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POLITICS OF LANGUAGE

Political language narrowly defined refers to a specific use of language for political means. In a broader sense, political language refers to *language policy* or *political linguistics*—that is, the ways in which governments attempt to shape the linguistic structure of the society or the claims issued by linguistic groups to change existing language arrangements or legislations. Neither of these working definitions fully captures the relevance of language issues to politics and political science. This entry therefore reviews three types of related but not overlapping issues: (1) the way social sciences address the relationship between language and politics, (2) classical language policies and legislation, and (3) the “normative turn.”

Until recently, language matters in social sciences have been addressed in anthropology, sociolinguistics, and sociology, focusing almost exclusively on language *identity* (class or group identity) and language as an expression of a specific culture—hence its intrinsic value as a unique cultural vehicle. These approaches are consequently committed to language diversity. But language diversity generally hinders efficient political administration, and comparative politics have shown that the most classical sequence of nation building is language rationalization, that is, the imposition of one or more official national languages. Monolingualism is not the norm; most countries have to manage language diversity, either by admitting a set of official languages or by tolerating language diversity.

Language and Politics

To the Greeks, language and politics are so closely related that the practice of democracy is impossible without a theory of language. “Nature makes nothing in vain . . . man is the only animal with the gift of speech” (Aristotle, *Politics*, I, 2). Politics is language, because language enables deliberation and debate and rules out violence, as Norbert Elias has shown in his *Civilizing Process*. Language is therefore central to any political activity.

Language is also central to social interaction, and social scientists have been indebted to pioneer linguists such as Ferdinand de Saussure, who

claimed that language is the epistemological model of society. In other words, society is structured like a language. Structuralism indeed claims that there is a “social grammar,” and social sciences in general became fond of the idea that the implicit and explicit code ruling society resembles a constraining grammar of interaction. Social theory in the 1970s understood social action as either conforming to that grammar or violating its rules.

Three main movements characterize the past decades of research:

1. The first is the reception of nominalism in analytical philosophy and its durable influence on constructivism in general. Nominalism holds that there are no universal concepts, only empirical observations; referred to language, reality pertains to our ways of constructing/naming it; John Austin’s illocutionary acts, for instance, are means of “doing things with words”: A minister saying, “I baptize this child,” ipso facto baptizes it.

2. The second involves studies on language and domination, with two subfields. One is concerned with routinized forms of domination, as in Pierre Bourdieu’s *Language and Symbolic Power* (1982, 1991), for whom the linguistic market is similar to any other market, or Basil Bernstein’s *Class, Codes and Control* (1971), where a sharp line is drawn between the “elaborated speech codes” of the middle classes seeking social mobility and the “restricted speech codes” of the working classes. Speech responds to strong cultural pressures: An elaborated code summarizes general social means and ends, whereas a restricted code is limited to local means and ends. The other subfield is concerned with the exacerbated form of domination: propaganda and totalitarian language. George Orwell depicts the deterioration of language in his novel *1984*, and Viktor Klemperer’s diary (*Lingua Tertiæ Imperii*) describes the sheer truth of how the Nazis systematically destroyed the German language, not only by evacuating the bald words but by substituting them with euphemized codes, such as “final solution” or “special treatment.”

3. The last movement is a legacy from philosophy and anthropology and relates to the profound skepticism concerning the written form of language and its potential link to illiberal policies (Plato, accusing the logographers, wrote that script

lies and that speech is sincere; script is compared to a *pharmakôn*—poison and medicine alike). Anthropology confirms that script is historically linked to despotism, as the original use of script was for accountability and domination of vast territories, not poetry. Classification might be a natural property of language; it enables governments to control society through rules enabled by script.

Language Policies

Language policy is an attempt to weigh collective language choices by institutional means, to prescribe the public use of one (or more) language(s), and to adopt language legislation. Historically, creating, rationalizing, or maintaining a language is the classical (European) sequence of language policy, mostly congruent with nation building in the 19th century. Official languages are not always national languages (an official language can coexist with a set of national languages), and substate national communities or groups with a strong regional identity may challenge the official language and make new language claims. Official- and national-language policies are only efficient alongside compulsory education, a wide interest in learning and using the official/national language, and some kind of reward for doing so (professional, symbolic)—the latter is particularly true for national-language policies: “What the eye is to the lover, language is to the patriot” (Benedict Anderson, 1983, p. 154).

The French example is telling. From the 16th century (the Édit de Villers-Cotterets, 1539) to the 1992 constitutional revision, France has always aimed at rationalizing, spreading, and maintaining the French language as a symbol of common belonging, a means of effective administration in a centralized state, a key element of republican identity, and a sign of equal citizenship. Ironically, it was an abbot during the peak of the French Revolution (1790–1794), Grégoire, who was convinced that revolutionary ideas could only be thought of in French and who implemented the first true language policy: Political praxis and language practice are inseparable.

Language Legislation

The next step is language legislation and consequently language rights. All states “speak,” issue

laws, and administer; language, therefore, cannot be benignly neglected as religion, for instance. In monolingual settings, the public sphere is entirely ruled in/by one language. In multilingual states, mostly federations, legislators have a choice between two principles: the territoriality and the personality principles. The first, and most widespread, principle is based on territorial rights (Belgium, Switzerland, and Cameroon): It legally recognizes a monolingual territory. Variants are territorialized individual rights (Catalonia and South Tyrol), special policies for minorities (Australia, the United States, and Germany, Hungary), and territorial bilingualism for minorities (Estonia, Bosnia, and Pakistan). Territoriality is usually associated with administrative bilingualism (civil servants speak all or part of the official languages) to ensure statewide communication; it provides language stability and language security (small languages are protected on their territory, and language scales are relatively stable) but obliges all to speak the official language in its territory of reference. Territoriality generally leads to juxtaposed unilingualisms and may disrupt inter-community communication, such as in Belgium. The personality principle, on the other hand, is best described by institutional multilingualism: The state acknowledges and recognizes individual language choices. Regardless of where one is in the territory, civil administration has to cater to the individual’s language choices. Most of Canada follows this principle, with both French and English as official languages; however, in response to Québec’s desire to preserve the French language, legislation (Bill 101, 1977) was passed that makes French the sole official language in the province.

Language legislations are mostly a blend of different types of territoriality associated with individual rights. Strategic multilingualism in India or South Africa hints at political rather than linguistic difficulties in a postcolonial or postapartheid era, respectively. Very few states have achieved “liberation” from the colonial tongue. The Arabization movement in Algeria (the return to Arabic as the only official language) was a linguistic and political failure: The Algerian upper classes continued to speak French, the token of upward mobility. One interesting feature of language policy is internationalization (spreading a national language worldwide). Colonial empires did so in Africa, Australia,

and India; and half a century after decolonization, means of social mobility are still linked to “colonial” language skills.

Almost all states enforce linguistic assimilation policies, and very few states decide not to intervene in language matters, favoring as such the dominant group(s). A complete language shift is generally achieved in the third generation; diglossia and bilingualism are common among immigrant children.

Language and Fairness

Noam Chomsky’s theory about the grammatical similarity of all languages within a universal mind-brain set had expelled sociolinguistics and diversity studies from the linguistic departments in the 1970s. A similar change of paradigm took place in the 1990s with the normative turn in language studies. Until recently, and despite a fair amount of language conflicts, normative literature in political science had not paid much attention to language and even less to the linguistic dimension of democracy. Post-Rawlsian political theory has been discussing many culture- or identity-related topics but has barely considered language. Neither liberals or liberal-culturalists, nor communitarians have really addressed language equity. It is only in the 1990s that scholars in comparative politics and economics started to invest in language issues. However, shedding a new light on linguistic diversity and linguistic justice in a system dominated by powerful global languages rapidly led to a wider discussion on the usefulness and the threats of a common language, a lingua franca (in Europe but also in multilingual societies and sometimes even on a global level), the founding idea being that somehow a healthy democracy depends on a common tool of communication. The path taken by recent literature is an attempt to reconcile the polity’s systemic and linguistic capacity alongside the citizen’s effectiveness or voice. The “deliberative turn” of the 1990s and the following “talk-centric” theories of democracy indeed focused on communication and debating rather than on voting but without mentioning the precondition of a successful public debate: a common language. The discussion on such a common language as a necessary condition of a more substantial democracy has been particularly vivid in Europe and poses interesting questions: Do we need a common language

for a supranational or even a global democracy? Do we need a common tool to discuss global concerns (environmental issues, for instance)? Would social mobility and employability be enhanced if we all spoke the same language? The possible answers are contained in three different models. The identity model argues for some kind of restorative justice after centuries of nation building and linguistic rationalization: The claim for language diversity is morally relevant, and states ought to acknowledge those claims instead of reducing language variety by imposing global/official languages. The procedural model is not outcome oriented: People should fairly discuss the language choices of their polity. The economy or utility model focuses on the social and economic usefulness of one or more *linguae francae*, the costs and benefits of learning/spreading common language(s).

Many political theorists would argue that given the huge translation costs in the European Union, the most efficient policy would be a fair combination of three official languages (English, French, and German) and a three-communication-languages repertoire, including one of the official languages. Such a language coordination policy would rest on an official language set and a free language market for the citizens; it would cost less, enable governments to invest in language training, enhance the possibilities of communication among European citizens, and maintain the possibilities of connecting European repertoires with extra-European language constellations.

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See also European Integration; Identity, Social and Political; Nation Building; Nationalism; Normative Political Theory; Postcolonialism; Regionalism; Rights; State Formation; Territory

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POLITY

See Political Systems, Types

POPULAR CULTURE

The term *popular culture* has three levels of meaning, which though interrelated are mutually distinct. It refers first, in a generalized way, to the form taken by the totality of everyday practices followed by a society or a group within a society. In this sense, the term is, from the cultural history perspective, a descriptive one, devoid of any further theoretical implications. Historically, a second, more narrowly defined meaning of popular culture first came into use. It was applied to the culture and lifestyle of a population's lower social strata and referred—mostly within a historical perspective—to the perceived polarity between the culture and lifestyle of the general population, seen as the uneducated masses, and the dominant high culture of the elites. The third meaning of the term *popular culture*—which, in the English-speaking world in particular, equates *popular culture* with *pop culture* and thus denotes cultural industry products distributed by the mass media unrelated to the canon of classical high culture—arose from the specific dynamics of the breakdown of Marxist class antagonism in the intellectual circles close to the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (established in 1964). In effect, the vertically and hierarchically conceived juxtaposition of two cultures was now replaced by a horizontal array of multiple equal-status “cultures” subsisting within the polarities of class, race, and gender. Below, the historical

developments and the interaction of these concepts are discussed.

Early Developments

The concept of a (popular, indigenous) “folk” culture (*Volkskultur*) existing in its own right originated in the second half of the 18th century, born partly of the physiocrats' interest in the population at large and partly of the romantic notion of a “folk soul” (*Volksseele*) characterized by supra-individual, nation-specific features. During the Napoleonic period, and in the context of the nascent discourse of nationalism, this concept of *Volk* underwent reformulation; the relationship between popular culture and high culture came to be conceived of as an organic unity, its elements defined in terms of each other. Yet at the same time, in the context of industrialization and of the developing social crisis, the mutual antagonism of the two cultural levels became an increasingly prominent feature of socialist and Marxist cultural theory. The origins of the concept of popular culture at the time of the Enlightenment are linked to the physiocratic interest in resources, generally—to agricultural production, mineral resources, and proto-industrial production—linked ultimately, that is to say, to the discovery of the productive capacity of a territory's working population to increase its wealth. Michel Foucault used the term *biopolitique* (biopolitics) to denote this new, calculating concern with the productivity potential of the population as a feature of the new power structure, directed against the ancien régime.

This same interest was accompanied, and dignified ideologically, by the notion of a productive national soul (*Volksseele*), in which the quintessential nature of a people was supposed to find its expression. It was this latter notion, too, that underlay the romantic preoccupation with collecting nation-specific texts—folksongs (Johann Herder, William Wordsworth), fairytales (Jacob & Wilhelm Grimm), proverbs, and diverse idiomatic materials. Among those thinking in terms of the nation-state, from about 1800 onward, the biopolitical interest became ideological: The idea of a nation as an entity, at one with itself and clearly distinct from other nations, was no mere matter of drawing geographical frontiers. Much more

important, it called for cultural demarcation to take place—a process complicated by the conflicting pulls of a nation's high culture and its "cultural substrate" (Friedrich Jahn and Wilhelm Riehl). The term *folklore*, coined by William Thoms in 1846, denotes the attempt to record the cultural substrate of individual nations, national minorities, or groups in genealogical form and to subject the recorded materials to comparison with a view to identifying what is universal in human socialization, along with what is specific to the respective groups. The positivist collector activity focused on folklore was now accompanied by scientific analysis and sorting of the material under the disciplines of ethnography and ethnology. During the ensuing development of the cultural and social sciences, the culture of the people (*Volk*), of "the nameless masses," was identified for the first time as a subject meriting research. As such, it embraced the material and ritual-performative patterns of existence and action peculiar to the lower social strata of people or genealogical groups and their ideas on religious, juridical, and everyday practical matters, along with their approach to positioning the individual in society (relative to ancestral descent, family, and sequence of generations).

Depending on the political and social conditions prevailing in national groups, cognizance of the everyday perspectives and material culture of the lower strata will tend toward one or the other of two postulates: comparative and open-minded or ethnocentric and hypostatizing. It is unlikely that there has ever been a clearer example of the latter than the direction taken by German ethnology from about 1900, which amounted to disowning the tradition of a comparative ethnology or anthropology concerned both with industrialized societies and with nonstate groups. However, neither line of development succeeded in demonstrating a robust link between high culture and cultural substrate. It was only 20th-century sociology that first developed sophisticated models for such a linkage. The behavioral standards in Norbert Elias's theory of the civilizing process and the habitus variants represented by Pierre Bourdieu must both be seen as distinction-drawing processes, as deliberate differentiation of the elites from the "broad masses"—though this was later rationalized from the psychological angle in the contexts of social, medical, or public hygiene debates.

Nationalist and Marxist Approaches

Thus, in its early stages and subsequent development, the concept of popular culture marked off the sociocultural living patterns of what was initially the agrarian, peasant population, and later included the proletariat and lower middle classes, as separate and distinct from those of the higher and socially influential classes. Two conflicting inheritances can be traced, one nationalistic and focused on origins, the other Marxist and antagonistic. The nationalistic, origins-focused line reaches its culmination in National Socialist ideology; here, the existence of cultural antagonism within a society is denied, and a countermodel, based on ideas such as national character and the "bonding" of a nation's various cultural levels, is proclaimed: the *Volkgemeinschaft*. This was seen as a closed continuum, within which cultural substrate and high culture cross-fertilize and interweave, since both are rooted in the same humus and are inseparably linked. The soil metaphor is complemented by that of blood—*blood* standing here for the vitality and strength of the current generation at any given time.

