaps not always with the same consistency. In 'The ends of man' Derrida uses the phrase 'a new writing'. The more careful formulation which corresponds to Heideggerian usage – 'another writing' – can also be found (P 72/53; D 172/149).

The question is that of whether there is available for us a language other than the language of metaphysics. The two quotations from Humboldt which end Heidegger's essay must be read in the light of it. The first passage includes the sentence: 'a people could by inner illumination and favourable external circumstances, impart so different a form to the language handed down to them that it would thereby turn into a wholly other, wholly new language.' Strictly speaking a wholly new language is impossible. It could arise only through the 'application of an already available phonetic form'. This is confirmed by the second passage Heidegger quotes from Humboldt, where he is found writing of filling an old shell with new meaning. This is what happens when the transformation of language becomes operative in our reading of the history of philosophy, transforming it into the history of Being: metaphysical language comes to echo with the *Geläut der Stille*.

The end of philosophy, or rather its closure (*Verendung*), takes place in both Heidegger and Derrida therefore only as a transformation of our relation to previous thinking. It is not therefore a termination of the

tradition, a 'dead end', nor does it take place in turning one's back on what has gone before. And yet even though there is no clean break with metaphysics there is a rupture, a discontinuity which cannot be understood simply as a dialectical reversal.

VI

How does it stand with the Derridian strategies listed in part two above after this re-reading of Heidegger's essay?

First, the inscription of presence in the notion of experience. Just as Derrida has provided a 'deconstructed' reading of certain metaphysical texts and their concepts, Heidegger has in *Hegel's Concept of Experience* in his reading of Hegel's word 'experience' as a word of Being heard its claim from beyond metaphysics. There Heidegger establishes the relationship in Hegel between experience and presence as *parousia* precisely to call it into question. So in seeking an experience with language what is experienced is not a presence but a lack, the lack of a word of Being in our epoch. And yet Heidegger is careful to insist that this lack is not a simple defect or something merely negative (US 266/134). This experience is for thinking the passage from the realm of the opposition of presence and absence into 'the special realm' within which that opposition arises and which as such is not governed by it.

Secondly, in Heidegger the priority accorded to speaking is mentioned only to be displaced. Speaking is secondary, not to the originary nature of silence, but to that relation of silence which Heidegger describes as an *Entsprechen* or 'corresponding' (US 262/131). Given that for Derrida the reversal of the priority of speaking and writing is for the sake of disturbing the privilege accorded to speech within the tradition and not in order to privilege writing (for that would be to maintain the metaphysical system of opposition) Heidegger subverts the metaphysical schema. The privilege is disturbed, but not in favour of another oppositional system.

Thirdly, there is the question of origins. We have seen how Heidegger turned away from regarding silence as an origin in the sense of *Ursprung*, but there remains the discussion of the origin of the word in the sense of *Herkunft* (US 265/133). This origin is not thought of as a first word, but in terms of *Ereignis* as the oldest of the old. In this way the quest for origins as a quest for a ground is abandoned (US 256/125). So far as the spoken word is concerned, it is rethought as 'an answer, a counter-saying' (US 260/129). But there are of course not two separate events – the speaking of language and the human speaking which answers to it. That the origin of human speaking takes place as an answer must be

understood as obeying that same 'logic' that Derrida's describes with Rousseau's word 'supplement'.

Fourthly, Heidegger's recollection of *logos* takes place from the experience of the end of philosophy. The recollection of *logos* does not remain within the logocentrism of metaphysics. The word *logos* like the word 'experience' is, as we saw, no longer determinative for us, nor available to us for our use as it was within metaphysics.

Fifthly, how can *Ereignis* overcome the connotations of ownership and property? What we witness here is the deconstruction of man as appropriating, man as the measure. Rather he is appropriated. Nor does Heidegger seek to appropriate the *lethe* but lets it be as *lethe*.

Finally, with the lack of a universal, the essence of language in the sense of the unifying unity passes into the unbinding bond (US 262/131). In being bound over to *Ereignis* the search for the unifying unity of language gives way to *Gelassenheit*. Or to put it another way, there takes place a transformation in the notion of 'essence'. This transformation is parallel to that we find in the essays 'The essence of truth', 'The question concerning technology' and 'The essence of language' and which we here recognize as a transformation of language.

How does it stand then between Heidegger and Derrida? In the 1968 essay 'Ousia and gramme' Derrida sets himself against a complicity between devoted Heideggerians and anti-Heideggerians in their refusal to *read* the texts of the history of metaphysics. Derrida there describes the opening of the Heideggerian breakthrough as the only place where the excess of metaphysics is thought, recalling to us the sense in which *a-letheia* has hitherto remained unthought. But at the same time Derrida insists that the texts of metaphysics be read 'beyond certain propositions or conclusions within which the Heideggerian breakthrough has had to constrain itself, propositions or conclusions which it has had to call upon or take its support from' (M 72/62). Derrida refers explicitly to the place of Aristotle and Hegel during the epoch of *Being and Time*. It is striking how modest is the position Derrida allots himself vis-à-vis Heidegger here. Nevertheless the question remains as to how and how far Derrida succeeds in going 'beyond' the propositions or conclusions Heidegger has in his reading of the history of metaphysics drawn on from that history for his support. The question is concerned with the sense of this 'beyond'.

What Derrida at this point of the 1968 paper was indicating as the great danger was the 'closing off of questions' brought about by the complicity of Heideggerians and anti-Heideggerians. The danger lay in the difficulties which would ensue were Heidegger's readings of the history of philosophy to fall into self-evidence, to be presented not as a dialogue between thinkers, but as a standard interpretation. It would be to reduce to assertion what lives only in the transformation of language away from assertion. By the same token, the ambiguity of Derrida's own

relation to Heidegger, the way in which he seeks to sustain a metaphysical reading of Heidegger and yet find a transgression within the Heideggerian text must be maintained.

The complicity of 'Heideggerians' and 'Derridians' is that their very stance towards each other closes off that non-oppositional relation to texts which is the hallmark of both Heidegger and Derrida. If the essay 'The way to language' appears now as Heidegger's own attempt to 'deconstruct' *Being and Time* then there can be little doubt that we are conceding that when we read Heidegger today, we find Derrida's Heidegger. We are no longer in a position to say how much of our current reading of Heidegger is indebted to Derrida. We can always point to those moments when we can distinguish the two, when (as Derrida himself would say) 'the seam does not hold', but that does not make it possible for us to use the distinction more universally. One consequence is that it ill behoves Derridians to try and contrast Heidegger with Derrida to the latter's advantage. If Derrida has helped us to a reading of Heidegger which gives the destruction of metaphysics the central place already allotted to it in *Being and Time* then we cannot subsequently identify Heidegger exclusively with, for example, the ahistorical readings of Heidegger which were at one time fashionable. Derrida's reading of the text belongs to the text just as much as those other readings.

But do Derrida's readings nevertheless attain a certain priority over other readings? If they do, would not the only way of justifying it be by referring those readings to the epoch, the time which we share with them? But would not that be just another way of maintaining the privilege of the present? The notion of 'trace' or, as in the explication of Heidegger's essay above, the notion of *a-letheia* or of *Ereignis* as the oldest of the old, must be understood as addressing precisely that issue. The closure is not brought to a text from outside; one should not really speak of 'imposing the closure on a text'. So Derrida writes:

Henceforth the closure of metaphysics . . . would not occur *around* a homogeneous and continuous field of metaphysics. Rather, it would fissure the structure and history of metaphysics, *organically* inscribing and systematically *articulating* the traces of the *before* and the *after* both from within and without metaphysics. Thereby proposing an infinite, and infinitely surprising, reading. An irreducible rupture, an excess, can always be produced within an era, at a certain point of its text (for example, in the 'Platonic' fabric of 'Plotinism'). Already in Plato's text no doubt.

(M 206/172)

And in 'The way to language' Heidegger also makes an attempt to save us from the idea that the transformation of language is something that

simply happens in our time and thus is our contribution. 'But it is only to us and only with regard to ourselves that the change of the way to language appears as a shift which has taken place only now' (US 261/130). The shift from understanding language in terms of human activity to the entry of the essence of language into *Ereignis* implies the shift away from thinking the closure as situated at an end-point.

And a further consequence is the disappearance of the idea that texts like those of Heidegger or Levinas should because of their contemporaneity not be given a 'double reading' on the grounds that they stand unambiguously outside metaphysics. If the notion of 'outside' has any meaning in this context it would have to be thought in terms of the entry into the 'ambiguity' of the *Geläut der Stille* which ambiguity precisely disturbs the definition of the outside. It is in this light that we must reexamine Derrida's practice of 'prefacing' his readings of the 'philosophical' classics with a presentation of translations of them or the standard interpretations which at one time seemed quite adequate to that for which they served proxy. Derrida's use of these surrogates is the conventionalizing of a common Heideggerian practice, especially visible in his essays on Greek thinkers where he would remind us either of the conventional translation or of Hegel's interpretation before providing his own. But this is no idle-preparation for the 'real' reading of the text. The space of the Heideggerian reading is the between-space which relates the multiplicity of different translations, the previous ones and his own. By conventionalizing this relation and turning it into a strategy Derrida misleads the Derridian. The language of strategy as a human activity is applied to the reading, but that reading takes place only as a necessity. This 'necessity', to which Derrida often refers, is the necessity of responding to what has already happened, specifically that the words no longer say the same to us, we can no longer follow the old ways.

The reference to inadequate translations and blatantly metaphysical interpretations belongs to the ambiguity of the text, its play, and is supported by the memory of what has gone before. This memory is kept alive in a history of textuality, a history of reading, a notion which in the absence of any detailed explication by Derrida should presumably be understood as similar to Heidegger's history of Being. So Derrida keeps open the space of Heidegger's thinking which is in danger of collapsing as Heidegger's readings fall into self-evidence. If the translations and previous interpretations were forgotten or ignored then the so-called ambiguity would be lost, the ringing of stillness would fade into silence, the discontinuity of rupture would dissolve into continuity. The maintainance of the rift is essential. (This would be the point to introduce Derrida's reading of the rift in 'The *Retrait* of metaphor'.) It is not that the metaphysical is needed as one term in an oppositional structure. The advantage of the account of the 'ringing of stillness' over an account

presented in terms of inside and outside lies precisely in avoiding that impression.

The fact that Derrida is parasitic on Heidegger is not from a Derridian point of view a weakness. Heidegger *experiences* the end of philosophy; but even if it is conceded that this is no longer a metaphysical concept of experience, it would still be the case that according to the logic of supplementarity the parasite is more original than the original. The difficulty in assessing the relation between Derrida and Heidegger is a much more complex issue when we look to see what Derrida has done to keep open the ambiguity – the play – of the Heideggerian space. This is most apparent when we return to the question of the two strategies that Derrida outlines at the end of 'The ends of man'. It is Derrida who here (and elsewhere) accentuates the inside-outside opposition, which may be present in Heidegger, but certainly does not dominate his texts as they have dominated so many of Derrida's. By identifying Heidegger's strategy predominantly with that of attempting an exit without changing ground, while conceding that the other strategy of deciding to change ground was also operative in his works, Derrida imposes a distinction born of a metaphysical opposition where it did not belong and at once denies it. The opposition Heideggerian-Derridian as a cultural event has come to be understood so that the terms serve as a reinscription of the metaphysical dualism of inside and outside. But the discussions of *Ereignis* and *a-letheia* which arise out of the transformation of the language of the history of philosophy into the language of the history of Being have precisely the effect of rendering otiose the application of the two strategies to a discussion of what Heidegger understands by 'another beginning'. With the notions of 'another beginning' and 'another writing' Heidegger and Derrida have attempted to think the sense in which there is today both a changing of ground and a dissolution of the notion of ground.

Heidegger abbreviations

- BR 'Brief an Richardson' *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* by W. J. Richardson, Nijhoff, 1963.
- BW *Basic Writings* ed. D. F. Krell, New York, Harper & Row, 1977.
- EB *Existence and Being* trans. R. Hull and A. Crick, London, Vision, 1949.
- HG *Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein', Gesamtausgabe* Band 39, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1980.
- ID *Identität und Differenz* Pfullingen, Neske, 1957; trans. J. Stambaugh, *Identity and Difference* New York, Harper & Row, 1969.
- L *Logik, Gesamtausgabe* Band 21, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1976.
- PLT *Poetry, Language, Thought* trans. A. Hofstadter, New York, Harper & Row, 1971.

- SZ *Sein und Zeit* Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1967; trans. J. Macquarrie and J. Robinson *Being and Time* New York, Harper & Row, 1962.
- US *Unterwegs zur Sprache* Pfullingen, Neske, 1959; trans. P. Hertz and J. Stambaugh, *On the Way to Language* New York, Harper & Row, 1971.
- W *Wegmarken* Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1967.
- WD *Was heisst Denken?* Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1954; trans. F. D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray, *What is called thinking?* New York, Harper & Row, 1968.
- ZSD *Zur Sache des Denkens* Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1969; trans. J. Stambaugh, *On Time and Being* New York, Harper & Row, 1977.

Derrida abbreviations

- D *La Dissemination* Paris, Seuil, 1972; trans. B. Johnson *Dissemination* University of Chicago, 1981.
- ED *L'Écriture et la différence* Paris, Seuil, 1967; trans. A. Bass *Writing and Difference* University of Chicago, 1978.
- G *De la Grammatologie* Paris, Minuit, 1967; trans. G. Spivak *Of Grammatology* Johns Hopkins, 1976.
- M *Marges de la philosophie* Paris, Minuit, 1972; trans. A. Bass *Margins of Philosophy* University of Chicago, 1982.
- P *Positions* Paris, Minuit, 1972; trans. A. Bass *Positions* University of Chicago, 1981.

Note

The reading of Heidegger's essay 'The way to language' to be found here was first offered at the Collegium Phaenomenologicum, Perugia in August 1982.

I have in a number of places, and particularly in the case of 'The way to language', adapted the existing translations. I have been fortunate to have had at my disposal an unpublished translation of that essay by Ivan Ivanishevich. I have on occasion both adopted and adapted his 'solutions'.

Language and reversal

John Sallis

I The problem of language and reversal

The way on which Heidegger's thinking has moved is a way with which the question of language is intertwined, not just in the sense that language is one of those questions that is encountered on that way but also in the sense that language is the medium of that endowment with which anything like a way first opens up. How is this intertwining of language and way to be understood, especially in light of the fact that this way proves to be such that the movement appropriate to it is one of reversal? How is it that language and reversal belong together?

In *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger bears witness to the importance which the question of language had for his way even at that stage. Here he writes: 'It is, in the end, the business of philosophy to preserve the *force of the most elemental words* in which Dasein expresses itself. . . .'¹ Already, however, this statement betrays the curious character of Heidegger's involvement with the question of language by the way in which it construes the relation between language and philosophy. Rather than assigning to philosophy the task of determining the essence of language, of developing, as it were, a theory of language, he projects the task of philosophy with respect to language as one of preservation: it is the business of philosophy to preserve language, to preserve the force of the most elemental words. What is that way by entrance onto which the question of language comes to present itself in the guise of a demand for preservation? We need to see that what is at issue is a way on which thinking is drawn back into its element, a way on which thinking lets itself be engaged in a movement of reversal. We need to understand how the problem of language becomes in Heidegger's thinking the problem of language and reversal.

The peculiar way in which the question of language enters into Heideg-

ger's thinking is again indicated in Heidegger's denial that he is engaged in 'philosophy of language'.² Obviously, this denial is not to be taken as indicating that for Heidegger the question of language lacks sufficient importance to warrant an engagement in philosophy of language; on the contrary, this issue is so fundamental for his problematic that justice could not be done to it by engaging in mere philosophy of language. Heidegger says that the question of the essence of language 'is something other than philosophy of language'.³ To engage straightforwardly in philosophy of language would be already to presume that language is, as it were, one item among others to be interrogated in terms of an already established framework of interrogation, capable, in particular, of assuring us as to what is at issue in every search for an essence. But, as Heidegger says, 'Not only does language stand in question now, but also what essence means [*heisst*] – more still: it stands in question whether and how essence and language belong to one another'.⁴ A framework would need to be presupposed – hence, we cannot proceed immediately to a philosophy of language. Also, however, Heidegger's statement makes it clear that it is not a matter simply of suspending the question of language in order to turn to the question of the framework, to the question of essence, as though it were a prior question. The question of the meaning of essence is not just a question to be taken up by a questioning already assured of its own possibilities and directives but rather has, since Plato, belonged together with the question of the meaning of philosophical thinking as such; and this latter question directs us, in turn, back into the question of language inasmuch as philosophy is itself a distinctive way of speaking. Heidegger writes: 'Without a sufficient meditation on language we never truly know what philosophy is as a distinctive response [*Ent-sprechen*], what philosophy is as a distinctive way of speaking.'⁵ The questions of language and of essence meet in the question 'Was heisst Denken?' and it is only within the compass of this question that we can properly respond to the question 'whether and how essence and language belong to one another'. The question 'Was heisst Denken?' in its most decisive sense asks: 'What calls us to think?'⁶ To hear the question in this, its decisive sense is to be led into the movement of reversal.⁷ The problem of language enters into Heidegger's thinking not in the form of a philosophy of language but as the problem of language and reversal.

II The structure of the problem

The problem of language and reversal enters into Heidegger's thinking in two ways. The first of these ways is expressed in the fact that the very possibility of reversal is tied somehow to language – to such a

degree as to allow Heidegger to say that that division of *Sein und Zeit* which was to have carried through the reversal originally proposed, the reversal from 'Being and time' to 'time and Being', was held back because the language was lacking, because 'it did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics'.⁸ Language is, Heidegger says, that originary dimension in which man is first able to enter into that conformity by which he is engaged in the domain of the reversal.⁹ It is in the dimension of language that the movement of reversal is granted to him. This movement of reversal is a step out of metaphysics back into the ground of metaphysics,¹⁰ and for this movement the language of metaphysics – that is, language as dominated by metaphysics, language as it shows itself within the compass of the metaphysics of language – is insufficient. Language under the domination of metaphysics has fallen 'out of its element';¹¹ it has come into a condition in which precisely its character as the originating dimension capable of granting entry into the movement of reversal is concealed. Hence, the language of metaphysics cannot but fail to grant entry into the movement of reversal. What is called for, however, by this situation is not a mere exchanging of the language of metaphysics for another language but rather, more fundamentally, 'a transformed relationship to the essence of language'.¹²

How is this transformation with which language would be brought back into its element to be accomplished? The terms of this transformation, its 'from which' and 'to which', are expressed in a statement from Heidegger's essay 'Bauen, Wohnen, Denken'. He writes: 'Man behaves as though he were the moulder and master of language, but *it* nevertheless remains the master of man.'¹³ The transformation moves from a relationship to the essence of language in which this essence remains concealed and language gets taken as an activity of man¹⁴ to one in which language reveals itself as the master of man, as the 'clearing-concealing advent of Being itself' by which man is overpowered.¹⁵ But this transformation is, then, nothing less than the reversal itself. The reversal requires a transformation of our relationship to the essence of language, yet this transformation is itself identical with the reversal. Thus, there is here no question of simple priority; it is not a matter of the reversal having as its pre-condition the transformation demanded with respect to language; neither does this transformation, on the other hand, require the reversal as its pre-condition. Each requires the other. It is a matter of intertwining; the problem of reversal and that of language *belong together*.

The second of the two ways in which the problem of language and reversal enters into Heidegger's thinking provides a means for articulating that intertwining, that belonging-together, to which the first way leads. What is the character of this second way? Here the problem arises from the apparent discontinuity, even conflict, between what Heidegger says regarding language in *Sein und Zeit* and what he says of it in his later

writings. Within the architectonic of *Sein und Zeit*, language occupies a rather inconspicuous position. The only explicit discussion of it occurs in the chapter entitled 'Being-in as such', specifically in the portion of that chapter that is entitled 'The existential constitution of the "There"'. In this section Heidegger is involved in uncovering the constitutive structures, the existentials, by virtue of which Dasein is able to be its 'there' (*Da*), by virtue of which Dasein is 'in-the-world' in such a way as to be capable of encountering beings 'within-the-world'. There are three such constitutive structures, disposition (*Befindlichkeit*), understanding (*Verstehen*), and discourse (*Rede*). Language (*Sprache*) is introduced in subordination to the third of these existentials, discourse, which is defined as 'the articulation of intelligibility'. He writes: 'The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse.' Language itself he describes as 'the way in which discourse gets expressed'.¹⁶

This apparent confinement of the issue of language seems almost totally out of keeping with the importance which language so obviously assumes in Heidegger's later writings. For example, in *Über den Humanismus* he discusses what he calls the nearness of Being (*die Nähe des Seins*) and proceeds to identify this nearness with the *Da* of Dasein. This nearness, he then insists, takes place (*west*) as language.¹⁷ What is obviously suggested is that language is not, as in *Sein und Zeit*, a mere derivative of the third of the three constituents of the *Da* but, rather, precisely the constituent of the *Da*. Language alone, it seems, is now regarded as enabling Dasein to be its *Da*. Much the same is suggested in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* when Heidegger writes that 'Language first enables man to be that creature which he is as man'.¹⁸ Language, it seems, is quite simply what makes man to be what he is. But, we feel compelled to ask, what about the other constituents of the *Da* which Heidegger elaborated with such care in *Sein und Zeit*?

There is still a further, even more fundamental difference between what is said regarding language in *Sein und Zeit* and what is said in the later writings. According to the former, language is the way in which discourse, the articulation of intelligibility, gets expressed. There is virtually nothing to suggest that such expression is anything other than an activity of man, something accomplished by man. Language, it seems, is simply an activity of man. But in the later writings, to state it in the boldest fashion, 'language is the language of Being', and man is called only to respond to 'the unspoken word of Being': '*Die Sprache spricht*.'¹⁹

Between what Heidegger says regarding language in *Sein und Zeit* and what he says in the later writings stands the reversal in Heidegger's thinking. Hence, it is only through a reflection on the reversal, only through an effort to understand in what sense the reversal 'stands between' *Sein und Zeit* and the later writings – it is only thus that we can approach the problem of the coherence of what Heidegger says

regarding language. Does the transition from the discussion of language in *Sein und Zeit* to the discussion in the later writings become intelligible in light of the reversal, in light of the way in which the issue of the reversal allows us to understand the movement from *Sein und Zeit* to the later writings? It is through this question that we shall attempt to take up the problem of language and reversal.

III Language in *Sein und Zeit*

Before considering the question of the reversal we need to ascertain more specifically what Heidegger says about language in *Sein und Zeit* and what is at issue behind what he says. We focus on two sections of Division I: (1) the section in Chapter 3 where Heidegger offers a description of signs and (2) the section in Chapter 5, referred to above, which deals with the constituents of the 'there'.

In the first of these sections there is a statement which comes directly to the point that is relevant to our problem. Heidegger writes: 'A sign is not a thing which stands to another thing in the relationship of indicating; it is rather an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself.'²⁰ Signs, presumably also linguistic signs, are not mere things. Like the other beings encountered within the *Umwelt* they are items of equipment bound up in an equipment-totality. A sign, however, is not just another item of equipment but rather has a distinctive function which distinguishes it from all other equipment. This distinctive function Heidegger calls 'indicating' (*Zeigen*). Indicating, however, is not a matter of a co-ordination of certain pieces of equipment, namely signs, in a one-to-one correspondence with other pieces of equipment, namely what is indicated by the sign. Rather, a sign, as indicating, raises the total meaning-context, the referential totality, into our circumspection.

It follows, then, that language is not to be regarded in terms of individual words or linguistic units correlated in some fashion or other either with discrete meaning-contents or with individual things. Rather, linguistic signs are bound up in a total meaning-context in the sense of bringing that total context to light. The way in which language indicates needs to be understood in reference to the total meaning-context rather than in terms of correspondence between words and things or words and meanings. Heidegger thus attempts to get beneath the traditional understanding of language in terms of correspondence and thereby to undercut the classical alternatives of correspondence by nature and correspondence by convention. This is not to say that the understanding of language in terms of correspondence is incorrect; it has its rights, but it is

not primordial. Heidegger wants to point beneath it to a more primordial dimension where language is, first of all, a lighting-up which lets the world, the total meaning-context, announce itself.

In the discussion of the constituents of the 'there' in Chapter 5, the issue of language enters much more explicitly. We have referred already to the way in which Heidegger takes up this issue in the context of his account of discourse, the third existential constituent of the 'there', and describes language as the way in which discourse gets expressed. However, it is not only in relation to discourse that the issue of language is taken up; Heidegger refers to it also, though briefly, in the course of his elaboration of the structures which derive from the first of the three basic constituents of the 'there', understanding (*Verstehen*).

Let us briefly review this elaboration in order to place the issue of language within it. Understanding is described by Heidegger as the projection of Dasein's Being upon possibilities, upon what Heidegger calls a 'for-the-sake-of-which' (*Worumwillen*).²¹ In projection Dasein throws before itself possibilities as possibilities, lets possibilities be its possibilities, and is itself these possibilities as possibilities. Possibilities, in turn, prescribe a referential totality, a totality of involvements, a world, in which ready-to-hand beings or equipment can be involved and thereby be what they are.²² However, in understanding, neither the possibilities nor the prescribed totality of involvements are grasped thematically, and understanding thus has itself the possibility of developing itself into a thematic grasp of the possibilities which it has thrown before itself. This development, this appropriation of what is already understood, Heidegger calls interpretation (*Auslegung*). In interpretation, items of equipment are made explicit with respect to their 'as-structure', with respect to their involvement in the referential totality, in the totality of signifying references which make up the structure of Dasein's world. Interpretation is an articulation prior to all thematic assertion, an articulation of what has been understood, of that upon which Dasein, in understanding, has projected.²³ The upon-which of a projection Heidegger identifies as meaning (*Sinn*).²⁴ Interpretation is an articulation of meaning prior to thematic assertion. Finally, there is the structure which Heidegger calls assertion (*Aussage*), which derives from the further development of interpretation. Assertion is not, however, merely an extension of interpretation but involves a decisive change, the transformation of the 'hermeneutical as' – the as-structure based in the referential totality – by which interpretation lets itself be guided *into* the 'apophantical as' under the guidance of which beings are now articulated with respect to definite characteristics. It is only with assertion that we gain access to such things as properties, and it is here that Heidegger sees the origination of presence-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*) out of readiness-to-hand (*Zuhandenheit*). Heidegger assigns to 'assertion' three interconnected significations: 'pointing out',

'predication', and 'communication'.²⁵ With the last of these the analysis has obviously reached the plane of language. But Heidegger does not elaborate.

The dual locus of the issue of language in Heidegger's account of the constituents of the 'there' raises two problems. Through these problems, we can see how what is at issue behind what Heidegger says begins to take shape. First, we have seen that Heidegger states explicitly that discourse, the third basic existential constituent, is the foundation of language. We have seen, further, that language also is involved in the derivative structures which originate from understanding, specifically in assertion as communication. The problem is: How is it possible for discourse to be the foundation of language if language is also involved in another existential constituent, namely understanding – specifically in what develops from understanding? How can language be grounded in discourse and yet have one foot, as it were, in another of the three basic constituents of the 'there'? Presumably, this is possible only if the two basic constituents, understanding and discourse, are themselves fundamentally connected. This, then, is the second problem: What is the character of this connection? What is the character of the unity by which understanding and discourse belong together?

Let us try to formulate this problem more precisely. Heidegger defines discourse as the articulation of intelligibility or meaning. Thus, language, as the way in which discourse gets expressed, is the expression of an already accomplished articulation. Discourse provides something pre-given to the act of expression. What is crucial here, however, is that this definition of discourse corresponds precisely with the definition which Heidegger gives of interpretation. The latter too is an articulation of meaning. What, then, is the difference between interpretation and discourse? Heidegger writes: 'The intelligibility of something has always been articulated even before there is an appropriative interpretation of it.'²⁶ There is, in other words, an articulation of meaning prior to that articulation that occurs in interpretation. What is this prior articulation? Heidegger proceeds to identify it as discourse.²⁷ Discourse as articulation of meaning is prior to the articulation of meaning in interpretation. When meaning is articulated in interpretation, such articulation takes place against the background of a prior articulation already accomplished by discourse. What is the character of the prior articulation?

We have seen that in the development of understanding into interpretation and assertion the question of language first enters in connection with the third signification of assertion, namely communication. In the context in which communication is discussed, Heidegger alludes to a link between communication and what he calls 'fore-conception' and then makes the following crucial statement: 'The fore-conception which is always implied in an assertion remains for the most part inconspicuous,

because language already conceals in itself a developed way of conceiving [*eine ausgebildete Begrifflichkeit*].²⁸ This statement provides a solution to our problem, for it points to the fact that that articulation of meaning which is prior to interpretation and which Heidegger calls discourse is precisely that articulation – that ‘developed way of conceiving’ – which is always already accomplished by language itself but which remains concealed, hidden away in the language. Discourse is not, therefore, primarily an articulation of meaning which *we* perform but rather an articulation which is always already performed for us, an articulation which is, of necessity, already delivered over to us, which we have already taken over inadvertently, by virtue of our living in a language – by virtue of our having been thrown into a language with its concealed, yet already developed ways of conceiving.

Now it is clear also how interpretation, as operating always within the compass of the prior articulation (discourse), can stand in a relation to language. Interpretation always takes place against the background of articulation already accomplished by language. And *Sein und Zeit* itself, as an interpretation,²⁹ is likewise bound to the pre-articulation hidden away in language. What Heidegger’s work uncovers as regards language reflects back upon the character of the work itself and requires that *Sein und Zeit*, in its character as a work, be understood in its relation to language, as bound to what is handed over in language. Here is a clue for understanding Heidegger’s description of the business of philosophy as one of preserving the force of words.

We need to draw out a further conclusion implicit in this development of the problem of language in *Sein und Zeit*. In order to do so we call attention to a significant ambiguity centered in Heidegger’s account of understanding. This ambiguity is evident in the two fundamentally different ways in which Heidegger describes understanding: In the one instance, understanding is described as a projecting of Dasein’s Being *upon* possibilities, in the sense of letting possibilities be possibilities for Dasein, in the sense that Dasein assigns itself to possibilities so as to be these possibilities;³⁰ in the other instance, understanding is described as a projecting *of* possibilities, Heidegger writing explicitly of ‘possibilities projected in understanding’.³¹ The difference between possibilities projected *upon* by Dasein and possibilities projected *by* Dasein is, if taken without further refinement, immense, and it is especially crucial granted the context of the project of *Sein und Zeit*. Since a possibility related to Dasein’s projection is a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ and, hence, prescribes a totality of involvements that constitute the structure of world, nothing less is at stake than the origination of world. If Dasein quite simply projects its own possibilities, bringing them forth, as it were, entirely out of its own resources, then it would follow that world is, in the end, something which Dasein projects. But it is precisely the referential

totality, constitutive of world, which allows ready-to-hand beings within-the-world to be what they are, which, consequently, is the Being of these beings.³² It would follow, then, that the Being of the ready-to-hand is nothing more than something projected by Dasein.

This conclusion is fundamentally at odds with the very project of *Sein und Zeit*. Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes in his various commentary statements on *Sein und Zeit* what was already evident in the work itself: that it already is involved in the step back out of metaphysics and specifically out of the subjectivism that characterizes modern metaphysics. But what is subjectivism if not the locating of the ground of objectivity, of the Being of beings, in the subject?³³ And if it is objected that, nevertheless, Dasein is not a subject in the modern metaphysical sense, then the problem is only re-stated; for it remains to be determined how Dasein is distinguishable from a subject if, indeed, Dasein projects its world and thereby the Being of what is encounterable within the world.

Clearly this alternative – that Dasein projects its possibilities – can be retained only if we grant that there is something else involved that serves to modify the most immediate sense suggested by such a notion of projection. Indeed, Heidegger himself indicates this when he writes:

In every case Dasein, as essentially dispositional [*befindliches*], has already gotten into definite possibilities; as the potentiality-for-Being [*Seinkönnen*] which it is, it has let such possibilities pass by; it constantly sets about the possibilities of its Being, grasps them, and makes mistakes. But this means that Dasein is Being-possible which has been delivered over to itself – *thrown possibility* through and through. . . . By way of having a mood, Dasein ‘sees’ possibilities, in terms of which it is. In the projective disclosure of such possibilities, it already has a mood in every case. The projection of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being has been delivered over to the fact of its thrownness into the ‘there’.³⁴

These statements call attention to the fact that understanding is not the sole constituent of the ‘there’ and indicate that the various constituents do not simply stand, as it were, alongside one another but belong essentially together. Dasein as projecting is thrown-projecting, a projecting executed within thrownness, a projecting of world only from out of its situation of being already engaged in a world already disclosed in disposition. Heidegger writes: ‘Indeed *from the ontological point of view* we must as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to “bare mood”.’³⁵ It is this discovery which always lurks behind every projection. Again, Heidegger writes: ‘As something factual, Dasein’s projection of itself understandingly is in each case already alongside a world that has been discovered. From this world it takes its possibilities. . . .’³⁶ It is, in

other words, primarily in disposition that possibilities are first delivered over to Dasein in order that Dasein might project these possibilities as possibilities, in order that it might assign itself to them, thus throwing them before itself and letting them *be* as possibilities. Dasein indeed projects *upon* possibilities in that Dasein 'has already gotten into definite possibilities', in that possibilities are already, by way of disposition, disclosed as delivered over to Dasein; yet, in the same measure, possibilities are projected *by* Dasein in that it is through Dasein as projecting, through Dasein's assigning itself, that they are thrown ahead and allowed to rule as possibilities, allowed to be as possibilities. Hence, Heidegger can speak indifferently of possibilities as being projected *upon* by Dasein and as being projected *by* Dasein.

The ambiguity is thus resolved, but beneath it a further problem opens up: the problem of how disposition and understanding belong together. It is on this problem that the development of the issue of language in *Sein und Zeit* has a crucial bearing. Discourse, we have seen, is, in the final analysis, that articulation of intelligibility which is already bound up and hidden away in language. Discourse is not simply an articulation which we perform but rather is an articulation which is always already in effect, delivered over to us insofar as we *find ourselves* in a language. Thus, discourse refers to a kind of finding-oneself-as-thrown (*Befindlichkeit*) which, as involving us in an articulation of intelligibility (*Verständlichkeit*), is inherently linked to interpretation and understanding (*Verstehen*). It involves a finding-oneself-as-thrown into a certain medium of intelligibility, into a certain already established way of articulation. It is discourse which points back to the unitary, yet complex, ground from which the multiple constituents of the 'there' arise. It is discourse as itself this 'common root' in which understanding and disposition meet – without, however, necessarily having their distinctive characters dissolved – it is this which forms the bridge from the analytic of *Sein und Zeit* to the insistence in the later writings that the 'there' takes place as language.

IV Reversal

Between what is said regarding language in *Sein und Zeit* and what is said in the later writings stands the reversal (*Kehre*). It is to this that we must now turn in order to be able to come to terms with the question of the coherence of what Heidegger says regarding language.

Heidegger uses the term 'reversal' in describing the relation between what is accomplished in the published portion of *Sein und Zeit* and what was to have been accomplished in the unpublished final section of Part I. In this final section, which was to have carried the title 'Zeit und Sein' everything would, Heidegger tells us, have been reversed. He describes

the reversal as a reversal from 'Being and time' to 'time and Being'.³⁷ Inasmuch as the later writings remain underway to what was still unaccomplished in *Sein und Zeit* as published, the term 'reversal' is used to describe the transition from *Sein und Zeit* to the later writings. What is the character of this transition that is here underway? What does Heidegger mean in speaking of reversal?

In the attempt to think through what is at issue in the reversal everything depends upon understanding the proper locus of the reversal. The reversal is not, Heidegger insists, 'a change of the standpoint of *Sein und Zeit*',³⁸ not a shift to a different, presumably more adequate, point of view in principle discontinuous with that which defined the project of *Sein und Zeit*. Nevertheless, he writes: 'The thinking of the reversal is a change in my thought.'³⁹ The reversal involves a change but one which is not to be construed as a shift from one standpoint to another – nor, indeed, as any other kind of shift executed merely within the movement of thinking: 'The reversal is above all not an operation of interrogative thought.'⁴⁰ The proper locus of the reversal lies rather in what is to be thought; in Heidegger's words, 'The reversal is in play within the matter itself';⁴¹ there is a reversal in the medium of thought, a change in Heidegger's thinking, only insofar as this thinking is led into the movement of reversal by letting itself be bound in essential cor-respondence to what evokes thought, to what calls it forth, and hence, to the reversal which is 'in play within the matter itself'.

A thinking which is able to let itself be bound by what calls forth thinking, by its sustaining source, is a thinking which, indeed, has undergone a change but which has not, as it were, executed that change out of its own resources. In order for it to be able to come to bind itself to what genuinely sustains it, the sustaining source must have shown itself in its capacity as granting sustenance to thinking. That which sustains thinking cannot, however, be posed before thinking as an object which could be made wholly transparent, from which all concealment could be banished, but rather is able to sustain thinking only in that it simultaneously withdraws from thinking. The source sustains thinking by drawing it along in this withdrawal.⁴² The sustaining source could show itself to thinking in such a way as to allow thinking to be bound to it, drawn along in the withdrawal, only by showing itself as withdrawing.

If thinking comes to be bound to what sustains it, it does so always from out of its situation of having been cast into an age determined by its characteristic mittence of Being (*Seinsgeschick*), by the way in which the source grants itself to and withholds itself from those cast into that age.⁴³ It is in the mittence of Being which governs our age that the source must reveal itself in order that, in thinking, we may be bound to it. Yet our age, the age of technology, is determined precisely by a radical self-concealment of the source; our age is the age in which the

forgottenness of Being reaches its culmination so that 'it appears as though there were no such thing as Being'⁴⁴ – as though Being were only 'a vapor and a fallacy'.⁴⁵ Ours is the age in which it comes to appear as though there were no sustaining source or, rather, as though thinking were its own sustenance, as though thinking were capable of providing its own sufficient ground, capable of executing that self-grounding for which it has striven at least since the beginning of modern metaphysics.⁴⁶ The source not only withdraws, not only conceals itself, but in our age has come to the point of concealing its concealment; it has come to conceal precisely that withdrawing in which thinking is drawn along and thereby sustained. Our age is determined by a radical self-concealment of Being, not because Being remains simply concealed from us, but rather because this concealment is itself concealed to such a degree that we are cast into utter obliviousness to Being. What is decisive is not that the source is concealed but rather that the fact of the source is concealed – the fact that thinking is sustained by a source and not by itself. Yet even in its obliviousness to its sustaining source thinking continues to be sustained by this source, and what is called for is that, in the midst of the effort on the part of thinking to be its own source, this effort reveal itself as violating what it would establish, that this effort reveal itself as sustained precisely by that whose sustenance it would deny. What is called for is that man's belongingness to Being break through at just that point at which the most radical concealment prevails – at the point of what Heidegger calls the highest danger. This is the reversal: 'In the essence of the danger a favor takes place and dwells, namely the favor of a reversal of the forgottenness of Being into the truth of Being.'⁴⁷

What calls for and calls forth this reversal is not, however, man himself. As sustained in his thinking by the source and as cast into an age of radical self-concealment of this source, man is able to enter into the movement of reversal only through being led into and sustained in it by the source itself. The reversal has its proper locus in the clearing-concealing advent of Being itself. There is a reversal in thinking only insofar as thinking succeeds in cor-responding to this '*Ereignis der Kehre im Sein*'.⁴⁸

The proper locus of the reversal is the clearing-concealing advent of Being itself. Now we can begin to understand the involvement of the problem of language in the reversal, for, Heidegger says, 'language is the clearing-concealing advent of Being itself'.⁴⁹ Language is the proper locus of the reversal. This is why, in discussing the fact that that portion of *Sein und Zeit* in which the reversal would have become explicit was not carried through, Heidegger calls attention to the issue of language. This also is why the reversal requires 'a transformed relationship to the essence of language'. But this transformation is no mere prerequisite to the reversal; it is the reversal. And it is a transformation of which we are capable only by cor-responding to what is granted to our thinking.

This conclusion – that language is the proper locus of the reversal – goes beyond what we have said thus far regarding language; we have been led to it only by introducing a cryptic statement from the later writings – that language is the clearing-concealing advent of Being itself – a statement which remains largely unintelligible as long as we have not understood the way in which the problem of language is taken up in Heidegger's later writings. But, then, it was precisely in order to move from what is said about language in *Sein und Zeit* to what is said in the later writings that we found it necessary to take up the question of reversal. The problem of language directs us into that of the reversal, and conversely. The two problems are intertwined; they *belong together*.

In order to lead back into the question of the coherence of what Heidegger says regarding language, we need now to try to understand, more generally, how the project of *Sein und Zeit* coheres with the thinking of the reversal that is underway in the later writings.

At first it appeared that the reversal stood between *Sein und Zeit* and the later writings, that it represented the point of transition. Now it is evident, however, that the reversal is not something once accomplished or undergone and then left behind for the sake of something else to which it is only a bridge. It is significant that Heidegger speaks not of the thinking *after* the reversal but, instead, of the thinking *of* the reversal. Thinking, when it enters into the movement of reversal, remains, as always, bound to that which calls forth thought but which does so only in that it simultaneously withdraws. Being incessantly withholds itself even in the midst of showing itself in that advent into which the reversal leads. The reversal does not terminate in a total revealment with which thinking could be brought to completion but rather issues in a recalling of Being as withdrawing. Heidegger's later works remain, and must remain, *in* the movement of reversal: 'Thinking itself is a way. We respond to the way only by remaining underway'; 'What remains in thinking is the way'.⁵⁰

Granted that the later works are engaged in the movement of reversal, how, then, are we to understand their relation to *Sein und Zeit*? Is this engagement already in effect even in *Sein und Zeit*, or is it only initiated in the later works? If the latter, then does *Sein und Zeit* in some fashion prepare the way to such engagement, or is it, on the contrary, simply left behind once Heidegger's thinking has entered into the reversal?

This final alternative is already virtually excluded by Heidegger's statement that the transition to the later writings does not involve an alteration of standpoint. Heidegger elaborates what is meant in this statement:

The thinking of the reversal *is* a change in my thought. But this change is not a consequence of altering the standpoint, much less of abandoning the fundamental issue, of *Sein und Zeit*. The thinking of

the reversal results from the fact that I stayed with the matter-for-thought [of] 'Being and time' [*bei der zu denkenden Sache 'Sein und Zeit'*], sc. by inquiring into that perspective which already in *Sein und Zeit* (p. 39) was designated as 'Time and Being'.⁵¹

The entry into the movement of reversal is, therefore, not an abandonment of *Sein und Zeit* but, on the contrary, is the outcome of staying with its fundamental issue. It came about through inquiring into the domain of the reversal already proposed in *Sein und Zeit*, the reversal from 'Being and time' to 'time and Being'. Heidegger's later works remain on the way to which *Sein und Zeit* pointed.

We have seen that the entry of thinking into the movement of reversal takes place only in a cor-responding in which thinking is able to let itself be drawn along by its sustaining source. The way of this entry is not something which is established by thinking but rather something granted to thinking. Thinking is of itself able to build no bridge by which it could pass over into the movement of reversal. Rather this entry is, regarded from the side of thinking, a leap. But, Heidegger insists, in the leap of thinking that from which it leaps is carried over: 'The leap of thinking does not leave behind that from which it leaps, but rather appropriates it in a more primordial way.'⁵² Not only, then, does the thinking of the reversal not abandon the fundamental issue of *Sein und Zeit*, but furthermore it is precisely the fulfillment of what was there undertaken: 'The question of *Sein und Zeit* is decisively fulfilled in the thinking of the reversal.'⁵³ In the thinking of the reversal what was undertaken in *Sein und Zeit* is fulfilled by being appropriated in a more primordial way.

Sein und Zeit already points ahead into the movement of reversal. Already it is engaged in the step back out of metaphysics through the fact that 'the problem is set up outside the sphere of subjectivism'. Already it keeps its distance from the effort by thinking to be its own sustaining source: '... the "Being" into which *Sein und Zeit* inquired can not long remain something that the human subject posits.' On the other hand, the thinking of the reversal appropriates in a more primordial way what was accomplished in *Sein und Zeit* and, hence, as Heidegger says 'furnishes for the first time an adequate characterization of Dasein'.⁵⁴ It is this way of understanding the coherence of his work which Heidegger expressed in his response to the distinction which Fr. Richardson formulated between 'Heidegger I' (the Heidegger of *Sein und Zeit*) and 'Heidegger II' (the Heidegger of the later works): 'only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But [the thought of] Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II.'⁵⁵

IV Language in the thinking of the reversal

The thinking of the reversal involves an appropriation in a more primordial way of what was accomplished in *Sein und Zeit*. Presumably, this holds, specifically, of the problem of language, and it is in this connection that we turn, finally, to what Heidegger says regarding language in the later writings. We need to try to understand the way in which the issue of language is taken up in the thinking of the reversal as a fulfillment of what was undertaken with regard to language in *Sein und Zeit*, as an appropriation in a more primordial way.

In the thinking of the reversal the issues of *Sein und Zeit* are appropriated. However, they are not just appropriated in the sense of being taken over; rather, they are, Heidegger says, appropriated in a more primordial way, in such a way as to be brought, through this appropriation, to their fulfillment. This means that the issues of *Sein und Zeit* are, in the thinking of the reversal, brought explicitly into the compass of the fundamental issue their relation to which remained implicit in *Sein und Zeit*. This fundamental issue is that for the sake of which the entire analytic of Dasein was undertaken; it is the question of the meaning of Being. *Sein und Zeit*, however, failed to carry through the reversal in which this analytic would have been led back into the fundamental issue, and the connection of the analytic of Dasein to the question of the meaning of Being remained largely implicit. But in the thinking of the reversal this connection can come into the light. This thinking is enabled to take the step back out of metaphysics, to recover (*verwinden*) from the incessant effort on the part of thinking to be its own sustaining source. It is a thinking to which is granted the transition *from* utter obliviousness as regards Being, for which Being is simply nothing, *to* an experience of this nothing of Being as precisely the double self-concealment of Being, the concealment of concealment. It is thus that Heidegger writes: 'We must prepare ourselves to experience in the nothing the vastness of that which gives every being the warrant to be. That is Being itself.'⁵⁶ But, to be led to experience the nothing as the double self-concealment of Being is to be led from the concealment of self-withdrawing Being to the recalling of self-withdrawing Being, of the truth (clearing-concealing) of Being. The thinking of the reversal is a being drawn along in the withdrawal of Being itself, its withdrawal from every effort to set it back upon a ground in subjectivity. To appropriate the issues of *Sein und Zeit* in a more primordial way is to let them come into the compass of the recalling of Being as withdrawing. We need to understand how what is said about language in the thinking of the reversal is an appropriation of what was said in *Sein und Zeit* – *and also* how it is constituted as a more primordial appropriation through relation to the issue of withdrawal.

We saw through the analysis of signs in *Sein und Zeit* that language is not to be regarded in terms of correspondence between two classes of things, linguistic units, on the one hand, and what is meant or referred to, on the other. It is not, at the fundamental level, just a matter of words being matched up, as it were, with meanings or things, not a matter of simple correspondence. Rather, Heidegger insists that language needs to be understood in its involvement with the total meaning-context, with world which it brings to light as a whole, which it raises explicitly 'into our circumspection' so as to orient us within the world.

Implicit in this analysis is a denial that language is to be regarded in terms of the concept of expression. In the later works this is explicitly enunciated: 'Language is neither merely the field of expression, nor merely the means of expression, nor merely the two jointly.'⁵⁷ Fundamentally, language is not a matter of expression in the sense of words serving simply as vehicles by means of which something else, units of meaning, are made conveyable, made available for exchange. It is not as though a word were, first of all, merely a sound, something sensible, which then has, in addition, a nonsensible component, a signification, so that we would need to invoke 'a sense-giving act that furnishes the word-sound with a sense'.⁵⁸ It is not a matter of a word, as sound, containing sense as a bucket contains water. We pass over what is fundamental in language when we say that 'the word's signification attaches to its sound';⁵⁹ even in *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger said, not that significations get attached to words, but just the opposite, that 'to significations, words accrue'.⁶⁰ Words are not buckets filled with sense; they are rather like wellsprings that must be dug up:

Words are not terms and thus are not like buckets and kegs from which we scoop a content that is there. Words are wellsprings that are found and dug up in the telling, wellsprings that must be found and dug up again and again, that easily cave in, but that at times also well up when least expected. If we do not go to the spring again and again, the buckets and kegs stay empty, or their content stays stale.⁶¹

To speak is not simply to express, not merely to translate certain significations that we have on hand into a ready-made communicable form. It is not a matter of attaching significations to words. Indeed, there is a significance which sustains our speaking, which is taken up into it and to which our speaking must remain attached; we must 'go to the spring again and again'. But this taking up is no mere translating of something already on hand, no mere external attaching of significations to words. On the contrary, it is in being taken up into words that this significance first comes to light, and it comes to light not as so many discrete units of meaning through which reference to individual things

could be effected but rather in such a way that it 'explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection'. Thus, Trakl's poem, 'Ein Winterabend', is no mere describing, no mere naming in the sense of distributing titles, applying words, to the various objects and events that pertain to a winter evening but is rather an invoking, a calling forth into words, which by calling is able to bring near what is called; and what it invokes are things in their intimacy with the world to which they belong and from which they are granted to us⁶² – just as in the context of the analysis in *Sein und Zeit* the sign 'raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself'. To significations words accrue in such a way as to bring to light significance, that is, world in its intimacy with things. Hölderlin wrote: 'But that which remains is established by the poets.'⁶³ Heidegger writes:

The poet names the gods and names all things in that which they are. This naming does not consist merely in something already known being supplied with a name, but rather in that the poet speaks the essential word, a being is by this naming nominated as what it is. So it becomes known *as* being [*als Seiendes*]. Poetry is the establishing of Being by the word [*worthafte Stiftung des Seins*]. . . . The essence of language must be understood through the essence of poetry.⁶⁴

To significations words accrue, however, not only in the sense that words invoke significance and bring it to light but also in the sense that significance, first of all, calls forth words. Our words, our speaking, is sustained, is called forth, is evoked. The poet names the gods; but, Heidegger writes, 'the gods can acquire a name only if they themselves make a claim upon [*ansprechen*] us and place us under their claim [*Anspruch*]. The word which names the gods is always an answer to such a claim'.⁶⁵ In the context of Heidegger's λόγος-interpretation this claim is thematized as what is given to speaking so as to come to light in the speaking. Speaking as λέγειν, laying, letting-lie, gathering and keeping watch over what is given, what is sent, is a speaking that is evoked, sustained by what is sent; speaking is ὁμολογεῖν.

We have seen that in *Sein und Zeit* discourse (*Rede*) is described as 'the articulation of intelligibility'. We saw, furthermore, that this articulation is not something which we simply execute but rather that it is an articulation in which we are caught up, which is always already handed over to us by virtue of our having been cast into a language – that it is an articulation already established, yet concealed, within language. It appeared then that discourse is promordially linked to the other two basic constituents of the 'there', that what is designated by 'discourse' is one's finding-oneself-as-thrown into a certain medium of intelligibility,

into a certain already established articulation. In the later writings what was called 'discourse' (*Rede*) in *Sein und Zeit* comes to be regarded as the primary sense of 'language' (*Sprache*). But beneath this shift the conclusion to which the analysis of discourse in *Sein und Zeit* pointed is not only retained but explicitly elaborated. Heidegger writes that 'language is not a tool';⁶⁶ language is not something which we have simply at our disposal, of which we are master. It is not an instrument with which to master things,⁶⁷ which itself would, in order to serve most effectively, need to be mastered. Rather it is something to which we are handed over, something in which we are always already caught up, something which we are subject *to* rather than subject *of*. According to Heidegger's λόγος interpretation speaking as ὁμολογεῖν is a gathering and a keeping watch over what is given to our speaking, that is, language itself. With this we return to what Heidegger said in *Sein und Zeit*: It is the business of philosophy to preserve the force of words.

In the same connection Heidegger writes that 'we are moving within language, which', he adds, 'means moving on shifting ground, or, still better, on the billowing waters of an ocean'.⁶⁸ If, again, we recall from the analysis in *Sein und Zeit* that discourse, language in its primary sense, is intended to indicate our finding-ourselves-as-thrown into a way of articulation, into a medium of intelligibility, then it is clear that this movement 'within language' is not just one movement among others but is rather that ground-movement through which intelligibility is already delivered up to our understanding, always already granted. But what is this understanding that is always already granted? *Sein und Zeit* gives the answer: 'Understanding of Being has already been taken for granted in projecting upon possibilities.'⁶⁹ This understanding which is always already taken for granted is what Heidegger calls pre-ontological understanding of Being. It is taken for granted, however, not in the sense that man as a subject is always in possession of a representation of Being, but rather in the sense that it is always granted to man in that he 'stands in the openness of the project of Being'.⁷⁰

The fulfillment, the more primordial appropriation, of these issues in *Sein und Zeit* comes about in the later writings in that language is now brought explicitly into connection with the pre-ontological understanding of Being and thereby its character as 'common root' made explicit. Language comes to be called 'the house of Being', and Heidegger adds, 'In its housing man dwells'.⁷¹ Man is housed in language, he moves within it, and thereby he is sustained in an understanding of Being. The development is explicit in a statement in *Was Heisst Denken?*: 'Every human attitude to something, every human stand in this or that sphere of beings, would rush away resistlessly into the void if the "is" did not speak.'⁷² Every human stand, all human comportment with regard to beings, requires – what? *Sein und Zeit* would answer: the pre-ontological

understanding of Being. But now Heidegger says: that the 'is' *speak*. It is required that the 'is' speak, that Being speak. It is required, not just that Being grant itself, but that it speak, and the two are now identical: Being grants itself in that Being speaks. But where and how does Being speak? It speaks *in language*:

‘Eon [Being] names that which speaks in every word of the language, and not only in every word, but before all else in every conjunction of words [*Wortgefüge*], and thus particularly in those junctures [*Fugen*] of the language which are not explicitly put in words. ‘Eon speaks throughout language and maintains for it the possibility of saying.’⁷³

Language is the language of being⁷⁴ – that in which Being speaks. It is in that which is hidden away in language and to which we are already subject that Being speaks, thereby sustaining man in a clearing of intelligibility, thereby sustaining him as the ‘there’. Precisely through a more primordial appropriation of that three-fold constitution of the ‘there’ elaborated in *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger is brought to say that the ‘there’ takes place as language. It is now evident why ‘language is the clearing-concealing advent of Being itself’; this, we have seen, is the proper locus of the reversal.

Heidegger says that Being speaks ‘particularly in those junctures of the language which are not explicitly put into words’. Being speaks unobtrusively in language. In its speaking Being conceals itself as that which speaks; it speaks, most of all, in those junctures which remain unspoken by us. At the heart of language as the language of Being there is self-concealment, withdrawal. Heidegger writes: ‘If we may talk here of playing games at all, then it is not we who play with words, but the essence of language plays with us, not only in this case, not only now, but long since and always. For language so plays with our speech that it likes to let our speech drift away into the more obvious meanings of words.’⁷⁵ Language is no game that *we* play; rather language plays with us and can do so precisely because we are not its master, because it withdraws its essence from us, holds itself aloof from us. It lets our speech ‘drift away into the more obvious meanings of words’ – the meanings that have lost their connection with the unspoken, the meanings in which the unspoken lies forgotten. Yet the unspoken is, most of all, where Being speaks: ‘Language denies us its essence: that it is the house of the truth of Being.’⁷⁶

In the folds, the junctures, of language Being conceals itself, withdraws itself from us. To be drawn along in this withdrawal is to enter into the movement of reversal; to be drawn along in this withdrawal is also to be drawn into ‘a transformed relationship to the essence of language’. Language and reversal belong together.

Notes

1 Heidegger, Martin: *Sein und Zeit* (9th Ed.; Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1960), p. 220, Heidegger has pointed out that even earlier, in the *Habilitations-schrift* of 1915, he was already engaged with the question of language, specifically with 'the metaphysical reflection on language in its relation to Being'. *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1959), pp. 91–2.

2 *Über den Humanismus* (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann), p. 9.

3 *Was Heisst Denken?* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1954), p. 100.

4 *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 174.

5 *Was ist das – die Philosophie?* (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1956), p. 45.

6 *Was Heisst Denken?* pp. 79–80.

7 Heidegger writes 'Dass das Fragen nicht die eigentliche Gebärde des Denkens ist, sondern – das Hören der Zusage dessen, was in die Frage kommen soll'. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 175.

8 *Über den Humanismus*, p. 17.

9 *Die Technik und die Kehre* (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1962), p. 40.

10 See *Was Ist Metaphysik?* (8th Ed.; Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1960), p. 9.

11 *Über den Humanismus*, p. 9.

12 *Zur Seinsfrage* (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1956), p. 25.

13 *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1954), p. 146.

14 See *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, pp. 14ff.

15 'Sprache ist lichtend-verbergende Ankunft des Seins selbst.' *Über den Humanismus*, p. 16. On the 'overpowering' see *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1958), pp. 114–15.

16 *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 160–1.

17 *Über den Humanismus*, pp. 21, 25.

18 *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 11.

19 *Über den Humanismus*, pp. 47, 45; *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 12.

20 *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 79–80.

21 *ibid.*, p. 145.

22 *ibid.*, p. 86.

23 *ibid.*, p. 149.

24 'Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility [*Verständlichkeit*] of something maintains itself. . . . Meaning is the upon-which [*Woraufhin*] of the projection from out of which something becomes intelligible [*verständlich*] as something. . . .' *ibid.*, p. 151.

25 *Aufzeigen, Prädikation, Mitteilung.* *ibid.*, pp. 154–7.

26 *ibid.*, p. 161.

27 'That which can be articulated in interpretation, and thus *even more primordially in discourse*, is what we have called "meaning".' *ibid.* (Italics mine.)

28 *ibid.*, p. 157.

29 See *ibid.*, p. 37.

30 *ibid.*, pp. 145, 147.

31 *ibid.*, p. 148.

32 *ibid.*, p. 87.

33 'One need only observe the simple fact that in *Sein und Zeit* the problem is set up outside the sphere of subjectivism . . . for it to become strikingly clear that the "Being" into which *Sein und Zeit* inquired can not long remain something that the human subject posits.' Heidegger's 'Preface' to William J. Richardson,

Heidegger: *Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), p. xviii.

Again, Heidegger speaks of his attempt 'to liberate the essential determination of man from subjectivity. . . .' He adds: 'Any attempt, therefore, to re-think *Sein und Zeit* is thwarted as long as one is satisfied with the observation that, in this study, the term "Dasein" is used in place of "consciousness".' *Was Ist Metaphysik?*, pp. 13-14.

See also *Über den Humanismus*, especially p. 25 where Heidegger states explicitly, in reference to *Sein und Zeit*, that the 'projection does not create Being'.

In *Sein und Zeit* itself see ¶13, ¶43(a) and note especially that Heidegger originally projected a 'destruction' of Descartes' *Cogito Sum* (pp. 24f.).

34 *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 144, 148.

35 *ibid.*, p. 138.

36 *ibid.*, p. 194.

37 *Über den Humanismus*, p. 17.

38 *ibid.*

39 Heidegger's 'Preface' to Richardson, *Heidegger*, p. xvi.

40 *ibid.*, p. xviii.

41 'Die Kehre spielt im Sachverhalt selbst.' *ibid.*

42 *Was Heisst Denken?*, p. 5.

43 See *Der Satz vom Grund* (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1957), pp. 108ff.

44 *Zur Seinsfrage*, p. 34.

45 *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 27.

46 See *Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den Transzendentalen Grundsätzen* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1962), pp. 74-83. See also my paper 'Towards the movement of reversal: science, technology, and the language of homecoming', in *Heidegger and the Path of Thinking* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1970).

47 'Im Wesen der Gefahr west und wohnt eine Gunst, nämlich die Gunst der Kehre der Vergessenheit des Seins in die Wahrheit des Seins.' *Die Technik und die Kehre*, p. 42.

48 *ibid.*, p. 44. This issue is discussed at length in my paper 'Towards the movement of reversal', *Heidegger and the Path of Thinking*.

49 *Über den Humanismus*, p. 16.

50 *Was Heisst Denken?*, p. 164; *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 99.

51 Heidegger's 'Preface' to Richardson, *Heidegger*, p. xvi.

52 *Der Satz vom Grund*, p. 107.

53 Heidegger's 'Preface' to Richardson, *Heidegger*, p. xviii.

54 *ibid.*, p. xx.

55 *ibid.*, p. xxii.

56 *Was Ist Metaphysik?*, p. 46.

57 *Was Heisst Denken?*, p. 87. Cf. *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 19. In his λόγος-interpretation Heidegger writes: 'Expression and signification have long been taken as the manifestations, and presented as the unquestionable characteristics of, language. But they do not reach genuinely into the region of the primordially essential determination of language, nor are they at all capable of determining this region in its primary characteristics.' *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, p. 212.

58 *Was Heisst Denken?*, p. 88.

59 *ibid.*

60 *Sein und Zeit*, p. 161.

- 61 *Was Heisst Denken?*, p. 89.
- 62 *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, pp. 21, 26–8.
- 63 *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung* (3rd Ed.; Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1963), p. 31.
- 64 *ibid.*, pp. 38, 40.
- 65 *ibid.*, p. 37.
- 66 *Was Heisst Denken?*, p. 99.
- 67 *Über den Humanismus*, p. 9.
- 68 *Was Heisst Denken?*, p. 169.
- 69 *Sein und Zeit*, p. 147.
- 70 *Der Satz vom Grund*, p. 146.
- 71 *Über den Humanismus*, p. 5.
- 72 *Was Heisst Denken?*, p. 107.
- 73 *ibid.*, p. 141.
- 74 'Die Sprache ist so die Sprache des Seins, wie die Wolken die Wolken des Himmels sind.' *Über den Humanismus*, p. 47.
- 75 *Was Heisst Denken?*, p. 83.
- 76 *Über den Humanismus*, p. 9.

Meaning adrift

John Sallis

For language plays with our speech – it likes to let our speech drift away into the more obvious meanings of words.

—Heidegger, *Was Heisst Denken?*

But for the slightest twist, Nietzsche would be just the last metaphysician.

The story is at least twice-told. Once in Heidegger's text 'The will to power as art': the story of how Nietzsche set out to overturn Platonism, to invert it, to stand it on its head, of how, according to a familiar schema, he could not but be caught within that which he would invert, remaining ensnared in it almost to the end, twisting free of it only at the last moment:

During the time the overturning of Platonism became for Nietzsche a twisting free of it, madness befell him.¹

At the end, the slightest twist, setting one from that moment adrift from the logic of opposition, adrift in a certain oblique opposition to logic. Twisting, turning, drifting – into what? Into the end? Into a beyond? Into madness?

Yet Heidegger only retells – with a certain twist – a story that Nietzsche himself told during his final year. The story is, of course, that of 'how the "true world" finally became a fable'.² By now the story has perhaps been too often retold, has perhaps become all too familiar. Who cannot recite its six great episodes, the history of metaphysics from Plato to Nietzsche condensed to just over a page! The most fitting preface to every contemporary discourse that wants to be done with metaphysics, that thinks it can be done with metaphysics, every discourse that in addressing the end of metaphysics would fancy itself securely installed in a present perfect, if not a past perfect.

The story ends with high noon:

Noon; moment of the slightest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity; . . .

What happens in this final moment, this end told of at the end of the story, in the sixth, the final episode? The earlier episodes tell of a certain drift of the 'true world', a certain drifting away in which that 'world' becomes unattainable for now, then unattainable as such, and eventually unknown. In the end, this drift is what serves to expose the 'true world' as an error, as due to be abolished. And yet, the abolition of the 'true world' is not what occupies the final moment, at least is not what is told of in the last episode. It is, rather, the penultimate episode that tells of how the 'true world' was done away with, of how well before noon it was thoroughly dismantled, at the coming at bright day, at breakfast, to the cheers, the infernal noise (*Teufelslärm*) of all free spirits. The final episode begins, then, with these words: 'The true world we have abolished: . . .' So, when it begins, the 'true world' has already been abolished; presumably, it is thus that the words no longer need be enclosed in those quotation marks which, in the fifth episode and in the title of the entire story, serve to mark a certain impropriety. When the final episode begins, the true world has drifted utterly out of sight, and, thus effaced, has been abolished, done away with. And that would be the end of it. The end of the supersensible, the end of Platonism, the end of metaphysics. That would be the end of it, were any of these such as could end once and for all. But do they indeed have – could they have – an end beyond which one would simply be done with them? Do they simply end? Is it not rather precisely because there is no simple end that a final episode is required? The final episode does not, then, tell of something after the end, of a 'beyond' in which the end of metaphysics would have been left behind. Rather, it continues the story of the end, tells of something else that cannot but have been done in and through the abolition of the true world, something which, though done at the same time, comes to be realized only after a certain lapse. The end is not a moment but an interval. It extends from daybreak to noon. At least to noon.

Thus extended so as to encompass (at least) both the twilight of the idols and the high noon of humanity, the end is anything but simple. Not only in its extension but also in its textuality; for it is, to adapt Nietzsche's words, a 'question mark so black, so monstrous [*ungeheuer*], that it casts shadows upon the man who puts it down'.³ How, then, does the end cast shadows upon its very inscription? The end is the end of a story, the story of how the true world finally became a fable, of how it finally turned into a story, of how in the end it proved to be nothing

more than a story, not only something told about but something posited only in the telling, in the story. What story? The story told by Nietzsche, perhaps for the first time in its full compass, certainly for the first time *as a story* and not as the history of being, as the 'history of an error'⁴ and not as the history of truth. The story is, then, on the one hand, a story about the true world, about its drift and eventual abolition, its drifting into abolition; and yet, on the other hand, the story is that which the true world becomes, the story into which it turns. In short, the story is about the true world becoming finally just the story itself. It is the story of the true world becoming the 'true world', words inscribed within and extending into the story itself. It is, then, a story from which that of which it tells cannot be simply set apart. It is the story of how the true world, drifting away into abolition, drifts into the very story of the drift into abolition. It is a story whose very meaning is set adrift in language.

It is thus appropriate that the story begins and ends as it does, enclosing the drift of the true world between two instances of writing. At the beginning, when the true world assumes its least remote, its simple, convincing guise, it is literally the translation of a sentence – a 'transcription [*Umschreibung*] of the sentence "I, Plato, *am* the truth" '. Product of a rewriting, the true world and its drift could never have been distinct from the drift in language, the drift of the story, which thus also ends by telling of a writing:

INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA

Another story, beyond the story of the end, or, rather, a story that would extend the end.

The extension, the opening of the end, is produced, or at least decisively prepared, by what is told of in the sixth episode of Nietzsche's story. What is it, then, that happens at the end, disrupting the simplicity of the end, extending it not only from daybreak to noon but even, perhaps indefinitely, beyond? What is it that cannot but have been done in and through the abolition of the true world?

The true world we have abolished: What world has remained? the apparent one [*die scheinbare*] perhaps? . . . But no! *with the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.* [The punctuation and italics are Nietzsche's.]

The true world has drifted utterly out of sight, has disappeared once and for all; and in the end one has now only to proclaim that disappearance. The point of the final episode is that this proclamation does not leave simply intact the other world, the apparent world, that has always (i.e., since the beginning of metaphysics) been simultaneously both opposed

and subordinated to the true world: With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.

And yet, there is a critical difference. What is proclaimed in the abolition of the true world is the utter disappearance of that world. What is proclaimed in the abolition of the apparent world is not its disappearance; for those things that have previously been consigned to the apparent world have by no means disappeared, but rather, whatever the story told, whatever the proclamation, they continue stubbornly to appear, to show themselves. What has been abolished is not that world that has always been understood as apparent but rather the possibility of continuing to understand it in that way prescribed by the metaphysical opposing of it to a true world. What has been abolished is any understanding of the apparent by reference to the true, by reference of the apparent thing to its meaning in the most rigorous determination; for the drift of the true world is the drift of meaning, and meaning set adrift can be, for metaphysics, hardly more than the sheer dissolution of meaning, its disappearance. What disappears is not the apparent world but its meaning; and the abolition of the apparent world is the proclamation of its meaninglessness, moment of the slightest shadow.

One could, of course, say – and it has often been said – that, once the true world has vanished, then the apparent one loses the character of apparentness, ceases to be appearance *of* the true, much less its mere semblance or even its dissemblance. What then would be required would be an understanding of the things of that world *from themselves* rather than one that would proceed by referring them to the true, to the intelligible, to meaning. And yet, things can be understood from themselves only by being taken as they show themselves, as they appear – that is, only by continuing to be taken (though now in a different way) as apparent, as appearances, if not as appearances *of* something exceeding the world of appearances. The things of *die scheinbare Welt* are to be taken as they shine forth in their self-showing. It is a matter of letting them show themselves.

It is, then, toward such a hermeneutics that the end of metaphysics opens. Afternoon. The shadows begin to lengthen; now in the opposite direction.

It is; then, upon phenomenology that the end of metaphysics opens. Rigorous openness – that is, engagement in the things themselves, in their self-showing, and simultaneously, reticence before them.

One could say, then, that the end of metaphysics is phenomenology. This would not be the same as saying (as has now often been said) that phenomenology is the end of metaphysics – that is, that phenomenology in the end only repeats, even if most rigorously, the founding gestures of metaphysics. The difference could perhaps be marked – though not

without beginning to disfigure the schema – as that between an end that opens out and one that closes off.

It all depends on how the things themselves are taken, for metaphysics too, from Plato to Hegel, appeals to τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτό, measuring its rigor by its adherence to this injunction. In any case, to take the things themselves as they show themselves is never – whether in metaphysics or in phenomenology – simply to suppress all reference beyond the things; it is never simply to turn the thing upon itself (though such a turning does become a moment in the metaphysics of the subject); nor is it ever simply a turning of one thing toward another, a reference of one being to another. It is never a matter of forsaking the γιγαντομαχία περὶ τῆς οὐσίας for the sake of telling stories merely about beings.⁵ It is not movement within every field of reference that is – or can be – suppressed at the end of metaphysics but only movement within that field constituted by the metaphysical opposition between true and apparent, between intelligible and sensible. What must be inhibited in the face of the things themselves as they show themselves is the reference to an essence, an εἶδος, a meaning (in its classical determination). Otherwise, one ends up reconstituting metaphysics within phenomenology – that is, closing off phenomenology within the end of metaphysics.

Need it be said that *Being and Time* opens another field of reference, a field other than that in which appearing things would be referred to an εἶδος and thus understood from that εἶδος? *Being and Time* opens a field that is both other than the metaphysical field and in a founding way inclusive of that field, which is thus, in a sense, made possible by the phenomenological field.⁶ *Being and Time* opens a field in which appearing things, things as they show themselves, can be understood without the metaphysical opposition between true and apparent being reconstituted, without the story of the true world having to be retold.

Let it suffice to recall the phenomenological opening in the most schematic terms. The field opened by the phenomenological analyses in *Being and Time* is not, as with the metaphysical field, one that would lie between appearing things and something else to which, as to a true world, they would be referred. Rather, the reference through which things would come to be understood would be a referral of them to this field, a certain dispersion of them into the field, in no case a referral beyond the field. The phenomenological field is, of course, what Heidegger calls – at least in the initial analyses – *world*. To understand something by reference to world is not to refer it to something else that would shine through it, expropriating its self-showing, but rather to refer it to an open system of references to which, in its very self-showing, it is already referred. To understand something in this manner is to understand it *from itself*, to take it *as it shows itself*; for what the initial analyses of *Being and Time* demonstrate is that self-showing is always,

first of all, a showing from out of a system of references, from out of an envining world. Those same analyses, accordingly, also set about determining intraworldly reference as meaning (*Bedeutung*), hence broach a redetermination of meaning that would differ radically from the metaphysical determination.⁷ In place of meaning posited over against self-showing things in such a way as to expropriate their showing, in place of meaning as it has drifted away out of sight when the true world finally becomes a fable, Heidegger's phenomenological analyses redetermine meaning as nothing less than the very *drift of the world* from out of which things show themselves.

Meaning a drift, meaning adrift – as the very site of self-showing. To be in the world is, then, to mean this drift, to look ahead into it so as to let things show themselves from out of it. Being-in-the-world is being adrift in meaning a()drift.

Meaning, thus redetermined, is not simply to be set over against language as something utterly autonomous that language would only express. Even in *Being and Time* any such utter separation is already undermined, at least by the inclusion of discourse (*Rede*) as one of the constituent moments of the *Da* of *Dasein*, that is, of the disclosive opening of the world, of what Heidegger calls simply: disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*).⁸

He calls it also truth, the primordial phenomenon of truth, ἀλήθεια. Thus, the phenomenological analyses of *Being and Time* issue in a re-determination of truth, one which does not metaphysically oppose truth to appearances, true world to apparent world, but rather displaces that opposition: truth as the opening/openness of the very site of self-showing. It is precisely for the sake of enforcing this displacement that Heidegger insists on distinguishing between truth as ἀλήθεια and truth as correctness (ὁρθότης), even if finally at the cost of relinquishing the word *truth*.⁹ This displacement, in turn, produces a displacement of the relation between truth and meaning, dissociating them only then to set meaning adrift in truth, to redetermine it as the very drift of truth. A()drift, too, in language.

This double displacement could provide a context for a careful reading of the recently published text of Heidegger's lecture course of 1942–3 entitled *Parmenides*.¹⁰ For that entire text, beginning with the Parmenidean words on/of the goddess truth, is addressed single-mindedly to the question of truth, perhaps most notably to recovering the meaning of truth and of untruth and to retelling the most momentous story told by the Greeks about truth and untruth, the μῦθος told at the end of Plato's *Republic*. One could perhaps even characterize the text *Parmenides* as an assembling of the elements of the double displacement.

Let me limit my reading to a single short passage. It occurs near the beginning of the text. Heidegger has introduced ἀλήθεια and proposed

the translation: *Unverborgenheit* – let us say: unconcealment. The word itself contains two indications, points in two directions in which *Unverborgenheit* can be investigated: (1) to *Verborgenheit* (concealment); and (2) to an overcoming of *Verborgenheit*, a kind of strife with concealment. These indications suffice to allow Heidegger to propose that truth is never simply present in and of itself but rather is something contested in strife with concealment, from which it must be wrested. Truth has – one might say – always already drifted away into untruth. The third direction thus indicated is that of truth as standing in ‘“oppositional” relations’ (‘*“gegensätzliche” Beziehungen*’).¹¹ It is a matter, then, of asking about the counter-essence (*Gegenwesen*) of ἀλήθεια. Or, rather, of asking about the *word* for the counter-essence of ἀλήθεια. Almost immediately the interrogation has drifted into language.

An interrogation of ληθές and of ψεῦδος commences, a discussion of the fundamental meaning (*Grundbedeutung*) of each. But the discussion is abruptly broken off, or, rather, it is interrupted, and before resuming it on the following page, Heidegger inserts two very remarkable paragraphs.¹² It is to this passage that I want especially to call attention.

The passage begins:

In the attempt to trace the fundamental meanings of words and expressions, we are, to be sure, not infrequently guided by an inadequate conception of language as such, from which then arise the familiar erroneous judgments concerning the investigation of fundamental meanings. We ought not think that the words of a language initially possess pure fundamental meanings and that with the passage of time the latter get lost and become deformed. The fundamental and root meaning remains quite concealed [*verborgen*] and appears only in what one calls the ‘derivative’.

Words are not like coins which with the passage of time, with the passage from hand to hand, get so effaced that their inscriptions become more and more difficult to discern. Words do not, in this sense, get worn out, used up; the very model of use and wear arises from an inadequate conception of language. The fundamental meanings of words do not get effaced in the course of time, through use or perhaps misuse, but rather are always already effaced, concealed, apparent only in what is already derivative. The root appears only in the stem.

The passage continues:

But this designation is misleading, because it presupposes that somewhere there is for itself a ‘pure fundamental meaning’, from which others are then ‘derived’. These erroneous conceptions, which even today still govern the science of language, have their source in the

fact that the first reflection on language, Greek grammar, was developed under the guidance of 'logic', i.e., of the theory of the saying of assertion [*vom Sagen der Aussagen*], as the theory of the proposition [*als Satzlehre*]. According to this theory propositions are composed of words, and words designate 'concepts'. The latter indicate what is represented [*vorgestellt*] universally along with words. This 'universal' of the concept one then regards as 'the fundamental meaning'. The 'derivatives' are particularizations of the universal.

An erroneous conception, still in force today, has arisen from the Greek reflection on language, from the reflection on language carried out both within and then under the guidance of Greek philosophy, preeminently the philosophy of Plato and of Aristotle, that is, at the beginning of metaphysics. That reflection proceeds according to the theory of the proposition as composed of words, the latter designating concepts or universals – that is, meanings as classically defined, fundamental meanings in distinction from the more particular meanings that can derive from and even serve to conceal the fundamental meanings.

It goes almost without saying that this reflection on language, setting meaning over against word, over against language, is inseparable from the metaphysical tale of the true world over against the world of appearing things. And equally, that this reflection is precisely the one that – now that the true world has finally become a fable – the phenomenological analyses of *Being and Time* radically displace by demonstrating that assertion is a derived (*abkünftig*) mode of interpretation; and that the apophantical 'as', according to which the proposition would be assembled from words designating meanings already detached from the world of appearances, is secondary in relation to the hermeneutical 'as' and a corresponding speech that would be attuned to meaning adrift in the world.¹³

But what is the erroneous conception that has arisen from the Greek, i.e., metaphysical, reflection on language? Heidegger is explicit: It is the supposition that somewhere there is for itself such a thing as fundamental meaning. Somewhere – not only beyond derivative meanings, but, more critically, beyond the designating words, beyond in a subsistence for themselves, independent of those words, capable even of drifting away behind the cover of 'derivative' meanings, of having always already begun drifting away, of drifting away just as, according to that history of an error told by Nietzsche, the true world has drifted away out of sight, beyond recall. Something to be abolished.

The passage concludes:

Yet, when in connection with our investigation we think about fundamental meaning [*auf die Grundbedeutung hindenken*], we are guided

by an entirely different conception of the word and of language. To think that we are pursuing a so-called 'word-philosophy', which sorts out everything on the basis of mere word-meanings, is, to be sure, a very comfortable opinion, but also one so superficial that it cannot even any longer be designated as a false opinion. What we call the fundamental meaning of words is that about them that is originary [*ist ihr Anfängliches*], which never appears at first but only in the end, and even then never as a detached and prepared structure [*als ein abgelöstes und präpariertes Gebilde*] that we could represent for itself. So-called fundamental meaning holds sway concealedly in all the ways that words have of telling [*in allen Sageweisen der jeweiligen Worte*].

Once meaning has – as the true world – drifted away out of sight, it comes – unless understood outside the classical definition – to be mere word-meaning, virtual meaninglessness; and nothing could be more superficial than to sort out everything on the basis of such word-meanings, except perhaps to mistake for such a 'word-philosophy' an attentiveness to the meaning of words as that which is originary in them. Fundamental meaning, displaced from the metaphysical opposition that has always determined it, is, then, that which is originary about words, that which, invoked by them, housed in them, lets things originate, come forth into self-showing. The originary in language is nothing other than world, ἀλήθεια, the open site of self-showing. It is also what lets metaphysics itself originate, enclosing the founding oppositions of metaphysics so as to delimit and yet withhold itself from metaphysics, remaining inaccessible, never appearing at first, in the beginning, in the origination, but only in the end, only when the drift of the true world finally transgresses the limit. It is not something detached that can be represented for itself, not only because all representing is already drawn along into its drift but also because it is itself drawn into the drift of language, holding sway in the ways that words have of telling.

Suppose that the originary, which can be called truth and world, were now to be called the true world. And suppose that one were to tell then of how the true world drifts along in the drift of language, in the ways that words have of telling, in their *Sageweisen*, or – letting the translation itself now drift ever so slightly – in the styles (*Weisen*) in which a fable (*Sage*) can be told. One would then have begun again to tell – though with an ever-so-decisive twist – the story of how the true world finally became a fable.

Notes

Originally published in *Heidegger Studies*, vol. 1 (1985).

1 Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 1: 233.

2 Nietzsche, *Götzen-Dämmerung*, 74f.

3 *ibid.*, 51.

4 'Geschichte eines Irrthums': The subtitle of the section 'Wie die "wahre Welt" endlich zur Fabel wurde.'

5 This contrast derives from Plato's *Sophist*, from the same context as that from which Heidegger takes the passage with which *Being and Time* begins (244a). Cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 1, 2, 6.

6 This peculiar inclusion is outlined most directly in the following passage from 'The end of philosophy and the task of thinking': 'No look [*Aussehen*] without light – Plato already knew this. But there is no light and no brightness without the clearing [*Lichtung*].' *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 74. In this text it is ἀλήθεια that is being thought as clearing.

A similar indication, but in direct reference to Husserl, is given in *Being and Time*: 'Even the phenomenological "intuition of essences" ["Wesenschau"] is grounded in existential understanding' (*Sein und Zeit*, 147).

7 Cf. *Sein und Zeit*, §18.

8 Cf. *ibid.*, §§28, 34.

9 Cf. *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 77.

10 *Parmenides*, Freiburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1942/3, vol. 54 of *Gesamtausgabe*.

11 *ibid.*, 27.

12 *ibid.*, 31–2.

13 Cf. *Sein und Zeit*, §33.

Poetry and language in Heidegger

Walter Biemel

There are two ways of dealing with the difficulties presented by Heidegger's thought: either it can be analyzed and criticized from the outside, or an effort can be made to understand it from the inside.

Let us look closely at the first possibility. It is in no way difficult to pin Heidegger's position down to certain theses and then to argue that these theses are untenable because they do not harmonize with the way of questioning one has adopted. This approach suggests itself especially if one tries to measure Heidegger with traditional conceptual schemes. In that case it soon becomes clear that this cannot be done; but this can mean two things: either that Heidegger's position is indeed untenable or that such an approach is intolerable. Obviously, the interpreter will most likely defend the first alternative; otherwise he would have to give up his own position and thus revoke his own interpretation. The difficulty which hides behind this approach, however, is even greater. When a thinker, in carefully considering tradition, tries to call it into question, his gradual abandoning of the language of tradition is inherent in his attempt. This can be shown very clearly in Heidegger; in *Being and Time* there already is no longer room for the traditional subject-object problematic, and a new way of understanding man is inaugurated, with the concept of 'Dasein'. It can be shown further that such concepts as 'phenomenology' and 'ontology', which are found in *Being and Time*, are later avoided. In fact, in *Being and Time* the concept of phenomenology is already substantially modified. The questioning back for the ground, which governs Heidegger's thought for such a long time, is finally superseded too in his last writings. All of this is merely meant to explain how, while thought proceeds, the language of thought changes. If an interpretive assessment is attempted from the viewpoint of traditional language, precisely that which constituted progress will be reproved by the interpreter because it does not harmonize with his position.

This difficulty must not be underestimated. We necessarily seek access to Heidegger from the standpoint of the tradition of Western metaphysics in which we stand. We are so biased by this tradition that we do not see how he moves away precisely from it. This moving away finds its linguistic expression in the phrase 'the overcoming of metaphysics'. In an interpretation based on this tradition Heidegger can easily be reproached with what, from his point of view, is precisely the advantage of his presentation, and his language, which frees itself from metaphysics, can be unnotedly retranslated into the language of metaphysics. As we have noticed already, this retransformation, although it seems to facilitate understanding, in fact makes understanding impossible; for that which is then 'understood' is no longer what Heidegger means but that from which he pushes himself away. It is then not difficult to advance criticisms, but these (in the final analysis at least) miss the point.

What about the second possibility? Here an attempt is made to arrive at Heidegger's position with a leap and then to remain there. What Heidegger says is no longer translated into a 'foreign' language and thus alienated, but now another difficulty arises – namely, that it is no longer apparent what explanatory steps were necessary in order to move into this new position. There is a false impression that Heidegger simply jumped out of the tradition one day and forcibly started something new; at the same time there is an impression of a relapse into the archaic – something new that is opposed to what is genuinely new. Such an interpretation is usually limited to repeating what Heidegger has said already, so the question immediately arises: What is the value of such an interpretation? Is it not merely a poor copy of the original?

There is also the question of whether the interpreter is really speaking from Heidegger's attitude or whether he merely believes he is doing so. There is thus a certain presumption in this way of speaking. The interpreter passes himself off as Heidegger, knows what is meant by this concept and that one, and can therefore save himself the trouble of traveling the laborious route over which Heidegger has gone. The interpreter even seems to be more fully informed of Heidegger's thought than Heidegger is himself. Strictly speaking, however, his interpretation is no more than a toilsome stuttering in which, however, neither the toil nor the stuttering are admitted. The movement in Heidegger's attempt at thinking from the very beginning until this very moment is thus denied; the interpreter acts as if Heidegger's insights sprang straight from a sudden inspiration, whereas Heidegger continually refers explicitly to the necessity of the movement and the execution and even wishes his entire thought to be understood as pathway. Hegel has already rebuffed the presumption of wanting to possess the results without traveling the road that leads to them. However, Heidegger cannot be hastily identified with Hegel; the characteristic of absolute certainty, which Hegel's philosophy

possesses, is not found in Heidegger, and this is certainly not just by chance. Heidegger is not pretending modesty when he allows a questionableness to hover over all his searching. We are here not in the position of absolute subjects for whom knowledge and truth coincide. This way of interpreting in which the interpreter argues that he stands within Heidegger's thought and is fully acquainted with it, would be rejected by Heidegger because it is not in harmony with the caution of his proceeding and the movement of his thought. Moreover, this kind of speaking about Heidegger contains a precipitance that contradicts the style of his thought.

If both possibilities of interpretation – the one that alienates from the outside and the one that overleaps from the inside – are inadequate, what are we then to do? We must begin by admitting that we are wholly unable to give an interpretation. An interpretation must be revealing. It must be able to show what lies hidden in a thought, on what that thought is grounded, what dimensions are opened up by it, and thus what margin for questioning is freed by it; and, where possible, the interpretation must be able to show what kind of change in understanding is brought about by that thought. None of this can be done as long as Heidegger's thought is the issue at stake. We can present criticisms of his thought, we can rebel against it, and we may try to unmask it or find delight in it; but in the final analysis all of this remains unimportant. To this day a genuine dialogue with Heidegger has never taken place because the partner for such a dialogue is lacking and because, strictly speaking, we remain strange to his thought. It is more honest to admit this strangeness than to pretend that what is said here is already known and familiar.

In this paper I will try to make some of this strangeness visible. This paper is not an interpretation; it cannot lay claim to such a title. If it should succeed in coming somewhat closer to Heidegger, I will be satisfied. It will not hide the difficulties that reading Heidegger has in store for us, but it will not act as if Heidegger is necessarily to be blamed for them. If a genuine discussion with Heidegger is ever to take place, preparatory work must be done; this text may be understood as a contribution to such preparatory work.

In order to experience something of the movement that is inherent in Heidegger's thought and to avoid the impression that his last and most strange insights emerged like a flash of lightning, I would like to pursue the following course. First I will briefly discuss the conception of language in *Being and Time*. Then, corresponding to the theme of this essay, I will describe language and poetry as found in 'The origin of the work of art' and 'Hölderlin and the essence of poetry', texts which stem from the period of the mid-1930s. Finally, a discussion of the later texts on language will consider those aspects of Heidegger's thought which are the most difficult and most strange.¹

Language in *Being and Time*

Language plays an important part already in *Being and Time*. In accordance with the existential-ontological formulation of the question which aims at freeing the structure of Dasein and which shows that the structural moments possess a constitutive function in regard to Dasein, language is shown to be such a structural moment (*Existenzial*). We need not elaborate here on the character of this analysis or on how Heidegger conceives of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. In chapter 5 of *Being and Time* the meaning of 'Being-in' is explained: Da-sein as moodiness (sec. 29), Da-sein as primordial understanding (sec. 31), and Da-sein as *logos* – language (sec. 34).

Heidegger says at the beginning of section 34 that 'the fundamental *existentialia* which constitute the Being of the "there", the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, are primordial mood and primordial understanding'.² He leaves *logos* out of consideration in order to be able to make visible first what is characteristic of the immediate openness of Dasein in primordial mood and then the peculiarity of primordial understanding which belongs to Dasein in such an original way that Dasein can ek-sist only as understanding. Therefore, primordial understanding comprises the entire complex of Being-in-the-world – that is, the meaningfulness as basic structure of the world and the possibility of Dasein's own power to be. In so doing Heidegger shows that primordial understanding dwells always in the dimension of possibilities, because it is not a particular act of man but something that is founded in Dasein's original project – and the project constitutes the leeway of the power to be. 'As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities.'³ Without understanding there is no Dasein.

Dasein possesses the possibility of expressly appropriating to itself the understanding within which it keeps itself; for this Heidegger uses the term *interpretation* (*Auslegung*). 'Interpretation [is not] the acquiring of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding.' Heidegger further defines *assertion*, in contrast with *interpretation*, as 'a pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which communicates'.⁴ Assertion is possible only on the ground of that which is already made accessible in understanding. The question of how far Heidegger considers assertion to be a derivative mode of interpretation need not be dealt with here. What is important is the fact that it is founded in primordial understanding.

What new element emerges with *logos* when Heidegger attributes to *logos* such significance that he introduces it as being equiprimordial with moodiness and understanding?⁵ *Logos* is first determined as 'the articulation of intelligibility'. In order to forestall misunderstanding *logos* as something supplementary in regard to interpretation and assertion

(something like the mere report of what was already 'thought'), Heidegger says expressly that it is at the root of interpretation and assertion. What becomes articulated in *logos* is its meaning (*Sinn*). 'The intelligibility of Being-in-the-world – an intelligibility which goes with a mood, *expresses itself as logos*.'⁶ Original mood, understanding, and *logos* constitute a structural unity. Any context of meaning that was disclosed in primordial understanding is now spoken out in words. Primordial understanding always moves within contexts of meaning (cf. the concept of world as total meaningfulness). For these meanings words are created; words are necessary for one to utter meanings. Words do not exist for themselves as things to be supplied with meanings, but their Being is justified by the fact that they can manifest meanings. Since meanings and contexts of meanings become accessible in understanding, words are needed to make them comprehensible. It is in *logos* that 'the "significant" articulation of the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world' occurs.⁷

What must first be maintained in this determination is the relationships among moodness (original being open for . . .), understanding, and *logos* (articulation of moodlike understanding); they form a unity, articulated in a threefold way, in which Dasein ek-sists. *Logos* is in no way to be equated with language. In this period of Heidegger's thought *logos*, in contradistinction to the usual meaning of the word, is the constitutive moment, and language is merely 'the way in which *logos* gets expressed'.⁸ Language is that through which *logos* makes itself mundane; through language it becomes an element of the world and can be treated like other things found in the world.

Let us briefly consider the conception of *logos* as communication. The presupposition of communication is Being-with. Dasein is always with other Dasein and need not first secure the existence of its fellow men by means of artificial operations. In this Being-with Dasein understands itself and the other, as well as the world in which they, in each case, are; the other is at the same time given to Dasein in its own moodness as 'being tuned', although this giving might very well be subject to illusion. This sharing of the common experience that is immediately lived is expressly articulated in communication. Only because Dasein is Being-with, in Heidegger's view, is communication – that is, the explicit utterance of the gained experience in which Dasein in each case finds itself – possible. For this reason also, strictly speaking, communication is only possible among Dasein having a common experience of world. A report of the extreme living conditions on an exploring expedition becomes communication only if the reader is able to picture the conditions as possibilities that eventually could happen to his own existence. If this is impossible, then what is accessible through reading is not genuinely understood, does not become communication, but remains a 'foreign matter' (*Fremdkörper*). Communication thus does not create community

but presupposes a lived community which through communication merely experiences its explicit articulation. Dasein expresses itself in communication; this is not an uttering of something that was inside but an articulation of Dasein's Being-outside; it brings into work the original mood in which fellow men and environment encounter one another, as well as fellow men's understanding of environment and Being-with.

The leading idea in Heidegger's arguments about *logos* is the following: 'In *logos* the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world (an intelligibility which goes with moodness) is articulated according to significations; and *logos* is this articulation.'⁹ Heidegger thus does not take as his point of departure a subject which has the ability to speak, to disclose with words what is inside; his point of departure is the basic structure of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. *Logos* is considered from the viewpoint of this basic structure; it is nothing but the articulation of each concrete Being-in-the-world and implies all of the moments that belong to Being-in-the-world. As far as *logos* is concerned, utterance is not the decisive moment; each utterance is founded in the specific mode of Being-in-the-world.

Heidegger distinguishes four moments in *logos*: the 'about which' (that which the talk is about), the announcement (that which is said in the talk), the communication (taken here in the narrow sense), and the manifestation (that which is uncovered by *logos*). In *Being and Time* this distinction is only briefly mentioned; later, particularly the moment of manifestation (in the sense of uncovering or freeing) comes more and more to the fore, and this element then leads to the connection between *logos* and truth. But here we wish to draw attention only to the relation between *logos* and listening. Dasein is able to hear because it is determined by openness. In listening, Dasein is with the other and what he says; here we pay attention primarily not to words and speech but to that which is uncovered by them. Modulation, rhythm, and everything that can be said to belong to the modes of speech are subordinated to a manifestation, or, it can also be said, to the engagement, of the speaker to the thing which is at stake. In other words, the manner of saying is heard also, not in order to stick to it, but in order to make understandable the relation, the attitude of the speaker in regard to the events brought forth. Thus, via *logos*, we are with the thing itself and immediately with the attitude of the speaker in regard to the thing. In *Being and Time* Heidegger reproaches linguistics because, in its conception of *logos* as utterance (*Aussage*), it attempts to conceive of language by taking the present-at-hand as guiding clue, as if language were a present-at-hand mundane thing, and because the mode of Being characteristic of language is therefore not expressly thematized. This is an idea which governs *Being and Time*, an idea which circles around the differences among the Being characteristic of man, the intramundane ready-to-hand, and that which is merely present-at-hand. This distinction is the

presupposition which is necessary in order genuinely to ask the question concerning the meaning of Being. This brief characterization of *Being and Time's* formulation of the problem in no way exhausts what is said there about *logos* and language but is intended to be merely an introduction to the context in which *logos* is seen there and what it means to understand *logos* as an existential of man's being-in-the-world.

Language and poetry

In 'The origin of the work of art', which was written in 1935, expanded in 1936, and published in *Holzwege* in 1950, Heidegger says, 'All art, as the letting come to pass of the advent of the truth of beings as such, is in essence poetry'.¹⁰ An explanation of this sentence will be presented which, it is hoped, will show a development in Heidegger's thought about language. It is necessary in this regard to give a comprehensive presentation of the truth concept, a central concept of Heidegger's thought.¹¹

In 'On the essence of truth', the first draft of which originated in the early 1930s and which may thus be drawn upon here, Heidegger begins with a description of the current concept of truth: truth as conformity. This conformity can be understood in two ways. (1) The thing tallies (*stimmt*); it can be seen as that which corresponds with what we possess of it as foreknowledge. The thing upholds, as it were, the scheme in which it is thought. True friendship, for instance, fulfills all conditions that we connect with the concept of friendship. (2) The proper place of truth, however, is preferably put in the realm of judgment; one may say that this has been done since Aristotle, although there is still another conception of truth in Aristotle, just as Heidegger has shown. According to this conception, what is stated in the assertion conforms to reality (to the thing). 'Veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus', as it has been said in medieval philosophy. The term *adequatio* can be understood in a twofold way. Man's intellect conforms to the things created by God; on the other hand, things conform to the *intellectus* – not man's, however, but God's, since they come into Being according to God's Idea. 'Both concepts of the essence of *veritas* always mean a conforming to and thus conceive truth as correctness.'¹² That man's intellect is able to conform itself to things is shown by the fact that both man and thing are mutually coordinated on the ground of the divine plan of creation.

Heidegger is not satisfied with this concept of truth, which is maintained even in modern times, although the Christian system of the world no longer possesses authority as ultimate truth. Heidegger asks more fundamentally for that which makes conformity at all possible. In order for an assertion to conform with the thing, the thing itself must be in

the realm of the open, appear as something manifest, be present. The one who makes the assertion must in turn take his domicile in the same domain so that the relevant thing may encounter him. In Heidegger's formulation, 'The assertion must derive its correctness from the openness [*Lichtung*] of the comportment'.¹³ Truth is thus understood from the viewpoint of the openness in which both the thing and the man who comports with this thing find themselves. This openness, however, is in no way to be seen as a pure clearing in which what was in the dark before becomes gradually brighter and brighter, the eventual goal being maximum brightness. It might be understood, rather, as a medium that at each time lets certain determinate traits come to the fore so that the being is able to show itself according to the openness that has been achieved. Therefore, the openness is subject to change. The openness of classical Greek thought (that is, of the Greek world) is different from the openness of the medieval world view, and the modern openness is, once again, quite different from both. This change is, for Heidegger, the fundamental change of history.

In the passage quoted earlier from 'The origin of the work of art', Heidegger defines art as 'the letting come to pass of the advent of the truth of beings as such'; by this he means that art is the 'bringing about' of the openness. 'It is from the poetizing essence of art that it comes to pass that [art] erects in the midst of beings an open place in whose openness everything is different from usual'.¹⁴ By speaking of 'letting come to pass' rather than of simply 'positing' or 'creating', Heidegger implies that in the final analysis the taking place of the openness is not merely an achievement of man but that, as it were, man can receive only what Being itself sends him and may open himself to or shut himself off from this. Art is eminently a possibility for opening, for meeting.

What until now has been the genuine poetizing element of art thus becomes the change of the openness by which being is able to show itself, to appear. At the end of his interpretation of the Greek concept of *alētheia*, Heidegger also uses the term *unconcealment* instead of *openness*. 'The effect of a work does not consist in a working. It consists in a change in the unconcealment of beings which comes to pass through the work, and this means a change in the unconcealment of Being'.¹⁵ *Being* means here 'Being-ness'; how beings in the ensemble become accessible depends on the unconcealment. What comes to pass in poetry is not the inventing of occurrences and events, as this is attributed to our poetizing fantasy, but the openness in whose open being makes its appearance, shows itself, is. The change is here conceived of as 'clearing project' – a project in which what is projected is the clearing (the openness). Later, Heidegger clearly specifies the character of this project in such a way that it is not man who 'throws out', but Being itself. The expression 'letting come to pass', which was quoted earlier and which

also appears in the following sentence, points in the same direction. 'What poetry as clearing project unfolds in the way of unconcealment and projects to the rift of the form is the open which lets the unconcealment come to pass in such a way that in the midst of beings the open makes the beings shine and sound forth.'¹⁶

If what is poetized in poetry is the openness, and if poetry is the essence of art, it may be understood that all other arts are to be reduced to poetic art in the narrow sense of poetry. However, this is not what Heidegger means in 'The origin of the work of art'. He conceives of poetry here so broadly that it is the basic condition of all art, including the art of language (*Sprachkunst*). But why draw upon this essay if our main interest is in language? The reason is that in a second move Heidegger expressly shows interest in the art of language, to which he grants 'a privileged position in the whole of the arts'. That is why we must first overcome the current conception of language as 'communication'. 'Language is not only and primarily a phonetic and written expression of that which is to be communicated.' Heidegger is criticizing the view that language forwards by means of words what is already manifest. He confronts this view with his interpretation that 'language first and foremost brings being as a being into the open'.¹⁷ In naming a being one first makes it appear. Where there is no naming, there is no openness. Therefore, Heidegger equates saying with the project of the clearing; through saying, unconcealment comes into being.

Thus, what Heidegger stated previously in regard to art as poetry (taken in a broad sense) he now concretizes with the help of the example of naming. Through naming, beings first become accessible as beings; it is the condition necessary for them to be recognized and used as determinate beings. This becoming accessible of beings as beings, this uncovering of their beingness, is unconcealment. This must not be understood as if beings were present before but in a state of concealment; unconcealment means, rather, the entering into Being as appearance. Through unconcealment there is being for man; being is integrated into the project of world. According to the way in which this happens the history of a certain nation comes to pass, and its essence becomes materialized.

Something peculiar is taking place here. Heidegger starts with poetry in the broad sense of the term in order to proceed to poetry in the narrow sense. But even before he speaks of poetry in the narrow sense, it becomes clear that what comes to pass in language coincides with the essence of art as poetizing which was first outlined. The explanations concerning language thus do not bring us anywhere other than where we were already in the first delineation of the essence of art; on the contrary, we have returned to it. This circumscription of the essence of art becomes concretized to the extent that language is that through which openness (unconcealment) comes to pass. 'This naming first nominates

a being to its Being, and from this Being. Such a naming is a projecting of lighting in which is expressed the manner in which being comes into the open.¹⁸

Heidegger does not go into detail as to how in the various languages different worlds come to the fore; that would be beyond the scope of this reflection on art. In his lectures, however, he refers repeatedly to the differences between the Greek and the Roman worlds in relation to the differences between their languages.

The train of thought of Heidegger's essay on the work of art undergoes a change when he asks 'whether art, specifically taken in all its modes from architecture to poesy, exhausts the essence of poetry'.¹⁹ Here he is pointing out that we may not limit ourselves to art in order to experience what poetry means but that we must appeal to thought in order to comprehend what occurs in poetry. This idea occupies Heidegger through his latest works.²⁰

Let us now return to language. 'Language itself is poetry in the essential sense. Because language is that event in which for the first time being as being is disclosed to man, poesy [poetry in the narrow sense] is the original poetry in the essential sense.'²¹ How is this statement to be understood? To understand it, we must explain the relationship between language and poesy. For poesy to be possible, man must move in the realm of language, must disclose to himself being through the medium of language. Within this domain poesy occupies a privileged position; it is expressly and exclusively dedicated to the disclosure of being. Poesy completes what is set up in language, that at which language aims. The arts which do not realize themselves in the realm of language presuppose the disclosure of being through language. 'Each of them is a special poetizing within the clearing of Being, which, wholly unnoticed, already came to pass in language.'²²

We must therefore distinguish an original clearing such as that which comes to pass in language from that which, within the clearing that already has taken place, establishes itself in a determinate way and gains a foothold there. Heidegger limits himself in this regard to concise remarks. Only one wishes that his analysis of this distinction were more concrete – for instance, showing how the Greek world, founded by its language, finds expression and reaches its completion in architecture. Without a doubt Greek architecture supposes a determinate conception of the essence of the gods and of the relationship of man to the gods. If the divine had not first been said in language, it would have been meaningless, even impossible, to erect memorials to the gods. In these memorials, sacred woods and temples, a certain measure is revealed, an order having an effect on the lived self-understanding of the Greek man and influencing him by forming him. Within the history of a nation, one form of art can temporarily occupy a privileged position and can give

new impulses, whether this be architecture, painting, or music; but in each case language is already there. The question now is whether language can decay in a certain way and whether one of the arts can guard the openness.

We have seen that the essence of art is poetry. The essence of poetry, in turn, is establishing the truth, the articulated clearing in which Being comes to pass. In 'The origin of the work of art' this establishment is seen in a threefold manner: as bestowing, founding, and beginning. *Bestowing* is understood as the making available of what is new, which 'never can be compensated or equaled by what is present-at-hand and available', and thus possesses the character of abundance. *Founding* frees the historical ground on which a nation stands. *Beginning* is the instigation of the agonistic essence of truth. 'The genuine beginning, as a leap, is always a leap forward in which all that is to come is already overleaped, albeit as something which is still veiled.'²³

This digression has shown how Heidegger understands language as poetry in connection with the essence of truth; that which comes to pass in art is 'an excellent manner in which truth is – that is, historically comes to be'. As historical, art is 'the creating preservation of the truth in the work'.²⁴ When art comes to pass, a nation begins a new epoch in its history.

In 1936, approximately one year after writing 'The origin of the work of art', Heidegger takes up the theme of poetry again, in his lecture 'Hölderlin and the essence of poetry'. For Heidegger, Hölderlin is the poet par excellence. Because he poetizes the essence of poetry, he can be questioned about it. Heidegger borrows five sayings from Hölderlin and, in explaining them, presents the essence of poetry and that of the poet.

1. [Poetizing is] that most innocent of all occupations.
2. Therefore language has been given to man as the most dangerous of possessions . . . in order that he may testify to what he is.
3. Man has experienced many things
And many of the heavenly ones has he named
Since the time we are a dialogue
And able to hear from one another.
4. But what remains is established by the poets.
5. Full of merit, and yet poetically, dwells man on this earth.²⁵

Since my intention here is not to present the relationship between Heidegger and Hölderlin but to deal with language and poetry, I will draw attention only to those passages of explanation which contribute something to this purpose.

In Heidegger's explanation of the second saying, the following state-

ment is found: 'In order that history be possible, language has been given to man.'²⁶ This is completely in harmony with the explanation from 'The origin of the work of art'. In language man may testify as to who he is; in language the constitution of a world comes to pass. Heidegger maintains the relation between language and openness also when he says: 'But now it is only by virtue of language at all that man is exposed to what is open, which *as* being besets and inflames man in his Dasein and as not-being deceives and disappoints him.'²⁷ Without language there would be no experience of being; there would be no realm of what is open, in which all doing and undergoing of man takes place. Heidegger sees the danger that Hölderlin attributes to language in several ways. The first of these is to be understood from Heidegger's basic statement 'Danger is the menace of being to Being'.²⁸ Language as danger can also mean that what is freed and at the same time preserved in language by no means needs to be the most noble; it can just as well be the most vulgar. Language can also become an illusion – the unessential can pretend to be the essential.

All of these latter statements constitute a resumption of the arguments central to 'The origin of the work of art':

Language is not a mere tool that man possesses in addition to many others; on the contrary, it is only language that affords man the very possibility of standing in the openness of Being. Only where there is language is there a world, i.e., the perpetually changing environment of decision and work, of action and responsibility, but also of arbitrariness and noise, of decay and confusion. Only where world holds sway is there history. . . . Language is not a tool which is at man's disposal but rather that event which disposes of the supreme possibility of man's being.²⁹

In this manner Heidegger wishes to remove the common comprehension of language as a means of communication and to make language the basic event of man's Being.

In the third saying language is conceived of as a dialogue in which the gods get a hearing and a world appears. Being able to talk and being able to hear are seen as equiprimordial, just as the naming of the gods and the appearance of the world are also simultaneous with language. In this connection the naming of the gods is possible only if they address themselves to us. (This parallels Heidegger's conception of Being – that it can be experienced only if it addresses itself to us.) This dialogue is mediated by the poets. In these comments a distinction must be made between what Heidegger has Hölderlin say – for instance, about conflict, intimacy, and the gods – and what Heidegger himself says about language and unconcealment.

In the discussion of the fourth saying Heidegger says, 'Poetry is establishment by and in the word'. The idea with which we are already familiar – namely, that what is established is the open – is further developed as follows: 'That which supports and holds sway over all that is must become manifest. Being must be disclosed in order that beings may appear.' That which is open of the Open is here explicitly called 'Being'; and Heidegger refers to the way in which Being is in need of man, is entrusted to man, in the same way as in Hölderlin everything heavenly is 'entrusted to the poets as a matter of care and service. . . . When the poet speaks the essential word, being is by this name first nominated as that which it is. Poetry is the establishment of Being by means of the word.'³⁰ Taking up what was said in 'The origin of the work of art', Heidegger sees the establishment of the open as simultaneous and somehow identical with grounding. 'The saying of the poets is establishment not only in the sense of the free bestowal but at the same time in the sense of the firm grounding of man's Dasein on its ground.'³¹ Heidegger later overcomes this idea of establishment as positing, as we shall see, and considers it to be a hidden echo of the philosophy of German idealism.

We started with the view that poetry needs language in order to be able to be; it appears that in the course of this presentation a change has taken place. Poetry that makes what is open possible at the same time makes language possible. The essence of language must be understood from the essence of poetry. Heidegger therefore calls poetry the aboriginal language – that is, what is at the root of language. In this connection poetry is then understood in the specific sense, as the disclosure of unconcealment, not as poesy. It can thus be maintained that in this period of Heidegger's thought the essence of language is understood from the essence of poetry. 'The ground of human Dasein is the dialogue in which language does truly come to pass. The aboriginal language is poetry as establishment of Being.'³²

From poetry understood as aboriginal language, Heidegger then comes to see the poets as Hölderlin sees them – namely, as the mediators between gods and men. The poet's establishing is hereby conceived of as an independent act but, at the same time, as an act of highest necessity. The naming of the gods presupposes that the gods grant themselves to be known through signs mediated to the nation by the poets. On the other hand, however, the poets are bound also to the myths of a nation, in which the historical good is preserved; and it is their duty to explain these myths. In Hölderlin's definition of the essence of the poet, Heidegger sees a verification of his interpretation of poetry as a coming to pass of the truth; the idea is taken from Hölderlin but is formulated by Heidegger in his own language.

Heidegger experiences yet another point in Hölderlin in which the two meet one another. Hölderlin's definition of the essence of poetry cannot

be atemporal, for man's existence is historical. Therefore, the time for which this definition holds good is specified, namely, the time in which the gods have flown and the coming of God is expected. Heidegger uncovers the kinship between this point of Hölderlin's and his own thought, which is understood as the revealing of Being's forgottenness – of Being's withdrawal – and as preparation for a possibly new approach. The expression 'needy time' also holds true for the way in which Heidegger interprets metaphysics and its being overcome. The coming to an end of the epoch of metaphysics and the preparation for the time of thought is the 'needy time' of that philosophizing which prepares for the transition to thought.³³

Poetizing and thought

We must now attempt the leap to Heidegger's later texts on language, written in the 1950s, two decades after the Hölderlin lecture. In his introduction to three lectures entitled 'The essence of language', Heidegger formulates the issue: 'to gain an experience with language'. This cannot mean that we should engage in experiments with language but that, 'once we become attentive to our relationship to language', we should reflect on our abode in language.³⁴ In other words, we should become fully aware of something that immediately concerns our own Being. Heidegger refers expressly to the fact that the issue is not to gather knowledge about language in the sense of metalanguage and metalinguistics. The question is therefore not merely one of criticism of another possibility of dealing with language. Heidegger makes it clear from the beginning that his questioning concerning the essence of language will no longer take place within the perspective of modern metaphysics and that the investigations in the sense of metalanguage remain dominated by that perspective. 'Metalinguistics is the metaphysics of the universal technification of all languages into the only functioning interplanatory instrument of information.'³⁵ In opposition to the scientific and philosophical knowledge of language, he proposes 'to gain an experience with language'. It might be added here that the issue is to try to get close to language in a thoughtful way; for in Heidegger's view philosophy and thought are basically different ways of approach.³⁶

In the experience with language one must try to have language bring itself up for discussion. Language has the special characteristic that we live in it, are familiar with it, and deal with it without catching sight of it. We continuously heed what becomes accessible to us through language and thereby overlook language itself. In order to get out of this position Heidegger again appeals to the poet, not merely because he has a privileged relationship to language but because he brings this relationship up

for discussion. Whereas Hölderlin poetizes the essence of the poet, Stefan George poetizes the relationship with language, our experience with language. This is why at the center of these explanations Heidegger interprets George's poem 'The word' (published in 1919).

I brought to the border of my country
 Miracles from afar or dreams
 And waited until the fierce Fate (Norne)
 Found their name in her well.
 Thereupon I was able to grasp it tight and strong
 Now it blooms and shines through this mark. . . .

Once after a good journey I arrived
 With a gem rich and tender
 She searched for a long time and told me,
 'There is nothing like it among the things
 which sleep in these depths.'
 Thereupon it escaped from my hand
 And my country never gained that treasure. . . .
 Thus I sadly learned the renunciation:
 'No thing be there where the word is lacking.'³⁷

One could immediately object that George's way of writing poetry, which tends to what is 'pathetically precious', no longer has anything to offer us. He is scarcely known, let alone read, by today's youth. His way of writing poetry is barely possible today, just as it is no longer possible to compose in the manner of Wagner. However, although George is obviously not 'up to date', it is possible that in his poem something of our experience with language becomes manifest, something that outlasts and surpasses his pretentious style of writing. Art can never be measured in terms of its popularity.

This poem is dedicated completely to the poet's experience with the word. The first stanza describes the power of the poet. He is able to collect astonishing things, as well as what has been seen in dreams, for which the Fate goddess grants him names. In this way the being which already is becomes fully manifest through its word, manifest also for others. Through the names, the poet secures what he has seen. A climax of the poetic activity is shown here. What the poet is able to grasp is hereby also accessible to others. Even the exceptional ('Miracles from afar or dreams') is brought close to his fellow men, albeit only with the help of the Fate goddess. By ending the stanza in the present tense ('Now it blooms and shines through this mark'), the poet shows the persisting, the presencing, which comes to pass in this poetizing in which the names receive power over the things.

In contrast with this, in the second stanza the poet mentions an experience in which he brings to the name-giving not something that comes from afar but something that lies in the hand (*auf der Hand liegendes*), which he calls 'a gem'. A gem is that through which the Being of the wearer becomes manifest. But it is precisely for this thing that the Fate goddess does not find a name. In view of the fact that until now she has found a name for every being, it might be assumed that what is presented is something which is not-being. On the other hand, however, it is designated as a gem, as being particularly precious, and thus as a being of a special kind. When the word for it fails to appear, the gem disappears; the poet is unable to retain it. Here a new mode of Being of the word comes to the fore. The word not only is able to yield the name for a being that is already there – 'it is not merely the naming grasp for that which is already present and proposed as such'³⁸ – but also grants the being present.

How is the final line of the poem to be understood? According to Heidegger, it names not what is renounced but the domain into which the renunciation must enter. 'What the poet learned to renounce is the view that he formerly subscribed to concerning the relationship between thing and word.' The word *be* (*sei*) must be understood as imperative; more carefully formulated, the renunciation of his former understanding implies a command. 'The word addresses itself to the poet as that which keeps and maintains a thing in its Being.'³⁹

The poet experiences himself as the custodian of the word. A limit experience for which the word does not suffice (the Fate goddess does not find a name) must not be understood merely negatively; for, with the poet's learning to renounce, it also becomes clear what the word is able to do. Heidegger sees in the mood of sadness 'the mood of composure in regard to the nearness of what is withdrawn but at the same time saved for an original advent'.⁴⁰ This mood can also be considered the basic mood for Heidegger's thought. Let us draw attention to the concept of 'needy time', to Heidegger's thought concerning Being's withdrawal, in which a possible new advent announces itself when the withdrawal is experienced as such, and which, at the same time, makes Heidegger's position in regard to metaphysics understandable. The history of metaphysics is thought of as the epoch of the forgottenness of Being. This epoch is not immediately overcome in Heidegger's thought, but in it the absence of Being is for the first time expressly thought; this epoch is conceived of as the time of Being's farness. In this way the possibility of a reversal is given, as this is expressed in the quotation above. Heidegger returns to the original thinkers, for in their thought the originating is still alive. From that, we wish to gather only the following: the considerations of language – the word of the poet – are

problems in which Heidegger's basic experience collects; in them a purified retrieval of the Being question takes place.

As far as Heidegger's way of proceeding is concerned, what matters for him is to listen to the address (*Zusage*) of language. 'Language must in its own way address itself – that is, its essence – to us.'⁴¹ If we succeed in this listening, we will be able to gain a thoughtful experience with language. The preparation for such an experience is being able to catch sight of the proximity of poetizing and thought, even being able to settle in this proximity.

Heidegger's explanation will show that, notwithstanding the important statements about language in the realm of thought, notwithstanding the exciting data found in what has been composed in language, the essence of language 'everywhere does not bring itself to word as the language of Being'. We have seen first that in speech language recedes on behalf of what is said in it. This recession can find its ground in the fact 'that language with its origin holds itself back [*an sich hält*] and thus denies its essence to our current pro-posing representation'. The difficulty is not immediately to personify the state of affairs expressed in this way; the formulation can certainly tempt us to do so. Heidegger points to a possible reason why the essence of language withholds itself: 'that the two privileged modes of saying – poetizing and thought – were not searched for expressly, that is, in their proximity.'⁴² This is exactly what Heidegger wishes to do in the second of the three lectures entitled 'The essence of language'.

Heidegger's interpretation of the final stanza of 'The word' was to show that the issue is to be found in the relationship between thing (being) and word – specifically, that the word helps the thing to its Being and keeps it therein. Thus the word is not merely related to the thing; it is that 'which maintains the thing as thing', that which Heidegger calls 'the relationship' (*das Verhältnis*). The word is thought of not as a mere reference or relation but as that which keeps and maintains (*das Haltende*) in the sense of that which grants.

What poets and thinkers have in common is the element 'language'; but we do not yet know how 'element' is to be understood and how it varies in meaning depending on whether the word is used poetically or in thought. At the beginning of the interpretation of George's poem it seemed as if the proximity of poetizing and thought was reached: that which has been composed must become accessible through thought. But, as Heidegger says in the second lecture, something essential is lacking in this interpretation – namely, the comprehension of proximity *as such*, the proximity which the interpretation takes as its point of departure. In both poetizing and thought we dwell already in language, but to catch a glimpse of this sojourn is most difficult. Since this sojourn determines man in his essence, the return 'into the region of our being human'⁴³ is

our main task and that which, within Heidegger's dimension of thought, governs all his pains and efforts. This region is not to be understood as a 'stationary place' to which man is nailed down but as the abode in which the possibility of developing is given to him.

Heidegger has never conceived of the return to this abode as an arbitrary archaization; that is impossible because Dasein is understood to be essentially historical, and history never goes backward. Indeed, Heidegger's comparison of 'the step backward to the abode of man's essence' with 'the step forward to the essence of the machine' – where the latter obviously is meant critically – is governed by the conception that, as long as man does not know in what his essence consists, in what it is grounded, progress in the sense of technical mastery is questionable. The one who progresses in this way can measure his progress only in regard to his progressing ability to master nature; he need not know anything about the position in which he finds himself there.

In the interpretation of George's poem it was left undecided how the gem is to be understood. But now Heidegger proposes that the gem for which the Fate goddess does not find a word is nothing but the word itself. According to Heidegger the limit manifests itself here for the poet. In the domain of the poet no word can be found for the word itself. Can that perhaps take place through thought? The word is not a thing. If we search for it among things, we shall never find it. The word 'is' not, if we reserve the word *is* for the realm of things; but nevertheless it 'is' in a more privileged way than all things. Heidegger expresses this in the following way: 'As far as the word is concerned (if in thought we wish to do justice to it) we should never say "it is" [*es ist*] but rather "it gives" [*es gibt*].'⁴⁴

Es gibt must not be understood here in the sense of being present-at-hand, in which one can say, 'There are [*es gibt*] beautiful apples this year', but in the sense of giving as granting. The word, according to its very essence, is granting. What it gives is *Being*. This is not to be understood in the sense that the word lets the thing come into being just as, according to the medieval conception, everything originated from God's thought. We must recall here the concept of clearing in which all being can appear without its being created by the clearing. The question remains as to how we are to conceive of the word as that which gives; that is precisely the task of our thoughtful concern for the word.

In searching for the proximity of poetizing and thought we have, so far, only reached the point of understanding that their nearness is to be conceived of on the basis of language. In the following statement a decisive shift is expressed: 'For man is man only insofar as he is devoted to the address of language, is used for language, to speak it.'⁴⁵ Until now the determination of man's essence was the main issue, and we came across language as the abode which, although nearest to man,

remains hidden from him; but here man suddenly steps backward, and language comes to the fore. This statement represents the extreme pole of the conception of language as merely a means of communication, a commodity. Man suddenly appears as the one who is used – by language. Is this not an impermissible hypostatization of language? How is language to be understood as the essential element with man merely at its service?

In order to proceed, Heidegger assumes that the essence of language is to be found in the saying (*Sage*). 'Saying [*sagan*]' means to show: to let appear, to free in a way which is at the same time clearing and hiding, taken in the sense of pro-offering of what we call world.⁴⁶ This is first of all the consistent continuation of the conception of language as found in 'The origin of the work of art', where the letting appear is seen in its twofold character of freeing and holding back, of revealing and concealing, and as mentioned there also in connection with the explanation of truth.⁴⁷

In order to get closer to the essence of language Heidegger takes the following guiding principle for his experience with language – the essence of language: the language of Being (*das Wesen der Sprache: die Sprache des Wesens*). In this guiding principle a change takes place which – once we have understood it, once it has taken place with us – will lead us to the extreme.

In the first part of this principle 'essence' (*Wesen*) is understood as quiddity (*to ti estin*). 'Language' is the subject; what is at stake is understanding the *essentia* of the subject. 'The essence which is thus understood is delimited to that which is later called the concept, the representation with the help of which we bring close to ourselves and grasp what a thing is.'⁴⁸ (This refers back at the same time to the first stanza of 'The word' by Stefan George.) The essence which is understood in this way keeps us in the domain of the proposing representation of metaphysics.

In the second part of the principle it is in no way permitted merely to bring a change of terms about so that *Wesen* thus becomes the subject and 'language' is attributed to it; this change must bring about a turn from the proposing representation of metaphysics to a thought which is no longer metaphysical. Since we have grown up wholly within the representation of metaphysics and have inherited from it one mode of representing, this new way of speaking must appear strange to us.⁴⁹

In the first statement *Wesen* means quiddity; in the second statement it must be understood as continuing and lingering, not as mere duration, but as that which concerns us, strikes us, touches and moves us. 'Language belongs to this continuous abiding and is inherent in that which moves everything as that which is most characteristic of it.'⁵⁰ However, how are we to think of that which moves everything? In one of Heidegger's most recent publications⁵¹ it is thought of as the Fourfold, as the

four regions of world – earth, heaven, men (mortals), and gods – which in their interplay constitute the world.

In his interpretation of some lines from the fifth stanza of Hölderlin's 'Bread and wine' Heidegger sees 'the word . . . as the region which lets earth and heaven, the flowing of the depth and the power of the highest, encounter one another, and which determines earth and heaven as the world regions'.⁵² Language is thus understood as that which governs the interplay of the four world regions. In this mutual interplay nearness takes place. Nearness and saying as that which lets appear are what continuously abide from language – they are the same (*das Selbe*).

Language as the Fourfold of world is no longer merely such a thing with which we, the speaking men, have a connection in the sense of a relation which exists between man and language. Language as the saying which moves the world is the matrix of all relationships. It relates, supports, and enriches the 'opposition to one another' of the world's regions, maintains and guards them while it – the saying – holds to itself [*an sich haltet*].⁵³

In this connection Heidegger no longer understands the sounding forth of language as a result of physiologico-physical processes. 'The sounding forth of language is detained in the tuning which chimes the regions of the world structure to one another by playing them onto one another.'⁵⁴

Heidegger has reached here, in regard to language, a summit in the realm of saying which touches upon the limit of that on which we can reflect and which must evoke astonishment. Language is thought of as the original source which keeps the world regions together, which keeps them opposite one another. We are constantly in danger of falling back into the usual representations, according to which language is like an external link, and one cannot understand from where this link comes or from what it derives its linking power.

If Heidegger is understood in an approximately appropriate way, language is nothing separate, found outside the Fourfold of the world (where else then should it be?); it is the relatedness of the Fourfold in the Fourfold itself. It is not a transcendent power, for that would be a metaphysical representation; it is, rather, the proximity that governs in the Fourfold, for which Heidegger uses the word *nearness* (*Nahnis*). Formulated in a different way, it is the original gathering (*Versammlung*). Here Heidegger agrees with Heraclitus and his idea of the *Logos*, which Heidegger for years has explained as the original gathering. Language as the original gathering is soundless. Through language, seen in this way, it is given to man to say 'is'; and Heidegger has thought about this from the start. The gathering and soundless language of the silence is the language of abiding Being (*Wesen*) – of Being provided it is not

represented metaphysically. In the last line of George's 'The word', Heidegger sees a poetic reference to the breakdown of the word as we are familiar with it and to thought's comprehension of language's stillness. This is possible only because poetizing and thought possess their proximity in language as nearness.

In order to avoid the impression that the issue here is about decreed theses through which the truth concerning language is fixed and not about a tracking of the unsayable or about always new traces which could lead to further approximation, another idea will be presented for consideration. This idea is taken from Heidegger's 'The road to language', which is the most recent of his texts on language. In this lecture Heidegger considers how man's speaking, man's language, is related to the language of the stillness. To understand *Ereignis*, a word which is at the center of this text, we must first briefly indicate the context in which the word emerges.

Language speaks by pointing. 'Language speaks in that it is the one that points; and, reaching into all the regions of the world, it lets that which comes to presence out of each region appear and disappear.'⁵⁵ The connection between language and letting appear is found in all texts about language, starting with *Being and Time*; but of course how this letting appear is to be thought of and what it is that speaks change. According to Heidegger, the speaker (man) can speak only because he listens to language, and he is able to hear only because he belongs to language. 'Only to those who belong to [language] does the saying grant the possibility of listening to language and thus of speaking.'⁵⁶ Thus Heidegger sets off this granting as a fundamental trait of language. The relationship between the speaker and language recalls the relationship between Dasein and Being that Heidegger mentions earlier, when he says that Dasein can be only by the grace of Being, but on the other hand Being is in need of Dasein.⁵⁷ 'Language is in need of man's speech and is nevertheless not the mere product of his speech activity.'⁵⁸

The basic language, which Heidegger calls saying, makes all appearing possible. 'The saying governs and joints the "Free" of the clearing, for which all appearing must search and from which all disappearing must flee, whereunto each being present and being absent must point itself, must announce itself.'⁵⁹ From what takes place in saying, conceived of in this way, Heidegger comes to the *Ereignis*. It makes something be suited for (*ereignet*), that is, it grants 'the Free of the clearing in which what is present can abide and from which what is absent can escape and, in withdrawal, can keep its abiding'.⁶⁰ This granting must not be understood according to the cause-effect schema. 'There is nothing else to which one could still reduce the e-vent and with the help of which it could be clarified.'⁶¹ It is the last thing that our glance comes across as it tries to unravel saying's granting. In another essay Heidegger says of

Being, 'it gives [*es gibt*]'; here he says that the *Ereignis* also grants this *es gibt*, 'of which Being, too, is still in need in order (as presence) to arrive at what is proper to it'.⁶²

The manifold possibilities of showing refer to the saying as that which shows, and this, in turn, refers to the *Ereignis*. It may be appropriate here to remember that we are not permitted to hypostatize the *Ereignis* as a power which is beyond everything and which holds sway over Being; we must rather try to grasp the *Ereignis* as that which governs in language and which we run into in our questioning back concerning language's pointing. In our attempt at thinking the *Ereignis*, by no means do we leave language behind. A new aspect of language offers itself here: the way in which language lets man himself speak by making available to him the clearing in which each being will appear. Again, this connection must not be understood in the sense that man is subject to a power to which he must submit himself; Heidegger wishes to show what man owes to language as saying. Through language man is able to speak in the sense of the *logos* that expresses itself with spoken words. (A change has taken place here which, in regard to *Being and Time*, is radical.) Genuine speech is for Heidegger a cor-responding to the saying and to the appropriating e-vent. The relationship between Dasein and Being, which we mentioned earlier, returns when Heidegger says, 'Man is used in order to bring the voiceless saying to sounding'.⁶³

In genuine speech nothing takes place but a manifestation of the appropriating e-vent, which remains hidden, however, for the one who speaks. That is why, according to Heidegger, the thinking experience of the essence of language is nothing but the freeing of the movement that leads from the appropriating e-vent to man's speech. Language is able to grant the clearing because in its very essence language is a granting and an appropriating e-vent. The historical moment, which Heidegger's thought never leaves, is present here too. The appropriating e-vent is not a unique occurrence. It is able to reveal itself, to show or to hide itself; according to this showing or hiding, language comes to pass, and man's speech is something that changes.

All language of man comes to pass in the saying, and as such it is genuine language in the strict sense of the word, although in each case the nearness to the appropriating e-vent will be different. Each genuine language, because it is assigned to man by the movement of the saying, because it is sent to him, is therefore fateful [*Geschicklich*].⁶⁴

In what way does this surprising idea at all pertain to the subject of this paper, which is poetry and language? Heidegger says, 'All pondering thought is poetry, but all poetizing is thinking'.⁶⁵ In Heidegger's view,

what genuinely poetizes is the appropriating e-vent, which remains appropriated also to language; in his earlier texts it can therefore be addressed as poetry.

Notes

1 Wolfgang Zucker made the following comments, with which Professor Biemel expressed agreement: 'Professor Biemel correctly warns against any fixation of Heidegger's thought into theses to be accepted or rejected by the reader and, in contrast, correctly demands an openness of the reader for the "strangeness" of Heidegger's way of thinking and a readiness for a dialogue beyond assent or dissent. Has not Heidegger demonstrated this very *methodos*, this sharing of the way, in the introduction to his own attempt at translating-interpreting the strangeness of the Anaximander fragment? Is not his analysis of the process of thinking as *nach-denken*, *an-denken*, and *danken* precisely the necessary attitude and activity by which, according to Professor Biemel's lucid presentation, the reader may approach an understanding? Furthermore, is not any attempt at translating Heidegger's German sentences into any other language perhaps one of the best ways of training in this "following on the road of thought" [*nach-denken*], in this use of strangeness as crystallization point [*an-denken*], and in this recognizing of strangeness as a favor [*danken*]?'

2 SZ 160.

3 SZ 145.

4 SZ 148, 156.

5 SZ 161.

6 SZ 161.

7 SZ 161.

8 SZ 161.

9 SZ 162.

10 HW 59 (693-4).

11 Some of the following material is taken from the introduction to the French translation of 'On the essence of truth', by Alphonse De Waelhens and Walter Biemel, which appeared in an expanded form in *Symposium*, III (1952). Cf. Ernst Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967).

12 WW 8.

13 WW 11.

14 HW 59 (693-4).

15 HW 59 (693-4).

16 HW 60 (694-5).

17 HW 60 (694-5).

18 HW 61 (695).

19 HW 61 (695).

20 See pp. 235-44 below [in the present volume-ed.].

21 HW 61 (695).

22 HW 61 (695).

23 HW 62-3 (695-7).

24 HW 65, 64 (698, 697).

25 Johann Hölderlin, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. N. V. Hellingrath (Munich: Müller, 1923), III, 337; IV, 246, 343, 63; VI, 25 (editor's translation).

26 HD 34.

27 HD 34.

28 HD 34.

29 HD 35.

30 HD 38.

31 HD 39.

32 HD 40.

33 Erling W. Eng made the following comments which, according to Professor Biemel, certainly indicate an important task for the poet in our time: 'Is the poet perhaps limited to disclosing to us the uncanny character [*das Unheimliche*] of the machine? Since the meaning of the machine lies in its functionality, does it have any sense as phenomenon? Perhaps Brecht's "estrangement effect" [*V-Effekt*] is aimed precisely at the machinal as such, to expose it.'

34 US 159.

35 US 160.

36 L. J. Ferguson questioned Professor Biemel as to the difference between the approach of philosophy and the approach of thought to language. Biemel answered: 'By philosophical dealing with language Heidegger means the metaphysical approach which in our century is embodied in metalinguistics; by thoughtful dealing Heidegger does not mean to force language into the channels of metaphysics and to fasten it there, but rather to lead us to "make" an experience with language, as he explains in *On the Way to Language*, or, more carefully formulated, to think about language from the e-vent not as something that rules over man but as that to which he is exposed, that about which he must think.' (For the difference between philosophy and thought, see also Heidegger's illuminating text 'Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens', *SD* 61ff.).

37 US 220 (editor's translation).

38 US 227.

39 US 167, 168-9.

40 US 169.

41 US 180.

42 US 186.

43 US 190.

44 US 193.

45 US 196.

46 US 200.

47 WW 41ff.

48 US 201.

49 See pp. 222-4 above [in the present volume-ed.].

50 US 201.

51 Cf. VA 176-81.

52 US 207.

53 US 215.

54 US 208.

55 US 255.

56 US 255.

57 Cf. HB 74-6 (281).

58 US 256.

59 US 257.

60 US 258.

61 US 258.

62 *US* 258.

63 *US* 260; cf. p. 241–2 above [in the present volume–ed.].

64 *US* 264.

65 *US* 267.

Heidegger and Hölderlin: the over-usage of 'Poets in an impoverished time'

Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert

It seems that everything there is to say on the topic of Heidegger and Hölderlin – if not too much – has already been said. Heidegger's philological errors have been thoroughly analyzed, as has the path of his thinking from the encounter with Hölderlin.¹

In 1934/5, Heidegger composed his first Hölderlin lecture as the answer to and justification for an abortive political commitment. The first interpretive option is naturally – if we follow Heidegger's later self-interpretation – the failure to disclose an error or misdirected commitment in this. Consequently it was also the case that from the perspective of practical philosophy, the relationship between thinking and acting, between interpreting and politics in Heidegger's encounter with Hölderlin, is treated exhaustively. At least Heidegger himself obviously must have accepted his confrontation with Hölderlin as the version of the way out of the political error that appeared most responsible to him, and indeed he camouflaged it as something wrung from his own cleverness. At the same time, it was to be understood as a clear rejection of the creations of National Socialism.²

If one reads Heidegger's Hölderlin interpretation in light of the clarification of the facts of the unpleasant political commitment to National Socialism, then the activity which apparently was thought to be only philosophical also reflects political errors and practical misdirections. We cannot settle the question here of the extent to which Heidegger, in his self-interpretation, is playing down an error, or the extent to which he interpreted differently in conscious distortion of what took place. On the other hand it can be shown that in Heidegger's way out of political activities (*Gemächte*), and in his way back into the power of poetizing (*Dichtens*) and thinking, the reason for the political error of misjudgment repeats itself in such a way that the factual decision turns out to be based on principle. Thus what is at issue is not a verdict of guilty, but

the question of the extent to which a person can obviate with philosophy a 'philosophy' which on the one hand is itself grounded in the tradition, but which on the other hand as 'authentic' thinking, essentially avoids its standards. As for Heidegger's 'path of thinking with Hölderlin', this path from the philosophical tradition to a new beginning allows essential thinking to be elucidated from the perspective of more practical consequences. At the same time we can find the first beginnings for not going along with Heidegger's advance from philosophy to 'thinking' as he understood it.³

1 Poesie and politics

Otto Pöggeler points out that in his first Hölderlin lecture, Heidegger wants to move away equally from a determination of the poetic and the political.⁴ Although Heidegger strictly refuses to rank the poet Hölderlin alongside the philosophers of German Idealism (cf. e.g., *Höld.* 34/5, p. 6; *EH*, 85f.), with the explicitly formulated intention of his Hölderlin interpretation he reverts to a manner of questioning that is constitutive for German Idealism.⁵

In fragmentary reflections referring to Schiller and in dialogue with Hegel (at first by letter, later in person), Hölderlin first sketched out an 'ideal for the education of a people' (*Ideal der Volkserziehung*) through art, which he hoped to satisfy in his poetry. Together with Hegel, Hölderlin wanted to expand Schiller's conception of aesthetic education in the sense of an historical ideal. This ideal extends from a unity of poetry and politics, which Heidegger also made his own. The decisive point is that the education for the coming of the age of reason, where it would be fulfilled through poetry, at the same time extends, indeed must extend, the original sequence of determinations of historical existence; it does not want the 'revolution of the spiritual world' as Kant had prepared it – hence Schiller's aporia – to founder on the principle of an apraxis of the Ideal.

Heidegger presupposes precisely this claim in his determination of the poet. First of all, he is a poet in 'an impoverished time', i.e., in that situation of 'being torn asunder' ('*Zerrissenheit*') which Schiller, according to Heidegger's partner in dialogue, Hölderlin, set forth as the symptom of modernity. Here, according to Hölderlin, it does not suffice to place the thought of a more human world in opposition to reality. Rather, everything rests on discovering a possibility for imagining it in history. Heidegger too defines poetry on the basis of this unity of projection and effect (*Entwurf und Wirkung*). Poetry and politics are joined together in such a way 'that the historical Dasein of the people – their ascent, peak and descent – spring forth from poetry, and from this authentic knowing

in the sense of philosophy, and from both springs the realizing of the Dasein of a people as a people through the state – politics'. Any 'original, historical time for a people' is thus for Heidegger 'the time of the poet, thinker, and founding father, i.e., of that which authentically grounds and establishes (*gründen und begründen*) the historical Dasein of a people. They are the authentic creators' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 51). In opposition to his own intention,⁶ then, Heidegger explicitly retrieves that early conception of the ideal of the education of a people in which Hegel and Hölderlin meet, the working-out of which they divided up into an ideal of art, an ideal of religion, and the critique of their factual expressions.

Hegel paraphrases the same connection with a view to the 'ideal' of the efficacy of art and religion when he characterizes the Greek *polis*, the model for a fatherland which was founded through art, as 'work of art'. This characterization already arises – to be sure, just as with Hölderlin's late hymns – from the insight into the difference of times, into the distance to the origins, or rather, into a time in which art no longer produces religion, which in turn no longer produces the orientation of the ethicality of a people, the beautiful polity.

Heidegger skips such differentiations. With Hölderlin, he can emphasize in his lectures, it is a matter of 'our fatherland Germania' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 4), [and] indeed not of 'what is handy and practicable for daily needs', nor of 'moderate timeliness', but again of something which, as 'loftiest', 'most difficult', and 'ultimate', must be achieved. Hölderlin gives no consistent clue for this *aggiornamento* [Italian; process of modernizing an institution or organization – trans.]. He himself sketches out more versions of the attempt to 'establish' a fatherland through art. A first such sketch is found in the novel *Hyperion*, in the fiction of founding a state through humane, 'beautiful' actions. The constitutive moments of this fictive founding agree in principle with requirements for an historical revolution. 'Difficult' because ultimately not practicable, but it remains not just the path from fiction into reality; rather it is already the determination within narrated history itself. Poetry generates itself with artistic immanence, i.e., if it narrates the history of a political achievement, [it does so] with no achieved world. Hegel's 'thesis for Germany', which makes possible the humanizing of the state, the revolution from above, becomes revitalized in the form of *Hyperion*. Intention and realization of successful life run aground because individual and collective success are not compatible. Consequently, motivated by the dialogue with Hegel, in working on *Empedokles* Hölderlin intensifies the immanent aporia of the work of art for the sake of the aporia of the confrontation between projection and historical reality. Wherever the actions of the individual want to set the conditions for the success of all, a human state, the projection into the effective making of one's mark, into what is concrete, turns into a legal entity instead of into a residue of the ethicality of the

people. Hölderlin's artistically immanent solution: the tragic conception implies a fixing of the general relationship between projection and actuality. The projection of a state produces no fatherland, but rather leaves it to historical action (which from time to time supersedes anew) to realize such a fatherland.⁷

Hölderlin's hymns, upon which Heidegger relies, modify this conception again in the sense that Heidegger himself also cites: they constitute that 'dialogue' by means of which action first becomes possible. The dialogue of the poet, language, creates – through exemplary experience of the poet and poetizing – the origin of historical human action, but first produces the (new) historical actuality in a dimension which continues to withdraw from poetry, which only prepares for it. The fatherland as 'secret origin' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 4) at best still plays the role here of an intended (necessary to have established) but not yet realized goal.

Heidegger passes over the origin of the formulation of the question of early idealism altogether. Along with the majority of Hölderlin research at that time, he had 'no eye . . . for the way Hölderlin adopted the tendencies of the French Revolution and argued with them'.⁸ As to whether Heidegger shared a tendency of National Socialism with this blindness remains undecided. The question is: How does Heidegger's conception of the political look if it springs forth from the determination of Hölderlin's poetry, but if it interprets this poetry itself without its temporal referent, without the constitutive debate of the poet and the poetry with the great historical turning point, the French Revolution?

According to Pöggeler, Heidegger wants 'to adhere to the reference to the political only as withdrawal into an innermost domain'. Poetry itself appears as true actuality, or rather it suggests the truth about beings. If at the same time it names the origin of the political, then we must be permitted to expect a sufficient (true) orientation for action from it, at least in the form of a recommendation (as projection of reality). With the late Hölderlin, however, Heidegger believes he can disregard the concretion of the poetic world-projection. As a consequence, it is no longer a matter of a new politics, of historical action based on the projection of the poet and the orienting power of poetry (the new gods which Hegel had designated as ethical '*path*'). It is instead a matter of action which situates the *epoch*, which is legitimated after the analogy of historical activity (*Wirkens*) to poetic 'action'. But a conception of the political can also easily be found in this: namely, the generalization of existentiality in the sense of its intersubjectivity as language and – in combination with a generalization of historicity to history – the conception of complete historicity as event or destiny (*Ereignis oder Geschick*) of Being. Its primary, obvious advantage – the advantage of any theoretical acting as opposed to problems of execution – lies in the nonutility; its disadvantage not least in the utility of the

tendencies of authenticity à la Heidegger II or Heidegger III generated by contemporary Anglo-Saxon Heidegger interpretation.

The beginning and carrying-out of the Hölderlin interpretation contain inexplicability and legitimizable philosophical sense in difficult, more soluble connection. The neuralgic points are unambiguously (if not also completely) designated:

1. The beginning with the later Hölderlin, with the abstention from the politics of the hymns, reduces *poiesis* to interpretive acting.
2. On the basis of this reduction, the poetic existence becomes 'poetic'; but therein it becomes human 'dwelling'; it becomes the primal image (*Urbild*) of authentic historical existence.
3. Human existence is not just interpreted poetically, but rather owes itself to 'art'. The work of art does not indicate any functioning of human beings through art, but instead the functioning of art itself. Heidegger hypostasizes the cultural event (*Ereignis*) (work of art) just like Being as interpretive horizon for human destiny.

2 Interpreting as surrogate for action

It is not without attention to the rigorous distinction between poetizing and thinking, historical interpretation and its reflection in and through philosophy, already familiar from the existential analytic, that Heidegger begins his consideration of Hölderlin. Nevertheless, he denies a strictly defined stipulation of this differentiation between poetizing, thinking and saying. The mysterious ground which is common to all three, language, harbors a structural affinity to the three differences through the fact that it depends less on what is immediately said as on 'what is silent in this saying' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 41; cf. also 4f., 29f., 150f.). Implicitly, this distinction also affects the difference between poetizing and acting.

Heidegger distinguishes the poetic from the practical or political as 'a saying like the making-manifest which guides' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 31; cf. p. 127), and thus he articulates a renewed version of the phenomenological principle 'to the things themselves'. The characterization of poetry, always drawn upon and usually sufficient, as poetic in the sense of the 'making, producing of something' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 29), still appears undifferentiated for Heidegger. In any case, *poiesis* guides in the direction from which the 'knowing about the essence of the "poetic"' can be found. In an etymological exertion of the sort peculiar to him Heidegger then fixes the sphere of the poetic as interpretive performance. *Poien* points to 'the original lexical meaning of *tithon-dicere*. . . . This word is from the same root as the Greek *deikenomi* . . . showing something that can be seen, something that makes manifest . . . on the path of its own

showing' (ibid.). To be sure, this differentiation was typical of the caution, so that Heidegger takes up Hölderlin's poetic conception not with the *Hyperion*, not with the *Empedokles* works. Here the 'undifferentiated' interpretation of the poetic is still preserved. In that case a narrated acting, a speaking which is detached from acting, remains in the grip of the Aristotelian conception of poetics. The poetic conception appears as the thesis of the exemplary nature of human acting which was manifest in beautiful acting and which was realized in good acting. It is different in the hymns, in the restriction of poetizing to the word, the interpretive performance and the 'dialogue', intersubjectivity. Word and dialogue name the holy, the 'beckoning of the gods which is veiled in words', but they name it with reference to a community: 'Poetry is the further working of this beckoning in the people, or seen from this perspective, poetry is: the existence [Dasein] of the people set within the sphere of this beckoning' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 32; cf. p. 127f.).

Nevertheless, Heidegger further preserves his own careful differentiation in two ways. Poetry, as 'saying in the manner of the making-manifest which guides', is at the same time foundation (*Stiftung*), 'effecting grounding of what lasts' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 33). Heidegger extends this to historical functioning in the determination of the poet 'in an impoverished time'. This poet, who endures the 'no-longer of the gods who have fled', consequently the loss of the self-evident, living orientation for action (if we follow the conceptions of Hegel and Hölderlin) and the 'not-yet of the coming', 'brings about . . . truth, vicariously and hence truly, for his people' (*EH*, 44). By emphasizing the difference between what is said poetically and what is unfolded by thinking, Heidegger preserves the difference between interpreting and functioning. The poet appears as 'grounder of Being', not just in the dimension of interpretation, but at the same time in the sphere of realization, in historical Dasein. 'While the beckoning of the gods has been built, so to speak, into the ground floor of the language of a people by the poet, without the people perhaps suspecting this to begin with, Being is established in the historical existence [Dasein] of the people, [and] in this Being and behind it a direction and dependency can be found' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 33).

What perhaps produces a still more irritating effect in view of the initial differentiation are the delimitations of the occurring of poetry itself and of its understanding. For this Heidegger finds all the categories of the engaged-emphatic actions: of struggle.⁹ The successful, historical interpretive performance is indebted to struggle and persistence [over time]: 'Duration and fullness' of time, as opposed to its inadequacy, is 'contended for and kept awaiting a solution' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 56). Hölderlin's letters to his mother show 'the enormous need of his calling and the true heroism of his existence' (Dasein) (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 35). Hence the poet Hölderlin also demands 'conquering with thought for his poetry'

(*Höld.* 34/5, p. 5), and because he put a stop to the coexecution of interpretation, he demands up to the 'struggle against us' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 23; cf. also pp. 19, 8). Consequently in his early lecture, Heidegger in a sense circumscribes precisely this understanding fulfillment through categories of acting *so that interpreting as well as understanding become pseudo-actions*. Essential thinking, in a different way than empty philosophy, is existentially (*existentiell*) enthusiastic for the object which is to be laid out from an ontological perspective. The pathos of the thinker misinterprets poetry, interpreting similarly to understanding, as engaged acting. Furthermore, in Heidegger's Hölderlin interpretation art becomes the organon of philosophy: the meaning of *poiesis* between interpreting and acting, the language of the poet and of philosophy are no longer differentiated, but stand for an 'essential acting', realizing the truth of Being itself. Alluding to Schelling, art for Heidegger prepares for thoughtful consideration through an indifference by not-just-perceiving and not-yet(really)-acting (*Noch(Doch)-nicht-Handeln*).

Heidegger himself should have to reject this amalgamation which to him suffuses the fulfillment of its philosophical – now: thoughtful – elucidation. His intention remains the thoughtful occupation with historical interpretation in and through poetry. At the same time to be sure, 'essential' thinking, like 'essential' poetizing, includes an emphatic distinction aside from the philosophical. One could neglect Heidegger's manner of presentation as a problem of philosophical taste, as stylistic clumsiness if he did not voluntarily break further with the advantage of his initial differentiation. What could be transformed by harmless factual constellation, by allegation, to separate sharply philosophy and politics in an historical thinking, Heidegger links with the justification of the political power which he wanted to overcome according to his own testimony through differentiated, critical vision.

3 Poetry and authenticity

Prior to his early interpretation of the hymns 'Germanien' and 'Der Rhein', Heidegger mentions a distinction between historical interpretation of the poet or his work and the direct entering-into Hölderlin's 'work which is still timeless and spaceless, (which) our historical affection has already overcome and which has grounded the beginning of another history'. In the understanding therefore, it serves to bring 'us and the future under the standard of the poet' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 4), to allow 'our Dasein (to become) the bearer of the life of the power of poetry' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 19). Understanding of poetry works cathartically, it becomes the activist-moralizing challenge of the 'struggle against us': for in it lies the 'working passage through the poem' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 23).

Poetry consummates and teaches authentic existence as 'arousal and . . . pulling-together of the authentic essence of the individuals, through which it returns to the ground of its Dasein' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 8).

Poetry is therefore 'the same as the basic occurring of the historical human Dasein' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 40).

Here too the manner of Heidegger's circumscribing again oscillates (already critically objecting in opposition to *Being and Time*) between categories of reflection and of presentation. The heightened demand for concreteness of the poet, the 'more alive' historicity, makes a separation of life and concept more difficult. Understanding, as 'working passing through' cannot deny the allusion to the work-world. The results of labor (material) (*Zeug*), poetizing (work), and understanding (truth) prosper in confused proximity because the 'basic structure' of all three is also retrieved in the poetic. That is to say, poetry becomes authentic existence which, according to Heidegger, interprets historically and concretely the basic structure of 'care', and also occasionally for a time, this (care) constituted in its self-evidentness as time. Consequently and by way of example it is called, in Hölderlin's words (borrowed from the *Titanen*): 'Participation and having-been-bound-together thus constitute the necessary condition for the fact that in general it becomes time for us' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 57f.). Heidegger takes up this interpretation of the historical relevance of poetry in general and sallies forth: 'The participation which the poet means constitutes our Dasein as such; in any case it is our Dasein in which it is generally about Being and non-Being – namely, "care" ' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 58).

So the poetic *is* at the same time 'basic fabric of historical Dasein' and questionableness of human beings, which is a matter of enduring 'the very short lifetime' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 59).¹⁰ Poetry, the poetic, becomes the quintessence of 'authentic' existence, the living fulfillment and projection of life upon its sense: historicity. According to Heidegger, the analysis of this authenticity also does not open up psychic or psychological conditions, but rather conditions of the history of Being. Man *is* in the poetic, happening at the same time occasionally on the basis of an historico-concrete projection of sense, on the basis of the constellation of a destiny. In this way, here too authenticity necessarily wins from articulation the ambiguity of relativity which is composed in advance, composed with, and composed spontaneously. Temporality of Dasein no longer endows simply sense, but instead historically determined sense, interpretation and life from content-specific pre-givens: the holy, the divine, God. Heidegger's thesis that the sense of Dasein (Being mediated by means of temporality) was not just constituted through execution is heightened while the moment of composing recedes. The poet reverses the impoverishment of the time, endows history, owing to the fact that it leads up to a new destiny, or leads up anew to an old one – which

applies to all. The interpretive performance itself does not stand within the poet's power, it is not composing. Rather, its succeeding or failing has presuppositions: interpretation, like what is interpreted (authentic existence), is 'destiny'.

In just this way, the possibility of historical human action is reduced to 'corresponding-to'. Sensible existence (*sinnhafte Existenz*), like its condition, does not compose a significant (*sinnvolles*) destiny which delivers (does not deny) sense, but instead it awaits. The exemplary actor, the poet, was already the interpreter. The spontaneous moment of interpreting itself, however, which has an affinity for action, rescinds itself once more on the grounds of the concrete point of departure, in favor of receptivity. 'Composedness' [*'Gelassenheit'*] characterizes authentic existence as genuine acting.¹¹

In a lecture from 1936, Heidegger summarizes it again with regard to language: 'Language is not simply [one bit of] equipment among many others which man also possesses. Rather, language first grants in general the possibility for beings to stand within the openness. Only where there is language is there world, which means: the constantly changing circumference of decision and work, of deed and responsibility, but also of arbitrariness and turmoil, decay and confusion. Only where the world holds sway is there history. Language . . . renders security that as historical, man can *be*. Language is . . . that happening [*Ereignis*] which has at its disposal the highest possibility of human Being [*EH*, 35].' The poet now also remains the 'first child' of language, his saying is 'creative', 'establishing saying' (*EH*, 63), and yet to it he responds only with a destiny.¹²

So interpreted, the 'working pulling-[oneself and the world] together' (*'arbeitende Zusammenriss'*) is confined to a particular creature within the field of historical *interpretation*, not that of acting here again in receptivity, not the spontaneity of *responding* instead of composing [or 'setting in place']. For Heidegger, characterizations of redemption follow from the categories of religious response. Poets in an impoverished time feel 'singing the trace of the gods who have fled' and trace 'the related mortals, the way . . . to the turning point' (*HW*, 250). Of course, as Heidegger shows in later reflections, for all that it is a matter of forgotten Being. Nevertheless the principle ambiguity of an existing which is reduced to responding (analogous to the interpretation-acting) also remains preserved up to this time. In Hölderlin's poetry, Heidegger also finds the justification for this (cf. *Höld.* 34/5, p. 184). In the essence of poetry as 'verbal foundation [*worthafte Stiftung*] of Being' (*EH*, 39), 'human thinking is used in a fixed reference and is placed on a ground'. As such, man 'dwells' 'on this earth'. 'Poetic dwelling' means 'to stand in the presence of the Gods and to be affected by the essential proximity of things'. 'Fundamentally, Dasein is' poetically '— which is to say: as

established (grounded), it is nothing earned, but is rather a gift' (EH, 39).

Still later, Heidegger also determined the function of poetizing analogously to the Greeks. Not only the individual, but also an historical community finds its essence in the poet's word, just as the Greeks won their state and their politics through their beautiful gods. The 'blind singer' as Hölderlin entitled a hymn with fully conscious allusion to Homer, who – as Hegel would have it – had given the Greeks their gods, names the holy and opens up not just itself, but rather a people's destiny, their historical place: homeland. Homecoming in the interpreting of the poet 'is the future of the historical essence of the Germans. They are the people of poetizing and thinking' (EH, 29).

In the discussion of the hymn *Andenken* (1943), Heidegger himself connects poetizing as interpreting which orients with the sweeping category of poetic dwelling. As Heidegger expressly notes (EH, 83), Hölderlin wants to learn in distinction from Greece 'the free use of [what is our] own [des *Eigenen*]'.¹³ But Heidegger himself rewrites this use of (what is our) own in stricter analogy to the Greeks; indeed the Greeks come into the foreign, into the Hesperidian, in a way into their own, the national, which skips over the difference of historical peculiarity to the Germans. Indeed, the art-religion of the Greeks is first recognized for what it is in light of reason which posits rationally: as 'the grounding and building of the *polis* as the essential place of history, determined by the holy'. Indeed, 'the political' is originally determined from the polis; but is it possible as well for the German poet to presuppose a similar effect based on the assumption that contemporary man is again able 'to have a destiny'? For Heidegger this question is determined because man 'dwells poetically, and so receives his culture from a destiny' (EH, 84f.). Hence that means 'the natural has become what is historical in its history'; it has found 'the history of the people in what is its own', and it dwells therein (EH, 84f.).

During all of the preceding, where the *Hyperion* novel and the *Empedokles* poem belong 'in the wanderings' (EH, 121), Hölderlin's hymn *Andenken* should yield this 'ability to remain in what is its own'. Here too Heidegger vacillates. In the first place, poetizing is still reputed to be dialogue, and hence interpretive suggestion. The 'basic law of historicity' appears as a 'law of becoming at home. . . . But this is based in the passage . . . through the Being-not-at-home, and as such a passage it is only suitable for the appropriation of what is its own' (EH, 122f.). At the same time, however, the basic law is 'dwelling'. 'Poetizing is remembrance [*Andenken*]. Remembrance is establishing. The establishing dwelling of the poet shows and consecrates the ground of the poetic dwelling of the mortal' (EH, 143). The remaining in the interpreting, or rather the 'poetic remaining in the essence of the appropriate community

of poets' (EH, 142) – remembrance – shows the ground for their establishment 'in the festive destiny of the future history of the Germans' (EH, 142). 'What remains in the remaining' arises here. Heidegger only gives an interpretation, with regard to its contents, of the reference to destiny as ground for the establishment of history and tradition, for the sedimentation of interpreting to the life form, in referring to the Greek *polis*. There was realized (still unconsciously) what modern poetizing names and what as 'dwelling' must again be allowed to become history in the sense of the tradition. But is Hölderlin the reflective Greek to whom poetry has given his Gods, his ethicality, and consequently his state and his politics? Is the 'remaining' which is established through 'remembrance' poetic, hence 'German', dwelling? Put another way: Does modern man have his destiny (*Geschick*) in the same way that his fate (*Schicksal*) befell the Greek? Or does he only know of this that, as one who is historical, he lives from what has become, but answers for this individually, carries it forward, changes? Seen in this way, the difference between the mere, instinctive awareness of the Greeks, mere substantial ethicality as Hegel defined it, and subjectivity, merely presented destiny, is dissolved: both the conception and its problem. Heidegger does not formulate this difference between the ancient and the modern, which Hölderlin inherited in the hymns' recourse to Schiller's conception of Elysian poetry.¹⁴ He skips over it himself in the philosophical determination of 'Being' from poetry.

Through the inextricability of the poetic projection of history as destiny and of 'what follows' in the historical dwelling which is yielded in destiny, Heidegger's Hölderlin interpretation is premodern in the sense of the 'quarrel between the ancient and the modern'. That is to say, he transplants Hölderlin's poetry into a situation in which the difference between the ancient and the modern which was codiagnosed by the poet himself does not arise, in which the 'modern' differentiation between aesthetic religion and the requirements of reason articulated in the ideal of educating a people is not carried out with it. Poetry, in antiquity the teacher of man, foundation of the gods and of the state, in modernity must become the naming of this grounding dimension. In this way it leads to the experience of the manifold, the dissimilar, but at the same time to historically growing and culturally virulent possibilities of human Being. At the same time, however, poetry – as language – becomes the orientation-intending mediation of such experiences. The new gods shed the unequivocal unconditionality of antiquity in favor of the fictionally possible which likewise dovetails the actual and the actual which is past in the projection of a human and historical human Being. Indeed, in his *Beiträge zur Philosophie* [*Contributions to Philosophy*], a large recently published manuscript from 1936–8 – trans.] Heidegger speaks, in the sense of the prehistorical representations of God, of the detachment of

past dogmatic religions through a 'final God', which could be determinative for our time. So far he appears to take up Hölderlin's conception, and by means of it he mediates between the thought of a mediation by the representation of God which was formulated in the program of the 'mythology of reason', and the historically varying shape, although he himself is occupied not with early Idealism but rather with Nietzsche. But he reveals a philosophical consequence which at the very least runs contrary to the peculiar connection with Hölderlin because he interprets this historical dimension as *destiny*. In this way he preserves an essential moment of the poetico-mythological conception of interpretation as *proton pseudos*, namely the requirement according to reason in the philosophical generalization.

Here Heidegger presents the conception of the poet analogously to the situation of the problem formulated in early Idealism, which was examined based on the account of the consequence of poetic departure as compared to the matter. Schiller, and with him Hegel, Hölderlin and the young Schelling, start from the fact that in the 'world which is torn asunder', and thus in one of those 'troubled times' which occur again and again in history, art is to bring about a humane world. (Perhaps we should retain this model throughout as the structural delimitation of the historical function of art.) The carrying out of this program at first shows great similarities to Heidegger's, but [in fact] it leads to a decisive difference, namely, to the establishment of the fictional character of the interpretive performance which arises from poetic existence. The theory of beautiful appearance¹⁵ offers the link in the mediation between theory and reality, between interpretation and history, just as it separates both from the proposed (fictional) transformation of the empirical carrying-out-anew through poetry. In Heidegger's philosophical interpretation of the poets, a critique of a foundational identification of the aesthetics of enlightenment decisive for early Idealism is lost: namely, the rejection of the structural identification of the artist and statesman in the concept of genius, or rather in the version of this concept which was modified in accordance with the quarrel and which can be found in both Hegel and Hölderlin, the conception of the 'great individual'. By way of example, Hegel repeats Hölderlin's tragic conception in his interpretation of Schiller by means of a critique of the 'great individuals of modernity', the actions of whom should establish a new – if not world-historical then still national – destiny in a pregnant version of the partiality of individual actions under social conditions: in the modern world, the 'great individual' becomes necessary to the 'rogue' (against the society which it wants to shape decently). Hölderlin's reflections like Hegel's are therefore developed as the gradual demolishing of the moments identified in the concept of genius, and both formulate the poetic as well as the philosophical consequences of this critique of enlightenment. The 'great

individual', only as poet, has another meaning which is not distorted: his 'establishing' of a destiny lies in the formative interpretation which indeed can choose to have for its theme the historical actions of the statesman or the poet. The decentralization of the various versions of creative projection in thinking, interpreting and acting remains decisive for this pursuit of the notion of genius.

In contrast to Hölderlin, Heidegger generally rejects the notion of genius, Schelling's as well as Schopenhauer's, taken from the tradition of the *Critique of Judgement*, but he does so in such a sweeping way that he retains essential moments without being able to know or realize it. In this way he again lays out poetizing, strictly interpreted as receptive, as the 'comportment' of authentic existence with categories of action, just as in the analysis of *Dasein* he likewise wanted to have grounded a practical philosophy. The aporias only get worse. In the determination of the poetic, Heidegger then does not retrieve the identification of artist and statesman by itself, without taking into consideration the later differentiation. He supports it philosophically, moreover, through a structural, advance justification: through his new determination of Being as *Ereignis*. In this way he loses not only the difference between art and politics; he again loses sight of the difference between theoretical and practical Philosophy.

The seeing [person], the teacher of wisdom or duty, the poet or philosopher, should not just reflexively consider activities. Rather, he himself becomes the great activity. The deeds of both the reflecting thinker, seer or poet on the one hand and those of the politician on the other are describable with identical categories. Thus the poet who purifies the light of reason, the glance of recognition into the wisdom of the world view, is first of all reputed to be the 'genius', or rather the 'great individual'. At the time of Hölderlin's late hymns, however, Schelling alone held this conception. With the expression of the differentiating considerations of the relationship between artistic appearance and reality, the genius, who – according to Schelling – founds the whole culture (*Bildung*) of his epoch, at the same time generates (a community of) acting because the work of art (the beautiful) provides 'his' world view for an historical people; it universalizes wisdom by means of the artificial result: the beautiful shape. The encroachment by ways of being reasonable, by unobstructed experiences, by the establishment of a new experiential community in the assignment of a destiny, is neither further grounded nor seen in its danger by Heidegger. Hegel and Hölderlin had sought to delimit the task of *poiesis* as the establishment of the spirit of a people, as tradition and renewal of their cultural accomplishments (wisdom). From this wisdom one expects a turning point of the times, certainly in the careful, reserved differentiating between new insight and

new Dasein, new existence. This heading itself permits – insofar as one follows Schiller – a long ‘educational’ process from insight to acting.

Just as Hegel had in the context of his early critique of religion, so Hölderlin outlined a similar model in poetry leading to discerning action, i.e., to action which is consciously ethical and political (corresponding to the ideal of the citizen in the ancient *polis*). Interestingly, this outline subsists on the reinterpretation of a further basic category of Enlightenment aesthetics, namely, the concept of the copy (*Nachahmung*). Copy comes to be personalized into a conception of imitation (*Nachfolge*), of the copy not of what is intuitively given in advance, but rather of an acting person. In this way, for Hölderlin as well as Hegel the conception of genius is definitively formed into a distinctive determination of the great individual: into the ideal of the ‘teacher of virtue’. Thereby it can be shown at the same time that an original aesthetic act, the copy, leads to a pattern of living (the community), and mediating in this way, to action. In the connecting, mediating step of self-interpretation, or rather in the cultivation of a tradition, the pattern of living produces the imitation of individual, consciously-accepted acting in the sense of a living, consummated ideal. This model of education for morality over intersubjectivity, and for praxis which is not only legitimizable but actually legitimated, not only supplies Hegel with the first, principle, but no longer altered determination of the ‘ideal’; at the same time it forms the content for the *Hyperion* novel as well as the nerve of the *Empedokles* poem in the modification up to the tragic conception. In spite of all the need for revision (already thematized by Hegel and Hölderlin themselves), through the connection of the thought of the genius (namely, the conception of the ‘great individual of modernity’ as the ‘teacher of virtue’) with the basic idea of Enlightenment aesthetics (the copy), we attain a differentiated model of the transition from clear, mediating insight (world view) into acting.

For Heidegger, on the other hand, the transition from the establishing of a new insight to the assignment of a people’s destiny must become a vicious circle because philosophical reflection upon history conveys no possibility of differentiating between insight and salvation. Heidegger himself succumbs to his error that one may be able to turn from the wisdom of the times, that the great individual might be able to operate in like manner and convincingly in the sphere of better knowledge of what was to be done as well as in the sphere of acting. He therefore skips over, as does Hölderlin, this ‘practical’ dimension of the establishing of a world view, the ‘orientation function’ the taking over of which would make art assailable.

In poetry – for Heidegger: in the pattern of poetic existence as ‘care’ – Dasein appears on the one hand as *in need of interpretation*. However poetry, i.e., the poet as he who consummates Dasein in exemplary

fashion, does not stop with the need for interpretation but instead begins here with the purpose of interpreting what is interpretable. In any case, as 'poetic poet' he ventures a projection of the time upon the 'divine' as what allows understanding from out of newly experienced history in the sense of what has come to be. Conversation is thus not a matter of the Being of conversation – perhaps this was the reflection of the thinker upon the condition for the possibility of poetic 'acting', or as Heidegger dramatizes it: struggling. Wherever the poet 'struggles and patiently preserves . . . the duration and fullness (of time)' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 56), he determines time 'in the sense of the original time of the people' (p. 51): this means without characterizing categories of action: he interprets them – and what is more [he interprets them] anew, often in opposition to traditional interpretation and always in opposition to the *prima vista* certainty of everydayness. Poetry, at least as the 'business' of the poet, exists in a *suggestion of an answer*, always time-specific, an interpretation of Dasein. But how does 'authentic Dasein' behave as interpreted if not actively? With regard to the dimension of authentic creating, Heidegger forgot the claim that was decisive for early Idealism: to project a 'regulative total image' ('*regulatives Gesamtbild*') – to use a Nietzschean expression – of the historical situation for the purpose of feeding a new fantasy which reason prepares, but above all to qualify as human acting without grounding (in the sense of the Aristotelian concept of a copy of beautiful acting), as ethical behavior.

The sense of the reference to the Greeks has long been insufficiently determined as Heidegger does not take it in this matter-of-fact function to demonstrate the interplay of poetry and politics upon the concrete image of an historical ideal. The poet establishes the gods, and with them the ethicality of the people and the *polis*, i.e., the principles of human acting together with an institution in accordance with them, a city-state and its politics. The interpretation of the poet here is itself certainly not *practical*, as Heidegger's category of 'creating' suggests, but it takes aim at praxis, acting, and historical activity.

The debate over the role of the 'great individual', to the extent that he acts historically and does not just poetize, consequently leads Hölderlin in the *Empedokles* poem and Hegel in the joining of his discussion with Hölderlin in his *Wallenstein* essay (1801) to the outlining of a world, of a state concretely established. Here as there, the upshot of this is the renunciation of the action of the interpreting, the decentralizing of historical acting by the poet or historical interpretation and the statesman, or rather of the alteration of reality. Beneath the complex conditions of the modern world, art cannot automatically, i.e., not through the power to the fiction of a humanly interpreted world, produce an existence such as its real, historical determination. That happens only with the help of the assumption that interpreting, thinking as quasi acting, exhausts the

determination of the historicity of Dasein. In the (Frankfurt) dialogue between Hölderlin and Hegel, precisely this problem of the becoming 'positive' of the laws of reason in the historical law of the state and in the dogma of the theologians was discussed. If Hölderlin together with Hegel had perhaps still intended with art to permit an 'ideal for the education of a people' to become historically effective, which the superseding of 'positivity' has the power to do, so no later than his hymn *Andenken*, this concept had undergone a decisive modification. Here art can only set possible human experiences – namely intercultural – against fixed relations and must abandon the turning point of the times to the individuals, or rather to those who act.¹⁶ So if Hegel speaks of the character of art as something past, Hölderlin speaks in a different fashion of its mediating character, of the possibility of the establishment of a critically evaluative self-consciousness, but not of a new time or of a new community. In Heidegger's encounter with Hölderlin, this *epochē* is lost.

Heidegger's turn to the 'poet in an impoverished time', initially oft spoken of and full of hope, has thus been seen as neither unique nor consistent. Considered in light of the philosophical tradition, it loses its enigmatic charm, for Heidegger merely retrieves what had already been sought for in connection with the Enlightenment: to allow philosophy to become practical. In light of the aporias we have seen which are inherited from this, the 'salvation' forfeits its sense of achievement to them. For it escapes from the renewed confusion of a concept which is already developed more distinctively with Heidegger's model of Hölderlin; it is owing to the mixture of theoretical concepts or concepts of reflection with categories of action.

4 Artwork as historical work

Already in the Hölderlin lecture concerned with an analysis of the poetic as a 'basic mood of historical Dasein', Heidegger lays the foundation for the next generalization in the philosophical determination of Being.

In contrast to merely historiological truth (*historischen Wahrheit*), historical truth (*geschichtliche Wahrheit*) is disclosed as an analogue to existentiality in a basic determination. In the concretization of the analysis of care which he retrieves, Heidegger interprets poetically-established Dasein as: 'essentially Being-with-another, Being-for-another and Being-in-opposition-to-another' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 143) from the 'basic determination of holy affliction which is grieving but prepared' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 146; 223). According to the basic character of Dasein, the Being-with-another of Dasein is historical in itself, and hence is bound to the forces of history and is joined through them' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 143). In other words, Dasein turns to the collective-individual and his knowledge, and in the

same step to the will, to the ground of acting. 'The truth of a people', namely, what the poet brings forth through the awakening of the determination of ground which he creates, 'is that capacity for Being to be manifest, from out of which a people knows what it wills historically while it wills *itself*, it wills itself to be.' Heidegger once more scrapes together here the structural analogy which guides him. The basic mood – opened through the poet – finds its analogue not just in thinking but also in the 'creating of a state'. The three 'creative powers of historical Dasein' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 144) together bring about the determinate historical truth of a people. In the equivocal wordplay accompanying the determination of the demigods as 'overmen' or 'undergods' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 166), Heidegger unfolds the determination of historicity as destiny, which he took up once again in the essay 'Origin of the work of art', to the characterization with regard to its content of the formal elements of historicity which were laid out in the poetic determination of the basic mood. What Hölderlin put into words concerning *physis* was retrieved by Heidegger in his general opposition of Earth and World. He finds his entrée in Hölderlin's poem (*Der Rhein*) about identification: 'Earth and homeland are meant historically' (cf. *Höld.* 34/5, pp. 196, 223), and both experience their interpretation on the basis of this historicity in poetry: on the strength of destiny (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 196).

Although Heidegger expressly denies that 'to this Being which is embodied in the saying of the poet, the robe of a "philosophical" language is still to be hung hastily in another place' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 150), the original dialogue of thinking with poetry appears as the transformation of the authenticity of an individual people in Being. Hence it is for this reason that 'not only . . . compromises between the poetizing, thinking, and acting forces are to be established; rather their concealed, limiting isolation is to be taken seriously, and therein the mystery of their original belonging-together is to be experienced in a new previously undiscussed structure of Being to be formed originally' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 184f.). The 'thinking' of the poet is a matter of 'an original, projecting establishing' (p. 226). The philosophical 'penetration [*Ergründung*] to the ground of the Being of poetry', to the extent that it grounds this Being in the 'essence of Being as a whole' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 237), allows too little of the difference between poetic interpretation and philosophical reflection to be felt (cf. also *Höld.* 34/5, p. 269f.).

The explicit philosophical interpretation of poetry in 'The origin of the work of art'¹⁷ retrieves the characterization of poetizing in any case as just such Being. Truth 'dresses itself in the work' as the strife between earth and world, between lighting and concealing. In poetic projection – [which] furnishes the paradigm for Hölderlin's way through – 'Being-in-the-world' is concretized as Being-on-the-earth.

On the grounding level of philosophy, Heidegger plays with poetic

interpreting as 'creating', as bringing forth not the formed object but its 'unconcealedness' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 65). Being-created is determined from the 'work-Being of the work' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 66), which in turn is determined as the 'event' of truth in the sense of a struggle, namely, as the oft-cited 'strife'.¹⁸ Above all Heidegger still stresses here that world-horizon and earth are revealed reciprocally: 'The essence of earth . . . is unveiled . . . only in the projecting [*Hineinragen*] into a world, in the opposition of both' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 79). As historical truth, art functions in the threefold sense of the establishing as 'giving', 'grounding' and 'beginning', as projection (*Entwurf*) of an historical self-understanding, as the uncovering of one which was previously mentioned, already effective, and as the beginning of both a new self- and world-understanding. To this extent the analysis of the poetic basic tone (*Grundstimmung*) was perhaps to be retranslated even into the existential structure of *Being and Time*.¹⁹

In the unreflected polemic against the cultural philosophy of neo-Kantianism, Heidegger finally closes out a step beyond his goal. Art, which in no case is permitted to be understood as 'cultural performance of man' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 35), is not just historical; rather, art *is* the origin of the work of art. As 'cultural performance', art may still appear in the temporary, concretizing comprehension of the individual Being-thrown, as Heidegger determines history, namely, as the 'rapture of a people in their offering, as rapture in their giving-with' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 89). The subsequent determination of the historical – now ontological – character of Being as fourfold, however, uses a surplus of concretization as to its contents which Heidegger brings with him from his exegesis of Hölderlin. While the poet, like poetry, is reputed to be 'projection' – admittedly circumscribed in the categories of action – at one point in the *Rhein* hymn where the poet pretends to think, Heidegger finds a determination of the Being of the demigods. The 'over-men' or 'undergods' also remain no mere conceptual-tasteful slip of the tongue. On the contrary, they serve as the legitimation of the transition from 'care' as the 'basic metaphysical essence of Dasein' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 281) to the realization of the expanded basic tone and basic determination (*Grundstimmung und Grundbestimmung*) of the poetic. They *are* what the poet *says*: destiny, or rather the 'strife in the midst of Being', which from itself finally mediates Being itself. This destiny, Being as 'conflict between what springs forth and Being-sprung-forth', which is interpreted ontologically as the strife of world and earth, becomes real in the 'actually created', namely, 'on the grounds of the worked-out work' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 284). Heidegger paraphrases the interrelation of interpretation and historical realization in the first place as follows: The 'Being of the demigods – destiny – is established poetically. This saying is placed amidst the language of the people. Only an historical people is truly a people. It is

only historical, however, if it takes place on the grounds of the center of Being, if the intermediate is there, if the demigods, the creating, bring about occurrence as history' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 283f.).

Already in 'The origin of the work of art' Heidegger must have 'turned' the perspective of the Hölderlin interpretation into his later philosophy of Being if art suddenly takes over the same onto-ontological function as essence which is the crux of poetizing: to extinguish the hiatus by projection and history. That philosophy itself recognizes the necessity for 'Hölderlin's word to create the hearing'²⁰ in Heidegger's secret major work *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, also remains traceable to the influence of that 'last God', the experience of which now no longer recoins poetry, but philosophy, in an ontological determination, in the determination of Being as *Ereignis*. According to 'The origin of the work of art', no further step is necessary to the determination of Being as *Ereignis*, of history as destiny, other than the ontological clarification of the misunderstanding of poetry, which is not permitted to be a cultural performance because in the historicity of Dasein the moment of subjectivity of 'settling' should be extinguished.

In the lecture treating *Ausgewählte 'Probleme' der 'Logik'* (*Selected 'Problems' of 'Logic'*) from the winter semester 1937/8, Heidegger accepts his assertion that art establishes the artwork, especially once again from the perspective of the determination of Being. The determination of art first becomes possible from the 'other beginning' of thinking, thus from the conversion to historicity as the authenticity of Dasein as it had arisen as modification through Hölderlin's poetry.²¹ In the further grounding, Heidegger himself summons a 'most distant God' who 'makes necessary' (cf. *Grundfragen*, 194), who distinguishes art as 'setting of truth into the work'. The converted line of sight of the other beginning contains problems as well as advantages as opposed to fundamental-ontological analysis. The advantage to such a consideration lies without doubt in the conclusiveness at least of the formal characterization. History culminates in the work; in its truth it *is* authentic work. Without wanting to fall back on Nietzsche's eternal recurrence of the same, Heidegger makes use of the same model. The truth's attachment to work stands for the *conclusiveness* of history. The grounds for the conclusiveness of history as the historicity of Dasein lies analogously in the restrictive interpretation of authenticity as 'corresponding' (*Entsprechen*). Heidegger expressly accents the advantage of this restriction. From the poetically-effected, philosophically-characterized basic tone, the turning point of 'destiny' in the interpretive dimension, now the different-initial thinking, again applies. With this sanitizing of the interpretive dimension it appears – for Heidegger in any case – that actuality is also altered, if not automatically then consequently. By analogy to the poetic, thus by analogy to the conception of a perfectibility of action in history

as 'corresponding to',²² the 'work' indicates (i.e., makes necessary through 'art' the 'farthest God' or 'Being as *Ereignis*') definitiveness, or rather finality of history. That is valid structurally, even if Heidegger himself, for example, wants to set his reference to the 'last god' in the *Beiträge zur Philosophie* directly against the thought of the definitiveness and finality of history. Also a god who works only in the past and not in the determinative present becomes 'destiny' because the experience of god became restricted.

An end of history as turning back to the 'other beginning' is constituted through an activity 'of Being' which is correlative to the receptivity of authenticity (cf. *Grundfragen*, 210; cf. also the supplement to §41: 226f.). Being turns into conclusive actions because – as Heidegger says, because the 'essence of Being' – it can be appropriated in the brightness of the 'Clearing' of Dasein, but also its 'self-concealing' and 'self-denial' is possible and must be accepted. In this way, the forgetfulness of Being is dramatized to become the 'abandonment of Being' (*Grundfragen*, 187). The causal actor is not man who, on the basis of error, misses the dimension of knowledge which is possible to him, and thereby performs falsely. Here as well Being inherits the 'geniality' of the 'great individual', it assumes the part of the authentic and actually powerful actor.

The continuity of the analytic of Dasein construed in the lectures appears to shift the occupation with Hölderlin, the determination of the work of art and of Being as *Ereignis* in continuity with *Being and Time*, deceived about the breaking away. Small causes – minimal emphasis and indifference in the interpretation of Hölderlin, in the generalization from this interpretation of poetry to the determination of the work of art, art and Being – breed great effects.

The 'turn' in the determination of historicity and the generalized turn in the concept of the work of art and its consequence could be viewed as continuity of the development of thinking (as Heidegger's 'path of thinking with Hölderlin'), not yielding aggravating consequences, even in view of the meaning and interpretation of those appropriations (*Ereignisse*) of Being which for Heidegger are manifested in extraordinary forms of Dasein, indeed in towering individuals. Heidegger's neglect of the fact that 'Being' from which one expects a change of epoch is not thinkable without fulfillment, is without justification. It can be found neither in the power of the subject, of Dasein, to bring forth this 'it gives', nor is this dimension of openness, from which salvation, the holy, and the divine can then be expected, to be found in the justification of the subject. Everything is released from the justification which is self-evident with the 'poet in an impoverished time', for whom salvation still remains ungraspable. Whether 'it' gives time, and with it an experience of Being, lies not in the power of the fulfilling individual who eventually just guiltily closed his mind to it, but is in the manner of destiny (*Ge-*

schick), or rather fate (*Schicksal*), that thinking like poetizing is at the mercy of *Ereignis*. But wherever the occurrence of the character of the Being of law is lost which is secured through wanting to recognize or through acting, and wherever it is reduced to the character of pure experiential openness, it appears to be based on evil, to demand justification, the '*logon didonai*' as non-philosophy becomes taboo.

On the other hand, however, the historical power of such exemplary experiencers as the poet and in particular the thinker is still sustained. History, made possible through [the historical power of the exemplary experiencers], and for which 'there is' salvation, the holy, the divine, God, and Being, is utilized at least in the second step: in Heidegger's above-named unfortunate equation of the genius in the political and the poetic work, namely, in his identification of poetic interpretation as the original human experience and acting. Here history becomes, if not history without subject, then history without accountable subject. 'Responding', as form of an interpretation which precedes the acting, as theorizing of praxis, preserves the Categorical Imperative in all its substantial-historical consequences.

In the practical dimension, this combination of new beginning by means of new authenticity of historical subjectivity and the preserving of the thought of subjectivity, of the weakening of fulfillment in the theoretical, leads to Heidegger's noteworthy reaction to the events of 1933 and after. The thinker Heidegger can only avoid the statesman, i.e., the authentic practical-political dimension, in that of interpretation. He picks Hölderlin as the forerunner of this turn in his personal destiny. What must be accomplished in 'impoverished times', however, remains structural, identically so for poetizing and thinking. One could formulate the inverse: error in the political is the result of error in the interpretive performance and its assessment. Moreover with Heidegger, after 1933 it leads to a heightening of this structural weakness, although Heidegger explicitly polemicizes violently against this identification with the tendencies of National Socialism (cf. *Grundfragen*, 53ff., 126, 143). The connection which has been exposed appears not to be stringent, at least from Heidegger's vision, although it is suggested by his philosophical activities. Truth happens through the poetic word or essential thinking, and not, if indeed one follows Heidegger, held-for-true, consequential (action-orienting) worldview, but the appropriation (*Ereignis*) of Being. The quasi-pacifistic conception of the historically creative individual has its necessary response (admittedly, only construed philosophically) in the 'deed' ('*Tun*') of Being. As medium of poetry, language becomes an historical vehicle which, through the steering stroke of the oar, ventures – by cautious adaptation of the world of the adapting navigator (the thinker, the poet) – into the element of steering, of bearing, and is remarkable there as 'capable of bearing'.

A circle which is in fact vicious – from Heidegger's determination of acting as interpreting, i.e., as responding (a more passive activity) and its proving true, meant to be granted only by responding – allows history to appear as prestabilized Harmony, to appear as a nonsubjective, substantial process. Moreover, this process itself again bears the attribute of the 'genius', of the artist as the extraordinary (authentic) historical subject. It is the side of responding, itself personified and complementary, which the interpreting rounds into reality. History and Being themselves become the work of genius; they are therefore interpreted most adequately as works of art.

Here Being itself as 'destiny' or fate moves historicity into the encroaching, quasi-cosmic horizon, which appears in the interpreting of the poet and in the examinations of the thinker to grasp history 'in principle' and at the same time as totality. History is not determined through human action, it is not a construct with the help of which a philosophical characterization of all human actions and their quasi-natural consequence, culture, becomes possible. It becomes, as Hans-Georg Gadamer paraphrases, substantiality, the bearing process in which the subjectivity wanting knowledge is an almost neglectably small moment. From this comprehensive view of a withdrawing and granting occurring, acting and interpreting are in fact leveled in the manner that both remain evenly supplemental, not allowed to alter or change the basic facts. Authentic acting occurs from the comportment of '*Gelassenheit*', from the waiting for granting or withdrawing in the 'clearing' of Dasein; likewise authentic interpreting; and likewise authentic thinking – the projecting of interpreting and acting upon the dimension of their origin.

In this way, Heidegger wins an indifference-point in his philosophizing which complies with an old philosopher's ideal, namely, a uniform point of departure for any fulfillment, and for philosophical reflection which admittedly can no longer be called reflection but responding hearing. Either one charges this construction to the Mystics – with the consequence that philosophy is freed for new questions – or one takes it seriously as philosophy. Then critique becomes necessary which, buoyed by Heidegger's flawed intrahistorical performance, once more has to discuss the question concerning the differentiation of the indifference-point.

How, in Hölderlin's interpretation, is the germ of error situated in an unhistorical assumption of thinking which is historically (*des seinsgeschichtlichen Denkens*)? Not only Heidegger's Hölderlin interpretation, but also the conception of art, is simply 'non-modern'. In the polemic against art as cultural treasure (*Kulturgut*),²³ Heidegger also 'overcomes' the achievement of the post-Enlightenment, the conception of a subject which has come to the age of using reason. Only in this way can he outfit art in the sufficient and – certainly not necessary, but – needed way

to be the organon of essential thinking. In terms of content, Heidegger formulates not only the poetry, but also the thinking of another beginning in the 'new Greece'. The 'other beginning' of thinking is the retrieval of what the Greeks jointly thought of as the future (cf. *Grundfragen*, 124), it is 'relative to the *one* and the first' (*Grundfragen*, 195). 'That the Greeks were the beginning thoughtfully, poetically, politically, for this reason it is hardest to demonstrate that the end at which we stand today is none other than the falling away from that beginning, the growing Being-no-longer-grown [*das wachsende Nichtmehrgewachsensein*]' (*Grundfragen*, 115). Not only in Hölderlin's poetry (cf. *Grundfragen*, 135), but simply in historical existence, the fulfillment of the possibilities (cf. *Grundfragen*, 133) of the first beginning becomes comprehensible and alive; 'what initially radiates as *aletheia* in order immediately to be extinguished again' should 'once upon a time become the *fire glowing on the hearth* of our Dasein' (*Grundfragen*, 140). That is to say, it appears as that 'occurring' of truth 'wherein poetry and pictorial art, the deed which grounds a state and the reverence for the gods first receive their essence, in order then to make that essence exist historically and as history in their words and works, actions and ecstasy, storms and failures' (*Grundfragen*, 147f.).

In the new Greece of the other beginning, the previously named prejudices of Hölderlin interpretation, the decisive arguments for the 'fulfillment' of history, are supplied at the outset. The devaluation of 'appearance' and with it the non-truth of fiction not only leads to the benevolent synchronization of poetizing and thinking under the consideration of permitting historical truth; it also requires the identification of the work of art and the work of the state, or rather of history from 'art', or rather from 'Being'. While poetic projection loses the conceptual in the character of settlement in favor of an apparent becoming-nurtured on the basis of a dimension – from an action of authentic existence and its ontological correlates – with higher guarantee of truth. Man, like the poet, can simply hear it wrong, can be lacking, but can no longer be mistaken or responsibly defended (namely, in the acting which was grounded in error).

Finally, Heidegger actualizes in pure culture the conception of Greek ethicality which Hegel restricted to the aesthetic religion of the Greeks in his theory of tragedy. So Antigone, like the Greeks and modern man, also simply follows a call of destiny, which binds one to that (one's) existence, by that (one's) God. The necessary collision of ethical powers – for Hegel, the aporia of the thematizing of man's historical Being through art – and their reconciliation which is attainable only in faith, to be sure cancel each other out for Heidegger in a preestablished harmony between poetizing, authentic existence as the groundwork for it, and the appropriation (*Ereignis*) or withdrawal of Being. In the

dimension of authenticity, there can only be the collective flaw like the collective corresponding, but which does not deserve to be called 'guilt' because it is destiny. Where Greek tragedy according to Hegel needs at least one other particular, introductory, transsubjective act of reconciliation, actions which are conflicting but indifferent in the dimension of grounding, Heidegger renounces the conflict. Only half of the completeness was mentioned: In the *Hyperion* and the *Empedokles*, Hölderlin submits to this conception in the situation of modernity and relativizes it in the hymns in a way which conforms to Hegel's thesis of the character of art as something past.

Historical reality as a whole is thus for Heidegger no longer the dimension of human interaction, but is the dimension of dialogue. In art, on the other hand – if one follows Hegel as well as Hölderlin – dialogue guides the dimension of the grounding of action (the Greek God, like the Germanic and Oriental Gods) in the field where doubt about *which* historical future man is to attain should be treated. Art thematizes (either in an initial, intuitive way as with Hegel, or in a reflective way as in Hölderlin's hymns) the grounds for the conflict, namely, the underlying ethical *pathē*, which seizes it in the image of the respective historical God. It revolutionizes neither acting nor the world because revolution cannot be a return to the Greek beginning (cf. in contrast Heidegger: *Grundfragen*, 41).

Here we can only suggest that Hölderlin himself projected his poetizing from the consciousness of a situation which may be called an 'impoverished time' to no less an extent than that prognosticated by Heidegger. The situation following the French Revolution, and with it post-Kantian philosophy, was marked to be sure by a fright of another sort. It was a matter of the disillusioned and disillusioning insight that the translation of explanation into reality, of philosophy into life, destroys this, that one exterminates men where the rational law degenerates into the political slogan. New conceptions of the reference of philosophy to life lead to new poetry (Hölderlin), to new religion and new philosophy (Hegel). Thus Hölderlin saw, along with Schiller and Kant, that poetry articulates the playful occasion (fiction) which establishes a culture grounded on morality, reason, and freedom. Religion, as its complement, was the serious occasion for the institution of a way of life from the new insight. For Hölderlin, both go hand in hand at first in the preparation of a new political domain. While Hölderlin's *Hyperion* still presents the moments of such a humanizing in the context of the narrated history of an exemplary community, restricting the hymns of this interpretive performance which were consulted by Heidegger, to be sure already in the sense that only language (which is preparatory for human acting), and the truth in it which is experienceable and sayable, are still content as the vehicle for poetry. History itself appears explicitly in these poems as interpretive

elements, or rather in the element of interpretation for purposes of the exemplary ties of intersubjective communication. One can show this well in the poem *Andenken*, which Heidegger moved to center stage. Immediate action no longer follows from remembrance (*Andenken*); instead, action is prepared for through language. In dialogue, the individual attains the dimension of understanding his action in connection with the 'ethicality of a people'. For Hölderlin, this initial and apparently unremarkable transition from the humanization-story narrated as history to the experience of the poet behaving as interpretation of history as a whole, i.e., from acting as the first to interpretive acting (language) as the genuine content, the decisive step: the step from willing-acting (Being-revolutionary) to compelling-advising (Being-poet). The playful event is no longer disguised as a serious event in this poetizing, but remains in the domain of the worldview-proposal. To be sure, the conscious renunciation of action here at the same time contains the separation of the artistic flash of genius from that of the founder of a state. The interpreter does not found the institutions of the new world, he only prepares them, or rather suggests their establishment through his interpretation.

Similarly, Hegel develops philosophy as the reflection of this historical occurrence. Philosophy as a whole is the 'owl of Minerva' which expressly raises the unity of Idea and reality only in its over-exertion as Logic of absolute knowing, which can merely be presupposed in all willing-to-know as 'requirement of reason'. Likewise, this event of reflection (philosophy) then only becomes historical reality itself if the requirement according to reason as *desiderium naturale*, if Kant's 'metaphysics as natural predisposition' must have been transported at the same time into metaphysics as science, in order to assure the not-unrealizability which is its due. Heidegger and Hegel rally against willing in a philosophizing from theological *certitudo*, where the late Heidegger conceives of thinking as elevation of a destiny of Being, also if Heidegger wants to break ranks on purpose with all metaphysics in paradoxical inversion of the power of the concept in the powerlessness of philosophical knowing.

In the symbiosis between poetizing and interpreting in the dialogue between Hölderlin and Hegel, to which Heidegger does not want to admit, beneath a concern for the historical situation of 'modernity', Heidegger's underlying indifference of poetizing and thinking which results from the involuntary retrieval of the concept of genius from the Enlightenment is preserved. Interpreting (poet) in an impoverished – orientation-poor, or rather needy – time is not acting. Poetic interpretation, philosophical reflection, or rather an art which is projected upon its function in history, contain a multitude of orientation suggestions in the form of an *alternative* (to everydayness), but not thereby (without further verification) already *authentic* world-view. The step from alternative, or rather other, to authentic is only fulfillable philosophically.

For Hölderlin it failed to appear; Hegel sought to fulfill it with the conception of a system of absolute knowledge. Having been forced to relativize the theory of full philosophical grounding, and also final philosophical grounding, a conception of ad hoc philosophical grounding still remains operable in the determination of art, which Heidegger had been able to carry out approximately in the sense and style of his Dasein analysis from *Being and Time*. Unfortunately, he himself withdrew from this conception in the Hölderlin interpretation. That made it possible for him to continue using the explicitly rejected, identificatory conception of the genius: authentic interpreting guides the misappropriation of time (*Zeitenwende*) here. To be sure, Heidegger was not only hampered by this in developing a sufficiently differentiated philosophical theory of historical acting, but it also aggravated coming to terms with his problematic conception of authenticity. That is to say, once we have gone with Heidegger on the path from philosophy which is still metaphysico-mathematical (Philosophy of value reflections) to essential thinking, then the disagreeable episode of misdirected acting from interpreting's exaggerated potentiality unavoidably becomes projecting.

Heidegger's history, which was established through art, is thereby indebted to prejudices which in recourse to its own considerations appear to be eliminable. Just as with 'art', likewise with 'Being' as *Ereignis*, Heidegger's overemphasis of thrownness – formulated from the perspective of *Being and Time* – allows of being questioned. The consequence was another concept of history: history became history of action instead of history of *Ereignis*. By way of suggestion, the problem as well as its avoidance may be characterized. History, or rather its moment of unavailability, must not be determined as destiny (i.e., ultimately religious as the sending of something unavailable which is prudently-acting, i.e., 'ingeniously' conceived), as it was for Heidegger. History could have been taken up just as well as the concept for those traces of human, inner-worldly acting (seen globally) which, as traces of acting, have only been diverted (in the forming of culture or technology) or which are no longer graspable at all. For history to lead back to acting indeed appears banal in comparison with the depth of Heideggerian analyses, but is suggested even so. Because the results and consequences of past action also are largely withdrawn from view and from reach, history seen in this way also remains dependent upon interpretation. Any acting: the altering, the intrahistorical, individual decision as well as the renunciation of alteration, leaves behind traces either in 'nature', in institutions, or in the others. These traces bear their origin in themselves, namely, acting, only it is more or less unrecognizable. Interpretation of destiny is granted therein, to lead the quasi natural back to its origin, namely acting. The philosophical assessment (*Deutung*) of history again appears, as it did for Heidegger, as interpretation (*Auslegung*) of acting

in its temporality, which discloses the transitoriness of the actual setting in place as ground for the sedimentation of acting into quasi nature, into substantiality.

In my opinion there is, from Heidegger's *Being and Time* on, a 'path of thinking' to a philosophy of historical culture which Heidegger himself obstructs. His own 'path of thinking with Hölderlin' appears, on the contrary, as an erroneous path from the perspective of the question concerning the practical dimension and meaning of philosophy. This erroneous path rests to be sure not on Hölderlin's error, but on Heidegger's.

Translated by Richard Taft

Notes

1 I have cited the following works of Heidegger: *Hölderlin's Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein'*, in M. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 39 (Frankfurt: 1980) (hereafter cited in the body of the text as *Höld.* 34/5); *Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte 'Probleme' der 'Logik'*, in *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 45 (Frankfurt: 1984) (hereafter: *Grundfragen*); *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlin's Dichtung*, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt: 1963) (hereafter: *EH*); and *Holzwege* (Frankfurt: 1963) (hereafter: *HW*).

The following Heidegger interpretations are cited by name only: J. W. Wahl, *La pensée de Heidegger et la poésie de Hölderlin* (Paris: 1952); B. Allemann, *Hölderlin und Heidegger* (Zurich: 1954; 2nd ed., 1956); O. Pöggeler, 'Heideggers Begegnung mit Hölderlin', *Man and World*, 10 (1977); C. Jamme cites Heidegger's self-interpretation of the reference to Hölderlin, as well as several investigations of the Heidegger-Hölderlin relationship in his 'Dem Dichten Vor Denken', *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 38, no. 2 (1984), especially 193f.

2 In opposition to A. Schwan (*Politische Philosophie im Denken M. Heideggers* (Köln: 1985), O. Pöggeler is the first to follow this interpretation: cf. his *Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger* (Freiburg: 1972). This interpretation was revised in several important areas on the basis of new materials – which depart from Heidegger's self-interpretation – in 'Den Führer führen? Heidegger und kein Ende', *Philosophische Rundschau*, 32 (1985), 26ff.

3 In his contribution, 'Heidegger und das Prinzip der Phänomenologie' (in *Heidegger und das Praktische Philosophie*, ed. O. Pöggeler and A. Gethmann-Siefert (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988), 111), K. Held refers to this consequence from another perspective. He traces the path of Heidegger's thinking as a line of reasoning the zenith of which is to abandon initial, voluntaristic elements in the determination of Being (i.e., all the elements of the fixing or rather the emphasizing of Being are not without execution). This reconstruction also traces the aporia of the superseding of the philosophical argumentation in favor of essential thinking.

4 C. Jamme adds to Pöggeler's thesis that there can be found in Heidegger's critique of technology the 'starting point for a political philosophy' in a sense which the Hölderlin lecture suggests: So 'one would be able to say with

justification that at the core of Heidegger's philosophy of art is a practical, i.e., a *political*, philosophy' ('Dem Dichten Vor-Denken', 210). With this, however, the principal aporia of this conception of the political has been mentioned.

5 Hölderlin's agreement with Hegel deepens in the discussions from their time together in Frankfurt, but has already been quashed by direct reference to Schiller in a fragment from 1797 (written) in Hegel's hand, namely the so-called 'ältesten Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus' ('The earliest system program of German Idealism'). The intention of extending Schiller's conception to history with the use of Kantian philosophy is also obvious from Hölderlin's correspondence with Hegel. Cf. *Briefe von und an Hegel*, vol. 1, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: 1952), especially 20. Hegel's corresponding point of view can be found in a letter to Schelling (*ibid.*, 25f.).

6 In this connection O. Pöggeler points out only: 'Heidegger . . . does not show how in the dialogue with the philosophy of his time, on the level of the *Hyperion*, Hölderlin set theory and praxis against the experience of beauty, how on the level of the *Empedokles* he thinks of beauty as a tragic occurrence, how he then takes this occurrence as a dimension of the divine, but how in the final poem of the great synopsis the hymn breaks apart' ('Heideggers Begegnung mit Hölderlin', 47). J. Wahl again moves Heidegger on Hölderlin closer to Hegel; H. J. Schrimpf ('Hölderlin, Heidegger und Literaturwissenschaft', *Euphorion*, 51 (1957), 308–23) stresses the symptomatic shifting of interests with which Heidegger first interprets the poems from the transitional period of 1800–1, although he justifies his thoughts on the basis of Hölderlin's late work. In the Hölderlin lecture it becomes clear that Heidegger himself thinks he thereby has the late work in view. If we see the Frankfurt dialogue as a crisis in the early efforts of Hölderlin as well as Hegel, then certainly its consequences are only unambiguously comprehensible if we consider the common starting point as well. From here, the differentiation between poetry and politics, which Heidegger overlooks in Hölderlin because he tailors the hymns from the transitional period too closely to the traditional conception of the *Hyperion*, becomes clear.

7 Heidegger refers us to the *Empedokles* in connection with Hölderlin's madness (*EH*, 41, 42), but without further characterizing the tragic conception as break. Indirectly, a justification can be found for starting with the hymns in Heidegger's reference to the conception of *Hyperion* which was taken up in a different form in *Andenken: EH*, 121. The Hölderlin lecture also emphasizes this correlation; cf. below, note 13.

8 O. Pöggeler, 'Heideggers Begegnung mit Hölderlin', 59; *ibid.* for the following quote.

9 The later interpretations transpose the contested categories less conspicuously in the characterization of poetizing than in historical interpretation, although without abandoning it. The references from the Hölderlin lecture are allowed to multiply, cf. e.g., *Höld.* 34/5, pp. 13, 214, 239ff., 257, 293. From time to time there it revolves around poetry as struggle or freeing of the creature (*Wesens*) from gods and men to its determination, around the sphere of influence for this primal language, around the truth of poetry as strife.

10 For a further interpretation of 'Care', cf. *Heidegger und die Praktische Philosophie*, 207f., 213f.

11 As it does for Heidegger in the essay of the same name.

12 Cf. *Höld.* 34/5, pp. 51, 60, 62, and up to 67: Poetry itself is just 'the outstanding event in the event of language . . . the poetic is the basic texture of historical Dasein and that now means: language as such constitutes the original essence of the historical Being of man'.

13 Cf. in addition B. Allemann, 'Hölderlin zwischen Antike und Moderne', in *Hölderlin-Jahrbuch* (1984–5), esp. 41f., 56. Allemann shows that Hölderlin was concerned with 'the viewpoint from which we have to consider antiquity' (as he explains it in a sketch), to characterize the difference between our development and that of antiquity. Heidegger skips over this difference as well as at other points in his early Hölderlin interpretation in the characterization of the contents of *Germanien*; cf. *Höld.* 34/5, p. 15. Indeed he emphasizes the difference between the Greeks and modern man: to the Greeks the 'dispensation of Being in the seam of the work' is closed off; whereas 'we set the portion of the ability to comprehend into the work in such a way that this comprehending binds and determines and is joined to the seam of Being' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 293). To be sure, Heidegger stops with the identity of the results 'as we battle the battle of the Greeks, but on the opposite front, we become not Greeks, but Germans' (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 293). But this means that the identity of poetry and politics applies to modernity as well. For this interpretation, there are further annotations to the *Empedokles* (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 258f.), and the retrieved elimination of the concept of appearance as the mediator between fiction and reality (cf. *Höld.* 34/5, p. 217: 'Poetry, as what has been established, is what is actual').

14 Schiller determines 'modern' ideal poetry in connection with the essay *Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung* ('On naive and sentimental poetry') in a few noteworthy passages. In this regard, cf. A. Gethmann-Siefert, 'Idylle und Utopie', *Schiller-Jahrbuch*, 24 (1980), 32ff. Hölderlin's *Andenken* is also presented in this context as conclusive modification of his 'Ideal of educating a people'; this in 'Die "Poesie als Lehrerin der Menschheit" und das "neue Epos" der modernen Welt. Kontextanalysen zur poetologischen Konzeption in Hölderlins "Andenken"', in *Poetische Autonomie. Zur Wechselwirkung von Dichtung und Philosophie in der Epoche Goethes und Hölderlins*, ed. H. Bachmaier et al. (Stuttgart: 1987), 70ff.

15 For Heidegger, appearance (*Schein*) is explicitly and unequivocally deception, which can only stand in opposition to truth. Cf. *Höld.* 34/5, p. 62; cf. above, note 13.

16 Cf. O. Pöggeler, 'Heideggers Begegnung mit Hölderlin', 14f. Even in his later occupation with Hölderlin (1942), and in the interpretation of *Andenken* or *Heimkunft* (1943), Heidegger simply glosses over important considerations of Hölderlin's – to the detriment of the philosophical interpretation. As one curious fact we could call attention to the following: For Hölderlin the fact that the reference of his own cultural surroundings (*Kulturraum*) to the Orient becomes significant was already noticeable in the hymn *Germanien*, and it could not be overlooked in *Andenken*. Heidegger interprets this philosophico-existentially for itself in terms of the necessity of dialogue with the east Asian beginning. In place of the cultural blending of horizons which Hölderlin's poetry prescribes, the authenticity of individual destiny walks vicariously – that 'compromise between the Western and the east-Asian beginning' documented in Heidegger's conversation with the Japanese. Cf. O. Pöggeler, 'Heideggers Begegnung mit Hölderlin', 60; D. Henrich, *Der Gang des Andenkens. Beobachtungen und Gedanken zu Hölderlins Gedicht* (Stuttgart: 1986), 50f.; A. Gethmann-Siefert, 'Die Poesie als Lehrerin der Menschheit', 89.

17 Cited according to the Reclam edition, Stuttgart, 1967.

18 For the above, *Höld.* 34/5, p. 257. Cf. also the corresponding passage in the 'Work of art' essay: 'Whenever and however this strife breaks out and happens, the opponents, lighting and concealing, move apart because of it. Hence, the open of the place of strife is won' (67) [other editions: *Gesamtausgabe*,

vol. 5, p. 48; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. A. Hofstadter, 61 – trans.]. Nevertheless it is a matter of ‘establishing’ the truth (68; (*Gesamtausgabe*, p. 50; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 62)), concerning which he says, ‘As this strife of earth and world, truth wills to be established in the work’ (70; (*Gesamtausgabe*, p. 50; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 62)). Knowing is ‘standing within the strife which the work has fitted into the rift’ (77; (*Gesamtausgabe*, p. 56; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 68)). The Hölderlin lecture prepares this. Poetry was – but with Hölderlin himself in an insufficient generalization – as an institution, nothing more than the sound of battle of Nature itself, because ‘Being shows as hostility’, so the ontological dimension must also become strife (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 257).

19 Gadamer at least hints at this possibility; cf. the *Nachwort* to the ‘Origin of the work of art’, esp. 108f. [This *Nachwort* by Gadamer appears only in the Reclam edition of ‘Origin’, published as the monograph *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, Reclams Universal-Bibliothek, # 8446 (2) (Stuttgart: 1960) – trans.] The characterization of the poetizing projection speaks for this interpretation: ‘Truly poetic projection is the opening up of that into which Dasein, as historical, has already been thrown. This is the earth and, for an historical people, its earth, the self-closing ground on which it rests together with everything that it already is, though still concealed from itself. It is, however, its world, which prevails in virtue of the relation of Dasein to the unconcealedness of Being. Hence everything with which man is endowed must, in the projection, be drawn up from the closed ground and expressly set upon this ground’ (86f.; (*Gesamtausgabe*, p. 63; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 75f.)).

20 Cf. O. Pöggeler, ‘Heideggers Begegnung mit Hölderlin’, 14.

21 Heidegger retrieves, for example, the care distinction (cf. among others, *Höld.* 34/5, p. 141f.); he retrieves in particular Hölderlin’s characterization of the Hesperidian spirit through the ‘Juno-esque emptiness’ in the unfolding ‘basic mood’ as ‘pure emptiness of thinking’, ‘restrainedness’ (*Grundfragen*, 2) as not-from-another-knowing (154f.), and finally as ‘astonishment’ (165ff.). From conversion to discoursing, Heidegger at least suggests then the other beginning is the ‘transformation of the line of vision, the standard and the claim’ (*Grundfragen*, 190).

22 Along the same lines, in the *Grundfragen* Heidegger also juxtaposes poetizing and thinking as hearing, interrogating the original origin (*Höld.* 34/5, pp. 197, 200f.) and the closer discussion as ‘holding one’s ground’ (*Höld.* 34/5, p. 201), the enduring of the first beginning. Cf. pp. 136, 138, 142, 148, 175ff.

23 Cf. also the sharp rejection of the concept of culture in general, *Grundfragen*, 182.

‘The flower of the mouth’: Hölderlin’s hint for Heidegger’s thinking of the essence of language

Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann

I On the metaphysical determination of the sound character of language

In his lecture trilogy ‘The essence of language’¹ Heidegger seeks a thinking experience of the essence of language, directed by the words ‘The essence of language: The language of essence’ (*US*, 176). Taken as a directive, these words function as a guide for the path of thinking – a path which, as such, proceeds in the neighborhood, or nearness, of thinking and poetizing. Their nearness to each other relies on the excellent relation that each has to language and its essence. But, at the same time, this nearness is determined by a ‘delicate, but clear difference’ (*US*, 196), which excludes their blending, or the assimilation of one by the other. The word-directive ‘The essence of language: The language of essence’ contains a directive for thinking. These words are to direct thinking as it experiences and thinks the essence of language.

Taken as a directive, these words have the character of a hinting. ‘A hint hints away from the one toward the other’ (*US*, 202). The hinting which occurs in this word-directive is, therefore, a hinting away from and a hinting towards. This hinting hints thinking *away from* the first phrase, before the colon, hinting *towards* the second phrase, after the colon. Thus, in its hinting away, this hinting initially refers thinking to that from which it hints away. The phrase ‘the essence of language’ articulates the traditional determination of the essence of language – and this determination must first be considered, with regard to its insufficiency. However, such a critical approach is possible only on the basis of a prior understanding of a more originary and root experience of language. This prior understanding is articulated in the second phrase of the word-directive, ‘the language of essence’. But the second phrase of the word-directive hints towards the possibility of an original experience of the essence of language only haltingly. To get thinking involved in

this possibility, thinking must first engage in a critical reflection on the basic traditional representation of language which is expressed in the first phrase. According to the traditional representation we view language as the vocal utterance of inner ideas and thoughts. We grasp the vocal utterance as a phenomenon of the human body which, together with the body as a whole, belongs to the realm of sensibility. What gets expressed in vocal utterances (the *content* of language, its sense and meaning) we take as the spiritual part of language. We then imagine the spoken and written language to be the unity of sensible sound and spiritual meaning.

This basic representation of language harks back to the old and traditional representation of man as *animal rationale*, as the living being who is endowed with reason. As a living being, man belongs to the realm of the sensible, which he shares with all other, nonhuman living beings. As *ratio* man is a thinking, reasoning being and belongs to the realm of the spiritual. Through *ratio* man raises himself above the realm of a merely existing being, differentiating himself from nonhuman living beings. The basic representation of language as the unity of what is vocal, bodily, and sensible with what has a spiritual content or meaning and is expressed therein – this basic representation stems from representing the essence of man as a living being who is endowed with reason.

This essential conception of man seems to be well-founded and untouchable as long as a more original experience of man is not manifest. But this more original experience occurs only when thinking realizes that the traditional determination of the essence of man as *animal rationale* is formed within the horizon of an understanding of being that is developed by looking at an extant being, by *not* viewing man as man. The traditional, metaphysical determination of the essence of man shows itself to be guided by a conception of being which covers over and conceals the most proper way in which man is man. If the traditional, metaphysical representation of language corresponds to the metaphysical determination of the essence of man, this representation of language, too, is formed by that understanding of being which is developed outside the view of man as man.

To what extent is the essential determination of man as *animal rationale* guided by an understanding of being which does not have its origin in man as man? The essential determination '*animal rationale*' is a logical and ontological definition based on *genus proximum* and *differentia specifica*. The *animal* is the genus 'living being', within which various kinds can be distinguished: plants, beasts, and humans. What they have in common is being a living being: that by which they differ from one another is their own particular way of being. What constitutes the specific difference of man as a human living being is *ratio*. Genus and kind are thought as essence in the sense of whatness, or *essentia*. When we think in terms of genus and kind, we are thinking of an aspect which we name by means

of distinguishing characteristics. We distinguish the essence as whatness from that-ness, or being-real. Being as what-ness and being as that-ness articulate the metaphysical concept of being. Metaphysics and ontology extend this ontological pair of concepts to all beings. Accordingly, all beings – stone, plant, beast, and man – are determinable with regard to their differentiated inherent what-ness and their unified way of being-real – in contrast to non-being or merely possible-being. According to the metaphysical determination of the essence of man as *animal rationale*, man belongs to the genus of living beings, differentiating himself from other beings only through his specific way of being. But, considering how man is a real being, he shares the real character of his being with all other beings. Within the horizon of being that is differentiated metaphysically according to what-ness and that-ness, man is a being among other beings.

But this determination of the essence of man covers over man's ownmost being (his ownmost how-ness) as an existence that understands being. This way of being is man's 'ownmost' because it is proper only to man. But this way of being cannot be grasped within the distinction between what-ness and that-ness (*essentia* and *existentia*). On the contrary, the ontological separation of what-ness and being-real is possible only for a being who in its ownmost being understands being. The ontological pair of concepts, *essentia* and *existentia*, unfolds in terms of beings that are on hand and lie before us as handy and as such can be defined in terms of their inherent what-ness. But in order for beings as beings to lie before us and to be determined in terms of their what-ness and being-real, being as such must have disclosed itself in the enactment of ek-sistence of thrown projection. That being which in its being understands being through thrown projection of being cannot be grasped according to those concepts of being which are themselves only possible on the basis of an ek-sistential understanding of being and which are developed according to an ek-sistential understanding of being in view of beings that do *not* understand being. If the distinction between *essentia* and *existentia* is a distinction that applies ontologically to things (because it is based on things that are at hand), then the determination of man's essence as *animal rationale* is also a determination which applies ontologically to things and not to Dasein. The notion of *animal rationale* fails to grasp man as a being that existentially understands being – fails to grasp man as Dasein. But if the basic metaphysical representation of language has its origin in the metaphysical determination of man as *animal rationale*, then this basic representation of language is also formed by a thinking which, ontologically, is concerned only with things.

But if we get a critical distance from the metaphysical determination of language, which takes its departure from the vocal utterance, then we must call into question the notion that the sound aspect of language is sensible and bodily. This representation of language takes the sounding

aspect of language to belong to the sensible and to what is animalistic in the rational animal. Because, as *animal rationale*, man shares his corporeality as well as his being a living being with all nonhuman living beings, he must also share with them the vocal or sounding aspect of language. Thus, along with corporeality and animality, the sounding aspect of language is also interpreted from within the ontological horizon of being as inherent what-ness and as being-real.

What is decisive about the insight into man's ownmost way of being as existence is that existence that understands being does not simply replace *ratio*, as if existence were just another *differentia specifica*. If we view existence in this way, we remain within the metaphysical perspective of *essentia* and *existentia*. If it is only within the metaphysical-ontological horizons of what-ness and that-ness that an essential definition is possible – by indicating the nearest species and the specific difference which constitutes a class within the species – then that means: Man's ownmost essence is not at all comprehensible according to a definition which indicates the character of species and class. If existence which understands being is not developed according to the character of a class derived from the notion of species shared by other beings, then that means: Existence that understands being determines man as a being as a whole, including his corporeality and whatever pertains to it. Man as *Dasein* – existence that understands being – does not share his corporeality with nonhuman living beings. In the *Letter on Humanism* Heidegger writes: 'Thus even what we attribute to man as *animalitas*, on the basis of comparison with the "beast", is itself grounded in the essence of ek-sistence. The human body is something essentially other than an animal organism.'² This does not exclude our investigating our body like an animal organism. But such is possible only because the body and its corporeality already belong to us in a manner that is determined by ek-sistence, which is open to being and the world. The critical distance from the metaphysical determination of the sound character of language prevails over the covering over of the ways of vocal utterance and *Dasein*'s whole corporeality that are determined by ek-sistence.

Therefore Heidegger has us consider whether 'the element of language that pertains to the human body, as well as the sound and written character of language, is adequately experienced' in the basic metaphysical representation of language (*US*, 204). Is it sufficient to relegate 'the sound character of language to the body understood physiologically' and to classify that body within 'the metaphysically intended sphere of sensibility' (*US*, 204–5)? We cannot and should not deny that linguistic utterances can be 'physiologically explained as the generating of audible sounds' (*US*, 205). But the real question here is whether the physiological perspective on vocal utterance, on the sound character of language, and on the body as such constitutes the sole means of access to language –

or whether this perspective is only *one* possible access, preceded by another access, in which Dasein's corporeality and the corporeality of language are determined differently, prior to the representation in terms of physiology. This other manner of access to language is indicated and sketched out in man's ownmost way of being in terms of ek-sistence, which understands being and is open to the world. Only when this initial manner of determining the sound character of language is closed off can the linguistic utterance be taken as the sensible expression of inner thoughts and be scientifically-physiologically thematized. The physiological way of explaining the linguistic utterance does not experience 'what in each case genuinely belongs to the sounds and tones in speech' (US, 205); the physiological approach conceals this characteristic. Looking ahead towards the thinking experience of the essence of language, announced in the second phrase of the word-directive ('the language of essence'), we must now think and experience what properly pertains to sounds and tones in speech – that is, we must hold within our phenomenological gaze what is thus experienced. What genuinely belongs to the sounds of language differs from the sounds produced by animals, which, along with the animal organism, are not determined by the way of being of ek-sistence open to the world.

One would think that one sees what properly belongs to language by focusing on rhythm and melody, which are distinctive of song, and how they also belong to language – so that language is related to song. But this way of looking at it still does not disclose what genuinely belongs to the sound and tone of language, because this way of looking also represents what resounds in melody and rhythm 'from within the perspective of physiology and physics' (US, 205). The physiological and physical representation of what is soundable in language, song, and music leads to correct results, whose correctness cannot be disputed. But 'correct' here means just the determination which is aligned to what has already been explicated or made explicit. And that way of bringing sound into the explicit realm covers over the original manner of determining sound, namely, from out of ek-sistence, which is open to the world. What genuinely belongs to sound can no longer be experienced within the sensible, physiological, and physical perspectives. Sounding, ringing, oscillating, vibrating, and pulsing belong properly to language, just as the spoken word and the conjunction of words have a 'meaning'. But everything depends on whether sound and 'meaning' are viewed and determined in accordance with their essential character. *This* way of determining sound and 'meaning' is constantly threatened by the danger of succumbing to the traditional metaphysical way of representation, which, for its part, has enabled the physiological and physical as well as the scientific-technological manner of explanation. Such a metaphysical way of representation and such a technological manner of explanation

prevent a 'proper reflection' (*US*, 205) on language, on what resounds in speaking and on the meaning 'sounded'. If we pursue a 'proper reflection' instead of a metaphysical-technological explanation, then in this 'reflection' we will be dealing with a thinking that tries to experience and determine language and sounds from within the horizon of ek-sistence which understands the world. If this reflection is to be 'proper', then it should be guided by the phenomenological maxim 'to the things themselves.' The sound character of language should show itself within the horizon of ek-sistence which understands the world. Thinking should take place as a letting be seen, showing what shows itself, in and from itself, as what properly belongs to language's sound and tone.

II Hölderlin's poetic experience with language as a hint for the proper reflection on what genuinely belongs to the sound of language

Heidegger begins the proper reflection on what genuinely belongs to sound by referring to the dialects of a language. These dialects present 'various ways of speaking according to regions' (*US*, 205). We also call these dialects *Mundarten*, 'ways of the mouth', 'kinds of tongue'. Now: How do we differentiate the sounds in the dialects? Usually we answer this question using phonetics and the theories of phonology and voice formation. But phonetics stays within physiological and physical representation and explanation. For phonetics explains the differences in dialects in terms of 'the different ways in which the tools of language move' (*US*, 205). This phonetic-physiological-physical way of explanation is characterized, for its part, by the metaphysical representation of language – and phonetics does not know its metaphysical presuppositions.

In contrast to the phonetic-physiological-physical manner of representation, which is correct within its own realm, Heidegger now suggests, in accordance with the required proper reflection, that in the different dialects and their sounds 'each landscape or region – earth itself – speaks differently' (*US*, 205). Here the fundamental word *earth* is introduced for the first time. This word opens the dimension wherein the sound character of language genuinely belongs. What Heidegger calls 'earth' will soon be shown to be one of the four regions of world, which as world opens itself up in the clearing-concealing freeing and proffering of world (*US*, 200). The world that is opened shows itself in ek-sistence which understands world. But if earth is a region of world and if what genuinely belongs to the sound of language is experienceable and thinkable from out of its relation to earth, then we begin to surmise what it means to determine properly the sound character of language within the horizon of ek-sistence which understands world.

As each dialect sounds differently, so does the region or earth speak

differently in each case. But how does earth 'speak'? What can 'speaking' mean here? Seen from the point of view of phonetics, mouth or tongue is an organ which belongs to the body represented as an organism. As long as we posit the human body as an organism, it is identical with animal organism and as such belongs to the realm that we represent as the animal realm. However, when it is viewed from within the proper reflection as it occurs in the horizon of ek-sistence which understands world, when it is viewed from within the thrown projecting that stands in the clearing of the self-projecting world, then 'body and mouth' are part of 'the flowing and growth of earth' (*US*, 205). The flowing and growth of earth names that which in our understanding of world is disclosed and understood as earth. The intelligibodily sound belongs to the way in which earth gets disclosed. We 'flourish' as 'mortals' (*US*, 205) in that understanding of flowing and growth of earth which belongs to our understanding of world. With this fundamental word for man experienced as *Dasein*, Heidegger in his later philosophy takes up what in *Being and Time* was called the existential ontological character of 'being-towards-death'. The understanding of being and of world proper to ek-sistence is thought here as essential openness to death. That is why Heidegger names 'mortals' as another of the four regions of world.

The earliest indication by Heidegger that the sound character of language pertains to earth as a region of world occurs in terms of Hölderlin. For the thinking experience of world as the unity of the four regions of world, which Heidegger calls the fourfold, and the experience of the relationship of the sound character of language to the world-region of earth take their guiding hint from the encounter with Hölderlin's poetry. Thus Heidegger introduces some of Hölderlin's verses in which language is characterized poetically as 'the flower of the mouth' – but mouth, and along with it the body and bodily utterance, as connected to earth. Now, since the task is to think the sound character of language from out of the essence of language as saying, thinking receives its direction from Hölderlin's poetry, by remembering its own nearness to poetizing. Now the situation is different from that in the first two lectures of the trilogy, where Heidegger was dealing with the poetry of Stefan George. For George's poetical experience with the word does not extend to the relationship of the sound character of language with the earth as world-region. George's experience does not extend into the essential origin of the word, which in his experience is what alone offers being to things. By contrast, Hölderlin's poetic experience with the essence of language is more original, because it reaches deeper into the essence of language.

Altogether Heidegger draws upon excerpts from four of Hölderlin's poems. The first excerpt comes from the fifth stanza of the later hymn 'Germanien'. The eagle of Zeus says to the 'quietest daughter of God':

And secretly, while you dreamed, at noon,
 Departing I left for you a symbol of friendship,
 The flower of the mouth, and you spoke in solitude.
 Yet an abundance of golden words you also sent,
 O fortunate one! with the streams, and they flow
 Inexhaustibly into all regions.³

Here language is poetically experienced as 'the flower of the mouth'. Insofar as the 'golden words . . . flow . . . with the streams' of the earth, a relation of word and earth is poetically named.

The second text, taken from the first stanza of the elegy 'Walk in the country', unfolds the poetic image of 'the flower of the mouth':

Therefore I even hope it may come to pass,
 When we begin what we wish for and our tongue loosens,
 And the word has been found and the heart opened,
 And from ecstatic brow springs a higher reflection,
 That the sky's blooms may blossom even as do our own,
 And the luminous sky open to opened eyes.⁴

Here too the poetic word is addressed. According to its meaning the line 'That the sky's blooms may blossom even as do our own' is to be thought thus: We hope that with our blossoming heaven's blossoming would also begin. With our blossoming, that is to say, with the blossoming of the flower of the mouth, the blossoming of language begins. Hölderlin experiences and poetizes the essence of poetic language as the blooming of the flower of the mouth. With its blooming the earth blossoms towards the blossoming of the heavens. In the blooming of the flower of the mouth, i.e., in the poetic saying of the poetic word, the earth and heavens blossom. When we transpose the poetic experience of Hölderlin from the level of his poetic path into the path of thinking, then we can say: In saying what is uttered as sounding word, earth opens itself up as earth, heaven as heaven. But this happens in such a way that earth blossoms and emerges as earth under sky, and sky blossoms and emerges as sky above the earth. The earth is only the earth of the heavens, just as the heavens are only the heaven of the earth.

Before Heidegger introduces two more excerpts from Hölderlin's poems, he says, with regard to the excerpts already quoted, that in them the essence of language as 'saying', as 'way-making for everything' (*US*, 206) announces itself. What 'makes way for everything' is the clearing-concealing offering of world for ek-sistence which is open to and understands world. What is named the clearing-concealing offering of world is an initial characterization of what is meant in the second phrase of the word-directive: the 'language of essence'. The essence of language

as the essential origin of Stefan George's poetic experience of the being-bestowing word – this essence is the world which lights up, conceals, and offers to ek-sistence which understands world. Now, when Heidegger says that the essence of language announces itself in Hölderlin's poetic experience with language as the flower of the mouth, in whose blooming earth and sky blossom toward each other, and when we realize that way-making for all *is* clearing-concealing offering of world, then Hölderlin's experience sheds light on the manner in which world as world is to be experienced in the offering of world. Accordingly, earth and sky belong to world as regions of the world. In Hölderlin's experience with language, *that* essence of language announces itself which, in light of the second phrase of the word-directive, should be experienced and determined as the language of essence. Hölderlin's experience with language reaches deeper into its essence than George's experience, for whom the poetic word for the essential origin of the being-bestowing word remained hidden.

Nevertheless Heidegger speaks about Hölderlin only in the context of an 'announcement', which means that in Hölderlin's experience with language its essence does not readily show itself. What is needed is to bring to light, through thinking experience, the essence of language, which announces itself in Hölderlin's poetic experience. This must be done in such a manner that this essence of language shows itself in its structural tonality from out of itself by itself. What announces itself in Hölderlin's experience is brought over into thinking, so that the essence of language, which shines *poetically*, shows itself to a thoughtful seeing as something experienced in *thinking*.

The third excerpt from Hölderlin is taken from the fifth stanza of the elegy 'Bread and wine':

Such is man; when the wealth is there, and no less than a god
tends him with gifts, though he remains blind and unaware.
First he must suffer; but now he names his most treasured
possession,
Now, now words for it must emerge like flowers.⁵

The fourth excerpt from Hölderlin is another version of these same lines from 'Bread and wine':

Long and hard is the word of this coming, but
White (light) is the moment. But those who serve the gods
Know the earth well, and their step toward the abyss is
In its youth more human, but still what is in the depths
is old.⁶

Taking both of these excerpts into account, Heidegger states that 'once again', as in both previous excerpts, the word appears in and as the region which allows earth and sky to 'encounter each other' (*US*, 207). He suggests that Hölderlin experiences the word as the region which determines earth and sky to be 'world regions' (*US*, 207). Here, in this lecture trilogy, the word *world-region* surfaces for the first time. But both excerpts name much more. The third excerpt names man, god, and 'words like flowers'. The fourth excerpt names word, 'servant of the gods', and earth. Keeping in mind that later in the text of the third lecture Heidegger thinks the world as a whole and as the unity of the four world regions – and thinks these four as earth and sky, god and mortals – then we may say that in those excerpts, in addition to the world regions of earth and sky, the world regions of 'god' (or: 'the heavenly ones') as well as 'mortals' are also poetically named.

Heidegger emphatically points out that Hölderlin experiences language in the heightened manner of poetic language as 'flower of the mouth', as 'words, like flowers'. Heidegger sums up: Within Hölderlin's experience of the essence of poetic language lies 'the awakening of the deepest view' (*US*, 207). The poet sees language as an essential occurrence. This is the deepest possible view, reaching deeper into the essence of language than Stefan George. It is also deepest in a further sense, namely, insofar as it reaches into the deepest expanse of the opening of the world as it and its regions open up for man in language. Hölderlin's experience with language amounts to an awakening of the deepest way of language, an awakening from a slumber, from the closing-up in which Hölderlin's experience of the essence of language was hidden – the essence of language as that which lets world regions appear.

Hölderlin's experience with the essence of poetic language is the awakening of the deepest view because in this essential experience 'the word is harbored back into its essential source' (*US*, 207). It is here that the word first of all becomes poetic word, in that in its saying and naming it lets what it names come into the manifestness of its being. The word which names and renders manifest, the sounding word whose naming renders things manifest, is experienced out of its essential source, i.e., out of the emergence of world regions. But why does Heidegger say that in Hölderlin's experience the word is 'harbored back'? 'Harboring' here means 'saving' and 'sheltering preserving'. As long as the word is represented as the vocal expression of a meaning content – that is, as long as the word receives its determination from basic metaphysical representations – the word remains unharbored and estranged from its essential source. On the other hand, if we experience its essential source, then it is saved in its essence, or: it is harbored. Insofar as it receives its harboring from its essential source, from which the word was removed

in metaphysical determining, its harboring is a harboring back, i.e., back to the place from where the word has its essence.

Insofar as in Hölderlin's experience the poetic word is harbored back into its essential origin, it is 'brought forth . . . from its origin' (US, 207). Harboring the poetic word back into its essential source is also a 'bringing forth of the word from its origin'. The essential source, the emergence of world and its regions, is the origin where the poetic word begins. This can only be a naming which renders things manifest insofar as its naming begins with the emergence of world. The poetry of Hölderlin is 'the bringing forth' of the word out of its origin, in a twofold sense. When Hölderlin experiences the essence of language and poetizes this experience in the phrase 'words, like flowers', then his poetizing of his experience of this essential word is bringing forth the poetic word out of its origin. That is the first meaning. The second meaning is this: When Hölderlin explicitly experiences and poetizes the essential source and origin of the poetic word, then what comes to pass is not only his poetizing of the poetically experienced essence of language; but – deeper and more essential than that – what takes place in his poetizing as a whole is the poetic bringing forth of the poetic word (poetry as a work of art in language) out of its poetically experienced origin. Simply put, Hölderlin understands his poetic creation as creative emergence of the poetic word out of its origin.

When Hölderlin, in his experience with language, brings forth the poetic word out of its origin, such a bringing forth is only possible as the 'ability to listen' to the essence of language that addresses him in the experience and befalls him (US, 207).

Thus Heidegger characterizes Hölderlin's experience with language in four ways: (a) as an awakening of the deepest view, (b) as a harboring return of the word to its essential source, (c) as a bringing forth of the word out of its origin, and (d) as the ability to listen to the essential source and origin of language.

III The earthbound emergence of the sounding of language from out of saying as resounding, as letting appear of world

The intimate relationship between sounding words and the world regions of earth, which Hölderlin experiences poetically, must now be explicitly brought over into thinking, into that thinking which – with a view to the second phrase of our word-directive, namely, 'the language of essence' – would experience and determine this no-longer-metaphysical essence of language. That is the task of the step in thinking that we now take. The turn towards Hölderlin's poetic experience with language should give thinking a hint and a direction. Thinking receives such a direction

from the poetic word for language as experienced in its essence. This word is: 'flower of the mouth', 'blossom', and 'words, like flowers'. When Hölderlin the poet experiences and names the essence of word and language as the 'flower of the mouth' and as 'blossom' and when – in a hermeneutical dialogue with poetry – thinking turns towards poetic experience thus brought to word, then thinking 'hears the sounding of language rising in an earthbound manner' (US, 208). As hearing, thinking understands what announces itself through poetic words as the essence of language. Here Heidegger speaks about 'rising' in view of 'blossom', whose blossoming and blooming is an emergence out of concealment. The sounding of language rises in an 'earthbound' manner, i.e., it rises as everything that belongs to earth rises. When the sounding of language rises in an earthbound manner, we must ask 'from where' it emerges. The answer is: 'From saying, in which world is allowed to appear' (US, 208). The sounding of language rises in an earthbound manner 'out of saying'. This means: This sounding arises out of saying, out of the unfolding of language in its non-metaphysical essence, out of the way-making that makes way for everything – all of which is indicated in the second phrase of our word-directive. Because the way-making for all as clearing-concealing releasing is what allows the world to appear, we can say that the sounding of language arises in an earthbound manner out of what 'allows world to appear', out of the region of earth which belongs to world. This insight into the emergence of the sounding of word out of the emergence of regions of world as the origin and essential source of word belongs to Hölderlin's experience with language. However, what Hölderlin experiences poetically thinking can experience in *its* own way and bring into the word of thinking, as distinguishable from poetic word. To experience in *thinking* and to determine what has been *poetically* experienced means that thinking can experience *in its own way*, as a phenomenological matter, what the poet experiences in *his* way. The matter which shows itself now as the earthbound rising of the sounding of language out of saying, that allows world to appear, is not something merely poetic – because it is initially experienced by the poet – that thinking can merely re-think. Rather, even though this matter is initially experienced by poetizing, it can be phenomenologically exhibited by thinking in its own way.

After Heidegger experiences the sounding of language phenomenologically, from the earthbound manner of emerging/rising of sounding out of saying as that which allows world to appear, he now shows phenomenologically the 'letting appear of world'. The essential source of the sounding word 'letting appear of world' is characterized as a 'resounding' which 'gathers' the world regions 'by naming' (US, 208). When thought in an initiatory and original manner out of the origin, letting appear of world – that is, lighting, concealing, releasing of world – is an offering

for ek-sistence which understands world. But in the meantime we have seen that the world, which lights up and conceals itself, is the totality of the four world regions. Worldbound relations, which constitute with their web a totality of meaningful relations, manifest as relations within the regions of the world and among these regions as they relate to one another. The releasing which lights up and conceals and allows world to appear is a naming and gathering, insofar as the world regions are gathered in the rising which lights them up in the totality of their being related to one another. This gathering which takes place in the letting appear of world has the fundamental feature of a naming, insofar as the world regions call one another as they emerge and thus allow the sway of their interconnectedness. What lights up as world, as the worldbound totality of relations of the world regions, shows its own active sway. This active sway makes up the relations which light up among the world regions. This sway of the gathering of the world regions as they call one another Heidegger calls 'resounding'. Why does Heidegger choose the word *resounding* (*das Läuten*) for the sway of what allows world to appear as the essential source of the naming word? His choice of words is in part with a view to the activeness that is proper to the gathering which names the regions of the world, but also with reference to the sounding (*das Läuten*) of language. 'The sounding rings out of the resounding' (*US*, 208). The naming which gathers the world regions does not itself sound. However, in its not sounding it is not deprived of its own activeness, which is resounding and as such enables the sounding word which names and makes beings manifest.

In what relation of possibility does the resounding – the gathering which calls world regions – stand to the naming which makes beings manifest? Heidegger responds to this question by saying that resounding, as the calling gathering of the world regions, allows this gathering to appear 'in things' within the open which makes up the world's clearing. This is an essential statement about the relation of world and thing. The lighting, concealing, releasing and extending of world, which allows world to appear, the calling gathering of the interrelated world regions – this occurrence of the clearing of world is essentially a relation to beings as things. World's clearing occurs in relation to things, which are things only because of this relation. As innerworldly things, things are world-gathering. Their inner-worldliness is the manner by which, in their manifestness, they gather world. The respective what-ness and how-ness of things get determined by the manner in which they gather the meaningful relations of the world regions as these light up. They harbor the world's clearing in that they gather world. This harboring belongs essentially to the occurrence of the clearing-concealing emergence of world. The clearing of world occurs originally only when the world which is lit up is also harbored originally in beings and their manifestness. Harboring the truth

of being and the clearing of world are part of the essence of truth when the latter is experienced according to the history of being. Thus this harboring is one of the essential insights into the way in which the question of being gets worked out in the history of being. This issue is treated for the first time and in a fundamental and comprehensive way in *Beiträge zur Philosophie*. What Heidegger thinks in the lecture trilogy as the theme of letting world appear in things and what he thinks in the lecture entitled 'The thing'⁷ as thing's gathering of world is given its groundwork in the part of *Beiträge zur Philosophie* which is entitled 'Die Gründung'.⁸

If sounding of the naming word, which names things, rings out of the resounding as gathering which calls the world regions and if the world which is lit up appears in the world-gathering-things, then letting the world appear in things takes place in the naming of the word. What sounds and transpires in the naming of the word is the manifestness which gathers world, made possible by the clearing of world. These exist only within the space of language, in the context of a naming which has the character of word and in the context of the essential source of this naming which makes things manifest out of a resounding, which is the clearing of world.

If the sounding of language is experienced from the earthbound emergence and if this emergence is experienced in terms of a sounding as the calling gathering to which earth belongs, then the sound character of language is no longer subordinated to the bodily organs alone, as in the metaphysical determination of language. The phenomenological reflection that we have just carried out released the sound character of the voice and of language from the perspective of the physiological-physical explanation, which for its part is metaphysically determined. A proper, phenomenological reflection, when guided by the second phrase of our word-directive, must 'hold the sound of language and its earthiness [. . .] within the attuning, which tunes the regions of the world's jointure, playing them off one another and tuning them to one another' (*US*, 208). Here we are talking about an 'attuning' which tunes the world regions to one another. The world regions do not exist for themselves, but are related to one another – and in such a way that each is tuned to the other. We must rethink what Heidegger says here about tuning and attuning in terms of what he discussed in *Being and Time* (Section 29), in the context of his existential-ontological analysis of Dasein, about the existential-ontological essence of attunement of Dasein in its being-in-the-world. Attunement (*Befindlichkeit*) is the existential-ontological term for the existentiell phenomenon of the attuning and being-attuned of Dasein. In opposition to the metaphysical and psychological explication of being-attuned as an affective, psychic condition, Heidegger shows that attunements are ways in which Dasein is disclosed in the existential,

horizontal disclosedness of its total being-in-the-world. The essence of attunements pertain to the fundamental phenomenon of disclosedness. Attunements are not something merely subjective, which colors external things. Rather attunements factically disclose Dasein in the disclosedness of its complete being-in-the-world. This is never neutral, but is essentially attuned this way or that way and is disclosed according to attunements. Since complete disclosedness of being-in-the-world includes the ecstatic-horizontal disclosedness of world as significance, world and worldly signification are disclosed according to attunement. The world-relations which form the totality of referential signification are in each case unconcealed according to attunement. To be attuned is not something merely subjective and internal. Rather, because world is disclosed for Dasein in the manner of an attunement, moods and attunement of Dasein have world character.

If we want to understand what Heidegger is aiming at when he says that attunement tunes the regions of world to one another, we must bear in mind these ontologically interrelated issues of world, disclosure, and attunement of Dasein, which Heidegger demonstrates through a phenomenological analysis. Just as in *Being and Time* disclosedness of world is disclosed essentially by attunement, so the clearing of the world which is experienced in terms of the history of being – and letting appear of world – is also a matter of attuning. What calls the gathering of world regions is a tuning clearing, which tunes the unconcealed regions of the world to one another in their interrelatedness.

So far Heidegger has addressed the world regions. But now he speaks of the 'regions of the jointure of the world' (*US*, 208). World as wholeness of regions of the world builds a jointure. The joined character of this jointure ensues from the manner in which world regions in the clearing of world call and gather into one another, play off one another, and are tuned to one another. A proper reflection on language has to hold its sounding character – in its belonging to the earth as one of the four world regions – into a core harmony of earth and the other world regions. By contrast, in the metaphysical determination of language and in its physiological-physical phonetic explanation the sounding of language is estranged from its essential source.

Translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly

Notes

1 Martin Heidegger, 'The essence of language', in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1979), 159–216. Hereafter referred to in the text as '*US*'.

2 Martin Heidegger, *Brief über den Humanismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio

Klostermann Verlag, 1981), 15; *Basic Writings*, trans. F. Capuzzi (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 204.

3 Friedrich Hölderlin, *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. N. v. Hellingrath (Munich and Leipzig, 1916), IV, 183; in *Freidrich Hölderlin: Poems and Fragments*, trans. M. Hamburger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 405.

4 *ibid.*, 112.

5 *ibid.*, 122.

6 *ibid.*, 322f.

7 Martin Heidegger, 'Das Ding', in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1954), 163–81; in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. A. Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 163–86.

8 Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, Band 65 of the *Gesamtausgabe*, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1989).

Heidegger on metaphor and metaphysics

Joseph J. Kockelmans

I

Over the past 60 years a great number of important treatises on metaphor have appeared, mainly in the Anglo-American world and in France. Ricoeur has given us a truly excellent, critical discussion of the most important insights proposed in these treatises; this discussion places the new ideas that have been developed in this century, in the perspective of our entire Western tradition that reaches back as far as Plato and Aristotle.¹ In this discussion it is made clear that whereas at the beginning the concern with metaphor was concentrated mainly within the domain of rhetoric, in modern times the center of gravity of this concern has shifted from rhetoric to semantics, and still later from semantics to hermeneutics and literary criticism. Finally, this discussion shows that in addition to the 'scientific' interests in the phenomenon of metaphor, there also are a number of typically 'philosophical' treatises in which their authors have tried to explain the precise position and function of metaphor in philosophical discourse as such. These latter treatises were influenced in part by the study of the history of philosophy, but particularly by the ideas in this regard proposed by Hegel and Nietzsche.²

Greisch has suggested to divide the *philosophical* literature on metaphor into three main parts. In his view in philosophy the problem of metaphor may be asked in three different ways; these three ways of asking questions lead to three different theories about metaphor: (1) there is the analysis of its function in Anglo-Saxon philosophy of language; then (2) there is the study concerning its link with the problem of interpretation (hermeneutic approach); finally (3) there is the ontological question of its meaning for philosophy (Heidegger and Derrida). As Greisch sees it the most important contribution in analytic philosophy consisted in the realization that in addition to the classical, rhetorical

theory of the metaphor (Aristotle) which sees in the metaphor a substitution of one word for another, there is a semantic theory of the metaphor in which metaphor is the effect of meaning which comes to the word but has its origin in a contextual activity which brings the semantic fields of several words into interaction with each other. Ricoeur has tried to show that on this basis there appears to be a remarkable parallel between the problem of how to interpret a metaphor and the problem of how to interpret a text, even though metaphors and texts usually differ considerably in length (hermeneutic dimension). In this essay we shall be concerned only with the ontological question of the meaning and function of metaphor in philosophical discourse.³

Heidegger's concern with metaphor occupies a rather peculiar place in this impressive philosophical body of literature on metaphor. And this is so for a number of reasons. First of all, Heidegger has really made only some very brief statements about the relationship between metaphor and metaphysics.⁴ This fact seems to suggest that he did not think the issue of metaphor to be of great philosophical significance. If he would have shared the views of Derrida and Ricoeur he would have devoted an entire lecture course to the problems involved. Furthermore, Heidegger's attitude in regard to metaphor is, at first sight at least, very paradoxical. For, even though he claims that the language of the thinker cannot be interpreted in such a manner that metaphor would appear to be an important element in philosophical discourse, his later philosophy seems to be metaphorical through and through. Heidegger seems to employ in his later works more metaphors than anyone before him, except perhaps Plato, Hegel and Nietzsche. Then, Heidegger's position is rather radical; for he definitely rejects metaphor in philosophical discourse on the ground that metaphor is an intrinsic element of classical metaphysics which is to be overcome. Finally, Heidegger's position appears to be rather offensive to a number of authors in that Heidegger's claims seem to make all philosophical discourse on metaphor to be suspicious.

Several authors have already addressed the issue of metaphor and metaphysics in Heidegger. Particularly the studies by Derrida, Greisch, Bruzina, and Ricoeur must be mentioned here.⁵ In my opinion, these authors have, each in his own way, given us a clear description of the manner in which Heidegger concerned himself with metaphor, both as far as his actual use of 'metaphors' and as far as his explicit claims about the relationship between metaphor and metaphysics are concerned. Furthermore, these authors have placed Heidegger's critical remarks on the relationship between metaphor and metaphysics in their proper philosophical context so that they can be understood correctly.

In light of this state of affairs I have decided in this essay to be rather brief in my exposition of Heidegger's claims about metaphor. I shall, however, say something about his use of metaphor particularly in his

later philosophy. I wish to conclude these reflections with a careful examination of the criticism which one can level at Heidegger's position. In this examination I am guided only by my desire to come to a better understanding of Heidegger's own position. I hope to show there also that if Heidegger's remarks on the relationship between metaphor and metaphysics are understood from the perspective of his own conception of the truth of Being as this has been developed in his later philosophy, his remarks on the relationship between metaphor and metaphysics are not open to the kind of criticism that some authors have raised against it.

II

There are several works in which Heidegger directly or indirectly speaks about the relevance of both metaphor and of a philosophical investigation of metaphor for *philosophical* discourse as such. Two of these passages are usually discussed in the literature in detail, the first is found in *Der Satz vom Grund* (1957) and the second can be found in *On the Way to Language* (1959). Before I turn to the two passages discussed by virtually all 'commentators', I shall first say a few words about some of the other passages, two of which are of much earlier date than the ones just mentioned. But first I wish to make a few general, introductory remarks.

In all relevant passages it is immediately clear that Heidegger's concern with metaphor in its relation to metaphysics moves on a quite different level than that on which rhetorical, semantical, or hermeneutical reflections on metaphor move. If one looks at Heidegger's claims from the perspectives of these three 'classical' approaches to metaphor, then Heidegger's position appears to be somehow beyond the law that holds for people who concern themselves with, and think about, language in a common way.⁶ It is then understandable that one often feels threatened by the position Heidegger seems to promote. Much misunderstanding of Heidegger's conception of metaphor has flowed from the idea that in his later works Heidegger developed a new 'philosophy of language'. Yet one should realize that Heidegger has never been interested in discourse *about* language.⁷ The manner in which Heidegger deals with language is strange, and it is not possible to appoint a place for it among the possible approaches to language with which one is familiar in our Western tradition. According to Greisch, Heidegger's way to language is 'extravagant' and one must learn to understand the specific 'extravagance' of his thinking, if one is to understand his concern with language and metaphor.⁸ Thus one must make a special effort to convince himself that Heidegger's reflections on language and his attitude in regard to metaphor do not fit into the patterns laid down by rhetoric, semantics,

hermeneutics, analytic philosophy, and 'common' philosophy of language. Heidegger's discourse attempts to speak about something that lies 'beyond' the subject matter of the 'classical' forms of discourse on language. Anyone who wishes to understand Heidegger will have to recognize the *place* where his thinking occurs, i.e., the intimate link between the specific stylistic gesture of this philosophy and the thing itself with which as thought it concerns itself, i.e., the intimate link between *Erörterung* and *Ereignis*.⁹

Heidegger has never questioned the correctness and the relevance of the current views on metaphor defended in rhetoric, semantics, hermeneutics, and analytic philosophy. Yet it is true that he questions their 'metaphysical' presuppositions. In Greisch's view, it is not possible to come to a meaningful discourse with Heidegger's conception of language of metaphor, if one is not willing to accept that the modern rhetoric, semantic, hermeneutic, and analytic approaches to language flow from a certain *metaphysical* conception of language, a conception which in these approaches themselves remains unexamined and has to remain unexamined. Heidegger's thinking about language and metaphor does not move in the domain of an 'it is a fact that . . .', but rather in the domain of an original '*es gibt . . .*', and '*it grants . . .*'¹⁰ – Let us now turn to some of the more important places where Heidegger himself explicitly addresses the basic issue of metaphor insofar as this is pertinent to his own way of thinking.

In his reflections on Hölderlin's hymn 'Andenken' (1941–2), Heidegger writes that Hölderlin often speaks about fire, sun, and wind.¹¹ In his view, we tend to take these terms to refer to natural things. We also tend to assume that when Hölderlin employs these words, they usually have another meaning; fire, sun, and wind 'give themselves' first as natural phenomena and then also signify still something else; they are symbols. When we speak in this way, we take it for granted that we are able to know *the* sun and *the* wind in themselves. We take it furthermore for granted that also ancient peoples first got to know *the* sun, *the* moon, and *the* wind, and that they later learned to employ these alleged natural phenomena as images (*Bilder*) for some other world. Yet just the opposite is the case: *the* sun and *the* wind first come to appearance from out of a 'world'; they are what they are only insofar as they are poetized from the perspective of this world.¹²

After pointing out that the same applies to our scientific conception of things Heidegger concludes this brief reflection with the following important observation: 'We must now only note that the main key of all "poetics", namely the doctrine of images (*Bilder*) in poetry, the doctrine of metaphor, does not open one door in the realm of Hölderlin's poetic hymns. . . . It suffices here to consider only that the "things themselves", too, are already poetized in each case before they can become so-called

"symbols". The question only is one of in what essential domain (*Wesensbereich*) and from what truth of poetizing [they have been poetized].¹³

In his elucidation of Hölderlin's hymn 'Der Ister' (1942), Heidegger makes a similar observation about the fact that Hölderlin often speaks about streams.¹⁴ He again remarks there that we tend to take streams to be perceptible things of nature. In poetry these things of nature receive the function of appearances that can be grasped by the senses; they present a view and, thus, they give us an 'image' or picture. Such images present a non-sensible meaning in poetry. The sensible image points to a spiritual content. Under the general heading of sensible image (*Sinnbild*) we usually also subsume allegories, sagas, tales, parables, similes, symbols, metaphors, examples, and even insignia. The only thing that is important in the present context, Heidegger continues, is that we look at what all of these cases have in common, namely the basic distinction between the sensible and the non-sensible. Any time we use these sensible images we take this very distinction always as already effected. The most important articulation of this distinction is found in the philosophy of Plato. There it is made perfectly clear that the nonsensible, i.e., the spiritual, constitutes what one calls genuine reality (*ontōs on*); the sensible is something of a lower order. The sensible can also be called the physical; thus the non-sensible is something that lies beyond and above the physical; it is the meta-physical. The distinction between the sensible (*aisthēton*) and the non-sensible (*noēton*) constitutes the basic structure of what since antiquity has been called *metaphysics*. All Western conceptions and interpretations of the world since Plato have been meta-physical.¹⁵

We must now turn to a passage that is of a later date. In the essay 'The nature of language' (1957-8), which appeared in *On the Way to Language*, Heidegger suggests that there is a close relationship between thinking and poetizing.¹⁶ One obviously will wonder, Heidegger continues, what 'neighborhood' is supposed to mean here. 'A neighbor, as the word itself tells us, is someone who dwells near to and with someone else.' Neighborhood is a relation which results from the fact that people settle face to face in regard to each other. The expression, 'the neighborhood of thinking and poetizing', thus means that these two dwell face to face in regard to each other, that the one has drawn into the other's nearness.

Heidegger then turns to a brief reflection on his own approach to this issue. First he observes that the remark about what constitutes a neighborhood seems to be by way of figurative talk (*bewegt sich in einer bildlichen Redeweise*). Yet, he continues, in saying this are we really saying something that is genuinely to the point? What does 'figurative talk' really mean? One usually turns in these and similar cases to an

explanation of a difficult issue that employs a figurative use of language. Yet one cannot claim to have given a meaningful explanation as long as it remains unclear what is to be understood here by 'talk' and by 'image' (*Bild*), and in what sense language speaks in images, if indeed language does speak in this way at all.¹⁷

In this passage Heidegger thus first suggests that in order to understand the relationship between thinking and poetizing one has to move from the known to the unknown, from the familiar conception of neighborhood to the unfamiliar concept of neighborhood, presupposed in the expression that poetizing and thinking are neighbors. But then Heidegger immediately observes that in so doing one makes assumptions about language and metaphor (figurative talk) that are not, and perhaps even cannot be, justified in that they rest on an unacceptable conception of both language and metaphor.¹⁸ – Let us now turn to the passages usually discussed in the secondary literature.

In *Der Satz vom Grund* (1957), reflecting critically on the classical principle of ground as formulated by Leibniz, Heidegger is at a certain moment led to meditate on a few lines by the German mystic Angelus Silesius, on which both Leibniz and Hegel had already focused attention, also. In the course of his own elucidation of these lines Heidegger dwells on the idea that it often happens that we see things and yet do not fully catch sight of what is closest. We see many things and fully catch sight only of few things. Meditating on this paradox Heidegger then comes to speak about understanding and thinking as forms of seeing and hearing. This finally leads him to a brief remark on metaphor.

One will observe, Heidegger suggests, that thinking can be a seeing and hearing only *in a figurative sense*. It is indeed true, he continues, that what we have seen and heard in thinking cannot be physically perceived by our eyes and ears. When we conceive of thinking as a form of hearing and seeing, sensible hearing and seeing is carried over from the domain of the sensible to that of the supra-sensible. Such a bringing-over, such a transfer, is called in Greek *metapherein*. In our technical language we call such a transference a metaphor. Thus it seems to follow that thinking can be called a seeing and hearing only in a metaphorical sense.¹⁹

Heidegger then shows that in the case of human beings seeing and hearing can never be reduced to a simple sensible 'taking-in'. But if this is so, then it is also not correct to claim that thinking can be called a seeing and hearing only in a metaphorical sense, namely as a carrying-over which carries what allegedly is purely sensible over into the domain of the supra-sensible. Our common conception of such a carrying-over and of metaphor rests on a complete separation of the sensible and the non-sensible as two independent domains, each of which exists by itself independent of the other. Now, Heidegger continues, the making of this

distinction between the sensible and the non-sensible, between the physical and the non-physical, is a basic characteristic of what we call *metaphysics*, and which has determined our Western thinking in a decisive way. Yet the moment one fully understands that the distinction between the sensible and the supra-sensible is inadequate, metaphysics at once loses its rank of being the decisive mode of thinking.²⁰

But, Heidegger concludes these reflections, the moment one realizes that metaphysics is restricted and even very narrow-minded, the idea that metaphor is a decisive element of all philosophical discourse also becomes superfluous and even untenable. For in metaphysics metaphor has been taken to be the measure for our conception of the essence of language. This is also the reason why metaphor is very often used as the means for the elucidation of the meaning of poems and of the meaning of all artistic productions. Yet the metaphorical is found really only within metaphysics.²¹ – After these observations Heidegger immediately returns to the main theme of the lecture course, i.e., to the principle of ground.²²

In *On the Way to Language* (1959) there is another brief reflection on metaphor in connection with an elucidation of poems by Hölderlin. Heidegger tries to transcend there the common, metaphysical conception of language which treats language as expression, as the exteriorization of man's inner life. To facilitate the transition beyond the common conception of language, Heidegger appeals to poems by Hölderlin, where language is called 'the flower of the mouth', and where the poet writes 'words, like flowers . . .'.²³ Heidegger leaves it to the reader to think about these verses, taken from the hymn 'Germania' and the elegy 'Bread and wine', in light of what he has been trying to say in his lectures on the essence of language. He only makes two brief observations before returning to the main theme of his lectures. The first is that one would stay 'bogged down in metaphysics if . . . [one] were to take the name Hölderlin gives here to "words, like flowers" as being just a metaphor'. Secondly, he reproaches Gottfried Benn where he claims that the word 'like' in the expression 'words, like flowers' is a break in the vision, that this 'like' adduces and compares, and that it is not a primary statement; that it is a flagging of the tension of language, and a weakness of creative transformation.²⁴

Before we can make an effort to come to a better understanding of these brief remarks on metaphor we must first turn to a reflection on the fact that Heidegger, more than almost any other philosopher, in his later philosophy seems to make use of metaphors. In so doing I shall paraphrase and comment on some ideas developed by Greisch and Derrida. I shall make a special effort here, following these authors, not only to show that and in what sense Heidegger effectively uses metaphors, but also point to the implications which the use of metaphors in

philosophical discourse has. The question as to whether or not these implications are, indeed, pertinent to Heidegger's philosophy will then be examined in part IV of this essay.

III

Several authors have made the remark that Heidegger makes an effective use of metaphors in his later philosophy and that he does so in a manner which is much more prominent than that which one finds in the works of most other philosophers. This phenomenon has been interpreted by different authors in different ways.²⁵

Greisch, Ricoeur, and Derrida have made a special effort to examine this issue. In their view, 'metaphor' functions obviously everywhere in Heidegger's philosophical discourse; this is true particularly for his later work. Yet it is difficult to give reasons for this presence and this is particularly so because of the critical remarks Heidegger has made on the intimate relationship between metaphor and metaphysics.²⁶

Greisch begins his investigation with an examination of some passages taken from Heidegger's booklet *From the Experience of Thinking*.²⁷ This booklet consists of a series of short epigrams which are divided into two different sets of statements printed on opposite pages facing one another. In each case there is a poetic text and opposite to it a few philosophical reflections which have the form of aphorisms. In his discussion of some of the epigrams²⁸ Greisch focuses mainly on the kind of relation that appears to exist here between the poetic and the philosophical parts of the text. Does one here find a metaphoric statement that then is translated into a set of rather dull philosophical phrases? Or is the poetic statement just an ornament that is to decorate and facilitate the reading of the philosophical propositions? It is clear that both these questions already reflect a particular conception of metaphor. In the first case, metaphor is a semantic deviant form which philosophy must translate into a 'rigorous' text; philosophy thus must change it into a literal transcription of what the metaphorical statement attempts to say. In the second case, the metaphor is just an ornament which does not contain anything to be thought about. Yet according to Greisch, it is obvious that neither one of these interpretations can give us an account of the *experience of thinking* that the text as a whole tries to convey. The relationship between the two parts of the discourse contained in this remarkable booklet rests on a *new experience of thinking* which permits us to state a completely new harmony between thinking and poetizing and, thus, also between metaphor and philosophical discourse.²⁹

A second example which shows the seemingly metaphoric nature of Heidegger's philosophical discourse is taken from the *Letter on Human-*

ism. This example is discussed by Derrida in 'Le retrait de la métaphore'.³⁰ In the *Letter on Humanism* Heidegger writes that thinking builds upon the house of Being (*baut am Haus des Seins*) such, that the jointing (*die Fuge*) of Being can assign and enjoin to man's essence the possibility of living and dwelling in the truth of Being.³¹ In the same paragraph, after a quote from Hölderlin, he continues: 'The talk about the house of Being is no transference [*Übertragung, metaphora*] of the image [*Bild*] "house" to being. But one day we shall, by thinking the coming-to-presence of Being in a way that is appropriate to its matter, more readily be able to think what "house" and "to dwell" are.'³² The expression 'the house of Being' does thus not function here as a metaphor. The common conception of metaphor would transport a familiar predicate (and what is more familiar than house or home?) to a less familiar subject, one that is unfamiliar, *unheimlich*, and that, in this manner, one would like to bring closer and understand better. Heidegger again rejects this common interpretation and in this case it is Being itself that gives us insight into how to think house.

Derrida suggests that one could try to use all kinds of terms and schemas, derived from some kind of meta-rhetoric, in order to conquer the problems in Heidegger's suggestion, in a purely formal manner. In this way one could try to formalize the rhetoric 'inversion' in which in the trope 'the house of Being' the word 'Being' is to say more and is also to be more familiar than the word 'house'. But according to Derrida, such an endeavor would mean that one would miss the genuine meaning of what Heidegger's text tries to say. There is no question here of a metaphor, nor is there question of an inversion. And this is so first of all because the claim made by Heidegger is not a regular statement which tries to posit something about some ontic thing. Secondly, this is so because the claim deals with language as the *element* of what is metaphorical. Thirdly, the claim is about Being itself which is not a thing and which is to be thought here according to the ontological difference which makes metaphoricity precisely possible. Then there is no term here at all that could be said to be used in a proper, usual, or literal sense. This way of speaking by Heidegger is thus neither literal nor metaphorical. Heidegger's conception here is in complete harmony with what he says at the beginning of the essay 'The nature of language': the more one finds metalanguage and metalinguistics, the more one will find the metaphorical and the metaphorical.³³

Another example which I just would like to mention is also discussed by Derrida.³⁴ It is concerned with Heidegger's use of the word 'Riss'; this word is a member of two families of words that regularly cross one another in Heidegger's later works, namely, *ziehen, Zug, Bezug, durchziehen, entziehen*, etc., on the one hand, and the family *reißen, Riss, Aufriss, Umriss, Grundriss*, etc., on the other. As far as the term

'Riss' is concerned, it is taken by Heidegger both in the sense of that which tears (fission) as well as in the sense of the fissure (rift) that the fission opens up. The term is used usually in a context in which Heidegger is concerned with the ontological difference in one of its various modalities. Thus we find the term used in the essay 'Language' (1950), where it is used to characterize the difference, the separation which at the same time is a gathering middle, in whose intimacy the bearing of things and the granting gift of the world pervade one another. The fission or rift of the difference expropriates (*enteignet*) the world into 'doing' what as world it is supposed to do, namely to grant things.³⁵

The term is also used to describe the relation between thinking and poetizing. The *Riss* is described there as the fission that rips open thinking and poetizing and assigns them to be near to one another.³⁶ In the essay 'The way to language' (1959), Heidegger states that the unity of the essence of language should be called the fission that tears open (*auf-reissen*) as well as the primary sketch or outline that results from it (*Aufriss*). Heidegger adds here that the word 'Riss' is now usually employed only in a derivative sense for tear, cleft, crack, etc.

One of the first texts in which Heidegger uses the term 'Riss' as a 'technical' term is his lecture 'The origin of the work of art' (1935-6), where the word is used to characterize the strife between world and earth. The fission draws those which turn against one another (namely, world and earth) into the source of their unity, which flows from their common ground. *Riss* is the drawing together into a unity of *Aufriss*, *Grundriss*, *Durchriss*, and *Umriss*.³⁷

We thus have here again a way of speaking which at first sight is metaphoric through and through. Yet Heidegger continues to maintain his position that the language that tries to respond to Being's address is not and cannot be metaphorical, because it is no longer metaphysical. In other words, this way of speaking appears to correspond again to a completely new form of thinking.

This new manner of thinking is what Heidegger elsewhere calls '*eine Erörterung*', a search for the place (*Ort*, *topos*). This search deliberately seeks the proximity of the poet and, as we have seen already, it is often used in the form of a thinking elucidation (*Erläuterung*) of some carefully chosen poems.³⁸ But this new manner of thinking appears also to include a special concern with the original sources of the relevant words. As Greisch sees it, the problem of metaphor in Heidegger's thinking is intimately bound up with this dual aspect of *Erörterung*. The main issue at stake in both cases is Heidegger's mistrust of ordinary language, in which genuine sayings (*Worte*) become just words (*Wörter*).³⁹

It is this phenomenon in which the 'death' of language consists. This erosion begins when words are represented as 'receptacles' which are to receive a certain content. According to Greisch, one must avoid this

ever threatening degradation of language and go from ordinary language against the stream, so to speak, to the point where one can find the original meaning of words. Heidegger's discourse as a whole, Greisch feels, represents such an effort to reach sources that perhaps can never be found. It is clear that such an attitude often implies a dubious use of etymologies which, as Derrida says, under the pretext of finding the original richness of words, seems to give the priority to diachrony at the cost of the linguistic system.⁴⁰

Greisch is also of the opinion that in Heidegger's later works one can find a certain 'symbolist a priori' which depends on the opposition between dead and living metaphors. It is always possible, under the sedimentations of our ordinary language, to find the 'original source', as long at least as language has not yet suffered its second death, a death which is definitive and irreparable, and which, in Heidegger's opinion, came-to-pass in the merely instrumental use of language commonly used in the sciences. But, Greisch asks, to what degree is Heidegger tricked here by a rather simplistic conception of etymology? Does the return to the forgotten history of some basic words of thinking (*Grundworte des Denkens*) not mean that thought is condemned to being no more than a very problematic commentary on the 'primitive' meaning of certain words? For to find their origin one must concern himself with the history of these words; yet for philosophy the origin does not coincide with the beginning. Heidegger himself has made the claim that the 'primitive' meaning of a word does not have a normative value; it only has an indicative function (*Wink, Hinweise*).⁴¹

At any rate, it seems that this *Erörterung* cannot be dissociated completely from some form of metaphorization; the traces of this process can be found everywhere in Heidegger's philosophical discourse. But what are the basic implications of this process for Heidegger's philosophy as a whole? In Greisch's view, it is here that one must turn to what Heidegger calls '*Ereignis*'. This, too, is a metaphor and, as far as Heidegger's own thought is concerned, it is perhaps even the metaphor of all metaphors. *Ereignis* is perhaps the last instance which guarantees the survival of metaphor in Heidegger's thought; and to some degree it even may perhaps be the survival of philosophical discourse as such.⁴²

According to Greisch, in Heidegger's philosophy there is a close relationship between what he has to say about *Ereignis* and his position in regard to metaphor. The way that in Heidegger's thought leads to *Ereignis* runs via the expression: '*Es gibt . . .*'. It is impossible to grasp Being itself, as long as one understands this '*Es gibt . . .*' merely in terms of a 'There is . . .', regardless of whether this 'There is . . .' is the 'There is . . .' of ordinary language, that of the sciences, that of metaphysics, or even that of thinking. One cannot meaningfully say: 'There is Being'. What one should say is rather: '*Es gibt Sein.*' What

Heidegger calls *Ereignis* is nothing but this mysterious giving that makes us perceive Being as a gift.⁴³ But, Greisch asks again, is this granting not another trick played by metaphor? Does Heidegger here not again appeal to a metaphor which makes it possible to move from the 'There is . . .' to the gift and, thus, also to move from pure dissemination to a first gathering, however neutral and anonymous this gathering still may be? In the final analysis is it not metaphor then which makes it possible to place thought under the sign of the simplicity of the *same* (*das Selbe*)? According to Greisch, *Ereignis* marks the return of the *same* in Heidegger's philosophy, insofar as it contains his answer to the question of identity. What Heidegger calls *Ereignis* reflects the typical manner in which he thinks identity as well as the harmony between identity and difference.⁴⁴ Is this not so because metaphor is in essence built upon resemblance?⁴⁵

Metaphor gathers that which resembles each other. In effect, it constitutes the *same* in its circular form. But if what Heidegger calls *Ereignis* confirms the presence of metaphor in his thought, it also seems to confirm the heliotropic character of his thinking. And if his thought is heliotropic in nature then it also still is some form of onto-theology. Thus all Heidegger's criticism of onto-theology notwithstanding, Heidegger's own thought still is onto-theologic. As a matter of fact, this is the reason, Greisch claims, why Heidegger's discourse is not just a simple rhapsody, and why it does not just fall apart into a set of unrelated aphorisms. His discourse is essentially encyclical; it continues to gravitate around the *same*, around Parmenides' *enkuklios alêtheia*.⁴⁶

In Heidegger's concern with *Ereignis* we also find a fascination with *center* and *light*; note that the German word *Ereignis* is related to the verb *sich ereignen* which originally was spelled *sich eräugnen* or even more originally *sich eräugen*; the latter had the meaning of *erblicken*, to catch sight of, to 'eye'.⁴⁷ What Heidegger calls *das Ereignis* is not just a simple event; thus the word can never be used in the plural. It means the pure lighting emergence and the original clearing of the truth. Heidegger's entire discourse moves within this clearing and is lighted by this light, even there where this light appears to become more important than the sun was for Plato.⁴⁸

For all these reasons, Greisch concludes, Heidegger's effort to go beyond onto-theology, which is effected by means of his reflections on *Ereignis*, a theme that according to Derrida remains the most important and the most difficult clue to Heidegger's later thinking,⁴⁹ remains ambiguous. This philosophical discourse, too, does thus not seem to be capable of escaping from the prestige of the image of light and the seduction of metaphor. This is clear particularly where Heidegger in *das Ereignis* stresses the aspect of 'what is proper', an aspect that reflects itself in the metaphor of gold. According to Heidegger himself *das*

Ereignis appears to dwell in the silence of gold. Speaking about the lighting emergence of the truth of Being which comes-to-pass in *das Ereignis*, Heidegger once wrote the following: 'But the golden gleam of the lighting's invisible shining cannot be grasped, because it is not itself something grasping. Rather, it is the purely appropriating event (*das reine Ereignen*).'⁵⁰

As Greisch sees it, there is a paradox hidden in the manner in which Heidegger tries to explain the richness of what he calls '*das Ereignis*'. The paradox has its origin in the fact that Heidegger moves from *Ereignis* to the metaphor of gold *via* the idea of 'what is proper'. But this would mean that according to Heidegger that which for a thing constitutes what is proper, also makes it really ungraspable. In other words, Greisch argues, as the origin of all belonging to, *Ereignis* is also that which disappropriates.⁵¹ – I do not share Greisch's view here in that in my opinion, even from Greisch's own perspective, the move from *Ereignis* to the metaphor of gold is not mediated by the value character of gold, but rather by its shiny polished surface. Yet this need not occupy us here further.

At this point we must rather ask the question of whether *all* of this, indeed, gives us an accurate description of Heidegger's own conception. One could say first, with Greisch, that the *Ereignis*, as the place of all places, makes it possible to develop a new conception of metaphor, which somehow runs parallel to the metaphysical conception of metaphor that Heidegger has 'destroyed'. Just as *Ereignis* leads to a new conception of Being, language, and man, so it also can lead to a new conception of metaphor. In Greisch's opinion such an effort would be successful only if two basic conditions are met: (1) One must start from Heidegger's new conception of language which reverses the 'domination' of man over language and no longer treats language as an instrument that man just uses.⁵² In the new conception of language the stress must be placed on showing (*Zeige*) not on demonstration (*Ausweisung*); it will then be possible to give a new meaning to polysemy which in that case, from Heidegger's own perspective, no longer appears, in opposition to logical univocity, as a weakness in language but rather as language's strength.⁵³ Thinking must move effectively within this vital element of 'essential' polysemy. Heidegger sometimes distinguishes the 'essential' polysemy which one finds in the works of poets and the thinker's readiness for the unexpected (*Bereitschaft für das Unvermutete*) from the very limited meaning of the univocal opinion of the 'they'. Polysemy does not necessarily lead to vagueness; polysemy is a sign of the richness of meaning.⁵⁴ (2) What is needed also, Greisch feels, is a more careful reflection on the poetic element in Heidegger's later thought and on the relationship between poetizing and thinking. Here one will have to show also that the poetic function cannot possibly consist in the projection of the unreal.⁵⁵

Yet there is also another way that one could follow here. Greisch assumes that Heidegger, indeed, does use metaphors, and thus that some kind of thoughtful 'theory' of metaphor will be necessary. This has to be a *new* conception of metaphor which is to replace the metaphysical one Heidegger tries to overcome. Yet Heidegger himself explicitly denies that what seem to be metaphors, are indeed 'true' metaphors. As far as I know, Derrida is the only one who has taken this alternative seriously.⁵⁶ What is needed in this case, thus, is an explanation of why Heidegger thinks that he legitimately can make this claim, even though it is so obvious that he does use 'metaphors'. It is this latter road I plan to take in section IV. There I hope to show that if one, as Greisch suggests, seriously begins with Heidegger's own conception of language and carefully considers his view on the relationship between poetizing and thinking, it is possible to explain that what seem to be metaphors, indeed are no metaphors at all and that the language 'of philosophical discourse' cannot possibly be metaphorical. Let us see where this road will lead us.

IV

After the many treatises on metaphor written since the time of Aristotle and particularly after the numerous modern publications on metaphor the extremely sparse and negative remarks on metaphor made by Heidegger must seem to be trivial and irrelevant.⁵⁷

Let us say at once that it is not Heidegger's position that one should not concern oneself with metaphor. Obviously one should make a careful study of the leading treatises on metaphor, and one should do so from the perspective of a number of disciplines, such as rhetoric, semantics, hermeneutics, literary criticism, philosophy of language, philosophy of literature, etc. Yet once this enormous task has been completed and once a great number of correct and important insights have been achieved in this manner, then still several important questions are to be answered: Precisely to what extent is strictly philosophical discourse itself metaphorical? To what extent is it the case that all concern with metaphor is intrinsically metaphysical? Could it perhaps be the case that in the realm of thinking there is a form of discourse possible that is neither metaphysical nor metaphorical?

Before we can discuss Heidegger's attempt to answer these questions, we must first try to eliminate some basic sources of possible misunderstanding of his position.

It seems to me that many people who have adopted a negative attitude in regard to Heidegger's thinking as a whole and to his conception of metaphor in particular, have done so because they understood Heidegger's thinking to imply a denial of what they themselves hold to be

important in the domain of their own research in the sciences or in the realm of speculative thinking. I feel that much criticism could have been avoided if one would have stressed more strongly the fact that Heidegger's thinking is indeed *radically different* from the thinking of most philosophers who have preceded him.⁵⁸ Heidegger might in this connection have quoted his teacher Husserl and have said that the kind of thinking he is concerned with 'lies in a completely new dimension',⁵⁹ insofar as it attempts to focus on what in the thinking of the past remained unthought. At any rate, as far as metaphor is concerned, one should begin by realizing that Heidegger's claims about the meaning and function of metaphor *in thinking*, does not at all exclude its meaningful use elsewhere, just as little as his own discourse on metaphor would imply the meaninglessness of the discourse on metaphor by other thinkers. For Heidegger the question is merely one of whether *in the thinking of Being itself*, there is still room for a 'common' use of language, for analogy, for metaphor, for 'syntax' in the usual sense of the term, for the use of strictly predicative statements, and thus also for logic.⁶⁰ In Heidegger's view, the same questions must be asked for 'essential' poetizing.⁶¹

Furthermore, it is also important to observe that Heidegger's rejection of metaphor *in thinking*, on the ground that it is intrinsically metaphysical, does not necessarily entail a negative judgment on the validity and the legitimacy of scientific and philosophical theses about metaphor. In Heidegger's view, many of these theses are correct, even though they often do not yet reveal the truth about what is to be thought here. On the few occasions in which Heidegger made some statements about metaphor, he meant to express only a warning not to interpret *his own efforts in thinking* from some other perspective that he precisely was in the process of overcoming.

One should note also that the expression 'to overcome metaphysics' for Heidegger does not mean to just step outside metaphysics and to simply leave it behind. Heidegger, too, stands in our Western, metaphysical tradition. The expression rather means that one should focus on 'the conditions of its possibility', to use a Kantian expression. Before one can say that any form of discourse is indeed possible, before one can say that science is truly possible, that any form of metaphysics is possible, one must think about the conditions of its possibility. Thus before one meaningfully can speak about beings, one must think about Being itself which grants itself *historically* to a people at a given epoch of its development in the form of a *certain world* which lets these beings be, and lets them be as what, for this people, they properly are in their basic mode of Being. To the 'fact' that Being grants itself in a giving, sending, or hailing that has the character of a finite and inherently temporal and historical event of appropriation, Heidegger refers with the technical term '*das Ereignis*'. As Greisch has correctly observed, it is this

fundamental *Ereignis* with which Heidegger's philosophical *Erörterung* is basically concerned.⁶²

Much confusion also flows from the fact that one does not sufficiently realize that in *On the Way to Language*, Heidegger's basic theme is the *essence* of language, i.e., language insofar as it is *the language of Being*. Heidegger is thus concerned in that work with the language that Being itself 'speaks' in saying something about itself to man as *Dasein*. Furthermore, the issue there is mainly about the 'basic words' that are relevant to such a limited, but fundamental domain of meaning. The issue is there about those basic words that can characterize the coming-to-pass of the truth of Being in this epoch of the history of the West.

Another source of confusion is Heidegger's so-called etymologism. One then attributes to him the participation in a process in which he, *as a thinker*, was never engaged. In their efforts to say what the basic words that Being addresses to thinker and poet really mean, both the thinker and the poet, each in his own way, must try to have first an experience with the words so spoken in and through Being's saying. One must learn to taste these words and to savor them; one must learn to listen to them. Sometimes these words of Being themselves, as they 'just stand there' in a given context, give us to think. That this heeding of these basic words has little to do with common, scientific etymology is obvious.

Yet one may still be inclined to think that Heidegger's break with metaphysics and with the 'classical' metaphysical conception of language seems to reduce his own thinking to some form of hermeticism which carries his etymological games back to the mystification of 'primitive' sense.⁶³ It seems to me that perhaps one should admit that Heidegger indeed engages in *some form of etymology*. Yet this is extremely seldom a scientific, historical, or linguistic etymology, although he never denied the latter's correctness and importance. His own work in 'etymology' is strictly philosophical in character, and is concerned with an effort to let 'basic' philosophical words once again be themselves, i.e., that through which the thinker and the poet let beings be what they properly are, when, in responding to Being's address, they bring about in an 'original' manner the difference between world and thing. Heidegger's etymology is thus concerned with promoting the happening of the truth.⁶⁴

One must thus constantly keep in mind here that Heidegger's 'etymological' efforts cannot properly be understood from the perspective of scientific etymology and, furthermore, that these efforts are limited to 'basic' philosophical words, only. His effort is, indeed, concerned with the 'true' meaning of these words; yet this 'true' meaning is never claimed to be the primitive or historically first meaning of those words. Thus the expression the 'true' meaning of these words does not mean the 'privileged', definitive, or 'absolute' meaning, i.e., the meaning which these

words have in '*rationibus aeternis*'. The expression rather refers to that meaning which for a people during a certain epoch of its history is genuinely revealing.

At any rate, it seems to me that one should limit the entire discussion about metaphor to Heidegger's concern with *the meaning and truth of Being*. I thus suggest that the claims that Heidegger has made about language, words, analogy, and metaphor be restricted to *his own* philosophical discourse about the truth of Being. This discourse obviously also involves a discourse about truth as *a-lētheia*, *logos*, language, time, space, world, beauty, the relation between Being and *Dasein*, etc. Furthermore, as far as the proximity of thinking and poetizing is concerned, I would limit this, too, to Heidegger's own concern with Being and the poet's involvement with the 'holy'. There is evidently much more to be said about poetizing and about the arts, but this lies outside the domain of Heidegger's own *immediate* interest.⁶⁵

Heidegger's opinion is that the 'common' conception of language applies to discourse about beings; so does the 'common' conception of word, analogy, and metaphor. Heidegger's basic thesis seems to be that in strictly philosophical discourse that is concerned with Being, another conception of language and word is necessary so that in that domain of inquiry there is no room for metaphor in the traditional sense of the term. – Let us try to explain this more carefully, focusing mainly on the two fundamental issues, namely Heidegger's conception of the essence of language and his view on the meaning and function of basic (philosophical) words.

Heidegger has made a 'systematic' effort to explain what he takes to be the very essence of language in *On the Way to Language*. In one of the central essays of this rich book Heidegger writes that for him the essence of language is the language of Being. The word 'of' has here the meaning of a subjective and objective genitive. In other words, the issue here is about the language by and about Being. In this language the thinking poetizing of Being becomes articulated (ontological difference).⁶⁶ In an essay entitled 'The saying of Anaximander' Heidegger explains this as follows.

Thinking of Being is the original way of poetizing. Language first comes to word [language], i.e., into its essence, in thinking. Thinking says what the truth of Being dictates: it is the original *dictare*. Thinking is primordial poetizing, prior to all poetry, but also prior to the poietics of art, since art shapes its work within the domain of language. . . . The poetizing mode of Being of thinking preserves the sway of the truth of Being.⁶⁷

The speaking of all members of a people is an effort to respond to

what Being's saying addresses to them by bringing about the primordial differentiation of world (with its typical structure) and things for that people in a given epoch of its history. But among the members of a people poets and thinkers occupy a privileged position in that they respond 'authentically' to Being's address. It is in and by the saying of Being's address and the response to this saying by thinkers and poets that beings begin to be, come to be what they properly are. This happening, thus, is what Heidegger calls *das Ereignis*, the appropriating event.

The original saying of Being's language is in each basic epoch of a people's history a showing that lets what is present appear while it conceals what is absent. This primordial saying is thus *in no way a linguistic expression of something already manifested earlier* that is now merely trotted out; each appearing and disappearing rests precisely on the primordial saying of the language of Being that shows everything in a truly original way. This saying frees what is present in the direction of being abidingly present, just as it fetters what is absent in its being enduringly absent. This saying thus joints (*fügen*) the openness of the clearing (*Lichtung*) for which all manifestation looks and from which all concealing flees. This saying is the gathering together (*logos*) of a manifold pointing, 'jointing' together any appearing and letting what was manifested remain by itself.⁶⁸

The saying of Being thus calls; it brings what is so called closer. However, this bringing closer does not bring what is called nearer in the sense of putting it down in the domain of the immediate. Although this calling calls hither what is called, that which is called remains at a distance where it remains as absent. This saying therefore indeed calls nearer what is called, but it does not withdraw it from the distance where it was and remains. This saying of the language of Being calls something, as it were, back and forth, calling it to become present and nevertheless summoning it to remain absent at the same time. What is called to the fore by this saying is not present in space as tables and chairs are present in a room. Even the place which is co-summoned in this calling, and to which, therefore, what is so summoned is called, has a mode of being present which includes its remaining absent. In the final analysis this place is the world. It is thus to a world that this saying calls the things which are summoned; it invites them as things to 'concern' man. The summoned things gather a world around themselves. The saying of Being summons things and lets them be what they are; but the thing is what it is only as a thing that 'bears', so to speak, a world in which it remains as what it is, a world in which it can appear as meaningful.

Just as the saying of the language of Being summons things, so does it also summon a world. It entrusts a world to things and, at the same time, preserves things in 'the luster of a world'. This world grants things their proper modes of Being, whereas things 'bear' their own world. The

saying of the language of Being therefore speaks; it makes things come to a world and a world to things. Because world and thing can never be independent of one another, these two ways of 'making something come' cannot be separated, either. They penetrate each other, and in so doing they cross, as it were, a middle point in which they are one. However, world and thing do not melt into a unity at this middle point; even there they remain distinct in their closeness. In an 'original' difference the saying of the language of Being, in a manner of speaking, keeps apart from itself a middle point to which and through which world and thing are one toward each other. This saying makes the things be things and the world be world, and thus carries them toward each other. But this saying does not make the things and then the world be present in order to appropriate one to the other in a later phase by connecting them at the middle point. The difference of this saying, as the middle point, mediates world and things in their own and proper modes of Being and thus carries out their belonging together. That which this saying first summons is thus the *difference* between world and things in their essential correlatedness.⁶⁹

In this way the primordial saying of Being makes a world and things be what they are. It makes what is present and what is absent attain their characteristic modes of Being from which they can manifest themselves and abide according to their own characters. It makes world and things achieve what is proper to them by appropriation. What this appropriation, which comes about through the saying of the language of Being, is, cannot be explained by comparing it with the activity of a cause; neither can it be described as some occurrence. In the manifestation of the saying it can be experienced only as that which grants. There is nothing to which this appropriation could be reduced or from which it could be explained. The only thing that can be said of this appropriation is that it appropriates; it lets things and world be what they really are. It lets the world come to the fore and so grants to man an abode in his own proper mode of Being so that he can manifest himself as speaking. The only thing that man as *Dasein* can do in his speaking is to listen to the primordial appropriation which comes about in the saying of the language of Being, and to respond to it in his own speaking.⁷⁰

Before going on to the next issue, a very brief reflection on the meaning of the expression 'basic philosophical words', I would like to make a few brief comments to prevent misunderstanding. First of all, all that has been argued for here in regard to the thinking of Being and for the thinking and the poetizing that authentically respond to this thinking of Being, is obviously true also for Heidegger's own thinking to the degree that it tries to respond to Being's address and attempts to think

the various ways in which Being sends itself in the history of Being and, thus, prepares for a new form of thinking.

Secondly, the expression 'metaphysics as such' (*die Metaphysik, la métaphysique*) can easily be misunderstood. In some sense one could indeed say that metaphysics as such does not exist; it does not exist in the sense in which things exist; nor does it exist in the sense in which common events can be said 'to exist'. It does not exist either as some doctrinaire system. Yet it is not meaningless to speak about metaphysics as such to refer to the large historical epoch in the history of Western thinking between Plato and Nietzsche in which the leading thinkers of the West have tried to think Being in terms of beings. Taken in this sense, the term does not suggest that one can throw all forms of metaphysics together and derive some lowest common denominator of meaning from this conglomerate. The large epoch obviously consists of a number of shorter epochs, and each shorter epoch is to be characterized by the manner in which great thinkers have tried to think the *Being of beings* in terms of some being (a first cause, a first mover, an absolute substance, a transcendental subject, will-to-power, etc.).

Furthermore, when Heidegger speaks about metaphysics he does not mean to refer to a historical movement or process for which some form of closure would be essential. Yet even though Heidegger does not take metaphysics in a Hegelian sense, he nonetheless can still legitimately claim that metaphysics has come to its end. What in Plato began as metaphysics has now run its course; and it came to its end when it made itself superfluous by the positivist interpretation of science and technology which it itself had generated (nihilism).

Also, Heidegger does indeed claim that in each epoch of metaphysics' long history Being itself hides itself. Yet Being itself does not then appear under different guises, such as *eidos*, *idea*, *energeia*, *actualitas*, reality, substance, subject, Spirit, will, will-to-power, objectivity, etc.⁷¹ One should note here that it is only the *Being of the beings*, i.e., *ousia*, that after the withdrawal of Being itself begins to appear in ever new modalities.

There is another point that I would like to discuss here briefly.⁷² This concerns the claim made by several authors to the effect that Heidegger's own philosophical discourse, even though it may not be metaphorical in the usual sense, nonetheless still is metaphorical in another sense. It seems to me that if Heidegger had meant to say this, he would have done so. Instead he continually states that the thinking of Being is not and cannot be metaphorical.⁷³

For Heidegger 'basic texts', i.e., texts that genuinely reflect the thinking of Being and texts that 'result' from original poetizing are not and cannot be metaphorical; for if original poetizing and original thinking truly respond to the originary thinking and poetizing of Being itself, then

their language brings about a difference, or it responds to such a difference, which is to be taken strictly as a *singulare tantum*.⁷⁴ The difference between world and things is in each case unique; it holds apart the middle in and through which world and things are in a completely new manner at one with each other. Thus metaphor has its place *within* a given world; it cannot yet have a meaningful place and function where world and things for the first time come-to-presence. Metaphor has its proper place in ontic discourse, not in discourse that focuses on the ontological condition of all ontic discourse. One could also say that it makes no sense to call the language that tries to articulate the coming-to-pass of the ontological difference metaphoric because this language and this speaking are precisely the conditions of the possibility of metaphoricality.

Note, however, that the discourse of Being is obviously metaphorical, if one looks at it from the perspective of metaphysics, i.e., from the perspective of a 'closed' epoch of Being's history. But if one looks at it from the perspective of Being itself, of the thinking and speaking of Being as language (*logos*), it is not metaphorical and cannot be so simply because it is not concerned with beings, things, events, or even the Being of beings.⁷⁵

One should also note that when Being itself withdraws in one of its concrete forms of sending, metaphoric discourse on things has then been made possible. However, metaphor itself has to withdraw from that form of discourse that authentically tries to respond to the thinking of Being. For this latter thinking tries to show how Being itself became concretized into a particular world, whereas metaphoric discourse is about things and, thus, presupposes that these things have already been made possible as what they are by the particular world to which they belong. – We must now make a few remarks about Heidegger's conception of 'basic' philosophical words, a conception that is essential for a proper understanding of his position in regard to metaphor.

According to Heidegger, the basic assumption in our everyday conception of language as well as in all scientific theories about language is that words are things, namely signs, that can have multiple meanings and 'fixed' characteristics which in the different sciences can be discussed methodically and systematically.⁷⁶ Heidegger does not reject or criticize this conception of the word; this assumption about the word's mode of Being, an assumption that is particularly relevant for our discourse about *beings*, is correct; yet Heidegger himself focuses mainly on the *essential historicity* of the basic philosophical words that function in the discourse about *Being*.

Seen from the perspective of the coming-to-pass of the truth of Being, basic words let beings be present in light of the truth of Being that historically comes-to-pass. Basic words, thus, let beings be in a truly

original manner (*ur-sprünglich*). What is to be understood in each epoch of Being's history by a basic word is not something that an individual thinker can determine. Basic words are the words which Being itself suggests to the thinker and the poet at the proper time. Heidegger has discussed the most important of these basic words in his efforts to retrieve the thinking of past thinkers. Yet it is Being itself that in each epoch dictates what these basic words are and how they let beings be by bringing about for each epoch the difference of Being and beings, world and things.⁷⁷

For Heidegger the most important question with respect to basic philosophical words thus is the problem of how these basic words receive in each case the meaning they actually have in a certain epoch of philosophy's history. It is obviously the case that these words are polysemous; of each of them one can say with Aristotle: *polachōs legetai*. But if one tries to give a philosophical account of these meanings by means of an appeal to the metaphoric use of these words, then one of these meanings will be given a primary, privileged, or 'primitive' function, and all others will receive a justification or explanation on the ground of some relationship between these meanings on the basis of a different but parallel relationship between the 'things' to which these words refer. Among the latter relationships the relation of participation and the causal relation have always played the important parts. Once one has arrived at this point, classical metaphysics and onto-theology have in principle arrived on the scene.

According to Heidegger, the multiple meanings of basic philosophical words are not arbitrary. For they are the 'result' of the 'fact' that Being grants itself to man in different epochs of its history in different ways, in each case bringing about the ontological difference in a new way.

As Heidegger sees it, every time one tries to achieve clarity with respect to such basic words as truth, beauty, Being, art, knowledge, history, and freedom, which recur in each epoch of Being's history, one must always heed two things. First one should realize that the fact that a clarification is necessary in this case has its ground in the *concealment* of the coming-to-pass (*Wesen*) of what is named in such words. Secondly, one must also pay attention to the way in which such basic words vary in meaning.

When one considers this state of affairs in relation to a word such as truth, Heidegger says, one is inclined to say that it has many meanings, meanings that are not sharply distinguished from one another and seem to belong together on the basis of some common ground which we are vaguely aware of, but which we do not yet clearly perceive. The most extreme form in which we encounter the ambiguity surrounding such words is the 'lexical' form. In the dictionary the meanings of these words are enumerated and exhibited for selection. The 'lexical' representation

of the multiplicity of the meanings of such a basic word easily causes one to overlook the fact that all these meanings and the differences among them are *historical* and therefore necessary. Thus it can never be left to an arbitrary choice, which of the word's meanings one chooses in his attempt to grasp the mode of Being named and illuminated in the relevant *basic* word. Every effort of this kind is a historical decision. The leading meaning of such a basic word is nothing evident, even though our being accustomed to it seems to suggest that. Basic words are historical. That does not mean simply that they have various meanings for various epochs; it means rather that they *ground* history, now and in the times to come, in accordance with the interpretation of them that comes to prevail.

Furthermore, basic words continue to vary in meaning. The word 'education' has for Goethe and Hegel a different meaning than it has for us. When Goethe speaks about 'nature' and when Hölderlin employs the same word, different worlds reign. There is nothing arbitrary about this; it is connected with the fact that in the very foundation of our Being, language roots us to the earth and ties us to our world.⁷⁸ – We are now in the position to understand Heidegger's thesis about the relationship between metaphysics and metaphor, the implications of which have been spelled out by Derrida and Greisch.

I think that Heidegger would agree with these authors that indeed there is an intimate connection between metaphysics, metaphor, and 'heliotropism'. In *Der Satz vom Grund* Heidegger writes that in metaphysics the 'classical' conception of metaphor is taken to be the measure of our conception of the essence of language. I take Heidegger in this passage to mean that according to the 'classical' conception of metaphysics and language, metaphor makes metaphysical language possible as such.⁷⁹ In other words, if it were not for the possibility of metaphor, then metaphysics which appeals to a supra-sensible world, would not have been possible at all. Metaphysics does not speak about what is immediately visible; this is the domain of the sciences ('physics'). Metaphysics speaks about what goes beyond this. Classical metaphysics focuses always on beings; it tries to explain their mode of Being (*ousia*). Metaphysics never focuses on being itself which as the 'ultimate transcendental synthesis' makes all meaningful discourse possible and which itself is inherently finite, temporal, and *historical*. Classical metaphysics, which realizes that beings cannot be taken for granted in their immediacy, tries to give an account of them in terms of a source, ground, or cause. This source, ground or cause cannot be one of the 'visible' things, nor can it just be the 'whole' of the visible things; thus there must be something that is beyond the visible things.

Now in view of the fact that between Plato and Nietzsche in the West all thinkers, without exception, in their metaphysical discourse have not

explicitly focused on the *coming-to-pass* of the truth of Being for a people during a given epoch of its history, but have tried to speak about something that in some sense or other is supra-sensible, universal, definitive, eternal, absolute, etc., a speaking which in many instances ultimately implies an explicit reference to God, this form of thinking can be called onto-theo-logical. In such a form of metaphysical discourse there also belongs the 'common' conception of language and word; in that kind of discourse there is also located the concern with analogy and metaphor. In the philosophical discourse about Being itself, taken in Heidegger's sense, however, *this* conception of language and word is not applicable; and the same holds true for reflections on analogy and metaphor.

In Heidegger's view, in the philosophical discourse about Being, i.e., in authentic thinking, the thinker tries to respond to the address of Being; in each epoch of his people's history Being dictates what the thinker is to say in response. This dictation by and about Being and this response by the thinker bring about originally in each case the primary differentiation between Being and beings (ontological difference); once this primary differentiation becomes articulated in language the concretization from Being to world and the differentiation of world and things come-to-pass there, also. This 'speaking of the language of Being' is never ontic in character, but concerns itself always with the condition of the possibility of all ontic speech.

During the same epoch some poets may also respond to the original address of Being which is present to them in the form of the holy, the wholesome. They, too, then participate in their people's response to the process of aboriginal differentiation, dictated by Being itself.

Now it is in these two authentic responses that words can be used as they basically were meant to be employed. They let things be in an '*original*' way. On this level of discourse, thus, words do not yet *have* meaning, just as little as things *have* meaning.⁸⁰ The things now rather begin in a new way to be and to *receive* meaning, because the original word (for this people during this epoch) lets them be what from now on they properly will be; they become now newly appropriated to themselves and appropriated to the world to which they henceforth belong.⁸¹

In conclusion we thus may say that if one reviews all the evidence which is actually available to-date, one must come to the conclusion, I think, that Heidegger indeed legitimately can make the claim that from his own basic conception of Being, truth, language, world and thing it is indeed the case that truly 'philosophical' discourse is not and cannot be metaphorical, just as little as this thinking can make use of analogy.⁸² The reason for this is that the basic words of a strictly philosophical discourse (in Heidegger's sense) are not things that are already supplied with significations before they become an essential part in the thinker's

and the poet's response to the 'original' address of Being itself in which in each epoch of a people's history Being sends and grants itself. These words are not just simple signs that in a given linguistic system have a limited number of significations. Rather these words let things once more be 'originally' what they are in that they in a new way articulate the ontological difference of world and things. In other words, such words are concerned with the 'conditions of the possibility' of the metaphysical and the scientific conceptions of language, word, analogy, and metaphor.

This conception of the non-metaphorical character of 'philosophical' discourse that articulates its basic insights with the help of 'basic words' obviously does not pass a definitive and negative judgment on the metaphysical and scientific theories of metaphor. Yet it is of vital importance to reflect on Heidegger's claims about metaphor. For if Heidegger's conception about the non-metaphorical character of philosophical discourse, taken in the strict and limited sense which he has given to it, were to be unacceptable in principle, then indeed all the implications to which Derrida, Ricoeur, and Greisch have alluded, would indeed follow, I think.

But as it is, philosophy does not need to swim against the stream to undo what ordinary language use has done. What is needed mostly is that one constantly heeds the inherent historicity of all thinking and speaking that responds to the 'gift of Being'.

Notes

1 Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor. Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*, trans. Robert Czerny, Kathleen McLaughlin, and John Costello (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).

2 Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 209–29, and *passim*; cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, trans. T. M. Knox, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 404–8; *The Complete Works of Nietzsche*, ed. Oscar Levy, 18 vols. (New York: Gordon Press, 1974), vol. 2, p. 180. Cf. also Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule*, pp. 285–6; Jacques Derrida, 'Le retrait de la métaphore', in *Poésie*, 7 (1978), 103–26.

3 Jean Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses. La métaphore chez Martin Heidegger', in *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, 57 (1973), 433–55, pp. 434–5. Cf. Paul Ricoeur, 'Metaphor and the main problem of hermeneutics', in *The New Literary History*, 6 (1974), 95–110.

4 Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlins Hymne 'Andenken'*, ed. Curd Ochswald (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982), pp. 39–40; *Hölderlins Hymne 'Der Ister'*, ed. Walter Biemel (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1984), pp. 17–23; *Der Satz vom Grund* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), pp. 77–90; *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), pp. 199–216; English translation by Peter D. Hertz, *On the Way to Language* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 93–108. There are other works

in which Heidegger touches on the relevant issues; some of these will be discussed later in this essay.

5 In addition to the literature mentioned already see Ronald Bruzina, 'Heidegger on the metaphor in philosophy', in *Cultural Hermeneutics*, 1 (1973), 305-24; Jacques Derrida, 'White mythology: metaphor in the text of philosophy', in *Margins*, pp. 207-71.

6 Jean Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses', p. 435.

7 Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 147 (English, p. 49).

8 Jean Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses', p. 435.

9 Jean Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses', p. 436; cf. Otto Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1962), pp. 280-99; 'Heideggers Topologie des Seins', in *Man and World*, 2 (1969), 331-57.

10 Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 154 (English, p. 54); cf. Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses', pp. 436-8.

11 Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlins Hymne 'Andenken'*, pp. 39-40.

12 *ibid.*

13 *ibid.*, p. 40.

14 Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlins Hymne 'Der Ister'*, p. 17.

15 *ibid.*, pp. 17-19. In *Hebel - Der Hausfreund* (Pfullingen, Neske, 1958) Heidegger seems to contradict this conception (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 37-8). Yet it seems to me that the careful reader will discover soon that Heidegger here does not subscribe to the 'common' interpretation of the opposition between the sensible and the spiritual; rather he is concerned here with the relationship between the spoken and written words and that which they mean.

16 Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, pp. 186-9 (English, pp. 81-4).

17 Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, pp. 186-7 (English, p. 82).

18 Jacques Derrida, 'Le retrait de la métaphore', pp. 121-3.

19 Martin Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund*, pp. 86-7.

20 *ibid.*, pp. 87-9.

21 Martin Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund*, p. 89. Cf. Jean Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses', pp. 439-41; Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule*, pp. 281-3.

22 Martin Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund*, pp. 89-90.

23 Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, pp. 202-8 (English, pp. 96-101).

24 *ibid.*, pp. 206-8 (English, pp. 99-101). Cf. Jean Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses', pp. 441-5; Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule*, pp. 283-4.

25 Cf. the interpretations given by Derrida, Greisch, Ricoeur, and Bruzina.

26 Jean Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses', p. 445; Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule*, pp. 281-4; Jacques Derrida, 'Le retrait de la métaphore', pp. 118-21.

27 Martin Heidegger, *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954); an English translation of this booklet by Albert Hofstadter can be found in *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), pp. 3-14. Cf. Jean Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses', p. 445.

28 Cf. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*, pp. 22-3 (English, p. 12).

29 Jean Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses', pp. 446-7.

30 Jacques Derrida, 'Le retrait de la métaphore', pp. 118-20.

31 Martin Heidegger, *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Mit einem Brief über den 'Humanismus'* (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1947), p. 111; an English translation of the *Letter* by Frank A. Capuzzi and J. Glenn Gray can be found in Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, ed. by David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 193-242; the text referred to can be found on p. 236.

32 Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, p. 112 (English, pp. 237-8).

33 Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 160 (English, p. 58). Cf.

Jacques Derrida, 'Le retrait de la métaphore', p. 120. Note that Derrida qualifies his claims; he speaks about 'metaphor in the usual sense' and about 'simple inversion'.

34 Jacques Derrida, 'Le retrait de la métaphore', pp. 121–3.

35 Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, pp. 28–9 (English, pp. 203–4).

36 *ibid.*, p. 196 (English, pp. 203–4).

37 Martin Heidegger, 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes', in *Holzwege* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1963), pp. 7–86; English translation by Albert Hofstadter in Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 17–87. The passage referred to can be found on pp. 51–2 (English, pp. 63–4).

38 Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, pp. 37–9 (English, pp. 159–61).

39 Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Was heisst Denken?* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1961), p. 89; English translation by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray, *What is Called Thinking?* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 130.

40 Jacques Derrida, *Margins*, p. 217. Cf. Jean Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses', pp. 448–9.

41 Jean Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses', p. 449; cf. Martin Heidegger, *Was heisst Denken?*, p. 91; cf. pp. 86–95 (English, p. 138; cf. pp. 126–43, *passim*).

42 Jean Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses', p. 449.

43 Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), pp. 2–25, 38–47; English translation by Joan Stambaugh in *On Time and Being* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 2–24, 35–44.

44 Martin Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), pp. 9–10; English translation by Joan Stambaugh, *Identity and Difference* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 21–2.

45 Jacques Derrida, *Margins*, p. 243.

46 Jean Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses', p. 450. Cf. *Zur Sache des Denkens*, p. 80 (English, pp. 72–3).

47 Martin Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz*, pp. 28–9; this passage is not translated in *Identity and Difference*, cf. p. 36. See also William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), p. 614.

48 Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens*, p. 50 (English, p. 46).

49 Jacques Derrida, *Positions* (Paris: Minuit, 1972), p. 74.

50 Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, pp. 281–2; English translation by David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi in *Early Greek Thinking* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), pp. 122–3.

51 Jean Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses', pp. 449–51.

52 *ibid.*, pp. 452–3.

53 Martin Heidegger, *Was heisst Denken?*, p. 68 (English, p. 71).

54 Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 75 (English, p. 192); cf. *Was heisst Denken?*, p. 68 (English, p. 71).

55 Martin Heidegger, *Was heisst Denken?*, pp. 79–86 (English, pp. 113–21); *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, pp. 159–96 (*passim*); (English, pp. 57–90); Jean Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses', pp. 454–5.

56 Jacques Derrida, 'Le retrait de la métaphore', pp. 118–21.

57 For bibliographic information cf. Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule*, pp. 369–80 and Warren A. Shibles, *Metaphor: An Annotated Bibliography and History* (White-water Wisc.: Language Press, 1971).

58 Otto Pöggeler, 'Being as appropriation', in *Philosophy Today*, 19 (1975), pp. 152–78, 153.

59 Edmund Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, trans. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), p. 19.

60 Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens*, pp. 1–2, 27–8 (English, pp. 1–2, 25–6); *Was heisst Denken?*, pp. 83–6 (English, pp. 118–21); *Schellings Abhandlung 'Ueber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit' (1809)*, ed. Hildegard Feick (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1971), p. 233.

61 Martin Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund*, p. 89.

62 Jean Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses', pp. 449–51.

63 Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule*, p. 313.

64 The word 'etymology' comes from the Greek word *etumos*, which usually is taken in the sense of 'true'. *To etumon* refers to the true meaning of a word. *Etumos* is related to *eteos* and *etos*, which perhaps is a verbal adjective derived from *eimi*, Being; *etos* also means 'true', 'as it really is'. *Etymologia* thus means the discourse about the 'true' meaning of words. Cf. H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, 2 vols. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1960).

65 Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 86.

66 Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, pp. 159–216 (English, pp. 57–108).

67 Martin Heidegger, *Holzwege*, p. 303 (English in *Early Greek Thinking*, p. 19).

68 Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, pp. 256–8 (English, pp. 125–7).

69 Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, pp. 28–30 (English in *Poetry, Thought, Language*, pp. 205–8).

70 Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, pp. 208–16 (English, pp. 101–8).

71 Cf. Jacques Derrida, 'Le retrait de la métaphore', pp. 116, 117, 123.

72 *ibid.*, p. 116; Jean Greisch, 'Les mots et les roses', pp. 452–3; Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule*, pp. 283–4.

73 Jacques Derrida, 'Le retrait de la métaphore', p. 119.

74 Martin Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz*, p. 29 (English, p. 36).

75 Jacques Derrida, 'Le retrait de la métaphore', p. 116.

76 Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, ed. Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1981), pp. 1–22 where Heidegger makes analogous remarks for 'basic' concepts.

77 Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, pp. 184–96 (English, pp. 80–90).

78 Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 2 vols. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), vol. 1, pp. 167–70; English translation by David Farrell Krell, *Nietzsche*, vol. I (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), pp. 143–5.

79 Martin Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund*, p. 89.

80 Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1957), p. 151; English translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, *Being and Time* (London: SCM Press, 1962), pp. 192–3.

81 Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, pp. 159–77 (English, pp. 58–73).

82 Martin Heidegger, *Schellings Abhandlung, 'Ueber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit'*, p. 233.

Heidegger and Ryle: two versions of phenomenology

Michael Murray

In an effort to throw light on some issues of recent philosophical history, I propose to examine a cluster of matters common to Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* (1949) and to Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (1927). A very pertinent element for such a discussion is Ryle's feature-length review of *Sein und Zeit*, published in 1929;¹ attention also should be drawn, however, to three additional writings: his paper 'Phenomenology' (1932),² a review (1946) of *The Foundation of Phenomenology*,³ and most recently a paper delivered at the Royaumont Conference in 1962, 'Phénoménologie contre *The Concept of Mind*'.⁴ From them one learns something about the development of Ryle's thought, its relation to phenomenology in general and Heidegger in particular.

An alternative title for this discussion might have run: 'Heidegger or *The Concept of Mind*'. Its ambivalence provides a direction. Read in an inclusive or appositional way 'or' has the sense of 'Heidegger revisited', while interpreted exclusively it confronts us with the necessity to choose between two incompatible versions. No one would seriously dispute that there are significant differences in technique, motive, and goal between Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* and Ryle's *Concept of Mind*, and in their philosophizing generally. Ryle's technique is that of the linguistic portrayal or sentence-frame analysis; his goal is not a science or a clarification of the meaning of Being, but rather a 'theory of mind' or philosophical psychology. His method lies within what may be termed a behaviorist perspective (*CM*, pp. 327–8) and, implicitly, he adopts the verification principle of meaning. The source of the behavioral indicators of 'mind' as well as its measure (i.e., the criterion for true judgments), unlike the source and measure of Skinnerian behaviorism, is provided for by ordinary, cultivated English. In Heidegger's work the appeal to the evidence of ordinary language, the language of everyday being in the world, is also frequent. He often cites linguistic usage for guidance

in his analyses, as for example the passages on the hammer (SZ pp. 73, 154, 360–1), on social inauthenticity (pp. 127–8, 174, 178, 252–8), on temporal expressions (pp. 330, 349, 406–9, 416), and on the grammar of listening and hearing (pp. 163–4, 173–4, 271). At this stage he is not nearly as self-conscious of this method as is Ryle in a later period, although it is consonant with Heidegger's emergent stress on the importance of language. For Heidegger, of course, these analyses of ordinary language are not ends in themselves, because this realm is meant to exhibit certain *a priori* structures of human existence, which he calls the 'existentials' in contradistinction to the 'categories' applicable to things. Furthermore, his interest in these existential clarifications is governed by his contention that they afford a necessary basis for and prelude to ontology, for which reason he designates this endeavor 'fundamental-ontology'. The analysis of being human, consequently, can never, according to Heidegger, be autonomous and self-sufficient, because man's very constitution is meshed (a fact which subjectivism misses) with that of others, things, and instruments, with works of art, thought, and politics, and above all with Being. His analysis also differs in an important way from Ryle's in his view that our understanding of the world is ensnared in the conflicting claims of authentic and inauthentic possibilities for life. As a result, from the outset, ordinary language, the theme to which he later returns in his essays on Hölderlin, represents a threat as well as a rich fund of expression. Lastly, there is nothing in Ryle resembling Heidegger's detailed examination of gossip, hearsay, and curiosity, boredom, fear, and dread, time, freedom, and death.

The notion of a striking contrast and incompatibility between Heidegger and Ryle tends to be taken for granted, and with some good reason as I have indicated. But a second interpretation, which does not cancel out these differences, is possible; and precisely because of the obviousness of the first, it would be more interesting and worthwhile to press the seemingly implausible view that there exists a substantial affinity between their works. At the close and at some intervenient points, I shall return to the connection between the plausible and the implausible interpretations.

According to the implausible interpretation, the various parallels discernible between the two mentioned works show the unmistakable impact of *Sein und Zeit* and its type of phenomenology on Ryle. The same subjects, same forms of argument, same families of concepts and sometimes even examples found in *Sein und Zeit* (which Ryle had read very closely) reappear in *The Concept of Mind*. First among them comes a renewed critique of Cartesian philosophy, a program very conspicuous in *Sein und Zeit*, and defined in detail specifically in part I, division iii, §19–21 on the nature of 'world'. Heidegger entitles section 18b: 'A contrast between

our analysis of worldhood and Descartes's interpretation of world'. There he presents an incisive analysis of Descartes's concepts which he fills out more in later writings. Weighed historically Heidegger's analysis is all the more striking since it appears against the background of the avowed Cartesianism of Husserl, his close friend and teacher. Ryle devoted considerable attention to pre-Heidegger phenomenology and was well aware of this fact as he noted at the time of the review (Rev/SZ, p. 56), although he did not fully appreciate it until much later. Husserl's phenomenology, he then says, 'burgeoned into a full Cartesian metaphysics' (Rev/FP, p. 267). Ryle's own anti-Cartesian design is an underlying theme of *The Concept of Mind* and is introduced in the first chapter: 'Descartes's myth'. Despite this, however, just who gets criticized in the critique of Descartes (CM, p. 8) and even the full content of 'the official doctrine' remain in a kind of twilight land: 'It would not be true to say that [it] derives solely from Descartes's theories . . .' (CM, p. 23; cf. p. 11). In Ryle's version the relation between the legend and history remains less clear than it should, but the general features emerge nonetheless: the mind occupies the place of a ghost inside a machine as the soul is inside of the body. And as a result, theoretical discourse is ruled by a dualism of psychic and mechanistic talk, of inner and outer, internal and external, segregated and estranged from one another; and lastly, this inner self is a transparent consciousness capable of absolute certainty of itself and of complete doubt about the external world, physical and custom-made. Ryle's purpose is to dismantle this doctrine as a mismatch of conceptual frameworks and to substitute a more effective account of mind in its place (CM, chap. 1, et passim). I shall sketch comparatively the consequences of the Cartesian dualism which both attack – such as the intellectualist model of consciousness, the problem of other minds, and language as assertion – but let me indicate first the orientation of Heidegger's criticism. In the Cartesian view, since knowing 'is not some external characteristic [bodily property], it must be "inside" ' (SZ, p. 60), whereas human being-in is conceived as 'the Being-present-at-hand of some corporeal Thing (such as a human body) "in" an entity present-at-hand' (SZ, p. 54; cf. pp. 107–8). Heidegger stresses more than Ryle the underlying ontological suppositions of Descartes and Galilean science: 'The idea of Being as permanent presence-at-hand . . . keeps [Descartes] from bringing Dasein's ways of behaving into view in a way which is ontologically appropriate' (SZ, p. 98). Instructively, Heidegger never uses the word 'consciousness' except within quotation marks, in order to make plain its theory-ladenness. The thesis of the published part of *Sein und Zeit* is a declaration of conceptual independence from the Cartesian and Galilean deformation of the meaning of human existence. Thus 'man's "substance" is not spirit as a synthesis of soul and

body; it is rather *existence*' (SZ, p. 117; see also pp. 62, 119, 205, and passages cited below).

In his review of Heidegger, Ryle criticizes Heidegger's theory of 'being a self in the world' and asserts that scientific knowledge has been smuggled in beneath the primitive situation thus described, 'which knowledge necessitates universals and categories' (Rev/SZ, p. 59). An important point concerning the 'language' of *Sein und Zeit* is raised, one still worth discussion, and as we know, Heidegger himself has acknowledged that this language was not yet wholly emancipated from the language of metaphysics. But Heidegger's reservation goes in the direction opposite Ryle's desire here to argue for the priority of the categories of objects and things over those of persons and events. His claim is not that in *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger's language is insufficiently freed from the grammar of 'mere entities' and thus interferes with its purpose, but rather the more traditional one that, since the logical grammar of science is fundamental, attempts to escape it are misdirected. Such suggests that at this stage in his thinking Ryle himself is too Cartesian to grasp the meaning of the Cartesian critique, a suggestion borne out by another passage: 'For instance the general characterization of our conscious being as a "being-in-the-world" surely implies that *underlying* our other reactions and attitudes there is *knowledge*. We "have" or are "in-the-world" only if we know that at least one "something" exists' (Rev/SZ, p. 63). Ryle fails to recognize that in his very assertion of the necessary priority of knowledge of an object, some sense of the world has been presupposed. At the same time he tacitly promotes the myth of a world-less 'subject' which is the counterpart of the epistemological 'object', prior to the world, revealing in another way Ryle's commitment to both the subject and the object poles of the Cartesian outlook.

World cannot be based on advance 'knowledge' of some *res*, because we never encounter anything except within a context or against a background. The theoretician may ignore or pass over in silence this context but this does not eliminate it. There can be knowledge of the requisite sort only within a world horizon, one which the 'knower' inhabits and lives through. Heidegger's argument is not intended to throw out the concept of knowledge, but rather to distinguish between what we might call knowledge *within* the world and knowledge *of* the world, or in his terms, between the original founding mode of transcendental being-in (constituted by the existential of understanding) and the regional or special areas of things that provide the reflective subject matter of particular sciences (SZ, p. 59). Related to this question is the way that Ryle construes Heidegger as redirecting our attention to the *sum* and the *ego* of the *cogito* and his persistent mistranslation of *Dasein* (human being; lit. 'there-being') as 'I' (Rev/SZ, pp. 58, 59, 60, 62). On this last point Heidegger was quite emphatic and in another way gave voice to his

break with Descartes: 'It is of course misleading to exemplify the aim of our analytic historically in this way. One of our first tasks will be to prove that if we posit an "I" or subject as that which is proximally given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein' (SZ, p. 46; cf. p. 116).

A profound shift has taken place from the Ryle of the Heidegger review to the later-Ryle of *The Concept of Mind*, a shift indicated by his own words: 'The assumptions against which I exhibit most heat are assumptions of which I myself have been a victim. Primarily I am trying to get some disorders out of my own system' (CM, p. 9). Now he maintains that 'during the three centuries of the epoch of natural science the logical categories in terms of which the concepts of mental powers and operations have been coordinated have been wrongly selected' (CM, p. 8; cf. pp. 18–23). More than two decades earlier, Heidegger undertook to demonstrate how traditional ontology had invariably subjected human being to objective categorial structures (*Vorhandensein*), above all 'Nature' as conceived by the natural sciences, and traced this penchant even further back to its roots in Greek thought (SZ, pp. 24–6, 45, 48, 63, 70, 98, 106, 361, 428–9, 437). In his review of *Sein und Zeit* Ryle took explicit note of the fact that Heidegger was trying to penetrate beneath 'the technical terms which science and philosophy in the course of a long development have established' (Rev/SZ, p. 57). To 'categories' as traditionally conceived, Heidegger opposed the 'existentials' or structures of human existence, and substituting the former for the latter would constitute, in Ryle's own terms, 'a category mistake' (CM, p. 16). Ryle's move is a strictly analogous one in the sense that he is attempting to articulate a set of concepts appropriate to an account of mind together with a critique of the inappropriateness of the influential categories of the modern natural sciences.

In this new search Ryle underscores, in a manner reminiscent of his interpretation of Heidegger (Rev/SZ, p. 56), that his positive goal is not some new speculative construction. In *The Concept of Mind* he wants to get at 'the knowledge we already possess' (CM, p. 7). (Elsewhere Ryle states the same thing with regard to Husserl, though he doubts that Husserl was true to his own belief.) Compare this with his quite apt explication of Heidegger: 'He [Heidegger] is simply telling us explicitly what we must have known "in our bones" all the time . . . he is telling us something which we, when told, recognize that we knew implicitly from the start' (Rev/SZ, p. 61). Explicating this osteological sense of things entails the rejection of the traditional accounts of 'other minds' and the related, so-called problem of the 'external world'. To be human is to be in a world actively engaged with others, a given existential structure that Heidegger calls Dasein's being-with (*Mitsein*) (SZ,

pp. 116–30); our relation to others is not that of merely ‘looking at’ an object situated in space (e.g., a body) but is specifically that type of care directed to other human beings called solicitude (*SZ*, p. 121). In the face of the apparent inaccessibility of the other, a theoretical consequence of the Cartesian philosophy and for him a problem most recently revived again by Husserl, Heidegger writes:

Theoretically concocted ‘explanations’ of the Being-present-at-hand of Others urge themselves upon us all too easily; but over against such explanations we must hold fast to the phenomenal facts of the matter . . . namely, that Others are encountered *environmentally*. . . .
(*SZ*, p. 119)

Ryle takes up the same argument against English philosophy, which in this respect shares a more or less common bent with Continental thought, as well as against features of his own previously held position. Summarizing the problem in its most skeptical form, Ryle explains:

Contemporary philosophers have exercised themselves with the problem of our knowledge of other minds. Enmeshed in the dogma of the ghost in the machine, they have found it impossible to discover any logically satisfactory evidence warranting one person in believing that there exist minds other than his own.

(*CM*, p. 60; cf. pp. 13, 15)

The way out of the Robinson Crusoe conclusion (*CM*, p. 13) is simply a superior description of the phenomena to that given by either objectivist mechanism or subjectivist mentalism. ‘I discover’, argues Ryle, ‘that there are other minds in understanding what other people say and do. In making sense of what you say, in appreciating your jokes . . . I am not inferring to the workings of mind, I am following them’ (*CM*, pp. 60–1). While in these formulations there is basic agreement between Heidegger and Ryle, Heidegger does not provide the precedent for Ryle’s extreme and, I think, rightly criticized statement that knowledge of others is at virtual ‘parity’ with self-knowledge and that they differ only in degree (*CM*, pp. 155, 179).⁵ Explaining away rather than explaining our being with others, this solution nearly eliminates the difference between myself and yourself, the disappearance of which is the definition of the social anonymity of the inauthentic One (*das Man*).

According to Ryle there is something mistaken and confused in the entire employment of the inner-outer, mind-matter pairs, which is the assumption behind the problem of the external world (*CM*, p. 22 *passim*). To the metaproblem of this problem Heidegger dedicated the section of *Sein und Zeit* titled ‘Reality as a problem of Being, and whether the

“external world” can be proved’ (sect. 43a). Exposing this extensively debated problematic is an important part of Heidegger’s critical analysis.

When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always ‘outside’ alongside entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered. Nor is any inner sphere abandoned when Dasein dwells alongside the entity to be known, and determines its character. . . . And furthermore, the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one’s booty to the ‘cabinet’ of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it. . . .

(SZ, p. 62)

For Heidegger is in exact agreement with Ryle (or vice versa) that the very question posed by the traditional, modern model of consciousness is a misprision. ‘The question of whether there is a world at all and whether its Being can be proved makes no sense if it is raised by *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world; and who else would raise it?’ (SZ, p. 202). ‘The “scandal of philosophy”’, Heidegger observes in his critique of Kant and Descartes, ‘is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that *such proofs are expected and attempted again and again*’ (SZ, p. 205).

The later Ryle follows Heidegger in attacking the theoretical prejudice of Western philosophy which treats theorizing as the paradigm of mental acts and the theoretician’s ‘object’ as the solely ‘real thing’. Ryle wants to maintain that, ‘On the contrary, theorizing is one practice among others . . .’ (CM, p. 26; cf. pp. 26–8, 137), and he offers the same explanation as Heidegger of a motive behind the conventional view: theorists have been preoccupied with the task of investigating theoretical cognition. ‘Preoccupation with “theories” has led to ignoring the question what it is for someone to know how to perform tasks’ (CM, p. 28). Heidegger attributes this distortion to the focus on *intuitus* and ‘seeing’ in most conceptions of knowledge (SZ, p. 358). Yet he also emphasizes that theoretical behavior *is* a form of behavior, a way of being in the world, with a *praxis* of its own, determined by a special mood of its own (SZ, pp. 69, 138, 358). This intuitive-sight model is the model of a ‘just looking’ according to a *method* (SZ, p. 69), oriented toward objective uniformities (‘present-at-hand’), which requires the mood of ‘a tranquil tarrying alongside’ (p. 138).

Such a model of knowledge is radically incomplete because it is incapable of self-understanding even its own specialized activities (not to mention others) and research skills – reading off measurements in experiments, making up ‘preparations’ for microscopic observation, doing calculations and writing out theories (SZ, p. 358). Indeed, there is a

rough but quite clear epistemological correspondence between what Ryle calls knowing-that and knowing-how (*CM*, chap. 2, esp. pp. 27–35, 40–2, 59–60) and Heidegger's fundamental distinction between the kind of understanding involved with mere entities and essences (*Vorhandensein*) and the understanding of instruments and signs ready-at-hand (*Zuhandensein*) (*SZ*, pp. 55, 61, 69, 71, 74, 83–4, 87, 183). Understanding a hammer is knowing how to use it in contexts of utility and significance. Heidegger portrays knowing-how in general terms thus: 'As a disclosure, understanding always pertains to the whole basic structure of being-in-the-world . . . that which is ready-to-hand is discovered in its serviceability, its usability, and its detrimentality' (*SZ*, p. 144). Theoretical knowledge, in contrast, is always of a thematic sort, a knowledge that something appears such and such, that such and such is the case. Of this kind of knowing Heidegger says: 'Looking at something in this way [in the way they look, their *eidōs*] is a definite way of taking up a direction toward something – of setting our sights toward what is just there as an entity (present-at-hand)' (*SZ*, p. 61). Ryle aims 'to prove that knowledge-how cannot be defined in terms of knowledge-that, and further, that knowledge-how is a concept logically prior to the concept of knowledge-that'.⁶ Though Heidegger would cast it in the vocabulary of the 'primordial' and the 'derivative', this is a perfect statement of a major intent of *Sein und Zeit*.

Know-how, Ryle tells us, is going by unformulated rules and, although know-how is learned, learning-how is accomplished by practice, not by just knowing the rules of chess or language (*CM*, pp. 41–2) or of being informed of this or that truth (*CM*, p. 27). One can know the grammar of a language without knowing-how to speak it, or know-how to speak it without expressly knowing or even having learned the grammar (*CM*, p. 42). The kind of beings other than men which knowing-how engages is precisely the type Heidegger terms 'equipment', whose nature it is to be ready-at-hand for use. In Ryle's two cases, the equipment is, in the one, the chess pieces and board, and in the other, the linguistic signs whether written or phonetic or both. The sense of things accessible in the mode of knowing-that includes a range of theoretic and thematic awareness but is typified by a proposition like 'The hammer has the property of heaviness' (see analysis below) or by concerns like that of Descartes who asserts that the truth of nonmental reality is extensive magnitude, or *res extensa*. What characterizes in common the 'hammer' or all of physical reality in this mode of knowing is its mere present-at-handness.

Now in fact there are some uses of Ryle's 'knowing-that' which are quite different from the corresponding notion in Heidegger, and there are dialectical objections possible to both their views on this which cannot be taken up here. When Ryle declares that the intellectualist legend

assimilates knowing-how to knowing-that (*CM*, pp. 29, 31, 40f.), he echoes Heidegger's repeated complaint that philosophers have too long overlooked the most everyday and immediate contexts of human life, equating the whole of experience with the theoretician's mode of it.

One particular application of the theoretician's bias is featured in both their accounts of the nature of language. Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* (pp. 153–60) and only much later, Ryle, in *The Concept of Mind* (pp. 185, 311), attack the all too exclusive dominance assumed by the assertoric proposition. To quote from Heidegger:

Prior to all analysis, logic has already understood 'logically' what it takes as a theme under the heading of the 'categorical statement' – for instance, 'The hammer is heavy.' The unexplained presupposition is that the 'meaning' of this sentence is to be taken as: 'This Thing – a hammer – has the property of heaviness.' In concerned circumspection there are no such assertions 'at first'. But such circumspection has of course its specific ways of interpreting, and then, as compared with the 'theoretical judgment' just mentioned, may take some such form as 'The hammer is too heavy,' or rather just 'Too heavy!', 'Hand me the other hammer!' Interpretation is carried out basically not in a theoretical statement but in action . . . – laying aside the unsuitable tool, or exchanging it, 'without wasting words'.

(*SZ*, p. 157; cf. pp. 360–1)

Ryle observes that 'theorists like to define intellectual operations as operations with propositions' but neglect or camouflage the fact that this is language in the didactic mode of lesson-giving, lesson-taking, and lesson-using activities (*CM*, p. 311). To understand theoretical propositions as presupposing an instructional situation enriches our awareness and supplements the account that Heidegger wants to give.

In discussing Heidegger in his review essay, Ryle correctly noted Heidegger's stress on the importance of examining man in his 'average everydayness', essential yet constantly neglected since it is the closest to us; and Ryle was struck by Heidegger's use of ordinary language instead of a technical metaphysical language. What he does use, Ryle describes as 'the many barrelled compounds of everyday nursery words and phrases' (*Rev/SZ*, p. 57) and uses them, as earlier pointed out, to get beneath 'the technical terms which science and philosophy . . . have established'. Ryle's point here is worth repeating especially because this side of Heidegger has been almost totally submerged in the legend of his metaphysical jargon. At the same time we must not lose sight of the fact that Ryle's pretext for these remarks is that he felt the pathway through ordinary language to be a threat to his own conception of philosophy. Of this pathway, on which he himself later embarks, he then

wrote: 'The hypothesis seems to be a perilous one, for it is at least arguable that it is here, and not in the language of the village and the nursery that mankind has made a partial escape from metaphor' (Rev/SZ, p. 58). Of course, in *Sein und Zeit* the everyday idioms, usage, and metaphors are in the service of phenomenological inquiry; they are valuable only if they serve to disclose the phenomena and if not, new ones must be and are forged. And to be sure many of the concepts by which Heidegger describes Dasein (facticity, existence, temporality, transcendental horizon) plainly are not found in the vocabulary of the village or nursery, even German ones.

In a recent discussion with Urmson, Ryle declared that in his 'Systematically misleading expressions' (1931–2) – written about the same time as his Husserl paper (*P*) – he was under the direct influence of the doctrine of the ideal language (= logical form) and that he now (1962) rejected it as a bad method.⁷ It is not difficult to see and perhaps Ryle would agree that the same 'bad method' held sway in 1929 when he felt the appeal of the tractarian mode (see n. 15) and continued at work in 'Categories' (1938–9).⁸ The question can be raised how completely Ryle in his later writings breaks away from the 'theoretical' conception of language, that is, of language *as* logic (*CM*, pp. 8, 126, 150, 155–6, 171, 194, 198). At one juncture, for instance, Ryle describes his entire book as 'a discussion of the *logical behavior* of some of the cardinal terms' (*CM*, p. 126, italics added), and since for him the problems and mistakes are logical, so must be the solutions. Elsewhere he rejects the claim of Husserl that phenomenology can function as First Philosophy (*erst Philosophie*), because that would assign it priority *even* over logic (*P*, p. 77); the same misgiving runs throughout 'Phénoménologie contre *The Concept of Mind*'.

Nevertheless, there are several significant parallels between the later Ryle and the Heidegger conceptions of language vis à vis a Cartesian orientation. Both are alert to the clear-distinct bias in the image of theorizing as sight (*CM*, p. 303; *SZ*, pp. 171f.). As we have noted, Ryle, like Heidegger, points out the heavy influence of this train of thought upon interpretations of language. The logician's 'either categorical *or* hypothetical is highly misleading' (*CM*, p. 140), and true-false propositions do not all connect up attributes to objects (*CM*, p. 120). According to Heidegger, assertion itself is a derivative variety of interpreting (*SZ*, pp. 153–60) – a mode of interpreting because it represents a particular stance toward what is asserted and expresses itself in a select grammatical emphasis and vocabulary; and derivative rather than original because asserting presupposes as a condition of its possibility an already given and open context of signs, instruments, and speech. Interpretation is the way in which the understanding of the world becomes concrete and actual, and interpretedness should be regarded not as a special local

feature but as deployed throughout the lived world. While assertion is a species of interpretation, not all interpreting is assertive.

Against the traditional insensitivity, encouraged by the supreme importance granted the assertion in theoretical discourse, Ryle calls attention to the sheer variety of talk:

What is said is said either conversationally, or coaxingly or reassuringly, or peremptorily, or entertainingly, or reproachfully, and so forth. Talking in a bargaining way is different from talking in a confessional way, and both are different from talking anecdotally. . . . Even what we write is meant to be read in a special tone of voice, and what we say to ourselves in our heads is not 'said' in a monotone.

(CM, p. 310)

The above passage on language is strikingly similar to one of Heidegger's published in 1927 and studied by Ryle in 1929:

Being-with-one-another is discursive as assenting or refusing, as demanding or warning, as pronouncing, consulting, or interceding, as 'making assertions', and as talking in the way of 'giving' a talk. Talking is always talking about something. . . . Even a command is about something. And so is intercession. . . . What is talked about in talk is always 'talked to' in a definite regard and within certain limits. . . . As being-in-the-world man is already 'outside' when he understands. . . . Being-in and its disposition are made known in discourse and indicated in language by intonation, modulation, the tempo of talking, 'the way of speaking'.

(SZ, p. 162)

Ryle uses 'disposition' in what Heidegger would call both an existential sense as applied to persons, and a categorial sense pertinent to things. His discussion is complex and many of its subtleties are dependent upon special properties of English. Heidegger makes no effort to inventory the wealth of terms and sentences which Ryle does, but is chiefly interested in root characteristics of man, the existential *a priori* which underlies the manifold and variable forms of expression. (The question of the relation thus is whether the linguistic distinctions and nuances become *intelligible*, supposing Heidegger's existentials to be necessary.) While there is no elaborate resemblance between Ryle and Heidegger here, two specific points of contact deserve mention, 'dispositions' and 'feelings'.

Ryle employs 'disposition' as a property concept of certain things, such as the brittleness of glass or the solubility of sugar, which denotes a liability and propensity toward a particular state, such as being broken

or dissolved. Ryle's analysis of the dispositional property of 'hardness' adheres rather closely to an account that Heidegger offers in his critique of Descartes (*SZ*, pp. 91, 97, 209). Ryle concludes that to express it properly we should 'have to produce an infinite series of different hypothetical propositions' (*CM*, p. 44), whereas Heidegger claims that 'hardness' is the experienced resistance of some entity to human effort and as such implicates a context of significant action. The 'discovery of what is resistant to one's endeavor is possible ontologically because of the disclosedness of the world' (*SZ*, p. 211).

These accounts have something in common, although Ryle's strikes me as the more odd, and the reason for its peculiarity appears to be the inadequately developed sense of world in his theory of mind. For Ryle speaks not about what is the case but what *would* be required for its meaning to be made out, where Heidegger speaks of what must already be the case for such an experience – for instance, the oak tree resisting the axe of the lumberman – to take place. In Heidegger's terms the role of the infinitude of propositions is occupied by the temporal transcendence of Dasein. What Ryle does not really explain is the unity of the properties or its contextual supposition which Heidegger's account encompasses, e.g., the experience of the resistant oak. Ryle's analysis could be extended to stipulate that the individual expressions of a language always presuppose a background of other expressions. These other expressions form the local context of an expression's meaningfulness and utilizability. Such a range of reference corresponds to Heidegger's notion of a 'region' (*SZ*, p. 103), an empirical circumstance as is the region of the workshop for the carpenter's utterance, 'Too heavy!' Of course this analysis can and must be extended further, because the local range of utterance itself draws from and delves into the totality of expressions, or language as a whole. If we reflect upon the background of any possible expression, expressibility as such, we are close to Heidegger's existential, transcendental concept of world.

If we turn to 'disposition', as a mental property in the Ryle sense, we can recognize certain comparisons. Ryle's use of 'disposition' as a category of mind to signify its capacities, tendencies, and propensities is expressed in dispositional nouns like 'habit' or dispositional adjectives like 'greedy' and dispositional verbs like 'know', 'believe', and 'aspire' (*CM*, p. 118). This concept group is akin to a family of existential concepts introduced by Heidegger who says that Dasein is its potentiality-for-being (*Seinkönnen*), since its essence is its self-understanding (*Verstehen*), and basic state-of-mind (*Befindlichkeit*), while its being is structured by care for things, self, and others, and is founded in an 'ec-static' temporality. Dasein stands out and stretches itself into future, past, and present. With these positive notions Heidegger seeks to overthrow the

atomistic theory of 'inner states' and modern subjectivism and also the traditional equation of the actual with the present (or Now).

Heidegger and Ryle both give 'disposition' a distinctively temporal meaning and also contrast it with discrete episodes or occurrences (*CM*, p. 118). Disposition traits are essential to an interpretation of man and as early as the Heidegger review, Ryle expressly recognized such a theoretical direction in Heidegger, even so far as noting down the concept of a 'disposition' (*Rev/SZ*, pp. 56, 58). Ryle's statement that know-how is a 'disposition' (*CM*, p. 46) – say the skill of the chess player in Ryle's example or the knack of the craftsman in Heidegger's – conforms to the way Heidegger describes Dasein's involvement in the signifying structures of the ready-to-hand (*Zuhandenes*) with its in-order-to (*um . . . zu . . .*) and that-for-the-sake-of-which (*umwillen*). As Ryle translates it rather well, Dasein in the world is 'a "being-about" (*besorgen*)' (*Rev/SZ*, p. 58), and the *praxis* of man's being-about is not a 'blind' behaving but has its own kind of circumspection (*Umsicht*), which is close to the intent of Ryle's view that 'understanding is a part of knowing-how' (*CM*, p. 54) and to his characterization of practice as intelligent or skilled performance (*CM*, pp. 33, 45, 60).

Ryle's treatment of mental disposition is burdened with a difficulty that Heidegger's is not, similar to his problem with thing-dispositions previously considered, namely the inability to explain the unity and identity of mind. This is a consequence of his view that the nature of mind can only be truthfully articulated by 'an infinite series of propositions' and his rough equation of the mind with 'the topic of sets of testable hypothetical and semi-hypothetical propositions' (*CM*, p. 46). In this regard Ryle has only overthrown Descartes to become, perhaps not surprisingly, the heir of Hume.

In *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger calls for a more thorough-going phenomenology of the 'affects', which he describes as having made little serious progress since Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (*SZ*, p. 138). Ryle's fascinating and intricate studies on this subject can be construed as at least consistent with and at best as a response to this asserted need. Heidegger avoids the concept of 'emotion' because it has gained the popular sense of being the anticorrelate of 'cognition' and he rejects the accepted view of both (*SZ*, pp. 138–9). Ryle is alive to this issue too (*CM*, pp. 104, 258), and in the foreword to his chapter on emotions, he says that the word designates at least three or four different things: 'inclinations', 'moods', 'agitations', and 'feelings' (*CM*, p. 83). Appreciating the importance Heidegger assigns in principle to this topic, Ryle wrote: 'Feelings . . . are at least as directly constitutive of my world as ideas or concepts . . .' (*Rev/FP*, p. 269). Heidegger had worked especially with the notion of 'state-of-mind' or 'disposition' (*Befindlichkeit*) and 'mood' (*Stimmung*) as the concrete attunement (*Bestimmtheit*) of the individual life.

We cannot rehearse the details of Ryle's discussion or review any of Heidegger's significant later thoughts on the problem, but consider for instance Ryle's concept of 'mood' (CM, pp. 98–104), which plays an important role for him and bears an obvious resemblance to Heidegger's concept of *Stimmung*. 'In saying that he is in a certain mood', explains Ryle, 'we are saying something fairly general . . . that he is in the frame of mind to say, to do and feel a wide variety of loosely affiliated things.' And, he goes on, 'Moods monopolize. To say that he is in one mood, is, with reservations for complex moods, to say that he is not in any other' (CM, p. 99). Heidegger makes 'disposition' and 'mood' primary and necessary constituents of existence in the world, and as Ryle himself had properly noted, essential to Dasein's 'being-itself' are 'moods, tensions, and inflections' (Rev/SZ, p. 59). Both agree that moods and feelings must be distinguished, and both agree that these states are not 'subjective' in the popular sense of a merely 'inner' self.

The objection must be met that the clue to the direction, if not the thrust of Ryle's thought might naturally be expected to have derived from the thought of Wittgenstein. Chronologically speaking, we know that when he wrote his feature review of *Sein und Zeit* in 1929, Ryle was unfamiliar with the later Wittgenstein. This is hardly strange if one recalls that Wittgenstein had not returned to Cambridge until early the same year. Wittgenstein states in the 1945 preface to the *Philosophical Investigations* (part 1: 1945; part 2: 1947–9) that the work goes back to 1929. Apart from the fact that Wittgenstein distrusted promulgation of his teachings, the turn of his thinking required a transitional period which has been variably described. Rhees argues convincingly in his introduction to *The Blue and Brown Books* (1933–6) that the latter are rather more in the shadow of the *Tractatus* than in the light of the *Investigations*.⁹ Wittgenstein himself seems to be of the same opinion when he labels the revisionary effort of the *Brown Book* 'worthless'.¹⁰

If Wittgenstein can be said to have taught some of the notions discussed prior to *The Concept of Mind* (just which ones cannot be set forth here), the following facts must be kept in mind: that the second part of the *Investigations* was written contemporaneously with *The Concept of Mind*; that the former work was unavailable in its full published form until *after* the latter; that *still earlier* these notions had been systematically explored by Heidegger; and that Ryle was fully acquainted with Heidegger's work, having called attention to these notions in his review.¹¹ In addition certain general features of *The Concept of Mind* distinguish it conspicuously from the episodic structure of the *Investigations*. *The Concept of Mind* is a book organized around a central concept and problem, and laid out in a fairly systematic manner with conventional forewords,

chapters, and subdivisions. Formally speaking the resemblance is closer to Heidegger's book or to others than to Wittgenstein's.

Ryle later abandons most of the reasons for which he took Heidegger to task in the review, and his new approach involves analyses and concepts comparable in significant regards to ones in *Sein und Zeit*. Even then Ryle declared explicitly that the contemporary 'danger' to phenomenology 'is not necessitated by the idea of Phenomenology, which I regard as good' (Rev/SZ, p. 55). On that occasion his concluding judgment on Heidegger was enormously honorific and open:

He shows himself to be a thinker of real importance by the immense subtlety and searchingness of his examination of consciousness, by the boldness and originality of his methods and conclusion, and by the unflagging energy with which he tries to think beyond the stock categories of orthodox philosophy and psychology.

(Rev/SZ, p. 64)

Evaluated from the angle of Ryle's philosophical aims, the extractable similarities between the two works are rather great. Yet a few years before publishing *The Concept of Mind*, Ryle announced that he had washed his hands of phenomenology and thus contradicted both his word and deed: 'In short, Phenomenology was, from its birth, a bore' (Rev/FP, p. 268). It is still hard to see how his original estimation can have been so completely amiss.¹² On the other hand, one *might* be tempted to construe Ryle's cryptic remark, made barely three years before *The Concept of Mind*, as a kind of advanced notice for his book: 'For it is a part of culture to believe that all culture comes from Paris, so Martin Heidegger's graft upon his former master's [Husserl's] stock is not unlikely before long to be adorning Anglo-Saxon gardens' (Rev/FP, p. 268).

A still further possibility would be that Ryle does not care about the question at all because he does not consider it to be of itself a philosophical question. This possibility implies a thesis about the nature of the relation of philosophical work to history and raises a question that cannot be left unanswered. Among Anglo-American philosophers a belief prevails that the history of philosophy, not to mention history, *is* separate from philosophy proper, that the history of philosophy is rather more the business of historians than of philosophers. The task of philosophers is to analyze or dispell problems and dilemmas. The separatist position, to give it a name, does not make the philosophical demand that one philosopher's estimation of another be a truthful reflection, but imagines itself to be honoring truth in some higher nonhistorical sense. That this position could be regarded as detrimental to philosophical discourse or as a mere form of *divertissement* seems not to occur. A recent case in

point is Ryle's cavalier retort to an altogether justified criticism of his account of Husserl, that he did not care whether or not it was a 'caricature' (*P-CM*, p. 87). Such an attitude indeed more typifies Ryle today than at the time of his *Sein und Zeit* study where he does appear genuinely concerned for an accurate representation of phenomenology. What can a title such as 'Phénoménologie contre *The Concept of Mind*' – or what has been rightly suggested as more appropriate: '*The Concept of Mind* contre Phénoménologie' – mean when its author concedes that his description of the opponent is a caricature? Does that not make the *contre*, the opposition or strife itself a caricature?

When a thinker or his advocate attributes revolutionary significance to a work,¹³ the separatist view runs into an unresolvable impasse. In such a context 'revolution' is necessarily an historical concept; a nonhistorical conception of revolution would imply less the idea of decisive shift or advance than that of mere turning about in circles – its original astronomical meaning. One of those who endorsed the separatist theory of revolution was Wittgenstein when he held that it made no difference to him what others had said (note its family resemblance to his other contention that, whatever it was, it was only mystification), and that he had 'found, on all essential points, the final solution'.¹⁴ Such a standpoint, already hallowed in Descartes's *Discours de la méthode*, continues only slightly impaired in the *Investigations*. Analytical philosophy prides itself on its talent for dissolving and banishing traditional philosophical problems (therapy); and yet often it has not bothered in any careful way to ascertain what *were* and *are* the essential philosophical problems (diagnosis).¹⁵ Quite obviously, good therapy must presuppose thoughtful and perceptive diagnosis. If one is *spoken to*, and the texts of the tradition do speak, one must listen before one can understand and reply. Any other approach is irresponsible or, to continue the medical analogy, quackery. Both the diagnostic and the therapeutic sides are required if *philosophical* work is to be responsible and whole. Precisely because philosophy is concerned with the issue, it is concerned with history, and indeed history in a sense that interests few historians, namely as the life of philosophical truth. Without this concern it becomes impossible to speak meaningfully of advance, revolution, or of setback.

Now we are in a position to underscore the second, exclusive 'or' (the reasons for which have been summarized) and to ask whether Ryle's appropriation of Heidegger does not, in fact and in principle, miss a dimension of genuine revolutionary significance. This can best be understood by considering a key theme in Ryle's criticism that runs through all four papers on phenomenology, namely his repudiation of phenomenology as 'first philosophy' (in Husserl's phrase borrowed from Descartes

and Aristotle) or as 'strict science' (*strenge Wissenschaft*) and Heidegger's related though different interpretation of it as 'fundamental ontology'.

In the review of *Sein und Zeit* Ryle feels that the dangerous move by Husserl occurs when phenomenology 'is given primacy over all other sciences, and is itself presuppositionless . . .' (p. 55) '... a vital ambiguity [is] present in that expanded theory of Phenomenology which makes it the logical "prius" of not only psychology but logic, metaphysics, and the mathematical and natural sciences' (p. 62). Next, in the essay 'Phenomenology', Ryle maintains that phenomenology is a part of philosophy and is a priori, but that it is neither science nor rigorous science nor 'science of sciences' (p. 69). This follows from the view of phenomenology as 'science of the manifestations of consciousness', one equivalent to epistemology (p. 70). In his review of *The Foundation of Phenomenology*, a presentation of Husserl by Marvin Farber, Ryle describes Husserl's best work as that part of the *Logische Untersuchungen* devoted to the reconstruction of epistemology and philosophy of mind. Heidegger, he adds, modifies the representational theory of perception but retains the 'intentionality dogma' (p. 268).¹⁶ Lastly, in 'Phénoménologie contre *The Concept of Mind*' Ryle says that his book may be described as a sustained attempt at phenomenology, not as a contribution to any science whatever, but rather philosophical psychology (pp. 75, 82; cf. *CM*, p. 319). Conceptual research is not a science of sciences; it differs according to type but not hierarchically. Ryle assigns the philosophy of mind no privileged position and, speaking on behalf of British philosophers, states: 'we doubtless incline to say that it is logic which controls and deserves to control the other researches' (p. 68).

In the above line of criticism two things should be observed that are at the heart of the *difference* between Heidegger and Ryle. These are, first of all, the correctness of Ryle's inference and the falseness or question-begging character of his premise. If we accept the reduction of phenomenology to psychology, it follows – as both Husserl and Heidegger would agree – that phenomenology can only provide a regional ontology rather than a foundation for ontology. This is what Ryle does by reading *Sein und Zeit* as a design for a philosophical psychology, albeit a revolutionary one as he argues. The premise of the argument, however, is one that Husserl and Heidegger would both strongly reject. If *Sein und Zeit* is looked upon as another regional ontology (i.e., the region of 'mind'), then what is most important for Heidegger is ignored.

Despite the numerous particular parallels in their attacks on Cartesianism and in their positive concepts, Ryle in his critique and in his own work remains on the plane of traditional ontology rather than fundamental ontology. The aim of fundamental ontology is to lay bare the indispensable relation of man to things in their Being. The existentials are so-called not because they describe the nature of man which might later

be correlated with a general metaphysics, as Ryle seems to think (Rev/SZ, pp. 61, 64); rather they show up Dasein's relation to beings, to others, to its own self as pregnant with a sense of Being and as the questioner of the meaning of Being. Man's understanding of Being affects the what and how of his nature. Heidegger's subsequent working out of the question of the meaning of Being assumes many paths, including a reevaluation of the results of his own earlier work, yet he continues to pursue the same question. (Contemporary linguistic physicians are prone to confuse performing a task wrongly with performing the wrong task.) Heidegger would agree with Ryle that philosophy is not a superscience, but that is because the question of Being is more fundamental than any science or logic.

Ultimately one cannot do full justice to the concrete and close analysis of phenomena – to which Ryle has made signal contributions – in independence of fundamental questions. This fact can be brought home by comparing again Heidegger and Ryle's respective treatments of moods. Heidegger describes and distinguishes the specially revelatory moods of fear, which is object-oriented towards some fearsome thing within the world (SZ, pp. 140–3) and dread (*Angst*) which has no inner-worldly object (SZ, pp. 182–91). Dread is dread in the face of being-in-the-world as such, not of a particular threatening item within it and, in this sense, is dread of 'nothing'. For this very reason the experience of dread casts light across existence as a whole and so discloses the world in its worldliness.

For Ryle there can be no connection of the dread experience with the world, because he does not recognize the phenomenological sense of world as a lived transcendental horizon. Everyday speech busies itself constantly with know-how and things ready-to-hand (SZ, p. 186), hence with items within the world, and this is the primary field of Ryle's attention. 'For, roughly, the mind is', Ryle writes, '... the topic of sets of testable hypothetical and semi-hypothetical propositions' (CM, p. 46). The mind or the world thus defined lacks unity and self-identity like the bundle of Humean impressions which is its ancestor. One might well argue that Ryle lacks the world in the mentioned sense just because he makes no room for the experience of dread. A better guide is Wittgenstein who, some months after the Ryle review, expressed sharp appreciation for Heidegger's notion of dread as that which reveals the limits of existence and points to Being.¹⁷ We can now speak more precisely of two versions of phenomenology to signify the sense in which each thinker is a phenomenologist and each expresses views about the nature of phenomenology. The differences between Heidegger and Ryle include radical ones, and Ryle scarcely concurs in the philosophical program of Heidegger, still less that of Husserl, but acknowledgment of Ryle's substantial debt to Heidegger is overdue.

Note

In his pithily condensed 'Autobiographical', Ryle takes due note of the fact that among the first courses he taught was one dealing with Brentano and Husserl and that his first published things were the reviews of Ingarden and Heidegger. While respectfully, but emphatically, denying that his colleague John Austin had any philosophical influence on him, of his possible youthful indebtedness to Husserl he says 'there is not much truth' in this opinion. About the philosophical proximities to Heidegger (or for that matter the distances), he confines himself to the remark: 'I was amused to find [Husserl's *Phenomenology*], together with Heidegger's Existentialism, becoming the *dernier cri* in France after the Second World War.'¹⁸ More recently, in a letter that greeted the preceding discussion 'with interest and general approval', Ryle indicated his own view about the influence of Heidegger:

I don't suppose in 1928–29 I exchanged a word with anyone about Heidegger. Logical Positivism did capture my colleagues and in good measure me. . . . Of course I have no idea how much *Sein und Zeit* affected me. My anti-psychologism, which expanded into anti-Cartesian dualism later on, was alive and kicking as early as in my first reading of Frege, Husserl, Meinong, and Brentano, when Austrian intentionality-theory partly paralleled Cambridge anti-idealism. But I may well have found in *Sein und Zeit* (not the Meaning/Nonsense theory that I wanted), but anti-dualistic *cum* pro-behavioristic thoughts which were later congenial to me.

I did work hard over my *Sein und Zeit* review; but don't *think* it got as deep under my skin as did some of the other things. But it is not *now* for me to say! I'm pretty sure that I never lent (or refused to lend!) my *Sein und Zeit* to any colleague or pupil. But this could all have been 'cover up' for an indebtedness that I wanted to keep dark.¹⁹

Notes

Reprinted from *The Review of Metaphysics* 27 (September, 1973) with permission of the editor. The present version includes revision and incorporates comments kindly provided by Gilbert Ryle in correspondence.

1 *Mind* 38 (April, 1929): 355–70; reprinted in Gilbert Ryle, *Collected Papers* (New York, 1971), vol. 1, pp. 197–214, and the present volume [*Heidegger and Modern Philosophy*], pp. 53–64. Hereafter cited as *Rev/SZ*, page references are to this volume. *The Concept of Mind* (London, 1949) is cited as *CM*. *Sein und Zeit* is cited from the 7th ed. as *SZ*; trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (New York, 1962), with marginal pagination.

2 *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supp. vol. 11 (July, 1932): 68–83. *Collected Papers*, vol. 1, pp. 167–78. Hereafter cited as *P*.

3 An exposition of Husserl by Marvin Farber. *Philosophy* 21 (1946): 263–9; *Collected Papers*, vol. 1, pp. 215–24. Hereafter cited as *Rev/FP*.

4 *La philosophie analytique*, ed. Leslie Beck, Coll. Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie IV (Paris, 1962), pp. 62–104; *Collected Papers*, vol. 1, 179–96. Hereafter cited as *P-CM*.

5 'The sorts of things that I can find out about myself are the same sorts of things that I can find out about other people. . . .' (*CM*, p. 155).

6 'Knowing how and knowing that', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 46 (1946); reprinted in *Collected Papers*, vol. 2, pp. 212–25; see p. 215.

7 'Histoire de l'analyse', *La philosophie analytique*, pp. 11–39.

8 *Logic and Language*, 2nd series, ed. A. Flew (Oxford, 1955), pp. 286–8, 291.

9 (New York and London, 1958; 2nd ed., 1960), pp. viii, x, xiv, xvi.

10 *ibid.* Applied to the present text (1960 edition) at about p. 154. See note p. viii.

11 When Merleau-Ponty asked Ryle whether he adhered to Wittgenstein's program, he replied, 'I certainly hope not!' adding that for him Wittgenstein had opened up ways but provided no solutions to problems (*P-CM*, p. 98).

12 On this point Ryle writes, 'My . . . "as from its birth, a bore" referred to Husserl's 1913 and post-1913 Phenomenology. And it is, was, will be a bore! Heidegger (which for other reasons I could not face re-reading) is quite explicitly *not* covered by this phrase of mine. By 1946 it was clear to me (tho' not in 1929) that Heidegger's stuff was not Phenomenology, or not what Husserl meant by "Phenomenology"' (31/10/73).

13 See *The Revolution in Philosophy*, introduction by Gilbert Ryle (London, 1957).

14 *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London, 1961), p. 3.

15 Examples ready at hand: Carnap (*ergo* Ayer, Quine, and Pitcher) on Heidegger; Russell and Popper on Hegel; Bowsma on Descartes. For a good critical survey of analytical philosophy in relation to philosophical history, see Richard Bernstein, *Praxis and Action* (Philadelphia, 1971), pp. 230–304, 316–20.

16 Despite the fact that the word appears but once in *Sein und Zeit*, in a footnote on Husserl (p. 363), accompanied by the statement that 'intentionality' must be thought through on another, more fundamental basis, viz., temporality. The argument is pursued in *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (1929), *The Essence of Reasons*, trans. T. Mallick (Evanston, 1969), pp. 28–9, 110–15.

17 *Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, Gespräche aufgezeichnet von Friedrich Waismann*, Schriften 3 (Frankfurt am Main, 1967), pp. 68–9. For the full translation and my commentary, see 'On Heidegger on being and dread'.

18 *Ryle: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. by Oscar P. Wood and George Pitcher (Garden City, New York, 1970), pp. 1–15; cf. p. 9.

19 To the author, dated 31/10/73, Oxford.

Wittgenstein and Heidegger: language games and life forms

Karl-Otto Apel

1 Thirty years on: a retrospective overview

In this paper, I would like to take up once again and develop still further the comparison between Wittgenstein and Heidegger which I undertook at the beginning of the 1960s in a series of papers.¹ In what follows I shall therefore be concerned with such questions as: what new insights have been opened up since the beginning of the 1960s with regard to the evaluation of Wittgenstein and Heidegger? And what follows therefrom for the critical development of the comparison I made at that time between the two thinkers?

(1) First, it seems to me that my positive evaluation of the epochal significance of both thinkers and of their – at that time still surprising – affinity has been confirmed both by the world-wide influence and by the convergence of their thinking. We no longer – as in my student days in the decade after 1945 – have to contend with the hermetically sealed and starkly opposed fields of (Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian) *analytical* philosophy and (continental European) *phenomenological* philosophy. Rather, a convergence along the lines of a linguistic-pragmatic, or even a hermeneutical, turn has taken place – right up to (post-Kuhnian) philosophy of science – and this situation is due largely to the historical impact of the convergence between Wittgenstein and Heidegger – whereby American pragmatism functions as the sounding-board and amplifier.

(2) On the other hand, it seems to me that my critique of Heidegger and Wittgenstein – or, more exactly, of both thinkers' inadequately conducted reflection upon the logos (i.e., of discursive language games and their unquestionable presuppositions)² – which was only intended as provisional at the beginning of the 1960s, has, in the meantime, acquired

an increased relevance. Briefly, the reduction of philosophy to self-therapy, a reduction which Wittgenstein's critique of language and meaning linked with the pseudo-problems of traditional metaphysics, was paradoxical from the very beginning; for it represented a negation of Critical philosophy's own claims to meaning and truth. Precisely this tendency created its own disciples. Moreover, in Heidegger's ever more radical 'Destruction' of Western metaphysics (and more completely in Derrida's 'Deconstructivism' and in Lyotard's 'Post Modernism', which refer back to Heidegger and Wittgenstein) this tendency is strengthened to the point of attesting to something like the self-destruction of philosophical reason.³ The opportunity opened up by Wittgenstein and Heidegger of effecting a post-metaphysical transformation and reconstruction of philosophy – from the standpoint of discursive language games containing the conditions of the possibility and validity of a critical hermeneutics and a philosophical critique of language and meaning – seems to have gone to ground in a self-destruction of philosophical discourse through an all too uncritical pursuit of the more problematic suggestions of two of the most prominent thinkers of the century.

The theme of my present paper is already indicated in advance with this ambivalent retrospective view of the historical impact of Wittgenstein and Heidegger.

In the first part of my paper, I would like once again to set out the main points of the convergence of the positive achievements of Wittgenstein and Heidegger in the form of a summary and a supplementation of my previous comparison. Admittedly, and due to the lack of space, this cannot be done with reference to the Wittgenstein and Heidegger editions which have appeared in the meantime. Instead, we shall concentrate upon a selection and a description of what is essential in the historical impact of the two thinkers from the remote perspective of the present.

In the second, critical part of my paper which, in this instance, will carry the most weight, I would like to enter more closely into an argument with Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Finally, I would like to show that neither thinker was fully cognizant of, and so failed to measure up to, the primary requirement of philosophical *logos* or language game, namely, a rigorous reflection, in the medium of public language, upon what is undertaken, believed in and presupposed when philosophical questions are raised and theses developed – or even only suggested. These latter, no matter how self-critical they may turn out to be, must after all claim to consist of statements capable of eliciting assent about how things are in general, that is, about the status of philosophy and its relation to the world.

First of all then, let us proceed with our comparison between the positive achievements of Wittgenstein and Heidegger.

II The linguistic and hermeneutical turn in philosophy

As already indicated, what the achievements of Wittgenstein and Heidegger have in common is the rendering possible of a philosophical critique of language and meaning, on the one hand, and a pragmatic hermeneutic, on the other. What is meant by this? Let us first try to point out the paradigmatic function of the critique of language and meaning with reference to a problematic which plays an exemplary role in modern philosophy.