The background to this blood-and-soil fixation can be traced to 19th-century organic models of society: Nationalistic thinkers generated, for the benefit of the nation's imagination, the self-image of a solitary tree, its roots reaching deep down to the first beginnings of the nation's separate cultural identity and the new blossoms seen on it each year (i.e., individuals who have to put the community before themselves) representing national uniqueness and vigor. In this figurative thinking, every nation constituted a self-contained entity, a clearly demarcated "body" of the people. Being the social stratum seen as tillers of the soil and as essentially enduring, farmers became the ideological standard-bearers for this ideology of *Volkstum*, or national distinctiveness, which postulated a continuity stretching from early origins to the present level of development. The continued efficacy of the strength-giving pure origin was exposed to many and various dangers: nonrecognition and relinquishment of the We as a consequence of fascination with the Other (or Alien) or the sustained infiltration of the "body" of the people (or nation) by "alien elements," the existence of which was perceived as parasitical (e.g., anti-Semitism). It has to be emphasized that all postulates of *Volkstum* and folklore

regarding industrialized societies and the research on them, both the more radical and the moderate variants, are ideologically motivated. While it is true that this readiness of the upper strata of society to turn to the *Volkstum* and folklore of the lower strata embraces a certain element of compensation for modernization *Angst*, the ideologically transmitted postulate of pure origins with minimal contamination from outside is nevertheless preeminent. In other words, the everyday perspectives of the lower social strata were almost lost from sight in the ideological canon centered on origins and race.

The Marxist approach, focused as it was on class antagonism, led to the evolution of the theory of “two cultures” in “the same society” (Lenin). The antithesis inherent in the power disparity will prove to be a productive stimulus for both sides; high culture, having become weak and decadent, will be goaded into repressive action, while proletarian counterculture, with hitherto untapped reserves of energy to draw on, will indeed lose some of its impetus but will prove unstoppable in the long run. With the concept of the struggle for cultural hegemony as outlined by Antonio Gramsci, this black-and-white characterization of the cultural confrontation (subordinate to the economic) becomes less simplistic and more applicable empirically. So Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony being “negotiated” within society after the demise of both the origin-focused and the class warfare-motivated models of national culture was to prove exceptionally fruitful in both historical and contemporary social research.

Modern Approaches

Inquiry into such negotiation (there are a host of parallel developments besides those of Gramsci) implies knowledge of the specific thinking of the actors concerned. Thus, while the special fascination of the term *folklore* lay in its inbuilt tension between “knowledge of the people” and “the people’s knowledge,” the need that now arose for empirical study of the multifarious “culture and way of life” of the population’s lower strata ensured that it was their viewpoint that now became the central concern. The common feature of all these more modern approaches is that they seek to collect and to focus on the inside views peculiar to the various social environments and thus—here revealing an anthropological cast of

mind—to supplement the “grand historical narratives” with detailed studies at the grassroots level (microhistory). The now widely established pursuit of historical research on popular culture owes much to a history that started from the bottom.

Among the points of departure for this historical anthropology was the school that developed around the French journal *Annales d’histoire économique et sociale* (launched in 1929). Its founders, Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, announced a historiography that would subordinate event history to a structural history concerned with everyday life and the mentalities that it engendered. The long duration (Ferdinand Braudel’s *longue durée*) of production methods, ideas, and behavioral patterns now became no less a central focus than single events: violently erupting rebellions (as described, e.g., by E. LeRoy Ladurie, *Carnival in Romans*) or ideas about the nature of the world, put forward at Inquisition hearings but running counter to contemporary trends (e.g., the worldview of a miller around 1600 in the *benandanti*, the work of Carlo Ginzburg). The ethnological line taken by the Prague School applied the structuralist method of meaning-constitutive opposition—this was still before Claude Lévi-Strauss—to elements of popular culture (P. Bogatyrev). Mikhail Bakhtin, with a background in Russian formalism, developed his theory of folk laughter in late medieval popular culture from the antithetical pairing of work culture and feast-day culture.

Particularly in academic research in the fields of family, childhood, women’s, and gender studies (and, not least, feminist studies), but also in the field of everyday living patterns and of power relationships in agrarian, early-modern urban, and proletarian industrialized cultural phenomena, popular culture researchers have set new and lasting standards in historiography. In its early stages, still adhering to the Marxist class antagonism concept, the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies later came to place the dynamics of the hierarchically subordinated cultural forms qua counterculture and subculture, possessing their own symbolic language, at the very heart of its activities: “culture as a whole way of life” (R. Williams; R. Hoggart). This assumed the recognition of individual identity positioned on criteria of social background, occupation, and philosophical-political, religious, and sexual orientation as a decision in favor of a form

of living that constitutes a cultural sector in its own right. Under the influence of Gramsci's theory of hegemony, the counterculture and subculture theory evolved—with youth culture and music culture in the forefront—into a new theory that accords parity of status to a range of cultures; the erudition-laden high culture of earlier times is now just one culture among many.

The most complete transformation has been in the area of mass media cultural products. The Adorno/Horkheimer thesis of a culture industry manipulating the scene from the top has been challenged, in S. Hall's encoding/decoding model, by consumer appropriation of the narrative. John Fiske, taking all categories of mass media-transmitted pop culture products into his purview, demonstrated the creative resistance potential of this appropriation process. From a feminist perspective, Angela McRobbie has emphasized the gender specificity of the manner of appropriation. Cultural studies had already gone separate ways by the time the Birmingham Center was wound up in 2002. Influenced by accelerated media transmission and communication, by the increasing dominance of the visual in cultural output, by consumer-centeredness (among young shoppers no less than others) in the developed societies contrasting with abject poverty in the underdeveloped world, and by the enormous differences globally with regard to women's autonomy of action, the lines of research pursued today in cultural and postcolonial studies are characterized by a bringing together of class, race, and gender.

A detailed study of popular culture (Facebook, blogs, discussion forums, etc.) on the World Wide Web is beginning, but it will take time until web culture research becomes an established discipline in its own right.

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See also Culturalism; Feminism; Marxism; Nationalism; Political Culture

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POPULISM

See Populist Movements

POPULIST MOVEMENTS

A distinction must be made between more or less coherent populist movements on the one hand and populism as a generic theoretical concept referring to a variety of demagogic messages and attitudes on the other. In the following, the various phases of populist movements and ideas are discussed in their historical contexts. The conclusion points to current concerns.

Phases of Populist Movements

Scholars conventionally identify the first historical manifestation of populism in the Russian intellectual populism of the late 1840s *Narodnikis* (i.e., populists in Russian; the word *narodnitchestvo*—populism—appeared in the 1870s). Influenced by the ideas of Aleksandr Herzen, Mikhail Bakunin, and Nicolai Tchernichevski but devoid of any elaborate ideology, these *Narodnikis* emerged as a revolutionary movement adhering to some kind of idolatry of the peasantry and the rural village (*obchtchina*). They were ultraleftist, prone to the use of violence and even political assassinations.

This led, later on, to nihilism—terrorism as propagated by Nicolai Nekrassof and Sergei Netchaiev. They were also fiercely anti-Western (Orientalists) and proslavist (an extremely radical variety of revolutionary slavophiles).

Thereafter, during the last quarter of the 19th century, populism made a second appearance in the very different world of the European and North American industrialized societies. It thoroughly transformed itself into an anti-elitist, anti-parliamentarian, and nationalist-chauvinistic movement, especially in France between 1886 and 1889 (Boulangism, derived from the name of its charismatic leader General Boulanger) and in the United States during the 1890s (with the xenophobic Protestant and anticapitalist People's Party of the small White Anglo-Saxon Protestant [WASP] farmers and miners). Under these circumstances, populism shifted from the most extreme Left to the radical nationalist Right, appearing to some extent as the ancestor of today's xenophobic and anti-immigrant Western European populist parties. Both French and U.S. populism of this second period only enjoyed a short time span. In this way, they introduced a feature of populist movements that remained for a long time quite typical—that is, their short duration, due to the ephemeral excesses of popular fever generated by a recurrent hostility to the existing ruling elite or to a newly established democratic government (in Europe of the late 19th century in particular). They also inaugurated populism as an unsteady form of mass electoral movements cemented by an orientation toward the "citizens of true stock."

Between 1925 and 1955, populism made a third appearance. This time, it emerged in Latin America, with the semidictatorships of Getulio Vargas in Brazil and Juan Peron in Argentina (notwithstanding other populist governments, e.g., Carlos Ibañez's in Chile or General Rojas Pinilla's in Colombia, alongside their much more recent revival in Hugo Chavez's Venezuela or Evo Morales's Bolivia). In this region, populism seems to revive in part the older tradition of caudillismo, that is, that of a predestinate Savior of the People, wielding power by virtue of Providence against the lofty and corrupt oligarchy of big landowners. This inheritance did not prevent Latin American populism from becoming the most accomplished of all populist manifestations till now, a complete political

regime of some sort, offering an actual alternative to West European or North American representative democracy. This alternative could be called "incarnate democracy," considering its embodiment of the Sovereign People by a charismatic leader. Institutionally, these regimes are based on state-controlled labor unions for the incipient working class rather than on a single party inspired by European totalitarian states. Though rather authoritarian and by no means liberal, they, indeed, introduced for the first time some kind of political participation of the Latin American masses into the political arena to gain support from this popular base. They did so to such an extent that they deserve to be considered in some countries as the real forerunners of democracy in this part of the world. This particularity makes Latin American national populist regimes unique.

After World War II, other forms of even more dictatorial charismatic populism occurred in East Asia (Kusno Sukarno in Indonesia, Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines) and in the decolonized countries of Africa (Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, Ahmed Sekou Touré in Guinea, and Kwame N'Krumah in Ghana). These personalized regimes generally gave birth to a Third World populism in which the unity of the nation was expressed in a single party).

In a fourth period, populism has dramatically evolved in Western Europe during the past 30 years. Between 1980 and 2000, it first resuscitated and modernized at the same time the hitherto customary form of factious agitators acting as outsiders opposing the "political correctness" and hypocrisy of representative democracy. In Denmark and Norway, to begin with, "progress" parties were born as anti-taxation groups committed to denounce the excessive fiscal pressure of the Scandinavian social-democratic welfare states. Later on, mainly in Jean-Marie Le Pen's France, Jörg Haider's Austria, Christoph Blocher's Switzerland, Bruno De Winter's and Vlaams Belang's Belgium, or Pim Fortuyn's Netherlands, this precursory kind of populism, whose slogan was "less state," turned principally xenophobic. It depicted the dangers of an extra-European "invasion" and denounced multicultural values and devotees.

These xenophobic parties now have toned down their discourse in many cases. Some of them at least, particularly in Scandinavia, are trying to

get a better position inside the democratic party system. To this end, they do their best to touch a more sympathetic chord in the middle classes and authenticate the new political respectability they are trying to gain. Simultaneously and more interestingly, a number of established politicians belonging to the great parliamentary parties now imitate a part of the campaign techniques of the formerly infamous populists (without admitting it, of course). This is the great novelty that makes the populist performance becoming commonplace instead of being irregular, temporary, and subversive. In a first mutation, a few respectable politicians claimed to do so in order to fight the populists of an orthodox persuasion with their own weapons (this partly was the case with Jacques Chirac in France or the People's Party [Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP] in Austria). But now, they are geared to use these methods indiscriminately in order to face the competition of any other party—whether populist or not. From 1994 onward, Silvio Berlusconi in Italy outperformed everybody else in this unprecedented art of improving his popularity by giving up the condescension of old-style politicians. Later on, the 2007 French presidential campaign spectacularly went along this path, even though Tony Blair's and Edmund Stoiber's 2002 electoral campaigns can be considered as the first examples of this populist contagion in Britain and Germany.

Current Concerns

The term *populism* has so often been misused as an insult by pouring scorn on almost any politician capable of winning an election that difficulties arise to define it more strictly as a social science concept. If we do so, we would argue that its core classical feature relates to the strong and emotional direct relationship that exists between the mass of a population and the populist charismatic leader—or sometimes a party as in Mexico before 2000—who pretends to embody the People and whose ideas and feelings are supposed to correspond to the People without any mediation of representative democracy. According to Max Weber, the term *charisma* applies to a certain quality of a personality, by virtue of which this person is treated as endowed with exceptional powers or qualities. “We believe in the common sense of the

common people,” as stated on page 9 of the Reform Party of Canada's *Principles and Policies: The Blue Book* in 1991. Populism is also antipolitical inasmuch as it assails the art of using time as a resource for delaying and cooling down premature or counterproductive popular demands, an art that commonly represents the core technique of moderate liberal governments. In this way, populist leaders dismiss the “pseudodemocratic” classical management of the political agenda by professing that they are able to keep their promises overnight. Furthermore, Ghita Ionescu, Ernest Gellner, and Edward Shils in particular distinguished a number of additional features for a description of populism in general:

1. Populism is moralistic rather than programmatic.
2. Populism is generally loosely organized and ill disciplined, a movement rather than a party.
3. Populism is based on a state of mind rather than on an explicit doctrine or ideology.
4. Populism is anti-intellectual.
5. Populism is strongly opposed to the Establishment and to the alleged treachery of the elites, most commonly with an anticapitalist pretence.

In addition, populism is first of all a polemical style of political communication that places emphasis on the alleged will of the “True People” and that defends a culture of decency against a culture of irresponsibility. This is perhaps the reason why it increasingly permeates the behavior of politicians and the political stage of the old democracies. Since for inhabitants of emerging countries often a revolution in practical lifestyles has priority over general human rights and political freedom, it seems reasonable to reckon under such conditions that populism still has a promising future in the postindustrial societies as well as in the less affluent parts of the world.

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See also Charisma; Democratization; Social Movements

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POSITIVE PEACE

Positive peace implies more than the absence of war. It suggests creating social relationships that contribute to mutual well-being and human flourishing. The concept goes beyond the negative definition of peace as the absence of war, which is upheld in international law. According to Johan Galtung, the Norwegian sociologist and father of peace studies, peace is not necessarily the opposite of war. Indeed, peace and war are not necessarily exclusive states. Galtung's innovation was to define *negative peace* as the absence of direct violence and *positive peace* as the absence of structural violence or, to put it positively, the presence of conditions in which people can realize their potential. This wider understanding of peace has been controversial but has fostered an enriched understanding of the relationship between building peace and ending war.

Concepts of Positive and Negative Peace

A positive understanding of peace has been implicit in the term for *peace* in many cultures. The Greek word *eirene* meant not only the cessation of hostilities between states but an organized common peace. The Roman *pax* meant an order governed by laws and common citizenship. The Hebrew word *shalom* comes from a root meaning "wholeness" and has connotations of well-being, social

peace, and living in accordance with God's will. The Christian sense of the *peace of Christ* carries this forward and evokes the idea of the community of Christendom. The close idea of reconciliation means "to make whole again." The Muslim word *salaam* also echoes the Hebrew concept. It means peace with Allah, with one's neighbors, and oneself. The Indian *shanti* embraces inner harmony and avoidance of harm, while the Chinese *heping* denotes harmony in society and with nature. A positive, though variously interpreted, meaning to peace seems to be part of our common heritage.