II.i Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's critique of the mentalism of modern philosophy

The way in which the problem is posed in modern philosophizing might be expressed in the following train of thought:

In reality – and this is the basic assumption – only that is certain which is evident to me in inner experience, therefore not the existence of things and persons in the external world but only that I believe I am perceiving something here and now. Thus my sensational experience or at best my representation of the external world is the only genuine object of my consciousness whilst the things and persons which occupy the external world, including thereunder the common world, are at best a result of justified conclusions drawn on the basis of the data of immanent consciousness. Indeed, even the fact that such conclusions are justified in principle must, in principle, remain doubtful for epistemological philosophy. In the end, everything I take to be real could be something which only appears in my consciousness, for example, could only be my dream. Or, the being of things might only consist in their being perceived, and so on.

With this sketch of a problem, which could always be extended and spun out further, I wanted to point to the paradigmatic presuppositions of modern philosophy, which already figured with Augustine and with the Okhamism of the late middle ages, and which have at least served to determine the problem of consciousness in modern philosophy from Descartes to Husserl. Even today philosophers can be found who take the questions mentioned above to be meaningful and pressing. But one may then be sure that they are thinking in accordance with a pre-Wittgensteinian and a pre-Heideggerian paradigm. The 'intellectual revolution' implied in the critique of meaning which has taken place here can be most effectively illustrated with reference to the 'language games' of late Wittgenstein; more precisely, with reference to the famous thesis

that a 'private language' is impossible, in other words, that 'a solitary individual' cannot follow a rule.⁴

From this standpoint, precisely what, after Okham, and even more so after Descartes, featured as the only certainty of human knowledge – the evidence of my inner experience – became irrelevant in the framework of an intersubjectively valid world and self-understanding.

With this however the *subjective certainty* of inner experience, for example, the certainty that I have pains or the Cartesian certainty that I think or that I have specific representations, is not called in question. What is denied is only that this purely subjective certainty can be distinguished epistemologically and that an (epistemological) primacy can be accorded to it over any intersubjectively valid knowledge of the external world.

The reason why the epistemological primacy of inner experience cannot be legitimately sustained is that our knowledge-claims are bound up with the assumption of a shared language (not only with regard to their possible truth but also with regard to their intelligible meaningfulness) and, to this extent are, in the course of the language game, bound up with a publicly controllable rule-following procedure. In this linguistically-founded assumption of the intersubjectively valid understanding of something as something lies the new paradigm for philosophy. For it follows therefrom that the never certain but still publicly intelligible (and with regard to criteria controllable and correctable) experience of the external world must assume a primacy over the subjectively private certainty of inner experience.

Should the epistemological primacy of inner experience be upheld, it would have to be possible for the epistemological subject to validate the certainties of inner experience (for example, the certainties of pain sensations or of a reflection about thinking or about representations immanent to consciousness), in a private language, that is, in a language which no one else could understand because it would only be characterized by 'private ideas' in John Locke's sense. Such a language is however unthinkable, because its rules – both syntactical and semantical – cannot be learned and taught with reference to rule-following criteria.

If the certainty of inner experience were to furnish the basis for the introduction and application of semantic rules, there would then, according to Wittgenstein, have to be something like a 'dictionary' which would only exist in my mind; that is, its word meanings would have to be established by means of definitions relating to private sensations or representations. And in order to re-identify these sensations and representations one would have to refer the table of meanings in the dictionary to the representations in question. In other words, with a view to justifying the correctness of my application of the semantic rules I would never be able to appeal to anything independent of my consciousness. Rather,

I would have to rely upon memory. According to Wittgenstein, this would be as if I could only decide about the question of 'whether I had correctly noted the departure time of a train' by remembering an image of the page of the timetable and not by testing this memory image with reference to a publicly accessible timetable.⁵ This means however: it is impossible to establish the distinction between right and wrong. For without recourse to an instance independent of my consciousness there could be no distinction between 'following the rule' and 'thinking one is following the rule'.⁶

In fact, the indubitable certainty of inner experience in the post-Cartesian philosophy of modern times exists precisely because the distinction in question between doing and thinking one is doing, i.e., between being and appearing, would be suspended. And this positive paradigm serves to account for the direction of the modern critique of knowledge, namely scepticism. For Descartes' 'problematic Idealism' which was taken so seriously by British empiricism and which Kant accepted as meaningful even if refutable, this doubt fundamental to the modern critique of knowledge rests on the supposition: whatever is not certain in the sense of inner experience, that is, those judgments which are at times true and at times false because they relate to an external world independent of me, these judgments could always be false because there might be no external world, because it might be the case that everything which is taken to be real simply exists as my dream.

At this point, the critique of meaning implicit in the consideration of language games underlying all world and self-understanding will become still clearer than with the destruction of the paradigmatic illusion of the epistemological primacy of 'inner experience'. For it is enough to check the language game with reference to the phrase '*simply* my dream' (i.e., '*simply* in consciousness') in order to recognize the meaninglessness of the statement 'everything . . . could *simply* be my dream' (i.e., could *simply* be in consciousness). For the language game which makes the dramatic meaning of the phrase '*simply* my dream' possible clearly presupposes as a paradigmatic certainty, that not everything is my dream but that a real world exists. For this language game would have to be suspended as a possible language game if everything were simply my dream. But then, in practice, nothing has changed. One has only introduced a new language game of such a kind that in place of what was previously understood by '*simply* my dream' now has to be introduced with the description 'dream'.

In his last book (unpublished in his lifetime) *On Certainty* (*Über Gewissheit* (U.G.)), Wittgenstein brought out even more pointedly the suspension of the language game in question through the Cartesian dream argument. He says there: 'the argument, perhaps I am dreaming is simply devoid of meaning because in that case I would have had to dream the

expression of it, indeed, that these very words are/themselves meaningful' (*U.G.*, 383). The self-suspension of this language game is, in the final analysis, traced back here to the performative contradiction inherent in the argument – a point to which I will return in the second part of my paper.

The arguments brought forward so far might suffice to elucidate the point of the revolution brought about by Wittgenstein's critique of language and meaning. It should also be noted however that Kant's transcendental epistemology is no way immune to what is in question in this critique of meaning. To be sure, Kant tried to refute the primacy accorded to 'inner experience' and, accordingly, to 'subjective Idealism'. And Peter Strawson has undertaken a critical reconstruction of this argument in *The Bounds of Sense*.⁷ But at the same time he also pointed out that the presupposition underlying a 'transcendental Idealism of consciousness', that, namely, of a transcendental realism, of unknowable things in themselves, itself rests upon a metaphysical claim which is undermined by a critique of language and meaning.

It is for example simply not possible to distinguish, along Kantian lines, the concept of 'appearances' or of the 'world of appearances' on the one hand from that of 'mere semblance' – in the sense of the 'empirical reality' of objects of experience while, on the other hand, distinguishing the former from the concept of 'unknowable' but still 'thinkable' things in themselves in the sense of pure appearances.⁸ A language game containing these distinctions – or so Wittgenstein would have said – cannot function because it cannot be learnt. The sense in which the concept of 'pure appearances' can be learnt presupposes the concept 'knowable reality' just as much as it does that of 'mere semblance'. Thus, the reality which we can know cannot be distinguished over again as 'pure appearance' from a 'noumenal' reality. (In fact, Kant took note of the problem of the consistency of this conceptual usage in his *Critique of Judgment*, where he found himself obliged to introduce a 'symbolic use of language' with an 'analogical schematism' to accommodate the epistemological talk about 'things in themselves'.⁹)

It is now time to consider the correspondences and convergences between the 'intellectual revolution' implied by this critique of meaning and the philosophy of Heidegger.

Significantly, a correspondence can be most easily established between Wittgenstein and Heidegger on the basis of the latter's early major work *Being and Time*, even though in this work Heidegger has not yet introduced language as the 'house of being' and as the 'habitation of mankind' as he will later in *The Letter on Humanism*. But even here the pre-linguistic, so to speak, visual-eidetic suppositions of Husserlian phenomenology have already been transcended in favour of the hermeneutic of

a being-in-the-world which has always already been linguistically interpreted, as for example in the following paradigmatic statement:

This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown up in the first instance, with never a possibility of extrication. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating anew, are performed. In no case is a Dasein, untouched and unseparated by this way in which things have been interpreted, set before the open country of a 'world in itself' so that it just beholds what it encounters.¹⁰

It is evident that this passage cannot be fitted into the context of a Wittgensteinian critique of language and meaning without further ado. Rather, it contains the key to a hermeneutic of language and refers to the so-called 'pre-structure of understanding being-in-the-world' and, as such, of an 'already' linguistically disclosed and so pre-figured pre-comprehension of the life-world. In *Being and Time* a dimension of temporality or historicity is therewith already in question, a dimension which, with Wittgenstein, is not articulated in this form. For Wittgenstein concedes that language games are historically engendered and are transformed. But he hardly ever investigates the historical dependence of our thinking upon the tradition of Western philosophy, a tradition which preoccupied Heidegger throughout his life. Wittgenstein prefers to construct functional models of as many simple language games as possible – 'objects of possible comparison', as he likes to call them – which are supposed to facilitate the description of everyday language usage. To this extent, Wittgenstein remains throughout his life a trained aircraft engineer who does not have much feeling for the humanities, while Heidegger continually embodied the *modus vivendi* of a philosophically and historically oriented scholar.

For all that, this distinction, which is certainly relevant, does not prevent the two kinds of analysis, the analysis of the 'everydayness' of understanding being-in-the-world, an analysis drawn from *Being and Time*, and the analysis of 'everyday' language games, bound up as they are with activities, concrete expression and world interpretation and representing as they do 'cross-sections of life-forms', from throwing light upon each other, substantiating and completing each other, at least in part.

In relation to the key points of the hermeneutical stance, cited by us, an even more direct relation between Heidegger and Wittgenstein can be set up. It is for example clear that Wittgenstein emphatically substantiates Heidegger's construction in the sense of an entanglement in the linguistic world interpretation and in the sense of having always already been

seduced by it. He would admittedly have placed less emphasis upon the aspect of a 'concealing-revealing' world disclosure made possible by the foregoing and more upon the aspect of everyday speech patterns and, to this extent, upon the emergence of the *vacuous language games* of philosophy, games which are no longer connected to a meaningful life-praxis.

But it is possible to establish direct correspondences with Heidegger even on the plane of just such a critique of meaning. Such a correspondence is for example to be found in *Being and Time* in the hermeneutical indication that we are only able to understand immanental objectivities made up of sense-data or pure presentations on the assumption that our ordinary understanding of the world assumes the form of being-in-the-world and, to this extent, uncovers the real being itself 'as something' in a 'relationship' or 'meaning context' – the 'roaring car', the 'motor bike' and the 'tapping woodpecker', not the corresponding noises in consciousness.¹¹ If we wanted to try and grasp our being-in-the-world as 'being-alongside' the immanental sounds in consciousness, *qua* sense data, such a 'being-alongside' could only be understood as a 'deficient modus' of being with things themselves – originally disclosed and comprehended as something. (Analytical philosophers would talk here of a parasitic relationship.)

Moreover, Heidegger not only established the Cartesian position with regard to immanental consciousness as a deficient mode of being-in-the-world, but – as an extension of this critique – also that represented by Husserl under the auspices of 'methodological solipsism', that is, the primordial 'solitariness' of the transcendental ego, which now figures as a deficient mode of being-in-the-world under the auspices of being-with-others.¹²

On the basis of this analysis of being-in-the-world and the world-understanding which belongs to it, Heidegger was able to formulate a hermeneutical equivalent to the epistemological critique of Descartes' dream argument in his own critique of Kant's demand for a proof of the 'existence of things outside me'.¹³ He shows that Kant set out from the Cartesian assumption of an 'isolated subject present at hand' and from the primacy of the inner experience of this subject and does not get beyond this assumption even in the proof of a necessary coincidence of the changing and the persisting through time. For this very reason, Kant has to concede that 'problematic Idealism' is both 'reasonable and in accordance with a thorough and philosophical mode of thought', and so 'allows for no decisive judgment until sufficient proof has been found'.¹⁴ Against this position, Heidegger contends that both the distinction and the connection of 'inner' and 'outer' in relation to my consciousness can only be rendered intelligible if the primacy of being-in-the-world as being alongside external entities has already been presupposed. (The corre-

sponding analysis of the way in which language games are learnt arrives at precisely the same result.) In this way Heidegger arrives at his conclusion that the 'scandal of philosophy' against which Kant rails consists not in this, that the proof of the existence of an external world has not yet been provided but in this 'that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again'.¹⁵

It is understandable that Heidegger's analysis of being-in-the-world as being-with should also lead to an equivalent conclusion relative to the traditional problematic of the existence of 'Other Minds'. Heidegger explicitly rejected the theory (represented by middle Dilthey and by Husserl) of the constitution of the other subject on the basis of 'empathy', for example through an analogical inference, because such a conception wrongly presupposes the reflective self-understanding of an isolated 'I' subject.¹⁶ In opposition to such a position Heidegger shows that 'empathy' does not constitute being-with in the first instance but 'is itself first possible on this basis' and 'gets its motivation from the deficiency of the dominant modes of being-with'.¹⁷ Even this phenomenological reference can be strengthened and deepened through a language-game analysis which starts out from possible ways of learning the meaning of personal pronouns, and in such a way that statements by Hegel, Humboldt, G. H. Mead and Rosenstock-Huussy on the equi-primordially and the reciprocity of communication roles thereby become applicable.

II.ii The deconstruction of world understanding and of the idea of truth in Western metaphysics in general

Up to now, the point of departure for my comparison of the positive results of the thinking of Wittgenstein and Heidegger has been the heuristic standpoint of the critique of mentalism and the methodological solipsism which goes along with it. My aim has been to bring out the hermeneutical-phenomenological equivalences in Heidegger. A still broader horizon opens up for the comparison when one sets out from Heidegger's 'destruction' of the ontology of pure 'presence-at-hand' or, in other words, from the standpoint of a hermeneutical-pragmatic analysis of the 'relational' world – more precisely, in Heidegger's sense: from the world as the 'wherein of self-referring understanding', i.e., the 'upon which' of a letting be encountered of entities in the kind of being that belongs to involvements.¹⁸ On one occasion, Heidegger formulates this conception of the pre-theoretical constitution of the life-world in terms of the possible structural pre-stages of any theoretical use of language.

Between the kind of interpretation which is still wholly wrapped up in concerned understanding and the extreme opposite case of a theoretical assertion about something present-at-hand, there are many intermediate gradations: assertions about the happenings in the environment, accounts of the ready-to-hand, reports on the situation, the recording and fixing

of the facts of the matter, the description of a state of affairs, the narration of something that has befallen. We cannot trace back these sentences to theoretical statements themselves, they have their 'source' in circumspective interpretation.¹⁹

It is clear that these passages can be read in the Wittgensteinian sense of a reference to the multiplicity of non-theoretical language games. Even with regard to the Heideggerian point – the founding of 'theoretical statements' about what is present in a pre-theoretical ('circumspective') 'interpretation' of the 'relational-world', it is possible to find a fairly close equivalence in Wittgenstein, namely – as has yet to be shown – in his pragmatically-oriented critique of the traditional absolutizing of that nominative or descriptive function of language in which the latter is referred to objects.²⁰ The basis of comparison which is in question here goes further than the Cartesian critique of meaning in this sense that, with Heidegger, as also with Wittgenstein, it reaches back to the beginnings of Western ontology and philosophy of language in Plato and Aristotle. Let us first consider Heidegger's 'destruction' of the ontological (or objectively theoretical) world understanding.

First of all we need to show that under the assumption of a purely theoretical distancing from beings as simply 'present-at-hand' something like a *de-worlding* has to make its appearance.²¹ This means: the connection of the 'significative-references' inherent in the life-world, in the sense of the relatedness or meaningfulness of entities, is dissolved. In so far as there is now only a 'staring' at the present-at-hand, nothing like a 'hermeneutical synthesis' of 'letting something be as something' is conceivable, and this implies that the basis for a predicative synthesis of the apophantical *logos* also falls away. Putting this together one might conclude: the fact that something is confronted as something standing over against presupposes that beings were encountered previously as something in a pragmatically relational-totality. And, according to Heidegger, this in turn presupposes that human Dasein as being-in-the-world is able to disclose the 'significance' of the world out of the horizon of being-ahead-of-oneself in the mode of 'care', and of 'concernful having to do with'. A purely theoretical consciousness of objects of the kind Husserl assumes is given originally is quite incapable of conferring 'significance' upon the world.²² (This circumstance was not properly thought through by Husserl even with his introduction of the concept of the 'life-world' in *Crisis*, which seeks to respond to Heidegger's *Being and Time*.)

I would however like to note here that this pragmatic conception of the life-world has to be applied even to the constitutional conditions of scientific theorizing and its connection with experimental *praxis*, if one wants to think with Heidegger beyond the Heidegger of *Being and Time*. For the latter cannot be rendered intelligible in terms of Heidegger's purely theoretical limiting case of being-in-the-world, which implies

simply staring at the present-at-hand. For example, the meaning-constitution of the categories of proto-geometry and proto-physics can only be re-constructed under the assumption of a human measuring practice, as Hugo Dingler and Paul Lorenzen and Peter Janich have shown.²³ Something similar is to be found with the category of the causal necessity of the succession of two events, for example, the expectation that, when iron is heated, it expands. This understanding of causal necessity, which differs from mere (Humean) regularity (as is seen in the proposition 'when iron is heated, the earth rotates'), can only be constituted – as G. H. Von Wright has shown²⁴ – on the pragmatic assumption that the experimental praxis of physics (and before that of human labour) is, through our intervention in the course of nature, able to bring about something which, without that intervention, would not have happened.

If one's point of departure is that these pragmatic conditions of the possibility have to be rooted in a world-constitution already presupposed by science, Heidegger's concept of 'de-worlding' can then be supported with a famous example from the history of philosophy, namely, David Hume's conclusion that nothing like a necessary relation between the occurrence of one natural event and a preceding or succeeding event can be discovered. In my view, Hume arrived at this conclusion simply because he conducted his analysis from the standpoint of a purely theoretical remoteness from the world, because he had abstracted altogether from the worldly involvement of experimental *praxis*. His discovery therefore depended upon a *de-worlding*. (I am, like Paul Lorenzen, convinced that even the most abstract relations (those, for instance, of logic and mathematics) would fall to the ground if, through a total abstraction from the life-*praxis*, we effected a de-worlding in Heidegger's sense.)

However, if the above-mentioned conclusions concerning life-worldly constitutional foundations apply equally to science, an important reservation must be voiced against the Heideggerian thesis about the ontological primacy of the relational world of concerned dealings (i.e., everyday being-in-the-world) over any world conception in the sense of *objectivity*, an objectivity founded by Descartes and Kant but already laid down in that understanding of being implicit in Greek ontology (e.g., nature as the being-there of things in so far as they belong together in a law-governed connection). A state of affairs makes itself known which is never taken into consideration in *Being and Time*. Between the existential relational-world, a relational-world which is itself related to a being-in-the-world founded in mineness or ourness and which is, to this extent, subjectively perspectival and historically pre-structured, and the limiting case of de-worlding which arises as the correlate of a simple staring at things (therefore of a complete disengagement from any life-*praxis*), between these two poles which were thematically articulated by

Heidegger, a world-understanding which takes on a destinal significance for the West emerges, that of an objective (and this means at least in principle intersubjectively valid) science. This world-understanding does indeed abstract, and in principle, from any 'purely subjective' (and so also from any collectively subjective) presuppositions but it does not abstract – as does the purely theoretical world-understanding outlined in *Being and Time* – from any practical involvement that, as an epistemological interest, might open up the worldly significance of a referential totality of signs. Rather, it does itself rest upon the quite unique 'discovery' of an objectivity which constitutes itself for every 'consciousness as such' and as that which can be measured and causally explained. That 'existential fore-structure' of the historically-determined world-understanding which first made possible the concrete theoretical constructions of science has not prevented scientific theories and experiments from being intersubjectively reproducible, and to this extent, universally valid.

What I have just pointed out was recognized by later Heidegger to the extent that in his concept of the *Gestell*, scientific world-understanding (an understanding whose roots can be traced back to classical ontology) is explicitly related to a *praxis* which furnishes the a priori conditions for the latter – that of technology.²⁵ But he fails to connect this discovery with any appreciation of the phenomenon of strictly *intersubjective validity*, which requires that scientific statements (as also those of philosophy) be validated through a procedure of argumentative discourse. Still less did he appreciate the circumstance that that objectivity which makes the world available to science does not have to lead to a scientizing conception of the world as absolute – a 'making available' in the sense of an 'enframing' – quite simply because the making-available of the world in the sense of the subject-object relation 'always already' presupposes that complementary communicative-understanding of one's co-subjects which proceeds from the existence of a discursive community. That through this complementarity a definitive success, i.e. an absolutization of methodologically reductive scientism is excluded a priori is even today hardly recognized.

Instead, late Heidegger will conceive of the objectivity of science (and the claim of philosophy itself to the intersubjective validity of its statements) as a merely contingent pre-condition of world-understanding, a pre-condition which is grounded in the 'thrown projection' of being-in-the-world – and, after the *Kehre*, this means in a world-establishing, epochal event in the history of being. I will come back later to this question of the threat represented by the above to the validation of philosophical statements, as also to Heidegger's statements about the historical conditions of the possibility (and validity) of Western science and philosophy. But first I would like to maintain that a peculiar reflective deficiency with regard to the constitution of objectivity (and

connected therewith to the intersubjective criteria of validity for a scientific experience – as Kant had shown) attaches to the genial analysis of the pre-theoretical relational-world in *Being and Time*. Already in *Being and Time* Heidegger had only the following to say about the meaning of the Kantian idealization of the epistemological subject in the sense of a ‘pure ego’ or a ‘consciousness in general’:

Is not such a subject a *fanciful idealization*? With such a conception have we not missed precisely the *a priori* character of that merely ‘factual’ subject Dasein? Is it not an attribute of the *a priori* character of the factual subject (that is, an attribute of Dasein’s facticity) that it is in the truth and in untruth equi-primordially?²⁶

After the turn introduced by Heidegger’s ‘hermeneutical revolution’ no philosopher is going to deny that the world-understanding which comes before the truth of science and which makes it possible has the character of ‘revealing-concealing’. But surely the possibility of the simple intersubjective validity – and of absolute truth in this sense – of the findings of science must therewith also become a questionable issue. Heidegger’s answer to this question in *Being and Time* can be found in the following passage:

There is truth only in so far as Dasein is and as long as Dasein is. Entities are uncovered only when Dasein is; and only as long as Dasein is, are they disclosed. . . . To say that before Newton his laws were neither true nor false, cannot signify that before him there were no such entities as have been uncovered and pointed out by those laws. Through Newton the laws became true; and with them, entities became accessible in themselves to Dasein. . . . That there are ‘eternal truths’ will not be adequately proved until someone has succeeded in demonstrating that Dasein has been and will be for all eternity. . . . Even the ‘universal validity’ of truth is rooted solely in the fact that Dasein can uncover entities in themselves and free them. . . . Why must we presuppose that there is truth? What is ‘presupposing’? What do we have in mind with the ‘must’ and the ‘we’? . . . ‘We’ presuppose truth because ‘we’, being in the kind of being which Dasein possesses, are ‘in the truth’.²⁷

But even this answer to the question posed by us with regard to the possibility of a strictly *intersubjective validity* remains ambiguous. That the truth of ‘propositions’ can no longer – as Thomas Aquinas and even Bolzano held – be regarded as independent of human knowledge on the ground of the creative knowledge of an ‘intellectus divinus’ can be accepted as following from Heidegger’s ‘methodological atheism’. But

that the validity of true statements for any 'epistemological subject in general' has to be regarded as relative to the temporal duration of a world-disclosure which belongs to human Dasein, is already problematic. In his first Kant book Heidegger tried to align his thesis with regard to the dependence of truth in general upon the world-understanding of human Dasein with Kant's transcendental philosophy, more specifically, with the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and not with the second.²⁸ But after the historico-ontological 'Turn' of his interpretation of human Dasein and its 'disclosiveness' as that of 'thrown-projection', Heidegger radicalized the thesis about the relativity of the truth as the unhiddenness of the world with regard to the temporal-historical Dasein of human being in this sense, that even this relativity can be understood as relative to a specific epoch in ontological history, for example, as the relativity of the concept of the universal validity of scientific and philosophical truth with regard to the epoch of metaphysics which began in Greece and which is coming to an end today. At this point, a difficulty inherent to Heidegger's philosophy can, I suggest, be noted, a difficulty to which we shall have to come back, namely, the *pragmatic contradiction* between the relativity thesis and its own claim to universal validity. For the historico-ontological relativization of the universal validity of truth will itself have to be true, that is universally valid, as an insight into the necessity of this very relativization, and this in a sense which cannot itself be relativized – and that means for any possible epistemological subject in the context of an ideal dialogical community of human beings as potentially rational beings.

Here we see that even the much vaunted *pragmatism* of the Dasein's analyses undertaken in *Being and Time* is ambiguous. It may well be that it displays – as Richard Rorty has suggested²⁹ – an affinity to William James' and John Dewey's reduction of scientific and philosophical truth to practically serviceable aims in the sense of the needs of (individual or collectively individual) human beings who happen to exist in a given world. But it has nothing to do with Peirce's pragmatism, for instance, with what Peirce, in opposition to James and Dewey, later called 'pragmaticism'. To be sure, the latter also interpreted the meaning of any possible true or false statement in terms of a possible life-*praxis*. But he also distinguished the intersubjective validity of experimental procedures and the dialogical *praxis* of an 'unlimited community of scientists' as the only possible regulative context for the pursuit of truth in practice. In distinction from Heidegger, he did not attempt to found the ultimate validity of truth upon the 'factual apriori' of being-in-the-world, but upon the ability of the truth to establish a consensus for all rational human beings, a consensus which is counterfactually anticipated in advance.³⁰

So much for Heidegger's 'destruction' of world-understanding and for

that idea of truth to which Western philosophy and science subscribe. With regard to what has already been said, where are we to locate the correspondence between Wittgenstein's critique of language and meaning and Heidegger's ambition to undertake a comprehensive philosophical destruction?

In the first place, a positive correspondence between language-game analysis and the pragmatically-oriented existential-hermeneutical analysis of the relational-world, together with the transition from world-understanding to the deficient mode of de-worlding (simply staring at what is present-at-hand) can very easily be found. It is to be sought in this, that the privileging of the denominative language game (taken for granted since the founding of ontological philosophy in Greece), a strategy pushed to the limit by Wittgenstein himself in the *Tractatus* through his characterization of objects and states of affairs, is radically called in question in his later language-game analysis. But it is not so much a matter of Wittgenstein completely giving up his earlier conception of name-giving and ostensive definition later on. Rather, he made it clear that a quite special language game operated here, one which always presupposed other language games which for their part were intimately bound up with the practice of a given life-form. The following passages from *Philosophical Investigations* will suffice to bring out these presuppositions.

The ostensive definition explains the use – the meaning – of the word when the overall role of the word in language is clear. . . . One has already to know (or to be able to do) something in order to be capable of asking a thing's name.

(*P.U.*, I, §30)

And:

When one shows someone the king in chess and says: 'This is the king', this does not tell him the use of this piece – unless he already knows the rules of the game up to this last point: the shape of the king. . . . Only someone who already knows how to do something with it can significantly ask a name.

(*P.U.*, I, §31)

A remark by Wittgenstein should also be seen in this connection, a remark which, so to speak, marks the semiotic equivalence with Heidegger's theory of 'de-worlding'. It shows how a self-sufficient theory of meaning-constitution through name-giving, taken out of the pragmatic context of language games bound up with life-forms, exactly corresponds to the transition described by Heidegger from contextual world-understanding over to the deficient mode of simply staring at the present-at-hand. Wittgenstein formulates this as follows:

Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object – And you really get such a *queer* connexion when the philosopher tries to bring out *the* relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word ‘this’ innumerable times. For philosophical problems arise when language *goes on holiday*. And *here* we may indeed fancy naming to be some remarkable act of mind, as it were a baptism of an object.

(*P.U.*, I, §38)

To the Heideggerian limiting case of ‘de-worlding’ (in which what is present-at-hand is simply stared at and so can have no more ‘meaning’ for us), there corresponds, with Wittgenstein, the limiting case in which language ‘goes on holiday’, that is, is no longer bound up with its use in a given *life-praxis*. In this limiting case, it is indeed only possible to substitute a name for the ‘this-there’, a name which no longer carries with it any intelligible meaning. And this naturally implies that under these conditions the constitution of the meaning of linguistic predicates cannot be rendered intelligible.

It is therefore quite impossible to found a universally valid theory of linguistic meaning by the co-ordination of pure ‘sensations’ with ‘logically proper names’ as the elements out of which a given world can be constructed, as Russell, for example, wanted to do. Rather, the naming language game – or even the question concerning the correct way of naming some given entity – already presupposes those very language games in and through which the context of a *life-praxis* determines the possible role of words in the language game and so also, to this extent, their meaning.

We are now in a position to pull together the philosophical achievements of Wittgenstein and Heidegger. I would like to appeal here to the concept of the ‘life-world’ employed by late Husserl and advance the thesis that Wittgenstein and Heidegger each discovered the life-world in their own way and, moreover, that they were able to work out this concept (in opposition to the world-conception of the philosophical tradition) in a much more radical way than Husserl was able to do in *Crisis*.³¹ To be sure, Husserl had seen that the abstract idealizing objectification of European science presupposed the emergence of meaning out of the life-world (and so had to be understood philosophically out of the latter). But, as the last classical representative of the post-Cartesian philosophy of consciousness, he assumed that even the meaning-constitution of the life-world and its intersubjective validity *could* be traced back to the intentional operations of a solipsistically transcendental consciousness, an ‘I think’ and, in the last analysis, *had to be* so understood. That the meaning-constitution of the life-world, as publicly valid, was always dependent upon language and that, to this extent, it was always depen-

dent upon a historical and socio-culturally determined life-form, was something he did not appreciate.

While with Husserl the pre-linguistic intentional operation of an Ego consciousness is supposed to found the meaning-constitution of the life-world, it is this very life-world which, with Heidegger and Wittgenstein, assumes the role of the ultimate bedrock: with Heidegger, in the form of a historically determined 'thrown projection' of 'being-in-the-world' and, with Wittgenstein, in the form of the 'life-forms' which make up the background of those very 'language games' which have already been taken account of. In fact, bound up with the latter we find insights into the quasi-transcendental conditioning of our world and self-understanding, beyond which, at the present time, philosophy cannot go back. Belonging thereto we find, on the one hand, the insights mentioned by me concerning a critique of the meanings involved in metaphysical pseudo-problems, meanings which rest upon the non-reflection upon the linguistic a priori of language games and, on the other side, the corresponding existential-hermeneutical insights into the dependence of our positive understanding of worldly significance upon human being-in-the-world and, in connection therewith, upon the worldly disclosiveness of historical language(s).

With reference to this linguistically and historically conditioned pre-understanding of the life-world, we are no longer able to go back to a null-point of presuppositionless thinking about whatever is present, for example, to the self-givenness of phenomena. This can today be regarded as generally accepted by a philosophizing which has gone through the linguistically pragmatic and hermeneutically-oriented turn introduced by Wittgenstein and Heidegger. That things are like this can also be shown through a complementary turn in the philosophy of science which, since Thomas Kuhn's analysis in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, has also brought out the dependence of scientific thinking and its possible development upon a historically conditioned agreement between a community of scientists.³²

This reference to Kuhn's philosophy of science, in which Wittgensteinian motifs join together with motifs drawn from the hermeneutical philosophy inspired by Heidegger (and Gadamer) is intended to point to the questionable suggestions inherent in Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's thinking: the absolutization of the contingently a priori, the historically conditioned life-world, which does not lend itself to the forming of a consensus because it calls in question the conditions of the possibility of a universal philosophical consensus. I am here deliberately harping upon the pragmatic requirement of philosophical consistency, that is, upon the requirement of avoiding any *performative contradiction* in the argumentation. And I am drawing attention to the fact that, in his *reductio ad absurdum* of the Cartesian dream argument in *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein

himself offered an example of the very self-suspension of a philosophical language game which has to be avoided.

With reference to Heidegger I have already had occasion to point to the danger which results from the inconsistency inherent in his destruction of that idea of truth which underlies Western metaphysics. Let us now take a closer look with reference to Wittgenstein. Consider Wittgenstein's radical critique of the vacuity or the 'disease' of language games. As is well known, in his *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein did not really take back the dictum of 'non-sensicality' expressed in the *Tractatus*, a dictum directed against the propositions of philosophy in general – including those of the *Tractatus* itself – at least, not in the form indicated there. For he did not answer the question of how that critical language game of philosophy, the language game in which one talks about language games in general (their function and dis-function) and so is able to 'show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle', is itself possible and valid. To these questions, he seems only to have given critically therapeutic answers which apply equally to the language game needed to cure the disease and which, at the very least, seem not to recognize that the legitimacy of his characterization of philosophical problems in general as a linguistic disease itself rests upon a specifically philosophical insight which lays claim to universal validity (cf. especially *Philosophical Investigations* (P.I.), I, §§133, 255, 309).

If, as has been shown, the proof of the self-suspension of the philosophical language game through the performative self-contradiction involved turns out to be the most radical form of the critique of language and meaning, it then becomes possible to think with Wittgenstein against Wittgenstein and to conclude that the recommended programme of a *total self-therapy of philosophy as a disease* proves to be defective. It then becomes possible to counter the exaggerated emphasis laid upon the contingently a priori character of the many life-forms, for instance, that of the historically-determined own life-world, with one argument which, in the final analysis, so far from reclaiming a metaphysical standpoint beyond language and the world, simply recognizes the impossibility of getting behind that language game which is philosophy as the legitimate form of reflection with regard to all thinkable language games and life-forms and, to this extent, of any historically conditioned life-world.

And so I come to the second part of my comparison between Wittgenstein and Heidegger.

III Philosophy: self-criticism or self-suspension?

Thomas Kuhn's theory of the 'paradigms' of the history of science can with good reason be taken up as a particularly instructive example for

the convergence of the historical efficiency of the thinking of Wittgenstein and Heidegger. For the concept of a paradigm, a concept which is introduced by Kuhn in the double role of the positive condition of the possibility and of the historical relativization of scientific progress,³³ this central and multi-faceted concept can be elucidated both out of the perspective of Wittgenstein's language games and their paradigms of 'certainty' and out of the perspective of the epochal revealing-concealing establishment of the world in Heidegger's history of being.

Seen from a Wittgensteinian perspective, Kuhn's 'incommensurable' paradigms of science and their possible development appear as illustrations of the idea that language games, as parts of 'life-forms', are 'bound up' with 'activities' and grammatically conditioned a priori valid forms of world-interpretation. To this extent they function as 'norms' for language usage, experimental *praxis* and for any acceptable research findings which can be expected to yield true or false conclusions and which for this reason cannot be called in question by empirical science since they have to be known a priori as conditions of the possibility of the functioning of the scientific language game and the *praxis* which belongs to it. The provocative point of the Kuhnian paradigm concept (both for the traditional linear representation of progress and for the unitary rationality of science) is to be sought along the lines of Wittgenstein's suggestion that one cannot go behind the multiplicity and the variety of language games and the life-forms which support them, that the multiplicity of life-forms, functioning as they do as the background for the different language games, can even make comprehension through the medium of language impossible. Lions, for example, could not be understood by us humans even if they could talk;³⁴ more pertinently, a similar limitation of our understanding must perhaps be assumed for the understanding of foreign human life-forms, i.e., so-called primitive cultures.³⁵

To this primarily synchronous relativism of the Wittgensteinian perspective there now largely corresponds the primarily diachronic relativism of epochal world-clearing which (as has been shown above) with Heidegger emerges out of the historical transformation of a Dasein-related concept of truth as 'disclosure'. Above all it is the following intellectual configuration which seems to correspond to the function of Kuhn's concept of a paradigm. In a later statement in *Zur Sache des Denkens*³⁶ Heidegger conceded on the one hand that it would be 'inappropriate' to interpret his concept of world-clearing (for example, revealing-concealing or *a-lethia*) as the 'original concept of truth'. For the element of correctness, in the sense of a correspondence with something pre-given, is lacking. On the other hand, he emphasized once again that, with the concept of 'lighting', a dimension had been opened up which systematically preceded the traditional concept of truth. For in this instance it

was a question of the condition of the possibility of true or false judgments, i.e., statements about beings.

The connection of this intellectual configuration with the function of the Kuhnian paradigm is clearly to be found in this, that in both cases in which the possibility of an advance in knowledge is in question – including the process of verification and falsification – the latter is, in a one-sided manner, made to appear dependent upon a preceding condition. To Kuhn's normative paradigm there corresponds Heidegger's clearing, a clearing which, as linguistically world-disclosive, first opens up the meaning-horizon for possible scientific questions. And true or false judgments must, as Gadamer has shown, be understood as answers to actual, or at least to possible, questions.³⁷ To this extent it would be true to conclude that the findings of Western science in general are dependent upon paradigmatic meaning or interrogative horizons, horizons which could not be opened up at all in cultures with different linguistic modes of world-disclosure – for example the Hopi Indians of New Mexico.³⁸ At this point the convergence between Heidegger's hermeneutical understanding of language and Wittgenstein's analytical understanding of language games becomes even clearer.

One difference between Heidegger and Kuhn or Wittgenstein seems to consist in this, that the uncovering-covering, meaning-clearing inherent in Heidegger's understanding of Western world history is as a whole quite explicitly characterized by the 'event' of the founding of philosophy as metaphysics by the Greeks. To this extent, the different scientific paradigms which follow therefrom can obviously not be regarded by Heidegger as 'incommensurable' in every respect since they have to be understood as consequences of the founding of metaphysics. The point of Heidegger's supposition is to be found in the thesis that already in the metaphysical uncovering of the meaning of being with Plato – that is, in the so-called 'theory of Ideas' – the mode of uncovering of the world assumes the form of the subject-object relation and therewith also of an 'enframing' of scientific technology, that is, of the technological science of modern Europe.

By comparison with this Heideggerian vision (which corresponds to his life-long attempt at a reconstruction and destruction of Western metaphysics) the Wittgensteinian representation of infinitely many language games and life-forms is, on the one hand, and as we have already noted, marked by an a-historical intellectual model – especially in the transitional period between the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. On the other hand, it is illustrated in late Wittgenstein along the lines of ethnological examples and, globally, with reference to the idea of a 'natural history'.

These differences do not however make it impossible for us – as the example of Kuhn has already shown – to establish a convergence of the

Heideggerian and the Wittgensteinian perspectives, in the sense, too, of a relativistic and historicistic orientation of Western philosophy in general. Frequently these very characteristics are rejected as a misunderstanding – as the consequence of a way of thinking which is itself metaphysical and which has not learnt how to assimilate the new standpoint ‘beyond relativism and objectivism’. At the end of my paper, I would like to resist precisely this suggestion.

To this end, I would like first to set out what, in my opinion, constitutes the most important philosophical results of the historically effective convergence of the intellectual claims of Wittgenstein and Heidegger. With Heidegger the most important claim consists in this, that meaning-clearing and the truth which, in the final analysis, is dependent upon it, must be thought as a meaning- (or truth-) *event*, that is, in its most radical accentuation. Even the insight – opened up with the philosophical truth claim – that our ability to pose questions is genetically dependent upon the clearing-event of the history of being is clearly, according to Heidegger, itself dependent upon the temporal occurrence of the history of being for its validity. The *logos* of our thinking (for instance, our argumentative procedures) which was above all taken to be independent of time by the Greek founders of philosophy now has to be regarded as dependent upon the ‘other of reason’ – the temporality of being. Nevertheless, it should be possible to frame this insight in the form of a universally valid philosophical thesis about the history of being. Is this claim, a claim which has been carried over from Heidegger into philosophical post-modernism, tenable from the standpoint of a critique of meaning? Or does it not rather lead to a self-suspension of the language game of philosophy?

With a view to answering these questions, we shall have recourse to Wittgenstein’s critique of language and meaning. However, it must be said that Wittgenstein and the Wittgensteinians do not offer much in the way of helpful objections but rather tend to complete and to strengthen the Heideggerian claims. To be sure, Wittgenstein tirelessly traced the disease of seemingly unsolvable philosophical problems back to a misunderstanding of the function of language. And in this sense he did indeed – as shown above – take into consideration the phenomenon of the self-suspension of the philosophical language game. But he never applied these kinds of analyses in a strictly reflective manner to his own, suggestive statements about philosophy as a disease resulting from a misuse of language. Above all (and particularly after the paradoxical self-suspension of the philosophical language game in the *Tractatus*) he never again posed the reflective question concerning the linguistic conditions of the possibility of one’s own language game, that is, the question concerning the presuppositions not of the pseudo-language games of metaphysics which were to be critically resolved by him, but about the

language game involved in his own critically therapeutic philosophy which, clearly, could only 'show the fly the way out of the fly bottle' and cure the sickness through linguistically formulated insights, and not through the dispensing of medicaments.

At this point, we have to take account of the following circumstance. The well-known statements by Wittgenstein on the method of philosophy as, for example, 'we may not advance any kind of theory. . . . We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place' (*P.I.*, I, §109) or 'Philosophy simply put everything before us and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us' (*P.I.*, I, §126). Statements of this kind certainly attest to the originality of his method. But they do not make it clear to what extent they make it possible for Wittgenstein to communicate, through the summoning-up of examples, those insights into the 'workings of our language' (*ibid.*, §109) which should help us to get things 'straight' and which are so complete 'that philosophical problems should completely disappear' (*ibid.*, §133). It is just not enough to simply set out, or to describe, the everyday language games on the one hand and, on the other, the empty language games of philosophy. Rather, it is necessary to at least point out the reasons – that is, the universally valid insights of philosophy – which make it possible to play off the one language game against the others. These reasons are at least suggested by Wittgenstein in his ever-renewed intimations toward philosophical theory-building at the level of a specific philosophical language game in which he, as much as any other philosopher, was obliged to participate.

Here we run up against a *reflective deficiency* which is bound up with his – in many instances helpful – predisposition for the 'pure describing' of examples. Certainly it is possible – as Wittgenstein's work demonstrates – to correct the a priori assumptions and over-hasty generalizations of systematic philosophy with the analysis of examples. But one cannot hope to render intelligible in this way the specific claims to validity of all philosophical statements – even those statements which bear the brunt of the critique of language and meaning. To put it otherwise; one cannot render intelligible the actual function of philosophical language games through language-game analysis in this way; that one presents this language game as just one language game among others or alongside others, which means, embedded in a particular form of life with particular 'conventions', 'uses', or 'customary practices'. For the claim that is raised by the philosophical language games practised by Wittgenstein in the descriptive presentation of particular 'conventions' has to rise above the embedding of all language games in particular life-forms and, to this extent, above the facticity and contingency of all language games and life-forms and so express something that is universally valid. This

unavoidable claim to universality can only be rendered intelligible in the following way, that one seeks to analyse the function of the philosophical language game in strict reflection³⁹ upon what one does and presupposes as a philosopher, with the description of particular language games and life-forms. Such a methodological claim would however, at least for the post-*Tractatus* Wittgenstein, be taboo – as though, for the pragmatic language-game analysis, the view oriented toward the semantics of the statement were still true, the view namely, that any actual reflection upon language has to lead to semantic antinomies.⁴⁰

A radically pragmatic questioning of the semantic paradigm, of the kind introduced by Wittgenstein in his language-game theory, leads however to the conclusion that the pragmatic function of language games must also be analysed, which means suspending the semantically-oriented prohibition against the self-reference of the speech act. Only in this way does one find oneself in a position to recognize the denial of the specifically philosophical claim to universality as a performative contradiction and, to this extent, as the self-suspension of the philosophical language game.⁴¹

As things stand today, Wittgenstein's one-sided and unsatisfactory thematization of the philosophical language game – just like Heidegger's one-sided (forgetfulness of the *logos*) analysis of the facticity of being-in-the-world (as a historically 'thrown projection') has tended to promote a very general confusion concerning the self-understanding of philosophy and to provoke an era of pragmatically inconsistent philosophical statements. I would like to support this with reference to two famous Wittgensteinian theses: the argument against the possibility of a 'private language' and the argument against the possibility of universal doubt in *Über Gewißheit*.

In both cases I am deeply indebted to Wittgenstein's theses. And I would here like to interpret these theses in a transcendently pragmatic fashion – as I have attempted to do elsewhere.⁴² What does this mean?

In the case of the argument against the possibility of a private language, the emphasis should be placed on two points:

(1) It is not possible to talk meaningfully about a person S following a rule – for example, speaking a language – if it is not in principle possible for other subjects – for a community – to control the following of the rule on the basis of public criteria which make it possible for them too to follow the rule, for instance, to enter into communicative relations with the person S.

(2) In addition, the following must also be emphasized. The person S – e.g., the speaker S – must link up with an already existing procedure for rule-following – e.g., an actual language usage. To this extent, one might say, he is in fact subjected to a *factual a priori* and to *historicity*.

These two requirements can be grounded in a pragmatically transcendental manner. Their rejection through arguments which must be capable of eliciting acceptance must lead to a performative contradiction in the argumentative procedure. The latter could not of itself avoid the objection of having, in the course of his argumentative procedure, followed a rule which is in principle private. For in that case he would have suspended the language game of arguing – rather like the one who says (or thinks): ‘Perhaps I am always dreaming.’

So far, so good. But the difficulties with Wittgenstein’s argumentative procedures begin when one asks with him the question who – on the basis of what criterion – decides whether a rule – e.g., addition in arithmetic – has been followed correctly. Two possible answers for Wittgenstein can be distinguished here, even though both will have to be rejected in the end.

(1) The possibility of recurring to the remembered rule-following intentions of individual subjects as the actual states of a possible inner experience. Here Wittgenstein can quite appropriately object that in inner experience no distinction can be established between following the rule correctly and thinking that one has followed the rule correctly. The last of these alternatives can only be subjective, as I have already pointed out earlier.

(2) For Wittgenstein the possibility is also excluded of positing the criterion of validity for following rules with Plato or Frege – or with Karl Popper – as the ideal content of a third world (beyond the material outer world and the subjective world of inner experience). Wittgenstein is always able to object to such a rule-determining Platonism⁴³ that it is by no means clear how the individual subjects of the rule-following procedure are going to relate, or be referred to this ideal criterion without once again recurring to the purely subjective evidence of their inner experience. They cannot have recourse to the ideal rule-following criterion in the same way that one has recourse to a public timetable.

If things are like this however, then what remains of the possible criterion for correct rule-following? Painfully tedious passages in the *Philosophical Investigations* and in the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* are devoted to thought-experiments which show, over and over again, that a rule – e.g., addition – could be followed quite differently from the way that is normally supposed and that these discrepant rule-following procedures cannot be excluded on the grounds that we would be referred to a mental fact pertaining to the intention to follow a rule. How then is it going to be possible to distinguish between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’?

Wolfgang Stegmüller has characterized the calling in question of ‘rule Platonism’ by Wittgenstein as follows: Wittgenstein rejects even that

objectivity which is recognized by mathematical intuitionism. In Wittgenstein's sense one could say:

that, in so far as we have explained the meaning of a logical expression by means of a convention, we should think that such and such must now be recognized as a logical truth or as a logical inference – *this* is once again simply a new form of the platonic myth. . . . It is the belief in a logical 'must', in a logical necessity which forces us even if only in the form of the binding consequences of specific assertions.⁴⁴

If however we are serious about letting go of these presuppositions what possible meaning can it then have to raise questions about the problem of 'rule Platonism' on the plane of philosophical discourse? Surely, at least on this plane, are we not assuming the 'unconstrained constraint' (Habermas) of arguments as an irradicable element?

As a matter of fact, it seems to me that Wittgenstein's point does not consist in saying that I can decide *ad hoc* that 'this sentence or that relation has to be regarded as irrefutable, so that nothing could count as an objection' (Stegmüller), even though it must be conceded that the non-necessity of the criteria of rule-following can be rendered intelligible in the light of 'rule Platonism' in the sense of decisionism. But then in what, according to Wittgenstein, is the *non-arbitrary* basis of the 'criterion' of rule following – e.g., linguistic usage – supposed to consist?

It seems to me that no other answer can be found in Wittgenstein's work than a reference to actual rule-following customs in actual situations in an actual rule-following community – in the same way as his theory of meaning relies, in the final analysis, upon actual linguistic usages under pragmatically determined circumstances. This is, or so it seems, the sense in which such typically obstinate expressions of later Wittgenstein are to be understood: 'this language game is played' (*P.I.*, I, §654); 'this is simply what I do'; or more explicitly: 'If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached the bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do." ' (*P.I.*, I, §217). And finally: 'What has to be accepted, the given is – so one could say – forms of life' (*P.I.*, II, p. 226).

If one takes these communications as ultimate answers a whole series of difficult questions immediately arises. What happens with innovations in the rule-following procedure – in the context of scientific progress for instance, or in an ethical or political context? Is it its correspondence with the actually existing usages of a community which provides the criterion for establishing a consensus over the right way to follow a rule or even over which rule or norm should be followed? Charles Peirce called this the 'method of authority', a method which is superseded by philosophy and science.⁴⁵ Or should the answer to our question even lie

in Wittgenstein's talk about learning through a 'training' (or drill) by way of a 'blind' following of rules? It seems to me that this affirmation of Wittgenstein's can only mean that the learning of rules by children cannot begin with an interpretation (and the equivocation which belongs thereto) since the field for possible rule-interpretations is in principle unlimited and therefore does not lend itself to 'usages' which could be adopted along these lines. In my opinion, on the Wittgensteinian assumption of a learning through 'training', it is in turn not explicable how human children, in distinction from animals, are able to develop a capacity for interpreting and reflecting upon rules which manifests itself in a communicative competence that is not tied down to the linguistic competence of using one's mother language, but consists, for example, in an ability to translate out of one language into another.

The following question, a question which moves beyond the conception of the learning of rule-following, in the sense of the following of an already-existing usage, seems to me to be decisive: is it possible for Wittgenstein to argue that an individual (for example, a scientist or a philosopher or a reformer of customary practices) might be right against everyone else and might be capable of convincing them that his own conception of rule-following is the right one in cases where a dispute arises concerning the right way of following a rule or even concerning the right rule? Unless one is going to observe and describe language games behaviouristically from the outside rather than as intelligible components of a cultural reality in which the describer must be capable of participating, the latter must be possible. And then it is going to be necessary to allow for a relation of reciprocity between a rule-following community and an innovator of new rule-following procedures or between the former and the philosopher who describes language games and life-forms. In which case the same problem arises anew: on the basis of what criterion can one or should one arrive at a consensus over the right rule-following procedure?

Faced with this situation I have, with Charles Peirce, J. Royce and G. H. Mead, fallen back upon the normative conception of an ideal consensus to be established within an ideal and unlimited communicative community, that is, upon the conception of a regulative idea regarding the building up of a consensus over rule-following. In this connection the latter also leads to a regulative Idea regarding the normatively correct meaning of concepts (as for example over the simultaneity of two events or over justice or truth) which, in accordance with the 'pragmatic maxim' of Peirce, has to be tried out first in thought-experiments and therefore does not have to be reducible to actually existing linguistic usage even though it has to stand in relation to the latter. So it has to be emphasized that there would also have to be publicly accessible criteria for the establishment of a consensus in any post-conventional situation in which

a consensus had to be established (experimental evidence, logical coherence and incoherence or even requirements or interests which could be transformed into morally valid claims) and this whether we are talking about scientific language-rulings or extensions of knowledge or a matter of the practical founding or application of norms. Such criteria would never be sufficient in themselves to build up a consensus. However, in the context of an experience which could be brought under the regulative principle of an ideal consensus, they could furnish the basis for a preliminary consensus, as also for a calling in question of any actual consensus with a view to arriving at a better solution to relevant problems.⁴⁶

But this transcendently pragmatic way out seems in the end not to be reconcilable with Wittgenstein's suggestions. In any case, this is the impression one gets when one tries to understand the convergence between the historical efficacy of Wittgenstein's thinking and the American neo-pragmatism of our times. Richard Rorty has done us the service of openly drawing all those radically relativistic and historically bound consequences of the thinking of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, which consequences are ordinarily only drawn in a marginal way. I mean such consequences as the denial of all universal (and if possible also transcendently founded) criteria of philosophical discourse and also the ethically relevant thesis with regard to the necessity of falling back upon the only available basis for a consensus, namely, that of a contingent life-form, for example the political and cultural tradition of America.⁴⁷ Fortunately, it is a matter here of a tradition which, in distinction from the politico-cultural tradition of the Nazis in Germany, itself goes back to an institutional foundation which has not betrayed its philosophical legitimation with reference to universally valid principles, those of the rights of man. In this way Rorty is able to avoid the philosophical call to universal criteria of rectitude with reference to a political allegiance to rights already institutionalized in the American constitution; with the result that only the pragmatic inconsistency of the philosophical thesis – itself obviously claiming universal validity – that in a philosophical discussion one can only fall back upon a contingent basis for establishing a consensus remains indicative of the paradox inherent in this understanding of Wittgenstein.

The paradox of an understanding of Wittgenstein which relies upon an actual 'usage', for example a 'life-form', which is even more crass than that of Rorty is to be found in the Norwegian philosopher Viggo Rossvaer. For the latter has advanced the thesis that one can see – in so far as one has been taught to see by Wittgenstein – that in a certain sense even the SS in Auschwitz could have been observing the 'categorical imperative'.⁴⁸ This argument is supported by the claim that Wittgenstein has shown that the concept of a rule only becomes meaningful in conjunction with the appropriate application within the context of an

actual life-form; to elaborate: the meaning of a rule is not given in a *counter-factual anticipation of a possible practice* which can be represented as the correct application of the rule in Peirce's sense.

It is perfectly obvious that the understanding of Wittgenstein illustrated above actually operates a suspension of the good sense of anything that might be called a rule – and especially any meaningful moral norm. For the latter are clearly only there – at least upon the plane of a *post-conventional* human culture – to provide a point of orientation for the practice, and that means: calling forth in advance and legitimizing a comportment in conformity with the rule through an application appropriate to the situation. One often has the impression with Wittgenstein that the post-conventional function of rules and norms has to be traced back to just such conventions and usages which always already preclude any possible explication and justification of the normative meaning of rules. And this fits in well with the conservative and populist tendency (inherent in the idea of a therapeutic philosophy) to suppose that in the life-world prior to philosophical clarification and its artificially constructed and so irresolvable pseudo-problems everything is already in order, both with respect to language usages which are intricately bound up with a *life-praxis* as also with respect to what Hegel would have called 'naively substantialized moral conventions'.⁴⁹

It is admittedly – perhaps – possible to interpret the ultimacy Wittgenstein attributes to language games (or the practice of a life-form which upholds them) in another sense. And this second interpretation can, in particular, be supported by the last writings *On Certainty* where statements can be found such as the following:

Any proof, any validation or invalidation of a claim already takes place within a system. This system is not a more or less arbitrary and dubious starting point for all our reasonings. Rather it belongs to the very essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure as rather the vital element of the argument.

(Aphorism 105)

Here it is once again pertinent to think about a transcendental-pragmatic interpretation of the impossibility of going beyond or behind the language games constitutive of *philosophical argumentation*, and in particular: the paradigmatic certainty of those presuppositions whose denial inevitably leads to the suspension of the philosophical language game. As a matter of fact, interpretations are to be found which do adhere to such a conception.⁵⁰ However, it seems to me today that they cannot be presented as Wittgensteinian interpretations, for the simple reason that Wittgenstein never reflected upon (and indeed never noticed) the difference in principle between those life-forms which are always presented in

the plural and so as already contingently relativized and the discursive language game of philosophy itself in which a relativization of the many contingent life-forms, together with that paradigmatic certainty which belongs to them, can be carried through. It is therefore more plausible to conclude with Peter Strawson that Wittgenstein's argumentative procedure in *On Certainty* is to be understood as 'soft naturalism' and, to this extent, as the de-transcendentalized substitute for the foundational claims of transcendental argumentation.⁵¹ The point would then be the following, that in place of the foundational claims of transcendental philosophy it would become apparent that it is simply unavoidable that certain presuppositions of the argumentative procedure (together with the life-*praxis* that goes along with them) should be presented as certain.

Many people today would be pleased with this. They would like to see an alternative to a transcendently pragmatic foundation for philosophy – even for Ethics. However it does seem to me that, with Strawson (who has given his assent to this view), the decisive objection against such a substitution thesis has been voiced. For any philosophy which adopts a practical standpoint the task remains of distinguishing between the universally valid presuppositions of its critically reflective language game – the argumentative discourse – and the purely contingent, historically conditioned presuppositions which make up the background of the life-world, that is, of the many and various life-forms.

But for those who in a certain sense belong to a given life-form (e.g., a given language game) the latter would also furnish an *ultimate bedrock*. To be sure, it is only in a historically factual sense (in Collingwood's sense) that they are ultimate. On the other hand, since the philosophical enlightenment in Greece and again in modern times, they are already relativized by philosophical discourse as non-ultimate. Only those presuppositions – presuppositions of the entire argumentative procedure – are in a strict and methodologically relevant sense ultimate which function in the self-reflective language game of philosophy as conditions of the possibility of the relativization of all specific life-forms and which, in so far as they must still be presupposed cannot be challenged along with the condemnation of the performative contradiction involved in philosophical argumentation; as, for example, the presupposition that in any argumentative discourse a whole series of claims to validity are always going to make themselves known, and amongst these are the universal claims to validity and consensual legitimacy of certain basic moral norms.⁵²

It is easy to see today that it is no longer possible to found a concrete life-form (e.g., some form of customary morality in Hegel's sense or even any recommendation for the individual realization of the good life) on the basis of such universally valid presuppositions of philosophical discourse alone. The only ultimately founded and universally valid

discursive principles are those which are formal and procedural, which, as such, moreover establish limiting conditions for the complementary task of realizing the good life with respect to concrete, historically-evolved life-forms. On the basis of this complementarity thesis, a tendency inspired by Wittgenstein and/or Heidegger, a tendency shared by so many contemporary philosophers such as P. Winch, late Rawls, Rorty, Williams and MacIntyre, a tendency which consists in understanding moral norms simply as the reflective convictions of a historically contingent life-form, this tendency not merely becomes intelligible but begins to betray its limitations.

What seems to me to be decisive here is the assumption of the unavoidable complementarity of the ultimate presuppositions of philosophical discourse, on the one hand, and the contingent presuppositions which lie at the root of concrete life-forms, on the other. From the standpoint of the philosophical presuppositions of Wittgenstein and Heidegger such an assumption does not seem to me to be possible. In both cases it is obstructed by a certain forgetfulness of the *logos*, that is, a reflective deficiency with regard to their own intellectual and argumentative presuppositions. With Wittgenstein this leads quite obviously to a tendency to confuse his own philosophical language game with the descriptively objectifiable and, at the same time, contingently relativized language games – together with the concrete life-forms which underlie them. With Heidegger it leads to a deliberate overstepping of the philosophically universal validation of his own claims in favour of a hermeneutics of the facticity of understanding being-in-the-world; and this means in *Being and Time*: the temporality and historicity of ‘thrown projection’. In the late work it goes even further in the direction of a total historicism, a reduction of the philosophical *logos* itself to an epochal event in the history of being. As was mentioned earlier, so-called post-modernism latches on at this point to a thinking which starts out from the standpoint of an ‘alternative to reason’.

I hardly need to emphasize that I find in this outcome of the historical impact of two outstanding thinkers of this century the signs of a dangerous crisis in philosophy. Instead of moving towards a critique of meaning and a hermeneutical clarification of the presuppositions of philosophical and scientific thinking that would deepen and complete the previous phases of philosophical enlightenment and critical thinking, we seem to be moving towards a paralysis of post-conventional reason. The reflective concern for the rationality of argumentative discourse, a concern which lies at the root of both philosophy and science and which even today still links them together, this concern is (to the extent that there is any awareness of it left at all) understood to be just a reflex reaction left over from a contingent ‘usage’ or a hangover from a ‘metaphysical’ epoch

in the history of being. 'What people accept as a justification – is shewn by how they think and live' (*P.I.*, I, §325). Indeed!

Translated by Christopher Macann

Notes

1 Cf. K.-O. Apel, *Transformation der Philosophie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973), Bd. I, Part II.

2 Cf., *ibid.*, SS. 247ff., 269f., 272ff.

3 Cf. here also K.-O. Apel, 'Die Herausforderung der totalen Vernunftkritik und das Programm einer philosophischen Theorie der Rationalitätstypen', in *Concordia*, 11 (1987), pp. 2–23.

4 Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, tr. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), I, §§138–242, also §§243–363.

5 *ibid.*, §265.

6 *ibid.*, §202.

7 Peter F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense* (London: Methuen, 1966), pp. 125ff.

8 *ibid.*, pp. 247ff.

9 Cf. E. K. Specht, *Der Analogiebegriff bei Kant und Hegel* (Köln, 1952 (Kantstudien, Erg.-Hefte, Vol. 55)).

10 Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Halle: Niemeyer), tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson as *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 213 (H. 169).

11 *ibid.*, p. 207 (H. 163).

12 *ibid.*, §26.

13 *ibid.*, p. 248 (H. 204ff.).

14 See I. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, tr. Norman Kemp-Smith as *The Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Macmillan, 1929), B 275, p. 244.

15 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 249 (H. 205).

16 *ibid.*, p. 160 (H. 123).

17 *ibid.*, p. 162 (H. 125).

18 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 119 (H. 86).

19 *ibid.*, p. 201 (H. 158).

20 Cf. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, I, §§1–60.

21 Cf. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 105 (H. 75), p. 147 (H. 112), p. 190 (H. 149).

22 Cf. here Erich Rothacker's book *Zur Genealogie des menschlichen Bewußtseins* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1966).

23 Cf. G. Böhme (ed.), *Protophysik* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976).

24 Cf. G. H. von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), chap. II; also K.-O. Apel, *Die Erklären: Verstehen-Kontroverse in transzendental-pragmatischer Sicht*, tr. G. Harnke as *Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984), pp. 57ff. and pp. 83ff.

25 Cf. M. Heidegger, 'Die Frage nach der Technik', in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen, 1954).

26 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 272 (H. 229).

27 *ibid.*, p. 269 (H. 226).

28 Cf. here K.-O. Apel, 'Sinnkonstitution und Geltungsrechtfertigung. Heidegger und das Problem der Transzendentalphilosophie', in Forum für Philosophie Bad Homburg (eds), *Martin Heidegger: Innen und Außensichten* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989), pp. 131–75.

29 Cf. R. Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982).

30 Cf. K.-O. Apel, *Der Denkweg von Charles S. Peirce, Eine Einführung in den amerikanischen Pragmatismus* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1975), tr. J. Krois as *Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism* (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981).

31 Cf. E. Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*, tr. David Carr as *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

32 Cf. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

33 Cf. here M. Masterman, 'The nature of paradigm' in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 59–89.

34 Cf. L. Wittgenstein, *Schriften* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1960ff.), Bd. I, p. 536.

35 This is the sense in which Peter Winch first interpreted Wittgenstein's philosophy. See *The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).

36 Cf. M. Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen, 1969), pp. 76ff.

37 H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1960), pp. 344ff.

38 Cf. B. L. Whorf, *Sprache, Denken, Wirklichkeit* (Reinbeck: Rowohlt, 1963). Also H. Gipper, *Gibt es ein sprachliches Relativitätsprinzip?* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1972).

39 Cf. here W. Kuhlmann, 'Reflexive Letzbegründung. Zur These von der Unhintergebarkeit der Argumentationssituation', in *Ztschr. f. Philosoph. Forschung*, 35 (1981), pp. 2–26.

40 It should not be overlooked that the penetrating distinction made in the *Tractatus* between what can be said and what can only be shown – the logical form of language and of the world – relies upon a transcendental and mystico-metaphysical transformation of Russell's theory of types. In the paradox of the self-suspension of the *Tractatus* only the pragmatic inconsistency – the performative self-contradiction – of the theory of types is reproduced, an inconsistency which can now be reformulated in a meta-language which could not have been foreseen and which holds for all signs.

41 Cf. here K.-O. Apel, 'Fallibilismus, Konsenstheorie der Wahrheit und Letztbegründung', in *Philosophie und Begründung*, ed. Forum für Philosophie Bad Homburg (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987), pp. 116–211, 130ff., 174ff.

42 Cf. here K.-O. Apel, 'Das Problem der philosophischen Letztbegründung im Lichte einer transzendentalen Sprachpragmatik', in B. Kanitscheider (ed.), *Sprache und Erkenntnis* (Innsbruck, 1976), pp. 55–82; tr. as 'The problem of philosophical transcendental grounding in the light of a transcendental pragmatics of language' in *Man and World*, 8 (1975), pp. 239–75, reproduced in K. Baynes et al. (eds), *After Philosophy: End or Transformation?* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 250–90.

43 Cf. here W. Stegmüller's reconstruction of Wittgenstein's 'Philosophy of logic and mathematics', in *Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie* (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1969), pp. 673ff.

44 *ibid.*, 685ff.

45 Charles S. Peirce, 'The function of belief', collected papers, ed. C. Hartshorne and R. Heiss (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931–5), vol. V, §§58–387.

46 Cf. here my work cited under note 41; also 'Linguistic meaning and intentionality', in G. Deledalle (ed.), *Semiotics and Pragmatics* (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamin PC, 1989), pp. 19–70.

47 Cf. finally R. Rorty. 'The priority of democracy to philosophy', in M. Peterson and R. Vaughan (eds), *The Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), and *idem*, 'Pragmatism and philosophy', in K. Baynes *et al.* (eds), *After Philosophy: End or Transformation?*, pp. 26–66. Cf. also my argument with Rorty in K.-O. Apel, *Diskurs und Verantwortung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988) pp. 394ff.

48 Cf. V. Rossvaer, 'Transzendentalpragmatik, transzendente Hermeneutik und die Möglichkeit, Auschwitz zu verstehen', in D. Böhler, T. Nordenstam and G. Skirbekk (eds), *Die pragmatische Wende* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), pp. 187–201.

49 In my paper 'Wittgenstein und das Problem des hermeneutischen Verstehens' (1966), reprinted in *Towards a Transformation of Philosophy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), I have already advanced the thesis that late Dilthey's distinction between 'pragmatic' and 'methodological-hermeneutical understanding' opened the way for an important critical re-evaluation of Wittgenstein's contribution to the theory of understanding. Today I would want to give this point even greater emphasis, as follows: Wittgenstein's clarification of understanding seems to reach just as far as Dilthey's concept of 'pragmatic understanding', for which Dilthey, just like Wittgenstein, adopted as his criterion of validation factual agreement in a comportmental *praxis* (e.g., in a 'common sphere' of work). According to Dilthey however, the conditions of the possibility and the criteria of validity are precisely not made available in this way for a – I would like to say: post-conventional, e.g., post-traditionalist – 'methodological understanding' of 'hermeneutics', for instance, for the understanding of foreign cultures or documents stemming from one's own culture from which one has become estranged. Here, where the hermeneutical reflection upon post-Enlightenment culture took its start, it is not possible to adopt the factual agreement in comportmental *praxis* as a sufficient criterion for reciprocal understanding (otherwise, it would have to be admitted that the members of a particular community understood each other better in every respect than any researcher could ever possibly do). Worse, it cannot even be assumed that the methodological-hermeneutical understanding of a foreign life-form (at the limit, the quasi-hermeneutical understanding of the behaviour of a pride of lions which does not even assume that the lions are capable of language!) suffices for a clear recognition of any such factual agreement with the comportmental *praxis* of the life-form in question (this would exclude a critical understanding from the very outset). In any case, this post-conventional, critically hermeneutical understanding would have to recognize a counter-factual ideal for the communicative understanding of differing forms of *praxis* in an ideal 'interpretative community' (J. Royce). Moreover, in the course of a hermeneutical discussion with the representatives of other life-forms, it would also have to be assumed that there existed sufficient agreement with regard to the normative conditions for an understanding of the differences implicit in the life-form. Cf. here also K.-O. Apel: 'Szientismus oder transzendental Hermeneutik?', in *Transformation der Philosophie*, Bd. II, pp. 178–219. Also in *Towards a Transformation of Philosophy*.

50 Cf. for example my paper cited under note 42.

51 Cf. Peter Strawson, *Scepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties* (London: Methuen, 1985); also the excellent work of M. Niquet, *Transzendente Sinnkritik. Untersuchungen zum Problem transzendentaler Argumente* (Frankfurt University: Ph.D. dissertation, 1989, forthcoming with Suhrkamp).

52 Cf. J. Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981), Bd. I–III, and also *Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983). I have to admit I am bothered by the proposal (inspired by Wittgenstein) for a solution to the problem on page 108 of the last-mentioned work. Cf. here K.-O. Apel: 'Normative Begründung der "Kritischen Theorie" durch Rekurs auf lebensweltliche Sittlichkeit? Ein transzendental pragmatisch orientierte Versuch, mit Habermas gegen Habermas zu denken', in A. Honeth (ed.), *Zwischenbetrachtungen. Festschrift für J. Habermas* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989), pp. 15–65 (English tr. forthcoming with Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press).

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Critical Assessments

Edited by Christopher Macann

VOLUME IV: REVERBERATIONS

First published 1992
by Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
a division of Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc.
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Selection and editorial material © 1992 Routledge
Individual chapters © 1992 the respective authors

Phototypeset in 10/12pt Times by
Intype, London
Printed in Great Britain by
TJ Press (Padstow) Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Martin Heidegger: critical assessments.
I. Macann, Christopher
193

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Martin Heidegger: critical assessments/edited by Christopher
Macann.
p. cm.—(Routledge critical assessments of leading philosophers)
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Heidegger, Martin, 1889–1976. I. Macann, Christopher E.
II. Series.
B3279.H49M2854 1992
193—dc20 91–46751

ISBN 0–415–04982–2

Contents

VOLUME IV: REVERBERATIONS

| | |
|---|-----|
| Acknowledgements | ix |
| Introduction | 1 |
| <i>Christopher Macann</i> | |
| 49 Heidegger and the thing | 17 |
| <i>Jean-Pierre Faye</i> | |
| 50 Heidegger's Nazism and the French debate | 33 |
| <i>Tom Rockmore</i> | |
| 51 Philosophy and politics: by way of Martin Heidegger | 78 |
| <i>Joseph Margolis</i> | |
| 52 The shadow of this thinking | 104 |
| <i>Dominique Janicaud</i> | |
| 53 Heidegger's Nietzsche and the Third Reich | 135 |
| <i>Endre Kiss</i> | |
| 54 Heidegger and the Imperial question | 145 |
| <i>Eliane Escoubas</i> | |
| 55 Fundamental ontology and political interlude: Heidegger as Rector of the University of Freiburg | 159 |
| <i>István Fehér</i> | |
| 56 Authenticity and Heidegger's challenge to ethical theory | 198 |
| <i>Douglas Kellner</i> | |
| 57 Who is Dasein? Towards an ethics of authenticity | 214 |
| <i>Christopher Macann</i> | |
| 58 The place of the work of art in the age of technology | 247 |
| <i>Kathleen Wright</i> | |
| 59 Heidegger's poetics: the question of mimesis | 267 |
| <i>John Sallis</i> | |

| | | |
|----|--|-----|
| 60 | Heidegger, madness and well-being <i>Charles E. Scott</i> | 279 |
| 61 | Heidegger, the possible and God <i>Richard Kearney</i> | 299 |
| 62 | Heidegger and the new images of science <i>Theodore Kisiel</i> | 325 |
| 63 | Heidegger and the physical sciences <i>Catherine Chevalley</i> | 342 |
| 64 | On the origin of nihilism – in view of the problem of technology and karma <i>Akihiro Takeichi</i> | 365 |
| 65 | Heidegger and Japanese thought: how much did he know and when did he know it? <i>Graham Parkes</i> | 377 |
| 66 | Does the saving power also grow? Heidegger's last paths <i>Otto Pöggeler</i> | 407 |

Acknowledgements

Jean-Pierre Faye 'Heidegger and the thing'. Original piece written for this collection and printed by kind permission of the author.

Tom Rockmore 'Heidegger's Nazism and the French debate'. Original piece written for this collection and printed by kind permission of the author.

Joseph Margolis 'Philosophy and politics: by way of Martin Heidegger'. Original piece written for this collection and printed by kind permission of the author.

Dominique Janicaud 'The shadow of this thinking'. First published by Editions Jérôme Millon, Grenoble as two chapters of *L'ombre de cette pensée* by Dominique Janicaud. Two sections of 'La politique introuvable', translated by Pierre Adler, are reprinted by kind permission of *Social Research* in conjunction with a translation of 'Le dernier cercle' by Christopher Macann.

Endre Kiss 'Heidegger's Nietzsche and the Third Reich'. Translated from the German by Christopher Macann and reprinted by kind permission of the author.

Eliane Escoubas 'Heidegger and the Imperial question'. First published by the Collège Internationale de Philosophie, 1988 as 'Heidegger: la question romaine, la question impériale autour du "tournant"', and translated by Philip Leider. Reprinted by kind permission of the author and the translator.

István Fehér 'Fundamental ontology and political interlude: Heidegger as Rector of the University of Freiburg'. First published by Westview Press in *From Knowledge and Politics* (ed. Dascal and Gruengard), 1989 and reprinted by kind permission of the author and of Westview Press.

Douglas Kellner 'Authenticity and Heidegger's challenge to ethical theory'. First published by the University of Oklahoma Press in *Thinking about Being* (ed. J. N. Mohanty), 1984. Reprinted by kind permission of the author who wishes to state that he has since changed his position.

Christopher Macann 'Who is Dasein? Towards an ethics of authenticity'. Original piece written for this collection.

Kathleen Wright 'The place of the work of art in the age of technology'. First published in the *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 22, no. 4, 1984 and reprinted by kind permission of the author and editor.

John Sallis 'Heidegger's poetics: the question of mimesis'. First published in *Gedächtnisschrift zum 100 Geburtstag von Martin Heidegger* (ed. W. Biemel and F.-W. v. Herrmann) V.-Klostermann, Frankfurt, 1989 and reprinted by kind permission of the author and editors.

Charles E. Scott 'Heidegger, madness and well-being'. First published in the *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 4, no. 3, 1973 and reprinted in *Thinking about Being* (ed. J. N. Mohanty), University of Oklahoma Press, 1984. Reprinted by kind permission of the author and editor.

Richard Kearney 'Heidegger, the possible and God'. First published by Grasset, Paris, 1981 in *Heidegger et la question de Dieu* (ed. R. Kearney and J. O'Leary) and reprinted by kind permission of the author and editors.

Theodore Kisiel 'Heidegger and the new images of science'. First published in *Research in Phenomenology* (ed. J. Sallis), vol. 7, 1977 and reprinted by kind permission of the author and editor.

Catherine Chevalley 'Heidegger and the physical sciences'. First published in *Les Etudes philosophiques*, no. 3, 1990 and translated by Christopher Macann. Reprinted by kind permission of the author.

Akihiro Takeichi 'On the origin of nihilism – in view of the problem of technology and karma'. First published in an English translation in *Heidegger and Asian Thought* (ed. G. Parkes) University of Hawaii Press, 1987 and reprinted by kind permission of the author, the editor and the University of Hawaii Press.

Graham Parkes 'Heidegger and Japanese thought: how much did he know and when did he know it?' Original piece written for this collection and published by kind permission of the author.

Otto Pöggeler 'Does the saving power also grow? Heidegger's last paths'. Translated from the German by Henry Pickford and reprinted by kind permission of the author and translator.

Introduction

Christopher Macann

It is in times of great danger
that philosophers appear.

(Friedrich Nietzsche, *Grossoktavausgabe* X, 112)

The term adopted to christen this fourth and final volume of the four volume set dedicated to the thinking of Martin Heidegger is Janus faced: *Reverberations*. In the double sense of implications, applications, receptions, repercussions, etc., on the one hand, and, on the other linguistic resonances. The dynamic of the word, which is the verb, a work in the world.

Of all four volumes this was the one whose field was least circumscribed in advance and of whose contents I could therefore be least certain. Like Topsy, 'it just grewed' – in response to the priorities of my contributors rather than those of their editor. My original intention was to employ this volume as a general catchment for such less clearly defined parameters of Heidegger's thinking as his aesthetics (Wright/Sallis), his theology – or the theological implications of his philosophy (Kearney O'Leary), his psychology – or the psychological implications of his philosophy (Scott), his ethics – or the ethical implications of his thinking (Kellner/Macann), his impact on science (Kisiel/Chevalley), his reflections on technology (Takeichi), his reception in Japan (Parkes) as well as his political involvement. For reasons which have, no doubt, much to do with the controversy aroused by Farias' book, a controversy which shows no signs of abating, at least for the time being, this fourth volume has become dominated by the political question (Faye/Rockmore/Margolis/Janicaud/Kiss/Feher/Escoubas).

Until quite recently I knew next to nothing about the political side of Heidegger's life and work. And what little I knew (the Spiegel article, the existence of the Farias book, then the Ott response and so on) dic

not prompt me to press the investigation further – but for reasons which are perhaps somewhat unconventional. It has always seemed to me that the debate about ‘Heidegger and politics’ is neither philosophical (Heidegger had little to offer in the way of a political philosophy) nor political (he was by nature and temperament one of the least political of individuals) but *moral*.

And this presents me with a moral dilemma. On the one hand, I would not wish to say anything which might be taken to imply a diminishment, let alone a suspension, of the moral responsibility of a philosopher, either towards himself, towards the discipline which he represents in person, or towards others. However, twenty years of professional life within the framework of the university have led me to the conclusion that morality plays but a small part in the calculations of the professional philosopher. So that a great part of what passes for a moral assessment by philosophers of Heidegger’s political involvement cannot but appear as ‘moralizing’ – in the worst sense of that word.

But that is not the worst of it by any means. For one of the most self-defeating effects of the moral condemnation directed against Heidegger has certainly been to divert attention away from the many ills that abound in the university world, the very ills which give the ‘moralizing’ a hypocritical flavour; with the result that with the ‘Heidegger and politics’ controversy we often seem to be facing a phenomenon of ‘scapegoatism’ (a phenomenon which, I need hardly remind the reader, played a very large part in the rise of the Nazi party) – the tendency to project upon a self-styled adversary qualities one would rather not see in oneself in order precisely that one should not have to come to terms with these same qualities in oneself.

Sartre coined the term ‘bad faith’ to deal with phenomena of this kind. But if anything, this goes further than Sartrean ‘bad faith’. For Sartrean ‘bad faith’ was set up as a ploy adopted to *evade* responsibility. But what we are confronted with here is an *assumption* of responsibility which has become officially legitimized and which can therefore not merely be used to give professional philosophers the *impression* of assuming an ethical stance but do so in such a way that any further discussion about the ethicality of the profession is thereby suspended.

‘Scapegoatism’ of the kind indicated above would be a triple disaster. First, it would postpone the task of *critical self-analysis* and, moreover, would be specifically intended to do so – in short, it would work *against* the spirit of what Heidegger claimed he intended with his Rectoral address: ‘Die Selbstbehauptung der Universität’.¹ Second, it would give contemporary philosophers a feeling of *moral superiority* where in fact there might well be grounds for deploring what often seems to me an unprecedented decline in ethical standards within the university world, explained in part perhaps by the ease with which less qualified persons

were able to slip into the system in the halcyon days of the 1960s. And third, a displaced condemnation of this kind might lead philosophers to overlook not merely the *intellectual* merits of Heidegger's thinking but those other sides of his thinking in which he struggled to evoke the *spiritual* resources which might perhaps suffice to stem a decline of which he was himself well aware. In his *Introduction to Metaphysics*, a text in which we find the supposedly 'notorious' reference to the 'inner truth and greatness' of the National Socialist movement, we also find the following passage: 'The spiritual decline of the earth is so far advanced that the nations are in danger of losing the last bit of spiritual energy that makes it possible to see the decline and to appraise it as such.'²

If the singular case of Martin Heidegger's practical excursion is to bear fruit it can only be from the standpoint of a reflection upon the place of the philosopher in the only world in which the philosopher can be practically effective – the university world. Heidegger's temporary involvement in the political processes of his day cannot even be explained away as professional naivety, since countless other, supposedly far more worldly-wise, authorities were also misled into thinking that they too could 'lead the leader'. When Hitler was made Hindenberg's Chancellor, the exalted eminence of one of Germany's greatest military leaders was supposed to be sufficient to keep the young man under control. Schleicher and Papen grossly underestimated Hitler's political capacities, which included setting each against the other. When the Thyssens and the Krupps made financial deals with Hitler, it was assumed that the young upstart would be no match for the power of Germany's wealthiest industrialists. The Pope signed a Concordat with Hitler, assuming that this would confer some measure of protection upon the Catholic church in Germany. And abroad, when Hitler was appointed to the Chancellorship, the major powers did not hesitate to recognize the legitimacy of his position, as Heidegger himself pointed out in his *Spiegel* interview,³ and indeed *deliberately* turned a blind eye on what was going in Germany right up until the Second World War, and this despite frequent and renewed reports of atrocities. Heidegger's 'error' was an error to which most of those who might have done something to correct the situation, had they acted in time and in concert, seem to have been equally susceptible, and this whether we are talking about Germans or about foreign nationals.

I shall therefore leave it to my contributors to discuss the *philosophy of politics*. I, for my part, should like to use this Introduction to raise a different, though related, question: *the politics of philosophy*.

In a piece on Heidegger and Jaspers which I have not had room to publish, Tom Rockmore writes:

It is reasonable to expect that a philosopher be held to a higher

standard than the average person, for virtually since the inception of the ancient Greek philosophical tradition philosophers have maintained that philosophy offers a deeper, in fact incomparable insight into the nature of reality.⁴

There are indeed good reasons why these kinds of expectations should be entertained. First, a large number of great philosophers have been persons of very considerable moral stature, even when this ethical integrity only manifested itself in a relatively undramatic way. Socrates' personal integrity has been cast in an unforgettably dramatic mould. But the quietist piety of a Descartes, a Spinoza or a Kant, would hardly have attracted much attention at the time even though, at the very least, it does most certainly attest to an impressive rejection of the worldly seductions of wealth, power or influence. More recently, philosophers such as Russell and Sartre have left their readers in no doubt about the political responsibility of the philosopher and have devoted considerable time and energy to defending the political causes in which they believed.

Second, ethics (or what has sometimes been called the 'moral sciences') has, for reasons which relate to the genesis of this discipline, been assigned to philosophy and has come to constitute a specific province of philosophical enquiry – along with logic, epistemology, aesthetics, metaphysics and so on. To be sure, considerable efforts have been made in recent years to reduce the *moral* import of ethics. In the analytic tradition, the tendency to transform ethics into a matter of conceptual clarification or the assessment of the epistemological status of ethical theories has done much to neutralize the *moral* implications of the discipline while, on the continental side, it is not even clear that ethics still constitutes a distinct branch of philosophy, and for reasons which have something to do with the Heideggerian influence. And yet, as Heidegger made perfectly clear in his later deliberations, the species finds itself today at an unprecedentedly critical crossroads, which leads *either* in the direction of technological destruction *or* in the direction of a transformation of our very being-relation. And such a transformation, I would argue, cannot but be ethical in character.

Third, and because ethics has traditionally been regarded as a province of philosophy, it is the philosopher who is called upon to teach the discipline of ethics in the classroom. And not only in the classroom. In America, and elsewhere, ethics is currently becoming a fashionable subject, with a proliferation of new courses on business ethics, medical ethics, sexual ethics, etc., courses which are often sponsored by businesses themselves and offered to their employees on the premises in a desperate attempt to stem the disastrous financial and economic consequences of fraud on a scale never before seen.

In principle this supposition is not unreasonable. In practice however,

it attests to a naive extension of the conventional *technological* conception of the relation of theory and practice – practice as the application of theory. The accomplished student of computer science is indeed the man to employ in the solution of practical computer problems since *knowing* usually does lead to *doing* in a way which is not complicated by extraneous considerations. But in the moral sciences the relation is much more complex. However one may applaud, in principle, the Platonic conception of the relation (whereby ‘knowing the good’ implies ‘doing the good’), it is difficult not to note the difficulties attending such a conception in the actual circumstances of life. First, *knowing the good* may, and indeed usually does, call for action *contrary* to the interests of the agent (and if one is a Kantian, this conflict will precisely attest to the genuinely ethical character of the action in question). It is this ‘price to be paid’ which acts as a deterrent to any effective application of the ‘right’ course of action. Second, so far from it being the case that those most capable of knowing the good actually *do* do the good, it is, in my experience, the simpler and more integral natures who are usually most responsive to the claims of morality, while the ‘cleverer’ and more ‘educated’ natures will always be able to find some ‘good’ reason for evading these claims.

Third, in the ethical sphere, *doing* is bound up with *being* in a way that has no parallel in the technical sphere or the sphere of practical efficacy. It is certainly the business of philosophy to investigate this extremely complex relation with a view to determining how knowledge of the good can be so presented as to result in a transformation of the very being of the one to whom this knowledge is transmitted. For, in the end, doing the good will never be more than a pragmatic maxim unless it emanates from a nature which is good in its very being, that is, in its intrinsic constitution. Precisely because, in the ethical sphere, the relation between knowing, being and doing is extremely complex, the only ultimately convincing proof is *proof by example*.³ It is for this reason that the very least that can be expected from philosophers is that those professionally qualified and duly appointed to *teach* the discipline of ethics exhibit, in their day-to-day behaviour as professionals, *conduct* which meets and matches the principles taught in the classroom. To insist upon this is to do no more than to endorse the time-honoured maxim: *Practice what you preach!*

In the course of twenty years of professional life I have witnessed a range of practices I never thought to see in an academic environment. Most of these practices can be brought under a rubric which forms the topic of the first two books of Plato’s *Republic*, and against which Plato has Socrates strenuously labour throughout this, his longest and most complete, dialogue: *Justice is the interest of the stronger!* Together with its collateral maxims: In a position of institutional weakness, do whatever

the *strong require*. In a position of institutional strength, do whatever you want; in the knowledge that what you want is what you will be able to get, thanks to the overt or covert complicity of the other, 'weaker' members of the institution, who can be counted on to 'know' where their best interests lie. Since, in a normal university framework, weakness turns to strength of its own accord as you climb the steps of the institutional ladder, what this maxim in fact enjoins is the 'worldly wisdom' of initially suppressing any moral scruples you might have with regard to policies adopted by your 'superiors' with a view to soliciting the support of those who can help you to positions of strength in which you yourself will also eventually be able to enjoy the same immunity from scrupulous resistance to your own self-interested action.

In his article on the 'Ethics of authenticity' Kellner summarizes Heidegger's position as follows:

Heidegger claims that in everyday behaviour most people are not aware of their unique potentiality for individuality or of their possible authenticity, and have not chosen their own possibilities. In his [Heidegger's] view, calculating where one stands in the social hierarchy and concern for one's social status puts one in subjection to the other. For in order to maintain one's standing, one must do what *'they'* approve of, praise, command and require, and refrain from socially disapproved or forbidden behaviour. In this way, one submits to an often subtle and unnoticed domination by the norms and conventions of society and forfeits one's own possibilities of thought and action. This submission and bondage to one's social norms, peers and leaders results in an averageness, a levelling down of social behaviour to a certain homogeneity and sameness. In this way, one is disburdened of individuality and responsibility for being-a-self and is accommodated by one's society, rewarded for one's submission. However, 'in these ways of being', Heidegger writes, 'one is in a state of inauthenticity and failure to stand by oneself'.

I have chosen to reproduce this passage at length despite the fact that it does not claim to do more than simply *summarize* the Heideggerian position because it also expresses, to perfection, the kind of behaviour that makes for success in the contemporary academic environment. To make the pertinence of the above-cited summary even more dramatic, it should be noted that where Kellner talks of 'refraining from socially disapproved or forbidden behaviour' he might also have added that this socially disapproved or forbidden behaviour might also be, and often is, behaviour which, by even the most elementary standards, would be ethical in character and its contrary (the socially approved or enjoined) unethical. No doubt it is for this reason that nothing seems to be more

embarrassing to the professional philosopher than the raising of ethical questions in the context of the day-to-day business of academic life.

This unreadiness to let philosophical communication be contaminated by ethical questions belongs to precisely that levelling-down process which Heidegger identified with such perspicuity and attributed to the 'They'. Worse, to the extent that there is an appeal to morality in contemporary Western society at large, it is coming to take on the ever more Heideggerian guise of deliberate, though perhaps not fully self-conscious, concealment. It should not therefore come as a surprise to discover that the very societies who are most outspoken in their defence of the values of law and order, religion, morality, the family, health and sanity and so on and so forth, actually *lead the way* (statistically speaking) in the violation of the very principles they profess to espouse.⁶

Dominique Janicaud in his recent book *L'ombre de cette pensée*,⁷ a chapter of which I am fortunate enough to be able to reproduce in this collection, quite rightly takes Farias and others to task for failing to substantiate the claim that the philosophy of *Being and Time* was in accord with Nazi ideology. I would like to go further and insist that, in my view, few texts have an equivalent power to inspire in the reader resistance to what 'They' require, to call the reader away from lostness in the 'They' and toward an authentic sense of self than those passages of *Being and Time* devoted to an examination of the issue of conscience.

It frequently falls to the lot of a junior professor to be asked to evaluate the work of a colleague in a context in which he 'knows', in advance, what is expected of him by the institution he serves or rather by those who temporarily occupy the leading positions in that institution. He 'knows' that 'They' want negative or positive assessments (depending on whether or not 'They' want to dismiss or retain the individual in question). And he may very well also 'know' that this assessment has little or no bearing on the intrinsic quality of the work under review or even upon the intrinsic quality of the person who did the work. And, if he 'knows' what is good for him, he will not let this 'knowledge' arouse in him anything resembling a moral scruple.

But there is more, much much more that he will also 'know' – in that quite specific way in which knowledge happens in the 'They'. He will also 'know' that if a negative judgment is being solicited from him it will be recorded in such a way that his own identity will be carefully concealed. He will 'know' that the greater the discrepancy between the judgment arrived at and the work on which it is supposed to be based, the greater will be the eventual gratitude of those whose intentions and ambitions he will thereby be advancing and that, consequently, even if, perchance, a discrepancy of this kind is brought to light, he will be able to count upon the co-operation of the vast majority of those in the profession to diminish the impact of the discrepancy and so to divert

responsibility for the discrepancy from specific individuals to, at worst, procedural irregularities.

But this by no means exhausts the 'knowledge' available to him through the 'They'. He will also 'know' that even if he supports those whose intention it is to dismiss a colleague and is in turn appropriately rewarded, his relation with the colleague in question will remain on a better footing than if he had supported the colleague and secured thereby his own eventual downfall – and this no matter whether his earlier action was successful or not. For he will 'know' that, in the final analysis, professional friendships are based not upon a recognition of intrinsic human or intellectual qualities but upon a calculation of extrinsic power-political relations. This means that success in institutional terms (no matter what the means employed to obtain this success) will, in the end, prove self-justifying, whereas failure, in institutional terms, even, and even especially, if it follows from a 'resolute' determination to adhere to morally acceptable principles will, in the end, prove self-defeating. For, from the strategically advantageous position of institutional command, violators are capable of legitimizing the steps that led them to their decisions (even, and even especially, if these decisions were clearly illegitimate) while, from the strategically disadvantageous position of institutional marginalization, the victims of such violation will not only find it impossible to get a hearing but will find their actions (and probably also their very persons) represented in a light which justifies the action taken against them; so that, paradoxically, though in complete accord with that logic of 'ambiguity' which prevails within the 'They', the more *morally impeccable* the action in question, the more *morally suspect* the individual will have to be *made to appear* in order to justify the steps taken to neutralize the moral effect of his action.

In every instance, I have put the word 'know' and 'knowledge' or even 'moral' and 'morality' in quotation marks because, as we all know, this 'knowledge' and this 'morality' is never, and can never be, made explicit as such. For only if it is left *implicit* does it become possible to employ the strategy of 'deniability' (so resolutely adhered to by Nixon's Watergate cabinet) or, at least, to leave room for that range of interpretations which is essential to the critical tactic of evasion and ir-responsibility, a tactic in the absence of which the institutional practices in question could not be sustained. I know of no philosopher who has analysed the phenomenon of the a-, or even the im-, moral impact of social and institutional pressure more effectively than Martin Heidegger.

It might seem to be the case that the prevalence of a 'They' self in the academic community was of no greater (nor less) significance than in any other institutional environment – except that, from the very beginning, as mentioned before, philosophers have conceived of themselves as ethical arbiters and therefore, in a special sense, as persons

exceptionally well qualified to dismantle, or at least to cast suspicion upon the dominion of the 'They'. Is it an accident that three of the greatest thinkers of the last hundred years (Marx, Nietzsche and Freud) have frequently been called 'philosophers of suspicion'?⁸ If not, it cannot but be a matter of especial concern to philosophers to discover that the dominion of the 'They' is *more than averagely* prevalent in their own institutional environment, and for the very simple and sheerly *practical* reason that philosophers are today almost entirely dependent upon the university institution for their very survival. Once the Socratic gadfly has become an institutional parasite, a collapse in ethical standards within the profession is almost inevitable.

As I have tried to show in my paper on 'The ethics of authenticity', I believe that, with appropriate modifications, an ethics can be developed out of the critical theme of 'authenticity'. Of course, we know that Heidegger not only disclaimed any intention to develop an ethics but insisted that ethics was a derivative discipline and that therefore any genuinely fundamental analysis must get back to roots which antecede the very possibility of the emergence of ethics as a distinct discipline. This does not militate against the ethical import of Heidegger's doctrine of authenticity (which many critics have interpreted as an ethics, or at least a proto-ethics). But it does help to explain certain theoretical inadequacies inherent in the doctrine itself – and, in particular, the refusal of the transcendental contribution to ethical theorizing.

In a passage from his *Notizen zu Martin Heidegger* (§157)⁹ Jaspers objects: "'Resoluteness", but with respect to what?' What indeed! It is the vacuousness of the principle which constitutes the problem. Heidegger always resisted any attempt to elicit a specification of concrete forms of behaviour which might be in accordance with the principle of 'resoluteness', as transgressing the legitimate sphere of philosophy. And this rejoinder is, in the main, entirely legitimate. But even though such a specification of *concrete forms of behaviour* might have been out of order, still, *Being and Time* might at least have furnished *criteria for determining*, in any given instance, whether a specific form of behaviour did or did not meet the legitimate requirements of resoluteness.

To put the matter in the most dramatic way possible (and surely this must have been at the back of Jaspers' mind), a way which is for historical reasons entirely pertinent to the discussion of 'Heidegger and politics', nobody could possibly fault Hitler on his 'resoluteness', nor even upon the intimate connection between the causes which Hitler espoused and his very own being (his being-toward-death?). It was not his resolute commitment to certain causes (in which he most probably sincerely believed) which is the issue but the nature of those same causes and the manner in which they were pursued. But any evaluation of the causes in question presumes a suspension of the ethical suspension which

Heidegger himself adopted. To put it in the language of a Lévinas, ethics cannot be subordinated to (still less eliminated by) ontology.

Moreover, a careful reading of the contexts in which Heidegger employs the concept of *Eigentlichkeit* (and its related themes) makes it very difficult to sustain the thesis that this concept is evaluatively neutral and has nothing to say with regard to the ethical viability of the authentic individual. *Eigentlichkeit* is that to which *Being and Time* calls the reader. It is Heidegger's *ethics* in that large sense of ethics which made it possible for Spinoza to call his entire ontology an *Ethics*. As such, *Being and Time* remains, to my way of thinking, and subject to all the necessary qualifications, one of the most impressive contributions to ethical philosophy of this century. And yet, as we know, and as the contributors to this volume have amply demonstrated, rarely has a major philosopher been subject to such extensive moral condemnation as Martin Heidegger.

It would be foolish of me to venture upon territory which has been so thoroughly and carefully cultivated in this volume. But I would like to say a word about a very recent, American, attempt to come to terms with the political issue, Richard Wolin's *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger*.¹⁰ I would like to focus on this one instance not so much for its own sake (though it is a persuasive piece of writing) but because it exhibits many of the characteristic, and characteristically naive, prejudices of our times.

Wolin begins by deriving a political critique from cultural elitism. But what culture worth the name has ever been anything other than elitist, the work of 'aristocrats' in that quite specific, original Greek sense of the word in which by the latter (the *aristoi*) was meant the excellent (morally as well as intellectually)? The difference is that whereas in Greek times culture was (and was expected to be) produced by the few it was not produced for the few but for the *entire citizenry*. Greek culture sought to level up not to level down. It is our contemporary culture, with its populist tendencies, which discourages cultural discrimination and which seeks to make money out of the production, sale and consumption of spiritual goods which is truly contemptuous of the people and, in this sense, utterly undemocratic.

Wolin's critique of the undemocratic character of Heidegger's thinking continues with the by now almost standard confusion of authoritarianism with conformism; this despite Tillich's careful differentiation of the two in *The Courage To Be*.¹¹ The difference between authoritarianism and conformism can be brought out very easily in terms of the concept of responsibility. When the Nazi state assumed 'responsibility' for, among other things, the German university world, it led to an authoritarianism which stifled thought (when it did not destroy the lives of thinkers). In the university world with which I am familiar, the seemingly opposite tactic (passing the responsibility on to someone else) often leads to a very

similar result. Decisions are taken and specific individuals are affected by these decisions, often adversely, and often for reasons which can be shown conclusively to have been wrong. And yet *no one* can be found who actually took the decision, so nothing can ever be done to rectify the situation. It was always 'someone else'. And that 'someone else' can never be identified in person, since they have always already taken refuge – in the 'They'.

No philosopher has done more than Heidegger not just to identify and characterize this kind of conformist irresponsibility (which is never more evident than in our larger and more impersonal institutions) but also to expose its hidden strength, the grounds for its almost universal dominion. 'It "was" always the "they" who did it, and yet it can be said that it has been "no one"' (SZ, S. 127). 'Everyone is the other, and no one is himself' (SZ, S. 128). 'And because the "they" constantly accommodates the particular Dasein by disburdening it of its Being, the "they" retains and enhances its stubborn dominion' (ibid.).

The best defence against conformist irresponsibility is, of course, the contention that the alternative (collectivist authoritarianism) is even less acceptable, conformism and authoritarianism being thereby represented as mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives. But between a situation in which *no one* can be found to take responsibility and a situation in which *one* takes responsibility for *everyone* there is surely room for middle ground, a ground, namely, where *everyone* takes responsibility for his or her *own self*. And this does not mean a self-relation which abstracts from the other. Quite the contrary, the very word 'responsibility' means, in English, the ability to respond (to others). In German, the corresponding word *Verantwortung* contains the component *Antwort*, meaning 'answer', therefore, response to a question, therefore, a dialogical relation. Taking responsibility for oneself therefore means responding to others, treating the other as an end in itself. Nor should this middle ground (between *no one* and *one*) be represented as a kind of compromise between two equally unacceptable, because extreme, alternatives. Rather, this *mean* is itself the extreme, the *ideal* extreme, the extreme which, in any given situation, is never going to be more than partially represented but which can at least be pointed out as a *limiting* ideal, a *regulative idea* (to use the Kantian phrase) which can be worked towards and approximated. And if it is an implication of Heidegger's analysis of the 'They' that this situation does not, or does not at present, obtain, then I am very much afraid that Heidegger is more or less right.

It is not given to us philosophers to be rulers of men, captains of industry, even top-level negotiators and administrators. Our sphere is in one sense a limited one, in another, the most extensive of all. Alfred Whitehead's claim that human civilization is, in the end, the history of its thinkers is, in one sense or another, obviously true; very obviously

true in the sense that human civilization is presently the more or less direct outcome of those advances in our scientific and technological culture which are sponsored in our universities, not so obviously true in the sense that human civilization is likely to take a form determined by the basic attitudes which we humans adopt towards the earth, towards other creatures living on the earth and towards one another, which attitudes are both expressed in, and promoted through, our spiritual culture. The danger (and it is a very real and present danger) is that the neutrality, impartiality, valuelessness, in a word, 'objectivity' (and it matters little that objectivity, in the traditional sense, may today be called in question as a theoretical category) of science and technology will bring with it an *indifference* and even an *utter blindness* to the 'inner truth and greatness' of *existence* in general and *human existence* in particular, thereby affording our more atavistic instincts free and untrammelled rein. When Sartre wrote in 1943: 'there are men who die without – save for brief and terrifying flashes of illumination – ever having suspected what the Other is',¹² he was not indulging in rhetorical fancy but simply recording, in sober prose, a conclusion to which his own *contemporary* experience (of the occupation) had led him.

What is truly astonishing about the academic world of today (the world in which the philosopher is more or less obliged to work) is not the widespread closedness to the call of conscience and therefore the unreadiness to do what is right *because it is right* and for no other reason (with all appropriate qualifications) but *how little* it takes to persuade academics to deviate from courses of action which they know to be right, and whose implicit rightness is attested by their very unreadiness even to discuss (that is, to bring out into the clear realm of explicit discourse) the rights or wrongs of the issue in question.

This basic confusion between authoritarianism and conformism leads on endlessly to further dubious 'political' conclusions. 'The gateway to Heideggerianism as a political philosophy', Wolin writes, 'is the category of "resolve" or (as he puts it) "decisiveness".'¹³ Wolin then quite rightly links 'resoluteness' with a suspension of the 'They', prompted by the call of conscience. And he also, to my mind quite rightly, objects to the ambiguity at best, vacuity at worst, not merely of the concept of 'conscience' but also, and as a result, of 'resoluteness'. But from here his analyses make a truly astonishing leap of faith by explicitly connecting 'decisionism' with 'conformism'. 'Not only is decisionism thoroughly unprincipled it is also on this account nakedly opportunistic. And all voluntaristic bluster about "will", "choice" etc., notwithstanding, opportunism in the end reveals itself often enough as a base and simple conformism.'¹⁴ It is this conceptual connection which is then supposed to provide an explanation for Heidegger's mistake. 'The consequences of this decisionistic "ethical vacuity" coupled with the prejudicial nature

of Heidegger's conservative revolutionary degradation of the modern life-world, suggests an undeniable theoretical cogency behind Heidegger's ignominious life choice of 1933.¹⁵

These consequences follow neither in theory nor in practice. If you look at Heidegger's practical impact in the university environment of his day you find, on the one hand, hosts of former students and younger professors who are ready to attest to Heidegger's supportiveness, encouragement, fair-mindedness etc. (not to mention his regard for work of real quality), while, on the other, you find a few cases in which Heidegger certainly does appear to have criticized a candidate for his Americanization or lack of patriotism or left-wing politics or even his Jewishness, though, with regard to the best known cases (Staudinger/Baumgarten/Hevesey/Fränkell), the criticism appears not to have had any terminal consequences for those at which it was directed. Much more serious (because the victims in this instance were relatively powerless) are the stories of students whose studies Heidegger refused to supervise or approve – because they were Jewish (see especially Rockmore's paper). But it seems that at least Heidegger had enough integrity to give his reasons for reacting in this way. Today, if a university wants to get rid of someone because they are homosexual, or Marxist, or female, or black or Jewish or even (and even especially) because their morality is insufficiently flexible to suit their colleagues, 'they' never so much as hint at *this* as the grounds for dismissal. Instead, the much more successful (because more deceitful) ploy is adopted of condemning the scholarly work of the individual in question. And this ploy is adopted even (and even especially) if the work in question threatens to be *so good* as to make that of its self-appointed judges appear inferior by comparison.

That the consequences mentioned above do not follow in theory either can best be brought out with reference to the following sloganistic caricature of Heidegger's position: 'if authentic Dasein is to lead', Wolin writes, 'inauthentic Dasein must follow.' It sounds plausible, just as long as one remembers to 'forget' the short but extremely dense passages in which Heidegger wrote about solicitude, more specifically the distinction between 'leaping in for him' (*für ihn einspringen*) and 'leaping ahead of him' (*ihm vorausspringen*). I prefer to render these virtually untranslatable phrases in the more characteristically English phraseology of (inauthentic) 'standing in for' and (authentic) 'standing up for'. The authentic individual does not 'stand in for' and so take over the existence of the other. The authentic individual 'stands up for' the other – but only in the sense that he gives back to the other his responsibility for himself. Concretely, this means that so far from declaring: Follow me! the authentic individual is committed to impressing upon the other the importance of the radically different precept: Follow yourself! So Wolin's seemingly plausible exegesis comes down to this: the authentic individual is the one

who deals inauthentically with the inauthentic – as an expression, or attestation, of his very authenticity!

But then how did someone whose thinking, in my view, leads in the very reverse direction from that indicated by Nazi ideology come to associate himself with the Nazi party? I leave it to my contributors to seek an answer to this delicate and complex question. As they are themselves only too well aware, the explanatory hypothesis: 'noble thoughts and dirty deeds' is one which has often been voiced by Heideggerian detractors. For my part, I would simply like to point out that this time-honoured tactic is one which is *all too common* in the contemporary university environment. Professors have plenty of time to indulge in the elaboration of 'noble thoughts'. And these 'noble thoughts' are often very badly needed not merely to alleviate the 'bad conscience' of those engaged in 'dirty deeds' but also to divert attention from the deeds in question.

Professors of philosophy work within the context of a university. The university is a 'world within a world'. Within the confines of this world are gathered activities corresponding to the three primary expressions of the being of human being – thought: corresponding to the domain of the mind, art: corresponding to the domain of feeling, and athletics: corresponding to the domain of the body. A university has its theatres and its orchestras and its art exhibitions as well as its scientific and technological courses, its athletic as well as its social life. And within this privileged 'world within a world' one might even venture to suggest that philosophy enjoys an especially privileged place, a world 'within' a 'world within a world', a world wherein these various expressions of the being of human being are gathered together into one comprehensive understanding of human reality.

Moreover, how philosophers in particular, and academics in general, comport themselves within the privileged frame of what has sometimes been called (usually derogatorily, though I think it is time that the more idealistic, if not idyllic, connotations of this expression were revived) the 'Ivory Tower' can have long lasting implications for those for whom they are responsible. When students witness, within the circuit of their professorial role-models, a pale replica of the marital merry-go-round presently operative in our society at large, when students witness the professorial politics which lead to the dismissal of teachers they know from direct experience to be persons of moral integrity and academic excellence, when students' fees are hiked (or grants slashed) with no comparable improvement in the quality of the education afforded, when students are subjected to arbitrary and unsubstantiated evaluations against which no appeal is permitted, they go out into the world with a conception of life which confirms their worst suspicions, and prepares

them for behaviour which will carry their society on still further in the dis-integrative direction it has already assumed.

All of this is only what was foreshadowed from the very beginning in the Socratic conception of philosophy as a dialogue with the young, a dialogue the topical scope of whose address could not be limited in advance, a dialogue whose purpose was *e-ducation* in the original sense of that word, a *leading out* of the spirit of those addressed, a dialogue whose importance could not be underestimated because it was directed to those at that critical turning point in their lives when they turn away from the original, though limited, framework of the family into the derivative, but more extensive sphere of society at large – to found families of their own. And it is surely more than ‘Socratic’ irony that the charge brought against the man who understood, better perhaps than any other teacher, the *moral* responsibility he assumed in *e-educating* the young should have been that of . . . ‘corrupting the young’.

Perhaps one should leave the last word to Nietzsche.

What provokes one to look at all philosophers half suspiciously, half mockingly, is not that one discovers again and again how innocent they are – how often and how easily they make mistakes and go astray; in short their childishness and childlikeness – but that they are not honest enough in their work, although they all make a lot of virtuous noise when the problem of truthfulness is touched even remotely.¹⁶

Notes

1 In the *Spiegel* interview Heidegger claimed that this address was specifically intended to resist the politicization of the University *from without* and to affirm the need for the self-determined responsibility of each university for its own affairs.

2 Martin Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, GA 40; tr. Ralph Manheim as *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p. 31.

3 Martin Heidegger, ‘Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten’, in *Der Spiegel*, 23, 31 May 1976; reproduced as ‘Only a God can save us: *Der Spiegel*’s interview with Martin Heidegger’, in *Philosophy Today* (1976), p. 272.

4 Tom Rockmore, *Jaspers and Heidegger: Philosophy and Politics*, unpublished paper.

5 It is not the *teachings* of the great religious personalities (many of whom either failed to develop such teachings or made little or no attempt to preserve them in the form of writings) which are responsible for the immense influence they have exerted. It is the exemplary quality of their *life*.

6 I have spent several years researching the social problems to which our contemporary, democratic societies are prone – soaring crime rates, sexual abuse rates, divorce rates, drug addiction rates etc. – together with the by now well-publicized infractions of the ‘men of God’ who inveigh most uncompromisingly,

and most successfully (in money terms), against these very developments. The end result is an informative and eminently readable text *Egoism and the Crisis in Western Values* (based mostly on American data) which is apparently unpublishable in the very societies whose citizens are most affected by these developments, and even though the 'moral' positions assumed are almost banally orthodox – my intention being not to write a moral treatise but to point out the practical consequences of certain quite contemporary ways of thinking about being human. I am consequently in the strange position of watching every one of my social predictions becoming ever more sickeningly true with each passing year, while still being unable to reach the public for whom my predictions might have functioned as a warning.

7 Dominique Janicaud, *L'ombre de cette pensée* (Grenoble: Editions Jérôme Millon, 1990).

8 'Three masters, seemingly mutually exclusive', writes Ricoeur in his *Freud and Philosophy*, 'dominate the school of suspicion: Marx, Nietzsche and Freud.' Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, tr. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 32.

9 Karl Jaspers, *Notizen zu Martin Heidegger* (Piper: München/Zurich, 1989), p. 176.

10 Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

11 In my social ontology, I have extended the Sartrian dialectical degeneration in two basic ways; first, and within the sphere of the 'private', I complement the Sartrian analysis of love (degenerating into sado-masochism) with an examination of the degeneration of friendship into indifference (through mutual utilization); second, and within the sphere of the 'public', I draw a further distinction between 'anonymity' and 'autonomy', the first of which leads to conformism, and the second to authoritarianism. This entire analysis is furthermore englobed within the much more comprehensive context of a general theory of empathic relations which, in the end, and through an elaborate series of detours and deviations, makes possible both 'love' and 'friendship', in the sphere of the private, and 'impartiality' and 'propriety', in the sphere of the public.

12 Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, tr. Hazel Barnes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 381.

13 *ibid.*, p. 35.

14 *ibid.*, p. 65.

15 *ibid.*

16 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Part One, sect. 5, 'On the prejudices of philosophers'.

Heidegger and the thing

Jean-Pierre Faye

The motivation for action
will no longer be found exclusively,
or preponderantly,
within the domain of fear.

– Jan Patochka

What is the thing? To put it in another way, *when* does Heidegger's *die Frage nach dem Ding* (the 'question concerning the thing') first make its appearance?

We have shown, claimed Heidegger, that the answer to the question 'What is a thing?' can be expressed in the following way: a thing is what supports properties and the truth which corresponds to it is to be found on the side of language – in the proposition as the juncture of a subject with a predicate.¹ This answer is of course only a first approximation which the Heideggerian way will abruptly cast aside.

The question and the answer – or should we say, the encoding of the answer – took place at a definite moment in time. It happens to have been the Winter Seminar of 1935–6, in a course of lectures held at Freiburg University.

This 1935 Winter Seminar follows the path opened up by Heidegger's second great book, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, published in 1929, which itself elaborates a meditation whose first step brings us back to the 1935–6 Winter Semester.

Following the decennial cycle and the seasonal rhythm, we should listen silently to the Heideggerian move, investigating the Black Forest of being – through the clearing of Being. The two English forms of the verb 'to be' give an approximate translation of the German verbal forms, the infinitive and the present participle: *Seiende* and *Sein* – *ens* and *esse* – *on* and *einai* (ὄν and εἶναι).

Yet we shouldn't forget the event of the Summer Semester. Especially the Summer Semester of 1935. Before the luminous path of the 1935–6 Winter Semester, we shall have to deal with the unique darkness of the 1935 Summer Semester. A startling process awaits us, a process which may very well inflict a fatal wound upon our minds.

Metaphysics vs Nihilism

Curiously enough, it usually passes unnoticed that between the Kant book of 1929 and the Summer Semester of 1935 a deep gap intervenes. Also unnoticed goes the fact that the title given to the 1935 Summer Semester lecture course in 1933 – *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (*Introduction to Metaphysics*) – will mean introducing oneself into an unfathomable abyss (*Abgrund*). The Kant book of 1929 seeks the way to the ground of metaphysics. Its last sequence goes back to *Fundamentalontologie*. *Grund*, *Fundamental* are the main words and also the last words, in §§42–4, of *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. What could have occurred in the meantime?

In 1929 'Metaphysics' means the surpassing of *Seiende*, of beings. In 1935, metaphysics is itself supposed to stick to *Seiende*, to beings as the object of its quest. So metaphysics must itself be surpassed, through *Überwindung*. What happened in the meantime?

The text of the Winter Seminar opens with a tale told by Plato in the *Theaetetus* (174a), about a little Thracian servant girl who laughs at Thales as he falls into a well, while looking at the stars. Thales' well, which features as an introduction to the Winter Semester course, also figures in the Summer Semester as an *Introduction to Metaphysics*, and tells of some kind of fall – *Verfall*. The question for Heidegger is now: whether we stand in History or whether we are not rather only tottering. (Die Frage . . . ob wir in der Geschichte *stehen* oder nur taumeln.) The answer is: 'Metaphysisch gesehen *taumeln* wir' ('Seen from a metaphysical point of view, we *totter*'). What does this tottering step of metaphysics, as articulated here by Heidegger, mean to us today?

A little further, we should notice another tale which has, up to now, remained unnoted. 'We are also tottering . . . when, more recently, one tries to show that this question of Being . . . is Nihilism' ('Wir taumeln auch dann . . . wenn man sich neuerdings sogar bemüht zu zeigen, dieses Frage nach dem Sein . . . sei Nihilismus').² Who is this *one*? Who can this '*man*' be? Let us see if we can discover the one who 'recently', (*neuerdings*), that is before 1935, played the tottering role by interpellating between the two words: '*Metaphysisch*' and '*Nihilismus*'.

The best way to go would be – to listen to the tale. In fact, interviewed

by a French reviewer, Heidegger himself did add a few details,³ speaking about a Nazi aggressor called 'Krieg', 'Kriegh' or 'Kriegk'. . . . It could be said that French philosophers are not concerned with the *problem of names*? So this *one* could simply be christened with the letter K.

In fact, the letter K may bring us to another narration which bears the whole K signature. But the problem which then occurs is how far a 'tale' can be taken into account *inside* a philosophical discourse – not as a break in the discursive network, as the *mythos* breaking the thread of the Platonic *logos* – or the reference to the 'infinite fly' in the Spinoza ethics – but as the arrow of language hitting the core of another language.

The K postulate

The K attack on 'the meaning of Heidegger's philosophy' was to label it as a *metaphysischer Nihilismus*. To assign the predicate 'metaphysical' to the noun phrase 'Nihilism' is to announce the very philosophical problem which remains the 'unthought', the *Ungedacht*, standing in the way of Heidegger's path in the forest. It finds its zero hour at the very moment when what we shall call the K postulate is uttered.

It should now be said straight away that this 'K' is not to be aligned with the Kafka hero. We shall discover his identity as a *völkische*⁴ militant who joined the Nazi party and will become an Obmann of Nazi 'science' – let us say a corporal or a sergeant-major. Later on, an SS Obersturmbannführer. In 1934, he becomes the Rector of Frankfurt University.

But the K postulate involves a corollary. 'Metaphysical Nihilism' says K – 'as it used to be presented to us, mostly by Jewish Literati'⁵ – ('wie es sonst vornehmlich von jüdischen Literaten bei uns vertreten worden war'). The fatal corollary allows Heidegger no reply; in 1934, no one is permitted to raise the question whether or not he deserves to be called a Jew. Yet the tale of K includes a Scolia: Heidegger's so-called 'Nihilism' belongs to a long stream of thought, flowing from Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas: from the 'Greek doctrine of Being' – (*die griechische Seinslehre*). On this basis, Heidegger did build up some kind of an answer to the K attack. It is not the *Seinslehre* but, on the contrary, the 'forgetting of Being' – *die Seinsvergessenheit* – which is the source of all evil, the mother of Nihilism. In this case the corollary may be transformed. There must be no further allusions to 'Jewish *Literaten*'. Even the Greeks, the creators of ontology, have to be rejected,⁶ must no longer be alluded to. From now on, the Heideggerian task will be to prove that the Greeks are already guilty of the so-called 'forgetting' of *Sein* – now considered as the equivalent of 'metaphysics'.

However, 'there's the rub!' – for our Hamlet. In his first great book,

Sein und Zeit, it was clearly stressed that, since the Greeks, the task of philosophy has been *Sein*, beginning with Plato's *Parmenides* and Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Book Z. In *Being and Time* and, at a different level, through the analytics of existence, the oblivion of *Sein* is the fall into 'average everydayness' – *Alltäglichkeit*. This is the *verfallen* of the everyday mode of existence.

Heidegger's new task, after 1934, will have to be the discovery of the 'proof' of the *Fall*, stemming as it does from the Greeks. In other words, the K postulate will have to be transformed into some kind of an H theorem. Nevertheless, such a careful Heideggerian disciple as Jacques Derrida emphasized the method (or the manner) in all sorts of Heideggeriana: no 'argument' or 'refutation' is needed – 'disqualifying' is enough. . . . This kind of strategy will prove to be very efficient in the pursuit of the process we are learning to uncover, as attested by the disciples of the 'discovery'. It is therefore worth investigating with exact attention, for it involves a real inversion of the method of 'investigation', pertaining, as it does, to the surprising Athenian word *philosophia*.

After 1934, the new accent will be placed upon the 'falling out of *Sein*'. No longer an everyday affair, but an original sin, which proceeds further and grows ever worse throughout the entire course of History. This gnostic reinterpretation of the Tora account (the biblical narrative) about the Paradise of the Garden of Eden was handed down through German 'revolutionary conservatism', mainly along the Wagnerian path. For Houston Chamberlain, Wagner's Wagnerian son-in-law and 'thinker' in Bayreuth, *Geschichte als Verfall*⁷ (history as the Fall), is taken for granted. This language appears for the first time in Heideggerian speech during the Summer Semester of 1935, as the first answer to the K denunciation of 1934 – and the first tacit *acceptance* of the K postulate. But making the K postulate *acceptable* will prove to be a long process and will be undertaken with a view to changing it into an H theorem, using for this purpose the strategic means of 'disqualification'.

The first version of the new Heideggerian doctrine, in the 1935 Summer Semester, is quite dramatic. It was abruptly delivered by way of a question: 'does our falling out of Being come from *Sein* itself, from language, or from ourselves?'

'*Dass wir . . . aus dem Sein herausgefallen sind?*'⁸ It is we who have fallen out of Being. And the tale goes on: 'from the beginning on, it has made its way through Western history' ('was von Anfang an durch die abendländische Geschichte zieht'). 'An event', Heidegger goes on, 'which the eyes of historians will never catch sight of' ('ein Geschehnis, zu dem alle Augen aller Historiker nie hinreichen werden'), and yet it is that which was before, is now, and will be hereafter ('und das doch geschieht, vormals, heute und künftig').⁹ This event which no historian could ever grasp is supposed to be the key to the whole of history:

Geschichte of course and not mere *Historie*. As far back as Heroditus himself, the severe linguocentrism of Heidegger's discourse excludes ἱστορίη – the first word in the world's first book of 'history'. Of course, the knowledge that pertains to this kind of 'original' history is *mythology* (Wissen von einer Ur-geschichte . . . ist . . . Mythologie).¹⁰ So we have to direct our investigations towards the new Heideggerian labyrinth of mythology, starting from 1935.

The predicate event

The track left by the 1935 Summer Semester leads us straight on to the *event* of the predicate, as an unhappy ending. To remain in the 'forgetfulness' of Sein (In der Vergessenheit des Seins) . . . 'this is nihilism'.¹¹ We must add: the 'forgetting of Sein' is also the 'simple exercise of Seiende' – and the later process suddenly becomes the new definition of 'Metaphysik'.

In a carefully thought-out essay of 1929, *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (reprinted in 1934 without a change), metaphysics meant precisely the 'surpassing of *Seiende*'. Now *metaphysisch gesehen*¹² is synonymous with a simple exercise and 'enterprise' – *Betrieb* – alongside of *Seiende*. Hereafter 'the first step' will be the 'overcoming of nihilism' ('der erste Schritt . . . zur . . . Überwindung des Nihilismus').¹³ Soon equivalent to the 'overcoming of Metaphysics': 'Überwindung der Metaphysik'¹⁴ – as can be seen from the postscript in 1943 to the 1929 lecture: *What is Metaphysics?*

In the lectures on Nietzsche from 1936 to 1945, later collected in the huge Nietzsche book, a clear light is thrown upon the new topic: '*Die Metaphysik ist . . . der eigentliche Nihilismus*'.¹⁵ During the post-war period, the 1955 homage to Ernst Jünger puts it more and more in spatial terms: 'the essential place of nihilism is shown to be the essence of metaphysics' (als Wesensort des Nihilismus das Wesen der Metaphysik). At the time, the event of the predicate was fulfilled and Heidegger was able to help it through the uneasy moment of the collapse of the Third Reich on 4 November 1945. In his letter to the new Rector of the University of Freiburg, nihilism is no longer referred to *Jüdischen Literaturen*, but is referred hereafter to 'the political form of fascism'.¹⁶

Scheu, Angst – fear and anguish are the words used in the 1943 Postscript¹⁷ – and what could be more fearful than the storm of the *Obersturmbann*? Yet all is forgotten in Winter 1945 when he now talks of a fight against fascism in its 'political form'.

Being and being

When we make use of an English translation of Heidegger's terms which attempts to come to terms with his principal problem, the unavoidable question arises: how to translate the 'essential' *difference* between *Sein* and *Seiende*. Strangely enough, for a language stemming from Saxon sources, this difference is unperceivable in English, since the infinitive 'to be' can hardly be used to translate the infinitive-substantive: *das Sein*/το εἶναι/*essell'*être; and so will usually be replaced with the participle 'being' (with a capital B). Some of the earliest and most daring pioneers in the art of transforming Heideggerian German into English tried to circumvent the difficulty by rendering *Sein* (infinitive) as *Being* and *Seiende* (participle) as *being*.¹⁸ Who would have presumed to ask them, or indeed to ask the master himself, whether the greatest question in the whole of History (*Geschichte*, of course) could be solved by invoking the simple difference between a capital B and a small b? Certainly, the necessity of avoiding the *Verfall* into nihilism – more precisely, into *metaphysischer Nihilismus* – will give us the courage to face such a risk, using as our only weapon the B/b difference. The *Fall* from B to b may then be described as the 'fundamental event', the *Grundgeschehen* in the sense of the Summer Semester Lecture of 1935. Was it really the best way to escape the K attack and the effects of the K postulate? The 'fundamental event' as an answer brings us to the point where a new gnosis has been founded, a new secret doctrine of a Fall throughout History.

Should we then be grateful to the author of the K postulate who enabled us to discover such a measure and thus opened the way to a new salvation through the H theorem? Though *Obmann Kriek*, the scientific sergeant-major, hardly measures up to the criterion of serious philosophical discourse, are we not indebted to his linguistic discovery (or better, his invention): the event of the predicate?

A connoisseur might object: surely the author of the K postulate is really a genuine philosopher who goes by the name of Friedrich Nietzsche? Heidegger's *Nietzsche* book, with its 1500 pages, seems to offer the most convincing proof of this allegation. Unfortunately for this claim, in the finest fragments of Nietzsche's *Nachlass*, a clear distinction is drawn between the time of metaphysics and the time of nihilism, with its three phases – the first phase, the 'extreme' phase and then the phase of 'active' nihilism.¹⁹ The sixteen sequences written on the way to Sils Maria, in Lenzer Heide,²⁰ on 10 June 1887, are developed in the form of a sort of musical refutation of Heidegger's huge *Nietzsche* book. However, the book can in itself be read as a gigantic laboratory in which the future is concocted with a view to pressing the investigation through

to the time of the greatest danger – from 1936 to 1945 – in the uncanny light of the K postulate.

The Heidegger *alagon*

In the space of philosophical discourse, the encounter between the K postulate and the H theorem can remind us of what was said in the Aristotelian *Poietike* about the meeting of Laios and Oedipus outside the narration, the *mytheuma*, which is displayed in the Sophoclean tragedy – *exo tou mytheuma*: this ‘outside’ is described as an *alagon*. The very word *alagon* which is used in Greek geometry, inclusive of Plato’s *Meno*, to describe the incommensurable proportion between the side of a square and its diagonal. In the series of natural numbers, the irrational number means the break in the set of rational numbers: two infinite series of rational fractional numbers approach this *coupure*. Infinite sets of ‘reasons’ bring Oedipus and Laos to the point where they meet face to face. Yet this point is an *alagon*.

The K and H encounter is an *alagon*, in this sense, one which resides inside the language of philosophical discourse. There is no other reported dialogue between K and H at this point in their relationship – in spite of their having been together before, in 1933. For example, both campaigned in the Nazi KADH²¹ organization as Rectors – at the Universities of Frankfurt and Freiburg respectively. The mutual defiance of 1934–5 is never the field of a bilateral recognition. The K aggression is only alluded to by Heidegger, first in the 1935 Summer Semester as ‘*man . . . neuerdings*’ (‘one . . . recently’). Then it is alluded to again in the 1943 Postscript, the so-called Nachwort to *What is Metaphysics?* as ‘blind polemics’ (*verblindete Polemik*). Each time he is dealing with ‘nihilism’ and ‘metaphysics’ and their presupposed relationship.

It is obvious that the two words are often employed as variables in the frame of Nietzsche’s language – but they are not supposed to meet in a predicative relationship. Moreover, they are often very clearly opposed, as in the Lenzer Heide suite: the Nietzsche sonata. The *predicate event* arises through the K and H encounter at the intersection of two series of languages, one of which (the *metaphysische*) comes from the code label inserted by Bicolaos Damaskus as a Scolia concluding the Theophrastos: τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, ‘the books after the Physics’. This sequence of words is fully preserved in the Cordoban school of Arabic philosophy, mainly by Ibn Rochd (Averroes), as *ba’d al-tabiah*,²² running parallel to ‘*metafisika*’. The Latin translations of Averroes and Aristotle by Michael Scot of Edinburgh, in the thirteenth century, finally introduces the noun phrase ‘*metaphysica*’ into the European lexicon. As for Nihilism, it seems to appear occasionally during the French Revolution,

for instance in a sentence from the German member of the Convention Anacharsis Cloots (it is used there in a 'positive' sense). And later on by Jacobi. But as a lexical term with a specifically 'negative' meaning, it appears abruptly with Turgenyev and Dostoyevsky. There is little to say about what could be common to Michael Scot from Balwearie in the county of Fife, Scotland in his *Metaphysica Nova* or his *Theatrum chemicum* (thirteenth century), on the one hand, and the characters of Bazarov and Verkhovensky in the Russian novel, between 1860 and 1880, on the other. The handling of the two variables by the K and the H postulate or theorem belongs to a questionable *coupure* in language – at the crossroads of a narrative *alolon*, in a sense near to the *Poietike* analysis of the Oedipus *mytheuma*.

Richard Rorty rightly defines as *incommensurable*²³ some kinds of philosophical discourse, among which he places the later Heidegger. We should say, the *alolon* draws its figures outside the *mytheuma*, in the space where K and H meet at the fracture – *à la coupure*. The point of encounter 'outside the narrative' is not outside History as a complex space, *nor is it outside the philosophical Problematic*.

The enigma of the 'later Heidegger' is written here on the edge of the narrative compass. This does not mean that it will not involve a momentous display of what Nietzsche calls the *Machtquantum*. Quite the contrary. The fight for *Macht*, the ferocious struggle for power and the praise of terror – *Schrecken des Ungebändigten*²⁴ (the Terror of the Unbounded) – are here at their climax. At the very moment when the 1935 Summer Semester comes to an end, proclaiming the 'inner truth and greatness' of the Nazi movement (die innere Wahrheit und Grösse dieser Bewegung).²⁵ Then the line of the *alolon* is cut. As incommensurable.

The Terror of the Unbounded

Hazy in many ways is the question concerning the relationship between 'politics and philosophy', a question which was deliberately kept in the dark by Heidegger. The debate always springs up anew: is Heidegger guilty? Should we organize a Heidegger trial? Even the answer can take the form of a question: should we conduct Socrates' trial over again? Does the indicted philosopher need defending? . . .

In my opinion we should try to get out of this *circulus vitiosus*. What is puzzling is the way in which the tumultuous vortex of the historical turmoil penetrates through to the language of thought. The *Confession* of November 1933 – *Bekenntnis zu Adolf Hitler und dem nationalsozialistischen Staat* – describes the new situation: 'Not to shut ourselves out of the Terror²⁶ of the Unbounded and the Chaos of the obscure' (Sich

nicht verschliessen dem Schrecken des Ungebändigten und der Wirrnis des Dunkels). Important is the second phasis, when the *Wirrnis des Dunkels* assails Heidegger himself – indicting him as a ‘Jew’. . . . The result of this story is our problem here; starting from this point in time, how does the Nazi narration about the *Verfall* or the *Untergang* of European history get accepted? The Summer Semester and the *Nietzsche* lectures attest to this protracted moment of rendering acceptable.

The Great Return

Truly the *Bekenntnis* is already a philosophical text. Here we find the key terms of *Sein und Zeit* being used to come to terms with the language of the Nazi movement: *Sein*, *Seiende*, *Dasein*, *Wesen* make friends with *völkisch*, *Volksgenosse*, *Volksgemeinschaft*. . . . And the ‘turning back towards the essence of Being’ (nach dem Wesen des Seins wiederkehren) is described as equivalent to the *nationalsozialistische Revolution*. . . . But the second phase goes further, into the depths of the *Wirrnis*. What is at stake is then the politicizing of the whole process of philosophy, since the Greeks, translated into the Nazi or the ‘revolutionary conservative’ mythology of the Fall, the *Verfall*. The so-called ‘ontological difference’ between *Being* and *being* – to *einai* and to *on/esse* and *ens/être* and *étant/Sein* and *Seiende* – suddenly becomes the clue to the whole of History, right up to the instance of the new *Aufbruch* and by way of the *Wiederkehren* which is brought about by the ‘movement’. Even after 1945, Heidegger admits to having taken a positive stand with regard to the ‘movement’ (not the ‘party’ . . .). The Nazi movement is supposed to initiate the turning around – from being to Being. Thomas Mann described the Great Return, *das grosse Zurück*, as the premonitory symptom of Nazi mythologies.

Perilous is the distortion which this will bring about, even with regard to the mere understanding of philosophical terminology. Aristotle is once again accused – of having ‘forgotten’ *Sein* and privileged *Seiende*. Even though it was he who first clearly and accurately distinguished the two uses of the same verb. In Book Alpha of the so-called *Metaphysics*²⁷ comes the first insisting reference to the verb used as an infinite noun-phrase. ‘In each thing there is as much Being as there is truth.’²⁸ In Book Gamma we find the definition of *to on* (τὸ ὄν): being as the object, no longer Being and the light of truth. *Sein* comes before *Seiende* in the axiomatic books of the ‘foremost philosopher’.

This Athenian clarity then fell into the dark abyss of *Wirrnis* and remained there from 1935 until the ‘testament’ of 1966. This is both the target and the victim of the predicate event of 1934. The *Letter on Humanism*, addressed to Jean Beaufret in 1946 and distributed in French

philosophical circles as a world message, conveys the last word: even 'ethics' are a symptom of *Verfall* and *vergehen*,²⁹ as a result of which the thought of origins falls apart. As a final Act to the Third Reich play, this conclusion, delivered in 1946, would be sheerly ironic were it not for the fact that it was spoken with prophetic earnestness. In French philosophical circles at any rate, this message was taken seriously. For Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, 'Auschwitz reveals the West'.³⁰ Should we not be thankful – in this case to the Heideggerian clue – for having been taught that the Nazi massacres were the true heirs of the great rational tradition of philosophy from the Greeks down to the time of the Enlightenment? Or to extend the scale still further, 'from Anaximander to Nietzsche'?³¹

Of course, the Nazi ideologues knew perfectly well that their real target was precisely the Western 'heroism of reason' – as Edmund Husserl said in Vienna in 1935, before going back to Freiburg, into the tiger's mouth. But the change of language³² from the K postulate to the H theorem worked well enough to invert responsibility. Since 'Anaximander' – and on the whole since Athens – Heidegger would consequently be the sole philosopher *not* to have been guilty of the Nazi liability! At least if we accept the argument of his epigonal inheritance.

On the eve of 1989, the final revelation in this line of thought emerged: 'totalitarianism, nazism and racism', on the one hand, 'human rights and democracy', on the other, were both masked by a common 'contamination' and 'complicity', since they are both related to the same 'metaphysical gesture'.³³ Seldom has the abyss been so thoroughly vacuous. With Heidegger and his heirs we can now truly explore the *Inferno* of the twentieth century's deepest danger. Provided (since we are still onlookers) that we don't become believers. 'Greatness', if such there be, could *not* pertain to the 'movement', not even to the philosopher himself, notwithstanding his poetical aura. It could only assume the perilous form of the curative power of poison – as a *pharmakon* perhaps.

Not only have the Gods withdrawn, philosophical irony itself – effective from Zeno to Nietzsche – has been obliterated by the K/H postulate.

From danger to deconstruction

'It is in the time of greatest danger that philosophers arrive on the scene.' The *Nietzsche* book opens with this Nietzschean quotation. What does Heidegger mean in 1936 with such a hint? Karl Löwith meets him in Rome, the same year, wearing the Nazi crooked cross, the swastika, on his jacket. In reply to Löwith's question, he confirms that his own philosophy does in fact conform to the National Socialist *Weltanschauung*.

The Nietzschean danger! Nietzsche himself experiments with the

emergence of such a shadow in his own thinking. Against his own 'declaration of war', he foresees a 'party of peace . . . soon to be the Grand party', a 'party of the oppressed'. He denounces the *plump Canaille* and the *Canaille* of the newborn Anti-Semite Party. Not Nietzsche but Martin Heidegger is a convinced ally of the Nazi movement.

So what does the danger mean? Is it *what* the Nazi movement is supposed to heal – as poison carries its own cure within itself? What does Heidegger really mean when he concludes the Summer Semester course of lectures with 'the inner truth and greatness of the movement'. Does his reproducing the sentence in book form in 1953 mean that he still believes in this 'truth and greatness'? Is he still alluding to the same reality? At the time this very question was raised by Jürgen Habermas in *Die Zeit*; a student at that time, his boldness was to cost him dear in the course of his career in the academic establishment.

Confronting the problem, we are obliged to try and carry through some kind of Copernican Revolution. But we shall have to ask the philosopher what he calls the 'outer' danger.

Describing *the danger itself*, we can note *how it questions philosophy as such*. The 'inner side' of its answer assumes the form of a temporal frame through which we can enter the abyss. The Summer Semester, the *Nietzsche* book, even the *Question Concerning the Thing* but mainly the post-war Homage or *Festschrift* dedicated to Ernst Jünger³⁴ would then furnish the rooms in which we might try to decipher the hieroglyph of the European catastrophe.

Among the above, the Jünger *Festschrift*³⁵ provides us with a privileged clue. Speaking about the author of *Total Mobilization*³⁶ and *The Worker*³⁷ – in which a 'total Dictatorship' is both envisaged and announced – Heidegger comes back to the movement which will 'win back the original experience of *Sein*'³⁸ and which will subvert 'Metaphysics' as the *Wesens-ort* (essential locus) of 'Nihilism'.

This is what Heidegger calls *Abbau* and what the French translators and commentators will name deconstruction. Neither the English³⁹ nor the Spanish translators,⁴⁰ for example, seem to have hit upon such an ambiguous monster of non-thought.

Never had the event of the unfolding of the predicate ensnared such a puzzling wonder. Or displayed such a potent weapon. The experience of Being (*Sein*) having to 'win its way back [*zurückgewinnen*] up the slope of being [*Seiende*]' had managed in the meantime to realize the 'reconquest', an event already foreseen in 1945 by a distressed Heidegger. The Deconstruction fable has not only become, according to Tony Wolfe, a fashionable slogan in Manhattan, capable of competing with his own white woollen socks in a TV debate. It also seems to have been the Trojan horse thanks to which the Heideggerian discourse would eventually be permitted entrance to the New World, as a respectable sample

of continental philosophy. Did the 'closedness of metaphysics' open up a new frontier?

It is also likely that the accusations launched against 'metaphysical' language would appear congruent with the empirically oriented Anglo-American tradition – if we forget Whitehead's second philosophy. In the same way, we could see disappointed Marxist/Leninists accepting the destruction/deconstruction of metaphysics . . . regardless of a tragedy whose effect was to consign logical positivism, Marxist–Hegelian dialectic and neo-Kantianism to the purgatory of 'metaphysics' – to which science itself should also be added as the exclusive preoccupation with, or the obsessive pursuit of, *Seiende*.

Poetics and venom

Looking back over our shoulders it is difficult to avoid feeling some sort of regret. Rediscovering the gloss of *Dichter–Denken*, the implication of poetical language in the blooming of philosophical thought from the Ionians to Hölderlin, we have to admit that our thankfulness to Heidegger cannot allow us to forget the long-range venomous effect of the K postulate, lying as it does at the very heart of the predicate event. Deconstruction then turns out to be the second phase of dissimulation. The *Abbau/Verborgenheit* game was actually a winner-take-all, seen through 'spectacles made up out of the scrap metal of 1934–5'.

Predicate or event, wrote Leibniz, quoted here by Deleuze. In the discourse of classical metaphysics, the event itself is implicated in the analytical unfolding of predicative positions, inside the divine understanding. There is certainly no point in going back to the infinite intellect. It is the linguistic effect of a predicative indictment which brings us to the threshold of a new space of investigation. Narration itself, as a cognitive act. Narration is a (*g*)*narus*, and primarily a *gnoscens*, the first glance of knowledge or *gignoskein* glimpsed through the act of reporting action and lighting up – could we say, the glade? – of narration, amid a vibrating universe. This movement of thought finds a field of exploration within the folds of Heidegger's *Stoffwechsel* – if we may use Hölderlin's word.⁴¹ The 'stuff change' in question here is worth investigating.

Hölderlin, Rilke, Trakl, Rimbaud seem to move close to Parmenides and Heraclitus in the Heideggerian track. We have to take these pieces out of the jigsaw puzzle and, in the wink of an eye, listen to the Parmenidean enigma: ἐὼν ἔμμεναι 'to be being'. In Book Alpha of the Aristotelian text, we hear the harmony of a proportion: ὡς ἔχει τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας.

Vibration and navigation

Not the 'oblivion of Being' but, on the contrary, the first enlightenment of language in the ability to speak that which is; this is the Greek venture, working its way and then travelling on from Ionia to Italy – and so on to Athens. Not a *Vergessenheit* or *vergehen* through a 'Western Fall' but a voyage of thought towards an Eastern heart of the debate, from Harran and Koufa to Boukhara and Farab. In Alfarabi's poetics and work on music – *Kitab al-Musiqā* – the vibration of the voice in poetic song comes to the invention of musical organs, a kind of expansion of the body itself into a first experiment in what will become, between Samos and Croton, the birth of acoustics – the first physics in its first phase. The long way of philosophical *disputatio* is indeed a path of thought, moving from *τό εἶναι* to the Arabic *wujud*, towards *esse* and *Sein*. The Heideggerian mythology of the 'oblivion of *Sein*', is actually the obliteration of the passage by which the working out of thought discovers its horizon through the hazard of history. 'Hazard' happens to be an Arabic word and horizon a Greek vocable. This network of active languages was woven into Greek, Arabic, Hebraic and Latin – long before it came to the Western European pentagon of languages, forgetting none of the five: Italian, Spanish, French, English, German. The Greek/German scheme as a *direct* transmission of the philosophical impulse is a typical *völkish* model, driving away the so-called *Fremdwörter*. The complete omission by Heidegger of the universe of English poetical and philosophical language, as that of a Latin-German tongue, is also very characteristic. Yet is Kant thinkable without the philosophical moment of Hume? No road leads straight from Parmenides to the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, the target of detailed commentaries in *Die Frage nach dem Ding*.⁴² The Greek alpha/bet is itself named after two hebraic words, and its system of signs was forged from the time of the sumero/akkadian superimposition. The library of Sippar,⁴³ between Babylon and Baghdad, recently discovered by an English-Iraqi archaeological excavation into the clay of time, stands testimony to such a tangle. Out of which emerges what Athenian philosophy has named the *noos poietikos* (poetic intellect). And through the travelling labour of the Rochd/Michael Scot attempt at a translation of the *subjectum movens*, the name of the *denkende Subjekt* in Kant's *Kritik* is hammered out and inscribed. From Asia and North Africa to Arabian Spain, Scotland, southern Italy and Sicily – through Paris on the Montagne Sainte Geneviève, Oxford, Cologne, Padua, Naples.

The *Irrnis*, the wandering discovery about the *subjectum* through the tale of Being is to be found *here*, in the working space of transformations such as these. As a landmark, the Heideggerian Winter Semester on 'The Thing' could appear as an important and beautiful piece of work –

were it not at the same time a strategic piece in the game play initiated by the K and the H postulate. Indeed the 'little book on the small question' – what is a thing? – deals very cautiously with the background relevant to its inquiry. For it aims at the 'Advent', the 'great beginning of the question among the Greeks',⁴⁴ the historical – or 'historial' – 'position of Kant in the womb of metaphysics'.⁴⁵ The caution expressed in the 1935–6 lectures 'about the Thing' make it a great book, located as it is in the gap between the 1935 Summer Semester and the first 1935 lectures relating to the *Nietzsche* book. At the end of chapter XIII of Part A, Heidegger notes: 'if we don't pay attention to the Danger signal inscribed upon a high voltage electric line, we die; if we turn a deaf ear to the question: what is a thing? nothing happens'.

Precisely, 'that which happened in Europe' – if we bear in mind the words of Adorno's *Minima morali* – did occur when the Danger signal was set off. But the philosopher ignored the signal, or was too obtuse to take note of the thing that manifested itself through language – and within the reality of history – between the years 1933 and 1945.

Existence is not a real predicate for a thing, insisted Kant. A hundred possible thalers are not 'more' than a hundred real thalers. . . . In his *Kants Lehre* book, Heidegger insists on this: Being-present is not a predicate. The same *quidity*, the same *res*, the same *Dingheit* is there for the possible just as well as for the actual thing.

Yet the predicate did itself overturn the 'reality' of the Thing through the predicative event, or better *Advent*, which changed the Nietzschean *antiphrasis* of the Lenzer Heide sonata into the *cataphasis* of the K and the H postulate. If 'occidental-metaphysical' is the predicate of 'Nihilism' – and if 'Nihilism' (forgetting its 1934 equivalence with 'jüdischen Literaturen') becomes the 1945 'political form of fascism' – then even in this extreme case, does it still make sense to say that 'Auschwitz reveals the Occident?' We know that it *was* actually said.⁴⁶ Yet Nazi ideological language in its entirety is a cruel offensive against 'Western' *abendländische* thought, from Descartes to Locke and Rousseau.

But even if it were possible to assert that the whole philosophical ('metaphysical') trend of the West implies the industrial massacre in Auschwitz-Birkenau, this could just as well be a way of saying *either* that this renders the process which leads to Auschwitz 'acceptable' *or* that 'nothing' actually happened at Auschwitz. Moreover it is also possible to find critical expositions which fluctuate between these two positions.⁴⁷ Quite recently, one finds a statement to the effect that 'even if Heidegger had killed ten million people with his own hands, this wouldn't change the true value of his doctrine'.⁴⁸

At this point in time, the story of the historical present is not a simple 'object' which could be investigated by the philosopher. It is the gravi-

tational field of the narrative which itself questions *philosophia* and never ceases to encompass it with questions. At this very moment we may nevertheless hear some sort of signal being given off within the acoustics of the poetical aura and the philosophical strife. That of peril.

Notes

1 *Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den Transzendentalen Grundsätzen* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1962). This book – *The Question about the Thing* – is the text of lectures given during the Winter Semester of 1935–6 at the University of Freiburg.

2 *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, 2nd edn (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953), 5. 155.

3 *Les Temps Modernes*, 1946. L'Herne: Heidegger, ed. Michel Haar (Paris: L'Herne, 1983).

4 The *Grimms Wörterbuch* and the *Brockhaus* explain this word, used by Heidegger's *Bekenntnis zu Adolf Hitler* in 1933, as meaning the *Rassengegensatz gegen die Juden* or the *Rassengedanken*, more precisely, an *antisemite Nationalismus*.

5 *Volk im Werden*, 4, 1934: Ernst Krieck, *Germanischer Mythos und Heideggersche Philosophie*. (Literati is the derogatory synonym for a writer, like the French word 'littérateur'. It is directed here at both Heine and . . . Husserl, the spiritual father of Heidegger.)

6 In 1940, Rektor K, the scientific *Obmann*, will renew his attack on Heidegger with the following imperative: 'Deliver us from the ontologers . . . (*Volk im Werden*, October 1940).

7 H. S. Chamberlain, *Richard Wagner*.

8 *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, S. 28.

9 *ibid.*

10 *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, S. 110.

11 *ibid.*, S. 155.

12 *ibid.*, S. 154.

13 *ibid.*, S. 155.

14 *Was ist Metaphysik?*, 1943, Nachwort.

15 Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), 2. Band, S. 343.

16 L'Herne, *Cahier Heidegger*, ed. Michel Henry (Paris: L'Herne, 1983), p. 102.

17 Postscript to *What is Metaphysics?*

18 See *The Question of Being*, tr. W. Kluback and Jean T. Wilde (New Haven: Twayne Publishers, 1958).

19 Schopenhauer, Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche himself.

20 Cf. Jean-Pierre Faye, *La raison narrative* (Editions Balland, 1990), Livre VII, 'La sonate de Lenzer Heide'.

21 Kulturpolitische Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutschen Hochschullehrer, founded in 1933.

22 In the *Tafsir Kitab ma ba'd at-tabiah*, *The Great Commentary on Metaphysics*, written in 1190. It is a Western illusion which brings Heidegger to denounce 'metaphysics' as 'occidental', thereby forgetting its long migration through central Asia and North Africa.

23 *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 368–70.

24 Martin Heidegger, *Bekenntnis zu Adolf Hitler und dem Nationalsozialistischen Staat*, Dresden, November 1933.

25 *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, S. 152.

26 According to François Fedier's attempt at a translation, *Schrecken* should here be taken to mean the somewhat old German *scricken*, that is, 'the leap of Dasein before Sein'. This nice pun seems to forget that for Hegel *Schrecken* means *Terror*.

27 The word, as we have seen, entered the philosophical lexicon only during the twelfth century, through the Averroist school. The term is not to be found in a Greek dictionary.

28 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book Alpha, 1.

29 To fail, to lose, to perish, to fall into ruin.

30 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Fiction du politique*, 1988.

31 *Einleitung in Was ist Metaphysik?*

32 'My intention was to attempt to undertake a spiritual transformation from within national socialism.' Letter to the President of the Political Committee, end 1945 (cf. L'Herne: Heidegger, 1982, p. 104).

33 J. Derrida, *De l'esprit*, 1987, p. 65. And Heidegger, *questions ouvertes*, Cahiers du College international de philosophie, 1987.

34 *Zur Seinsfrage (About the Question of Being)*. Formerly called *About the Line (Of Nihilism)*, 1955.

35 Title: *Freundschaftliche Begegnungen, Festschrift für Ernst Jünger* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1955).

36 Published in *Krieg und Krieger (War and Warriors)*, 1930.

37 *Der Arbeiter*, 1932.

38 *The Question of Being*, tr. W. Kluback and J. T. Wilde, pp. 92-3.

39 The Kluback and Wilde translation of 1958 proposed 'abandonment'.

40 Who propose: 'derribo'. (*Sorbe la cusion del Ser*, tr. German Bleiberg (Madrid, 1958).)

41 'Die Verfahrungsweise des poetischen Geistes' (in Homburg Essays), 1979. Hölderlin, *Sämtliche Werke* (Stuttgart, 1962), 4. Bd.

42 Subtitle: *Zu Kants Lehre von den Transzendentalen Grundsätze* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1962).

43 From whose name we get the Hebrew word *Sepher*, the book. And the Arabic word *Cifr*, the number zero.

44 *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, A, XIII.

45 *ibid.*, B, I.

46 Cf. Lacoue-Labarthe, *Fiction du politique*.

47 Jean Beaufret's letter to Robert Faurisson, the absolute denial of genocide, appears as a token of this possibility. Recently, a publication curiously named *Krisis* (Director: Alain de Benoist) ended in Heideggerian exaltation, and in a way which intersected with Faurissonian 'revisionism'.

48 Cf. the review *Krisis*, No. 1, 1988.

Heidegger's Nazism and the French debate

Tom Rockmore

Any thinker who departs from the previous discussion in a significant manner, who displaces the discussion, for instance through the introduction of different categories, a new approach to a problem in the debate, in practice any important thinker requires a process of reception in order to assimilate and evaluate novel insights. The process of reception required for Heidegger is also necessary for such other important contemporary thinkers as Quine and Wittgenstein, Russell and Husserl. The unprecedented difference with respect to Heidegger is that alone among major thinkers in this century Heidegger was a Nazi.

Heidegger's penchant for Nazism has seriously affected discussion of his thought. It would certainly be interesting to sketch the Heidegger reception in general, in practice an enormous task. Even more than Wittgenstein and Lukács, Heidegger is perhaps the most influential philosopher in this century. His thought has impacted directly and indirectly on an enormous number of writers, in philosophy and in other fields. It would be useful to discuss Heidegger's reception in French thought in general, where he has had a particularly significant following.¹ It would also be interesting to consider the reception of Heidegger's Nazism in general since it became public knowledge in the Rectoral address in 1933. The more limited aim of this paper is to consider the reception of Heidegger's Nazism in the French philosophical discussion. The French discussion is specifically interesting for its length and intensity. It is further interesting as so far the richest source of the main lines of criticism and defence of Heidegger's Nazism. The aim of this paper is to describe the little-known French discussion of Heidegger's Nazism in some detail,² and then to draw some conclusions concerning the reception of Heidegger's theory. In view of the scope of the French discussion, the main stress will be placed on an understanding of the main lines of

the controversy as distinguished from an encyclopedic presentation of all the material.³

1 The French reception of Heidegger's Nazism

The reception of Heidegger's Nazism, although not always under that name, has been underway for several decades, at least since the 1930s.⁴ The first philosophical debate between representatives of different views of Heidegger's Nazism only began about a decade and a half later, in the second half of the 1940s in the pages of the French intellectual journal, *Les Temps modernes*.⁵ Until recently the reception of Heidegger's Nazism developed in a largely desultory fashion, attracting little attention, with occasional bursts of activity. Significantly, as late as the mid-1970s, in a detailed study of Heidegger's political thought, an observer could state that only three books required mention.⁶ Although the reception of Heidegger's Nazism was never as tranquil as ordinary scholarly debate, it was burst asunder, literally transformed, by two publications in the late 1980s: Farias' resolute effort under difficult conditions finally to study Heidegger's Nazism in a wider historical context,⁷ and Ott's historically more careful but even more damning effort towards a Heidegger biography.⁸ Farias' book served as a catalyst for a strident debate virtually across Western Europe, which now gives signs of spreading, in more scholarly, less virulent form, to the United States.⁹ It is a measure of the subversive character of Farias' assault on the Heideggerian establishment that although he lives and teaches in Germany, he was only finally able to publish his book in France.

In order to understand the particular, indeed peculiar, nature of the French reception of Heidegger, it is helpful to provide a brief characterization of the French intellectual context, above all French philosophy. Philosophy in general is not given to rapid changes, since it often takes centuries for problems to be formulated, for ideas to attain wide appeal, for shifts in emphasis to occur. Just the opposite is the case in French thought as viewed on a certain level. In the last two decades, an exceedingly short period by philosophical standards, French philosophy has considered and later discarded options proposed by structuralism, post-structuralism, the *nouveaux philosophes*, hermeneutics, existentialism, semiology, post-modernism, etc. There is obviously no guarantee that the latest mode on the scene, deconstruction, which is better known and more influential in the United States than in France, will survive, or survive more than the proverbial fifteen minutes during which each of us will supposedly be famous.¹⁰

The rapid pace in which the various aspects of French thought come into being and pass away suggests that French philosophy – which gave

rise to the post-modernist theory according to which there is no ground, no overarching single tale which locates all its variants – is itself post-modernist.¹¹ One could easily infer from what by philosophical standards seems to be the nearly instantaneous rise and fall of competing points of view that, to parody Yeats, things have indeed fallen apart since the centre does not hold, in fact fails even to exist.¹² But these appearances are indeed deceiving since to a perhaps unsuspected extent there is an intellectual centre in French intellectual life, which underlies and makes possible the profusion and confusion of swirling ideas as only its various manifestations.

Although French thought may seem to be the philosophical analogue of the Maoist injunction to let a hundred flowers bloom, from a historical point of view it has long been dependent on a single main component. After the French Revolution, which in principle guaranteed fundamental rights, including religious rights, to all, France remained, and still remains, a mainly Roman Catholic country;¹³ to a scarcely lesser extent French thought has been dominated over several hundred years by forms of Cartesianism.¹⁴ It is hard to imagine and difficult to describe the extent of Descartes' influence on French intellectual life, which descends even to the level of a correctly-written paper, the so-called *dissertation*, in the *lycée*. It is not without reason that Sartre has been called the last of the Cartesians and Merleau-Ponty, his younger colleague, has been hailed as the first non-Cartesian French philosopher. For in France over the course of several hundred years, Descartes has played the role of the master philosopher, *le maître penseur*, whose thought furnished the central organizing principle of all intellectual life.

In the period since the 1930s the two main philosophical developments in French thought, namely the attention to Hegel and then to Heidegger, can both be explained in respect to the dominant Cartesianism. The introduction of Hegel in France has been aptly, although not entirely accurately, traced to the influence of Alexandre Kojève's famous seminar on the *Phenomenology* during the late 1930s.¹⁵ Although a brilliant thinker in his own right, a major star in the philosophical firmament, and indeed critical of Descartes, Hegel is also in numerous ways a neo-Cartesian, who perpetuates the well-known Cartesian concerns with certainty, truth in the traditional philosophical sense, metaphysics, first philosophy, etc.¹⁶ The importance of Hegel's influence on French thought in this century should not hide the extent to which, in reacting against Hegel as the *maître du jeu*, the master of the game, later French thinkers were reacting through Hegel to the continued influence of Descartes.¹⁷ This reaction is in part prolonged in the more recent turn to Heidegger, a notorious anti-Cartesian.

Roughly since 1945, and increasingly in recent years, French thought has been dominated by Heidegger.¹⁸ To understand the turn to Heidegger

in French philosophy, two factors are important. First, there is Heidegger's well-known anti-Cartesianism, which conveniently meshes with the continued reaction against the father of French philosophy, in a form of conceptual parricide stretching over more than three centuries. Heidegger's thought is inseparable from its anti-Cartesian bias which only grows deeper in his later turn away from *Dasein* in part in order to expunge any residual Cartesianism.¹⁹ Heidegger's attempt to dismantle modern metaphysics resembles French philosophy itself. The introduction of his thought within the French context as part of the reaction against Hegel, or rather the French form of Marxist Hegelianism, only showed the persistence of the difficult effort to throw off the Cartesian background.

Second, there is the more immediate anti-humanist reaction to the prevailing left-wing Marxist, humanist form of French Marxism, associated with such writers as Kojève in the first place, as well as at various times Camus, Nizan, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Garaudy, Foucault, perhaps Lévi-Strauss, Barthes, etc., which bothered, in fact offended, those concerned to maintain the traditional French value-system. Heidegger's self-proclaimed anti-humanism, in fact an effort to found a new humanism surpassing the old variety, provided a convenient way to throw off the yoke of Hegel's influence, which to many seemed merely a stand-in for Marxism, including its political dimension.

Jean Beaufret later played a leading role, but at least initially Jean-Paul Sartre was mainly responsible for creating the French fascination with Heidegger. Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, which was doubly dependent on both Hegel and Heidegger, focused attention on both thinkers during the Second World War, reinforcing the interest in Hegel and turning attention to Heidegger. Sartre's dual interest in Heidegger and Hegel was seen by many as problematic. The form of Hegelianism current in France, to which Sartre also subscribed, was a left-wing Marxist humanism pioneered by Kojève. Heidegger's own self-described anti-humanism was to begin with perceived as humanism, particularly in the extensive discussion of *Dasein* in *Being and Time*. Heidegger's thought was in part seen as a necessary course correction to what, certainly from a Roman Catholic religious point of view, was perceived as a form of anti-humanism associated with Sartre's atheistic form of existentialism.²⁰ The point is that although Heidegger left the seminary and later the Church, and his link to Nazism was not an expression of humanism in any ordinary sense, his thought was perceived as a *moindre mal*, a lesser evil, by those appalled by Sartre's own form of existentialist humanism.

What is the extent of Heidegger's influence in French philosophy? There is a measure of truth in Heidegger's famous *boutade* that when the French begin to think they think in German.²¹ To an important extent Heidegger's thought now forms the horizon of French philosophy. The dominance of Heidegger in French philosophy can be illustrated by

the startling fact, certainly unprecedented in any other country with a major role in the Western philosophical tradition, that at the present time the three main younger scholars of Aristotle (Rémi Brague), Descartes (Jean-Luc Marion) and Hegel (Dominique Janicaud) in France are all deeply influenced by his thought. French Heideggerianism is a flourishing industry, perhaps the most important contemporary source of studies of Heidegger's thought in the world today. Within France, Heidegger's influence has in the meantime penetrated in other directions as well. It is no exaggeration to say that at present Heidegger and Heidegger alone is the dominant influence, the master thinker of French philosophy, and that his thought is the context in which it takes shape and which limits its extent. It is, then, no wonder that in the recent resurgence of controversy about Heidegger's link to Nazism French philosophy has tended to equate the attack on Heidegger with an attack on French philosophy.

2 Origins of the French discussion of Heidegger's politics

This incomplete account of the source and extent of Heidegger's influence in French philosophy is intended to make possible a closer look at the French discussion of Heidegger's Nazism. This complex discussion, which is still underway, has so far unfolded in three separate moments, or waves. These include a short, initial debate (1946–8) shortly after the end of the Second World War, in which the topic was examined in a cursory manner; a rapid revival of the same debate in the mid-1960s after, indeed partly as a result of, the publication of certain documents calling attention to Heidegger's Nazism; and more recently in the direct, ongoing reaction to the publication in French translation of the Spanish manuscript of Farias' already classical study.

Even before we examine the debate on Heidegger and Nazism in France, we can note in passing three significant features which distinguish it from other portions of a discussion which has by now largely exceeded the limits of a single country or language. First, there is a certain well-known parochialism, long characteristic of French thought of all kinds, which traditionally proceeds as if it formed the entire conceptual universe whose centre and nearly sole focus was Paris. Just as with selected exceptions French thinkers are mainly, even cheerfully, unaware of non-French forms of thought, so the debate on Heidegger's relation to National Socialism has largely occurred without consideration of the discussion underway elsewhere. To be sure, there are occasional references to Hugo Ott, the Freiburg historian, or to Otto Pöggeler, the author of an influential study of Heidegger's thought; but for the most

part, to a degree unusual in the ever-smaller cultural world, the French debate concerns mainly, often only, itself.²²

Second, in contrast to the widespread French cultural and political xenophobia, we can note that a number of the most important participants in the French debate on Heidegger's relation to National Socialism are either foreign-born French, or not French at all, e.g. Farias, Weil, Löwith, Tertulian, Lukács. This extra-French influence, which has throughout tended to calm and to refocus an often wildly passionate, occasionally irrational debate, was present even at the beginning.

Third, there is a particular philosophical focus due to the contingent fact that until several years ago, when a pirated translation of *Being and Time* was published, only the first half of the book was available in French. Even access to this part of the text was severely restricted by the dependence on a single, strategic Heideggerian essay as the way into fundamental ontology.²³ The French reception of Heidegger has for many years been focused through Heidegger's *Letter on Humanism*. This text is Heidegger's response to a letter addressed to him on 10 November 1946, by Jean Beaufret, the French philosopher, who later became the main figure in the introduction of Heidegger's thought in France, a tireless proselytizer for the Heideggerian point of view. Heidegger replied to Beaufret's letter in December 1946, and then reworked his response for publication.

The resultant text is both philosophical and strategic in character. Although this text is a serious philosophical study, it is also a masterly effort by Heidegger to attract attention to his thought in a neighbouring country at a time when he was seriously beleaguered in his native Germany. As an open letter to a figure on the French philosophical scene at a time when Heidegger was in eclipse because of his association with the Nazi regime, there was an obvious strategic value to the claim that there had been a turning (*Kehre*) in his position, by implication a turning away from his earlier view which was also a turning away from Nazism. Understood in this way, the concept of the turning appears as a tacit, even graceful admission of an earlier complicity, combined with a suggestion of a fresh start, untainted by earlier transgressions, and a suggestion to provide a reasonable alternative to Sartre, a perhaps objectionable French guru. These are all characteristics which quickly raised Heidegger's stock in French intellectual thought and may even have been calculated to do so. Significantly, although at the time Heidegger had already moved far from his original position, his *Letter on Humanism* has been described by a French commentator as the best introduction to *Being and Time*.²⁴

In other texts from his later writings, Heidegger continues to insist on the uniqueness of the Germans; but not by accident in the *Letter on Humanism* Heidegger opposes nationalism of any kind as metaphysically

anthropological and subjective.²⁵ His stated opposition here to biologism, a doctrine to which Heidegger seems never to have subscribed, limits the dimensions of Heidegger's admitted political error.²⁶ Heidegger's opposition to Sartrean existentialism and humanism of all sorts as metaphysical²⁷ is balanced by his careful description of his alternative as the only one able to think 'the humanity of man', as an attempt to 'think the essence of man more primordially' in order to restore its original sense, and as a view that 'in no way implies a defence of the inhuman but rather opens other vistas'.²⁸ Heidegger's depiction of his form of non-metaphysical humanism as more meaningful than its better known alternative is clearly stated: 'To think the truth of Being at the same time means to think the humanity of *homo humanus*. What counts is *humanitas* in the service of the truth of Being, but without humanism in the metaphysical sense.'²⁹

The fact that, for contingent reasons, the French reading of Heidegger has largely proceeded from an anti-metaphysical humanist focus explains the relative ease with which Heidegger displaced not only Sartre but Hegel as well in French thought and the violent reaction to the appearance of Farias' book. Beyond his status as an important thinker, Heidegger's implicit claim to be a true humanist smoothed the way for the displacement of views frequently regarded as either anti-humanism or associated with anti-humanism. The shocking revelation that what many had long regarded as essentially humanism in the deepest sense was possibly no more than a false appearance is basic to the French reaction to recent revelations about Heidegger's politics. It is, then, not by chance, that the French discussion of Heidegger's political thought has been so heated since the debate revolves around the essentially political question of whether, as Heidegger and his followers claim, Heidegger's position is a new anti-metaphysical humanism or whether, on the contrary, as others have held, it is a metaphysical form of racism, based on a durable commitment to the superiority of the German people.

In France, the intellectual debate on Heidegger's Nazism began in the pages of *Les Temps modernes*, one of the best known French intellectual journals. This journal was founded by Sartre and his colleagues when France was liberated from the Nazis and later edited by him for many years. The early existentialist Sartre is well known as the author of the view, which to some, including the later Sartre, appeared to ignore the constraints of real life, that we are always and essentially radically free. The initial phase of the debate, which includes texts by Karl Löwith, Alfred de Towarnicki, Eric Weil, Alphonse De Waelhens and Maurice de Gandillac, is preceded by an editorial note. Here, immediately prior to the publication of the famous *Letter on Humanism*, an unnamed editor, in all probability Sartre, draws a comparison between Heidegger and Hegel. Just as the latter's later thought led him to compromise with

Prussia, so Heidegger the man and Heidegger the political actor are one and the same; and his political choice follows from his existential thought. In the same way as an analysis of Hegel's position removes any suspicion with respect to dialectical thought, the writer suggests that a similar analysis will do the same for Heidegger, in fact will demonstrate that an existential view of politics is at the antipodes of Nazism.³⁰

3 The first wave

With respect to the later debate on Heidegger's Nazism, the initial phase of the French discussion is important in setting out the main criticism, and two of the main defences of Heidegger against criticism based on his Nazi turning. Löwith argues that Heidegger's Nazism follows from his philosophy, a point which recurs in the later discussion, most recently in writings by Janicaud, Zimmerman and Wolin. De Waelhens counters with two of the main defences, due ultimately to Heidegger himself,³¹ which have since been belaboured by some of Heidegger's closest students. On the one hand, Heidegger the man and Heidegger the philosopher are unrelated so that Heidegger's political engagement is insignificant with respect to his philosophy, a view later advanced by Fédier and Aubenque in the French discussion, as well as by a host of others outside it. On the other hand, Heidegger's critics are uninformed, so that at the limit only someone who has totally accepted Heidegger's position, in effect a true believer, can possibly criticize it. Beside Fédier, the main current proponent of this idea in the French discussion is Derrida, and in the German discussion, Vietta.³² At present, the American phase of the discussion is just beginning, but already the idea has been voiced that it is a mistake to understand Heidegger's philosophy in terms of his politics³³ and a reading of the Rectoral address has appeared which 'brackets' the available discussion in order to follow Heidegger's own view of it as a mere defence of the German university.³⁴

The initial phase of the French discussion comports no less than three sub-phases, including articles by Karl Löwith, Maurice de Gandillac, and Alfred de Towarnicki, followed some time later by articles by Eric Weil and Alphonse De Waelhens; and ending with responses by Löwith and De Waelhens. Gandillac, who was apparently the first French philosopher to come in contact with Heidegger after the war, went on to an important career as a professor at the Sorbonne. Löwith is a former student, later colleague of Heidegger, who spent the war in exile. He is well known for his own work as well as for an interesting study of Heidegger which attempted to understand why and how Heidegger achieved such philosophical importance.³⁵ Weil, a Jew who was the assistant of Cassirer, himself a Jew, emigrated early to France where he achieved prominence

as an original thinker, above all for an important analysis of philosophical categories.³⁶ De Waelhens was a well known Belgian scholar of phenomenology and existentialism, the author of important studies of Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, etc. Towarnicki is a journalist who is still active.

Here, as in the later debate, it is instructive to regard the discussion as a series of dialectically interrelated analyses of the same phenomenon from diverse points of view. Both Gandillac and Towarnicki embroider various themes of the 'official' view of Heidegger's Nazism, due finally to Heidegger himself. Gandillac provides a short account of a visit to Heidegger's home which from the present perspective makes two interesting points.³⁷ On the one hand, he presents with sympathy Heidegger's view that Hitlerism was the historic manifestation of a so-called structural disease of human being as such. It is significant, since Heidegger later insists on the misunderstood essence of Nazism, that in Gandillac's account he refuses to incriminate the fall of the Germanic community whose true sense of liberty he still desires to awaken. On the other hand, several times in the article we are told that Heidegger was seduced like a child by the exterior aspects of Hitlerism, that he was induced to enrol in the Nazi party by his children, etc. Taken together, these two points tend to indicate that Heidegger was unaware of the consequences of, and hence not responsible for, his political actions, while holding open the possibility, which he later never renounced, of the true gathering of the metaphysical *Volk*.

Towarnicki's version of the official view is at least partly false.³⁸ He suggests that Heidegger was unanimously elected Rector, although that is now known to be untrue. Towarnicki quotes Heidegger to the effect that the death of Röhm opened his eyes to the true nature of Nazism, which he later criticized in his courses on Nietzsche; but we know that Heidegger continued to affirm his belief in an authentic form of National Socialism. The article ends with an affirmation, in the form of a direct quotation, of Heidegger's emotional proclamation of the spiritual importance of France to the world. When we recall that Heidegger also justified his turn to Nazism through the concern with the spiritual welfare of the German people, this remark appears less uplifting.

Löwith's discussion, which was written outside Germany in 1939, hence at the beginning of the war which was to devastate Europe, is still surprisingly complete.³⁹ It mentions topics which continue to occur and recur in the later debate such as the link between Heidegger's turn towards Nazism and his famous description of resoluteness in paragraph 74 of *Being and Time*, an analysis of the *Rektorsrede*, Heidegger's praise of Schlageter, Heidegger's relation to the students of Freiburg, the role of E. Jünger, etc. Löwith's analysis can be summarized as follows: in the final analysis *Being and Time* represents a theory of historical existence. It was only possible for Heidegger to turn towards

Nazism on this basis since an interpretation of his thought in this sense was possible. Further, Heidegger's turn to National Socialism follows from his prior philosophy, in fact is squarely based on a main principle of his thought: existence reduced to itself reposes only on itself in the face of nothing. Finally, this principle expresses the identification of Heidegger's thought with the radical political situation in which it arose.

Löwith's analysis is a clear attempt to understand Heidegger's Nazism as following from Heidegger's position, and his position as the expression of the historical situation, in Hegelian terms as the times comprehended in thought. Löwith contradicts two points maintained by all subsequent defenders of Heidegger: Löwith denies that Heidegger's philosophy can be understood other than through its social and political context. Accordingly, he contradicts in advance the well-known 'textualist' approach, especially prevalent in French circles, to Heidegger's writings without reference to the wider social, political and historical context in which they arose. He further denies the 'official' view of Heidegger's National Socialism – most prominently represented in the French debate by Fédier and Aubenque, and from a different perspective by Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe – which tends to minimize, even to excuse, Heidegger's turn towards Nazism as unfortunate, temporary and above all contingent with respect to Heidegger's thought.

At the outset of the French debate, the opposition between Löwith on the one hand and De Gandillac and Towarnicki on the other already symbolizes the two basic alternatives in their respective readings of Heidegger's Nazism as either necessary or contingent. All other later debate, both within and without the French context, only varies, but does not fundamentally modify, these two main options. Obviously, these two extremes are incompatible. Since Löwith traces Heidegger's actions to his thought and Heidegger's thought to the historical context, Löwith disputes Towarnicki, who regards Heidegger's link to National Socialism as temporary, regrettable and unmotivated by the underlying position; and Löwith disputes as well De Gandillac's assertion that Heidegger was unaware of what he did.

The disagreement gave rise to a debate. In the debate Weil, who correctly qualifies Towarnicki's article as a plea for Heidegger, intervenes against the necessitarian thesis, whereas De Waelhens defends the contingency view. Weil criticizes Heidegger for a supposed failure to assume responsibility for his acts and as the sole important philosopher who took up Hitler's cause.⁴⁰ But he denies the necessitarian thesis on the grounds that even by Heideggerian standards the link between Heidegger's thought and National Socialism is illegitimate. According to Weil, what he incorrectly calls Heideggerian existentialism is intrinsically defective since it leads to a decision in general, but not to any particular decision. From this perspective, Weil claims that Heidegger has falsified his own

thought in merely pretending *a contrario* that a political decision could be derived from his apolitical thought. Although it is correct to point to the open-ended quality of Heidegger's view of resoluteness, this does not impede the derivation of a political consequence from another aspect of Heidegger's position, such as his conception of authenticity.

This effort to deconstruct the necessitarian reading is peculiar – not because of the amalgam between Heideggerian phenomenology and existentialism, which Heidegger took pains to deny in the *Letter on Humanism*, nor in virtue of the denial that Heidegger is a privileged interpreter of his own thought, since there is no need to accord him this interpretative privilege – because it fails to address the claim that a clear political decision follows from Heidegger's view of authenticity. Now Alphonse De Waelhens – who also identifies Heidegger's thought as an existential phenomenology – suggests, through an attack on the necessitarian thesis, that the theme of Heidegger's fidelity to his own position is less significant than its possibly intrinsic relation to National Socialism.⁴¹

De Waelhens' attack on the necessitarian thesis is remarkable for two reasons. On the one hand, he raises the issue of who really understands Heidegger as a precondition for the critique of the latter's thought. Later in the discussion, even when the defenders of Heidegger are led to acknowledge that Nazism is central to his position, Derrida and others, including numerous writers outside the French debate, continue to insist that only someone deeply steeped in Heidegger's thought, by inference an unconditional adherent, is possibly competent to measure its defects. On the other hand, De Waelhens formulates a kind of transcendental argument meant to demonstrate that Heidegger's political turning could not have followed from his philosophy. According to De Waelhens, who has obviously been contradicted by history, an analysis of Heidegger's conception of historicity shows that its author could not accept fascism, a doctrine incompatible with the ideas of *Being and Time*. And he disposes of Löwith's version of the necessitarian thesis through a rapid, but unconvincing effort to demonstrate that Heidegger's former colleague did not always possess a sufficient grasp of the master's texts.

When we compare the views of Weil and De Waelhens, we see at once that since both deny that Heidegger's thought bears an intrinsic relation to Nazism, each is obliged to interpret what Heidegger thought and did as an instance of Heidegger's infidelity to Heidegger's own position. De Waelhens is more radical than Weil since he does not assert that Heidegger misunderstood his own thought, but rather claims – a point widely asserted in the later discussion – that the action of the individual Heidegger is without philosophical interest. Perhaps for that reason, he drew a response by Löwith, who does not take up the issue of who is capable of judging Heidegger.⁴² This omission is important, since it is always possible to claim that a criticism, any criticism at all,

is based on an insufficient awareness of the position. Rather, Löwith restates his own conviction that Heidegger's relation to Nazism is a necessary consequence of Heidegger's philosophy of existence. He further affirms that it is curious to defend Heidegger against Heidegger's own voluntary political engagement. In his rejoinder⁴³ De Waelhens insists that his attempt to show that Heidegger's political action did not, and cannot, follow from the latter's philosophy is only a specific instance of the more general claim that one cannot deduce a particular political stance from a philosophy.

De Waelhens' rejoinder invokes a principle, which, if followed, would effectively suppress the possibility of analysing the relation between thought and action. His principle, which contradicts the entire ethical tradition, whose unexpressed premise is that reasons can be causes, is false for at least two reasons: first, throughout history, at present in Eastern Europe, millions of people have been motivated to political action on behalf of ideas. This is a point De Waelhens can accommodate only on pain of denying that such ideas are philosophical. Second, De Waelhens calls on us to abandon the political act of an analysis of the link between Heidegger's philosophy and politics, which precisely assumes the political efficacy of philosophy he is concerned to deny.

4 The second wave

The initial phase of the debate presents a clear opposition between Heidegger's critics, who argue that his Nazism 'necessarily' follows from his thought, and his defenders who maintain that his Nazism is merely a contingent fact. The opposition between necessitarian and contingent readings of Heidegger's Nazism sets the stage for all later discussion of this theme in France and elsewhere. The second phase of the French debate differed in numerous ways from its predecessor. To begin with, it is less compact, and for that reason more difficult to delimit. It occurred over a number of years, roughly from 1948, when the first French edition of Lukács' book appeared, to the publication of Jean-Michel Palmier's study in 1968, the year of the French student uprising. It further includes articles by François Fédier, Jean-Paul Faye, François Bondy, Alfred Grosser, Robert Minder, Aimé Patri, etc., and journals such as *Méditations* and *Critique*. Another difference is the increasingly international character of the second phase of the debate, which makes greater reference to materials published in languages other than French. Further, the discussion now takes on an increasingly heated, often overheated, on occasion even strident, character, which surpasses the generally polite nature of traditional scholarly discussion. One can specu-

late that the excited character of the debate indicates the political stakes of the critique or defence of Heidegger's form of National Socialism.

The remarkable change in tone is arguably due to a variety of factors. On the one hand, in the initial phase of the discussion a number of those who took part, including Löwith and Weil, were not native French, but those who intervene in the next stage of the debate are mainly of French origin. It is a fact that debate in French intellectual circles tends to be noisier and more strident than elsewhere. On the other hand, in the meantime, the full effect of Heidegger's *Letter on Humanism* had begun to be felt. As a result, Heidegger had already begun to acquire a commanding presence in French intellectual life, whose horizon was increasingly constituted by his thought. The greater identification of French thought with Heidegger even as his position displaced Hegel's in the role of the master thinker meant that French scholars on occasion tended to act if they were as much engaged in defending French thought as in defending Heidegger's position. Further, the appearance in the meantime of Guido Schneeberger's collection of relevant documents, as well as other studies, such as those due to Adorno and Huhnerfeld, meant that Heidegger's philosophy, and not only his personal reputation, was now at risk. Finally, France was then approaching a political crisis which would nearly paralyse the country for a number of months beginning in March 1968.

Although in his *Letter* Heidegger implicitly admits his culpability in his stated desire to turn over a new leaf, Beaufret took a more extreme line, which developed only slowly. As early as 1945, when he was close to Marxism, he described Heidegger's adhesion to National Socialism as the result of a naivety linked to a bourgeois character.⁴⁴ But Beaufret rapidly abandoned his youthful flirting, common in France at least until 1968, with revolutionary thought. In his letter to Heidegger, he mentions his concern with the relation of ontology to the possibility of an ethics. Beaufret later provided a curious answer to his own concern in two ways: through the denial of a more than casual relation between Heidegger and National Socialism, itself a form of the contingency thesis,⁴⁵ but above all in his own later turn to a form of revisionist history in which he simply denied the existence of Nazi concentration camps!⁴⁶ Taken to its extremes, the result is to deny that there could be a problem in the link between Heidegger and National Socialism, which, on Beaufret's demonstrably false reading of history, was intrinsically unproblematic. In a word, Nazism was not Nazism! This is surely the most extreme possible form of the deconstruction of the necessitarian thesis, since from this angle of vision it is fully possible to accept that Heidegger was led by his thought to Nazism but to deny that the acceptance of Nazism is problematic.

We can deal separately with the works by Georg Lukács and Jean-

Michel Palmier. Lukács, the important Marxist philosopher and literary critic, is the author of *History and Class Consciousness*, a celebrated book which almost alone created the Hegelian approach to Marxism widely influential in later Marxist discussion.⁴⁷ His study of Marxism and existentialism, written during his Stalinist phase, was a consciously polemical intervention in the debate, intended to dismiss existentialism from an orthodox Marxist perspective.⁴⁸ Here, he applied Engels' depiction of the relation between thought and being as the watershed question of all philosophy to oppose the possibility of a putative third way, supposedly sought by existentialism, between idealism and materialism. According to Lukács, existentialism is merely a form of subjective idealism linked to the defence of bourgeois class interests. In passing, he specifically attacks Heidegger's position as pre-fascist. He developed this criticism at length in an appendix, 'Anhang; Heidegger Redivivus' – in direct response to the publication of Heidegger's *Letter on Humanism*, the same document which cemented Heidegger's relation to French philosophy – added to the German edition of his book.⁴⁹

Lukács' book seems to have affected the French discussion of Heidegger only marginally, mainly through its influence on Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. Lukács was in part later answered by Merleau-Ponty who, in a famous discussion, identified Lukács as the founder of so-called Western Marxism.⁵⁰ And Lukács clearly influenced Sartre's later turn to Marxism. Writing two decades later, Palmier, a careful student of Heidegger, casts himself in the role of a defender of the master against the various attacks which, for perhaps the first time in the French discussion, he attempts to parry through detailed textual analysis. Palmier's study, which appeared at the close of the sharp exchange between Fédier and Faye, is intended by its author as an initial approach to Heidegger's writings from April 1933 to February 1934, that is during his period as Rector.⁵¹ But by casting his net so narrowly, Palmier perhaps unintentionally takes this period, which he recognizes as belonging to Heidegger's *oeuvre*, out of context, since he renders it exceedingly difficult to grasp the degree of continuity between it and the later evolution of Heidegger's thought. Perhaps for this reason, despite the serious nature of Palmier's study, it seems not to have attracted attention in the later debate.⁵²

In order to characterize the second phase of the discussion, whose conceptual and chronological limits fall between the books by Lukács and Palmier, we do well to turn to the polemic between Fédier and Faye. Unlike the initial phase of the discussion, which began with a defence of Heidegger, the opening shot was fired by an attacker who was met after a short interval by a committed defender, determined to repulse any assault on the house of Being. This phase of the attack, in fact the second battle of the conceptual war concerning Heidegger, was launched by Jean-Paul Faye in 1961⁵³ through the publication of the

French translation of certain Heideggerian texts, notably the *Rektorsrede* and the homage to Schlageter. In a short presentation preceding the texts, Faye notes the violence of Heidegger's revolutionary language, particularly in the Rectoral speech, and its link to Nazi terminology. In a further article⁵⁴ in the same journal, Faye reproduces the famous passage on the essence of authentic Nazism from *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, as well as Heidegger's endorsement – in a letter to *Die Zeit* dated 24 September 1953 – of the effort by Christian E. Lewalter to explain away Heidegger's apparent concern with Nazism – published in the same journal on 13 August. Here, Faye develops his earlier discussion by insisting on the relation between Heidegger's views and those of Ernst Krieck. Faye also took the occasion, prodded by Aimé Patri, to correct his earlier translation of Heideggerian texts.

In retrospect, Faye's articles did not break new ground. His main contribution was to make available material which tended to cast doubt on the contingency analysis. The initial intervention by François Fédier, after Beaufret's death Heidegger's most ardent defender in the French philosophical discussion, only occurred some five years after Faye's articles. Even then, Fédier's ire was mainly directed towards other targets. Fédier only turns to Faye when the latter dared to respond to his impassioned defence of Heidegger against all comers. Since that time, Fédier has maintained his visible role – which now after the death of Beaufret, his former teacher, is nearly his alone – as the self-appointed, official spokesman for the contingency thesis, determined to deconstruct any and all forms of the necessitarian analysis. With the exception of Aubenque, at present no other prominent French defender of Heidegger argues that the link between Heidegger's philosophy and politics is merely contingent.

Fédier's initial article⁵⁵ was prompted by his perception of attacks on Heidegger by Guido Schneeberger, Theodor Adorno and Paul Hühnerfeld. Instead of a response to a polemic, the author describes his intent as an examination of the presuppositions of so-called hostile arguments. In each case, Fédier shows to his satisfaction that the writer in question is methodologically incapable of comprehending Heidegger's Nazism before describing what he calls reality through a simple statement of the 'main facts' of the case. According to Fédier, who does not examine other, later evidence, with the exception of the *Spiegel* interview, an analysis of Heidegger's courses between 1934 and 1944 suffices to perceive the exact meaning of Heidegger's opposition to Nazism and, for the same reason, to understand why he desired in 1933 to contribute to the realization of something other than what Nazism became.

It is noteworthy that none of the works to which Fédier responds here is due to a French author or published in French. Fédier's discussion, which is a form of the contingency thesis, specifically a further version

of the claim that the critics of Heidegger are insufficiently familiar with the object of their criticism, is only innovative as an early attempt within the French context to respond to foreign criticism of Heidegger. Although Fédier's *défense tous azimuts* did not even consider the nascent French effort to come to grips with the problem, it is not surprising that he was quickly answered by three French writers, including Patri, Minder and Faye, which in turn evoked a rapid rejoinder from Fédier.

Fédier is defended by Patri. In his short paper, he argues in support of Fédier and against Faye that – on linguistic grounds alone – one cannot identify a relation between Heidegger and Nazism, since the adjective 'völkisch' was already used by Fichte who was not an SS.⁵⁶ This version of the attack on the necessitarian thesis because the critic is allegedly misinformed was immediately contradicted in another short paper by Minder, who asserts that even a cursory examination of Heidegger's language supposes an acceptance of some fundamental principles of the Third Reich.⁵⁷ He further notes, as Farias and especially Ott later argue in detail, that Heidegger was strongly influenced by a certain rustic, but politically reactionary form of Roman Catholicism.

The latter point is a form of the necessitarian thesis interpreted in a historicist manner directly counter to the evolution of Heidegger's thought after the famous turning. For the claim that anyone, including the author of fundamental ontology, is *not* in part a product of the surrounding environment precisely contradicts Heidegger's own claim that we are all determined by the modern world, by technology, ultimately by metaphysics, even by Being. In his response, Faye returns to the attack with a perceptive comment on nascent right-wing Heideggerianism.⁵⁸ He notes in an ironic remark that there is at present a Parisian sect devoted to protecting its masters in the way that the RSPCA is devoted to protecting animals! He provides a discussion of the history of the term 'völkisch' and its relation to racism, in particular anti-semitism, later developed by Bourdieu, before turning his critical gaze on the difference, crucial in his eyes, between being in the world and transforming it.

Faye's article could only have been perceived as it was in part intended: as a provocation. In his article, Faye commits a strategic error, since he attempts to show that he has the appropriate knowledge which Fédier accuses him of lacking. The argument cannot be won on such terms, since it is always possible to maintain that the critic knew some things but not others, and the other things are relevant, indeed crucial. In short, it is always possible to claim and in effect to make out the claim that one who opposes a doctrine, any doctrine, is not sufficiently informed. This insight was not lost on Fédier, who quickly responded in this way in order to show that *après tout* Faye was uninformed, in any case not sufficiently informed to criticize such a difficult thinker as

Heidegger, since he did not know German sufficiently well. This is a technique which Fédier has continued to employ with frequency in his now numerous attempts to defend the 'sacred' cause.⁵⁹

In his response, Fédier concedes that Heidegger did use certain incriminating expressions over a ten-month period, but he denies that as a result Heidegger's thought is compromised in any way. In the course of a veritable demonstration of why no translation is safe from 'deconstruction', which anticipates Derrida's use of this method in his best days, Fédier goes so far as to say that a 'real' translation (sic!) of the Rectoral address will remove the vestiges of Nazism which Faye has 'injected' into it. He further advances a claim – which he later developed at length in a book – that although Heidegger was mistaken in 1933 in his allegiance to Hitler at the time it was impossible to understand what Hitler would become. He closes with a triple criticism of Heidegger's failure: to foresee the consequences of Nazism, to measure the powerlessness of thought with respect to Nazism and to grasp that thought could not modify what was underway. The latter two points are different versions of the same idea of the weakness of thought, which represent an application of Heidegger's own later view, in the *Letter on Humanism* and elsewhere, of thought as different from and opposed to philosophy.

For present purposes, Fédier's argument is interesting as the basic statement of the contingentist attack on the necessitarian analysis. More than twenty years later, one can no longer in good faith doubt the existence of a form of right-wing Heideggerianism determined to save Heidegger at all costs, even if to do so on occasion requires one to deny the apparently evident. At this early stage, with the exception of Beaufret, Gandillac and De Waelhens, and to a lesser extent such secondary figures as Patri, Fédier was virtually isolated as the keeper of the grail of Being. But as early as his first skirmish, he identified the basic form of his response to any form of the necessitarian argument.

Fédier's strategy is obviously dependent on that of such pioneer defenders of Heidegger in the French-language discussion as De Waelhens, who formulated the initial version of the attack on the necessitarian thesis for insufficient evidence. Now De Waelhens' version of this gambit was unconvincing since it was no more than the claim, which can always be made, that the critic is uninformed. Yet this claim was unconvincing, or at least not convincing, certainly not sufficiently convincing to be acceptable with respect to such a truly knowledgeable observer as Löwith. Yet if he does not perfect this strategy, Fédier at least takes it much further by developing it into a coherent defence, much as in chess the difference between an isolated move and a viable defence consists in the articulation of the various elements. Fédier's counter consists in the following elements, all calculated to make it difficult, even impossible to make out a claim for a durable, or even a transitory, link

between Heidegger and Nazism: the assertion that Heidegger was naive, but not culpable since he did not, or could not, know the nature of Nazism; the intimation that the critic is inadequately informed, for instance about Heidegger, as concerns the German language, etc.; and the pretension that a simple statement of the 'facts', including a look at the statements of others who were there and hence by implication know the 'real' story is sufficient to separate the 'real' Heidegger from the mythic figure who is the target of his critics. Combined in different ways, all of these elements later return in the third phase of the French debate on Heidegger and National Socialism.

5 The onset of the third wave

The third, most recent phase of the French debate began when Farias' study burst onto the intellectual scene in the fall of 1987. Any account of this phase needs to distinguish between the immediate reaction to Farias' book in French circles and the more measured, but often still heated discussion which followed and at the present time is still underway. The immediate French reaction to Farias' book was part of a rapid response which, it is fair to say, swept over Western Europe. The major newspapers and many magazines in all the major European countries carried articles concerning this study, often with a kind of concealed amusement directed at the French reception of the work.

Two examples from the West German press and one from an Italian newspaper are typical. In an article in a well-known liberal German daily, the author, apparently unaware of the preceding discussion, comments that the question of the negative influence on Heidegger's thought will henceforth be raised in France as well as in Germany.⁶⁰ In a respected intellectual German weekly, another writer concludes that Heidegger's letter to Jean Beaufret did not remain without a response, since it led to French post-modernism, although none of the post-modernists, who are all staunchly anti-totalitarian, can be simply assimilated to Heidegger in a political manner.⁶¹ Both of these articles are cautious and, in the best German sense, *sachlich*, concerned more to report than to pass judgment.

We find a much sharper, less journalistic reaction in an Italian daily newspaper which counterposes articles by two well-known Italian philosophers: Roberto Maggiori, an anti-Heideggerian; and Gianna Vattimo, a well-known Heideggerian. Responding to an earlier review by Vattimo of the Farias book, Maggiori criticizes Vattimo's view that the whole 'affaire Heidegger' is an operation directed against certain Parisian thinkers. In a sharp response, which recalls Beaufret's estimate of Heidegger as a conceptual giant among pygmies, Vattimo dismisses Farias' work as of little historical consequence.⁶²

The sharp exchange between Maggiori and Vattimo is similar in content, but not in tone, to the often much sharper character of the French discussion. The immediate reaction, what in French is aptly called the *réaction à chaud* was precisely that, namely heated, in fact overheated to a degree unusual even in French intellectual circles. This phase of the controversy, which was more symptomatic of the depth of feeling than insight into the problem, was uncharacteristically played out in the pages of the daily papers, the weekly magazines, in art and literary journals, on television, etc., in short through forms of communication not often associated with the measured tread of philosophical debate. It involved such well-known figures on the French intellectual scene as Derrida, Finkielkraut, E. de Fontenay, Baudrillard, Lévinas, Aubenque, Blanchot, Bourdieu, Renaut, Ferry, Daix, etc., as well as a large number of less well-known figures, all of whom felt called upon to comment on the situation; it involved as well foreign scholars imported for the occasion such as Gadamer. What had earlier been a philosophical debate, a disagreement between scholars on a theme concerning a well-known, but obscure German thinker, quickly became a kind of intellectual free-for-all in which opinions, even frank accusations, were voiced in rapid fashion. The result was to guarantee a *succès de scandale* for a book which rapidly became a *cause célèbre*.

One way to indicate the amplitude of the immediate reaction, which lasted for weeks in certain cases, is by a simple list, in no particular order, of some of the newspapers and journals which ran articles, sometimes numerous articles, on the topic: *Art Press*, *La Quinzaine Littéraire*, *Le Monde*, *Le Matin*, *Libération*, *La Croix*, *Le Quotidien de Paris*, *Le Figaro*, *Le Magazine Littéraire*, *Le Canard Enchaîné*, etc. The tone of the debate to follow was given by the opening shot, fired by Christian Jambet, a former *nouveau philosophe*, in his preface to the French edition of Farias' work. His sharply-worded preface begins with a reference to the traditional belief in the virtue of philosophy for life, before building to remarks on the manner in which Heidegger allegedly identifies authentic existence with a mere semblance, itself representative of the politics of extermination. Jambet ends with a statement intended to sum up Heidegger's thought in a reference to a well-known film, *Night and Fog* (*Nuit et brouillard*) on the Nazi concentration camps:

Heidegger has the merit of making ontology the question of our time. But how can we accept that philosophy, born of Socrates' trial for leading a just life, ends in the twilight where Heidegger wanted to see the end of the gods, but which was only the time of Night and Fog?⁶³

In his preface, Jambet raises the question of the specific difference which opposes, or seems to oppose, Heidegger to the entire philosophical

tradition through the relation between his own thought and absolute evil. Yet Jambet does not raise the other theme, highly relevant in the French context, of the specific link between Heidegger's philosophy and French thought. Certainly, the latter topic is partially responsible for the inflamed, passionate character of the immediate French reaction. Perhaps Hugo Ott, the Freiburg historian, caught the mood best in the opening comment of his review of Farias' book: 'In France a sky has fallen in – the sky of the philosophers.'⁶⁴

Even a small selection will communicate the sheer breadth of opinion in the immediate response to Farias' study in French circles. In a sober article, Roger-Pol Droit states that as a result of his study Farias has dismantled the 'official' view of Heidegger's merely contingent relation with National Socialism, long maintained by Beaufret and other friends.⁶⁵ According to Droit, who clearly denies De Waelhen's claim, in the future it will be impossible to separate Heidegger the philosopher from Heidegger the man, and it will be necessary to think the link which unites them. Georges-Arthur Goldschmidt, a French refugee from German Nazism, welcomes Farias' study for swelling the meagre ranks of those bothered by Heidegger's Nazi past; he regards Farias' book as a means to impede the normal business of the Parisian Heideggerians, henceforth obliged to confront the issues.⁶⁶ In a response, Emmanuel Martineau, the author of the pirated translation of *Being and Time*, a friend and student of Beaufret, admits that the latter became part of Heideggerian fascism, which he regards as matched by an hysterical anti-Heideggerian fascism. He accuses Goldschmidt of falling prey, not to the hate of Nazi cruelty, but purely and simply to the hatred of thought.⁶⁷

Alain Finkielkraut complains that in noting the connection between *Being and Time* and *Mein Kampf*, there is a concealed risk of promoting a kind of fascist reaction against philosophy.⁶⁸ In a response to Finkielkraut, Goldschmidt suggests that in France there is little real knowledge of Nazism; there is further an incapacity to see that a kind of Nazism rooted in German thought since Fichte is central to Heidegger's thought.⁶⁹ Jean Baudrillard observes that the so-called necrological discussion concerning Heidegger has no intrinsic philosophical meaning. He maintains that this discussion only betrays a transition from the stage of history to the stage of myth in which events, which we cannot grasp on the plane of reality, give rise to a convulsion indicative of a loss of reality.⁷⁰

Martineau's version of the lack of critical competence, already in evidence in earlier discussions, is further developed by Jacques Derrida in an interview.⁷¹ According to Derrida, then on the point of publishing a book coincidentally concerned with Heidegger and politics, the so-called facts discovered by Farias are not new for anyone seriously interested in Heidegger; and the interpretation of their relation to the master's thought

is so insufficient as to raise the question of whether Farias has devoted more than an hour to reading Heidegger. Yet Derrida also concedes the need to show the deep link between Heidegger's thought and actions to the possibility and reality of what he calls all the Nazisms.

In the face of Derrida's claim that Farias is not a competent reader of Heidegger's texts, Farias' enumeration, in his response, of a list of facts, supposedly brought to the attention of scholars for the first time, seems vaguely unsatisfactory.⁷² A still more radical response is furnished by Pierre Aubenque, the well-known Aristotle scholar, who, in a bitter article⁷³ simply denies all the relevant points, including the relevance of Farias' book, the intellectual honesty of his analysis, the need for a study of this kind and the lack of a significant connection between Heidegger's thought and Nazism. Aubenque's analysis is supported by Pascal David, who ends a review of Farias' study with a quotation from Abraham a Santa Clara – the Augustinian anti-Semite whom Farias regards as influential on Heidegger – to the effect that God loves fools, not foolishness.⁷⁴

In his article, Aubenque refers approvingly to Derrida, but the difference between their respective readings of Heidegger's Nazism places them in different camps. Although infinitely more clever than Fédier in his avowal of a version of the contingency thesis, Aubenque is finally close to Fédier's wholly unyielding defence, which simply denies that there is a problem worthy of consideration. In comparison, Derrida's response is more innovative in 'deconstructing' the opposition between representatives of the necessitarian and contingentist analyses. In essence, Derrida proposes that we can acknowledge the intrinsic link between Heidegger and Nazism, although he continues to insist that only the anointed few can comprehend it in the correct manner.

The result is to concede the main point of the necessitarian approach, but to restrict its development by continuing to insist, as the contingentists have all along, that only the 'orthodox', or more precisely the 'orthodox' critic of Heidegger, can measure the problem. An appropriate analogy is the claim made by a former Stalinist that only Stalin's victims can legitimately judge his crimes. This new standard of criticism, which couples an admission of the problem – which can no longer be denied, and is in fact no longer denied in any straightforward fashion by any observer with the clear exception of Fédier and Aubenque, who continue to represent the original form of the contingentist view – with the insistence on expert knowledge of Heidegger's thought as a precondition for valid discussion of Heidegger's Nazism, represents a significant evolution in the scholarly French discussion of this theme. As a result, the gap between the discussants has narrowed considerably since the point at issue is no longer whether there was a real and durable link between Heidegger and Nazism – something perhaps only Aubenque among the more significant French intellectuals still denies – but rather how to

understand this link, in particular how to understand its significance for his philosophy.

In philosophy, because of the length of the gestation period, the debate normally unfolds rather slowly, over a period measured at best in years and more often in decades or centuries. Now in French circles, where the half-life of a theory is very short, the debate usually unfolds more quickly, since to publish slowly would be to run the risk of being able to comment on a topic only as it was in the process of disappearing from the intellectual scene. Until recently, that is until the publication of Farias' work, with the exception of Palmier's study, no books wholly, or even mainly, centred on the theme of Heidegger and Nazism had appeared. This lacuna, if it is one, was now rapidly corrected, at a speed extraordinary even by the standards of the French intellectual discussion. Farias' book was published in October 1987. From that period until the following May, even as a steady, but steadily diminishing, stream of articles devoted to the topic continued to pour out, in an extraordinary burst of scholarly creativity no less than six studies devoted to this theme appeared.⁷⁵ Not surprisingly, in most cases they reflected the new consensus that there was a problem, although they differed widely on its description and analysis.

6 The third wave

Let us discuss these books in the order in which they appeared, which corresponds at least roughly to the order of their composition. We can begin with three rather different studies by Pierre Bourdieu, by Jean-François Lyotard, one of the main representatives of the post-modern tendency in French philosophy, and by Fédier. Bourdieu's discussion of what he, following Heidegger's concern with Being, calls Heidegger's political ontology, is the second edition of a text originally published in 1975, rewritten and adapted to recent revelations about Heidegger. Lyotard's study is the apparent result of the desire, or at least felt need, of every well-known Parisian intellectual, who desires to avoid regression to the state of mere anonymity, to comment rapidly on any major topic. Fédier's work is a further example of his continued effort, which in the meantime has lost any semblance of scholarly credibility, to maintain the contingentist thesis in its original, but now outmoded form. These three disparate works nicely illustrate the range of the next strand in the scholarly discussion by those whose relation to Heidegger is either tangential or, if the relation is on the contrary close, at least tangential to the further evolution of the Heidegger debate.

In a short introduction to his short study, Bourdieu, a well-known Marxist sociologist, indicates that his analysis of methodology has been

updated in the footnotes and by placing at the end three chapters concerning the analysis of Heideggerian language.⁷⁶ In an evident reference to the first edition of his book, he remarks – with a certain self-approval – that, despite the image of sociology, a close reading of Heidegger's work already revealed such themes as: anti-Semitism, his refusal to break with Nazism, his ultra-revolutionary conservative tendencies, as well as his disappointment in the lack of recognition of his revolutionary aspirations as the philosophical *Führer*.⁷⁷ In a clear allusion to the prior debate on Heidegger and politics, Bourdieu states that the failure to understand what has occurred was aided by Heidegger's erection of a wall between anthropology and ontology,⁷⁸ although we need now to examine the intrinsic blindness of these 'professionals of lucidity'.⁷⁹

Bourdieu is prescient in his allusion to Heidegger's anti-Semitism which has only recently been established.⁸⁰ His comments are significant in raising the second-order question of how so-called professionals of lucidity are able to respond to a situation of this kind. He provides an answer as to how one ought to proceed in a manner which reveals the politically conservative thrust of purely textual analysis, favoured most prominently in the current French discussion by Derrida and other so-called deconstructionists. According to Bourdieu, even the most determined adversaries of Heidegger have missed some of the signs concerning his Nazism since they unfortunately accept the form of immanent textual hermeneutics on which others, that is, Heidegger's epigones, insist. An approach of this kind, even its most radical form, can at best be partially successful since it concerns certain presuppositions only.⁸¹ In fact, this sort of approach is dangerous since when rigorously applied it has the effect not only of sanitizing what is unsavoury but of turning attention away from the political dimension to which the texts in question, even by their failure to state their aim, none the less refer. A striking example provided by Bourdieu concerns the manner in which a variety of participants in the French discussion, e.g., Beaufret, Lefebvre, Châtelet and Axelos – in fact those who accept Heidegger's own effort in the *Letter on Humanism* to measure his thought in terms of Marx's – see a convergence between Heidegger and Marx.⁸²

Bourdieu insists that we must abandon the separation between a political and a philosophical interpretation in order to institute a double reading (*lecture double*) which is both political and philosophical for Heideggerian texts characterized by an intrinsic ambiguity.⁸³ His aim is to break out of the circle formed by an exclusively immanent reading of the text, doubly confined within the text and to professionals, such as professional philosophers, or even confined to those philosophers who profess allegiance to Heidegger.⁸⁴ He regards Heidegger as representative of extremely conservative revolutionary tendencies which arose in Germany between the two World Wars. And he agrees in part with the

tendency of French defenders of Heidegger to discern two basically different stages in his thought. According to Bourdieu, Heidegger II constitutes a series of commentaries on Heidegger I in which, as the master himself notes, nothing is abandoned but, in Bourdieu's words, the celebrated author now absolutizes his practical choices in philosophical language.⁸⁵ He regards Heidegger's denial of a relation between his and any other position as an exercise in negative political ontology.⁸⁶ In Bourdieu's view, only those sensitive to the situation beyond the internal approach to the reading of the text can finally decode it.⁸⁷

Bourdieu is in part correct that Heidegger refused to explain his relation to Nazism since to do so would have been to admit that the essential thought never thought the essential, since Heidegger did not and could not grasp Nazism on the basis of his thought of Being. Bourdieu's error, which reveals a problem in his methodology, is to trivialize Heidegger's position by reducing it merely to an unconscious component which it supposedly later erects as a philosophical standard. Yet when we consider Heidegger's texts, not only in the context of his thought, but his thought in the context of the social and political context, we clearly have access to a dimension not accessible if we limit ourselves to a more immanent textual approach. Bourdieu's point tends to undermine various forms of immanent hermeneutics, including the celebrated view of intertextuality. It further reveals a conscious or unconscious strategy on the part of some right-wing Heideggerians, the reason for its relative success, and the way in which, as Bourdieu's own essay demonstrates, one can surpass its limits.

Bourdieu's book is a significant effort, altogether too rare in the discussion, to come to grips with the political dimension of Heidegger's thought against the historical background. The limitation of his account is that he mainly relies on an essay already in hand with only minor changes to react to more recent discussion. Although both Lyotard and Fédier make greater efforts to confront the latest research, their books are less impressive. Like Bourdieu, Lyotard also refuses to amalgamate Heidegger's thought and his politics.⁸⁸ Yet in comparison with Bourdieu's book and his own earlier writing, Lyotard's essay appears hasty and unsatisfactory. Bourdieu's work is saturated with references to English and German discussion, and is particularly rich in allusions to the constitution of the Weimar ethos against the nineteenth-century German background. Bourdieu's analysis of the relation between Heidegger's thought and the historical, cultural and political background, are still unsurpassed in the French discussion. With the exception of the obligatory tipping of the hat to Freud and Kant, Lyotard is exclusively concerned with French sources, something unsurprising since he holds that the 'problem' is essentially French.

Despite Habermas' effort⁸⁹ to portray him and his colleagues as crypto-

conservatives, Lyotard's approach reveals a fashionable, post-modernist form of liberalism. The term 'Jews' (*les 'juifs'*) in the title refers not only to the Jews, but to all those who in Europe have always been assimilated to them. This slight volume is divided into two chapters, respectively titled 'The "Jews"' and 'Heidegger'. According to Lyotard, who seems to like quotation marks, what he refers to as the Heidegger problem is a 'French' problem.⁹⁰ He holds that 'the Jews', those 'outcasts' of society, demonstrate that man's misery is constitutive of his being.⁹¹ Lyotard insists on the need to think the Heidegger problem⁹² without accepting the modish view that Nazism can either be deduced from *Being and Time* or that this book arose from an ethos which was already Nazi or pre-Nazi.⁹³ After stating that both Farias and Derrida are correct, Lyotard asserts that there is, however, something unforgettable but still forgotten, and which constitutes the real problem, that is that Heidegger could possibly have thought that in and through his collaboration with the Nazi party a real opportunity existed.⁹⁴

Lyotard is close to Bourdieu with respect to the famous turning, which he describes in difficult language as 'the amnesiac meditation of what will occur in Heideggerian "politics"'.⁹⁵ He suggests that *Being and Time* makes possible, but does not require, Heidegger's political engagement,⁹⁶ as witness the political reading Heidegger gave of his own thought during the Rectoral episode.⁹⁷ The remainder of the book consists in a serial critique of the views of other French commentators, including Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy. For Lyotard, all of them fail to grasp that – as Lyotard notes in a comment on Heidegger's 'Essence of truth' – in Heidegger's turn towards Being and by inference away from the Jews, or 'Jews', Heidegger's thought commits a cardinal 'fault' since it is still the hostage of the Law (*la Loi*).⁹⁸

This discussion is perhaps most enlightening as an undeveloped, but correct suggestion: although not an overtly political book, *Being and Time* could be and in fact was read by Heidegger in a political sense as the basis of his turn towards Nazism.⁹⁹ The suggestion that the basic flaw in Heidegger's thought resides in its relation to the Law, perhaps by extension in its dependency on the non-differentiated other, or other than itself, calls attention to a possible relation to the German Idealist tradition; but it is unfortunately too vague to state clearly, much less to evaluate. This is not the defect of Fédier's work, which could hardly be clearer in its intent or weaker in its arguments.

Fédier's book¹⁰⁰ is the latest, hopefully final expression of his unremitting faith as an orthodox Heideggerian unswayed, or even chastened, by new information or the intervening debate. He displays this point of view in his study with increased ardour even as he becomes the most prominent and certainly most persistent representative of this angle of vision, a sort of living dinosaur. Like the mythical author in Camus' *La*

Peste, the entire bibliography of certain writers is wholly composed of multiple versions of a single text, which they write again and again in different forms. Fédier's scenario follows in detail the meanders of his initial defence of the master in articles published more than two decades ago. The relevant difference is that here the *rappel des faits*, meant to exonerate Heidegger, is not due to Fédier and does not follow, but precedes the discussion. In a 'bibliographical essay' ('essai bibliographique') which begins the work, and which opens and closes with comments on the tranquil little city of Messkirch where Heidegger was born and is buried, François Vezin declares that the period of the Rectorate is no more than a parenthesis in Heidegger's life.¹⁰¹

Like the earliest forms of the contingentist analysis, Fédier's book is intended to defend Heidegger by attacking his detractors, in particular Farias. In the course of a difficult defence, the author is compelled to take extreme measures. Two examples worth noting are the tortured distinction introduced between anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism,¹⁰² and the defence of the German bishops for their 1933 decision to remove the interdiction which prevented Roman Catholics from adhering to National Socialism. In his Introduction, Fédier indicates that his book is meant as an apology in a supposed Socratic sense in order to dispose of the charges.¹⁰³ Like a good defence lawyer, he begins by exaggerating the 'crime' in order to show that his client could not possibly be guilty of it. According to Fédier, who perhaps had Adorno in mind, Farias holds that Heidegger never said nor thought essentially anything other than Nazism, a charge which Fédier affirms to be a calumny.¹⁰⁴

This attempted defence is problematic, since neither Farias nor anyone else has ever criticized Heidegger as broadly as Fédier pretends. Although he is concerned to refute all the charges brought against Heidegger, Fédier mainly concentrates on the Rectoral period. He claims that whereas it is permissible to accuse Heidegger of adhesion to Nazism in 1933–4, it is slanderous to describe the adhesion as total, since he never adhered to biological racism, etc.¹⁰⁵ But, then, by this standard there never were many total adherents of Nazism, especially among German academics, since few wholly accepted all aspects of the doctrine. Fédier's main argument consists in a perverse form of scepticism, according to which in 1933 it was not possible to foresee the future of National Socialism.¹⁰⁶ He even asserts that the definitive form of Nazism was not known prior to 1 September 1939.¹⁰⁷ But although many aspects of what would occur were indeed unclear in 1933, and by definition the future is what has not yet happened, the situation was already sufficiently clear then, well before the outbreak of the war, for many, including numerous Jewish philosophers, such as Cassirer, Marcuse, Weil, Benjamin, Löwith, etc., to choose exile. In fact, even Fédier is not convinced by his argument, since he also concedes that when Heidegger took up the cause of

National Socialism it already carried with it the signs of an essential perversity.¹⁰⁸

The first part of Fédier's discussion, entitled 'Un pseudo-événement', is a long attack on Farias' book because of its allegedly: inquisitorial tone,¹⁰⁹ obfuscation,¹¹⁰ unconscious appeal to Freudian mechanisms of condensation and displacement,¹¹¹ failure to respect the rules of honest scientific procedure,¹¹² etc. Alone at this late date, when so much is known, indeed when even such *croyants* as Derrida claim incorrectly that everything is known, Fédier explains the existence of Farias' study as a sheer invention (*montage*) of which almost no page resists serious study.¹¹³ In the second part of the discussion, entitled 'Heidegger et la politique', having disposed of Farias to his satisfaction, Fédier provides his own analysis of the problem raised by the Rectoral period, which he attributes to Heidegger's impatience.¹¹⁴

In the course of his defence, Fédier makes the following controversial points: the Rectoral address does not show an acceptance of Nazism but only a concern to defend academic science in the university,¹¹⁵ Heidegger later distinguished himself in his opposition to Nazism,¹¹⁶ the source of his action lies in a philosophical error leading to a need to modify the position¹¹⁷ and Heidegger's later silence is to be respected after the martyrdom (sic!) he endured.¹¹⁸ Yet unfortunately the Rectoral address not only shows an interest in the defence of science, but an explicit concern, which Heidegger underlines here and specifically admits in the article on the Rectorate, to utilize the university to attain a common goal shared with the Nazis: the destiny of the German people; and Heidegger's silence is neither honourable nor acceptable. And examination of Heidegger's texts refutes Heidegger's own claim to have confronted Nazism in his later writings.

Fédier's most interesting point is his claim in passing that a philosophical error necessitates a modification of the position, which suggests, reasoning *modus tollens*, that if a position leads to an incorrect form of action there is something mistaken in its very heart. In different ways this theme is developed in three further books on Heidegger and politics, due to Jacques Derrida, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Luc Ferry and Alain Renault. Derrida requires no introduction. Lacoue-Labarthe, Derrida's former student, is a well-known Heidegger specialist, who has worked closely in the past with Jean-Luc Nancy, another of Derrida's close associates.¹¹⁹ Ferry and Renault are two young anti-establishment philosophers who have collaborated on several other works. Derrida's book, which coincidentally appeared almost immediately after Farias' study, caused a stir in Heideggerian circles. Lacoue-Labarthe's work is an effort to think through the problem in a manner related to, but also significantly different from, Derrida's analysis, itself apparently dependent on Lacoue-Labarthe's earlier writing. The study by Ferry and

Renaut is an attack on French right-wing Heideggerianism as a form of anti-humanism due ultimately to Heidegger.

Derrida is an important thinker as well as presently the leading Heideggerian in France. His thought is deeply marked by, in fact inconceivable without, the encounter with Heidegger; he has also commented on Heidegger's position in numerous writings.¹²⁰ His influential but unorthodox Heideggerianism is itself an important form of Heideggerian 'orthodoxy', especially in France.¹²¹ Derrida's study, which can be viewed as a long meditation on Heidegger, is thoroughly Heideggerian since it proposes to thematize the concept of spirit, something Heidegger never does, in fact avoids. It can be read from at least two perspectives: as a Heideggerian analysis of Heidegger; and as an indirect, but pointed response to the theme of Heidegger and politics.¹²²

Derrida's defence of Heidegger, like so much of the French discussion of Heidegger, rests on a creative use of the *Letter on Humanism*. Derrida applies Heidegger's remark that humanism is metaphysical to characterize Heidegger's own Nazism as a metaphysical humanism which, in his later writings, he supposedly overcomes in a non-metaphysical, deeper form of humanism announced in this text. This analysis presupposes on the one hand that the later Heidegger, but not the early Heidegger, is anti-metaphysical, or more precisely beyond metaphysics in any ordinary sense – precisely what Heidegger himself claimed in his later writings, such as the *Beiträge* – and on the other hand that there is a break between the early and later phases of Heidegger's thought.

As a defence of the importance of Heidegger's thought while acknowledging the clear, undeniable link to Nazism, Derrida's strategy is reminiscent of a form of 'orthodox' Marxism, most clearly represented by Althusser and his associates, which argued for a break situated within Marx's thought. On this reading – already foreshadowed in Marx's view of the break between pre-history and human history in the transition from capitalism to communism – Marx's thought allegedly decomposes into two chronologically separable positions, the first of which can be described as philosophy but not yet as science, and the second of which breaks with philosophy in order to assume the form of science which is supposedly beyond philosophy. Althusser, who was obliged by the tardy publication of Marx's early writings to acknowledge the philosophical tenor of the early position, sought to defend the non-philosophical, allegedly scientific character of the later theory, that is, the supposedly mature form taken by Marx's theory after it broke with philosophy. In a similar manner, apparently relying on the concept of the turning in Heidegger's thought, which he does not, however, discuss, Derrida correlates the initial Heideggerian critique of metaphysics with Heidegger's supposedly still metaphysical philosophy, which then later gives way to what Heidegger later describes as an anti-metaphysical view of thinking beyond philo-

sophy. According to Derrida, in his still metaphysical phase Heidegger turned to Nazism, which he renounced in his later move away from metaphysics and beyond philosophy.

Derrida's Heidegger interpretation takes shape as a meditation on the terms *Geist*, *geistig* and *geistlich* in Heidegger's thought.¹²³ He points out that in *Being and Time* Heidegger warns against the use of *Geist*, which he puts in quotation marks; but twenty-five years later in an essay on Trakl¹²⁴ he speaks freely of the same term, which he now employs without quotation marks.¹²⁵ Derrida's hypothesis is that for Heidegger this term refers to such supposedly metaphysical concepts as unity (*l'Un*) and gathering (*Versammlung*).¹²⁶ According to Derrida, for Heidegger spirit is neither *pneuma* nor *spiritus*, but finally a flame more originary than either the Christian or the Platonic-metaphysical concepts.¹²⁷ He maintains that even in 1933, for instance in the Rectoral address, Heidegger rejected the reduction of spirit to reason¹²⁸ in order to spiritualize Nazism,¹²⁹ as can be seen in the role of spirit in the Rectoral address.¹³⁰ It follows, then, that Heidegger's Nazism was metaphysical, and that he overcame it when he overcame the metaphysical element in his own thought.

This attempted defence is problematic for various reasons. To begin with, in his self-described Heideggerian effort to think the unthought Derrida exaggerates the importance of a concept which Heidegger never thematizes precisely because it is not fundamental but ancillary to or even insignificant in his position. Derrida is unconvincing in his claim that spirit is central to Heidegger's thought, in which this concept seems at best a minor concern. Derrida unfortunately trivializes Heidegger's commitment to Nazism as following from a residually metaphysical turn of mind, in effect by reducing a practical political engagement to a philosophical commitment from which it apparently followed but to which it cannot reasonably be equated. A form of thought which makes it possible to accept a particular political approach, no matter of what kind, must not be conflated with its consequence. Obviously, metaphysics as such does not necessarily lead to Nazism, since there are many metaphysicians who did not become Nazis. Yet when Heidegger renounced metaphysics after the turning in his thought, he did not give up Nazism. Further, Derrida is obviously incorrect if he means to suggest that when Heidegger employs the term *Geist* without quotation marks in the 1953 article on Trakl Heidegger has overcome both metaphysics and Nazism. For in the same year he republished *An Introduction to Metaphysics* in which he publicly reaffirmed his commitment to a form of Nazism present, in Heideggerian terminology, under the mode of absence. At most, Heidegger turned away from Nazism as it was, although there is no evidence that he ever accepted it without reservations, but he never turned away from it as he still desired it to be. Finally, the interpretation

of the turning in Heidegger's thought, on which Derrida's defence of Heidegger rests, is basically mistaken if judged by Heidegger's texts. As the *Beiträge zur Philosophie* shows in detail, the turning is intended, not to indicate a break or discontinuity between phases of Heidegger's thought; rather, it is intended to point to further progress from a first beginning to another, deeper beginning more originary than, and a condition of, his initial, but more superficial starting point. Since there is, then, no break in Heidegger's thought, his position cannot fairly be defended in this way.

Lacoue-Labarthe presents a clearer, even more extreme, less acceptable form of a similar argument. Lacoue-Labarthe's consideration of 'la question' antedated Farias' book. In a recent collection¹³¹ he includes two earlier papers concerning Heidegger and politics which preceded and obviously influenced both his and Derrida's later discussions of Heidegger and politics: 'La transcendance finie/dans la politique' from 1981, and 'Poétique et politique' from 1984. In the former, he poses the question of the possibility of a politics which takes into account Heidegger's thought. Here, he examines the Rectoral speech in order to show its link to the destruction of the history of ontology and, by extension, to the effort to rethink the problem of the meaning of Being. In this paper, he makes two points: the Rectoral speech is not an occasional document, but a reflection on science, which is metaphysics as such; and this speech is intended as a philosophical foundation of the political. According to Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger's political engagement in 1933 was metaphysical and its basic result is the collapse of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. In the latter paper, in an examination of the question why the poetical dimension arose within political discourse, he argues that Heidegger's effort at the leadership (*Führung*) of National Socialism was essentially spiritual.¹³²

There is an obvious, striking continuity between the views of Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe in their joint insistence on the metaphysical nature of Heidegger's turning towards Nazism and the spiritual component of Heidegger's view of politics. But there is an even more important difference in Lacoue-Labarthe's stress on the link between the political and the philosophical in Heidegger's thought, in virtue of which Heidegger's original philosophical project is compromised by the political action to which it led. The assertion that Heidegger's effort at fundamental ontology was irreparably compromised by his turn to Nazism derives from the recognition – now rarely denied, and explicitly affirmed by Heidegger – that at least his initial enthusiasm for National Socialism followed from his position. This insight is significant for an understanding of the link between Heidegger's thought and Nazism. It leads to a conclusion which Lacoue-Labarthe does not draw, and which Heidegger means to deny in his description of the Rectoral episode as meaningless

(*beudeutungslos*): the later evolution of the Heideggerian position, perhaps even the famous turning in his thought, must be understood, in fact cannot be understood otherwise than in relation to Heidegger's Nazism.

I stress this unstated, but important consequence of Lacoue-Labarthe's article since he mainly develops other themes from his earlier analysis of the relation of poetry and politics, less menacing for the faith of a Heideggerian, in his later treatment of the political as fiction.¹³³ Unlike some others in the French discussion, who are concerned mainly, or even solely, to defend Heidegger at all costs, and hence unconcerned to present a full record, Lacoue-Labarthe does not hesitate to mention items rarely evoked in the French debate, such as the problem of anti-Semitism, the comments by Löwith and Jaspers, Heidegger's denunciation of Baumgarten, Heidegger's meditation on the nature of the holocaust, etc. It is especially significant, in view of the author's obvious identification with Heidegger as incontestably the best thinker of our time,¹³⁴ that he does not hesitate clearly to denounce Heidegger's failure to descry the holocaust which, from Heidegger's conception of history as the unfolding of metaphysics, supposedly constitutes a metaphysical event.¹³⁵

In his book, Lacoue-Labarthe modifies his earlier analysis. According to Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger's political engagement in 1933 was based on the idea of the hegemony of the spiritual and the philosophical over the political¹³⁶ – a stance in obvious continuity with *Being and Time*¹³⁷ and coherent with all his earlier thought¹³⁸ – which cannot be explained as an error¹³⁹ but must be viewed as a consequence.¹⁴⁰ Now abandoning his earlier insistence on the significance of the Rectoral speech, Lacoue-Labarthe argues for a caesura (*césure*) in the sense of Hölderlin.¹⁴¹ Heidegger's understanding of the political does not lie in his texts from 1933, including the Rectoral address, but in writings after the break with Nazism, specifically those on technology. In this respect, Lacoue-Labarthe makes two important points: on the one hand, he suggests that there is a beginning of the *Verwindung* of nihilism in the poet's thought,¹⁴² since for Heidegger art opens the possibility of the historicity of Dasein;¹⁴³ on the other hand, he maintains that Heidegger's discourse on art throws light on the essence of Nazism as a national-aestheticism.¹⁴⁴

These suggestions are independent of each other and must be discussed separately. Lacoue-Labarthe is certainly correct that Heidegger never abandoned his concern to seize the destiny of the German people, and that he later linked this possibility to an interest in the alethic qualities of poetry. Yet this point is inconsistent in two ways with his own analysis. For whereas he insists on a break in Heidegger's position, this point requires an acknowledgement of the essential continuity of Heidegger's thought over time as concerns the destiny of the Dasein. And, as a

further, direct consequence, it requires an acknowledgement of a conceptual kinship with Nazism, which Lacoue-Labarthe strongly denies in his critique of Adorno's well-known claim that Heidegger's thought was Nazi to its core.¹⁴⁵ It is further inaccurate to regard Heidegger's discussion of art or technology as illuminating the essence of Nazism. One can concede a certain perverse aestheticism in Nazi ideology, for instance in the writings of Albert Speer, the Nazi architect. But one must resist the idea that the massive political phenomenon of German fascism is solely, or even mainly, or essentially aesthetic.

The usefulness of Lacoue-Labarthe's book is limited by the depth of his own commitment to Heidegger's thought. As a result of his basic acceptance of Heidegger's position, Lacoue-Labarthe is unable to draw the consequences of his own critique of it. For instance, Lacoue-Labarthe cites a passage from an unpublished conference on technology, already cited above, where Heidegger likens agricultural technology to the Nazi gas chambers.¹⁴⁶ Despite his criticism of the patent inadequacy of Heidegger's dreadful comparison, Lacoue-Labarthe, the Heideggerian, is unable to perceive the full implication of Heidegger's statement in at least two ways: in his quasi-Heideggerian claim that this phenomenon somehow reveals the essence of the West,¹⁴⁷ which Heidegger allegedly failed to perceive, which in turn supposes the Heideggerian view that technology is the extension of metaphysics; and in his inability to draw the obvious consequence of his own indictment of Heidegger's failure, due to the inadequacy of fundamental ontology, to grasp the essence of the Nazi phenomenon.

Lacoue-Labarthe's analysis – patient, sober, careful, informed, considerate of other points of view – exhibits virtues unsurpassed in the present French Heidegger debate. This comprehension and tolerance gives way in Ferry and Renault's work to an accusatory, pamphletary, confrontational style, more characteristic of recent French philosophy. In their attack on the separations between various forms of French Heideggerianism as in effect distinctions without a difference – which they paradoxically represent as an effort to surpass mere polemics¹⁴⁸ – they deny the shared assumption, common to Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe, of a break in Heidegger's thought. Their book is the successor of their earlier work on contemporary anti-humanism, centred mainly on French varieties of Heideggerianism.¹⁴⁹

Ferry and Renault are most original in their effort to develop Lyotard's suggestion of the link between the defence of Heidegger and French philosophy. They draw attention to the parallel between the French controversy about Marxist anti-humanism in the 1970s and the current Heidegger controversy.¹⁵⁰ Their aim is to diagnose a link between Heidegger's anti-humanism, which they comprehend as the rejection of modernity¹⁵¹ and the supposed *erreur par excellence* of contemporary French

philosophy.¹⁵² They illustrate this error by Lacoue-Labarthe's strange, even wild comment, in the course of his attempt to differentiate the later Heidegger from the earlier Nazi enthusiast, that 'Nazism is a humanism'.¹⁵³

After some remarks on the significance of Farias' book in the context of the French debate, Ferry and Renault develop their indictment of contemporary French philosophy through the identification of the common thread of various forms of French Heideggerianism. They isolate three variants: the so-called zero degree, represented by Beaufret, which simply denies any relation between Heidegger and Nazism; Heideggerian orthodoxy, which admits, by playing Heidegger II off against Heidegger I, that in 1933 the master was not yet free of the metaphysics of subjectivity; and Derridean, or unorthodox, Heideggerianism, which relies on Heidegger's purported later deconstruction of the concept of spirit. According to Ferry and Renault, in the final analysis there is no difference between Derridean and orthodox Heideggerianism since at best the Derridean approach innovates on a strategical plane only.¹⁵⁴

Other than through their remarks on Farias' work, the main contribution of Ferry and Renault lies in their survey of various factions of the French debate about Heidegger's politics. They are most helpful in their suggestion of a relation between French post-modernism, or anti-humanism, and Heidegger's own Nazi proclivities. They usefully relate Heidegger's well-known reading of modernity as the reign of technology to his view that democracy and totalitarianism are similar in their domination by subjectivity, and his further adherence to the possibility of a good form of National Socialism¹⁵⁵ as by inference post-modernist and anti-modernist.¹⁵⁶ They criticize Heidegger's general incapacity to think subjectivity¹⁵⁷ because of: an inability to think humanism in a non-metaphysical manner,¹⁵⁸ an inattention to the plural character of modernity,¹⁵⁹ and the inconsistency in his rejection of a humanist vision of man in his view of Dasein in terms of Being. And they invoke a certain humanism in his view of man as transcendental in order to criticize Nazi biologism and racism.¹⁶⁰

These criticisms are well taken in virtue of Heidegger's identification of humanism with metaphysics. The relation of post-modernism and 'anti-humanism' in the work of recent French thinkers such as Derrida, Lyotard, Foucault and Lévi-Strauss among others is too well known to require detailed commentary. The most original point is insistence on Heidegger's supposed inability to differentiate the various forms of modernity while implying the point, clearly articulated only by Lacoue-Labarthe among Heidegger's French disciples, that Nazism is humanism of a different, supposedly acceptable kind. Beyond its indictment of the French identification with the Heideggerian rejection of Cartesian subjectivity – manifest in the ongoing effort to decentre the subject –

the most important result of this work is to question Heidegger's conception of the subject as transcendence, a theme present throughout his writings from his dissertation on Duns Scotus onwards.¹⁶¹

7 After the third wave

The French discussion of Heidegger's relation to politics is still underway. Its most recent phase includes a debate between Fédier and Nicolas Tertulian, the well-known Lukács specialist,¹⁶² Janicaud's sober, insightful discussion of the intrinsic link between Heidegger's conception of Being and Heidegger's Nazism,¹⁶³ and Meschonnic's remarks on Heidegger's politics in the context of a discussion of Heidegger's language.¹⁶⁴ Tertulian, who is one of the sharpest critics of Heidegger's political engagement, has so far developed his point of view only through a series of polemical articles. Janicaud's contribution is especially important for two reasons. On the one hand, he shows not only insight, but considerable courage, in the context of the highly inbred context of French philosophy, in now taking a more nuanced view of Heidegger's thought.¹⁶⁵ Janicaud's fidelity to the truth above philosophical friendship is as important as it is rare in the discussion of Heidegger's Nazism. On the other hand, Janicaud now clearly insists on the link between Heidegger's thought of Being, what he calls Heidegger's '*historialisme destinal*'¹⁶⁶ and Heidegger's Nazism while also underlining the irreducibility of Heidegger's thought merely to Nazism. In the French debate, Janicaud provides the most developed form of the effort, initiated by Löwith more than four decades ago, to comprehend Heidegger's Nazi turning as by no means contingent but as rooted in his philosophical position. This point, which has been urged with increasing frequency recently, and which I believe to be correct, will probably be the eventual verdict of history.¹⁶⁷

One lesson of this review of the French debate on Heidegger's Nazism concerns the delicate relation between thought and the context in which it arises. We do not know how a philosophical theory takes shape; but we do know that it can neither be reduced to nor separated from the context in which it emerges, including the social, historical and political context on the one hand and the network of competing views against which it strives on the other. Heidegger's position – despite his repeated, but apparently strategical claims, clearly meant to create his own legend, to accept a positive relation of his position to pre-Socratic thought only – needs to be understood against the complex background of theology, German neo-Kantianism, particularly Lask, and Kant's thought, medieval Aristotelianism as well as the social, political and historical situation in Germany between the two World Wars. Heidegger insisted throughout his writings on the crucial difference between philosophy and a mere

Weltanschauung, but his own 'philosophy' is in some respects the best counterexample.¹⁶⁸ For his theory of Being is also clearly a *Weltanschauung* which reflects, in fact incorporates, the 'philosophy' of the Weimar Republic.

The French debate offers a particularly interesting example of the delicate relation between thought and its context. With the exceptions noted, it is distinguished by its concern even now to defuse the problematic relation between Heidegger's thought and politics by arguing for a discontinuity between Heidegger's early and later position in order to 'save' his thought and – in so far as the French discussion is dependent on Heidegger's theory – itself. Yet Heidegger only turned against one form of Nazism, not Nazism as such. To fail to see this point, to conflate his withdrawal from the historical form of National Socialism with an unproven rejection of the essence of a movement Heidegger continued to embrace, is to overlook the emperor's new clothes.

Now French philosophers are not less intelligent or well-informed than those elsewhere. How can we explain their reluctance to see that the emperor has no clothes on? I believe that the reason lies in a persistent, unhealthy degree of identification of contemporary French philosophy with Heidegger's position, which literally forms its horizon. We can formulate what is clearly an existential predicament in the form of a paradox: to the extent that the horizon of contemporary French philosophy is constituted by Heidegger's thought, it cannot examine Heidegger's link to Nazism without putting itself into question, that is without simultaneously criticizing the Heideggerian position. In a word, Heidegger's French connection prevents, or impedes, the French thinkers from perceiving that the emperor has no clothes.

The French example is unusual for the extent to which Heidegger's thought dominates French philosophy. The result of this domination is to remain attentive to the unthought in Heidegger's position, at the cost of obstructing any attempt to place the Heideggerian horizon into question. This consequence is useful to the extent that French philosophy remains within the Heideggerian orbit, but also philosophically dangerous. For at least since Plato philosophy has consisted in the refusal to accept undemonstrated assumptions, in the constant effort to clarify, demonstrate or eliminate what it merely presupposed, in order to progress through an examination of its presuppositions.

The recent effort of some dissident French thinkers, especially Bourdieu, Janicaud, Tertulian and from another angle of vision Ferry and Renaut to examine the roots of French Heideggerianism, to reflect on the so-called French problem, is a healthy sign. Despite Heidegger's oft-cited claim that when French philosophers begin to think they think in German – or by implication think about Heidegger, or even within the ambit of Heidegger's thought – it indicates that French thought will be

even more robust, and accordingly able to grow in new and different ways, when it has finally examined its own Heideggerianism. For to the extent that Heidegger still forms the horizon of French philosophy, to appreciate the limits of his thought is to go beyond Heidegger and hence beyond French philosophy. But this move beyond Heidegger is, however, necessary if French thought is to advance beyond its present level.

The French discussion is an extreme example of the problem posed by the reception of Heidegger's Nazism. For a variety of reasons, philosophers in general, not just Heideggerians, have been slow in confronting Heidegger's Nazism. Yet Heidegger's Nazism is deeply rooted in, indeed basic to his philosophy, which cannot be comprehended in isolation from his political turning. At least since De Waelhens, a number of Heideggerians, particularly in France, although elsewhere as well, have insisted that the link between Heidegger's philosophy and politics can be understood only by someone so deeply versed in Heidegger's thought as to be a follower of the master. If we accept this claim, then the result is still another paradox, which can be formulated as follows: only a Heideggerian can grasp Heidegger's thought, including the relation between Heidegger's Nazism and his philosophy; but as our discussion of the French debate illustrates, the link between Heidegger's Nazism and his philosophy can only be grasped from a vantage point located outside of Heidegger's position. It follows, then, on this Heideggerian hypothesis for the understanding of Heidegger's thought, that Heidegger's political engagement is literally beyond criticism: for either it can only be understood by Heideggerians, who cannot confront the problem within the framework of Heidegger's own theory, to which they are committed, or it must be understood by non-Heideggerians who, according to the Heideggerian claim about understanding Heidegger, also cannot understand it. The result, then, of the Heideggerian view of Heidegger is to render this aspect of Heidegger's thought strictly unknowable, a kind of thing in itself, a theory about which anything can be believed but nothing can be known.

The Heideggerian approach to Heidegger suggests that in the final analysis a careful, responsible, but critical reception of the complex issues raised by Heidegger's turning on the basis of his thought to National Socialism is impossible. Yet this inference is unacceptable since we need to understand his Nazism as part of the process of reception of Heidegger's novel position. I am convinced that we can best, and perhaps only, understand Heidegger's theory, including his Nazism, if we are informed about his view but also not committed to it as in principle correct. The discussion has shown that Heidegger's Nazism, and, hence, his thought, cannot finally be comprehended by someone unconditionally committed to the truth of his thought. I conclude that Heidegger's theory, including

his Nazism, like the theories of other thinkers, is finally best understood, by someone committed not to the truth of his position but to the truth.

Notes

1 For a recent, short discussion of the French reception of Heidegger, see Jürg Altwegg, 'Heidegger in Frankreich – und zurück?', in Jürg Altwegg (Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1988), pp. 14–25. See also *Cahier de l'Herne, Martin Heidegger*, edited by Michel Haar (Paris: Cahier de l'Herne, 1983) and *Magazine Littéraire*, 235 (novembre 1986). It is significant that as late as this period, in a special issue containing a 'dossier' specifically devoted to 'Martin Heidegger, l'être et le temps', there was only a brief discussion of the problem of politics. See François Fédier, 'La question politique', pp. 51–2.

2 For an account from a different perspective, see Richard Wolin, 'The French Heidegger debate', in *New German Critique*, 45 (Fall 1988), pp. 135–60.

3 The texts omitted include Georges Friedmann, in *Cahiers de Sociologie*, xvi, 1954, and *Mélanges Lucien Febvre*, 1954; Robert Minder, 'Hegel and Heidegger. Lumières et obscurantisme', in *Utopies et Institutions au XVIII^e Siècle*, ed. P. Francastel (Paris-The Hague: Mouton, 1963), and 'Heidegger und Hegel oder die Sprache von Meßkirch', in Robert Minder, *Dichter in der Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt: Insel Verlag, 1966), pp. 210–64; and Alexandre Koyré, 'L'évolution philosophique de Heidegger', in *Critique*, 1 (1946), pp. 73–82, and *Critique*, 2 (1946), pp. 161–83.

4 For a brief introduction, see Richard Wolin, 'Introduction to "Martin Heidegger and politics: a dossier"', *The New German Critique*, 45 (Fall 1988), pp. 91–5. Wolin regards the problem as concerning Heidegger and politics, whereas in fact it more narrowly concerns Heidegger and Nazism.

5 With the exception of a version of Löwith's contribution, this debate is still not available in English. See Karl Löwith, 'Political implications of Heidegger's existentialism', *New German Critique*, 45 (Fall 1988), pp. 117–34.

6 See Karsten Harries, 'Heidegger as a political thinker', *The Review of Metaphysics*, 24 (June 1976), reprinted in Michael Murray (ed.), *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 306–7, n. 10.

7 See Victor Farias, *Heidegger et le nazisme* (Paris: Editions Verdier, 1987).

8 See Hugo Ott, *Martin Heidegger. Unterwegs zu einer Biographie*.

9 See particularly Michael E. Zimmermann, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990) and Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

10 Despite the 'violence' of the recent French reception of Heidegger's Nazism, interest in the discussion seems now to have significantly waned. Significantly, the recent publication of a French translation of Ott's book has attracted little attention. For a review in the best academic style, written by Thomas Ferenczi, see 'Douze ans dans la vie de Heidegger. L'historien allemand Hugo Ott confirme que, de 1933 à 1945, le philosophe est resté fidèle au régime hitlérien', *Le Monde*, vendredi 16 novembre 1990, p. 26.

11 For a classic French study of post-modernism, see François Lyotard, *La condition postmoderne* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1979).

12 It has been suggested that the rapid pace of change in French thought

indicates that it is in crisis. See Paul de Man, *Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism*, Introduction by Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), pp. 3–5.

13 The tenth article of the 'Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen', promulgated by the Assemblée nationale in August 1789, reads: 'Nul ne doit être inquiété pour ses opinions, même religieuses, pourvu que leur manifestation ne trouble pas l'ordre public établi par la loi.'

14 For a recent example, see André Glucksmann, *Descartes, c'est la France* (Paris: Flammarion, 1987).

15 See Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, ed. Allan Bloom, tr. James H. Nichols, Jr. (New York: Basic Books, 1969).

16 For an analysis of Hegel's residual Cartesianism, see Tom Rockmore, *Hegel's Circular Epistemology* (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1986), chap. 6, esp. pp. 142–54.

17 In his otherwise excellent study of Hegel as the central thinker in recent French philosophy, Descombes fails to appreciate the sense in which his role in French thought was in part dependent on his relation to Descartes. See Vincent Descombes, *Le même et l'autre. Quarante-cinq ans de philosophie française (1933–1978)* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1979).

18 For a recent analysis of the role of Heidegger in French philosophy, see Alain Badiou, *Manifeste pour la philosophie* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1989), chap. 4: 'Heidegger envisagé comme lieu commun', pp. 27–32.

19 For Heidegger's later criticism of philosophical anthropology as deriving from Descartes, see 'The age of the world picture', in Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, tr. and with an Introduction by William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 115–54.

20 Sartre's basic statement of the humanist thrust of his existentialism is contained in his popular lecture, 'Existentialism is a humanism', tr. Philip Mairet (London: Methuen, 1948). Heidegger's rejection of humanism as a metaphysical concept is developed in his *Letter on Humanism*, in Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, edited by David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977).

21 See 'Only a god can save us: *Der Spiegel's* interview with Martin Heidegger', *Philosophy Today* (Winter 1976), p. 282.

22 The main exception to this tendency in the French discussion is the work of Bourdieu. See Pierre Bourdieu, *L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1988).

23 For a representative sample of how *Being and Time* is received in the French discussion, see 'Dossier: Martin Heidegger', in *Magazine littéraire*, 235 (novembre 1986), pp. 16–58.

24 See Martin Heidegger, *Lettre sur l'humanisme*, translated with an Introduction by Roger Munier (Paris: Aubier, 1964), p. 7.

25 See Martin Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism*, p. 221.

26 See Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, p. 231.

27 See Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, p. 202.

28 See Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, pp. 221, 224, 227.

29 Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, p. 231; Heidegger's emphases.

30 See 'Deux documents sur Heidegger', *Les Temps Modernes*, 1(4) (janvier 1946), N.D.L.R., p. 713.

31 For Heidegger's self-serving view that in the Rectoral address he was engaged only in defending the German university, see Martin Heidegger, 'The Rectorate 1933/34: facts and thoughts', in 'The self-assertion of the German university: address, delivered on the solemn assumption of the Rectorate of the

University Freiburg. The Rectorate 1933/34: facts and thoughts', tr. with an introduction by Karsten Harries, *Review of Metaphysics*, 38 (March 1985), pp. 467–502.

32 See Silvio Vietta, *Heideggers Kritik am Nationalsozialismus und an der Technik* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1989).

33 For Sallis' claim that we have to let Heidegger's texts speak to us without any interference due to consideration of his political transgressions, see John Sallis, *Echoes: After Heidegger* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 11.

34 For a reading of the Rectoral address which mainly follows Heidegger's own self-serving view of it, see Charles Scott, *The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger*, 'These violent passions: the Rector's address', pp. 148–72.

35 See Karl Löwith, *Heidegger. Denker in dürftiger Zeit: Zur Stellung der Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1984).

36 See Eric Weil, *Logique de la philosophie* (Paris: Vrin, 1950).

37 See Maurice de Gandillac, 'Entretien avec Martin Heidegger', *Les Temps Modernes*, 1(4) (janvier 1946), pp. 713–16.

38 See Alfred de Towarnicki, 'Visite à Martin Heidegger', *Les Temps Modernes*, 1(4) (janvier 1946), pp. 717–24.

39 See Karl Löwith, 'Les implications politiques de la philosophie de l'existence chez Heidegger', *Les Temps Modernes*, 2 (14) (1946), pp. 343–60.

40 See Eric Weil, 'Le cas Heidegger', *Les Temps Modernes* (juillet 1947), pp. 128–38.

41 See Alphonse de Waelhens, 'La philosophie de Heidegger et le nazisme', *Les Temps Modernes*, 3 (1947), pp. 115–27.

42 See Karl Löwith, 'Réponse à M. de Waelhens', *Les Temps Modernes*, 35 (août 1948), pp. 370–3.

43 See Alphonse de Waelhens, 'Réponse à cette réponse', *Les Temps Modernes* (août 1948), pp. 374–7.

44 See Jean Beaufret, *Introduction aux philosophies de l'existence*, série Médiations (Paris: Denoël/Gonthier), p. 30, reprinted as *De l'existentialisme à Heidegger* (Paris: Vrin, 1986), p. 25.

45 See, e.g., his article, 'En chemin avec Heidegger', in Michel Haar (ed.), *Cahiers de L'Herne. Heidegger* (Paris: L'Herne, 1983), pp. 205–33; see also his statement in J. Beaufret, *Entretien avec F. de Towarnicki* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1984), p. 87: 'Heidegger n'a jamais rien fait qui ait pu motiver les allégations formulées contre lui' and the examination of his philosophy from a political perspective represents 'la conspiration des médiocres au nom de la médiocrité'. Essentially the same defence is offered later by Vattimo in his claim that Heidegger's thought is more important than that of his accusers.

46 See *Annales d'histoire révisionniste*, 3 (automne–hiver 1987), pp. 204–5; for a discussion of the link between Beaufret and Robert Faurisson, see Michel Kajman, *Le Monde*, vendredi 22 janvier 1988, pp. 1, 18. The following passage (cited in Jean-François Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, tr. Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 3) provides an idea of Faurisson's view: 'I have analyzed thousands of documents. I have tirelessly pursued specialists and historians with my questions. I have tried in vain to find a single former deportee capable of proving to me that he had really seen, with his own eyes, a gas chamber.' This form of historical revisionism is fundamentally different from the more benign discussion in German intellectual circles where the controversy does not concern the existence, but rather the interpretation of, the so-called final solution. See 'Historikerstreit'. Die

Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der national-sozialistischen Juden vernichtung (Zürich/Munich: Piper Verlag, 1987). For a philosophical reaction to Faurisson, see Jean-François Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, pp. 3–4.

47 For a good recent survey of his thought, see Werner Jung, *Georg Lukács* (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1989).

48 See Georg Lukács, *Existentialisme ou Marxisme?* (Paris: Nagel, 1948).

49 See Georg Lukács, *Existentialismus oder Marxismus?* (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1951).

50 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Les aventures de la dialectique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), chap. 2: 'Le Marxisme "occidental"', pp. 43–80.

51 See Jean-Michel Palmier, *Les écrits politiques de Heidegger* (Paris: L'Herne, 1968).

52 Palmier argues that Heidegger made two basic mistakes: he thought that through the Nazi party he could realize an intuition he perceived in Ernst Jünger's book, *Der Arbeiter*; and he thought that within Nazism he could develop a philosophical dimension since he deluded himself into perceiving within it a spiritual potentiality. For a statement of his view, see Jean-Michel Palmier, 'Heidegger et le national-socialisme', in M. Haar (ed.), *Cahier de l'Herne. Heidegger* (Paris: L'Herne, 1983), pp. 409–46. For a summary of Palmier's criticism, see *ibid.*, pp. 443–4.

53 See Jean-Pierre Faye, 'Heidegger et la révolution', *Médiations*, 3 (automne 1961), pp. 151–9. Faye has continued to develop his critique of Heidegger. For its most recent form, see Jean-Pierre Faye, *La raison narrative* (Balland, 1990).

54 See Jean-Pierre Faye, 'Attaques Nazies contre Heidegger', *Médiations*, 5 (été 1962), pp. 137–51.

55 See François Fédier, 'Trois Attaques contre Heidegger', *Critique*, 234 (novembre 1966), pp. 883–904. The discussion begun by Fédier including a series of responses and rejoinders, ended with contributions by Bondy and Fédier. See François Bondy, 'Une lettre de Heidegger à François Bondy', *Critique* (1968), pp. 433–5, and François Fédier, 'Le Point', *Critique* (1968), pp. 435–7.

56 See Aimé Patri, 'Serait-ce une querelle d'allemand?', *Critique*, 237 (février 1967), pp. 296–7.

57 See Robert Minder, 'Langage et Nazisme', *Critique*, 237 (février 1967), pp. 284–7.

58 See Jean-Pierre Faye, 'La lecture et l'énoncé', *Critique*, 237 (février 1967), pp. 288–95.

59 See François Fédier, 'A propos de Heidegger. Une lecture dénoncée', *Critique*, 242, pp. 672–86.

60 See the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 245, Donnerstag 22 Oktober 1987, 'Bis zuletzt ein Nazi Heidegger im grellen Licht/Eine Pariser Sensation', p. 11.

61 See *Die Zeit*, 46, 6 November 1987, 'Wie braun war Heidegger? Die postmodernen Grossfurthsen und ihr deutscher Ahnherr'.

62 See Gianni Vattimo, 'Il pensiero di Heidegger più forte di chi lo accusa', *La Stampa*, 14 November 1987.

63 Christian Jambet, Preface to Victor Farias, *Heidegger et le nazisme*, p. 14 – translation Tom Rockmore.

64 Hugo Ott, 'Wege und Abwege. Zu Victor Farias' kritischer Heidegger-Studie', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 275, Freitag, 27 November 1987, p. 67: 'In Frankreich ist ein Himmel eingestürzt – le ciel des philosophes'.

65 See Roger-Pol Droit, *Le Monde*.

66 See Georges-Arthur Goldschmidt, 'Heidegger, militant et penseur nazi', *Le Matin*, jeudi 15 octobre 1987, p. 16.

67 See Emmanuel Martineau, 'De la haine de la pensée aux "faurissonneries"', *Le Matin*, lundi 26 octobre 1987.

68 See Alain Finkielkraut, 'Heidegger: la question et le procès', *Le Monde*, mardi 5 janvier 1988, p. 2.

69 See Georges-Arthur Goldschmidt, 'Heidegger: l'allemand et le ressentiment', *Le Monde*, mercredi 13 janvier 1988.

70 See Jean Baudrillard, 'Nécroscopie autour de Martin Heidegger', *Libération*, mercredi 27 janvier 1988, pp. 1-2.

71 See Jacques Derrida, 'Un entretien avec Jacques Derrida. Heidegger, l'enfer des philosophes', *Le nouvel observateur*, 6 novembre 1988.

72 See Victor Farias, 'Victor Farias: pas d'accord avec Jacques Derrida', *Le nouvel observateur*, 47, 27 novembre-3 décembre 1987.

73 See Pierre Aubenque, 'Encore Heidegger et le nazisme', *Le Débat* (janvier-février 1988), pp. 113-23. This issue, which provides a good point of entry into the recent French discussion of Heidegger and Nazism, contains a diverse collection of articles by P. Aubenque, H. Crétella, M. Deguy, F. Fédier, G. Granel, S. Moses and A. Renaut under the heading of 'Heidegger, la philosophie et le nazisme' as well as a collection of twelve texts under the heading of 'Martin Heidegger: Textes politiques 1933-1934'.

74 See Pascal David, 'Heidegger et le nazisme. A propos du livre de V. Farias de même intitulé', *Les Etudes philosophiques* (avril-juin 1988), pp. 257-63.

75 See also Heidegger. *Questions ouvertes*, Collège international de philosophie (Paris: Editions Osiris, 1988). This volume contains a diverse collection of articles on different themes presented at a seminar organized by the Collège international de philosophie. Under the heading of 'Histoire, Politique', there is a series of articles by J. Rolland, Eliane Escoubas, P. Lacoue-Labarthe, J. Derrida, M. Abensour and E. Lévinas on various aspects of the theme of Heidegger and Nazism. For a review covering the works by Fédier, Bourdieu, Lacoue-Labarthe, Renaut and Ferry and Lyotard, see Jean-Michel Palmier, 'Heidegger et le national-socialisme', *Magazine littéraire*, 255 (juin 1988), pp. 89-93.

76 See Pierre Bourdieu, *L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1988). For a more recent French study of Heidegger's language, see Henri Meschonnic, *Le langage Heidegger* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1990).

77 Bourdieu, *L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger*, p. 7.

78 On the importance of Heidegger's refusal of an anthropological reading of his thought, see Martin Heidegger, *La lettre à Jean Wahl*, cited in Bourdieu, *L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger*, p. 114.

79 See Bourdieu, *L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger*, p. 8.

80 On this point, see Bourdieu, *L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger*, p. 59, where he refers to Toni Cassirer's well-known comment and 61n., where he discusses the influence of H. von Treitschke on later German thought, including the German academy. See also a letter of Husserl to Dietrich Mahnke, dated 4 May 1933, in which Husserl writes: 'Vorangegangen ist der von ihm [Heidegger - T.R.] vollzogene Abbruch des Verkehrs mit mir (und schon bald nach seiner Berufung) und in den letzten Jahren sein immer stärker zum Ausdruck kommander Antisemitismus - auch gegenüber seiner Gruppe begeisterter jüdischer Schüler und in der Fakultät.' Cited by Hugo Ott in Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert and Otto Pöggeler, *Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), p. 69. This contradicts the widespread view, represented by

Pöggeler, *ibid.*, p. 17, that the story of Heidegger's anti-Semitism is at best apocryphal.

81 See Bourdieu, *L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger*, p. 67.

82 See Bourdieu, *L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger*, pp. 107–8.

83 See Bourdieu, *L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger*, p. 10.

84 See Bourdieu, *L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger*, p. 102.

85 See Bourdieu, *L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger*, p. 115.

86 See Bourdieu, *L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger*, p. 117.

87 See Bourdieu, *L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger*, p. 118.

88 See Jean-François Lyotard, *Heidegger et 'les juifs'* (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1988), pp. 97–101.

89 See Jürgen Habermas, 'Die Moderne ein unvollendetes Projekt' in Jürgen Habermas, *Kleine politische Schriften I–IV* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981), pp. 444–64.

90 'L'affaire Heidegger est une affaire "française"', in Lyotard, *Heidegger et 'les juifs'*, p. 16.

91 See Lyotard, *Heidegger et 'les juifs'*, p. 52; see also *ibid.*, p. 71 'judéo-christianisme'; p. 73, 'société'; p. 103, 'politique'; p. 146, 'faute'; p. 153, 'Celan', etc.

92 'Penser l'affaire Heidegger', Lyotard, *Heidegger et 'les juifs'*, p. 87.

93 See Lyotard, *Heidegger et 'les juifs'*, p. 90; see also *ibid.*, p. 109.

94 See Lyotard, *Heidegger et 'les juifs'*, p. 95.

95 'La méditation anamnésique de ce qui aura eu lieu dans la "politique" heideggerienne', in Lyotard, *Heidegger et 'les juifs'*, p. 103.

96 See Lyotard, *Heidegger et 'les juifs'*, p. 110.

97 See Lyotard, *Heidegger et 'les juifs'*, p. 111; for an initial discussion of this hypothesis, see *ibid.*, pp. 115–20.

98 See Lyotard, *Heidegger et 'les juifs'*, p. 148.

99 Lyotard here contradicts such French commentators as Aubenque, who directly deny the political nature of Heidegger's work. For Aubenque's denial, see Aubenque, 'Encore Heidegger et le nazisme'. *Le Débat* (janvier–février 1988), pp. 118–19.

100 See François Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1988).

101 'Le rectorat n'a cependant rien d'une parenthèse dans la vie de Heidegger et il vaut la peine de lire les "textes politiques" de la période de 1933–1934', Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, p. 22.

102 See Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, p. 67.

103 Or as he says, 'lever l'accusation portée contre Heidegger', Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, p. 30.

104 See Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, p. 31.

105 See Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, pp. 31–3.

106 See Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, p. 37.

107 See Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, p. 162.

108 See Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, p. 185.

109 See Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, p. 114.

110 See Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, p. 115.

111 See Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, pp. 115, 147.

112 See Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, p. 116.

113 See Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, p. 136.

114 See Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, p. 152.

115 See Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, pp. 198–9.

116 See Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, p. 234.

117 See Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, p. 237.

118 See Fédier, *Heidegger: anatomie d'un scandale*, p. 240.

119 Among the French Heideggerians, Lacoue-Labarthe has been most persistent in pursuing the problem raised by Heidegger's Nazism in all its many variations. Heidegger's later view of the role of poetry in the disclosure of truth led to his encounter with Paul Celan. For a recent effort to study the role of poetry based on that encounter, see Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *La poésie comme expérience* (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1986).

120 A short list of his writings on or about Heidegger includes *La vérité en peinture*, *Ousia*, *Grammé*, 'Geschlecht. Différence sexuelle, différence ontologique', 'La main de Heidegger (Geschlecht II)', etc. His writings on Heidegger have recently been brought together in a single volume. See Jacques Derrida, *Heidegger et la question* (Paris: Flammarion, 1990).

121 For denial of the importance of the distinction or distinctions between the Derridean approach and so-called orthodox Heideggerianism in France, see Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, *Heidegger et les modernes* (Paris: Grasset, 1988), pp. 99ff.

122 The latter aspect has not been lost on orthodox, or Derridean, Heideggerians. It is significant that his study has in fact been praised by Heideggerians for its Heideggerian quality. For instance, David Krell, in a long review in part intended to defend Heidegger against Farias' criticism, makes this point. See David Farrell Krell, 'Spiriting Heidegger. A discussion of *De l'esprit: Heidegger et la question*, by Jacques Derrida', in *Research in Phenomenology*, 18 (1988), pp. 205-30.

123 See Derrida, *Heidegger et la question*, p. 11.

124 See Martin Heidegger, 'Die Sprache im Gedicht, Eine Erörterung von Georg Trakls Gedicht', 1953, in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959).

125 See Derrida, *Heidegger et la question*, p. 12.

126 See Derrida, *Heidegger et la question*, p. 24.

127 See Derrida, *Heidegger et la question*, p. 156.

128 See Derrida, *Heidegger et la question*, p. 155.

129 See Derrida, *Heidegger et la question*, p. 64.

130 See Derrida, *Heidegger et la question*, p. 66.

131 See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *L'imitation des modernes. Typographies II* (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1986).

132 See Lacoue-Labarthe, *L'imitation des modernes. Typographies II*, p. 184.

133 See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique. Heidegger, l'art et la politique* (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1987).

134 See Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique. Heidegger, l'art et la politique*, p. 14.

135 See Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique. Heidegger, l'art et la politique*, p. 75.

136 See Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique. Heidegger, l'art et la politique*, p. 28.

137 See Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique. Heidegger, l'art et la politique*, p. 35.

138 See Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique. Heidegger, l'art et la politique*, p. 38.

139 See Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique. Heidegger, l'art et la politique*, p. 39.

140 See Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique. Heidegger, l'art et la politique*, p. 43.

141 See Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique. Heidegger, l'art et la politique*, p. 64.

142 See Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique. Heidegger, l'art et la politique*, p. 86.

143 See Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique. Heidegger, l'art et la politique*, p. 87; see also *ibid.*, p. 91.

144 See Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique. Heidegger, l'art et la politique*, p. 91; see also *ibid.*, p. 115.

145 See Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique. Heidegger, l'art et la politique*, p. 150.

146 See Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique. Heidegger, l'art et la politique*, p. 58.

147 See Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique. Heidegger, l'art et la politique*, p. 59.

148 Ferry and Renault, *Heidegger et les modernes*, p. 12.

149 See Luc Ferry and Alain Renault, *La Pensée 68. Essai sur l'antihumanisme contemporain* (Paris: Gallimard, 1985).

150 Ferry and Renault, *Heidegger et les modernes*, p. 40.

151 See Ferry and Renault, *Heidegger et les modernes*, p. 10.

152 See Ferry and Renault, *Heidegger et les modernes*, p. 12.

153 Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique*, p. 58.

154 See Ferry and Renault, *Heidegger et les modernes*, p. 117.

155 See Ferry and Renault, *Heidegger et les modernes*, p. 149.

156 See Ferry and Renault, *Heidegger et les modernes*, p. 155.

157 See Ferry and Renault, *Heidegger et les modernes*, p. 227.

158 See Ferry and Renault, *Heidegger et les modernes*, p. 170.

159 See Ferry and Renault, *Heidegger et les modernes*, p. 172.

160 See Ferry and Renault, *Heidegger et les modernes*, pp. 224–5.

161 See Heidegger, 'Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus', in *Martin Heidegger. Frühe Schriften* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1972), p. 141: 'Es fehlt dem Mittelalter, was gerade einen Wesenszug des modernen Geistes ausmacht; die Befreiung des Subjekts von der Gebundenheit an die Umgebung, die Befestigung im eigenen Leben.'

162 See Nicolas Tertulian, 'Trois témoignages: Löwith, Jaspers, Marcuse', *La Quinzaine littéraire*, 496 (1–15 novembre 1987), pp. 10–11; 'A propos de Heidegger, la manipulation des textes a tout de même des limites', *La Quinzaine littéraire*, 515 (1–15 septembre 1988), pp. 18–21; 'Quand le discours heideggerien se mue en prise de position politique', *La Quinzaine littéraire*, 523 (1–5 novembre 1988), p. 26; 'Esquives, abandons et nouvelles inexactitudes; Un tournant dans les recherches sur Heidegger', *La Quinzaine littéraire*, 526 (16–28 janvier 1989), pp. 19–21; Nicolas Tertulian, 'Heidegger et le national-socialisme. Aspects et points de vue', *Tramonto dell'occidente?*, ed. Gian Mario Cazzaniga, Domenico Losurdo and Livio Sichirollo (Napoli: Istituto per gli Studi Filosofici, 1989), pp. 165–206.

163 See Dominique Janicaud, *L'ombre de cette pensée. Heidegger et la question politique* (Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 1990).

164 See Henri Meschonnic, *Le langage Heidegger* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1990).

165 For Janicaud's earlier view of Heidegger, see Dominique Janicaud and

Jean-François Mattéi, *La métaphysique à la limite. Cinq études sur Heidegger* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1983).

166 See Janicaud, *L'ombre de cette pensée*, p. 49.

167 For other versions of this argument see Michael Zimmerman, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity, Technology, Politics, Art* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990) and Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). See also Tom Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy* (Los Angeles, Berkeley and London: University of California Press – forthcoming).

168 This insistence is present in his writings as early as the initial lecture series. See Martin Heidegger, 'Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem', in Martin Heidegger, 'Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie', *Frühe Freiburger Vorlesungen Kriegsnotsemester 1919 und Sommersemester 1919*, ed. Bernd Heimbüchel (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987). It is restated in his review of Jaspers' *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, and in numerous other writings.

Philosophy and politics: by way of Martin Heidegger

Joseph Margolis

There are two quite different issues regarding philosophy and politics that Martin Heidegger's career as a professional philosopher poses that we cannot ignore. One concerns the question whether Heidegger's philosophy is inseparable, in whole or in part, from his political commitment as a Nazi; and, more generally, whether there is a principled distinction between philosophical and political convictions that can be made out just where the analysis of the human condition is at stake. The other concerns the question whether (and if so, how) Heidegger's original inquiries decisively affect *our* sense of the constraints under which moral and political legitimation henceforth obtains.

It is easy to see that if the answer to the second question is significant in an affirmative way, then we cannot deny that Heidegger's philosophy must bear on the viability and validity of inquiries that do not share his own political convictions, whether or not we find it possible to disjoin philosophy and politics altogether. Since there can be no doubt that the answer to the second question *is* in the affirmative, it cannot be the case that Heidegger's philosophy can be completely or largely rejected simply because, as he worked out his own views, he did so to a significant degree, perhaps largely, possibly even essentially, as a proto-Nazi, a public Nazi, a deviant Nazi, a utopian Nazi in defeat.

Now, it does also appear that Heidegger *did* produce his philosophy chiefly as all those sorts of Nazi. The entire direction of the analysis of his work, both early and late, for instance the analysis of the hitherto largely unknown *Beiträge*,¹ confirms more and more compellingly (and dishearteningly) that Heidegger was indeed extraordinarily singleminded philosophically from the very beginning of his career,² and that the nerve of his entire endeavour really concerned the indissolubility, in the largest sense, of philosophy and politics. In fact, given the truth of this judgment, it is much less surprising that Michel Foucault confesses in a pointed

way, in what seems to have been his own last interview, that Heidegger was a most important influence in his own work³ – despite the fact that Foucault never discusses Heidegger's actual theories and despite the plausible sense (contestable in a deep way, it must also be admitted⁴) in which Foucault was radically opposed to the moral and political convictions Heidegger represented.

In any case, the discussion of Heidegger is particularly arresting, intellectually. Just because he was a Nazi, his philosophy organically involves his Nazi proclivities and convictions. It was a theorizing influence throughout a large part of the twentieth century both in philosophy and beyond philosophy *and* among opponents and would-be opponents of Nazism; *and* (so) *we*, despite our failing to disjoin his philosophy and his politics, cannot quite manage to dismiss Heidegger's philosophy altogether, or to give up using or debating its findings and claims in a featured way in inquiries that are clearly opposed to anything like Heidegger's Nazism. We obviously do not feel bound to treat Heidegger merely as a Nazi. There can be no doubt that the situation is a unique one.

I

There are two closely related themes that span Heidegger's *Being and Time* and the Marburg lectures of 1927 (translated as *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*) that bear directly on the connection between philosophy and politics: the first concerns Heidegger's repudiation of canonical philosophy from, say, Aristotle to Kant; the second, Heidegger's radical distinction between 'scientific philosophy' and philosophy as *Weltanschauung*. Both themes betray certain doubtful features of Heidegger's own line of argument: they *could*, certainly, have been formed to serve quite deliberately Heidegger's Nazism. But they confirm in a wider sense the close conceptual connection Heidegger acknowledged between philosophy and politics; and, what is more interesting, both are marred on philosophical grounds and both are redeemable on philosophical grounds, in ways that continue to confirm the strong connection between philosophy and politics – without implicating Nazism at all.

It is here, of course, that Heidegger's more permanent contribution may be discerned; for, ironically, the correction of his *philosophical* mistakes are themselves informed, at least in part or at least by parallel speculations, by a more rigorous application of his own insights into the puzzles of the connection between philosophy and politics. Grasping that, we are led to the conclusion originally broached, namely, that Heidegger's intellectual importance in the twentieth century can be justified well beyond the local link between his philosophy and his use of it (even his

opportunistic reshaping of it again and again) as a Nazi of the various stripes already mentioned. No doubt the admission is a disturbing one. But honesty at this late date is a political act – as well as a philosophical one. It must be so, on the argument being mounted.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger charges philosophy with 'the task of destroying the history of ontology' (*Destruktion, destruieren*).⁵ Heidegger did not mean, here, to destroy ontology or metaphysics in the usual sense of 'destroy', that is, to eliminate it altogether, to cause it to cease to exist or to cease to be able to be recovered. He meant, rather, what he took to be the phenomenological project of 'deconstructing' or 'de-structuring' the accumulating (and misleading) history of ontology, so that whatever *it could recover* would no longer be read erroneously in terms of the false privilege of the canon but now in terms of his own deeper understanding of the relation between ontic and ontological inquiry:

We understand [the fundamental] task [of philosophy] as one in which by taking *the question of Being as our clue*, we are to *destroy* the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being – the ways which have guided us ever since.⁶

Clearly, Heidegger meant to *recover* what he thought could be recovered of ontology, by way of the new clue that 'destroys' the tradition. He actually says elsewhere, somewhat more perspicuously:

our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein's Being remains only *one way* which we may take. Our *aim* is to work out the question of Being in general. The *thematic* analysis of existence, however, first needs the light of the idea of Being in general, which must be clarified beforehand. This holds particularly if we adhere to the principle which we expressed in our introduction as one by which any philosophical investigation may be gauged: that philosophy 'is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its departure from the hermeneutics of Dasein, which, as an analytic of *existence*, has made fast the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it *arises* and to which it *returns*'. This thesis, of course, is to be regarded not as a dogma, but rather as a formulation of a problem of principle which still remains 'veiled': can one provide *ontological* grounds for ontology, or does it require an ontical foundation? and *which* entity must take over the function of providing this foundation?⁷

The offending canon, which Heidegger traces incisively in Aristotle, Descartes and Kant, fails, he believes, to understand the full meaning

of the fact that 'the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time', which the analysis of Being (*Sein*), 'rightly seen and rightly explained', would show. Correspondingly, he holds, 'temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*] [is] the meaning of the Being of that entity which we call "Dasein"'. What Heidegger means is that the analysis of Being (a fortiori, the Being of *Dasein* itself) proceeds by way of analysing the 'average everydayness' (*Alltäglichkeit*) of 'factual *Dasein*'; but in doing that, it merely achieves a 'provisional' and 'incomplete' anthropology of *Dasein*; it cannot rightly 'interpret . . . its meaning' (which, of course, requires a grasp of its 'ontological' (in one sense, its temporal nature) and not merely its 'ontical' structure (in particular, whatever temporal structure may be derivatively ascribed to distributed objects – including 'factual *Dasein*' – by virtue of the temporal structures of *Dasein*'s subjectivity). As Heidegger puts it: 'Dasein has a pre-ontological being as its ontically constitutive state. Dasein is in such a way as to be something which understands something like Being.' *Dasein* does so

with time as its standpoint. Time [he says] must be brought to light – and genuinely conceived – as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it. In order for us to discern this, time needs to be explicated *primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being*.⁸

The novel and difficult theme, here, is that *Dasein*'s temporality, which is the ontological import of its ontic (or its ordinary discursible) structure, is essential to its pre-ontological disposition and capacity for understanding Being (which cannot be ontically analysed at all): that constitutive condition accounts for its (equally ontological) disposition of 'historicality' (*Geschichtlichkeit*) in virtue of which, *ontically*, it construes its ('objective') world by 'historizing' it discursively (*geschehen*). As a result, the 'elemental historicity of *Dasein* may remain hidden from *Dasein* itself'. It *may* discover it by way of 'discover[ing] tradition. . . . But historiography – or more precisely historicity [*Historizität*] – is possible as a kind of Being which the inquiring *Dasein* may possess, only because historicity is a determining characteristic for *Dasein* in the very basis of its Being.⁹ So *Dasein*'s grasp of its own (ontological) nature is achieved by reversing the order of capacitation by and in the order of inquiry – provided it eventually comes to understand that what it is discovering is *not* explicable in terms of the discursive categories of the early (ontic) phase of its characteristic work. Furthermore, on Heidegger's view, this is only one possible way of proceeding. One might even imagine that something like the *Kehre* of the *Letter on Humanism* is

already adumbrated here.¹⁰ Whether or not this is so, we cannot fail to remark, in hindsight, the easy *passage* from the one stage to the other.

Heidegger immediately follows this analysis, in *Being and Time*, by charging Kant with having prolonged the Cartesian (the canonical) error in a double way: first, by utterly neglecting 'the problem of Being'; and second, by failing to bring 'the phenomenon of time back into the subject again' (that is, into *Dasein*, construed 'phenomenologically'). Kant failed, therefore, to perceive that there was even a problem in 'the decisive connection between time and the "I think"'.¹¹

II

The strenuous and rather baffling nature of all this is more apparent than real. What Heidegger is claiming is, first of all, that *Being* (*Sein*) rather than plural, individuated things or 'beings' (*Seiende*) is the proper, even essential concern of philosophy; second, that whatever may be said regarding *Seiende* must be construed as pertinent to the possibilities that *Sein* 'first' provides; third, that that defines the inherent conceptual dependence of ontic distinctions on, and its subordination to, ontological discoveries; fourth, that there is no true universality that can be assigned to the merely ontic but only to the ontological; and fifth, that our understanding of this relationship (that is, our human understanding) is made possible (perhaps not exclusively) by the dawning of *Dasein*'s self-understanding (our understanding as 'ontico-ontological' incarnations of *Dasein*¹²) of its being ontologically structured as it is. In the *Phenomenology*, Heidegger explicitly says: '*Being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy*';¹³ and, in *Being and Time*, he says: '*Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being*. *Dasein* is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.'¹⁴ This fifth theme is contested, of course, in Heidegger's papers following the *Kehre*. (We shall consider the matter, below.)

Effectively, this means that *all* discourse that proceeds by way of categories, conceptual distinctions addressed to *plural, numbered, individuated, ontic entities*, depends for its relevance and validity on its issuing from the peculiar *ontological* encounter between a certain uniquely endowed ontic *Seiendes* (*Dasein*, or 'factual *Dasein*') and *Sein* itself, which is utterly numberless and utterly structureless. That is, *Sein* cannot be made to conform to the referential and predicative devices (and categories) of enunciative discourse; but it is not (on Heidegger's view) therefore impossible to determine 'its meaning', it is intelligible:

'Being' cannot have the character of an entity. Thus we cannot apply to Being the concept of 'definition' as presented in traditional logic,

which itself has its foundations in ancient ontology and which, within certain limits, provides a justifiable way of characterizing 'entities'. The indefinability of Being does not eliminate the question of its meaning; it demands that we look that question in the face.¹⁵

This means, of course, that both theoretical and practical discourse – which inescapably involve numbered, individuated entities – depend on a 'ground' (the postulated phenomenological encounter between *Dasein* and *Sein*) that precludes, by way of its ('higher') temporality, any privileged invariance or necessity regarding such entities: either by way of an escape, from their provisionality, to changeless discoveries governing such plural entities; or by way of generalizing among them to such invariances.¹⁶

Therein lies the failed presumption of classical Greek philosophy and its most celebrated progeny, particularly in Plato's, Aristotle's, medieval, Descartes', Kant's, and Hegel's philosophies (all succinctly condemned in the space of a few pages). But the new philosophical orientation Heidegger offers is not without its own difficulties. For, first of all, it itself *depends* for its validity on discoveries accessible to *us* as historical instantiations of *that Dasein* that is putatively in a certain privileged, ontologically receptive role *vis-à-vis* numberless *Sein*; and second, *that* very discovery – the discovery about the nature of such discoveries – is also a discovery of particular entities in historical time. For example, it is some 'factual *Dasein*', some philosopher, in effect – Heidegger says – that discerns that 'Being is always the Being of an entity'.¹⁷

The lesson to be drawn is uniform for theoretical and practical inquiry (science and politics, for instance). It is simply this: no science and no morality discursively addressed to plural *Seiende* can take a necessary, invariant, universal, transhistorical or suprahistorical, categorically normative, or transcendently validated form as such. All ontic discourse is provisional, partial, historically transient, subject to change under conditions that ontic discourse cannot fathom, radically contingent: to adhere to its findings merely as such is rationally indefensible. 'Inquiry', says Heidegger, 'as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought. So the meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way . . . we always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being.'¹⁸ Hence, since 'Being is always the Being of an entity',

the totality of entities can, in accordance with its various domains, become a field for laying bare and delimiting certain definite areas of subject-matter. These areas, on their part (for instance, history, Nature, space, life, *Dasein*, language, and the like), can serve as objects which corresponding scientific investigations may take as their respective themes. Scientific research accomplishes, roughly and

naively, the demarcation and initial fixing of the areas of subject-matter. The basic structures of any such area have already been worked out after a fashion in our pre-scientific ways of experiencing and interpreting that domain of Being in which the area of the subject-matter is itself confined. The 'basic concepts' which thus arise remain our proximal clues for disclosing this area concretely for the first time. And although research may always lean towards this positive approach, its real progress comes not so much from collecting results and storing them away in 'manuals' as from inquiring into the ways in which each particular area is basically constituted [*Grundverfassung*] – an inquiry to which we have been driven mostly by reacting against just such an increase in information.¹⁹

Narrowly construed, Heidegger is here opposing *every* form of foundationalism and cognitive privilege. He himself draws attention to the fact that he is attacking the foundationalism of mathematics and the sciences. In this he is still very close to his mentor, Husserl.²⁰ But he goes on, of course, as did Husserl himself in a *radically* different way, to discuss the 'ontological' (or phenomenological) *foundations* of those sciences:

The question of Being aims . . . at ascertaining the *a priori* condition not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type, and in so doing, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations. *Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task.*²¹

In short, Heidegger, like Husserl, moves in the direction of the phenomenologically apodictic with respect to the use of the categories of the understanding applied to the distributed things of our everyday world. In this regard, both are Kantian and both are opponents of Kant. But there the similarity ceases. For Husserl attempts to determine the inherent invariant structure of the concepts with which we (as Transcendental Ego) first 'constitute', phenomenologically, the (*already experientially given*) world in which we live; and Heidegger treats the givenness of the world itself as a late, transient and potentially replaceable artefact of the 'prior' encounter of *Dasein* and *Sein* that *cannot* itself be analysed in either Kant's or Husserl's way.

So Husserl's interest in the invariant structure of our concepts is con-

trolled by the efforts of a postulated ideal rational intelligence (the Transcendental Ego) to determine whether and in what way those concepts, the concepts we employ in our sciences, mathematics and elsewhere are subject to limitations of change when applied to the *Lebenswelt* we inhabit.²² To put the point in a somewhat vulgar way, Husserl is a super-Descartes or a super-Kant; but Heidegger repudiates Descartes and Kant – and Husserl, ultimately. For Heidegger's certitude regarding foundations is thoroughly *noumenal*, in the Kantian sense; whereas Husserl heroically treats his own phenomenology as the most inclusive and ultimate form possible of *phenomenally*-governed transcendental reflection.

III

If Heidegger is right in emphasizing the radical contingency of the historical and artefactual nature of *our concepts*, then Husserl is off on the wrong track altogether as far as any asymptotic approximation to the invariance of our concepts is concerned; although a phenomenologically more labile review of the structure of our concepts, within the terms of a historicized critique, would still be useful.²³ But in the attempt to understand Heidegger's linking of philosophy and politics, we cannot rightly rest with this quite plausible criticism. Husserl genuinely retreated from what should have been his effort (through the acknowledged influence of Max Weber) to come to terms with historicity and social construction, in writing the *Crisis* volume. In any case, the contingency of our concepts in ordinary use cannot fail to infect their phenomenological review as well: there cannot, on Kantian-like grounds, be a hierarchy of cognitive resources. The same weakness must infect the entire canon Heidegger discloses.

Heidegger appears only occasionally to have pursued in a detailed way anything like an 'ontologically' privileged science. It is certainly clear that, in general, particularly during the rectorate at Freiburg and afterwards (even when he became disillusioned with Hitler), he conceived the sciences as rightly informed by what rightly informed the political and moral orientation of the German world.²⁴ The supreme expression of this conviction is, without question, Heidegger's rectoral address on assuming the post, 27 May 1933, at the University of Freiburg. There, addressing the question of 'the spiritual *leadership* of this university', Heidegger remarks that the question is rightly answered 'only and above all when the leaders [*Führer*] are first led themselves – led by the relentlessness of that spiritual order that expresses its history through the fate of the German nation'. 'Has this essence [*Wesen*]', Heidegger asks, 'real

power to put a stamp onto our existence [*Dasein*]? Only if we wholeheartedly *want* this spirit.' Hence,

the self-determination of the German university is the original common will to its essence. . . . To will the essence of the German university is to will that science [German science] to be informed by the historical spiritual mission of the German people. Science and German fate must *above all* gain power in the will to essence [*Wesenwillen*].²⁵

Here, the crucial complications begin to surface in a legible way. For, on this thesis, Heidegger no longer restricts himself to a merely phenomenological (his own phenomenological) reading of the fateful mistake of the Western *ontic* canon that, contrary to the de-privileging, negative function of *Zeitlichkeit*, presumes to discern the conceptual necessities of, say, Aristotle, or Descartes, or Kant or Husserl; he now claims a positive, cognitively superior, prescriptive – in fact, *noumenal* – instruction directing the work of science and political morality.

Husserl had been mistaken in attenuating, as far as he could, the resources of a *phenomenally grounded transcendental or critical reflection*. On Heidegger's view, the argument against Kant must ultimately be effective against Husserl as well. But the instruction of the *Rektorsrede* is apparently drawn from the *phenomenological* powers of *Dasein* – a collective *Dasein*, the *Dasein* of the German nation that individual persons may share only by a decisive act of will; and yet, it affords a pronouncement that bears directly on the *ontically* regularized and individuated lives and commitments of particular persons. On a strict Kantian reading, it would be illicit to derive determinately valid findings or directives regarding empirical science or historical commitment from *any* noumenal sources: for, such sources are not discursible at all (though, on Kant's view: again, dubiously), we *are* entitled to *treat* ourselves as if we were noumenally competent agents.

Hence, Heidegger is committed, certainly in the *Rektorsrede*, perhaps already in *Being and Time*, certainly in the *Letter on Humanism* and 'The question concerning technology', to an utterly illicit inverted Platonism of historical destiny construed as a disclosure of the *essence* of the 'ontico-ontological' existence of *Dasein* (taken aggregatively and collectively). What, for instance, can we make of that remarkable passage in *Being and Time* that, read forward to the *Rektorsrede* and beyond, declares:

if fateful *Dasein*, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with-Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as *destiny* [*Geschick*]. This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a people. Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another

can be conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects. Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein. . . . *Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate – that is to say, authentic historicity.*²⁶

It seems quite impossible to construe this pronouncement in any other way than as a noumenally privileged utterance: an utterance that, escaping the contingencies of mere ontic (phenomenal) discourse, discerns an essentially valid instruction *about* our historical existence (that is, the existence of the German nation) that, depending on 'authentic temporality', is phenomenologically prescriptive (noumenally prescriptive, by some monstrous Platonist/historized mixture) *for* our individuated lives. The pronouncement is utterly arbitrary, indefensible on any pertinent grounds at all, completely incompatible with the *Kantian* cast of Heidegger's own work – that is, with his own severe correction of Kant's tendency to impose illicit noumenal constraints on his own transcendental reflections.

This is perhaps the import of Heidegger's having brought Kant's famous three questions (in 'the canon of pure reason'), in the *Critique of Pure Reason*,²⁷ to rest 'in the fourth [question] "What is man?" For the determination of the final ends of human reason results from the explanation of what man is. It is to these ends that philosophy in the academic sense also must relate.'²⁸ In effect, theoretical and practical concerns must be joined (as the *Rektoratsrede* makes clear). Hence, philosophy and politics are joined in joining science and political morality in the phenomenologically disclosed destiny of the German people – *in* the ontically determinate moments of the historical time they share.

But the argument is entirely illicit. Ironically, the usual criticism of Heidegger's *ontologically* oriented account of the empirical sciences is plausibly pursued on the grounds that, there, he imports too much from the 'theory-dominant [*ontic*] prejudices' of the traditional view of science, notably along the lines favoured by Husserl.²⁹ The deeper 'Platonism' is treated, then, as more atmospheric than not, if it is broached at all. But regarding practical life in the narrower and more conventional sense, Heidegger can, with justice, only be said to have mounted a strong argument against: (1) any noumenal intrusions into phenomenal or historical life that would claim *ontic* credentials of a prescriptive sort (whether by way of Kant's objectivism or by way of Hegel's historicism or by way of Husserl's phenomenology); and (2) any self-legitimizing or

normatively universal or invariant rules of phenomenal or historical life itself.

Furthermore, if the foregoing argument is compelling, then, by default (*only*), contrary to his own intention, Heidegger also 'demonstrates' that: (3) there cannot be any viable noumenal intrusions of an *ontological* sort either (phenomenological, on his own account, or 'hermeneutic' or 'transcendental'³⁰) by which determinate direction may be given to our 'ontic' or 'ontico-ontological' life. The reason is simply this: on Heidegger's own theory, these 'higher' discoveries are accessible to 'factual *Dasein*', which is first individuated and characterized in the discursive terms of the canon Heidegger wishes to 'destroy' or supersede. It does no good claiming that *that* individuated entity (a *Seiendes* among others) possesses as well an 'ontological' nature that cannot be grasped in terms of ontic categories, though it is indeed intelligible. For, it is *of* that individuated *Dasein* that *that* nature *is* predicated. The very intelligibility of what is thus claimed – particularly, its being predicatively pertinent *in this or that case* – presupposes the competence of *Dasein*'s ordinary categories. It is idle to quarrel about whether there is any discernible (not: demonstrable!) difference between the ontic and the ontological, for the pertinence of the ontological is, on the argument, entirely dependent upon, and subject to the cognitive validity of, *Dasein*'s *ontic* pronouncements. And of course, Heidegger himself came to be profoundly dissatisfied with his own failure, in *Being and Time*, to 'destroy' the traditional history of ontology. He found that he had simply given it (unintentionally) another inning.

Here, we may also observe (parenthetically) that the recent extravagances of post-structuralist thought (in Jean-François Lyotard for instance) and the immense confusions of Emmanuel Levinas' speculations (which are certainly one of the principal sources of the post-structuralist insistence on *l'autre* or *l'Autrui*, that either utterly escapes referential and predicative discourse altogether or, self-contradictorily, is both initially accessible to it and ultimately escapes it) are the proper progeny of Heidegger's line of argument under review here.³¹ And, of course, it goes without saying that any attempt to link philosophy and the moral or political by way of the self-legitimizing powers of *sittlich* practices, now so much favoured in the thin Hegelianism of a great deal of contemporary American and British moral theory, is defeated out of hand by the leaner critique of the traditional canon we must share with Heidegger (objection (2), above), *without subscribing to Heidegger's strange phenomenological prophecies* – a fortiori, without sharing his Nazism.³²

There you have the clue as to how to salvage Heidegger's philosophy from Heidegger's own use of it, without disconnecting philosophy and politics at all.

IV

We have now answered the first of our original questions. We must turn to the second.

In the 1927 Marburg lectures (the *Phenomenology*), Heidegger very trimly connects philosophy and politics:

what is meant by [world-view: *Weltanschauung*] is not only a conception of the contexture of natural things but at the same time an interpretation of the sense and purpose of the human Dasein and hence of history. A world-view always includes a view of life. A world-view grows out of an all-inclusive reflection on the world and the human Dasein, and this again happens in different ways, explicitly and consciously in individuals or by appropriating an already prevalent world-view. We grow up within such a world-view and gradually become accustomed to it. Our world-view is determined by environment – people, race, class, developmental stages of culture. . . . A world-view is not a matter of theoretical knowledge, either in respect of its origin or in relation to its use. It is not simply retained in memory like a parcel of cognitive property. Rather, it is a matter of a collective conviction which determines the current affairs of life more or less expressly and directly. A world-view is related in its meaning to the particular Dasein at any given time.³³

This is *not* to say that *Weltanschauung* is philosophy. Of course, for Heidegger, it is not. But it is the view of Karl Jaspers, in his *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, which Heidegger ridicules and holds up as an example of an utterly untenable view: 'the notion of a world-view philosophy', he says, 'is simply inconceivable . . . an absurdity'.³⁴

Weltanschauung is very close to what, by freeing the term from its original Marxist sense, we now usually mean by 'ideology': the abstract unity of a set of historically formed and collectively effective practices, beliefs and norms that integrate a society's largely tacit understanding of nature, its own objectives and the improvisational possibilities of aggregated behaviour by which they may be achieved – within the context of divergent such ideologies viewed both diachronically and synchronically.³⁵ Since philosophy presupposes something very much like *Weltanschauung*, in Heidegger's view, without actually being identical with it, since it presupposes *Weltanschauung* in a sense analogous to (but also profoundly different from) the Kantian sense in which transcendental considerations have application ultimately only to the phenomenal world they serve to organize conceptually, *Weltanschauung* also *presupposes* philosophy in a deeper sense (a sense in which its very origination and ultimate legitimization require the priority of the philosophical mission). One might almost

say (with some caution) that, for Heidegger, phenomenology without *Weltanschauung* is empty and *Weltanschauung* without phenomenology is blind; and, of course, that philosophy, equated with the phenomenology of Being, constitutes a cognitive source that is foundational in the order of understanding, the findings of which cannot be formulated in terms of conceptual categories suited to discourse about distributed entities. Heidegger construes philosophy, therefore, in that it is 'ontological' rather than 'ontical', as being never in violation of the Kantian injunction against discourse about the noumenal world. Nevertheless, by bifurcating the very nature of intelligible discourse, he claims to recover universal truths *at* what is effectively the noumenal level without either breaching that injunction or endorsing the failed Kantian conception of a scientific philosophy of beings – which, though not a mere *Weltanschauung*, shares with it the same 'incomplete condition':

We assert now that being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy. . . . Negatively, this means that philosophy is not a science of beings but of *being* or, as the Greek expression goes, ontology. We take this expression in the widest possible sense [Heidegger's own phenomenological sense, that pursues ontology beyond the 'ontic'] and not in the narrower one it has, say, in Scholasticism or in modern philosophy in Descartes and Leibniz. . . . Philosophy is the theoretical conceptual interpretation of being, of being's structures and its possibilities. Philosophy is ontological. In contrast, a world-view is a positing knowledge of beings and a positing attitude toward beings; it is not ontological but ontical. The formation of a world-view falls outside the range of philosophy's tasks, but not because philosophy is in an incomplete condition and does not yet suffice to give a unanimous and universally cogent answer to the questions pertinent to world-views; rather, the formation of a world-view falls outside the range of philosophy's tasks because philosophy in principle does not relate to beings. It is not because of a defect that philosophy renounces the task of forming a world-view but because of a distinctive priority: it deals with what every positing of beings, even the positing done by a world-view, must already *presuppose* essentially.³⁶

Heidegger affirms that 'all the great philosophers since antiquity' have pursued ontology in the sense he here formulates; but, as he has also demonstrated (in his lectures of the Summer semester 1926 and the Winter semester 1926–7), as he reminds his auditors, 'they [notably, the tradition from Thomas Aquinas to Kant] had to fail'. For, of course, as they did not realize and as Heidegger urges his auditors, 'Philosophy must legitimate by its own resources its claim to be universal ontology'.³⁷

We cannot fail to see here the correct way to integrate the lessons

of *Being and Time* and the *Phenomenology*. But the entire effort is brokenbacked, quite impossible – and, on Heidegger's own grounds. For, it cannot be true that philosophy 'in principle does not relate to beings'. It cannot be true, because the very science of being, ontology (in the sense that goes beyond the 'ontical'), is the work of a particular being (a *Seiendes*), namely, *Dasein*, whose *ontic* structure (according to Heidegger) is 'ontological' (in the special phenomenological sense he favours).

It is not merely that *some* discursively apt agent pursues philosophy. That itself poses a puzzle that needs to be examined – for instance in the way Descartes, Kant and Husserl do. And indeed, it is a puzzle Heidegger never rightly clarified in the period following the *Kehre*, when *Dasein* was denied the midwife role it plays in *Being and Time* and the *Phenomenology*. But never mind that complication for the moment. The additional point needs to be made that the 'science' of Being, in the period we are considering, is a science that implicates the special role of *Dasein*, *Dasein's* special relationship to *Sein*. This means that the disclosures of ontology (of *Sein tout court*) presuppose (and entail) the universal validity of whatever is ontically true of individuated *Dasein*; and if that is so, then there cannot be a viable bifurcation of the ontic and the ontological, of the phenomenal and the noumenal, of the *Weltanschaulich* and the philosophical, of the categorical and the existential-hermeneutic, of the Kantian and the Heideggerian. And, of course, if that is so, then Heidegger cannot but have utterly failed in his own undertaking. This difficulty signals the extraordinary conceptual pressure within Heidegger's own system leading to the desperate moment of the *Kehre* – which, of course, had its political motivation as well.

There is no being, Heidegger says, but the being of *beings*: 'Being is always the Being of an entity'. (We have already taken note of the fact.) The science of Being is the science of 'its possibilities', the *Phenomenology* says; and its possibilities are the structured plural entities that 'it' may be manifest in. So Heidegger's phenomenology is dependent on the *ontic* articulation of a world every bit as much as it is in Kant's and Husserl's philosophies, and what he now says is arbitrary and conceptually incoherent and intrinsically incompatible with his own view of things.

But it also helps to locate the privilege Heidegger presumes to assign to the 'higher' noumenal prophecy of the *Rektorsrede* and, much later, to the monstrous possibility of the self-disclosure of Being bypassing the full mediating role originally assigned *Dasein*. The first of these manoeuvres confirms Heidegger's desperate effort to improve the sense in which he could, in the early period following the *Phenomenology*, present himself to the National Socialists as capable of delivering a pertinent, fully articulated political programme grounded in his philosophy; and the second confirms Heidegger's equally desperate effort to

free himself, *at almost any cost*, from the deep inconsistency of the earlier philosophical position. In a word, in the first, Heidegger chooses utter arbitrariness and opportunism, for political reasons, at the price of coherence; and in the second, he chooses befuddlement (plain incoherence) in order to eliminate a palpable, a devastating, an ineliminable philosophical inconsistency.

But *all* of his alternatives are tarred with the same noumenal brush, and it is only by its privilege that Heidegger *is able at all* to bring philosophy and politics together *in his own terms*. Philosophy and politics remain indissoluble in a larger sense, of course, simply because the 'science of Being' can justify no bifurcation among the plural 'possibilities' (the *Seiende*), over which it reigns supreme. This is the obvious message of the *Rektorsrede*. It is also the clear (the milder) instruction of the *Phenomenology*:

We must understand actuality, reality, validity, existentiality, constancy in order to be able to comport ourselves positively toward specifically actual, real, living, existing, constant beings. We must understand being so that we may be able to be given over to a world that is, so that we can exist in it and be our own Dasein itself as a being. We must be able to understand actuality *before* all factual experience of actual beings. This understanding of actuality or of being in the widest sense as over against the experience of beings is in a certain sense *earlier* than the experience of beings.³⁸

In this 'plain' sense, philosophy *is* politics as well as science: it provides the noumenal discovery on which politics and science depend (in an ontological sense of priority that goes beyond mere logical priority); and philosophy itself has no other function but to orient us, among the actual entities of politics and science, *to this condition*.

V

One sees at once the threatening sense in which Heidegger's philosophy risks being utterly vacuous with regard to historical content, historical direction, historical application. Heidegger has no option, therefore: to be relevant, he *must* invoke, however illicitly, *some determinate instruction regarding plural Seiende*. Hence, the extravagant historicized Platonism of the *Rektorsrede* points to a constant *philosophical* need in Heidegger's system, even if (surely) the specifically National Socialist themes are not actually required. There you have the essential thread linking philosophy and politics that runs through all the stages of Heidegger's work.

The lesson is also more than that. It puts *us* on our mettle as well. For Heidegger saw in an unblinkingly clear way that, without the saving fixity of his noumenal prophecies, there could be no way of resisting relativism, historicism, the triumph of technology and social *praxis*, *on the essential thesis he himself advanced*. That is, once give up the *ontic* canon (ranging, say, from Plato to Husserl), once admit the historicity of philosophy and science and politics, and legitimation in terms of universal invariances becomes utterly impossible. Unless, that is, there is a saving noumenal (ontological) privilege (as Heidegger believed).

In a way, there are two sorts of motivation internal to the series of changes through which Heidegger's philosophy moves. In the one, Heidegger saw that he must give locally convincing evidence of the political pertinence of his otherwise too abstract and seemingly irrelevant metaphysics. In achieving this objective rather brilliantly – in fact, altogether surprisingly – in the *Rektorsrede* and in his numerous speeches to Nazi student cadres and university-centred audiences, he obviously more than annoyed Ernst Krieck and Alfred Rosenberg.³⁹ He actually made a serious bid to become the educational *Führer* of the Third Reich. But of course he ultimately failed in this; knew that he had failed, retreated from what he took to be the misguided brand of National Socialism that eventually won out; and so turned, still convinced by his own utopian message, to the peculiar political quietism of the late essays. In the other, he saw that he must give a philosophically cogent account of just how he could claim to have restored philosophy to its original intuition (among the pre-Socratics), to have worked through and to have replaced the classical canon that culminated in the work of Kant and Husserl, and to have secured nevertheless, despite the inconsistencies of time and history, a sense of legitimating universalities, conceptual necessities, essential invariances that escaped the *Weltanschaulich* particularities of mere ontic categories. In achieving that, through the period of *Being and Time* and the *Phenomenology*, Heidegger realized that he must eliminate the central inconsistency of *Dasein*'s role, without disturbing the congruence among his other concepts. The required transition moves from *Entschlossenheit* to *Gelassenheit*: which is to say, from the resolute midwifery of *Dasein* to the initial passivity of *Dasein*'s reception of the prophetic self-disclosures of *Sein*.

The remarkable thing is that both of these lines of development converge in one supreme economical manoeuvre: the *Kehre*. With it, philosophy and politics, as indissolubly intertwined as ever, lead to the pessimism of the imminent victory of technology – which, again, is both philosophically and politically decisive.⁴⁰ 'Each epoch of philosophy', Heidegger says,

has its own necessity. We simply have to acknowledge the fact that a

philosophy is the way it is. It is not for us to prefer one to the other, as can be the case with regard to various *Weltanschauungen*.

In this historically *pluralized* ('disclosed') sense, philosophies come to their 'end'. That is, 'The end of philosophy is the place, that place in which the whole of philosophy's history is gathered in its most extreme possibility. End as completion means this gathering.'

'Philosophy [Heidegger holds] is metaphysics', and 'Metaphysics is Platonism'. Heidegger's meaning here is that philosophy *thinks* Being,

the ground . . . from which beings as such are what they are in their becoming, perishing, and persisting as something that can be known, handled, and worked upon. As [that] ground, Being brings beings to their actual presencing . . . the transcendental making possible of the objectivity of objects.⁴¹

So, *necessities*, in philosophy – a fortiori, in politics – are epochal *and* noumenal. It is for that reason that philosophy does not fall back to Kant's or Hegel's or Husserl's solutions. This is of course also why Heidegger had to eliminate the disturbing role of *Dasein* as it functioned in the earlier phases of his philosophy. It is also why he feels more secure philosophically, why he reaches in a more extreme way politically, why he is ultimately more discouraged in both regards, in writing his last papers regarding the terrible ease with which

philosophy turns into the empirical science of man, of all of what can become for man the experiential object of his technology, the technology by which he establishes himself in the world by working on it in the manifold modes of making and shaping.⁴²

If it were possible – but Heidegger doubts that it is, in our epoch: the opportunity has been lost, the utopian vision of National Socialism Heidegger espoused has been denied in Germany itself and overwhelmed by American pragmatism and Russian Bolshevism – 'the [correct] answer [to the question of our epoch] would consist in a *transformation of thinking*, not in a *propositional statement about a matter at stake*'.⁴³ A 'transformation of thinking', of course, signifies a recovery of the priority of the noumenal inspection of Being.

What we may draw from this is that the force of Heidegger's critical work, as opposed to his peculiar form of Platonist redemption, confirms that, *henceforth*, the constraints on science and political morality are obliged either to conform to what we have previously numbered as Heidegger's arguments (1) and (2) (against certain legitimitative presumptions) as well as to *our* argument (3) against Heidegger's own legitimitative

presumption, or else to counter these same objections effectively. In this, Heidegger certainly leads us to see (against his own intention) the utter bankruptcy of pretending to pull some noumenal legitimation or prescription out of his hat, and the impossibility of securing any legitimation of a strictly universalized sort for either science or politics.

The upshot is breathtakingly simple – but disturbing: if they are eligible at all, second-order legitimative ('transcendental', 'critical', 'pragmatic' or similar) arguments need not be necessary, synthetic a priori, universal or universally presupposed, essential, invariant or anything of the kind; and, they cannot be such if they are cast (as they must be) in ontic, *weltanschaulich*, historicized, praxical or similarly encumbered terms.

So the game has been worth the candle. Heidegger's extravagance, pursued in the extraordinarily tenacious and inventive way he had, closes the door as securely as we are ever likely to be able to do, on the pretensions of *noumenal philosophy*. The short truth is: there is no such philosophy. This is just as true of Jaspers' more appealing and more humane use of the inexhaustibility and/or ineffability of noumenal *Existenz* and transcendence as it is of Heidegger's ultimately anti-humanist recovery of noumena.⁴⁴

VI

We need, before closing this account, to fix as clearly as possible – for the period after the 'turning' – the final version of Heidegger's preposterous solution of the would-be noumenal direction of science, philosophy, politics, morality and art. The master clue appears at the beginning of the notorious *Letter on Humanism*. It speaks in a quintessentially Heideggerian voice:

We are still far from pondering the essence of action decisively enough. We view action only as causing an effect. . . . But the essence of action is accomplishment. To accomplish means to unfold something into the fullness of its essence, to lead it forth into this fullness – *producere*. Therefore only what already is can really be accomplished. But what 'is' above all is Being. Thinking accomplishes the relation of Being to the essence of man. It does not make or cause the relation. Thinking brings this relation to Being solely as something handed over to it from Being. Such offering consists in the fact that in thinking Being comes to language. Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells.⁴⁵

This extraordinary opening paragraph must be read as a contorted reinterpretation of *Being and Time*. It very nearly ensorcelles us into

bewildered acquiescence. It zaps us. But it is an enormous conceptual fraud. Notice particularly the analysis of 'accomplishment': 'only what already is can really be accomplished.' What does that really mean? It should by rights mean only that Being, to which we can assign no intelligible structure at all, really *has* no structures – except (negatively and figuratively) as the undifferentiated source of all that *is* (in the pluralized, structured sense in which, as Heidegger also says, 'Being is always the Being of an entity'). But now it means not merely that, but, since '*accomplishment*' (whatever it is) must *be* the prefigured 'essence' of *some* determinate action, also the noumenally determinate form of *that* particular being that *is* phenomenally or ontically effectuated in historical time.

That, now, proves to be utterly incoherent, utterly ruled out, utterly contrary to the corrected Kantian theme Heidegger imposes on Kant's own (reverse) presumption. That is, Kant, read metonymically as the voice of the entire Western canon of philosophy, illegitimately presumes the self-legitimizing powers of ontic discourse: Heidegger's phenomenology exposes the presumption. (There you have the clue to Heidegger's permanent contribution to philosophy and politics.) For his own part, however, Heidegger had, in *Being and Time*, mistakenly read the lesson of the temporality of *Dasein* and the historical contingency of the conceptual analysis of plural beings (the 'ontological' contribution) as (somehow) permitting a determinate destinal interpretation (from that ontological vantage) of the ontically deployed phenomena of any given existentially encountered epoch. Now, correcting the obvious inconsistency of *Dasein's* indissolubly particularized function straddling both 'levels' at once, Heidegger opts for the deeper incoherence of retaining, separately, the ontological dispensation first marked only *within* the constitutively original ontic function of ('factual') *Dasein*. He keeps the discursive intelligibility of the phenomenological intrusion in our lives and destiny, but he no longer bothers to account *for the origination of that intelligibility itself*. There you have the absurdity of the famous *Kehre*: the strange doctrine of intelligibility's or essence's or legibility's or discursible structure's being 'handed over to [human or *Dasein's* thinking] *from* Being'. That last notion should be a purely heuristic device if it is to have any function at all. But, alas, it is intended as a serious form of determinate prophecy from a privileged source.

So the entire mystery of the *Letter*, both in terms of science and politics, is probably meant quite deliberately to obscure the hocus pocus by which, first, a determinate instruction is assigned human life *from* noumenal sources (that require a poet, a sage, a *Führer*, a Hölderlin); and, second, that instruction comes directly *from* Being, is said to be 'brought to' language but not 'made' or 'caused' by *Dasein's* languaging Being (so to say) – by acting as Being's midwife.

The doctrine is more than a little puzzling, you must admit. It is, of course, Heidegger's last mystery. One cannot appreciate the brilliance and slyness of Heidegger's resolution here – its reaffirmation of the unity of philosophy and politics even (or especially) in Germany's defeat, its consistency with the Platonism of the *Rektoratsrede* but (now) no longer with the specific instruction of that address: the epoch, you see, has changed! – unless one reads it as a radical rereading of *Being and Time*. Allow it a few more lines, therefore:

Thinking acts in so far as it thinks. Such action is presumably the simplest and at the same time the highest, because it concerns the relation of Being to man. But all working or effecting lies in Being and is directed toward beings. Thinking, in contrast, lets itself be claimed by Being so that it can be the truth of Being. Thinking accomplishes this letting. Thinking is *l'engagement par l'Être pour l'Être*. . . . Thinking is not merely *l'engagement dans l'action* for and by beings, in the sense of the actuality of the present situation. Thinking is *l'engagement* by and for the truth of Being. The history of Being is never past but stands ever before; it sustains and defines every *condition et situation humaine*. In order to learn how to experience the aforementioned essence of thinking purely, and that means at the same time to carry it through, we must free ourselves from the technical interpretation of thinking. . . . Philosophy is hounded by the fear that it loses prestige and validity if it is not a science. Not to be a science is taken as a failing which is equivalent to being unscientific. [But] Being, as the element of thinking, is abandoned by the technical interpretation of thinking.⁴⁶

Now, this *could* have meant no more than what might summarize Heidegger's entire diatribe against the philosophical canon that suicidally restricts itself to ontic resources. If it were merely that, it would simply recover, unaltered – toward the end of his life – the message of Heidegger's earliest productive period. But it must also, now, resolve the philosophical and political inconsistencies Heidegger himself discerned in the interim. The surprising trick is this: *language* is not rightly a human *instrument* at all, it does not belong primarily to *Dasein*. It is 'essentially', after all, 'the house of the truth of Being'. In the merely 'technological' view of language, 'language surrenders itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an instrument of domination over beings'.⁴⁷ So the choice (according to Heidegger) is the following: either *Dasein* (in effect: the members of human societies) prepares itself to *receive* the 'utterance' of Being's language (whatever that may be supposed to be) or else it employs its own (derivative) natural language (shall we say) to *dominate* *Seiende* (the entities of nature and human societies thereby revealed).

There are no other options; the two are disjunctive, and both are philosophically and politically significant.

Heidegger would have us believe that language *already* belongs (in some sense) to Being; whereas, in *Being and Time*, it is precisely the mediating, symbiotizing function of *Dasein's* unique *relation* to *Sein*. If the latter doctrine were permitted to stand, then language would be inseparable from *Dasein's* mode of functioning; and if that obtained, then language would be tethered to 'subjectivity' – and, thence, to technological domination. Extraordinary! Since, therefore, Heidegger regards the defeat of Germany as the victory of technology (or, better, the victory of the technological philosophy of language and thought that permeated the politics of Germany's enemies), the conception must be corrected *for the future*.

Fortunately, the trick may be turned at a stroke, and in a way that erases (or perhaps merely obscures) the disturbing inconsistency of the earlier period. Merely change the role of *Dasein* in the noumenal/phenomenal equation. That's all. Merely make it out that Being is the supreme *care* of *Dasein* – that in virtue of which man's humanity is realized. Then, man may still be said to be *related* to Being all right – but no longer in that way in which beings are first *constituted* as the entities they are. *There* is the essential equivocation: in *Being and Time*, plural *Seiende* are what they are *only* in virtue of *Dasein's* internal relation to *Sein*; in the *Letter on Humanism* (after the *Kehre*, that is), what *Seiende* are depends only on what Being 'permits' to be 'handed over to [*Dasein*, or to man, or to man's care] from Being'. In the first, both the ontic structure of beings and the ontico-ontological import of *that* structure as well as the essence of *Dasein* are constitutively dependent on *Dasein's* reflexive function: in the second, only the *care* of those matters entails a strong relation between *Dasein* and *Sein*.

So Heidegger speaks of 'the word's primordial belongingness to Being'. 'This relation', he warns, 'remains concealed beneath the dominance of subjectivity that presents itself as the public realm.'⁴⁸ So he comes to his final formula, at once superb and preposterous: 'In its essence language is not the utterance of an organism; nor is it the expression of a living thing. . . . Language is the lightning concealing advent of Being itself.' 'This indicates', he explains,

that 'essence' is now being defined from neither *esse essentiae* nor *esse existentiae* [against Sartre, finally] but rather from the ek-static character of *Dasein*. As ek-sisting, man sustains *Da-sein* in that he takes the *Da*, the lightning of Being, into 'care'. But *Da-sein* itself occurs essentially as 'thrown'. It unfolds essentially in the throw of Being as the fateful sending.⁴⁹

What Heidegger accomplishes here – necromantically – is the dethroning of man or *Dasein* as (in the Kantian sense) the *constituting* site of the conceptually legible structures of all that is real. The latter seemed to be the theme (the improved Kantian-like theme) of the *Phenomenology* and *Being and Time*. Now Heidegger replaces it with the theme of man's 'thrownness' (*Geworfenheit*), which signifies his initially completely receptive role with regard to the fulgurating 'utterances' that originate from Being *itself*: 'what is Being? It is It itself', he says. 'Man is the shepherd of Being [not the 'lord of being']': 'he . . . guard[s] the truth of Being, in order that beings might appear in the light of Being as the beings they are.'⁵⁰

This is now offered as a clarification of the crucial passages of *Being and Time* (p. 42 particularly) in which the Being of beings (both of *Dasein* and of other entities) *seemed* to be such only, *constitutively*, in being such *for* *Dasein* (or, such-for-*Dasein*). Now, in the *Kehre* here intended, 'Man is rather "thrown" from Being itself into the truth of Being':⁵¹ he plays no role in the 'constituting' of beings; he is a witness or a shepherd of the way in which they are epochally disclosed from Being itself. What is conceptually monstrous, here, what is incoherent in the strictest sense, is the double claim: first, that the determinate structures of plural beings, discernible (somehow) by human thought and language, can be said to issue meaningfully from a 'source' (Being) that is indiscursible as such; and, second, that those structures are in some sense constituted linguistically but in a way that is utterly alien and prior to any merely human language. Recall Heidegger's formula: 'in thinking Being comes to language. Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells.' Unbelievably cunning.

So thinking and 'linguaging' are more than human, more than science or philosophy. They are certainly that in virtue of which man 'comes home' to Being.⁵² They are that in virtue of which Heidegger eclipses mere humanism (the humanism of Sartre's existentialism, for instance), since such an existentialism 'does not set the *humanitas* of man high enough'. The humanism needed 'thinks the humanity of man from nearness to Being . . . a humanism in which not man but man's historical essence is at stake in its provenance from the truth of Being'.⁵³

VII

All this needs to be said with great care to be believed: to believe that Heidegger did say these things and to understand what he meant by them. It is in their sheer extravagance and desperate arbitrariness that they are defeated. The irony remains, therefore, that, by their self-defeat, we are led to grasp the plausible sense in which philosophy and

politics remain indissolubly linked, the sense in which (therefore) this holds true of Heidegger's work as well, *and* the sense (yet) in which his own philosophy contributes a saving theme that cannot be merely equated with his own fantastic use of it as an aspirant proto-Nazi, as an enthusiastic and visionary Nazi, as a defeated but still prophetic Nazi.

Two final lessons. First of all, the recovery of what deserves to be saved in Heidegger's philosophy radically reduces the importance of a very large part of his own work. The damning themes, at once philosophico-political in the complex Nazi sense we have been labouring to isolate, are surely utterly worthless, except perhaps as warning specimens of how the mind can be derailed. Notice, however, that in dismissing Heidegger's notions of noumenal destiny's descending into the ontic world that is itself contingently formed from a historically similar *alētheia*,⁵⁴ we are not dismissing the essential connection between philosophy and politics. On the contrary, the theme is actually enhanced by discerning the outrageous use Heidegger makes *of* the conceptual bond between the two entailed *in* his own phenomenological critique of the purely ontic tradition he exposes.

This is precisely the same theme discovered and alternatively formulated in Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida and the post-structuralists. It is not similarly formulated in the views of all these thinkers, to be sure; but it remains constant nevertheless. It is simply the implication of acknowledging *the incapacity of any human conceptual scheme to capture the essential, invariant, universal, necessary, or totalized structure of all that is real*: the consequence of that incapacity concerns the contingency, inevitable opportunism and advantage in the distribution of power associated with the spontaneous use of any conceptual scheme or of any social process that would replace any given such scheme by another.

The second lesson is more inclusive than the first. For Heidegger's Nazism is, on his own say-so, a historicized form of Platonism: a body of normatively legitimated disclosures of collective destiny yielded by Being itself. It is, therefore, an extravagant version of an extravagance. It is a *noumenal* pretension. It would be the same whether it was Nazi or not, and it would be illicit for the same reasons. The second lesson, therefore, erases an even wider swath of Heidegger's philosophy than the first; but, once again, with the exception of collecting specimens of how the mind can be derailed.

The trouble is that Western philosophy has, to a greater extent than it would care to admit, actually *been* committed to similar noumenal pretensions embedded in its own 'phenomenal' resources. Indeed, the entire bewitchment that is philosophy is largely occupied with illicitly exceeding the limits of discursive thought, once we admit that there is no cognitive hierarchy to be had. (In Heidegger's terms, after all, it is

factical *Dasein* that discovers that it has 'ontological' resources beyond its 'ontical' ones.)

From this point of view, Heidegger represents one of the clearest appreciations of the peculiarly transient nature of ordinary conceptual schemes. Construe all such resources as 'phenomenal' – addressed to individuated, numbered, plural things (Kantian, in *that* sense; where the 'noumenal' signifies that whereof one cannot speak at all; *not*, of course, the mere concept of the noumenal).

So seen, the lesson is a remarkably simple one: we must reclaim all philosophical problems under the constraint of *never* intruding a noumenal advantage and of admitting, *everywhere*, the horzonal limitation of the phenomenal presence of our world and our understanding of our world, symbiotized in the same apparent history. Heidegger may then prove to have been the last of the great philosophical pretenders who fully grasped this second lesson and still elected to deny it. There *is*, after all, no developed philosophy that has ever had the courage to embrace that very large constraint and still afford a plausible system of great scope and power. That is surely what is needed – and what will be seen to be needed in the next century. But it will not, indeed it could not, deny the ineluctable link between philosophy and politics.

Notes

1 The first sustained analysis in English is to appear shortly in a book-length study of Heidegger by Tom Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy*, to be published by the University of California Press.

2 The point has been pressed in a telling way by Theodore J. Kisiel, 'The genesis of *Being and Time*', first presented at a meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Villanova University, Villanova, Pennsylvania, 20 October 1990.

3 See 'The return of morality', an interview between Foucault and Gilles Barbadette and André Scala, in Michel Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977–1984*, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman, tr. Alan Sheridan and others (London: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1988): 'For me [says Foucault] Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher' (p. 250).

4 See, for instance, J. R. Merquior, *From Prague to Paris* (London: Verso, 1986), chap. 5.

5 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. from 7th edn by John Maquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 19 (in the German pagination).

6 *ibid.*, p. 22; cf. p. 436.

7 *ibid.*, p. 436.

8 *ibid.*, pp. 16–18; in the context of Introduction II.

9 *ibid.*, pp. 19–20.

10 See Martin Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism*, tr. Frank A. Capuzzi, in collaboration with H. Glenn Gray and David Farrell Krell, *Basic Writings*, ed.

David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), which offers a rereading of certain relevant passages of *Being and Time* (cf. pp. 216–17 of the *Letter*).

11 *ibid.*, p. 24.

12 *ibid.*, p. 14.

13 Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, tr. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 11.

14 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 12.

15 *ibid.*, p. 4.

16 *ibid.*, pp. 2–4.

17 *ibid.*, p. 9.

18 *ibid.*, p. 5.

19 *ibid.*, p. 9.

20 See Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, tr. Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper & Row, 1965). Lauer joins here two essays of Husserl's: 'Philosophy as rigorous science', which dates from 1911, and 'Philosophy and the crisis of European man', which dates from the 1930s. This is, of course, not to say that Heidegger adheres to Husserl's notion of phenomenology.

21 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 11.

22 See Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, tr. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), §§26–7, for a brief impression of Husserl's view.

23 See, for instance, the carefully balanced effort to recover phenomenology in a temperate way, in J. N. Mohanty, *Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), chap. 3. Mohanty appears to be in transition to a more radical reading of the bearing of history and relativism on the work of transcendental phenomenology.

24 See, particularly, Victor Farias, *Heidegger and Nazism*, ed. Joseph Margolis and Tom Rockmore; French material tr. Paul Burrell, with the advice of Dominic Di Bernardi; German materials tr. Gabriel R. Ricci (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), Part II.

25 Cited from 'The self-determination of the German University' (the Rectoral Address), by Farias, *ibid.*, pp. 98–9.

26 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 384–5.

27 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B833; see, also, *Kant's Introduction to Logic and His Essay on the Mistaken Subtlety of the Four Figures*, tr. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (London: Longmans, Green, 1885): §iii, in the *Logic* (p. 15).

28 Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 8.

29 See, for instance, Joseph Rouse, *Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), chap. 4, esp. p. 79; cf. also pp. 60–2.

30 See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 37–8.

31 See Jean-François Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, tr. Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988); Emmanuel Lévinas, *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*, tr. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985).

32 For an overview of this literature, see Joseph Margolis, 'Moral realism and the meaning of life', *Philosophical Forum*, xxii (1990).

33 Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, pp. 5–6.

34 *ibid.*, p. 12.

35 See, for instance, Martin Seliger, *Ideology and Politics* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976); Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Dialectic of Ideology and*

Technology: The Origins, Grammar, and Future of Ideology (New York: Seabury Press, 1976). A more conventional view, that is, a view of ideology that features the interests of socio-economic classes and, in that sense, unconscious distortion, is examined in various larger contexts by Kai Nielsen, *Marxism and the Moral Point of View: Morality, Ideology, and Historical Materialism* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), chap. 5.

36 Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, pp. 11–12.

37 *ibid.*, p. 12.

38 *ibid.*, p. 11.

39 See Farias, *Heidegger and Nazism*, Part II.

40 See, for instance, Martin Heidegger, 'The question concerning technology' and 'The end of philosophy and the task of thinking', in Krell (ed.), *Basic Writings*.

41 'The end of philosophy and the task of thinking', tr. Joan Stambaugh, pp. 372–5.

42 *ibid.*, p. 176.

43 *ibid.*, p. 373; italics added.

44 See, for instance, Karl Jaspers, *Philosophy*, vol. 2, tr. E. B. Ashton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 162. I have compared the two in an as yet unpublished paper, 'On the responsibility of intellectuals: reflections on Heidegger and Jaspers', first presented in a symposium: 'The idea of the university and the civil society', at a meeting of the Karl Jaspers Society of North America, meeting jointly with the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, Boston, Massachusetts, 28 December 1990.

45 Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism*, p. 193.

46 *ibid.*, pp. 193–5. (The essay was first published, in German, in 1947.)

47 *ibid.*, p. 199.

48 *ibid.*, p. 198.

49 *ibid.*, pp. 206–7.

50 *ibid.*, pp. 210, 221.

51 *ibid.*

52 *ibid.*, p. 242.

53 *ibid.*, pp. 210, 222.

54 See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 33; *idem*, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, pp. 215–17; also, Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, tr. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1984).

The shadow of this thinking

Dominique Janicaud

Part I The undiscoverable politics

Le plus grand défaut de la pénétration n'est pas de n'aller point jusqu'au but, c'est de le passer.

– La Rochefoucauld

Whoever relies only on the recent polemics launched by Victor Farias's *Heidegger et le nazisme*¹ will find it extremely difficult not only to weigh fundamental philosophical questions but even to form an idea of Heidegger's thought that is not a caricature. Heaping up unevenly relevant facts and hastily solicited testimonies, the debate runs the risk of limiting itself to expatiate on Heidegger's 'Nazism' and to issue moral condemnations intended to be final. But which Heidegger is being judged? Is it the character who, during the summer of 1933, 'wore knee-length pants'?² Or is it the author of the most decisive interpretation of Nietzsche's thought put forth to this day? Farias makes the most out of the first and downplays the second.³ Made unrecognizable, Heidegger's thought is reduced to a vague pathos of pseudoheroic existentiality, provincial attachment to the *Heimat*, and, especially, a petit-bourgeois reactionary spirit.

The need to reverse this perspective, blurred by sensationalism as well as by the desire to purchase a clean conscience cheaply, is urgent. Critical and responsible minds in the present and the future must start again from what interests them (whether positively or negatively, or both positively and negatively, or even if it is undecidable) in a philosopher whose many books and published lecture notes are – until there is proof to the contrary – the only authentic repositories of his thought. To do

just that with respect to the question of politics is my aim in this paper,⁴ without ignoring, however, a serious and perhaps crippling difficulty: a heedful and sustained reading of Heidegger's work does not easily discern in it the question of the political *as such*. Are we then faced with an indeterminable politics? May we even go so far as to contend that there is *no link* between the philosophy of *Being and Time* and Heidegger's political commitment of the years 1933 and 1934? According to this latter view, Heidegger is a fundamentally apolitical thinker. Owing to dramatic historical circumstances, he encountered politics only against his will. Once in the political realm, he ran up against the worst misunderstandings and finally saw his loftiest thoughts disfigured into their grinning opposites. That thesis will be examined first. It will be discussed on the basis of *Being and Time* and then on the basis of a reading of the Rectorial Address.

Even if a connecting thread – no matter how tenuous and even negative – can be discerned between the ontological quest and the political concern ('which deals with public affairs', as the Littré dictionary has it), does it form an 'ontological politics', and, when such a politics ends in failure, does it turn into a denial of politics? These are questions which must make their way through Heidegger's self-critique (which is also a self-reinterpretation) in order to reach the level of a genuinely critical revaluation of the relations between ontology and politics.

The broken thread

To what extent is the thesis of the absence of a link between the philosophical work prior to 1933 and the commitment of '33 defensible? It seems corroborated by the attacks launched by the Nazi camp. Ernst Krieck, indeed, reproached the author of *Being and Time* with having a philosophy that was incompatible with National Socialism: 'There is nothing in it that speaks of the people and the State, of race and of all the values characterizing our National Socialist worldview.'⁵ Pierre Aubenque, who cites these lines, gives an answer that is formally identical, albeit one that is issued from a completely different point of view: '*Being and Time* is obviously an apolitical work.'⁶ Given that Heidegger puts forth a 'formal description' of human existence in that book, he does not, according to Aubenque, offer 'any criterion [that would be] of practical use' to form the basis of a politically determinate authenticity. From that, Aubenque concludes that there is no 'essential dependency' between Heidegger's philosophy and his 1933 commitment. He even goes so far as to affirm that 'Heidegger's initial adherence to the "movement" is not a philosophical act.'

This thesis must be examined with the utmost care, for the continuation

of the discussion depends, to a large extent, upon its degree of validity. What argues in its favor is obvious: at no time do either *Being and Time* or the works of the following years present themselves politically. Neither the fundamental project (the reformulation and elaboration of the question of being⁸) nor the unfolding of the enterprise in its different phases (the theme of the analytic of *Dasein*, the distinction among existentials, the critique of everydayness, the disclosure of a new sense of temporality, etc.) lead to any 'program' of political reform or revolution – nor, incidentally, to a conservative one. Not only is Heidegger in dialogue, from beginning to end of *Being and Time*, with metaphysical and not political authors (even if these 'great' representatives of metaphysical thinking, beginning with Plato and Aristotle, also had political philosophies), but, as Pierre Aubenque rightly reminds us, the method is essentially *formal* (the 'formal structure' of the question of being is emphasized as early as subsection 2 of the book). In this respect, Heidegger remains entirely faithful to the demand for neutrality made by the phenomenological *epoché* – this holding true of his analysis of resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) as well. To these considerations, which in principle are already sufficient, another may be added that points out the fragility, if not the absurdity, of the attempts at an ideological assimilation of *Being and Time* to Nazism. This last position is epitomized by Georges-Arthur Goldschmidt in *Le Monde*: 'Both stylistically and lexically, *Being and Time*, from its second section onwards, is unfortunately quite close to *Mein Kampf*.' This bold comparison, which is not supported by any examples, is more circumscribed than appears at first sight: it is restricted to the second section and abstracts from the content. Duly noted. Nonetheless, even if we keep to the vocabulary, we seek in vain in *Being and Time*, even in its second section, for the *völkisch* phraseology (i.e., the phraseology about the essence of the people) attacking the *Judentum* (Jewry) and the 'Anglo-Saxon plutocracy' on every page of *Mein Kampf*, the whole vulgar arsenal of the frantic propaganda surrounding the National Socialist *Weltanschauung*. In it, neither a *Weltanschauung* nor, still less, propaganda or the party are at stake! Conversely, it is impossible to credit *Mein Kampf* with the concepts that make up the hermeneutic wealth of *Being and Time*, including its second section: think of *Sorge* (care), *Gewissen* (conscience), *Schuld* (guilt), and lastly of the understanding of an ec-static temporality and historicity.¹⁰ Will the excessive character of the comparison be attenuated by Goldschmidt's conceding that 'one cannot judge in French'? This is a curious polemical reversal of the preeminence of German, which was so violently attacked by Farias.¹¹ Not only were Hitler and Heidegger born the same year, but both spoke German! Would prolonged sessions of oral declamation allow us to grasp as quite close (stylistically?) this sentence penned by Hitler: 'Dass man ein Volk nicht durch Beten freimacht, weiss man

im allgemeinen' (Everyone knows that a people does not free itself by praying)¹² and the following one by Heidegger: 'Das Ziel ist die Ausarbeitung der Seinsfrage überhaupt' (The goal is the elaboration of the question of being)?¹³ If abstraction is made from content, by what rule are we expected to carry out these 'comparisons'? Does it suffice to refer to Adorno and his *Jargon der Eigentlichkeit*? Does this not amount to forgetting, to Heidegger's sole detriment, that National Socialism's pseudoauthenticity has retroactively polluted many great German texts in which the vocabulary of *Eigentlichkeit* (authenticity) and even of *Entschlossenheit* (resoluteness) occurs – for example, the writings of Eckhart, Luther, Hölderlin, Nietzsche? Is it not saddening – and contrary to the good cause that one claims to defend – to give Hitler's hate-filled and verbose phraseology the honor of becoming in short, the truth of an ontological discourse to which finally one denies any dignity of its own? The same Goldschmidt has written elsewhere a telling sentence whose gravity perhaps eluded him: 'Heidegger's "thought" is only the shadow of Auschwitz.'¹⁴ We now understand why Goldschmidt confined himself to the style: Heidegger's thought does not exist. Q.E.D.

In a sense, Farias is somewhat more serious (hardly, however, since he devotes only a few of his 305 pages to the philosopher's major work): he envisages 'correspondences' whose thematic content foreruns Heidegger's 'political preferences'.¹⁵ He recognizes that it does not suffice to question the 'destruction' of an objectifiable concept of truth carried out in favor of a prepredicative horizon (in reference to subsection 44).¹⁶ He writes: 'To go further, one would have to exhibit the veritable moments in *Being and Time* that may effectively be considered to be forerunners of Heidegger's subsequent evolution.'¹⁷ Does Farias really do that? On the basis of a sound remark (authenticity is not solipsistic), he directly passes over to considering subsection 74. This enables him to give the impression of being relatively precise, while arrogantly ignoring the quasi totality of a work of which he will state, in conclusion, that it 'positively sets into place properly fascist elements. . . .'¹⁸ What are these elements?

Farias attempts firstly to support the claim that tradition founds authentic existence. He does so with a quotation from subsection 74 of *Being and Time*,¹⁹ on which he does not even comment and which he does not seek to understand, since he claims that 'tradition and heritage' are 'forms of another reality which founds them . . . : namely, the people. . . .'²⁰ In this, he is completely mistaken: according to Heidegger, tradition is not an 'archetype'. All Farias needed to do was to read the line immediately following the citation in order to note that '[r]ecapitulation is explicit handing down, i.e., going back to the possibilities of the *Dasein* that has been there'.²¹ On the other hand, recapitulation cannot be 'founded' upon tradition, since it is a mode of resoluteness

(*Entschlossenheit*). The *Dasein* is indeed 'futural in its being' (*in seinem Sein zukünftig*).²² We have a sentence here that could have embarrassed Farias if he had wondered about Heidegger's innovative understanding of temporality. As he does not care about it nor about its ontological sense, he gets out of trouble by appealing to a 'conservative/revolutionary' scheme: 'In the future, the people must be that which the heroes have represented within the tradition.'²³ According to Farias, recapitulation consists in recovering an identical (ontical) content. Heidegger says the contrary. On his way, Farias further mutilates the text on several essential points. He has the reader believe that the only act constitutive of decision is combat. We read, however: 'Only in communication and in battle does the power of destiny become free.'²⁴ Communication (*Mitteilung*) has simply been ignored! Must we be reminded to what extent the ontological solidarity expressed by the *Mitsein* (being-with) excludes battle's being the sole constitutive relation with others? That is one of the points over which Sartre had disagreed with Heidegger: 'The essence of relations among consciousnesses is not the *Mitsein*, but conflict.'²⁵

Secondly, Farias would have us believe that the agent of decision is directly the community of the people. It is true that Heidegger restates that *Dasein* is 'being-with' and that, for that reason, 'its occurrence is occurrence-with and is determined as *destiny*'.²⁶ But the subject described in those pages is a Self, existing, free for its death, and taking over its anguished choice (it is by no means dissolved into the community).

Thirdly – this misrepresentation being doubtless the least innocent of the three – whereas Heidegger says that in authentic recapitulation '*Dasein* may choose its heroes',²⁷ Farias manages, on two occasions, to change this plural to a singular (in one of the two passages, we even encounter the word *Führer*!).²⁸

So many distortions in so few pages! If Farias's thesis could be supported, would it not find a precise argumentative basis more easily? Instead, we note that it ends up contradicting itself. Four lines apart, we read that Heidegger's ideal in 1927 is 'a kind of revolutionary-traditionalist communalism' and that his political preferences 'exhibit themselves with complete clarity'.²⁹ 'A kind of . . .': that is the opposite of a clear model! Moreover, the word 'communalism' is thoroughly inadequate.

To conclude this topic, we note that Farias went from a relatively flexible formulation of his thesis (which solicits the reader's approval) to an unbending conclusion (which tends to put pressure on the reader). According to the first formulation, *Being and Time* presents 'a philosophico-political horizon which . . . included the possibility of the subsequent choice in favor of National Socialism' (among other choices?). According to the second one, the book 'positively sets into place properly fascist elements'.³⁰ We have just seen that this last thesis treats the text

of *Being and Time* with few scruples. It is more reasonable and more in conformity with the truth to state with George Steiner that no one would have taken it into one's head to look retrospectively for politically suspicious 'traces' on the basis of the sole text of *Being and Time*.³¹ In it, we have a book which is philosophically overdetermined and of uncommon hermeneutic wealth. It is the *working drawing* for the structures of ec-sistence. As a matter of fact, over the last sixty years, many readings have been put forth: in France, the success of the Sartrian interpretation has occluded the medical approach (that of the Swiss psychiatrist and longtime friend of Heidegger, Medard Boss) or the theological one (that of Rudolf Bultmann). The resoluteness itself has more often been understood in an Augustinian or a Kierkegaardian sense than in relation to the political situation of the last years of the Weimar Republic. One could also claim (this would not be the most absurd claim, although these are painful examples) that poets such as Trakl and Celan attest to what the resoluteness of poetic existence may be. In any case, the 'political' reading certainly is not the only possible one, and it runs the risk of being particularly unfruitful if it becomes exclusive of other readings.

Having set aside the extreme thesis of a unilaterally political reading of *Being and Time*, must we accept the opposite view, introduced at the outset, which understands the work to be utterly apolitical? If we look at the matter more closely, even Pierre Aubenque does not claim that there is *no link at all* between *Being and Time* and the political commitment of 1933: '*Being and Time* is obviously an apolitical work. This very apolitical character of the book makes it negatively responsible for Heidegger's political commitment, in the sense that it was not able to hold him back.'³²

We already see in what respect Aubenque is right. Since there is no positive and determinate political philosophy in *Being and Time*, since even the 'few fascist elements' allegedly isolated by Farias manifest themselves as such only at the cost of considerably off-handed simplifications, Heidegger could not have 'derived' his adherence to National Socialism from it. We are, thus, left with the much more likely hypothesis of there being a solely *negative* link between the masterpiece of 1927 and the commitment of 1933. According to this view, Heidegger's enormous error has a philosophical origin *by default* only. It is precisely the absence of a political philosophy – and perhaps even of an ethics – which made him considerably more vulnerable.

The difficulty appearing now is not negligible, however: the absence itself of a *political* philosophy in Heidegger's philosophy has a philosophical significance. This want is not a lack that is external to thought: it is attributable to it. It must therefore be explained in one way or another, but without abstracting from the thought that indeed constitutes the

horizon within which his choice was made (even if nonphilosophical circumstances and motivations were also at play in it). The term 'apolitical' is besmirched, and it is not devoid of ambiguities. If it turns out to be an appropriate qualification for the author of *Being and Time*, it will be so in a philosophical sense that must at all costs be specified.

A reconnected thread: the a-politics of *Being and Time*

Our thesis is taking shape: if there is no politics in *Being and Time*, there is an 'a-politics'. This term must be understood in an ontological sense: *Dasein* is *apolis*. Originally, being-there (*Da-sein*) is defined neither as *animal rationale* nor as a political animal (the two go hand in hand in Aristotle). Although Heidegger does not explicitly treat the question of politicization and apoliticism, it is within the logic of his discourse to consider that these attitudes are complementary and susceptible of passing into each other according to circumstances. The 'they' is in the habit of undergoing such reversals. Apoliticism as a lack of differentiation is an attitude that is itself ensnared (*verfallend*), neither appropriated nor taken over. It excludes neither idle talk, nor curiosity, nor ambiguity, all characteristic traits of the 'they'.

To clarify what has been put forth, it must be recalled that the existential analytic aims in the first place at 'destroying' the definition of man as *animal rationale*. After reminding us that 'the person is not a thing, not a substance, not an object',³³ Heidegger proposes a radical critique of both ancient and Christian anthropology. The ancient understanding of man, as *zōon logon echon*, is quite briefly (and expeditiously) criticized, insofar as it strengthens the forgetfulness of being: 'The kind of being of the *zōon*, however, is understood here in the sense of being objectively present and occurring.'³⁴ The definition of man as a living thing is ontical. As for the *logos*, it constitutes 'a higher endowment whose kind of being remains as obscure as that of the being so pieced together'.³⁵

On the one hand, then, there is the forgetfulness of being in its distinctive difference (the ontological difference, i.e., that between being and beings). On the other, there is an obscurity (i.e., a lack of thought) concerning the operative notions. These are the two traits which the existential analytic not only wants to correct but aims at eradicating with its elucidation of the ontico-ontological preeminence of *Dasein*. The existential analytic brings together, under the sign of the ontological difference, the care of existence (which appropriately recovers that which 'animality' concealed) and existence's project of understanding (which thinks very closely what the 'natural' *logos* occluded). Now, if we turn to the beginning of Aristotle's *Politics*, we read that 'man is by nature

a political animal'.³⁶ The definition of man as 'rational being endowed with speech' cannot be dissociated from his condition as a 'political animal'. Because man can speak, he can 'make known what is beneficial or harmful, and so what is just and unjust'.³⁷ The utterance emitted within the space of the City allows man to unfold his rational potentialities, his virtues, and to realize the Good toward which he tends by nature. If he claims to elude it by either lack or excess of being, he is 'either a brute or a God'.³⁸ The chain of relations linking the human to the rational, city-dwelling, and political constitutes the natural metaphysics with which Heidegger takes issue throughout *Being and Time*, down to his deconstruction of the 'vulgar concept' of time.

It is therefore obvious that Heidegger here meets the political question, even though he does not say a word about it. He encounters it only in order to subordinate it to the ontological question. What is henceforth of consequence to the *Dasein* is that which is *daseinsmässig*, that is, truly characteristic of *Dasein*, suited to its fundamental difference. This requirement implies a complete structural-transcendental redistribution aiming at the appropriation of this radical difference. *De facto*, in *Being and Time*, the *Dasein* is thought of as *apolis*, or, in Aristotle's terms, as equally capable of being a brute or a god. The existential analytic takes the measure of the standardlessness of that being.

However, among the possibilities available to the *Dasein*, there is 'initially and for the most part' (an extremely frequent expression in *Being and Time*) that of being with others in the mode of the 'they'. The ontological field defined by falling away from authentic self and falling prey to the 'world',³⁹ which, according to Heidegger, is all too accessible, does correspond to the dimension (founded in nature) where rationality, speech, and life become articulated within a political community. In other words, the field on which Aristotle builds an economics and a politics and with respect to which Heidegger takes a radical ontological step back is *the same*: it is that of everydayness and *doxa*. But Aristotle is not content with establishing the general conditions of man's existence in a community regulated by the search for the common interest. Basing himself on the (ideal) principle that 'the state is an association of freemen',⁴⁰ he undertakes a methodical and structural study of the respective advantages of the three correct constitutions (monarchy, aristocracy, and republic) as well as of the disadvantages of the regimes straying from them (tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy). This investigation is itself guided by a consideration of the just mean (*mesotēs*).

This reminder is not meant to reproach Heidegger with the absence of such analyses in *Being and Time*, for they do not at all constitute the explicit goal of the existential analytic. It enables us, however, to understand that Heidegger's ontological radicalism no longer offers a foundation for a *possible* structural and critical study of forms of sovereignty.

This is so because the everyday social space, shot through as it is with ambiguity, idle talk, and curiosity, is unsuited to becoming the vector of positive ontological determinations. Although Heidegger never acknowledges it, the negative characteristics attributed to the 'they' overlap, at bottom, with the Platonic depreciation of *doxa*. Is not this anonymous, unstable, novelty-seeking existence, the one that was led in the agora, always exposed to the bright and vivid appearances? Far from being able to give occasion to a just (and better) social environment, it seems to secrete nothing but mediocrity.

To this, Heidegger would object that he does not have a *pejorative* conception of the 'they', and that, on the contrary, he recognizes it as an unavoidable structure of existence,⁴¹ the ensnarement (*Verfallen*) being our everyday lot and having to be thought as such. These denials are frequent in *Being and Time*: for example, '[t]he expression "idle talk" will not be used here in a disparaging sense. Terminologically, it means a positive phenomenon which constitutes the mode of being of the understanding and interpretation of everyday *Dasein*.'⁴² All the same, the entire motion of the *Dasein* toward appropriated-existence (*Eigentlichkeit*) will go against the grain of the 'they' and will imply its critique (for example, the inability of the 'they' to choose⁴³). And it cannot be said that the connotations of 'idle talk' are particularly favorable, since the reciprocity between listening and speaking, which makes an existential out of *Rede* (discourse), is absent from idle talk. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the vocabulary applied to the 'they' is not only unfavorable but often, intentionally or not, *political*: Heidegger speaks of the 'dictatorship' and the 'authoritarian' character of the 'they'.⁴⁴

In *Being and Time*, there is thus an especially negative phenomenology of being-with, which at no point issues in a positive phenomenology of political sociability. The fundamentally ontological turn given by Heidegger to the phenomenological project, as early as subsection 7, reduces the rational, city-dwelling, and political space to the 'they' and only leaves open to the *Dasein* concerned with its possibilities, an a-politics, that is to say, an indeterminate and – as Hegel would say – abstract authentic sociability. The self, which is led toward the most extreme appropriation of its ec-sistence, is called to its own-most, most faithful possibility. Now, the criterion of this appropriation is neither tradition nor a fusion with the people, as Farias claims, but the mineness: 'The two kinds of being of appropriated existence [*Eigentlichkeit*] and unappropriated existence [*Uneigentlichkeit*] – these expressions are terminologically chosen in the strictest sense of the word – are based on the fact that *Dasein* is in general determined by mineness [*Jemeinigkeit*].'⁴⁵

The properly political problem (that of knowing how the ontologically sovereign *Daseins*, albeit always at risk of relapsing into the 'they', are to live together – according to which distribution of authority, which

rules of government, which civil laws, and which economic constraints, etc.) remains entirely open. The subsection devoted to discourse (*Rede*), which connects the immediate existential of attunement and the mediate existential of understanding-interpretation, affords the best sketch of an 'authentic sociability'. In it, we discern that Heidegger seeks a being-with freed from the demands of constant presence, a being-with (*Mitsein*) which – as Sartre had seen – is existentially experienced in the workshop or the sports team.⁴⁶ In sharing an activity together, we understand each other without words: dialogue becomes shared in its very suspension.

In this, there is nothing politically determinate. This is attested to by the fact that on the basis of this ontological radicality and this search for authenticity at all cost, the most opposed political attitudes are possible (the Maoist cultural revolution, as well as the fateful choice of 1933), but also nonpolitical attitudes (e.g., the evangelical conversion of Saint Augustine, who inspires Heidegger so much in *Being and Time*, or the most decided exposure to poetic or artistic illumination, as with Hölderlin, Van Gogh, Trakl, or Celan).

Apoliticism often results from indifference. On the contrary, the a-politics of *Being and Time* derives from an exacerbated concern for difference, from the extreme appropriation of *my* mortal condition, which sets me apart from the City's everydayness to leave me only with the poise and self-assurance of others in communication or battle. Such is my condition in quest of the futural temporalization of a beginning.

Did the ontological radicalism of this a-politics contain a danger? Yes, the one to which Heidegger succumbed. This danger may also be characterized as the will to constitute *directly* an authentic, existential-ontological politics, as the will to found a politics anew on the ontological *difference* alone. This amounts to a wager, since the rational, city-dwelling, and political space has literally been deserted, emptied of all its positive determinations (while truth as rigor in adequation, as well as any ethical ideal, have also been deconstructed)! But this desertion or this withdrawal could have been temporary, if Heidegger had not given in to the temptation – perhaps due to the unexpected repercussion of the book – to turn *Being and Time* into the cornerstone of a new radical *foundation* (which amounted to his repeating the metaphysical gesture, while denying that he was doing precisely that).

Curiously, Heidegger did not realize that the Aristotelian rationality which he was then setting aside was not at all that of the *mathēsis universalis* (universally dominating the 'world' and reducing it to a *res extensa*), but rather that of the crafts, a poietic and prudent rationality whose full ontological scope was, however, experienced by Heidegger at the level of handiness (*Zuhandenheit*) and its sleights of hand – a rationality indeed precious in a realm exposed to all manner of errancy, as politics is.

Part II The last circle

Denn das Schickliche bestimmt das Geschick und dieses die Geschichte.
 – Martin Heidegger

From 1945, Heidegger had not simply developed a 'low profile' personal strategy of defense (the theme of the 'six months'); he had above all followed his own intellectual itinerary in a non-repetitive fashion by taking up a distance with regard to what remained 'metaphysical' in *Being and Time* by patiently constructing a second work. It would be reasonable to surmise that the strategy was conceived with a view to protecting this work, unreasonable to reduce the work to a sort of *trompe-l'oeil* of purely circumstantial requirements.

Heidegger always claimed that he gave the priority to thinking, even during his most active engagement (if one takes this claim at its face value, the set-back with the rectorate is due less to impossible compromises than to the pitiless manifestation of a de-stabilization of the thinking itself). We have seen that he claimed that the refusal to publish the *Spiegel* interview during his lifetime was intended to protect his work. We have no reason to doubt the sincerity of this claim. As to its legitimacy, that's another matter. But there can be no doubt that the publication by Heidegger of a self-critical statement concerning the Nazi period (however radical it might have been) would have focused public and academic attention on this question and would have opened a series of intense debates comparable to those we have known recently.

In addition Heidegger – working in the first instance for those 'in the know' – certainly thought that the development and the deepening of his work would throw a retrospective light upon the limits and the presuppositions of the labors and of the positions assumed decades earlier. Here again, it is necessary to draw distinctions. To criticize him in this respect for his 'elitism' or his 'aristocratic stance' (and a fortiori to confuse these with his Nazism) is not in good faith. It amounts to ignoring the specificity of his philosophical work and not permitting him to be zealous (and to be it in his own fashion). A meanness of spirit which can lead to a form of intellectual terrorism. It is infinitely more interesting to determine whether the later works after the famous 'turn' make it possible to disentangle the imbroglio of his historical 'politics'.

We are going to raise the question once again from the standpoint of the Heideggerian interpretation of the history of being by undertaking a critique of his radical 'historicism'. Does the thinking of 'Heidegger II' allow one to raise the principal difficulties supposedly aroused by the

philosophy of 'Heidegger I'? In this regard, Ferry and Renaut are right to put us on our guard: 'Heidegger II' cannot be played off against 'Heidegger I'; the limits common to both have to be thought through. However, if it is going to be fruitful, this line of inquiry should not ignore the fact that a creative enterprise is on the way with 'Heidegger II', which is not to be reduced to a retrospective 'stylization' of the work of 'Heidegger I'. The hermeneutical situation which we are going to confront is therefore still more complicated than was suggested by Habermas, whose critique – let us admit it – deserves a double credit: it puts us on guard against the establishment of an excessively narrow relation between the work and the person and it criticizes the 'essentializing' abstraction which allows 'Heidegger II' to disconnect ontological history from politico-historical events.⁴⁷ Habermas' critique itself gets stuck half way: entirely preoccupied in passing judgment on the Heideggerian itinerary in ideological terms it reduces the destinal historicism to a banal and irrational fatalism. Thus one risks losing sight of the fact that Heidegger's defensive system would not have been so effective if it had not been attached to a serious (which does not mean indisputable) philosophical re-interpretation. It is therefore the latter which will not have to be reexamined.

Re-tying the knot: the a-political stance *vis-à-vis* history

It has already been shown that Heidegger's engagement of 1933 plunged him into the imbroglia of a direct ontologization of politics. Did Heidegger really get out of this imbroglia later on? In one sense, the ever-increasing distance adopted with regard to *Being and Time* (and to the 'philosophical complex' that Richardson called 'Heidegger I') is impressive. With the possible exception of Schelling, there is no other example in the history of philosophy of an author taking so great a step back with regard to his major work. To disengage the question of being as such from the limits of the analytic of existence, to make these limits appear as inherent in the metaphysics of subjectivity in the framework of a general reinterpretation of metaphysics as the history of being, to try to find a new way of questioning, a new language which will make it possible to re-turn fundamental questions to their un-thought site and, at the same time, to outline the signs of a 'reference' different from (thought more originary than) that of metaphysics: this immense labor is indeed a prodigious intellectual advance which has no equivalent in the West and which seems to sweep away the petty objections inspired by the political and existential adventures of the years 1933–4. Reproducing this line of argument does not mean hiding behind academic dignity or behind the subtlety and the hermeneutical complexities of this

entire work undertaken since 1935 (the richness of which, especially in the case of the *Beiträge*, has not yet been assessed by the critics). One has to bear in mind that Heidegger has offered a self-interpretation which also institutes a self-criticism while proposing, at the same time, a 'self-defense' or, more exactly, a re-situation or re-distribution of personal destinies based upon a holistic articulation of the relation between the political (or a-political) and the intellectual.

This self-interpretation (an expression due to von Herrmann but taken up again more critically by Pöggeler)⁴⁸ is well known and is already itself over-interpreted. The great difficulty here is to stick to the essentials in what concerns the political question. The principal difference apparently characterizing the thinking of the 'second Heidegger' on this question slides, through a seemingly negligible displacement, in an a-political direction, not simply by default but by virtue of a deliberate plan. The meditation upon the history of being (and of Nietzsche's thinking as the last figure in the latter) assigns the field of modern politics to the will to will. But this political field is by no means that of a *polis*. As Hannah Arendt has shown in her own way,⁴⁹ it is that of a planetary technology which commands the cycle of production and consumption and which both agglomerates and atomizes society at the same time. Faced with the deployment of this technical apparatus, Heidegger will henceforward maintain the view that there is (fundamentally) nothing to be done except wait for a destinal reversal. The thinker recommends an a-political patience. The 'truth' of the planetary deviation becomes the endurance of thinking, a relinquishment (*Gelassenheit*) which is both too near and too far for any specific commitment.

This explicitly 'a-political' attitude, which has nothing to do with any indifference towards politics or with the 'apolitical' attitude of *Being and Time* is based upon a reinterpretation of the world situation as a function of his reading of the history of metaphysics. Just as metaphysics culminates in cybernetics (in the broadest sense), so 'classical' politics (the deliberate calculation of an equilibrium of forces and powers) yields to a technical formulation of all problems, including political problems. Instead of 'pretending' to influence events (the derisory ambition of the leaders, parties, the media), would it not be better to think about the destinal dimension of this situation, in order to safeguard what still remains possible?

The heart of the debate: a destinal thinking (integral historicity) which separates (from an ontological point of view, henceforward displaced toward the 'event') what does not depend on us (the course of the world) from what does depend on us (thinking). A highly stoical division which is not to be despised but from whose elevated point of view formidable difficulties are overlooked (or avoided).

To put it in a nutshell, here are the difficulties (we will have to

disentangle them later): isn't this all going to lead to – even if it is denied – a new philosophy of history (more negative than positive) whose qualities and defects will have to be assessed as a function of the kind of objection that any philosophy of history encounters today? Does this destinal vision really work out the questions as persistently as it claims? It settles the question of responsibility (human, all too human) with one step, a negative one – or rather in accordance with a putatively authoritative assignment: thinking and everything else. Finally, and above all, does it recognize or does it not rather ignore the status of the political and of politics today?

Major questions which will have to be patiently examined; they will lead us to a *dénouement* which is not that proposed by Heidegger: not an integrally destinal division, but – let us anticipate brutally – the dissolution of the Heideggerian conjunction of appropriation and historicity (or destination). An appropriation open to a destination in suspense? The perspective of this kind of thinking, a thinking referred to the Nazi question, will permit us to apply the retrograde movement of truth, but in a hermeneutical sense: if Heidegger had untied the knot in this way would he not have been able to throw light upon this 'past which won't go away?'⁵⁰ But the knot remains tied, the imbroglío has been displaced, loosened – but not untied. It has been tied up again in a (destinal) way which could not but obscure the specific, but vital issue of the status of Nazism and of the sense (or nonsense) of the Extermination. It does not fall to me here to determine whether this obscurantism was, from beginning to end, deliberate. The knot is philosophical in character: the analysis of the texts (including the one which bears upon the 'internal truth and the greatness' of the National Socialist movement) confirms it.

Heidegger did not lack the courage (though perhaps the critical lucidity) to take up so profoundly tangled a thinking. Only on the basis of a debate carried to the very heart of this thinking will it be possible to extract, if not the rationale, at least the motives which lie at the root of the acquiescence, of the non-condemnation, of the silence. Which is why this knot will only be untied, if at all, by a critically rational labor which will set limits to Heidegger's integral historicism.

Destinal historicalism

This is how the thinking which claims that 'everything is destinal dispensation' (*Alles ist Schickung*)⁵¹ has to be named. Not only is there not for Heidegger any superior instance (theological or normative), history itself is dispensation and destiny (*Geschick*) and before all else this is valid of metaphysics as the history of being. But from the moment being is

understood as the name for presence it no longer functions as the last instance: written in the old form (*Seyn*), then barred, it is finally 'replaced' by a trans-epochal instance, the event. Already, in *Being and Time*, the destruction of the history of ontology led to the understanding of being as time in an ekstastic sense and essentially out of the future. Later, in *Time and Being* for example, temporalization is expressly referred to the fourth dimension of time: the gift itself. We are therefore entirely delivered over or exposed to historicity. This is our lot, our 'thrown being' in its most radical form. And the fact of being exposed to the technical enframing (*Gestell*) is only the ultimate version, provisionally unsurpassable.

Let us dwell on this statement: 'Everything is dispensation'. It bears fully and completely upon being in totality and, from this point of view, it remains metaphysical – in the sense of general metaphysics. Objection: it is no longer a question of *justifying* being in general in the manner of onto-theology. Reply, in the form of a question: but doesn't it lead nevertheless to an inversion (hidden, displaced) of every *foundational* justification, that is, of any theodicy? Consider the first of Leibniz' twenty-four theses which (quite rightly) fascinated Heidegger: *Ratio est in natura cur aliquid existat quam nihil*⁵². As the reverse of this universal ordering principle, the sentence 'everything is dispensation' is a challenge to any unified necessity, one which is expressed as the accommodation of givens which are always singular. Historicity itself becomes the irreducible horizon of all phenomenality. Strange offering without anyone either sending or receiving, secretly related to what is fitting and anticipating an event of appropriation.⁵³ 'Everything is destinal dispensation' is the hall-mark of Heidegger's fundamental thinking, slipping sometimes into a more circumspect mode of expression (for example, 'destiny tests itself against the destinal'⁵⁴).

Is Heidegger still engaged in an inquiry when he writes: 'everything is dispensation'? He affirms, he pronounces, he confirms; and he closes history down on its finitude, reducing the humanity of man to the latter. Is it the case then that radical historicalism still remains a thinking about destinal dispensation and the event, a thinking which aspires to be definitive? The 'piety of the thinking' makes itself known henceforward on the basis of a network of presuppositions, redistributed admittedly (the possibility of taking stock of metaphysics as such, of distancing oneself from it historically). It was never very different with any great metaphysics, fixing the fundamental presuppositions which determine a possible view of the world (radical scepticism was almost always marginalized, rejected with suspicion and even ridiculed).

If Heidegger's historicalism started out linked up with this metaphysics (which he tries to transform), his calling in question also has to bring with it a calling in question of the presupposition of the completion of

the said metaphysics. Is it going to be necessary to suspend rationality in favor of the historicity of its dispensation, as Heidegger seeks to do? It has just been suggested that Heidegger does not escape altogether from a logic which orients and governs the most authentic metaphysical breakthroughs. Ambivalent praise: for the recognition thus accorded to Heidegger's understanding of metaphysics is not exactly what was claimed by him.

How can historicalism be thought as the metaphysical new deal? According to Heidegger, historicity is referred to a more secret instance, namely the destinal, which is not to be reduced to the inevitability of what comes about. The Heideggerian 'dispensation' is not to be identified with a fatality which strikes you as one might receive a blow on the head without being able to identify its origin. It's a *moira*, an allotment which one discovers as one's own and which one appropriates in order to take over the possibilities and impossibilities which it imposes: a destination which opens up a world. This thinking is already, and quite explicitly presented in *Being and Time*: 'Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its "generation" goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein.'⁵⁵ Destiny does not deliver Dasein over to an indiscernible or undecidable dissemination, but to a recuperation of its possible and shared meaning. The epoch, the generation offers a possibility which can become mine (within a community). Probably a Hegelian feature; for it assumes a unity of epochal meaning in world history. But also a supplementary metaphysical feature; for it presupposes that, in addition to the thinking which closes down the meaning of being in totality, there arises a recourse to, a collection of the possible – and all this still within the perspective of world history. That 'repetition' which makes up both the initial and the final theme of *Being and Time* announces perhaps – subject to (and in spite of) the denials, beyond the challenge of the Platonico-Christian, onto-theological element – the re-sumption of the originary in metaphysics, the repetition of the metaphysical foundation. Such is the scope of this 'mimicology' that Lacoue-Labarthe analyzes in *The Fiction of Politics*.⁵⁶ a mimicology with regard to which what is at stake is easier to grasp than the game itself (for the latter operates without any more pregnant archetype than the destinal appropriation itself). Destinal historicalism stands therefore in a relation to the unsurpassable element of metaphysics which is both tense and extremely intimate. Its destiny is still metaphysical but as though it were turned back against what made up its dominant development, glimpsing an origin which is still to come – and which is perhaps mythical.

To be sure, this historicalism no longer has anything to do with a simple historicism. On the one hand, because it arises out of an ontological (and, it is now evident, also metaphysical) concern which is in no way ontic, anecdotal or historiographical. On the other hand, because it

is sufficiently well advised to avoid any imprudent projection upon the future other than that which results from its fundamental presupposition (the anticipation of a destinal turning). As for the philosophy of history, it is excluded in the classical sense; and Heidegger does everything he can to avoid its return, even in the apparent guise of a reappearance. However, from the moment when his vision of history is set out in accordance with the referential axis of the history of being, from the moment when the latter is understood as a function of a fundamental thinking which, as we have seen, affirms the definitively destinal character of being, it is not itself able to escape this destiny. And then it is taken over by what has been called elsewhere 'rationality as allotment'⁵⁷ with regard to which it has not been adequately emphasized that it enforces a suspension of all historicalist dogmaticism.

What one now has to try to understand better is the internal articulation of this destinal historicity and the point from which it becomes excessive. A reexamination of the 'explanation' with reference to Nietzsche will help us. In the case of a thinking which exposes itself to the errant (*Irre*), the political danger is not the only one – even if it is the most salient. Ceaselessly, thinking is exposed to the possibility of finding itself on a path which leads nowhere (*a Holzweg*), a risk which must not be allowed to paralyze the spirit of the research. The 'turn' allowed Heidegger to achieve an intellectual attitude which is nonactivist, non-voluntarist and which excludes any engagement comparable to that of 1933. In this regard, the thinking of 'Heidegger II' relaxes the imbroglia of a politics which is directly ontological. But a thinking which is henceforward both responsive and anticipatory is still just as defenseless against the possible articulation of public life and its rational determinations. Since the circle of an integral historicity has not been broken, its exclusive presupposition prevents it from operating a dia-critical disjunction with respect to the permanent requirements of rationality.