As Europe became secular and organized in sovereign states, the understanding of peace began to change. At the domestic level, *the king's peace* implied a state of law and order. Between states, relations were either in a *state of war* or a *state of peace*. Hugo Grotius elaborated this distinction and international law embodied it. Complete peace became a distant goal. While Desiderius Erasmus had sought to ground peace and tolerance between Lutherans and Catholics on reason and common Christianity, Immanuel Kant looked to a future state of perpetual peace, outside the frame of existing state relations. Peace required voluntary consent to an agreement to abstain from wars between states, on the basis of reason and a moral imperative. Thomas Hobbes similarly saw peace as far from the present state of affairs. Peace meant only the time when states were neither fighting nor being predisposed to fight. Given the nature of sovereignty, this predisposition was ever present in anarchic systems, and so the normal state of Europe was one of war. Thus, political theorists relegated positive peace to a remote future in which people either consented to renounce war or accepted a common sovereign.

In the deadly context of European wars, however, negative peace seemed enough to strive for. A generation shocked by the destruction of World War I founded international relations as an academic inquiry into the conditions of war and peace. They wanted to understand the causes of wars and find a basis for peaceful settlement of disputes and peaceful change. After World War II, when realists became dominant in international relations, this became the central research question for peace studies. The most urgent concern was how to prevent a global war, wrote the editors of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, in the first issue

in 1957. Researchers on the correlates of war aimed to reduce the frequency of wars. Others, such as Anatol Rapoport, aimed to eliminate war as an institution. In the early years of the nuclear age, when warfare appeared to threaten human survival, the top priority was to secure the absence of war.

But critical voices in peace studies questioned this emphasis on negative peace. They pointed to the war of “pacification” in Vietnam and the widespread inequalities and injustices between the developed and the developing worlds. Was peace between states real peace if it rested on relations of dominance between hegemonic powers and their clients and coexisted with exploitation of the poor by the rich? Could a cold peace be acceptable if it was maintained by the threat of nuclear weapons? It was in the context of such criticisms that Galtung launched his idea of positive peace.

Galtung had already put forward a first notion of positive peace in 1964, in his editorial to the first edition of the *Journal of Peace Research*. Here, he saw negative peace and positive peace as two dimensions, with the task of peace research to understand progress in both dimensions—both to eliminate war and to secure solidarity, community, and empathy—in short, “the integration of human society.” In 1969, he sharpened this idea with his distinction between direct and structural violence and their opposites, negative and positive peace. Galtung retained the idea of peace as absence of violence but broadened the meaning of violence to denote the difference between the actual and the potential. Any deprivation of life chances, whether deliberate or not, constituted a form of violence. Direct violence is harm directly imposed by an actor on a victim. Indirect or structural violence is imposed by a whole social system, with no conscious intention to harm. Negative peace is the absence of direct violence and positive peace, the absence of structural violence. Galtung left the relationship between positive peace and negative peace indeterminate. His goal was general and complete peace, achieved by peaceful means, but progress could be made in either dimension independently.

Galtung later added *cultural violence* to direct and structural violence. The corresponding state of absence of cultural violence was a culture of peace in which people regard each other with respect and understanding. Feminists insisted that

an understanding of positive peace also needed to include equal relations between men and women and the upholding of human rights. Thus, positive peace is emancipation from oppression, in gender as well as in other social relations. Others extended positive peace to balance with the environment. Peace between people could hardly be at the expense of other species; so *Gaia peace* was juxtaposed with ecological violence. Finally, *inner peace* was included as the opposite of violence against oneself. All of this gave a rich spectrum of meanings to positive peace but at the same time made its achievement an all-encompassing task.

Critique of Galtung's Concept of Positive Peace

The main critique of Galtung's idea of positive peace came from the British political scientist Peter Lawler. Lawler argued that Galtung's definition of structural violence was intrinsically value laden and devoid of substance. It could be taken to mean anything one dislikes. To define peace as the full realization of human potential and the absence of war was tantamount to making the study of peace a quest for nirvana. Instead, he argued, it was more important to focus on direct violence and to see peace studies as a way of articulating wider developments in social and political theory with the narrower analysis of violence and its conditions. Lawler argued that the concept of positive peace made peace studies “a black hole” from which nothing could be excluded and left it with no distinctive identity or purpose. The economist and peace researcher Kenneth Boulding made a similar point when he argued that poverty and violence were distinct phenomena with different causes. It blurred the distinction between them to extend the meaning of violence to cover both. The Peace Research Institute at Oslo (PRIO), which Galtung had founded, resisted his broad agenda and continued to focus on the causes and conditions of wars.

Positive peace has remained controversial and is interpreted in different ways. Critical theorists argue that peace depends on a form of emancipation that must include liberation from discourses based on power and hegemony. Peace is constituted by an intersubjective dialogue in which the Other is included. Some poststructuralists see it as a pluralistic encounter through agonistic dialogue between actors who recognize and accept their differences.

The Way Forward

The notions of positive and negative peace had a strong influence on the literature on peace building, which combines the aim of avoiding a return to war with the need for new institutions, relationships, and structures on which to found a durable peace. It was clear that effective peace building could not be limited to the repression of fighting but must involve the creation of positive associations and healing of social injustices.

This highlights the importance of understanding the relationship between steps toward positive peace and the ending or prevention of wars, which returns to the earlier preoccupation with the causes and conditions of wars. Most schools of thought in international relations accept that peace must be more than the absence of war. Even realists emphasize the importance of establishing a stable and legitimate international environment that reflects the realities of power but allows for peaceful change. The issue that divides different schools in international relations is what conditions are necessary for durable peace—or to put it in other terms, what the constituents of positive peace really are.

A way forward beyond the terminological disagreements is to consider the idea of peace not as a state but as a process in which initiatives or “seeds of peace” have peaceful consequences. The philosopher Gray Cox suggested that peace is a practice of cultivating agreements. Adam Curle, Professor of Peace Studies at Bradford University, argued that peace involves the coming together of people to achieve goals they could not have achieved separately. In this sense, positive peace is a process in which responses to other people and to suffering lead to greater empathy, cooperation, and solidarity (following Galtung’s 1964 definition). If this becomes self-sustaining, it constitutes a form of peace that can be created, even at times of war. Such associative and integrative processes also limit the incidence of violence. Seen in these terms, the relationship between peaceful processes and the ending of war is a matter for research and analysis and not only a matter of definition.

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See also Conflict Resolution; Peace; War and Peace

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POSITIVISM

The concept of positivism has had different careers in the philosophy of science and in the social sciences and political science. Whereas in the philosophy of science, it is often used to denote a specific school in the history of philosophical thought of its *époque*, the concept is still used in the social sciences to refer to a broad range of theses, attitudes, and dispositions generally associated with the scientific method. As a school in the history of philosophical thought, positivism is usually characterized by its research of the identification and explanation of universal laws in unity, or in conformity, within the practice of the natural sciences and especially physics. These laws should be discovered not through induction but by theoretically oriented experimentations. In the social sciences, there is a tendency among some tenants and critics of positivism to characterize it as a homogeneous epistemological tradition. This entry nuances this social representation.

Auguste Comte and the Early Positivist Program

Many thinkers (Francis Bacon [1561–1626], Madame de Staël [1766–1817], Henri de Saint-Simon [1760–1825]) have been associated with different philosophical and epistemological positions later associated with positivism. However, it is generally the French sociologist Auguste Comte

(1798–1857) who is regarded as the father of positivism. In the history of philosophical thought, late-19th-century positivism was a theoretical movement in reaction to different branches of idealisms, Kantism, and Hegelianism, to which it proposed a greater emphasis on empirical knowledge. In his *Cours de philosophie positive* (*The Course in Positivist Philosophy*, 1830–1842), Comte described his positivist perspective as an approach seeking to ground theoretical models on empirical knowledge and observations. Once acquired through cognitive processes, knowledge had to be verified through empirical testing. Empiricism, therefore, was brought back to the forefront of epistemology. To the extent that it was led by an adequate conception of science, *un esprit positif* (a positive spirit), Comte was tremendously confident as regards the future of modern societies. His writings were no stranger to a national context that had celebrated a *culte de la raison* (cult of reason) after the Revolution. One could still find a similar optimism in the work of Marie Curie (1867–1934).

Comte's philosophical project was much broader than a mere philosophical or epistemological intervention. Following Staël and many of his contemporaries, Comte's conception of science was embedded in a teleological philosophy of history where the triumph of science was linked to the triumph of humanity. The core of his philosophy of history comprised the description of three evolutionary stages: theological, metaphysical, and positivist. With the last stage, humanity was seen as realizing its full cognitive and political potential with the elimination of anterior, primitive, or chimerical schemes of cognition. Positivism's political project was also conceived as an antidote to social "disorder," the latter being an important preoccupation for the emerging social sciences of the late 19th century. Comte's espousal of a form of social evolutionism was not unusual in this context. Social Darwinists such as Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) had a similar conception of history, and so did Karl Marx (1818–1883), Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936), and Max Weber (1864–1920), who adopted a teleological reading of history, even though they did not locate the motor of history in the same social processes. Comte spent the end of his life trying to build a religion of humanity in accordance with positivist principles.

Historically, positivists have been accurately depicted as the tenants of an opaque opposition between sentences of fact and sentences of value. Social and political scientists, according to the tenants of this opposition, should hold back from deriving normative propositions from factual ones. Positivists, however, have not been alone in defending this standpoint. In the philosophy of social sciences, the neo-Kantian sociology of Max Weber shares it without agreeing with an epistemological position hostile to the development of interpretative strategies in the social sciences.

Another important posture generally associated with positivism is the adhesion to the project of a unified scientific program, or the defense of a unity of science. As a philosophy of the social sciences, therefore, positivism is usually associated with a commitment to either methodological naturalism or ontological naturalism. While methodological naturalists argued that the social sciences should adopt the same methods as the natural sciences, ontological naturalists, or physicalists, defended the naturalization of the social sciences. Through the 20th century, different variants of this program or project have been formulated via different epistemological or ontological positions, not all of which were enunciated by positivists.

Toward the dawn of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the optimistic philosophy and teleology of history at the core of Comte's *Cours de philosophie positive* had been given up by several European practitioners of positivist methods and other philosophical currents such as romanticism and phenomenology. The German philosopher and historian Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) is among the important figures to have defended an antipositivist dualism between the human and natural sciences in this context. Among other things, Dilthey developed two arguments often found in the camp of the tenants of such a dualism: (1) the rejection of evolutionism as an adequate prism to analyze social processes and (2) an emphasis on the category of meaning and the use of interpretative strategies in the social sciences.

The often heard claim that the triumphalist conception of social and cognitive progress was a shared feature of modernity in general should be nuanced. Positivism was an important chapter of the intellectual history of the 19th century. Yet it

was fostered by specific social and intellectual contexts that do not represent a complete picture of the contradictory intellectual trends of the modern era. It remained influential and a source of political inspiration in parts of the world where local liberal movements sought to overcome traditional religious elites by importing France's institutions.

The Vienna Circle

In 1929, a handful of scientists and philosophers of science (Moritz Schlick [1882–1936], Rudolf Carnap [1891–1970], Otto Neurath [1882–1945]) published a manifesto titled *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis* (*A Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle*). The manifesto became a central artifact in the history of positivism and the platform of logical positivists. At the confluence of the empirical tradition and the analytical philosophy of Bertrand Russell, logical positivism was characterized by three elements: (1) its critique of speculative metaphysics, (2) its quest for a foundation of empirical sciences, and (3) the project of unifying the scientific language (Robert Nadeau, 2000).

Logical positivists adhere to a theory of meaning grounding the meaningfulness of a sentence on its empirical conditions of verification. As a corollary, all propositions whose conditions of truthfulness could not be described were considered “meaningless.” This argument was notoriously put forward by Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) in *The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language* (1959). This position was a declaration of war against Martin Heidegger, his disciples, and idealists in general. During the following decades, most of the core elements associated with logical positivism were contested in turn by its former exponents or by its heirs. Carl Gustav Hempel (1905–1997) explicitly renounced the program of a scientific unity of science. He gave up the belief that specific theories could be captured through the same analytical vocabulary as broader general theories (ontological naturalism).

Even though the tenants of logical positivism were against the idea that science was morally or politically laden, several signatories of the manifesto believed that the struggle against metaphysics was entirely reconcilable with socialist political views. Therefore, while logical positivism is associated

with a reaffirmation of the fact–value dichotomy, in practice several members of the circle were socialists and critics of the characteristically metaphysical ethos of the German and Austrian nationalist jargons. Unsurprisingly, the Circle was banned by the Nazis in 1938.

The Rejection of Verificationism, Popper, and Critical Rationalism

Neo-positivism, or critical realism, is an epistemological posture that was developed by Karl Popper (1902–1994) as a critique of some of the weaknesses of the logical positivism associated with the Vienna Circle. Among other things, it sought to address the problem of induction, or raw empiricism, unsatisfactorily dealt with by the logical positivist theory of verification. Popper revolutionized the positivist tradition by adopting the principle of refutation, or falsifiability, instead of the principle of verification. This epistemological model distinguishes theoretical from experimental laws. Theoretical laws are formulated as universal laws. They are of a higher level of abstraction. Experimental laws direct how to carry out an experiment so that it leads to an eventual validation or invalidation of the theory's predictions. A theory is articulated by means of an ensemble of interlinked propositions, the theoretical laws, via logical connectors. Theoretical laws can only be put to the test through the experimental laws that are derived from them. To be falsifiable, a theory must be potentially false. That is, there must be potential empirical cases, the observation or occurrence of which would go against the predictions provided by the theoretical frame. If it is not possible to point to a fact whose occurrence would mean the invalidity of the theory, the theory is not falsifiable and is thus not part of the scientific domain. According to Popper, one cannot prove that a hypothesis has been verified as true; one can only contend that it has yet not been falsified. For instance, the empirical observation of one white swan does not prove the conjecture that all swans are white. On the contrary, this proposition would be refuted by the occurrence of a black swan. To “test” this theory is a question of looking for a nonwhite swan rather than accumulating the occurrences of white swans. As the author of *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* puts it, “Now I hold

that scientific theories are never fully justifiable or verifiable, but that they are nevertheless testable. I shall therefore say that the objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be intersubjectively tested" (Popper, 1992, p. 22).

Science, therefore, according to Popper had to be conceived like a never-ending process of attempts to falsify conjectures. Accordingly, a scientific theory had to be considered "true," along a regulatory concept of truth, until it had been definitely falsified. He attributes a character that is in principle objective, universal, and intersubjective to the results of research, insofar as each subject must be able to achieve the same results through experimentation. The principle of falsifiability remained consistent with the positivist objective of achieving a unity of science. Here, the ground of this unity was not ontological naturalism, or physicalism, but methodological naturalism. Thus, the unity of science resides in a specific methodology: falsificationism. It relies on a processual conception of truth rather than a physicalist ontology. As a philosopher of the social sciences, Popper thought that sociology was the discipline more apt to achieve such a methodological unity. He was suspicious of behaviorism in psychology, which he deemed incompatible with his epistemology.

Popper was not an apolitical animal. He developed a conception of liberalism in continuity with his epistemology and with liberal theories of totalitarianism. His feelings for Marxism were the complete opposite of those of some members of the Vienna Circle and especially from those of the sociologist Otto von Neurath. In *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, published in 1945, Popper argued that Plato, Hegel, and Marx had formulated proto-totalitarian philosophical systems. The core philosophical assumptions of their political thought, he argued, were teleological and could not be submitted to falsifications. Hegel, here, was presented as an inspiration of National Socialism. It is generally admitted today that there was something naive and polemical in Popper's crusade against these three pillars of Western philosophical thought, not only because few research programs in the social sciences would survive the criteria put up front by Popper's philosophy of science but also because some have raised serious doubts regarding the adequacy of Popper's philosophy of science to describe the

practices of natural science itself (Thomas Kuhn, 1996). Critiques of the adoption of Popper's standards in the social and political sciences have argued that whereas in the natural sciences there are situations where only one research program is in a position of quasi monopoly in a given discipline, thus creating the conditions of possibility of a period of normal science, in the social and political sciences, it is very unlikely that only one theoretical paradigm could dominate the entire discipline. Social and political scientists have come to accept that this theoretical pluralism is an important characteristic, rather than a weakness, of their discipline.

Neo-positivism had its hours of glory after the translation and publication in English of *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* in 1959. More important, it dominated the perceptions that some social scientists had of the natural sciences until even later. When the international relations theoretician and father of neorealism, Kenneth Waltz (1924–) formulated his critique of induction and of the criterion of predictability in the literature on international relations, he was very close to Popper's conception of science. In the field of Anglo-American international relations, the multiplication of contending approaches to the mainstream of the discipline was labeled as a "postpositivist" era by several observers (Steve Smith, Ken Booth, & Marysia Zalewski, 1996). Most of the time, what was at stake was less the rejection of positivism, as traditionally understood in the philosophy of science, than the rejection of a narrowly conceived definition of the discipline and its methodology by neorealism and institutional neoliberalism.

From the *Positivismusstreit* to Theoretical Pluralism in the Social Sciences

While the end of the positivist hegemony in the social sciences is often associated with the rise of postmodernism, it would be more accurate to locate it within the debate notoriously labeled the *positivismusstreit*, or the German dispute in social sciences (1961–1969). During the dispute, Popper's conception of the philosophy of the social sciences, critical rationalism, was challenged by, among others, Theodor Adorno, Ralf Dahrendorf, and Jürgen Habermas. It is not possible here to summarize the block of arguments that were raised

against Popper in the context of this epic disagreement. They often came from different, and contradictory, traditions of the social sciences from scholars of different political inclinations. What matters, however, is that most of the epistemological positions that were injected in the dispute were developed and, sometimes, radicalized during the 1970s and 1980s. Since then, there has virtually been no pause to the development of new arguments in defense of historicism, of interpretative strategies or hermeneutics (Hans-Georg Gadamer, 2004), of standpoint epistemologies (Sandra Harding, 2004), of a critique of the relation between positivism and social engineering and power (Michel Foucault, 1980), or of a more reflexive approach to the social sciences (Pierre Bourdieu, 2004). Moreover, most epistemologists and methodologists have abandoned the idea that to practice good science, social and political scientists should imitate the natural sciences. For a few decades, one of the epistemological controversies emerging in political science has been to what extent political scientists should borrow the methods and models of the economists, not of physicists.

One of the central critiques of the covering law model often associated with tenants of positivism is that it cannot escape reifying the observable regularity of a specific historical context resulting from petrified relations of power. What if, for instance, the concepts of state, nation, sovereignty, or power meant very different things in different sociohistorical contexts? What if the theoretical hypotheses of a general covering law model in the social sciences were guiding social researches in systematically ahistorical directions (Habermas, 1988)? And what if these intellectual practices had the impact of silencing, marginalizing, or negating alternative social experiences and modes of being? Are positivists not guilty of an implicit favoritism in favor of a defense of a given social order? These are some of the questions that recent scholarship by critical theorists, postmodernists, feminists, and postcolonial scholars has raised.

One should note that the critique of positivism has been especially important during the 1980s and 1990s in the subfields of the discipline of political science where the use of quantitative methods had become synonymous with real science. The tradition of American international relations, for

instance, is one subfield where the critics of positivism have been notoriously active in the 1980s and 1990s. In the field of development studies, researchers working with the dependency theory have been extremely skeptical regarding the application of ahistorical and nation-centered models of economic and political developments along the lines of modernization theory. Among other things, they have argued that the idea that economic and political development can be reproduced with the precision of a laboratory experiment was a problematic remnant of a positivist conception. Against this conception, they have argued that economic and political institutional developments had to study within the broader context of the global historical development of capitalism, where specific national institutional developments never occurred in national conceits.

Today, most philosophers of science have given up the concept of positivism. The different lines of demarcation that several philosophers of science have historically tried to draw between science and nonscience have not proven decisive. Among the core arguments underlying a certain conception of positivism, the claim that there could be a clear line of demarcation between judgments of facts and judgments of value has been under heavy fire (Hilary Putnam, 2002). Some philosophers of science and social scientists, notoriously scientific realists, have also challenged the positivist emphasis on directly observable entities, leading to an inversion of the hierarchy between ontology and epistemology (Roy Bhaskar, 1989). The former argued that if one had to rely only on a methodology with an emphasis on direct observation, one would have to reject the validity of new scientific territories where the progress of knowledge depends on the observation of the effects of unobservable entities on other entities.

Even though positivism does not have the intellectual authority that it once had, one cannot conclude from what precedes that the positivist tradition did not have an important impact on contemporary research practices and methodological dispositions in social and political sciences. Most practitioners of political science are still working along standards that were developed by the positivist tradition. For instance, few practitioners would give up the idea that the theoretical laws of a theory have to be internally consistent.

Furthermore, practitioners of the social or political sciences by and large agree that a theory that fails to find support in empirical evidence should be either revised or abandoned. In addition, the argument that the result of social research should be accessible through intersubjective processes remains a central claim held by the majority of social and political scientists. Along this line, while most tenants of reflexive social theory would renounce the quest for an opaque line of demarcation between judgments of fact and judgments of value, they tend to agree that judgments of value should be submitted to a similar intersubjectively oriented ethic of discussion rather than judgments of facts. However, the early positivist claim that the development of science and technology will necessarily lead to the achievement of a greater humanity has been thoroughly challenged by the history of the 20th century.

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See also Behavioralism; Causality; Comparative Methods; Critical Theory; Epistemic Communities; Epistemological and Methodological Foundations; Experiments, Laboratory; Experiments, Natural; Hermeneutics; Measurement; Paradigms in Political Science; Prediction and Forecasting; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods; Statistics: Overview

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POSTCOLONIALISM

There is no consensus regarding what the term *postcolonial* connotes; indeed, both the range of meaning of the term and of the issues covered by it are immense. However, despite the contestations around the range of meaning and issues, certain fundamental assumptions are subscribed to postcolonialism. First, postcolonialism suggests that the colonial juncture played a critical role in the shaping of the modern world. Second, although there have been both continuities and ruptures from the world of classical colonialism, its presence, legacies, and hierarchies still endure in the modern world. It is thus important to note that the *post* in postcolonialism does not allude to an era in which colonialism is dead. Nor does it imply an uninterrupted classical colonialism. Rather, postcolonialism suggests that the modern world exemplifies both historical continuities and ruptures with classical colonialism. This entry provides an introduction to the ways in which these complex shifts and continuities manifest themselves in the variety of meanings assigned to postcolonialism, its genealogy, and the criticisms leveled against it. Finally, it discusses the usefulness of postcolonialism

for understanding the politics of the modern world.

Meanings, Controversies, and Criticisms

Although it is unusual to begin the discussion of a topic with the controversies and criticisms surrounding it, highlighting at least three controversies that haunt postcolonialism will help clarify what postcolonialism means. The first controversy focuses on the dissimulations and the political acceptability of the term *postcolonial* in Western academic circles. Some scholars suggest that the prefix *post* in postcolonial implies that we are now past the era of colonialism, global dominance, and hegemony. The term is thus preferred and has gained currency in Western academia because it is politically less threatening than terms such as *neocolonialism*, *imperialism*, and the *Third World*. Postcolonial scholars have challenged this misconception and stated in no uncertain terms that postcolonial does not imply the end of colonization: Rather, postcolonialism enables us to examine both the historical continuities and ruptures with classical colonialism.

The second controversy raises questions regarding the spatial parameters of postcolonialism. Should all societies that were once colonized be included under the umbrella term *postcolonial*? Should the United States, Australia, and South Africa, which had an experience of being both colonized and colonizers, be included with other postcolonial societies such as India, Senegal, and Brazil? In other words, are there specific features of the “truly” postcolonial countries that help us distinguish them from non-postcolonial ones, or is *postcolonial* a catchall word? On this issue, some postcolonial scholars suggest that while it is important to discuss the differences in the particular colonial histories, all colonizing practices, including the contemporary colonizing practices of nation-states, can be included under the term *postcolonial*.

The third controversy focuses on the allegedly culturalist focus of the postcolonialists and their neglect of materialist concerns. Critics accuse postcolonial scholars of neglecting traditional Marxist issues such as capitalism, poverty, and inequality and focusing too much on issues of concern to the poststructuralists, such as representation, identity, and culture. While some postcolonial scholars are

guilty of focusing solely on culturalist concerns, most suggest that culturalist and material issues are mutually embedded. For them, isolating materialist from culturalist concerns would be a serious analytical shortcoming of any scholarship. For example, scholars like Edward Said, demonstrating the cultural underpinnings of classical imperialism, have suggested that the success of imperialism would not have been possible without the dissimulations affected by the cultural constructions of African, Asian, and American peoples as the savage, uncivilized “others.” Calls for *mission civilisatrice* (the civilizing mission) and “the White man’s burden” not only obscured the violence and exploitation engendered by colonization, they were also successful in legitimizing the colonial enterprise.

Even as postcolonial scholars continue to be influenced by Karl Marx, they seek to wrest Marxist analysis from its heavy Eurocentrism. Postcolonialism “historicizes” Marx. In other words, it contextualizes Marx’s scholarship in the changes of 19th-century Europe and argues that despite the usefulness of Marxist analysis, Marxism cannot be imported in its wholesale Eurocentric form to other situations. For example, the focus on class in Marxist analyses, which subsumed other categories of social stratification, has led to the neglect of important factors such as race, gender, caste, and ethnicity. Offering a corrective, postcolonial scholars stress the importance of these categories of analyses, at the same time stressing their mutual imbrication with each other and class.

The Genealogy of Postcolonialism

The origins of postcolonialism cannot be traced to a single event or a single author. Scholars trace the origins of postcolonialism from the postcolonial fiction of writers from ex-colonial countries, such as Chinua Achebe, Ngugi W’Thiongo, Wole Soyinka, and Ousmane Semebede; through the literary criticism of the 1980s and 1990s; to the new historiography of the Subaltern Studies Group. In addition, others point to certain events in decolonization such as the Bandung conference of 1955 and the anticolonial movements in Egypt, Ghana, India, Cuba, Vietnam, and China as foundational to the emergence of postcolonialism.

The anticolonial movements of the 20th century are among the first organized institutional

challenges to European myths about European superiority, laying the foundations for postcolonial scholarship. For example, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi's challenges to British imperialism are as foundational to postcolonialism as are the Marxist/Maoist-inspired liberationist movements of Cuba, Vietnam, and China and the Algerian anticolonial revolution in which Frantz Fanon participated. These decolonization movements are foundational to postcolonial narratives as they systematically challenge European narratives of modernity, race, gender, and the like. Several key figures of the decolonization struggles, like Gandhi, Fanon, and their counterpart Albert Memmi, recognize that the decolonization struggle is not merely the physical removal of the colonizers from colonial territory—it should also include the struggle for cultural decolonization. They suggest alternative paths for nationalist futures, recognizing that breaking from the stranglehold of the colonial imagination is difficult. The postcolonial condition is marked by a paradox; the colonized both fear/loath and admire the colonizers. They want to exhume the presence and memories of colonization, yet they desire to become “modern” like the colonizers. These insights frame postcolonialism.

The postcolonial fiction of writers from ex-colonial countries is also critical in the genealogy of postcolonialism. Since colonial occupation rested on racialized and gendered constructions/representations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the first wave of postcolonial fiction sought to both deconstruct received national identities as well as to reconstruct them in more “positive” ways. This project of forgetting and recovery was complicated, and it continues to be so, by several legacies of colonization. First, the politics of using a colonial language to re-create national identity haunted several postcolonial writers; some like Soyinka opted for local languages, while others like Sembene opted for making films in local languages. Second, the desire for modernity, as defined by the West, in the nationalist imagination has led to mimicry as well as hybridity, both of which are discussed later in this entry.

The iconic scholarship of Edward Said has been enormously influential in shaping postcolonialism as it has brought to the forefront the importance of

discursive formations to the imperial project. Influenced by Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci, Edward Said's *orientalism* highlights the mutual imbrications between colonial/Eurocentric knowledge and colonial/Western power. According to Said, intellectual and cultural activity regarding the “Orient” is intimately linked to the “West's” colonial project of producing, managing, and controlling the Orient. These cultural productions not only are critical in the production of the orient in the Western imaginary, they are also central to the production of Western identity that is produced in opposition to the non-Western world. Postcolonial debt to Said's scholarship on the imbrications of knowledge with power; the sociality and materiality of texts, which suggests that all texts are political and social commentaries and are embedded in relations of power; the salience of discourse to ideological formations; and the importance of agency to resistance cannot be underscored enough.

The influence of the school of Subaltern Studies on postcolonial scholarship has also been significant. Influenced by Antonio Gramsci's scholarship on the subaltern classes (those who are at the margins of state power such as peasants, the working class, etc.), this school was created by historians of South Asia to produce an alternative to the elite focus of South Asian history. Although the many volumes produced by the Subaltern Studies project have provided inspiration, it has also raised important questions about subalternity that are discussed in the following section.

What Is Postcolonialism?