The 'historicalist singularity'

Once again in 1942, Heidegger raises National Socialism to this literally fatal height while severely attacking its ideological catch-all.⁵⁸ It is evident that in purely representative (in the Hegelian sense) terms it is very difficult to understand the almost schizophrenic juxtaposition of recognition and condemnation, allegiance and reserve; what is more, a chronological reading will allow us to discern a clear change of tone between the writings of 1933–5 and those which come later than 1936, in particular, the *Beiträge*: from enthusiasm to disillusionment, from mobilization to critical analysis. Even the 1942 lecture course on Hölderlin ends in the most questioning fashion (and no longer with a call to action): 'Are

there any norms left on earth?'⁵⁹ But we still have to interpret this radical modification. Let us agree that it has nothing to do with a rejection, in the sense in which we might have wished to see such a rejection emerge. 'The moral indignation of those who still do not know the facts is often turned against the arbitrariness and the dominating pretension of the Guides – the most fatal form of that appreciation which continues to be offered them'.⁶⁰

Let us leave Heidegger with the responsibility for this declaration and simply apply the interpretative network which he offers us himself. Instead of limiting ourselves to diagnosing an ever more antagonistic attitude within the regime, which makes sense only within the limits of the most well-worn political categories, let us take a more radical approach and watch his dis-discovery of the epochal essence of the will to power, interpreted as the culmination of metaphysics. Dis-discovery which covers – if it does not recover – at least three semantic fields: metaphysics as such, the internal logic of the philosophy of Nietzsche and the historical conjuncture which singularizes Germany. It was not at all evident that these three fields would overlap, and at this point; with the lapse of time (this is a lesson to remember) it is becoming clear that it was and still remains extremely hazardous to decide, on the spot, that this event (or series of events) was destinal. Otherwise expressed, it is not illegitimate in itself to account for a conjuncture on the basis of a philosophy and the latter on the basis of the essence of metaphysics; this methodological approach stands to the credit of Heidegger. But what is difficult to accept (an extreme audacious and questionable gesture) is the short-circuiting of these three fields, and in such a way that metaphysical depth is impeded by the conjuncture at least as much as it illuminates it. Strange reversal of the historical which does not escape the historicist caricature, in spite of everything: to interpret the defeat of France in 1940 in the terms cited above is full-blown 'fatalism'; and if there is then a resurgence of Hegelianism, it is hardly the best aspects of the latter which survive.

But however critical one is tempted to be with regard to this destinal historicity, it has to be admitted that the fundamental feature of the Heideggerian evolution during the years 1935–45 becomes clear: the Nietzschean system with its five interconnecting fundamental terms (will to power, nihilism, eternal return, overman, justice) is the metaphysical motor (or the 'truth') of that active nihilism which finds expression in Germany in National Socialism. In this regard, the Nazi will to power cannot be distinguished – unless it is by virtue of its 'sincerity' – from the other forms (Americanism, Communism) across which the 'machinations' of the universal struggle for power are deployed. Therefore, a correspondence with the ultra-modern (and not the post-modern as Ferry and Renaut think): such is the dominant face of the Germanic fate. Let

us take a look at what Heidegger thought Germany was entitled to in 1934–5: 'the acquisitive power, the preparation and planification of different domains, and calculation, a readiness to deploy "organization"'.⁶¹ This corresponds well to the efficacy of that active nihilism that Heidegger considers inevitable.

On this basis one can understand the disappearance of enthusiasm from 1936–7, the contrary impact of distress – if not of despair (in 'Overcoming metaphysics'), for, according to Hölderlin:

Nothing is more hateful
To a ruminative God
Than an untimely growth.⁶²

The theme of waiting for God makes its appearance in the *Beiträge*: a waiting to which the rest of his work assigns no end. The National Socialist 'possibility' is diminished until it is no more than an empty form on the horizon. There remains an anterior future or rather an unreal conditionality of the past. But Heidegger will refuse to settle whether it is still too much to admit.

One sees to what an extent the 1942 allusion to the 'historicalist singularity' of National Socialism is a significant key. In its structure, the development of the lecture on the 'Ister' reproduces the rhetorical and intellectual bifurcation of the declaration of 1935 on 'the internal truth and the greatness' of the National Socialist movement. There is a pretence of adopting a point of view above any open and banal political commitments. And it is precisely this 'lordly' tone together with its anti-ideological bent which prevents one from according – without further ado – a stamp of approval to the interpretation which results from this retrospective justification: opposition to Nazi ideology. On the one hand because if the latter is not purely theoretical, the 'movement' is even less monolithic; on the other hand, for the following, much more fundamental, reason: if the importance of the 'movement' is recognized – nobody would wish to deny it – the latter is only comprehensible on the basis of a thematic core closely linked to the thinking of Heidegger (the destinal significance of Hölderlin, in constant tension with the reinterpretation of efficacy). So it is Heidegger himself who obliges us to track back to this theme and to investigate it at a level where ideologies and opinions are circumvented, surpassed, but where more subtle elective affinities nevertheless make their appearance under the cover of a veritable law of history: 'The law of history situates historical man in such a way that what is fitting is furthest removed and the way to the most fitting is the longest and most difficult way.'⁶³

Nietzsche: discord without *dénouement*

One of the most remarkable paradoxes of the Heideggerian reinterpretation of Western history as the history of being is that – while pretending not to be Hegelian (since it no longer recognizes anything like a transcendent rational necessity) – it finishes up in fact by admitting a necessity (if not a destinal ‘inevitability’) at least as implacable as the judgment of the tribunal of universal Reason. Nietzsche serves here as a counter-attack against Hegel but in a way which is never either simple or innocent or devoid of solicitations. To attempt to storm the gigantomania Heidegger–Nietzsche in a few pages is to assume a risk. Explaining Heidegger by way of his ‘most intimate adversary’ is complicated; it calls for – from 1935 to the 1950s – interpretative variations and levels which we cannot analyze here.⁶⁴

In his ‘Letter to the Rectorate of the University of Freiburg’ (1945), Heidegger writes:

From 1936, I undertook a series of lectures and conferences on Nietzsche, continued up to 1945, which constitute both an attempt to come to terms with [*Auseinandersetzung*] Nietzsche and a spiritual resistance. In truth, it would be wrong to associate Nietzsche with National Socialism, an assimilation which, regardless of anything more fundamental, is already forbidden by his hostility to anti-semitism and his positive attitude towards Russia. But, at a higher level, the debate over Nietzsche’s metaphysics is a debate over nihilism, inasmuch as it makes itself known ever more clearly in the form of a politics of fascism.⁶⁵

This declaration should be taken very seriously. It is based on a number of incontestable facts and is to be located at the very center of the debate which interests us here, by linking indissolubly this debate with Nietzsche and his ‘resistance’ towards National Socialism. It is impossible to understand fully the extraordinary attention given to Nietzsche by Heidegger outside the political context of the years 1935–6 on. How would it have been possible to ignore the shameless utilization of Nietzsche by the Nazi regime, his elevation to the rank of official master thinker, but at the cost of innumerable deletions of his texts and of gross schematizations? From an external standpoint, giving lectures on Nietzsche could not but be well viewed by the authorities (in this respect, Heidegger is without ‘merit’); but it is evident that the content of Heidegger’s lectures marks them off radically from the ideological speeches of the time, not simply by virtue of his knowledge of the texts but by his refusal to resort to the new ‘values’, to biologicalism and to the activism of the will to power. That there is a ‘spiritual resistance’ to Nazi ideology

is indisputable. The purely metaphysical reading of Nietzsche's work – done so systematically and so sublimely – attest to a radical break and even a contempt for the short-sighted exploitation of Nietzsche for propaganda purposes and for 'promotion'. So what Heidegger has to say on this subject in 1945 is not altogether off the mark. However, the very date of his declaration should draw our attention to the fact that he is undoubtedly engaged in self-justification. In fact, Heidegger never associated fascism with nihilism as closely as in this text written under the constraint of a procedure of 'de-nazification'. The allusions to what is going on at the time of the lectures held during this period (which, for the most part, have only been made known quite recently) hardly reveal any resistance on the part of Heidegger to the regime.

What is in question here is not that Nietzsche's thought is interpreted as metaphysics and that it is thought to revolve around the tension between the will to power and eternal return, playing respectively the roles of the *essentia* and the *existentia* (this Heideggerian option has already been heatedly discussed and remains one of the controversies of present-day philosophy), it is the historical status of this metaphysics (a status condensed into the following phrase: 'the history of being is being itself and nothing but the latter'⁶⁶). He could have contented himself with thinking about the modernity of Nietzsche – which would not have been a small task. He goes much, much further. He makes of Nietzsche the thinker of nihilism, that is, of the metaphysics which is on the way in an age which devalues the supersensible by inverting it. The historical role of 'Nietzsche's thought' is only intelligible within the schema of the history of being as the destiny of Platonism (a schema which implies that 'metaphysics' possesses a unity, that this unity is ontological and that it is ushered in by 'Platonism'). The expression 'historical role' is too feeble to characterize the direct and integral historicalization of metaphysics. An interpretative frame which presupposes in advance the juncture of being and historicity or better still: that being is itself fundamentally historicity (the hermeneutical breakthrough of *Being and Time* is then wholly integrated within the hermeneutical horizon of Nietzsche). 'What is, is what comes about' Heidegger insinuates at the end of the most audacious and the most disconcerting chapter of the second volume of his Nietzsche.⁶⁷ But he adds immediately thereafter: 'What comes about has already come about'.⁶⁸ An apparently negligible nuance which confronts us with a sort of ontological *fait accompli* (which, from the first, goes beyond the facts). What has already come about, not in the sense of a purely chronological anteriority but in the sense of a freedom of the possible, is the metaphysical revelation of being as the presence of the present, reoriented (in the modern version) as the unconditional domination of subjectivity (since Descartes).

If it is true that no 'external' necessity has ever been attributed to the

thinking of Nietzsche, then its degree of necessity has not been determined. But this thinking has been integrated (as a function of its internal structure) at the very heart of the schema for the historicalization of metaphysics – towards which we find ourselves carried along by this inescapable ‘fact’: we are the descendants of both Platonism and its modern Cartesian reorientation. It is not surprising that a destinal thinking does not arise on the basis of principles but radically subverts every principle by coming about (or by affirming what has come about through it). What Heidegger imposes as ‘self-evident’ is more than just one inheritance among others but assumes the form of what he calls the unconditional domination (*Herrschaft*) of the metaphysics of subjectivity (up to Nietzsche). The continually surprising feature of these pages lies in the *mélange*, in Heidegger, of an extremely lucid consciousness of the difficulties of his procedure (which cannot dispense with the ‘clubs and the crutches’ of metaphysics)⁶⁹ with a disingenuous intrepidity which sweeps away all obstacles with a view to imposing a new language – precisely that of the *Notwendigkeit* of nihilism.

Notwendigkeit: necessity. Are we going to allow ourselves to be held up by translational preliminaries, the impatient reader might object, exasperated by the Heideggerian procedure, which consists in substituting attention to an etymology or to a linguistic peculiarity for the reasoned resolution of an a priori? Since every objection has to be translated back into Heideggerian ‘language’, it surely thereby loses its edge and even its legitimacy. Let us try to reduce this kind of preliminary to the minimum by paying attention to the wordplay (which Klossowski fails to appreciate) as between *das Un-ablässige* (the necessary in the sense of that which does not let go of us) and *das Brauchende* (the necessary in the sense of someone ‘who is in need’).⁷⁰ Being necessitates in a sense which is both dual and unique because it is at one and the same time both imperiously inevitable and (in silent neediness) the manager of *our* being. Being imposes and awaits; constrains and accommodates. Its countenance is imperious: the domination of metaphysics as nihilism; its face reserved: the accommodation of neediness (*Not*) by a thinking which outlines metaphysics’ step back.⁷¹

The Janus face of historical being? Such a reference is hardly satisfying, for the ‘economy’ of the two aspects is neither symmetrical nor complementary but the play of one and the same step back. If the latter is mystified, being is taken for nothing by the ‘dictatorship’ of the will to will being. If the step back of being appears as such, then its neediness makes itself known, our neediness (and the secret need for the absence of need). What separates active nihilism from the thinking which ‘overcomes’, appears highly fragile. It is this moving limit which Ernst Jünger names ‘the line’ and to which Heidegger devotes a well-known text.⁷²

Several lessons can be drawn from the rereading of the end of chapter

VII of Nietzsche,⁷³ lessons which bear on the status of Heidegger's language, its political 'results' and finally, the ultimate consequence of destinal historicity.

Nietzsche himself? Let us admit that he disappears completely here in favor of his extraordinary metaphysico-historical elevation as thinker of the will to power and prophet of the Overman (interpreted by Heidegger as Man dedicated to a total mobilization for the mastery of the earth: technician-worker-soldier). His historicalist 'placing in perspective' reduces the ambiguities in favor of the destinal meaning. To the thrusts of the Nazi ideologues Heidegger replies with an infinitely more subtle thrust: instead of refuting the thinking on the basis of values he brings to light both the historicalist necessity and its limitation; the 'un-thought' of Nietzsche eliminates many of the moves intrinsic to his thinking. With Nietzsche, discord becomes the very Discord of the nihilistic age. Is this an exacerbation of the will to power or simply an historical turning point?

Heideggerian discourse becomes stranger still. From the shelter of the authority of his chair he presents a monumental interpretation of the most celebrated philosopher of the Nazi regime. But this discourse is doubly odd. It comprises a continual critique of official ideology and it is presented in a language which becomes ever more personal and even esoteric – and which nevertheless claims to be the truth, the unveiling of what comes about through the history of the twentieth century. A discourse which is both irrelevant (by virtue of its extreme elevation) and extremely relevant (by virtue of a continual 'diagnosis' referring to the world situation). A discourse which purports to be beyond both pessimism and optimism but which claims not to entertain any illusions, exposed as it is to an almost apocalyptic suffering. 'Unlimited and measureless suffering openly, though tacitly, announce a universal situation overflowing with distress'.⁷⁴ Terrible words about which one has to ask how they could have been pronounced in a lecture, that is, in public.

The political consequences are considerable. But they can in no way be deduced from political requirements proper to politics considered as an autonomous sphere. Politics, in Heidegger's eyes, is entirely delivered over to technique (itself determined by the essence of nihilism). The *polis* in the Greek sense has become impossible precisely because the city can no longer be for us a habitation, even a questionable habitation.⁷⁵ Henceforward, politics is withdrawn from all questioning and no longer offers any recourse since it has been handed over to a total calculability for the domination of the earth (no matter what the constitution of the regime officially in place).

Let us go over the evidence. Destinal historicity leads Heidegger to a purely epochal interpretation of Nazism. This does not come down to saying that everything is necessary but that the fundamental feature of

the epoch is its inevitability. Destiny which, for Hegel, was only the still indecipherable constraint of rational necessity⁷⁶ only refers here to the 'closure' of being. It is not less brutal but, on the contrary, still more insufferable, no longer subjected to any higher resolution, implacably exposed to the retreat of being, awaiting protection.

More precisely, this destinal historicalism leads Heidegger well beyond the illusions of 1933–4 concerning a direct and immediate revolution, well beyond his voluntarism and his relative 'activism', also beyond his faith in Hölderlin, at least to the extent that for several years he had been perceived as truly capable of touching the people. Heidegger does not seem to entertain any further illusions about the possibility for Germany of escaping the planetary destiny. One should also not hide the other side of this point of view. On the historical field, nothing is fundamentally opposed to active nihilism nor can it be opposed by anything. It is henceforward evident (which confirms from within the declaration of 1945) that Nazism is understood as a form (doubtless the most bare-faced) of this active nihilism.⁷⁷ Even if Heidegger's whole intellectual effort consists in differentiating another intellectual horizon, nevertheless his practical stance takes on (and has effectively taken on) the appearance of a fatalistic acceptance of the ineluctable. 'Historical Man' has no other way out but to experience the danger and the suffering, to go in a certain sense ahead of the retreat of being and so to pave the way for a reception (of this retreat) which will not be nihilistic.

The gravest consequence of this destinal historicity proves to be the ontological justification of this active nihilism, including thereunder the reduction of *ratio* to *animalitas* – to which we shall return later. By justification, we do not mean primarily a personal allegiance nor a subjective approbation but this form – quite peculiar to Heidegger – of a posteriori assignment of necessity to Western history reinterpreted on the basis of its metaphysical axis. It's a justification in the sense of a recognition of justice (*die Gerechtigkeit*), a theme which, with Nietzsche, is supposed to set its stamp upon the institution of the will to power as transvaluation (inverted subjectivity).⁷⁸ The more one raises the question to what an extent this feature can determine the interpretation of the West today, the more disputable it becomes – to say the least – to include an historically extremely localized characteristic in a comprehensive historical schema (whose necessity has been presupposed) – biologism, racism – which thereby also acquires *de facto* a historical status. Read these lines from *Holzwege*, lines which remain totally enigmatic if one does not insert them into the frame of that destinal historicity which Heidegger puts in place:

Man as the reasonable being of the age of enlightenment is no less a subject than the Man who conceives of himself as a nation, who

cultivates his racial being and finally who increases his power to become master of the planet.⁷⁹

Far from being approved, these different 'fundamental positions' of subjectivity are certainly heavily criticized. But, in spite of everything, racism is assigned the 'fundamental position' and slides to the center of a process which is regarded as world-historical and in consequence, inevitable – and into a proximity with such notions as 'people' and 'nation' as does not seem accidental. If the reign of subjectivity is unconditional it is evident that it no longer spares Nazism. On this point the Heideggerian critique is penetrating. But what is less so is the dissolution of the specificity of Nazism into an active nihilism (common to the technical era) and, at the same time, the attribution of a decisively planetary dimension to the biological conditioning.

The Man who has become the rational animal, which means today the one who works, can do no more than wander across the deserts of the ravaged earth. . . . The total liberation of the Under-man goes along with the full power accorded to the Overman. Animal impulse and human reason become identical.⁸⁰

Certainly one can lay stress upon the fact that, in this way, Heidegger is trying to think the metaphysical presupposition of conditionings and of threats which surpass the problem of racism and which, more recently, Foucault has for his part identified under the name of 'bio-power'; but the generality of Heidegger's proposal is such that, adjoined to destinal historicity, it lends itself to this 'factualism' which Nietzsche made fun of with reference to the Hegelians:

Take a look at the religion of historical power. Watch these priests of the mythology of ideas and their scorched knees! Can't you see the virtues themselves marching along behind this new belief? Is it really an act of abnegation when historical Man lets himself be levelled down to the status of an objective mirror? What magnanimity – to renounce all the powers of heaven and earth because, in all these powers, one adores power in itself [*die Gewalt an sich*]⁸¹

Even if these lines cannot be applied *as is* to Heidegger they nevertheless retain a corrosive force – and this for two reasons. First, because it is pertinent to recall the strangeness of an interpretation which employs Nietzsche to recover *one* necessity (even a posteriori) in history, an idea foreign to Nietzsche for whom life defies all necessity. Then, because in Heidegger's own conception of metaphysical domination there is certainly a 'power in itself', to the extent that something religious survives – or

so it seems – in the thought that being, of its own accord, harbors a shelter or safeguard. The power of being, the power of God in history: almost substitutable terms. Being is almost substantialized, accorded a quasi-reflectivity. A Nietzschean critique is undertaken to put into effect a historical schema which, in the name of being, endorses as necessary what is not known to be so in reality (but which one hopes is so, to avoid critical questioning?). A historical schema which, by denying to Man the least hold upon the fatal course of things, forbids all *effective* resistance.⁸²

Critical epilogue

What is most fundamentally susceptible to criticism is not the accent placed upon historicity but its exclusive and unconditioned character, which leads correlatively to a conception of planetary nihilism which is too global. This extremism concerning nihilism (then technology) constrains Heidegger to think of totalitarianism as inevitable, as the political system which corresponds to the essence of technology and which – at the very least – responds most directly to its requirements for command, production and control. This slip explains the error of judgment regarding Nazism but should not be understood uniquely on the basis of the latter. For it is implicated in any determinate and positive approach to the rationality (always relative) of political phenomena. The philosophical root of this decisive suspicion is the direct and exclusive juncture of being with historical deviation, in the form in which he articulates it – most evidently in the ‘Saying of Anaximander’ where the recollection of the closure (and withdrawal) of being into beings (a theme which is only intelligible on the basis of a rereading of *The Essence of Truth*)⁸³ leads abruptly to a thinking about history which is essentialist and ontological. Heidegger goes as far as to write: ‘Error is the essential domain of history’.⁸⁴ This statement is on the face of it absurd. However, *Irrtum*, anterior to the subject, does not strictly speaking mean error but more fundamentally – a hardly translatable word-play – the reign of the errant. Heidegger will explain, immediately afterwards, that this *Irrtum* is the epoch understood as an epoch of being, that is, the enlightening reservation of the latter. ‘Every epoch of world history is an errant epoch’. A later indication situates this deviance within the horizon of time. Historical deviance is ‘ek-static’, conceived in the image of what is essential in temporality.

It is not difficult to formulate a critique of a thinking about originary time which goes directly over into a philosophy of history. Our objection here aims to catch Heidegger at that minimal but decisive turning point where a transcendental meditation upon the essence of truth passes over

into an essential determination of history. We find here an intellectual audacity, a *tour de force*, which has no equivalent in the history of the West. One should be as cautious about this conjunction of being and history as about the Hegelian correspondence of Spirit and history. The one arises on the basis of the withdrawal of being, the other as a function of the development of rationality. In both cases, significantly, we find an appeal – oblique or frontal – to necessity. From the standpoint of rationality, it attributes a meaning to history. From a destinal standpoint, it imposes a constraint and exerts an enigmatic attraction.⁸⁵

This *tour de force* of destinal historicalism is not to be found in this text alone. With a view to a systematic recuperation of its various occurrences, let us quote two more notable examples. In his book *Schelling, Being and Time* is said to put into effect a turn in being itself,⁸⁶ in the remark added in 1954 to *On the Essence of Truth*, Heidegger's 'turn' is presented as 'the dictum of a turn at the heart of the history of being'.⁸⁷ Being, history of being, (ontological) history of the world, these terms are not equivalent but they do authorize certain tendencies and are perhaps the sign of so many preparations for a destinal historicalism as the new (and negative) philosophy – of history. In this regard Hans Jonas is perhaps right when he says that the second Heidegger, with his metaphorical conception of being, abandons any strict respect for the ontological difference (the sense of being in the infinitive, it should be added).⁸⁸ Such a perspective would call for a critical rereading of the 'turn' which would bring out the fact that the recoil of the *Schritt zurück* should not mask what is not only not in question but is on the contrary continually recovered by the second Heidegger: what authorizes thinking to pass from the transcendental plane to that of the worldly historical? What price must be paid for this veritable transgression of finitude? What kind of pretension does it arouse despite the apparent modesty of its 'remission' of metaphysics? So many question which our own itinerary has already covered but which will have to be taken up again.

For the time being it is enough to note that the Heideggerian recoil was not so radical as to represent an 'auto-critique' of his earlier ontologization of politics, then his destinal historicalism. Historicalism paralyzes political rationality, just as it suspends rationality in general. By becoming exclusive, historicalism neutralizes both the political field and rational possibility. It gets stuck between the a-political and the 'a-rational'. Heidegger, so lucid in other respects, only confirmed the internal limitation of his thinking, this intimate commitment to finitude contained in his destinal historicalism. One should not overlook the exceptional density of this obscure circle where being presupposes its historicity, its collectively assumed temporality. This secret habitation is certainly the ek-static character of time, a character which Heidegger hopes to recover in the epochal.

But it is one thing to plunge to the very heart of time, quite another to pursue an irrepressible determination to unify the intellect with the real – even if only on the basis of the hypothesis of the retreat of being. Can one have one without the other? Can what sets Heidegger apart from metaphysics (even from within his Nietzsche interpretation) be suspended? Metaphysics does not let go of its own as easily as this, especially if, as is the case with Heidegger, one is neither content to deconstruct it, nor yet capable of ever surmounting it. Certainly, ‘no one can leap over his own shadow’.⁸⁹

Part I translated by Pierre Adler and Part II by Christopher Macann

Notes

1 Victor Farias, *Heidegger et le nazisme*, tr. M. Benarroch and J.-B. Grasset (Lagrasse: Verdier, 1987).

2 *ibid.*, p. 153.

3 Not a word about Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche in Farias's book! This is an enormous and scandalous gap, among other ones, which are no less deplorable – e.g., four very quick pages (pp. 72–6) are devoted to *Being and Time*, and two miserable ones (pp. 282–4) to Hölderlin.

4 This paper is part of a more encompassing critique that will be the subject of my forthcoming book.

5 Guido Schneeberger, ed., *Nachlese zu Heidegger: Dokumente zu seinem Leben und Denken* (Berne: privately printed, 1962), p. 225.

6 Pierre Aubenque, ‘Encore Heidegger et le nazisme’, *Le débat* 48 (1988): 118.

7 *ibid.*, p. 119.

8 Translator's note: To designate the ontological difference, I keep to the following rule of translation: being = *être* = *Sein*; beings, what is = *étant*, *ce qui est* = *das Seiende*.

9 Georges-Arthur Goldschmidt, ‘Heidegger: l'allemand et le ressentiment’, *Le Monde*, Jan. 13, 1988, p. 2.

10 Translator's note: Henceforth, all translations of *Being and Time*'s highly distinctive lexicon, as well as of all quotations from that work, are taken from Joan Stambaugh's unpublished translation of the book, except where Janicaud's text necessitates an alternative translation.

11 See, e.g., Farias, *Heidegger*, p. 303.

12 Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Munich: 1938), 2: 777.

13 Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 15th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1979), p. 436.

14 Georges-Arthur Goldschmidt, *La quinzaine littéraire*, November, 1987.

15 Farias, *Heidegger*, pp. 75–6: ‘Thus in the context of the problems raised in *Being and Time* – namely, of ontological concerns – Heidegger's political preferences become quite visible, and show themselves to be tied to a general model of political society: Heidegger relies on citations from Count Yorck von Wartenburg and asserts that any explanation of historicity will have to conform to his doctrine and to that of Dilthey’ (subsection 76).

16 See *ibid.*, p. 73: ‘Karl Löwith and Ernst Tugendhat have rightly observed

that Heidegger's connection to National Socialism would not have been possible outside a conception of truth already stated in *Being and Time*. By making the questioning about being the prepredicative horizon within which the "disclosing" of what is takes place [subsections 7 and 44], he removes from reflection any possibility of finding verifiable or falsifiable criteria of judgment at the level of an effectively realizable intersubjective rationality. . . . However, it seems to us that something is lacking here: albeit exact, these remarks do not allow one to grasp the properly positive aspect of Heidegger's positions around 1933.'

17 *ibid.*, p. 73.

18 *ibid.*, p. 76.

19 See *ibid.*, p. 74. The text quoted by Farias is as follows (*Sein und Zeit*, p. 385): 'It is not necessary that resoluteness *explicitly* knows of the origin of its possibilities upon which it projects itself. However, in the temporality of *Dasein*, and only in it, lies the possibility of fetching the existentiell potentiality of being upon which it projects itself *explicitly* from the traditional understanding of *Dasein*. Resoluteness that comes back to itself and hands itself down then becomes the *recapitulation* of a possibility of existence that has been handed down.'

20 *ibid.*

21 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 385.

22 *ibid.*

23 Farias, Heidegger, p. 75.

24 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 384.

25 Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'être et le néant* (Paris: Gallimard, 1948), p. 502.

26 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 384.

27 *ibid.*, p. 385.

28 See Farias, Heidegger, p. 75: 'The existence that has been (*gewesene*) which the *Dasein* must and can choose as exemplary, is that of the hero.' 'Führer' occurs on p. 76. Farias also speaks of an elimination on Heidegger's part of public opinion (*ibid.*), whereas Heidegger tirelessly emphasizes the inevitability of the 'fall' into publicness (*Offentlichkeit*).

29 *ibid.*, p. 75.

30 *ibid.*, pp. 75, 76.

31 On the French television program *Océaniques* that was devoted to Heidegger and broadcast in December 1987 on channel FR3.

32 Aubenque, 'Encore Heidegger', pp. 118–19.

33 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 47.

34 *ibid.*, p. 48.

35 *ibid.*

36 Aristotle, *Politics*, tr. Hippocrates G. Apostle and Lloyd P. Gerson (Grinnell: Peripatetic Press, 1986), 1253a 3.

37 *ibid.*, 1253a 15.

38 *ibid.*, 1253a 29.

39 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 175.

40 Aristotle, *Politics*, 1279a 22.

41 See Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 129: 'The "they" is an existential and belongs as a primordial phenomenon to the positive constitution of *Dasein*.'

42 *ibid.*, p. 167.

43 *ibid.*, p. 391.

44 *ibid.*, pp. 126, 128.

45 *ibid.*, pp. 42–3.

46 Sartre, *L'être et le néant*, pp. 302–3.

47 Jürgen Habermas, *Martin Heidegger. L'oeuvre et l'engagement*, tr. R. Rochlitz (Paris: Editions du Cert, 1988), pp. 69 and 53. See also chap. VI of *Discours philosophique de la modernité*, tr. Bouchindhomme-Rochlitz (Paris: Gallimard, 1988).

48 Who prefers to talk of 'self-understanding' or 'self evidence' (see Otto Pöggeler, *Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie*, ed. Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert and Otto Pöggeler (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), p. 17 sq.).

49 See Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).

50 An expression of Ernst Nolte quoted by Marc Froment-Meurice at the beginning of his fine text 'Tourner la page?', *Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse*, 37 (1988).

51 Quoted by Otto Pöggeler, *Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie*, ed. A. Gethmann-Siefert and O. Pöggeler (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), p. 41. This sentence, drawn from a marginal note to the lecture 'Der Ister', has not been reproduced in the published edition. To the extent that it concerns an 'intimate note' corroborated by numerous 'echoes' in the work, it seems to us symbolic of a very fundamental orientation in Heidegger's thinking.

52 Leibniz, *Philosophische Schriften*, vol. VII, ed. Gerhardt, p. 289.

53 A paradox which offers Jacques Derrida the pretext for *La carte postale* (Paris: Aubier-Flammarion, 1980). See in particular pp. 71-5.

54 Heidegger, 'Geschick versucht sich an Geschick', in *Holzwege*, p. 311.

55 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 385.

56 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique* (Paris: Bourgois, 1987).

57 Dominique Janicaud, *La puissance du rationnel* (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), pp. 283ff.

58 See Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe (GA)*, 53, p. 98.

59 *ibid.*, pp. 203ff.

60 *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, p. 93; On the same page Führers are thought as 'the necessary consequence of the passage of being into errance' (our italics).

61 *GA* 39, p. 292.

62 Hölderlin, 'On the cycle of the Titans', IV, p. 218, quoted by Heidegger at the end of his *Introduction to Metaphysics*.

63 Heidegger, *GA* 53, p. 179.

64 Analyzed with a great deal of finesse by Michel Haar. See in particular two texts (so far unpublished): 'L'adversaire le plus intime. Heidegger/Nietzsche: proximité et distance'; 'L'Impensé ambivalent du Surhomme et la double pensée politique de Heidegger'.

65 *Cahier de l'Herne Heidegger* (Paris: L'Herne, 1983), p. 102.

66 Heidegger, *Nietzsche II*, p. 489.

67 *ibid.*, p. 388 (in the chapter on 'The ontologico-historical determination of nihilism').

68 'Was ist, ist das, was geschieht. Was geschieht, ist schon geschehen' (*ibid.*).

69 *Nietzsche II*, p. 397.

70 *ibid.*, p. 391. *Brauch* is a word which belongs essentially to Heidegger's vocabulary but which is very difficult to translate; see in particular, 'The saying of Anaximander', in *Holzwege*, pp. 338-9.

71 Heidegger already nominates this step as the *Schritt zurück* (*Nietzsche II*, p. 390).

72 See Heidegger, *Zur Seinsfrage* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1956).

73 This rereading does not pretend to be exhaustive, for it concerns one of

the densest and most difficult texts in this book, perhaps in the entire Heidegger corpus.

74 Heidegger, *Nietzsche II*, p. 392.

75 Heidegger, *GA 55*, p. 99.

76 See Dominique Janicaud, *Hegel et le destin de la Grèce* (Paris: Vrin, 1975); in particular, 'Anamnèse et destin', pp. 317–24.

77 The will to power was an openly proclaimed inspiration of the Nazi regime.

78 See Heidegger, *Nietzsche II*, pp. 314–34.

79 *Holzwege*, p. 102.

80 *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, pp. 72, 94.

81 Nietzsche, *Considerations inactuelles II* (Paris: Aubier, 1964), pp. 334–5.

82 Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, p. 93. Otto Pöggeler shows that 'spiritual resistance', according to Heidegger, was inseparable from an abstract conception of modern society and an ignorance of the specifics of the political dimension. See 'Heideggers politisches Selbstverständnis', in *Heidegger und die praktischen Philosophie*, pp. 48ff.

83 In particular, from §7, 'The un-truth as errance'.

84 Heidegger, *Holzwege*, p. 310.

85 See *GA 53*, p. 98.

86 Schellings *Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1871), p. 229.

87 *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1954), p. 26.

88 See Hans Jonas, 'Heidegger and Theology', tr. Louis Evrard, *Esprit* (July–August 1988), p. 187.

89 See Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953), p. 152.

Heidegger's Nietzsche and the Third Reich

Endre Kiss

The points of view adopted in our title which, on the one hand seeks to thematize Martin Heidegger's 'role' and, on the other hand, his 'fate' in the Third Reich, deliberately play on the ambivalence of Heidegger's own attitude. Was his 'role' in this time period the decisive issue? Did he in fact play a 'role' in the Third Reich? Or did he play a 'role' which diverged markedly from the one he really wanted to play? If however he did not play a 'role' then was he not rather subjected to a fate, a fate which he had to suffer, like many others? Many important investigations have recently appeared which seek to clarify the question whether he played a role or was simply subjected to a fate in Adolf Hitler's German state. None of these recent and thoroughly competent studies pays much attention to Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures. This is both comprehensible and incomprehensible at the same time. It is comprehensible in the sense that the philosophical opportunity of 'reconstructing' Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures has not yet been taken, either in the context of an academic discussion, or in that of Heideggerian apologetics, so that it readily came to appear as though the Nietzsche lectures were not necessary for arriving at a decision on the question concerning Heidegger's attitude toward the Third Reich. It is incomprehensible at the same time because Heidegger himself, in a 'preface' to the Nietzsche lectures, written in 1961, described the Nietzsche text as his *Denkweg*, a *Denkweg* which was certainly more important than anything that came before it or which followed after it.¹ It is also incomprehensible because, in a very obvious way, Nietzsche's philosophy represented the secret centre of the 'ideological' discussion in the Third Reich and this not only in a philosophical but also in a political sense. So that, for this reason alone, Heidegger, in the course of his extensive and intensive involvement with Nietzsche, had to take up a position with reference to the political realities of his time. What is incomprehensible does not become

any the more comprehensible if one takes into consideration the extent to which research into the fascist Nietzsche interpretation was delayed and indeed has still not been brought to completion. So it has to be admitted that, up till now, and in this specific connection, the Heidegger discussion has received little help from the Nietzsche research.

In order to arrive at an adequate conceptual and historical framework for assessing Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation, a reconstruction of the relation of Heidegger to Alfred Baeumler is unavoidable. There are two reasons why Baeumler features as the key to an understanding of Heidegger's attitude toward the Third Reich. The first is the need to evaluate the close personal relationship between Heidegger and Baeumler and precisely in the time period immediately preceding the National Socialist takeover. The second reason is based upon the need to make a comparison of Baeumler's Nietzsche interpretation (especially, *Friedrich Nietzsche, the Philosopher and the Politician* (Leipzig, 1931)) with that of Heidegger. The interpretation of Nietzsche now remains the only material capable of demonstrating Heidegger's philosophical attitude toward the Third Reich concretely rather than apologetically. In this case the emphasis lies on the word 'philosophical'. In this aspect of the discussion about Heidegger, it is well known that whereas the question concerning the rectoral speech appears to be more or less settled, so that one is almost in a position to talk about a consensus, it is still being claimed that the episode with the rectorate has nothing to do with the philosophical substance of his work.

It is necessary however that we raise questions concerning what was specifically ideological in the Third Reich. In this field we find the most varied opinions. At one extreme, the position is adopted that the Hitler State had no 'genuine' and systematically worked out ideology. Everything that was said in this field was in the final analysis nothing but the meaningless and incoherent rhetoric of a self-assuming power. At the other extreme, we find opinions which talk about a coherent ideology of the Third Reich. The greatest problem encountered so far is that, hitherto, this comprehensive ideology has been described with concepts which have proved to be unsatisfactory instruments with which to describe this spiritually doctrinaire reality. In our opinion, this quest for a comprehensive ideologically integrating conception should not be given up – especially since, as we hope to show, Heidegger's philosophy is inseparably bound up with such a conception of National Socialism.

The quasi-philosophical, ideologically oriented picture which did in reality play the role of just such an integrating and all-encompassing ideology was that of Alfred Baeumler's Nietzsche interpretation. It is important to note that Baeumler's Nietzsche interpretation could only become the all-embracing ideological doctrine of the Third Reich because

it was able to confer a certain legitimacy upon this Reich. Dieter Grimm portrayed the situation as follows:

The older generation of Jurists who decided for National Socialism after 1933 could, in the last phase of the Weimar Republic, only represent the new state as a legitimate state with an independent judiciary. The younger supporters of a total state had already given up this position and justified themselves with reference to Carl Schmitt. For him the legal system was advisory – in striking contrast to the legality of a truly effective will. The latter was however no longer to be justified along the lines of a constitutional legalization. Schmitt claimed that legality as a thought form historically linked to the parliamentary law-giving state had become obsolete with the collapse of the latter in 1930. Therewith the state won its freedom from the bonds of legitimacy.²

This example relates to juridicial legitimation. But it goes without saying that the compass of legitimation is broader than 'just' the field of law. Alfred Baeumler's Nietzsche interpretation fulfilled the function of legitimizing the Third Reich. The core of his view of things related to the very difficult, indeed unsolvable, problem of legitimacy. If one holds that the will to power is metaphysical, in the sense intended by Baeumler, then it is possible to conclude that the Third Reich is legitimate. It can be so because, for all practical purposes, Baeumler identified a concept of the will to power drawn from Nietzsche with numerous features of the National Socialist movement (later, with the National Socialist state). Baeumler's Nietzsche interpretation turned out to be the most effective legitimation of the Third Reich not only for immanent reasons (connected with the content and systematic coherence of the doctrine) but also because its author, from 1933, took up that very position within the Nazi hierarchy which legitimized and authorized him. With regard to his position in the Third Reich, Baeumler was the man whose views on legitimacy were supported by the entire weight of the party, for example, by being widely distributed. To this it should be added that Baeumler was well known, at least in philosophical circles, as the man who conferred legitimacy upon the Third Reich.

It is this threefold qualification of Baeumler's Nietzsche interpretation as a direct and effective political legitimation of the Third Reich which defines the conceptual framework in which both Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation and his personal relationship with Baeumler have to be investigated with appropriate care. In the light of these facts, the collaborative commitment, not to mention the friendship between Heidegger and Baeumler, cannot be seen as just an accidental personal relation. Hugo Ott compares Baeumler and Heidegger with two athletes in their

blocks, waiting for a good start in the new Reich. In my opinion, it is not so much a matter of individual athletes in their starting blocks as rather of a basketball team trying to gain the advantage by passing the ball to each other. The high point of this connection can be seen in the rift of 1934 when, in the final analysis, Baeumler, in conjunction with Heidegger, was unable to get a grip on the German university system and to permit his friend to play a leading role.

After this description of Baeumler's position in the Hitler state, it might seem as though we could go over to a comparison between Baeumler's and Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation without further preparation. However, it would be impossible to do this and for a reason which is neither purely historico-political nor purely philosophico-systematic. This reason has to do first and foremost with the sociology of knowledge and is based upon the ideological quality of that Nietzsche interpretation through which Alfred Baeumler hoped to legitimize the Third Reich. Baeumler brought a new sociological quality to thinking which I have called Positive Political Metaphysics, especially in my study: 'On the concept of positive political metaphysics'.³ Our presentation only becomes complete with this recognition of a positive political metaphysics. On the basis of a distorted, and at times simply false, Nietzsche interpretation, Baeumler created a positive political metaphysics while, at least until 1945, Heidegger remained in the frame of the above-mentioned sociology of knowledge. It is not a matter of Heidegger 'only' taking over Baeumler's interpretation and so offering a new Nietzsche interpretation of purely academic interest. The critical question bears not so much upon the many similarities between two Nietzsche interpretations which perforce had to be advanced in a political context under specific historical conditions. The critical question concerns the fact that Baeumler inaugurated a way of thinking by means of which he not only sought to legitimize the archaic intellectual edifice of a positive political metaphysics with reference to Nietzsche but also succeeded in promoting it to high intellectual rank. It goes without saying that Baeumler's legitimization project is rooted in a positive political metaphysics. If, therefore, we are going to assess Heidegger's taking over of Baeumler's Nietzsche interpretation, we have to take into consideration a variety of factors: behind this 'philosophical' interpretation there stands, on the one hand, a positive political metaphysics which, though fundamentally archaic, had been raised to full philosophical rank. On the other hand, this construction sought to accomplish the almost impossible task of legitimizing the Third Reich.

The politically actualized positive metaphysics is a clearly distinguishable way of thinking about the sociology of knowledge. It carried through the task of legitimizing the Third Reich and thereby brought to it a world-historical significance which even today has not been recognized

with sufficient clarity. Further attempts to explain this way of thinking, for example, with reference to 'irrationalism', as Georg Lukács has done in his 'Destruction of reason' with historically catastrophic results, can be refuted without difficulty through a simple comparison with this positive political metaphysics.

Undoubtedly, the most important qualifying characteristic of positive political metaphysics is *this-sidedness* (*Diesseitigkeit*). This means that the basis of a metaphysical construction is not transcendent, that is, not 'other-sided', as it is in most religiously coloured metaphysics and metaphorical, that is, no longer to be taken quite literally, as it still was in the great thought-constructions of classical German Idealism. A positive metaphysics is *political* when the basis of the metaphysical construction is taken from the sphere of the this-sided and is, in a broad sense, politically applied. The most important positive metaphysics for the modern philosophical tradition, Arthur Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will, is an example of a supremely positive metaphysics which is not at all politically applicable.

The second, equally qualifying feature of positive political metaphysics is that it is thought as a *comprehensive law of being* (*Seinsgesetz*). It is from this trait that the destinally archaic, even atavistic character of positive political metaphysics can be most exactly derived. In the context of modern rationality and post-Kantian criticism, the very existence of such a thought-structure speaks for itself. The threefold negative attitudes of positive political metaphysics arise in part out of the previously named characteristics, in part from other reasons. It is *anti-historical*; it is *anti-scientific* and it is dedicated to the *elimination of the political* in favour of the supremacy of metaphysical laws of being. This last feature of positive political metaphysics proved to be the most important since it read an affirmation of the positive metaphysics of the will to power into every political (and *mutatis mutandis*: historical or scientific) event. It meant however that the political (historical, scientific, etc.) quality of these events was actually eliminated. All that remained over was the metaphysics.

Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation also satisfies the strictest criteria of a positive political metaphysics defined in this way. Just like Baeumler, he interprets Nietzsche as a philosopher of the will to power and understands him as offering a this-sided, positive foundation for a law of being. He also understands the will to power (in its all-embracing compass) in a political sense. That is, he deliberately takes the extension of positive metaphysics in a political direction. Furthermore, he understands the this-sidedness of the will to power as a law of being, or, as it is often expressed, as the 'truth of being'. Martin Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures satisfy the above-mentioned negative criteria of positive, political metaphysics just as completely. The *anti-historical* feature finds expression

very frequently. What really takes place, the historical, normally acquires its significance by way of a metaphysical comparison with the law of being. The anti-scientific character of the Nietzsche lectures appears to be many-layered, most noticeably however on the destinal plane of Nietzsche philology. That it is the political terrain in which what is metaphysical in these texts is completely absorbed goes without saying. The struggle for world dominion, to take only one example, appears not as a political but as a metaphysical affair, governed by the law of being.

It is worth noting that Jean Wahl shows an astonishing sensitivity for the deep connection between the metaphysical and the political attitudes in the Third Reich. 'It [Heidegger's Germanic nature] allowed him to believe that, in the final analysis, everything depended upon the metaphysically distinctive people who, at the same time, were the people in the middle of Europe.'⁴ Despite its terminological variations we take this insight of Wahl's to be theoretically well-founded. But our question remains, how this author (Wahl) can see this metaphysics of a philosophical people as so unproblematic that he can simply 'set this question aside'?

With this introduction and clarification of the concept of a positive political metaphysics we are already in a position to pull our earlier thesis together:

- (1) Alfred Baeumler's Nietzsche interpretation articulates a conception of the will to power as a law of being which proves to be the very political ideology through which the Third Reich seeks to legitimize itself.
- (2) This conception should not be taken as a 'simple' academic interpretation. In it we find articulated a clearly definable 'mental representation', a system of thought which can only be adequately interpreted along the lines of a sociology of knowledge.
- (3) At the beginning of the 1930s, Martin Heidegger stood in a friendly relation with Alfred Baeumler and this proved to be decisive in the first phase of Hitler's dictatorship.
- (4) Martin Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures, which in 1961 he singled out as his true *Denkweg*, is rooted in the paradigm of Baeumler's conception of the will to power as a law of being.

Our last point is already directed towards a 'purely' philosophical content. The question of where the National Socialist commitment makes itself known in Heidegger's philosophy answers itself. The presentation of a metaphysical principle of the will to power as a law of being does not in itself amount to a philosophical National Socialism. It can be regarded either as an archaic, pre-critical and to a certain extent therefore also 'dangerous' conception or, on the other hand, and from a historico-philological standpoint, as a false interpretation of Nietzsche. But when

one bears in mind that this conception emanates from what was at that time the leading ideologue of the Third Reich and was sanctioned as such, as also that it was this conception which was employed to legitimize the Third Reich, it then becomes necessary to reassess one's views as to how Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's will to power as a law of being is to be judged. To act as though it was only an accident (both 'personal' as well as intellectual) that this interpretation comes close to Baeumler's is to succumb to a naivety which belongs neither to reason nor to morality – still less to a moral assessment of reason. Right up to the very end of the Third Reich, Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation falls under the rubric of Baeumler's theses. This is the position upon which we have wished to lay the greatest stress. However, we do not mean by that to deny that there might have been several, for the most part minor, modifications *within* this paradigm. The working out of these modifications does therefore, in the final analysis, serve to reflect the changes in Heidegger's philosophy and world view over the period in question.

'Introduction to metaphysics', written in 1935, speaks against the theory that Heidegger withdrew into the province of pure philosophy after 1933–4, that is, after becoming aware of his mistake over the rectorate. Indeed, he seeks here to prove that the 'fate of a people' can hardly be determined without the help of philosophy. What is most important about the philosophical significance of this work, and what touches Nietzsche most closely, can again only be presented in terms of the Baeumler paradigm. He is perfectly aware of the anti-metaphysical dimension of the young Nietzsche (above all on the basis of 'On truth and lies in the extra-moral sense') but neutralizes these tendencies in order to be in a position, to put it simplistically, to defend the metaphysical claims of positive political metaphysics against the anti-metaphysical approach of Nietzsche himself. The full force of this work for Heidegger's Nietzsche reconstruction (in truth the betrayal of Nietzsche implied therein) consists in this, that Heidegger turned out to be someone who took full cognizance of the anti-metaphysical Nietzsche. There can therefore be no question of his positive metaphysical interpretation of Nietzsche being derived *directly* from his Nietzsche reading.

The Nietzsche lectures from the years 1936 and 1937 still remain within the paradigm of the will to power as a law of being. These years also however attest to positions opposed to those of Baeumler. One such position is to be found in Heidegger's emphasis upon Eternal Return (*Die Ewige Wiederkehr*), which is largely underestimated by Baeumler. Another is to be found in the thematization of aesthetics in the context of Nietzsche's philosophy. These positions are to be understood as an explicit distancing from Baeumler, even though there is nothing like an overcoming of the metaphysical paradigm. One example in support of

the last claim is that the introduction of Eternal Return takes on a clearly metaphysical, that is, an ontologically regulated, character, so that for Heidegger there arises a new problem, that of determining the relation between these two kinds of metaphysics. This does not mean – and this has to be emphasized with regard to these years of revolt against Baeumler – that he himself managed to move beyond the paradigm in question.

In 1939, the will to power as law of being again dominates Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures. This is accompanied by a noticeable regression to the positions of the years 1933–5. At the same time he makes known his withdrawal from the significance accorded earlier to the thinking about the Eternal Return. The latter is now made to depend upon external historical events. Insight into this idea is now supposed to be determinative for 'future decisions'. And the will to power is now nominated Nietzsche's 'unique thought'. In this same year he identifies his acceptance of the thinking about the will to power with world war and emphasizes that 'the history of being' is decisive. As a result of his fidelity to the Baeumler paradigm, Heidegger is repeatedly forced to return to the legitimation of the *status quo*, in this case, to war – and this not only for personal but also for deeper structural and philosophical reasons. Though only on the surface and with certain hermeneutical difficulties, Heidegger clearly identifies 'legitimacy' with the will to power as a law of being, an identification which is entirely characteristic for two reasons. On the one hand, the identification of the will to power as a law of being with legitimacy does, as a matter of fact, fully confirm the concrete content of the will to power. To put it plainly, whatever takes place in the Third Reich is 'legitimate'. On the other hand, this expression acquires an additional relevance. With the onset of world war, Heidegger argues that the manifestation of the metaphysical principle has proved to be 'correct'. No other option remains open but to participate in the war and, in this way, to allow the law of being to prevail through one's own activity.

In the Nietzsche lectures of the year 1940, 'nihilism' emerges as possibly the most important new component. This nihilism is articulated in a way which is relatively independent of the complex of positive political metaphysics and is designed to found an attitude which will help to make the war, portrayed as metaphysical, more bearable. War is admittedly still presented as metaphysical. This insight is necessary in order that it should be reflectively conducted. Once again metaphysics legitimizes the *status quo*. The goal of a deliberately conducted war once again betrays the complicity of those philosophers who identify with the regime. This insight into the metaphysical reality of war brings with it the already mentioned, and wilfully coloured, nihilism, since the warmongers no longer believe in any highest values. At first sight this assessment appears both sober and objective – this war does not reflect any humanitarian features and can hardly be reconciled with the positing of highest values.

In fact, the 'valuelessness' of war equips the listener with an insight which permits him to participate in the war *nevertheless*, since it is in effect a metaphysical matter. Hence the necessity of emphasizing its wilful character.

The struggle for world dominion and the exposition of the supporting metaphysics brings to fulfilment an epoch of world history and of historical man; for here we find realized the most extreme possibilities of world domination and of the attempt, undertaken by man, to determine his essence from out of himself alone.⁵

So what has to be done is to 'determine one's essence from out of oneself alone', in other words, to struggle for 'the most extreme possibility of world dominion' without even possessing a valid world view. In other words again: one has to struggle for world dominion even if the latter cannot be brought into connection with any positive world view (hence the nihilistic element), because this struggle is determined by the will to power as a law of being. It would certainly be forcing matters to interpret this expression – and it is only one single example – as a sign of an 'inner resistance and an inner revolt' against the Third Reich. Besides, 1940 is the year in which Heidegger himself changes his concept of truth as *alethea* and, moreover, in favour of a hardening of the thinking about the will to power. As a symptom it is therefore a further confirmation of Heidegger's return to the positions of the years 1933–5.

In 1941 the new emphasis of existential ontology made its appearance in the Nietzsche lectures. Even the term 'existence' is new in this context. In as much as the law of being takes on Christian traits, Christian elements make their appearance as well. This year marks Heidegger's dissociation from any strong programme of the will to power as a law of being, which latter features as the index of his identification with the Third Reich.

Between 1944 and 1946 the picture changes again. Out of the nihilism stemming from the World War problems like those of language and technology appear as central moments of the two-thousand-year tradition of Western philosophy in the place of the positive political metaphysics of the will to power as a law of being. The scope of the principle of the will to power as a law of being was initially and self-evidently restricted to Germany and the Third Reich. Heidegger's shift to the West is therefore an all too evident sign of his new appreciation of the situation. Furthermore, the will to power is no longer a law of being which operates in a, so to speak, 'valueless' and objective fashion and so, on occasions, also leads to nihilism. Now being appears in essence as a value category and it is the occasional absence of values which attests to nihilism. Being is brought under the rubric of value categories – precisely in 1944–6!

One might add: the world is for him once again brought under the rubric of value categories. If one relates the modifications in these philosophical positions to what was then still the recent past, the fundamental shift in Heidegger's viewpoint becomes clear again. But that this shift set in spontaneously and had nothing to do with the military defeat of the Third Reich, is difficult to believe. The reality of the Third Reich is no longer conceived, or rather interpreted, as the consequence of a two-thousand-year history of the West. The very basis of metaphysics is changed. It has become 'Western'. A further indication of this shift is undoubtedly the fact that, in these years, Heidegger frequently attempts explicitly to connect elements of the Nietzsche interpretation with his main work *Being and Time* in order, in this way, to be able to demonstrate the continuity of his path of thought.

In the introduction we spoke about the 'role' and the 'fate' of Martin Heidegger in the Third Reich. At the beginning he played a considerable role while aspiring to play an even larger role. All this was built on the contents and the structure of positive political metaphysics. Later he did not so much play a 'role' in the Third Reich as rather submit to a 'fate'. But even in his accommodation to this fate he did not separate himself conclusively from the metaphysics of the will to power as positive political metaphysics.

Translated by Christopher Macann

Notes

1 M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche I* (Pfullingen, 1961), p. 10.

2 D. Grimm, 'Die neue Rechtswissenschaft: Über Funktion und Formation nationalsozialistischer Jurisprudenz', in *Wissenschaft im Dritten Reich* (Frankfurt am Main, 1985), p. 47.

3 Esp. in the paper 'Zum Begriff der positiven politischen Metaphysik', in *Recht, Politik, Geschichte* (Vienna, 1988).

4 J. Wahl, *Critique* (April 1956) Paris, p. 354.

5 M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche II*, p. 261.

Heidegger and the Imperial question

Eliane Escoubas

In the *Parmenides* (lecture course of 1942–3),¹ Heidegger writes: ‘We think the political in a Roman, that is to say imperial, fashion’ (p. 63). Later he writes: ‘Since the imperial epoch, the Greek word “politics” means something Roman. As for the Greek, only the word remains’ (p. 67).

For Heidegger, then, it is a matter of marking a rupture between ‘Greek’ and ‘Roman’. Moreover it is a matter of remarking that our experience of the political is a thoroughly Roman and imperial experience, that the Roman and imperial experience extends its empire over all of modernity. The *Parmenides* exposes the foundation of this motive. This foundation obtains in what Heidegger calls the ‘mutation of the essence of truth’: the translation/interpretation of the Greek *aletheia* into the Latin *veritas*. Translation/interpretation means: radical displacement of the ‘domain of experience’ of truth and Being. Between the Greek domain of experience and the Roman domain of experience there is a rift: this rift inaugurates modernity. Modernity that, none the less, for Heidegger, does not seem homogeneous – we find an indication of this when Heidegger, speaking of the German words *falsch* and *wahr*, says that these are ‘un-German words’ (*undeutschen Wörter*) which have an ‘un-German meaning’ (*undeutsche Bedeutung*): these are words of Latin origin (*falsum*, *verum*). Within the German language something was taking place comparable to the displacement that took place historically between the Greek language and the Latin language: German, a double language, a ‘conquered’ language. Similarly, political modernity would be in the mode of *division*, supporting and transporting a rupture comparable to the displacement sustained in history between the Greek ‘domain of experience’ and the Roman ‘domain of experience’.

This theme is banal enough and at first glance only reproduces a well-known German tradition: that of rejecting Latinity. Furthermore,

Heidegger borrows the expression *undeutschen Wörter* (to qualify *falsch* and *wahr*) from the Grimm dictionary. As for knowing how the *Roman world* is thought in the German tradition, it will suffice to read Hegel in the 'Philosophy of history': Rome 'goes beyond' the Greek world by founding the abstract State, the aim of which is 'domination of the earth'. Certainly, in Hegel, the *negative* is always 'sublated', but Hegel's tone here remains extremely pejorative.

But is it sufficient to see in the 'Roman theme' of the *Parmenides* the pure and simple resumption of the German tradition? A term will detain us here: Heidegger designates the 'mutation of the essence of truth' as *das eigentliche Ereignis* ('the event/advent proper'). What does *das eigentliche Ereignis* mean? Event of the history of Being, advent of the 'political' – of Roman politics – upon the scene of history, 'the event proper' is an integral part of the *interrogation* of *Geschichte* in Heidegger's texts. But, and this will be my hypothesis, the interrogation of *Geschichte* is doubled by a properly Heideggerian scenario – the scenario of the 'turn', the *Kehre*. The Heideggerian 'turn' is not just a Germanic response to the Roman displacement-turn, but rather more an 'explanation' (*Auseinandersetzung*) of the Roman displacement-turn by way of the contemporary figure: *National Socialism*. One could say that twice, for Heidegger, history appeared on its proper scene, twice it is 'the same old story': in a word, *nihilism*. But, it seems to me, it is still more complex than this: for the three themes (the 'event proper', *die Geschichte*, the 'turn') are linked and so bound up together that each one is explained by way of the others. In a sense, Heidegger's 'explanation' of National Socialism is inseparable from his 'explanation' of these three themes.

In order to follow this double 'explanation', we will use three textual markers, all three from after 1933 and taken up in the following order: the *Parmenides* (1942–3); the *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935); *Nietzsche I* (1937) and *Nietzsche II* (1939–41).

Our guiding thread will be the analysis of Hannah Arendt² which, on one hand, situates the Heideggerian 'turn' *between Nietzsche I and Nietzsche II*, and, on the other hand, notes that Heidegger himself performed a 'reinterpretation' of the 'turn' in the *Letter on Humanism* (1946) – a reinterpretation in which the accent is no longer placed on the *will* (as in the two *Nietzsche* volumes), but on the relation between *Being* and *Man* (here Heidegger himself places the accent on the *continuity* of his thought, making *Sein und Zeit* appear as if it were preparation for the 'turn' itself). Now it seems to me that the *Parmenides* is precisely the textual hinge where once *again* a 'before' of reinterpretation (*already* itself a reinterpretation), is exposed.

The *Parmenides* (1942–3)

Concerning the 'mutation of the essence of truth' or 'the event proper', the *Parmenides* puts the Platonic moment on the second level and places the Roman moment, contrarily, on the first. Thus the opposition, which is that of two 'domains of experience' and which takes the name 'translation', is situated not so much within the Greek world as between the Greek and the Roman. Thus nihilism (dealt with earlier in the *Nietzsche* volumes) finds its *beginning* in history: a Roman beginning. Again, it is necessary to determine the 'domain of experience' where European nihilism takes root. The major part of the *Parmenides* is devoted to this determination, notably paragraph 3: 'Clarification of the mutation of *aletheia*.'

Here the domain of experience proper to the *imperium romanum* finds its essential determination in the notion of *commandment* (*Befehl*), which is therefore the domain of experience of the Latin *veritas* (whereas the domain of experience of Greek *aletheia* is that of *bringing-to-appearance*, of *unconcealment*: *Unverborgenheit*). It is in this notion of *commandment* that Heidegger found *the reversal of history*, a reversal in which the rupture or division of a world takes root: its mutation (*Wandlung*).

Let us hold on to three strands of the Heideggerian text where this belonging together of the *imperium romanum* and the *commandment* is exposed:

(1) The word *imperium*. *Imperare*, *im-parare*, which Heidegger says means to install, to prepare, to dispose in advance, to dispose of something and thus to be master of it: 'The commandment [*Befehl*] is therefore the essential ground of domination [*Herrschaft*]; and not a contingent form of it.

(2) *The Roman gods*: whereas the essence of Greek 'divinity' obtains in the domain of *aletheia* (Greek gods are gods that 'reveal', that 'give signs'), the essence of the Roman gods manifests itself in *numen*, which is commandment and will (Heidegger adds that the God of the Old Testament is himself 'a god that commands', the *numen* is the imperative: 'Thou shalt', 'Thou shalt not'. To this the Greek gods are utter strangers).

(3) *Roman law* also takes up again the determination of sovereignty as commandment ('to have the right', 'to be within one's rights'). Whence a radical separation of Roman *justitia* and Greek *dikē* (which consists in the experience of *aletheia*). And Heidegger will connect 'justice' (*Gerechtigkeit*) back to *justitia* as Nietzsche enunciated it and in whose work it is of the order of *will* as *will to power*.

Let us take up again, therefore, the terms in which the domain of experience of the *imperium romanum* and the *commandment* is enunciated:

- (1) Domination, 'super-elevation', 'being superior' (*Obensein*),
- (2) Surveillance, control: 'overseeing' (*Übersehen*), 'on the lookout' (*Auf-der-Lauen-liegen*),
- (3) The *actio* of the *actus* (which substitutes for Greek *energeia*), the consequence of which is Caesarean 'conquest',
- (4) The felling (*Zum Fall bringen*) of other peoples; and this is the domain of the *falsum* (*fallere*: to fall, to cause to fall). The *falsum* is what 'falls', what runs aground (whereas the *pseudos* is inscribed in the experience of dissimulation and not at all in that of felling – and it is here that we encounter the theme of translation,³
 - (a) Felling takes two forms: either direct repression (war) or the indirect form (the trap that snatches by surprise) – deception as trickery,
 - (b) Indirect 'bringing to a fall' allows one to *fix* to the ground what one has grounded, what one has run aground. To fix in Latin is *pango*: the *pax romana* is the accomplished form of *felling*.

Therefore: *imperium romanum* = *pax romana* = *falsum/verum*.

These three notions designate the same 'domain of experience', that of the *commandment* (where the Latin *veritas* and the will to power come together). Let us note that Heidegger finds these features in the *Roman Church* where the imperial is given in the mode of *curacy*, the accomplished form of which is the Spanish Inquisition.

So the question is: can we assert that, in 1942–3, Heidegger considered the Roman Empire the historical figure in which National Socialist politics should be read? Heidegger did not make this claim himself.

Let us open a parenthesis in order to test (briefly and independently of the Heideggerian text) a possible Roman Empire–National Socialism confrontation.

We will engage three texts (among others):

- (1) *Rudolph Otto: The Sacred (Das Heilige)*, 1917. Otto determines the sacred by way of the notion of *numen* (*Das Numinöse*) and, symptomatically, he determines the 'numinous' by way of the very characteristics of Roman political form and in Latin terms: *tremendum* (the frightening), *majestas* (the *magnum*, power and political power), active force (*vis activa* or *actus*). And he finds these three characteristics joined in the term *Augustus* (*August* – imperial). The *numen* then, would be at one and the same time the feature of god, *imperator* . . . and perhaps later of the *Führer*.
- (2) *Simone Weil*; texts from 1940,⁴ where the confrontation of the Roman Empire and Hitlerism is organized around the notion of terror. Simone Weil also takes up the constant deception of the Romans

with respect to other peoples. (We find the same argument in Montesquieu, though in a somewhat more ambiguous fashion).

- (3) *Franz Neumann: Behemoth – Structure and Practice of National Socialism – 1933–1944.*⁵ Neumann's analyses, which bear exclusively on National Socialism, allow the similarities and differences with respect to the Roman Empire to appear. They are organized, it seems to me, around two features:

- (a) Roman colonial expansion and German expansion, with the notion of *Grossdeutsche Reich* and *Lebensraum* (living space). We will note, in particular, the theory developed by Ratzel: *the law of spatial growth* and the notion of *frontier*, which, writes Neumann, 'is not an arbitrarily fixed line, but a strip or band marking the meeting between a movement and a counter-movement'. Nevertheless, there is an important difference: the founding principle of National Socialism is the principle of 'a racial people'. Neumann shows that racism supplants nationalism, that sovereignty no longer resides in the State but rather in race ('ascent takes precedence over citizenship'). Hence, it seems to me, Roman imperialism is entirely different from that of National Socialism, and two Nazi theoreticians state this precisely – Carl Schmitt insists on the difference between 'Roman totality' and 'Germanic totality'. The first is said to be quantitative, the second qualitative. Alfred Rosenberg writes: 'Today we must choose [1927] between Crusade politics and territorial politics; between world imperialism and the racial will of the state; between Barbarossa and Henry the Lion; between the Stresemann-League of Nations and the racial National Socialist Germanic state' (for Rosenberg it is a matter of breaking free from English imperialism). *Mittel Europa*, therefore, is opposed to 'Roman totality'.
- (b) The concentration of power in the Roman Empire and the concentration of power in National Socialism: elimination of the distinction between the legislative and administrative functions (*Gleichhaltung*: the law of synchronization, that is, control from above – and also the Enabling Act of 24 March 1934 which conferred all legislative powers on the government). Comparable also are the figure of the *Führer* as 'charismatic leader' and that of *imperator* (cf. the *numen*). However, Neumann shows convincingly that the notion of the *totalitarian state* is very quickly abandoned in favour of that of the *Party* (after 30 June 1934). And again it is Rosenberg who writes in 1934 that 'the abstract totalitarian State belongs to the liberal phase . . . henceforth it is the party that matters'. Now the Party is not an organ of the State; it is an extremely hierarchical mass organization. Evidently we have nothing of this sort in the Roman Empire.

Apparently, then, the comparison between the Roman Empire and National Socialism encounters at least two limits: *racism* and *the Party*.

Introduction to Metaphysics (1935)

Let us pose the following hypothesis: the *Introduction to Metaphysics* (where an allusion is made, very equivocally, to National Socialism and where an allusion is also made to the Rectoral Address of 1933) contains absolutely no 'explanation' of National Socialism, but it does expose the elements of a 'launching' of a theoretical explanation in the figure of *Greek tragedy* that Heidegger does not touch on again and which will take place in the courses on Nietzsche. Why speak of the 'launching' of an explanation? Because *Greek tragedy* will serve as the 'inverted mirror' of National Socialism – or, rather, it will serve as a *counter-proof*, *before* the proof itself of the explanation: thus the counter-proof *precedes* the proof.

Three motifs concerning Greek tragedy in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*⁶ will detain us here:

(1) The figure of Sophocles' *Oedipus*:

Let us consider the *Oedipus Rex* of Sophocles. At the beginning *Oedipus* is the saviour and lord of the state, living in an aura of glory and divine favour. He is hurled out of this appearance, which is not merely his subjective view of himself but the medium in which his being-there appears; his being as murderer of his father and desecrator of his mother is raised to unconcealment. The way from the radiant beginning to the gruesome end is one struggle between appearance (concealment and distortion) and unconcealment (being). The city is beset with the secret of the murderer of Laius, the former king. With the passion of a man who stands in the manifestness of glory and is a Greek, *Oedipus* sets out to reveal this secret.⁷

Oedipus Rex: 'tragedy of unveiling' – tragedy of the passion for unveiling, the passion for *aletheia*. By *anticipation*, therefore, *counter-proof* of another 'tragedy' that we will designate, for the moment, as a tragedy of power.

(2) The *deinotaton* of the first chorus in Sophocles' *Antigone*:

Much is monstrous [*Unheimliche*],
But nothing is more monstrous than man.

Around the *deinotaton* a constellation takes shape: that of the 'terrible'

[*Furchtbare*], of violence [*Gewalt*], of dreadful panic [*panische Schrecken*].

(3) It is here that the Heideggerian determination of the *polis* intervenes:

Polis is usually translated as city or city-state. This does not capture the full meaning. *Polis* means, rather, the place, the there, wherein and as which historical being-there is. The *polis* is the historical place, the there *in* which, *out of* which, and *for* which history happens. To this place and scene of history belong the gods, the temples, the priests, the festivities, the games, the poets, the thinkers, the ruler, the council of elders, the assembly of the people, the army and the fleet. All this does not first belong to the *polis*, does not become political by entering into a relation with a statesman and a general and the business of the state. No, it is political, i.e., at the site of history, provided there be (for example) poets *alone*, but then really poets, priests *alone*, but then really priests, rulers *alone*, but then really rulers. *Be*, but this means: as violent men to use power, to become pre-eminent in historical being as creators, as men of action. Pre-eminent in the historical place, they become at the same time *apolis*, without city and place, lonely, strange, and alien, without issue amid the essent as a whole, at the same time without statute and limit, without structure and order, because they themselves *as* creators must first create all this.⁸

Let us note that 'violence' is here the mode common to *techne* and *physis*.

These three motifs from the *Introduction to Metaphysics* converge in the Greek 'domain of experience': *aletheia*. Thus a quasi-'homologous' relation is woven between *Geschichte* and *aletheia*; thus the importance of *Geschichte* grows in the Heideggerian text:

for us history is not synonymous with the past; for the past is precisely what is no longer happening. And much less is history the merely contemporary, which never happens but merely 'passes', comes and goes by. History as happening is an acting and being acted upon which passes through the *present*, which is determined from out of the future, and which takes over the past. It is precisely the present that vanishes in happening.⁹

Two remarks: (1) the mutation of *aletheia* is enunciated in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* as a passage from *aletheia* to correctness, and this is the Platonic moment: the passage from *physis* to *idea*. The Roman 'event' is like a previously unperceived horizon. (2) The question of nihilism is presented as follows:

To forget being and cultivate only the essence – that is nihilism. Nihilism thus understood is the ground of the nihilism which Nietzsche exposed in the first book of *The Will to Power*.¹⁰

Nietzsche I (1937) and Nietzsche II (1939–41)

Let us suppose that the 'turn' contains Heidegger's 'explanation' of National Socialism – that around the 'turn' Heidegger 'explains himself' with respect to National Socialism.

Let us recall the argument of Hannah Arendt. Hannah Arendt locates the 'turn' between *Nietzsche I* and *Nietzsche II*; what the 'turn' (accomplished in *Nietzsche II* but not in *Nietzsche I*) summons is the *will* in its culmination as *will to power*; what is implicated in the explanation of National Socialism is the will to power: Hannah Arendt asserts that this 'taking to task' of the will to power constitutes the settling of accounts with the 'event' of 1933. None the less, with the *Letter on Humanism* (1946) a reinterpretation of the 'turn' becomes manifest: for quite a while the will had not constituted Heidegger's focus of interrogation, but rather 'the whole of history, from the Greeks down to our day, understood in terms of the relation between *Being* and *man*'.

Hence, several questions: this reinterpretation of the 'turn' in 1946 by Heidegger himself involves, on the one hand, a retreat, a distance taken up in relation to the 'event' of 1933; but does this not also involve, on the other hand, a distance taken up in relation to the 'explanation' of National Socialism? Does this mean that Heidegger no longer feels the need to 'explain himself' with respect to National Socialism? Or has the 'explanation' taken on a whole new *dimension*? Could it be that for Heidegger it is not at all a matter of 'defending himself' by exhibiting 'proof to the contrary' (as will again be the case in the *Spiegel* interview), not even a matter of 'explaining his relation to' National Socialism or even of explaining National Socialism in itself? That the 'explanation' is taken up in an *entirely different questioning*? And perhaps history itself drew out, produced, this 'explanation' in the defeat of National Socialism? Has history thus itself become, at a certain moment, *aletheic*, itself the 'unveiling', itself presenting somehow the 'explanation'? It is in the *Parmenides* that the connection between *Geschichte* and *aletheia* is put to work most flagrantly.¹¹

Let us first try to bring to light the steps Heidegger will take to arrive at this point – that is to say, pass through *Nietzsche I* and *Nietzsche II* and wind up at the *Parmenides*. My hypothesis is the following: the steps Heidegger takes represent the *end* of the 'explanation of his relation to' National Socialism, that is, its culmination as an 'explaining away' and

its inclusion within another dimension of questioning (that which sustains the reinterpretation of 1946).

*Nietzsche I (1937)*¹¹

Heidegger's thesis consists in the following: the relation between the *will to power* and the *eternal return of the same* denotes, in Nietzsche's work, *ontological difference*: 'The fundamental character of being as such [*des Seienden als solchen*] is "will to power". Being [*Das Sein*] is "eternal return of the same" ' (p. 35).

Now *power* is the essence of the will: 'He who says will says power, he who says power says will' (p. 52); the will to power is also 'will to will'.

The characteristic of will is the *commandment* (*Befehl*); the characteristic of power is the will to growth (the 'desire-to-be-always-more'). Consequently the accomplishment of will to power – which is 'will to will' – is nihilism: Heidegger repeats after Nietzsche: 'The will prefers to desire nothing rather than not to desire at all.' And *art* constitutes the counter-movement to nihilism: 'pure and simple metaphysical activity', art is 'will to appearance', therefore, 'anti-Christian movement', 'anti-nihilist' *par excellence*. The eternal return, which is the characteristic of Being, therefore escapes nihilism: it is the 'overcoming of nihilism' (*Überwindung des Nihilismus*) (p. 432) which is presupposed as the characteristic of being.

So, for Heidegger, Nietzsche's ambivalent terminology bears the mark of the ontological difference and ascribes nihilism to being as being.

Nietzsche II (1939–41)

Henceforth Heidegger poses the essential unity of the *will to power* and the *eternal return* in Nietzsche's work: Nietzsche is no longer the thinker of ontological difference (the difference *will to power/eternal return*) but the thinker of *the end of history* (*endgeschichtlich*) (p. 13). Nietzsche's two thoughts think the same thing, the end of history, and together they are 'the last word of metaphysics' (p. 17). The 'turn', if it is effected here, is located at the moment where the theme of 'the end of history' takes the place of the theme of ontological difference in Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche.

Let us underscore the following points:

(1) In *Nietzsche II*, as in *Nietzsche I*, 'power' is self-intensification, self-aggrandizement. As in *Nietzsche I* the will to power is 'the supreme form

of domination and organization', it is commandment: 'man is destined to be the measure of being', and Heidegger speaks of 'the organized conquest of the earth' and of a 'centralization, which is the most general effect of the machine'.

(2) Nietzsche brings metaphysics to its culmination in that the transvaluation-devaluation he poses is destructive (*Zerstörerisch*) (p. 339). Destructive because, as in *Nietzsche I*, 'the will prefers to desire nothing rather than not to desire at all'. Destructive because it is 'destructive' of ontological difference: Nietzsche folds Being back into being. 'Nothing is said with respect to Being' (p. 339). Nietzsche's metaphysics is the culmination of the forgetting of Being: the *nihil*. Nietzsche's metaphysics is not an 'overcoming' (*Überwindung*) of nihilism but rather its 'accomplishment' (*Vollendung*). Destruction (*Zerstörung*), as the unique modality of Nietzsche's metaphysics, of *European nihilism*, sweeps out what, in *Nietzsche I*, was still determined as *anti-nihilism* under the name of *art*.

Consequently we have, on the one hand, the *Introduction to Metaphysics* and *Nietzsche I*, and, on the other hand, *Nietzsche II*. Between the two: the 'turn'. The 'turn': now Heidegger will no longer distinguish the thought of eternal return from that of the will to power in Nietzsche's work; now the character of the will to power (*nihilism*) invades everything – and now in Nietzsche's work, according to Heidegger, but also possibly in Heidegger's own work, the theme of ontological difference is effaced.

(3) Possibly in Heidegger's own work, for we will find in *Nietzsche II* an indication of another questioning. This indication is given to us by a term: the term *Machenschaft*. It is announced in the first text of *Nietzsche II* (1939) that 'the era of the absence of sense' which is the 'absence of the truth [*Lichtung*] of Being': that is to say, now truth is determined as *adequatio* and Being is swept out into being. Heidegger writes then: 'Die Vormacht des Seins in *dieser* Wesensgestalt heisse die *Machenschaft*' ('the pre-power of Being in *this* figure is called: *Machenschaft*') (p. 21).¹²

Now, we already find the term *Machenschaft* in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*. However, the clarifying text is the penultimate text of *Nietzsche II*: 'Projects for the history of being' (1941) where he writes: 'die *Machenschaft* (das Ge-stell)' (p. 471). *Machenschaft* says the same things as *Gestell*. Is this not the outline of another questioning: the injunction to question starting from *Gestell*?¹³

So, starting from *Nietzsche II*, I can enunciate again – and otherwise – my hypothesis. I will say that the end of Heidegger's 'explanation' of National Socialism will be the moment where he will have finished with the thought of the *end of history* as 'the last word of metaphysics'. In *Nietzsche II*, from the 'tragedy of unveiling' that it was in Greek times, history becomes the tragedy of planetary domination. But it is a misunderstanding to continue to speak of tragedy: tragedy took 'place' in the

domain of the experience of *aletheia* – it is necessary to speak of modernity in terms other than those of ‘tragedy’. The opposition sustained by *Nietzsche II* is therefore that of the *tragic* (Greek) and of *nihilism* (European). We can find an expression of this opposition in a course from the period where the ‘turn’ commences: *Grundfragen der Philosophie* (1937–8),¹⁴ where the opposition of *astonishment* [*Erstaunen*] and *terror* [*Schrecken*] is enunciated:

In a-stonishment, the basic mood of the first beginning, beings are first brought to a standstill in a formal configuration. In terror, the basic mood of the other beginning, the dark vacuity of aimlessness and the weakening of resolve lies concealed behind every kind of progress and domination of beings.¹⁵

Thus we can come back to the *Parmenides*.

Heidegger’s verdict is clear: Nietzsche is ‘un-Greek’ [*schlechthin ungrisch*] – ‘purely and simply un-Greek’ (p. 139). He is ‘Roman’, he thinks Greece in a Roman way: ‘Even for Nietzsche the true is the correct, the just. . . . Roman *veritas* has become the *Gerechtigkeit* of the will to power’ (pp. 77–8). ‘Jacob Burckhardt has contributed much to the idea that Nietzsche thinks the essence of Hellenism and its *polis* in a Roman manner. . . . Burckhardt thinks the whole of history according to three powers: State, religion, culture’ (p. 134).¹⁶ ‘Nietzsche, Rilke, and psycho-analytic doctrine know nothing of *aletheia*’ (p. 231). That is why this transformation of Hellenism by Romanism is ‘an event [*Ereignis*] that touches on our historical *Dasein* most profoundly’ (p. 66).

We find Spengler on the same side as Nietzsche: in *The Decline of the West* ‘Spengler speaks nowhere, says nothing about, history [*Geschichte*]’ (p. 168). ‘If he really thinks, he thinks history [*Geschichte*] un-historically [*geschichtlos*]’ (ibid.).

How are we to understand *geschichtlos*?

What *geschichtlos* means is indicated starting from the determination of *Geschichte*: ‘it is the event [*Ereignis*] of the essential decision of the essence of truth, an event that is always the “yet to come” and never the past. But, in forgetting, we have submitted ourselves most severely to the past’ (p. 168). It is also manifest now that Nietzsche and Spengler think history starting from the past. Now there is only history as ‘thought starting from the yet to come’.

It is here, it seems to me, that the subsequent Heideggerian reinterpretation of the ‘turn’ justifies itself (*Letter on Humanism* – 1946): where the ‘turn’ is reinterpreted in terms of *continuity*. In fact, the theme of *Geschichte*, as *thought that thinks starting from the yet to come*, has been present throughout: since *Sein und Zeit*. But it does not take on its interpretative charge until now, after having passed through *Nietzsche I*,

Nietzsche II and the *Parmenides*, where it ceases to be a 'partial' theme and becomes a 'domain of experience' homologous to that of *aletheia*.

We find a recurrence of the theme of nihilism *ten years afterward*: it will be in *Was heisst Denken?* (1951–2) – where the fact that a course on Nietzsche is followed by a course on *Parmenides* no longer comes as a surprise. The course on Nietzsche *Was heisst Denken?* interrogates the saying of Zarathustra: 'the desert grows' [*die Wüste wächst*]. Heidegger comments:

'The wasteland grows'. It means, the devastation is growing wider. Devastation is more than destruction. Devastation is more unearthly than destruction. Destruction only sweeps aside all that has grown up or been built up so far; but devastation blocks all future growth and prevents all building. Devastation is more unearthly than mere destruction.¹⁷

This theme is not entirely new, since we already find *Verwüstung* (desertification) in *Beyond Metaphysics*. But here it has a particular resonance, for it is consonant with the theme of *Geschichte*. In fact Heidegger distinguishes here between *destruction* (*die Zerstörung*), which bears on the past, and desolation/desertification (*die Verwüstung*), which bears on the future. If *Geschichte* is thought that thinks/thinks itself starting from the yet to come, what desertification makes disappear is, then, *the very thought of history, of Geschichte* – not just the historical past, but the very historicity of history, the historic essence of history.

Two remarks then:

(1) If Nietzsche, even though he asserts the 'desert' through the voice of Zarathustra, thinks un-historically, it must be that he thinks the desert starting from the past: he does not think the desert but the *destruction*. In what sense does Nietzsche think the desert starting from the past? In the sense that he has not 'gotten beyond' Platonism but has merely 'inverted' it.

(2) So, is it not with this notion of desolation/desertification that the encounter of imperial Rome and National Socialism takes place? Is this how imperial Rome becomes the very figure of National Socialism? If so, must we not recognize that Heidegger's 'explanation' of National Socialism finds its accomplished theoretical form in the *Parmenides*? Must we not also recognize that the desolation/desertification of imperial Rome and of National Socialism is not just an 'end of history' in the nihilist, that is to say, metaphysical sense of the term. Rather: the form taken by 'catastrophe' in what one could call the Heideggerian 'vision' of history is something like the *entry into the un-thought*.

Here, again, it is Hannah Arendt who can shed some light. In *The*

Life of the Mind, volume I, in the chapter entitled 'The Roman answer', Hannah Arendt opposes Greek *thaumazein*, astonishment, and Stoic *nil admirari*, the 'do not be astonished by anything'. With Rome, writes Arendt, 'philosophy becomes the opposite of what it had been in Greece'. While the Greek experience is the experience of '*coming-to-presence*', of *unveiling*, the Roman-Stoic one is, writes Arendt, 'that of making disappear and rendering *absent* that which is present in reality' (it is the 'not wanting to see', the 'not wanting to know'). The catastrophe would be, then, when we can no longer be astonished by anything.

It seems to me, therefore, that Heidegger's assertion in the *Parmenides* must be understood in this context: 'We think the political in a Roman, that is to say, imperial fashion. . . . As for the Greek, only the word remains.'

Translated by Philip A. Leider

Notes

1 *Gesamtausgabe* (GA) 54 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1982).

2 *The Life of the Mind* (San Diego, New York, London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1981).

3 The theme of translation which I have explained in: 'La traduction comme origine des langues: Heidegger et Benjamin', *Les Temps Modernes*, 514-15 (mai-juin 1989).

4 In *Ecrits historiques et politiques* (Paris: Gallimard, 1960): 'Quelques réflexions sur les origines de l'hitlérisme' - two articles on 'Hitler et la politique extérieure de la Rome antique' and 'Hitler et le régime intérieur de l'Empire romain'.

5 The first English edition, 1941.

6 *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Tübingen: Niemeyer Verlag, 1976).

7 *ibid.*, p. 112.

8 *ibid.*, p. 117. We should remark that in the first version of the 'Origin of the work of art', which is also from 1935, the work of art is said to be the capacity of founding history.

9 *ibid.*, p. 36.

10 *ibid.*, pp. 169-70.

11 The courses on Nietzsche are now almost integrally published in the *Gesamtausgabe*. Nevertheless, we will refer here to the two volumes published by Heidegger himself in 1961 and which are currently designated by the titles *Nietzsche I* and *Nietzsche II*.

12 To me it seems entirely inadmissible to translate *Machenschaft* as 'machination' as Klossowski does in the French translation. It would be necessary, in fact, to manifest in the translation the kinship of this term with the terms *Macht*, *Vormacht*. Let us note that we also find the term *Machenschaft* in *Beyond Metaphysics*.

13 And/or the injunction to question starting from *Ereignis*. From this perspective let us remark that the theme of *Ereignis* appeared in prominent fashion after the *Beiträge* of 1936-8.

14 *GA 45* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1984). This course is situated precisely between those of *Nietzsche I* and *Nietzsche II*.

15 *Grundfragen der Philosophie* (1937–8), *GA 45*, S. 197.

16 Heidegger none the less recognizes in Burckhardt a ‘thinker of history’ (*Geschichtsdenker*) and not a ‘historian’ (*Historiker*).

17 *Was Heißt Denken?*, tr. Glenn Gray as *What is Called Thinking?* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 29.

Fundamental ontology and political interlude: Heidegger as Rector of the University of Freiburg

István Fehér

In April 1933 Heidegger assumed the rectorate of the University of Freiburg. The months following constitute the only period of his life – one which did not abound in dramatic events or spectacular changes – which gave rise to vehement reactions and sharp criticisms for reasons other than the philosophical views which Heidegger put forward. A university professor's getting elected rector is, to be sure, not an event which requires special attention: it is well within the limits of a normal academic career. It was, however, at an extremely delicate moment, a few months after Hitler's appointment as chancellor, that Heidegger took over this office – and this, of course, is not without importance. What are the reasons which led Heidegger to assume this office, and what prior judgments about the era underlie his decision? And more akin to the concerns of this book, is this decision connected with his philosophy, and if so, how?

In what follows, an attempt will be made, first, to sketch Heidegger's basic philosophical outlook leading up to, and as elaborated in, *Being and Time*, concentrating on those tenets which can be shown to have some bearing upon his political involvement. This preliminary analysis will be followed by a reconstruction of Heidegger's conduct during his period as rector. I think that his activity as rector should be explored against the background of his philosophical outlook and of concrete historical circumstances, rather than stripped of (both philosophical and historical) context and judged by extrinsic criteria – that is, mainly by reference to what the social movement (national socialism) to which he temporarily committed himself subsequently became.

I Heidegger's philosophical outlook by the end of the 1920s

I.i

One might briefly characterize Heidegger's fundamental philosophical efforts leading up, after more than ten years' silence, to the publication of *Being and Time* in 1927 – as found, e.g., in his lectures of the period, now gradually appearing in the *Gesamtausgabe* – as an attempt to unify the so-called irrationalistic or 'existentialist' or 'historicist' problematic which permeated post-war European culture (and was represented by thinkers like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, Spengler, Dilthey, and Simmel) with the Husserlian ideal of 'philosophy as strict science' (and, thereby, through Husserl, with the whole epistemological-metaphysical tradition going back to Aristotle and the Greeks).

Brought up in the scholastic tradition, but extremely responsive to the contemporary logical-epistemological ways of philosophizing represented by neo-Kantianism and phenomenology, Heidegger had as early as his doctoral dissertation and his *Habilitationsschrift* (published in 1914 and 1916, respectively) hoped to pose the Being-question, viz., to renew the metaphysical tradition.¹ His appropriation of the modern logical-epistemological tradition is conditioned from the very beginning by his endeavor to arrive at metaphysical conclusions; doing pure logic, epistemology or methodology, indispensable though it may be as a preparatory step, is seen by him as futile when conceived as an aim in itself.² His gradually deepening acquaintance with Husserl's phenomenological method provides him, in addition to theoretical insights, with a new access to classical philosophical texts, especially those of Aristotle and the Greeks.³ His intense studies of the philosophical tradition as well as of modern philosophical trends thus become fused within a perspective which does not separate systematic and historical points of view. From this perspective, traditional doctrines no longer appear as mere relics worthy of only antiquarian interest, as opposed to the theoretical validity possessed by contemporary doctrines. Rather, traditional tenets are seen both as illuminating modern theories and as illuminated by them, and contemporary positions as proceeding from earlier ones.⁴ Historical interest, in this sense, is strictly connected to systematic interest – indeed is at the service of it. Only if history is not 'pure history' – that is, a heap of past and dead facts – will the history of philosophy regain its relevance for systematic thinking (cf. GA 1: 195ff., and later GA 61: 110f., GA 24: 31f.).

This point is important for our present purposes, not only because it sheds light on some of the presuppositions of Heidegger's first philosophical attempts, but because we need to realize that the *systematic* positing and working out of the Being-question proposed in *Being and Time*⁵ rests upon a preliminary confrontation with the tradition. This point has

become clearer since the publication of some of Heidegger's Marburg lectures. Further, Heidegger's way of approaching the history of philosophy already contains a conception of history implicitly – one to be thematized explicitly in *Being and Time*, and particularly relevant to his engagement with politics. Studying modern logical or epistemological theories in order to use them for metaphysical purposes meant, for Heidegger, recognizing the fact that such theories are not exempt from metaphysical presuppositions.⁶ Nor, inversely, can metaphysical or ontological theories be exempt from logical or epistemological presuppositions; that is, from more or less explicit assumptions concerning human thinking or knowing – in short, from a theory of man as a rational animal (see e.g., *GA* 20: 174). The insights into the metaphysic-ladenness of the logical-epistemological tradition and into the logic-ladenness of traditional ontology may be said to be the two basic, and reciprocal, results of Heidegger's early confrontation with, and appropriation of, Western philosophy. The necessity of positing the Being-question as the question to be asked first and foremost is derived, for Heidegger, from the highly paradoxical result of his confrontation with Husserl's phenomenology (the most advanced transcendently oriented epistemology of the day). Indeed, Husserl, though claiming to suspend or bracket 'assertions concerning being', cannot help committing himself to certain prior ontological distinctions, in particular, that between Being as consciousness and transcendent being – which Husserl himself called, symptomatically, 'the most radical of all distinctions of Being' (Husserl 1976: 159). This prior commitment is left completely unthematized, having been antiphenomenologically (that is, dogmatically) assumed (see *GA* 20: 157f., 178). If the claim to dispense with the Being-question is thus shown to be a pure illusion, necessarily presupposing a dogmatic prior answer to it, exempt from and unsusceptible to any kind of critical examination (or, in other words, if dispensing with it turns out to be equivalent to answering it without first posing it), then the situation seems simple enough: what is needed is to explicitly pose or thematize this first and foremost question of all philosophy. In the light of the recognition, however, that traditional ontology is from its very beginning grounded in, or centered around, the doctrine of *logos*, i.e. logic,⁷ an uncritical natural recourse to any kind of traditional ontological perspective must be out of the question. It even remains uncertain if the Being-question, lacking a prior ground in which to be embedded, can be posed at all.⁸

The way out of this impasse was suggested to Heidegger by his insight into the strict correlation between being and *logos* in Western philosophy – more concretely, by an ontological thematization of logic, of the theoretical-cognitive attitude or comportment (*Einstellung*) in the broadest sense. Heidegger's starting points were (1) the correlation of being and *logos* in the history of philosophy; (2) the functioning of the *logos* of

the 'subject' as the 'ground' or 'place' of the ontological problematic properly so-called; and (3) logic as the theoretical comportment *par excellence*. Thus he was able to thematize the *being* of the subject in a deeper way than that provided by the tradition – one capable of showing the very epistemological comportment as a derived mode of being. This offered a possible operative basis for the positing and working out of the Being-question. The metaphysical tradition from Aristotle onward had gained its access to Being from within the conceptual horizon provided by the theoretical attitude, giving thereby rise to theories of Being in terms of objective presence. That this comportment was far from being *the* original mode of being of human existence was, however, an insight which required the prior unification of the Husserlian perspective of philosophy 'as strict science' with the 'anti-metaphysical', 'existentialist' tradition.⁹ Contrary, however, to the tendency of thinkers like Pascal, Kierkegaard, Dilthey, and Nietzsche to combine a turning to factual-historical human existence with a turning *away from* metaphysics, and thus totally to reject systematic thinking, Heidegger's appropriation of the problematic of factual-historical life was conceived from the very beginning as a starting point *for* the renewal of metaphysics. The posing and working out of the Being-question pertains to what Heidegger calls fundamental ontology. As the above considerations suggest, this becomes embedded in, and begins with, a thematization of the *being* of the subject – a discipline named existential analytic.¹⁰ The immanent critique and internal radicalization of phenomenology and epistemology, and the attempt at a radical re-examination of the whole metaphysical tradition through the assimilation of the 'irrationalistic' problematic, are fused in Heidegger's effort to gain a new ground for the Being-question.¹¹

I.ii

Man's¹² fundamental mode of being, Heidegger claims in *Being and Time*, is Being-in-the-world. His original relation to things emerging in his environment is one of using, handling, employing, arranging rather than 'knowing' them. These are modes which presuppose antecedent acquaintance, familiarity, with the world. Even 'knowing' things is one way of having to do with or caring about the world – a comportment which comes about as a modification of man's original relating himself to things. A phenomenological description of man's primary way of being should, therefore, suspend, i.e., 'put into brackets', scientific or epistemological concepts and strategies of description. Only thus will it be sufficiently original, sufficiently unaffected by traditional theories concerning the issue, and able to *derive* scientific comportment from man's primordial way of relating himself to his world. If, apart from and prior to any kind of self-description such as 'the totality of foundational connections of true statements',¹³ science is primarily one of man's modes

of being – ‘not the only and not the first possible mode of being’ at that (SZ 11) – then existential analytic must not resort to the conceptual framework provided by science. To do so would imply losing the possibility of gaining a perspective upon it.

Without going into the details of Heidegger’s description of Being-in-the-world, it may be relevant to see how the epistemological problematic, with which Heidegger had first engaged himself on his way to *Being and Time* and whose insufficiencies led him to assume an explicit ontological standpoint, is treated within the framework of the new ontological perspective.

Given his thesis that man’s primordial mode of being is Being-in-the-world, Heidegger’s treatment of the epistemological tradition from Descartes on has two major aspects: a negative, or polemic, one and a positive, or ‘integrating’, one. As to the first, he shows that the epistemological perspective properly so-called (with its typical questions concerning the relation of the subject to the object, of mind to the world, the way the knower can acquire knowledge about the object) is not meaningful without a prior ontological dualism such that knower and known, subjects and objects are assumed to be two separate entities, their relation being one of mutual exclusion (subject is what is not object and vice versa). However, if man and world are not two independent entities, and human *Dasein* is not the worldless (*weltlos*) ‘subject’ characteristic of modern philosophy, but is in itself worldly (*weltlich*), having always already committed itself to the world, then the ontological ground underlying the epistemological perspective becomes untenable.¹⁴ Heidegger’s attitude is negative or polemic in that he elaborates his concept of *Dasein* and Being-in-the-world by opposing them to, and challenging, the traditional concepts of ‘subject’ and ‘object’. He insists that Being-in-the-world, as *Dasein*’s fundamental mode of being, must not be conceived of as an epistemological relation between subject and object.

Having developed his concept of Being-in-the-world through a contrast with the subject-object relation, he is in a position to show how, in virtue of what modifications of Being-in-the-world as an all-encompassing phenomenon, man’s *knowing* relation to the world springs. This may be called the positive, or integrating, aspect. Heidegger shows, in a series of analyses, that in order for a thing to become an object of knowledge or scientific research, our preliminary access to it, that is, our way of having to do with it, must have undergone a specific modification. Only as a result of this will the thing as tool originally made use of, or handled, reveal itself as a neutral substance, simply ‘out there’, susceptible of being determined by what traditional philosophical theories have come to call ‘qualities’ and ‘properties’.

Heidegger illustrates his point with critiques of Descartes’s conception of the world and of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism. He shows that

Descartes's definition of world in terms of *res extensa*, that is, a neutral, indifferent space filled up with equally neutral, homogeneous substances, fails, in the light of Heidegger's own analyses of 'world', to do justice to the genuine phenomenon of world met with in everyday experience – indeed, is based upon losing sight of and forgetting it. This is the negative aspect of his treatment of Descartes. However, that definition of world reflects a theoretical-intellectual comportment to the world (itself one way of Being-in-the-world), one which presupposes that what the glance characteristic of mathematical knowledge discovers in things constitutes their *real* being (see SZ 95f.). This is the positive, or integrating, aspect.

As far as Kant's Refutation of Idealism is concerned, Heidegger first shows some of the inconsistencies inherent in Kant's proof of the existence of the outer world. Then, more significantly, he proceeds to undercut the very bases of Kant's undertaking, insisting that the quest for a proof of this sort is not meaningful unless one assumes the Cartesian standpoint of the isolated subject. Indeed, once man is assumed to be basically Being-in-the-world, the question of how a knowing subject can get out of its interiority in order to ascertain the existence of, and establish a contact with, the outside world – the major epistemological problem of modern philosophy – loses its legitimacy. Attempts to demonstrate the 'reality' of the outer world, or, for lack of such a demonstration, the mere 'belief' in or presupposition of such a world (comportments which are themselves definite ways of Being-in-the-world), do not make sense without the prior assumption of a subject closed in itself – a subject which, uncertain about its world, should begin by acquiring certainty about it. The question of whether or not there is a world, and whether its being can be proven, Heidegger remarks significantly, is without sense for human *Dasein* conceived as Being-in-the-world – and who else could pose it (SZ 202)? If there is a legitimate question, it concerns rather the reasons why *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world tends to sink, *erkenntnistheoretisch*, the 'reality' of the outer world into nothing in order to produce, after splitting up the unified phenomenon, infinite hopeless attempts to put together the two wrecks left: the isolated subject and the outer 'world' (SZ 206).¹⁵

The aspects of Heidegger's existential analytic singled out thus far show how Heidegger's own ontological perspective enables him to make visible the implicit ontological framework latent in traditional epistemological-metaphysical thinking. Traditional ontologies are shown to be rooted in *Dasein*'s ways of relating itself to its world. The analytic of *Dasein*, by proposing to illuminate deeper and more original dimensions of *Dasein*'s being, both criticizes or dismisses *and* integrates or 'justifies' them (in the specific sense of revealing their condition of possibility).

I.iii

What remains to be seen is the way in which the irrationalistic or existentialist or historicist problematic, accompanied by a strong anti-metaphysical bias in the thinkers who gave rise to and defended it, joins in, and becomes an integral part of, Heidegger's systematic ontological perspective.

The question of how Heidegger's ontological treatment of the epistemological perspective within a neutral analysis of *Dasein* relates to a Kierkegaardian problematic of authenticity is not easy to answer. Arguing along the lines elaborated by Richard Rorty (see Rorty 1979: Ch. 8, especially 360ff.), it might be claimed that knowing the world is just one among many human projects of edification (not the primary one, Heidegger would add). It might then be suggested that it is because the project of knowing the world has traditionally been assumed to be *the* proper path to authenticity (an assumption congruent with the prevailing conception of man as a rational animal¹⁶) that authenticity, for the epistemological-metaphysical tradition from Descartes on, was not, and could not be, a problem. (It became a problem, symptomatically, only for non-metaphysical thinkers like Kierkegaard.) Because Heidegger sets out to get behind the view of man as a rational animal, it is natural that the problem of authenticity will become an explicit problem for him, one distinct from the problematic concerned with knowing. We might also say, using the terms of our previous description of Heidegger's way to the Being-question, that the neglect of the question of authenticity by the epistemological-metaphysical tradition is a matter of answering it without first having posed it.

The question concerning *Dasein*'s inclination to dissolve the outer world into nothing is answered by Heidegger by reference to man's basic tendency to *Verfallen*. This is an encompassing concept of inauthenticity, characterizing a tendency inherent in everyday *Dasein* to interpret the world and itself within the horizon of what turns up *within* the world, thus taking itself to be one among the entities existing alongside others in the world (cf. SZ 58). The possibility of *Verfallen* lies in the fact that *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world is always already alongside (bei) beings in the world. Indeed, because, as early as the Greeks, Being was interpreted in terms of beings in the world (cf. SZ 44), the concept of inauthenticity provides what we have been calling an integrating aspect. It does so by accounting for the failure of traditional ontologies to seize upon the ontological problematic proper – a major reason why Heidegger names his investigation 'fundamental ontology'.

Considerations concerning authenticity emerge basically in connection with the concept of *Being-with* (Mitsein). The 'existence' of other human beings is for Heidegger as unquestionable as that of the 'outer' world.

Dasein's way of relating itself to others is called (parallel with, and contrary to, man's *Besorgen* with the things of his environment) *Fürsorge*, care for. This has, apart from the deficient and negative modes characteristic of everyday Being-with, two positive modes: 'leaping in' and 'leaping ahead' (Einspringen, Vorausspringen). The first is characterized by taking the 'care' over and away from the other, 'leaping in' for him in order to do what constitutes the other's concern *for* him. The other may thereby become dependent and dominated. The second, by contrast, does not refer to the other's *Besorgen* with things. One 'leaps ahead', not in order to disburden the other, but rather to give him back his authentic and primordial care, that is, his existence, thereby helping the other to become conscious of it and free for it (cf. SZ 122; for a fuller analysis see Elliston 1978: 66ff.). Everyday Being-with, however, is characterized by *Dasein's* losing itself in the faceless amorphous anonymity of the 'One' (das Man). Only therefrom can it pass to the authentic way of existing.

The full concept of authenticity is developed in the second division of *Being and Time*. Living originally in an inauthentic way, *Dasein* can reach authenticity only in Being-toward-death (Sein zum Tode) and resoluteness (Entschlossenheit). The concept of authentic existence is often explained very crudely as something denoting an aristocratic detachment from, and a scornful contempt of, everyday life. A closer examination of the Heideggerian texts lets one dismiss this reading as wholly unfounded. Deriving as it does from inauthenticity, authentic existence remains forever bound to it: it is but the constant transition or passage from the inauthentic existence to the authentic, and not a kind of independent realm opposed to it. Authenticity, to put it briefly, consists in consciously setting a limit to one's manifold possibilities – seeing them against the background of one's ultimate possibility, that is, death. This resolution, once taken, is capable of transforming one's life into a whole and giving oneself selfhood (Ganzheit, Selbstheit). The authentic project of Being-toward-death is then confirmed, on the part of the factually existing *Dasein*, by the phenomenon of conscience. *Dasein's* proper response to the call is, first, to make itself ready for it, that is, to-want-to-have-conscience (Gewissen-haben-wollen), and second, resoluteness. Rather than eluding death by escaping into the anonymity of everydayness, authentic *Dasein* anticipates it; rather than averting the call of conscience, thereby precluding becoming *itself* and being responsible for what it is, *Dasein* resolutely assumes it. Both ways enable *Dasein* to be authentic (eigentlich), that is, to appropriate the being it already is. On a closer look, resolution turns out to be not only compatible with, but even requires, authentic Being-toward-death. If resolution arbitrarily varied, without a view to death as *Dasein's* ultimate possibility, there could be no question of resolution being authentic (SZ 302, 305ff.; see Gelven

1970: 176; Demske 1963: 48f.; Ugazio 1976: 48). The unified concept of authenticity is therefore anticipatory resoluteness (*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*). Resoluteness in its turn gives rise to 'situation'. The latter does not mean a set of conditions given in advance, but rather being revealed and disclosed only by and in resolute *Dasein* (cf. SZ 299f.). Authentic *Dasein* should nevertheless not persist rigidly in any one situation; it has to leave itself open for the possible, and indeed necessary, re-appropriation of itself. Since the relapse into the existential irresolution of *das Man* remains a constant possibility, it is only in repeating, retrieving itself that resolution is what it is (SZ 307f.).

For the full concept of authenticity to be arrived at, however, a further addition is needed. The question of what should fill in the 'content' of resolution is, Heidegger repeatedly claims, no part of the existential analytic. It may be answered only by resolution itself. However, it is legitimate to ask whence such possibilities may arise (SZ 294, 383). This origin is history. Resolute *Dasein* opens up its possibilities by taking upon itself a given heritage of the past – a heritage in which it resolutely hands itself down. Grasping its innermost finitude in anticipating death, *Dasein* is driven back to itself. In handing itself resolutely down in a freely chosen tradition, it acquires destiny (*Schicksal*). Seen from the perspective of Being-with, authentic historicity reveals itself as the common destiny of a community (*Geschick*) – a community in which the destinies of individuals are preliminarily assigned their role (SZ 384). It is not necessary, Heidegger remarks, that *Dasein* should explicitly be aware of the origins of the possibilities upon which it projects itself. But there lies in it the possibility to derive its project (the 'content' of its resolution) explicitly from a tradition. Resoluteness, coming back upon itself from fallenness and handing itself down consciously, becomes then the repetition, or retrieval (*Wiederholung*) of an inherited possibility of existence.¹⁷ To 'repeat' in this sense does not amount to 'make a piece of the past actual again', 'bringing it back', but rather 'retorting', 'replying' to a past possibility of existence (SZ 385f.).

II Heidegger the Rector and his philosophy

This short sketch of Heidegger's philosophical development, together with a quick survey of the basic philosophical outlook of *Being and Time*,¹⁸ puts us in a position to proceed to our proper theme. We can now set about answering our initial questions – above all, the question of how Heidegger's assuming the office of the rectorate can be connected to his philosophy. In doing so, we shall return to and single out some of the themes previously touched upon, and occasionally thematize them in more detail.

II.i

Authentic existence, as we have seen, was explained in *Being and Time* in terms of anticipatory resoluteness. Coming back upon itself from the world of inauthenticity characterized by the anonymity of *das Man*, resolute *Dasein* does not become detached from the world. This would be impossible, for *Dasein* is and remains Being-in-the-world all along (cf. SZ 298). Resoluteness implies, on the contrary, entering fully into the world, opening up and projecting oneself upon the (finite) possibilities which offer themselves in a given situation. It is in anticipating death, in becoming aware of what it means *not* to be, that the awareness of what it means to be becomes accessible. Although in anticipation and conscience *Dasein* becomes isolated, deprived of all its (inauthentic) links (that is, it becomes precisely its own self), nevertheless, in choosing itself, *Dasein* not only chooses itself 'out of' the world (to use Kierkegaard's illuminating terms), but at the same time and in the fullest sense, chooses itself 'back into' it (cf. Kierkegaard 1957: 265; see Chiodi 1965: 107; Guignon 1984: 337f.). It is also resoluteness that makes authentic Being-with possible, permitting *Dasein* to let the others 'be' in and for their own being. Once free for its own possibilities, *Dasein* is both free of the danger (inherent in its tendency to fallenness) of losing sight of or ignoring others' possibilities – possibilities which may supersede its own – and of the temptation to reduce them to, and thus take them to be identical with, its own.¹⁹ 'Leaping ahead', as the authentic positive form of Being-with, gains its full concreteness only in and by resoluteness. As opposed to inauthentic *Dasein's* tendency to disburdening (Entlastung), only the willingness-to-have-conscience, the assumption of one's own being, makes responsibility for oneself and others possible. Only resolute *Dasein* can become the 'conscience' of others (cf. SZ 122, 127f., 288, 298; see also Demske, 1963: 66). The thesis that *Dasein* is always its own, that it exists for its own sake, Heidegger says, does not imply egoism; the concept of *Dasein* is not equivalent to that of the isolated, egoistic subject. Because only in relating to itself can *Dasein* understand something like 'self' (selbst), only thereby can it listen to a 'you-self' (Du-selbst), and thus make something like human community (Gemeinschaft) possible (GA 26: 244f.).

Anticipatory resoluteness, therefore, points to something like social activity, or engagement. However, the analysis of authenticity is not yet complete. The concept of resoluteness, as we have seen, attains its ultimate form as a result of the analysis of historicity. If resoluteness, at an earlier level, meant keeping itself free to *retrieve* itself (Wiederholen), then authentic existence appears now, at the level of historicity, as the retrieval of a historical heritage that has been both handed down and freely assumed – a heritage in which *Dasein* hands itself over (SZ 308,

383ff.). By freely and resolutely taking over a historical heritage, authentic existence acquires its destiny (Schicksal). Authentic Being-with thereby becomes, at the level of history, a common fate (Geschick), a community of authentic people (SZ 384f.). It may even be said that it is only in and by *Wiederholung* that its own history reveals itself to *Dasein* (SZ 386).

II.ii

If the existential analytic (moving, according to its hermeneutic character, in a circle) is guided by a 'presupposed' idea of existence, and if philosophy, for Heidegger, must not deny its own 'presuppositions', but rather elaborate them together with that for which they are presuppositions (SZ 310), then it seems legitimate to examine whether, and to what extent, such an idea may be brought to bear upon the author of *Being and Time* himself.

If authentic existence consists in retrieving a historical heritage, then the philosopher's activity as one possible human activity, one way among others to relate oneself to the world, is authentic insofar as it aims at retrieving his own historical heritage – that is, the tradition of philosophy itself. It is easy to see that *Being and Time* should be understood from its very first pages in terms of an explicit attempt at bringing back the most original of all the traditions of philosophy, that is, the Being-question. (This retrieval of ontology – the latter being at the time a 'condemned term' (SD 47) – is also a retrieval of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.)²⁰ *Being and Time* tries to retrieve, to revive, the Being-question (or since the question itself has long sunk into oblivion, 'awaken' an understanding of its meaning (SZ 1)) by inquiring into the horizon of traditional philosophies' access to Being (time, presence), and by showing this access to be rooted in and dependent upon *Dasein*'s theoretical comportment. Authentic retrieval is, therefore, not a blind attachment to the tradition, but rather the unfolding of a horizon within which the re-appropriation of traditional concepts becomes possible; the ontological transformation of phenomenology claims to be nothing less than 'the retrieval . . . of the origins of our scientific philosophy' (cf. GA 20: 184, 187f.). When the early Heidegger speaks of the oblivion of the Being-question, of the forgottenness of being, what he has in mind is not the claim that the history of philosophy has completely ignored this most original of all its questions, but rather the contention that the tradition blindly took over and tied itself to the Greeks, taking up their concepts and then building them into petrified systems. These concepts were conserved and dragged along through the centuries without any effort at an original re-appropriation or renewal – concepts whose roots in lived experience (from which they once emerged) have indeed long withered away. The 'destruction' proclaimed by Heidegger does not propose to

set the tradition aside, to rule it out, but rather to re-appropriate it into a conceptual framework able to respond to today's lived experience.²¹

A retrieval or revival of the tradition must go back as far as the Greeks because the perspective of modern philosophy appears, taken by itself, rootless. Heidegger does not see modern philosophy as having brought about a decisive change or development, for its basic concepts are wholly penetrated by the structural elements of the traditional Greek-Christian outlook – an outlook that itself had by then become rootless (see e.g., *SZ* 22, 93, 96; *GA* 20: 179; *GA* 21: 13; *GA* 29/30: 52f., 64). These 'presuppositions' underlying Heidegger's access to the history of philosophy, and his fundamental problem, are hardly conceivable without resting upon his direct experience of the ever more intensifying crisis of European culture and civilization.²² The initial contention of *Being and Time* that traditional metaphysical concepts of man like 'subject', 'ego', 'reason', 'spirit', and 'person' are ontologically unthematized and thus obscure (*SZ* 22) implies that these concepts have become vacant for everyday life, worn out and empty. Indeed, the concept of an 'ideal subject', characteristic of transcendently oriented epistemologies, is, as Heidegger unequivocally says later in the book, a '*phantastically idealized* subject'. Such a subject fails to do justice to nothing less than the 'a priori' of the "factual" subject', that is, *Dasein* (*SZ* 229).²³ We are not, to be sure, provided with anything that might properly be called Heidegger's 'criticism of society'. Nevertheless, his occasional remarks, in the course of lectures, about the culture and philosophy of the age – remarks often amounting to informal quips – are very effective. It is worthwhile to dwell upon them in some detail.²⁴

II.iii

First of all, as far as developments in German culture and philosophy during the second half of the nineteenth century are concerned, Heidegger is highly critical of the epistemological-*wissenschaftstheoretisch* turn typified by neo-Kantianism, considering it to be a sign of going astray, of perplexity and, in a sense, even of decadence (see *GA* 20: 17f., 20f.). The same judgment is expressed in even stronger terms during his debate with Cassirer in Davos, when he remarks that the genesis of neo-Kantianism is to be sought only 'in the perplexity of philosophy concerning the question of what it properly is that in the whole of knowledge has been left for it' (*KPM* 246). After the human and natural sciences, around 1850, had monopolized the totality of what can be known (*die Allheit des Erkennbaren*), all that was left for philosophy was knowledge of science, not of beings. Neo-Kantianism then re-interpreted Kant too, transforming him into an epistemologist of the mathematical-physical sciences, and 'between 1900 and 1910 Husserl himself in a certain sense fell victim to Neo-Kantianism' (*KPM* 247). The breakdown of German

Idealism is considered by Heidegger to be an undisputable fact; but, as he puts it in 1935, the very expression 'breakdown' (*Zusammenbruch*) amounts to a kind of shield, behind which the rise of superficiality (*die schon anbrechende Geistlosigkeit*) and the dissolution of the original spiritual forces are taking shelter. For it is not so much German Idealism that broke down, but rather it was the age that was no more able to be equal to the greatness and originality of its predecessors' achievements (*EM* 34f.; see also *GA* 32: 57; *SA* 7).

The following excursus in Heidegger's 1925–6 lectures is characteristic. When neo-Kantianism, taking up Lotze's obscure and incoherent notion of validity (*Geltung*),²⁵ became a philosophy of values (*Wertphilosophie*),

it was soon discovered that Kant had written three Critiques, which were supposed to have discussed the theoretical, the practical, and the aesthetic attitudes, and to refer respectively to these three kinds of values. Kant had, of course, had something to say about religion too, but unfortunately not in the form of a Critique; nevertheless, religion must also be secured a place within the system, so the value of the 'sacred' was discovered. This, for Windelband, is of course no autonomous value; to put forward a claim of this sort *circa* 1900 would be too risky. As the world, however, has become very religious since the war, and as with international associations of chemists and meteorologists, even world congresses are being organized, one might now run the risk of claiming that religion is also a value. Or, since it is impossible to leave it at that (the insights presumably grow deeper and deeper), one must say that God is also a value, and, for that matter the highest one. The latter thesis is an obvious blasphemy, surely not mitigated by the fact that theologians assert it as an utmost truth. All this would be highly comical, were it not deeply sad, showing as it does that philosophy no longer reflects upon the things and problems themselves [*man nicht mehr aus den Sachen philosophiert*], but upon the books of colleagues.²⁶

It is not difficult to see that this cultural decadence and shallowness affected Heidegger deeply. Someone committed to the appropriation and creative transformation of the problems of the philosophical tradition would naturally be repelled by the 'self-conceited modernity, fallen into barbarity', which pretends that Plato's questions 'are settled' once for all (*GA* 24: 157; see also *GA* 29/30: 48). Husserl had already complained about 'the sort of pseudo-philosophical literature [*philosophische Scheinliteratur*] . . . which nowadays pullulates so abundantly' (Husserl 1965: 47). He had also described the extent to which the social changes taking place in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, and

the consequent prevalence of positivistic culture, were transforming the framework of academic life:

The natural science departments of the philosophical faculties – he wrote in 1910 – are now very persistent in their efforts to acquire professorships in philosophy for researchers who may perhaps be very eminent in their own fields, but have no more sense of philosophy than, say, chemists or physicists.

(Husserl 1965: 47)

The idea of renewing philosophy emerged in connection with considerations pertaining to *Weltanschauung* as early as Heidegger's *Habilitationschrift* (cf. *GA* 1: 406ff.). Although the term 'Weltanschauung', because of abuse made of it at that time, does not turn up in his vocabulary,²⁷ it is clear that, from the 1920s onward, his retrieval and reformulation of the Being-question acquired its specific outlines against the background of more or less explicit expectations of a social-spiritual regeneration. Husserl's observations had shown the extent to which the development of science and philosophy cannot be viewed as a simple linear unfolding of their allegedly intrinsic character and potentialities, but is, instead, dependent upon extrinsic circumstances, rooted in the historical-intellectual climate of the age. Heidegger, much more susceptible to the central importance of historicity than Husserl, had already remarked in the 1920s: 'each philosophy and each science has its own destiny, and it would be petty-minded (*kleinlich und bürgerlich*) to think that we can abstract from the conditions which direct the questions . . . of philosophy' (*GA* 21: 53; see also 280 and *GA* 20: 182). Awakening the Being-question in an attempt to retrieve the philosophical tradition and to clarify the meaning of the question itself was however just a preparatory step, and Heidegger was very early aware of its limited (finite) possibilities.

In the inaugural lecture at Freiburg in 1929 Heidegger explicitly formulated his view of the situation of the sciences:

The fields of the sciences lie far apart. Their ways of treating their objects are fundamentally different. This disintegrated multiplicity of disciplines is held together only by the technical organization of universities and faculties, and through the practical direction of the disciplines. . . . The roots of the sciences in their essential ground have, however, withered away.

(*WM* in *GA* 9: 104)

II.iv

Heidegger's taking over the rectorate in 1933 must thus be seen as connected to his hope of finding a way out of the spiritual decadence, the deep crisis convulsing the whole country. (It may be sufficient to think of the economic crisis between 1929 and 1932, and of the masses of unemployed whose number increased from two to six million during these years). He hoped for a popular-national revival, perhaps giving rise to a philosophical renewal, that of the Being-question. Such a renewal would open up a new historical epoch, no longer characterized by the forgottenness of being. Was not such a hope unfounded, and indeed illusory? This (slightly pedantic) question – to adopt a Heideggerian phrase – arrives too late. That certain features of the renewal were from the very beginning critically assessed by Heidegger is, as will immediately be seen, beyond doubt. As soon as these features gain momentum and prove to have the upper hand, Heidegger will resign, and finally pass into opposition.²⁸

For many different sorts of intellectuals who had been critical of developments in Germany during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – such as the malignant growth of industrial-technological civilization, the springing into being of big cities with their slums, as well as the growing commercialization, fragmentation, and instrumentalization of science and culture – the idea of 'national socialism' was pregnant with significance.²⁹ Since Germany's decadence could well be seen partly as a result of its being fitted into 'international capitalism', the structure created in Europe by the Versailles pact (the source of a continuous sense of national humiliation in Germany), the attempt to find a national solution of the crisis was coupled, for good reasons, with strong anticapitalist feelings. 'If Heidegger' – writes Bernard Willms –

had made more public his political attitude before 1933 . . . he would sooner and more unambiguously have been considered as a representative of the kind of thinking which may be defined as that of the 'Conservative revolution'. . . . This reference to the 'Conservative revolution' is of course meaningful only if it is taken to mean something different from the 'preparation of National Socialism'. . . . It was no less typical of the 'Conservative revolution' that its representatives, for a short time and with hesitation, joined the National Socialists, than that the latter, simultaneously or very soon, pushed them aside, and finally even persecuted them.

(Willms 1977: 17f.)³⁰

II.v

In April 1933, after holding office for less than one week, Rector Wilhelm von Möllendorf, professor of anatomy and a Social Democrat, resigned. Immediately after, he and other colleagues approached Heidegger, urging him to be a candidate in the new election. After some hesitation Heidegger gave his consent to his election – mainly because of the danger that otherwise a functionary would be named rector. One of his first measures as rector, taken a few days after having been elected by the university senate, was to prohibit the hanging of the so-called Jewish poster in the university – a prohibition which, in spite of repeated urgings put through from Berlin, he did not cancel later. He also forbade the book burning planned by Nazi students, seeing to it personally that the University Library remained untouched (cf. Fédier 1966: 899ff.; Allemann 1969: 252f.; Palmier 1968: 74f.; Moehling 1981: 33; *GR* 193ff.; *SUR* 23, 31f.).

These were but defensive steps. As for his constructive ideas, Heidegger repeatedly pointed to the above-quoted passage of his inaugural lecture in 1929 – namely, to his view of the situation of the sciences and the university (see *GR* 196; *SUR* 22). Heidegger's ideas about a cultural renewal, when reconstructed on the basis of his activity as a rector, may be summed up as having centered around the reciprocal coming together of the university (science) and the folk or nation (*Volk*). On the level of concrete measures, as will be seen, they took the form of accommodating students' lives to that of the nation or folk, on the one hand, and attempting to raise the *Volk* to science (university), on the other. But how is the awakening to take place? Who is to direct whom – should science lead the people or vice versa?

Given the premise that the decline of science and philosophy was but a reflection of a general social disintegration ensuing in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, and the idea that even science and philosophy have their own destinies, it is obvious that spiritual life could not be revived from and by itself. A comprehensive social renewal was required. Heidegger was well aware of this, as is shown by his quips connecting neo-Kantianism, and the state of German philosophy in general, to all-encompassing social developments. But there can be no question of the university and the sciences being renewed from 'outside', as it were. For the university would then run the risk of total subjection (a possibility that was to become painfully true later) – a risk that the renewal will *not* be a *spiritual* one. Heidegger's rectorial address treated the theme of the *self-assertion* of the university (a title no other rectorial address bore at the time) because he wanted to actively anticipate the possibility that the reshaping of the university would be determined by social transformations from 'above'. At the same time, he was attempting to re-define and give a new sense to the concept of learning and its role

in social renewal (see *GR* 193, 196, 198; *SUR* 25f.; Moehling 1981: 33). Inconceivable as the renewal of the university may be without an overall social awakening, still, the renewing of the university must nevertheless be carried through and achieved by the university itself – specifically, by way of a radical rethinking of its essence and tasks, a reappropriation and a retrieval of the original meaning of science and of its vocation. Were *that* to come about, science would have been re-united with and accommodated to the nation's life, not by some external force, but by itself (for as we know from *Being and Time*, science is but one of man's modes of being, and not the primary one (cf. *SZ* 11; *SU* 7). It is thus no mere accident – although it might well have seemed somewhat strange at the moment – that Heidegger should have begun his rectorial address in May with an analysis of the notion of science, and that, after tracing it back to the Greeks, should have linked it to the historical destiny of a people, claiming: 'a spiritual world alone is the guarantee of the greatness of the people' (*SU* 13).³¹

A new aspect of the notion of retrieval thus comes to the fore. The Being-question, the original meaning of philosophy. Heidegger says at the beginning of his address, was rooted in the Greek people's historical-national existence (*Dasein*); science was not for them a so-called cultural good, nor was it pure contemplation, that is, 'theory' conceived in opposition to 'praxis'. On the contrary, it was 'the highest realization of authentic praxis', a force encompassing the whole of their existence as a state and as a folk (cf. *SU* 9f.). If science was the Greeks' original mode of being, toward which all their efforts pointed, then it is very much a question of retrieving *that* world, of '*re-cuperating* [*wieder-holen*] the origin of our historical spiritual *Dasein*' (*EM* 29).³²

But how is the relation between leaders and followers within the university to be reshaped, once the university re-appropriated its original essence? What are the implications of the retrieval of the original notion of science? What difference will its rootedness in the historical-spiritual world of the people make for the task, mission, and internal life of the university? When we hear Heidegger saying at one point that 'the much celebrated "academic freedom" is driven out of the German university' (a statement that was to raise no little astonishment in decades to come), we should be aware of the precise context of this statement. The essence of the university, Heidegger says at the beginning of the address, is usually found in its 'self-direction', but that is a purely formal way of putting the matter. If 'self-direction' is taken to mean simply exemption from external influences and interventions, there will be a danger of increasing isolation, fragmentation, and disintegration. This would compromise the very notion of science, for, pushing this logic to its extremes, science is no longer science if any one university, faculty, or individual scholar can pursue, as it were, a science all on its (or his)

own. If one calls an arrangement for the interconnection of the various disciplines (Fachwissenschaften) a 'university' – Heidegger says in 1935 – then 'university' becomes an empty name. 'It no longer signifies a primordially unificatory and authoritative spiritual force' (EM 37). Such putative self-direction can be seen, in the light of Heidegger's diagnosis of Germany's spiritual decline, to be no more than 'the *Verkapselung* of the sciences into isolated branches [Fächer]',³³ 'an unhindered and senseless dispersion' (SU 12), a boundless activity of research which – as he formulates it in another lecture – 'hid its own uncertainty under [the mask of] the idea of an [alleged] international progress of sciences' (Schneeberger 1962: 74). If this 'much celebrated "academic freedom"' is now rejected by Heidegger, the reason is given by the words immediately following, namely, that 'being merely negative, this freedom was inauthentic', because 'it meant predominantly lack of concern, arbitrariness of aims and inclinations, licence [Ungebundenheit] in acting and not acting' (SU 15; see also GR 196).³⁴

Heidegger, however, as we have seen, is concerned with retaining the idea of a university's self-direction, and with doing so precisely by attempting to explore its deeper dimensions. A closer reflection upon the idea of self-direction, that is, of autonomy, freedom, shows it to mean 'giving the law to oneself' – a very Kantian view. The university is, accordingly, 'the place of spiritual legislation' (SU 15, 21).³⁵ If self-direction is possible only on the basis of reflection upon or awareness of what one is (Selbstbesinnung, SU 6), and if science's gaining awareness of itself consists in retrieving its original sense, meaning, and roots, by committing itself to shaping and reshaping the spiritual world of a people, then the task of the university cannot be confined to a 'dull and quick schooling [of the students] for an "elegant" profession' (SU 16). Such a conception of the university's task is, in Heidegger's eyes, the correlate of an otherwise unconstrained academic freedom; both are interpretations of the university imposed upon it from 'outside'. The university may not aim at providing whatever specialized professional training may be asked for. Rather, it is because the different professions of 'the statesman and the teacher, the physician and the judge, the priest and the architect lead and guard the existence of the people as a state [das volklich-staatliche Dasein]' that education in these professions is the task of the university. That the university is to shape the spiritual world of a people cannot imply domination over the nation, but rather that those educated and released by it will take care of and enrich the whole people's knowledge of its *Dasein* (SU 17).

The relation of leaders and followers is described by Heidegger in terms of *authentic existence*. Self-direction (Selbstverwaltung) based upon prior awareness of one's self (Selbstbesinnung) presupposes *resoluteness*, and the latter presupposes autonomy. What matters in leadership is not

so much the will to lead the way (Vorangehen) as the strength to walk alone (Alleingehenkönnen) (SU 14). The leaders should concede autonomous initiatives to the followers, and, conversely, the latter should not blindly yield to the leaders. 'Every following carries resistance with it. This essential tension inherent in leading and following must not be obscured, let alone eliminated' (SU 21; cf. De Waele 1947: 119; Harries 1976: 654; Guzzoni 1986: 76f.). Only thus will self-awareness be turned by self-assertion into authentic self-direction (SU 21).

Autonomy, as giving the law to oneself, is for Heidegger not so much obedience to the authority of pure reason, unaffected by sensibility, as it is rootedness in an effort to retrieve a historical heritage freely and resolutely assumed. If science for the Greeks meant taking a stand in the midst of beings which are constantly hiding themselves, this persistence is nevertheless well aware of its powerlessness in face of destiny. Indeed, this amounts to what may be called the 'creative powerlessness of knowledge' (SU 9f.).³⁶ For resoluteness, striving for the retrieval of the tradition, the future is open and indefinite. Taking over a heritage can never be compelled, but only free.³⁷ It is never unconditionally necessary that science as such should *be* at all, Heidegger says at the beginning of the address. In his conclusion he restates the same point. It is up to us, he says there, whether and how intensely we dedicate ourselves to the work of the renewal, whether we commit ourselves entirely to it, or merely change old rules and measures, replacing them by new ones. Nobody will prevent us from doing the latter. But neither will anybody ask about our approval or disapproval, if Western culture, well on its way to decline, ultimately collapses, thereby sweeping everything into confusion and madness. Whether that will come about or not is solely a question of whether we as a historical-spiritual people still want to be ourselves – but the young forces of our people have already taken their decision. 'The greatness and splendor of the renewal', he says in the last words of the address, 'will however be fully understood only if we assume that . . . soberness which the old Greek wisdom expressed this way: "Every greatness stands in the storm" ' (SU 21f.; Plato, *The Republic*, 497d, 9).³⁸

II.vi

The rectorial address may, in the last analysis, be seen as a dramatic call for the rescue of a declining culture, for the building up of a new spiritual world. However, not only the concluding words, but also the remarks about the powerlessness of knowledge warned against an ardent zeal and excessive enthusiasm. The breakdown of a culture makes the building up of a new world no more than possible – and *that* requires long and patient work. If the Greeks needed three centuries – Heidegger significantly said – in order merely to formulate meaningfully the very

question of what knowledge was, then we must not expect the complete clarification and realization of the German university to be carried out during the present or the following semester (*SU* 19f.). That Heidegger entertained few illusions about the tempo of the renewal becomes clear from a remark of his, made during the 1925/6 semester. Aristotle's logic has but one single child of the same rank, Hegel's, Heidegger said. No other descendants are possible; what is required is a new species.

When that species will come into existence cannot be known, but we, men of today, are certainly not of that species . . . our efforts may only be directed toward effecting the transition: what we can do [here Heidegger changes his tone] is no more than making the past alive for a future for which we yearn, but we shall not reach.

(*GA* 21: 14)

In keeping with his claim that real progress in science and philosophy is brought about only in and by a revision of fundamental concepts, a change in our access to the object or area of research,³⁹ Heidegger envisaged the renewal of the metaphysical tradition, the new elaboration of the Being-question, as attainable only after a laborious and careful re-appropriation of the basic metaphysical concepts of Western philosophy. (The previous quotation may help explain why external pressure was needed to make Heidegger publish *Being and Time*.)⁴⁰ So it is no accident that he saw European culture and civilization, the development of which had underlain the unfolding of Western philosophy and which was now in a deep crisis, as something not to be renewed overnight.

Heidegger's recognition that the renewal, both of the philosophical tradition and of the social-national framework, is a long process requiring the refoundation of the bases may shed new light upon a statement he made in his debate with Cassirer in Davos – a statement which has an odd ring: 'philosophy has the task . . . to push man back into the hardness of his destiny' (*KPM* 263; see also *GA* 29/30: 248). And if in his lectures in 1935 Heidegger once more emphasizes that 'philosophy, according to its essence, never makes things easier, but only harder' (*EM* 9), his underlying view is not a gloomy pessimism, but rather the conviction that the recovery from the decline, the creation of a new world, is dependent primarily upon a full and inexorable awareness of the extent, depth, and scope of the crisis. To suggest quick and random solutions is to mask the real character of the crisis. If the *Selbstbesinnung* remains blocked half-way, only pseudo-solutions will emerge, thus deepening the crisis even further.⁴¹

Given that his critical appraisal of *international* liberalism and its culture had left Heidegger susceptible to the idea of *national* socialism, does it follow that he remained insensitive to the condition of other nations,

or that he thought Europe's spiritual reorganization should be performed under German hegemony? That Heidegger approved of Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations in November 1933 cannot, in the light of what we have said above, be a surprise. But it is important that in the very address in which he defended this step he emphasized:

Our will to the self-responsibility of the nation [völkische Selbstverantwortung] wills that each nation [Volk] shall find and guard the greatness and truth of its own determination. This will is the highest guarantee for peace among the nations, for it is tied to the fundamental law of manly respect and unconditional honor.

(Schneeberger 1962: 150)

And in another address he put it even more clearly: 'The will to build a genuine community of nations [Völkergemeinschaft] is equally far from the desire for a lame and unconcerned world-fraternity [Weltverbrüderung] and from the desire for a blind despotism. That will is operative at a higher level than this contrast' (Schneeberger 1962: 145).⁴²

Further, in 1937, long after he had detached himself from political developments in Germany and had retreated from public activity into inner emigration and nearly complete silence, he once again took up this theme – presumably because of the ever more aggressive and military character which nazism had adopted. 'A genuine reciprocal understanding between the nations', he wrote, 'may be achieved only in that creative dialogue in which each nation commits itself to gaining full awareness of its historical endowments and of the possibilities that history assigns it.' The rescue of European culture may be carried out only if each nation gathers itself unto a responsibility for its own historical traditions and heritage. Renewal must be effected by each nation one by one. 'Understanding in the genuine sense is possible only . . . through acknowledgment of what belongs properly to the other from out of an all-encompassing necessity' – its traditions and tasks. 'Genuine reciprocal understanding is not reciprocal reassurance [Beruhigung]⁴³ which soon leads to mutual indifference, but rather a constant and intensive questioning of each other [die Unruhe des gegenseitigen Sich-in-die-Frage-Stellens] – a questioning that springs out of concern for common historical tasks. . . . One of the most German thinkers of all, Leibniz', Heidegger observes, 'was inspired throughout his philosophical effort by a confrontation with Descartes.' The renewal of the spiritual world has, from this point of view, two necessary conditions: 'the persistent will to listen to or hear the other, and the resolute fidelity [der verhaltene Mut] to one's own determination' (WA in DE 15ff.). A creative historical commitment – he says in his lectures on Nietzsche in 1936/7 – 'cannot be limited either to particular groups, classes or sects, nor even to particular states and

nations, but must be at least European in scope.' The fact that this commitment must be accomplished by each nation separately does not imply 'separation from the other nations or, still less, their oppression', but rather the rise of the nations through and in a confrontation in which they develop, each by itself, the strength of rising one above the other (*N 1*: 185). The question of who man really is (the main problem of Europe in the present and the next century) 'may only find an answer in an exemplary . . . history-shaping [Geschichtsgestaltung] brought about by the nations competing with each other' (*N 1*: 361).

Heidegger's attempt at an original renewal of the essence of the university, or science, trying to tie these to and root them in a people's historical existence, was only one aspect of his activity. On the level of concrete measures, as we have said, there was the problem, not only of reconciling the students with, and making them participate in, the life and work of the people, but also, and of equal importance, of raising the people up to science. The program of national awakening included the project of procuring the unemployed not only work but also education. So we should look at the address that Heidegger gave to several hundred unemployed people who had been admitted to Freiburg University.

Heidegger spoke as rector in the assembly hall of the university. His speech starts out from the thesis that the end of unemployment should not be understood purely as the fact that one has now finally a job to do and is able to improve one's conditions of living. One should view it also as entering into the national community. Those given a job now belong to the whole of the nation, and are molding its future. It is from out of this lived experience that the formerly unemployed are supposed to recover their dignity *for themselves*, as well as appropriate security and resoluteness in relating themselves *to others*. Supplying with work is also supplying with knowledge [Arbeitsbeschaffung, Wissenbeschaffung]. If younger colleagues are ready now to transmit knowledge, Heidegger points out, it is not as 'learned' men belonging to the 'upper' classes, or as 'educated' people over against a stratum (a 'lower stratum') of the 'uneducated'. Rather, they do so as comrades, as members of the same national community (Schneeberger 1962: 200). The new common will is directed toward bridging the gap between manual and intellectual workers, and this bridge building (Brückenschlagen) is today no mere illusion.⁴⁴ For science is, he goes on to say, not the privileged property of the bourgeoisie to be utilized for the exploitation of the laboring people. Rather, it is a more rigorous and more responsible form of that knowledge which the whole German nation requires and seeks for its historical-national existence (assuming that this nation is to secure and guard its life and greatness at all). 'Knowledge had by genuine science is essentially no different from knowledge had by peasants, woodmen,

navvies, miners. . . . For to know means: *to know one's way* [sich auskennen] in the world, in which we all and each find ourselves'; to know means to master the situation, to be equal to it, to come up to the task. 'We do not make a distinction between those "educated" and those "uneducated" . . . not because there is no difference, but because our evaluation does not depend upon this distinction. Genuine knowledge is possessed by the peasant and the manual worker, each in his own way and in his own field.' A learned man may, for all his learning, go astray with his pseudo-knowledge (Scheinwissen). Not only the concept of science, but also that of labor is to be transformed. Spiritual labor is not exclusively that done by scholars: 'every labor *as* labor is something spiritual', for it is based upon competence, freely appropriated skills, and an intelligent understanding of the rules to come by – that is, upon authentic knowledge. The performance of the navvy is fundamentally no less spiritual than the achievement of the scholar. There is no real contrast between the 'workers' and those having knowledge peculiar to the sciences. 'Every worker, each in his own way, is a knower, and it is as a knower that he can work at all' (Schneeberger 1962: 201f.). Such an understanding of knowledge and of labor is the condition of the possibility of a 'bridge building' which is no longer extrinsic and artificial.⁴⁵

II.vii

It was thus within the framework of a general spiritual awakening that the National Socialist revolution was meaningful for Heidegger. What mattered was not to 'politicize' science and university but rather to lend spiritual content to society and politics – that is, to help shape an already existing movement, a movement born out of crisis, into a force capable of creating a genuine spiritual world.⁴⁶ Insofar as a renewal basing itself upon self-awareness presupposes resolute retrieval of and rootedness in one's own being, such a renewal is opposed to a radical subversion of factual conditions. (Philosophy, it may be remembered, has precisely the task of pushing men back into the hardness of their destiny). The universities' gaining awareness of their original meaning and mission by bringing themselves back to the national-historical community does not, therefore, imply in the least that the universities should, as it were, 'march into' the sphere of politics, taking over the role of the politicians. This mistake would lead, indirectly, to the same 'politicizing' of the university against which its *self-assertion* had tried to defend it. Its own 'political' function may be performed by the university only *as* university, that is, as a given, bounded domain within the national-historical community.⁴⁷ These considerations, which are in keeping with the main line of thought found in *Being and Time*, and with Heidegger's whole outlook, may account for the fact that Heidegger wanted to partake in the revival precisely

from his own place. He did not desire to assume another, perhaps higher, position.

He might, however, have had a chance to do so. In September 1933, as the German press of the day reported in detail, Heidegger was offered the chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin, upon an initiative of the Prussian minister of culture. Scarcely one month later, the Bavarian minister of culture invited him to accept the premier chair of philosophy at the University of Munich. In neither of the cases did the newspapers leave much doubt that the calls carried no little political weight with them.⁴⁸ However, Heidegger refused both calls. The reasons for his refusal are made explicit, and put in a particular light, in a radio lecture Heidegger gave in the autumn of 1933 – a lecture bearing the title ‘Why do we stay in the provinces?’ It offers no plausible arguments, but, once again, a meditation.

On the steep slope of a wide mountain valley in the Southern Black Forest [Heidegger begins the lecture] there stands a small ski hut; scattered throughout the base of the valley lie farmhouses, higher up the slope the meadows lead to woods with fir trees. This is my world. When the young farmboy drags his heavy sledge up the slope and guides it, piled high with beech logs, down to his house, when the herdsman drives his cattle up the slope, when the farmer in his shed gets the shingles ready for his roof, my work is of the same sort. A city-dweller thinks that in condescending to have a longer conversation with a peasant, he has gone ‘out among the people’. But when in the evening during a work-break I sit with the peasants at the chimney-corner, we mostly do not speak at all. We just smoke our pipes in silence. City-dwellers are ‘livened up’ by a so-called ‘outing in the country’. My work is however sustained and guided by the world of the mountains and peasants – a work of which I am not at all the master. City-dwellers are often amazed by such long monotonous periods of loneliness. But in large cities one can easily be lonelier than anywhere else. In the public world one can be made a ‘celebrity’ overnight by the newspapers and journals. That is the surest way to have one’s intentions misinterpreted and quickly forgotten. In contrast, the memory of the peasant has its simple fidelity which never forgets. Recently an old peasant woman died up there. She used to chat with me frequently, telling me many old stories of the village. Even in the past year, with her eighty-three years, she would still come climbing up the slope to see whether I was still there or whether ‘someone’ had stolen me off. The night of her death, not long before the end, she sent one more greeting to the ‘Professor’. Such a memory is worth incomparably more than the most astute ‘report’ of any international newspaper about my alleged philosophy. – Lately a very loud and

active obtrusiveness has been emerging, passing itself off as a concern for the world of the peasant. Men of letters chatter about 'folk-character' and 'rootedness in the soil'. What the peasant wants is however no such citified officiousness, but solely quiet reserve with regard to his own way of being. – Recently I got a second invitation to teach at the University of Berlin. On that occasion I left the city, and withdrew to the hut, where I listened to what the mountains, the forests and the farmlands were saying. I went to see my old friend, a seventy-five-year-old peasant. What would he say? He had read about the call in the newspapers. Slowly he fixed the sure gaze of his eyes on mine. Keeping his mouth tightly shut, he thoughtfully put his hand on my shoulder – and ever so slightly shook his head. That means: inexorably no!⁴⁹

II.viii

The hope for a spiritual reorganization of the nation, for the university's self-renewal and for its becoming rooted in an organic national community was soon to become untenable, thanks to the ever faster and wilder politicization of the society, the conversion of efforts to control the anarchy into those making for a totalitarian system, and the consequent solidification of a state-ideology, namely, racism. In the second half of 1933 Heidegger was already facing increasing difficulties. His ideas concerning renewal met pronounced resistance on the part of both 'the old' and 'the new'. The 'new' was represented by the idea of 'politicized' science – an idea that Heidegger looked upon as a falsification of the essence of truth. The 'old', by contrast, was the idea that everybody should be concerned with his own discipline and its progress – thereby dismissing general philosophical reflection upon fundamentals as mere 'abstraction', or admitting them as, at best, extrinsic ornaments (cf. *SUR* 22f.; *GR* 196).

In the winter semester of 1933/4 Heidegger intended to nominate outstanding young scholars as deans of the faculties, without any regard to their relation to the Nazi party (cf. *GR* 201; *SUR* 35).⁵⁰ By Christmas it had become clear that his planned renewal could not be carried through. Within the university there emerged objections to his idea of introducing students into responsible positions in the administration of the university. At the 'Todtnauberg camp', held by Heidegger to discuss impending tasks for the winter semester and to explain his ideas about science and about the university, some government functionaries, as well as some visitors from Heidelberg, introduced the theme of racial thought, thereby attempting to exercise pressure upon Heidegger and upon Freiburg University. In October 1933 the German rectors held a conference in Berlin to establish the new legal framework for subordinating the universities to the state. Freiburg University boycotted this conference:

Heidegger did not go, nor did he send a representative. In February 1934 Heidegger was called to Karlsruhe by the minister, who demanded that he dismiss, and replace with colleagues more acceptable to the party, Wilhelm von Möllendorf, dean of the Faculty of Medicine, and Erik Wolf, dean of the Faculty of Law. Heidegger refused the request, and offered his resignation, should the minister persist in his demand. This is precisely what happened. At the end of the winter semester 1933/4 Heidegger resigned. He tendered his resignation about a year after assuming office, and several months before the concentration of all power, subsequent to the death of President Hindenburg in August, in the hands of Hitler.⁵¹

In 1934 the orthodox Nazis started an open attack against the 'Jacobinical', plebeian wing of national socialism. At the end of June Hitler destroyed the faction of the party which was demanding fulfillment of its social promises. There would be no more talk about the 'spiritual revolution' of the workers, no more use of other ideas inspired by German Idealism. Their place would inexorably be taken over by a concept of the people defined in terms of race. By the time this new course prevailed, Heidegger had withdrawn from the movement.⁵²

The certainty peculiar to resoluteness – we read in *Being and Time* – must open itself to what is disclosed in resolution. That means: it may not stiffen itself in the situation, but should rather keep itself open for the possible, and indeed from time to time necessary, re-appropriation of itself. Resoluteness as fidelity to one's self, as destiny, is freedom for the *giving up* of a particular resolution – a giving up required by the possible situation (SZ 307f., 391).

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the editors for their comments and suggestions. I also wish to thank Richard Rorty for reading a first draft of this chapter, for commenting upon it, and – last but not least – for helping improve my style.

Notes

1 Cf. GA 1: 186f., 406, 410f. Heidegger's reading, at the age of eighteen, of Brentano's dissertation *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* may be considered to be the first and decisive incitement to formulate the Being-question. Cf. his Preface to Richardson 1963: xi; and GA 1: 56.

2 'The constant sharpening of the knife', Heidegger quotes significantly Lotze in his *Habilitationsschrift*, 'is boring if one has nothing to cut with it' (GA 1:

200). In a review written in 1912 on recent developments in logic, Heidegger even mentions Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica* (see GA 1: 42).

3 Cf. SD 87. For the presence of Aristotle in the formation of the young Heidegger's thought see Sheehan 1975, and Volpi 1984b, chapters 1-3.

4 An example may be the *Habilitationsschrift* itself, in which Husserlian phenomenology is utilized to illuminate, and thus show the theoretical significance of, Scotus's thought – an accomplishment which enables Heidegger, conversely, to situate Husserlian phenomenology historically as a continuation of a traditional problematic.

5 To pose and elaborate (work out) a question means for Heidegger primordially to clarify the prior ground or horizon which lends meaning to the terms in question. To put it roughly, so as to be able to answer any question, we must have already understood its meaning (to the question, e.g., 'What color is the table?' the answer: 'Square' would fail to understand the *direction* of the question); that is, any question implies or carries with itself a pre-conceptual or – as Heidegger puts it – 'pre-ontological' understanding of its meaning. We are able to *take up* the Being-question, J. Sallis comments upon the first paragraphs of *Sein und Zeit*, 'only to the extent that we can *pose* it; to pose it appropriately . . . is to let the structure which belongs to the question unfold from the question itself' (Sallis 1978: 28f.). See SZ par. 2, 32; Gadamer 1975: 250ff.; Herrmann 1987: 51ff.

6 The metaphysic-ladenness of epistemological or logical theories is, however, of a peculiar sort – one which those moving within the theory cannot become aware of. Incapable of being thematized, it is not susceptible of critical discussion or examination. See e.g., Heidegger's discussion of the latent, 'dogmatic' metaphysical presuppositions inherent in Husserlian phenomenology (GA 20: 140ff., in particular 147, 155, 158, 178). Concerning Heidegger's confrontation with Husserl, see Volpi, 1984a; for the concept of phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger see Herrmann 1981, in particular, 37ff.

7 Cf. GA 20: 200f.; GA 24: 103f., 154f., 172, 444; GA 25: 167; GA 26: 19ff., 109; SZ 154, 183, 212; later e.g., EM 78. In Heidegger's perspective it is no mere accident that Hegel's ontology, as the offspring of a long development, is symptomatically called *Logic* (cf. GA 25: 167; see also GA 21: 311).

8 For Heidegger's discussion of the logic of questioning in his dissertation, see GA 1: 160.

9 I borrow the term 'anti-metaphysical' from Otto Pöggeler (1963: 28).

10 Existential analytic might be seen as a polemic radicalization of Kant's replacement for traditional ontology, namely, a transcendental analytic of the pure intellect ('blosse Analytik des reinen Verstandes': *Critique of Pure Reason* A 304 = B 247). Heidegger, writes Richardson, 'shifts the emphasis from an investigation of man's reason . . . to an investigation of man in his totality' (Richardson 1963: 31).

11 Existential analytic, so conceived, is not anthropology. For to elaborate a theory of man as one being among others already presupposes a prior clarification of the different domains of Being – a task not to be accomplished until after the Being-question is answered; cf. SZ 17, 45ff.; KPM 202ff., 227.

12 The term used by Heidegger for man is *Dasein*, which will be left untranslated in the text. The reason why Heidegger does not use the term 'man' is, negatively, that this term is laden with traditional metaphysical presuppositions, suggesting as it does a 'rational animal', a being 'endowed with reason' (a conception Heidegger intends to criticize). The positive reason is that man, for Heidegger, has an intrinsic relation to *Sein*, and possesses a pre-conceptual

understanding of Being. Man is indeed the very being which poses the Being-question. The term *Dasein* is apt to suggest all these connections with *Sein*. Concerning the term *Dasein* see King 1964: 65ff.; Richardson 1963: 44ff.; W. Marx 1961: 209ff.; Fell 1979: 31f.; Pöggeler 1983: 93; Biemel 1978: 111ff.

13 'Das Ganze eines Begründungszusammenhanges wahrer Sätze' (SZ 11). For the term 'Begründungszusammenhang' see Husserl 1980. What Husserl means by this central term of his *Wissenschaftslehre* is that *Wissenschaft* (as opposed to mere *Wissen*) consists not only in one's *knowing* particular perceptions, or having isolated knowing acts. Rather, it requires, if it is to be worthy of its name, some 'systematic connection in theoretical sense', that is, 'the founding of knowledge' (Begründung des Wissens) (cf. Husserl 1980: 15, 230ff.).

14 Concerning parallels between Heidegger's ontological refutation of the epistemological standpoint and the perspective of German Idealism see Gadamer 1976: 140f.

15 Heidegger's argument may be seen as amounting to a kind of 'refutation of skepticism'. Insofar as it shows that some prior knowledge must by necessity precede or underlie all sorts of doubt, rendering doubt possible, his strategy is analogous to that of the later Wittgenstein (see Wittgenstein 1984: 141, 143 (pars. 105, 111)).

16 This may be one of the reasons why Heidegger rejects the application of traditional categories to man (e.g., 'subject', 'ego', 'reason', 'spirit', etc.; see SZ 22). One can say, Gadamer writes, that 'it is *Dasein's* inauthenticity from which metaphysics as the ontology of *Vorhandensein* developed itself' (Gadamer 1985: 19).

17 Cf. SZ 383f. For the variety of meanings and implications of the term *Wiederholung* see Caputo 1982: 343ff.

18 I should note that some basic issues – above all Heidegger's discussion of truth and time – have been neglected. Also the *vexata questio* of the incompleteness of *Sein und Zeit* cannot be discussed in the present context.

19 Cf. SZ 264, 298. Since finitude is the basic character of *Dasein*, gaining awareness of it by anticipating death helps it become conscious both of what possibilities are uniquely its own (that is, not the others'), and, vice versa, of those possibilities of others which are not – and perhaps necessarily cannot be – its own. Demske rightly speaks in this sense of a 'social aspect' of the anticipation of death (Demske 1963: 38).

20 The term 'Wiederholung' appears as early as the title of the first section ('Die Notwendigkeit einer ausdrücklichen Wiederholung der Frage nach dem Sein': SZ 2; see also KPM 232; Richardson 1963: 93). The notion of 'retrieval' is thus present and operative long before the analyses of authenticity are provided (for this notion in the young Heidegger see GA 61: 80). From another perspective, Heidegger intended to 'retrieve' the whole existential analytic from within the elaborated horizon of the Being-question. Because of the incompleteness of the work, this did not come about. But nevertheless the 'second' Heidegger may pertinently be held to be a retrieval of the 'first' Heidegger (cf. Richardson 1963: 625; Fehér 1984: 146). – All such attempts at retrieval must, however, be conscious of taking their starting points *from within* history (see SZ 20f.). So when Heidegger says in his lectures that his investigations too are determined by the historical situation, and thereby conditioned by traditional philosophies' access (Zugang) to beings (cf. GA 24: 31), this situation both characterizes *extrinsically* the moment of his positing the Being-question and emerges *intrinsically* as one of the main tenets of *Being and Time*: namely, that authenticity is only an existential modification of inauthenticity, always preceded by the latter, and that

Dasein can never remain unaffected by inherited everyday opinions (alltägliche Ausgelegtheit). It is in these opinions, for them and against them, that all genuine understanding, interpretation, communication, discourse and re-appropriation take place. It is likewise in them, against them, and at the same time for them, that resolute *Dasein* projects itself upon the chosen possibility (cf. *SZ* 169, 383). This view helps us understand why and how the history of philosophy constitutes an integral part of systematic philosophy.

21 Cf. *GA* 61: 21; *GA* 20: 179, 188; *GA* 21: 13f.; *GA* 26: 101, 196f.; *SZ* 21ff.; *GA* 29/30: 53ff.; *EM* 10. As to 'blind' traditionalism, see his critique of Husserl, his remarks upon Descartes's 'dogmatism', present also in Kant, and his observations on Descartes's own inauthentic traditionalism: *GA* 20: 147; *GA* 21: 291; *GA* 29/30: 30, 64, 84; *GA* 32: 196.

22 The point that the cultural crisis in Europe was felt most intensively in Germany is made in a lively and convincing manner by Gadamer (see Gadamer 1983: 9f.).

23 I do not, of course, wish to claim that in his critique of traditional notions of man, Heidegger did not employ eminently *theoretical* arguments. (Indeed, I attempt to show some of these above). What I do suggest is that, whatever the particular 'psychology of discovery' may have been, the starting intuitions of such a critique must have been provided by factual experience of life. (We do know that one of his early lectures bore the title 'Hermeneutik der Faktizität' [cf. Pöggeler 1963: 29 and the forthcoming *GA* 63; see also Gadamer 1986/7: 16].) Put in another way, the starting point of such a criticism must have been a prior dissatisfaction with commonly accepted notions of man.

24 We may refer first of all to his *Habilitationsschrift*, and in particular to those passages which offer critical reflections on the culture of the day (see *GA* 1: 200, 408f.).

25 Plato is claimed by Lotze to have remained captive to incoherence; however, Heidegger remarks, it is only in his interpreters that Plato turns out to be senseless (*GA* 21: 71).

26 *GA* 21: 83f. (The above passage is a close paraphrase rather than a translation.) – Not only has the Kant literature, he says on another occasion, become more important than Kant himself, but its effect will be that nobody will be able to get access to the thing (*Sache*) (*GA* 32: 41). To appropriate intentionality, he observes on yet another occasion, what one needs is not sharp intelligence (*Scharfsinn*), but only refraining from prejudice, concentration upon and disciplined description of what one has before one's eyes. Objectivity (*Sachlichkeit*) concerning what is evident, he adds, is nevertheless the most difficult thing one can achieve, for man is naturally at home in what is artificial, deceptive, what he picks up from idle talk with others (*GA* 20: 37). Finally, consider one last, interesting, series of observations, made in 1925: 'Today people decide about metaphysics or even higher things at congresses. Nowadays there are conferences to decide every question – that is, people come together, and keep coming together, and everybody expects the other to tell him what to do. If he is not told, it is also of no importance, for what really matters is that one has spoken [hat sich ja nun ausgesprochen]. Though all the speakers may have little understanding of the thing in question, nevertheless it is believed that some understanding *will* finally be derived from the accumulation of non-understanding [Unverstehen]. So there are people today who travel from one conference to the other, and get the feeling that something is really happening, as if they had been really doing something. But in fact they have just relieved themselves from work, and have tried to conceal their own helplessness under the cover of idle talk. . . . So

finally people think that everything is all right, and one should be present at every congress' (GA 20: 376f.). 'It is clear', he adds somewhat later, 'that research and science are also *Dasein's* possibilities, and are, therefore, susceptible to the modifications of *Dasein's* being . . . , and in particular to fallenness . . . : so philosophy contains, always and necessarily, a bit of sophistry' (GA 20: 416f.; see also GA 32: 41).

27 For a critique of the philosophy of *Weltanschauung*, see Husserl 1965, and Heidegger's analogous considerations in GA 24: 5ff., especially 13, and GA 61: 44. For Heidegger, however, the insistence upon 'scientific' philosophy in contrast to the philosophy of *Weltanschauung*, viz., rationalism in contrast to irrationalism, is simply beside the point. Cf. GA 1: 410; SZ 136; EM 136; N 2: 372, 531; BH in GA 9: 349; GA 32: 143; GA 52: 133; SD 79. See also Hogemann 1986/7: 56, 62; Kisiel 1986/7: 106f.; Rodi 1986/7: 168.

28 Heidegger, Karl A. Moehling writes, 'was both attracted to and repelled by Nazism. He was put in what he called a "middle position" of believing in the social and national ideas of the movement while rejecting the essential racism' (Moehling 1981: 36). At that time, Jaspers admits in his notes, 'neither he nor any of us could know what was going to become of it all' (Jaspers 1978: 180). For Adorno's analogous misinterpretation of the situation, see Pöggeler (1985: 28).

29 The idea goes some decades back. The attempt to bring together the two major intellectual trends of the past century, nationalism and socialism, dates as far back as the 1890s. Friedrich Meinecke, the great German historian, shows this convincingly in his memoirs, written immediately after World War II (see Meinecke 1949: 33ff.). There was first of all Friedrich Naumann's attempt, in the early 1890s, to fuse the nationalistic and the socialist trends (the former supported mainly by the middle class, the latter by workers). Naumann tried to quell the hostility between the two classes so as to mitigate the extremely anti-nationalist (that is, internationalistic) faith of the socialists by attending to the workers' material and spiritual needs. Had Naumann's attempt succeeded (an attempt Meinecke calls 'one of the noblest dreams of German history'), Meinecke thinks, Hitler could never have risen to power (Meinecke 1949: 34). It is significant that Naumann's name is mentioned by Heidegger in a positive sense in the *Spiegel*-Interview (GR 196; see also Pöggeler 1988: 27). As to differences between the forms of early national socialism and the subsequent totalitarian regime, see also Palmier 1968: 193; Pöggeler 1983: 392; Pöggeler 1984: 234.

30 Hermann Rauschning, a Conservative and one of the founding members of the Nazi party, who in 1934 went into exile and became a bitter enemy of the regime, spoke in 1938 about the 'National Socialist usurpation' of the idea of the Third Reich. This was originally 'a slogan of the Young Conservatives, the title of a book published in 1922 by Moeller van den Bruck', - an idea which in its author's 'original conception was not a German idea', but 'a political idea of European scope'. 'In spite of its manifest defects', writes Rauschning, 'National Socialism offered opportunities of pursuing initiatives in which the Young Conservatives were interested. . . . Many conservatives . . . found their way into the ranks of National Socialism from the very best of motives and in perfect good faith.' ' . . . ten years before the National Socialist seizure of power, the Young Conservatives of Germany had a home and foreign policy immeasurably superior to that of the present regime of violence, and envisaged Germany's recovery only in connexion with a universal idea of right, with a "European solution". Nothing was more horrifying to the Conservatives than the gradual recognition that the "national rising", with which they had associated themselves to that

end, was in reality a cynical nihilist revolution, the negation of their own ideals.' (Rauschnig 1939: 121, 119, 309; see Stern 1984: 12ff., 18). Heide Gerstenberger characterizes revolutionary Conservatives by the attempt 'to revolutionize spiritually the society [Gesellschaft] by transforming it into a community of the people [Volksgemeinschaft]' (Gerstenberger 1972: 343). That conservative thinkers cannot be taken as simple precursors of nazism is also stressed by Palmier (1968: 172; see also Pöggeler 1974: 109). For a sense of the general historical atmosphere, Alan Bullock's analyses are useful: '1933, like other revolutionary years, produced great hopes, a sense of new possibilities, the end of frustration, the beginning of action, a feeling of exhilaration and anticipation after years of hopelessness. Hitler recognized this mood when he told the German people to hold up their heads and re-discover their old pride and self-confidence. Germany, united and strong, would end the crippling divisions which had held her back, and recover the place that was her due in the world. Many people believed this in 1933 and thought that a new era had begun. Hitler succeeded in releasing pent-up energies in the nation, and in creating a belief in the future of the German people. It is wrong to lay stress only on the element of coercion, and to ignore the degree to which Hitler commanded a genuine popular support in Germany' (Bullock 1952: 253; concerning the last statement, see also Picht's memoir of Felix Jacoby, quoted in note 46, *infra*).

31 It is not without significance that at this point Heidegger makes use of the term *Geist*, which he had primarily put in quotation marks and treated as an ontologically obscure concept. The fact that he takes it up now by re-defining it in terms of his own notion of authenticity ('Spirit is primordially attuned, knowing resolution towards the essence of being' (*SU* 14)) supports the assumption that retrieval of the philosophical tradition was for Heidegger not a merely intellectual project, and that his objections to traditional ontological concepts should be seen in the context of his dissatisfaction with lived experience which was linked to those concepts. 'Heidegger's insistence on the autonomy of the university', writes Karsten Harries, 'challenged those who wanted to make it into a tool of the movement and reduce it to a vocational school, while his emphasis on the spiritual opposed Rosenberg's subordination of spirit to race and biology.' ('For Heidegger', writes Lucien Goldmann, 'anti-semitism must have been but a serious and unfortunate error, for the biological has no place in ontology, and can, therefore, neither limit, nor increase *Dasein's* possibilities of choice between the authentic and the inauthentic.') 'This is not to suggest', Harries goes on, 'that Heidegger's commitment to the Nazis was less than genuine. He appears to have been convinced at the time that in spite of the threat posed by party functionaries and ideologues, the engagement of people like himself could help to shape the Nazi movement in such a way that it would become a force which could rescue Germany from crisis and confusion' (Harries 1976: 653; Goldmann 1973: 78; see also Palmier 1968: 63). 'Fatal though the impression of some Heideggerian texts of the time may be upon us today', writes Hermann Mörchen, 'it is equally remarkable that in those very texts no concessions to anti-semitism can be found' (Mörchen 1981: 254; see also to the same effect Ott 1984b: 122; Pöggeler 1985: 62, 44). Moehling rightly makes the point that the rectorial address 'was a revolutionary appeal in that he argued that the time had come in German history when an examination of the relationship between the university and the nation was not only desirable but an absolute necessity. He urged the re-assertion of the university and learning in the life of the nation so that pressing and urgent spiritual issues could be confronted' (Moehling 1981: 33f.).

32 Heidegger, writes Harries, 'calls for a thinking which, no longer content

with the splintering of science into sciences, will help to establish the "spiritual world" of the German people and thus help to overcome the disintegrating tendencies of the age' (Harries 1976: 654). 'Clearly', writes Moehling, 'Heidegger's thinking in 1933 on learning and the German university demonstrates a serious departure from the Nazis' understanding of the University as a place for training a racial elite subservient to the state' (Moehling 1981: 34; see also Richardson 1963: 257; the title of the rectorial address, as Michael E. Zimmermann points out, was 'a daring title during the time when Hitler expected the universities to submit to what he asserted to be the demand of *das Volk*' (Zimmermann, 1981: 171). Seen in the context of other rectorial addresses of the time, writes Bernd Martin, Heidegger's was an exception; it was not at all in line with what the Nazis had expected (Martin 1986: 52; see also Schmidt 1986: 88). Obviously, this departure could not remain hidden. As Heidegger recorded in his recently published memoir, Minister Wacker immediately let him know his view of the rectorial address. In the minister's judgment, the address represented a sort of 'private National Socialism', which circumvented the perspectives of the party program, failed to be based upon 'racial thought', and rejected the idea of the 'politicized science' (cf. *SUR* 30f.).

33 The expression 'Verkapselung' is applied also technically by Heidegger to denote the 'worldless' subject characteristic of modern philosophy (see *SZ* 62).

34 Heidegger's rejection of 'academic freedom', writes Palmier, is not equivalent to the repudiation of the liberty of teaching or of the expression of thought (cf. Palmier 1968: 83). 'In Heidegger's understanding', Moehling writes, 'academic freedom in the modern age had come to mean academic specialization and the fragmentation of learning into distinct and isolated areas. It was the modern trend towards specialization, relativism, and irrelevancy which molded the university into a corporate entity which took pride in its autonomy but failed to recognize its isolation from the spiritual needs of the nation' (Moehling 1981: 34). That *Gebundenheit* in the positive sense is not synonymous with lack of freedom or subjection is a point made already in Heidegger's *Habilitationsschrift* (cf. *GA* 1: 199; see also *SZ* 122: 'Authentic Verbundenheit alone renders proper objectivity [*Sachlichkeit*] possible'; and *WW* in *GA* 9: 189: 'Freedom is not the *Ungebundenheit des Tun- und Nichttunkönnens*').

35 Concerning the Kantian concept of freedom as *Selbstgesetzgebung* see *GA* 31: 24 (where it is called 'the positive concept of freedom') and *passim*. The notion of the university as 'the place of spiritual legislation' shows many parallels with similar views characteristic of German Idealism (see Moehling 1981: 35). The most relevant text in the writings of German Idealists is perhaps Schelling's *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums* (1802). See Schelling 1977: 251, 254, 257 (Universities are defined here as 'Verbindungen für die Wissenschaften', and Heidegger claims, in like manner, that the commitment to the essence of the university is the commitment to science (*SU* 7: 281f., 284, 299, 304f; see also Fichte 1971: 110)). Here we touch upon a further aspect of the concept of *Wiederholung* – namely, in the sense of a retrieval of German Idealism's understanding of the cultural role of philosophy in the national awakening, and in the nation's life in general (see also Hegel 1970: 402ff.). It must be added that one of Heidegger's constant philosophical concerns was the *essence of the university*: he repeatedly gave lecture courses on it, the first as early as 1919 (see Richardson 1963: 663, 666; Pöggeler 1988: 21f.; see also *GA* 61: 62ff.).

36 See also the remark, quoted in section II.iii, on the destiny of science and philosophy.

37 For a Kantian parallel, cf. Kant 1982: 704.

38 Werner Jäger, who was soon to leave Germany because of his Jewish wife, had the intention of publishing the rectorial address in the review *Die Antike*, for he held it to be an outstanding example of how the classical heritage was alive in the present (see Petzet 1983: 34). Karl Jaspers wrote to Heidegger on Sept. 23, 1933, that the rectorial address 'is up to now the only document of a present academic will . . . that will be lasting [bisher einzige Dokument eines gegenwärtigen akademischen Willens . . . , das bleiben wird]' (Jaspers 1978: 13).

39 A view which has significant parallels with Kuhn's. See GA 1: 419; GA 20: 4; GA 21: 16f.; GA 25: 30ff.; SZ 9ff.; FD 50ff.

40 Cf. SD 87f. For the details of the publication of Heidegger's *magnum opus* see Sheehan 1981: 15; Sheehan 1984: 181ff.

41 Heidegger's critique of Nazism from 1934 on will be based upon the insight that Nazism, instead of offering a genuine solution to Europe's spiritual crisis, is, with its racial ideology, rather a continuation, and indeed a consummation, of the decline of the West, predicted by Spengler (see e.g., his critique of Rosenberg and Kolbenheyer in his lectures of 1934/5 (GA 39: 27f.; see also Schmidt 1986: 86). It is only too natural that those who were offering such pseudo-solutions were the first to accuse him of 'pessimism' and 'nihilism'. 'The meaning of this philosophy' – we can read in the journal *Volk im Werden* in 1934 – 'is outspoken atheism and metaphysical nihilism, as it formerly had been primarily represented by Jewish authors in Germany; therefore, a ferment of decay and dissolution for the German people. In *Being and Time* Heidegger philosophizes consciously and deliberately about "everydayness" – there is nothing in it about nation, state, race, and all the values of our National Socialist world-view' (Kriek 1934: 247, reprinted in Schneeberger 1962: 225; see Moehling 1981: 36f., whose translation, with slight modifications, I adopted).

42 It is important to see that Heidegger's description of the passage from inauthenticity is now transposed to the level of history: just as *Dasein*, in effecting the passage, first becomes isolated by anticipating death and harkening to the call of conscience, in order to open itself newly and genuinely for the world, and to render authentic Being-with possible, a nation is now seen as stripping itself of the inauthentic international *Mitsein*, conceived of in terms of *das Man*, in order to set an example for other nations' possible retrieval of themselves, and to open up for them, in authentic 'leaping ahead', their own and genuine care (the term 'Verbrüderung' is characteristically adopted in *Being and Time* to denote inauthentic *Mitsein* [SZ 298]).

43 The term 'Beruhigung' also denotes inauthenticity: it is in fact a category of fallenness (see SZ 177).

44 It should be noted that the expression *Brückenschlagen* is also part of Heidegger's philosophical vocabulary, denoting as it does the (mostly hopeless) attempts made by modern philosophy to mediate between the subject-object dualism, viz., the self-autonomous egos (cf. SZ 124; GA 21: 91ff.). Heidegger's application of the term in a different context should not, I think, be taken as a mere extrinsic analogy. It should rather be seen as an aspect of the previously mentioned connection between the renewal of the Being-question, of the meta-physical tradition (of which the subject-object dualism is, after Descartes, an integral part), and the reshaping of the historical-factual grounds underlying the tradition. A new access to Being is, after all, not a purely intellectual operation. Heidegger may legitimately be said to have expected the national awakening to provide a new experience of Being (for hints to this effect see SU 10, 14; GA 26: 23).

45 The notion that labor is not equivalent to physical labor – a notion that

goes back to Hegel and was elaborated in detail by Ernst Jünger in his *Der Arbeiter*, published in 1932 (see Jünger 1959: 74, 84, 223, 283, *et passim*) – is stressed by Heidegger on other occasions too. He explains thereby why animals, properly speaking, cannot *work* (see Schneeberger 1962: 180; on Jünger's influence upon Heidegger cf. Petzet 1983: 37f.; concerning Jünger's rejection of racism see e.g., Jünger 1959: 160; on Jünger's becoming an opponent of the regime see Krockow 1958: 112, who mentions that Jünger's *Auf den Marmorklippen*, published in 1939, was generally understood as a *Widerstandsschrift*). Given this conception of labor and knowledge, the students' *Arbeitsdienst* can no longer be seen as 'condescension' from a higher world to a lower one. 'The so-called "spiritual work" is not such because it concerns "higher spiritual things", but because *as work* it reaches deeper into the necessity of a people's historical *Dasein*' (Schneeberger 1962: 181; see Schwan 1965: 182).

46 Cf. *SU* 8, 14; *GR* 198; *SUR* 23; Schmidt 1986: 90. Concerning the way Heidegger conceived of the revival of the university, and particularly of what should *not* be part of the revival, Georg Picht relates an interesting story. To give the first lecture within the framework of 'political education' – a measure introduced at the German universities by the Nazis – Heidegger invited a man, Victor von Weizsäcker, who was known not to be a Nazi. After interrupting abruptly the introductory words on national socialist revolution, pronounced by the leader of philosophy students, Heidegger let von Weizsäcker speak about Freud. Picht also relates the words with which Felix Jacoby opened his university lectures on Horace in Kiel, in 1933. It is perhaps worthwhile to quote them, to illustrate the general atmosphere of the day: 'As a Jew, I find myself in a difficult position. But as a historian, I have learnt that historical events are not to be assessed from a personal perspective. From 1927 onwards I have made my option for Adolf Hitler, and consider it an honor to be able, in the year of the nation's rise, to lecture on Augustus' poet. For Augustus is the only figure of world history whom one can compare to Adolf Hitler.' Jacoby, as Picht writes, later emigrated to Oxford (Picht 1977: 198ff.; see also Petzet 1983: 37; Stern 1984: 39f.).

47 Heidegger did not elaborate anything like a 'political theory', for, as will have become clear by now, the 'theoretical-practical' distinction was one of the traditional metaphysical distinctions he wanted to overcome (see e.g., *SZ* 193; *SU* 10). The elaboration of a 'political theory' requires conceding some autonomy to the political sphere – a concession which, given his critical attitude toward the fragmentation characteristic of modern societies, Heidegger obviously could not make (see Pöggeler's objection to this effect in Pöggeler 1982: 50). Nevertheless, it may be said that Heidegger's philosophy, in a certain precise sense, is very political – namely, in a sense of the term associated with the Greek *polis* (cf. Palmier 1968: 159). The rejection of the autonomy of the 'political', and the consequent lack of a 'political philosophy' in his thought is explicit in his lectures in 1943. Commenting upon Heraclitus, Heidegger asks: 'And what, if, thought in the manner of the Greeks, the concern for the emerging presence [Anwesenheit] of the Gods were the highest concern for the *polis*? . . . If such is the case, then . . . the thinker, in his concern for the essential proximity of the Gods, is the authentically "political" man' (*GA* 55: 11f.).

48 Cf. Schneeberger 1962: 123, 132f. Heidegger received a previous call to Berlin in 1930 (Schneeberger 1962: 12).

49 'Warum bleiben wir in der Provinz?' *Der Alemanne*, 2 March 1934, reprinted in *DE* 9ff. English translation by Thomas Sheehan (see Sheehan 1981: 27ff.). I adopted this translation, with slight modifications, in the above paraphrase.

50 Heidegger himself was by then a member of the party. He entered on May 1, 1933, in order primarily to facilitate his relations with the ministry, and to be thus in a better position to put his ideas through – that is, as he wrote in a letter to the de-Nazification committee at Freiburg University after the war, ‘to attempt from *within* National Socialism and while having a point of reference to it, to bring about a spiritual change in its development’. But it caused no little astonishment in the ministry that none of the deans appointed by him in the autumn were party members (Heidegger’s letter is quoted by Moehling (1981: 33); see also Fédier 1966: 900; Allemann 1969: 252; Palmier 1968: 9, 89; Pöggeler 1974: 18f.; *SUR* 33, 37). Erik Wolf, dean of the Faculty of Law, later to become a bitter enemy of the regime, wrote in 1945 that what he found fascinating in Heidegger’s ideas was the hope in a ‘regeneration of the university’ (see Hollerbach 1986: 39f.).

51 Cf. *GR* 201; *SUR* 37; Fédier 1966: 901; Allemann 1969: 253; Moehling 1981: 37; Palmier 1968: 159; Martin 1986: 67. His successor was appointed by the ministry, and Heidegger refused to be present at the public celebration of his successor’s assumption of office (see also Wisser 1977: 264). The final events took place at the end of April (see Ott 1984a: 357). Although Ott is critical of Heidegger, he admits that ‘the accord between National Socialism and Heidegger could not last long, provided that Heidegger was to remain true to his own convictions, and the Nazis to theirs’ (Ott 1984a: 353).

52 Cf. Youssef Ishaghpour’s Introduction in Goldmann 1973: 44f. See also Picht 1977: 198. The tendency to overlook such changes in the concrete historical situation surrounding Heidegger’s activities as rector is illustrated by Farias (1987), a book which appeared after the completion of this paper. A critic with strong anti-Heideggerian inclinations admitted that from Farias’s book ‘nothing decisively new had come to light’ (Augstein 1987: 215). It remains to be seen whether the German edition of this book, now in preparation, will contain substantive documentary support for its claims, as urged, among others, by Aubenque (1988) and Rorty (1988: 32). Some like Aubenque (1988) and Rorty (1988: 32) urged for more substantive documentary support. For more detailed remarks on the recent discussion raised by Farias’s and Ott’s books, together with a critical evaluation of the a priori notions inherent in them as well as an attempt to enlarge the context of those approaches, see now my paper ‘Fakten und Apriori in der neueren Beschäftigung mit Heideggers politischem Engagement’ in *Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers. Symposium der Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung vom 24–8. April 1989 in Bonn-Bad Godesberg*, ed. by D. Papenfuss and O. Pöggeler, vol. 1: *Philosophie und Politik* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1991), 380–408.

References

- Allemann, Beda. 1969. Martin Heidegger und die Politik. In O. Pöggeler (ed.), *Heidegger. Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werks*. Köln/Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, pp. 246–60.
- Aubenque, Pierre. 1988. Grobe Irrtümer über Heidegger. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25 January 1988.
- Augstein, Rudolf. 1987. Aber bitte nicht philosophieren. *Der Spiegel*, 23 November 1987, pp. 212–20.
- Biemel, Walter. 1978. Heidegger’s concept of Dasein. In F. Elliston (ed.), *Heidegger’s Existential Analytic*. The Hague: Mouton Publishers, pp. 111–31.
- Bullock, Alan. 1952. *Hitler. A Study in Tyranny*. London: Odhams Press.

- Caputo, John D. 1982. Hermeneutics as the recovery of man. *Man and World* 15: 343–67.
- Chiodi, Pietro. 1965. *L'esistenzialismo di Heidegger*, 3rd ed. Torino: Taylor.
- Demske, James M. 1963. *Sein, Mensch und Tod. Das Todesproblem bei Martin Heidegger*. Freiburg/München: Alber.
- Elliston, Frederick. 1978. Heidegger's phenomenology of social existence. In F. Elliston (ed.), *Heidegger's Existential Analytic*. The Hague: Mouton, pp. 61–77.
- Farias, Victor. 1987. *Heidegger et le nazisme*. Paris: Verdier.
- Fédier, François. 1966. Trois attaques contre Heidegger. *Critique* 234: 883–904.
- Fehér, István M. 1984. *Martin Heidegger*. Budapest: Kossuth.
- Fell, Joseph, P. 1979. *Heidegger and Sartre. An Essay on Being and Place*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Fichte, J. G. 1971. Deducirter Plan einer zu Berlin zu errichtenden höheren Lehranstalt. In *Fichtes Werke* (ed. by I. H. Fichte), reprint edition, vol. 8. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 95–204.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1975. *Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*, 4th ed. Tübingen: Mohr.
- 1976. Die philosophischen Grundlagen des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts. In H. G. Gadamer, *Kleine Schriften*, vol. 1, 2nd ed. Tübingen: Mohr, pp. 131–48.
- 1983. *Heidegger's Wege*. Tübingen: Mohr.
- 1985. Gibt es auf Erden ein Mass? *Philosophische Rundschau* 32: 1–26.
- 1986/7. Erinnerungen an Heideggers Anfänge. *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* (ed. by F. Rodi) 4: 13–26.
- Gelven, Michael. 1970. *A Commentary on Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Gerstenberger, Heide. 1972. Konservatismus in der Weimarer Republik. In G. K. Kaltenbrunner (ed.), *Rekonstruktion des Konservatismus*. Freiburg: Rombach, pp. 331–48.
- Goldmann, Lucien. 1973. *Lukács et Heidegger* (ed. by Y. Ishaghpour). Paris: Denoël/Gonthier.
- Guignon, Charles B. 1984. Heidegger's 'Authenticity' revisited. *The Review of Metaphysics* 38: 321–39.
- Guzzoni, Ute. 1986. Bemerkungen zu Heidegger 1933. In B. Martin and G. Schramm (eds), *Martin Heidegger. Ein Philosoph und die Politik. Freiburger Universitätsblätter* 25(92): 75–80.
- Harries, Karsten. 1976. Heidegger as a political thinker. *The Review of Metaphysics* 29: 642–69.
- Hegel, G. W. F. 1970. Konzept der Rede beim Antritt des philosophischen Lehramtes an der Universität Berlin. 22. Okt. 1818. In G. W. F. Hegel, *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, Theorie Werkausgabe, vol. 10. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, pp. 399–417.
- Heidegger, Martin. (BH). Brief über den Humanismus. In *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Mit einem Brief über den 'Humanismus'*. Bern: Francke, 1947.
- (DE). *Denkerfahrten* (ed. by H. Heidegger). Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1983.
- (EM). *Einführung in die Metaphysik*. 4th ed. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976.
- (FD). *Die Frage nach dem Ding*. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1962.
- (GA). *Gesamtausgabe*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1975–. Quoted by volume and page numbers.
- (GR). 'Nur noch ein Gott uns retten'. Spiegel-Gespräch mit Martin Heidegger am 23 September 1966. *Der Spiegel*, 31 May 1976, pp. 193–219.