Although it is not possible to identify a singular postcolonial approach, there are certain foundational characteristics that can be ascribed to postcolonialism. The following section identifies characteristics of postcolonialism, including postcolonial feminism, that may enable us to think about what postcolonial scholarship, in all its variance and vitality, means. Clearly it is not possible to highlight every key postcolonial/postcolonial feminist concept in such a brief space. The following points highlight what many postcolonial scholars consider some of the more prominent concepts in postcolonialism. It is important to note that the discussion under each concept is limited in scope

as the length constraints of this entry do not permit a detailed discussion.

1. Postcolonialism begins with the assumption that the imperialist juncture was critical in the shaping of the modern world. Although the modern world exhibits both continuities and ruptures from its colonial past, what is clear is that the legacies of imperialism continue to haunt us.

2. Postcolonialism focuses on the imbrications of knowledge with power; For example, it suggests that what passes for expert and universal knowledge in the humanities, social sciences, and other disciplines is deeply embedded in the colonial enterprise and is essentially Eurocentric. This body of knowledge developed in juxtaposition with colonization and was used (and continues to be used) in instrumental ways to bolster Euro-American power. The aim of postcolonial scholars is to “provincialize” this knowledge—that is, to uncover its universal pretensions and to always historicize and contextualize these claims.

3. The interconnections between European political and material power and their power to represent “the other” is highlighted by Edward Said, Chandra Mohanty, Gayatri Spivak, and Trinh Minh-ha, among others. In her classic “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses,” Chandra Mohanty suggests that a discursive colonialism, a sort of neo-orientalism, is at play in some Western feminist texts discussing the “Third World woman.” In many such discourses, a monolithic image of the poor, victimized, oppressed, and other such “Third World woman” is created in contrast to the Western, liberated, educated woman, who is free and in control of her own destiny. The authoritative power of these representations is enormous, as is their influence. As stated earlier, the allegedly civilizing mission of the colonizers was seen as legitimate in part because of the success of the racialized and gendered images of inferiority and savagery that came to be associated with the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Similarly, images of Third World women are contemporarily used to legitimize various types of interventions into the Third World.

4. Despite, and maybe because of, their Marxist leanings, many postcolonial scholars focus on the importance of race, ethnicity, gender, caste,

religion, nation, and class in the construction of colonial, postcolonial, and national power. Interrogating these constructs of stratification and their deployment by global, national, and local structures of power enables postcolonial scholars to “world” these issues—that is, to interrogate the ways in which dimensions of power are embedded in global, national, and local discourses.

5. Some scholars prefer to identify postcolonial theories as interrogations of modernity. Postcolonial and other scholars trace the origins of modernity to the ideas that emerged in Europe during the Renaissance, their consolidation in Europe during the 16th century, and efforts at spreading them throughout the world during European colonization of Africa, Asia, and the Americas. The use of modernity in colonial discourse can be seen in its efforts to explore, conquer, categorize, and map the peoples of Africa, Asia, and America. The discourse of modernity is thus associated with historical developments in Europe and North America. In this discourse, modernity also becomes a tool for the construction of new identities; to be modern is to be superior, more rational, more in charge of one’s own destiny, and more Western than one who is described as traditional. In addition, the identity of the “modern” West, the “developed” world, is contrasted to the “traditional,” “underdeveloped,” or “developing” world. In addition, the idea of modernity has become a tour de force for nationalist dreams and aspirations as well as the spread of globalization. Postcolonial scholars interrogate the discourse of modernity to highlight its seductions as well as its slights and marginalizations.

6. The concepts of nation and nationalism are important in the lexicon of postcolonial scholarship. The first wave of postcolonial scholarship focused on decolonization and the creation of independent nations, the recovery of national identity through the creation of nationalist histories that challenged colonialist representations and histories, and the development of nationalist consciousness. However, as the euphoria of national independence subsided and it became obvious that the newly independent nations bred their own exclusions, the very idea of nation came into question. Contemporary postcolonial scholarship highlights this disillusion with the nation. Focusing on the social construction of nation as an “imagined

community,” postcolonial scholars, like many scholars of nation and nationalism, suggest that this community is forged around certain markers of identity such as ethnicity, religion, race, gender, and sexuality. However, these same markers are also used to identify those who do not belong or are marginal to the body of the nation. According to Partha Chatterjee, this dynamic of inclusion/exclusion, corresponding with the liberal and illiberal faces of the nation, reflects the inherent contradiction within the nation as it is currently imagined.

The construction of nationalist discourses is critical for the creation and maintenance of nations. Dominant, idealized, and elite narratives of the nation’s history, including the history of decolonization and originary myths, are often constructed that leave out the histories of subaltern groups within the nation. The Subaltern Studies collective and postcolonial scholarship focus on highlighting the histories and lives of the subaltern within the nationalist project. According to Homi Bhabha, there are two types of nationalist discourses that work simultaneously to construct the undivided, unified nation: pedagogical and performative. Pedagogical discourses about the nation claim a fixed origin for the nation and an essentialist national identity. These discourses establish the nation as an unquestioned and legitimate political, social, cultural, and so on, unit in which people, as national subjects, “naturally” belong. In these discourses, nation, national subjects, and their histories are genealogically developed, linking in a “natural way” the past with the present. In contrast, performative nationalist discourses refer to the need for nationalism to be constantly created and recreated, or in other words, nationalism needs to be constantly performed. While performative modes may reinscribe old nationalist symbols and signs, they may also provide an aperture in which the subaltern may be able to perform new counternarratives about the nation that disrupt its essentialist identities. This is what Bhabha calls the “disruptive double narrative movement.”

7. Hybridity and mimicry are two interrelated and widely used concepts in postcolonial scholarship. As stated in Point 4, there is a growing disillusionment within some postcolonial scholarship with a nationalism in which cultural essentialisms and difference become the basis for national identity

and national borders. For example, while an anticolonial narrative with its rigid national essentialisms may be “strategically essential” for subverting the colonial narrative, many postcolonial scholars like Fanon, Said, and Bhabha are uncomfortable with the simple and exclusive identitarian politics this may engender. These scholars suggest that rather than being based on exclusions and uniqueness, cultures of the colonized and colonizers are also mutually embedded. For Bhabha, the cultural impact of colonization (and globalization) may manifest itself in mimicry and/or hybridity. While mimicry may appear at a very basic level to be imitation, it may also include some form of mockery and can work to subvert colonial power. Hybridity is seen as an in-between stage, in which colonial and/or globalization narratives/texts are “adopted” but in new forms that reflect the intermixing of the global and local.

8. While the commitment of postcolonial scholars to resistance and agency is strong, their focus varies. As stated earlier, for the first wave of postcolonial scholars, resistance and agency not only meant participation in decolonization struggles, it also meant the development of counternarratives to recover history, identity, and the “native” self from the degenerative effect of the colonial narrative. For the “postnational” wave of postcolonial scholars disenchanted with the marginalizations engendered through nationalisms, it has meant recuperating the stories of the subaltern as well as arguing for a postnational, global politics. However, the politics of recuperating subaltern histories and voices became the subject of controversy when Spivak raised the fundamental question, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” While some have focused on the conclusion by Spivak to support or critique her argument that the subaltern cannot speak, others have suggested that her question is better understood as rhetorical and an effort to make researchers aware of the difficulties inherent in representing the subaltern “other.” For example, through this question Spivak alerts us to several questions regarding voice, authority, representation and the subaltern: Who is the “authentic” subaltern? Is it possible for the researcher to avoid presenting himself or herself as the authoritative voice of the subaltern? Can the voices of the subaltern be heard through these authority claims?

Politics and Postcolonialism

Although postcolonialism has only recently started to assert its presence in the field of politics and international affairs, the essentially political lenses of postcolonialism provide critical vantage points from which to understand politics. As the discussion above demonstrates, postcolonial approaches provide essential tools for interrogating, among others, the politics of race, class, and gender in the making of the modern world. In addition, they help us understand the inclusions and exclusions of nation and nationalism, modernity, globalization, and diaspora. Most of all, postcolonialism's focus on the interface between materialism and culturalism in the maintenance of power provides us with a more holistic understanding of the exercise of power globally. All these insights from postcolonialism are fundamentally political treatises about power and hegemony that deepen our understanding of the "modern" world.

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See also Colonialism; Empire; Feminist Theory in International Relations; Gender; Hegemony; Marxism; Nationalism; Orientalism; Racism

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POSTCOMMUNIST REGIMES

The concept of postcommunism is disputed because it merely describes the *previous* regime in a given country and says nothing about the newly formed regimes subsequent to the collapse of communism. As such, the concept of postcommunism is imprecise, both as a descriptive and as an analytical category in social science. It can be applied only to the relatively short period of time between the collapse of the old and the establishment of the new regime—in other words, to the period in which the social and political relationships are defined far more by the legacy of the previous regime than by internal and external factors. The essence of postcommunism is to stress the domination of a non-democratic political legacy in new settings after dictatorship. It is for this reason that the concept had been used, first and foremost, in the international political science literature in the 1990s. This entry discusses the uses of this concept and its reduced utility in recent years.

Communist regimes operated in the countries that are now termed *postcommunist*, representing a systemic alternative to liberal democracies. These regimes were based on Marxist–Leninist ideological foundations, or referred to these ideologies, while striving to attain global communism vis-à-vis Western capitalist democracies. The Cold War era, which emerged after 1945, was characterized by the confrontation between “two world systems” and the potential threat of a third world war. The “First World,” led by the United States, saw the systems of Soviet Union and China, who dominated the “Second World,” as communist.

The extent to which these regimes were communist in the original, Marxist sense is disputable,

given that market coordination was not replaced by the voluntary collaboration of social communities but rather by the domination of the party-state. Left-leaning critics of these regimes, precisely for this reason, claimed that the systems that had emerged in the Second World were not in fact communist but rather state-capitalist. Others had considered these systems as state-socialist, arguing that nationalization had only represented the first step in building communism, after which the process of social reconstruction would have to follow. One could speak of communist systems, collectively, in the sense that the political leadership in these countries had referred to themselves as Communists: They shared similar ideologies; employed similar political, police, and military methods; and endorsed similar goals for social transformation. Attaining these goals had failed not due to a lack of will but because these political goals were simply unrealistic.

A study of posttotalitarian systems reveals that despite the fact that the term *postcommunism* is imprecise, it has nonetheless achieved a successful career in the international political science literature; the same cannot be said for the term *postfascism*. Often, many ex-communist countries, even 20 years after the democratic transition, are still called postcommunist; however, it can be recalled that ex-fascist countries 20 years after World War II were not labeled postfascist. The evolution of these two terms is clearly related to the Cold War and the confrontation of the two world systems, in which the majority of the once-fascist regimes had become democratic and joined the Western political and military organizations, thus confronting the Soviet Union-led political and military bloc. Fascist regimes were relatively short-lived, and their collapse was followed by the global confrontation between the forces of communism and democracy. Communist systems, by contrast, endured for longer periods, and their collapse was not followed by a confrontation that generated a threat of a world war. The image of a common enemy and the lack of alternative world systems enabled the perception of the legacy of communism to endure, which in turn gave space for the term *postcommunism* to blossom. East Germany was the first among the ex-communist countries to shed the stigma of postcommunism and in 1990, with the reunification of Germany, ceased to exist

as an independent state. It is interesting to note that researchers do not label Germany as postcommunist, and the integration of the East German territories appears as a domestic policy issue, much more so than a question of political system.

In the 1990s, the international political science literature used the terms *postcommunist countries* and *new democracies* interchangeably, which for a long time nourished the hope that the end of communism would eventually lead to democracy in all ex-communist countries. It took nearly a decade for researchers to arrive at a consensus and agree that postcommunist countries cannot be treated as a unitary bloc. The expression *postcommunism*, as the term *communism* had in the past, highlighted the fundamental commonalities among countries ranging from Poland to Mongolia, or from Slovenia through Turkmenistan. In other words, it harnessed a false image that the political structures in these countries were essentially similar. For this reason, the concept of postcommunism could not evolve to become a valid analytical category for all countries that for shorter or longer periods had experienced regimes based on communist ideologies. The concept suggested that there are far greater similarities between these countries than differences. Moreover, as we know today, existing similarities do not necessarily stem only from the communist legacy: Precommunist historical traditions, and their long-term consequences, are equally important.

Nevertheless, some fundamental commonalities, at least in the beginning, could be observed. In addition to the transition from communist rule, a fundamental restructuring of the economic and social systems, and thus a "triple transformation," has been taking place. All this had to be done in a relatively short period of time, and indeed, in the apt formulation by Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich Preuss (1998), it required "rebuilding the ship at sea." This, generally, went into the direction of more market-oriented capitalist economies but with distinct forms of transferring state-owned enterprises into private hands. Not rarely, this was accompanied by the emergence of "newly rich" and "oligarchs" who benefited from their positions in the old regimes in these transformations. By contrast, the populations at large often suffered from deindustrialization processes, increasing unemployment, and rising costs of living, contributing to the

emergence of strong social inequalities on a scale that was unknown before in these societies.

Similarly, different ways of coping with the communist past and often considerable human rights violations by the security apparatuses of the previous regimes created new tensions. In a number of countries, "lustration" procedures (i.e., procedures for screening persons seeking public positions in the new democratic government to avoid inducting former communists, especially those who worked for the secret police in previous regimes) were carried out. In others, former perpetrators of human rights violations and those politically responsible remained largely untouched. The former communist parties often acted under new labels such as "socialist" or "social democratic" ones. In the course of time, however, they became integrated in the new parliamentary systems. At the other side of the political spectrum, some strongly nationalist parties emerged. On the positive side of the communist legacy, a high level of literacy of the population and of education in general must be noted. Nevertheless, levels of political interest and participation still show a rather mixed picture.

The use of the expression *postcommunism* subsided somewhat after the change of the millennium. This decreased popularity of the term can be linked to events such as the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., in 2001, the ex-communist East-Central European countries joining NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), or the accession of 10 ex-communist countries to the European Union in 2004 and 2007. Today, the new member states of the European Union, which include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, are usually no longer described as postcommunist countries but rather as new member states. Freedom House has classified these countries as full democracies for more than a decade, and according to the Human Development Index, they belong to the most advanced group of countries on a global scale. Most of the Balkan countries, with the exception of Bosnia and Kosovo, are on their way in joining the league of the Baltic republics and the Central European countries in terms of democratic development. These countries have become, or are increasingly becoming, a part of

Western political, military, and economic integrational frameworks, in a world in which religious fundamentalism and large-scale immigration from Third World countries have become important issues. Faced with these challenges, the West has found allies in the East-Central European countries, enabling them in turn to shed the term *postcommunism* and its derogatory connotations.

The term *postcommunism* continues to be employed widely across those countries in which the process of democratization was stalled, or had been reversed, after 1991. For the most part, these countries had been part of the ex-Soviet Union: They range from Belarus to Kazakhstan, Georgia through Kyrgyzstan, and Russia to Armenia. When applied to these countries, the term *postcommunism* not only serves to describe a common past, it also highlights the fact that the process of democratization has come to a halt. The term *postcommunism* here indicates the most convenient common denominator, based on which the various new, hybrid regimes, ranging from electoral democracies through competitive authoritarianism to almost full authoritarian systems, can be mentioned. The systematic study of these regimes began only after the year 2000 and had produced significant findings in understanding and describing the political and economic transformations in the Caucasian states and the Central Asian countries as well as in Ukraine and Russia. Yet again, the concept of postcommunism has proven imprecise and much too broad an umbrella term, by bringing very dissimilar, nondemocratic systems under the same rubric. Until a broad consensus concerning the academic classification of the new hybrid regimes emerges, it is likely that the concept of postcommunism will continue to be applied to these countries.

The concept of postcommunism cannot serve as a legitimate analytical category for a comprehensive description of consolidated regimes. However, as a modifier it can be broadly applied for a better understanding of certain social and political processes. Contemporary historians, political scientists, and sociologists will most probably analyze, for a long time to come, the various aspects of the historical transformation, which as a modifier can be labeled as postcommunist transition and which in scientific thinking and historical awareness will doubtlessly remain

one of the fundamental historical narratives of the 20th century.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Cold War; Communism; Communist Systems; Democratization; Marxism; Political Systems, Types; Totalitarian Regimes; Transition

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POSTMATERIALISM

The term *postmaterialism* refers to a specific set of modern values that form a contrast to traditional “materialistic” values. In his seminal work *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles in Western Publics*, Ronald Inglehart introduced this term to the scientific discussion about changing value orientations in advanced industrialized societies. In earlier publications, Inglehart had initially used the term *postacquisitive values* instead of postmaterialism. Postmaterialism primarily covers values such as environmental protection, quality of life, citizen participation, gender equality, autonomy, and self-actualization. In contrast, materialistic or acquisitive values focus on

internal and external security, obedience, material affluence, and economic growth. In Inglehart’s understanding, the term *postmaterialism* (as well as the term *materialism*) concerns *social* and not *private* values. Values are defined as conceptions of the desirable; therefore, postmaterialism describes a specific concept of a desirable type of society and not a concept of the desirable order of private life. As abstract conceptions, social values are not part of the belief systems of individuals. They are cultural objects that exist independently of their supporters. But individuals can internalize such values, so that they become individual *value orientations*. A value orientation then is a value that a person has accepted as a moral guideline. In contrast to attitudes, value orientations are conceptualized as being more central and more deeply rooted in the belief systems of individuals. Thus, value orientations determine attitudes and are more resistant to change. This relative stability of value orientations is one of their most central definition elements. In this entry, the essentials of Inglehart’s theory of the silent revolution are presented first. This is followed by a short description of the most important survey instrument for the measurement of postmaterialism. Finally, the main arguments of Inglehart’s critics are summarized.

Inglehart’s theory claims that postmaterial value orientations became gradually more widespread among the publics in advanced industrialized societies after World War II. His theory is based on two simple hypotheses: the *scarcity hypothesis* and the *socialization hypothesis*. The first states that an individual’s priorities reflect one’s socioeconomic environment, while the second postulates that to a large extent, one’s basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one’s preadult years. To put Inglehart’s theory in a nutshell, the need structure of human beings develops as Abraham Maslow predicts in his theory of the need hierarchy. There are lower needs, such as hunger, thirst, and the need for housing and security. Inglehart calls these needs *material*. Furthermore, there are higher needs, such as the desire for social integration, esteem, and self-realization. Inglehart calls these needs *postmaterial*. In the logic of the need hierarchy, higher needs do not gain priority as long as lower needs are not satisfied. Inglehart further assumes that in the preadult years, the fundamental need structure of a person is cognitively transformed into social value

orientations, which remain relatively stable in the adult years. The next step in his argument is that after World War II, the great majority of the population grew up under conditions of peace, security, and economic prosperity. Their material needs were satisfied, so they developed higher order needs that were cognitively transformed into postmaterial value orientations. Even if Inglehart allows for period effects, that is, short-term value fluctuations in response to altered environmental circumstances, he sees the major force of value change in the generational change. In his theoretical perspective, the postwar generations are the demographic basis of postmaterialism, and when the older generations disappear, the society as a whole develops toward postmaterial values. Inglehart calls this process the “silent revolution” because generational change works only slowly.

One important peculiarity of Inglehart’s theory is that it deals with value priorities. Inglehart is not interested in the *absolute* importance people give to different values but in their *relative* importance. He is especially interested in the question whether a person gives greater priority to material or to postmaterial concerns. This focus on value priorities has several causes. First of all, it follows directly from the Maslowian need hierarchy, which is the theoretical basis of Inglehart’s argument and deals with relative priorities. Further, Inglehart argues that in the field of politics, priorities are crucial. Most people will find material and postmaterial concerns important: They want to have economic growth *and* a clean environment, wealth *and* greater possibilities to participate in politics. But because politics is about choices and it is not possible to have everything—so goes Inglehart’s argument—people have to decide between different desirable political goals. The fact that Inglehart’s theory deals with value priorities implies that the value space in his concept is necessarily a one-dimensional continuum with the poles of materialism and postmaterialism. People are either materialists or postmaterialists, but they cannot give priority to both material and postmaterial values.

The most important and widespread survey instrument for the measurement of postmaterialism is the so-called Inglehart Index. Inglehart constructed it to measure value priorities in which he is primarily interested. For that reason, the

Inglehart Index forces respondents to rank order four political goals, each of which by itself would be rated as very important by the respondents. The underlying assumption is that the respondents rank order these goals according to their basic value priorities. This instrument has been regularly included in the biannual Eurobarometer surveys of the European Commission since the beginning of the 1970s. In the Eurobarometer surveys, the Inglehart Index is implemented in the following form:

There is a lot of talk these days about what [name of the Nation]’s goals should be for the next ten or fifteen years. On this card are listed some of the goals that different people say should be given top priority. Would you please say which one of them you yourself consider to be most important in the long run?

- Maintaining order in the country
- Giving the people more say in important government decisions
- Fighting rising prices
- Protecting freedom of speech

And what would be your second choice?

In the empirical analysis, respondents who give top priority to the two materialistic goals (first and third goal) are classified as materialists, while those who give top priority to the two postmaterial goals (second and fourth goal) are coded as postmaterialists. Finally, respondents who name a material and a postmaterial goal on top of their priority list or vice versa are classified as a mixed type.

Inglehart’s numerous books and articles on postmaterial value change as well as his measurement instrument have been extremely influential in the scientific discussion about changing value orientations in Western publics. Nevertheless, Inglehart’s work generated a lot of theoretical and methodological criticism. From a theoretical point of view, it was criticized very early that Inglehart did not distinguish clearly between the concepts “individual need” and “social value orientation”: Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, which is a psychological model of personality development, may not necessarily be adequate for the analysis of the escalation of public wants and political demands. Furthermore, there is no reason why individuals must set priorities among material and postmaterial goals and values,

since these options are not at all exclusive of each other in real-world politics. There is, for instance, no natural trade-off between giving people more say in government and fighting inflation. In addition, there is a lot of empirical evidence that value orientations can and do change over the life course and that they do this in a predictable manner. Inglehart's socialization hypothesis has therefore been repeatedly challenged by a rival life cycle hypothesis. Finally, the validity of the Inglehart Index cannot be taken for granted. When there is no natural trade-off between material and postmaterial goals, forcing the respondents to rank order these political goals is not appropriate. Empirically, the Inglehart Index reacts very sensitively to the rate of inflation: When the inflation rate is high, the percentage of materialists in a country is high too; when the inflation rate is low, the issue "fighting rising prices" is not of importance and the percentage of materialists is consequently low. These short-term fluctuations do not fit in with the theoretical status of value orientations as relatively stable constructs. So, possibly the Inglehart Index does not measure value but issue priorities.

During the past 2 decades, the focus of Inglehart's work has gradually shifted away from postmaterialism. He now interprets postmaterial value change as an important but by far not the only component of a broader process of postmodernization. In his latest work coauthored with Christian Welzel, he puts postmaterialism in the even broader context of the so-called human development sequence.

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See also Modernization Theory; Political Culture;
Postmodernism in International Relations; Values

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POSTMODERNISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Postmodernism names an increasingly varied set of intellectual strategies that, in contradistinction to the rational empiricist method of mainstream international relations thinking, in particular, and political science, in general, foregrounds the interpretive, ethical, and/or political nature of international relations scholarship (see particularly, Robert Walker, 1993). Its general aim is to test the limits and assumptions of our forms of knowledge of the political world and open up alternative ways of conceiving and practicing the political. With its focus on contingency, uncertainty, and plurality, postmodernism considers itself an appropriate form of political thinking for a global political age. In comparison to the schools of liberalism, realism, and Marxism in international relations theory, postmodernism does not present a school of thought however. According to David Campbell (1998), no scholar of a postmodern disposition accepts the term uncritically, and a wide variety of practices are covered by the term. That said, the above definition underscores, in Wittgensteinian terms, a basic "family resemblance" between the arguments of these scholars. This resemblance has allowed the concept of

“postmodernism” to acquire in the past 25 years intellectual consistency in the disciplinary field of international relations (IR) and to designate something like a specific approach to IR. In this light, the following considers (a) the intellectual origins of the term and its application to the discipline of IR, (b) its major strategies and engagements within the field, and (c) future perspectives.

Origins

Postmodernism in IR can be traced back to the major moves of French thought in the 1960s and 1970s. Amalgamating a set of arguments from modern linguistics, anthropology, psychoanalysis, post-Kantian philosophy and phenomenology, and literary theory, intellectuals like Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Julia Kristeva, and Roland Barthes launched a series of critiques of the major tenets of humanism in the humanities and soft sciences. They questioned, in particular, the authority of the modern subject qua the ground of modern knowledge, ethics, politics, and aesthetics; representative theories of truth and reality; and progressive theories of history. Although these critiques were different in kind and, at times, mutually incompatible, all the above thinkers engaged, to greater or lesser degrees, with the following: to look to differences, otherness, and the nonhuman where the modern period, within a larger metaphysical movement or not, secures identity through reason; to undermine any straightforward correspondence between representation and reality, the knowing subject and the known object; and, by showing the constructed nature of our representations of the world, to prise open the limits of these constructions and allow marginalized and alternative voices to emerge. All have been concerned, in other words, with undermining and transcending Cartesian-inspired epistemology, with expositing forms of critique that do not rely on a final instance of truth (God, humanity, the modern subject, the proletariat, and nature), and with rehearsing a distinction between ethical transcendence and political determination. (The work of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault—together with the that of the Heideggerian philosopher Giorgio Agamben—has foremost importance in this respect.)

From the 1980s onward, this thought began to influence the subdiscipline of IR within political science. Scholars like Richard Ashley, David Campbell, James Der Derian, Michel Dillon, Jim George, Michael Shapiro, and Robert Walker are important figures in this translation. The aforementioned critiques of language and representation help, notably, to critique the empirical rationalism of mainstream IR thought: The belief that theory describes the world and is validated through empirical evidence. The above refusal of an ultimate referent in language and of the concomitant “performative” nature of all knowledge allows IR scholars, on the one hand, to historicize the dominant objects of international relations thought (interstate relations, the sovereignty of the state, security, peace, and interdependence) contra the perceived abstractions of rational choice theory and the empirical research methods of neorealism and neoliberalism. On the other hand, it allows them to reveal relations of interest and power within *any* theoretical construction of political reality. Since knowledge is not neutral (representing its object as such), it always already involves hierarchies of interpretation. As a result of these two gestures, the field of international relations is pulled away from explanatory analysis and related back to political theory and political sociology, and its objects are, in principle, opened up to alternative possibilities of political knowledge, power, and organization.

Engagements

Since the establishment of these strategies within IR theory, postmodern IR thought has increasingly weighed theoretical understanding with empirical investigation. Some standard themes and authorships are briefly listed here. Postmodern topics in IR range from genealogies and deconstructions of the IR tradition (Walker, Campbell), through focused attention on modern delimitations of sovereignty (Ashley, Walker, Shapiro), to theorizations of contemporary modalities of warfare and security (Michel Dillon and Julian Reid, Maja Zehfuss), of “liberal” regimes of governance and surveillance (Didier Bigo, Claudia Aradau, Louis Amoore, and Marieke de Goede), of American and British foreign policy (David Campbell, Michael Hardt, Toni Negri, and Michael Shapiro),

of “humanitarian” interventions (Michel Dillon and Julian Reid), and of migration, asylum, and refugeeship (Jenny Edkins). Since postmodern approaches to these topics simultaneously open up questions of patriarchy and Western domination, they have also dovetailed with respective concerns in IR with feminist and postcolonial issues (e.g., Kimberly Hutchings and Vivienne Jabri). Given constraints of space, rather than expositing these arguments, this entry focuses on the topic of “modernity” as such in postmodern IR theory. All the above engagements presuppose something like a common approach to it. To understand the “how” of these postmodern positions in the field of IR entails, in other words, first understanding this presupposition.

In its strongest formulations, the “post” of “postmodern” designates neither an “after” nor an “against” of the modern period, of modernization processes, or of the general descriptive “modernity.” It refers, rather, to a critical, ambiguous relation to the general tenets of the modern. These well-known tenets consist in a belief in progress, in the emancipating powers of reason, in the political centrality of subjectivity, and in ethical and—in historical tension with nation-state particularism—political universalism. Together with these tenets, the discourse of modernity affirms the exemplarity of Western processes of modernization: the distinction between religion and the state, the separation of civil society from the state, the emergence of the individual and the categories of ethical and political personality *and* solidarity, democracy and the rule of law, industrialization and urbanization, and so on. For postmodern thought, following Foucault (1980), these processes dominate and discipline the individual as much as they individualize and empower him or her: Subjectivity implies, also, subjection. Following Derrida (1992), modern law is considered to cover over its own violent emergence and is consequently unable to reflect on its own ethical and political limits. Liberalism affirms, for example, universal tolerance and general assembly. But the spaces of both are necessarily exclusive and violent, organizing the “others” of liberalism in self-legitimizing ways. Finally, for postmodern thought, following Emmanuel Levinas’s attention to ethical singularity, the immanent relation between theoretical and practical reason in modernity codifies ethics and

turns the Enlightenment principles of freedom into those of abstract domination with little eye to locality and contingency (the major critique of Western interventionism). In these three respects, modernity’s promise of a generalizable axiomatics of freedom hides practices of discipline and domination. Modernity is to be neither avoided nor transcended; its limits of violence are, however, to be critiqued and negotiated.