- (KPM). *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. 4th ed. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1973.
- (N 1, 2). *Nietzsche*, Vols. 1–2. Pfullingen: Neske, 1961.
- (SA). *Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (ed. by H. Feick). Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1971.
- (SD). *Zur Sache des Denkens*. 2nd ed. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976.
- (SU). *Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität*. Breslau: Korn, 1933.
- (SUR). *Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität. Das Rektorat 1933/1934* (ed. by H. Heidegger). Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1983. Also, translated with an introduction by Karsten Harries (*The Review of Metaphysics* 38: 467–502; 1985).
- (SZ). *Sein und Zeit*, 15th ed. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1979.
- (WA). *Wege zur Aussprache. Jahrbuch der Stadt Freiburg*, vol. 1. Stuttgart, 1937, pp. 135–9 (reprinted in *DE*, pp. 15–21).
- (WM). *Was ist Metaphysik?* Bonn: Cohen, 1930.
- (WW). *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1943.
- Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm von. 1981. *Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
- 1987. *Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins. Eine Erläuterung von 'Sein und Zeit'*. Band 1: 'Einleitung: Die Exposition der Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein'. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
- Hogemann, Friedrich. 1986/7. Heideggers Konzeption der Phänomenologie in den Vorlesungen aus dem Wintersemester 1919/20 und dem Sommersemester 1920. *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* (ed. by F. Rodi) 4: 54–71.
- Hollerbach, Alexander. 1986. Im Schatten des Jahres 1933: Erik Wolf und Martin Heidegger. In B. Martin and G. Schramm (eds.), *Martin Heidegger. Ein Philosoph und die Politik. Freiburger Universitätsblätter* 25(92): 33–47.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1965. *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (ed. by W. Szilasi). Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
- 1976. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (ed. by K. Schuhmann, *Husserliana* III/1). Den Haag: M. Nijhoff.
- 1980. *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. 1. *Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, 6th ed. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Jaspers, Karl. 1978. *Notizen zu Martin Heidegger* (ed. by H. Saner). München: Piper.
- Jünger, Ernst. 1959. *Der Arbeiter*. In E. Jünger, *Werke*, vol. 6. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, pp. 9–329.
- Kant, Immanuel. 1982. *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*. In I. Kant, *Werkausgabe*, vol. 8 (ed. by W. Weischedel), 5th ed. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, pp. 645–879.
- Kierkegaard, Søren. 1957. *Entweder/Oder*. Zweiter Teil. Düsseldorf: Diederichs Verlag.
- King, Magda. 1964. *Heidegger's Philosophy*. New York: Macmillan.
- Kisiel, Theodore. 1986/7. Das Entstehen des Begriffsfeldes 'Faktizität' im Frühwerk Heideggers. *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* (ed. by F. Rodi) 4: 91–120.
- Kriek, Ernst. 1934. Germanischer Mythos und Heideggersche Philosophie. *Volk im Werden* 2: 247–9 (reprinted in G. Schneeberger, *Nachlese zu Heidegger. Dokumente zu seinem Leben und Denken*. Bern, 1962, pp. 225–8).
- Krockow, Christian Graf von. 1958. *Die Entscheidung. Eine Untersuchung über Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger*. Stuttgart: F. Enke Verlag.

- Martin, Bernd. 1986. Heidegger und die Reform der deutschen Universität 1933. In B. Martin and G. Schramm (eds.), *Martin Heidegger. Ein Philosoph und die Politik. Freiburger Universitätsblätter* 25(92): 49–69.
- Marx, Werner. 1961. *Heidegger und die Tradition*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
- Meinecke, Friedrich. 1949. *Die Deutsche Katastrophe. Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen*, 4th ed. Wiesbaden: Brockhaus.
- Moehling, Karl A. 1981. Heidegger and the Nazis. In T. Sheehan (ed.), *Heidegger. The Man and the Thinker*. Chicago: Precedent, pp. 31–43.
- Mörchen, Hermann. 1981. *Adorno und Heidegger. Untersuchung einer philosophischen Kommunikationsverweigerung*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Ott, Hugo. 1984a. Martin Heidegger als Rektor der Universität Freiburg 1933/34. *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins* 132: 343–58.
- 1984b. Martin Heidegger als Rektor der Universität Freiburg i. Br. 1933/34. II. Die Zeit des Rektorats von Martin Heidegger (23 April 1933 bis 23 April 1934). *Zeitschrift des Breisgau-Geschichtsvereins ('Schau-ins-Land')* 103: 107–30.
- Palmier, Jean-Michel. 1968. *Les écrits politiques de Heidegger*. Paris: L'Herne.
- Petzet, Heinrich Wiegand. 1983. *Auf einen Stern zugehen. Begegnungen und Gespräche mit Martin Heidegger 1929–1976*. Frankfurt am Main: Societäts Verlag.
- Picht, Georg. 1977. Die Macht des Denkens. In G. Neske (ed.), *Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger*. Pfullingen: Neske, pp. 197–205.
- Pöggeler, Otto. 1963. *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*. Pfullingen: Neske.
- 1974. *Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger*, 2nd ed. Freiburg/München: Alber.
- 1982. Neue Wege mit Heidegger? *Philosophische Rundschau* 29: 39–71.
- 1983. *Heidegger und die hermeneutische Philosophie*. Freiburg/München: Alber.
- 1984. *Die Frage nach der Kunst. Von Hegel zu Heidegger*. Freiburg/München: Alber.
- 1985. Den Führer führen? Heidegger und kein Ende. *Philosophische Rundschau* 32: 26–67.
- 1988. Heideggers politisches Selbstverständnis. In A. Gethmann-Siefert and O. Pöggeler (eds.), *Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, pp. 17–63.
- Rauschning, Hermann. 1939. *Germany's Revolution of Destruction*. London/Toronto: William Heinemann (German edition: *Die Revolution des Nihilismus*. Zürich/New York: Europa Verlag, 1938).
- Richardson, William J., S. J. 1963. *Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought* (Preface by Martin Heidegger). The Hague: M. Nijhoff.
- Rodi, Frithjof. 1986/7. Die Bedeutung Diltheys für die Konzeption von Sein und Zeit. Zum Umfeld von Heideggers Kasseler Vorträgen (1925). *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* (ed. by F. Rodi) 4: 161–77.
- Rorty, Richard. 1979. *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- 1988. Taking philosophy seriously: Heidegger et le Nazisme by Victor Farias. *New Republic*, 11 April 1988, pp. 31–4.
- Sallis, John. 1978. Where does 'Being and Time' begin? Commentary on sections 1–4. In F. Elliston (ed.), *Heidegger's Existential Analytic*. The Hague: Mouton, pp. 21–43.
- Schelling, F. W. J. 1977. *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studi-*

- ums. *Schellings Werke* (ed. by M. Schröter), Dritter Hauptband, 3rd ed. München: C. H. Beck, pp. 229–374.
- Schmidt, Gerhart. 1986. Heideggers philosophische Politik. In B. Martin and G. Schramm (eds.), *Martin Heidegger. Ein Philosoph und die Politik. Freiburger Universitätsblätter* 25(92): 83–90.
- Schneeberger, Guido. 1962. *Nachlese zu Heidegger. Dokumente zu seinem Leben und Denken*. Bern: Author's edition.
- Schwan, Alexander. 1965. *Politische Philosophie im Denken Heideggers*. Köln und Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Sheehan, Thomas J. 1975. Heidegger, Aristotle and Phenomenology. *Philosophy Today* (Summer): 87–94.
- 1981. Heidegger's early years: fragments for a philosophical biography. In T. Sheehan (ed.), *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*. Chicago: Precedent, pp. 3–19.
- 1984. 'Time and Being' 1925–7. In R. W. Shahan and J. N. Mohanty (eds.), *Thinking About Being: Aspects of Heidegger's Thought*. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, pp. 177–219.
- Stern, Fritz. 1984. Der Nationalsozialismus als Versuchung. In F. Stern and H. Jonas, *Reflexionen finsterner Zeit*. Tübingen: Mohr, pp. 3–59.
- Ugazio, Ugo Maria. 1976. *Il Problema della Morte nella Filosofia di Heidegger*. Milano: Mursia.
- Volpi, Franco. 1984a. Heidegger in Marburg. Die Auseinandersetzung mit Husserl. *Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger* 37: 48–69.
- 1984b. *Heidegger e Aristotele*. Padova: Daphne.
- Wachlens, Alphonse de. 1947. La philosophie de Heidegger et le nazisme. *Les Temps Modernes* 2: 115–27.
- Willms, Bernard. 1977. Politik als Geniestreich? Bemerkung zu Heideggers Politikverständnis. *Martin Heidegger. Fragen an sein Werk*. Stuttgart: Reclam, pp. 16–20.
- Wisser, Richard. 1977. Das Fernseh-Interview. In G. Neske (ed.), *Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger*. Pfullingen: Neske, pp. 257–87.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1984. *Über Gewissheit. Werkausgabe*, vol. 8. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Zimmermann, Michael E. 1981. *Eclipse of the Self. The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Authenticity and Heidegger's challenge to ethical theory

Douglas Kellner

Martin Heidegger's concept of authenticity in *Sein und Zeit*¹ offers a series of interpretive problems and challenges. Heidegger claims that his existential analytic is purely ontological and disclaims that his analyses have ethical import. Yet generations of readers, including some of the century's most prominent philosophers,² have been convinced that Heidegger has offered an ethical doctrine. Indeed there is a lively controversy as to whether Heidegger is nihilist who has devaluated traditional values and offered little or nothing in their place,³ or whether Heidegger has provided a liberating doctrine of an authentic existence that is the foundation of an existentialist ethics.⁴ In this paper I wish to sort these claims out and to inquire what relevance, if any, Heidegger's doctrine has for contemporary ethical theory. I shall argue that Heidegger's analyses contain a critique of ethical prescriptivism and put into radical question one of the hallowed dogmas of empiricism: the distinction between fact and value and normative and descriptive statements. Heidegger, we shall see, also provides an interesting contribution to the is-ought controversy and to our understanding of the relations between ethics and ontology. It could be possible that current discussions of ethics could profit from the study of a philosopher who is taboo in many analytical circles. Indeed, one of the benefits in reading Heidegger is his putting into question and offering alternatives to many of our dominant philosophical prejudices and our complacent commonsensical view of both our philosophical practice and everyday ways of being.

An obstacle to the appropriation of Heidegger into the English-speaking world is the work of Heidegger's interpreters and camp followers and their misleading and obscure renditions of his philosophy. His interpreters are for the most part mystifiers, or simplifiers. The majority are more obscure than Heidegger and heavy-handedly repeat his jargon without his originative philosophical talent, his vision, his prolonged

meditation on the problems he handles.⁵ There has been, however, some promising recent work on Heidegger's philosophy that discloses the positive contribution his work could make to the English-speaking philosophical world. It is in this spirit of communicating Heidegger's philosophical contributions that the present essay was composed. My critique of Heidegger has been published elsewhere.⁶

In this paper I shall first discuss Heidegger's distinction between an authentic and inauthentic existence and shall discuss the sense in which he is, or is not, offering a normative doctrine and engaging in social critique. This discussion will raise the question of the normative-descriptive distinction and the linguistic status of Heidegger's concept of authenticity. I shall then discuss the transition from an inauthentic to an authentic existence in Heidegger's account and shall elucidate his concept of authenticity. Finally, I shall raise the issue of the ethical implications of Heidegger's work and his contributions to contemporary ethical theory.

I

Our starting point in the search for authenticity will be Heidegger's inquiry into average everydayness and the everyday self. Average everydayness describes how most people, most of the time, behave in the work world (*Umwelt*) and social world (*Mitwelt*). Heidegger claims that in everyday behavior most people are not aware of their unique potentiality for individuality (*Jemeinigkeit*), or of their possible authenticity, and have not chosen their own possibilities. He is calling attention to the conformity and other-directedness that prevails in everyday behavior. In his view, calculating where one stands in the social hierarchy and concern for one's social status (*Abständigkeit*; SZ 126) puts one in *subjection* to the other. For in order to maintain one's standing, one must do what *they* approve of, praise, command, and require, and refrain from socially disapproved or forbidden behavior. In this way, one submits to an often subtle and unnoticed domination by the norms and conventions of society and forfeits one's own possibilities of thought and action. This submission and bondage to one's social norms, peers, and leaders results in an averageness, a leveling down of social behavior to a certain homogeneity and sameness. In this way, one is disburdened (*entlastet*) of individuality and responsibility for being-a-self and is accommodated by one's society, rewarded for one's submission. However, 'in these ways of being', Heidegger writes, 'one is in a state of inauthenticity and failure to stand by oneself' (SZ 128).

We see that Heidegger characterizes the prevalent behavior of everyday existence as 'inauthentic'. This term, and Heidegger's analyses, would seem to imply that Heidegger is engaging in a type of social

critique, that he is using 'inauthenticity' and its family of explicative concepts in a pejorative sense to condemn blameworthy mediocrity, conformity, and forfeiture of individuality. Thus it seems that Heidegger has developed a negative evaluation of social forms of everyday behavior. But this interpretation is put into question by Heidegger's claim that he is not engaged in a 'moralizing critique of everyday Dasein' and his counter claim that he is doing 'pure ontology'

It may not be superfluous to remark that our interpretation has a purely ontological intention, and is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein and from the aspirations of 'culture philosophy'.

(SZ 167)⁷

This disclaimer raises extremely difficult problems which are central to the question of interpreting Heidegger's concept of authenticity. For the question arises as to whether authenticity-inauthenticity are *evaluative* or *descriptive* categories. Although it seems that these categories are evaluative, Heidegger claims that his intentions (and thus categories) are purely ontological, which might lead one to conclude that Heidegger's categories are purely descriptive. In fact, this is exactly what interpreters of Heidegger's SZ who took into consideration the problem of the status of the language of authenticity have concluded. Löwith, for instance, in an early article (1930) stressed the neutrality of Heidegger's 'formal ontological assertions', which are completely 'neutral' and 'indifferent' to all valuational claims,⁸ thus sharply ruling out the possibility of a normative dimension in Heidegger's text. This interpretation was later proclaimed by Vietta who argued that Heidegger's language of authenticity was purely descriptive (*reine Beschreibungslehre*).⁹ But despite the disclaimers of Heidegger and his interpreters, there are good reasons to put into question the dubious claim that Heidegger's distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity has no evaluative aspects.

First, his concepts do have an evaluative connotation if one takes them in their ordinary signification, or their philosophical usages, i.e., inauthenticity, alienation, averageness and leveling down, idle chatter, etc., have a pejorative tone both in their everyday uses and in the works of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Simmel, Scheler, and the other philosophers from whom Heidegger borrowed his terms. Moreover, a careful reading of Heidegger's description of inauthenticity on SZ 126-30, which we have briefly examined, and his description of the 'fall' away from one's self and into inauthentic ways of being (SZ 167-80) discloses a rather thoroughgoing condemnation of inauthentic everydayness. For he describes an inauthentic existence as an 'absorption' in the everyday routine, a 'dispersion' into inauthentic ways of being such as idle chatter,

a constant search for diversion (*Neugier*), and a spurious, non-committal surmising about things to do and changes to make without really ever carrying through or changing anything (*Zweideutigkeit*). Surely, Heidegger's description of these inauthentic ways of talking, understanding, acting, etc., is disparaging, critical, and contains a negative evaluation. For example, idle chatter is described as a 'perversion' of the act of communicating which builds a false understanding. 'Curiosity' and 'ambiguity' are described as uprooted, alienated forms of 'groundless floating'. The whole process of getting entangled in an inauthentic existence is described as a 'downward plunge' (*Absturz*) into 'the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness' (SZ 178). Thus Heidegger's own formulations of his concepts seem to be strikingly evaluative. In fact, when Heidegger characterizes his concept of authenticity, he admits that an ideal of existence underlies his interpretation (SZ 310), indicating that authenticity is an *ideal* for Heidegger which he is recommending as a modification of inauthenticity. Hence Heidegger's contrast between inauthenticity and authenticity indicates he is maintaining an *axiological dualism* which he dialectically develops, spelling out oppositions and differences between authentic and inauthentic ways of being. This interpretation would suggest that Heidegger's analysis of an inauthentic existence contains a negative evaluation of everyday behavior, whereas the concept of authenticity contains an ideal of being human.

I do not want to imply here, however, that Heidegger's doctrine of authenticity is merely 'evaluative' in a pejorative emotivist, non-cognitivist sense. Indeed we shall see that one of the novel characteristics of his doctrine of authenticity is that his contrast between an authentic and inauthentic existence contains *both* an evaluative and descriptive dimension and thus *undercuts* and puts into question a strict descriptive-evaluative distinction. Thus I suggest that Heidegger offers a new type of evaluative language that is grounded in a descriptive ontology. In this interpretation, Heidegger's concept of authenticity would replace traditional ethical theories which would be shown to be deficient in a yet unspecified sense.

Finally, I would suggest that Heidegger's concepts and distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity have the same *function* as traditional ethical language (i.e., to condemn, criticize, elicit change, recommend modifications, guide action, propose alternatives, etc.). Heidegger's analysis of inauthenticity provides a new way of looking at our everyday life and brings to attention some usually overlooked blameworthy characteristics and tendencies which he describes as 'inauthentic' ways of being. Crucially, these ways of being are *to be modified*. To be authentic one must change one's life:

Authentic being-oneself does not rest upon an exceptional condition

of the subject, a condition that has been detached from *das Man*; it is rather an *existentiell* modification of *das Man*.

(SZ 130)

Heidegger's theory helps in this process of self-transformation by forcing us to put into question some of our everyday habits and tendencies (and ways of doing philosophy) and attempts to provide an authentic disclosure of everyday being-in-the-world and its higher alternative (authenticity): 'this disclosure of human being (*Dasein*) is always accomplished as a clearing away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which the individual bars its own way' (SZ 129). The breakthrough to an authentic existence is accomplished, Heidegger tells us, through a process of extrication and individuation in which one goes through the experiences of anxiety (anxiety from leading a meaningless existence, from failing to realize one's authentic potentialities; SZ 40); experiences of one's impending death which makes one aware of one's unique selfhood and the finite amount of time at one's disposal (SZ 46–53); and a call of conscience which informs one that one is guilty of living inauthentically, of running away from oneself, and that summons one to choose to become authentic, to resolutely take responsibility for one's choices (SZ 54–60). To be authentic one must choose and commit oneself to authentic possibilities. One must take over one's freedom, uniqueness, finitude, and failures and resolutely engage in the authentic projects through which one creates an authentic self.

The key to this process is Heidegger's concept of *resoluteness* (SZ 60, 62 and 74). To be authentic one must resolutely choose to liberate oneself from domination by social conventions and inauthentic ways of being and liberate oneself for one's own projects and self-determination. Choosing to be authentic 'in the light of the projected field of one's self-chosen potentiality-for-being, the resolute individual frees itself for its world' (SZ 298).

Heidegger is re-interpreting here, I suggest, the themes of self-determination and constitution. He rejects the Kantian model of 'pure reason' forever struggling to control and defeat 'empirical' passion, and utilizes a model of the individual struggling against society (*das Man*). The issue here concerns the determination of one's choice and the constitution of one's life. An inauthentic person does not determine itself, for it either blindly follows social convention, evades decisive choice by losing itself in distraction, or ineffectually surmising what it should do. Heidegger calls this forfeiture of self-determination *irresoluteness*. An irresolute person surrenders to the way things have been publicly interpreted and falls into the ways of being that are socially prescribed and recommended. An authentic person, on the other hand, resolutely rejects the authority

and domination of society and other people and takes over its freedom and responsibility to constitute its own *situation*.¹⁰

On Heidegger's account, only by resolving on some project or choosing a set of possibilities as one's authentic resolve does one constitute one's own situation, hence 'the situation has its foundation in resoluteness' (SZ 299). 'Situation' thus seems to signify the resolute individual's choice of its own possibilities, commitments, context of meanings and life-style – one's own distinct way of being-in-the-world. Heidegger is here, I believe, re-working the notion of 'constitution'. On Heidegger's analysis what the self constitutes is not the entire 'not I' (Fichte), or the phenomenal world (Kant), or the object of consciousness (Husserl), but rather it constitutes its own situation. Thus Heidegger modifies the idealist notion of the self constituting the world through his analysis of the authentic self constituting its own situation through its projects and resolves.

For Heidegger the authentic self is a self-made project. Heidegger's analysis here can be contrasted with Sartre's doctrine that 'man is what he makes himself to be'. For whereas Sartre argues that one's continuous making of oneself is a resultant of natural and spontaneous self-creation, Heidegger claims that one's creation of an authentic self is a state that is only attained by a *project* of self-being, implying that most people do not make themselves but are 'made' by their social environment and socialization. The claim that authenticity consists in a project of self-transformation calls for an explication of Heidegger's concept of project (*Entwurf*). The primary function of the understanding is, in Heidegger's account, to project possibilities. But *Entwurf* does not merely signify throwing oneself into something (as Sartre's *project*), but rather signifies designing, sketching, and planning, for the German term *Entwurf* literally means 'design, plan, project, scheme, blueprint'. These connotations suggest that the primary function of the human understanding is to sketch and project possibilities, to choose projects and weigh alternatives, to conceive what is possible for one, to decide how one can best carry out one's resolves. Thus the clear connection with autonomy which presupposes an ability to conceive and choose between alternative possibilities and a capacity for creative choice. What is constituted in an authentic project is an authentic self. The authentic self is the creation of a resolute individual who chooses to become authentic and to carry through authentic possibilities. To be a self is thus an achievement on this view characterized by resoluteness, autonomy, individuality, responsibility, loyalty and commitment. The criterion of an authentic self is *Selbständigkeit*, a steadfast standing loyal to one's authentic projects and remaining true to oneself.

Although Heidegger leaves open what possibilities an authentic person resolves upon (SZ 298), he does indicate the sort of choice he has in

mind and the *how* of authentic choice in his discussion of choosing one's authentic possibilities from one's heritage (SZ 74).¹¹ Section 74 of the chapter on 'Temporality and historicity' contains the key, I believe, to Heidegger's concept of an authentic existence. Those many interpreters who claim that authenticity is solely a way of being toward death have overlooked the importance of this late chapter for Heidegger's concept of authenticity and thus have omitted the most important aspects of his concept of authenticity and existential ontology. For in a key passage he describes the resolute choice of one's authentic possibilities as a *repetition* (*Wiederholung*) of authentic possibilities from one's heritage:

The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the repetition of a possibility for existence that has come down to us. *Repetition is the explicit handing-down*, that is, the going back into the possibilities of the human beings that have been. The authentic repetition of a past possibility of existence, the choosing of one's hero, is grounded in advancing resoluteness; for in resoluteness one first chooses the choice that makes one free for the struggle of loyalty and the struggling succession of the repeatable possibility. (SZ 385)

'Choosing one's hero' from the heritage can be explicated as the choice of one's vocation, or the choice of models to guide one in one's projects. This choice of one's hero has some similarity to Sartre's concept of the fundamental project, but with the requirement that one consciously and resolutely makes one's choices out of the heritage of possibilities. For example, after a careful consideration of one's own potentialities and possibilities ('what one is capable of' and 'what is open to one'), one can choose, say, philosophy as one's authentic possibility, and can choose past philosophers as, for example, Aristotle, or Marx, or Nietzsche as one's models. Or one could choose Christianity or revolutionary socialism, taking Jesus or Lenin as one's 'hero'.

The choice of one's authentic possibilities leads to a 'struggle for loyalty', referring to the repetition of one's choices in the present situation, so that one is true to one's resolve in standing by and remaining steadfast to one's projection of authenticity. The criterion for loyalty is *Selbständigkeit* which refers to the authentic person's autonomy, self-determination, and self-constancy. This criterion applies only to an authentic person for only the individual that has chosen authentic possibilities and constantly repeats its choice has achieved the 'steadiness' and 'steadfastness' of self-constancy. Seizing on a definite possibility and loyally standing by it refers to an activity of *commitment*.

This loyal repetition of one's possibilities can be contrasted with the irresoluteness which hops from possibility to possibility without ever

committing itself to anything (*Neugier*), and which covers over its irresoluteness with ambiguous idle talk. Thus, Heidegger's suggested way of transforming a dispersed, alienated existence is the resolute repetition of authentic possibilities, followed by a struggle for loyalty in which one remains true to one's choice against social pressures and the ever present possibility of backsliding.

Our interpretation suggests that Heidegger's concept of authenticity yields notions of self-determination, autonomy, responsibility, commitment, loyalty and a concept of the authentic self. Only an authentic person, Heidegger argues, has the essential characteristics of selfhood (individuality, identity, unity, substantiality and personality), hence he claims that his concept of authenticity provides an ontological grounding of what are taken to be traditional features of selfhood. Hence Heidegger corrects the idealist-transcendentalist account of the self of such people as Descartes, Kant, and Husserl.¹² Moreover, one could argue that Heidegger's distinction between an authentic and inauthentic existence also provides an ontological grounding of some of the fundamental concepts of ethics. Although we have but roughly sketched out Heidegger's concept of authenticity here,¹³ rather than further spelling out and developing these ideas, I would like to now show the relevance of Heidegger's concept of authenticity to contemporary ethical theory.

II

Let us begin with a passage that indicates a positive relation of Heidegger's existential analysis to ethics. In indicating the relation of his existential-ontological analysis of guilt to moral guilt Heidegger writes:

This essential being-guilty is equiprimordially the existential condition for the possibility of the 'morally' good and the 'morally' evil – that is, for morality in general and for the possible forms which this may take factically. The primordial 'being guilty' cannot be defined by morality, since morality already presupposes it for itself.

(SZ 286)

This passage suggests both a possible connection between Heidegger's ontology and ethics, and a general notion of the relationship between ethics and ontology. For Heidegger implies here that ontology is the foundation of ethics, and that it is illegitimate for ethics to define such concepts as guilt, 'since morality already presupposes it for itself' (SZ 286). If it is the task of philosophy to 'work out its presuppositions with more and more penetration', as Heidegger states on SZ 310, then it follows that the presuppositions of ethics must be analyzed, grounded,

and delimited in an ontological analysis. This would imply that ethical theory must be aware of its presuppositions and be sure they are adequately grounded in an ontology of human being – indicating that ethics requires existential–ontological clarification and understanding. This notion is repeated in another context on SZ 293:

Even the theory of value, whether it is regarded formally or materially, has as its unexpressed ontological presupposition a ‘metaphysic of morals’ – that is, an ontology of Dasein and existence.

What is clear from the passage cited is that Heidegger claims that ethics (1) has ‘unexpressed ontological presuppositions’ (SZ 293), and (2) cannot define its own presuppositions (SZ 286). These statements suggest a superordinate position in regard to ethics for ontology, and suggest that one of the tasks of ontology in relation to ethics is to work out the presuppositions of ethics, and thus to provide a grounding of its basic concepts. Following this argument, it could be suggested that ontology functions as a court of jurisdiction that validates or criticizes ethical theories, according to whether they are in accord with the being that is in question, as disclosed by the analysis of a well-grounded ontology, such as Heidegger claims to provide in SZ. That is, the ought must be shown to be grounded in the is, in much the same way that Heidegger holds that the ontological must be grounded in the ontic. Those philosophers who advocate the ‘autonomy’ of ethics, and hold that the ‘ought’ is an ideal that is far removed from the ‘is’ (which is human being and doing), must, I believe, answer the questions Heidegger raises and defend their enterprise by showing that their theory is based on an adequate foundation, that they have secured and clarified their presuppositions, and that they have a penetrating understanding of the subject matter of ethics – human being-in-the-world. Thus I believe that part of the ethical import of SZ rests upon the questions it raises for ethical theory and the challenge it presents to existing theories.

What is at stake is the question of the conditions of the possibility of ethics. Before, on this analysis, one can define such concepts as ‘good’, ‘guilt’, ‘responsible’, and so on, one should be clear as to the conditions of the possibility of being-good, being-guilty, being-responsible. That is, what kind of a being can ‘be good’ and what does this mean? What kind of a being can assume moral guilt? can be blamed? praised? held responsible? obligated? This type of questioning, if developed, would, I believe, lead to a powerful critique of existing ethical theory. Moreover, I believe that these considerations also illuminate Heidegger’s own position in regard to ethics. For his seeming rejection of ethical analysis as a separate, specialized mode of inquiry is an implicit critique of the fragmentation of philosophical analysis that considers questions of the

good, right, or ought without having adequately secured a conceptual understanding of human being. By not securing an adequate foundation for its theories and imperatives, ethics is condemned to be merely prescriptive or emotive, confessional (or trivial, apologetic, and conformist, as in the case of much 'ordinary language' ethics). Thus if ethics is to be a philosophically respectable discipline it must become aware of its presuppositions, and build its theories on the firm foundation of an ontology of human being, or some general theory of human nature. Such are the considerations suggested by Heidegger's remarks concerning the relations between ethics and ontology.

Heidegger is a great enemy of philosophical dualisms which he believes are the source of much philosophical error. For example, he opposes dividing philosophy into theoretical and practical disciplines (and into dividing human behavior into theoretical and practical categories; SZ 300-1). Hence his analyses combine subject matter traditionally separated into ethics and ontology. In this regard, it would be a mistake to try to characterize Heidegger's concept of authenticity as either purely descriptive ontology or an evaluative ethics, for his project cuts beneath this distinction. The interconnection of what is usually separated into normative and descriptive disciplines and statements is thus a distinctive feature of Heidegger's concept of authenticity. In fact, it could be that the upshot of this problem of interpreting the propositional status of authenticity forces us to reconsider our often rigidly maintained dichotomy between evaluative and descriptive statements, value and fact, normative and descriptive disciplines. I have proposed that Heidegger's concept of authenticity contains both a descriptive and normative dimension, neither of which can be eradicated without distorting and restricting the scope, depth, and import of Heidegger's work. Further, I propose that Heidegger's undercutting the descriptive-normative dichotomy *corrects* a dubious methodological procedure that results in a restricted or one-sided analysis which, intentionally or not, omits considerations that do not fall within the prescribed-delimited domain of inquiry (I am thinking of much American social science, pure phenomenology, linguistic analysis and other disciplines that maintain a strict fact-value, descriptive-evaluative distinction, and that claim to exclude all value judgments, evaluative presuppositions, and ethical claims). We encounter here a Heideggerian procedure that puts into radical question established practices, methodological presuppositions, and theoretical commitments prevalent in the Anglo-American philosophical world. This problem in the area of hermeneutics (or methodology) has its analogue in the ethical problem of the relation between 'is' and 'ought' in which Heidegger again puts our current dogma into question. This challenge to our current philosophical conventions is one of the valuable contributions which SZ offers the English-speaking philosophical world.

In regard to the normative–descriptive distinction, I suggest that a radical questioning of this distinction and a careful study of the language of authenticity in *SZ* can contribute to an elimination of what I believe to be a superficial foundational dogma of an outworn empiricism. The origin of this dichotomy in twentieth-century positivism utilized the distinction for the most part as a corrosive tool; i.e., ethical statements or ‘value judgments’ are on this model merely expressions of an attitude or ‘feelings’, and thus have an inferior cognitive status, since they cannot be verified by empirical observation statements. But this whole model rests on a questionable and largely discredited empiricist theory of verification, evidence, and a propositional cognitive hierarchy that divided our language into two exclusive classes of statements, in which evaluative statements are rated cognitively inferior, since they are not capable of objective or factual verification, and are therefore subjective, emotive, non-cognitive.¹⁴ But both the simplistic dichotomy between normative and descriptive and an explication of normative–evaluative statements as cognitively inferior are highly questionable notions which demand serious criticism and re-thinking.¹⁵ I believe that Heidegger’s language of authenticity puts the distinction and its positivist explication into question by undercutting the dichotomy and by offering a vocabulary that has both a descriptive and evaluative dimension.

In conclusion, I would like to suggest that Heidegger’s concept of authenticity contains two further criticisms of traditional ethical theories that are worth considering. He claims that traditional ethical theories presuppose an ‘ontology of the present-at-hand’ (the view that everything that *is* must be something present-at-hand, *Vorhanden*). That is, traditional ethical theories, he claims, characterize their ethical predicates such as ‘good’ or ‘value’ as something present-at-hand interpreted as a property or predicate of a thing or state of affairs. This ontological presupposition that everything that *is* must be something present-at-hand (and thus an observable, describable entity) is, according to Heidegger, the source of much bad philosophical thinking. Speaking of the concept guilt, Heidegger writes:

Least of all can we come any closer to the existential phenomenon of guilt by taking our orientation from the idea of evil, the *malum* as *privatio boni*. Just as the *bonum* and its *privatio* have the same ontological origin in the ontology of the *present-at-hand*, this ontology also applies to the idea of ‘value’ which has been ‘abstracted’ from these.

(*SZ* 286)

The passage suggests the extent to which ethical thinking has been dominated by the ontological model of the *Vorhanden*. Philosophers have traditionally taken values as something present-at-hand, either in a

Platonic world of Ideas, in an intelligible realm of consciousness, or in the 'objective' structure of reality. On this model of the *Vorhanden*, 'good' too must be something, a property, an entity, something intuitable. This ontological prejudice, then, is the source of the controversy over ethical naturalism (and the so-called naturalistic fallacy), over ethical intuitionism (which was honest enough to confess that they couldn't find 'good' or any ethical property in the world, but which was so stubbornly dominated by the metaphysics of the present-at-hand that they were forced into mystification to defend their enterprise), and over the question of the being (or 'logical status') of 'value'. The advocates of the linguistic 'revolution' in philosophy will agree with Heidegger that much ethical thinking has been dominated by bad metaphysics without seeing that they too are dominated by this ontological presupposition in their belief that ethical concepts can be reduced to (or explicated as) linguistic usage, speech acts, or social conventions: good solid factual data that one can set before him and analyze in a clear cut (if trivial) way. To these believers in *ordinary* usage, *common* sense, and social *conventions*, Heidegger could scornfully note that they are merely making explicit the social conventions of their (inauthentic) society and in submitting without criticism to these conventions are no better than 'slaves of Pharisaism' (SZ 293).

Heidegger's argument against the type of ethics that takes ethical concepts to denote entities present-at-hand could be that this enterprise is inadequate to the phenomena in question and must be replaced by a new vocabulary that is rooted in an authentic understanding of existence and a new way of thinking that does not become trapped in traditional presuppositions and inadequate thinking. Such an ontology Heidegger could claim to offer in SZ, and he claims that his existential ontology explicates the being of a being who is qualitatively other than the something present-at-hand explicated by the categories of traditional metaphysics (and ethics). One application of this thesis for ethics is its suggestion that ethicists should not waste their time searching for properties to which they can apply their ethical predicates, or sorting out different senses of the language of ethics, but should rather see into the ontological dubiousness of their procedure, and the need to ground their ethical analysis in an adequate ontology of human being.

Further, Heidegger puts into radical question the very possibility of a prescriptive ethics in his remarks concerning the ontological horizon of ethics. For Heidegger, any theory that interprets human being as a being who is to be evaluated according to its capacity and performance in either 'actualizing values' or 'satisfying norms' (or moral principles) operates within the horizon of everyday calculative concern and thus falls prey to an ontologically dubious practice. From this standpoint, ' "Life" is a business, whether or not it covers its costs' (SZ 289). That is, human

being is pictured as a household or business that is run according to some conventionally established procedure, and is judged and evaluated in terms of how it measures up to that standard. Heidegger suggests that most ethical theories operate in the sphere of everyday concern and calculation in which they presuppose certain standards, moral principles, or norms, and then measure human being according to whether it meets the mark or satisfies the demand in question. For example, he suggests that Kant, with his representation of conscience as a 'court of justice', has fallen prey to the horizon of concern and calculation, for his interpretation was guided by the idea of satisfying or transgressing the 'moral law' (SZ 293).

What is objectionable here is not only a crude, mechanical way of thinking, but also the ontologically unclear and questionable nature of the moral principles, laws, imperatives, and so forth that are used as the norms controlling the act of judging. In particular, Heidegger puts into question the notion of a moral law and *ought*, and the demand or requirement (*Forderung*) made that is supposedly *binding* or *obligatory* (*verbindlich*). In reference to guilt, Heidegger writes:

This kind of lacking is a failure to satisfy some requirement which applies to one's existent being with others.

It remains undecided how such requirements arise and in what way their character as requirements and laws must be conceived on the basis of their having this source. . . . The idea of guilt must not only be raised above the domain of that concern in which we reckon things up, but it must also be detached from relationship to any law or ought such that by failing to comply with it one loads himself with guilt.

(SZ 282, 283)

These remarks implicitly raise many difficult questions. For what is the source of obligation, moral law, ethical imperatives? Why *must* I do xyz, and *not* do abc? The ontological dubiousness of the concept of ought (moral law, prescriptives) thus throws into question the whole moral practice of calculating, judging, and condemning in relation to fulfilling, failing to fulfill or transgressing a moral law or ought. Heidegger's most critical remarks throwing into question the 'ought' or a binding, obligatory imperative are found in a neglected passage, SZ 156. In speaking of the phenomenon of validity (*Geltung*), he distinguishes three essential predicates: ideality, objectivity, bindingness (*Verbindlichkeit*). He argues that these 'significations' are 'not only opaque in themselves but constantly get confused with one another. Methodological fore-sight demands that we do not choose such unstable concepts as clues to interpretation' (SZ 156). These criticisms are directed against an analysis

of the 'theory of judgment', but I believe they also apply to ethical judgments, for the characteristics in question are generally taken to be essential constituents of ethical judgments.¹⁶ This means that the concept of 'bindingness' or 'obligatoriness' (*Verbindlichkeit*) is a dubious one for Heidegger, who would thus be forced by his own philosophical reflections from prescribing authentic possibilities that would be obligatory or binding (at least until the 'ontological opaqueness' and confusion surrounding these 'unstable' concepts is dissolved).

These remarks suggest a criticism of ethical prescriptivism: the claim of most ethical theories to lay down universally valid, binding, obligatory laws that provide a strict regulation of human behavior. The force of Heidegger's analysis is that he puts into question the two most important types of ethical theories in his tradition: Kantian *Moralität* whose prescriptivism has been thrown into question, and Hegelian *Sittlichkeit* whose social ethics are equated by Heidegger with inauthentic social conventions that are an obstacle to individual authenticity. On Heidegger's account, one who takes over the moral values, imperatives, customs, and attitudes that are transmitted to one through one's socialization, and who acts as if these human posits had an unquestionable validity and authority and were therefore to be taken over, followed, and actualized exemplifies the inauthentic way of being. It is this surrender of autonomy, discrimination, and evaluation that Heidegger is criticizing in his characterization of the fall into an inauthentic existence. His claim is that by disburdening oneself of the need to choose, evaluate, and resolve for oneself, one becomes an indistinguishable one-among-many, and loses one's ownmost potentiality-for-being in herd-being.

Thus, although Heidegger thoroughly rejects the prevalent ethical theories of his day, it would be a mistake to simply label him a nihilist for we have seen that he has strong *philosophical* objections against traditional ethical theories. Furthermore, we have seen that he lays at least the foundation for a new type of ethical theory grounded in a well-secured philosophical anthropology (whether Heidegger's anthropology does provide an adequate basis for a philosophical ethics is not an issue here). In fact, Heidegger suggests in a passage, that I shall cite in conclusion, that the task of developing a philosophical ethics and projecting a set of authentic ethical possibilities remains a task yet to be fulfilled by a 'thematic existential anthropology':

To present the factual *existentiell* possibilities in their chief features and interconnections, and to interpret them according to their existential structure, falls among the tasks of a thematic existential anthropology.

(SZ 301)

This passage suggests that the crucial philosophical tasks of ethical theory remain to be fulfilled.

Notes

1 *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: 1963). Hereafter *Sein und Zeit* shall be referred to as *SZ*; page references will be to the German edition and translations will be my own. The English translation is by Macquarrie and Robinson: *Being and Time* (New York: 1962). I shall limit my discussion of Heidegger's concept of authenticity and critique of ethics to an analysis of the doctrine in *Sein und Zeit*, thus avoiding the complicated and thorny issue of the relation between the early and the later Heidegger.

2 For example, Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* (New York: 1956); Ricoeur in *Heidegger and the Quest for Truth* (Chicago: 1968); Buber in *Between Man and Man* (New York: 1962); Adorno in *The Jargon of Authenticity* (Evanston: 1973); and Marcuse in 'Beiträge zu einer Phänomenologie des Historischen Materialismus', *Philosophische Hefte*, 1 (Berlin: 1928).

3 De Waelelens, *La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger* (Louvain: 1942); Körner, 'Heideggers Privatreligion', *Eckhart* 25, 1955; and Rosen, *Nihilism* (New Haven: 1970).

4 Wild, *The Challenge of Existentialism* (Bloomington: 1959) and Olafson, *Persons and Principles* (Baltimore: 1967).

5 The two most misleading types of interpretation are, first, those which interpret *Sein und Zeit* and the concept of authenticity from the perspective of the later Heidegger and often read into the text a questionable interpretation of the concept of authenticity. For example, Richardson defines authenticity as a 'transcendence unto Being which is proper to itself' (p. 83) and defines the constitution of an authentic self as a 'transcending beings to Being' (p. 50), which requires a recollection of the 'ontological dimension' (p. 51). William Richardson, *Martin Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (Den Haag: 1964). A second sort of dubious interpretation simplistically equates Heidegger's concept of authenticity with a way of being toward death, as if Heidegger had a death ethic. This interpretation is maintained by Sartre, op. cit., Ricoeur, op. cit., Löwith, *Heidegger: Denker in dürftiger Zeit* (Göttingen: 1965), Demske, *Being, Man, and Death* (Lexington, KY: 1970), de Waelelens, op. cit., and many others.

6 I am thinking of such works as Macomber's *The Anatomy of Disillusion* (Evanston: 1967), Schmitt's *Martin Heidegger on Being Human* (New York: 1968), and Olafson's *Persons and Principles*, op. cit. See also my review of Adorno's *Jargon of Authenticity in Telos* 19 (Spring, 1974). I should note that the present article was written in 1972 before my study of Adorno and consequent assumption of a more critical position towards Heidegger.

7 Further, he claims that his term 'fallenness' 'expresses no negative evaluation' (*SZ* 175), that his notion of 'idle chatter' does not have a 'disparaging signification' (*SZ* 167), and that his claim that one exists in a state of 'untruth' in the condition of inauthenticity excludes any 'negative evaluation' (*SZ* 222).

8 Löwith, Karl. *Theologische Rundschau*, N.F. II (1930), Heft 1, p. 60.

9 Vietta, Egon. *Die Seinsfrage bei Martin Heidegger* (Stuttgart: 1950), p. 46.

10 I should point out that 'situation' is a technical term for Heidegger that describes the result of a project of choosing authenticity and does not merely

refer to what is generally taken to be a 'situation' in ordinary language and in such philosophers as Dewey and Sartre.

11 Heidegger's analysis of historicity (*Geschicklichkeit*) is of crucial importance for his philosophical project and for his concept of authenticity.

12 Heidegger's concept of the self is inextricably interconnected with his concept of authenticity, thus providing another example of how Heidegger combines what is usually separated into theoretical-ontological and practical-ethical thematics. It is not that Heidegger endows the acting or ethical self with a primacy over the theoretical self as is sometimes argued. Rather, Heidegger combines characteristics of the knowing and acting self into a unitary concept of selfhood that accounts for both the ontological features of selfhood and the features of an authentic self.

13 I more fully develop the concepts and ideas sketched out here in my 1973 Columbia University Dissertation *Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity*.

14 The inadequacies of this model are well known and several papers criticizing its application to ethical analysis can be found in *Theories of Ethics*, Philippa Foot, editor (London: Oxford, 1967). Cf., especially Foot's 'Introduction', her essay on 'moral beliefs', Searle's essay 'How to derive "ought" from "is"', and John Austin's remark that, 'the familiar contrast of "normative-evaluative" as opposed to the factual is in need, like so many dichotomies, of elimination', op. cit., p. 13.

15 Limitations of space and time make it impossible to further develop the problems involved in the normative-descriptive distinction within the bounds of this study. The problem has produced a vast but inconclusive literature in the world of analytic philosophy (some references cited in note 4), and is a central philosophical issue in Europe where 'critical rationalists' (i.e., Popper and Hans Albert) defend the old positivist distinction against the attacks of 'Neo-Marxists' and others (i.e., Adorno, Habermas, Marcuse). The question is also an important one for social scientists, since the day of Max Weber's distinction between fact and value, and his notion of a value-free science.

16 The properties of a normative-ethical judgment are often taken to be 'ideality' (or in the Anglo-American philosophical world 'non-naturalness'), 'objectivity' (or 'universalizability'), and 'bindingness' (or 'prescriptivity'). Thus Heidegger's critical remarks can apply to certain features of ethical language, which he could claim are ontologically (or 'conceptually') unclarified, ungrounded, and confused.

Who is Dasein? Towards an ethics of authenticity

Christopher Macann

In his *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger cites, without mentioning by name, a statement made by Jean Beaufret: 'Ce que je cherche à faire, depuis très longtemps déjà, c'est préciser le rapport de l'ontologie avec une éthique possible.'¹ Notoriously however, Heidegger not only never developed anything like an explicit Ethics, he repeatedly rejected any such possibility.² In the *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger gives as his reason the derivative character of Ethics. Ethics, he tells us, arose along with Logic and Physics in the school philosophy of Plato. By that time thinking had been converted into Philosophy, Philosophy into Science and Science into an affair of the Schools.³

A second objection bears upon the impossibility of tacking on an Ethics to fill out a theoretical philosophy on the practical side. This objection is voiced in *Being and Time*⁴ where it is clearly directed against Kant. And yet, who would wish philosophy to be deprived of the Kantian Ethics? Moreover if, as Heidegger insists, the *Critique* is to be interpreted as a proto-ontology, then Kant's practical philosophy actually becomes an Ethics doubly grounded in ontology; first, in that the practical philosophy is already founded in the theoretical (now interpreted as ontology) and second, in that Heidegger, like Fichte before him, recommends a reversal of this very order of priority – with the Practical Critique grounding the Theoretical.

But perhaps the crucial complaint can best be captured in a metaphor which Heidegger does not hesitate to employ at the very end of his *Introduction to Metaphysics* ('Being and the ought'), the metaphor of the distinction between an 'upward' and a 'downward' direction. There, Heidegger makes use of a diagram whose nodal point is being. Along the horizontal axis, you find becoming, on the one side, and appearance, on the other while, along the vertical axis, you find the Ought, on the up side and Thinking, on the down side. 'The distinction between being

and thinking', Heidegger tells us, 'is downward. . . . The differentiation between being and the ought, on the other hand, is upward.'⁵ This, in the end, is why the ought defies being, because it lifts itself off from being (and so denies itself the grounding in being) and then, to make matters even worse, tries to give itself a pseudo-being, *qua* validity. 'As being itself becomes fixated as idea, it strives to make good the resulting degradation of being. But by now this is possible only if something is set *above* being, something that being never is but always *ought* to be.'⁶

But what if human being were, in its very being, not yet what it ought to be? And what if the very task of philosophy were nothing other than that of drawing attention to an ethical (in Spinoza's broad sense of that word) potential, inherent in the very being of human being, which it might not yet have realized but still could realize effectively – the 'possibility' which elsewhere Heidegger will say stands 'above actuality'? What if the entire saga of philosophy – beginning not with the Greeks but with a much, much older philosophical tradition, that of the Vedanta – were to be interpreted as a repeated attempt to help human being along the way to a self-overcoming which would realize that very 'ought' which, for the time being, human being is not? That Heidegger will not countenance any such suggestion is due to his refusal of anything like an *upward* orientation of consciousness, and this despite his explicit acceptance of its opposite, the *downward* orientation. That, especially in his critique of transcendental philosophy, Heidegger repeatedly effects a quite naive conversion (or inversion) of upward into downward should not blind us to the ethical blindness which must needs follow upon such a refusal of the upward implications of the motif of self-overcoming – and this from a philosopher who goes a long way with the Nietzschean prophecy of an Overman!

But although, for the reasons given above, nothing like an *explicit* Ethics is to be found in Heidegger, something like an *implicit* Ethics can be traced back to his thinking about authenticity in *Being and Time*. That such a connection is indeed appropriate is confirmed by the ethical significance accorded to the theme of authenticity by such French existentialist thinkers as Sartre and Camus.⁷ In his intellectually unsatisfactory but popular lecture 'Existentialism is a humanism', the ethical import of the slogan: 'Existence precedes essence' (a slogan which Heidegger specifically criticizes in his *Letter on Humanism*,⁸) becomes clear when Sartre borrows from Kant a universalizability thesis (when I choose, I choose for all mankind, i.e., absolute responsibility) which it is difficult to reconcile with his own existential commitment to authenticity (I make myself be through my choices, i.e., absolute freedom), and which he himself took over from Kant with a view to refuting the objection of egoism. Hence, not only must the question of an ethics of authenticity

remain an open question, it is doubtful whether, as yet, it has been settled satisfactorily.

I would like to argue that the theme of authenticity *can* serve as the basis for a possible Ethics and one which *is* rooted in an ontology, that Heidegger's own ontology *does* come close to laying the foundations for such an ethics but that the difficulty of carrying such a project through with regard to *Being and Time* has to be attributed to the inadequacy (bordering on inconsistency) of the existential categories Heidegger employs to set up his ontology. Rather than dismissing Ethics as an ontologically improper topic, I would like to suggest a revision of the existential categories Heidegger himself employs to characterize Dasein, a revision which might make just such an Ethics possible.

Just like a building, a philosophy can be no more stable or extensive than its foundations allow. The use of an architectural metaphor is not at all inappropriate in connection with Heidegger, since he himself repeatedly uses the concept of 'ground' with that ambiguity which characterizes the term in the German – ground as reason or cause, ground as foundation.⁹ For example, in the Kant book he has this to say about the expression 'to lay the foundation of . . .'. 'It's meaning', he claims, 'is best illustrated within the field of architecture. . . . Laying the foundation is the projection of the building plan itself in such a way as to indicate on what and how the structure will be grounded.'¹⁰ If I am right in thinking that a revision of Heidegger's existential categories is called for if an Ethics of authenticity is to be possible, clearly, this revision will have repercussions which extend far beyond the confines of an Ethics.

Our starting point must be a preliminary identification of the existential categories employed in *Being and Time*. Heidegger introduces the notion of existential categories in his Introduction.

All *explicata* to which the analytic of Dasein gives rise are obtained by considering Dasein's existence-structure. Because Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them '*existentialia*'. These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call '*categories*' – characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein.¹¹

That Heidegger postpones the detailed examination of the *existentialia* is due to the organization of the first part of *Being and Time* into three heads, 'World' (and the worldhood of the world), the 'Who' and 'Being-in' as such. For it is only in the conclusive context of being-in as such that the *existentialia* can be explicitly addressed.

In the fifth chapter devoted to Being-in as such, we do find a fourfold specification of the existential structures: State of Mind, Understanding, Discourse and Falling. But precisely because the existential category of

Falling is, and can only be, introduced to account for the inauthenticity of Dasein, the question of authenticity cannot itself be addressed until later, and is indeed saved up for the second part of *Being and Time* devoted to the problematic of time, where it is discussed under the head of a further existential possibility, namely individualization, which reverses the tendency inherent in Falling.

Before we begin our detailed analysis, there are two things to note. First, there can be no doubt about the importance of the theme of authenticity. It dominates the first three chapters of Division II, that is, takes up half of the space left to the second division. No other theme, with the possible exception of temporality, looms so large on the canvas of *Being and Time*. Second, since the issue of authenticity bears upon the being of the self, the very attempt to establish the basis for an ethics of authenticity will depend upon the way in which the self is conceived. Hence the question: Who is Dasein?

1 The existential structure of Falling

Falling means fallenness into *das Man* – the ‘They’. The concept of *das Man* is introduced in chapter IV, devoted to being-with and being-one’s-self, therefore in a context which, from the very beginning, raises the critical question of being-one’s-self. *Mit-sein*, or being-with, is a way of being of Dasein in so far as it is in the world. Being-with and being-in-the-world are equi-primordial structures. Hence, the world is always one that I share with Others. At the same time, as a being who shares a world with others, I have a mode of being of my own, which Heidegger calls *Mit-Dasein*. My very being-self is characterized by being with Others. ‘In this kind of being’, Heidegger tells us, ‘is grounded the mode of everyday Being-one’s-Self [*Selbstsein*].’¹² This recognition of being-Self is both significant and paradoxical, significant in that it implies a concern with what it means for Dasein to be itself, paradoxical, because the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that, proximally and for the most part, Dasein is precisely *not itself*. ‘Dasein is in each case mine, and this is its constitution; but what if this should be the very reason why, proximally and for the most part, Dasein is *not itself*?’ (Heidegger’s italics).¹³ The primacy of not-being-self is the reason why Heidegger has to take pains to point out that ‘the “not-I” is by no means tantamount to an entity which essentially lacks “I-hood” but is rather a definite kind of Being which the “I” itself possesses, such as having lost itself.’¹⁴

That Dasein is itself primarily in the mode of not-being-self is then further explained in terms of Dasein’s understanding itself out of the world in which it finds itself and in terms of those entities which it encounters in the world which, if they are not actually entities whose

mode of being is not that of a self, are at least persons whose mode of being can always be, and usually is, interpreted as that of a person-thing present at hand in the world. Thus, 'the Being of those entities which *are there with us*, gets conceived as presence-at-hand'.¹⁵ And yet, at the end of the section on the 'They', it becomes clear that Heidegger does not want to let go of the possibility that authentic being-self remains a real possibility. He does this by insisting that authentic being-self does not represent a suspension of the basic conception of being-with (which is that of not-being-self) but only a modification of the former. 'Authentic being-one's-self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the "They"; it is rather an existentiell modification of the "They" – of the "They" as an essential existentiale.'¹⁶

Notice Heidegger says 'existentiell' not 'existential' modification. In fact he cannot say 'existential', since the category of Falling (which is an existential category) will commit him to an existential analysis of inauthenticity. Thus by 'existentiell' Heidegger must mean a possibility which is actually available to Dasein but to which Dasein is not necessarily committed, indeed, is unlikely to ever realize. Hence his conclusion that there is an 'ontological gap' separating the self-sameness of the authentically existing Self from the identity of that 'I' which maintains itself throughout its manifold Experiences.¹⁷ Clearly Heidegger believes that this gap can be bridged. It will be our task to show that, as matters stand, this ontological gap cannot be bridged.

The investigation of the four existential structures is reserved for chapter 5 on being-in as such. But although the correct procedure would seem to be to begin with an examination of the three *existentialia* which operate at the level of experience and to proceed on from there to an examination of their expression in and through language, this is not how Heidegger does actually proceed. Rather, State-of-mind and Understanding are examined first, as ontologically equi-primordial structures in which the Being of the 'there' maintains itself. Interpretation is then derived as an extreme form of Understanding. And from interpretation, the analysis moves on into an exposition of Discourse, before coming back to an examination of Falling as the everyday being of the 'there'. In other words, under the head (A) of 'The existential constitution of the "there"', State-of-mind, Understanding and Discourse are investigated first, while Falling is only explicitly introduced under the head (B) of 'The everyday Being of the "there" '.

In fact, the displacement of the existential structure of Falling is even more radical than might appear from this division into the two heads A and B. For the initial introduction of the concept of Falling is only preliminary. It is succeeded by a description of concrete forms in which language has already fallen, namely, idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity.

Only then is Falling presented *explicitly* as a basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness. Implied therein is a thesis to the effect that language itself plays a large part in the phenomenon of Falling.

The question that arises from this organization of the material is the following: is Falling really an existential structure or, at least, an existential structure on a par with State-of-mind and Understanding?¹⁸ Or should it not rather be regarded as an existentiell structure, one grounded perhaps in other, more fundamental structures? Why, for example, does Heidegger never say that Falling is ontologically equi-primordial with State-of-mind, Understanding and Discourse? To be sure, he does say that '*Falling* is a definite existential characteristic of Dasein itself.'¹⁹ Or again, that '*Falling* reveals an essential ontological structure of Dasein itself'.²⁰ But it is noticeable that he does not use the concept of equi-primordiality. Understanding is explicitly said to be equi-primordial with State-of-mind.²¹ Again, he says quite unequivocally: '*Discourse* is existentially equi-primordial with *State-of-mind* and *Understanding*.'²² No such statement qualifies the presentation of Falling.

Given the order in which the *existentialia* are presented, it might seem as though language constitutes the specific moment in which being-self is diverted into not-being-self. Not only does language form the bridge between Understanding and Falling, Falling is itself understood out of inauthentic forms of Discourse. But then, not only does Heidegger recognize authentic modes of Discourse, the inauthentic are *specifically derived* as de-formations of the former. The analysis of idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity is itself preceded by an investigation of assertion or propositional language. Not only is the apophantical 'as' of assertion contrasted with the 'as' of an interpretation which understands circumspectively, the former is always seen as a derivation from the latter. Indeed it must be so seen, since it is described in terms of a deformation of that very 'as' structure which is definitive of hermeneutical understanding. Thus, Heidegger asserts, 'assertion cannot disown its ontological origin from an interpretation which understands'.²³ In other words, the inauthentic Understanding, expressed in assertion, is derived from authentic Understanding, as a deficient mode of the former.

It is for this reason that, in the section on 'Being-there as Understanding', Heidegger will say: 'Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-being; and it is so in such a way that this being discloses in itself what its being is capable of.'²⁴ That 'potentiality-for-being' has the meaning of being-self rather than not-being-self becomes even clearer when potentiality-for-being is itself understood in terms of the structure of 'projection' and when the structure of projection is laid out in such a way that, in projecting, Dasein is said to '*not yet*' be what it has in it to be.

Only because the being of the 'there' receives its constitution through Understanding and through the character of Understanding as projection, only because it *is* what it becomes (or alternatively, does not become), can it say to itself 'Become what you are', and say this with understanding.²⁵

That authentic self-understanding is *at least* as primordial as the inauthentic is confirmed in the very next paragraph. Heidegger tells us that Understanding can devote itself primarily to the disclosedness of the world, in which case it understands itself inauthentically in terms of the world. But Understanding can also throw itself primarily into the 'for the sake of which'. This means that 'Dasein exists as itself'. Hence 'Understanding is either authentic, arising out of one's self as such or inauthentic'²⁶ – presumably because it does not arise out of self as such. Only a little later we find a passage in which authentic being-self definitely appears to be accorded the priority over inauthentic not-being-self. Heidegger tells us that 'transparency' (*Durchsichtigkeit*) is the term he proposes to use to designate 'knowledge of the self' (*Selbsterkenntnis*). Transparency is 'the sight which is related primarily and on the whole to existence'.²⁷ He goes on to contrast this *Selbsterkenntnis* with the *Sichkennen* encountered earlier in the course of everyday being-with²⁸ in a context where solicitude is described as dwelling proximally and for the most part in 'deficient or at least Indifferent modes'. To be sure, Heidegger does distinguish two kinds of solicitude, the inauthentic kind that *leaps in for* the other and *takes away* his care and the authentic kind that *leaps ahead of him to give his care back* to him. But this only makes it that much more urgent to determine which is the original form and which the derivative.

The same question arises with the same ambiguity in relation to the first of the existential structures, State-of-mind. For State-of-mind is analysed in terms of 'thrownness' and 'facticity'. Thrownness is not an incidental but an essential characteristic of Dasein and the same goes for facticity. '*Facticity is not the factuality of the factum brutum of something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of Dasein's being*'.²⁹ Mood is nothing but the disclosure of that as which one is given over to being. In disclosive understanding of Mood, Dasein is itself, comes to terms with what it is. But Heidegger hastens to add that, proximally and for the most part, states of mind disclose Dasein 'in the manner of an evasive turning-away'.³⁰ Rather than seeking itself, Dasein tends to evade itself by fleeing from that very self as which it is delivered over to being. But even here it is intimated that Dasein could not flee itself if it did not have some (pre-ontological) understanding of that very self which it was seeking to evade.

One is bound at this point to ask: could either facticity or thrownness

(or both) not have been presented as the basic *existentialia*, thereby leaving open the question whether Dasein comes to terms with or evades that as which it is delivered over to being? If Falling turns out in the end to be a falling away from, or an evasion of, self then the more primordial structure would seem to be that as which Dasein is delivered over to being – its very own self as revealed in facticity. Falling could then have been introduced as an *existentiell* modification which would explain why, for the most part, self-disclosure takes the form of a fleeing from self rather than a seeking for self.

The critical question can perhaps be better formulated in other terms, terms which do not beg the ontological question from the outset. Is Falling a *primary* or a *secondary* phenomenon? Three alternatives seem to suggest themselves. First, Being-self could be presented as the ontologically primary phenomenon, from which not-being-self would accordingly be derived, perhaps incidentally and occasionally but also perhaps essentially, and for the most part. In this case Falling would be secondary. Second, not-being-self could be presented as the primary phenomenon from which, accordingly, being-self has to be derived as an *existentiell* modification but only at the risk of making the issue of authenticity one of Dasein's *merely ontic* affairs. In this case Falling remains primary. Third, Being-self and Not-being-self could be presented as equi-primordial – Falling following from *being-self* in the mode of absorption in the world. In this case, no decision could be arrived at with regard to the primacy of Falling. Though Heidegger tends to waver between the second and the third of these alternatives, it will be our task to show that the theory of authenticity holds up, as a theory, only if the first of these possibilities is adopted.

Falling is presented as fallenness into the average everydayness of *das Man*, the 'They'. The way in which the 'They' understands and interprets is, of course, non-ontological. Average everydayness conceals from the self its own ontological constitution and so exposes Dasein to that understanding of itself which comes to it from the world. 'Dasein understands itself proximally and for the most part in terms of its world.'³¹ The Who calls itself an 'I' but is nothing less than something individual. 'The "who" is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The "who" is the neuter, *the "They"*'.³² Because the 'They' constantly accommodates itself to the others, its understanding is nothing better than public opinion. 'Distantiality, averageness, and levelling down, as ways of Being for the "They", constitute what we know as "publicness".'³³

But if, as a result of Falling, Dasein has ceased to be itself, it would seem that Falling could remain an ontological structure *only if* it was presented as a Falling away from a more primary state in which Dasein was itself. That into which Dasein falls would then be something

secondary while that from which it falls would be *primary*. However, the structure which motivated the 'fall' might still be an ontological structure, if it enforced the passage or transition from the primary to the secondary. If, on the other hand, no such primary state is acknowledged then Fallenness into the 'They' must itself be envisaged as something primary. And then we are in difficulty.

Here we find ourselves faced with an equivocation of which Heidegger hardly seems to be aware. On the one hand, Heidegger specifically excludes the possibility that Falling might be a 'fall' from a purer and higher 'primal status'.³⁴ Or again: 'So neither must we take the fallenness of Dasein as a "fall" from a purer and higher "primal status"'.³⁵ This might be taken as an anti-Platonic move, refusing any interpretation of Falling as a Falling away from some more primary, and for this reason *higher*, state. And yet, just a little later he tells us: 'In Falling, Dasein *itself* as factual Being-in-the-world is something from which it has already fallen away.' In other words, being-self is here presented as something from which Dasein *has* fallen away when it falls into the world. Can this difficulty be resolved by distinguishing between a 'higher' and a 'lower' primal state? Dasein does not fall from a purer and 'higher' status because the self from which it falls away is actually a 'lower', less developed state of itself. But this still implies that there is a 'lower', more primal self from which Dasein falls away. Heidegger's objection that everydayness does not coincide with primitiveness³⁶ is no counter-example because, in this passage, he is contrasting developed with primitive cultures – which also have an everydayness of their own. So what sense does it make to say that Dasein, as fallen, is not itself, unless being-self is presented as an original possibility from which Dasein can fall away when it falls into the 'They'?

Or again, (in Falling) 'Dasein is said to plunge out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness'.³⁷ But if this downward plunge (*Absturz*), motivated by Falling, is a plunge into groundlessness then how can Falling be an ontological structure, since the function of an ontological structure is to furnish grounds, to lay the ground. Unless, of course, the ground (*Grund*) were an abyss (*Abgrund*). Could it be said that Dasein is so *grounded* that groundlessness, or the absence of grounds (nullity), arises, and this with necessity? This seems to be the gist of what he is driving at. But the question remains whether it is consistent with his concept of the self.

The difficulty could be presented another way. *In general*, being-in-the-world is supposed to be the original ontological condition which is lost sight of. Heidegger's analysis of the transformation of the ready-to-hand way of dealing with things encountered in a world into the present-at-hand representation of such things pursues this itinerary of forgetfulness. An ontological investigation is required to bring out the

groundlessness of the present-at-hand way of envisaging things and to ground the latter in the more fundamental, because more primordial, condition captured by the structure of being-in-the-world. In so far as Dasein is *in* the world, the being of Dasein is characterized by certain existential structures. State-of-mind is the disclosedness of the 'there' and, as such, brings Dasein before its self, *even if* Dasein is also able to evade its self. Understanding is the projective interpretation of the world in terms of the self and as such lets things be seen as they are 'there' for Dasein, *even if* Dasein is always able to transform this primordial fore-sight into the sightlessness of assertive understanding. Discourse articulates understanding and so is available to articulate a genuinely primordial understanding, *even if* Dasein, proximally and for the most part, lapses into degenerate forms of expression. In every one of the above-mentioned cases, the 'even if' expresses a possibility which is by no means a necessity and which, if it arises, is in any case a derivative possibility which, as such, depends upon the more primordial condition, indeed arises as a modification of the latter. And yet there is a tendency to reverse these ontological priorities, to make of the original something derivative, and to make of the derivative something original. And nowhere is this tendency more pronounced than with respect to the theme of authenticity, which is always presented as a step back out of the inauthenticity of *das Man*. The structure that is introduced to account for this otherwise inconsistent reversal is the structure of Falling. That the structure of Falling accomplishes this reversal is beyond question. What is questionable is whether it does not do so by way of an artificial contrivance and, much more seriously, whether this contrivance does not bring the basic ontological structures of *Being and Time* into contradiction with themselves.

To put it another way again: the reason 'world' takes Dasein away from itself is surely because the concept of 'world' in question is that false concept of world, fostered by Descartes, and enshrined in the everyday thinking of adults in advanced industrialized societies. But then, from the standpoint of *this* concept of world, being-in-the-world, in the ontologically proper sense, has already been lost. The findings of child psychology, of anthropology, of mythology etc., all confirm that there is a more original being-in-the-world for which 'world' is precisely the field for the *realization* of the self, in so far as the self projectively interprets and is affected by that which is projectively *there* for it. It is the loss of this more original concept of 'world', or the transformation of this 'world' into a matrix of objective relations which results in the self losing its primordial sense of self by, for example, coming to think of its self as something subjective. In order to accommodate such an insight, it would however be necessary to differentiate between the original 'world' and a derivative concept of, say, the *universe*.³⁸

There can be no doubt that Heidegger is aware of this difficulty. For he addresses it explicitly in a section in which he discusses the relation of Falling and thrownness. 'Can Dasein be conceived as an entity for which, in its Being, its potentiality-for-being is an *issue*, if this entity, in its very everydayness, *has lost itself* and in Falling, "lives" away from itself?'³⁹ Heidegger answers:

But Falling into the world would be phenomenal 'evidence' against the existentiality of Dasein only if Dasein were regarded as an isolated 'I' or subject, as a self-point from which it moves away. In that case, the world would be an Object.

But his answer begs the question. Certainly, there could be no *existential* analysis of Falling if the world in which Dasein found itself were envisaged, from the first, as an objective universe. But by prefacing the subject-object relation with a more primordial way of being, it does become possible to talk of Falling as a falling away from that primordial involvement which characterizes Dasein originally. And this does imply that Dasein cannot have 'fallen' from the very beginning, or that, if it has, fallenness is originally a way of being-in-the-world which is anything but inauthentic (i.e., thrownness).

Just as serious is the following difficulty. If Dasein is, in reality, its 'there' in such a way that a potentiality for being itself is always available to it, then it is precisely as being-self, that is, as being-in-the-world, that it ceases to be itself, since the world is that into which it has fallen, by which it has been taken away from itself in the form, primarily, of being-with. But if it is *as itself* that it ceases to *be itself* then how can it ever *become itself* in the manner required by the theory of authenticity? Indeed, one can go further and ask: how can it ever even *cease* to be itself, since it has lost itself from the very beginning, and so has *never* been able to be itself?

A way to resolve the difficulty would be to disconnect the subsidiary structures of thrownness and facticity from that of Falling, to confer upon the former a genuinely ontological status and to see Falling as a secondary derivative. Here is a passage in which Heidegger defines thrownness. 'The expression "thrownness" is meant to suggest the *facticity of its being delivered over*.'⁴⁰ This reference back to facticity requires that we also consider how Heidegger defines the latter.

Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact; and the factuality of such a Fact is what we shall call Dasein's 'facticity'. The concept of 'facticity' implies that an entity 'within the world' has Being in the world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its destiny

with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world.⁴¹

Facticity rather than thrownness or Falling is the concept with which such existential successors of Heidegger as Jean-Paul Sartre tend to operate. And in the light of their analyses we can perhaps give a more concrete sense to Heidegger's rather vague descriptions. Facticity means that I do not choose to be or choose who I am to be but simply find myself already in the world as given to be a specific someone. There is no necessity to my existing or to my existing as *this* person. It simply happens that I find myself as that very person who I am and thrown into a world which is not of my choosing. It is this factual happening which then serves as the foundation for everything I am to make of myself. This was what Sartre meant when he used that apparently contradictory phrase 'necessary contingency'. That I am is a purely contingent fact. But this fact is the necessary foundation of my existence as an appropriation of thrown being in the world.

In fact, facticity and thrownness are really two sides of the same primary structure. Facticity focuses on the fact of being a self (that I am) while thrownness focuses upon that in which I find myself as already existing, namely, the world. They are the existential counterparts of the ontological phenomena of the 'Who' and the 'World' which, of course, belong together in the unitary configuration being-in-the-world.

Strictly speaking, there is nothing secondary about either facticity or thrownness. From the very first, Dasein finds itself delivered over to itself as already existing in a world. Whether Dasein is born into an 'advanced' industrial society or whether it is brought into a 'primitive' world, it exists, factically, as thrown being in a world. Indeed, one might almost say, animals too exist as thrown being in a world, the world of the domestic pet, the world of animal husbandry, the untamed jungle. To be sure, awareness of factual existence in a world may never come to animals and may only come later on with humans. To borrow a phrase from Bishop Berkeley, if consciousness of existence is taken as that characteristic which distinguishes Man from the Beasts, many of those who pass for Men might have to be counted amongst the latter kind. This disparity between an ontological structure and conscious awareness of that structure, as a definite and determining characteristic of Dasein, is however already allowed for by Heidegger with his talk about a pre-ontological way of being. So far from it being the case that unawareness of the fundamental structures of existence militates against the ontological character of the being whose existence is in question, awareness of existence, when it comes, is most likely to be an existentially false awareness, an awareness of self out of and by means of categories which

are appropriate not to Dasein but to beings which do not have the mode of being of Dasein.

Unlike the structure of Falling however, that of facticity (or thrownness) does not carry with it the implication of not-being-self. Facticity and thrownness simply mean that I cannot *choose* that as which I am delivered over to being. But I can *be* it all the same. On the other hand, 'Falling Being-in-the-world', Heidegger tells us, 'is not only tempting and tranquillizing; it is at the same time alienating'.⁴² This latter characteristic is of especial interest since Heidegger concedes that 'alienation *closes off* from Dasein its authenticity'.⁴³ This suggests that, as factically existing in a world, Dasein is initially disclosed to itself as that very being which it is. The alienation of Falling, on the other hand, closes Dasein off from a being which it is actually given over to being by virtue of facticity and thrownness. So understood, Falling *could* be presented as a secondary modification of the more primordial structure of facticity. *Were* it to be so understood, the difficulties encountered above would be resolved.

These revisions are not arbitrarily recommended nor are they proposed with a view to forcing Heidegger's thinking into an alien mould. Rather, they are required in order to make Heidegger consistent with himself. To be sure, there are passages where even thrownness takes on the negative characteristics of not-being-self. 'Is not Dasein, as thrown Being-in-the-world, thrown proximally [*zunächst*] right into the publicness of the "they"?'⁴⁴ Heidegger asks. The answer is that, at the very most, only *adult* Dasein is proximally and for the most part thrown into the 'They' in the way Heidegger describes. This is not an incidental objection. When, in *Truth and Method*, Gadamer considers the problem of understanding and interpretation in *Being and Time*,⁴⁵ he specifically takes account of the problem of animals and children and admits that there are open questions still to be faced here. Perhaps it is in order to close off such questions that Heidegger himself devoted a section to 'The existential analytic and the interpretation of primitive Dasein'. Primitive Dasein, Heidegger concedes (and the same would go for children), can throw light upon human nature because '“primitive phenomena” are often less concealed', because primitive Dasein 'often speak to us more directly'.⁴⁶ He nevertheless still insists that 'everydayness does not coincide with primitiveness', the reason being that primitive Dasein has an everyday being of its own. But even if this is admitted, surely, the everydayness of primitive Dasein is so far removed from that of the 'Man' Heidegger has in mind that a comparison of the two would make it difficult to sustain the thesis of an original lostness in the 'They'. Surely animals, primitives and even children, do live in some primary accord with themselves and with nature, an accord which it is the very task of society to level down in such a way as to make them fit for (as being fitted into) being with one another. And possibly this levelling down is

not as negative as Heidegger makes it appear. Perhaps it even meets an ethical requirement, assuming, that is, that a relation *can* be established between ontology and a possible Ethics. But before we pursue this question further let us first turn to an examination of the procedure of individualization.

2 The procedure of individualization

Individualization reverses the tendency inherent in Falling. The self which says 'I' of itself has been shown, proximally and for the most part, *not* to be itself. Individualization reverses the tendency on the part of the self to evade its self, to flee from itself, to let itself be absorbed in *das Man*, by bringing the self face to face with itself, that is, before its ownmost potentiality for being itself.

Of course, if Falling is an ontological characteristic and, as such, one which determines the being of Dasein from the very beginning, the very possibility of being-self becomes eminently problematic, as we have seen. It is noteworthy therefore that Heidegger addresses this quite specific difficulty in the very section (§40) in which he introduces the concept of individualization.

From an existentiell point of view, the authenticity of being-one's-Self has of course been closed off and thrust aside in Falling; but to be thus closed off is merely the privation of a disclosedness which manifests itself phenomenally in the fact that Dasein's fleeing is a fleeing in the face of itself.⁴⁷

The force of Heidegger's response rests here upon the notion of a 'privative' mode.

Privative modes are a familiar item in Heidegger's analyses and are employed to indicate the derivative character of what is so described. The present-at-hand is a privative modification of the ready-to-hand. Space as an abstract system of relations (or as a container) is a privative mode of the primordial spatiality of de-severance and directionality. The ordinary conception of time is a privative mode of primordial temporality. Assertion is a privative mode of hermeneutical understanding. But elsewhere, when Heidegger describes privative modes, he first lays out the basic structures of the primordial mode in question, the ready-to-hand as such, primordial spatiality, primordial temporality, the hermeneutical 'as'. In this critical case, not only does he not do so, he *cannot* do so, due to the ontological character of Falling. Precisely there, where you would most expect an analysis of authentic being-self, prior

to the privative derivation of inauthentic not-being-self, you find the privative mode accorded the primary role.

Heidegger is aware of this difficulty and tries ingeniously to circumvent it by arguing that self-evasion is only possible in so far as the self is, in some sense, aware of that from which it flees. 'Only to the extent that Dasein has been brought before itself in an ontologically essential manner through whatever disclosedness belongs to it, can it flee in the face of that in the face of which it flees.'⁴⁸ The critically ambiguous phrase is 'whatever disclosedness'. Heidegger might have said that there is a pre-ontological comprehension of the self, from which the self is diverted when it falls into the 'They'. But then the structure of Falling, which is called in to account for this diversion, could not be an ontological but rather only an ontical, or at best an ontico-ontological structure. This option seems to be one which he accepts when he claims: 'This existentiell-ontical turning-away, by reason of its character as a disclosure, makes it phenomenally possible to grasp existential-ontologically that in the face of which Dasein flees, and to grasp it as such.'⁴⁹ The 'turning-away' in question is surely nothing but Falling, which is here characterized as something existentiell-ontical (even though Falling is supposed to be an existential structure), in order that Dasein itself should be grasped existential-ontologically in its very being; and this is given as the reason why 'in orienting our analysis by the phenomenon of Falling, we are not in principle condemned to be without any prospect of learning something ontologically about the Dasein disclosed in that phenomenon'.⁵⁰

Of course, we are familiar with analyses which begin upon the ontic plane to find there the phenomenal basis for an inquiry back into the ground. Indeed, this is the standard procedure adopted throughout *Being and Time*. But the phenomenal evidence here is not 'having already fallen', from which it might be possible to inquire back into a more primordial condition where Dasein had 'not yet fallen', which latter might then be presented as that *from which* Dasein falls when it falls away. Rather, 'having always already fallen' is implied by the ontological structure of Falling which, as such, precludes the very possibility of 'not yet having fallen'.

Thus the theory of individualization is much more complicated than it appears on the surface. On the surface, individualization looks like a turning away from that not-being-self which results from Falling which, as such, can be presented as a turning back toward that very being-self from which Dasein has fallen away. But if there is no being-self from which Dasein can fall away, then it becomes questionable whether Dasein can ever actually individualize itself.

The analysis of individualization arises in relation to four problematics, *anxiety*, *death*, *conscience* and *resoluteness*. The first of these is dealt with in division one, and in connection with the structure of care, the

other three in division two. We shall examine each of these in turn before returning to the structure of the *self*.

Anxiety

That in the face of which Dasein flees must have the character of the threatening. But what threatens Dasein is nothing definite, nor does it proceed from any particular region. As such it is not something of which Dasein can be afraid. Contrasting *anxiety* with *fear* not only has the function of bringing out the indefinite character of anxiety; much more important, it throws into relief its reflective character, though without appealing to structures which might be identified as 'reflective' in the traditional sense. That in the face of which Dasein shrinks back has the same character of being as the one shrinking back. But this self-sameness brings with it nothing like a reversion to self. Rather the contrary; that which Dasein is anxious about is its being-in-the-world in so far as the latter is the domain in which, and in which alone, Dasein is capable of working out its potentiality for being itself. The 'They' gives Dasein reasons for being which are not commensurate with its potentiality for becoming itself. Thus Dasein must first turn away from that turning *away* from self which characterizes Falling in order to be able to turn *toward* itself as that from which it originally turned away.

It is therefore no accident that Heidegger first introduces individualization in connection with solipsism. 'Anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as "solus ipse".'⁵¹ But the solipsism in question is the very opposite of that which features in the traditional literature. So far from bringing Dasein *to* itself by bringing it *away* from the world, indeed cutting it off entirely from the world, Dasein is now brought face to face *with* itself as being-in-the-world.

Death

Part One of *Being and Time* ends with the examination of a phenomenon (care) whose function it is to ensure the wholeness of Dasein. Part Two opens with a reaffirmation of the theme of wholeness, this time in connection with the problematic of Time. Rather than moving right away into an examination of time however, Heidegger focuses instead upon the phenomenon of death. Existence presupposes life which, as such, is still not yet at an end. Death is the end of any further possibility of existing and, as such, confers a wholeness upon life itself, provided that Dasein is able to comport itself towards its end in an appropriate manner. Heidegger begins by outlining inauthentic attitudes towards death before fastening upon three characteristics which distinguish death as a genuine possibility of being and which consequently individualize Dasein down to its ownmost potentiality for being itself.

Heidegger does not explicitly mention individualization in connection

with the first of these characteristics. But the characteristic of being an ownmost possibility obviously brings with it the implication of uniqueness. The only death which I can 'anticipate' is my own, and this ownness characteristic already implies a wrenching away from *das Man*. It is the non-relational character of death which is used to reintroduce the theme of individualization. 'The non-relational character of death, as understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself'.⁵² The connection is also made with regard to the third characteristic, the *unüberholbarkeit* of Dasein, translated as 'not to be outstripped'. 'As the non-relational possibility, death individualizes – but only in such a manner that, as the possibility which is not to be outstripped, it makes Dasein, as being-with, have some understanding of the potentiality-for-being of Others.'⁵³ The third characteristic serves not only to shatter the tenacious hold upon existence which Dasein may ordinarily exhibit, it releases the latter for an understanding of the existence-possibilities of Others. Thus the three characteristics seem to represent three steps along the way to authentic being-toward-death, first, a wrenching away from the 'They', second, a return to self and third, a release from self for authentic being-with.

Thus being-toward-death both reveals the fallen character of Dasein, as lost in the They, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being-itself. However, being-itself as implied by being-toward-death is still only a possibility, though admittedly an ontological possibility. In being-toward-death, the possibility which I anticipate is still not an actuality and can never be so since, as an actuality, it is the impossibility of any further possibility of being. Hence the need for some phenomenon in which Dasein's ownmost potentiality for being is attested concretely. It is this shift from an ontological possibility to an ontic potentiality for being which can be phenomenally attested which then leads the way into the analysis of conscience.

Conscience

Conscience, according to Heidegger, is that by means of which authentic being-one's-self is attested. As such, it is not an original phenomenon but manifests itself as an existentiell modification of the 'They'. 'Authentic Being-one's-Self takes the definite form of an existentiell modification of the "They".'⁵⁴ But if Dasein is originally *not* itself, then what is it that Dasein is restored *to* when it is restored to *itself*? How can Dasein ever be restored to its ownmost being-self when the existential structure of Falling precludes the possibility of an original being-self from which the self might have fallen away? Before we even attempt to answer these questions, let us first confirm that conscience is effectively a calling to self and that this calling to self is one which individualizes.

Conscience, Heidegger claims, is a mode of discourse⁵⁵ and it is this

existential assignment which justifies him in talking about conscience as a 'voice' and as a 'call'. Who calls? Obviously, Dasein. And to whom is the call addressed? Again, Dasein itself.⁵⁶ To what is one called by the voice of conscience. 'To one's *own Self*.'⁵⁷ In other words, in the call of conscience, Dasein is called *to* itself *by* itself *to be* its self. In order to avoid the 'metaphysical' implications of the reflectivity of conscience, Heidegger hastens to add that the self which is so called is not a subject and is therefore not turned inward upon itself when it is called but rather is called to be itself as being-in-the-world.⁵⁸

The derivative character of the individualization which emerges as a result of the call of conscience is reinforced by two further features. First, Heidegger recognizes the call as coming from over and beyond. 'The call comes *from* me and yet from *beyond me and over me*.'⁵⁹ This over and beyond is of course not explained with reference to God or to any internalized authority but is referred back to Dasein itself. That self which has lost itself in the 'They' can only experience its own self as something alien to it. 'What could be more alien to the "They", lost in the manifold "world" of its concern, than the Self which has been individualized down to itself in uncanniness and been thrown into the "nothing"?'⁶⁰ Due to lostness in the 'They', the alien appears own, the own alien and it is the alienness of its ownmost self which is supposed to account for the call appearing to come from over and beyond the self.

Second, so far from stressing the positivity of being-self, Heidegger goes out of his way to emphasize its negative character. Dasein is not so much called back to itself as called away from the 'They' and this by hearing the warning of conscience which addresses Dasein as Guilty! Guilty, namely, of *not* being its self. Thus, 'in the idea of "Guilty!" there lies the character of the "not"'.⁶¹ Dasein is not nor can it ever become the basis of its being. But it can and must be the being of its basis – which is itself a nullity. 'Not only is the projection, as one that has been thrown, determined by the nullity of being-a-basis; as *projection* it is itself essentially *nul*.'⁶² Not only is the calling to self a calling away from not-being-self, the self to which Dasein is called is itself a nullity. This way of analysing the self to which Dasein is called is imposed by the primordially of Falling. And yet it leads to difficulties which can only be resolved by a species of dialectical jugglery which requires that a positive character be ascribed to negativity itself – to the point indeed, that Heidegger ends up asking a question which it is not at all typical of *Being and Time* – though it may be taken to define the entire Sartrean project in *Being and Nothingness*. 'Has anyone ever made a problem of the ontological source of notness, or, prior to that, even sought the mere conditions on the basis of which the problem of the "not" and its notness and the possibility of that notness can be raised?'⁶³

Resoluteness

If there is a positive response to the call of conscience, it is to be found in resoluteness. Resoluteness is a mode of disclosedness which is attested in conscience. 'This reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety – we call "resoluteness"'.⁶⁴ The components of this definition already attest to the negativity of resoluteness. And yet it is often presented in positive terms. 'Resoluteness, as authentic being-one's-Self, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating "I"'.⁶⁵ The being-self which is referred to here is then developed in such a way that only by being itself does it become possible for Dasein to be with others authentically. 'Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the Others who are with it "be" in their ownmost potentiality-for-being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates'.⁶⁶

And yet this preliminary analysis of resoluteness is only existentiell. 'Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-being, in its existentiell attestation, has been exhibited, and at the same time existentially interpreted, as *resoluteness*'.⁶⁷ As such, it points forward to a more fundamental analysis which would be existential. The transition from an existentiell to an existential interpretation of resoluteness is effected with reference to the structure of anticipation. In effect, anticipation brings with it a host of considerations already dealt with previously, the wholeness of Dasein in being-towards-death, the temporality of Dasein, the nullity of Dasein. Anticipatory resoluteness brings these considerations together in an existential analysis by uniting them in the structure of care. The reappearance of the structure of care in turn makes it possible to consider the unity of the self as a unity of the totality of Dasein's structural whole.

Care and selfhood

It is no accident that the question of the unity of self reappears in connection with that of the structure of care at the very end of the entire theory of individualization and just before the final plunge into the theory of temporality which concludes the entire work. For, as Heidegger admits, despite the continual reference to the self, to being-self as well as to not-being-self, 'the question of the ontological constitution of Selfhood has remained unanswered'.⁶⁸ To some extent this critical section provides an opportunity for resuming the themes presented earlier. The connection between selfhood and care, selfhood and the wholeness of Dasein encountered in being-toward-death, are reproduced. More important, Heidegger reiterates the connection between inauthentic not-being-self and Falling. But he does so in a way which calls in question the existential character of Falling. For Falling is conceived here, quite

explicitly, as a modification of authentic being-self. 'It has been shown that proximally and for the most part Dasein is not itself but is lost in the They-self, which is an existentiell modification of the authentic Self.'⁶⁹ Here, the assignments are clear, an existential analysis of the authentic self and an existentiell analysis of the inauthentic self, as a modification of the former. This is of course only what one would expect. But it is in direct conflict with the ontological character of Falling. If the self is fallen from the very outset, which is the implication behind the existential character of Falling, then the inauthentic self cannot be a modification, whether existentiell or existential, of the authentic self. Rather the contrary, it is the authentic self which must be a modification of the inauthentic self.

How such a modification might indeed be possible is indicated in the substitution of the category of constancy for the traditional categories of identity, simplicity, substantiality, etc. The constancy of the self is presented as 'the authentic counter-possibility to the non-self-constancy which is characteristic of irresolute Falling'.⁷⁰ The implication is that Dasein lifts itself out of irresolute Falling into the 'They', not by conceiving of itself as an identical substance but by holding to whatever projects represent ownmost possibilities of being for the self. The self-identical substance self would be one which actually drifts from one mode of being to another, one way of thinking to another, and so becomes something shifting and transitory, despite its seeming self-sameness. The view of the authentic self which emerges from the characteristic of constancy as a counter-possibility to irresolute Falling, is closely related to the Sartrean view of the self as a nothingness which makes itself be by holding to those possibilities of being which it deems to be ownmost possibilities of being. There are of course elements in Heidegger's thinking which lend themselves to such an interpretation, especially the analysis of the thrown basis as a nullity. But it is entirely inconsistent with the characterization of the inauthentic self as an existentiell modification of a more primordial being-self.

So here, in this critical and conclusive chapter on the self, all the difficulties of the Heideggerian position emerge with full force. Both anticipatory resoluteness and Falling are existential structures, and yet they lead to contrary characteristics; constancy, on the one hand, and inconstancy on the other.

We have considered two solutions to this problem so far. First, due to Falling, the inauthentic self might be regarded as ontologically primary; in which case, authentic selfhood would emerge as an existentiell modification of the former. In so much as this route is adopted, the Sartrean position recommends itself. Because there is nothing like an original being-self, the self can only make itself be authentically on the basis of the nothingness of itself. Second, both authentic and inauthentic

modes of being could be ascribed to the self originally, the first clearly and explicitly, the second obscurely and implicitly. Authentic selfhood would then demand a shift of attention from the way in which the self is most readily and obviously conceived to that other way of conceiving of the self through which alone the self can come to conceive of itself authentically. No doubt this is why, earlier, Heidegger affirms the essential complementarity of resoluteness and irresoluteness. 'In anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein holds itself open for its constant lostness in the irresoluteness of the "They" – a lostness which is possible from the basis of its own Being. As a constant possibility of Dasein, irresoluteness is co-certain.'⁷¹

That neither of these two options are in fact satisfactory becomes especially clear when we encounter, once again, the problem of the hermeneutical circle. The circularity of the hermeneutical situation reappears, as a methodological issue, just prior to the investigation into selfhood, at ¶63, and it is re-introduced in the same way in which it was first introduced long ago in the Introduction: *'the entity which in every case we ourselves are, is ontologically that which is farthest'*.⁷² The objective of an ontological Interpretation of Dasein must be to articulate a way of being which is that of Dasein, prior to the covering up which results from Falling. *'Dasein's kind of Being thus demands that any ontological Interpretation which sets itself the goal of exhibiting the phenomena in their primordiality, should capture the being of this entity, in spite of this entity's own tendency to cover things up.'*⁷³ That Heidegger has in mind here not only a pre-ontological way of understanding one's self but one which is definitely linked with the way of being of pre-rational Man is indicated in a curious passage where he seems to defy his own prohibition against anthropological interpretations by exemplifying this pre-ontological understanding with reference to myth and magic.⁷⁴ But if it follows therefrom that an ontological investigation moves in a circle, the circularity of this procedure would only be effective in bringing to light Dasein's authentic being-self if such a way of being characterized the being of human being originally, no matter how indefinite and obscure this self-relation might be. Indeed, the very indefiniteness and obscurity of Dasein's own original self-understanding would then provide an exemplary motive for the kind of existential analyses in which Heidegger engages.

By the hermeneutical circle is meant a way of understanding for which the goal is effectively the ground, which, in moving forward toward an explicit laying out (*Auslegung*) actually only moves back toward what was already presupposed from the very beginning. But there are two *quite different ways* in which this circularity might be envisaged, one which starts upon the ontic place, moves back to the ontological ground and then forward again to the ontic; the other which starts with a pre-

ontological way of being of Dasein, moves forward to the ontic plane and then back again to a fully ontological clarification of this pre-ontological mode of being. We shall link the former with what we shall call the method of a 'regressive genesis'. We shall want to contend not only that the method of a regressive genesis fails to do justice to the radicality with which Heidegger poses the question of the being of Dasein, but that any effective resolution of the difficulties which it raises must depend upon the substitution, for this procedure, of an alternative procedure which might be called that of a 'progressive genesis'.

4 Progressive versus regressive genesis

Typically, Heidegger begins his investigations in *Being and Time* upon the ontic plane, and with a description of phenomenon which are readily accessible in so far as they characterize the average everydayness of Dasein. From here, the analysis moves back to an inquiry into the ground of what has been taken for granted. Finally, in so far as a ground has been disclosed, this same ground can then be investigated in its grounding capacity, that is, as giving rise to the very phenomenon which formed the point of departure for the entire analysis. There is a circularity here. But, in as much as the analysis both departs from, and terminates upon, the ontic plane, the circularity in question might be called 'ontic' rather than 'ontological'. In so far as Heidegger employs such a method, his analyses still operate within a Husserlian configuration, to the point that as acute a critic as Tugendhat is able to call the ontological investigation of *Being and Time* a radicalized transcendental phenomenology.

Such a conception of Heidegger's ontological phenomenology (as a sort of inverted transcendental phenomenology) finds some support in *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*,⁷⁵ where Heidegger contrasts the Husserlian reduction with his own 'step back' from the ontic into the ontological realm. But it does not do justice to the radicality of Heidegger's procedure. For first, Heidegger's existential analyses are much more radically opposed to that way of understanding beings which is operative upon the ontic plane than are Husserl's epistemological analyses. For the most part, Husserl only wants to provide a transcendental foundation for those regions of being which are naively taken for granted in the natural attitude. The relative legitimacy of science and common sense is not called in question, only its naivety with regard to foundations. Second, by recommending his move back to a transcendental subjectivity, Husserl is only intensifying an epistemological subjectivity which he already admits. Heidegger's aim is much more radical, nothing short of an 'overcoming' of the entire metaphysics of subjectivity, consciousness, interiority, etc. It is for this reason that the ontic plane cannot provide

an unambiguous point of departure for ontological analyses. Even if the working out of the discipline of ontology comes last, a pre-ontological insight is necessary, from the very outset, as that which it is the task of an ontological investigation to bring to explicit awareness, and which guides the movement back from the very beginning. Indeed, it is only if this pre-ontological way of being is taken as the interpretative clue that the circularity of an ontological investigation can assume its proper form as a conclusive disclosure of what is initially only obscurely and indefinitely projected.

Hence the question: is there some other procedure which Heidegger might have adopted which would have avoided the difficulties which we have had to confront and which would, in consequence, confer upon his analyses a consistency which, as it stands, they lack? An answer already springs to mind in so far as it is one which has been suggested before. Beginning with a pre-ontological mode of being of Dasein which, if not fully authentic, is at least not yet committed to fallenness in the 'They', one could then envisage the latter as an *existentiell* modification. Indeed, provided one meant by 'existential modification' an *unavoidable transformation* of the very being of Dasein and not a way of being operative from the very beginning, fallenness into the 'They' could even be presented as an *existential* modification. This would, in turn, prepare the way for an account of individualization as the return to an original being-self out of the fallen condition. Such a revision would demand that we shift the emphasis from Falling to *facticity* and *thrownness* and that the latter be interpreted in such a way as to be free, at least in principle, from any commitment to inauthenticity.

The key to such a re-interpretation of the hermeneutical circle (no longer ontic–ontological–ontic but pre-ontological–ontic–ontological) lies in the notion of a pre-ontological way of being. In the Introduction, this notion is presented in connection with the metaphors of 'closeness' and 'farness'. 'Ontically Dasein is not only close to us – even that which is closest: we *are* it, each of us, we ourselves. In spite of this, or rather just for this reason, it is ontologically that which is farthest.'⁷⁶ Or again, 'Dasein is ontically "closest" to itself and ontologically farthest; but pre-ontologically it is surely not a stranger'.⁷⁷ The difficulty concealed in this somewhat mysteriously worded paradox becomes much clearer in the light of a genetic analysis. The difficulty lies in the characterization of both the ontical and the pre-ontological as 'close'. In the first citation, the difficulty is avoided simply because no mention is made of the pre-ontological. In the second however, it is avoided by the dubious strategy of a wording sufficiently ambiguous to circumvent the confusion that would otherwise arise with the double meaning of 'closest', as both pre-ontologically, and as ontically, close.

A little later, Heidegger makes another and much more satisfactory

attempt to differentiate the pre-ontological from the ontological. He presents the distinction in terms of a distinction between a way of being of Dasein and a way of thinking about this same way of being, a way of thinking enshrined in the discipline of ontology.

Here, 'Being-ontological' is not yet tantamount to 'developing an ontology'. So if we should reserve the term 'ontology' for that theoretical inquiry which is explicitly devoted to the meaning of entities, then what we have had in mind in speaking of Dasein's 'Being-ontological' is to be designated as something 'pre-ontological'.⁷⁸

The further qualification which Heidegger is careful to make is specifically intended to disqualify any interpretation of the 'pre-ontological' as something ontic. 'It does not signify simply being-ontical however, but rather being in such a way that one has an understanding of being.'⁷⁹

By taking the distinction between a pre-ontological way of being and the discipline of ontology more seriously than Heidegger takes it himself, we shall find ourselves in a position to develop a progressive genesis in the context of which many of Heidegger's difficulties are resolved. In particular, the theory of individualization can now be rendered more consistent with itself by representing the possibility of authentic being-self as a recuperation of a primordial possibility inherent in Dasein. The turning away from the 'They' motivated by anxiety, being-toward-death, conscience and resoluteness would, at the same time, be a turning back toward the self in its original ontological constitution.

But an even more challenging possibility can be envisaged, one which is more in line with the development of a genetic ethics and which would have the merit of *including* rather than *excluding* transcendental philosophy from the purview of a phenomenological investigation of ethical phenomena. This more challenging possibility refers to the possibility not merely of substituting a progressive for a regressive genesis but of transforming the progressive genesis in question from a *two-stage* into a *three-stage* genesis (pre-ontological-ontic-transcendental-ontological).

We have already considered two objections Heidegger brings against the working out of an (ontological) Ethics; that it is a derivative development which, as such, should be traced back to the ontological ground in which it needs to be rooted, and that it is not possible to tack on an Ethics as a sort of practical supplement. There is a third objection which bears more specifically upon the attempt to develop a *genetic* Ethics. In the context of an existential interpretation of conscience, Heidegger warns us that even the attempt to advance a material as opposed to a (Kantian) formal Ethics must fail because 'the call of conscience fails to give any such "practical" injunctions, solely because it summons Dasein to existence, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self'.⁸⁰ This is a

very strange, and highly off-hand, dismissal of Scheler's achievement. Although Scheler, like Sartre, makes it his business to offer concrete examples of the way in which his principles are instantiated, such examples only serve as clarifications. They have no paradigmatic value and the conclusions drawn can always be questioned with reference to the principles laid out in the Ethics. Essentially, what Scheler does in his major work (*Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Value*), is to lay out a hierarchy of values and to found these different orders of value in correspondingly fundamental ways of envisaging the being of human being. Corresponding to the material, the vital, the spiritual and the religious dimension of human being, Scheler finds value configurations whose essential characteristics can be specified and, moreover, ordered in a logically necessary sequence.⁸¹

And surely this is not so very far from the Heideggerian project with its differentiation of the ontological from the ontic plane. There are two main differences; first, Scheler recognizes the relative legitimacy of each of the planes so distinguished, in the sense that he does not try to reduce the higher to the lower, and second, that he offers a more discriminating range of value configurations, in as much as he distinguishes four rather than two planes of being. Moreover, if, as I hope to show in my 'genetic' ethics, one reverses the order of priority established by Scheler and makes the vital configuration primary, then the material value order becomes the plane upon which an inauthentic accommodation to commonly accepted standards first becomes apparent. The spiritual and the religious value configurations then pick up the thrust of a movement away which finally brings the self back to the origin again.

With a view to laying the foundation for such a *genetic* Ethics, let us see if the resources of phenomenological philosophy do in fact permit a differentiation and a specification of the requisite planes.

First and originally, the being of human being is so constituted that it simply affirms itself as being what it is. This is the being-self the existence of which Heidegger will sometimes confirm even though, for the most part, the theoretical exigencies of the category of Falling make it difficult, or impossible, for him to recognize such an original way of being. At this level, being-self and being-in-the-world would have to be recognized as reciprocal and mutually confirming structures. As that very being which it is, the self projects possibilities of being and so finds itself in a world through which alone such possibilities can be effectively realized. But if the realization of ownmost possibilities of being is the 'ethical' goal, then, with this revision, surely we run the risk of locating the goal at the very *outset* and so of precluding the very process by which the self comes to be itself, becomes itself, as the *outcome* of the procedure of individualization?

At the risk of losing the philosophical thread, it is worth mentioning

en passant that any parent who has supervised the upbringing of a child knows full well the two-sided significance of just such an elementary self-affirmation. The charm of children is their spontaneity, the naturalness of their being-self. But the behaviour of most children at some time (and some children most of the time) is directed toward getting their way, to imposing themselves (for instance upon their siblings). This is so familiar a phenomenon it is not worth labouring. The Ethics that belongs to such a primordial self-affirmation is, by its very nature, not only an affirmation of the self but often also a negation of the other. It is for this reason that the child has to be taught to recognize the legitimate, even if rival, claims of the other. Adolescence represents yet another stage in life at which human being strives to realize its ownmost being self, frequently in the form of a defiance of social rules. Where this defiance takes the form of long hair, loud parties and a penchant for sex and drugs, society tends to turn a blind eye since it recognizes in these traits the symptoms of a by no means dishonourable struggle for self-realization. When it takes the form of hooliganism, on the other hand, society tries to put a stop to it. Where, in other words, self-affirmation does not imply a negation of the other, it is tolerated, where it does, it is suppressed.

Precisely because an Ethics of self-affirmation exhibits a partiality which makes of the self an absolute, the movement from this primary to a secondary plane cannot be portrayed in a purely negative light. There is a rationale to the construction of the 'They' self and that construction has an *ethical* legitimacy, the substance of which is contained in the principle of an essential accommodation to the *legitimate* wants and needs of the other. To be sure, there is a self-negation at work here too, a self-negation which leads in the direction of Heideggerian inauthenticity. But this self-negation brings with it, as its essential complement, an affirmation of the other, or rather, a freeing of the other from the absolutist claims of the self.

In my view, the Utilitarian Ethics is nothing but an elaborate working out of the implications of this self-negation which is, at the same time, an affirmation, or at least a recognition, of the legitimate claims of the other. Each is required to regard himself as one, on a par with every other. Each is required to recognize that the pleasure derived from a given quantum of goods must also be measured against the deprivation which the other suffers when those goods are assigned to himself, rather than to someone else. Each is therefore enjoined to act in such a way that the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' is promoted. Whether or not one is prepared to go so far as to subscribe to Nietzsche's contemptuous dismissal: Man does not pursue happiness; only the Englishman does that, nevertheless, inherent in the Utilitarian Ethics we do find a principle which functions as a cautionary corrective against the excesses of self-affirming integrity. Indeed, it is only in so far as a certain *relative*

legitimacy is accorded to the 'They' and to the kind of self-discipline which the 'They' enjoins does it then become possible to raise the question of how authenticity can be recovered without surrendering that recognition of the respective claims of the other which is enshrined in the Utilitarian Ethics.

To my way of thinking, the Kantian Ethics makes a major step in the right direction by undercutting the very foundations of the Utilitarian Ethic, the attempt to found normative principles upon the naturalistic concept of happiness. For Kant, Ethics begins where the self has succeeded in so overcoming its self (its needs and its wants) that its actions are no longer motivated by considerations of personal interest or satisfaction but by a simple reflection upon the right and a determination to do what is right because it is right *and for no other reason*. If, as has been suggested, the 'They' self, when it acknowledges an ethical dimension, operates, for the most part, along Utilitarian lines, then the Kantian Ethics represents a demolition of the 'They' self. It is no longer enough simply to do *what* 'They' deem right (for instance, honesty or patriotism) since doing what is right (from the standpoint of the 'They') might actually be, and most often is, either to the advantage of the self or the community. Rather, the self has first to learn to *know* the right (by dint of rational reflection) and then to *do* the right *because* it is right, even if, in doing right, the self acts *against* its interests and finds itself at odds with everyone else. However strenuously Heidegger might resist such a connection, the theory of conscience does perform this function of leading the self back to an evaluation which is, at the very least, self engendered (rather than engendered by the 'They') and which calls the self away from what 'They' would have it be.

The difficulty with the Kantian Ethics as a paradigm of self overcoming (strictly speaking, the *second* self-overcoming since a certain self-overcoming already pertains to the self negation characteristic of the accommodation to the commonality of *das Man*) is that the connection with the being of human being is not only lost but has to be given up as a necessary condition of the self placing itself upon the requisite plane, that plane, namely, where a certain universalization of the (noumenal) self makes possible a recognition of the legitimacy of the kind of universal principles upon which the Kantian Ethics is founded. In becoming the kind of being capable of implementing the Kantian Ethics human being has first to lose the sense of itself as a concrete human being with quite specific wants and needs – or so it would seem. We know how long and how hard Kant himself struggled with this problem of what might be called the ontological evisceration of the self, to the point of admitting such barely consistent (with his own position) motivational factors as *ethical feelings*. But this only brings out that much more convincingly the need for something like a restoration of the original mode of being of

human being, a restoration which can be nothing less than a repetition, since a simple repetition would be a denial of the entire development undertaken up to that point.

The same point can be made along more Husserlian lines. If being-with (in our case existence on the objective plane) is characterized by fallenness into the 'They', then the first step toward the recovery of self must surely be *not-being-with*, holding the other at a distance, *not* letting oneself get involved with others, i.e., transcendental solipsism. To be sure, for Husserl, it is the epistemological implications of transcendental solipsism which are of interest. But if transcendental solipsism is re-interpreted along existential lines it can then be understood in the light of that relatively familiar mode of being which we call that of the 'recluse'. In the context of a genetic Ethics the implication is that at some point the individual must go through some such procedure of self-isolation if it is to win itself against the levelling tendencies inherent in the 'They'. Husserl made little attempt, in his published writings, to develop the ethical implications of transcendental phenomenology but they are certainly to be found in Scheler's own laying out of the Husserlian position.⁸²

The same point can be made in yet another way. The reduction brings with it a self-suspension of the phenomenologist. The dis-interestedness inherent in such a self-suspension can also be envisaged as a self-detachment of the Kantian kind, that is, a detachment which makes it possible for the self to place its self upon a par with every other self and so to acknowledge the legitimacy of the principle: 'Treat every self as an end in itself'. The importance of the reflective detour as an alternative way back to the origin cannot be overestimated. It is not just that it permits us to include rather than exclude the contributions of transcendental philosophy to the discipline of Ethics; much more important than this purely *theoretical* consideration, it keeps alive the *practical* ideal of a 'higher consciousness' capable of resolving the conflicts which necessarily abound upon a more primordial plane. The 'Kingdom of Ends' may be nothing more than a Regulative Idea, but as an ethical vision, or pre-vision, it can hardly be improved upon. At the very least it serves a critical function, bringing to light the extent to which human conflict is the product of a failure to conform to the universal requirements of Reason.

However, to the self-suspension characteristic of the placement of the self upon a reflective plane something in the order of a self-realization or self-actualization must needs respond if the principle in question is to become practically effective. Nietzsche himself provided many indications as to how such a conclusive self-realization might be effected. When he recognized the artist, the philosopher and the saint as the three ideal types of human being, it was surely because these three types necessarily

subject themselves to a self-suspension, but a self-suspension of a kind which, in turn, leads on to a new kind of self-realization, a self-realization which not only does not imply a negation of the other but actually confirms and promotes an equivalent self-realization in the other.

And here we catch a glimpse of a possible *philosophical* ground for Heidegger's major historical error. For surely, whatever else he might have failed to do, Hitler did succeed in realizing his ownmost potentiality for being. A social non-entity by origin, he became the supreme head of the German state. A non-commissioned soldier, he became the head of the German army. An uneducated artist whose talent was so little appreciated that he failed to get into the Vienna school of art, he played out the artistry of his life upon the stage of world politics – with devastating consequences for the world. To very few has it been given to realize their own (no doubt sincerely held) convictions as fully and completely as Hitler. However, in realizing his own potentiality for being, he severely curtailed, when he did not annihilate altogether, the potentiality for being of others.

This is surely the point of Jaspers' comment in his *Notizen zu Martin Heidegger* (§157) where he objects: '“Resoluteness”, but with respect to what?'⁸³ It is the vacuousness of the principle which constitutes the problem. Heidegger could be excused for not having specified concrete forms of behaviour as exemplary instances of resoluteness but he might at least have furnished *criteria* for determining, in any given instance, whether a specific form of behaviour did or did not meet the legitimate requirements of resoluteness. The defence that Heidegger was offering an evaluatively neutral account of resoluteness simply does not stand up to a close examination of the numerous passages in which the concept figures. The supposedly neutral descriptions are undoubtedly evaluative recommendations and were intended as such. But if an ethics of authenticity is implied it becomes absolutely crucial to provide criteria for assessing the viability of that toward which resoluteness is directed.

As we have seen, the difficulty with an Ethics of Authenticity is not that it calls the self back to its ownmost being-self but that there can be nothing like a direct regression to such an original way of being. For any attempt to effect such an 'ontic regression' cannot but bring with it 'primitive' implications – in the worst sense of that word. In place of such an 'ontic regression' we have therefore sought to recommend something in the order of a 'reflective detour', a detour which first takes human being even further *away* from its self (and from others) in order, *on that basis*, to be able, eventually, to bring human being back to itself again in a *genuinely* authentic way.

The difference between an 'objective regression' and the 'reflective detour' can be brought out as follows: in as much as the placement of the self upon an ontic plane (fallenness in the 'They') represents a split

within the self, or a negation of the self by itself (as fallen, the self is *not* itself; 'not-being-itself' being precisely what 'They' want the self to be), the 'objective regression' heals the split in the most straightforward way. The self simply steps back out of this state of self-alienation and so is restored to itself again. The 'reflective detour', on the other hand, requires that the self first aggravate the split within itself, carry this division to the ultimate limit of a 'solipsistic' self-universalization and then, having done so, go on to *overcome* this very same abstraction of itself from itself – so that the movement of return which, in one sense, restores the self to itself again, in another, merely takes the self ever farther from itself by reversing the progressive dynamic of the entire genesis.⁸⁴

Nothing is more problematic in existential philosophy than the question of authenticity – and nothing is more important. In defence of an ethics of authenticity we have tried to show first, that without some original concept of being-self, the entire project is vitiated from the very outset; second, that the positing of such an original being-self calls for a progressive analysis of Fallenness into the 'They'; and third, that the eventual regression to being-self is one which has to include a 'reflective detour' if it is to avoid the 'primitive' implications of an 'ontic' or 'objective' regression. The long, indeed very long, detour which we have tried to outline in the name of a 'genetic ethics' is indeed a laborious alternative to the sweet simplicity of the Heideggerian directive. But in philosophy, as in life itself, the more indirect the way, the more certain it is that it will arrive at the desired goal, and this not just because the *goal is the way* but because the goal is the (way to the) ground and the ground, the (way to the) goal.

Notes

1 Martin Heidegger, *Brief über den 'Humanismus'*, GA 9 (*Gesamtausgabe*, Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, hereinafter referred to as GA), S. 349.

2 For example, *Sein und Zeit* 167 (tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson as *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962)) where Heidegger insists: 'our interpretation has a purely ontological intention, and is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein.'

3 Heidegger, *Brief über den 'Humanismus'*, GA 9, S. 349.

4 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 354 (H. 316).

5 Martin Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, GA 40, tr. Ralph Manheim as *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p. 164.

6 *ibid.*, p. 165.

7 Perhaps the most cogent and certainly the most poignant study of authenticity in Camus is to be found not in his philosophical writings but in his novel, *La chute*.

8 Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, tr. Philip Mairet (London: Methuen, 1948); Heidegger, *Brief über den 'Humanismus'*, S. 325.

9 In *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, GA 9, the issue gets more complicated. In the section itself also headed 'Vom Wesen des Grundes', Heidegger first distinguishes three ways of grounding: (1) ground as instituting, (2) ground as taking up a position, (3) ground as grounding, to finish up with a threefold distribution of the ground as world projection, absorption in beings and ontological grounding of beings.

10 Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, GA 3, tr. James Churchill as *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 4.

11 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 70 (H. 44).

12 *ibid.*, p. 149 (H. 114).

13 *ibid.*, p. 151 (H. 115–16).

14 *ibid.*, p. 150 (H. 116).

15 *ibid.*, p. 168 (H. 130).

16 *ibid.*

17 *ibid.*, p. 168 (H. 130).

18 In her paper on 'Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty' (chap. 30, vol. II of the present work), Christina Schües argues that there are, in the first instance, only two existentialia, *State-of-mind* and *Understanding*. To be sure, she admits the existential status of *Discourse* (while ignoring this third constitutive structure for practical purposes), but she treats *Falling*, and with some good reason, as a 'modification' of the two basic existentialia. But far from relieving the difficulties connected with the status of falling, she too finds this notion incoherent, especially when the analysis is extended to take in the thematic of time, where it requires from Heidegger an 'authentic' falling!

19 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 220 (H. 176).

20 *ibid.*, p. 224 (H. 179).

21 *ibid.*, p. 182 (H. 142).

22 *ibid.*, p. 203 (H. 161).

23 *ibid.*, p. 201 (H. 158).

24 *ibid.*, p. 184 (H. 144).

25 *ibid.*, p. 186 (H. 145).

26 *ibid.*, p. 186 (H. 146).

27 *ibid.*, p. 186 (H. 146).

28 *ibid.*, p. 161 (H. 124).

29 *ibid.*, p. 174 (H. 135).

30 *ibid.*, p. 175 (H. 136).

31 *ibid.*, p. 156 (H. 120).

32 *ibid.*, p. 164 (H. 126).

33 *ibid.*, p. 165 (H. 128).

34 *ibid.*, p. 220 (H. 176); cf. Heidegger, *Brief über den 'Humanismus'*, S. 329.

35 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 220 (H. 176).

36 *ibid.*, p. 76 (H. 50).

37 *ibid.*, p. 223 (H. 178).

38 In my own ontological phenomenology (*Being and Becoming* (for details see vol. I, chap. 4, n. 46 of the present work)), I operate with three concepts of the Other in general; the concept of world, to cover the first and originary stage, the concept of universe, to cover the second and objective stage and the concept of field, to cover the third and reflective stage. The latter I owe to Gurwitsch and his study of *The Field of Consciousness*.

- 39 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 223 (H. 179).
- 40 *ibid.*, p. 220 (H. 176), see also ¶38.
- 41 *ibid.*, p. 82 (H. 56).
- 42 *ibid.*, p. 222 (H. 178).
- 43 *ibid.*
- 44 *ibid.*, p. 210 (H. 167).
- 45 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1965), S. 249.
- 46 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 76 (H. 51).
- 47 *ibid.*, p. 229 (H. 184).
- 48 *ibid.*
- 49 *ibid.*, p. 229 (H. 185).
- 50 *ibid.*, p. 229 (H. 185).
- 51 *ibid.*, p. 233 (H. 188).
- 52 *ibid.*, p. 308 (H. 264).
- 53 *ibid.*, p. 309 (H. 264).
- 54 *ibid.*, p. 312 (H. 267).
- 55 *ibid.*, p. 314 (H. 269).
- 56 *ibid.*, p. 317 (H. 272).
- 57 *ibid.*, p. 317 (H. 273).
- 58 *ibid.*, p. 318 (H. 273).
- 59 *ibid.*, p. 320 (H. 275).
- 60 *ibid.*, pp. 321–2 (H. 277).
- 61 *ibid.*, p. 329 (H. 283).
- 62 *ibid.*, p. 331 (H. 285).
- 63 *ibid.*, p. 322 (H. 277).
- 64 *ibid.*, p. 342 (H. 296–7).
- 65 *ibid.*, p. 344 (H. 298).
- 66 *ibid.*, p. 344 (H. 298).
- 67 *ibid.*, p. 349 (H. 302).
- 68 *ibid.*, p. 365 (H. 317).
- 69 *ibid.*, p. 365 (H. 317).
- 70 *ibid.*, p. 369 (H. 322).
- 71 *ibid.*, p. 356 (H. 308).
- 72 *ibid.*, p. 359 (H. 311).
- 73 *ibid.*, p. 359 (H. 311).
- 74 *ibid.*, p. 261 (H. 313).
- 75 Heidegger, GA 24, tr. Albert Hofstadter as *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 21.
- 76 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 36 (H. 15).
- 77 *ibid.*, p. 37 (H. 16).
- 78 *ibid.*, p. 32 (H. 12).
- 79 *ibid.*
- 80 *ibid.*, p. 340 (H. 294).
- 81 In his *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materielle Wertethik* (tr. as *Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Value* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973)), Scheler not only lays out a hierarchy of values but ties these value configurations (physical, vital, spiritual and religious) down to the intrinsic constitution of human being itself. Given Heidegger's regressive methodology he would only have been able to follow Scheler a very short way along this path, had he even been prepared to contemplate a line of thought following the Schelerian directive. More specifically, one might say that his explicit

dismissal of the ontic dimension represents an implicit critique of physical values and the ethics to which they lead (Utilitarianism) in favour of vital values (a hypothesis which partly explains his fascination with the thinking of a Nietzsche). But the spirit of Scheler's enterprise moves in the opposite direction (and disregarding for the moment the, in my view, misplaced fundamentality accorded to the physical as opposed to the vital stratum), from the lower to the higher, from the physical and the vital toward the spiritual and the religious, and this without any disconnection or disjunction of the order of values from the being who posits such values as expressive of dimensions of its very own being. In other words, for Scheler, and for those who, like myself, would like to follow in Scheler's footsteps, there can be the 'higher' value orders only because these orders already 'exist' as constitutive of the very being of that being which projects such a value order, a being for whom, consequently, the ethical domain arises necessarily as a legitimate way of conceiving of, and, more important, of working out and developing, a distinctively human existence.

82 Alois Roth's *Edmund Husserls Ethische Untersuchungen, Phaenomenologica* (The Hague: Nijhoff) brings out the connection between Husserl's lectures on Ethics and the ethical philosophy developed by Scheler himself.

83 Karl Jaspers, *Notizen zu Martin Heidegger* (München/Zurich: Piper, 1989), p. 176.

84 What can only be outlined in a few words here forms the topic of my genetic theory of inter-personal relations, which is itself grounded in the several stages of the ontological genesis of human being. More specifically, the first and originary stage is developed under the rubric of a theory of *Empathy*, the second and objective stage, under the rubric of a theory of *Alienation*, the third and reflective stage, under the rubric of a theory of *Isolation* and the fourth and conclusive stage, under the rubric of a theory of *Sympathy*. Sympathetic inter-personal relations thereby assume the form of a recuperation of empathic relations, subject however to the detour through *alienation* and *isolation*. However long and complicated the presentation of such a movement must necessarily be, the underlying principle is very simple: becoming-self cannot be accomplished in any simple and straightforward way (and if such a way is adopted it will have 'primitive' implications – in the worst sense of that word) but has to assume the laborious form of a massive detour, a detour which necessarily includes moments which seem to be self-defeating, in the sense that they *seem* to take the self farther away from, rather than closer to, its self.

The place of the work of art in the age of technology

Kathleen Wright

But where danger threatens
That which saves from it also grows.

Hölderlin, 'Patmos'¹

For Heidegger the question of the essence of technology (*Technik*) is intimately related to the question of the essence of art. And yet he claims that 'the more questioningly we ponder the essence of technology, the more mysterious [*geheimnisvoller*] the essence of art becomes'.² What is the relation between art and technology? It is Hölderlin's poem, 'Patmos', that reveals to Heidegger the way to understand the relation between art and technology. Art grows out of the 'danger' of technology as a 'saving power'. Thus art is related to, yet distinct from, technology as a saving power is related to, yet distinct from, the danger from which it saves us. Yet why does Heidegger then claim that the essence of art becomes 'more mysterious [*geheimnisvoller*]'? Does Heidegger mean that even if we undertake to think what is dangerous in the essence of technology, in the end what can rescue us from this danger will not only remain a mystery but also become more mysterious? If this is what Heidegger means, why should we even begin to question technology? What does this claim mean?

For Heidegger technology is 'planetary' and its danger 'homelessness' (*Heimatlosigkeit*). Given this danger, what has been translated as 'mysterious', the German word 'geheimnisvoll', can assume the opposite meaning, 'filled with the familiar, the home-like' (*geheim, heimlich, heimisch*). 'Geheimnisvoll' can indeed mean both the familiar and the mysterious,³ and if Heidegger is right, that 'homelessness is coming to be the destiny of the world',⁴ then it will be precisely the familiar that is mysterious. In light of this reading of the word, 'geheimnisvoll', Heidegger's claim is the following: the more we question the homelessness of

technology, the more we find in art a dwelling. But can this claim be justified? Does it not presuppose that the realm of art is safe from the danger of technology? Why should works of art be free from homelessness?

To clarify Heidegger's claim, I shall explore in this paper how Heidegger would respond to an issue raised by Walter Benjamin's essay, 'The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction' (1936). Heidegger could not have read this work when he wrote 'The origin of the work of art' in 1935. Although what Heidegger says in 'The age of the world picture' (1938) might well be in response to Benjamin's essay, this is unlikely. Rather it seems that both Benjamin's essay and Heidegger's two works respond to the same short piece by Paul Valéry, 'The conquest of ubiquity'. Benjamin begins with this piece, and Heidegger, who corresponded with Valéry, speaks in 'The age of the world picture' of 'the conquest of the world as picture [*Bild*]'.⁵

I shall limit my discussion to the issue of the *place* of the work of art in the age of technology. First I shall draw on Valéry and Benjamin to pose the question of place in terms of the alternatives of *cult site* or *exhibition setting*. I shall argue that what Heidegger calls in 'Art and space' (1969) the *place (Ort)*⁵ of the work of art in the age of technology can no longer be the cult site. Next I shall consider the second alternative within the context of the larger set of questions raised by Heidegger about modern science, metaphysics, and technology. While acknowledging that the exhibition setting does indeed replace the cult site, I shall argue that for Heidegger the exhibition setting displaces the work of art, and that this displacement or homelessness of the work of art discloses in an exemplary way the essence of the modern age of technology. Finally I shall examine three of Heidegger's discussions of particular works of art: in 'Art and space', the anonymous work of sculpture; and in 'The origin of the work of art', the Van Gogh painting of the peasant shoes, and the temple. I shall argue that for Heidegger it is within and out of the displacement of the work of art in the age of technology that an alternative to place as cult site or exhibition setting emerges, an alternative which exemplifies what is for Heidegger the saving power of art. In 'Art and space', Heidegger says that there is as yet no name to distinguish this new conception of place. I shall however draw on Heidegger's frequent use of a line from Hölderlin's 'In lovely blueness . . .': 'Full of acquirements, but poetically, man dwells on this earth',⁶ and shall call this place (*Ort*) a *dwelling place*.

Benjamin's essay is introduced by and comments on the following statement from Valéry's 'The conquest of ubiquity':

Our fine arts were developed, their types and uses were established, in times very different from the present, by men whose power of

action upon things was insignificant in comparison with ours. But the amazing growth of our techniques, the adaptability and precision they have attained, the ideas and habits they are creating, make it a certainty that profound changes are impending in the ancient craft of the Beautiful. In all the arts there is a physical component which can no longer be considered or treated as it used to be, which cannot remain unaffected by our modern knowledge and power. For the last twenty years neither matter nor space nor time has been what it was from time immemorial. We must expect great innovations to transform the entire technique of the arts, thereby affecting artistic invention itself and perhaps even bringing about an amazing change in our very notion of art.⁷

Where Valéry attributes both the actual transformation of the 'entire technique of the arts' and the potential change of 'our very notion of art' to the revolutionary interpretation of matter, space, and time by quantum and relativity theory, Benjamin attributes the actual transformation of our notion of art to the 'first truly revolutionary means of reproduction, photography'. Valéry's piece is concerned with the 'immemorial alliance' between music and physics, and therefore concentrates on music as the 'first to be transformed in its methods of transmission, reproduction, and even production'. He notes that the control of visual phenomena, although not yet so advanced, will soon follow and predicts finally that 'works of art will acquire a kind of ubiquity'. Here 'ubiquity' means that no matter when, no matter where, the reproduced works of art can privately accompany 'men and women who are very much alone'.⁸

Benjamin, like Valéry, greets the technical transformation of the transmission, reproduction, and production of works of art, together with its consequence, the ubiquity of works of art, enthusiastically. While acknowledging the phenomenon of recording, Benjamin is above all concerned with the 'revolutionary' means of mechanical reproduction, photography, including silent and sound filming. In contrast to other means of reproduction (stamping, woodcutting, engraving, etching, lithographing, even printing), photography is 'revolutionary' not because now *all* visible works of art are in principle reproducible, but rather because the increased quantity of reproductions of each individual work of art brings with it a revolutionary change in 'the quality of the presence of the authentic art work', which Benjamin calls the 'aura'. Let us examine Benjamin's claim further for it is this claim – that the quality of the original work of art is diminished, not the quality of the reproduction – that might seem to challenge Heidegger's understanding of how the art work 'works', that is, discloses Being, in 'The origin of the work of art'

as well as his claim that art can be a saving power in the age of modern technology.

Benjamin defines the *aura*, the quality of the presence of an authentic work of art, in the following way: '*the unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be*.'⁹ According to Benjamin, the aura of an authentic work of art originates from its 'cult value', that is, from its use within a ritual, be this magical, religious, or more recently secular (the cult of the beautiful).¹⁰ The authenticity of the original work of art depends on its '*presence in time and space, its unique existence [sein einmaliges Dasein] at the place [Ort] where it happens to be*'.¹¹ While Benjamin makes authenticity just as dependent on presence in time as presence in space, I am concerned here with 'place' and how the 'place', the presence in a position in space, ultimately *secures* the authentic work's aura, 'the unique phenomenon of *distance*, however *close* it [the work of art] is'. Benjamin observes that in the age of mechanical reproduction initiated by the invention of photography, the authentic work of art loses its aura, the how or the quality of its presence. Benjamin attributes this loss to 'the technique of reproduction [which] detaches the reproduced object [the authentic art work] from the domain of tradition. By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence.'¹² Given the 'tremendous shattering of tradition' which Benjamin ascribes to mechanical reproduction by photography, the authentic work of art belongs *nowhere*.

To distinguish Benjamin's conclusion from that of Valéry, we can say that ubiquity has conquered the uniquely existing work of art. The ubiquity of the technical reproductions, that they can be exhibited and viewed anywhere and everywhere, transforms the 'place' of the uniquely existent work of art into *no place*, literally, *ou-topos*. Its cult site becomes *utopian*.¹³ Thus we may conclude that for Benjamin, ubiquity does not merely add to but instead *displaces* and *replaces* the 'unique existence at the place where it [the original work of art] happens to be'. The place of the work of art in reproduction is ubiquitous; it can be set up on exhibition anywhere and everywhere.

Instead of cult value, art works gain, Benjamin says, 'exhibition value'. Like film, which is created for reproduction and exhibition, art works will be designed for and evaluated in terms of their reproducibility, not their uniqueness. In contrast to Valéry, for whom the ubiquity of reproduced works was a private matter of individual choice, for Benjamin their ubiquity becomes a public matter and a social force. Benjamin concludes that the 'total function of art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to be based on another practice-politics'.¹⁴ Thus the technology of reproduction (photography, including film) transforms both the function of art and the very notion of an art work. In respect

to the question of place, Benjamin's essay suggests as the only alternative to the cult site the ubiquitous setting of exhibition.

Heidegger, like Valéry and Benjamin, acknowledges the need to question anew 'our very notion of art' in the age of modern technology. Like Benjamin, he recognizes the inadequacy of aesthetics, which takes works of art to be 'objects of an aesthetic experience'. Moreover he would agree with Benjamin's explanation of the social causes for the ubiquity of reproduced art works: 'the desire of contemporary masses to bring things "closer" spatially and humanly, which is just as ardent as their bent toward overcoming the uniqueness of every reality [here, original work of art] by accepting its reproduction'.¹⁵ Heidegger, however, would question whether works of art can be brought 'closer' *humanly* if, in being brought 'closer' *spatially*, their uniqueness is overcome.

In 'The origin of the work of art', the uniqueness of a work plays an important role. There it is one of the two ways to distinguish ontologically between a work of art and a tool (a piece of equipment). According to Heidegger, the createdness (*Geschaffensein*) of an art work differs from the readiness (*Fertigkeit*, better-finishedness) of a tool by 'the uniqueness of the fact that it [the work of art] is rather than is not'.¹⁶ On the basis of 'The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction', it might seem that this uniqueness cannot be sustained after photography, that this therefore cannot distinguish work from tool, and that ultimately Heidegger's distinction between art and technology cannot be maintained.

It is easy to confuse 'the uniqueness of the fact that it [the original work of art] is rather than is not' discussed by Heidegger with 'the unique existence at the place where it [the original work of art] happens to be' discussed by Benjamin, and therefore to mistake what Heidegger proposes for a return to what Benjamin has described as the cult value of the work of art complete with aura. Moreover his choice of a temple in 'The origin of the work of art', together with his statement that the presence of the god defines the precinct (*Bezirk*) of the temple as a holy precinct, encourages such a confusion. While it is true that Heidegger ultimately holds that 'only a god can save us',¹⁷ he also recognizes, in the words of Hölderlin's 'Patmos', that 'Near is/and difficult to grasp, the God'.¹⁸ Thus for Heidegger, the flight or loss of the god(s) (*Entgötterung*),¹⁹ that is, secularization, is a phenomenon essential to an understanding both of the modern age, the age of technology, and of the saving power of the work of art in this age.

In his discussion of the *displacement* (*Versetzung*) of art works when collected, exhibited, or even at their 'own site', Heidegger shows that he already agrees with Benjamin that the quality of the presence of authentic works of art has decayed. Moreover Heidegger concludes that: 'World-withdrawal and world-decay can never be undone.' Thus when

Heidegger raises as a question, 'Where does a work belong?', and maintains that: 'The work belongs, as work, uniquely within the realm [*Be-reich*] that is opened up by itself,'²⁰ he cannot be advocating that the 'place' of a work of art is the site of a cult. This, he would agree with Benjamin, has become utopian. Nor is he, however, advocating that the only 'place' remaining for the work of art in the age of technology is the ubiquitous exhibition setting, a 'place' which remains basically the same whether it be used for public and political or private and aesthetic purposes.

To understand why Heidegger claims for the work of art in the age of technology a 'place' other than the ubiquitous setting of exhibition and to clarify further his claim that the work of art opens up a dwelling place, we can ask how Heidegger would account for the revolutionary event described by Benjamin. To begin with, Heidegger would not agree with Benjamin that the cause of the decay of the aura, of the world of the original work of art is that photography replaces unique creations, works of art, through reproduction. Rather Heidegger would argue that the cause of this decay is modern science which replaces the world as a unique *ens creatum* through representation (*Vorstellen*). Accordingly, the 'revolution' which Benjamin attributes to the invention of photography would be for Heidegger only a special case, although an extreme case, of the 'revolution' that took place with the discovery of modern science. It would be an extreme case inasmuch as it brings to completion and thus discloses the limits of this revolution. In what sense would Heidegger understand the revolution described by Benjamin to be only a special case of the modern scientific revolution?

In 'The age of the world picture', as well as in his 1935-6 university lecture, 'Basic questions of metaphysics', Heidegger discusses the essence of the mathematical project of Galileo and Newton, of *representation* as the '*mente concipere*' ('I conceive in my mind') and its foundation in the metaphysics of Descartes and Kant. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger had already analyzed the distinctive kind of 'making-present' that goes together with representation. We are concerned now with the distinctive kind of taking of 'place' that goes together with this 'setting' of an object before and for a subject. Heidegger points out that in Aristotelian physics, there was 'an essential difference between the motion of celestial bodies and earthly bodies. The domains of these motions are different. How a body moves depends upon its species and the place to which it belongs. The *where* determines the *how* of its being. . . .'²¹ With modern physics, in the words of Alexandre Koyré, what was conceived of as 'a differentiated set of innerworldly places' becomes geometrized, yielding the 'essentially infinite and homogeneous extension'²² called space. This new concept of space is related in turn to new concepts of body (all bodies are essentially the same), of motion (motion is rectilinear; circular

motion is a special case of rectilinear motion), and finally of *place*. The new concept of position (*locus*) replaces Aristotle's concept of place (*topos*).

The mathematical project of modern natural science discovers a 'new world', one where 'every place is equal to every other'. Nowhere is there a 'where', a 'place', which determines the how, the quality, of something's being. Everywhere there is position; nowhere is there place. To use our former distinction, position is ubiquitous; place becomes utopian. The metaphysics of Descartes and Kant provide the philosophical foundation for this new concept of position in space. Neither philosopher questions the geometrization of space and the concept of position that belongs together with space so conceived. For both geometrized space is *a priori*. They differ from one another, however, in their account of the *a priori* – here the geometrized form of the representation of space. For Descartes, it is human thinking grounded transcendently in God's thinking; for Kant, it is human thinking grounded transcendently in itself that accounts for the *a priori*.

With Descartes, the mind which is non-spatial is removed from the world which is extended. Yet as a thinking thing, the human mind can represent to itself the idea of what is extended, space, as well as ideas of what are extended in space, bodies, including its own. Space, as 'I conceive in my mind', is geometrized. So too is position and extension, the relation between two positions (or locations) in space.²³ For Descartes, God ultimately guarantees that what the mind represents to itself clearly and distinctly does represent the extended world and the bodies included in it. Not only is God not a deceiver. God is also a geometrician. The Book of Nature is a book of geometry.

With Kant, the existence of God is indemonstrable; thus God is not an available concept to insure that space, position in space, and extension are as I conceive them to be. A different and more complex explanation is required. Kant makes a distinction between the outer and the inner sense: 'By means of the outer sense, a property of our mind, we represent to ourselves objects *as* outside us, and all without exception in space.'²⁴ The inner sense, in contrast, has the form of time. Kant maintains that 'since the outer sense gives us nothing but mere relations, this sense can contain in its representation *only the relation of an object to a subject*, and not the inner properties of the object in itself.'²⁵ Here he is arguing not only that the objects which we know do not represent the 'things in themselves', but also that the relations, for example, 'of locations [*Orte*] in an intuition (extension)' and 'of change of location [*Ort*] (motion)',²⁶ are not 'in themselves', but *are only insofar as they are related to, that is, represented by a subject*. The geometrized form of space and the concepts of position (location) and extension that go together with it are

'objectively valid' insofar as it is only in conformity with this form that something is an object for the subject.

For Descartes, the mind is 'the mirror of nature'.²⁷ What the mind represents to itself 'pictures' something 'outside' itself, the original world space (and time), along with the bodies and events within it. The 'original' world space, however, still exists independently of its 'representation', of its being conceived. As an *ens creatum*, it depends only on God for its being. Kant, however, reaches a different conclusion: 'It is, therefore, solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, of extended things, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can have outer intuition . . . the representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever.'²⁸ There is no 'original' world space apart from its 'representation' by the subject. World space is conceived to be and exists only from the human standpoint. It is in this sense that Heidegger speaks of the modern age as one in which the world and its space is ultimately conquered *as representation, as picture*. With Kant's 'Copernican revolution', the 'conquest of the world as picture' initiated by modern science reaches its metaphysical completion.

I have said that the technical revolution of photography which Benjamin holds responsible for the decay of the aura of original works of art would be for Heidegger only a special case of the revolution in science and metaphysics described above. I have shown that for Benjamin the aura – the quality of the presence – of the authentic art work depends on the work's 'unique existence at the place [*Ort*] where it happens to be'. Benjamin argues that what is revolutionary about photography is that it first makes possible the removal of works of art into the exhibition setting. Heidegger would agree, as I have argued, that works of art are everywhere replaced by their pictorial representation, by the photograph, the film (including television), the slide, the book plate, the print, the postcard, and even the postage stamp (in Italy). Moreover Heidegger would agree with Benjamin that the exhibition setting has everywhere replaced the cult site. But Heidegger would disagree with Benjamin's account of how the exhibition setting replaces the cult site.

Benjamin has argued that because photography makes possible many exhibition settings, the cult site loses its privileged position. For Benjamin, 'cult site' is conceived of as the same kind of place as 'exhibition setting'. It differs from an exhibition setting only in that it is one where the latter is many and ubiquitous. Benjamin conceives of the 'place' of the work of art before and in the age of technology solely as 'position' (*locus*). Heidegger would argue instead that 'cult site' is a different kind of place from 'exhibition setting'. A cult site is a *topos*, a 'where' that determines the 'how' of something's being. An exhibition setting is a *locus*, a position in space equal to any other position. Heidegger would explain the fact that exhibition setting replaces cult site as the displace-

ment of *topos* and the replacement of *topos* by *locus*. This displacement and replacement occurs independently of whether the *topos* or site is the work's 'original place' or its place in the museum, the site of the cult of the beautiful.

Heidegger would conclude that the technical revolution described by Benjamin is ultimately to be explained as a special case of the revolution initiated by modern science. The modern concept of position in space, victorious in the domain of the natural world, now conquers the domain of the non-natural, the realm of art. Moreover Heidegger would have also to conclude that the technical conquest of the original work of art 'as photograph' completes 'the conquest of the world', the original *ens creatum*, 'as picture'. These two conclusions, however, would seem to deny to art a saving power given the homelessness which Heidegger finds to be the *danger* of modern technology. Heidegger would grant that works of art are not *exempt* from homelessness. Whether collected privately, exhibited publicly, or visited at their own site, works of art are displaced in their 'exhibition setting'. Given that Heidegger has said that 'World-withdrawal and world decay can never be undone', if art is to be a *saving power*, art must *grow into* a saving power. Art grows into a saving power *first*, by warning us *in an exemplary way* of the essence of modern technology and its danger, homelessness, and *second*, by disclosing an altogether different conception of place, of a *dwelling place*. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to these two issues and to Heidegger's claim that art grows into a saving power.

First, how does the displacement of the work of art and its attendant loss of aura in the age of the technology of photography serve to warn us of the essence of modern technology and its danger? In the 'Age of the world picture', Heidegger maintains that: 'The world picture does not change from an earlier medieval one into a modern one, but rather the fact that the world becomes a picture at all is what distinguishes the essence of the modern age.'²⁹ While it is this fact that *distinguishes* the modern age, it is Enframing, *Gestell*, which Heidegger *identifies* with the essence of the modern age. Even though modern machine technology emerges later than modern science, Heidegger claims that the essence of modern technology governs both modern science and its philosophical foundation. The age of the world picture is the age of Enframing, of the essence of technology. What does Heidegger mean by the essence of technology and why does he call it Enframing, *Gestell*?

In ordinary usage, *Gestell* refers to some kind of framework or apparatus. However, Heidegger's name for the essence of modern technology is not this collective noun used for what is common to many kinds of technical apparatus: 'The essence of technology is by no means anything technological.'³⁰ By the 'essence' (*Wesen*) of technology, Heidegger does not mean what it is (*quidditas*). Instead Heidegger claims that 'It is

technology itself that makes the demand on us to think in another way what is usually understood by “essence”’.³¹ By ‘essence’ of technology, Heidegger means the way technology is present and reigns (*wesen*, a verb). The essence of ‘technology’ names a way of presencing that *masters* and *secures* all that comes to presence as an object for a subject. According to Heidegger, *Gestell* is deeply connected to the modern concept of representation (*Vorstellen*), which he characterizes as follows: ‘[O]f oneself to set [*stellen*] something before oneself and to make secure [*sicherstellen*] what has been set in place [*das Gestellte*], as something set in place.’³² Heidegger uses *Gestell* in a new way to gather together the ordinary language use of the *stellen* verbs, roughly equivalent in English to the verbs of ‘setting’. I am concerned here with how ‘place’ is taken in the ‘setting in place’ of technology.

In ‘The question concerning technology’, Heidegger describes one case of the ‘setting in place’ of technology:

The hydroelectric plant is set [*gestellt*] into the current of the Rhine. It sets [*stellt*] the Rhine to supplying its hydraulic pressure, which then sets [*stellt*] the turbines turning. This turning sets those machines in motion whose thrust sets going [*herstellt*] the electric current for which the long-distance power station and its network of cables are set up [*bestellt*] to dispatch electricity.³³

By the essence of technology, *Gestell*, Heidegger does not mean what is set in place, the assembly of machines described here that constitute the physical plant. Nor does he mean the network of interlocking ‘causal’ relations that takes place once the physical plant is set in place: that the plant causes the Rhine river to supply hydraulic pressure, that the hydraulic pressure then causes the generation of electricity, which finally causes the power station to supply electricity long distances. Technology is present and reigns before the functioning of the hydroelectric plant, and even before the constructing and setting into place of the plant. Before these can be set up and set in motion, technology is present and reigns in the *take over* of the ‘place’, the Rhine river, to be the ‘setting’ for a hydroelectric plant. Furthermore, technology continues to be present and to reign even at those ‘places’ where the river is not set to work. As set up by the tourist industry, the ‘place’ of the Rhine river is *taken over* as a ‘setting’ for sight-seeing and leisure activities. *Taken over* and *conquered* as a ‘setting’ or ‘place for us’, the Rhine river is then set upon and set to supplying our needs, whether for work or for play. The essence or reign of technology *takes over and occupies places*. It *conquers* the world.

Heidegger comments that the essence of technology, Enframing, is ‘in a lofty sense ambiguous’.³⁴ As long as ‘place’, the world we are in, is

taken over and conquered as a 'setting for us', we are always already 'in the picture'. Yet the more we secure and control the world we are in as a setting for us, the more we are threatened by the danger of modern technology, by homelessness. In 'The thing', Heidegger describes this danger:

All distances in time and space are shrinking. . . .

Man puts the longest distances behind him in the shortest time. He puts the greatest distances behind himself and thus puts everything before himself at the shortest range.

Yet the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness does not consist in shortness of distance. What is least remote from us in point of distance, by virtue of its picture on film or its sound on the radio, can remain far from us. What is incalculably far from us in point of distance can be near to us. Short distance is not itself nearness. Nor is great distance remoteness.³⁵

With our conquest of distance, with our setting of everything before and for ourselves, we are threatened with the loss of nearness, and with it of the loss of remoteness. The distant has been brought spatially close, but it has not yet been brought humanly near. To use the words of Clifford Geertz, we are 'experience-distant'.³⁶ The danger, homelessness, that Heidegger finds threatening us in the modern age of technology is the loss of a human sense, a humane sense, of being in the world as a dwelling place. Just as photography makes it possible for a work of art to be everywhere and anywhere and to belong nowhere, so our modern technology makes it possible for us to be everywhere and anywhere and to belong nowhere. Like the work of art which has lost its aura, being in the world in the age of modern technology has lost its aura, the quality of its presence: 'the unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be.' The displacement of the work of art warns us of our own impending homelessness. Can the work of art do more than warn? Can it grow into a saving power?

The setting of a work of art on view, on exhibition, shows how art can grow to be a saving power. I have argued that this 'setting' exemplifies Enframing and 'the conquest of the world as picture'. Thus the issue is not, as for Benjamin, whether what is on view is authentic or a reproduction. Nor is the issue whether the work is actually framed, as is Van Gogh's painting of the peasant shoes, or free-standing, as is the temple at Paestum. Finally the issue is not whether the work of art is or is not on its 'own site'. For the temple at Paestum is just as much displaced as the temple of Pergamon. And yet, according to Heidegger, it is out of this displacement, the homelessness of the exhibition setting,

that a work of art 'works', that is, originates being in the world as a *place for dwelling*.

Of Heidegger's many discussions of individual works of art I shall examine three: the work of sculpture treated in 'Art and space', the painting by Van Gogh of the peasant shoes, and the temple. In 'Art and space', Heidegger explicitly questions whether the physical-technical interpretation of space (as uniform extension within which every position is equal to any other) can remain valid as the 'only true space'.³⁷ On the basis of space so understood, both the 'space' of art works as well as the 'space' of our daily actions and interactions in the world are understood to be 'subjectively conditioned', that is, to be mere preformations (*Vorformen*) or at most transformations (*Abwandlungen*) of the one 'objective' cosmic space.³⁸ In 'Art and space', Heidegger's response to this question is that it is the 'space' of the work of art that alone enables us to understand the 'space' of our daily actions and interactions, and that it is more truly 'space' than the one 'objective' cosmic space. This same question is implicit in Heidegger's earlier discussion of the place of the work of art in 'The origin of the work of art'. There he maintains that: 'The work of art belongs, as work, uniquely within the realm [*Bereich*] that is opened up by itself.' This *realm* and the *place* (*Ort*) of the work of art in the age of technology is what I will call the world on earth as a 'dwelling place'.

In 'Art and space', Heidegger questions the 'space' of an anonymous work of sculpture. The work, he first remarks, is present in cosmic space. Its location in space can be fixed and its form of spatial figure can be geometrically described. Its form or figure determines a space within and space without. As a spatial configuration, the work of sculpture occupies a shape of space. These remarks, however accurate, fail to capture what is distinctive about the work of sculpture, namely, that it is a work of art and not a mere object. A work of sculpture, no mere object, is instead a product of a human artistic activity. To produce a work of sculpture, technical mastery is required. The work is thus a product of techniques and technologies. Does a work of sculpture 'occupy' space and a place in the same way a product of technology, for example, the hydroelectric plant set up on the Rhine, 'occupies' space and a place? We have seen that a product of technology occupies space by taking over and possession of (*Besitzergreifung*) a place, by conquering and mastering (*Beherrschung*) a place. A work of sculpture as a work of art, however, is more than a product of techniques and technology. As a work of art it does more than 'occupy' a place in space. According to Heidegger, it works as a *work of art* insofar as it 'embodies' (*Verkörperung*) a place.³⁹

How does a *work* of sculpture 'work', that is, be present and take place as a work of art? Heidegger argues that the work of sculpture does

not work *in* space but *as* space. A work of sculpture works and takes place as a work not by 'occupying' space (*Raum*) and a place (*Ort*), but by making room or space (*räumen*, a verb) for a place (*Ort*).⁴⁰ A work of sculpture 'embodies' space and place not by taking over and possessing a place in space but by emancipating and releasing (*Freigabe*) a place for space; it 'works' not by conquering and mastering space and a place but instead by letting them be free (*Freigabe*). Thus the work of sculpture works not in or at a place, but takes place as a place. It is 'in' the work of sculpture that place 'takes place'. Heidegger characterizes works of sculpture as follows: '[T]he embodiment of places [*Orten*] which by opening and protecting a region [*Gegend*] hold gathered together around themselves a free space [*ein Freies*]. This free space preserves a dwelling [*Verweilen*], a place to stay for things, and a dwelling place [*Wohnen*] for human beings amidst things.'⁴¹ In 'Art and space', Heidegger argues that a work of sculpture takes place in that it embodies a place. This embodied place makes possible and thus frees a free space which preserves a dwelling place for human beings amidst things.

The question of whether the physical-technical interpretation of space is to remain the privileged interpretation of space is explicit in the short essay, 'Art and space'. Heidegger shows how the work of sculpture as a work of art works, that is, makes room and makes space (*räumen*). In the work of sculpture, a place takes place which enriches (*bereichern*) space. The place embodied in the work of sculpture preserves and hence *saves* an enriched space (*Bereich*) for human dwelling amidst things in their nearness and remoteness. Given the danger of technology, the loss of the quality of the presence, the aura of being in the world, the place embodied in the work of sculpture grows into a saving power in the age of technology.

But is this saving power not specific to works of sculpture and to the way place and an enrichment of the world space that we dwell in takes place in such works? Or can other kinds of works of art also grow into a saving power? In 'The origin of the work of art', Heidegger does not deal directly with the question of the space of the work of art and cosmic space. Nor does he focus on the question of the place of the work of art in the age of technology as we have done in light of Benjamin's perceptive observations. Nonetheless by returning to the painting and the temple discussed in this early work, we find that in both cases the place of the work of art embodies and opens up a dwelling place that transcends the exhibition setting.

Van Gogh's painting, a pictorial representation, is presumed to be on exhibition. The shoes painted by Van Gogh are not shoes in use. They are represented as only standing there before us to be viewed. The shoes standing there before us to be viewed are 'in' the painting which is itself standing there before us to be viewed 'in' some sort of exhibition setting.

Let us note first what the place of the shoes, the space occupied by the shoes represented in this painting, tells us about the place of that which is set up on exhibition. Heidegger remarks that 'From Van Gogh's painting we cannot even tell where these shoes stand. There is nothing surrounding the pair of shoes in or to which they might belong – only an undefined space.'⁴² Standing there before us in the painting, the peasant shoes occupy an undefined space. They stand no place. Belonging nowhere, they are displaced and homeless. The undefined space represented 'in the painting' tells us of the displacement and homelessness which is the place of whatever is 'in' an exhibition setting. This 'pictorial representation', the painting by Van Gogh, does not appear at first to embody a place or to open up a dwelling place. Rather it seems instead to present the displacement and homelessness not only of a piece of equipment but also of a work of art in the age of technology.

But is the only place 'in' the painting the space which the pair of shoes occupy? Is there not also place 'in' the painting embodied 'in' the shoes themselves, a place which is more than the spatial form or figure of the shoes pictorially represented by Van Gogh? What does the place embodied 'in' the peasant shoes tell us first about the place of a piece of equipment, and second, about the place of a work of art in the age of technology? Heidegger describes the place 'in' the painting embodied 'in' the peasant shoes as follows:

From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes – the toilsome tread of the worker stands forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles vibrates the silent call of the earth, the quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before the impending child-bed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death.⁴³

The place 'in' the painting embodied 'in' the peasant shoes discloses *the place which belongs to the shoes*. Equipment, here the pair of peasant shoes, is that which is reliable. Its place is a dwelling place, the world on earth. This place, a dwelling place between birth and death, is a place filled with anxiety and joy. Van Gogh's painting 'works' as a work of art in that it embodies a dwelling place. Its own place, the place which it embodies, is the world on earth as a dwelling place. It does not represent but rather opens up this place, our own dwelling place, as a

place not to be conquered and occupied by us but instead as a place for us to dwell.

Let us look at Heidegger's discussion of a third work of art, a temple, presumed to be on site. Unlike the painting, the temple does not pictorially represent anything: 'It simply stands there in the middle of a rock-cleft valley.'⁴⁴ Does it too embody a place which opens up a dwelling place or does it stand there in its setting to be viewed like the painting at the exhibition? The temple which stands there is located at a particular, although we note unspecified, location in space. It is more than simply a configuration of space, a shape of space filled with matter. As a building, it structures the space within and the space without. As a temple building, moreover, the space within and the space without were once determined by the presence of the god. Heidegger notes that as a temple:

The building encloses the figure of the god, and in this concealment lets it stand out into the holy precinct [*Bezirk*] through the open portico. By means of the temple, the god is present in the temple. This presence of the god is itself the extension and delimitation of the precinct as a holy precinct. The temple and its precinct, however, do not fade away into the indefinite.⁴⁵

The temple that 'simply stands there' was once, as the site of a cult, 'in' a holy precinct. Its 'where', the holy precinct, determined the 'how' of its being, its being a *temple* building. But for us the space within and the space without, while structured by the temple, are no longer defined as a holy precinct (*Bezirk*). Insofar as the world which included the god of this cult has withdrawn and decayed, the cult site has become no different from an exhibition setting. The temple is present for us now only as a work of art. Yet as a work of art it does not appear at first to embody a place which opens up a dwelling place. Rather it appears instead simply to stand there on view 'in the middle of a rock-cleft valley'.

Does the temple simply stand there 'in' its setting to be viewed? Is the only place there its place 'in' this setting? As a work of art, is there not also a place embodied 'in' the temple? Heidegger first describes the place embodied 'in' this temple:

[T]he temple-work . . . first fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being. The all-governing expanse of this open relational context is the world of this historical people.⁴⁶

The place embodied 'in' the temple is *the world of an historical people*, the world which ranges between birth and death. Between birth and death, life takes place within the extremes of disaster and blessing, of victory and disgrace, and of endurance and decline. The work of art, the temple, embodies this place, its own place, as a place that takes place on earth. Heidegger next describes how the place embodied 'in' the temple lets the *earth* take place:

Standing there, the building rests on the rocky ground. This resting of the work draws out of the rock the mystery of that rock's clumsy yet spontaneous support. Standing there, the building holds its ground against the storm raging above it and so first makes the storm itself manifest in its violence. The luster and the gleam of the stone, though itself apparently glowing only by the grace of the sun, yet first brings to light the light of the day, the breadth of the sky, the darkness of the night. The temple's firm towering makes visible the invisible space of air. The steadfastness of the work contrasts with the surge of the surf, and its own repose brings out the raging of the sea.⁴⁷

The temple as a work of art 'works' in that it embodies a dwelling place. Its own place, which it embodies, is the world on earth as a dwelling place. Like the work of sculpture, and the painting, it does not represent but rather opens up this place, our own dwelling place.

In 'Art and space', Heidegger comments that we must learn to think the place that is in things rather than to continue to think that things, including works of art, are in a place, a position in space.⁴⁸ In his discussion of three works of art, he shows how the place of the work of art opens up the world on earth as a different place, a dwelling place. As the 'ever-nonobjective' and thus not the world as picture, this world discloses the limits of the world as picture. This world 'worlds'; it is not 'a merely imagined framework' (*ein nur eingebildeter . . . vorgestellter Rahmen*) but 'more fully in being than the tangible and perceptible realm in which we believe ourselves to be at home'.⁴⁹ The homelessness of where 'we believe ourselves to be at home' emerges as the world opened up by the work of art transforms the ordinary, the earth, into the extraordinary: 'The rock comes to bear and rest, so first becomes rock; metals come to glitter and shimmer, colors to glow, tones to sing, the word to speak'.⁵⁰ The place embodied in the work of art in the age of modern technology does not *represent* the world endangered by technology and threatened by the loss of its aura. Rather it *brings forth* or *originates* the world in which we dwell on this earth. The place in the work of art embodies and opens up *the world on earth as a place* not to be conquered as picture and by technology but rather as *a place for*

dwelling. Art grows into a saving power by embodying places which preserve and hence save a place for dwelling.

Heidegger is saying more than that the world disclosed in the work of art, for example, in Van Gogh's painting the world of the peasant woman, ultimately eludes representation so that the meaning of a work of art is inexhaustible. Rather, he is saying that the work of art discloses *the world which we are in*, and that the meaning and truth of being in the world on earth as a dwelling place cannot be conquered through a thinking that is only representation. Finally he is saying that 'the uniqueness of the fact that it' – the world in which we dwell on this earth – 'is rather than is not' calls for and calls forth a thinking which, like the work of art, is poetic.

In exploring the meaning of Heidegger's claim that 'the more questioningly we ponder the essence of technology, the more mysterious (home-like) the essence of art becomes', I began by showing that works of art are not *exempt* from the homelessness that is for Heidegger the danger of technology. Benjamin and Heidegger, I have argued, are in agreement that the 'place' of the work of art in the age of technology is no longer the 'cult site' which has become utopian but instead the 'exhibition setting' which is ubiquitous. Heidegger, however, would differ from Benjamin in his account of the displacement of the work of art in the age of technology. For Heidegger, this displacement is not due to the 'revolutionary event' of photography but instead a special case of the displacement that occurs to all that is with the advent of the modern scientific revolution. Heidegger, however, also claims that art grows out of the danger of technology as a saving power. In exploring this claim, I have shown that a work of art in its displacement discloses *in an exemplary way* the essence of technology and its danger. Finally, I have shown how for Heidegger a work of art serves as an *exemplar* for the overcoming of homelessness, by disclosing the world *viewed* to be more, to be a *dwelling place*. What I have not explored in this paper, however, is Heidegger's further claim, the claim that, for example, Hölderlin's poem, 'The Rhine', embodies a place, the Rhine. Although beyond the scope of this paper, it remains to be shown how the embodiment of place also occurs in literary works of art.

Benjamin comments that the discussion of whether photography is an art ignores 'the primary question – whether the very invention of photography had not transformed the entire nature of art'.⁵¹ To this, I have argued, Heidegger would respond that there is an even more primary question – whether the discovery of the essence of technology does not make manifest in a new way the essence of art.

Notes

1 Friedrich Hölderlin, *Poems and Fragments*, trans. Michael Hamburger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 463.

2 Martin Heidegger, 'The question concerning technology', in *The Question Concerning Technology*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 35. Heidegger does not mean by essence (*Wesen*) what something is, but how it comes to presence (*wesen*, a verb).

3 Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, Vol. 4 (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1897), IV, 2351–7, especially 2353 (3a). See also Sigmund Freud, 'The uncanny', in *Collected Papers*, trans. Joan Riviere (London: Hogarth Press, 1934), IV, 368–407.

4 Martin Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism*, in *Basic Writings*, ed. David Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 219. See also Michel Haar 'La demeure et l'exil: Hölderlin et Saint-John Perse', in *Les symboles du lieu, l'habitation de l'homme* (Paris: l'Herne, 1983), pp. 24–43.

5 Martin Heidegger, *Die Kunst und der Raum* (St. Gallen: Erker-Verlag, 1969), translated by Charles H. Siebert in *Man and World VI* (1973), 3–8.

6 *Poems and Fragments*, p. 601.

7 Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 217. This quotation is from: Paul Valéry, *Aesthetics*, trans. Ralph Manheim, Vol. 13 (New York: Bollingen, 1964), p. 225.

8 *Aesthetics*, p. 222.

9 *Illuminations*, p. 224.

10 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Sheed and Ward Ltd. (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), p. 133 for his discussion of the sacred quality of the work of art.

11 *Illuminations*, pp. 220–2. In Benjamin's discussion, the authenticity of a work cannot be destroyed by technical reproduction and continues even though the aura of the work decays. By emphasizing the *reproduction* of the authentic work, Benjamin concentrates on the copy relation not on the correlation between the decay of the aura and the increase in ubiquity. Thus he overlooks the importance of 'place'.

12 *Illuminations*, p. 221.

13 See Richard Wolin, *Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of Redemption* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 183–97 for the dispute between Benjamin and Adorno on the issues raised by Benjamin's essay.

14 *Illuminations*, p. 224.

15 *Illuminations*, p. 223.

16 Martin Heidegger, 'The origin of the work of art', in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 66. The distinction in question here is not the same as the distinction between a real work of art and kitsch. This essay is not a 'critique of judgment' and thus does not address the question of how we know what counts as a work of art. Instead Heidegger presupposes that 'works of art are familiar to everyone' (p. 18). Moreover to insure this starting point, he states that 'great art . . . and only such is under consideration' (p. 40). In thinking about art as the origin of the work of art, he acknowledges that hermeneutical circularity is inevitable: 'Not only is the main step from work to art a circle like the step from art to work, but every step that we attempt circles in this circle' (p. 18). Heidegger's main concern is how we can enter into this circle and can 'preserve' the great works of art with which we are familiar and their truth. Thus his essay begins and ends with a

question which is directed to us: 'is art still an essential and necessary way in which that truth happens which is decisive for our historical existence, or is art no longer of this character?' (p. 80).

17 'Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten', *Der Spiegel*, 31 May 1976, pp. 193–219.

18 *Poems and Fragments*, p. 463. This experience, of the divine as near but far, is akin to what Benjamin means by 'aura'.

19 Martin Heidegger, 'The age of the world picture', in *The Question Concerning Technology*, p. 116.

20 *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 41.

21 Martin Heidegger, *What is a Thing?* trans. W. B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1967), p. 84.

22 Alexandre Koyré, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), p. viii.

23 See also René Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy* in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. E. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), I, 261. Here Descartes distinguishes place and space. Place, he says, indicates situation; space, figure or magnitude.

24 Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 67. Emphasis added.

25 *The Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 87. Emphasis added.

26 *The Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 87.

27 See Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1979) for his discussion of the modern concept of representation. In my presentation of Heidegger's account of representation, I have not treated the association of representation with picture (*Bild*) as a matter merely of metaphor. Thus I am arguing that Heidegger would not agree with Rorty's solution: 'We must get the visual, in particular the mirroring, *metaphors* out of our speech altogether' (p. 371, emphasis added). Rather I am suggesting that the issue for Heidegger is one of another way of seeing, a new or renewed sensibility.

28 *The Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 71.

29 *The Question Concerning Technology*, p. 134. For other accounts of this issue, see Jacques Derrida, 'Sendings; on representation', trans. Peter and Mary Ann Caws, *Social Research*, ILIX (1982), 295–326. See also Véronique Fóti's perceptive reading of Heidegger and criticism of Derrida in 'Representation and the image: between Heidegger, Derrida and Plato', forthcoming in *Man and World*.

30 *The Question Concerning Technology*, p. 4.

31 *The Question Concerning Technology*, p. 30.

32 *The Question Concerning Technology*, p. 149.

33 *The Question Concerning Technology*, p. 16.

34 *The Question Concerning Technology*, p. 33.

35 *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 165.

36 Clifford Geertz, 'From the native's point of view: on the nature of anthropological understanding', in *Interpretative Social Science* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1979), p. 226f.

37 *Die Kunst und der Raum*, p. 6.

38 *Die Kunst und der Raum*, p. 7.

39 *Die Kunst und der Raum*, p. 5f.

40 *Die Kunst und der Raum*, p. 9.

41 *Die Kunst und der Raum*, p. 11.

42 *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 33.

43 *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 34.

44 *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 41.

45 *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 41f. See also Robert Denoon Cumming's 'The odd couple: Heidegger and Derrida', *Review of Metaphysics* 34 (March 1981), 487–521 for a discussion of other accounts of Heidegger's discussion of Van Gogh's painting, in particular, of Derrida's treatment of the lace of the shoes.

46 *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 42.

47 *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 42.

48 *Die Kunst und der Raum*, p. 11.

49 *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 44.

50 *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 46.

51 *Illuminations*, p. 227.

Heidegger's poetics: the question of mimesis

John Sallis

Poetics.

The title translates – or, rather, reinscribes – the title of the text by Aristotle: *Περὶ Ποιητικῆς*.

Poetics would be, then, a discourse concerning poetry. Or, rather, in the case of Aristotle it would concern a series of forms which, though gathered under *ποιητική*, correspond only quite roughly to what one would today call poetry. Indeed, Aristotle's list cannot but seem somewhat heterogeneous: epic poetry, tragedy, comedy, dithyrambic poetry, most flute-playing and harp-playing (1447 a 13–16). A rather odd assortment from the standpoint of modern aesthetics: a bit of poetry, a bit of drama, a bit of music. Also, perhaps, a warning against too easily assimilating poetics (first of all, Aristotle's) to aesthetics, a mark of their heterogeneity.

Heidegger will radicalize a connection already evident in Aristotle's enumeration: the connection with language, quite direct except in the musical forms. Not only poetics but also poetry is a form of discourse, so that poetics would be a discourse on discourse, language folded back upon itself, added to itself. To the extent that poetry is essentially narrative, bound to a story, a plot (*μῦθος*) – the most essential element in the constitution of tragedy, according to Aristotle (1450 a 38–9) – poetics would be a *λόγος* concerning *μῦθος*, a mythology. It would be a theoretical discourse (*θεωρία*) concerning poetical discourse, a theory of poetry.

Heidegger will radicalize also the question of such addition of discourse to discourse. He will ask: What occurs in the space between these two discourses? What is the relation of thinking to poetry? He will radicalize these questions beyond the closure of aesthetics, at a limit where the very determination of thinking as theory and, hence, of poetics as theory of poetry can no longer remain simply intact. Poetics will no longer be

bound to recover a sighting in advance, proceeding thus to an essence of poetry that would be had in common by all poetry, essence as τὸ κοινόν; rather, it will attend to such essence as is poetized when, as with Hölderlin, the poet poetizes the essence of poetry. Effacing itself before the poem, poetics would listen and respond to what speaks in the poem, to the speaking of language in which it is said what poetry is.

For Aristotle, too, it is a matter of saying what poetry is. Poetics is a discourse concerning poetry itself (the first words of Aristotle's text: περὶ ποιητικῆς αὐτῆς); poetics is to say what poetry itself is, before then going on to speak of its various forms (τε καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς). Indeed, this is how Aristotle's text begins, according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν), taking first things first, saying, first of all, what poetry itself is, saying what not only is common to all those forms enumerated but also constitutes them as poetry, determining them and in that sense preceding them, the *a priori* of poetry.

Aristotle's text says it in one word: μέμνηται.

This word, too, comes to be reinscribed, the name carried on. As such, it names that determination that has come to govern the theory of poetry and of art in general ever since Aristotle. Not that opposition cannot be found. Not that this determination is just emptily and dogmatically repeated in the history of the theory of art. And yet, even where the mimetic determination of art is most vigorously opposed, it is almost invariably a matter of rejecting a false mimesis for the sake of recovering genuine mimesis in its art-determining form. This gesture assumes one of its most subtle and complex – though still unmistakable – forms in the *Critique of Judgment*. For example, in rethinking art as the product of genius, Kant writes: 'Everyone is agreed that genius is to be wholly opposed to the *spirit of imitation* [*Nachahmungsgeiste*].'¹ And yet, in the same context he also writes: 'Nature is beautiful if it also looks like art; and art can only be called beautiful if we are conscious of it as art while yet it looks like nature [*als Natur aussieht*].'²

The relation between Heidegger's poetics and the determination of art as mimesis will prove to be at least equally complex. Heidegger's opposition is explicit, for instance in 'The origin of the work of art'³ where he speaks of the 'opinion, which has fortunately been overcome, that art is an imitation and depiction of reality [*eine Nachahmung und Abschilderung des Wirklichen*]' (GA 5: 22). His opposition to mimesis is equally explicit in deed: at a strategic point in this same text he takes a Greek temple as his example of a work of art – chooses it, as he says, intentionally (*mit Absicht*) – precisely because it is not mimetic, or at least not representational (*nicht zur darstellenden Kunst gerechnet wird*) (GA 5: 27). The question will be whether there is also in play in Heidegger's poetics a more originary sense of mimesis. Is Heidegger's opposition to mimesis in its traditional forms also matched by a recovery of a more

originary mimesis? Or rather, since Heidegger does not thematize any such recovery, can his opposition to mimesis be shown to have as its other side an unmarked recovery of mimesis? Can Heidegger's poetics carry on the name *mimesis*? Can one hear an echo of mimesis rebounding from that limit that marks the end of metaphysics and of aesthetics.

A trace of the gesture that I have just sketched can be discerned in the circling with which 'The origin of the work of art' begins. The first of the circles joins artist and work of art: on the one side, the work of art is ordinarily taken to arise through the activity of the artist, so that the artist would be the origin of the work; yet, on the other side, the artist is what he is only by virtue of the work, so that the work would be equally the origin of the artist as artist. Hence: 'The artist is the origin of the work. The work is the origin of the artist' (GA 5: 1).

Heidegger's first intervention is to open this circle: 'Nevertheless, neither is the sole support of the other.' Specifically, then, the work of art is not such as to be completely, essentially determined by its relation to the activity of the artist, not even if, in turn, determining the artist as artist. In a work of art there is essentially something more than its being produced by a certain kind of activity, something more than its correlation with the productive artist, an excess that opens the circle.

One way of determining this excess would be to refer to the mimetic character of the work of art, taking this character as an opening toward an other, which by imitation of the other would serve to disclose that other. Hence, the very beginning of 'The origin of the work of art' may be regarded as opening what could be (and traditionally would be) determined as a space of mimesis, an opening by virtue of which the work of art, mimetically disclosing an other, would essentially exceed the circle of production.

And yet, Heidegger does not move to such a determination, resisting it even at the risk of moving instead within mere tautology, merely compounding the system of circles. For what he calls the excess, both on the side of the work of art and on that of the artist, is simply *art*:

In themselves and in their correlation [*Wechselbezug*] artist and work *are* by virtue of a third thing, which is the first, namely, that which gives artist and work of art their names – art.

(GA 5: 1)

The question is whether there remains a trace of mimesis in this opening. Can mimesis be recovered within the tautological origination of the work of art?

Heidegger's initial move is to enter the system of circles: He begins with the work of art and proposes to move toward the discovery of what art, the excessive origin, is. 'The origin of the work of art' will continue

throughout to circle within this circle joining art and work of art; even when, in the final section of the text, the turn is made from the work of art to the artist, it turns out to lead almost immediately back to the work of art, back into the circling between work of art and art. And it is a matter not just of moving within this great circle but of circling within it: 'Not only is the main step from work to art, as the step from art to work, a circle, but every particular step that we attempt circles in this circle' (GA 5: 3).

There can be no question here of reconstituting this circling in all its compoundings and intricacies. Instead, I shall attempt to move as economically as possible to that complex of turns within which I shall propose a certain reinscription of mimesis, a reinscription that will follow the lines of a trace of mimesis discernible in those turns in Heidegger's text.

Beginning with the work of art, moving through the traditional concepts by which the work's thingly substratum would be interpreted and yet also obstructed, turning then to a description, without theory, of a pair of peasant shoes, or rather, to the shoes as depicted in Van Gogh's painting, Heidegger shows that the painting serves to disclose what the shoes are in truth. Thus, the work of art is shown to involve a happening of truth. Art is, then, to be determined as: truth's putting itself (in)to (the) work (*das Sich-ins-Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit*) – that is, to bring out the double sense: truth's putting itself to work in putting itself into the work of art.

Heidegger poses immediately the possibility of recovering mimesis in this determination of art as the happening of truth; yet he poses it ironically, characterizing the mimetic theory of art as 'that opinion, which has fortunately been overcome'. If art is a matter of truth and if truth means, as it has since Aristotle, correspondence with reality, then one might suppose art to be an imitation or depiction of reality. But does Van Gogh's painting simply depict some particular actual pair of shoes, doubling in the artistic imitation something actually existing? Heidegger is emphatic: 'By no means.'

And yet, as Aristotle recognized in differentiating between the poet and the historian (1451 a 36–1452 b 7), artistic mimesis need not pertain to particular, actually existing things. Thus, Heidegger continues, his irony slightly more veiled: 'In the work, therefore, it is not a matter of the reproduction [*Wiedergabe*] of some actually present particular being, but, on the contrary, a matter of the reproduction of the universal essence of the thing' (GA 5: 22). Art would be put forth as mimesis of essence or of universal truth, were not essence, universality, and truth so utterly in question. Heidegger invokes this questionableness: 'But then where and how is this universal essence, so that works of art are able to correspond to it? To what essence of what thing should a Greek

temple correspond?' (GA 5: 22). Here, then, it is a matter of opposing the determination of art as happening of truth to the mimetic determination, displacing the latter for the sake of the former. And yet, is it a matter of simple opposition, of simple displacement? Or do the opposition and the displacement perhaps inevitably retain a trace of that which would be opposed and displaced, a trace that would hold open the possibility of a recovery of mimesis. If truth happens in art and if it is – to borrow the phrase from von Herrmann⁴ – a matter of an ontological happening, in distinction from all interaction among beings, a matter of a happening in which, in Heidegger's words, 'the Being of beings comes into the steadiness of its shining [*das Sein des Seienden kommt in das Ständige seines Scheinens*]' (GA 5: 21), then can art simply no longer be determined as mimetic? Or is it possible to think mimesis ontologically? Can art be determined as mimesis of the happening of Being? Can art even always have been, beneath the interpretations given it by aesthetics, determinable as mimesis of the clearing in which Being can shine forth, as mimesis of truth as ἀλήθεια?

Indeed, truth and its happening are rethought in 'The origin of the work of art' as, ἀλήθεια, as that happening of clearing and concealing that first makes it possible for beings to come to presence; this text thus appropriates all the resources that are released by the crossing of the essence of truth and the truth of essence that is most rigorously developed in 'On the essence of truth.' Art is, then, one of the ways in which truth – as the strife of clearing and concealing – can happen. It is a way in which truth puts itself to work, becomes effective, comes into play. In art truth happens as the strife of world and earth. This is, then, precisely what Heidegger sets out to think: the artwork (its *Insichstehen*) in its relation to world, to earth, and to the strife of world and earth.

Let me attempt to sketch as economically as possible the main lines of this complex.

World, neither a totality of things nor a framework cast over them, is not anything that could come to presence in such a way that one might intuit it. It is, rather, that which first lets things be, lets them come to presence: 'By the opening up of a world, all things gain their lingering and hastening, their remoteness and nearness, their scope and limits' (GA 5: 31). World is, in Heidegger's phrase, *die waltende Weite der offenen Bezüge* (GA 5: 28): the governing expanse of the open relational complex, the expanse of the connections that hold sway for a historical people. As such, world so exceeds all beings that Heidegger will say, not that it *is*, but rather that *world worlds* (*Welt weltet*), thus again venturing tautology in the domain of the excessive and originary.

Earth, on the other hand, is thought in relation φύσις; it is thought as that which harbors such things as come forth in that emergence (*Aufgehen*) that the Greeks experienced as φύσις. Earth is that which

harbors such things in such a way as to secure and conceal them. As such, earth shatters every attempt to penetrate it, withdraws from all efforts to disclose it. It is essentially undisclosable, self-secluding, closed off.

In the relation of the work of art both to world and to earth there is operative a certain reciprocity. The Greek temple belongs to a world, is set within it; while, on the other hand, it also opens up a world, lets the expanse of its connections hold sway. Heidegger thinks this reciprocal relation more precisely as *Aufstellen* (setting up). The work of art is *set up* within a world; it is set up, not in the sense of 'a bare placing', but rather 'in the sense of erecting a building, raising a statue, presenting a tragedy at a holy festival' (GA 5: 29–30). And yet, thus set up within a world, the work of art itself sets up that world, opens and sustains it: 'Towering up within itself, the work opens up a *world* and keeps it abidingly in force' (GA 5: 30). The Greek temple does not just occupy a space but, belonging to the Greek world, opens and sustains that world: 'It is the temple-work that first fits together [*fügt*] and at the same time gathers [*sammelt*] around itself the unity of those paths and connections in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny [*die Gestalt seines Geschickes*] for human beings' (GA 5: 27–8).

The similarly reciprocal relation between the work of art and earth Heidegger thinks as *Herstellen* (producing, setting forth). The work of art is, as we say, *made out* of some earthy material such as stone, wood, or color; it is thus set forth, produced, from earth. But in the work of art the material is not assimilated to a function or use, as with equipment, but rather is allowed to show itself as material: 'By contrast, the temple-work, in setting up a world, does not cause the material to disappear, but rather causes it to come forth for the very first time and to come into the open of the work's world' (GA 5: 32). Thus, in being set forth from earth, the work of art is set back into earth in such a way as to set forth earth, that is, in such a way as to bring the earth into the open, the clearing, while still preserving its character as self-secluding, undisclosable. By its way of being made out of an earthy material, of being *set forth* from earth, the work of art, in turn, *sets forth* earth, brings it into the open precisely as undisclosable.

The work of art can, then, be described as involving two essential features or connections (*Wesensbezüge*): the setting up of world and the setting forth of earth, each taken in its essentially reciprocal character. These connections belong together in the work of art, and it is precisely their unity that constitutes the *Insichstehen* of the work. But how do world and earth belong together such that the setting up of world and the setting forth of earth can belong together in the unity of the work?

Heidegger's answer is decisive: world and earth belong together *in opposition*.

The world, in resting upon the earth, strives to surmount it. As self-opening it cannot endure anything closed. The earth, however, as sheltering [*als die Bergende*] tends always to draw the world into itself and keep it there. The opposition of world and earth is a strife [*Streit*].
(GA 5: 35)

The opposition is a strife (πόλεμος), not in the sense of mere discord and disorder, but rather in the sense of what Heidegger calls essential strife, that is, a strife in which each draws the other forth into the very fulfillment of that other's essence. Thus world can be as world only in its opposition, its strife, with earth, and vice versa. The work of art, setting up a world and setting forth earth, instigates such strife, lets happen such a happening of truth.

The work of art thus lets truth put itself to work. And yet, as *das Sich-ins-Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit*, art involves also another moment: truth puts itself to work in putting itself *into* the work of art. The happening of truth that is instigated by art takes place *in* the work of art. The question thus comes into focus: How is it that truth can (and, in art, must) happen in something like a work, in a being that is brought forth, created, by an artist? In Heidegger's more precise formulation: 'To what extent does truth, on the basis of its essence [*aus dem Grunde ihres Wesens*] have an impulse to the work [*Zug zum Werk*]' (GA 5: 48). It is a question, then, of the *Zug zum Werk*: a question of how truth is drawn toward the work; a question of how it is so aligned as to be inclined toward the work in which it will put itself to work; a question of how truth is trained on the work (as one trains one's gaze on something) and indeed even pulled toward putting itself into the work.

In a sense this is the pivotal question of Heidegger's poetics. Its development will gather up all the resources that 'The origin of the work of art' has prepared and will open upon Heidegger's thinking of poetry, also upon that trace of mimesis that I have proposed to mark. And yet, in the development of this question, it will not be a matter simply of arriving at an answer with which everything will then be settled. For the question is essentially unsettling, in Heidegger's term *ein Rätsel*. In approaching it nothing could be more appropriate than to incant the opening words of the Afterword to 'The origin of the work of art':

The foregoing reflections are concerned with the riddle [*Rätsel*] of art, the riddle that art itself is. They are far from claiming to solve the riddle. The task is to see the riddle.

(GA 5: 67)

To see it, first, in the establishing of truth in the open. It is a question of the site of truth, of the open space in which the strife of clearing and concealing can take place:

The openness of this open, that is, truth, can be what it is, namely, *this* openness, only if and as long as it establishes [*einrichtet*] itself in its open. Hence, there must always be in this open a being in which the openness takes its stand and attains its constancy [*ihren Stand und ihre Ständigkeit nimmt*]. In occupying the open, the openness holds open the open and sustains it.