Within the field of IR this kind of argument has meant the following. IR turns on the “anarchy” of relations that befall the state outside the parameters of its own sovereignty. For postmodernists, sovereignty and anarchy are mutually constitutive, violent constructions whose respective delimitations suppress the multiple differences and pluralities of the real. Modern political organization does wrong to these differences. *Contra* cosmopolitanism, however, postmodern IR thought does not affirm either the individual against the modern state or the transnational human rights regime that increasingly underpins supranational juridical personhood. For the limits of the individual are as constructed as those of the modern state. Modern liberal individualism and its international equivalent, cosmopolitan liberalism, codify subjects in particular ways as bearers of rights, as fully delimited and conscious persons, as beings prior to social interaction and meaning. These philosophies risk depoliticizing social agents. Therefore, aware of the freedoms gained through modernity (in distinction to the hierarchies of the premodern age), postmodern IR thought considers the state as only one actor in the plural fields of global politics and sees the individual and universalism as the legacies of *Western* Enlightenment. This legacy is particular. It cannot consequently theorize for humanity as a whole. When it does, non-Western social actors risk being perceived in a nonpolitical context; the consequences of universalism can be utterly self-contradictory (see particularly Mahmood Mamdani, 2009). Postmodern thought converges here with neo-Marxist and postcolonial critiques of Western imperialism. Modernity cannot be a straightforward counterforce to such imperialism, for, however much it distinguishes itself from authoritarianism, it is also complicit with strategies of domination.

What emerges from the postmodern analysis of modernity? Any countersubject to replace Western

modernity would simply reproduce the tenets of modernity. Postmodernists do not consequently seek a new political subject. They seek to untie and foreground what is repressed by political subjectivity as such, hence their practical concern with the excluded, the marginal, the dissenting, and an (often too) implicit engagement with political organizations that are more inclusive, less exclusive. Postmodern thought's ultimate concerns are, therefore, with ethics and (more long term) with the overall rethinking of modern political categories. The former ethics is not that of rational universalism, however; it addresses, as reasonably as possible, what political reason and subjectivity will necessarily exclude. It is an ethics of contingency, of uncertainty, of singularity in the interstices of political arrangement and institution. Given the recent economic and technological globalization, postmodernism in IR befits, it is argued, a global age. For in this age, plurality and difference are increasingly critical values. The postmodern engagement with modernity leads, as a result, to critical and dissenting approaches to all international topics, approaches that anticipate, some way down the road, a new politics of freedom.

Immediate Futures

Postmodernism is now settled within international relations theory. Its position remains, however, marginal. Just as French thought has been unable to dislodge scientific rationalism in the social sciences (remaining effective in the humanities and soft social sciences alone), so postmodern thought in IR has not perturbed, let alone dislodged, mainstream IR thought (political realism, rational choice theory, game theory, and empirical research methods in general). Although its present critiques of domestic and global liberal regimes are important, future perspectives for postmodernism in IR should be considered in this light. Two possibilities seem convincing here. Given its postpositivist roots and ethical orientation, postmodernism in IR will refuse to become more "mainstream," resisting empirical procedure and attending to the marginal—postmodernism will remain a marginal critique in this sense. Or it will theorize how to think and practice less violent political organization in an age of globalization and fragmentation. Although both options are intellectually justifiable,

the second requires on the part of postmodern scholars more rehearsal of postmodernism's own assumptions (especially around the concept and practice of freedom). This entry concludes with two examples. First, if all theory is interpretive to a greater or lesser extent, the criteria by which one theory is interpretatively better than another should be formalizable and, therefore, testable. If so, at the methodological level, postmodernism and empiricism could talk to each other. At the political level, postmodernism could exposit more what the lesser violence entails in global political life. Second—and consequently—for postmodern theory, freedom tends to be situated beyond liberal law, with the latter seen as coercive, disciplinary, and, at worst, depoliticizing. A clearer negotiation with the *inextricable* relation between freedom and law is, however, needed if postmodern thought is to help foster more progressive forms of governance. In an age of uncertainty regarding the future of global political configurations, both positions are of interest to progressive reorganizations of international relations. The future of postmodern thought in IR will probably depend on a careful balance struck between the two.

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See also Constructivism; Critical Theory; Identity, Social and Political; Political Theory

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POWER

Power is a concept broadly used both in personal and political communication and in scientific discourse. Everybody claims to know what power is. Yet looking at the wealth of meanings given to this concept in everyday life and among social scientists, the confusion is striking. There are several reasons for this confusion. By way of introduction, only two reasons need to be mentioned.

One reason for this confusion is that the use of the concept of power in common and scientific language is highly morally loaded. Power researchers committed to the Weberian epistemological norm of *Werturteilsfreiheit* (freedom from value judgment) are under extreme pressure both from the members of their own scientific community, who follow the contrary norm of critical analysis, and from the public to take a clear moral position on power. Critical theorists who have committed themselves to fighting power with the means of science, on the other hand, have been accused of normative bias when dealing with power analysis. Ever since power has been on the social scientific research agenda, it has provided one of the most prominent battlegrounds for conflicting epistemological approaches, political interests, and cultural beliefs. What is left after all these battles is not easy to put together again into one picture of social scientific power research.

There is a second reason why power research constitutes a particularly slippery ground for social scientists. Scholars of power are, like laymen in general, prone to being influenced by cultural images and ideologies of power. In Western culture,

there are mainly two contrasting images of power that have left their imprint on social scientists' efforts to deal analytically and empirically with this widespread phenomenon. According to the first image, power is a negative phenomenon. It is seen as a social force suppressing the weakest members of society and making them dependent on the power holders. According to this cultural image, power is considered "bad" because it is believed that the concentration of power undermines generally accepted social norms and values of democracy and disturbs the smooth functioning of its institutions. Popular Western culture continually feeds this negative image of power. Western mass media produce and reproduce stereotypes of bad power: The power holders are mainly males, meeting other powerful men in secret sessions and gathering around the top power holder, their boss. Violence is their ultimate power resource. Implicit in this stereotype of bad power are the beliefs that secret power in general is stronger than public power, that power has a gender bias in favor of the males, and that the strongest power resource is violence.

The imprint left by this cultural stereotype on social scientific research is threefold. First, following the first element of the cultural image of power according to which "real" power is invisible, scholars of power have insisted on the imperative to discover hidden power as their main research goal. Second, the gender bias implicit in the cultural image of power is reproduced by power research. Power is mainly a male affair. The overwhelming majority of power researchers are males, and their research subjects, the power holders, as a rule are males as well. There is practically no research on female (political, social, economic, cultural, and religious) power and their peculiarities, if any, as to its exercise. There is a third and contradictory imprint that the popular image of power has left on power research in the social sciences. Although it is generally believed that physical muscular components are the ultimate instruments of power, analyses on violence do not constitute a self-evident part of conventional power research. Leaving aside those cases when force and violence represent the last instance, as in riots, revolutions, and war, conventional power research has usually explored cases in which the exercise of power appears to be a bloodless, largely psychological, and mainly intellectual affair.

Whereas the negative image of power is strongly represented in Western cultural industry, its counterpart is less pronounced. When power is considered “good,” it is generally associated with a small group of gifted and qualified men constituting an elite in a specific societal segment. As long as these fragmented elites do not coalesce into one and the same elite, they produce the positive effects of power: know-how, expertise, trust, and vision. If power is good, it works on the basis of nonphysical and mainly intellectual means of convincing others. According to the institutionalized division of labor within the social sciences, elite research is separated from power research. This illustrates that the cultural image of positive or good power is underrepresented not only among laymen but also among students of social science.

All said, it becomes quite easy to understand why power is one of the most elusive, yet most widely used concepts in the social sciences. Some scholars have suggested getting rid of it, but the concept of power is and remains an essential tool of analysis. Power has always been the object of many controversies, both definitional and analytical. Accordingly, there are many different ways of how to define this concept and how to study power.

Definitions and Constituent Elements

As for many other social science concepts, Max Weber (1978) provides an excellent point of departure: “Power’ (*Macht*) is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (p. 53). Weber stresses that there are a wide variety of power bases: “All conceivable qualities of a person and all conceivable combinations of circumstances may put him in a position to impose his will in a given situation” (p. 53). It is with reference to this wealth of possibilities to mobilize and exert power that Weber has qualified this phenomenon as “sociologically amorphous.”

Departing from Weber’s definitions, four constituent elements of power can be distinguished: first, power is *relational*; second, it is *intentional*; third, it is based on social *resources*; and fourth, power is related to specific *contexts*.

Relational

Many authors have followed in Weber’s footsteps and see power not as a specific quality of a person but as a relation between two actors (A and B) or entities. For instance, according to Richard Tawney (1931), “power may be defined as the capacity of an individual, or group of individuals, to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in the manner which he desires” (p. 230). Robert Dahl’s (1957) elegant definition highlights the relational character of power: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (pp. 202–203). If power is understood as a relation in which not only can A modify B’s intentions and will, the question arises of how B can “relate” to A. On its part, B can try to resist A’s will by mobilizing counterpower. According to Heinrich Popitz (1992), the ultimate chance to break A’s power consists in B physically withdrawing from the power relation either by escaping from the situation, by committing suicide, or by being prepared to be killed. The willingness to die or to commit suicide is the strongest counterpower B can mobilize against A. Both in conventional and in terrorist warfare, it is a commonly used weapon.

Intentional

The definition of power is limited to cases in which A intends to carry out his will vis-à-vis B. In contrast, if B conforms with A’s wishes even without A’s intention to impose them on B, we are dealing with the phenomenon of *influence*. However, the borderline between influence and power is fuzzy. Carl Friedrich (first articulated in 1941, then in 1963) has suggested that a power relationship may exist even when no visible pressure or influence is applied. There may be cases when B seems to implement A’s will without pressures being put on B. B does so because, on the basis of B’s and others’ previous experiences, B is aware that A desires that specific type of behavior and is in a position to impart sanctions if it is not fulfilled. For instance, a U.S. senator votes in a certain way, contrary to his or her previously manifested views, because he or she knows that otherwise the president has the power to punish any contrary behavior by withdrawing some precious resources and/or acting in such a way as to exclude him or her from

prestigious positions and appointments. Behaviors of this type are, in Friedrich's language, instances of "anticipated reactions."

Not all scholars agree that (manifest or anticipated) intentionality is the definitional distinction between influence and power. As shown below, a heated debate has taken place from the mid-1950s to the 1970s focusing on, among other things, this distinction. Other controversies have dealt with the question of how the *intention* to use power manifests itself. Generally speaking, the expression of one's intention to use power depends on the type of resources available and the type of sociopolitical context in which power relations take place. Political scientists have given special prominence to the realm of decision making. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan (1950) define power as "participation in the making of decisions: G has power over H with respect to the values K if G participates in the making of decisions affecting the K-policies of H" (p. 75).

Control is another concept often used synonymously with the concept of power. The distinction between these two concepts, however, is important and useful for grasping two different phenomena. The powerful person or entity uses different resources including, if necessary, violence to enforce his or her intention. In contrast, the concept of control is used when the other's behavior is supervised and/or guided without wanting to change it. In politics, both informal and formal mechanisms of control are at play. Among the latter ones, the institutionalization of competition between political parties and the institutionalization of opposition to the governing party or party coalition are of crucial importance for making democracies work. The institutionalization of control mechanisms has the function to prevent the abuse of power and to stimulate power holders to use their resources according to the generally accepted goals and values. However, there is a tricky relationship between control and power.

Control without power can turn out to be inefficient when it is confronted with strong power holders. But who controls the controllers if they are given power resources? On the other hand, powerless controllers typically run the risk of being drawn into the very power constellation they have been given the function to supervise. United Nations peacekeeping and observer forces, for

example, have often enough become part of the conflicting groups they were supposed to control. Obviously, a necessary precondition for control mechanisms to perform their function of limiting power abuses is the knowledge of who uses power where and when. But, evidently, not all power relations are open and accessible. Secret power networks infiltrating official power centers are difficult, if not impossible, to check by institutionalized control mechanisms. If power works in the underground, also controllers have to move underground, taking the role of spies, concealed investigators, or secret agents. The power of power vis-à-vis its controllers consists in its capacity to dictate the means of control. Just because the relationship between power and control is so highly flexible, it is important to keep these two phenomena conceptually apart from each other.

The *intention* to exert power can also be expressed explicitly as an order to obey. This is especially the case when and if the power relation takes place within a system of authority. In this sense, David Easton (1965) speaks about the "power of the authority roles" (p. 207). In more informal social contexts, the powerful person can express his or her intention with the help of more or less subtle means of body language, with a sign of the hand or a raise of the eyebrow (Erving Goffman, 1963). Typically, only a limited range of persons are able to interpret these signs according to the intentions of the power holder. The intention to use power and the translation of this intention into action can be divided between A, the power holder, and persons who function as the staff of A. If this division of "labor" is given, power analysis has to shift from the analysis of dyadic relations between A and B to the analysis of triadic relations between A, C, and B. Whenever dyadic power relations are transformed into triadic power relations, power is undergoing the first stage in its transformation into authority (*Herrschaft*; Popitz, 1992, p. 232).

Resources

According to Weber, power relations can be built on a variety of possible resources. Efforts have been made to classify the types of resources that lend themselves most likely to be exploited as power bases. M. Rainer Lepsius (1968, 1990) has

proposed three different bases of power: the market, the association, and the state. Power based on the *market* refers to Karl Marx's insight into the power potential related to the ownership of the means of production. Understandably, the owners of the means of production in general have a higher chance to press through their will on others than nonowners do. Power based on *association* or organization refers to the chances A has to realize his will if this will has been transformed into an organizational goal of a political party, trade union, or voluntary association. Another lively debate fought out in the 1960s and 1970s refers to the role performed by organizations as a power basis. As Elmer Schattschneider (1960) aptly put it, "Organisation is the mobilization of bias" (p. 71).

Power based on the *state* refers to the (legitimate) use of violence as the ultimate means of compliance. Power can be strengthened if it is based on a combination of all three power resources. Actors who are situated in a privileged market position, whose power intentions are organized, and who have access to (legitimate) means of violence have a greater chance to succeed than nonorganized actors in an unprivileged market situation without access to (legitimate) means of violence. Strong power resources have the tendency to attract each other, whereas weak power resources tend to remain fragmented. Different patterns of power distribution within a society have been identified. Two extreme models of power distribution, the "elitist" and the "pluralist," have especially attracted the attention of U.S. scholars and been in the focus of a highly ideologically loaded controversy. Although this debate has taken place more than 4 decades ago, it is still of importance, especially for scholars dealing with the tension between democracy and power.

Taking into consideration the plurality of power resources and the ubiquity of power in social interaction processes, system theorists have conceptualized power more abstractly. Within his complex structural-functional framework, Talcott Parsons (1969) has suggested treating power "as a specific mechanism operating to bring about changes in the action of other units, individual or collective, in the processes of interaction" (p. 353). Even more abstractly, system theorists also speak about power as a medium of communication comparable with money in economic relations. As such, it

structures social relations by selecting the types and limiting the amount of action alternatives. Power conceived of as a medium of communication has the function to regulate the dynamics of interaction processes (see the classic study by Peter Blau, 1964). Like money, power obeys the law of diminishing returns. If inappropriately used, it can be wasted and may lose value. There is no fixed relationship between the increase in power and the increase in the selection of action alternatives. The system theoretical point of view of power allows for opening the scope of power analysis and integrating both positive and negative functions of power understood as a resource of the system into the empirical research.