(GA 5: 48)

Truth requires the open; it must be established *in the open* in order to be the openness it is. But to be established in the open is to take a stand *in a being*, in which, then, truth sustains the open. This need for coming to stand in the open is, in the case of art, the *Zug zum Werk*. Yet, how does this *Zug* arise from the essence of truth? One may say, as Heidegger does, that openness can be what it is only by establishing itself in the open, that there is need for truth to have a site, an open space, a *Da*. But this is only to reiterate the riddle: that the essence of truth prescribes, in the case of art, the *Zug zum Werk*, the establishing of truth in a being. To attempt to see further into the riddle at this level would require showing how the connection with a being is essential to the essence of truth – that is, how there belongs to the essence of truth another counter-essence (*Gegenwesen*) like the turn into errancy,⁵ but one which in closing the difference would – in a way that errancy does not – serve to reopen and sustain it. Such a turn to beings would be such as to reopen the difference within a being, even though it could not but always risk falling into complicity with errancy – which is to say that art and truth would always have to be thought in connection with art and error.

Heidegger does not extend the question in this direction. In any case, it remains questionable whether such an extension would really extend toward anything that could be characterized as an answer or whether it would not again come face to face with the riddle that art is, compounding the latter with the riddle of a truth to which manifold untruth essentially belongs. Remaining still within tautology.

But there is another step that Heidegger does venture toward the riddle. It is a kind of step back, a step that retracts an order that the initial step would seem to have posited. What has to be taken back is the apparent priority that truth would have with respect to the establishing of that truth at a site, in a being. In other words, it is not as though there were first a truth in itself which then only subsequently would come to

be established in a being. Rather, truth and its establishment in a being *belong together*:

But truth is not in itself present beforehand, somewhere among the stars, only later to descend elsewhere among beings. . . . Clearing of openness and establishment in the open belong together. They are the same one essence of the happening of truth.

(GA 5: 49)

It is not a matter of truth's going over into a being that it stands over against in advance; rather, truth is nothing apart from its coming to be established in a being. It is not as though there is, first, difference, which then comes to be mediated; rather, difference first occurs precisely at the site of the happening of truth.

The work of art is such a site, a being that is brought forth so as to establish truth, so as to bring about truth as the strife of world and earth. Such bringing-forth (*Hervorbringen*) is a form of *ποίησις*. Heidegger identifies it as that creating that is properly artistic, though he insists, on the other hand, that it not be construed merely as an activity of a subject. For here too it remains a matter of excess, of art's exceeding the circle of production so decisively that all creating must remain also receptive.

It is, then, in the work of art that the riddle – the riddle that art is – is to be seen. The work of art is the being in which truth, occurring as the strife of world and earth, is to have its site. This strife is not to be resolved in the work of art nor even just housed there. Rather, it is precisely there that the strife is to be opened, instigated. But the work of art can itself release the strife only if it embodies it: 'This being must therefore have in itself the essential features [or lines – *Wesenszüge*] of the strife' (GA 5: 50).

What, then, is the strife? What are its *Wesenszüge*? Heidegger says that the strife is a *Riss* and stresses by this word that the strife is not a matter simply of opposition but rather is such that the opponents belong to one another in their very opposition. He draws this out especially in the words *Grundriss*, *Umriss*, *Aufriss*, drawing, as it were, the essential lines of the strife. The opponents belong together by having a certain common ground or origin – that is, strife as *Riss* is *Grundriss*. Also, they belong together by virtue of a certain operation of measure or limit by which they are brought into an outline – that is, strife as *Riss* is *Umriss*. But as opposed they open the space of the emergence (*Aufgehen*, *φύσις*) of things – that is, strife as *Riss* is *Aufriss*.⁶

These essential lines of the strife must be embodied in the created being brought forth as work of art. More precisely, the strife (as *Riss* – one could say: rift) must be *set into* that being; it must be established,

set firmly (*festgestellt*) into the being that is thus to be a work of art. The question is: How does this setting (*Stellen*) occur? How does it come about? Heidegger's answer gathers up virtually all the resources that have been prepared by 'The origin of the work of art': truth can establish itself in such a being only if 'the strife opens up in this being, i.e., this being is itself brought into the rift [*Riss*]' (*GA* 5: 51). What appears here to be merely an equation is not such at all but, instead, is the hinge on which the entire matter turns: the strife (rift) is set into the being (work of art)/the being is itself brought (set) into the rift (strife). It is not that these two moments are identical; nor is one the ground of the other. Rather, it is a matter of gathering up those reciprocal connections that, earlier in the text, have been thought as *Aufstellen* (being set up in a world/setting up a world) and as *Herstellen* (being set forth out of earth/setting forth earth). Now it is a matter of thinking these together, of thinking the reciprocity that joins the work of art and the strife of world and earth: the strife set into the work of art/the work of art set into the strife. It is not a matter of explaining these settings (*Stellen*), nor of explaining one setting by means of another. The point is not to secure the settings but rather to discern and preserve their reciprocity, thus to see a bit further into the riddle that art is.

The issue of such reciprocal *Stellen* Heidegger names *Gestalt*. It is imperative not to surrender the word to its ordinary senses (for instance, by translating it immediately and without reserve as *shape* or *figure*) but rather to understand it, first of all, from its connection to *Stellen*, to understand it as what issues from that reciprocal *Stellen* by which strife is set into a being and that being, in turn, is set into strife. Such *Stellen* is, says Heidegger, a *Feststellen*. In the *Addendum* to 'The origin of the work of art', he proposes to interpret *Stellen* as θέσις, as bringing-forth,⁷ hence, as a form of ποιήσις. He proposes also to interpret the *Fest-* of *Feststellen* as: outlined, admitted into the limit, into the boundary in the sense of πέρας. Interpreted in this sense, limit is not such as simply to exclude and block out but rather gathers in such a way as to let something be brought forth, to let it shine forth; for example, 'by its contour [*Umriss*] in the Greek light the mountain stands in its towering and repose' (*GA* 5: 71).

It is, then, as *Gestalt* that the rift occurs within a being (the work of art) that is also, in turn, set into the rift. Hence: 'The createdness of the work means: truth's being set in outline [*Festgestelltsein*] in the figure [*Gestalt*]' (*GA* 5: 51). The *Gestalt* that issues from the reciprocal *Stellen* as *Feststellen*, this figure of truth, is also the place of the shining of truth – that is, of the beautiful:

Beauty does not occur alongside and apart from this truth. When truth sets itself into the work, it appears [*erscheint*]. The appearing

[*Erscheinen*] – as this Being of truth in the work and as work – is beauty. Thus the beautiful belongs to the self-eventuation [*Sichereignis*] of truth.

(GA 5: 69)

Rethought in its Platonic determination, the beautiful is τὸ ἐκφανέσ-
τατον.

Truth happens, shining forth as the beautiful, when a being is brought forth in such a way that truth (as strife, as rift) is set into that being and that being is set into truth. Such setting issues in the *Gestalt*. Through such bringing-forth, truth is set in outline, set within its limit (πέρας), in the *Gestalt*. It is not, however, as though a being were first brought forth, only then to be made object of the reciprocal setting, becoming the setting for truth and being itself set into truth. Rather, the bringing-forth and the setting are one and the same: in being brought forth, the work is set into truth and becomes the setting for truth; and, conversely, in undergoing the reciprocal setting and thus issuing in the *Gestalt*, the work is brought forth. Bringing-forth (*Hervorbringen*) is – that is, is Heidegger's translation of – ποίησις. That ποίησις that is the same as the θέσις of truth Heidegger calls *Dichtung*. It may also be called – reinscribing Aristotle's title once again – *poetry* in an ordinary sense. *Truth happens in art as poetry*: 'All art, as letting the advent of the truth of beings happen, is as such *essentially poetry* [*Dichtung*]' (GA 5: 59). Correspondingly, all philosophy of art – to say nothing of aesthetics – must become a thinking of poetry, that is, *poetics*.

Poetic thus reinscribed could also reinscribe *mimesis*. Of course, it could not be, any more than in Aristotle, a matter of simple imitation, as though the work of art were an image simply reproducing within certain limits some actually existing beings. But also it could not be a matter of imitating something universal, or representing within an individual being some universal form or truth by which being would, in the classical sense, be determined. The work of art does not imitate any being, whether individual or universal; it does not imitate anything that would simply *be* prior to the imitation, that would be set over against the imitation, which, then, would only double something already subsisting in itself. Indeed, one could say that the work of art *imitates nothing*, though one would need to regard such imitation of nothing, not as dissolving the riddle of mimesis (relegating it perhaps to some previous thinking of art that is now overcome), but rather as posing that riddle in the most unsettling way. Need it be said, after Heidegger, that the nothing is nothing simple? Indeed, one could say even that truth is nothing as long as it has not found a setting; and even in its setting, differentiated in the manifold reciprocity from the being in which it is set, it is (as differentiated from beings) still nothing.

It is, then, in the relation of the work of art to truth that a trace of mimesis is to be discerned: art as mimesis of truth. It would be a mimesis not preceded by truth, a mimesis that would take place precisely in giving place to truth, in that setting of truth into the work that is also a setting of the work into truth, that setting of truth into its limit. It would be a mimesis that would take place in and as the *Gestalt* in which truth would be set into the work, placed there, without having preceded the work and yet in such a way as to be doubled in the play of reciprocity between the work of art and the strife of world and earth. It is in this doubling – by which the Greek temple once brought into play the strife of world and earth into which it was, in turn, set – that mimesis can be rethought and reinscribed within Heidegger's poetics.

Notes

1 *Kants Werke: Akademie Textausgabe* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), 5: 308.

2 *ibid.*, 5: 306.

3 All references to works by Heidegger are to the *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975ff.). Such references will be indicated by 'GA' and given in the text by volume number and page number.

4 F.-W. von Herrmann. *Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst* (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1980), 94.

5 'Die Irre ist das wesentliche Gegenwesen zum anfänglichen Wesen der Wahrheit.' *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (GA 9: 197).

6 Cf. von Herrmann. *Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst*, 259–60.

7 'Stellen und Legen haben den Sinn von: *Her-* ins Unverborgene, *vor-* in das Anwesende bringen, d.h. vorliegenlassen.' GA 5: 70.

Heidegger, madness and well-being

Charles E. Scott

Any theory or description of Being that tells us nothing about human health and sickness remains irrelevantly abstract. Both Plato and Aristotle, as well as many of their predecessors and their successors, saw clearly that when one reflects on the meaning of 'is' he is asking about what human being is rightfully to be. Classically, knowledge issues into wisdom when one is able to decide, plan, remember, and relate to other people and to nonhuman beings in light of what is 'really real', i.e., when he *becomes* harmonious with being. Medieval scholastic philosophy characteristically culminates in worship of God and obedience to Him, because the full meaning (the living health) of human being is seen to occur as the creature affirms in a feeling, thinking, willing way his place within the divinely ordained scheme of things.

Counterwise, any understanding of human well-being assumes an idea of how man is in the world, whether or not that understanding is brought to thematic awareness. The assumption, for example, that physical illness is solely a matter of physical malfunctioning, that health is fully restored when an 'ill' part of a physical structure begins to function properly, assumes that the human body is best understood in totally objective, materialistic terms. Yet, health is a way of being, as is illness, not something that we possess as secondary to our existence. We *are* healthy or ill. How are we to understand this *are*? If we are like machines, how are we to understand the immediate event of being that way?

Heidegger's reflections, both early and late, also make claims about the fulfillment and injury of human being. Until one discovers the full import for human well-being and illness of his understanding of being as nonsubstantial, nonsubjectivistic, and nonintentional event, the meaning of being human, on his terms, is not adequately interpreted. His thinking – or better, the center of his thought – finds its fulfillment in an individual's release to his own responsive openness with the claiming

disclosures of beings. The purpose of this paper is to understand aspects of this last phrase, 'release to his own responsive openness with the claiming disclosures of beings', by dealing with two approaches to schizophrenia. I shall focus my remarks in the work of Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss, each of whom developed an understanding of psychopathology and health out of his own psychotherapeutic work, informed principally by Freud, and by his interpretation of Heidegger's thought.

We philosophers are usually spared, in our professions, dealing with insanity. Madness is more like a shadow for the enlightened and familiar realm of ideological connections. We challenge popular and everyday thought with its unchecked and unclarified values and assumptions. We take pride in mental freedom, the well-stated insight, the coherence of our thoughts. We are, however, fundamentally indebted to our patron, who found his wisdom by virtue of his ignorance. In spite of most schools' attempts to refashion Socrates in their own intelligence, he is above all else the man who asked questions because of what he did not know and who was led by an *eros* that often makes our work seem rather more clever than passionate. His capacity to bring into the light of ignorance the learning and intelligence of his time remains as the soul of philosophy.

Schizophrenia is a phenomenon of human illness in which the shadows of philosophy – disconnection, exaggeration, disorder, fantasy, radical dependence, withdrawn silence, hiddenness – make up the individual's particular way of being. Even the type of illness designated by this name is subject to no sufficient definition and is utterly vague as to what, exactly, it designates. In confronting what is called by the name, we encounter not just people who have 'lost touch with reality' in subtle as well as in frightening ways, we also encounter human being in ways that allow us to recognize aspects of our own existence in what we call madness. As philosophers, when we turn to madness, we join two remarkable human possibilities: the one, to be with things in a clarifying way, and the other, to be with things in the world as though logic were irrelevant for what we experience as real.

When madness is taken as a phenomenon, as a way human being is presented, we are less inclined to explain it or to provide conceptual analyses of the word's usage than we are to see human being as it happens in these certain ways. We allow it to be as it is, to show itself forth as we say, to cast its light on our learning and beliefs. And by confronting it, we confront the ignorance or shadow of philosophy. We come to see the openness of our own being which in no way finds its horizons in rational good sense or in steady, logical clarity. As a phenomenon, schizophrenia shows us at once how we may stand open in the presence of beings, falling utterly prey to *them* and suffering misery in a denial of *our* being, which we as philosophers may describe, but never,

as describers and clarifiers, bring to its own fulfillment. We are again cast into the light of philosophy's ignorance and may hope thereby to discover some measure of wisdom that is withheld as long as we try to live primarily in the clarity of our conceptual visions. By thinking in the light of human being gone mad, we are able to see part of the meaning of conceptualization: that it culminates in questions because conceptual activity does not happen as the fulfillment or completion of its subject matter. Madness occurs as the deprivation of human being, which no amount of description can restore, and as the disclosure of human being as a part of which conceptualization also occurs.

By virtue of conceptualization, however, we are able to interpret how we are to be, and our interpretations incline us toward certain directions of investigation, certain questions, particular ways of being, and the ideals in light of which we make our decisions and give cultural direction for ourselves. On these directions depend what we esteem and despise and to what extent we are able to look for what can, in fact, provide human fulfillment. Mental health has been interpreted largely as though human being did not occur, and the ideals for mental health have been developed as though man were best understood as an investigated object: the history of psychological and psychotherapeutic theory forms a large and important section in our cultural text of ontological forgetfulness. The result has been that sciences about man, but not a descriptive understanding of human being, have been the principal interpreters of what madness and health mean. Our conceptual task is consequently twofold: to call attention to the relevance of ontological descriptions for reconsidering the meaning of 'mental disease' (the task of this paper) and to structure a new approach to human misery and health that makes as the center of its focus the way human being happens.

I Claim, answer, and openness

The position which I shall describe for our purposes, but shall not attempt to found, is that human existence happens at once as claim and as answer. 'Claim and answer' describe something about what 'standing responsively in the open' means, i.e., the phrase elucidates Heidegger's understanding of *Ek-stasis*. *Claim* has the sense of 'to cry out' or 'to call' in its Old French heritage. 'Answer', coming from the Anglo-Saxon *and*, against, with *swerian*, to swear, can mean 'to be in conformity', 'to be adequate', 'giving attention', 'to act in response'. 'Attention', which shall also help in our discussion, means, for our purposes, 'state of giving heed' and 'readiness for what is given'. Human existence is a state of giving heed in the immediate presence of beings. The question of human

health has to do with how one attends to the claims and the responsiveness that make up his being in the world.

A being, some particular thing, happens as something that can be named, but does not come about by virtue of being designated.¹ It happens immediately as available for appropriation or designation: it happens *as* something, as meaningful. The stress falls on the happening of the thing. It takes place and is a place, not outside of our existence, but as immediately composing or constituting our existence, i.e., human being 'stands out' with beings and is worldwide in its scope. One might think of human existence as an 'inner' region, out of which one moves into an 'outside' region where things are, and in which things on the 'outside' are imagined. The claim that we are working with, to the contrary, is based on the observation that human existence happens as openness with the immediate presence of beings. Beings are not inaccessible and brute objects. They are given availabilities that mean something immediately in the way they occur, and which, in their occurring, bestow meaning, i.e., compose meanings, in existence.

When one takes an explanatory approach and sees things in terms of explanations, he may well ask, 'Yes, but isn't all this founded on such material conditions as brains, sensations, *a priori* structures, and so on? What are the *causes* of meaningful beings?' The nonexplanatory and descriptive way of seeing responds: 'Regardless what the conditions are and regardless what causes one hypothesizes, human existence does not happen as a condition or as a cause. "Condition" and "cause" have their meaning in explanatory interests. Human existence *is* not an explanation, nor are the happenings that we name and describe explanations. They are occurrences, here in certain ways, which compose the living event of being human. Our explanatory interests always idealize those things by placing them into a context of meaning which is imposed on their fundamental happening. That can issue in helpful beliefs and knowledge, but it always issues in confusion when one assumes that by explanation he describes the way things *are*.'

When something occurs it says itself in the sense that it occurs as something. We are always immediately imbued with a sense for what something is or is not, such that we *can* shut the door or pick up the pen, and such that we *can* be uncertain about a thing and feel the need to examine it further. 'What is that thing?' means, 'How is something that is present happening?'

Although the meaning of *claim* in the sense of 'to cry out' sounds rather too explosive or dramatic, the sense of 'saying itself' or 'to call' is helpful in interpreting how a being happens. It is present as something, never as nothing at all, and as something a being occasions an immediate range of possibilities for affirmation, negation, indifference, modification, explanation, appreciation. It happens as an address. *Dress*, in its French

derivation, meant to straighten or arrange. A being happens as a given composition or arrangement, *something* simply there, but not inertly there. 'There' as a saying, as coming forth, as a claim, as an event with which I am immediately in the possibilities that it occasions.

The immediate complement of 'claim' is 'answer'. Human existence says itself. That means that it is present always as someone. To be someone is to be a state of giving heed in the presence of beings. Even when I refuse a claim and turn away from it, I am attending to it, and I am in conformity with it in the sense that I respond with it, hear it, and answer. Whether or not I am conceptually self-aware, I am an attentive state as I pick up these things, avoid those, seek out others, et cetera. Answering need not be deliberate, then, but is my being 'this' way with 'these' claims. Meanings and being one's own event (i.e., *Eigenstaendigkeit*) are thus found to be nonreducible in human existence.

The genre of madness called schizophrenia within the *Dasein's* analytical approach has to do with the encroachment and constriction of the human capacity to answer and with a consequent domination by immediate claims. We need now to emphasize that being *at once* claim and answer, human existence is responsively open with the claiming disclosures of beings. It stands open in the availability of what immediately happens. Its hearing is the answered presence of what comes forth. The vulnerability of human existence is frequently remarked, and man's fear of his own state of being is frequently discussed. We are remarkably undefended in the immediacy of our being. We are constituted by givennesses which have at once the character of gift and threat because immediacy is neither deserved nor avoidable. When we answer by backing away from our own state of givenness, from what is given, and from the inevitability of answering, we literally refuse our own being, a refusal that immediately countenances what we refuse. This deep contradiction is lived as injury and misery, self-encroachment in the most profound sense, because in this case we are open (i.e., disclosive) in the disclosure of what is present by denying both our responsiveness and the meaningful presences. The at-onceness of claim and answer is elucidated by Boss's concept of perceptive world-openness.² Perceptive world-openness provides a basis for understanding what happens in schizophrenia. I interpret the term to name the happening of man and beings inseparably, the wholeness of human existence in which, primordially, there is neither subject nor object, but an answering presence in the composing presence of what is. *Compose*, a word I am using to interpret the immediacy of beings with human beings, but a word which Boss, Binswanger, and Heidegger do not use, has the interesting overtones of both 'to make up' and 'to be harmonious'. (I do not have in mind the transitive and agent-oriented sense of 'to put together'.³) It has the root of *poser*, to place, and with the *com* can mean 'in place with', i.e., free of

disturbance, fully appropriate. So 'composure' may be taken as an arrangement that is internally appropriate to itself. *Repose* is formed from the Latin *pausare*, to pause. It can mean both 'composure of manner' and 'state of rest'. These words help us to state how the living part-whole relation of human existence happens: human existence is rightfully to be a repose in its composure; it comes to bear as a way of preserving the claims that constitute it in the ways it answers them. Human existence is primordially a composure. It is being in the world – an ex-sisting out in the uncoveredness of beings. But a person may live contrary to his composure. He may be unable to tolerate his own world-openness in a free and open way. He is then not at peace in his relations in the world. The world happens for him in agitation – quite the opposite of being reposed in one's particular openness in the world. Human existence finds fulfillment when beings, which make up immediately its particular concrete moment, and its own possibilities for hearing and responding, which make up its given world-openness with beings, are borne or allowed or affirmed consonant with the way they are primordially together. The overtone of such statements is that when human being gives pause to the claims of beings in a way that is consonant with its own possibilities for hearing, i.e., its immediate openness, and with the beings themselves, a repose occurs that is a state of appropriateness vis-à-vis the particular disclosure and the disclosiveness or openness of the whole. The person then lives as a way of preserving the openness of being and beings, as a release to openness, as a profound repose with his being. One is then free to allow, choose, limit, and direct without denying the claiming, responding world-openness that he is as he allows, chooses, et cetera.

II Binswanger: world-design and transcendence

Binswanger has termed his reading of Heidegger a productive misunderstanding. I shall focus on one element of his misunderstanding in order to highlight the significance of Heidegger's work for our comprehension of human madness and well-being. We begin with ontological references, because both Binswanger and Boss have learned from Heidegger that human madness and well-being have to do with the ontological characteristics of being-in-the-world. The effort is to interpret human being so as to see the way a particular person is to be, i.e., so as to understand what sickness and health mean by reference to how human being occurs in all cases.

For our purposes, the most important element in Heidegger's way of seeing is his radically nonsubjectivistic comprehension of human being. By virtue of seeing this way, he has enabled us to approach health and

healing by reference to our primordial presence in the presence of beings. Traditionally, people have responded to the pervasiveness and primordially of being with theories about 'the unconscious', a realm taken to 'transcend' man's rational, clarifying, and volitional consciousness and to be constituted by the dark, nonappearing preconscious or unconscious aspects of his psyche. But the entire framework of consciousness, unconsciousness, and symbolic mediation between them falls away as unnecessary when one begins to see human being as openness with the disclosure of beings, as distinct to a subjective structure that is 'bordered' or 'fenced in' by an imaginative structure for the reception of things on the other side of it. Binswanger pointed out 'the fatal dichotomy of world in subject and object'. He saw with elegant insight that traditional psychology and psychiatry reduced human being 'to a mere subject, to a worldless rump subject in which all sorts of happenings, events, and functions occur . . . without anybody, however, being able to say . . . how the subjects can ever meet an object and can communicate and arrive at an understanding with other subjects'.⁴ But he himself was still captured by the subject-oriented approach to human being and was not able to make purchase of Heidegger's most important contribution to an interpretation of human well-being.

Binswanger read *Being and Time* as a study of the structural unity of human existence and interpreted it as an investigation of transcendental subjectivity. The 'existentials' are thus rendered by him as a transcendental, *a priori* structure that gives meaning to what occurs. Heidegger's work is 'an extremely consistent development and extension of fundamental philosophical theories, namely Kant's theory about the conditions and possibilities of experience (in the natural-scientific sense) on the one hand, and of Husserl's theory of transcendental phenomenology on the other'.⁵ Heidegger has 'elucidated the structure of subjectivity as transcendence'.⁶

Consequent to this interpretation, he understands Care, for example, as 'being in the world for the sake of myself', as the meaning of inward subjectivity, instead of as the meaning of standing *open* in the world with the uncoveredness of beings.⁷ He renders Thrownness as naming the given determinations of human existence, such as instinct and heredity. *Thrownness* names that dimension of human being which a person is without consent, and it functions as an explanatory, *a priori* structure which is taken to be ontologically prior to the disclosure of beings. The individual is 'enclosed, possessed, and compelled' in his Thrownness.⁸ Care, on this reading, has the sense of self-enclosed self-concern, and Binswanger finds need to develop the supplementary idea of 'being beyond the world', which he calls love. He found this further move necessary because he did not see the full meaning of Care as openness with beings. He knew that the self is worldly in its structures, but he

did not attend to the open eventfulness of being *in* the world in which self-concern, only one aspect of Care, happens as openness with the disclosures of beings. There is no 'sphere' out of which one needs to 'transcend,' unless self-concern be taken as an *enclosed* transcendental dimension instead of a way in which beings come forth. Thrownness has the sense of blind necessity, and Binswanger deals with Thrownness as human powerlessness, i.e., in quasi-volitional terms, until one chooses his Thrownness and achieves, by his limiting choice, power. Thrownness is thus taken by him as closedness over against the world, as 'having an environment like an animal',⁹ and that involves him immediately in a split within man of the human and nonhuman. Man, on this counting, transcends worldliness, which is a contradiction in terms when one defines man as being-in-the-world.

The emphasis on self-enclosure and volitional self-transcendence in both cases occurs because he has failed to see that Care and Thrownness, as well as all other ontological elements, do not in fact name *a priori* elements of transcendental subjectivity, but ways in which man is immediately with beings, i.e., ways human being is open *in* the openness of the world. And being open in the openness of the world is the polar opposite to self-*enclosed* self-concern and to *blind* (i.e., meaningless) determinism prior to choice. In both cases, Binswanger has adopted an approach that assumes that 'one has to start at transcendental subjectivity'¹⁰ instead of with Ek-stasis or openness in the openness of the world. Viewed in the latter emphasis, concern for oneself or the experience of given determination happen as ways of being *with* beings, and these two existentials, like the others, have their meaning *in the particular ways in which worldly relations occur, never in a trans-worldly, a priori dimension reached by inferential thought*. Loving is a way of relating caringly with beings, and being determined is a way beings appear. Neither Care nor Thrownness name for Heidegger a dimension apart from the disclosiveness of world-relations.

'World-design' is the term that stands at the center of Binswanger's approach to human being. The temporal, transcendental ego constitutes itself by 'directing itself' toward things. How a particular human existence is may be discovered by how it has designed its world. How it has misunderstood itself in its particular world-design may be discovered by reference to the transcendental, *a priori* structure of human subjectivity, which is the grounds or possibility for all world-designs. Binswanger found, for example, that manics have similar world-designs and are thus subject to general description and classification. He found, further, that when a world-design is founded in only a few of the fundamental possibilities of human subjectivity, one must constantly retreat from the worldly presences that he has systematically ruled out of his world, that 'in mental diseases we face modifications of the fundamental or essential

structure and of the structural links of being-in-the-world as transcendence'.¹¹ 'Thus, doing existential analysis in the area of psychiatry means to examine and describe how the various forms of the mentally ill, and each one from himself, designs the world, establishes their self, and, in the widest sense, act and love.'¹² The structure of being-in-the-world 'places a norm at our disposal and so enables us to determine deviations from this norm in the manner of the exact sciences'.¹³ And the structure of the specific world-design allows us to understand the way he relates to persons and things.

This conjunction of subjective transcendence and particular world-designs allows Binswanger to describe schizophrenic illness, for example, with regard to Extravagance, Rigidity, Covering, and Retreat. Schizophrenia is an 'ontological disorder', lived as the 'inconsistency of experience' that happens as one designs his world in a way that denies elements of *Dasein's* transcendental 'structural order'.¹⁴ Instead of being able to allow things to appear as they are according to his fundamental structure of experience, the sick person tries to enforce a certain restricting order onto things. He may flee the uncertainty of existence, its mundanity, its quality of constant change, his answerableness for what he chooses. Consequently his ideal of unbroken continuity, for example, constantly comes up against change, beginning and ending, absence, loss, growth, and decay. He seeks to escape this inconsistency of experience by ever more extravagant ideals and actions designed to deny or destroy the threat intrinsic in the relation of his inadequate world-design to the structures of his existence. His own design, though quite consistent within itself, 'has all the earmarks of the larger inconsistency'.¹⁵ He responds to this hard and fast stance by his impossible expectations and intentions. So, much of the world as it is constituted by his transcendental structure of experience denies the limits of his design, and he lives always with the threat that his world will be destroyed by forces impinging 'from the outside'. Everything in his world witnesses to a pervasive deficiency, and he is driven to cover over the threatening elements that deny the design on which he has staked his life. This futile project of covering what is intrinsic to his own being-in-the-world wears him away until he is forced to retreat and renounce the struggle by the fatigue caused by the impossibly burdening scheme. The culmination of this process is the autism characteristic of schizophrenic psychosis. One has been 'overwhelmed by a certain world-design', which is the opposite of letting the world occur according to the inevitabilities of being-in-the-world.¹⁶

Binswanger thus conceives of things encroaching on the schizophrenic because his world-design has refused central aspects of his transcendental subjectivity. The encroachment of beings and the consequent withdrawal and paranoia have their meaning in the overly limited world-design of the patient in relation to his *a priori* transcendental structure.

This understanding of madness develops out of a theory of intentionality founded in a structure of finitude. Binswanger says that Heidegger has shown 'how the intentionality of consciousness is grounded in the temporality of human existence, in *Dasein*. Intentionality in general is only possible on the basis of "transcendence" and is thus neither identical with it nor, conversely, does it make transcendence possible.'¹⁷ *Because* intentionality is not identical with 'transcendence' *can* an illness like schizophrenia occur, i.e., my world-design is able to be a refusal of parts of its own grounds. Or put again into Binswanger's language, 'the transcendental ego' is 'included' in the 'actual ego',¹⁸ and thus how I live can be a denial of how my being occurs.

But Binswanger describes the world-process by reference to something that he cannot, in principle, see, viz., a structure that transcends the world-occurrences and cannot be found in the purity that he posits for it. He thinks of being-in-the-world as a transcendental/worldly set of necessary categories: transcendence, he says, 'strides and swings' toward the world, as well as withdraws from the world and limits it. By choosing, i.e., limiting, one gains power 'over the world'. He has thus described worldly occurrence by reference to a ground reached by inference, i.e., by an idealization, and he has conceived this transcendental ground, which is termed being-in-the-world, as not being in the world, but as the apodictic necessity for world-occurrences. That is, he has conceived of human being as trans-worldly, and in that sense as an enclosed subjectivity. Heidegger's overcoming of that very way of thinking, his effort to describe how beings come forth *in* their disclosiveness (not in what is not disclosed – a transcending realm), lies at the heart of his interpretation of being. He describes how something comes forth *in* its coming forth. He describes its disclosure, its happening, and that means that one attends to a being in its occurrence. In contrast to Binswanger, for whom the grounds of description are not subject to direct description, Heidegger finds the grounds of description only in the occurrence of what comes forth. For Binswanger, the meaning of *is* is to be found by inferential thought, because he begins with the assumption that transcendental subjectivity is the basis for what occurs. Heidegger finds no basis for that assumption. Rather, when one begins with what does not come forth, he diverts himself away from how something happens and also keeps a subjective orientation toward phenomena. That, in effect, is an instance of covering the phenomena and of forgetting the disclosive openness of being.

By pointing out Binswanger's departure from Heidegger, my purpose has been to note an understanding of mental illness, and by implication, well-being, which is ontologically founded, but which has not taken account of the world-openness and immediate disclosiveness of being-in-the-world. The full import of Heidegger's thought for being ill and well

cannot be seen until we have struggled beyond all assumptions founded on the primacy of subjectivity and have come to see that being human is a worldwide event in which the *openness* of being-in-the-world can be encroached upon or fulfilled, not by virtue of world-designs founded in some third, transcendental power, but by virtue of our allowing and refusing the immediacy of being-in-the-world. In this instance, the forthcoming of what appears is the focus of attention, not a posited transcendental subjectivity, which functions as an explanatory principle, but not as a description of what is given.

III Boss: answering world-openness

The basis for Binswanger's understanding of schizophrenia as well as for human existence in general is, as we have seen, an acceptance of the hypothesis that human awareness is intentional and transcendental in nature. The transcendental basis is clearly hypothetically rather than descriptively discussed, as witnessed by his assumption of the 'fact' that the structure of seeing is itself not subject to direct description. The foundation of world-designs is to be taken on Binswanger's terms as not directly describable, but rather as induced in order to explain what is describable. In form the position is close to Freud's early observation that the doctrines about instincts are 'our myth', although this myth later gained a status, within his thought, closer to fact as he based more and more of his observations on it. The describable, for Binswanger, is to be understood by reference to the hypothetical, and he understands the structure of being-in-the-world not to be a direct description of the immediacy of being-in, but to be a highly promising hypothesis that becomes believable as we apply it to phenomena and lucidate them by it.

This position is profoundly different from Heidegger's descriptions of disclosiveness in which he gives an account of the immediacy of coming-forth. What Binswanger thinks not to be directly describable – the ontological foundations of what comes forth – is what Heidegger describes. This difference happens because Heidegger gave up the assumption of transcendental subjectivity from the beginning and attended solely to how phenomena are immediately present.

Boss has made this description on Heidegger's part the basis of his understanding of human well-being and illness. The schizophrenic, for example, is not primarily trapped by a self-defeating world-design, but is a person who is *open* in the world in a way that denies significant aspects of his world-openness. He lives a denial of how immediacy, in part, occurs, a denial of his perceptive world-openness. For Boss, the claims of beings are not products of human volition or of *a priori*

intentional structures, and are consequently not to be taken as aspects of a world-design. Mental illness *happens* fundamentally in the immediate presence of beings, in the way beings come forth such that one can have designs involving them. Human being is found to be composed of nonintentional ways of being open, *not* for contents that come to it, but *in* the immediate happening of beings. There is no effort on Boss's or Heidegger's part to explain why human being happens the way that it does. The effort, rather, is to describe how it happens. The link to health and illness is that how a human being is open with the disclosures of beings is the living moment of a person, that health and illness are how a person is immediately with beings.

The burden of Heidegger's descriptions is to show the structure of world-openness, and his radicalness within the phenomenological tradition is that this structure is found not to be *a priori* in any way analogous to Kant's Categories of the Understanding. It is found, rather, to be the structure of immediate givenness, of being *in* the world immediately. He is describing world-openness, the presence together at once of man and beings. We seem to be in the world in common ways and to share a world significantly common in spite of variety and difference. Nights and days, the past, present, and future, meanings, limitations, groundedness, freedom, appear commonly. And the basis of this common world-openness is not an external attribute of man, but is his being in common with what happens in particular. This commonness composes his event, his happening, the way he is.

We may say in this context that schizophrenic illness happens as an encroachment on a person's world-openness. *Encroach* has the meaning of 'to enter by stealth into the possessions or rights of another', 'to trespass', 'to advance beyond desirable or normal limits'. As we turn now to Boss's description of schizophrenia, we are dealing with a way in which a person experiences the encroachment of the immediate claims of beings, i.e., we are dealing with the weakness of one's responsiveness with the claims of beings that compose his own particular being-in-the-world. The task of Section One of this paper was to indicate that beings happen as immediate claims with the responsiveness of man, that human being is at once answering openness with the disclosures of beings. That means that bearing or preserving what occurs is man's answering presence with what comes forth claimingly (i.e., meaningfully). When one finds himself unable to answer, a deep confusion of human being occurs. Not only is the basis of continuity deeply disturbed.¹⁹ Beings themselves happen as unborne or as unpreserved, as an unanswered helter-skelter with which one finds himself absorbed as though *he* were hardly there.

'When seen from a daseinsanalytic or phenomenological viewpoint, the schizophrenic stands revealed as a human who is essentially and characteristically, in a specific way, no longer able to ek-sist, i.e., to bear

and maintain this being-open according to the norms [that are the human being's way of standing in the openness with what comes forth]. They are less able than all other existing people to maintain a free, open stance to what encounters them, to what, together with them, is manifest to all waking fellow humans in their surroundings.' 'There is no loosening of some postulated thought processes or associations. Rather, the whole existing of the schizophrenic, i.e., the whole spanning-the-world, as a free openness of perceiving and understanding of what is present is disturbed. . . .' The schizophrenic 'is in an especially high degree unable to open himself freely to the address of the realities of his world, to commit himself freely in his response to them, and yet preserve the independence of himself'. Rather, the schizophrenic in varying degrees, 'falls helplessly unfree under the spell of the address of what he encounters'.²⁰

Specifically, the schizophrenic process, in its beginning phases, may be seen by reference to a patient who found himself ensnared by everything he saw. The chair compelled him to sit on it. A spot on the wall forced him to consider and consider it. Everything he encountered threatened to 'snatch him under its sway'. 'Things', he said, 'give me no peace, and I cannot leave them in peace.'

As this inability to answer the address of beings grows, one finds himself increasingly 'benumbed by what he observes' so that 'he no longer has any distance from it, no longer has anything confronting him'. He 'loses the thread to himself'. This more advanced development is exemplified in a man who sees a clock on the wall and finds that the clock becomes dispersed so that the parts do not fit into a whole, but are scattered and random. As long as he could see the clock as a particular thing distinct from him he found himself differentiated and to a degree independent of the clock. But his relation to the clock becomes entirely different as the clock becomes fragmented. He finds himself in the observation engulfed into the observed. 'I am lost when I watch the clock on the wall', he says. 'It runs away out of itself. I am volatile, and I'm no longer present. I only know: the clock jumps around with many hands and cannot be brought together properly.' 'I am myself clock', he says. He has fallen prey to the clock, which has become, in the changed relationship, an *overpowering* claim, an event in which significance and place are lost as he becomes utterly mute in its presence. Rather than finding himself 'surrendered' over to something left out of his intentional design, he is engulfed by a claim that, in his dissolved responsiveness, loses its difference in its event with him, and he lives with it in its taking over his world-openness. This event does not happen with an object outside his existence. He and the wall and the clock occur with each other, and the sickness happens as the way they are together. His injured

responsiveness is his inability to be with the wall clock in its presence without finding himself in the possession of the appearing occurrence.

By attending to the way this world-relation happened, Boss has provided a description of the illness without appealing to a nonappearing superstructure or to a presumed isolated inwardness. The wall clock and the man were together in a particular way that need not be covered over by explanatory hypotheses in order to understand the way the schizophrenic episode occurred. The emphasis falls, rather, on this man's relation to the particular clock and not to time in general or to clocks in general. The focus is on how he and the clock happened together, how the clock addresses him. He finds himself in a decreasing relation with the clock as he becomes more absorbed in it. Under the circumstances, he may either, given enough strength, refocus the clock so that he again occurs as answering, as finding the clock an option for attention among other options, finding that he may respond to it in a variety of ways. Or he may withdraw from the encroachment on him, narrowing down his world-relations as much as possible so as to avoid being arrested and taken over by any claims whatsoever. He would then ward off and back away from all claims in order to avoid his being engulfed by what shows itself.

As a final example, we shall consider a patient termed the 'sun-man'. This lonely man lost contact with his only friend and shortly thereafter experienced the sun on the wall on his bedroom. It was at night, and the sun traversed the wall in an arching pattern during a several-hour period. Underneath the sun (which he saw as a small disc) was the figure of a man sleeping. The patient was awake during the event and in a state of extreme anxiety. Afterwards he was hospitalized in a mute, psychotic state. The episode was past after a few weeks of treatment, and the man returned to his life of working in a factory and living with his family. In a follow-up interview a year later he said, 'Through my illness it has become clear to me that one is dependent on the others. If one neglects the relationship to the other, he does not get anywhere and has no direction any more'. He said also, 'The sun was for me the supreme power from which all life and all growth proceeds'.

For our purposes we need to note that the patient experienced a dissolution into sheer light and power when his primary, concrete relation to another person failed. 'The collapse of his previous, narrowly confined world-relation changed suddenly to an unprecedented expansion beyond the old limitations of the openness of this existence.' Like the man-figure sleeping in the hallucination, he found himself at once devoid of nourishing human contact and wakeful responsiveness. He was threatened by dissolution into 'the supreme power from which all life and all growth proceeds'. He felt in extreme danger of total annihilation in the presence of that power, given the collapse of his one 'reliable

relation' that provided for him the focus of his world-relations. 'An unlimited incandescence . . . took the place of the once easily and joyfully born warmth of a concrete, limited relationship, to a friend, to a fellow human. He, in his radically weakened world relationships, experienced a radical threat of dissolution into his being.'

Boss describes this occurrence as a 'psychotic, unbounded being-in-the-world' in which the 'sun' 'disclosed something of the most hidden nature of that which holds sovereign sway behind everything'. 'The psychotic disruption of the boundaries of *Da-sein*, the widening of the being-open of an existence, often seems to go hand in hand with a "super-human" penetrability for the address of what is not observable in the everyday, but yet is the foundation of the everyday. . . . Nevertheless, schizophrenically ill patients prove to be people who are not equal to their supersensitivity. If they could stand firm in the face of what they perceived, they would not be sick, but would become and remain a visionary with genius, a philosopher, or a poet. So the bursting of the limits of the *Dasein* of schizophrenically ill people is not accompanied by a greater freedom, but by a serious encroachment on the freedom of their existing.'²¹

The basis of the methodological and theoretical differences between Boss and Binswanger is clear: Boss has made directly accessible *Ek-sistenz* and its encroachment the foundation for his understanding of human illness and well-being, whereas Binswanger has made intentional consciousness and a deduced transcendence his points of primary theoretical reference. In both cases they have found that human being, although quite differently interpreted, is the source for an adequate thematic grasp of sickness and health. Otherwise, they find, we are at the prey of assumptions which give direction for our efforts to be self-fulfilled, assumptions in relation to which we abnegate our responsibility because we have no clear grasp of who we are in our being. Human being, often taken as a mere abstraction, we find to be the deciding factor for the most concrete of human experiences: misery and well-being.

IV Well-being

Being well and ill inevitably raises the question of the meaning of being here as we are. People have always looked for norms because they experience fulfillment and deprivation. The difference between the two is remarkably great, and we all try to find the deciding factors, the demands to be met. Whether people fed virgins to the gods or tried to discover the 'nature' of things, they have done what they did, in significant measure, because of the experiences of suffering and well-being.

But soothing angry gods by sacrifice and treating ourselves as objects of investigation both ignore the significance of our happening as a temporal immediacy that is aware – the strangest phenomenon of all, the strangeness of which is intensified yet more when this event, this ‘species’, considers its own place within the seemingly infinite range of what it finds stretched out before it. Or when it confronts its own kind that are so odd, so sick, or so limited that it finds itself distorted terribly in the image it faces. Or when it finds madness as one of its own possibilities, along with the possibilities of joy and purpose.

The task is first to find where to look for the ‘norms’. Characteristically, in our tradition we have looked toward what we do not see, but which we think is necessary for what we do see, or we have looked at things with methods of looking that cannot take account of the immediacy of what is happening. In both approaches the immediacy of our own happening is lost or ignored. In the case of human being, that means that our norms for health and illness have not been focused on how man is with beings immediately. The psychotherapeutic appropriation of Heidegger makes apparent that the immediacy of being in the world is both nonsubstantial and aware, a fully historical event: we are such a happening, and health and illness are lived as nonsubstantial, temporal events of awareness. That is ‘where’ we must look in order to interpret our possibilities for being well and ill.

Heidegger has taken the temporal immediacy of awareness with unsurpassed seriousness. The judgment of many philosophers that his thought is elusive and vague has arisen because our standards for correctness and clarity have been so limited as virtually to ignore how human being happens, as distinct to accounting for the composition of many of the conditions necessary for the happening. We have looked away from the disclosive happening of human being by means of hypothetical and empirical investigations into what has to be present in order for man to be. When the necessary conditions are disturbed, man is surely disturbed. But the *meaning* of human being is to be found in how man’s worldly presence occurs. And by understanding the being of man, we understand how madness and well-being occur and what constitutes the fulfillment and injury of us in our uniqueness. At least a direction for developing this thought can be pointed out by recalling aspects of Heidegger’s theory of truth.

He has shown, with unsurpassed clarity, the limits of the idea that truth is correspondence, with its assumption of a *separated* agency and the option of truth as disclosure.²² Human being happens as a ‘region for relating’, a standing open in the occurrence of beings, a letting be of what comes forth. Being free, in this context, is being open for beings. Human being is a granting occurrence in the sense that it allows the opening forth of beings. Being free is fundamentally the same as Ek-

stasis, an 'admitting of the uncoveredness of beings', 'a standing out in the uncoveredness of beings'.²³ In particular, when a person does not resist the disclosive immediacy of being, when he 'openly welcomes the uncoveredness of beings', he is 'free for his own freedom'. That is, he responds openly in his own world-openness. He grants his own exposure in the disclosiveness of what occurs and *there-by* 'stands with' his 'possibilities for choice' in the givennesses, the beings, of his existence. This positive and individual attunement to the openness of being-in-the-world is the key to well-being. Its opposite, denying or refusing one's fundamental allowance of what comes forth, constitutes in a variety of ways what we call mental illness. This refusal is also a rejection of the chance to choose, because one then refuses or is unable to countenance the possibilities and presences which found the choice.

Given this fundamental understanding of truth and well-being, Boss has rejected the classical psychoanalytical notion that healing occurs as one releases a tension that has developed between 'unconscious and conscious' elements of the psyche. The traditional notion in effect begins by treating human awareness as though it were an enclosed phenomenon that is world-related only because of physical sense relations to the 'outside' world and symbolic representatives of what is separated from him. Madness is interpreted as a radical form of self-violation, and 'self' is assumed from the outset to be an interior, instinctual, imaginal realm, multi-dimensional, and basically isolated. 'Interior' patterns of association are taken to be more concrete than the way things happen. In Binswanger's phrase, cited above, 'a worldless rump subject' functions with axiomatic power in this conceptuality.

Yet Binswanger understood insanity as a destructive tension between a person's world-design and his transcendental subjectivity, whereas mental health is taken to be a fundamental harmony between world-design and transcendence.²⁴ Boss, on the other hand, conceives of madness as a *privation* of fundamental human possibilities found in world-openness. Mental disturbances occur as a person lives a denial of his fundamental world-openness and is unable to respond fully with the disclosures that make up his worldly presence. Healing happens with a profound countenancing of his 'truth', his standing out in the uncoveredness of beings, and of the claims that make up his particular way of being. Well-being occurs as a fulfillment of 'possibilities for world-relation' which in either a deprived or fulfilled state occur as the structure of world-openness, as the ways in which beings come forth and compose the concreteness of an individual's life. His understanding is founded by the occurrence of human being and not by an analysis of 'person' or 'self'. And while his therapeutic method is psychoanalytic, he has utilized an understanding of human being that obviates the subjectivistic, volitionally oriented psychoanalytic theories of consciousness and unconsciousness, which lead

inevitably to viewing man as an encapsulated event contained by an external world. One of the differences this emphasis makes therapeutically is that nonconceptual opening to one's openness in the world – compare the above discussion of Heidegger's understanding of truth and freedom – receives much more stress than rational acknowledgment and appropriation of previously unrecognized psychological characteristics.

The meaning of these claims is that being well and ill is a way of *being* and that human being is the source for an adequate understanding of human health. Anything short of an understanding of the openness of man with the disclosures of beings, i.e., of perceptive world-openness, promises to reflect a pathology of human thought in which the theoretician has not yet fulfilled the possibilities of his own temporal, immediate awareness which grounds his interpretations. In such a case, the equally dangerous madness of ignorance in the guise of intelligence will dominate, a domination in which the person repeatedly falls prey to his own interpretive creations and suffers, as a result, a *closure* from the world in the way he makes his interpretations of the world. *Madness* then reflects us to ourselves and fulfills the Socratic function of teaching us something about the ignorance of our best enlightenment.

Notes

1 In this discussion, the way beings are, how they come forth in their particularity, is one major point of focus. The difficulty of expression centers on how to elaborate 'beings' and not to imply objects of subjective action or surd-like things that are taken to be nondisclosed, but somehow present. How, in a word, are we to understand beings as claiming events? I have used the phrase 'disclosiveness of beings' and occasionally 'openness of beings' in order to elaborate 'claim'. Neither Heidegger nor Boss nor Binswanger uses the word *openness* to apply to nonhuman beings, although Heidegger places emphasis on the 'unhiddenness' of beings in *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*. Heidegger and Boss reserve the specific word *openness* for reference to *Dasein*. *Dasein* is a realm of openness that allows the entrance, the forthcoming of beings. But beings happen fundamentally as meaningful availabilities, as particular and meaningful possibilities for specific reference, amalgamation, and appropriation. The '*openness* of beings' underscores their being given as *available* in the allowance of *Dasein* for further disclosures. They are not subjective events that do something we call self-showing. They are given *possibilities* for specific reference which have intrinsic and immediate reference to the allowing openness of *Dasein*. As such they are open, i.e., they are the concrete and particular ways in which *Dasein* is world-related and specifically open to what has gone before and is up-coming. When Heidegger says that 'the posture [or comportment: *Verhalten*] of man is pervasively tuned by the openness of the being in the whole' (*Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, p. 18), he may be taken to mean in the context of the statement that man is temporally open in the ways things come forth. Beings are how man is particularly and temporally open. If beings, as unhidden, are not understood as opennesses in the openness of *Dasein*, the immediacy of the ontic (this particular way of being

open) and the ontological (the openness of *Dasein*) in human existence will be prone to be compromised and the historical meaning of beings will be more difficult to understand.

2 To develop this term adequately one would need also to deal with the full ontological structure of *Dasein*, with which perceptive world-openness is synonymous. That is too extensive a task for this discussion.

3 A being immediately constitutes or composes a particular human existence. Heidegger says in *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (p. 11) that 'jeder Offenständige Bezug ist Verhalten'. The 'Offenständigkeit' of man is ontically differentiated according to the different ways the *Verhalten* occur. As beings are allowed to come forth, one stands open in various *Verhalten* or postures. So we may say that a being makes a difference in how it enters in or occurs in the *Bezirk* of *Dasein*. How it happens is a particular ontic event and its making a difference is its claim. A being, as claim, composes a particular aspect of a person's existence.

4 'Existential analysis school of thought', *Existence*, ed. by R. May, Basic Books, p. 197.

5 *ibid.*, p. 193.

6 *ibid.*, p. 194.

7 *ibid.*

8 *Being-In-the-World* (Harper, 1963), p. 212.

9 *Existence*, p. 198.

10 *ibid.*, p. 197.

11 *ibid.*, p. 194.

12 *ibid.*, p. 198.

13 *Being-In-the-World*, p. 201.

14 *ibid.*, pp. 251-2.

15 *ibid.*, p. 254.

16 *Existence*, p. 194.

17 *Being-In-the-World*, p. 207.

18 *ibid.*

19 Continuity is found, not in steady *a priori* structures, but in the finite claiming and answering event of man, when 'answering and claiming' are understood as historical and linguistic in nature. I believe that this concept of continuity is best explicated by Gadamer's analysis of tradition and language in *Wahrheit und Methode*, in which he shows that continuity occurs as an historical event of transmission. His description is helpfully confirmed in instances of psychotic breakdown in which one's linkage with the past is thoroughly interrupted and the person loses the threads of meaningful continuity. On this understanding, the psychotic interruption is to be understood as an injury of the temporality of occurrences, not as a 'sealing off' of *a priori* categories.

20 Unless otherwise indicated, all quotes and references in this section are taken from *Grundriss der Medizin*, Hans Huber, 1971, Part III, Chap. II, Section d, pp. 483-511. In the direct quotes I have used an unpublished translation of this section by Dr. Brian Kenny. This book was written in close association with Heidegger and reflects some twenty-five years of conversations and jointly taught seminars by Boss and Heidegger.

21 By contrast, note the following statement by an Indian sage to Boss: 'But how should a person who does not trust his own basis and does not dare yield to it have the calmness and strength to give aid to others who need it? . . . [I am speaking of] the primordial trust in what is inconceivable by conceptual understanding, incalculable by all calculations, in which all things are rooted.

Even though all this is still a deeply veiled mystery to you, it will one day dawn on your intellect as that great beginning which, though incalculable, is never just the contrary of a calculable order, merely chaos, but is always what sustains all chaos and order together.' *A Psychiatrist Discovers India* (London: Oswald Wolff: 1965), p. 190.

22 *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, Klostermann, third ed., 1954.

23 Emphasis mine.

24 Transcendental subjectivity is not, for him, synonymous with the Unconscious, but the model of sickness as tension is nonetheless a fundamental characteristic of his thought, and conscious-unconscious tensions are a part of his larger scheme. 'Needless to say, I have never managed without the Unconscious: either in psychotherapeutic practice, which indeed is impossible without using Freud's concept of the Unconscious, or in "theory."' But after I turned to phenomenology and existential analysis, I conceived the Unconscious in a different way. The problem it presented became broader and deeper, as it became less and less defined as merely the opposite of the "conscious", whereas in psychoanalysis it is still seen largely in terms of simple opposition. Heidegger's existential analysis, as contrasted with Sartre, taken as its point of departure not consciousness, but existence as conceived as being-in-the-world; accordingly the opposition in question recedes into the background in favor of a description of the various phenomenologically demonstrable modes and structures of being-in-the-world.' L. Binswanger, *Sigmund Freud: Reminiscences of a Friendship* (Grune and Stratton, 1957), p. 64.

Heidegger, the possible and God

Richard Kearney

In the introduction to *Being and Time* (1927), Martin Heidegger announces his project of 'overcoming' metaphysics. One of the most salient features of this overcoming (*Überwindung*) is the subversion of the traditional metaphysical priority of actuality over possibility. From the point of view of a post-metaphysical or phenomenological ontology – of which *Being and Time* is to be the first sample – the possible is considered 'higher' than the actual.¹ But what precisely does Heidegger mean by 'the possible' and to what extent can a re-interpretation of the traditional meaning of this term contribute to the task of overcoming metaphysics? This is the main question, hitherto much neglected by Heidegger's commentators, I propose to reflect on in this study. And, as a corollary, I wish to explore some of the implications of Heidegger's thinking on the possible for a critical re-thinking of the concept of the divine.

It must be remarked, at the outset, that 'the possible' is not an unequivocal notion in Heidegger's philosophy. His understanding of this term alters and develops in tandem with the overall movement of his thought. Thus, borrowing the celebrated distinction between Heidegger I and II (first outlined by W. J. Richardson in his *Heidegger* and approved by Heidegger himself in an introduction to this work) I would say that the 'turning' (*Kehre*) from the early to the later Heidegger, in the thirties and forties, is evinced in a parallel 'turn' in his understanding of the possible. I shall attempt, therefore, to analyse Heidegger's post-metaphysical comprehension of the possible on the basis of his distinction between: (a) the possible understood as a mode of human existence, *Dasein* (Heidegger I), and (b) the possible understood as a mode of Being itself, *Sein* (Heidegger II). The understanding of the possible in *Being and Time* – as *Möglichkeit/Seinkönnen/Ermöglichen* – will serve as representative of Heidegger I; the understanding of 'the possible' in the

Letter on Humanism (1945) – as *Vermögen* – will represent the thought of Heidegger II. It is on the basis of the latter that I will sketch out an alternative post-metaphysical conception of god as *posse*, in the second part of this study.

Part I: Heidegger and the possible

The possible is one of the key – if largely overlooked – terms of the existential analysis of *Being and Time*. Heidegger's understanding of this term is threefold: (a) *Möglichkeit* (possibility); (b) *Seinkönnen* (potentiality-to-be); (c) *Ermöglichen* (to render possible). I will take each of these in turn.

(a) *Möglichkeit*/Possibility: in *Being and Time* Heidegger argues that human being is neither a worldless subject nor an object among others but a 'being in the world'. Phenomenologically considered, being is no longer reducible to a simple presence – whether this be the idealist notion of a subject present to itself, or the realist notion of an object given to us in its substantive presence. Heidegger maintains that phenomenology enables us to consider our being as a possibility rather than a simple actuality. He reveals that we are beings who exist beyond our present selves, always extending ourselves along ever expanding temporal horizons. We discover ourselves as beings in time, continually moving beyond the actual givens of the present towards the future and the past: those dimensions of ourselves which we possess only as absences, as *possibilities*. Phenomenology is therefore the first philosophy which permits us to 'overcome' the traditional hegemony of presence characteristic of all metaphysical systems. Thus, Heidegger founds his distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence on this primordial difference between presence and possibility.² More precisely, I am authentic when I understand my 'existence *qua* actuality' *on the basis* of my 'existence *qua* possibility' and not vice-versa.

This manner of understanding the being of human existence (*Da-Sein*) as possibility rather than presence goes against the whole metaphysical tradition. Aristotle accorded an absolute priority to act (*entelecheia*) over potency (*dunamis*).³ Faithful to this priority classical metaphysics designated the Divine Being as a pure and eternal *actus* over and above all transitory and material *potentia*. Hence St Thomas' definition of God in the *Summa*: 'Deus est Actus purus, non habens aliquid de potentialitate.'⁴ Even Leibniz who appeared to vindicate the possible in some measure, finished by reducing it to a mere represented *possibilitas* in the mind of a God perfectly actualized in His own Being.

By contrast, Heidegger sees the possible (*das Mögliche*) as the trans-

cidental horizon of *Dasein*. The possible is nothing less than that horizon of transcendence which makes possible both the individual historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of each individual and the general history (*Geschichte*) of humankind. Historicity and history are grounded on a fundamental human experience of openness towards time. By time Heidegger understands here, in *Being and Time*, the temporal horizons which extend the present towards the possible worlds of past and future thus endowing it with meaning. Time is an 'ex-static' horizon of possibility into which I step when I step outside of (*ex-stasis*) my present existence, i.e. my existence considered as simple presence. Heidegger argues that traditional metaphysics treated the human subject solely in terms of the simple presence of its being (*Seiende*) and thereby ignored the very Being (*Sein*) of this being-present. This Being of being reveals itself as the non-present possibility of *Dasein*. Heidegger can thus conclude that Being-there (*Da-Sein*) is my existence as *possibility*.⁵

In contrast to classical metaphysics which, since Aristotle, viewed time as an addition of present movements, Heidegger proposes a 'fundamental' ontology which will reveal time as an horizon of possibilities which possibilizes and grounds (*gründen*) the present.⁶ So doing, he will enable us to question the very Being of our being-present, that absence which grounds our presence and appears to us, phenomenologically, as possibility. By thus defining our 'fundamental' way of being-in-the-world (*in-der-Welt-sein*) as possibility, Heidegger intends to 'overcome' the standard metaphysical definitions of existence in terms of presence: *Ousia*, *Existentia*, *Substantia*, *Res Cogitans*, *Gegenstand*, *Gegenwärtigung*, *Vorhandenheit*, etc.⁷

But Heidegger does not suggest that human existence is only possibility. More exactly, he describes it as both actuality and possibility, stressing the fact that the latter is the site of the former. I am a being-there (*Da-sein*) who has been 'thrown' into existence and who can do nothing to alter this 'fact'. But the very 'meaning' (*Bedeutung*) of my thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) and facticity (*Faktizität*) as a being who *actually* exists, can only be comprehended from the more fundamental perspective of possibility. My comprehension of myself as 'thrown' (*geworfen*) into this actual world is only meaningful on the basis of my understanding of myself as a being who is always 'projected' (*ent-werfen*) towards the world as possibility. But we must not misunderstand this to mean that we inhabit two worlds. There is only one world which, like *Dasein*, is both actual and possible, both present and future. The possible is the horizon of the world; and the world is the horizon of *Dasein*. Possibility is that world-horizon towards which (*Woraufhin*) I direct myself in that temporalizing transcendence which alone gives meaning to our actual world.⁸

But if Heidegger maintains that an understanding of our existence as

'possibility' is the very meaning and ground of our actual existence, he does not deny that such an understanding may sometimes be inauthentic. Possibility is inauthentic when it is apprehended as a state of objectifiable givenness (*Seiende als Vorhandenheit*) rather than of the 'Being' of our being-present. All 'logical', 'factual', 'existentiell' or 'ontical' possibilities as outlined by Heidegger in *Being and Time* are inauthentic in so far as they construe the possible on the basis of 'presence', thereby masking its *authentic* role as the basis of 'presence'.⁹ Authenticity is used here as an ontological rather than a moral term. In short, possibility is authentic when it is understood as an expression of the *Sein* of our existence and inauthentic when it is understood as an expression of our existence as *Seiende*, i.e. as an entity of ontic givenness.¹⁰

But Heidegger goes further. He states that our inauthentic possibilities only have 'meaning' to the extent that they are recognized as ultimately 'grounded' in our authentic (*eigentlich*) possibilities, i.e. those possibilities which are acknowledged as the ownmost (*eigenst*) modalities of our being-in-the world.

I begin to exist authentically as soon as I cease to experience my life, and my life-world, as given actualities of presence and unveil that horizon of possibilities which is the hidden significance of this presence. The horizon of the possible is always covered over by the anonymous crowd (*das Man*) which reduces life to the uniform, compelling the past and future to conform to the one form of an insular present. The Crowd hides the possible because it threatens to expose the mediocrity and inertia of our daily life. The Crowd protects its subscribers from the responsibility of having to choose their actual manner of existence from a host of possibilities. It isolates the present from the unsettling dimensions of past and future. It assures us that all that is is well and could not be otherwise. The discovery of the possible, which alone renders our lives authentic, shatters this myth of anonymous presence and compels each individual to face up to his/her responsibility. The disclosure of the horizon of possibility which grounds our actual existence makes us respond to the past which made us and the future which calls us. This disclosure fills us with anguish (*Angst*): we realize that our sovereign limiting possibility is the possibility of death.

Death is our ultimate possibility. It is the fundamental project which founds all other projects. Thus Heidegger concludes that the horizon of our world – be it the *Umwelt* of serviceable and referential objects (*Dienlichkeit* and *Verweisungsganzkeit*) or the *Mitwelt* of interrelating subjects (*Miteinandersein*) – is finite. The temporal horizon of our existence is a transcendental horizon which leads from our present to our open future of possibilities. But the openness of the future is not infinite; it terminates in death, the end of all our possibilities. Heidegger defines us as temporalizing beings always transcending the reality of the present

towards the possibility of the future, and ultimately towards our most future possibility, death. Death is the possibility which it is impossible to go beyond. I am free to the extent that I experience my life as possibility; I am only authentically free, however, when I experience my death as my ultimate possibility, the impossibility of further possibility, the end of my time.

To acknowledge death as the supreme project of my existence is to discover that the world is always *mine* in so far as it is an horizon of possibilities limited by *my* death. Death represents the finitude of *my* temporalization; it cannot belong to another. In order to live our life, as a 'being towards death', authentically we must live it as our *own*, as individuals over and against the collective 'they'. In thus authentically experiencing death as *my* supreme possibility, I experience the possibility of the impossibility (*Unmöglichkeit*) of my existence, the possibility of being-no-longer-able-to-be (*das Möglichkeit der Nicht-mehr-Dasein-könnens*).¹¹ Death is the end (*Umwillen/Umzu*) of all our possibilities. I exist authentically when I live my possibilities *towards* my death.

It seems clear, then, that the Heideggerian notion of the possible as *Möglichkeit* cannot be understood metaphysically as either the represented *possibilities* nor the immanent *potentia* of some being considered as 'presence'. *Möglichkeit* for Heidegger in *Being and Time* is the horizon of *Dasein* which transcends all actual presence. It represents a post-metaphysical understanding of the possible which shatters the notion of being as a solid and substantial self-presence exposing it to the temporalizing projects of *Dasein*. I am a being who is always transcending my being as presence towards my being as possibility, because I am a being who exists in time. Metaphysics hid the truth of being in hiding this fundamental rapport between being and time.

(b) *Seinkönnen*: In addition to *Möglichkeit*, Heidegger employs two other key terms in *Being and Time* to express his understanding of the possible. *Seinkönnen*, translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as 'potentiality-for-being'; and *Ermöglichen* or the power of rendering possible, of possibilizing.

Potentiality-for-being (*Seinkönnen*) signifies *Dasein*'s ability to project in the first place. It is the *sine qua non* of every projection of possibility. And every projection is a projection of the possible to the extent that it is a surpassing of the present. We can only project ourselves towards our possibilities because we have the potentiality to do so, i.e. to *be* our possibilities. *Seinkönnen* means that it is possible to reach out towards the possible. To say, as Heidegger does, that *Dasein* exists as possibility is to presuppose that *Dasein* *can* project its possibilities, *can* exist as potentiality-for-being. To be able to project that which is able to be I must first be a being who is able to be.¹² More exactly, all our projection,

comprehension or realization of possibilities issues from our *potentiality-to-be* projection, comprehension or realization.

Seinkönnen, like *Möglichkeit*, may be either authentic or inauthentic, ontical, factual or existentiell.¹³ Whereas, for example, *Möglichkeiten* can refer to both the 'possibilities' of *things* (i.e. cultural, technical, linguistic or perceptual objects) and of *human existence*, *Seinkönnen* is attributable to human existence alone.¹⁴ If *Möglichkeiten* are the projects of *Dasein*, *Seinkönnen* is *Dasein*'s prerequisite power of projection. Similarly, if the former are extended along the temporal horizon of *Dasein*, the latter is *Dasein*'s very capacity to temporalize this horizon. Thus, while the 'possibilities' of *Dasein* may be said to be variable, its potentiality-to-be is constant. We may, for example, consciously project many possibilities which we simply don't have the potentiality-to-be, the possibility of being a bird or a god. And contrariwise, even though we are invariably potentiality-for-being-towards-death we are not always projectively aware of this as our most sovereign possibility. It is on the basis of this distinction between two modes of living the possible, that Heidegger speaks of a conscience (*Gewissen*) which calls each one of us to choose, from amidst the multiple possibilities of his/her horizon, the singularly authentic possibility of acknowledging oneself as a potentiality-for-being-towards-death.¹⁵ As Heidegger puts it: 'Being-towards-death is the anticipation of a potentiality-for-being of that entity (i.e. man) whose kind of Being is anticipation itself. . . . Death is *Dasein*'s *ownmost* possibility [*Möglichkeit*]; and being towards this possibility discloses to *Dasein* its *ownmost* potentiality-for-being [*Seinkönnen eigenst*].'¹⁶

Death is the limit of the possible both as our *ownmost* possibility and *ownmost* potentiality-for-being. But death limits us in different ways. As the limit of possibility it is that 'towards which' *Dasein* projects itself; as the limit of potentiality-for-being it is that 'for which' *Dasein* projects itself. To apprehend death as our sovereign possibility is to recognize *Dasein* as our potentiality-for-Being-in-its-totality (*Ganzseinkönnen*). This apprehension of our Being in the totality of its possibility presupposes that we recognize ourselves as temporal ekstases stretched between past and future. To recognize our *Ganzseinkönnen* thus is to gainsay the prefabricated opinions of the Crowd (*das Man*) which reduce us to a part of ourselves in reducing us to what we are exclusively now in the present, or to the illusion of a permanent undying 'presence'.¹⁷ To recognize our *Ganzseinkönnen* is to simultaneously recognize our *Selbstseinkönnen*, that potentiality-for-being-one's-self denied us by the Crowd.¹⁸ All the other potentialities-for-being, i.e. the potentiality to be someone who works, speaks, feels anguished, guilty or at issue, are ultimately derivative of our *ownmost* potentiality-for-being-towards-death which is at once our *Ganzseinkönnen* and our *Selbstseinkönnen*. Death is the potentiality-to-be one's whole self which in turn totalizes and individual-

izes all other *Seinkönnen*.¹⁹ Heidegger concludes accordingly: 'The certain possibility of death discloses Dasein as a possibility, but does so only in such a way that, in anticipating this possibility, Dasein possibilizes [*ermöglicht*] this possibility [*Möglichen*] for itself as its ownmost potentiality-for-being [*Seinkönnen*].'²⁰

(c) *Ermöglichen*: This last quotation underlines the difference between *Möglichkeit*, *Seinkönnen* and the third key term for the possible in *Being and Time* – *ermöglichen*. In this and other passages, the verb *ermöglichen*, meaning to 'make or render possible' is used to designate the most fundamental existential activity of *Dasein*, that is, the activity by which it deploys itself as a potentiality-for-being which projects its own possibilities of existence.

However, at several junctures during the concluding chapters of *Being and Time*, Heidegger seems to suggest that the subject of the verb *ermöglichen* may be other than *Dasein* itself. This enigmatic switch of subject is scarcely perceptible but is, none the less, of profound importance for the subsequent development of Heidegger's thought. In section 65, for example, Heidegger defines the 'meaning' (*Sinn*) of *Dasein* as 'that onto which' (*Woraufhin*) *Dasein* projects itself, a *Woraufhin* which for its part 'renders possible' (*ermöglicht*) all of *Dasein*'s projects. I cite in German, as this twofold meaning is lost in translation: '*Das Woraufhin eines Entwurfs freilegen, besagt, das erschliessen, was das Entworfenen ermöglicht*.'²¹ This sentence is ambivalent in that *das Entworfenen* (that which is projected) may be understood as either the subject or the object of the verb *ermöglicht* (to 'render possible'). If it is *subject*, then the *woraufhin* (the 'that onto which' *Dasein* projects itself which in turn 'renders possible' this projection) is nothing other than the projection of *Dasein* itself. In this case, the 'rendering possible' of *Dasein* constitutes a self-projecting, solipsistic circle. If *das Entworfenen* is *object* of the sentence, however, then it would seem that the *Woraufhin* which 'renders possible' *Dasein*'s projection is something radically *other* than this projection itself. The ambiguity is, I submit, intentional.

Macquarrie and Robinson offer the following translation here: 'To lay bare the "upon-which" of a projection, amounts to disclosing that which makes possible what has been projected.' The translators' choice here of the second of the two possible meanings is in line with my suggestion that the general movement of Heidegger's treatment of the possible in *Being and Time* is progressively away from a metaphysical interpretation which would see the possible as a dimension (*potentia* or *possibilitas*) immanent in the being of things towards a post-metaphysical interpretation which recognizes possibility as a transcendent dimension, emerging from beyond things (*Seiendes*), from that Being (*Sein*) which renders

things possible in the first place. The sentences which follow Heidegger's enigmatic phrase appear to confirm this reading:

What has been projected is the Being of Dasein, and it is disclosed in what constitutes that Being as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. That upon which [*Woraufhin*] the Being which has been disclosed and is thus constituted has been projected is that which makes possible this constitution of Being as care.²²

In section 71, we find an equally puzzling and ambivalent passage in which Heidegger suggests that the fact that 'temporality . . . is rendered possible by the "*Being*" of Dasein [*die Zeitlichkeit . . . das Sein des Daseins ermöglicht*]' can only be genuinely understood on the basis of an understanding of the meaning of Being in general [*Sinn des Seins überhaupt*].²³ Is there not here the suggestion that the '*Being* of Dasein' (*Being* underlined by Heidegger himself) which 'renders possible' temporality, refers ultimately to 'Being in general' which, as we know from Heidegger's later writings, is fundamentally 'different' from *Dasein* itself? As Heidegger puts it elsewhere, 'whereas Being in general may be [*weset*] without Dasein, Dasein may never be without Being'.²⁴

Heidegger corroborates this suggestion in section 76, when he makes mention of 'the quiet power of the possible' (*die stille Krafte des Möglichen*) which 'renders possible' both our history and our comprehension of history.²⁵ He goes on to identify this 'quiet power of the possible' with the futural 'towards-which' of all our temporal projections. Moreover, in the concluding sentences of *Being and Time*, this circular manner of referring possibility to temporality and temporality to possibility reconfirms our hypothesis that it is ultimately Being itself which 'renders possible' the projections of *Dasein*:

The existential-ontological constitution of Dasein's totality is grounded in temporality. Hence the ecstatic projection of Being must be made possible [*ermöglicht*] by some primordial way in which ecstatic temporality temporalizes. How is this mode of the temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way which leads from primordial *time* to the meaning of *Being*? Does *time* itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being?²⁶

The final suggestion would seem to be that it is Being which 'renders possible' (*ermöglicht*) time. Or more exactly, it is Being itself which 'renders possible' the temporality of *Dasein* as a potentiality-for-being which projects its own possibilities. But within the compass of *Being and Time* this reading remains no more than a suggestion; the overall perspec-

tive of the possible in this work appears to be based more on *Dasein* – on the Being of *human* existence – than on Being itself (*Sein als Sein*).

To summarize this analysis of the possible in *Being and Time*, we might say that just as our understanding of *Möglichkeit* referred us to an understanding of *Seinkönnen*, so in turn our understanding of *Seinkönnen* led to an understanding of *ermöglichen*. This movement from a nominal to a verbal notion of the possible, reflects in some fashion the progressive movement in Heidegger's thought away from being as a being-present (*Seiende als Anwesenheit*) who lives its possibilities only secondarily and accidentally, towards being as a Being-there (*Da-Sein*) whose temporalizing 'renders possible' and, more remarkable still, is 'rendered possible' by it. Heidegger himself does not at any time explicitly allude to this terminological progression. But as I hope to have shown he does not have to – the text speaks for itself. The important point is that with his original analysis of the possible in *Being and Time*, Heidegger has already taken the decisive step beyond a metaphysics of presence.

Before concluding this first part of our analysis some brief reference must be made to Heidegger's allusions to 'the possible' in two other works written before the 'turning' (*Kehre*) of his thought. In *Nietzsches Wort: 'Gott ist Tod'* (a resumé of lectures given between 1936 and 1940), there is a curious passage where Heidegger observes that for Nietzsche 'the essence of art is the creation of *possibilities* for the will, on the basis of which the will to power liberates itself for itself for the first time'.²⁷ Art reveals the essence of all willing to be a perpetual self-creation which goes beyond our given nature by appropriating other 'possible' experiences. A propos of this reading Heidegger cites the following sentence from Nietzsche's *Will to Power* (aph.796): 'The world like a work of art gives birth to itself.' Art is, as Heidegger comments, primarily a *value* for Nietzsche, the willing of *more* power: 'A perspectival direction towards possibilities . . . which are given only through a penetrating forward look that belongs to the essence of the will to power.'²⁸ It seems that here, as in *Being and Time*, Heidegger interprets the notion of possibility as an horizational projection of the Being of one human being, that is, of *Dasein*. The work of art constitutes a world of the possible. It unfolds as an horizon of valorizing human projection. Thus we recognize that just as the 'worldhood of the world' in chapter 3 of *Being and Time* was understood on the basis of 'readiness-to-hand' (*Zuhandenheit* as the totality of the referential valorization, *Verweisung*, and orientation, *Ausrichtung*, of *Dasein*'s projects), so also art as conceived by Nietzsche is a world of unfettered human valorizing. In short, in art the 'meaning' of the will to power is revealed as a valorizing projection of human being towards the possible.

It is in a similar perspective that Heidegger interprets the notion of possibility in part three of *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1929).²⁹ Here Heidegger defines possibility as the auto-affective horizon of human temporality grounded in the 'transcendental imagination'. With Kant the possible emerges, for the first time in the history of metaphysics, as the field of temporality. The possible is the temporal horizon of human imagination which renders possible the unity of understanding and sensibility.³⁰ For Kant in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as for Heidegger in *Being and Time*, the possible is that anticipative-projective structure (*Vor-haben*, *Vor-stellung*, *Vor-bildung*) which grounds human temporality. Thus when Kant says that the human self is a being who temporalizes by 'imaginatively' transcending the present towards the possible (i.e. non-present horizon of the past and future), he is anticipating Heidegger's claim in *Being and Time* that *Dasein* gives itself a world by projecting itself temporally toward a transcendental horizon of possibility. Heidegger fully acknowledges, moreover, that Kant's insight into the temporalizing nature of the transcendental imagination was the precursor to his own understanding of *Dasein*.³¹ Indeed Kant's attempt to think being in terms of time, and presence in terms of possibility, was one of the earliest challenges to the traditional metaphysical claim that Being be understood as 'presence' rather than temporality. But as Heidegger goes to great lengths to point out, Kant was so disturbed by the implications of this challenge that he suppressed his analysis of imagination as the temporalizing pass-over from presence to possibility in the second edition of the *Critique*.³² Not until the publication of *Being and Time* some 140 years later would this omission be redressed. We must bear in mind, nonetheless, that we are dealing here with Heidegger's *interpretation* of Kant's theory of imagination (as of Nietzsche's theory of will) rather than with the original theory itself.³³

In the two works cited, therefore, Heidegger's analysis of the possible shows itself to be perfectly consistent with his novel definition of this term in *Being and Time* as a temporalizing-projecting-valorizing horizon of *Dasein*. Heidegger I (Heidegger before the 'turning') thus leads us to think the being of the world less as a permanent substance or subsistence and more as *Dasein*'s transcendental horizon of possibility. But even if Heidegger I raises our understanding of Being from presence (*Vorhandenheit*) to possibility (*Möglichkeit*), he does so largely within the limits of transcendental subjectivity. In short, his analysis of the possible emerges from his original (i.e. post-metaphysical) disclosure of the Being of *Dasein* as temporality, rather than from an even more fundamental disclosure of Being as Being (*Sein als Sein*). This second disclosure was to be the prerogative of Heidegger II.

In the forties there occurred the famous 'turning' (*Kehre*) in Heidegger's

thought. This 'turning' is clearly manifest in his approach to the notion of the possible. Now the possible is thought in terms of Being itself rather than in terms of the Being of *Dasein* or a transcendental subject. As Heidegger makes quite clear in his introduction to Richardson's commentary, however, there is no question here of a philosophical *volte-face*. The thought of Heidegger II is to be understood as a deepening of, rather than a deviation from, Heidegger I. The two say the same thing but from different perspectives. The possible which is thought about in both instances remains the same, the only difference being that in Heidegger II it is approached from the perspective of Being as Being rather than Being as being-there. This point will become clearer when we show how the later Heidegger's interpretation of the possible as *Vermögen* already exists in germinal form in the early Heidegger's notion of *ermöglichen*.

The 'turning' in Heidegger's thought on the possible is best expressed, I believe, in the following key passage from *Eine Brief Über den Humanismus* (1947).

Being as the element is the 'quiet power' of the loving potency [*Vermögens*], i.e. of the possible [*des Möglichen*]. Our words 'possible' and 'possibility' are, under the domination of 'logic' and 'metaphysics', taken only in contrast to 'actuality', i.e. they are conceived with reference to a determined – viz. the metaphysical – interpretation of Being as *actus* and *potentia*, the distinction of which is identified with that of *existentia* and *essentia*. When I speak of the 'quiet power of the possible', I do not mean the possible of a merely represented *possibilitas*, nor the *potentia* as *essentia* of an *actus* of the *existentia*, but Being itself, which in its loving potency [*das Mögend*] possibilizes [*vermag*] thought and thus also the essence of man, which means in turn his relationship to Being. To possibilize [*vermögen*] something is to sustain it in its essence, to retain it in its element.³⁴

The first thing to be remarked here is that the repetition of the portentous phrase from *Being and Time* (i.e. 'the quiet power of the possible'), in hyphenated form, signals Heidegger's intention to rehearse and develop its original meaning. As we observed in our analysis of the term *ermöglichen* in *Being and Time*, the notion of 'possibilizing' was frequently used ambiguously to refer to either of two different subjects – Being as human being (*Dasein*) or Being as Being (*Sein als Sein*).³⁵ Here in the *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger replaces *ermöglichen* by *vermögen* thereby unambiguously identifying the fundamental power of possibilizing with Being itself.

Whereas *ermöglichen* could be either authentic or inauthentic, *vermögen* is always authentic. To put it in another way: *vermögen* (which I

translate as 'possibilization' or 'possibilizing' since the author uses it as both verb and noun) is to be correctly understood as the exclusively authentic essence of *ermöglichen* (to render possible). It is *ermöglichen* viewed from the point of view of Being in general (*Sein überhaupt*) rather than of human being in particular. As Heidegger explains:

It is on the strength of this loving potency or possibilization of love [*Das Vermögen des Mögens*], that something is possibilized [*vermag*] in its authentic [*eigentlich*] being. This possibilization [*Vermögen*] is the authentic 'possible' [*das eigentlich 'mögliche'*], that whose essence rests on loving [*Mögen*].³⁶

'Possibilization' (*Vermögen*) is thus identified with Being itself to the extent that it possibilizes what is most proper (*eigenst*) and authentic (*eigentlich*) for human being, i.e. thought. Correlatively, thought is that which cares for Being, shows care (*Sorge*) for what is most proper (*eigenst*) to it. Heidegger exploits here the hidden resources of the term *Vermögen*, notably its root, *mögen*, meaning 'to love'. To care for Being is consequently to love it in taking care of its essence as it manifests itself in all things: 'Thought is . . . to concern oneself about the essence of a "thing" or a "person", that means to like or to love them.'³⁷ Possibilization is, quite simply, the love of Being; and love of Being is to be understood as both a subjective and objective genitive, that is, both as *Dasein's* love for Being and Being's love for *Dasein* which possibilizes (*vermag*) *Dasein's* loving – thinking – in the first place.

Thus we may say that thinking is *Dasein's* most proper and authentic possibility (*eigenst und eigentlich Möglich*). Thinking is that which is possibilized by the 'loving possibilization' of Being itself so that it may, in turn, lovingly possibilize the coming to be (*wesen*) of all beings. Being possibilizes thought which in turn possibilizes the Being of things. This ontological reciprocity is ingeniously captured by the untranslatable accusative/nominative duplexity of the German *das*: '*Aus diesem Mögen vermag das Sein das Denken.*' Lohner's translation of this sentence as 'Being is capable of thought' is incorrect because it is one-sided. For it is not merely a question of Being being capable of thought, but also of Being making thought capable of Being, i.e. of thinking Being. Within a space of ten lines Lohner uses three different terms to translate *vermögen* ('potency', 'to be capable of', and to 'command'); and without the slightest indication to the reader that we are in all cases concerned with the *same* term. Our alternative rendition of *vermögen* as 'possibilizing' (meaning both 'to possibilize/possibilization') seeks to capture its complex double role as noun and verb. Accordingly, we render the German '*Aus diesem mögen vermag das Sein das Denken*' as 'Being possibilizes thought which possibilizes Being'. This version is confirmed, it seems to me, in

the sentences which immediately follow: '*Jenes ermöglicht dieses. Das Sein als das Vermögend-Mögende ist das "Mög-liche"*' – 'The one renders the other possible. Being as the loving-possibilizing is the "*posse-ible*"'.

There are three crucial points to be made about this telling statement (the entire second sentence of which Lohner omits to translate!). The first is that the juxtaposing here of *ermöglichen* (Heidegger I's term for the possible in *Being and Time*) with *Vermögen* (Heidegger II's word for the possible) shows how both terms refer to the *same* truth of the possible without denying the difference of their respective perspectives (that is, *ermöglichen* as the possible seen from the perspective of *Dasein*, *Vermögen* as the possible seen from the perspective of Being). In this movement from the *ermöglichen* of Heidegger I to the *Vermögen* of Heidegger II the ambiguity which we remarked above is shown to be – in its essence (i.e. from the point of view of Being as Being) – the very truth of Being itself as a reciprocity of loving and thinking.

The second point concerns the use of the term '*Vermögend-Mögende*' to describe Being. This particular grammatical usage means that Being is at one and the same time a possibilizing and a loving: it loves because it possibilizes and possibilizes because it loves.

Third, the direct equation of Being with '*das Mög-liche*' shows that the root of both loving (*Mögend*) and possibilizing (*Vermögend*) is the same, namely, *Mög*. It is impossible to render this two-in-one meaning of *Mög-liche* in English. But by translating '*Mög-liche*' as '*posse-ible*' we hope at least to have communicated one of the fundamental meanings, that is, Being as *posse*: to be possible, being-possible, possibilizing. Whatever about the impossibility of an adequate or elegant translation, however, it is abundantly clear that Lohner's omission of this pivotal sentence makes Heidegger's revolutionary identification of Being as *Vermögen* incomprehensible to the English reader.

In this cardinal yet much neglected passage from *The Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger goes so far as to describe Being itself as a 'loving possibilization' (*Mögende Vermögen*). In so doing he reveals the implicit truth of the three preceding notions of the possible – i.e. possibility (*Möglichkeit*), potentiality-for-being (*Seinkönnen*), and making possible (*ermöglichen*) – to be nothing less than the possibilizing (*Vermögen*) of Being itself.

Possibilizing is Being itself to the extent that it possibilizes (*vermag*) beings out of love for their essence. But there is another more literal meaning to the term *Vermögen* which might be immediately obvious to the German reader and which cannot be ignored in this context. Curious as it may seem, the current meaning of *Vermögen* is 'power' or 'property'. Used as a verb it can signify to have power or influence on persons or things. Though this alternative meaning of *Vermögen* appears in stark contrast to Heidegger's etymological rendition as a 'loving possibilizing', it is by no means accidental. Several critics, notably Emmanuel Lévinas

and Martin Buber, have attacked Heidegger's notion of Being as an anonymous Totality which reduces beings to the measure of its self-identical power.³⁸ Moreover, one of Lohner's three alternative translations for *Vermögen* was, as we noted, 'to command'. (His version runs as follows: 'When I speak of the "quiet power" [*kraft*] of the "possible" [I mean]. . . . Being itself, which in its loving potency [*Vermögen*] commands [*vermag*] thought and thus also the essence of man, which means in turn his relationship to Being.') Heidegger's hyphenated singularization of the term *Kraft*, meaning 'force', as a virtual synonym of *Vermögen* could be seen as further endorsing the 'power' signification of this term. It is not my intention, however, to assess the validity of the interpretation of Being as 'power'. Suffice it to say that the identification of Being with *Vermögen* can mean that Being is either a 'loving-possibilizing' or a 'power' which appropriates and commands, or even both at once. Indeed, it is just such an identity of Being as *both* 'possibility' and 'power' – which appropriates (*ereignen*) that which is most appropriate (*eignet*) and authentically proper (*eigentlich eigenst*) to beings – which emerges in Heidegger II's ultimate term for Being: *das Er-eignis*. *Vermögen* and *Ereignis* may both be translated as 'appropriation'.³⁹

In 'Time and being' (the projected third part of *Being and Time* which was rethought by Heidegger II and withheld from publication until 1969), the author renders the enigmatic '*esti gar einai*' of Parmenides as 'the possibility of Being'.⁴⁰ The *esti* here must, Heidegger states, be understood as the *es Gibt*, the giving of Being. The giving of Being is also, identically and simultaneously, a giving of time; and is not therefore to be confused with the metaphysical notion of Being as permanent presence. This reaffirmation of the identity of Being and time in this crucial late text shows how Heidegger II remains in direct continuity with Heidegger I's initial exhortation in *Being and Time* to think Being in terms of temporality which absences (into future and past) even as it presences (in the actual moment) rather than a metaphysics of simple substantified presence.⁴¹ As the giving of Being, *esti* is to be understood as that which 'is capable of Being' – the 'power' or 'possibility' of Being. The French translation here as *pouvoir-être* captures this double sense with felicitous ease. Being is thus identified as the 'possibility of Being' in the sense of 'that which *can be*'. And it is this very designation of Being as 'possibility of Being' which leads directly to Heidegger's celebrated definition of Being as *Ereignis* in this same work.

In a closely related text, 'The end of philosophy', Heidegger affirms that 'the end of philosophy is the place in which the whole of philosophy's history is gathered in its most ultimate possibility'.⁴² And he goes on to suggest that this 'ultimate possibility' is also the 'first possibility' from which all genuine thought originates. It is, in other words, an eschatological possibility which holds sway beyond *Dasein*'s power of determination,

'a possibility whose contour remains obscure, whose coming remains uncertain'.⁴³ It would seem that this 'ultimate possibility' is nothing other than the *Ereignis* of Being itself, the 'appropriation' of thought by Being whose final coming remains beyond our choice or control. Is this not what Heidegger is thinking of in the *Der Spiegel* interview when he declares that 'Only a god can save us now'?

Conclusion

Heidegger's complex thinking on the 'possible' represents a radical departure from traditional metaphysical theories on the subject. Whereas such theories tended to regard the 'possible' as a lack of presence or a mental re-presentation of presence, Heidegger proclaims it to be that which gives – i.e. possibilizes – all presence. No longer considered merely as a representational *possibilitas* of the subjective mind, or a *potentia* of objective reality, the possible (*das Möglich*) emerges as a 'loving power' which possibilizes all presence, be it represented or real. The possible, in short, is Being itself in so far as it gives and appropriates.

Whereas this identification of Being and the possible remains implicit in Heidegger I – where it is understood primarily in terms of the temporal horizon of human existence (i.e. as that 'onto which' *Dasein* projects itself in giving itself a world) – in Heidegger II the identification is clear and explicit. The 'turn' in Heidegger's thinking on the possible takes place, as we saw, in his *Letter on Humanism*. But more important perhaps than the internal development of Heidegger's thought on the possible is the degree to which his thought as a whole fulfils the programme of 'overcoming' metaphysics. This fulfilment is witnessed to a lesser degree in Heidegger I's threefold treatment of the 'possible' (*Möglichkeit*, *Seinkönnen* and *ermöglichen*) than in Heidegger II's identification of the possible with Being itself as *Vermögen* – and its cognates, *esti*, *es gibt* and *Ereignis*. But it is fair to say that in *both* Heideggers the 'possible' is thought of in a post-metaphysical fashion; that is, no longer as an accidental characteristic of the presence of beings, but rather as that temporality which is Being itself in its absencing-presencing, giving-withholding, loving-appropriating. May we not logically assume then that the task of overcoming metaphysics is nothing less than the task of thinking Being as possibility instead of simply as presence?

Part II: Heidegger and God

In the final part of this study I will outline some of the implications of Heidegger's rethinking of the possible for an understanding of the question of God.

The history of Western metaphysics is, for Heidegger, the history of

onto-theology. It is, in other words, an *epoche* where being manifests itself as the highest divine entity (*theos*) or the most general grounding entity (*on*). The list of onto-theological formulations of being as substantified presence include: the Platonic concept of *eidos* as timeless and immutable oneness; the Aristotelian concept of *telos* as self-thinking thought; the Augustinian concept of divine being as self-loving love (*amor quo deus se ipsum amat*); the Thomistic/Scholastic concept of divine being as permanent subsistence (*ipsum esse subsistens*); the Cartesian and Spinozist concept of the *res cogitans* as a self-sufficient substance echoing the divine self-causing cause (*ens causa sui*); or the modern rationalist concepts of objectivity (*Gegenwärtigung*), representation (*Repräsentanz*) and presence (*Vorhandenheit*).

Heidegger's project of overcoming metaphysics poses a challenge, as we saw above, to the traditional onto-theological priority of actuality over possibility. The implications of this for an alternative – i.e. post-metaphysical – understanding of God are radical. At its most basic, it implies that God is no longer to be thought of as some atemporal, static *esse* but rather as a temporalizing, empowering *posse*.

The God of onto-theology was a God devoid of possibility. As *sumмум ens*, *ultima ratio* or *causa prima et essendi*, God was precisely that being which needed no other being to fulfil it. Thomas Aquinas was quite explicit on this decisive point, as we noted above, writing in the *Summa I*, paras Q.3–4 that '*deus est actus purus non habens aliquid de potentialitate*'. Heidegger's impassioned response to this God of ontotheology is significant. 'Before such a God', he affirms,

man cannot pray or offer a sacrifice. It is not possible for men to kneel, sing or dance before the *causa sui*. Indeed, a thinking which has abandoned the notion of God as *causa sui* is perhaps more faithful and more open to the truly divine God than onto-theological metaphysics would like to admit.⁴⁴

Heidegger himself was reticent, for diverse reasons, to explore the possible consequences of the overcoming of the metaphysics of presence for a different thinking about God. His own reservations notwithstanding however, I shall briefly endeavour to suggest what some such consequences might entail. The post-metaphysical concept of God as *posse* I call the 'eschatological'.

First, it could be argued that the eschatological notion of *posse* better enables us to understand God according to the original scriptural notion of *kenosis*. Recalling Heidegger's own suggestive etymological linkage between the German terms *vermögen* (to possibilize) and *mögen* (to love), it would appear at least conceivable that the eschatological notion of God as possibilization approximates more accurately to the biblical

notion of divine *kenosis* (as self-emptying love) than to the ontological concept of a self-sufficient self-love. If divine love is that which grants the promise of a Kingdom to come, is it not more appropriate to interpret this love as *possibilizing* this Kingdom on earth – in giving itself to human beings as a possibility to be freely and creatively realized – rather than as a Kingdom already self-realized elsewhere irrespective of human freedom? Is the eschatological Kingdom not more true to its word as dialogical possibilization than as monological actualization? Indeed, is not such a view of things the only way to surmount the age-old onto-theological antinomy between divine omnipotence and human freedom? To understand God as *posse* – which I choose to render as *May-Be* – is to appreciate that we are entirely free to realize, or not to realize, the Kingdom possibilized by God. God's love is *kenosis* precisely because it is the gift of that which is most proper and precious to Christ – his life with the Father – in order to liberate his creatures by possibilizing a divine Kingdom in 'a new heaven and a new earth'.

Second, the eschatological interpretation of God as *posse* offers a way out of the traditional antinomy concerning the compatibility of God's goodness with the existence of evil. The historical scandal of theodicies and theocracies may be overcome if we acknowledge the *posse* as an ongoing dialogue between a divine love which possibilizes itself out of itself and a human *praxis* which strives to realize this possibilizing love. In this context, evil can now be understood as the consequence of the absence of such dialogue (in a revised form of the *privatio boni* argument). The evil in our world is not due to God but to us human beings to the extent that we refuse to realize the divine *posse* in our everyday existence. Evil results from our own unchecked expression of the will to dominate and possess (*libido dominandi*), from our closure to the gift of *other* possibilities of being from beyond ourselves. The eschatological God of the bible is not an Emperor of the World, as onto-theology proposed, but a 'voice crying in the wilderness', a voice which cannot be spoken until we hear it and speak for it.

Third, the eschatological concept of *posse* enables us to surmount another antinomy in the metaphysical understanding of God – namely, that he exists for himself and for others (*per se et per alio*) as a love of self and of others. Aristotle had no illusions about the onto-theological implications of the definition of God as Unmoved Mover. This meant that the Divine as pure actuality could motivate others to desire but could not itself desire others. The Divine *qua* self-thinking-thought is utterly without potentiality (*dunamis*) and so has no motivation in itself to seek actualization outside of itself. God is pure self-sufficient act. Anselm reiterates this onto-theological view when he defines God as *aseitas* – *a se esse*, a being unto himself. And Aquinas is working from a similar metaphysical framework when he concedes that '*necesse est*

quod deus primo et principaliter suam bonitatem et seipsum amet'. It was from just such a definition of God as self-loving love moreover that arose the substantialist notion of the Trinity as a *commercium* or *nexus amoris* in which Father, Son and Spirit exult in their self-regarding 'common possession' of each other. A far cry from the voice crying in the wilderness! The polar opposite of *kenosis*.

To understand God as kenotic *posse* is to see his love as a vulnerable and generous desire to be made fully incarnate in the eschatological kingdom – a kingdom possibilized by God but only realizable if and when we, human creatures, freely choose to respond to the divine call in word and action. Is this not the God of Abraham, Isaac and the Prophets whom Pascal contrasts with the God of the philosophers? Is this not a God before whom, in Heidegger's words, we could dance and kneel and pray – like David in the bible? Is this not the God who reveals himself, as Lévinas claims, in the naked and vulnerable face of the widow, orphan or famine victim – a God who created man because '*on est mieux à deux*'? Or whom Kierkegaard signalled when he wrote that 'Jesus Christ, even though he was one with the Father and the Spirit, still felt the need to love and be loved by man', adding 'If one denies this one can spiritualize God to the abstract point where he becomes cruelty itself'?

The eschatological God announced in the Old and New Testaments can now be recognized as a *deus adventurus* rather than a *deus absconditus* – as a God who *is not* but *may be*. Here is a God, in short, who negates and transcends all metaphysical conceptualizations of the divine in terms of a self-accomplished and self-adequate *esse* in order to reveal God as a *posse* whose Kingdom may yet come and whose will may yet be done on earth.

This brings us to the fourth and final point introduced by an eschatology of the possible – the relation of divine revelation to history. Traditional metaphysics could not convincingly account for the fact that God was at once timeless and temporal, at once transcendent of history and manifest in the world. In contradistinction to onto-theology, which tended to define God as a *nunc aeternum* residing outside of historical time, the post-metaphysical concept of *posse* suggests how God (as transcendent possibility) can give himself to human beings (as enactors of this possibility) through the adventure of history. The divine *posse* remains other not because it possesses an *esse* over and above the phenomenological being of our world. Its otherness takes the form of a radical transcendence of *possibility* which depends for its *actualization* on the historical actions of prophecy, covenant and salvation. The divine *posse* is not an 'other being' but an 'otherwise than being'. As Emmanuel Lévinas observes:

Man is indispensable to God's plan or, to be more exact, man is nothing other than the divine plans within being. . . . Man can do what he must do; he can master the hostile forces of history by helping to bring about a messianic reign, a reign of justice foretold by the prophets. The waiting for the Messiah marks the very duration of time.

(‘Judaism’ in *The Lévinas Reader*, ed. S. Hand (Blackwell, 1989), p. 252)

The God of transcendence revealed to us in the Bible is not the God of ontology (i.e. of the philosophers) but the God of eschatology (i.e. of Abraham, Isaac and the prophets). To rethink God according to the Heideggerian analogy of *Vermögen* is to recognize new options for appreciating the religious belief in a God who may be *at* the end, and *as* the end of history. It opens a way to understanding God not as a *topos* of being but as a *utopos* other than being.

While Heidegger does not explore these options himself, he does make it clear that any theological interpretations of his own philosophical deconstructions of metaphysics – such as the metaphysical concept of the possible – must observe the critical procedures of an analogy of proper proportionality. This means that instead of grafting God directly onto being, or rather a deconstructive re-thinking of being, we must observe the hermeneutic difference between the presuppositions of religious faith and revelation, on the one hand, and the philosophical questioning of being, on the other. The analogy of proper proportionality recommended by Heidegger reads as follows: *Dasein* is to *Sein* what the religious thinker is to God. So that what we are exploring in the concluding section of this study is not – if we are to be true to Heidegger – an identification of God and Being as *Vermögen/Posse* but rather a properly proportionate analogizing of two parallel post-metaphysical concepts of the possible: the one as applied to being, the other as applied to God. And such analogies inevitably carry differences as well as similarities.

If being as *Vermögen* discloses itself to *Dasein* as a wonder that things exist (*thaumazein*), a care for being (*Sorge*) and a questioning of being (*Seinsfrage*), the eschatological *posse* reveals itself to believers as a call to faith and to ethical *praxis*. Heidegger's notion of *Vermögen* as a ‘possibilizing love’ which cares for (*sorgen*) and watches over (*wahren*) the *topos* of being is, we have been suggesting, closely analogous to the eschatological notion of ‘possibilizing love’ as kenotic charity. However, the love of being is very much a guarding over beings in their topological being-there as things of the world; whereas the eschatological love of God is strictly (or at least scripturally) speaking *not* ‘of this world’. As Heidegger explains in the *Letter on Humanism*: ‘*Etwas vermögen bedeutet hier: es in seinem wesen wahren*’. Indeed, even when we are dealing with

the guarding over of what Heidegger calls a 'sacred' place – e.g. a temple, shrine, cathedral, holy mountain – we are, from an ontological point of view, dealing with one of the fourfold divisions of being (the sacred, mortals, sky and earth), and not with the revelation of a divine kenotic love *per se*. The latter implies an act of faith which reads the sacred in terms of eschatological revelation. So that it would seem fair to say that the phenomenological disclosure of the sacred serves as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the eschatological revelation of God.

A phenomenology of sacred places, rituals or symbols – as practised by the later Heidegger or Eliade for example – can teach us about the ways in which the divine manifests itself in and through the phenomenological horizon of our being-in-the-world. The eschatological *posse*, by contrast, while revealing itself phenomenologically through sacred places, rituals and symbols remains radically transcendent and other. For a phenomenology of the sacred, Christ and Apollo are brothers. And it is only if or when we adopt a hermeneutic of faith that we privilege one of these – e.g. the privileging of Christ in the Christian hermeneutic – as a unique incarnation of the eschatological *posse*. In this example, the God of Christian faith is not identical with a phenomenological concept of the sacred which is by definition polytheistic. For although the Christian God does, of course, reveal itself through icons of incarnation – ranging from the prophets and Christ to the saints, holy scripture and other places and objects of worship – it does so in a way that bears witness to a radical distance between the divine Other as vertical possibilization and being as a finite horizontal possibilization (*Vermögen*). This significant disparity between the infinite otherness of eschatological divinity and the finite being-there of the phenomenologically sacred is keenly preserved by the analogy of proper proportionality which enables us to both compare and contrast these two orders of possibilization. And the difference is ultimately a matter of belief.

Let us tease out some consequences of this difference. As that which *may be* the eschatological *posse* is also that which *should be*. Or to put it another way, while the ontological *posse* expresses itself as a *sein-können*, or capacity to be, the eschatological *posse* reveals itself as a *seinsollen*, or duty to be. It is this ethical exigency of the divine *posse* which Dostoyevsky alludes to when he declares that if God is dead all is permitted. From the point of view of an ontology of *Vermögen*, all is permitted. But this does not mean that ontology is immoral. It simply means that it is a-moral, or if one prefers, non-moral. Heidegger's fundamental ontology attempts to surpass the metaphysical framework which, since Plato, identified being and the good. Unlike Platonism which defined the highest Idea as the *Agathon*, or Thomism which declared that *ens et bonum convertuntur*, Heidegger affirms that the questioning

of being is a strictly phenomenological activity which describes beings as they appear, as phenomena – without judging morally as to whether they should or should not appear. Genuine ontology, Heidegger insists, is phenomenological description not ethical prescription. And he is equally reticent and non-committal with respect to theology, making no claims about which manifestations of the holy are true or false (e.g. as appearances of one true God).

This does not mean that Heidegger is either anti-ethical or anti-religious. It is simply a matter of recognizing the gap separating a phenomenology of finite being from an ethico-religious concern with that which is transcendent *vis-à-vis* the phenomenological horizon of Dasein's historicity. Heidegger is not concerned with God's existence or inexistence but with his phenomenological absence or presence. He does not deny the possibility of a transcendent deity; he merely acknowledges that such questions surpass the finite limits of a phenomenological ontology. And this is in keeping with Heidegger's admission to Herman Noack in 1954 that the divine which he invoked in the *Letter on Humanism* is the divine of poetic experience (e.g. of Hölderlin and Rilke) rather than the God of biblical revelation *per se*.

Where Heidegger and the poets speak of the contemporary 'lack' or 'absence' of the gods as a phenomenological event in the history of being, an eschatology of the possible might read this absence as a lack of human fidelity to the ethical exigencies of the New and Old Testaments – e.g. as a moral failure to realize the divine *posse* of social justice. Eschatologically viewed, the promised return of God is not just something which *may* happen but *must* happen, something believers have an ethical duty to bring about in this world through their historical actions. Heidegger's ontological approach to the return of the divine – as in the *Der Spiegel* claim that 'only a God can save us now' – has no such connotations of moral exigency. It is a *warten* rather than an *erwarten*, a will-less waiting rather than an urgent expectancy or hope for the coming of a kingdom which impells us to moral and social action. The ontological *Vermögen*, unlike the eschatological *posse*, does not depend on human intervention for its advent or return. The *Ereignis* of being *can be* independently of human action because it is, by Heidegger's own admission, a 'decree of being itself'. But the eschaton of God, by contrast, *may be* realized in history only if and when humans respond to the ethical call of revelation.

Whereas being and God can both be analogously described in terms of Heidegger's notion of 'loving possible' (*vermögend-mögende*), there are notable differences to be respected. And the most important of these may be expressed, in resumé, as follows: the eschatological view of the possible departs from the ontological in viewing mortals as beings who

transcend being toward what is other than being, towards the eschatological possibility of a kingdom yet to come.

Notes

1 Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Max Verlag, Tübingen, 1927), translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1962). Henceforth the German shall be referred to as *SZ* and the English as *BT*. The statement concerning the primacy of possibility is to be found in *BT*, 63; *SZ*, 38.

2 *BT* sections 25–38, especially 32.

3 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 9.8.1059.

4 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I pars. qu. 3, a. 4, c. Thus as the Supreme Being, God (*Summum Ens*) becomes an omnipresence (*Omnipraesentia*) in all beings in so far as He is the cause of their Being (*causa essendi*); *STh*, I, 8, a. 3. For a full development of Heidegger's critique of the scholastic notion of God as metaphysical presence, see his *Identität und Differenz* (1957). For most comprehensive commentaries on the subject see B. Welte, *La Métaphysique de St. Thomas d'Aquin et la Pensée de l'Etre chez Heidegger* (RSPT, Oct. 1966) and Bertrand Rioux, *l'Etre et la Vérité chez Heidegger et St. Thomas d'Aquin* (PUF, Paris, 1963). We should also add that even though Aquinas and the transcendental Thomists of today – Rahner, Lonergan etc. – consider man as a being who transcends himself in quest of an always more absolute knowledge, they still continue to understand man primarily as a *substance*, whose being, even as it transcends itself, remains a permanently identical presence. Furthermore, even such metaphysicians acknowledge a role for possibility or potency in their notion of knowledge as conative and transcending, they ultimately subordinate this possibility to the final presence which is achieved when the knower reaches what is known, i.e. Aristotle's *Noesis Noeseos* or the Thomist notion of absolute knowledge as an absolute identity and transparency of Being to itself. It is only with Descartes and the German Idealists that man is explicitly defined as a substance which is a 'self-presence'. It must be admitted that in points of detail, Heidegger's critique of the metaphysics of presence and substance leaves much to be desired. But the overall intention of his critique is clear enough.

5 *SZ*, 42f., 143–5, 188, 248f., 259.

6 We do not wish to make any claims here for the unconditional validity of Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's notion of time in book *V* of the *Physics*. Nor is it sure that all subsequent theories of time follow this interpretation. Augustine's understanding of time in *Confessions*, *XI*, would certainly seem to be an exception. But our purpose here is not so much to dispute the validity of Heidegger's interpretation as to state it; see note 41 below.

7 All of these metaphysical words for Being as presence share the common character of 'permanent subsistence' (*character des Ständige verbleibs*) such that the Being of a being is considered to be 'that which it always is', i.e., its subsistence in permanence. This is why in *BT* truth is no longer defined in terms of Being as 'permanent-subsistence' (*das Vorhandene*) but on the basis of the temporality of *Dasein* (i.e. as revelation and openness (*Erschlossenheit*)). For best examples of Heidegger's discussion of the priority of Being as presence *vis-à-vis* Being as possibility in the history of metaphysics see his *Die Physik Bei Aristoteles* (1958) and *Entwurf zur Geschichte des Seins als Metaphysik*, 458–80 (*Nietzsche*, Vol. II). As a good secondary source see Ysabel de Andia's *Présence*

et Eschatologie dans la Pensée de Heidegger (Editions Universitaires, 1975) particularly 150–90.

8 *BT* 271f.

9 *SZ* existentiell possibilities, 267; factual possibilities, 264; logical possibilities, 143; ontical possibilities, 312.

10 *BT* 250.

11 To express this idea Heidegger calls death the ultimate end (*Umwillen/Umzu* and *Wofur*) of all our possibilities, *ibid.* 93f, 109, 467.

12 On rapport between *Verstehen* and *Seinkönnen*, see *BT* sections 58, 68a, 73.

13 On authentic and inauthentic 'potentiality-for-Being' see *SZ* 233–5, 267–302. On three modes of inauthentic 'potentiality-for-Being' see: *SZ* existentiell, 260; factual, 341; ontical, 260.

14 The only critics to have stressed the importance of this distinction are, to my knowledge, the translators themselves, Macquarrie and Robinson, in a note 558, *BT*.

15 *SZ* 263, 268.

16 *ibid.* 263.

17 *ibid.* 267–8.

18 *ibid.* 267–9, 273–5, 298, 312.

19 *ibid.* 267.

20 *ibid.* 264: 'Die gewisse *Möglichkeit* des todes erschliesst das Dasein aber als *Möglichkeit* nur so, dass es vorlaufend zu ihr diese *Möglichkeit* als eigenstens *Seinkönnen* für sich ermöglicht.'

21 *SZ* 324; *BT* 271 – Macquarrie and Robinson offer the following translation here: 'To lay bare the upon which of a projection, amounts to disclosing that which *makes possible* what has been projected.' The translators' choice here of the second possibility of understanding this phrase is in line with my suggestion that the general movement of the approach to the possible in *BT* is progressively away from a metaphysical interpretation which would see the possible as a dimension (*protentia* or *possibilitas*) contained in the Being of man or things, towards a post-metaphysical interpretation (i.e. of fundamental ontology) which would see possibility as a dimension emerging towards man and things from that Being as Being (*Sein als Sein/Sein Uberhaupt*) which renders both man and things possible in the first place. Of course, Being cannot be understood here as residing in some Platonic otherworld before it comes to us; it is not *separate* from man and things but it is *different*: see the famous 'ontological difference' in *Identität und Differenz* (1957).

22 *BT* 371.

23 *ibid.* section 71, 423.

24 See *Was ist Metaphysik?* (1943 edition): 'Das Sein wohl west ohne das Seiende, niemals aber ein Seiendes ist ohne das Sein.' In *Identität und Differenz* (1957) develops this notion of the ontological difference between Being and being (or man as the highest form of being) at great length.

25 *BT* 446; *SZ* 394.

26 *BT* 488; *SZ* 437. We must point out here that there is nearly always an ambiguity in this work as to whether Being refers to the Being of Dasein or Being itself (as *Sein Uberhaupt*) or both at once!

27 See p. 85 in the English translation by William Lovitt, entitled *The Word of Nietzsche*, printed in the collection of Heidegger essays, *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays* (Harper and Row, 1977).

28 *ibid.* 85.

29 Translated by James Churchill as *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (Indiana University Press, 1962).

30 *ibid.* 120f, 141f, 161f.

31 *ibid.* sections 34, 39–45, in particular p. 251: ‘Kant’s laying of the foundation of metaphysics, which for the first time subjects the internal possibility of the overtness of the Being of the essent to a decisive examination, must necessarily encounter time as the basic determination of finite transcendence, if indeed, it is true that the comprehension of Being in Dasein spontaneously projects Being on time.’

32 *ibid.* 252: ‘If the essence of transcendence is based on pure imagination, i.e., originally on time, then the idea of a “transcendental logic” becomes non-sensical, especially if, contrary to Kant’s original intention, it is treated as an autonomous and absolute discipline. Kant must have had an intimation of this collapse of the primacy of logic in metaphysics when, speaking of the fundamental characteristics of Being, “possibility” (what-being) and “reality” (which Kant termed “existence”), he said: “So long as the definition of possibility, existence and necessity is sought solely in pure understanding, they cannot be explained save through an obvious tautology”. And yet, in the second edition of the *Critique* did not Kant re-establish the supremacy of the understanding? And as a result did not metaphysics with Hegel, come to be identified with “logic” more radically than ever before?’

33 Heidegger himself makes this point in his conclusion to part 3 of this work, *ibid.* 207: ‘It is true that in order to wrest from the actual words that which these words “intend to say”, every interpretation must necessarily resort to violence. This violence, however, should not be confused with an action that is wholly arbitrary. The interpretation must be animated and guided by the power of an illuminative idea. Only through the power of this idea can an interpretation risk that which is always audacious, namely, entrusting itself to the secret élan of a work, in order by this élan to get through to the unsaid and attempt to find an expression for it. The directive idea itself is confirmed by its own power of illumination.’ In the light of this claim we can perhaps understand, if not necessarily agree with, Ernst Cassirer’s description of Heidegger’s interpretation as ‘a usurpation of the text rather than a commentary’ – ‘Bemerkungen zu Martin Heideggers Kant-Interpretation’, *Kant Studien*, xxxvi, No. 1/2 (1931) 17. To further appreciate the singular nature of this reading we must recall Heidegger’s acknowledgement in the preface to this book on Kant, that this entire study was originally intended as a section of the projected part 2 of *BT*, to be entitled: ‘The fundamental characteristics of a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology under the guidance of the problematic of temporality.’

34 English translation by Edgar Lohner entitled *Letter on Humanism*, and published in *Phenomenology and Existentialism* (ed. R. Zaner and D. Ihde, Capricorn Books, NY, 1973) 147–81. I have made one important alteration in the Lohner translation (*ibid.* 150) in rendering ‘*Vermögen*’ as ‘possibilizing’ rather than ‘commanding’. Literally, *Vermögen* means to be able or to enable, i.e., to be or to make possible. Lohner’s rendition as ‘command’ as well as ‘potentiality’ and ‘is capable of’ – without an indication that it is the same word *Vermögen* which is being translated – makes little sense out of the German original. As this is the most crucial text in our commentary I cite the original passage in its entirety: *Das Denken ist – dies sagt: das Sein hat sich je geschicklich seines Wesens Angenommen. Sich einer ‘Sache’ oder einer ‘Person’ in ihrem Wesen annehmen, das heisst: sie lieben: sie mögen. Dies Mögen bedeutet, ursprünglicher gedacht: das Wesen schenken. Solches Mögen ist das eigentliche Wesen des Vermögens,*

dans nicht nur dieses oder jenes leisten, sondern etwas in seiner Herkunft 'wesen', das heisst sein lassen kann. Das Vermögen des Mögens ist es, 'kraft' dessen etwas eigentlich zu sein vermag. Dieses Vermögen ist das eigentlich 'Mögliche', jenes, dessen Wesen im Mögen beruht. Aus diesem Mögen vermag das Sein das Denken, Jenes ermöglicht dieses. Das Sein als das Vermögend-Mögende ist das 'Mög-liche'. Das Sein als das Element ist die 'stille Kraft' des mögenden Vermögens, das heisst des Möglichen. Unsere Wörter 'möglich' und 'Möglich' und 'Möglichkeit' werden freilich unter der Herrschaft der 'Logik' und 'Metaphysik' nur gedacht im Unterschied zu 'Wirklichkeit', das heisst aus einer bestimmten – der metaphysischen – Interpretation des Seins als *actus* und *potentia*, welche Unterscheidung identifiziert wird mit der von *existentia* und *essentia*, Wenn ich von der 'stillen Kraft des Möglichen' spreche, meine ich nicht das *possibile* einer nur vorgestellten *possibilitas*, nicht die *potentia* als *essentia* eines *actus* der *existentia*, sondern das Sein selbst, das mögend über das Denken und so über das Wesen des Menschen und das heisst über dessen Bezug zum Sein vermag. Etwas vermögen bedeutet hier: es in seinem Wesen wahren, in seinem Element einbehalten.

The identification of *vermögen* and *wahren* in this last sentence is very significant, for Heidegger sees *Wahren* (to guard or care for) as the root meaning of *wahrheit* (truth). Thus we see how easily Heidegger was able to identify 'possibilizing' as the 'truth of Being' (and later as *es gibt, esti, Ereignis*).

35 In fact, the two Beings in question here refer to the *Same* Being but differ in the way we think about this Being, i.e., as it reveals itself to man or as it is in itself. This duplicity in our thinking about Being is what Heidegger, in his later writings, referred to as the 'Januscope' (i.e., the double-glance).

36 Here I offer my own translation. The original German reads, as above: '*Das Vermögen des Mögens ist es "Kraft" dessen etwas eigentlich zu sein vermag. Dieses Vermögen ist das eigentlich "Mögliche", jenes, dessen Wesen im Mögen beruht.*' For Lohner's inadequate translation see *op. cit.* 150.

37 The original reads, as above: '*Das Denken ist, sich einer "Sache" oder einer "person" in Wesen annehmen, das heisst: sie lieben: sie mögen.*' For Lohner's translation see *op. cit.*, 151–2.

38 See Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totalité et Infini* (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1961): *Autrement qu'être* (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1974) and Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man* (trans. R. Smith, Fontana, 1947) 119–20.

39 The standard English translation of *Ereignis* is 'Appropriation', see Joan Stambaugh's translation of *Zeit un Sein* in *On Time and Being* (Harper and Row, 1972) 19–24. We must not overlook the significance of the fact that just as *Vermögen* can refer to wealth or power in the sense of 'property', so too *Ereignis* carries this sense of 'appropriation' as 'possession' or 'property' (as its etymological rapport with *Eigen-tum* suggests also). See Heidegger's play on this meaning in the following sentences from *On Time and Being*, for example, 22: 'Being proves to be destiny's gift of presence, the gift granted by the giving of time. The gift of presence is the property of appropriating'. ('Presence' here – *Answering* – is not to be confused with 'presence' in its metaphysical determinations – *ousia*, *substantia*, *actualitas*, *Vorhandenheit* – discussed earlier!). Or again 23: 'Because Being and Time are there only in appropriating [*Ereignis*], appropriating has the peculiar property of bringing man into his own [*eigenst*] as the being who perceives Being by standing within true [*eigentlich*] time. Thus appropriated, man belongs to appropriation.' As Heidegger goes on to say, to the extent that man is 'appropriated' and 'assimilated' by Being he is to be considered its 'belonging', as its property: that which is most proper to it.

40 See Stambaugh's translation, *op. cit.* 8.

41 This essential link between 'possibility' on the one hand, and 'Being-understood-as-time-which-absences-as-it-presences' (i.e. as *Es gibt, Esti, Ereignis*) on the other, is clearly manifest in the following passages from a letter which Heidegger wrote to a young student called Buchner in 1950 (printed pp. 183–6 of *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. A. Hofstadter, Harper and Row, 1971): 'Being is in no way identical with reality or with a precisely determined actuality (i.e. simple, substantified presence). Nor is Being in any way opposed to being-no-longer and being-not-yet, these two belong themselves to the essential nature of Being. Even metaphysics already had, to a certain extent, an intimation of this fact in its doctrine of the modalities – which, to be sure, has hardly been understood, according to which possibility belongs to Being just as much as do actuality and necessity'. (. . .) 'The default of god and the divinitas is absence, but absence is not nothing; rather it is precisely the coming-into-presence [*Anwesen*], which must first be appropriated [*ereignen*], of the hidden fullness and wealth of what has been and what, thus gathered, is presencing [*anwesende*] of the divine in the world of the Greeks, in prophetic Judaism, in the preaching of Jesus. This no-longer is itself a not-yet of the veiled coming-appropriation [*Ereignis*] of its inexhaustible nature. Since Being is never the merely precisely actual, to guard Being is vigilance, watchfulness for the has-been and future destiny of Being. (. . .) The step back from the representational thinking of metaphysics . . . is necessarily part of thinking the thing, a thinking that thinks about the *possible advent* [*Ereignis mögliche*] of world.' Once again we stress that this notion of Being as an absence which presences (*Anwesen–Abwesen/Abwesen–Anwesende*) is not to be confused with the metaphysical notion of presence as something actual or actualized, as re-presentation or, in its highest form, as some eternal presence (*Ipsum Esse subsistens* or *Nunc Aeternans*). This 'overcoming' of the notion of presence as enduring substance in favour of a notion of 'presencing' (*Anwesen*) as a possibilizing (*Vermögen*) which presences as it absences, is what we have tried to highlight in this article. We have avoided using the presence-presencing contrast because in English this double-use of the same term 'presence' loses the sharp distinction of the German where two *different* terms are always used, i.e., *Vorhandenheit* (*ousia, substantia, actualitas*, etc.) on the one hand, and *Anwesen* on the other. The presence–possibility contrast expresses this difference very clearly, even in English.

42 This text was originally presented for Jean Beaufret's *Kierkegaard Vivant* (Gallimard, Paris, 1964) 164f. It appears as a complementary text to *On Time and Being* in Staumbaugh's translation of this text, *ibid.* 54.

43 *ibid.* 59–60.

44 For this and subsequent references in this final section see my earlier version of this argument, 'Heidegger, le possible et Dieu' in *Heidegger et la Question de Dieu* (ed. R. Kearney and J. S. O'Leary), Gallimard, Paris, 1980, 125–68.

Heidegger and the new images of science

Theodore Kisiel

Heidegger and science? To some, the combination undoubtedly still sounds strange and unlikely, let alone fruitful and worthy of extended consideration. What could we possibly expect to learn about the inner workings of science from a thinker singularly and almost monotonously concerned with the time-honored and now grandiose question of Being? In the words of one astute commentator: 'On the longest day he ever lived, Heidegger could never be called a philosopher of science.'¹ And yet, those intimately acquainted with Heidegger's entire career can easily point to just such a day, and it must have been a long day indeed. For on July 27, 1915, the young Dr Heidegger (age 25) held his inaugural lecture before the philosophical faculty at the University of Freiburg in order to obtain his *venia legendi*, the privilege to teach in the German university system, conceiving the lecture precisely as a logical-epistemological examination of the concept of time in natural science and in historical science.²

True. But after all, it must also be granted that this was long before Heidegger became *Heidegger*, by achieving international notoriety as a philosopher of existence practically overnight in 1927 with the publication of *Being and Time*. And *Being and Time* is manifestly a philosophy of being and existence and not a philosophy of science. But the examination of existential phenomena in this *magnum opus* also includes reflections on an existential conception of science, distinct from his earlier logical conception, with a promise of a thorough-going interpretation of science as a positive mode of existence to be incorporated in the as-yet-unpublished³ Third Division of the First Part of the project. Instead, science appears in a less positive light in the Second Part of the Heideggerian project, the part entitled 'the phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology' and later elaborated under the rubric of 'overcoming metaphysics'. This third approach to science can be labelled the 'metaphysical'

or 'epochal' conception of science, inasmuch as modern science is seen as a terminal epoch in the long history of metaphysics now coming to its end in the planetary dominion of technology. Note that metaphysics here does not refer to an abstract academic discipline but rather to the prevailing presuppositions and concrete interpretation of reality which uniquely stamp an age, for example, in the institutions and attitudes which that age accepts as a matter of course. In this vein, Heidegger's latest statements – two letters to conferences on his thought in this country and the interview on German television on the occasion of his 80th birthday⁴ – make it clear that the present concretion of the question of Being is nothing less than the question of science and technology, insofar as the institutions and the attitudes they have provoked permeate the fabric of 20th century existence and thus indelibly mark the way we now live, move and have our being. In short, the question of Being now reads: What does it mean to be in a scientific-technological age?

Science and Being? The juxtaposition sounds even more ambitious and diffuse than the thematic combination Science and Society, to which increasing attention is being devoted by a number of disciplines, including the philosophy of science. Indeed, it is difficult to think of a reflection on science more far-reaching than Heidegger's, for whom science and technology are the culmination and fulfillment of the destiny of several millenia of Western philosophy. Moreover, inasmuch as they are taken to be the mortal gasps of a tradition of metaphysics which Heidegger is striving to overcome, science and technology appear in such a negative light that some have accused Heidegger of being a reactionary romantic and even a neo-Luddite. Recall his most notorious pronouncement in this vein: 'Science itself does not think.'⁵ The adversary relationship which has over the decades developed between Heidegger and more scientifically-oriented philosophers perhaps finds its epitome in Rudolf Carnap's debunking of what he considers to be Heidegger's 'pseudo-statements', statements like 'Nothing itself nothings', which have become the stock examples of meaningless metaphysical statements still circulating in neo-positivist circles. Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that Carnap's critique, which appeared in the journal *Erkenntnis* in 1913, is entitled 'Overcoming of metaphysics through logical analysis of language',⁶ antedating by several years Heidegger's own adoption of the phrase 'Overcoming of metaphysics'.

Heidegger's response to such critiques is characteristically sweeping. For him, the linguistic standards of clarity, formal exactness and univocity adopted by logical positivism find their natural place in the history of metaphysics in the spirit of modernity, in which (1) truth is certainty, (2) reality is objectivity, and (3) rationality finds its model in a *mathesis universalis*.⁷ And when Heidegger asserts that science does not think, he is in fact referring to the positivistic image of science, in which logic and

scientific method reign supreme over scientific content, where even the certifications of confirmation are made subservient to the so-called hypothetico-deductive method. Heidegger thus seems to make unholy alliance with his worst enemies, the positivists, in accepting their image as the ultimate upshot of modern science.

His broad historical perspective thus devolves upon an image of science oriented towards logic and the positive fact, which from the perspective of contemporary philosophy of science is now considered to be far too narrow. For the last decade or so has witnessed an anti-positivist revolt of major proportions in the philosophy of science which has challenged the positivist image of science on each of the three scores named above and, moreover, has shifted the locus of the essence of science in a direction which appears quite amenable to the direction suggested by Heidegger's existential conception of science.⁸ Instead of a logical analysis of the theoretical products of science, the new philosophies of science rely more heavily on historical case studies of the actual process of science. As a result of this shift in approach, Anglo-American philosophy now definitively reflects a wholesale overhaul of the positivistic treatment of science in terms of idealized formal systems mapping empirical data. The more historical image now views science as ongoing *research* in a changing *problem-situation* which is *interpreted* and resolved according to the resources of a particular *historical* and *conceptual context*.

By way of an initial guide to what follows, permit me to underscore once again the operative terms of this new image of science and to suggest in advance the different view of truth, objectivity and rationality which this new image implies. Note first that it does not particularly mention 'theory', 'fact', or 'method', which stood in the forefront of the positivistic image. The operative dimensions are rather (1) research or discovery, (2) the interrogative mood of a problem-situation, (3) the process of interpretation in a finite context, (4) which is a conceptual context or, more directly and simply put, a language. Finally, all of these dimensions are essentially pervaded by historical movement. Accordingly, the emphasis falls on the *dynamis* of truth *in via* rather than the *stasis* of truth once and for all, and on the holistic context rather than on an atomic objectivity. Consideration of the contextual process rather than the finished results of science suggests a more pragmatic and less syntactic and formal rationality, and, in view of the priority of the interrogative mood over the declarative mood, a more chiaroscuro and less clear and distinct rationality, more a finite sense of truth rather than the security of eternal verities.

One is immediately reminded here of Heidegger's efforts to shift the locus of truth from the proposition to the existentially rooted question, in order to view the finalization of truth against the background of the origin of truth, a background which Heidegger considers to be the more

original truth. The same reversal of orientation is strikingly evident in the new philosophies of science. By tracing the termination of the scientific process, finalized in the form of theoretical and observational statements, back to its most obscure origins in the problem-situation, the new approaches bring out the inseparable unity and reciprocal interplay of the 'context of justification' with the 'context of discovery' to the point of insisting that judicative verification must serve the interrogative demands of discovery. This reversal of the positivist stress on the truth of verification tends to be borne out by the culture of science as it is manifested in the attitudes of scientists, who are trained and conditioned to seek new discoveries, whose professional prestige hinges on just such inventiveness, who compete vehemently to be the first to solve the most current problems of their fields, who thus become involved in the numerous bitter disputes over the priority and independence of their discoveries. And nowhere is it more evident how truncated the positivists' image was than in their attitude to the problem of scientific discovery, which they systematically excluded from any consideration whatsoever by the strategy of relegating it to the 'waste basket' of 'mere' psychology. According to this positivist view, discovery is a matter of intuition, strokes of genius, the workings of the unconscious and other such imponderables and therefore not a fit subject for logical minds. This most important dimension of scientific activity was thus left unexplained and accordingly left to the raconteurs of those fascinating and at once obfuscating anecdotes of discoveries made as if by 'accident', and of illuminations that come from a magical 'nowhere': Archimedes' bath, Newton's apple, Kekulé's dream of the dancing serpents, Poincaré's step onto an omnibus, to name only some of the better-known. A narrow area of methodological rationality populated by secure results is thus sharply demarcated from a vast enveloping jungle constituting the irrationality of creativity, which is unceremoniously dispatched to the limbo of the non-science of science.

Even the narrow realm of logically secured results, demarcated as science proper by positivism, soon proved to be a paper-thin substitute for the thick situation in which science actually takes place. The bifocal view of positivism stratifies the structure of science into a formal calculus governed by the stable laws of logic over against an independent world of fixed observations. Science proper is thus made to move in a split-level universe defined by the eternal poles of logic and fact. The time-honored metaphysical quest for stability and security thus reasserts itself in the world of science as portrayed by positivism, in spite of its loudly professed anti-metaphysical stance, now in the modern guise of a methodological subject coupling with an empirical object. Despite its reputed anti-metaphysical stance, positivism betrays its metaphysical vestiges by proclaiming both poles of its universe to be uncorrupted by becoming

and change. In more epistemological terms, both formal and empirical levels are viewed as essentially uninterpreted, and interpretation becomes the act of the match maker who couples two virgins and brings them into a state of cohabitation. This is officiously executed by means of so-called 'correspondence rules', 'coordinating definitions', 'bridge principles', or 'rules of interpretation'. Feigl's description of this scientific situation is particularly graphic: The postulate system of the formal calculus is like a free-floating balloon hovering over the earth of empirical facts, which must be anchored to the soil of experience and filled with empirical meaning by means of connecting tubes, which permit an 'upward seepage of the empirical juice' of observational meaning to be pumped into the unvisualizable theoretical terms, thereby investing them with a partial interpretation. Interpretation is thus a matter of filling the theoretical forms of a parade of blimps by a one-way capillary pumping action skyward from the earth. This has come to be known as the Capillary Model of meaning and interpretation.⁹

In order to develop this theory of interpretation and meaning, the efforts of the logical positivists inevitably turned to linguistic reform. In the spirit of clarity and distinction aimed at expunging all vestiges of metaphysical obfuscation from the language of science, they sought to extricate from ordinary language two very non-ordinary languages, (1) an ideal language purified according to the demands of mathematical logic and (2) a neutral observation language based on the ontology of phenomenism. But decades of effort have not yielded anything like a satisfactorily neutral observation language and it soon became apparent that only a small part of science in its most advanced theoretical efforts even approached the high degree of formality demanded by mathematical logic. Recently, not only the possibility but even the desirability of these linguistic reforms for the philosophy of science have been challenged by old-timers like Carl Hempel as well as by the new upstarts, on the grounds that they constitute a ruthless abstraction from the complex reality of scientific theorizing, in which observation is *always already* theory-laden and formal algorithms are always '*already* rich with meaning, charged with structural representations of phenomena'.¹⁰ The two extremes which positivism sought to purify out of scientific practice are *in practice* never so pristine pure, but have all along been co-habiting on the sly, in an alliance which is not only not unholy but in fact the very source of the fertility of science. To separate the two extremes and to attempt to 'purify' them only serves to remove science from the profound and comprehensive reality with which it has come in contact in its formulations. Purification would mean sterilization. Science finds its proper element not in the thin clarity of extremes sifted out by the misplaced discreteness of logical positivism but in the already interpreted, conceptually organized context cultivated for science by a historical

tradition which has been transmitted to it largely in and through the usages of ordinary language, in which theory and observation already correspond with one another in the reality about which they speak.

Explicit and formalized rules of correspondence are accordingly by and large unnecessary in scientific theorizing. It is therefore not surprising that they have been notoriously difficult to pinpoint. Instead of explicit rules bridging the chasm between formal and empirical levels, actual practice suggests more of a tacit process of mutual interpretation of a theory by its particulars and of particulars by their comprehensive theory in terms of the cues of the problem-situation to which they are addressed. The process can be described in terms of what the philological tradition has called the 'hermeneutic circle', which cannot be construed as a vicious circle because it is ultimately not only logical but also and primarily ontological. For the spiral movement thus generated incessantly wends its way down toward the non-verbal frontiers of a verbally structured problem-situation, which in turn is *always already* understood according to the usages of ordinary language as well as being invested with the meanings developed by the tradition of the discipline in question. Ordinary language as well as scientific language thus always articulates the problem-situation, and solving the problem involves the ability to see the scientific linguistics of the problem *in* and *through* the ordinary language in which it is always couched. Recall the famous example of Eddington's elephant, a problem which is expeditiously solved if one knows how to translate it into the terms of the standard inclined-plane problem of physics. Viewed in this way, interpretation now is the direct perception of family resemblances between problem-situations, one already solved and the other in need of solution, without the aid of intermediate correspondence rules. If the function of correspondence rules is to correlate scientific expressions with nature, then this function is now served by these exemplar problem-solutions which one finds at the end of chapters in physics and chemistry books. One does not master his science until he 'gets the knack' of how to use and apply these prototype problem-solutions,¹¹ which are notably expressed in the language of models and metaphors, of waves, particles, hydraulic models for the flow of electric current, and the like.

This dimension of scientific language, which was forced to the periphery by positivism and downgraded to a 'mere' heuristic function, now comes to the fore in the new image of science and emerges front and center as the operative language in interpretation and discovery. In the words of Heidegger, one might accordingly say that the new image of science assumes 'a transformed relation to the essence of language'. For the operative language is now viewed as a cultural storehouse of metaphors latent with untold possibilities for adaptation to the shifting demands of the changing problematic of science. The leading edge of

scientific change is now situated in the interaction of the old language with a new situation which evokes surprising aspects from the old language not previously seen in it. The metaphoric shift ensuing from the translation of the scientific language from one problem-situation to another may at times shift the very bases of a scientific discipline, by making a hitherto peripheral metaphor into a root metaphor and thus reweaving the fabric of fundamental concepts of the scientific domain, producing as it were a re-edition of the Book of Nature. This ability of language to adapt to the changing demands of the scientific problematic constitutes a more diachronic sense of scientific rationality as compared to the synchronic concern for the form and validity of finished logical systems. This new notion of scientific rationality sees change and rationality as not only not incompatible but in fact essential to one another. In the face of a historically changing world, the most rational thing to do is to change with it.

Instead of the hermeneutic model, which focuses on the dynamics of the linguistic change which takes place in interpretation, an evolutionary model of 'variation and selective perpetuation' of concepts and hypotheses is more commonly used among philosophers of science to comprehend the rationality of scientific change. Thus, Toulmin speaks of the 'ecological demands' of an 'intellectual environment' imposing a 'selective pressure' on the available pool of conceptual variants in order to filter out the most adaptable for perpetuation.¹² In a similar vein, the hermeneutic model underscores the importance of sensitivity to contextual determinants as guides to the appropriate interpretation of texts. The same applies to discovery. As we search for the appropriate word for a particular context, we are acutely aware that the context 'demands' the recalcitrant word and no other, 'rejects' the ones we do pose to it and instead 'suggests' other directions of interrogation. The situation 'asks' to be straightened out in certain ways while it screens out others, and we must be responsive to these interrogative solicitations and salient vectors if we are to come to an appropriate solution. Such attempts to describe the selection process seem to attribute a much more active role to the context than a more positivistic mentality, wary of anthropomorphism, would allow. But it is in fact an attempt to establish a new and more holistic sense of 'objectivity' – *Sachlichkeit und nicht Objektivität* – oriented to the Gestalt complex of the problematic situation. Both the hermeneutic and the evolutionary model converge remarkably on such a demand-response 'logic' of selection imposed by the situation itself, and in fact take us to the threshold of a reversal after the fashion of the later Heidegger, where what is said and what is talked about now not only talks back to us but even decides for us! Thus, in his meditation on the nature of thinking in *Was heisst Denken?*, Heidegger culminates in a form of this question which he formulates variously as 'What calls

us to thought?', 'what invites (appeals to, demands, instructs, directs) us to think?' and hence 'What gives directions to thought?'¹³ Whence the hermeneutic maxim to which Ricoeur sometimes alludes: The context decides, and we are led to decide accordingly, as we use all available contextual determinants in order to expose the most appropriate sense of a message charged with a fluid potential of meanings. Consider, by way of example, the sentences 'Man is a wolf', 'Juliet is the sun', 'The world is my oyster', in which the action of the context excludes the literal sense by way of its absurdity and then directs us to more metaphorical senses. It is in terms of this interplay between restrictions and latitudes that one ultimately acknowledges that meaning is interpreted by its context, i.e., in terms of what the context permits.

But the context not only determines which interpretations are appropriate and thus provide an adequate solution to our problems but also, and perhaps more importantly, which problems are appropriate, in terms of both the importance of the problem and the readiness of the field to handle it. The researcher must take his cues from his historical situation in exercising 'good judgment' with regard to the most promising problems as well as their adequate solutions. Prior to the right solution comes the much more subtle – and risky – decision of asking the right question, and in the right way, under pain of squandering years in a fruitless search for the resolution of a problem which simply will not yield. A scientific problem quite often must await its opportune time before scientific developments provide it with the resources that make it veritably 'ripe' for solution. After a long incubation period, there comes a time when the potential of the field is such that the discovery of an outstanding solution cannot be postponed for long. Sometimes, precipitous events may suddenly turn a 'fruitless' search into a time to 'cultivate' new theoretical possibilities in order to 'reap' the benefits of a recent intellectual 'harvest' of 'seminal' ideas from a neighboring 'field'.¹⁴ When the opportune time for a problem comes, then the direction of its solution practically forces itself as 'the obvious guess'¹⁵ on the researcher steeped in his field, perhaps even leading to its simultaneous discovery by independent workers in the field. Consider, for example, the discovery of the double helical structure of DNA, prompted most proximately by the discovery of the α helical structure of a protein molecule and supported by the opportune confluence of efforts in the disciplines of bacterial genetics, crystallographic physics and organic chemistry. The genesis and rapid blossoming of molecular biology can be specifically located at the intersection of these three domains, whose fusion was brought about by Watson and Crick's discovery, which in turn provided the key insight into the plethora of problems surrounding the genetic code or, in more popular jargon, 'the secret of life'. Molecular biology is just one example of a minor and peripheral specialty which suddenly and dramatically

takes over the vanguard in the history of science and unfolds a new subject matter in a creative surge which makes it grow by geometric leaps and bounds from a handful of specialists to a dominant field populated by a sizable number of distinguished scientists. Other examples are x-ray crystallography and spectroscopy which played just such key roles at the turn of the century in the development of quantum physics. Such historical experiences suggest that it would be disastrous to distribute funds equitably to all fields; the task of the allocators is to play midwife to these spontaneous surges in burgeoning new fields of discovery, which are opening up at the expense of older fields in the process of being exhausted.

The unevenness of the internal history of science, with its surprising turns of events and unexpected surges in forward progress through conceptual explosions which intersperse long incubation periods of gradual development, suggests the Heideggerian model for historicity in terms of the intermittent rhythms of unconcealment and concealment, truth and error. With all the continuing emphasis on the winners of the Nobel sweepstakes, there is now also a growing recognition of the important, even essential, role of the genial error in the history of science. There comes a time when a promising idea must be followed through to an ill-fated dead-end and thus shown to be a blind alley, a *Holzwege*. Such failures may well merit the name of science just as much as those endeavors for which the Nobel prizes are awarded. Shapere suggests, for example, that Justus Liebig's search, in the early days of organic chemistry, for a mathematizable 'vital force' operative in organisms, analogous to the attractive forces of matter, was just such an enterprise.¹⁶ Of course, even the successes in science pick their way through a gauntlet of wrong turns and dead-ends. For instance, the initial steps toward the DNA discovery were marked by wrong decisions on both of the initial questions concerning the helical model, namely, the number of strands and the nature of the chemical bonding between the strands. Popper in particular has emphasized the trial-and-error character of scientific procedure and the significant role played by falsifiability in the logic of science. And Polanyi points to another kind of unavoidable error interwoven into the history of science, citing his own scientific work on physical adsorption as an example of a discovery not immediately accepted by the scientific community because it was an idea too much out of season with the reigning paradigm of physical chemistry at the time of its initial publication.¹⁷

The erratic course of the history of science is directly tied to the unspecifiability inherent in the process of scientific discovery. As noted above, the desire to eradicate this erratic dimension from science has found its extreme expression in the truncated image which equates science with the methodically controllable and verifiable and

consequently excludes any consideration of the dimension of discovery. But if one refuses to exclude discovery from the essence of science and at the same time considers discovery at its fundament to outstrip all method and logic, then, for such a one, science would not be science without its profound roots in the unspecifiable, and therefore cannot be explained in terms of wholly explicit, wholly formalizable knowledge. What is to be called science would then include, for example, the unspecifiable art of 'good judgment' by the scientific administrator groping in the dark in making his educated guesses on the most promising lines of research impending in his field.

Among the new philosophers of science, Michael Polanyi in particular has pursued this direction of thinking to the point of outlining the ultimately ontological character of this dimension of the unspecifiable as it makes its presence felt in every phase of the scientific endeavor. Under the rubric of 'personal knowledge', he stresses the central role of a kind of intimacy between the scientist and nature, an indwelling in its harmonies by means of theoretical patterns through which the discoverer senses the presence of the hidden truth which has yet to be revealed. The scientist acquires this intimacy by entering into the inherited interpretive framework of science and passionately committing himself to learning its ways. As they say in the vernacular, it is a matter of 'getting a feel for' nature in the way science currently comes in contact with it. This tacit knowledge can only be conveyed by practice and from practicing scientists, through whom the novice assimilates the subliminal premises of his science. These premises weave the framework within which all of his scientific assertions are made, and yet, for this very reason, they themselves cannot be asserted. But despite its inarticulate state, this network is known intimately as his own interpretative framework, in which he dwells 'as in the garment of [his] own skin'.¹⁸ Out of this background comes the particular but unspecifiable clues which guide the researcher from surmise to surmise, as well as providing intimations of being on the right track and drawing nearer and nearer to a solution. Even the resulting theory is more than explicit knowledge; it is a foreknowledge of things yet unknown, unforeseeable, and perhaps even inconceivable at present, and it is in anticipation of these implications that the scientist passionately commits himself to this theory. For he believes himself to have come in contact with a reality whose inexhaustible depth, independence and power will permit it to manifest itself through his theory in ways even beyond his ken. He believes his theory is true, even without confirmations, but also and primarily because of the indeterminate range of future discoveries that he expects will issue from it.

Thus Polanyi sees the entire process of discovery, from initial investiture through the explanatory phase to the final commitment to its outcome, under the sway of what he calls the 'ineffable domain',¹⁹ which

could readily be one of Heidegger's more topological names for Being. Polanyi himself explicitly acknowledges the kinship between the pretheoretical know-how that he calls 'personal knowledge' and Heidegger's conception of *Seinsverständnis*.²⁰ Moreover, he after a fashion performs a Heideggerian kind of reversal when he espies, in and through the tacit skills, a tacit dimension of reality operative as the alpha and omega of science.

In Polanyi's account, the locus of science is clearly displaced from the image of science as method to that of science as a craft skill, an intellectual 'savvy' and tacit judgment which cannot be supplanted by method, precedes and grounds it, and provides it with its viability. Put most starkly, science viewed from this side of its coin is no longer a science at all but rather an art, a *techne* in the best Greek sense of an artistic know-how capable of evoking (bringing forth, producing) truth in and through an artwork. The scientist is made a kin to the artisan-craftsman steeped in his art, responsive to his material as he attunes himself to it through his tools, and sensitive to how they relate to human existence. This emphasis provides a profound concretization to the few remarks in *Being and Time* (section 69b) on the roots of theoretical behavior in praxis, which fundamentally constitute Heidegger's existential conception of science, i.e. science as an authentic mode of Being-in-the-world.

Moreover, Polanyi's account also serves to counteract Heidegger's harsh and bleak metaphysical conception of modern science as 'the absolute priority of method over its possible objects'.²¹ But Heidegger himself promotes a similar move in his lecture of 1954 entitled 'Science and deliberation', which I believe can be read with great profit in the light of Polanyi's exposition of the tacit dimension of science.²² For the aim of this lecture is to promote a deliberation on a certain 'inconspicuous state of affairs' latent in the heart of the matter of science. This incipient state of affairs which pervades the essence of the sciences is however by and large ignored and passed over in silence by them, since their natural orientation is more toward certified results and further progress in knowledge. Yet no matter how far removed the sciences seem to be from this incipient core, it is indispensable to them. They inevitably reside in it as a stream in its hidden source. Accordingly, the most profound way of thinking of science would seek to attune itself to this subliminal mooring in the facticity in which the sciences find their home. But such a 'grass-roots' thinking in proximity to the source would involve a violent reversal of the normal movement of scientific progress. Indeed, it would constitute a regress from the sciences to their presuppositional underpinning. Because of their orientation away from their source, and the momentum of their progressive movement, the sciences of their own power cannot make this leap back to the source from which they have sprung.²³ This is the task of foundational thinking.

Even more worthy of attention in the present situation is that the very spirit of modernity, seduced by the spell of certitude, guaranteed truth and assured progress, which encourages us to view science as a panacea, radically militates against such a reversal. More and more, scientific progress assumes the character of a forward project without a grounding facticity. Kant²⁴ thus captured the essence of modern science when he noted that 'a light broke upon all students of nature' when they realized that nature is best understood according to a project (*Entwurf*) of one's own making. Rather than subjecting ourselves to 'nature's leading-strings', we must force nature to answer questions of our own choosing. In this vein, Einstein spoke of the 'free-inventions' of hypothesizing and Galileo readily admitted that fictional idealizations such as 'freely falling body' and 'frictionless plane' constituted a veritable 'rape of the senses'.

Yet both saw the adventures of hypothesizing counterbalanced by the security and control of method. Among the new philosophers of science, Feyerabend has reacted so violently against the image of science as method and of its truth as a security blanket that he highlights the heady willfulness of science to the point of arbitrariness. He thus proposes an anarchistic image of science based on the single methodological principle of 'anything goes' (short of murder). In practice, this entails 'scientific' opposition to everything which is now accepted by the scientific establishment. In short, currently accepted facts must constantly be opposed by counterinductions from experience and accepted theories countered by the proliferation of alternative theories inconsistent with the accepted point of view, whereby one not only learns by his mistakes (as Popper maintains) but also deliberately proves all rules by seeking their exceptions. In as much as Feyerabend concedes the need for a certain measure of tenacity to already established theories, his recipe stops just short of the nihilistic extreme of turning scientific change into a Dionysian frenzy of activism. Though at times it may approach slapstick pandemonium, when the active interplay between tenacity and proliferation becomes pitched to its most tumultuous, so that the thick of the action appears 'unreasonable, nonsensical, mad, immoral . . . when seen from the point of view of a contemporary'.²⁵ Feyerabend's irreverent recipe of calculated willfulness and recalcitrance aims to turn science into the carefree abandon of a frolic. Against the image of the scientist as *l'homme sérieux* hard at work in the solemn and even sacred task of 'the search for truth', Feyerabend would locate the sources of scientific discovery as much in spontaneous play as in reasoned planning. Whence his 'plea for hedonism' which would change science 'from a stern and demanding mistress into an attractive and yielding courtesan who tries to anticipate every wish of her lover'.²⁶

But Heidegger espies a similar frenetic character to science precisely within the secure confines of its method. Willful projects continue to

proliferate through the fissioning of scientific disciplines into specializations, each of whom are in turn prolific in the production of results. Each specialty imposes severe limits upon itself and the kinds of questions it wishes to pose, thereby cutting itself off all the more from an awareness of its enabling ground. The advantage of this strategy of minimizing thinking is to maximize results, so that the overall effect of the multiplication of specialties is the accumulation of a vast store of detailed, technically useful information. Here we encounter the narrower technocratic image of science as research and discovery which is wholly compatible with what Nietzsche termed the triumph of scientific method over science. 'Research' in this sense is now Big Business. The proliferation in recent decades of the 'think tanks' of research institutions for various and sundry purposes suggests to what extent the 'knowledge industry' has replaced manual and machine labor as the most important productive force today. That the businesslike pursuit of knowledge is virtually open-ended while at the same time remaining systematic indicates how the security of method and the adventure of research can be interlocked in their progressive drift toward rootlessness. To paraphrase Victor Hugo, technical science has long sought a perpetual motion machine. It has finally found it . . . in itself.

This total mobilization of human talent as well as natural resources finds its most intense expression in the uninhibited will to power toward planetary domination through technology. By means of the power of technology, nature has been provoked into revealing hitherto unsuspected sources of electrical and nuclear energy. Recently, even outer space has been placed at our disposal as another resource to be exploited. So sure were our planners of the power of technology that the question was never whether we would land on the moon, only how soon and by what means. The new cybernetic sciences appear to know no bounds in the possibilities of planetary planning and the capacity to work our will upon the entire earth. It appears that man is now in a position to assume the role of unequivocal lord and master exercising dominion over the earth.

But is the technological will really a freedom without limits? The ecology and the energy crisis dramatically testify to the contrary. And there is science-fiction's recurring nightmare of the giant computer turning the tables and overpowering its masters. In numerous ways, the technological matrix is impelled by a will to total efficiency which factors in man himself to the point of total absorption, who is after all also a natural resource to be exploited for its energy and distributed to its most effective stations in the 'manpower' grid. Technology thereby takes revenge on man himself.

But in the Heideggerian perspective, all of these are but symptoms of a more radical limit to our freedom, a fundamental non-willing latent in the very will to will of the technological project. To acknowledge this

most extreme limit is to take the first resolute step toward displacing this seemingly free-floating project back to its most factitious roots. For we can always ask: What demands that we demand to the point of excess in the technological mode of existence? What provokes us to provoke nature resourcefully to the point of including our own resourceful selves? Perhaps we will then see that the thoughtless willfulness of exploitation is basically not of our own will. Our changing of the face of the earth is ultimately not of our own doing. We have long ago been led to the historical destiny of technology and can no longer turn back. No International Planning Commission or Committee of Scientists have done so, nor can they really hope to do so.

But we can turn our thoughtless willfulness around by first acknowledging the oblivion of its rootedness, as well as the oblivion of this oblivion, so that we might then come to terms with the flow of our current historical situation, what is taking place in it, the leeway it grants us and what we can start with it. This orientation of questioning thus aims to bring us 'to experience the call of a more original revelation' within and through the truth of technology, to espy the harbingers of a new setting in and through the scientific-technological world, to find new roots for life in such a world, to find ways of making ourselves at home in this world, so that, in one of Heidegger's favorite expressions, we may once again learn 'to dwell poetically upon this earth'. Accordingly, Heidegger clearly hopes that the backtrack into and through the metaphysical conception of science and technology will be propaedeutic to a more poetic conception.

One of its central tasks would be to elaborate a new sense of the naturality of nature in and through the artifacts of science and technology, 'to recast and recover the calculability and technicality of nature in the open mystery of a newly experienced naturality of nature'.²⁷ And perhaps the time is not so far off for such a development. The ecology crisis and energy crisis suggest certain limits to our sense of nature as universally manipulable, whether as a scientifically calculable system of forces or as a technological fund of resources, and accordingly evoke the need to let it be, to cultivate, conserve, foster and cherish the *Dasein* of our planet in a more responsive manner. One might also hope for a measure of a poetic sense of science and technology from the more explicitly artistic endeavors to use their materials – Heidegger might call these the 'earth' of science and technology – in the mobiles of constructivism, technological sculpture, film, perhaps even cybernetic music. Perhaps some day we may well learn to view, for example, synthesized plastics as no less natural than things found more directly in nature. Then there is the poetic-mystical strain in the Marxist tradition which sees the progressive naturalization of man through technology in mutual coordination with a progressive humanization of nature. Among others

in this tradition, Marcuse, an old student of Heidegger, looks toward the emergence of a New Science and New Technology in which nature and man would no longer be related in the mutual exploitation of master and slave but rather in the mutual liberation of communicating partners, precisely to the degree that technology pacified the forces of nature by liberating them from the brutality, ferocity and blindness which has made nature our antagonist from time immemorial.²⁸ Astounding as it may sound to our positivistically conditioned ears wary of all anthropomorphisms, this kind of suggestion is being seriously entertained by thinkers of the most diverse philosophical perspectives. For example, Mary B. Hesse's quest for a new form of objectivity for science prompts her to consider a more internal relationship between man and at least biological nature than an epistemology based on the subject-object relationship would normally allow.²⁹ Others have suggested that such an intimate indwelling in wholly new dimensions of nature is acquired in our habituation to the instrumental complexes of experimental science.

So there is no lack of signs of a vigorous quest for a new habitat for man in a new, more ecological sense of the naturalness of nature, a more historical and topological form of objectivity (*Sachlichkeit*), a less mathematical and more hermeneutical notion of rationality.³⁰ Even though science has been rendered thoughtless by the positivistic image of science, there appears to be no dearth of thinkers, scientists included, seeking to provide us with more imaginative images of a science more responsive to the most profound exigencies of the human situation. I have tried to suggest that Heidegger has blazed a trail which helps us to see how this proliferation of new images converges on the simple heart of the matter in which we live, move and are.

Notes

1 William J. Richardson, 'Heidegger's critique of science', *New Scholasticism* xlii (1968) 511–36. But this opening sentence of the article is moderated by a concluding paragraph suggesting how a philosophy of science could be elaborated within a Heideggerian framework.

2 This early lecture, 'Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft', is now readily available in the collection of Heidegger's major works from the period 1914–16. Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1972) pp. 355–75. This early lecture marks the high point of what I have called Heidegger's logical conception of science, as distinguished from his later existential and metaphysical conceptions. Cf. my essay, 'On the dimensions of a phenomenology of science in Husserl and the young Dr. Heidegger', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* iv (1973) 217–34.

3 This is no longer quite accurate in view of the recent publication of the lecture course of 1927, in which philosophy itself is taken as the 'science of

being'. Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, volume 24 of the *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975), pp. 15ff.

4 Manfred S. Frings (ed.), *Heidegger and the Quest for Truth* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1968) pp. 17–21; John Sallis (ed.), *Heidegger and the Path of Thinking* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1970) pp. 9–11; Richard Wisser (ed.), *Martin Heidegger im Gespräch* (Freiburg/Munich: Alber, 1970) pp. 67–77.

5 Martin Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, translated by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1968) p. 8. For an extended commentary on this remark, cf. my essay, 'Science, phenomenology, and the thinking of being', in Joseph J. Kockelmans and Theodore J. Kisiel (eds.), *Phenomenology and the Natural Sciences: Essays and Translations* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970) pp. 173ff.

6 'Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache'. The English translation by Arthur Pap, 'The elimination of metaphysics through logical analysis of language', appears in *Logical Positivism*, edited by A. J. Ayer (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959) pp. 60–81.

7 These three intertwining dimensions, which will serve as touchpoints of comparison in what follows in the Heideggerian meditation, ultimately lead back to the pre-Socratic roots of the 'tree of metaphysics' and correspond respectively to those most elemental of Greek words, *alethia*, *physics* and *logos*. Cf. Werner Marx, *Heidegger and the Tradition*, translated by Theodore Kisiel and Murray Greene (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971).

8 Cf. my essays, 'Scientific discovery: logical, psychological or hermeneutical?', *Explorations in Phenomenology*, edited by David Carr and Edward S. Casey (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973) pp. 263–84; and 'Zu einer Hermeneutik naturwissenschaftlicher Entdeckung', *Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie II* (1971) 195–221. For recent developments in the new movement, cf. Theodore Kisiel, with Galen Johnson 'New philosophies of science in the USA: a selective survey', *Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie V* (1974) 138–91.

9 'New philosophies of science in the USA', pp. 142–4.

10 Norwood Russell Hanson, 'Logical positivism and the interpretation of scientific theories', *The Legacy of Logical Positivism: Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, edited by Peter Achinstein and Stephen F. Barker (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959) pp. 67–84, esp. p. 84. This recurring reference to the *immer schon* is what Heidegger would call the facticity of science.

11 Which is what T. S. Kuhn means by 'paradigms' in the strict sense.

12 Stephen Toulmin, *Human Understanding*, Volume I: *The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972) pp. 134–44, 211–12.

13 *What is Called Thinking?*, pp. 114–17.

14 The agricultural metaphors which scientists themselves use in describing their situation are reminiscent of Heidegger's treatment of poetic 'Building dwelling thinking'.

15 James D. Watson, *The Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of DNA* (New York: New American Library, Signet PB, 1968) p. 41.

16 Dudley Shapere, 'Plausibility and justification in the development of science', *The Journal of Philosophy* lxiii (1966), pp. 611–21.

17 Michael Polanyi, *Knowing and Being*, edited by Marjorie Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969) pp. 87–96.

18 Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964) pp. 60, 64.

19 *ibid.*, p. 87.

20 *ibid.*, p. x.

21 In the letter published in Sallis (ed.), *Heidegger and the Path of Thinking*, p. 10.

22 Martin Heidegger, 'Wissenschaft und Besinnung', *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen 1954) pp. 45–70. On the *unscheinbaren Sachverhalt*, cf. esp. pp. 59–70.

23 *What is Called Thinking?*, p. 18.

24 In a famous passage (B XIII) in the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

25 Paul Feyerabend, 'Against method: outline of an anarchist theory of knowledge', *Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology*, edited by Michael Radner and Stephen Winokur, *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Volume IV (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970) p. 103, note 33.

26 Paul Feyerabend, 'Consolations for the specialist', *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970) p. 229.

27 Martin Heidegger, *Hebel der Hausfreund* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957) p. 24.

28 Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964) pp. 166–7, 236–8.

29 Mary B. Hesse, *In Defence of Objectivity* (London/New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

30 Cf. my essays: 'The mathematical and the hermeneutical: on Heidegger's notion of the apriori', *Martin Heidegger: In Europe and America*, edited by Edward G. Ballard and Charles E. Scott (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973) pp. 109–20; 'Commentary on Patrick Heelan's "Hermeneutics of Experimental Science in the Context of the Life-World"', *Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie V* (1974) 124–35; 'Hermeneutic models for natural science', *Die Phänomenologie und die Wissenschaften*, edited by E. W. Orth as *Phänomenologische Forschungen* 2 (Freiburg/München: Alber, 1976) pp. 180–91.

Heidegger and the physical sciences¹

Catherine Chevalley

Mathematical physics holds an important place in the corpus of Heidegger's writings. Though this is especially evident in the course of lectures he gave in 1935, which were published as *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, it also emerges from many other pieces. However, Heidegger never expressed his concern with physics otherwise than through remarks, hints that are more or less extended promises to come back to the topic on some other occasion, or through elliptical judgments and paradoxes. On the other hand, it is well known that from 1938 on, Heidegger emphasized that one should be aware that the crucial problem was the problem of the essence of technology. Science, in as much as it is characteristic of modern times, rests on the foundation of technology, provided one means by technology something other than applied science or mechanization. Rather, technology means the very project of representing the thing as that which perdures through change in order to subject it to calculation. At first sight it would seem that Heidegger never mentions mathematical physics in any other context than the one delineated by such an identification of science with the essence of technology.

Nevertheless, I would like to suggest here that the way in which Heidegger chose to question mathematical physics before 1938 provides a clue to the privilege he conferred afterwards upon technology and that it also explains certain surprising features of relevant passages in the lectures he gave in the year 1950. This interpretation is however based on the assumption that Heidegger changed his mind about the meaning of the natural sciences.

I shall start indirectly by pointing out a difficulty which seems to be purely circumstantial. The difficulty arises when Heidegger refers to a sharp difference between two periods of modern science. Heidegger hints at such a difference throughout all his works, starting from 1927 – when this difference actually emerges in the development of physics – up to

the 'Seminaires du Thor'. There is no need to comment upon each occurrence and it will be enough to quote the following section of the 1953 lecture, entitled 'Wissenschaft und Besinnung'.

This summary reference (it concerns the preceding pages) to the difference which separates the two epochs in modern physics makes it possible to see clearly where the change from one to the other is to be located: in the apprehension and the determination of the kind of objectivity through which nature lets itself be known. But, in the course of this transition from classical, geometrical physics to atomic and field theory physics what does *not* change is the fact that nature is assumed in advance to be responsive to the demands made of it, demands which are laid out in theoretical terms. In the most recent phase of atomic physics however, the object itself also disappears, with the result that both the subject and the object come to be subordinated to the subject-object relation which thereby becomes the determining factor: This is however an issue which we cannot pursue here in greater detail.²

One can find here three distinct assertions and my goal in this paper will be to elucidate the link between them. The first assertion is the simple statement that there is a difference between two periods of modern science. To identify them is an easy task since Heidegger makes it explicit on many occasions that he means the difference between classical physics, which was born in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and contemporary atomic physics, namely quantum mechanics, which appeared in 1925–7. However it is more difficult, and somewhat surprising, to read what Heidegger has to say about the nature of this difference: how are we to understand the modification of the 'objectivity through which nature is presented' and the way 'object and subject disappear' in atomic physics? Finally, it is even more surprising to notice that Heidegger, having stressed the fundamental significance of the difference, states that the difference itself vanishes in the face of something more important: that requisitioning of nature through which modernity receives its determination.

I shall therefore consider each of these three statements one after the other. My first assumption will be that the aim of the course of lectures which Heidegger gave during the Winter of 1935–6 under the title of *Grundfragen der Metaphysik* was to introduce the existence of such a difference between two specific kinds of mathematical physics. This entails a slightly unusual viewpoint which calls for justification. I will attempt therefore to show that the notion that a profound change occurred in the fundamental concepts of physics begins to act upon Heidegger's works precisely in 1935 and to such an extent that it becomes

the starting point of these lectures. This happens because Heidegger puts forward the question of a clarification of the foundation of classical physics as a necessity for the present time. We must be able to take the measure of our own continuing dependence upon these foundations in order to understand the change in our basic position with regard to what is.

I The positing of the difference: the question of the thing and the situation intrinsic to the natural sciences

The text of the 1935 lectures is divided into two parts, one of which is much longer than the other. The first part is called: 'Various ways of questioning about the thing' and serves as a kind of extensive introduction while the second part is devoted to 'Kant's manner of asking about the thing' and proceeds to analyse 'the philosophical determination of the thingness of the thing which Kant has opened up'.³ It has therefore been considered quite normal to take the 1935 lectures as a course on Kant. Even if attention is paid to Heidegger's insistence on the first law of motion and his much developed analysis of Galileo and Newton, this is interpreted as a consequence of the fact that the lectures address the 'Analytic of principles' in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.⁴

A closer examination of the Introduction reveals however that Heidegger actually proceeds the other way around, and that the decision to comment on Kant's doctrine of objectivity is governed much more directly by the guiding question formulated in the introduction and not with a view to simply completing his exegesis of the *Critique*.

What is this question? It is the 'question of the thing'. The Introduction assembled a number of different attempts to clarify the meaning of this question until a threefold discovery was made in §IX. On the one hand, when, on the basis of immediate experience, we ask 'what is a thing?', the answer runs in terms of a thing as the nucleus around which (or a substratum upon which) many changing qualities are grouped and we regard this as the foundation of our 'natural conception of the world [*natürliche Weltauffassung*]'.⁵ On the other hand, when we turn to philosophy, we see that this is what philosophy has been saying all along, at least since Plato 'and above all since Aristotle'.⁶ Notwithstanding the difference, it is also what Kant stated as a principle: 'all appearance (namely all things for us) contain the permanent (substance) as the object itself and the changeable as its mere determination, that is, the way in which the object exists'.⁷ And finally, we see that this conception of the thing yields the essence of truth provided one affirms, as has always been the case, that truth consists in the adequation of words to things, in the conformity of a predicate to a subject. But having made this threefold

discovery on a seemingly sound basis, Heidegger shifts to an entirely new kind of perspective, starting with a simple remark which consists in pointing out that what presents itself as 'natural' is always historical, and that therefore this essential determination of the thing has not been such for all time. There has been a discovery of the thing – a discovery which may have been made at the same time as the discovery of the proposition – and our task is now to question this historical tradition. From the recognition of the task there follows the choice of a 'middle way',⁸ represented by the Kantian determination, whose examination is therefore subordinated to the question posed in the Introduction.

But we still have not touched upon the reason why the question of the thing ought to be asked anew. At this point we have to pay attention to two successive indications offered by Heidegger.

In the first place, Heidegger links the *taking up* again of the question of the thing with a 'decision which has to be *taken*': 'We want to contribute to the preparation of a decision which may be formulated as follows: is science the measure of all knowledge or is there a knowledge in which the ground and limit of science and thus its genuine effectiveness are determined?'⁹

Is science the measure of all knowledge? This question is responsible for many characteristic features of the text. Let us mention just two.

It is responsible first of all for the restricted meaning Heidegger accords to the word 'thing'. A thing is 'that which can be touched, reached or seen, that is, what is present-at-hand [*das Vorhandene*]'.¹⁰ The reason why the 1935 lectures privilege this restricted meaning to the exclusion of any other ('In asking "what is a thing?", we shall adhere to the first meaning'¹¹) is that science pretends to be true knowledge about what is present at hand. For Heidegger, *Vorhandenheit* is the name we give to the 'mode of being of natural things'.¹²

In the second place, and more importantly, the question mentioned above is responsible for the way Heidegger introduces certain fundamental themes. I shall take the one example of the 'distinction between subject and object', a distinction which may be, as Heidegger points out, 'highly questionable'.¹³ The 1935 lectures take up this theme by bringing to light the inner breakdown of classical science's pretence at capturing the essence of the thing. The whole of the aporetic argument in the Introduction is pervaded with the description of this failure; the hopelessness of Cartesian ontology is demonstrated and this demonstration is conducted in the style of Pascal. 'Where are we to get a foothold? The ground slips away from under us'.¹⁴ Why does the ground slip away? Let us suppose that we want to go right to things. Things are always particular. However some things are exactly alike; in this case one can still distinguish them from each other with reference to place and time: 'the essential determination of the thingness of the thing to be this one

[*je dieses*] is grounded in the essence of space and time'.¹⁵ But then what are space and time and how are they linked together? 'Are space and time only a frame for the things, a system of coordinates which we lay out in order to reach sufficiently exact statements about things, or are space and time something else again (cf. Descartes)'?'¹⁶ In other words, what does physical science teach us concerning the thingness of the thing when it gets hold of it analytically by means of space-time co-ordinates? Nothing at all: one is left with the impression that 'space and time are only derivative realms, indifferent towards the things themselves but useful in assigning every thing to its space-time position'.¹⁷ But if the scientific object does not give me the thing, would it be conceivable to find it in the subject, in the ostensivity of the 'this'? However, even on this side we are not be able to learn anything about the kind of truth in which the thing maintains itself.¹⁸ Finally, the reason why I do not get to the thing either through the object or through the subject is because the distinction between subject and object is itself highly questionable, even though it has been a 'generally favoured sphere of retreat for philosophy'.¹⁹ Thus, by way of the internal disintegration of the traditional scientific apprehension of the thing, Heidegger arrives at his fundamental theme regarding the breakdown of the distinction between subject and object.²⁰

But why? Why should it be necessary to question the kind of knowledge which science claims to give us since we have long been aware of the difference between the positive sciences and philosophy?

Heidegger now tells us why it will prove necessary to pose this question again even though it appears to have been resolved both by science (the spatio-temporality of the object) and by philosophy (the truth of the thing as the conformity of the predicate to it). It is, as we have seen, because what is 'natural' is also 'and in a special sense, something historical'.²¹ To see the thing as the bearer of properties is to be the heirs of an ancient tradition. 'But why not leave this history alone?' since we feel at ease with this tradition and since, in any case, it is not going to make any difference to the functioning of electric trains. Why? For a quite specific reason.

If, for example, we make the effort to think through the inner state of today's natural sciences, non-biological as well as biological; if we also think through the relations which obtain between mechanics and technology to our own existence (*Dasein*), then it becomes clear that knowledge and questioning have reached their limits, limits which demonstrate that, as a matter of fact, an original reference to things is missing.²²

The decision to take up again the question of the thing in its historicity

(*Geschichtlichkeit*) thus seems to be related to 'the inner state of today's natural sciences'. What is at stake here is clearly something quite different from sheer curiosity about this state of affairs. Rather the question touches upon a change actually taking place in our basic position within the relation to what is. Or rather, says Heidegger 'more cautiously', it touches upon the 'beginning of a transformation', upon a 'change in our ways of questioning and evaluating, of seeing and deciding'. What are we to do? 'To determine the changing basic position within the relation to what is, that is the task of an entire historical period'.²³ Certainly, but at least we should take account of 'what holds us captive and makes us unfree in our experience and determination of things'.²⁴ What is it that ultimately holds us captive? It is the fact that some fundamental features of modern natural science have become 'a universal way of thinking'. Therefore, we must inquire about our basic relation to nature and, more specifically, about this fact, that a definite conception of the thing has attained 'a unique preeminence', namely, the thing as a 'material concentration of mass in motion within the pure space-time order'.²⁵ The historical question of the thing leads to suspicions concerning the unshattered pre-eminence of the 'determination of the thing as matter present-at-hand'.²⁶

It is thus possible to assume that the 1935 lectures were written in order to stress the need to elucidate the historical character of the determination of the thing which natural science generates when it claims to provide us thereby with a true knowledge of things themselves. Objectivation of the thing in the form of being present-at-hand has made us blind as has also the belief that the scientific *Weltbild* was universal. But which science? It is crucial to note that Heidegger speaks about a decision to be made *because* a fundamental transformation in our position with regard to what is, is making itself known today as a result of what is going on in the natural sciences.

In support of this interpretation of the 1935 lectures it is worth recalling that, some years before, Heidegger had already mentioned the connection between the dissolution of our basic position with regard to what is and the internal state of physics. Let us quote two passages, one from the book on the *Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology* (1927) and the other from the 1930 lectures *On the Essence of Freedom*.

In *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, Heidegger stated clearly that there was a far-reaching contrast between philosophy and the positive sciences. Within the realm of the positivist experience of being, the ontological constitution of being is not accessible nor does it 'reach the level of conceptualization'. For this reason, the positive sciences can only 'dream about being'. They are not cognizant of what makes beings what they are, namely, the being relation, even though they do catch a glimpse of all this (without which there could be nothing like unveiling).

Heidegger recalls here the difference Plato saw between geometry and philosophy and he adds the further remark:

The history of all the positive sciences shows that only from time to time do they wake up and open their eyes to the Being of the very beings which they take as the object of their investigations. Today we are in just such a situation. The fundamental concepts of the positive sciences are undergoing a change. In the course of revising them, scientists have been obliged to go back to the original sources from which they were drawn.²⁷

The second passage I would like to cite is taken from the 1930 lectures *On the Essence of Freedom*. These lectures are also devoted to Kant, and especially to the connection which Kant establishes between causality and freedom. Section 15 offers a preliminary exposition of what is in question with the problem of causality in the sciences. Heidegger tells us yet again that 'the natural sciences and history have become more problematic than ever in their internal essence' and that 'there has never been a greater disproportion between the results regularly obtained and the uncertainty and obscurity which surrounds both the most fundamental and the most simple concepts and questions'.²⁸ Heidegger supports this statement with a discussion of causality in the 'new physical theories', a discussion founded on quotations from P. Jordan and M. Born, from which it transpires that 'the processional character of material processes has become problematic'.²⁹ In other words, the time of physics is no longer what it was. And here again one finds a reference to 'a shattering and an effective displacement of our entire being' with regard to which we

do not have the right (as philosophers) to neglect the new way of raising questions in contemporary physics by reducing them to an empirical material. For it could well be that this material gives us an indication of a novel and essential determination of *nature as such*.³⁰

What is the meaning of these two passages? It is that we are caught up in a transformation and a shattering of our basic position within being such that we cannot overlook the new determination of nature in the natural sciences – and that the natural sciences themselves have opened their eyes to the nature of the beings with which they are concerned. The 1927 and 1930 lectures thus anticipate the 1935 way of questioning: *what are we to make of the transformation of the thing into an object now that physics seems to call for a totally new way of determining nature?*

These two passages make it easier to understand why mathematical physics is given so much importance in the 1935 lectures, especially in

§V from the second part of the book where we find the Heideggerian version of §9 of the second part of *Krisis* (written about the same time). Heidegger uses very strong language to describe the decisive character he ascribes to the rise of modern science: 'a mutation of our *Dasein*', 'a unique passion . . . which finds its like only among the Greeks', 'a capacity to 'hold out in this mode of questioning',³¹ 'a liberation', 'a new experience and formation of freedom itself'.³² The greatness and superiority' of natural science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, says Heidegger, was due to the fact that all the scientists were philosophers. Similarly today,

where genuine and creative research is being done, the situation is no different from that of three hundred years ago. . . . Niels Bohr and Heisenberg think in a thoroughly philosophical way, thanks to which they are capable of initiating new ways of questioning and, above all, of holding out in the questionable.³³

In other words, contemporary atomic physics could represent something of the same order as that which took place with the birth of modern natural science. It would engender, or reflect, a mutation of our *Dasein*. Provided that this 'same order' is not a simple continuation but rather proceeds from a more subtle analogy, the analogy which pertains between two fundamental ways of questioning about the mode of being of entities. The sciences awaken from their dream.

But since what is repeated is in reality, as we have seen, quite different, what is required by contemporary physics is in no way a new *Critique of Pure Reason*. Heidegger's intention in writing the 1935 lectures was certainly not to promote, even for the future, the need to take up again the Kantian question: *quid juris*. How then are we to understand his remarks if we concede that they do not proceed from simple curiosity and therefore do not represent the prolegomena for a foundational programme? I shall temporarily avoid this difficulty by contenting myself with a comparison: Heidegger's position here can be compared with that of Aristotle.

Aristotle – as we read in §19 of *Grundprobleme* – was the last of the great philosophers who was capable of vision and, even more important, who possessed the strength and patience needed to compel research to go back to the phenomena, to what is visibly given in the phenomena, by entirely disregarding wild and empty speculations, no matter how popular they might be.³⁴

II The modification of objectivity in contemporary atomic physics

Let us then concede that Heidegger possesses Aristotle's strength and patience. What was he likely to find by 'going back to the phenomena' and by questioning 'the inner state of natural science?' My second assumption will be that, in the early 1930s, Heidegger becomes aware of the fact that quantum physics is very different from the kind of physics which he has dealt with in his *Habilitationsschrift* in 1915, even though it comes out of the latter. For quantum physics involves a wholly new conception of the relation between time and motion. It is precisely this difference that Heidegger will call a 'transformation of the objectivity through which nature manifests itself'.

Shortly before 1935, Heidegger's attention was most probably drawn by a paper published by Werner Heisenberg in 1934 in the journal *Die Naturwissenschaften* under the title of 'Wandlungen der Grundlagen der exakten Naturwissenschaft in jungster Zeit'.³⁵ This paper had aroused wide interest – due also to the fact that Heisenberg had just received the Nobel prize – and was to provide the title of Heisenberg's first collection of non-technical papers.³⁶ Heidegger also met Heisenberg in the fall of 1935. As Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker recalls: 'Someone suggested that Viktor von Weizsäcker and Werner Heisenberg should discuss the question of the introduction of the subject into the natural sciences in the presence of Heidegger; so we became Heidegger's guests for a few days'.³⁷ As Viktor, who was Carl Friedrich's uncle, was a biologist, it seems plausible to assume that this conversation was the occasion for the phrase quoted above: 'the inner state of the natural sciences, non-biological as well as biological'.

In many respects, Heisenberg's paper prepares the way for the 1935 lectures.

In the first place, Heisenberg affirms the difference between classical physics and quantum mechanics by stressing the fact that classical physics was a physics of the thing:

Classical physics was built on some fundamental presuppositions, which seemed to provide a self-evident starting point for all exact natural science and which therefore did not require any demonstration: physics dealt with the behaviour of things in space and with their evolution in time.

From there, one was led to the tacit assumption that there was 'an objective course of events in space and time independent of observation', and indeed still further on to the concept of an 'objective reality' based upon the interpretation of space and time as an immutable arrangement of things. Finally, the ultimate consequence of such a tacit universaliz-

ation of a region of experience (*Erfahrungsbereich*) was the construction of a scientific image of the world (*naturwissenschaftliche Weltbild*).

Heisenberg goes on to say that the primary consequence of the theory of Relativity and, even more so, of quantum mechanics, has been the breakdown of these presuppositions. The radical transformation of these space-time concepts and of the concept of motion has thus provided a 'new possibility for thought'. The question is whether physicists 'ought to renounce the very idea of an objective time-scale'. Heisenberg answers this question in the affirmative and mentions that, in consequence, the very notion of 'objective spatio-temporal processes' has become meaningless. What this means is that one now has to call in question the very way in which classical physics used to identify the thing with the object. The fact that quantum mechanics does not deal with objective spatio-temporal processes amounts to the recognition that it is no longer possible to perceive a phenomenon along the lines of what used formerly to be called 'objectivity', that is, the phenomenon as it lies there in front of me, undisturbed by observation and such that I, the knowing subject, have the ability to construct a representation of it in ordinary space and time.

This failure of the basic presuppositions of classical physics leads, in Heisenberg's view, to the paradoxical consequence that it is now impossible to develop a *Weltbild* or a *Weltanschauung* based on the kind of knowledge furnished by physical science. If we consider how these new dispositions impact upon 'the human situation', we have to conclude that we must 'replace the twentieth century *Weltbild* with something different'.³⁸ In other words, we must now leave the Cartesian *cogito* to adopt the itinerant stance of a Columbus. We have to 'have the courage to abandon entirely the lands we have known up to now'.

Turning to the meaning of such a transformation from the viewpoint of a 'theory of knowledge', Heisenberg stresses the need to clarify the a priori character of the Kantian forms of intuition and the categories. By changing the structure of physical theory, contemporary physics has undoubtedly overturned the very basis of this comprehension. However, 'the question of determining how to judge to what an extent this idea still remains fruitful in those more extended spheres which were essential to Kant has not yet been thoroughly discussed from within this new perspective'.

With this brief description of the main arguments contained in Heisenberg's paper, one can get some insight into the profound affinity which prevails between Heisenberg's question and the perspective adopted by the 1935 lectures. In particular, the connection between the impossible *Weltanschauung* and the suggestion that Kantian criticism has become problematic in a new way is especially important. If one recalls that, from Heilmholtz to Planck, the 'philosophically-minded physics' in

Germany has been essentially and explicitly Kantian in inspiration, it becomes clear that any German physics would interpret as a conceptual revolution the suggestion that the foundations of Kant's theory of knowledge ought to be re-examined.³⁹ The 1935 lectures take up this very suggestion, since Heidegger attempts to establish a connection between a critical examination of the Kantian doctrine of objectivity and an historical evaluation of the universalization of forms of thought derived from natural science.

For Heidegger, the meeting with Heisenberg certainly involved coming to terms with an extremely powerful, though aporetic, conception of the transformation of objectivity, and of the perception of Nature in atomic physics. Before moving on to the most fundamental level of this confrontation, the questioning of the essence of motion, I shall introduce a point of comparison by referring to a text which Heidegger had written long before, namely his *Habilitationsschrift* of 1915 'Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft',⁴⁰ a text which is hardly 'Heideggerian' in as much as it antecedes by quite some time the discovery of that temporality which belongs to Dasein, but whose influence pervades many of Heidegger's works thereafter in a variety of ways.

Though this is not apparent from the title, in the first part of this text Heidegger deals with the concept of time in the *physical* sciences. The central question is that of defining 'along what path we may most surely obtain knowledge of the logical structure of the concept of time in the historical sciences' and proceeding from there of the concept of 'time in general'. This path has to be a regressive one. One must go back from 'the structure of the concept of time in history to its function in the history of science' and this function must be rendered intelligible on the basis of what the 'history of science aims at'. Heidegger tells us that we should start from the 'science of history as a fact and study there the function of the concept of time, and on that basis go on to determine its logical structure'. But in order to render this clarification still more precise, it would be as well to follow this path in the first place with the case of natural science. In other words, it behoves us to determine first the objectives of natural science, then the function of the concept of time, before finishing up with the structure of physical time.

With regard to the aim of natural science, Heidegger asks: what is that fundamental tendency in physics which has revealed itself ever more significantly from Galileo up to the present time? This fundamental tendency was already exhibited in the new method which consisted in uniting a multiplicity of phenomena by way of a law.⁴¹ But 'modern physics did more'. In the course of its further development it accomplished another essential move in the direction of a unification of the objects of physics,⁴² with the result that we now find ourselves confronting only two main branches of physical science: mechanics, as the

theory of matter, and electrodynamics, as the theory of ether. This division also, according to Heidegger, created a 'deep conflict' between the 'mechanical *Weltanschauung*' and the 'electrodynamical *Weltanschauung*'. However, in Planck's view – and Heidegger quotes extensively from Planck's book of 1910⁴³ – the concepts of space, time and substance which serve as the fundamental concepts for mechanics are just as essential in electrodynamics, and therefore it is possible to hope for a reconciliation of these two branches of physics within a general dynamics. Heidegger tells us that this indicates very clearly what the aim of physical science might be. 'This aim is the unity of the physical *Weltbild*,⁴⁴ the reduction of all phenomena to the fundamental mathematical laws of a general dynamics, to the laws of motion of a definable mass-point.'

But now, what function does the concept of time have in this physics? Since it is the aim of physics to exhibit the law-like character of motion with the utmost generality and since motion takes place 'in' time – whatever this 'in' actually means – motion and time have to 'cohere' together in some way or other. They have to display that 'affinity' which Galileo used to talk about. Such an affinity appears through the essential part played by the process of measurement. In order to measure the position of a mass-point in space one has to assume that there is a fixed point and then one has to set up three co-ordinate axes. In order to analyse the motion of a point along a curb it is necessary to associate each second marked off on the clock with three measures, that is, three numbers which give the position of point *P* at instant *t*. 'Let us now give *t* all subsequent values; in as much as they are continuous functions of *t*, the co-ordinates will provide complete knowledge of all the positions. This knowledge of all the successive positions we call movement.' The intuited qualities of phenomena are thus deleted (*ausgelöscht*) and transformed (*gehoben*) into the mathematical. The function of the time concept is to allow for such a process by making possible the very act of measurement.

Thus the structure of the time concept becomes visible. Time acts in physics as an independent variable which guarantees the uniform flux of continuous motion. The only relation that exists between time points is that they are arranged in a successive order which coagulates time itself and makes it something which can be measured in the same way as a surface. 'Time has been turned into a homogeneous arrangement of positions, into a scale, into a parameter.' Time has been thought in terms of space.

By comparison, Heidegger finds a widely different view of the situation when he reads papers by Born or Jordan or when he talks to Heisenberg.⁴⁵ The new view breaks with the essential features mentioned above concerning both the aim of physics and the function of the concept of time. Consequently, in the 1935 lectures, Heidegger follows Heisenberg

in stating that 'it is no longer possible to find a foundational unity in the sciences and that such a unity is neither needed nor even in question'.⁴⁶ And so when Heidegger takes up again, with a view to developing further than in 1915, his analysis of the first law of motion, he takes care to specify that he is talking about 'Newtonian physics'⁴⁷ – whereas the 1915 *Habilitationsschrift* referred to physics in general.

Why? Why has the emergence of quantum theory transformed the fundamental concepts of physics to such an extent that Heisenberg is bound to say that an atom can no longer be described as a material thing situated in space with a definite evolution in time, and moreover that objective space and time no longer exist and that the very idea of a *Weltbild* has become anachronistic?

Many different aspects of quantum theory ought to be taken into consideration at this point, like the disappearance of the independence of the object, the non-neutrality of the subject or the way classical physics, the physics of the thing, is retroactively referred to ordinary language. Many of these features are consonant with the 1935 lectures; we may mention for instance the fundamental iconoclasm of physics, its renunciation of images; or the fact that, from 1925 on, quantum mechanics identifies 'classical' physics with an extrapolation of the intuitions incorporated in ordinary language (in Heidegger's words: the thing is defined through the essence of the proposition), while the quantum object itself remains inexpressible in this language; or finally the fact that the Copenhagen interpretation comments quite directly on the disappearance of the mirror relationship between subject and object. However, I shall restrict myself here to one feature which seems to be the most fundamental, namely, the requisitioning of the traditional determination of the essence of motion.

Quantum mechanics only emerged once physicists abandoned the classical concept of motion and went back to the more basic level of kinematics. No science forsakes a fundamental concept without being forced to do so. Therefore it took twenty-five years for physicists to admit that it was impossible to maintain the classical concept of motion. In 1924–5, that is, at the end of just such a twenty-five-year period, atomic physics was characterized by an absolute conceptual gap between the new data and classical concepts, and it became clear that the most primitive concepts would have to be redefined. Thus in July 1925 Pauli wrote to Bohr that 'it is not the concept of energy that has to be transformed first of all but rather the concepts of motion and force'.⁴⁸ Bohr also confided to the experimentalist H. Geiger that 'the difficulties we are encountering make it entirely impossible to maintain the ordinary spatio-temporal description of phenomena'.⁴⁹

In 1925, the quantum mechanics created by Heisenberg, Born, Jordan, Pauli and Bohr might be briefly described as a theory which provided a

law for the motion of an electron in the hydrogen atom,⁵⁰ the algebraic formulation of which established a correspondence between infinite matrices and those classical quantities which were a function of time. In addition it was also necessary to give up applying such classical concepts as position, velocity, trajectory, energy and causality⁵¹ to the electron. The 'three-man paper' by Heisenberg, Born and Jordan, entitled 'Zur Quantenmechanik II', states that 'the motions of electrons cannot be described in terms of ordinary concepts of space and time; a characteristic feature of the new theory is the modification it imposes upon kinematics as well as upon mechanics'.⁵²


Why was such an abandonment of the classical concepts necessary?

In the first place, as indicated in Planck's statements, quoted by Heidegger in 1915, atomic physics sought to unite mechanics and electrodynamics. The crucial problem was to understand the inner constitution of the atom, once it was admitted that this constitution was essentially electric, i.e., the atom was composed of a definite number of electrons.⁵³ The idea was to give an account of the existing knowledge about the atom, its chemical and physical properties, which would be based on a mechanical law of motion for electrons, namely on an electrodynamics. Ideally, one would obtain a planetary atomic model. Thus the unification of sky and earth, already accomplished by modern physics in the seventeenth century would be achieved over again on the side of the other infinite.

In 1913, the so-called Bohr atom already illustrated the failure of such a hope and demonstrated that it was impossible to establish a unique lawfulness for all motions. The Bohr atom was like a drawing that repudiated its own striving toward figurative representation.

The Bohr model for the atom brought about a recognition and synthesis of a given number of restrictive conditions: (a) the electron contradicted electromagnetism since the atom was not constantly losing energy (in spite of the accelerated motion of the electron); (b) the electron contradicted mechanics since, though there obviously existed a nucleus and therefore some gravitational structure, the atom was nevertheless stable within collisions (there was a fundamental state). Consequently: (c) the only thing that one could write down was an equation for discontinuous energy transfer. One could have no knowledge whatsoever of what actually 'happened' between two stationary states. The very notion of an evolution of the motion of the electron was deprived of meaning.

Finally, 'in desperation', Bohr was led in 1924 to renounce any kind of representation of atomic phenomena in space and time. Matrix mechanics was able to give a partial solution to these difficulties only because Heisenberg, as Bohr used to say, 'got rid of the classical determinations of motion'.⁵⁴ The classical analytic conception of motion, as the description of a continuous curb in the space of ordinary geometry, was



Bohr model for hydrogen atoms in simplified form
(with circles instead of ellipses)

Diagram taken from H. A. Kramers and H. Holst, *Das Atom und die Bohrsche Theorie seines Baues* (Berlin: Springer, 1925). Bohr for his part was opposed to any figurative representation of his atomic model.

Numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4: correspond to the stationary states of the atom. Arrows represent the spectral rays of the hydrogen atom. Circles, or stationary orbits, indicate the discontinuous series of the values given by the energy of the atomic system. Between orbits, the electron makes a transition or a 'quantum leap', which cannot be determined.

replaced by a quite different formalism and one had to let go of the notion of a trajectory. The concept of an object changing places also turned into an empty concept, since one could only calculate the probability that a given physical system would be found in a certain state in the spatial configuration.

Given the situation of physical science as Heidegger discovers it between 1927 and 1935, phenomena cannot be thought any more along the lines of the fundamental concepts of traditional ontology: permanence, continuity, substantiality, distinguishability. . . . Heidegger acknowledges this fundamental transformation and he cannot but view it against the background of the history of Western metaphysics. The fact that quantum mechanics conceives of 'nature' otherwise than through an underlying presence has to lead to a questioning of the Aristotelian *Problemstellung* of οὐσία, closely connected with the determination of time as the measure of motion.

Indeed, since Aristotle, the 'paradigmatic mode of being for ontology', namely, the kind of being which serves to 'decipher the meaning of being as such' was Nature, as an underlying being-present.⁵⁵ With regard to the essence of motion, 'philosophy has not progressed one single step since Aristotle'⁵⁶ and with regard to the question of the Being of being, the so-called 'return to the Ego' in modern philosophy has only led to the reinforcement of this same interpretation, since Dasein was thought

of as *res cogitans* on the model of *res extensa*. Even Kant, though he understands perfectly well that it is impossible to conceive of the 'I' along these lines,⁵⁷ maintains the privilege of an underlying being to such an extent that he always defines nature as the object of mathematical physics and that his concept of the thing-in-itself implicitly reasserts the 'traditional ontology of an underlying presence'.⁵⁸ Kant 'fails to question the thingness of the thing'.⁵⁹ Is it not precisely Heidegger's own discovery to have found in this kind of being that we ourselves are a mode of being which is that of existence and not of an underlying presence? But if such is the case would it not be plausible to find a 'parallel' discovery on the side of physics – of a physics which keeps its eyes open and which questions the essence of motion and therefore also the essence of Being – a discovery which would lead us to determine nature otherwise than as the set of subsisting entities? How are we to think the apparently final repudiation (obvious 'in the most recent developments in atomic physics') of the connection between permanence, *extensio* and substance?

III The difference vanishes: atomic physics and modernity

Heidegger does not however ask this question. For him, the difference between 'classical' physics and 'contemporary' physics is certainly decisive and touches upon the 'objectivity which manifests itself in nature' because it promotes a new conception of time. Still, this difference vanishes. Its suppression is easily seen in the style of most of the passages in which it is mentioned, passages which mark a contrast between the decisive character of the difference and the assertion that, for all that, it counts for nothing in the face of something even more essential. Why?

At this point it seems obvious that Heidegger, who was dealing in 1935 with a 'decision to be taken', makes his decision in the 1938 lecture, 'Die Zeit des Weltbildes', in which he analyses the meaning of the expression 'modern times'.

What is modernity? Heidegger enumerates five essential features of modernity but he only pays attention to the first: 'we shall restrict the question to the first phenomenon mentioned, namely science' – though Heidegger actually only takes mathematical physics into consideration. He then states that it is his aim to 'touch upon the metaphysical foundations of science in as much as it is *modern science*'.⁶⁰

What, then, is modern science? It is characterized in the first place by the fact that research (*Forschung*) fastens upon one specific region of being. Here Heidegger takes up his former remarks about the mathematical project of classical physics: nature is defined as the set of spatio-temporal motions of various centres of gravity, where motion means change of place. Modern science is also characterized by the fact that

its method seeks to fix variations within a framework of constant changes, i.e., by furnishing scientific laws governing processes. Here the 1938 lecture makes extensive use of the 1915 *Habilitationsschrift*. Finally, a third feature of modern science consists in the organization of research in institutes and the birth of a new type of man, 'the researcher engaged in research programmes' rather than in questioning.

What conception of being is proper to this modern conception of science? Being has to become an object. Nature has to be 'forced' and History has to stand 'still'.⁶¹ Also, the search for objectivity obeys a conception of truth which identifies truth with the certainty of representation. In other words, following Descartes, man must become the subject. What follows from these two transformations? The formation of a *Weltbild*. 'With the triumph of the *Weltbild*, there follows a decisive assignment with respect to being in totality. The being of being is henceforward sought and discovered in the being-represented of being'.⁶² Instead of talking about the philosophical conceptions of modernity, it would be better to say that modernity is defined by the invention of new conceptions of the world. 'Now the world as such becomes a mental construction. This is what characterizes and distinguishes the reign of modernity'.⁶³

Let us return to what was said earlier about the specificity of atomic physics in Heidegger's view. The object disappears, the subject disappears, and what emerges is the question of their relation. It follows therefrom that it is no longer possible to form a *Weltbild* based on atomic physics. Being is no longer conceived in accordance with laws governing change within a spatio-temporal process. Strictly speaking, *if modernity is what Heidegger said it was in 1938, quantum physics does not belong to modern physics*. This is not however the conclusion Heidegger draws when he repeatedly confirms that nuclear physics, or particle physics, remains within the realm of modern physics.

But perhaps this contradiction is only apparent. If quantum physics remains within modern science, this has to be because a crucial issue remains unchanged, despite the revision in the fundamental concepts and in the essence of motion. This crucial issue is the problem of technique, namely, the problem of the calculative projection of nature. There are at least three reasons why Heidegger wanted to insist upon this point and therefore decided to retain atomic physics within the realm of modernity.

A first reason can readily be seen in the very interpretation which Bohr and Heisenberg tried to work out. The major thesis characteristic of this interpretation is that in quantum physics one had to make use of classical concepts because there are no specific quantum concepts that might represent the essence of the object. No quantum concepts means: no ontology in the traditional manner, no transparency of the 'quantons' relative to ordinary language. All the same, one has to do physics and

to communicate the results of experiments (traces of electrons in a cloud chamber, impacts on photographic plates, etc.). But one should be aware that concepts such as these only serve as metaphors. Consequently, the situation remains unchanged. Language is employed to fix the variation of representations and remains within the sphere of the calculable.

A second reason has to do with Heidegger's pessimism concerning the readiness of science to stay the course. Already in 1927 Heidegger wrote that the awakening of natural science would not last: The sciences have begun to dream again. . . . One cannot but be ill at ease, seated on a powder barrel and knowing that the fundamental concepts in question are only worn-out opinions and that everyone wants peace and quiet'.⁶⁴ This was in 1927; and indeed as soon as the fundamental problems of quantum mechanics had been solved, the only physicists to remain seated 'on the powder barrels' were the founders of the theory. Other physicists went on operating as in 'modern physics', looking for ultimate components, breaking up, dividing, confident that they would find the things themselves, calculating, constructing an image of the world. Today, more than ever before, we find theories proposing some 'grand unification', theories striving for the unity of a physical *Weltbild*.

The third reason is that Heidegger himself certainly wanted to take seriously the question: how are we to think through the present situation in the natural sciences? I said before, apropos of the 1935 lectures, that Heidegger refers the difference between the two physics to a transformation of our basic position within what is. How are we to determine what is essential? Many roads are open and still remain so even today, provided one pays special attention to the locus where the most violent conflicts over quantum mechanics still abound. Should we look for an ontology which would be the contemporary equivalent of the Cartesian ontology? Or should we not rather turn our attention to theories of knowledge, in the manner of the neo-Kantians? Or should we be primarily concerned with what affects us most directly, that is to say, modern science, a science which, ever more in the 'atomic age', is directed toward the ideal of an appropriation of Nature and of man? By addressing the question of technology, in as much as technology already formed the essence of modern science at the time of the emergence of mathematical physics, Heidegger chooses the third road. Between the seventeenth century and Heisenberg's physics what disappears in fact is the 'Cartesian' ontology, not the examination of being from the standpoint of calculation. Therefore, whatever the force of our questioning with regard to the objectivity of nature, this questioning (assuming always that it remains alive) is less *urgent* for Heidegger than that which bears upon the persistence of modernity in our life.

And so we bring to an end the detour announced at the beginning, that is, the detour involved in the analysis of interpretative problems

connected with those passages in which Heidegger discusses the difference between classical physics and atomic physics. This detour has allowed us to suggest that one of the most important motives underlying the composition of the lectures of 1935 was the need to bring to light the Kantian objectification of the thing in order that we should be in a position to know what it is exactly that we now have to give up. Heidegger regarded the difference between the two physics as of decisive importance in the history of metaphysics since he interpreted it as a modification of the objectivity of nature which was previously conceived along the lines of subsisting being. At about the same time, Cassirer, the Vienna Circle, even Husserl himself also tried to understand the philosophical significance of quantum mechanics. However, Heidegger went further by abolishing the very difference which he had at first considered so decisive. My hypothesis is that the predominance of technology in Heidegger's work dates from the moment when he decides to say that physics, no longer capable of producing an ontology in the traditional sense, now leaves us completely free to decide what we want to make of nature. From the standpoint of any attempt to comprehend Heidegger's work, this hypothesis has the advantage of possibly resuscitating – and this is all I have tried to do – an angle on the genesis of this decision which has not hitherto been closely examined. This may not only help us to clarify the genesis of Heidegger's own approach but, more importantly, it may help us to understand those philosophical aspects of quantum theory which are linked to the collapse of the very foundations of classical physics.

Translated by Christopher Macann

Notes

References and Abbreviations

In the notes for this article, references to the following works have been given in the following form: first, the abbreviation of the title, then the page of the German edition.

'Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft', *Habilitationsschrift* (1915), in *Frühe Schriften (FS)* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1972), pp. 355–76.

Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (Gr. Ph.), *Gesamtausgabe (GA)* 24. *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in der Philosophie (WF)*, *GA* 31.

Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kant's Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen (FD) (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1962).

'Die Zeit des Weltbildes', a lecture from 1938 given under the title 'Die Begründung des neuzeitlichen Weltbildes durch die Metaphysik' in *Holzwege (H)* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1950).

'Wissenschaft und Besinnung', in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (VA) (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954).

1 Published as 'La physique de Heidegger', *Etudes philosophiques*, 3 (1990), 289–311.

2 VA, 61.

3 FD, 42.

4 The tendency to see the 1935 lectures as a course 'on' Kant with a general introduction added at the beginning seems to be associated with the idea that the lectures which Heidegger had formerly given on Kant exhibited an essential deficiency since they did not comment on the 'Analytic of principles'; instead, Heidegger had privileged the 'Transcendental aesthetics' and the 'Schematism' and he had stubbornly refused to admit that the *Critique of Pure Reason* could be a theory of knowledge. In fact however, a new perspective on Kant cannot be found in the 1935 lectures. Heidegger repeats himself frequently and repetitions are even to be found in a comparison of the 1935 lectures with the 1930 book on the essence of freedom, where we already find an analysis of the 'Analogies of experience'. Moreover, and this is the critical point, the confrontation with the 'metaphysical centre' of Kant's work is constantly referred by Heidegger to the leading question of the Introduction. For similar reasons it seems unsatisfactory to account for the 1935 lectures on the basis of a more or less explicit competition with Husserl who had been concerned with these issues not only in the *Ideen* but also at the beginning of the 1930s. Certainly, a comparison would be most fruitful. For instance the lectures given by Husserl in Belgrade in 1936 (also *Krisis*, 1–27) deal with the interpretation of the beginnings of modern science and modern philosophy and with the meaning of Kant's philosophy from the standpoint of an 'historical and critical regressive meditation' intended to 'prepare the way for a decision.' However, Heidegger does not, in my opinion, concentrate on these themes simply on account of his confrontation with Husserl but also in virtue of his own interpretation of the contemporary situation in the natural sciences in as much as this situation invites a reassessment of certain questions which he had already taken into consideration in the 1935 lectures.

5 FD, 25.

6 FD, 26.

7 *ibid.* Heidegger quotes Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (A 182).

8 FD, 42.

9 FD, 8.

10 FD, 4.

11 FD, 5. Heidegger distinguishes between different meanings of the word 'thing'. One can think of something in general 'every affair or transaction, something that is in this or that condition, the things that happen in the world, occurrences, events'. Or one can use the word 'thing' as in philosophy, having in mind, for instance, the Kantian distinction between the 'thing-in-itself' and the 'thing-for-us' or more generally thinking of anything that is a something and not nothing. Or one can just point to the meaning of the word in ordinary language. A thing is a piece of wood, a rock, a knife, an apple, spruce, lizard, wasp . . . it can be small or big, inanimate or animate, useful or just something to be looked at. But it will not be a number, or a word. It will not be said that the number 5 is a thing and everyone distinguishes between the word 'house' and the thing house. This last meaning is the restricted meaning which Heidegger takes into consideration.

12 *Gr. Ph.*, 36.

13 *FD*, 21.

14 *FD*, 21.

15 *FD*, 21.

16 *FD*, 13. Here we have again the piece of chalk already mentioned by Heidegger on other occasions and especially in the 1930 lectures on the essence of freedom, relative to his commentary of Book Θ of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Indeed the piece of chalk features here like a pastiche of the Cartesian piece of wax: let us break the chalk, Heidegger says, let us dissolve the chalk. Where is matter? Space is not in the chalk nor is it outside the chalk. And where is time to be found on the clock?

17 *FD*, 13.

18 Heidegger does not emphasize the problem of the subject here. One also notes his elimination of any analysis of instrumentality. The standpoint of Dasein certainly does not dominate. It is worth recalling that the 'turning point' in 1929 amounted to a decision to account directly for the historicity of Being. However, I would also like to emphasize the way in which Heidegger gets rid of the perspective of the analytic of Dasein to the benefit of a critical examination of the traditional metaphysical foundations of science.

19 *FD*, 21.

20 Heidegger frequently states that his approach in the 1935 lectures is independent of any presuppositions either about science or about philosophy. He 'forgets' all his former conceptions of what metaphysics might be and simply defines metaphysics as this procedure which entails falling into a well, a procedure which allows him to bring to light a 'pure' question: what is the thingness of the thing?

21 *FD*, 30.

22 *FD*, 31.

23 *FD*, 38.

24 *FD*, 38.

25 *FD*, 38.

26 *FD*, 39.

27 *Gr. Ph.*, 72ff.

28 *WF*, 141.

29 *WF*, 142.

30 *WF*, 147.

31 *FD*, 50.

32 *FD*, 75.

33 *FD*, 51.

34 *Gr. Ph.*, 329, see also *ibid.*, 97: 'The methodological maxim of phenomenology is to refuse to run away from the riddle of phenomena, or to try to get rid of it by way of a theoretical pronouncement; rather the riddle must be accentuated.'

35 *Die Naturwissenschaften*, 22 (1934), 669-75.

36 Up till then, Heisenberg had addressed a more restricted audience, namely, the physicists who were immediately concerned with the problem of the interpretation of quantum theory. Heidegger does not quote this 1934 paper by Heisenberg in the 1935 lectures but he frequently refers to it in later writings.

37 C. F. von Weizsäcker, 'Rencontres sur quatre décennies' in *Martin Heidegger* (Paris: Ed. de l'Herne, 1983), 156.

38 At this point in his argument Heisenberg pays considerable attention to the historical analysis of the gradual rigidification of the image-of-the-world which followed the liberation represented by the discovery in the sixteenth century of

a new realm of reality (*Wirklichkeit*) and by the establishment in the seventeenth century of deductive philosophical systems like those of Descartes and Spinoza. From the very first, he adds, these systems forgot that any knowledge of Nature as a machine was itself a product of man's representative power. Later this way of thinking became extended universally on the basis of the limited sphere of rationality proper to classical physics. This entailed a separation between science and the other aspects of life and we have now become prisoners of such a division.

39 Far from being strict Kantians, Helmholtz, Hertz or Boltzmann considered various local transformations of the concept of representation (*Vorstellung*) and of its different specifications. But the touchstone of criticism had remained, namely, the programme of a metaphysics of nature based on universal laws of thought which were partly derived from the 'universality and necessity' of the laws of nature exhibited in Newtonian physics.

40 *FS*, 355.

41 Heidegger exemplifies this by a thorough examination of the law of gravitation in Galileo's work and he emphasizes the fact that this approach abstracts from any considerations relative to specific bodies.

42 On the one hand, says Heidegger, physics incorporated acoustics and the theory of heat into mechanics. On the other hand, it incorporated optics, magnetism and the theory of thermal radiation into electrical theory (Fourier-Boltzmann and Maxwell-Planck). It is worth recalling that Planck's 'theory of thermal radiation' (1900) was the occasion for the introduction into physics of the idea of a discontinuity in the exchange of energy – even though this was not Planck's intention. This move is always represented as the birth of quantum mechanics.

43 Max Planck, *Acht Vorlesungen über theoretische Physik* (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1910). At this time Planck was desperately trying to resist the growing tendency to introduce discontinuity into the structure of radiation, to the point of proposing 'Planck's second theory' in accordance with which only the mechanism for the absorption of radiation by the atom is to be regarded as a discontinuous process, the emission itself being treated as continuous.

44 This expression is the very title of a famous paper by Planck, 'Die Einheit des physikalischen Weltbildes', *Physikalische Zeitschrift*, 10 (1909), 62–75, in which Planck sharply criticizes the ideas of Ernst Mach.

45 This might seem surprising, first, since in 1915 Heidegger adopts Planck's position and also quotes Einstein. However, it should be mentioned that in many respects quantum mechanics was developed in opposition to Planck's views whereas Relativity theory, for its part, remained a 'classical' theory from the standpoint of the description of phenomena. In 1930, Heisenberg remarks in his Chicago lectures that 'Relativity theory still meets the traditional demands of science since it allows us to divide the world into subject and object and to apply the principle of causality'.

46 *FD*, 51.

47 *FD*, 67.

48 Letter from Pauli to Bohr dated 27 July 1925, in *W. Pauli Wissenschaftliche Briefwechsel* (Berlin: Springer, 1979), 232.

49 Letter from Bohr to Geiger dated 21 April 1925 in N. Bohr, *Collected Works* (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company), V, 350.

50 Hydrogen has only one electron. All attempts to formulate laws of motion for atoms of more than one electron failed up to the 1927 synthesis of matrix mechanics (Heisenberg-Born-Jordan) and wave mechanics (Schrödinger).

51 Causality is here defined in connection with the formalism of differential

equations as the possibility of linking together, by means of continuous laws, a set of numbers describing the initial conditions of a system and another set of numbers describing its final conditions.

52 M. Born, W. Heisenberg and P. Jordan, 'Zur Quantenmechanik II', *Zeitschrift für Physik*, 35 (1926), 558.

53 Since the 1890s, the atom lost the legitimacy of its Greek name since it was now discovered to be divisible. Moreover, the inner structure of the atom was thought to be electrical. In other words, it was assumed that the atom was pervaded by positive and negative electricity. Physicists possessed three kinds of data about atoms: data relating to the chemical and mechanical stability of the atom, and spectroscopic data, that is, photographs of the radiation emitted by atoms in an excited state. The question was, how to derive this data from a law of motion of the constitutive components of the atom, that is, the electrons. Electromagnetic theory was expected to provide a dynamic which would make it possible to account for all the new experimental data.

54 Quantum mechanics was essentially worked out in the course of three years – 1925, 1926, 1927. In 1927, Bohr suggested the formulation of new conditions for the description of phenomena in physical space. While classical physics went on connecting representations in space and time with the principle of causality, quantum mechanics was forced to disjoin them. In other words, if the conditions for the definition of a system were fixed by describing its initial state (with the help of the ψ function) any possibility of representing the final state in space and time (there will only be a probability of any such representation) had to be given up. On the other hand, if it was the conditions for the observation of the system which were fixed, then the indeterminacy conditions forbade any simultaneous knowledge of the classical parameters (for instance, position and momentum) – which would then make it impossible to apply the principle of causality. The choice is thus between 'deterministic' equations which do not attempt to describe the actual reality of the system and conditions for actual observation of the system which have to forego any deterministic description. Nothing of this kind is to be found in ordinary space and time.

55 *Gr. Ph.*, 173.

56 *WF*, 31.

57 *Gr. Ph.*, 209.

58 *ibid.*

59 *FD*, 100.

60 *H*, 70.

61 *H*, 80.

62 *H*, 82.

63 *H*, 82.

64 *Gr. Ph.*, 74–8.

On the origin of nihilism – in view of the problem of technology and karma

Akihiro Takeichi

I

The fundamental form of European philosophy is metaphysics, which Aristotle called 'first philosophy'. First philosophy is 'the study of being as such' as well as a 'theoretical investigation of the primary origin and cause'. It would seem that these two different definitions are merged by positing the eternal unmoved mover which, as pure form, is the purpose of all beings and their movements. In this regard, God *qua* eternal unmoved mover is not simply the highest being (*das Seiendste*), but can serve as the primary origin of all beings by being the ultimate purpose and thereby the good. That is, because this being assumed the characteristic of the good, Aristotle was able to unify two definitions, 'the study of being as such' and 'the theoretical investigation of the primary origin and cause', by positing the Divine which is after all only a being in spite of being the highest.

However, this notion had already been established as a central feature of Western metaphysics when Plato sought the ultimate source of being in the idea of the good, which is the idea of all ideas. This character became all the more dominant from the medieval age onward when the Christian God with its ethico-religious character of love and justice was introduced into philosophy.

II

Consequently, when Nietzsche exclaimed 'God is dead', this did not simply mean the death of the Christian God. It also meant a collapse of the god of metaphysics, that is, the ultimate good posited as beyond all beings and as bestowing purpose and order to the totality of beings.

Nietzsche refers to this death of God by saying, 'The ultimate value is deprived of its value'. This, he claims, is the essence of European nihilism. According to this interpretation, the death of God as the collapse of the metaphysical world is interpreted in terms of value, which is a modern perspective. As a result, prior to his death God is already deprived of his beingness (*Seiendheit*) as the highest being, and thus he becomes simply a 'value' which is appropriate for something.

Two important problems emerge from this. One is that God is relativized by the interpretation in terms of value, as we have just seen. Value is value insofar as it bears a value for something in a given circumstance. This 'something', as in 'for something', is generally speaking a human subject. To use Nietzsche's expression, it is 'life' or 'will'. Consequently, God came to be regarded as a value for life, that is, a condition for the will. A condition is appropriate as a condition only in a given circumstance. Therefore, God cannot but die in a circumstance where the condition, God, is inappropriate and valueless for life.

What is the circumstance that has rendered the condition, God, valueless for life? It is the invasion of nihilism. But to respond in this manner is tautological insofar as we interpret the essence of nihilism as the death of God and the devaluation of the highest value. Thus, in seeking the origin of nihilism the answer to this question should be sought by determining the intrinsic cause of life itself which has rendered God, the condition for life, valueless.

But is this kind of search not already a thinking within a nihilistic circumstance? For insofar as we question the intrinsic cause of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of God regarded as the condition of life, God is not regarded as necessary for the life in essence. Therefore, life becomes primary, and God becomes a secondary being whose existence or non-existence does not in the final analysis matter. However, to disclose life as the principle of positing God means that the Western metaphysical system in which the highest good was regarded as the origin of Being collapsed in Nietzsche. Moreover, it means that the principle supportive of such a system is laid bare. That is, the essence of Being itself was presented for the first time by Nietzsche in terms of will, which posited the highest value as God and so itself transcends the perspective of value. This means that Aristotle's 'study of being as such' came to be carried out for the first time in its true sense.

III

Because 'the will to power' is a principle for positing values, it can also be a principle for overthrowing old values. This overthrowing leads old values to valuelessness. This means nihilism. To use Nietzsche's words,

it is a 'most extreme nihilism'. However, this 'most extreme nihilism', so long as its transvaluation is executed consciously with the principle for positing new values, is at the same time no longer nihilism. The will to power posits all beings as beings which are newly valued. Accordingly, beings are no longer nothingness, and therefore nihilism is overcome.

It is said that nihilism is overcome in Nietzsche. But has it really been overcome? Passive nihilism which is the deprivation of all values can at the same time be transformed into active nihilism. This is simply because it gains a principle for positing new values while overthrowing all old ones. Insofar as the will to power as this principle is the essence of Being, nihilism is after all nothing but a phenomenal fact; it is only a superficial, negative, and temporal aspect of 'life' (will) which develops as a whole while repeating the process of generation-extinction. But is nihilism nothing but a phenomenon to this extent? Can life or will, conceived of as the basis of this phenomenon, remain indifferent to nihilism without being subverted by it? Why does will have to posit value at all? We said that will or life, but not God, is presupposed as the primary Being in Nietzsche. But on what ground is this presupposition established?

Will constantly posits value, and by positing the condition for itself, will secures itself. This means that for will to be will it needs to posit itself (and thereby it maintains and enhances itself) by constantly positing an object. That is to say, to secure itself in this manner is the essence of will. The positing of an object for will is at the same time the giving of a ground for will's independent existence. Will, insofar as it is will, always needs to ground itself by positing a thing other than itself. This means that will itself lacks a ground; the basis of will is groundless. That its ground is nothing urges will toward positing values constantly.

We said earlier that Nietzsche regarded God as value prior to killing him, and that this was nothing other than nihilism. Now we must consider 'nothingness' as the 'origin of nihilism' which thrust this thought of Nietzsche's from its depth. This 'nothingness' lurks as the base of the will to power, which is itself the principle for the positing of all new values and so for overcoming nihilism. It would seem that this nothingness lurking at the base of the will to power was experienced by Nietzsche as the abyss of the eternal recurrence. But, since nothingness was experienced as that very eternal recurrence, this nothingness was incorporated within the will to power by the will to power itself in the manner of 'I willed! I will! And I shall will!' Thereby, nothingness is affirmed and is transformed into an objective being for will. Conversely, the will to power, which lacks a ground and hence must be constantly securing itself, comes to be endowed by means of the eternal recurrence with a ground that is eternity and necessity. Consequently, the nothingness lurking in the will to power (though such a nothingness is primordial

nothingness as the ground of the world, insofar as the will to power is the essence of Being) was not thoroughly thought out in Nietzsche in its relation to the nothingness of nihilism as the essential form of history.

To get a little ahead of ourselves, we could say that nothingness, as the ground of the world, is in this respect, the nothingness of the 'original nihilism' which Heidegger considered the essence of nihilism. Therefore, from this point on, we should like to reflect upon Heidegger's definition of nihilism and then move on to consider whether or not his definition can really reach the 'origin' of nihilism.

IV

The essay which best shows Heidegger's thinking on nihilism is 'The determination of nihilism in terms of the history of being' ('Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus'), which is contained in the second volume of *Nietzsche*. The title straightforwardly expresses the character of Heidegger's interpretation of nihilism. That is, nihilism has to do with nothing (*nihil-ism*), and he intends to determine it in terms of the history of Being.

First, to determine nihilism by way of the history of Being is to determine it in relation to the history of metaphysics, insofar as 'metaphysics has so far been the sole history of Being which can be surveyed'. That is, it does not mean to determine nihilism as a psychological phenomenon, nor to analyze it politically or sociologically, nor to deal with it ethically as a problematic of morality. But rather this approach thinks of nihilism as a phenomenon bearing the essence of metaphysics as 'the study of being as such'.

Secondly, if, judging from the above, metaphysics has an essential bearing on nihilism, we might say that the question that questions being as such in metaphysics, that is, the question about the Being of beings, is shown to have an essential bearing on nothingness.

Heidegger asserts in many places that the question of Being in metaphysics is the question about the Being of beings, and furthermore, it is a question questioning Being from the viewpoint of beings. In such a questioning the truth of Being itself, says Heidegger, is left out, and with respect to Being itself it is nothing (*es ist mit dem Sein nichts*). In contrast, Heidegger insists that his own questioning of Being is the question of Being itself, that is, the question about the truth of Being.

One might very well object that this sort of distinction, in which Being itself is nothing in the question of metaphysics while Heidegger questions Being itself, is meaningless unless the substance of each question is shown. In response to such an objection one needs to point out, as Heidegger has done, the fundamental structure of the oblivion of Being

throughout the history of Western metaphysics, so that it can be demonstrated that the content of the metaphysical question is questioned in the absence of the truth of Being itself. But even if one carries out the questioning as Heidegger actually did, that is, if one criticizes Western philosophical thinking as the oblivion of Being, placing Heidegger's standpoint of the thinking of Being itself on one side and Western philosophy as the standpoint of the oblivion of Being on the other, this would simply be in the end an external critique of traditional Western philosophy. Most criticisms of Heidegger defend the position of traditional philosophy, interpreting Heidegger's position in this manner.

However, an understanding of Heidegger's thought (with respect to his critique of metaphysics), which criticisms like this involve, in fact betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of Heidegger's thinking. Such a view assumes that something like Being itself is or can be thought in its pure form in Heidegger's thinking, while on the other hand Being itself is absent from metaphysical thinking. This sort of scheme of understanding is in the final analysis nothing but the method of cognition of metaphysics, which has not changed since ancient times. It is the method of placing on the one hand a pure thinking of the truth of the absolute and on the other hand an incomplete knowledge of the finite world.

But if we look at Heidegger's own thinking without distorting it through this sort of schema of traditional metaphysics, it is actually quite different. There is no denying that Being itself is questioned in his thinking, but this Being itself is nothing like an absolute or *causa sui*. Rather 'that it belongs to the truth of Being that Being never essentially presents itself without beings'.¹ That is, Being discloses itself (*lichtet sich*) in beings and it is nothing other than this disclosure. Accordingly, although metaphysics is endowed with the truth of beings and Being itself is absent in this openness (*Offenheit*) of beings, we must recognize that Being itself is essentially present as that very absence in metaphysics. The openness of Being is at the same time the concealment (*Verborg-enheit*) of Being, and the truth of Being emerges only as the untruth (*Unwahrheit*) of Being.

Therefore, if we designate as 'nihilism' the essence of metaphysics which is opened up as the truth of the Being of beings, and in which the truth of Being itself is 'nothing' (*nihil*), then this nothingness of nihilism is not simply derived from the knowledge of finite beings, but it belongs to the essence of Being itself. Conversely, we must grant that Being as absence must be the essence of nihilism.²

V

All nihilistic phenomena, or nihilism in the ordinary sense, are derived from the essence of nihilism which we have just discussed. Metaphysics seeks the Being of beings, that is, beingness (*Seiendheit*), in place of Being itself *qua* absence, and 'only beings' exercise 'sole authority'. For example, all the beings in the world of today are brought into the destiny of Being which is 'modern technology' appearing in the final perfected stage of the history of Being, and they are set up as that which is useful. The world is replete with these 'useful' beings.

However, since a being is recognized as a being only insofar as it is useful, it cannot maintain its own steady beingness through itself. Once it loses its usefulness, it will be thrown away. Not only that, if people get tired of it after a certain passage of time, it will be re-made even though it may still be useful. People do not expect a work of architecture to have an everlasting solidity. A building is constructed in such a way that it can be easily demolished in the future. To be 'built and scrapped' is the destiny of beings in the contemporary age. That something is a being is only a provisional, temporary appearance.

So, the contemporary world is replete everywhere with beings, and, no doubt, beings are exercising sole authority, but actually this fact itself is realized on the basis of the essential nihility of beings. We must recognize that the origin of the flood of beings in the contemporary world is nothing but this nihility of beings itself. For this reason, the various nihilistic phenomena in the contemporary world are the other side of the inundation of beings. (For example, we can think of the excess of commercial art in contrast to the absence of essential art.)

Thus, beings, to the degree that they exist in the contemporary age, are supported by nihility, but Being which has been concealed through the flood of beings is presented in this very nihility as concealed Being. That is, the essence of 'original nihilism', that is, the absence of Being itself, is disclosed in the nihility that negates beings unlimitedly and in their basis.

It would seem that the preceding is Heidegger's definition by way of the 'history of Being' which is given to the essence of nihilism and to the nihilistic phenomena derived therefrom. Going one step further, we must ask what is the 'origin' from which the essence of nihilism is derived. To respond to this question, we must think out further the absence of Being, which Heidegger has thought of as the essence of nihilism.

VI

As has been noted, absence belongs to the essence of Being itself, and since nihilism is *the* essential mode of the history of Being, 'the truth of Being has remained hidden from metaphysics throughout its history from Anaximander to Nietzsche'.³ But this can be restated by saying that the truth of Being has been kept essentially concealed, and for this reason metaphysics from Anaximander to Nietzsche was able to blossom. That is, the absence of the truth of Being and the blossoming of the truth of beings which is metaphysics are two sides of the same thing. The oblivion of the truth of Being is not a result of a deficiency in metaphysical thinking, but was an essential and necessary consequence for metaphysics, which is the truth of beings, the revealing (*Entbergung*) and the unconcealment (*Unverborgenheit*) of beings.

Accordingly, it would seem that one of the ways to investigate the origin from which the essence of nihilism as the absence or concealment of Being is derived is to inquire into how the revealing of beings, inseparable from the absence of Being, is realized. No doubt, one can think of investigating the origin of concealment (*Verborgenheit*) from the concealment itself, but insofar as it is an investigation by means of language whose essence is to express, such an alternative is not viable. Rather, the path we should follow lies nowhere else than in guarding (*wahren*) to the end the concealment *qua* concealment. Thus it should not end up that 'in the emerging of unconcealment what is essential to it, namely concealment, be lost, and moreover in favor of that which is unconcealed, which appears as what is'.⁴ In guarding the concealment, we must clarify how the unconcealment is realized, that is, how the unconcealment breaks through the concealment, thereby disclosing beings and (at the same time) concealing the concealment itself. That is, we must clarify how the truth of beings brings about the oblivion of Being and the oblivion of this oblivion.

If the unconcealment of beings and the essence of nihilism, which is the concealment of Being, are two sides of the same thing, then the destiny of Being as the essence of technology, in which nihilism culminates, is also the time when beings are completely revealed. In fact, all beings, as has been seen, are exposed in the world of contemporary technology in broad daylight throughout the world. And what are thereby exposed are taken up one after another as that which is useful in some manner or another. However, the destiny of technology, or to use Heidegger's terminology, 'enframing' (*Gestell*), is not the destiny of Being which has just now started, but 'has been dominant, though in a concealed form, from ancient times'.⁵ The function of setting up in 'enframing' (*Gestell*) is derived from the function of setting up in *poiēsis* in ancient times. The functions of these settings up are essentially related,

because they are both revealing (*Entbergung*).⁶ Moreover, the meaning of *thesis* (setting up) functions in a concealed way in the term *phusis*, which is the primordial word expressing Being.⁷ Heidegger characterizes it as follows: '*Phusis* is *thesis*: to lay something before one, to place it, to produce and bring it forth, namely into presence [*Anwesen*].'⁸

Seen in this manner, insofar as Being is Being, or insofar as Being is the revealing, it essentially has the function of 'setting up'. Therefore, the destiny of Being as 'enframing' is the destiny originally determined insofar as Being is Being. 'Enframing is the Being itself'.⁹ When 'enframing' can be traced back to the primordial essence of Being, the concealment of Being itself, which is inseparable from the derivation of 'enframing', is traced back to the primordial essence of Being also. However, from where are derived the functions of 'setting up' and 'revealing' which are 'the same'¹⁰ as the concealment?

'Enframing' is referred to as 'making' (*Machenschaft*) in the lectures of Heidegger's middle period¹¹ and indicates the gathered totality of human creation and doing. If we interpret the function of 'setting up' as the original sense of revealing, it corresponds to the 'projection of world' (*Weltenwurf*) in *Being and Time* which makes it possible in advance for beings to be. However, Heidegger does not question why 'projection of world', 'making', and 'revealing' emerge. Insofar as one remains within the standpoint of phenomenological description, one cannot go beyond asserting that Being always is only as revealing and that man is that which constantly acts and carries out the projection of world. This is nothing other than the fundamental fact of Being and man. If the unconcealment of beings is fundamental, then the concealment of Being, which is inseparable from it and which is the essence of nihilism, also turns out to be a fundamental fact. Consequently, it seems that one can only assert that nihilism is a fact of experience in the most profound sense.

If the essence of nihilism is manifest in the contemporary world as the fundamental nihility of beings, the contemporary period is the age when the oblivion of the truth of Being is thoroughly complete. And at the same time, it is also the age when the concealment of the truth of Being is exposed without any longer being obscured by the unconcealment of beings. When the concealment is experienced as concealment, it becomes possible to question the way to mitigate in some manner the violence of the destiny of technology which is the extreme form of the revealing of beings.

Incidentally, the fundamental nihility of beings in light of Buddhism is 'all that is, is transitory' (*shogyō mujō*). Buddhism teaches that 'all that is, is transitory' is the true aspect of the world and claims that the enlightened awareness of this is transformed immediately into Nirvanic awareness of tranquillity. In contrast, if we think of enlightened awareness in Heidegger or in the destiny of Western metaphysics, it must be

thought to be achieved through the process of history, and moreover, at the very time when the oblivion of Being, though preventing such an awareness, reaches its maximum limit. At this moment the oblivion of Being turns round.

However, there must also be in Buddhism an ideal that one is prevented from this enlightened awareness, with his eyes enchanted only by beings rather than by the truth of Being. This brings us to the idea of *gō* (karma), the discussion of which will shed some light on the question with which we have been concerned, that is, the origin of the revealing, and thus, the origin of nihilism.

VII

The term *gō* is a Japanese translation of the Sanskrit word *karma* and means 'making' (*zōsa*). That is, it means to 'make and act' (*gyō*; *saṃskāra*). If it is correct to understand *gyō*, which is the second element of the formula of twelve-fold causation (*engi*; *pratītya-samutpāda*), as *karma*,¹² then it means to 'make by gathering'. 'Gathering' is a gathering of all indirect and direct causes (*innen*; *hetu-pratyaya*). All things are realized by virtue of various harmonious combinations of direct and indirect causes. This requires something to gather all the direct and indirect causes: this is *gō*, or karma. The substance of karma is understood in early Buddhism to be 'intention' (*shi*), the 'function of will'.¹³ Seen in this manner, karma can be understood as the function of will that gathers all things in order for beings to be. This corresponds to what Heidegger called the revealing of beings, although the former is formed with a volitional aspect.

Where does karma thus understood come from? The origin of karma is the concealment of truth, as it is said that 'to make and act' (*gyō*; *saṃskāra*) is due to 'absolute ignorance' (*mumyō*; *avidyā*). Just as the concealment of Being engenders the revealing of beings in Heidegger, so the concealment of truth which is absolute ignorance emerges outwardly as karma. According to early Buddhist sutras, absolute ignorance is always juxtaposed with craving (*katsuai*). Craving is insatiable 'ego-desire', as in, for example, a thirsty person ceaselessly drinking water. Consequently, karma generated by absolute ignorance, that is, the essence of the function of will that reveals beings, can be understood as ceaseless ego-desire.

The idea of karma is further deepened in Mahayana Buddhism, especially in the thought of Shinran (1173–1262) in Japan. We have just said that the essence of karma is ego-desire. However, this does not mean that the 'I' performs karmic action. Whether the present 'I' does good or evil is dependent upon past karma (*shukugō*; *pūrva-karma*).¹⁴

The moral standpoint based upon the self-power (*jiriki*) is completely denied in the statement that 'it is not because my mind (heart) is good that I do not kill'. This means that all of one's existence is dependent upon past karma, that past karma determines all of one's present and future actions. However, the past, in which everything is determined beforehand, is no longer an aspect of time which is past, but is eternal. Past karma is an eternal fact without beginning or end. That is, past karma exists along with ignorance in an inseparable oneness with the existence of man. Past karma and absolute ignorance are, as it were, the fundamental fact for human existence. This corresponds to the very same fundamental fact that both the concealment of Being and the revealing of beings are equipurimordial.

As seen in the foregoing, past karma has ego-desire as its essence. Accordingly, if past karma is the fundamental fact for human existence, it means that we must carry on our shoulders ego-desire as the essence of our self, even though we have not chosen it ourselves. We must always live according to it. We are endlessly driven by our ego-desire, through which we constantly end up committing ourselves to something. This is our life. However, whatever we commit ourselves to, whether good or evil, is not our doing. It is brought about by our past karma, which is ego-desire.

Heidegger's investigation of the essence of technology does not attempt to define technology by placing man in the center in such a way as to regard technology either as a means for an end or as a tool for man's action. Rather, he regards the essence of technology as the function of truth that reveals beings, and through which all beings including man are set up. Consequently, the essence of technology thus conceived is not that which is 'made by man',¹⁵ that is, it is not technical. Rather, it has 'a transcendental character' which is unmanipulatable by man, tools, or machines produced by man. It claims man and thereby controls him. Because man always listens to the calling of this claim, he goes around ceaselessly so as to set up all beings as useful.

Seen in this manner, we must recognize that karma and the essence of technology are fundamentally functions of the same thing. In other words, karma or technology means ceaseless human action without beginning or end. An action in this sense has emanated from eons ago up to the present through the fountain of absolute ignorance (the concealment of Being) accompanying the flood of (essentially nihilistic) beings, and thereby has formed the essence of history. This I take to be the ultimate origin of nihilism.

VIII

Finally, I would like to offer briefly my thoughts concerning how we should deal with the destiny of nihilism. As we have observed, the revealing of beings (Enframing) or karma has generated history *qua* nihilism. However, insofar as revealing and karma are the eternal essence of human life and Being, their denial is a rejection of life and Being as such. That is, the origin of nihilism is Being and life as such. But if we do not somehow reject nihilism, it leads to the destruction of Being and life. Either alternative means death. This is, no doubt, an inescapable predicament. How do we break through it?

One must shatter the delusion of beings which dominates the contemporary period by seeing thoroughly into the fundamental nihility which runs at the bottom of the stream of beings. Thereby one must bring karma, which brought forth this stream of beings, to self-awareness (*jikaku*) as 'one's own sin of karmic action' which originated in the beginningless past. One must existentially bring to self-awareness the fact that Being is immediately 'danger' and life is immediately 'sin'. The origin of ignorance or nihilism will not be transformed fundamentally until each of us carries out this 'self-awareness'. Only then, it would seem, can the 'Enframing' and 'karma' be housed within a quiet and calm light. However, the self-awareness that would bring about a transformation of world history cannot be attained through a half-hearted reflection on sin. Every one in his or her own self-awareness must realize that he or she is the most sinful being in the world. The phrase expressing such a self-awareness is 'When I carefully consider the Vow (*gan, seigan*) which Amida brought forth after five kalpas' contemplation (*goko shiyui*), I find that it was solely for me, Shinran, alone!'

Translated by Monte Hull and S. Nagatomo

Notes

1 Martin Heidegger, *Was Ist Metaphysik?*, 6th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1981), p. 41.

2 Heidegger, *Nietzsche II* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), p. 356.

3 Heidegger, *Was Ist Metaphysik?*, p. 10.

4 *ibid.*, p. 11.

5 Cf. Heidegger, *Einblick in das, was ist* (1949).

6 Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1967), pp. 28, 38.

7 Cf. Heidegger, *Einblick in das, was ist*.

8 Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, p. 49.

9 Cf. Heidegger, *Einblick in das, was ist*.

10 Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, pp. 270–2.

11 Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953), p. 122.

12 Kazuya Funabashi, *Gō no kenkyū (Study of Karma)* (Kyoto: Hozokan, 1952), p. 13.

13 *ibid.*, p. 38.

14 I have learned much on the interpretation of *shukugō* (Karmic determination) from Yoshifumi Ueda's *Bukkyō ni okeru gō no shisō (The Thought of Karma in Buddhism)*.

15 Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, p. 26.

Heidegger and Japanese thought: how much did he know and when did he know it?

Graham Parkes

One branch of the burgeoning literature on Heidegger has remained relatively stunted – that concerning the relations of his thinking to Asian thought. And while the occasional comparative study has appeared over the past decade or two, discussions of the *influence* of Asian ideas on the development of Heidegger's thinking have been especially rare.¹ It may still be too early to form an adequate picture of the influences on Heidegger's thinking from East-Asian sources, and a thorough treatment would require extensive research in Germany and Japan.² But given the enormous impact of Heidegger's ideas on twentieth-century thought, and since the possibility of considerable influence on his thinking from non-Western sources has not been entertained in the Anglo-American scholarship, the amount at stake for the history of ideas calls for a provisional discussion in the meantime. All the more so since the answer to the question in the subtitle above would appear to be: 'Quite a bit, and early on' – and because the evidence suggests that during the 1920s and 1930s Heidegger may have appropriated a number of ideas from Chinese and Japanese philosophy into the central development of his own thought. Ultimately, the probability that Heidegger's thinking was influenced in its formative stages by ideas from the East-Asian tradition surely calls for some different readings of the Heideggerian text in future.

1 Three thinkers from the Orient

It was in 1921, when Heidegger was a *Dozent* working under the imposing presence of Husserl at Freiburg, that the first of several eminent (or, at the beginning, imminently eminent) philosophers from Japan made what came to be known as 'the Freiburg pilgrimage' to study with Heidegger. His name was Yamanouchi Tokuryû.³ The same age as

Heidegger, Yamanouchi was a scholar of broad range who went on to found the Department of Greek Philosophy at Kyoto University and at the same time was one of the first thinkers to introduce phenomenology to Japan. He was also a younger colleague of Nishida Kitarô, a philosopher at Kyoto University whose epoch-making work *Zen no kenkyû* (*An Inquiry into the Good*) of 1911 is regarded as the first masterwork of modern Japanese philosophical thought.⁴ Later, during the 1930s, Yamanouchi was to become one of the few thinkers of sufficient stature to challenge Nishida's formidable philosophical system.⁵

The following year two more visitors – men destined to become major figures in modern Japanese philosophy – arrived in Germany: Tanabe Hajime and Miki Kiyoshi. Again, both were younger colleagues of 'the Master', Nishida Kitarô. Tanabe first went to Berlin to study with Alois Riehl, and from there he moved to Freiburg to study with Husserl. In Freiburg he was introduced to Heidegger, who, though four years his junior, impressed him as brilliant. Miki went first to Heidelberg to work with Heinrich Rickert, and then on to Marburg – where Heidegger had just moved – to study with the thinker whose thought subsequent generations of Japanese philosophers would find so congenial.⁶ There being less to say about Miki in relation to our present concerns, let us consider his case first.

Miki Kiyoshi had studied philosophy at Kyoto with Nishida and another major figure in the 'Kyoto School' of philosophy, Hatano Seiichi, as well as with Tanabe. After a year at Heidelberg, he was induced by Heidegger's reputation to follow him to Marburg when he moved there in 1924. Deeply impressed by the 'postwar anxiety' that pervaded German society, Miki felt that this 'existential' atmosphere informed the development of Heidegger's thinking and contributed to his growing popularity as a teacher. Miki's first book, published in Japan in 1926 after a subsequent period of study in Paris, dealt with Pascal's conception of the human being by way of an application of Heidegger's hermeneutic analysis of *Dasein*. Since *Sein und Zeit* was not to appear until the following year, one assumes that Miki gained his understanding of Heidegger's method through conversations during his year at Marburg. Ohashi Ryôsuke has suggested that Miki's reading of Pascal, in which he emphasizes concern with death as the decisive element in our consciousness of time, is evidence of his appropriation of ideas Heidegger was developing at the time Miki had worked with him.⁷

Although after his return to Japan Miki became more and more concerned with social and political philosophy, being deeply influenced by Marx, the existential basis of his thinking endured, as is evidenced by his continuing concern with the idea of nothingness. He had been acquainted since his student days with the 'Pure Land' Buddhism of the thirteenth-century thinker Shinran, and on arriving in Europe, he was

intrigued to find how prevalent the idea of nothingness was there – albeit in the quite different context of European nihilism. Ohashi suggests (*JH*, pp. 27–8) that Miki's engagement with *das Nichts* in Heidegger proceeds from a basis in the Buddhist conception of nothingness (*mu*). At any rate, the idea of nothingness is at the basis of what many regard as his philosophical masterpiece, *Kôshôryoku no ronri* (*The Logic of the Power of Imagination*), which was clearly influenced by Heidegger's discussion of the transcendental imagination in his 1929 book on Kant. But to appreciate the significance of the fact that the topics of death and nothingness come up in Miki's engagement with Heidegger's thinking, it will help to step back for a moment before considering the more complex case of Tanabe Hajime.

If one were to characterize in the broadest strokes the major difference between the philosophy of the so-called Kyoto School (of which the thinkers mentioned so far were the founding fathers), and the mainstream of the Western philosophical tradition, one could concur with the judgment often advanced by the Japanese that whereas Western philosophies have tended to be philosophies of life based upon inquiry into the nature of being, East-Asian philosophies in general (and that of the Kyoto School in particular) have tended to focus much more on the topics of death and nothingness. Now, much of what makes Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* such a revolutionary work is the central role played by the idea of *das Nichts* and his existential conception of death – as confirmed by the part they play in Heidegger's subsequent pursuit of the *Seinsfrage*. A pertinent question, then, concerns the extent to which Heidegger had already developed his ideas on nothingness and death by the time of his first contact with the ideas of the Kyoto School thinkers.

A definitive answer to this question will be possible only when Heidegger's complete *Nachlass* from the period up to 1922 has been published. However, a perusal of the currently available materials does not provide any evidence that Heidegger engaged the ideas of death and nothingness on an existential or ontological level before the treatment in *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffes* in 1925.⁸ There is a brief discussion of *das Nichts* in Heidegger's lectures of the Winter semester 1921/2 at Freiburg (shortly before Tanabe and Miki arrived); but the nothing in question is very much a 'relative nothing', relative to the kind of negation involved, or else is 'the nothing of factual life'.⁹ And while there is a very brief mention in the lectures from the Summer semester of 1923 of such themes as *das Man* and *Angst*, there is no discussion of death or nothingness.¹⁰ Our question, then – whether Heidegger may have been prompted by his conversations with the Kyoto School philosophers to elaborate the idea of *das Nichts* at the level of fundamental ontology or develop his existential conception of death – remains interestingly open.

Tanabe Hajime is widely regarded as being the second greatest figure (after Nishida) in modern Japanese philosophy.¹¹ His personal and philosophical relationship with Heidegger was much closer and more enduring than Miki's, who became sharply critical of Heidegger after the events of 1933. It was in part because of Nishida's interest in phenomenology that Tanabe had gone to Freiburg to study with Husserl. Whether it was disappointment with Husserl and original phenomenology, or else enthusiasm over the new turn the method was taking at the hands of the younger thinker, Tanabe politely bowed out of Husserl's classes in order to attend the lecture course Heidegger gave in the Summer semester of 1923 under the title *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*. Heidegger had, in turn, ample occasion to be impressed by the visitor from Japan, having gladly agreed to Tanabe's request for private tutorials in German philosophy. Over the ensuing decades the two men remained on cordial terms, and when Tanabe was awarded (*in absentia*) an honorary doctorate by the University of Freiburg, Heidegger sent him a congratulatory copy of the limited edition of his *Gespräch mit Hebel* furnished with a recent photograph.¹²

An appraisal of the nature of the philosophical interchange between Tanabe and Heidegger is made difficult by the almost complete silence the latter maintained about his Japanese colleagues and their ideas. And while Tanabe continued to make reference to Heidegger's works throughout his career, he appears to have been a very reticent man, and relatively little of his correspondence has survived. However, approaching from the side of Tanabe's references to Heidegger, let us see what reconstruction of their philosophical relationship is possible – with respect first to the topic of death and then to the idea of nothingness.

After his return to Japan in 1924, Tanabe published an essay entitled 'The new turn in phenomenology: Heidegger's phenomenology of life'.¹³ Disregarding some book reviews that appeared between 1917 and 1919, this essay has the distinction of being the first substantial commentary on Heidegger's thought to have been published in any language. The essay is of particular interest since its concluding section gives us an idea of how Heidegger's 1923 lecture course ended. (The transcript published in the *Gesamtausgabe* is said by the editor to be lacking the last page or two: 'it breaks off suddenly in the middle of the train of thought'.¹⁴) It is interesting that a breach in the Heideggerian text should be fillable only on the basis of Tanabe's account – the ultimate topic of which is death.

Missing from the transcript of the lectures in the *Gesamtausgabe* – but prominent in the conclusion of Tanabe's discussion of Heidegger's phenomenology of life – is an account of the role played by the confrontation with death. Since the following passage apparently provides the

closest access to Heidegger's first words on the topic of death, it is worth citing at some length:

Just as life is not merely a passage [of time], so death is not the mere termination or breaking off of such a passage. Rather death stands before *Dasein*, as something inevitable. One can even say that it is precisely in the way life regards death and deals with it in its concern that life displays its way of being. If it flees from the death that stands before it as something inevitable, and wants to conceal and forget it in its concern with the world of relations, this is the flight of life itself in the face of itself – which means precisely that the ultimate possibility-of-being of life becomes an impossibility-of-being. On such a basis, to grasp *Dasein* in its primordial way of being is ultimately impossible. Because the way in which *Dasein* is concerned with death – from which it would like to flee but cannot – informs its very way of being, one must rather emphasize that it is just there, where life voluntarily opens itself to certain death, that it is truly manifest to itself.

(*JH*, pp. 107–8)

When translated into German this passage, written by Tanabe in 1924, sounds uncannily like the Heidegger of *Sein und Zeit*. The passage is all the more significant since Heidegger may not have written on the topic of death previously. In the event that he did not, then the fact that the first evidence of his interest in the topic comes from Tanabe is significant – since it suggests that Heidegger may have been encouraged to engage this issue, so central to the existential analytic and the theory of temporality presented in *Sein und Zeit*, precisely by his encounter with his Japanese colleague.¹⁵

This speculation is encouraged by some statements of Tanabe's that appear in his contribution to the *Festschrift* for Heidegger's seventieth birthday.¹⁶ The essay is a translation of the second half of a monograph published the previous year, in 1958, entitled 'Sei no sonzaigaku ka shi no benshōhō ka?' ('Ontology of life or dialectics of death?') – the original version of which bore the subtitle 'A polemical engagement with Heideggerian ontology'. Ohashi Ryōsuke points out that the first half of the monograph, which was not translated for the *Festschrift*, contains some quite vehement criticism of Heidegger's 'ontology of life' (*JH*, p. 26). Tanabe begins his contribution to the *Festschrift* by contrasting the general orientation toward philosophies of life in the Western tradition with the more death-oriented approach characteristic of East-Asian philosophies. For thinkers in the Buddhist tradition, 'in thinking of the enigmatic inevitability of death, the ephemerality and fragility of life pervades us to the very marrow' (pp. 93–4). For this reason, Tanabe continues,

he had always been dissatisfied in his studies of Western philosophy – until he went to Freiburg in 1922.

He goes on to recall how deeply impressed he was to discover, on first attending Heidegger's lectures, 'that in his thinking a meditation on death had become central to philosophy and supported it from the ground up. I could not help feeling that I had now found a way to the philosophy I had been seeking.' The impression these remarks may give of Tanabe's having come upon a fully developed Heideggerian philosophy of death is misleading. Tanabe was an exceedingly modest man – even in the context of a general tendency of the Japanese toward (by Western standards) extreme self-effacement – and these remarks constituted the introduction to his contribution to the *Festschrift* for the seventieth birthday of the man regarded by the Japanese as the greatest living philosopher.

Given that Tanabe's scholarly output prior to his trip to Germany had been largely in the fields of science and mathematics (his first two books, published in 1915 and 1918, were on the natural sciences), it seems as if the encounter with Heidegger helped him to connect his academic work with a deeper level of his existence. This deeper level had to do with Tanabe's lifelong concern with philosophy of religion: Christianity had interested him intensely during his school days, and he devoted most of his later career to religious philosophy, undertaking numerous comparisons between Christianity and Japanese Buddhism. It is reasonable to suppose that at the time of his meeting Heidegger Tanabe was himself deeply concerned with the existential problem of death, and the discovery that Heidegger was working a number of existential concerns into his 'phenomenology of life' showed him that such topics could be engaged philosophically as well as on a personal level.

Another factor that is relevant here will bring us to the related issue of nothingness. For several years prior to his visit to Freiburg Tanabe had been a junior colleague of Nishida's at Kyoto. While Nishida was well acquainted with German thought – the mystical tradition, German Idealism, and neo-Kantianism in particular – the philosophy he had begun to elaborate in his masterwork of 1911 was experientially based on the practice of Zen Buddhism and to a large extent turned on the Buddhist conception of nothingness (*mu*).¹⁷ Tanabe himself was to make the idea of *zettai mu* (absolute nothingness) central to the philosophy of religion he elaborated in his mature thought – even though his different understanding of the idea was a major point of contention in his subsequent philosophical disagreements with Nishida.¹⁸

Not long after his arrival in Freiburg, Tanabe was invited to give a presentation on Nishida's philosophy to a select group of German philosophers – including Heidegger – at Husserl's home.¹⁹ They could not have found a speaker more qualified, since Tanabe had been following the development of Nishida's thought for the previous ten years. Unless

some record of Tanabe's presentation is discovered, one can only speculate on its content. But since Nishida had been developing his idea of 'absolute nothingness' since 1911, and Tanabe was at the time the best interpreter of his mentor's thinking, his talk must have dealt with Nishida's conception of nothingness (especially since the idea of *mu* was to become so central to Tanabe's own thinking).

At the conclusion of a chapter of *An Inquiry into the Good* entitled 'The phenomena of consciousness as the sole reality', Nishida argues that – in contrast to the situation in the physical world under the law of causality – in consciousness something *can* arise out of nothing (chap. 7). In a chapter dealing with his conception of God as the ground of reality, Nishida follows the *via negativa* of Nicholas of Cusa and the idea of God as total negation: 'From this standpoint, God is absolute nothingness.' He goes on to say that 'precisely because He is able to be nothingness, there is no place whatsoever where he is not present, no place where he is not at work'.²⁰ And in the context of a later invocation of Nicholas of Cusa and Jakob Boehme, Nishida writes:

Nothingness separated from being is not true nothingness; the one separated from the all is not the true one; equality separated from distinction is not true equality. In the same way that if there is no God there is no world, if there is no world there is no God.²¹

The possibility that Nishida's thought is behind Heidegger's conception of nothingness deserves serious consideration – even though there are, of course, earlier prefigurations in the Western tradition. One thinks of the conceptions of 'nothingness' in such thinkers as Meister Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa and Jakob Boehme, with whom Heidegger was familiar (if perhaps not as familiar as Nishida was at the time), as well as in the idealism of Hegel and Schelling. It is interesting that Hegel, in the context of his well-known formulation in Book I of the *Wissenschaft der Logik*: 'Pure Being and pure Nothing are the same', refers to Buddhist thought: 'In oriental systems, and especially in Buddhism, *nothingness* or the void [*das Leere*], is the absolute principle.'²² Just as interesting is the fact that Schelling (on whom Heidegger gave many lectures) mentions Lao Zi's notion of nothingness in a passage in *The Philosophy of Mythology*:

The great art or wisdom of life consists precisely in attaining this pure potential, which is nothing and yet at the same time all. The entire *Dao de jing* is concerned with showing, through a great variety of the most pregnant tropes, the great and insuperable power of non-being.²³

An immediate (though generally unremarked) precursor with respect

to a radical notion of nothingness is Max Scheler, whom Heidegger refers to often in his lectures from the 1920s, as well as in the text of *Sein und Zeit*. In his essay 'Vom Wesen der Philosophie' of 1917, Scheler proposed as the fundamental basis of philosophical activity the insight 'that *there is anything at all* or, put more precisely, that "*there is not nothing*" (whereby the word "nothing" . . . means *absolute nothing* . . .)'.²⁴ After a discussion of how the circumstance that 'there isn't nothing' prompts philosophical wonderment, Scheler goes on to say: 'Whoever has not looked into the *abyss of absolute nothing* in this way will also completely overlook the eminently positive nature of the content of the insight that there is anything at all and not rather nothing.' This phrasing will be familiar to those acquainted with Heidegger's discourses on nothing published at the end of the 1920s.

In a discussion of religious activity in the essay 'Problems of religion' from 1920, Scheler returned to the topic of absolute nothing:

To believe in 'nothing' is something quite different from not believing. It is – as evidenced by the powerful emotional impact that the thought of 'nothing' exercises on our soul – a highly positive state of the spirit. *Absolute nothing* is to be sharply distinguished from every merely relative nothing as a phenomenon. Absolute nothing is not-being-something and not-existing in one, in utter unity and simplicity.²⁵

In a footnote at this point Scheler says that this unity distinguishes absolute nothing from the Buddhist idea of nirvana, which he understands (mistakenly) as 'merely freedom and redemption from the actual world'. Although Scheler's enterprise is more explicitly religious than Heidegger's, his talk later in the same paragraph of 'metaphysical *Angst*' and 'religious *Schauder* in the face of absolute nothing' is a striking anticipation of Heidegger's formulations several years later.

Assuming that Tanabe and Heidegger did talk about nothingness, it is probable that the precursor in the East-Asian philosophical tradition of the Japanese notion of *mu* was also a topic of conversation: the Chinese notion of *wu*, which figures prominently in the classical Daoist texts attributed to Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi. In his only reference to Tanabe in his published works, in the 1954 dialogue between a Japanese and an Inquirer, Heidegger has the Japanese say: 'Professor Tanabe often came back to the question you once addressed to him of why we Japanese didn't reflect upon the venerable beginnings of our own thinking instead of greedily chasing after the latest new things in European philosophy.'²⁶ The 'venerable beginnings' of Japanese Zen certainly include philosophical ideas from classical Daoism, and Heidegger knew this when he wrote the dialogue. As we shall see shortly, the relevant Daoist texts had been available in German since 1912, and so if Tanabe had referred

to them in their conversations Heidegger would have had access to the translations.

The influences on Heidegger's developing conception of *das Nichts* are multiple and complex, and deserve detailed study when all the relevant manuscripts have been published. The question is of course complicated by the fact that Nishida, Tanabe, *et al.*, were conversant not only with the German mystical tradition but also with the Idealists' understandings of 'absolute nothingness' – a familiarity that no doubt affected the development of their own, essentially Buddhist elaborations of the idea. But for the time being one can say that it is highly probable that Heidegger was introduced to the East-Asian conception of nothingness before he began to develop his own radical thinking on the topic of *das Nichts*.

Back in 1921 another Japanese philosopher had arrived in Europe who was to spend eight years of study there: Kuki Shūzō, often known as 'Count Kuki' because of his aristocratic origins. One year older than Heidegger, Kuki had been one of the co-participants with Miki in Rickert's seminar in Heidelberg in 1923. After three years in Paris studying French philosophy, Kuki returned to Germany in the spring of 1927 in order to work with Husserl in Freiburg.²⁷ After meeting Heidegger at Husserl's home, however, Kuki was sufficiently impressed by the younger philosopher that he moved to Marburg later that year in order to attend Heidegger's lectures. Apparently Kuki was already acquainted with Heidegger's philosophy, since it is mentioned in the first draft of his manuscript on the idea of *iki*, which he had completed in Paris the previous year.²⁸ His book *Haideggah no tetsugaku* (*The Philosophy of Heidegger*) of 1933 would be the first book-length study of Heidegger's thought to be published in any language.

Kuki was not only a brilliant philosopher but a man of supremely refined culture, and among the Japanese thinkers who visited Heidegger in the 1920s he seems to have made the greatest impression on the host. Kuki and his ideas play a major role in Heidegger's dialogue 'Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache' – indeed one quite disproportional to their presence in the actual conversation on which the dialogue was based.²⁹ While the dialogue in general bears only a tenuous relation to the original conversation, being for the most part Heidegger's free invention, the Inquirer's opening statement – 'To Count Kuki belongs my enduring remembrance' – is surely a genuine expression of the author's feelings. It also rings true when the Inquirer remarks that his conversations with Kuki, 'unfolded freely and spontaneously [*wie ein freies Spiel*] in our home, where Count Kuki sometimes came with his wife, who would wear traditional Japanese dress' – and that 'the East-Asian world would thereby shine more radiantly' (*US*, p. 89/4).

The Inquirer goes on to say that his conversations with Kuki concerned

the latter's notion of *iki* and, more broadly, 'the essential nature of *East-Asian* art and poetry'. Since Kuki had completed a first draft of his seminal work on *iki* in Paris in 1926, one can well imagine its being a topical theme in his conversations with Heidegger.³⁰ In fact we can probably gain a better sense of the content of these conversations from Kuki's side than from Heidegger's poetically processed recollections of some twenty-five years later. After his year at Marburg Kuki went back to France, and in August of 1928 he delivered two lectures in French at a colloquium at Pontigny under the title 'Propos sur le temps'.³¹

It is not unreasonable to suppose that Kuki was working on the ideas expressed in these lectures (and the subsequent book) while he was in Marburg and that he discussed them with Heidegger – especially since the second talk, entitled 'The expression of the infinite in Japanese art', deals precisely with what Heidegger's Inquirer would later refer to as 'the essential nature of *East-Asian* art and poetry'. In the first talk, 'The notion of time and repetition in Oriental time', Kuki deals mainly with Hindu and Buddhist ideas of temporality, but he also makes some interesting remarks about *bushidô*, the 'way of the samurai'. In view of his keen interest in *bushidô*, it is likely that Kuki's conversations with Heidegger touched upon the ethical code of the samurai – one of the major tenets of which is summed up in the maxim: 'The way of the samurai is death'. Heidegger would have been struck by the remarkable similarity between the attitude advocated by *bushidô* toward death and the ideal of *vorlaufende Entschlossenheit* he had just presented in *Sein und Zeit* (1927).

Kuki's second set of *propos* opens with a reference to the Japanese critic and philosopher of art Okakura Kakuzô, who introduced some of the theoretical background of Japanese art to the West with the publication in English of *The Ideals of the East* in 1903. If Kuki and Heidegger talked about Japanese art, then the former – who knew Okakura personally – must have recommended Okakura's books. Incidentally, a contemporary Japanese philosopher has pointed out that the earliest use of the term *In-der-Welt-sein* (resplendent with hyphens) occurs not in *Sein und Zeit* but in a German translation of Okakura's *The Book of Tea* published in 1919.³² If Heidegger did read Okakura, he would have learned a great deal about Daoism and the Zen-inspired arts of Japan, such as Noh drama and *tanka* and *haiku* poetry (with which he was certainly acquainted by the time he wrote the dialogue with the Japanese visitor). He would in any case have been introduced to these things by Kuki, since they figure prominently in the text of his talk about Japanese art.³³

In this second talk, Kuki quotes from no fewer than nine chapters of the *Dao de jing* by Lao Zi and also refers to the other major classic of philosophical Daoism, the *Zhuang Zi*. It is possible that Heidegger was already acquainted with these texts, there being several German trans-

lations available at the time. A translation of the *Lao Zi* with introduction and commentary had been published by Victor Von Strauss in 1870.³⁴ An edition of Zhuang Zi edited by Martin Buber had appeared in 1910 – with which we know Heidegger was familiar at least by 1930.³⁵ The following two years saw the publication of translations of both the *Lao Zi* and the *Zhuang Zi* by Richard Wilhelm which, like the Buber edition, have been in print more or less continuously since then.³⁶ And so, assuming Kuki did quote the classical Daoist thinkers in his discussions with Heidegger, the latter would have had to go no farther than the university library or bookshop in Marburg to find German editions of the relevant texts. And in view of Heidegger's acquaintance with the Buber edition of Zhuang Zi by 1930, it is more than likely that he discovered that text during the period of his conversations with Kuki in 1927/8 (if he had not come across it earlier).

The conclusion to be drawn from the account so far is that by the time *Sein und Zeit* was published, Heidegger had engaged in philosophical dialogue with three of the greatest thinkers of twentieth-century Japan, whose formidable intellects covered a range of fields: philosophy of science and religion (Tanabe), social and political thought (Miki) and metaphysics and aesthetics (Kuki).

2 Tracing the signs in the texts

The foregoing considerations should prompt us to view Heidegger's texts from the late 1920s on in a somewhat different light. Reinhard May has documented a number of significant similarities between formulations in Heidegger's texts and German translations of Daoist and Zen works which predate the respective writings by Heidegger. Limitations of space necessitate a restriction of the scope of what follows here to a few texts from Heidegger's 'middle period' (1929–35). Let us begin with the 1929 essay 'Was ist Metaphysik?', the main aim of which is to pose and respond to the question of 'how it stands with *nothing*'.

In a sense this essay is a reiteration and amplification of the discussion of *das Nichts* in *Sein und Zeit*. In both texts the basic mood of *Angst* plays a major role in revealing *das Nichts*, but there is a discernible change of tone. In *Sein und Zeit* there is something 'threatening' (*das Drohende*) that is so close 'that it constricts and takes one's breath away' (SZ, pp. 186, 343 (*Bedrohung*)). In anxiety 'it feels eerie [*unheimlich*]' and there is an unpleasant sense of being 'not at home [*un-zu-Hause*]' in the world (SZ, p. 188). When *Angst* arises, 'what is present . . . [shows itself] in an empty mercilessness', and with all meaning drained out of the environment one is left clutching 'at the nothing of the world [*ins Nichts der Welt*]' (SZ, p. 343). The confrontation with *das Nichts* is a

shattering experience, and one quite distant from the *Angst*-free attitude one finds toward nothingness and death in the texts of the Daoists.

By 1929, however, the feeling tone of anxiety has changed. Heidegger begins by remarking that anxiety stops any kind of confusion arising and is rather 'pervaded by a special kind of peace' (*eine eigentümliche Ruhe*).³⁷ He goes on to say that there is a certain 'retreating' in anxiety 'that is no longer a fleeing, but rather a spellbound peace' (p. 34). There is a certain equanimity now as *Dasein* watches beings in their totality 'glide away' – as if the thinker were familiar with the line in the *Lao Zi* that says 'Being and non-being give birth to one another',³⁸ or had been reading those magnificent passages in the *Zhuang Zi* that convey the serenity with which the Daoist sage participates in the cyclical interchanges between *yin* and *yang* that drive the transformations we call birth and death. And in view of the ineffability of the encounter with nothing – 'Anxiety deprives us of speech' (p. 32) – and of the way the *dao* steers all things yet is itself no thing, the following remarks of Lao Zi's about the Way come to mind: 'Tao is empty'; 'It is an abyss, like the ancestor of all things'; 'Always it is nameless and reverts to non-being'.³⁹

A related difference between the two texts concerns the pronounced emphasis in the latter upon the *unity* of *das Nichts* and *das Seiende im Ganzen*: 'Nothingness is encountered together with [*in eins mit*] beings in totality', and 'Nothingness announces itself precisely with and in what-is [*mit und an dem Seienden*] as it glides away as a whole' (pp. 33–4). This formulation is strikingly reminiscent of the central insight of Mahayana Buddhism (on which Zen is based), which is that nothingness or emptiness (*sunyatā*) is not beyond, or different from, the things of the phenomenal world. In the best-known formulation of the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*: 'Form is not different from emptiness; emptiness is not different from form.' Heidegger himself refers to this formulation in the 'Gespräch von der Sprache', when he has the Japanese say 'We say: Without *Iro* [colour . . . and more than whatever is perceivable by the senses], no *Ku* [emptiness and the open]' (*US*, pp. 102/14–15).

The first translation of any work of Heidegger's was the translation into Japanese of 'Was ist Metaphysik?', which was published in Japan the year after the original appeared, in 1930. The essay was translated by Yuasa Seinosuke, who had come to Germany in 1926 and was to stay until the late 1930s. After studying with Karl Jaspers for a year in Heidelberg, he had gone to Freiburg in 1929 to study with Heidegger. In view of the parallels we have noted between Heidegger's conception of *das Nichts* in that essay and East-Asian conceptions of nothingness, some remarks Heidegger made about the Japanese translation of the essay some thirty years later are revealing.

A philosopher by the name of Kojima Takehiko, who had studied

with Nishida and Tanabe in Kyoto, had visited Heidegger at his home in Messkirch in 1955. In 1963 he wrote a long letter to Heidegger which was subsequently published together with a lengthy reply as a pair of 'open letters' in both Japanese and German. Kojima starts out by saying that when an outline of Heidegger's *Gelassenheit* was published in a Japanese newspaper, 'it almost seemed to us as if you, Herr Professor, were directly addressing us Japanese' (*JH*, p. 216). (Hardly surprising, in view of the allusions in that text to both Zen and Daoism.) At one point in his reply Heidegger refers to 'What is metaphysics?':

That essay, which was translated into Japanese as early as 1930, was understood immediately in your country, in contrast with the nihilistic misunderstanding of what was said which is prevalent to this day in Europe. The nothing that is talked about there means that which in relation to what-is is never any kind of being, and 'is' thus nothing, but which nevertheless determines what-is as such and is therefore called Being.

(*JH*, p. 225)

Hardly surprising, again, that Heidegger appears not to have been so surprised at the immediacy of the understanding on the part of an apparently quite alien culture. The second sentence is significant in so far as it makes explicit the fact that Heidegger's concern to elaborate an original conception of nothing that is non-nihilistic is of a piece with the issue that drives his philosophical enterprise from beginning to end: the concern to reopen the question of Being.⁴⁰

In 1930 Heidegger delivered a public lecture 'On the essence of truth', which he would give frequently over the years until its publication in 1943. If this has often been regarded as one of the most enigmatic of his texts, one factor may be that it was written at a time when Heidegger was working to assimilate ideas from Daoism. In the interests of narrative continuity, it will be helpful to look briefly at this text even though it requires temporarily expanding our focus to include Chinese thought.⁴¹ It may be more than simple coincidence that it was after one of the earlier presentations of this lecture, in October 1930 in Bremen, that Heidegger gave the first recorded public reading of a Daoist text: the story of the exchange between Zhuang Zi and Hui Shih on the joy of the fishes.⁴² Petzet remarks that the occasion for Heidegger's asking his host to fetch his copy of the *Zhuang Zi* was a discussion of the question of whether it is possible to put oneself in the place of another. Petzet does not say how the discussion came out, but simply remarks that in Heidegger's reading 'the profound story put all those present under its spell'.

Heidegger had in fact been concerned with the question of putting oneself into another's place in his lecture course of the previous semester. He appears to have devoted several sessions to a discussion of the extent to which it is possible for human beings to transpose themselves into other people, animals and even stones. (Plants are not considered in this section, though there had been some talk about the vegetal realm earlier in the course). Heidegger's conclusion is that we can't transpose ourselves into stones because the stone doesn't have a world – is *weltlos*; but that we can transpose ourselves into animals since the animal does have a world – *weltarm* though it may be. He doesn't think the question should even arise in the case of other human beings, since human being is essentially 'being with [*Mitsein mit*] others' and 'being transposed [*Ver-setztsein*] into other human beings'. He even leaves open the possibility of such transposition into inanimate things – at least where human existence is attuned by *myth* and also in the case of *art*, which he characterizes as 'fundamentally different *kinds* of possible *truth*'. In view of how little reference is made to animals in the enormous Heideggerian corpus, it is significant that the only extended discussion of the animal realm should occur in these lectures from the time Heidegger was apparently involved with the *Zhuang Zi*.⁴³

In saying all this, Heidegger could just as well be giving an interpretation of Zhuang Zi's story of the philosophers and the fishes – or indeed of the *Zhuang Zi* as a whole. One of the most striking features of that text is the remarkable number of anecdotes about animals, fishes, birds and plants (trees especially) that aim to jolt the reader out of his or her anthropocentrism and into an experiential appreciation of the perspectives of other denizens of the realm between heaven and earth. The *Zhuang Zi* is a text highly prized by the great Zen thinkers, and Heidegger could equally well be giving a reading of a text by Dôgen (or one of his successors) on the topic of the 'Buddha nature' of all living things.⁴⁴ It is possible, too, that Heidegger heard his Japanese visitors ascribe similar views to Nishida, who argues that in order to know something one has to *become* it. In chapter 13 of *An Inquiry into the Good*, Nishida writes:

That we know a thing means simply that the self coincides with the thing. In seeing a flower, the self becomes that flower. To study a flower and illumine its nature means letting go of subjective conjecture to coincide with the nature of that flower.⁴⁵

To return to the essay 'On the essence of truth': it is here that Heidegger gives the first definitive formulation of an opposition that was to remain central to the subsequent development of his thinking: that between the *Stellen* (setting, placing, putting) of *Vorstellen* (representing)

and the *Lassen* (letting) of the kinds of *Denken* he proposes as preferable to the representative and calculative modes of modern European thinking. There is, in other words, a move away from the projection (*Entwurf*) of a world of potential *Zuhandenheit* to a more open stance that holds back from dictating to things in advance how they are to appear.⁴⁶ The consequences of such a move will be seen later in the use of terms like *Gelassenheit* and statements to the effect that it is *Sein* itself, rather than *Dasein*, that effects the historical projection of worlds.⁴⁷ The shift is adumbrated in the somewhat gnomic pronouncement from the beginning of the fourth section:

Freedom for what is manifest from an Open [*zum Offenbaren eines Offenens*] lets the being in question be the being that it is [*lässt das jeweilige Seiende das Seiende sein, das es ist*]. Freedom now reveals itself as letting beings be [*das Seinlassen von Seiendem*].

By a nice turn of etymological development, both the German *lassen* and the English 'let' are well suited in their ambiguity between 'allowing' and 'ordering' (letting something happen as opposed to making it happen) to translating the central Daoist notion of *wu wei* or 'nondisruptive activity'. According to the *Dao de jing*, the Daoist sage 'dwells in effecting without acting'.

Whoever acts in Dao reduces day by day;
reduces and reduces to arrive at not-doing.
He does not act, and yet he is not inactive.⁴⁸

In the next section of 'On the essence of truth', we learn that letting-be always involves a concealing. Speaking of 'the openness of beings in totality', Heidegger writes that, 'although it constantly attunes everything, it itself remains the indeterminate, the indeterminable. . . . What attunes here is, however, not nothing, but a concealment of beings in totality.' The first chapter of the *Lao Zi* reads (translated from Wilhelm):

'Non-being' I call the beginning of heaven and earth.
'Being' I call the mother of individual things. . . .
In [their] unity it is called the mystery [*das Geheimnis*].
The yet deeper mystery of the mystery
is the gate through which all wonders issue forth.

And chapter 25:

There is a thing, completed in undifferentiation.

Before heaven and earth it was already there,
so still, so alone. . . .

At the beginning of section 6 of his essay Heidegger writes that

the concealment of beings in totality . . . is older than any manifestation of this or that being . . . and older than letting-be itself. . . . What preserves letting-be in this relation to concealing? Nothing less than the concealment of what is concealed in totality . . . the mystery [*das Geheimnis*].

The final thrust of Heidegger's essay has the essence of truth (*das Wesen der Wahrheit*) turn into the truth of Being (*die Wahrheit des Wesens*), which in turn turns on 'the simultaneity of revealing and concealing' (sect. 7) – an idea that is central to the Daoist understanding of the reciprocal powers of *yin* and *yang* (and that also figures prominently in Nietzsche's thought). And when the essay's concluding note says that truth means 'clearing protecting [*lichtendes Bergen*]' as a basic trait of Being', it echoes a basic trait of the *dao*.

A striking feature of the *Lao Zi* is the poetry of its language, a fair amount of which can come across in translation – even though, to borrow an image from a Ming dynasty writer (quoted by Okakura), a translation is like the reverse side of a brocade: all the threads are there, but without the subtlety of the colours or the design. Indeed the texts of the *Lao Zi* and the *Zhuang Zi* are regarded by many to be among the most poetical ever written in classical Chinese (a language distinguished by the beauty of its poetry), and they are certainly two of the most poetic works of philosophy in any language. Heidegger's encounter with these texts appears to have a twofold effect on his thinking. For one thing his prose begins to change from the uncompromisingly functional language of *Sein und Zeit* to the more poetic evocations of 'On the essence of truth', and for another, he will soon begin to develop one of the major themes of his mature thinking – concerning the closeness of philosophical thought and poetry.⁴⁹

In his lectures on metaphysics from the summer of 1935, Heidegger remarks that the only thing that is of the same order as philosophy and its thinking is *Dichtung*. Though they are not the same, he continues, the only people other than philosophers who are able to talk about *das Nichts* are poets. In a pronouncement that could have issued from the brush of a commentator on the thinker-poet Bashô (in whose work Heidegger developed a keen interest), he writes: 'In the poetizing of the poet and the thinking of the thinker, there is always so much world-space bestowed that in it any thing whatsoever – a tree, a mountain, a house, a bird-call – completely loses its indifference and ordinariness.'⁵⁰

Heidegger's *Einführung in die Metaphysik* contains what may be the first published references to the Japanese, but they appear simply in lists of examples of *Seiendes*. But when it comes to a discussion of philosophies that have 'inquired about the ground of the things that are', no mention is made of the East-Asian traditions with which Heidegger was by that time familiar: only thinkers who think in the medium of Greek or German, 'the most powerful and spiritual language[s] with regard to the possibility of thinking'.⁵¹

The essay 'The origin of the work of art' (1936) constitutes Heidegger's first and longest meditation on the topic of art and is, as such, another manifestation of a shift in the direction of his thinking. The original stimulus for his engagement with this topic may well have been his conversations about art with Kuki Shûzô in 1927 and 1928; this essay at any rate shows the most influence from East-Asian thought among the works of the middle period. A shorthand way of showing this is to recommend a reading of my 'Thoughts on the way' – part of which was intended as an excursus on resonances between Heidegger's texts of 1935/6 and Daoist philosophical ideas – as a catalogue of the *influences* of Daoism on Heidegger's thinking of the mid-1930s.⁵² On the assumption that Heidegger had read the Richard Wilhelm translation of the *I jing* (published in 1923), one can see his idea of truth as the *Riss* denoting the interplay of *Welt* and *Erde* as an adaptation of the notion of the *dao* as the common root of the cyclical forces of *yang/chian* and *yin/kun*.⁵³

In the light of the discussion earlier of Kuki Shûzô's influence on Heidegger, an obscure but central passage in 'The origin of the work of art' becomes clearer. In the course of a discussion of truth as the unconcealment produced by the struggle of world and earth, Heidegger says more about the *Lichtung*, the illuminated clearing that in *Sein und Zeit* had been equated with *Dasein* and which now appears coextensive with *Sein* itself and *das Nichts*.

Beings stand in Being [*Das Seiende steht im Sein*] . . .

And yet, beyond beings – though not away from them but this side of them – something Other is happening. Amidst beings in totality there is an open space. A clearing is there. From the perspective of beings it is 'being-er' than beings [*seiender als das Seiende*]. The open middle is thus not surrounded by beings, but the central illumining clearing itself encircles – like the Nothing we hardly know – all that is.⁵⁴

Here, complementary to the Daoist ideas, is the Zen Buddhist idea of nothingness: *mu*, or *kû* – emptiness, distinct but not different from form. Heidegger's *Lichtung* may be seen as the German version of Nishida's

mu no basho, or *topos* of nothingness. Around the time Kuki was in Freiburg, Nishida was using a striking image to express the way the *topos* of absolute nothingness envelops all the other spheres of human activity and thought: *urazukeru*, 'to be lined' (as with the lining of a garment). One could well imagine an evening at Heidegger's home, with Madame Kuki sitting resplendent by her husband's side as he talks about Zen art with the great philosopher, her ceremonial kimono allowing the East-Asian world to shine – as Heidegger himself said – 'more brightly' in the dusky environs of the Black Forest. Heidegger would be questioning his guest, once again, about the Japanese conception of nothingness. An illustration occurs to the Count, who responds in his impeccable German:

Professor Nishida uses an expression in his latest essay, 'The Intelligible World', that could perhaps help in this context. He speaks of the way nothingness 'lines' the concentric spheres of our existence, just as the kimono my wife is wearing is lined by a precious silk lining that one hardly sees, since it shows only at the ends – and which in a way envelops the kimono as a whole.⁵⁵

Heidegger himself drops an enigmatic allusion to the source of 'The origin of the work of art' in a *Zusatz* he added to the essay in 1956, the year after his dialogue between the Japanese and the Inquirer. (The editor of the new edition of *Holzwege*, in which the supplement is included after the *Nachwort*, remarks that 'Heidegger repeatedly emphasized the importance of this "supplement" in conversation'.⁵⁶) The *Zusatz* is concerned mainly with resolving the apparent opposition between the 'establishing of truth' (in the work of art) and a 'letting the advent of truth occur', and emphasizes that 'this *Lassen* is not any kind of passivity but' – just like *wu wei* – 'the highest kind of doing'. It is the last paragraph that is remarkable:

It remains an inevitable and distressing difficulty that the reader, who naturally comes upon the essay from the outside, immediately and in the long run thinks of and interprets its content *not from the secret source of what is to be thought* [*nicht aus dem verschwiegene[n] Quellbereich des Zudenkenden*]. For the author himself there remains the difficulty of speaking of the various stations on the way each in precisely the appropriate language. (Emphasis added)

One wonders why the source of what is to be thought should be so secret – if only because *Quelle* was the term Heidegger used the previous year in discussing the possible basis for dialogue between Western and East-Asian thought (*US*, pp. 94/8, 115/24; discussed below).

At the end of this highly productive period from 1935–6 another visitor

from Japan arrived, Nishitani Keiji, a pupil of Nishida's with an intense interest in Nietzsche. Nishitani was to stay in Germany until 1938, attending Heidegger's seminars in Freiburg and having many informal conversations with him at his home.⁵⁷ Nishitani has written about how in 1938 he presented Heidegger with a copy of the first volume of D. T. Suzuki's *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, only to find that he had already read the book and was eager to discuss it. Nishitani also reports that at that time Heidegger read an anthology of Zen texts entitled *Zen: Der lebendige Buddhismus in Japan*.⁵⁸ In conversation in Kyoto in 1989, Professor Nishitani recounted how not long after his arrival in Freiburg Heidegger gave him 'a standing invitation' to come to his house on Saturday afternoons to talk about Zen. Heidegger was apparently most interested in the striking imagery that characterizes so many of the traditional Zen texts, and Nishitani concurs with other East-Asian interlocutors in saying that Heidegger was always a keen and insightful questioner when it came to the topic of Asian thought.⁵⁹

3 Oblique presentations and prognostications

In view of the amount of contact Heidegger had with East-Asian thinkers, the fact of his acquaintance with philosophical texts from that tradition, and the keen intensity with which he used to question his Japanese and Chinese interlocutors about those texts, the references to East-Asian ideas in his published works are remarkably few. There are only four instances, occurring between 1954 and 1958.

The first is the only extended discussion of East-Asian ideas in the entire Heideggerian corpus: the dialogue between the Japanese and the Inquirer, written over thirty years after the first contact with thinkers from Japan. This text itself deserves an extended discussion as a simultaneous revelation and concealment of the East-Asian influences on Heidegger's thought.⁶⁰ For now it will suffice to draw attention to a remark that becomes significant in the context of our discussion so far. At one point the Inquirer says to the Japanese that his visit is especially welcome since his experience in translating German literature (and Heidegger's essays on Hölderlin) into Japanese will have given him 'a keener ear for the questions that I addressed to your compatriots almost thirty-five years ago' – and adds in his next speech the understatement: 'and yet I think that in the meantime I have learned a thing or two [*einiges*] to help me inquire better than several decades ago' (*US*, p. 94/8; emphasis added). This dialogue contains the only references to Japanese ideas in Heidegger's works published in the West.

Three years later, in a discussion of the term *Ereignis* in 'Der Satz der Identität' (1957), Heidegger writes that the word 'can no more be

translated than the Greek word *logos* or the Chinese *Tao*'.⁶¹ At the time, probably no more than one reader of the essay would have known that Heidegger was speaking from experience – having spent a summer, ten years earlier, working with a Chinese philosopher on translating chapters of the *Lao Zi* containing the word *dao*.⁶² In 1958 Heidegger completed the essay 'Das Wesen der Sprache', in which two paragraphs on *Tao*, 'the key word in the poetic thinking of Laotse' (*US*, p. 198/92), shed light on Heidegger's frequent use of the key word *Weg* in his writings before and since. Finally, an essay 'Grundsätze des Denkens', published in a journal the same year – and not included in any subsequent edition of Heidegger's works – cites the line from the *Lao Zi*: 'Whoever knows his brightness veils himself in his darkness.'⁶³ If the jaded reader takes this as an ironical comment on Heidegger's attitude toward Light from the East, the less cynical commentator will still have to judge these few mentions of Daoist and Japanese thought as significant in their grudging paucity.

As if to supplement these scant references to Asian thought, Heidegger allows himself the occasional discussion of the possibility of dialogue between the Western and East-Asian philosophical traditions. Given his reticence concerning how much of his own thinking has appropriated from East-Asian thought, it is not surprising that one finds considerable vacillation in his position on the issue of inter-tradition dialogue.

In the essay 'Wissenschaft und Besinnung' (1953) Heidegger emphasizes that every meditation on the present situation must be rooted in 'our historical *Dasein*' by way of 'a dialogue with the Greek thinkers and their language' – and laments that such a dialogue has not yet begun.⁶⁴ He then adds, almost in passing: '[This dialogue] has hardly even been prepared yet, and remains in turn the precondition for our inevitable dialogue with the East-Asian world.' Despite its putative inevitability, doubts as to the very possibility of such a dialogue – based on the consideration that if language is the house of Being, 'we Europeans presumably inhabit a quite different house from the East-Asians' (*US*, p. 90/5) – are expressed by the Inquirer in the dialogue of 1954:

I do not yet see whether what I am trying to think as the essential nature [*Wesen*] of language is *also* adequate to the nature of East-Asian language – whether in the end, which would at the same time be the beginning, thinking experience can be reached by an essence of language that would ensure that Western European and East-Asian saying can enter into dialogue in such a way that there sings something that wells up from a single source [*Quelle*].

(*US*, p. 94/8)

Later in the conversation the Inquirer appears to be more sure that 'for East-Asian and European peoples the essential nature of language [*Sprachwesen*] remains quite different' (*US*, p. 113/23). The Japanese visitor, however, seems decidedly more sanguine. In talking about his experience of translating Heidegger's essay on Hölderlin's *Heimkunft* and some poems by Kleist, he says:

In the course of the translating it often seemed as if I were wandering back and forth between two different language-essences, and yet in such a way that every now and then something shone forth that made me think that the essential source [*Wesensquell*] of fundamentally different languages might be the same.

(*US*, p. 115/24)

Since 'the Japanese' in this dialogue is at least 90 per cent Heidegger, we can understand this discrepancy as representing ambivalence on the part of the author rather than a burst of objective reportage or a sudden ability to write dramatic dialogue.

The following year, in the context of a discussion of the possibility of 'planetary thinking' in 'Zur Seinsfrage', Heidegger remarks that neither side is equal yet to the encounters that the cultivation of planetary thinking will require: 'This holds equally for the European and East-Asian languages, and above all for the realm of their possible dialogue. Neither of them can by itself open up and ground this realm' (*Wegmarken*, p. 252). A hint of how this realm might begin to be opened up is given in a passage from the 1959 essay 'Hölderlins Erde und Himmel', where Heidegger speaks in vatic tones of the 'great beginning' of Western thought.

There can of course be no going back to it. Present as something waiting over against us, the great beginning becomes something small. But nor can this small something remain any longer in its Western isolation. It is opening itself to the few other great beginnings that belong with their Own to the Same of the beginning of the infinite relationship, in which the earth is included.⁶⁵

The opening anticipated here must at the very least be an opening to the 'great beginning' of East-Asian thought, wherever one locates it.

There is more talk of beginnings in the open letter of 1963 to Kojima Takehiko, where Heidegger writes of the necessity for a 'step back' (*der Schritt zurück*) if human beings are to escape the domination of *das Stellen* and find the way by which they can come into their own:

The step back does not mean a flight of thinking into bygone ages,

and least of all a reanimation of the beginnings of Western philosophy. . . . The step back is rather the step out of the track in which the progress and regress of *Bestellen* take place.

(*JH*, p. 224)

It is in the next paragraph of this letter that Heidegger talks about the immediate comprehension in Japan of his discussion of nothingness in 'What is metaphysics?' – which suggests that the step out of the progress–regress opposition that might be accomplished by our opening up to another great beginning could take us into the realm of nothingness as emptiness. This surmise is confirmed by a comment at the end of the letter, where he alludes to the possibility of a contemplative reconciliation with 'the still hidden mystery of the power of *Stellen*', which 'is no longer to be accomplished by Western European philosophy up till now, but also not without it – that is, not unless its newly appropriated tradition is brought on to the appropriate path' (*JH*, p. 226). Again the implication is that the reappropriation of the Western philosophical tradition will require a preliminary move out of it, optimally by way of a tradition untouched by the metaphysical ideas that gave rise to the modern Western world view.

Heidegger's next move with respect to this issue seems to be something of a *Schritt zurück*. In the 1966 interview that was posthumously published in *Der Spiegel*, his posture toward possible East–West philosophical dialogue appears negative and hints at a Eurocentric isolationism:

I am convinced that it is only from the same part of the world in which the world of modern technology arose that a reversal can come about, and that it cannot happen by way of an adoption of Zen Buddhism or any other oriental experience of the world. In order to think differently we need the help of the European tradition and a reappropriation of it. Thinking is only transformed by a thinking that is of the same descent and provenance.⁶⁶

The rejection of a wholesale substitution of Eastern wisdom for Western thinking is clearly unobjectionable. Nevertheless, quite apart from the question of how much Heidegger himself had 'adopted' from Zen Buddhism, the talk of a unilateral reappropriation of the European tradition rings somewhat hollow in view of the preceding pronouncements concerning the *unfeasibility* of precisely that – and the desirability of a bilateral approach involving East-Asian thought. One could have hoped for a more charitable attitude toward the possibility of our learning *something* from the Zen Buddhist tradition.

Suspicion that Heidegger may be speaking differently to a domestic audience and to the Japanese are confirmed by a passage written in 1968,

which appears to be his last remark on the topic. He is again optimistic about the possibility of opening up a realm for thinking dialogue between the cultures. In the foreword to the Japanese translation of his lecture 'Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens', he writes:

By thinking the clearing and characterizing it adequately, we reach a realm that can perhaps make it possible to bring a transformed European thinking into a fruitful engagement with East-Asian 'thinking'. Such an engagement could help with the task of saving the essential nature of human being from the threat of an extreme technological reduction and manipulation of human *Dasein*.⁶⁷

Given the importance of that task, and Heidegger's dialogue with Japanese philosophers over a period of forty years, one would like to read the quotation marks around the second 'thinking' not as indicative of second-rate thoughts but as acknowledging a difference between equals – so that we could take this last word on the topic as definitive.

What are we to make of all this? In the course of putting together *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, I had the opportunity for a conversation with H.-G. Gadamer. I asked him why, in view of Heidegger's long-term acquaintance with and enthusiasm for Daoist thought (the question and response apply equally well to the case of Zen), there were so few mentions of Daoism in his published texts. He replied that a scholar of Heidegger's generation and calibre would be reluctant to write anything about a philosophy if he were unable to read the relevant texts in the original language. In view of the foregoing exposition, this response may seem disingenuous. It is, of course, possible to understand Heidegger's reticence as stemming from an intellectual modesty, from his being unsure whether he really understands these ideas from an alien tradition couched in a language he doesn't know. But on the other hand, he did have numerous opportunities (which he apparently seized with alacrity) to question several of the greatest Japanese thinkers of the century precisely about the basic philosophical ideas of the East-Asian tradition.

As mentioned at the outset, more research needs to be done in order to flesh out that part of the evidence that is at present circumstantial. In view of the success with which Heidegger's translation work on the *Lao Zi* was kept secret, little of substance is to be expected from his *Nachlass*, though records of books checked out from university libraries might provide pertinent information – as could, on the Japanese side, a perusal of diaries and letters written by the earlier Japanese visitors. It would be interesting, too, to learn the reactions of contemporary Heidegger scholars in Japan to the suggestion that the sympathetic resonances – so often remarked upon there – between Heidegger's thought and ideas

from the Japanese tradition may be due in part to his having been influenced by such ideas. If this possibility has not been seriously entertained in Japan, it is because of the awe in which Heidegger has traditionally been held there – and the thinker's guarded silence on the matter.

None of this preliminary presentation is intended to deny that Heidegger produced what may be the most profound, complex and influential philosophy of the twentieth century: the question is whether the provenance of that philosophy is as exclusively Graeco-Teutonic as its author would have us believe. Even at this stage of the investigation, the conclusion is unavoidable that Heidegger was less than generous in acknowledging how much he learned from the East-Asian (and especially the Japanese) tradition.⁶⁸ But what is most important here are the implications for how we read Heidegger's texts – especially as more and more comparative studies are undertaken, but also in the context of the Western tradition *simpliciter*. The possibility that he may have absorbed a considerable amount from a philosophical tradition that is relentlessly *unmetaphysical* prompts at the very least the adoption of a different perspective on Heidegger's claims – however justified they may be – to have overcome or subverted the tradition of Western metaphysics.

Notes

1 A notable treatment of the topic is Otto Pöggeler, 'West-East dialogue: Heidegger and Lao-tzu', in Graham Parkes (ed.), *Heidegger and Asian Thought* (Honolulu, 1987 – henceforth abbreviated as *HAT*), pp. 47–78, the range of which is considerably broader than the subtitle might suggest. The only extended study to have appeared so far is Reinhard May, *Ex oriente lux: Heideggers Werk unter ostasiatischem Einfluss* (Wiesbaden, 1989 – hereafter *EOL*). As the subtitle suggests, the book is restricted to the influence of *East-Asian* (Chinese and Japanese) ideas on Heidegger's thought; but then Heidegger appears to have had relatively little interest in Indian philosophy. Though some might find a few of its conclusions overdrawn, May's study is required reading for anyone interested in the sources of Heidegger's thinking. Since the main weight of this work is on the Chinese side, the present essay will place complementary emphasis on Japanese thought.

2 This is suggested by Hartmut Buchner in the introductory essay to his anthology *Japan und Heidegger* (Sigmaringen, 1989 – henceforth *JH*). This collection is an invaluable source on the relations between Heidegger and Japanese philosophers. Translations from this and other German texts will be my own.

3 Japanese and Chinese names will be given in the East-Asian order: family name first. Yamanouchi is cited as the first Japanese to study with Heidegger by one of his later students, Tsujimura Kôichi, in his speech on the occasion of Heidegger's sixtieth birthday (reprinted in *JH*, pp. 159–65).

4 There are now two English translations of this text, which will be referred to shortly: *A Study of Good*, tr. Valdo Viglielmo (Tokyo, 1960), and *An Inquiry into the Good*, tr. Masao Abe and Christopher Ives (New Haven and London, 1990). It may be fair to say that Nishida is the only major figure in Japanese

philosophy of the first half of the twentieth century *not* to have been deeply influenced by Heidegger (perhaps in part because he was twenty years Heidegger's senior).

5 See the discussion of Yamanouchi's critique in Nishitani Keiji, *Nishida Kitarô*, tr. Yamamoto Seisaku and James W. Heisig (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford, 1991), pp. 198–205.

6 A brief account of Miki's relations with Heidegger can be found in Yuasa Yasuo, 'Modern Japanese philosophy and Heidegger', in *HAT*, pp. 155–74.

7 Ohashi Ryôsuke, 'Die frühe Heidegger-Rezeption in Japan', in *JH*, pp. 23–37, 27.

8 See Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe (GA)* 20 (Frankfurt, 1979), p. 403. Here the nothingness of *die Welt* is related, by way of the revelatory phenomenon of *Angst*, to the absolute nothingness of death in a way that prefigures the classic treatment in *Sein und Zeit* (§§49, 53, 57, 68b).

9 Heidegger, *GA* 61, pp. 143–8.

10 *GA* 63, pp. 31–2.

11 The only book of Tanabe's available in English translation is *Philosophy as Metanoetics*, tr. Takeuchi Yoshinori with Valdo Viglielmo and James W. Heisig (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1986). A good collection of essays on one aspect of his multi-faceted thought is Taitetsu Unno and James W. Heisig (eds), *The Religious Philosophy of Tanabe Hajime: The Metanoetic Imperative* (Berkeley, 1990).

12 See *JH*, pp. 181–8. Yuasa (in *HAT*) discusses Tanabe only briefly, and his judgment that the influence of Heidegger on Tanabe is 'relatively small' may understate the case. Tsujimura Kôichi's claim that Tanabe maintained 'a thinking dialogue with Heidegger's thought until his [Tanabe's] death in 1962' (*JH*, p. 159) seems closer to the mark. See, for example, the references to Heidegger in Tanabe, *Philosophy as Metanoetics*, and also the brief discussion of Heidegger's influence on Tanabe by Ohashi in *JH*, pp. 25–6.

13 'Benshōgaku ni okeru atarashiki tenkō: Haideggah no sei no genshōgaku', *Shisō* (Tokyo), October 1924. A German translation of this essay can be found in *JH*, pp. 89–108.

14 Heidegger, *GA* 63, p. 114.

15 My friend Charles Guignon has made the very plausible suggestion that Heidegger's taking up the issue of death may also have been prompted by his reading of Luther around this period. Given Tanabe's interest in Christianity, this consideration would make it all the more likely that the two thinkers would spark one another's interest in the topic of death.

16 Tanabe Hajime, 'Todesdialektik', in *Martin Heidegger zum siebzigsten Geburtstag: Festschrift* (Pfullingen, 1959), pp. 93–133.

17 See Hans Waldenfels, *Absolute Nothingness*, tr. J. W. Heisig (New York, 1980), pp. 37–9. Nishida practised Zen meditation regularly during the ten years leading up to the publication of *An Inquiry into the Good* – although he apparently gave up formal sitting as he began to develop his own philosophy. The characterization of his enterprise as the attempt to work out a new philosophy of Zen Buddhism in Western philosophical terms is perhaps too simple, but it is not misleading.

18 See Nishitani, *Nishida Kitarô*, chap. 9, 'The philosophy of Nishida and Tanabe'.

19 See the foreword by James Heisig to Tanabe, *Philosophy as Metanoetics*, p. xi.

20 Nishida, *An Inquiry into the Good*, chap. 14 (James Heisig's translation in Waldenfels, *Absolute Nothingness*, pp. 40–1).

21 Nishida, *An Inquiry into the Good*, chap. 31 (Heisig translation, p. 41). Nishida's understanding of God, conditioned as it is by the Buddhist idea of *mu*, is one Heidegger would not have found uncongenial.

22 G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Book I, sect. 1, chap. 1, C. *Werden*, 1. 'Einheit des Seins und Nichts', and *Anmerkung* 1. Heidegger quotes the first sentence with approval, though not without qualification, near the end of the essay 'Was ist Metaphysik?'

23 Quoted by May in *EOL*, p. 45. May also points out that Martin Buber writes in his edition of *Zhuang Zi* that Lao Zi 'overcomes the official wisdom [of his age] with his doctrine of "non-being"' (*Reden und Gleichnisse des Tschuang-Tse*, deutsche Auswahl von Martin Buber (Zürich, 1951), p. 185).

24 Max Scheler, 'Vom Wesen der Philosophie', in *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, in *Gesammelte Werke* (Bern, 1954), vol. 5, p. 93.

25 Scheler, 'Probleme der Religion', in *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, pp. 263–4.

26 Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen, 1959), p. 131; *On the Way to Language*, tr. Peter D. Hertz (New York, 1971), p. 37 (hereafter abbreviated as *US* followed by the page numbers of the German original and the English translation). The Inquirer says earlier (*US*, pp. 87/3) that he often discussed this question with Kuki Shūzō – whom we are about to meet.

27 Kuki then went back to Paris, and it was then that he came to know the young Jean-Paul Sartre. On this relationship, and other information about Kuki, see Stephen Light, *Shūzō Kuki and Jean-Paul Sartre* (Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1987 – hereafter *KS*), which also contains translations of some of Kuki's brief essays from the period just before he met Heidegger.

28 This acquaintance came at least in part from Tanabe's 1924 essay on Heidegger. See Ohashi in *JH*, p. 29.

29 According to the account of the original interlocutor, Professor Tezuka of Tokyo University, while Heidegger spoke of Kuki in the warmest terms, they spoke of him only briefly at the beginning of their talk – and Kuki's notion of *iki* was not a topic of conversation at all. Although Heidegger (in the *Hinweise in Unterwegs zur Sprache*) gives the date of composition of the dialogue as 1953/4, Tezuka's visit actually took place at the end of March 1954. Tezuka's account of the conversation, 'Haideggah to no ichi jikan' ('An hour with Heidegger'), is reprinted in the original Japanese with a German translation in *EOL*, pp. 81–99, and a different German translation is included in *JH*, pp. 173–80. Stephen Light cites a report to the effect that in 1957 Heidegger expressed (to Tsujimura Kōichi) his desire to write a preface to an anticipated German translation of one of Kuki's books – a significant desire when one considers that by that time Heidegger can hardly have been casting around for books to write prefaces for.

30 The final version of Kuki's best known work, '*Iki*' no *kōzō* (*The Structure of 'Iki'*), was first published in the journal *Shisō* in early 1929 and issued as a book the following year.

31 The texts of these lectures were published as a book, *Propos sur le temps*, in Paris in 1928; English translations can be found in *KS*, pp. 43–67. Kuki's mention of Heidegger's theory of temporality at the beginning of the first talk constitutes one of the earliest introductions of Heidegger's ideas in France – the discussion of which was later to become a major industry.

32 Imamichi Tomonobu, *Betrachtungen über das Eine* (Tokyo, 1968), p. 154. Okakura uses the term with reference to Daoism, calling it 'the art of being in the world' (see the chapter 'Taoism and Zennism' in *The Book of Tea*). Heinrich

Petzet quotes Okakura in the context of a discussion of Heidegger's acquaintance with Asian thought, though he does not say explicitly that Heidegger was acquainted with his writings; see Heinrich Wiegand Petzet, *Auf einen Stern zugehen: Begegnungen mit Martin Heidegger 1929–76* (Frankfurt, 1983), p. 177. Petzet does make it clear that Heidegger came to be very interested in Chinese and Japanese art, and he relates how, when he (Petzet) had to write a review of a large exhibition of Zen paintings and drawings, Heidegger 'brought [his] attention to the literature on the subject that seemed to him important' (*ibid.*, pp. 178–9).

33 The discussion in the dialogue with the Japanese about the pregnant gestures of Noh drama, where the Japanese demonstrates a gesture evoking a mountain landscape (*US*, pp. 107–18), echoes a line in Kuki's *propos* on Japanese theatre: 'Hands shading the eyes will make one think of a mountain landscape' (*KS*, p. 75 – Kuki is actually quoting from a French commentary: Albert Maybon, *Le théâtre japonais* (Paris, 1925)).

34 *Lao-Tse's Tao Te King*, translated from the Chinese, with Introduction and Commentary by Victor Von Strauss (Leipzig, 1870). Heidegger actually refers to this translation in an article published in a journal in 1958; see below, note 63. This edition, by the way, is probably the textual basis for Nietzsche's occasional remarks about Lao Zi. On the topic of Nietzsche and Asian thought, see Graham Parkes (ed.), *Nietzsche and Asian Thought* (Chicago, 1991).

35 *Reden und Gleichnisse des Tschuang-Tse*, tr. Buber (Leipzig, 1910). On Heidegger's familiarity with this text, see Petzet, *Auf einem Stern zugehen*, pp. 23–4; and also the discussions by Pöggeler and Parkes in *HAT*, pp. 52–6 and 105ff.

36 *Laotse, Tao te king: Das Buch des Alten vom Sinn und Leben*, translated from the Chinese with comments by Richard Wilhelm (Jena, 1911); *Dschuang Dsi: Das wahre Buch vom südlichen Blütenland*, translated from the Chinese with comments by Richard Wilhelm (Jena, 1912). Petzet, *Auf einem Stern zugehen* (p. 183) reports Heidegger's admitting to being a reader of Lao Zi and that he only knew the text through the mediation of Richard Wilhelm.

37 *Was ist Metaphysik?* (Frankfurt, 1969), p. 32. Page references in the next two paragraphs will be to this (tenth) edition.

38 Von Strauss translates: 'Denn/Seyn und Nichtseyn einander gebären', and Wilhelm: 'Denn Sein und Nichtsein erzeugen einander'; see, especially, Buber's *Reden*, pp. 62–71.

39 *Dao de jing*, chap. 4 (Von Strauss); chap. 4 (Wilhelm); chap. 14 (Von Strauss).

40 Both these themes are adumbrated in the dialogue with the Japanese, which was written the year before Kojima's visit. After a discussion of the emptiness (*Leere*) of the stage used in Noh drama, there is the following exchange:

Inquirer: The emptiness is then the same as nothingness, that Being [*jenes Wesende*] which we try to think as the Other to all presence and absence.

Japanese: Certainly. That is why we in Japan immediately understood the lecture 'What is Metaphysics?' when it reached us in translation in 1930. . . .

We are still amazed that the Europeans could misinterpret the nothingness discussed in that lecture in a nihilistic way. For us emptiness is the highest name for that which you would like to speak of with the word 'Being' . . .

41 It is important to bear in mind that Daoist ideas are an important element

in the development of Zen thought, in so far as Zen has its roots in Chinese (Chan) Buddhism and the Chinese assimilation of Indian Buddhism involved the incorporation of ideas from the indigenous philosophy. A consideration of Daoism at this point will also serve to fill out the picture given by May in *EOL*.

42 *Zhuang Zi*, chap. 17, in Buber, *Reden*, 'Die Freude der Fische', pp. 124–5. The best English translation, philosophically speaking, is A. C. Graham, *Chuang-tzu: The Inner Chapters* (London, 1981), p. 123. For a first-hand account of Heidegger's recitation of the text, see Petzet, *Auf einem Stern zugehen*, p. 24.

43 Heidegger, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* (GA 29/30), pp. 295–310 (quotations from pp. 300 and 301). The discussion of the animal realm ranges from pp. 261–388. My colleague Ronald Bontekoe has pointed out that there are, of course, two thinkers from the German tradition who had dealt similarly with the question of the transposition of awareness: Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Scheler (with both of whose work Heidegger was familiar at this time). As in the cases of death and nothingness, I would like to suggest that influence from the Western tradition was complemented by East-Asian sources.

44 For a comparison of some ideas in Heidegger and Dögen, see Graham Parkes, 'Dögen/Heidegger/Dögen', *Philosophy East and West*, 37 (1987), pp. 437–54.

45 Nishitani, *Nishida Kitarō*, p. 116. The context of Nishitani's discussion of this passage in Nishida is interesting for the parallels it suggests with Heidegger.

46 There are very few uses of the verb *lassen* in *Sein und Zeit*, and most of those are in the compound *bewendenlassen* which refers to situating things in a context of *Zuhandenheit*.

47 *Brief über den Humanismus*, in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt, 1967), pp. 168, 180.

48 *Dao de jing*, chap. 2 (tr. from Wilhelm) and chap. 48 (Von Strauss). The term *wu wei* occurs in eight other chapters of the *Dao de jing*: 3, 10, 37, 38, 43, 57, 63, 64.

49 It is also around this time, in the mid-1930s, that Heidegger turns his attention to the poetry of Hölderlin – the first of several German poets whose work will inspire his philosophical thinking. Later, in the *Letter on Humanism*, he writes: 'We have hardly begun to think the mysterious relations to the East that have been given voice in Hölderlin's poetry' (*Wegmarken*, p. 169). My colleague Manfred Henningsen has suggested that Heidegger's turn to Hölderlin was in part a reaction against the events of 1933–4 and a defence against the subsequent co-option of his work by the National Socialists. See, also, Otto Pöggeler's discussion of Heidegger's interest in the poets in the light of his acquaintance with Daoism (*HAT*, pp. 62–8).

50 Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Tübingen, 1966), p. 20; *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, tr. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, 1953), p. 26. Heidegger's keen interest in Bashō is attested by Tezuka Tomio (*JH*, pp. 174, 179) and Tsujimura Kōichi (*JH*, p. 265). See also the discussion of Bashō in a Heideggerian context in Michiko Yoneda, *Gespräch und Dichtung: Ein Auseinandersetzungsvorversuch der Sprachauffassung Heideggers mit einem japanischem Sagen* (Frankfurt, 1984), pp. 186–225.

51 Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, pp. 58, 29, 43; *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp. 76, 38, 57. For further discussion of this topic, see Graham Parkes, 'From nationalism to nomadism: wondering about the languages of philosophy', in Eliot Deutsch (ed.), *Culture and Modernity: East and West* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), pp. 455–67.

52 Graham Parkes, 'Thoughts on the Way: *Being and Time* via Lao-Chuang',

in *HAT*, pp. 105–44, especially the ‘Epilogue’. Footnote 9 stands in need of revision: as Reinhard May has pointed out, the Buber edition of the *Zhuang Zi* was first published in 1910, not 1921; and so there was ample time for Heidegger to discover the text (perhaps as a result of his talks with Kuki Shūzō) and assimilate its ideas by the time he wrote his own texts of the mid-1930s.

53 See Richard Wilhelm, *I Ging: Das Buch der Wandlungen* (Düsseldorf, 1970), pp. 14–16, 25, 30, 272–6. The assumption that Heidegger had read the *I jing* is not necessary: he could have gleaned an adequate sense of the ideas in question from his readings of the other Daoist classics, and especially from the commentaries of the translators or editors.

54 ‘Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes’, in *Holzwege* (Frankfurt, 1972), p. 41; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, tr. Albert Hofstadter (New York, 1975), p. 53.

55 See ‘lining’ in the glossary of Robert Schinzinger’s translation of Kitarō Nishida: *Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness* (Honolulu, 1966), which includes a translation of the 1928 essay ‘Eichiteki sekai’ where this expression occurs. Since Kuki mentions Nishida several times in his *propos* of 1928 – in ‘Bergson in Japan’ (*KS*, p. 72) and at the end of ‘General characteristics of French philosophy’ (*KS*, p. 97) – he surely discussed Nishida in his talks with Heidegger. D. T. Suzuki reports that in a conversation with Heidegger in 1953 he asked him what he thought of Nishida’s philosophy; Heidegger’s response was: ‘Nishida is Western’ (‘Erinnerung an einen Besuch bei Martin Heidegger’, in *JH*, pp. 169–72). Since only four essays by Nishida had appeared in German at the time – three of them in a well-nigh unintelligible translation – this judgment of Heidegger’s was probably based on conversations about Nishida with his Japanese visitors.

56 Heidegger, *GA* 5, pp. 70–4; editor’s note, p. 377. I am grateful to a correspondent, Holger Krüger of Essen, for bringing the following remark from the *Zusatz* to my attention.

57 Two of Nishitani’s works containing some discussion of Heidegger have been translated: *Religion and Nothingness*, tr. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley and London, 1982), and *The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism*, tr. Graham Parkes with Setsuko Aihara (Albany, 1990). This latter text devotes an entire chapter to Heidegger’s thought, although – written a dozen or so years earlier than *Religion and Nothingness* – the Heidegger in it appears comparatively ‘undigested’.

58 *Zen: Der lebendige Buddhismus in Japan*, ausgewählte Stücke des Zen-Textes, tr. Schuej Ohasama (Ohazama Shuei), ed. August Faust, with a foreword by Rudolf Otto (Gotha/Stuttgart, 1925). See also Parkes, ‘Introduction’ in *HAT*, pp. 9–10.

59 In an appendix to the Japanese translation of ‘Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache’, Tezuka Tomio recalls how during his meeting with Heidegger in 1954, the latter brought the conversation around to a *haiku* by Bashō he had read in translation:

He asked me about the poem in Japanese and posed a number of perspicacious questions about the special nature of Japanese thought as it manifests in language and in art. During my rather inept explanations it seemed as if various thoughts occurred in rapid succession to this prominent thinker. He took notes with great zeal.

(*JH*, p. 179)

See also the remarks by Paul Shih-yi Hsiao in *HAT*, p. 98.

60 See May’s discussion in *EOL*, especially pp. 25–36; also Yoneda, pp. 88–96.

As mentioned earlier, Tezuka Tomio's account of the conversation is indispensable for an informed reading of Heidegger's dialogue. Yoneda (p. 91) cites a note appended by Tezuka to his Japanese translation of the text, in which Tezuka says that he did not know Kuki personally or attend his lectures, that he himself was actually not very conversant with Heidegger's writings, and that he could not have uttered many of the things ascribed to the visitor from Japan.

61 *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen, 1957), p. 25; *Identity and Difference* (New York, 1969), p. 36.

62 See Paul Shih-yi Hsiao, 'Heidegger and our translation of the *Tao Te Ching*', in *HAT*, pp. 93–104. On how well kept a secret this translation work was until Heidegger's death, see *EOL*, p. 19, n. 37. This secrecy may account for the fact – strange in view of how much of Heidegger's *Nachlass* has been preserved – that no written record of his summer's work with Professor Hsiao has been found.

63 'Grundsätze des Denkens', *Jahrbuch für Psychologie und Psychotherapie*, 6 (1958), pp. 33–41. Heidegger cites chap. XVIII of the Victor von Strauss translation, but the lines in question occur in chap. XXVIII.

64 *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen, 1967), I, p. 39; 'Science and reflection', in *The Question concerning Technology and Other Essays*, tr. William Lovitt (New York, 1977), p. 158.

65 'Hölderlins Erde und Himmel', *Hölderlin-Jahrbuch*, 11 (1958–60), p. 36; quoted in *EOL*, p. 68.

66 'Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten' (1966), reprinted in G. Neske (ed.), *Antwort: Martin Heidegger im Gespräch* (Pfullingen, 1988), p. 107.

67 *Kôza-Zen*, 8 (Tokyo, 1968), pp. 321f.; reprinted in *JH*, pp. 230–1.

68 Hans A. Fischer-Barnicol reports that Heidegger once said to him, after remarking that from early on he had worked with Japanese philosophers, that 'he had nevertheless learned more from Chinese [visitors]' (*Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger*, ed. Günther Neske (Pfullingen, 1977), p. 102). This is an extraordinary remark for Heidegger to have made – and perhaps a revealing one – in view of the fact that none of his Chinese visitors came close, as philosophers, to the calibre of Tanabe, Miki, Kuki or Nishitani.

Does the saving power also grow? Heidegger's last paths

Otto Pöggeler

The one hundredth anniversary of Martin Heidegger's birth is also a conspicuous reminder that Heidegger's life slips ever more deeply into the past. In order for Heidegger's thought to have an influence, the tasks towards which he sought an approach must first be more clearly understood. Through his publications Heidegger exerted an influence upon people who never had personal contact with him. The force of the appeal lay in the concentrated earnest with which he forced himself and fellow philosophers into the decisive questions of human life. The systematic elaborations remained fragments; the confrontation with the history of thinking was the contrary of historical erudition, but also often an overlooking of concrete historical reality. Yet Heidegger's effect was due to the impetus he stimulated and he thereby elicited significant accomplishments from others: work as various as the new theological approach of the Bultmann school and Oskar Becker's philosophy of mathematics or the work on the metaphysical tradition and the relation to a painter like Cézanne. In the conversations which extended beyond the preliminaries of the first hours, Heidegger tried to steer his interlocutor towards his own path. For that reason the best encounters with Heidegger perhaps have been such conversations.

Each person takes from these conversations that which corresponds to his or her own horizon of expectations. Conversations across several days in Freiburg in 1959 and 1961 helped me of course above all to prepare the presentation which then appeared in 1963 as *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*.¹ Since this presentation was originally supposed to contain also a second part with confrontations on several exemplary topics, I submitted for discussion for example (each time after consulting with Oskar Becker in Bonn) the question of whether Heidegger did not overlook the achievements of mathematics and thereby also portray technology in a skewed light. Heidegger was so interested by these questions

that he sought out Becker in Bonn for a personal conversation.² In terms of art, Heidegger above all commented on Paul Klee in our conversations, and I in turn alluded to the lyric poetry of Paul Celan. However, my question concerning certain formulations in Hölderlin's hymn 'Der Einzige' made it clear for me that Heidegger did not follow Hölderlin's last steps. During a return visit (which was enriched by the presence of Keji Nishitani) Heidegger read us his 1964 lecture 'Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens';³ the visit concluded with Heidegger reading the 'Eisgeschichte' from Stifter's story 'Die Mappe meines Urgroßvaters'.⁴ The celebration of Heidegger's eightieth birthday in the Heidelberg Akademie took place (after Heidegger suffered a serious illness) at a time which had lost contact with Heidegger's questions, and therefore placed academic discussions in the foreground. The conversational openness was again present in the last personal meeting in the Spring of 1972. Because of American experiences, but also due to German initiatives, I raised the question of whether the scientific-technical world by its own constitution could come to a test of the necessary and the dangerous; Heidegger's resolute exhortation was to position oneself immediately in the confrontation with this world – without the detour into digressive and deferring discussions of the 'history of Being'. The liveliest attention and agreement centred on considerations of the relationship of Paul Celan to Friedrich Hölderlin. Heidegger was contemplating undertaking an edition of his works. Was Heidegger not exterior to the impetus of the times? Shortly before his death, I thought I'd bid him farewell in an appropriate fashion with a greeting from Delphi.

When Heidegger edited his Nietzsche lectures and texts,⁵ he finally gave up the attempt to produce the documented path of his thinking in a larger introduction. With that it was clear that it wasn't Heidegger's concern to comprehend retrospectively the path of his thought and to relate it to the themes and questions of the present. Rather he sought to develop further his thought in the immediate confrontation with the specific questions already posed. In 1959–60 the 70-year-old philosopher left no doubt that his task lay before him: to provide that essential main work, for which he had collected all his thoughts, but for which he lacked a language. The lecture 'Der Weg zur Sprache' of 1959⁶ says of Wilhelm Humboldt that he worked on his study of the diversity of human language, according to his brother, 'alone, in the vicinity of a grave' until his own death. Humboldt was able to find a popular influence through his letters to a friend and through his sonnets; yet the pioneering treatise always lay ahead. Are we lacking Heidegger's last work? Seminar protocols and occasional writings indicate yet another modification of approach; moreover Heidegger left behind him a wealth of drafts and notes. Yet is that an *opus posthumous*? We cannot yet know the answer.

In his first forays, Heidegger had combined the metaphysics of med-

ieval Aristotelianism with Kant and Hegel. However, by the First World War he was already concerned with a hermeneutic of factual experience of life and wanted to develop it by means of a remodelling of phenomenological philosophy. Aristotle could be a teacher in a new way, since, in the sixth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he also ascribed to the situational orientation here under the changing moon an *aletheuein* and therefore a particular *logos*. Could a formal-indicative hermeneutic, an existential conceptuality, provide access to the situation, even to the liminal situation (*Grenzsituation*) and the unavailable *kairos*? With this the question of Being and time was raised anew. Yet in 1929 Heidegger earnestly proposed that the guiding sense (*Sinn*) of Being in Aristotle must not be defined as *ousia* (as Brentano maintained), but rather as *energeia*, which bears in it potential and therefore is a being-at-work (*Am-Werk-sein*). Doesn't this being-at-work assert itself as unbridled technology, as the total mobilization of all energies, as Ernst Jünger suggested? Does man touch the mythical, which gives his life meaning, perhaps only still in art, which has not shed its cultic rootedness? Heraclitus, so imputes Heidegger, posed the question of a Being, which (somewhat as the linguistic root indicates, in that it still bears the 'I am') is also at once a Becoming – namely that *physis* to which the *aletheia* belongs. Nietzsche alluded to this dimension when he conceived of that which is particularly Greek as the antagonism between the Dionysian and the Apollonian, i.e. when he wanted to wrest the forms of Being from Becoming itself. Hölderlin developed this approach more purely, in that he comprehended the eternity of the divine as the 'stride past' (*Vorbeigang*), which always has its own respective place and hour, and therefore cannot be opposed to time. When the struggle of the great totalitarianisms for world domination openly took the stage in the Second World War, Heidegger in the Nietzsche lectures of 1940 no longer analysed 'Idealism' as the failure of truth, but rather 'Nihilism'. The 'seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus'⁷ from the sombre years of 1944–6 appears to combine Nothing and Being in an almost mystical fashion. What 'mystical' might mean here Heidegger clarified for himself when he began to translate Lao-Tzu in 1946–7. And thus from the Bremen lectures of 1949⁸ onward he could interpret the world in its contemporary constellations from the antagonism of 'enframing' (*Gestell*) and 'the fourfold' (*Geviert*). Is that which is here called *Gestell* still conceptualized from that disposal (*Verfügung*) of being (*das Seiende*) in the representing (*Vorstellen*) and delivering (*Zustellen*) of Being, which Husserl treated as the original foundation of philosophy through Plato and Descartes? How can the co-presence of the divine and the mortal in the fourfold today indicate the saving power (*das Rettende*)? Obviously Heidegger felt himself called upon by the age to rethink yet again his

philosophical approach, namely to juxtapose art to world civilization and its technology or 'artificial intelligence' in a new way.

Though it remains today still premature to say anything completely reliable about the paths taken by Heidegger in the last twelve years of his life, this paper will briefly consider two texts from this period: the *Spiegel* interview of 1966 and the Athens speech of 1967. With all the provisionality rightly reserved for the genre of the discussion, these texts will be used to put a question to Heidegger's thought: does the care (*Sorge*) for the proper (*das Eigene*) and the authentic (*das Eigentliche*) not lead to the premature rejection of the contemporary world as a closed structure (*Verschlossenheitszusammenhang*), and thereby as well to an inappropriate definition of the co-operation (*Miteinander*) of art and technology? When Heidegger used the fame which *Being and Time* brought him to break out of academic philosophy, this question of art and technology as a decisive one had fallen to him. The following reflections should make clear that Heidegger even on his final path yet again thought through this question anew.

I Two late texts

On 23 September 1966, three days before his seventy-seventh birthday, Heidegger was interviewed by the news-magazine *Der Spiegel*. According to the agreement the text was to be published only after the philosopher's death; at that time it had a worldwide echo as scarcely any other text.⁹ A passage from the discussion's minutes, which was replaced by a less personal formulation at Heidegger's request, portrayed the aged philosopher at work, endeavouring to introduce his fellow-thinkers into the essential questions, and thus to bring them onto his path of thought: 'I believe I am on the path, though I don't know whether I will complete it.' Heidegger elucidated what provoked him to his work when in May 1976, a few days before his death, he sent the *Spiegel* editor Georg Wolff his manuscript 'Modern natural science and modern technology' ('Neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft und moderne Technik') with the dedication: 'A question as of yet unthought' (*Eine noch nicht bedachte Frage*).¹⁰ The confrontation with the 'unbridled beast' (as Heidegger put it in his last Marburg lecture) had at least since the crisis Winter of 1929–30 pushed Heidegger in a direction which also made possible the temporary alliance with the National Socialist Revolution. That Nietzscheanism, which at once both joined and juxtaposed life and spirit (*Geist*) to each other, seemed to conceptualize the constellation of the time: a new transfigured figure (*Gestalt*) for the pain of becoming (*das Werden*) was to be wrested out of the antagonism of the Dionysian and the Apollonian. However, with the young Nietzsche's thoughts on art,

Heidegger sought not only an historical greatness in a world reconfigured by myths; he also accepted how the later Nietzsche juxtaposed Dionysus against the world-negating Christian eschatology, yet nevertheless proclaimed the death of traditional God. Ernst Jünger at that time gave this Nietzscheanism the final edge: in the total mobilization of all energies was to be won that contact with the 'mythical' which also through death in the *matériel* battle was to enable the experiencing of the identification with a meaning-giving and surviving figure (*Gestalt*): the soldier and the worker.¹¹ When Heidegger broke off his direct political engagement, he saw the constellation of the times more validly addressed in Hölderlin's discourse of the truth, which eventuates (*sich ereignet*) despite the 'long' time. The Germans, this restless and threatened people (*Volk*) in the endangered midst of Europe, appeared called upon to find a new future from its relationship to the Greeks. Yet even before National Socialism openly trod the path of struggle for world domination, Heidegger, in the lecture course *Einführung in die Metaphysik* from Summer 1935,¹² posited the retrograde tie (*Rückbindung*) of the still only mechanical mobilization and organization to the question of race alongside the retrograde tie of Bolshevism to the notion of 'class', although also in tandem with the collusion of groups in Western liberalism. Heidegger labelled all of these externalized formations of a common life as being completely oblivious to the actual task at hand. The *Spiegel* interview of 1966 repeats this view of things: National Socialism, as it were, had 'gone in the direction', of searching for a relationship to the essence of technology; 'these people, however, were far too unreflective in thinking to attain a truly explicit relationship to that which today happens and which is underway for the last three centuries'.

In a famous annotation to the lecture course from Summer 1935 Heidegger contrasted the actual National Socialism with its 'inner truth and greatness', namely the attempted confrontation with modern technology; the *Spiegel* interview still claimed an 'inner truth' for the confrontation of poetry and thought (*Dichten und Denken*) with the destiny (*Geschick*) which determines our time. The universal scientific-technical grasp (*Zugriff*) of what is (including the human being), should be shown its limits; in the Being of beings the withdrawal (*Entzug*) should be found, which withdraws the assigned (*das Zugewiesene*) from disposal (*das Verfügung*) and thereby allows to flash up that which grants meaning and binds, which is named the holy and the divine. Metaphysics, which found its culmination in a philosophical theology,¹³ is dismissed as an illusion. Thus Heidegger maintains that philosophy and in general 'all the merely human musings and endeavours' on their own cannot bring about a direct transformation of the present state of the world.

Only a god can yet save us. The single possibility remaining for us is

in thinking and in poetry to prepare a readiness for the appearance of god or for the absence of god in the downfall; that we go down in the face of the absent god.

Heidegger says only 'a' god, but that means: a 'god' such as showed itself high over the city of Athens in the meaning-bestowing form of Athena of the Parthenon and who orientated the entire life of the *polis*. Thus art as a counterforce to the technological disposal (*Verfügung*) comes into play, an art which still or once again possesses a cultic significance for life. The question remains of whether we are vouchsafed such an art, which allows the saving power to appear or which wakens a preparedness for it. Does Heidegger in the cited sentence mean that the 'appearance of god' (*Erscheinung des Gottes*) could save, but the 'absence of god' (*Abwesenheit des Gottes*) is ensnared in a downfall, which after the self-destruction of Europe as the former centre of the world also distorts the essence of man itself there? A few sections later Heidegger speaks of the 'preparation for the readiness of one's self-exposure for the arrival or the absence of god' (*Vorbereitung der Bereitschaft des Sich-Offen-Haltens für die Ankunft oder das Ausbleiben des Gottes*): 'Also the experience of this absence is not nothing, rather a liberation of man from that which in *Being and Time* I called the deterioration to being [*das Seiende*]'. In any case this indicates that one cannot reckon history according to happy or unhappy peoples or periods. He who flounders can also learn what he should have lived by, and towards which task his life was actually oriented. In its very downfall Europe can teach the world something! The Greeks knew that the downfall of a tragic figure is no mere loss: in her downfall Antigone showed a new experience of the divine, through which another time could be born (at least in Hölderlin's translation and reinterpretation of this tragedy, which was definitive for Heidegger).¹⁴

Half a year after the *Spiegel* interview, on 4 April 1967, Heidegger took his leave from public activity before the Academy of Sciences and Arts. His speech 'The provenance of art and the determination of thinking' ('Die Herkunft der Kunst und die Bestimmung des Denkens')¹⁵ reminds the age of the sciences and technology that the Greeks founded as the beginning for the Western European sciences and arts. The inception (*Anfang*) of a destiny (*Geschick*) however is the greatest power, which prevails before all belated followers and also awaits us as the future. Athena, 'the erstwhile protectress of the city and the country', is to accompany the lecture. The first step of the speech asks: what does the goddess say of the provenance of art? Athena is she who advises in manifold ways (in Homer, in the metope of the temple to Zeus in Olympia). For that reason she could assist those who weren't yet technicians but also not mere craftsmen (*Handwerker*), that is, the artists.

Besides the *techne* the *technites* needed a knowledge (*Wissen*) which looks ahead toward the standard-rendering invisible power (*das maßgebende Unsichtbare*). Athena can bestow counsel because she has the shining bright eye that also penetrates the night and renders the invisible visible. She who gives counsel and illuminates at once is also the meditating one (*die Sinnende*). She gazes at the border stone (as in the holy relief in the Acropolis museum). Only from the border does that, which is, find its essence: the mountain and the island, the glistening olive tree as the goddess's gift to her country. The *techne* belongs to the rising (*das Aufgehen*) and the abiding (*das Verweilen*), that is, to the *physis*. In order for *physis* and *techne* to come together, an element is needed, which even archaic Greece only cautiously touched on: the lightning of Zeus, which directs everything. According to Aeschylus, Athena guarded the key to the house in which this lightning lies locked and sealed.¹⁶ Thus could art earn its provenance from the rule of this goddess.

In a second step of the speech Heidegger needs to prove that the gods have fled: 'Delphi slumbers' (*Delphi schummert*). Art is no longer work (*Werk*) in the sense of Heidegger's artwork essay.¹⁷ Art no longer provides through its works the orientation to 'a world of the folkish and the national' (*eine Welt des Volkhaften und Nationalen*); rather art now belongs with the sciences and technologies in a 'world civilization'. In the world of this civilization science itself, to speak with Nietzsche, has been conquered by method, namely by the secured disposal (*Verfügung*) of all that is. Method unfolds as cybernetics. As futurology, cybernetics also draws into the programmable the single possibility of interference, the apparently free human action. The presupposition of these cybernetic-futurological graspings is the society which, relying exclusively on itself and its power of disposal (*Verfügungsmacht*), posits itself as an industrial society above its institutions as the constructed spheres of the lived world. In a third step Heidegger asks from where in this world a thinking might come which can reflect upon the provenance of art. Cybernetics encloses the human being and his relations to the world in the most extensive feedback control system of inter-relation between human and world; the futurology brings that captivity into the programmable, and the industrial society exists only 'on the basis of its incarceration within its own construct' (*auf dem Grunde der Eingeschlossenheit in ihr eigenes Gemächte*). Does modern art as well fall prey to the self-regulating artistic process? In that case, the claim, from which it lives, comes from the scientific-technological world; art too becomes an autonomous (perhaps compensatory) feedback of information in the feedback control system of industrial society. Heidegger searches for another path. Indeed he must ask whether the hope, as it is posited by Ernst Bloch as a principle,¹⁸ is 'not the unconditional selfishness of human subjectivity'. But even Heidegger does not want to renounce world civilization, rather he wishes to take a

step back from it; and from the distance gained he wants to perceive it as a destiny (*Geschick*), without being pulled back into its tendency towards its self-enclosedness (*Sichverschließen*). For that reason he recalls the inceptive (*das Anfängliche*), that from which art could become art, yet also that from which thinking (*das Denken*) is claimed, if it accepts that which was foretold, yet which remained unthought. The Greek light, which sets everything within its borders, indicates a concealment (*Verborgenheit*), which conceals, in that it reveals (*entbirgt*) at the borders. The temporal period of this unconcealment is a clearing (*Lichtung*); yet this clearing is not only light (*Licht*) (as the metaphysics of light and reason intended), but also at the same time darkness; one can also stride through darkness. The word *aletheia* points in this direction, yet this indication in the age of nuclear physics, genetic technology and astronautics must remain something slight and inconspicuous. Heidegger however can end his discourse with a verse of Pindar: the word determines life further in time than the deeds, if language brings it up out of the depths of the meditating heart.¹⁹

II Technology and politics

Heidegger's thought struck a chord, because it was not learned discussion, specialized analysis or hasty actualization, but because with concentrated seriousness it led to first and last questions, and thus from the point of view of the one and only question of Being problematized the possibility of philosophy itself. Under a certain necessity Heidegger was led to return to the beginnings of philosophy in the tragic age of the Greeks; he saw this beginning of thinking in close proximity to poetry (*Dichtung*), especially tragedy. One notices in Heidegger's Athens speech that it addresses the Greeks as the founders of our science and arts, but then does not speak of the philosophy and sciences of the Greeks, rather it elucidates the definition of thinking from the provenance (*Herkunft*) of art. Heidegger proceeded in this way, because he increasingly tended to the conviction that the beginning of thought was unable to incorporate its inceptiveness (*Anfänglichkeit*) into itself and therefore was unable to comprehend itself from out of the event (*Ereignis*) of truth. Thus philosophy was able to become the metaphysical grasp of being (*das Seiende*); it was of itself and with the sciences defined as 'technical' (*technisch*). Plato's doctrine of ideas is seen in this way in the light of Nietzsche's reflections on the history of nihilism, even though Nietzsche himself thereby becomes more and more hopelessly entangled in the metaphysical viewpoint. Thereby thinking (*das Denken*) itself cannot wish to remain 'Greek', but rather must lead its inception, which forgot its inceptiveness, to another inception. One of the last achievements of

bourgeois culture, tourism by ship, made it possible for Heidegger at an advanced age to visit the sites of the erstwhile Greek life, for example, on the first trip in April 1962, to walk through the lion's alley (*Löwenalle*) in Delos. Yet his very visits to Greece led Heidegger to revise his endeavours to think the beginning of thought: in the last of his four *Seminare* (1973 in Zähringen)²⁰ Heidegger made it known that he had again changed his interpretation of Parmenides. In Parmenides too there was no trace of the concealing (*Verbergung*) in the unconcealment (*Unverborgenheit*) and thus no trace of the essence of *aletheia*! That was a revocation of the approach with which Heidegger in his 1932 lecture course on the beginning of Western philosophy had articulated a new passage in this path of thought; without any support from the earliest obliterated traces Heidegger had to develop his theme, the clearing for the self-concealing (*Lichtung für das Sichverbergen*). Was not thereby the uni-linear drama of the history of Being also given up, which saw this history of thought yet again 'substantially', that is, solely from the vantage point of the single posited and failed task (of thinking)? For Heidegger's thesis, that the modern natural sciences are already technical in their very approach, one can also adduce parallel reflections in Max Scheler and the neo-Marxists. The development of the nuclear sciences and technologies especially is a convincing example that the scientists are, to a large extent, powerless and helpless, caught in the net of political and economical forces. One can find an early intimation of the victory of method over science in the conclusion of Hegel's *Logic*, where method is absolutized into the development of one logical relationship.²¹ The young Marx related the self-sufficient industrial society to a utopian goal, when in his Paris manuscripts for the public ownership of production and a humanized nature he proclaimed even the ontological proof of God.²² None the less the question arises of whether the first thesis of the victory of method over science is too undifferentiated and thereby finally false. When Heidegger locates the technical approach in modern natural sciences in its mathematicalization, then it must be noted that the Greeks had already made the move to pure mathematics and that Hellenistic astronomy created a mathematical natural science that is not a technical grasp. In point of fact the modern scientific approach is characterized by the analytical experiment which, for instance in the case of motion, abstracts the effective forces of resistance (such as friction) and thus through a methodological abstraction arrives at 'pure' phenomena and their laws. The methodology relativizes scientific labour towards the conceptualization of delimited and abstracted characteristics of reality; for this reason as well Heisenberg's later endeavours will be misunderstood, if they are characterized in a vulgar fashion as a struggle for a totalized 'universal formula'. In his lecture 'The question concerning technology',²³ Heidegger imputes to Heisenberg the thesis that in a

physics which takes account of the physicist and his experimental structure, man only encounters himself. Heisenberg however had to contradict this radicalization: physics, in its methodological abstraction and in the critical knowledge of its own boundaries, only interprets certain aspects of our being-in-the-world; the Platonic doctrine of ideas and the correctly understood mathematicalization have abiding validity for this comprehension of reality and exist on good terms with the interpretation of reality by artistic productions.

Being and Time in its confrontation with the Greeks sought to elaborate philosophically a 'science of Being', and thus to make possible a logical and existential differentiation between sciences such as physics, history and theology. Later Heidegger conceived of scientific labour as a single unified process which, as a grasping of the world in itself, is technical and thus inextricably linked with technology. Yet when the essay 'Die Frage nach der Technik' attempts to discuss and situate technology in its 'essence', then technology is interpreted not anthropologically or instrumentally, but ontologically. Technology (*die Technik*) is a disclosure (*Erschließung*) of being (*das Seiende*) according to its Being and therefore indicates the constellation of the truth of Being itself. The modern science of atomic energy would be impossible without nuclear technology; it is bound up with the dangers of military and industrial uses of this technology, yet it also discloses unfamiliar underlying dimensions of reality itself. However, such an articulated knowledge remains here limited to certain aspects of our being-in-the-world, and only this methodological abstraction leads to the disclosure of reality its scientific character. The uncanniness of the newly disclosed dimension of reality reminds man drastically of his powerlessness and finitude; the struggle against the dangers made possible by this new technology indicates that this human finitude has its practical dimension.

When Heidegger speaks of cybernetics, then he is indirectly recalling that the mathematical physics cannot sustain unchallenged the role of a paradigmatic science, as it was earlier believed. If biology has received a new significance, then genetic technology indeed demonstrates the advance of mechanistic ways of thinking; yet along with these tendencies in microbiology can be found the holistic characteristics of macrobiology, which on the other hand speaks of the uniqueness and the unavailability (*Unverfügbarkeit*) of life and its 'niches'. Astronautics as well reminds man of the limits of his expansion into space and of the openness and inexplicability of his situation (if there were a conversation, indeed an encounter with other intelligent beings in the universe, then the situation of humanity would drastically change). In the *Spiegel* interview Heidegger finds terrifying the televised view of the earth from the moon, and sees it as an indication of the deracination of man; but doesn't this image also show how improbable and how full of beauty, though also full of

dangers is this niche of life on this small blue planet? Nowhere is the concrete technology the unfolding of a single will to power which, eternally recurring, wills itself and thereby demands from humanity its self-sufficient 'industrial society'. This totalizing discourse of society perhaps conceptualizes a tendency in contemporary humanity; but a critical analysis of society must proceed with greater differentiation and can then relinquish such discourse to the vulgar beliefs, which have nothing more to do with science.

Nietzsche saw in the philosophers of the tragic age of the Greeks the testimony that philosophy could also exist among a 'healthy' people. Philosophy in this sense however presupposes the unitary style of a culture. Such a unitary style Heidegger finds only in the negative characteristics of a world civilization. Politics becomes meaningful only when it makes possible through its guaranteeing of delimited life-spheres a disruption of this disastrous universal network. Before the question therefore, of how the present world is apportioned into various dominions, is the question, for instance, of how the opposition of technology and art is vouchsafed a necessary scope of action. The *Spiegel* interview does not want to decide whether one day in China and Russia 'ancient traditions' (*uralte Überlieferungen*) will not contribute to 'making it possible for man to have a free relationship to the technical world'; it is significant that the hopes for the USA are more subdued. Heidegger, who in 1937 in the last public gesture of communication in a newspaper article had called for 'paths towards discussion' (*Wege zur Aussprache*)²⁴ with France, worked further toward a German-French encounter after the self-destruction of Europe; admittedly Heidegger, who in *Being and Time* still constructed the central concepts of the 'temporal interpretation' with words derived from Latin, wanted to oblige Romance language philosophy to a thinking in the original Greek and its echoed articulation in German. The resistance to the 'unbridled beast' of technology can be formulated with words of Heidegger's friend, the French poet René Char, the 'poet and resistance fighter', who let Hölderlin echo in the pathos of his poems and who united his native Provence with the Mediterranean realm and with Greece:

In Provence rocket bases are now being built, and the country is being devastated in an inconceivable fashion. The poet, who certainly is not to be suspected of sentimentality or a glorification of the idyllic, told me, the deracination of man, which there is taking place, is the end, if poetry and thought do not once again come to non-violent power.

The question remains, whether this 'contra' (*Gegen*) can be translated into a reasonable political *praxis*. In the *Spiegel* interview Heidegger maintains: 'It is a decisive question for me today how a – and which –

political system can be related to the technological age. I have no answer to this question.' The next clause is indeed fearful: 'I am not convinced that it is democracy.' Heidegger, who at least supported his students in their endeavours to create a new relationship between philosophy and politics, had for himself as well not completely ruled out political activity. Thus, despite the abstinence he imposed upon himself in the political realm after his aberration (*Verirrung*) in 1933, Heidegger joined a people's referendum in late 1975, which demanded a moratorium on nuclear reactor construction.

The decisive question remains of whether the totalitarianism of National Socialism should be seen as a prelude to a perhaps more terrifying future and whether it should be ascribed to a trivialization (that is, determined by the supremacy of instrumental reason, as the Frankfurt School exegesis, similarly to Heidegger, would have it). Is the 'inner truth', through which poetry and thought seek to answer a destiny (in a rupture or in the subversive endeavour to locate inconspicuous beginnings), really only the antithesis to totalitarianisms or rather often a tendency of them? The French Revolution and, more than a hundred years later, the October Revolution wanted to help humanity to achieve a better life; the conviction that history must lead to something absolutely new soon led to the view that in such an exceptional situation every form of terror is permitted, even necessary. This tendency may also have had its role to play in the National Socialist Revolution; a philosophizing, which knew itself committed to the hour and the historical upheaval, could join with the very first uncertain departure. In the *Spiegel* interview Heidegger claims that his lecture course of 1951–2 *Was heißt Denken?* strives for the inner truth of poetry and thought (*Dichten und Denken*), and yet for that reason is so little appreciated. Yet in this lecture course does not the inner truth turn suddenly and without mediation into a perverted triviality, when with Nietzsche and with a glance at the example of old Russia those institutions are recommended which could still be 'anti-liberal' 'to the point of malice'? Hölderlin's short ode is quoted, in which Socrates favours Alcibiades, that is, which portrays the union of wisdom with youthful and fervent beauty.²⁵ Hölderlin's point of departure is the *Symposium*, but he then conceives of beauty as a tragic process. But Thucydides can instruct us how the youth of Athens brought their city to ruin through their military adventure in Sicily, and how Alcibiades himself could offer his political art first to the Athenian, then to the Spartan and Persian, then finally to the Athenian faction again. Even Hölderlin's political dreams came to an end in that he would have been brought to trial and charged with high treason by Sinclair, had the poet's mental collapse not protected him. The appeal to Hölderlin's verse would be mere palliation, if one overlooks this crass reality and doesn't take it as an admonition for the path through the twentieth century.

III Art and the saving power

The Greek light (*Licht*), as Heidegger says in his Athens speech, places the simple within its borders: the island, the mountain, the olive tree. Can this light also lead us to the clearing (*die Lichtung*), as Heidegger conceives of it from its meaning as a demarcated woodland clearing? Heidegger relates the Greek light to the lightning of Zeus which directs everything. In the Heraclitus seminar which Heidegger held with Eugen Fink²⁶ he remembers one afternoon of his sojourn on the island of Aegina: 'Suddenly I heard [sic] a single stroke of lightning. My thought was: Zeus.' The key to the lightning, which directs the emergence of the Greek world, is in the safe keeping of Athena; yet if anything, art and not thinking remained close to this mystery (*Geheimnis*). Thus the beginning, which the Greeks made for history, is to be related to the actually posited task only through another beginning of thinking. The question arises where at all in Greek history one is to establish this beginning. A goddess such as Pallas Athena who comes to us from temple reliefs and archaic poetry exhibits murky beginnings, no doubt pre-Socratic: the tutelary spirit of cities, the aid in battle only gradually took on its later form, after the Indo-Europeans came to the Aegean Sea four thousand years ago. That Athena sprang fully armed from the head of Zeus, or that she safeguards the secret of his lightning, these are beliefs that were attributed to the goddess only much later. She first received her name from the Boetian and later Attic Athens and thus demonstrates how the gods of myths and epics were only retroactively associated with definite locales and regions. Is there at all anything simple and inceptive (*ein Einfaches und Anfängliches*) in this history, which one can hold onto and that can still give us an orientation?

On the one hand the Mediterranean peninsulas and islands must have seemed to the various groups of migrating Greeks like the land of Phaeacians, who hosted and fêted Odysseus; on the other hand they must have been overpowering with blazing sun and storm, and ever-surfing sea and earthquakes, and the elemental forces of nature. The emigrant newcomers brought with them their supreme sky-god, who also safeguards the lightning; this god had to join with the earth and mother divinities already present there. In these conjunctions the simple and the inconspicuous could have played its role. For instance one of the oldest shrines, the Temple of Hera at Samos, lay not only in the fertile plain; the divinity for it was also found in the lygeum (or esparto) bush, which even today protects fertility (without such hormonal assistance many children would not be born). Perhaps Zeus came to this goddess as a cuckoo, which might well mean: with the call of spring. In any case the Samian Hera is not simply the Hera of Argos; the Artemis of Ephesos is not (as Heidegger assumes in his Heraclitus lectures²⁷) the Artemis of

Delos and sister of Apollo. These figures of Greek divinity were in constant transformation; they existed only in a diversity, which in turn entailed confrontations: even Athena first had to wrest the Attic land from Poseidon, the sea-god and earth-shaker. The Greeks remained exposed to this diverse and conflictual multitude of divine powers in their small cities, which for their part were likewise in continual struggles with each other and thus equally exposed to downfall and arduous rebuilding. When the Age of Goethe sought a new art and literature for its new life-experiences, it wanted to draw its orientation from Greece; can we today assume this orientation, after Nietzsche has lent it a tragic intensity?

When Nietzsche spoke of the Dionysian and the Apollonian, he assumed that Schopenhauer had interpreted the view of Greece and aesthetics in general through the overturning of the metaphysical tradition: it is music which discloses the *an sich*, the ideal forms are finally only an illusion, which makes bearable the pain of becoming. Yet can epic and sculpture really be ascribed simply to the Apollonian, and can tragedy then be interpreted as the mediation of these elements with Dionysian music? Only heroic battle and death counted for Homer's heroes; what happened *in* death was irrelevant. Yet later the graves of heroes and the remembrance of the founding figures were again cultivated and the gods again united with the country; thus could all those tendencies appear anew, including the Dionysian. Nevertheless the Dionysian tragedy began – in the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus – with the invocation of Zeus. When Heidegger in the Winter of 1929–30 enlisted Nietzsche's antagonism to the interpretation of the argument about 'life and spirit' (*Leben und Geist*), he also took up Nietzsche's late slogan 'Dionysus contra the Crucified'. Nietzsche's friend Overbeck had impressed him with the 'world-denying' element of Christian eschatology; therefore with Hölderlin Heidegger inquired after the gods of the earth and the homeland (*die Heimat*) and after the demi-god, who like the Rhine makes an entire land fertile and habitable.

When the catastrophe which had occurred long ago finally became manifest in the Second World War, the saving power remained only as the slightness of inconspicuous beginnings; finally Hölderlin was heard from the echo which he had found in Trakl. If Trakl has him, who is called into the downfall (*Untergang*), encounter the spiritual blueness of the sacred (*die geistliche Bläue des Heiligen*),²⁸ then Cézanne 'realizes' in the autonomous medium of art as nature does, in that he allows inconspicuous things to emerge out of the blue shadows. The artist, who confined himself to Provence, found his theme not in the disquiet of Paris nor in the contrast between the poverty in the coal-mining region and the solitude of Bretagne, but rather in the peaceful Montagne St Victoire. When Heidegger spoke of Provence as the bridge to Greece,

then one wonders to what extent he saw Greece and the inceptiveness of its hills, islands and olive trees with Cézanne's eyes. One should not search out a place in the many centuries for that which is inceptive (*das Anfängliche*) in Greek history, in which for example Athena first becomes the figure we encounter in the temple pediments and the literary texts. The inceptiveness lies rather in that modest area, in which *mythos* and *logos*, *Dichten* and *Denken* separate from each other, yet according to Heidegger always remain in the vicinity of a common striving for a native (*heimatlich*) dwelling on this earth. However, perhaps thought in the tragic age of the Greeks was also more various than Heidegger wants to perceive it, yet always marked by a colonial push for world conquest, which must be separated from the traditional embeddedness in *mythos*. Thus Plato's doctrine of ideas in a genuine way might continue 'Greek' motifs, which for us today have a practical relevance. Philosophizing incidentally is related not only to poetry (*Dichtung*) and to a cultic form of art; it has its beginnings also in its diverging from other life-spheres. Therefore there can be no single beginning of philosophy at all. When work for everyone grows scarce and leisure time becomes problematical in an industrial society, then art for its part cannot be so intertwined with the active life, as once may have been the case in the Greek dawn.

Heidegger tried to remove Athens from its contiguity with Jerusalem, Carthage and Rome; thus he had to overlook how Hölderlin in the final phase of his creativity relativized the relation of German to Greek and the hope for an immediate return of the divine. In 1939–40 Heidegger put aside the problematic of the hymn 'Wenn am Feiertag' with Norbert von Hellingrath by deleting the fragmentary conclusion of the poem; in 1959 he simply omitted the thematically more complete early version of the late draft for the hymn 'Griechenland'. Yet that version shows that by then for Hölderlin the *mythos* of the Greeks had become only one of the guises of God and that the poet's concern was rather the transition over the Alps, indeed the Hesperian festivals such as the wedding of the heir to the Württemberg duchy in London. Thus the verses of 'Patmos' that speak of the danger, in which the saving power also grows, are reversed by Heidegger: the verses no longer warn against seeking a rupture and breakthrough to the divine at any cost, rather they refer to the nihilism in which every trace of the divine is gone. According to the Patmos hymn, however, the danger lies in the fact that the peaks of time (*Gipfel der Zeit*) are distressingly near. These peaks, which remain separate from each other, are those above which the eagle flies in the hymn 'Germanien': the mountains of Asia, where patriarchs and prophets encountered their god, the sacred mountains of Greece and Italy, the Alps, which led to Northern Europe and its history. Only the faithfulness, which keeps the one and the other and which mediates all that is bestowed, furthers the growth of the saving power. For that reason

Hölderlin flies with the Genius not only to Taurus in Asia, but also returns to the Aegean: above the shadowless straits of the sea, which are familiar to the sailor, he finds among the beloved Greek islands near Samos and Delos also Patmos, the island monastery. There Saint John, in a cave on the precipice of a mountain, underwent and recounted that revelation, which teaches endurance in dark times.

With Hölderlin's elegy 'Brot und Wein' Heidegger charged poets with the task of bringing back to mortals the trace of the absent gods. But he never considered how Hölderlin spoke of the trace in the hymn 'Der Einzige': in the desert as the place of temptation toward hubris Christ preserves 'the trace of a word' (*die Spur eines Wortes*), namely that of law, which is already written but once again is becoming a mere trace. The Hesperian especially, who perforce stands in an open history, should not reject the helpful trace. However, in 1942–3, when Heidegger in his lecture course *Parmenides*²⁹ tried to dissolve the opposition of *mythos* and *logos* and to regain a tragic experience of god, he was only concerned with Sophocles and the Greeks; the poet who placed Shakespeare next to Sophocles is depicted thus: 'Goethe is a disaster' (*Goethe ist ein Verhängnis*). According to Heidegger humanism mixed together that which is incomparable and made Greek antiquity 'completely' inaccessible. Certainly one needn't think immediately of Shakespeare's persiflage of the Greeks in *Troilus and Cressida*; but Shakespeare and Goethe belong to us. And in fact from the 1950s onward one sees Heidegger again and again presenting the path to that which is simple with a citation from Goethe, yet the gesture of rejection and the retreat to a proper and authentic (*ein Eigenes und Eigentliches*) remained. Thus can Heidegger, who none the less introduced 'deconstruction' (*die 'Destrucktion'*) into phenomenological philosophy, speak of contemporary literature in the *Spiegel* interview only as 'largely destructive'. When Heidegger was in Bremen once he made a rare visit to the theatre and there saw Lorca's *Dona Rosita*, in which the old professor Don Martin is mocked cruelly by his students and only the old housekeeper finds his question, 'What is an idea?' still meaningful. At this point Heidegger whispered to his companion, 'Yes, that's me'. Thereby he seemed to interpret himself – 'with an expression of composed sadness', as Lorca's stage directions put it. Yet only with difficulty could the critic of humanism have adopted the humanity of Molière, who has the extravagant Sganarelle in *L'escole des maris* say that it is 'better to belong to the multitude of fools than to be wise and stand alone against all the rest'. It is inconceivable that Heidegger could have recognized the grotesquerie of those statements from his *Parmenides* lecture course, which in the sombre winter of 1942–3 after the establishment of the 'Final Solution' and in the face of Stalin-grad yet portrayed the Germans as 'invincible', if only they would repeat

the Greek inception (*Anfang*) and remain 'the nation of poets and thinkers' (*Volk der Dichter und Denker*).

In his 'Rektoratsrede'³⁰ of 1933 Heidegger repeated the old legend of the Greeks, that Prometheus was the first philosopher; with reference to the *Prometheus* of Aeschylus Heidegger claimed that all knowing (*Wissen*) remained exposed to the predominance of fate (*Schicksal*). In the meantime man in another Promethean feat had acquired atomic fire, but also the atomic constituents of life itself, which is now threatened in its entirety, world-wide. Because of this humanity is now forced into a new solidarity and responsibility, and thus Heidegger's discourse on 'the planetary nature' (*das Planetarische*) of world civilization can be taken not only negatively as a reference to deracination. Out of the very dangers now arisen must man not bring his new intellectual and practical abilities to bear on prospects which Heidegger himself in 1927–8 with Max Scheler in a fully positive way had called 'metaphysical' or 'meta-ontological'? In this dimension philosophizing might enter into a new proximity to art; this proximity signifies however neither an overtaking of the mythical through *logos* nor the presupposition of an absolute inceptiveness (*Anfängliche*) in art. Hegel's discourse on 'the end of art' is qualifiably correct, in so far as art and poetry (*Dichtung*) constitute only one particular human pursuit alongside others (for instance the scientific-technical). Sometimes it seems as if in his final years Heidegger in his reflections on his companion in misfortune, Cézanne, had forgotten Paul Klee, from the perspective of whose theoretical writings Heidegger had wanted in 1959 to write a 'pendant' to his artwork essay.³¹ With all the inclination to the lyrical, the phantastic and also the farcical, Klee developed an art which consciously constructs and composes its figures out of the simplest elements. Thus in his art Klee incorporates the technological (*das Technische*), so as finally to induce from it the acceptance of finitude and fatefulness (for example the acceptance of one's own death in the last picture *Tod und Feuer* (*Death and Fire*), which Heidegger included with Trakl's poems and Heisenberg's formulae in his foreword to *Being and Time*³²). The saving power can grow only when humanity as a whole assumes responsibility for an always precarious and always finite and limited life on this concrete planet. The future name of the divine must derive its meaning from this adoption of a fateful finitude. The simple and the initial can only be found from within the overarching situation. For that reason Paul Celan in a poem, which at first was to be a poem of Hiroshima, also related the simpleness of the cherry blossom to that 'here', which remains determined by Hiroshima: 'Here – where the cherry blossom wants to be darker than there'.³³

Notes

1 Translator's Note (hereafter T.N.): *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1963); *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, tr. Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1987).

2 Cf. the Afterword to the second edition of *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1983), p. 355. The latter account in *Heidegger und die hermeneutische Philosophie* (Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1983) continues the thought of the first book with the attempt to reincorporate Heidegger's themes into a hermeneutical philosophy.

3 T.N.: in *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969), pp. 61–80; 'The end of philosophy and the task of thinking', in *Basic Writings*, ed. D. F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 373–92.

4 T.N.: cf. Heidegger's text 'Adalbert Stifter's "Eisgeschichte"' (1964), in *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 1910–1976*, GA 13 (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1983), pp. 185–98.

5 T.N.: M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 2 vols (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961); M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 4 vols, ed. D. F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1979–87).

6 'Der Weg zur Sprache', in Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), pp. 157–216; 'The way to language' in *On the Way to Language*, tr. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 111–38.

7 T.N.: Title of one of the lectures from *Nietzsche II*. Translated as 'Nihilism as determined by the history of being' in *Nietzsche*, vol. IV, ed. D. F. Krell.

8 T.N.: *Einblick in das was ist*. Bremer Vorträge (1949). 'Das Ding'; 'Das Ge-stell'; 'Die Gefahr'; 'Die Kehre'.

9 'Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten', in *Der Spiegel*, Hamburg, 31 May 1976, pp. 193–219. English trs, 'Only a god can save us now', tr. D. Schendler, *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, 6 (1977), pp. 5–27; '“Only a god can save us”: *Der Spiegel's* interview with Martin Heidegger', tr. M. P. Alter and J. D. Caputo, *Philosophy Today*, 20 (1976), pp. 267–84.

10 *Der Spiegel*, 31 May 1976, pp. 193ff.; 30 August 1976, p. 3. On the question, to what extent a practical or political philosophy might adjoin Heidegger's reflections on the significance of technology, see the controversy between A. Schwan and myself: cf. the Afterword to the second edition of Otto Pöggeler, *Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger* (Freiburg/München, 1974), pp. 155ff. Cf. also Otto Pöggeler, 'Heideggers politisches Selbstverständnis' in Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert and Otto Pöggeler (eds), *Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987).

11 T.N.: Pöggeler is referring to two texts by Ernst Jünger; *Der Arbeiter* (1932) and *Totale Mobilmachung* (1934). Cf. Heidegger's response to Jünger in 'Zur Seinsfrage', in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967), pp. 379–420; *The Question of Being*, tr. with Introduction by William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde (New York: Twayne, 1958). On Heidegger and Jünger see Michael E. Zimmerman, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics and Art* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1990).

12 T.N.: *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1976); *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, tr. R. Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955).

13 T.N.: On this point cf. for example 'Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik' in *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), pp. 31–68; *Identity and Difference*, tr. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).

14 T.N.: On Heidegger and Antigone cf.: George Steiner, *Antigones* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 131–5, 174–7.

15 In *Distanz und Nähe. Reflexionen und Analysen zur Kunst der Gegenwart* (Festschrift für W. Biemel), ed. Petra Jaeger und Rudolf Lütke (Würzburg, 1983). T.N.: to my knowledge no English translation of this text exists.

16 T.N.: cf. Aeschylus, *Eumenides* ll. 824–6.

17 T.N.: ‘Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks’, in *Holzwege* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950), pp. 1–72; ‘The origin of the work of art’, in *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 143–88.

18 T.N.: Ernst Bloch, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, now in Bloch’s *Werkausgabe* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985); *The Principle of Hope*, tr. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Knight (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986).

19 T.N.: Heidegger at the conclusion of the Athens speech cites Pindar’s Fourth Nemean Ode, ll. 6–8:

ῥῆμα ὃ ἐργμάτων χρονιώτερον βιοτεύει,
ὅτι κε σὺν Χαρίτων τύχη
γλώσσα φρένος ἐξέλοι βαθείας.

(‘Longer than deeds liveth the word, whatsoever it be that the tongue, by the favour of the Graces, draweth forth from the depth of the mind’. Sir John Sandys, *The Odes of Pindar*, Loeb Classics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 347.)

Heidegger translates the passage as:

Das Wort aber weiter hinaus in die Zeit als die Taten bestimmt es das Leben,
wenn nur mit der Charitinnen Gunst
die Sprache es herausholt aus der Tiefe des sinnenden Herzens.

20 T.N.: *Wer Seminare*, GA 15, ed. Curd Ochswadt (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1986).

21 T.N.: cf. the final chapter of Hegel’s *Wissenschaft der Logik*, ‘The absolute idea’:

More exactly, the absolute Idea itself has for its content merely this, that the form determination is its own completed totality, the pure Notion. Now the determinateness of the Idea and the entire course followed by this determinateness has constituted the subject matter of the science of logic, from which course the absolute Idea itself has issued into *an existence of its own*; but the nature of this its existence has shown itself to be this, that determinateness does not have the shape of a *content*, but exists wholly as *form*, and that accordingly the Idea is the absolutely *universal Idea*. Therefore what remains to be considered here is not a content as such, but the universal aspect of its form – that is, the *method*.

Hegel’s Science of Logic, tr. A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1969), p. 825.

22 T.N.: cf. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (1844).

23 T.N.: ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), pp. 9–40; ‘The question concerning technology’, in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, tr. with introduction by William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 3–35.

24 T.N.: 'Wege zur Ausprache', in *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens 1910-1976*, pp. 15-22.

25 T.N.: *Was heißt Denken?* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1954), p. 9; *What is Called Thinking?*, tr. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 20. The poem there reads:

Socrates and Alcibiades

'Why, holy Socrates, must you always adore
This young man? Is there nothing greater than he?
Why do you look on him
Lovingly, as on a god?'

'Who has most deeply thought, loves what is most alive,
Who has looked at the world, understands youth at its height,
And wise men in the end
Often incline to beauty.'

26 T.N.: *Heraklit* (Seminar with Eugen Fink) (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1970); *Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67*, tr. C. H. Seibert (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1979).

27 T.N.: *Heraklit*, GA 55, ed. Manfred S. Frings (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1987).

28 T.N.: Reference to Heidegger's reading of selected poems of Georg Trakl in 'Die Sprache im Gedicht,' in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), pp. 35-82; 'Language in the poem: a discussion of George Trakl's poetic work', in *On the Way to Language*, tr. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 159-98.

29 T.N.: *Parmenides*, GA 54, ed. Manfred S. Frings (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1982).

30 *Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität. Rede, gehalten bei der feierlichen Übernahme des Rektorats der Universität Freiburg i. Br. am 27.5.1933. Das Rektorat 1933/34. Tatsachen und Gedanken*, ed. Hermann Heidegger (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1983); 'The self-assertion of the German University: address, delivered on the solemn assumption of the Rectorate of the University Freiburg. The Rectorate 1933/34: facts and thoughts', tr. with an introduction by Karsten Harries, *Review of Metaphysics*, 38 (March 1985), pp. 467-502.

31 T.N.: 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks', in *Holzwege* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1950), pp. 1-72; 'The origin of the work of art', in *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 143-88.

32 On Heidegger's relationship to Klee, cf. H. W. Petzet, *Auf einen Stern zugehen: Begegnungen und Gespräche mit Martin Heidegger, 1929 bis 1976* (Frankfurt: Societäts-Verlag, 1983), pp. 154ff. (pp. 199f. narrate the Bremen-Lorca anecdote). Cf. also Pöggeler, *Die Frage nach der Kunst. Von Hegel zu Heidegger* (Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1984), pp. 26ff. On Heidegger's relationship to painting, cf. Pöggeler's Leiden lecture 'Kunst und Politik im Zeitalter der Technik', in *Heideggers These vom Ende der Philosophie Verhandlungen des Leidener Heidegger - Symposiums April 1984*, ed. R. J. A. van Dijk, M. F. Fresco and P. Vijgeboom (Neuzeit und Gegenwart, Bd. 5) (Bonn: Bouvier/VVA, 1988). On Heidegger's encounter with Celan, cf. the chapter 'Todtnauberg', in Pöggeler, *Spur des Wortes. Zur Lyrik Paul Celans* (Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1986), pp. 259ff.

33 T.N.: Periphrastic citation of the first line of Celan's poem 'Hier' ('Here') from the collection *Von Schwelle zu Schwelle* (*From Threshold to Threshold*).

The first full line reads: 'Hier – das meint hier, wo die Kirschblüte schwärzer sein will als dort' ('Here – that means here, where the cherry blossom wants to be darker than there').