Context

Power relations vary according to the type of the context within which they take place. These contexts can be more or less formal and/or have more or less systemic character. In informal contexts, the values, norms, and sanctions regulating power relations are not defined precisely and explicitly. Therefore, they tend to be more arbitrary, and the risk is that they will escape the control of both power holders and subordinates. If it is left to the personal whims of a powerful person how and when to press through his or her will, then the subordinates have no chance to appeal to common values, norms, or sanctions in order to limit the scope of their submission. In these cases, power tends to become "despotic." The more the context is formalized and the more it is constituted by systemic characteristics, the more the power relations become predictable and, therefore, manageable.

Weber's (1978, p. 212) famous distinction between three types of authority has been used to distinguish between three types of contexts within which power relations develop: (1) the context of *charismatic authority*, (2) the context of *traditional authority*, and (3) the context of *rational or legal authority*. In all three cases, the decisive criterion of distinction between power and authority is the claim on legitimacy by A and the belief in legitimacy by B. Speaking in terms of ideal types, B who is confronted with A's power has to comply willy-nilly with A's intention; B who is confronted with A's authority obeys A's order because B believes in its legitimacy.

In addition to the type of context within which power relations take place, it is also important to specify on which level power is studied: on the microlevel of power relations in everyday life, on the medium level of power relations in communities, or on the macrolevel of power relations on the top of authority systems or regimes. The more the power relations are globalized, the greater the need for power analyses both (horizontally) between different power centers and (vertically) between different interconnected levels of power.

In summary, it can be said that the concept of power consists of four constituent elements:

1. it is relational,
2. it is intentional,
3. it is based on resources, and
4. it is related to specific sociopolitical contexts.

The concept of power has two counterconcepts, influence, on the one hand, and authority, on the other. The distinctive criterion of definition between influence and power is the intention to exercise power; the distinctive criterion of definition between power and authority is the claim and the belief in the legitimacy of power. These distinctions help in presenting some of the most important debates among mainly American scholars of power and their contributions to power analysis and research.

Debates and Controversies

Between the 1950s and the 1970s in the United States, heated controversies concerning power raised significant questions from both substantive and methodological perspectives. In the research on power, substance and methodology have proved to be intimately connected with each other and have to be taken into consideration simultaneously in the presentation of these debates. Political scientists have applied three methods: the reputational, the positional, and the decisional. With reference to the patterns of distribution of power resources, two outstanding models have been formulated: the elitist and the pluralist.

To discover the powerful ones in a community, Floyd Hunter, who is positively responsible for launching the wave of research and controversies,

resorted to the *reputational* method. In 1953 he asked a panel of persons supposedly possessing a fair amount of information concerning the city of Atlanta the names of who they thought were the most powerful individuals in the affairs of the city. Though he supplemented the information obtained this way with his own acquired knowledge, his method was criticized as having several drawbacks. Not necessarily are those who are visible automatically powerful. Not always will prestige be translated into power. Moreover, often the very powerful ones succeed in keeping themselves out of the limelight. Interestingly, however, he reached the conclusion that, indeed, in the city of Atlanta, a few powerful individuals, most of them not necessarily occupying political or other types of office, were considered capable of guiding and controlling significant activities. There was a dominant elite. Aware of some of the pitfalls of the reputational method, other scholars decided to rely on the *positional* method. That is, they acquired information on all those individuals occupying important offices in the city government, in the business community, in the mass media, and in religious associations. In a few cases, they found some overlapping. In general, their conclusion was that many of those holding important offices, political offices as well, could influence in a significant way the activities of their community. There did not exist a single unified and dominant elite but groups of elites in competition. Hence, the structure of power could be defined as pluralist. The positional method too was subject to well-founded criticism. Wealthy people, especially, may neither need nor want visible offices. In many cases, the politicians may appear in charge, but they are to a great extent dependent on individuals who, for instance, finance their electoral campaigns; who control the most important economic activities, as occurs in many company towns; and who manipulate the mass media and the presentation of special technical knowledge indispensable to justify some choices and to defeat opposing alternatives. The positional method was accused of almost inevitably but unconvincingly leading to a pluralist conclusion.

Largely relying on the positional method, a highly provocative book made a thunderstorm irruption into the debate. Rightly and wrongly, *The Power Elite* by C. Wright Mills (1956) was

intended to challenge the received wisdom of the common perception that the U.S. republic is based on an irrepressible, competitive, and fruitful democratic pluralism. In the wake of McCarthyism and in the midst of the Cold War, Mills bluntly stated that the decision-making process at the federal level was dominated, if not monopolized, by a restricted combination of politicians (chief executives), military officers (warlords), and businessmen (corporate rich): the power elite. Interestingly, when leaving the presidency in 1960, former General Dwight H. Eisenhower himself warned against the exaggerated power of the "military-industrial complex." The question raised and the conclusions reached seemed so important and delicate that the response to Mills's analysis was provided by a score of the most outstanding social scientists of that period: Talcott Parsons, Daniel Bell, and Robert Dahl.

Indeed, Dahl and some of his students, especially Raymond Wolfinger and Nelson Polsby, engaged in a prolonged battle against both the method used by Mills and the implications of his substantive analysis. The battle was continued by several scholars well after Mills's death in 1962. At issue were two extremely important political and methodological problems. The political problem concerned the very nature of American democracy: Was it still open and pluralist, as Dahl and his disciples attempted to prove, or it had come to be dominated by a few groups as maintained by Mills (and the neo-Marxists)? The methodological problem was how to test the distribution of power and the way power was being exercised.

In response to Mills's *The Power Elite*, Dahl formulated the *decisional* approach to the study of political power. Focusing on one community, New Haven, Connecticut, where his university, Yale, is located, he chose three issue areas that he considered the most important ones: political appointments, public education, and urban redevelopment. The guiding assumption was that if a cohesive power elite existed in New Haven, its members would always be present and prominent in all three areas. If different groups of decision makers were present and influential only in some of the three issue areas, but not in all of them, the theory of the pluralists would be vindicated. At the end of a long and detailed study, Dahl (1961) came to the conclusion that there was no or little overlapping

among the decision makers and that no single group of elites controlled political power in New Haven. The decisional approach seemed to be more appropriate than both the reputational and the positional in identifying those effectively holding and exercising political power. According to Dahl, it was also superior and preferable to the other approaches because it provided for better empirical testing. Nevertheless, the debate was by no means exhausted and closed.

In an article published in the *American Political Science Review* (originally in 1962, then collected in a book in 1970), which became the single most quoted one, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz questioned the method and the conclusions reached by Dahl and by the pluralists. Their fundamental thesis is that there are "two faces of power." One is a visible face that finds expression in decision-making activities. It is not necessarily the most influential. There is a second face that may often be decisive and that the decisional method cannot illuminate. It is the invisible face that prevents important, perhaps the most important, issues from coming before the decision makers. Therefore, those issues cannot be discovered by the decisional method because they imply or are "nondecisions." Nor will the powerful ones be easily identified exactly because they operate, so to speak, in the dark.

Bachrach and Baratz's critics immediately pointed out two problems concerning their approach and conclusions. Who is in a position to convincingly claim that there are important issues in community life that are not even taken into consideration? The pluralists argued that all truly important issues are eventually articulated. In any case, as to the method, how can scholars study nondecisions? Inherently, nondecisions are not researchable and not subject to any empirical test.

The contrast between elitist and pluralist thinking about community power is very stark and revolves around all the most important aspects of the ownership, distribution, and exercise of power. The pillars of the two competing views have been summarized in an excellent and impartial manner, without any bias either political or methodological, by T. R. Dye (1970, pp. 36–37; but see also Andrew McFarland, 1969). The following paragraphs provide a comparative synthesis of the two views (Dye, 1970, pp. 36–38).

Whereas elitists believe that “political power is inextricably bound together with social and economic power” (Dye, 1970, p. 36) and, therefore, it is likely that “men of wealth and social position in the community are also men of power” (p. 36), pluralists consider power an attribute of individuals that finds expression in the ability to induce other individuals to act in ways they would not otherwise do if power were not applied. Where elitists stress that power is “structured” and, therefore, bound to last as long as the men having power continue in their roles, pluralists believe that power is bound to pass and that, in any case, it may lapse away after some specific decisions are made.

Whereas elitists state that there is a clear and persistent distinction between the elites and the masses and that the members of the masses will rarely succeed in joining the ranks of the elites, pluralists almost rule out the distinction between elites and masses and believe that it is possible for many individuals to exercise decision-making power at different points in time. Elitists stress that power derives fundamentally from the unequal distribution of economic resources and that politicians enjoy limited autonomy vis-à-vis business and financial leaders, while pluralists hold that the power to participate in decision making derives from the amount of interest individuals have in some specific issues.

Elitists consider that the powerful are a small group in any and all communities because political power is correlated with higher degrees of education, higher levels of income, and more prestigious occupations; in contrast, pluralists believe that power is acquired through superior leadership skills, greater managerial capabilities, and better knowledge of the democratic process. Wealth may help, but it is never decisive. For elitists, the image of power in a community is that of a pyramid: very few on the top having very much power. For pluralists, power is better depicted in the shape of an onion: a limited concentration of power on the top, much power given to those in the large middle of the onion, and very few powerless individuals at the bottom. For elitists, men of power share the same basic values and outlook, while pluralists point at the existence of a competition among different leaders seeking divergent policies and being obliged to bargain and to compromise.

Finally, according to elitists, the elites do not have to be responsible to the masses, who are

misinformed and unable to exert pressures on the elites. To avoid potential tensions and conflicts, however, the elites may behave in a benevolent manner out of a sense of duty to their respective communities. According to pluralists, however, community leaders are responsible to a variety of associations. Elections enforce an additional sense of accountability and allow some elite circulation.

The next stage of the debate focused on the question of how nondecisions could be defined more precisely and whether they could in fact be identified and made amenable to empirical research. To rescue the idea lying behind nondecisions, Frederick Frey (1971) suggested speaking of “suppressed issues,” that is, issues that do exist, are important, and would deserve attention. However, dominant groups are capable of vetoing them and preventing them from even getting on the agenda, for fear of diverting their political path. The implication is that the *structure of power* in a given community would make it rather unlikely or well-nigh impossible that some controversial issues be raised and find a place in the decision-making process. Avoiding any reference to Marxist scholars, the authors engaged in stressing the possibility of nondecisions have been fond of quoting a sentence by Schattschneider (1960):

All forms of political organisation have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others, because *organisation is the mobilization of bias*. Some issues are organised into politics while others are organised out. (p. 71)

Of course, not even the recognition of the possible existence of a mobilization of bias offers a completely satisfactory solution key to the analysis of the suppressed issues of when, how, by whom, and with what consequences. A convincing explanation is still required of why there is a specific structure of power, how it came into being, and how it succeeded in consolidating itself and in persisting. If the answer is that the structure of power itself has come into being thanks to the suppression of some not visible alternatives, then scholars would find themselves engaged potentially in an infinite regress. It will also be of not minor interest to know whether and how that structure of power has withstood what kind of

challenges and whether and how it has been transformed.

Reanalyzing and summarizing the entire debate in an incisive essay, Steven Lukes (1974) tried to go beyond both approaches. He referred to the decisional approach as one-dimensional, to the nondecisional approach as two-dimensional, and then he offered his own three-dimensional view. Lukes's view (1974) combines and redefines all the elements of the two other approaches, focusing on "(a) decision-making and control over the political agenda (not necessarily through decisions); (b) issues and potential issues; (c) observable (overt or covert) and latent conflict; (d) subjective and real interests" (p. 25). This highly ambitious blueprint has not found any practitioner so far. Moreover, one cannot refrain from remarking that, since Lukes refers to covert and latent conflicts and to subjective and real interests, his research proposal automatically falls under the criticism of all scholars who consider of the utmost relevance the identification of power through observable behavior and the drafting of an operational definition.

In a way, however, though unwillingly, Lukes exemplifies the major problem involved in the analysis of power. There are many faces of power. While the one that refers to decision making is easy to identify, scholars know that decisions are only the last stage in a long process/procedure. At the beginning of that procedure, power may be expressed in writing the agenda and in initiating or vetoing some issues. Of course, this face of power requires the difficult acquisition of information that the powerful may want to suppress and may succeed in doing so. Therefore, the scholarly (and the political) attention should turn to the analysis of the overall social and political structure to detect whether that structure has incorporated some bias and, in case it has, what kind of bias it is. The inescapable conclusion is that power must be studied with reference to an existing system (political, social, economic, religious, cultural, and media). As a consequence, the overall characteristics of the system acquire major importance in drawing the boundaries of its exercise and in assessing its impact.

Power in the International System

At this point, a digression is needed to briefly address power in the international system.

Unfortunately, the interaction between political scientists interested in the distribution and exercise of power within specific political systems and international relations analysts has been poor, infrequent, and sterile. However, it should be clear that power among nations constitutes a significant field for analysis. For more than a century, the debate among historians on what kind of equilibrium existed in European politics was dominated by the expression and the theme of "balance of power." That such a balance existed so that no single European state should acquire control of Europe was, indeed, the goal successfully pursued by the United Kingdom throughout the 19th century. Historians and international relations analysts are perfectly aware that the ways some states exercise power over other states; control, overtly and/or covertly, their behavior; shape the international agenda; and organize the international system are all themes worthy of analysis in terms of power. Some (see, especially, A. F. K. Organski & Jacek Kugler, 1980) have also come to the realization that even in the domain of international politics, power is neither simply nor exclusively a matter of physical resources. It consists more specifically of the capability in mobilizing, organizing, deploying, and orienting those resources. Not surprisingly in war, democracies have shown more power than expected: far superior to the supposed power of authoritarian regimes of all varieties.

Several of the tools and the approaches used in national contexts can be put to work when dealing with the international system. Some truly significant historical phenomena affected by the resort to power and that cannot be convincingly explained without taking into account several forms of power are, for example, colonialism and imperialism.

The reappearance of a debate on whether and how the United States, revealingly defined as a superpower (the only remaining one), can be characterized as an empire or not has brought to light a distinction between *hard* power and *soft* power (Joseph Nye, 2004). Hard power is based on military force leading to outright war; soft power relies on diplomacy, persuasion, manipulation of circumstances, and cultural influence. A superpower may launch and perhaps win some or even most battles, but it will be unable to conquer the minds of individuals if it resorts only to violent actions. On the contrary, hard power is likely to arouse

and excite hatred. Though from many points of view the United States is, indeed, a superpower, in the not too distant future likely to be challenged in terms of power by China, there are scholars who believe that at the international level it has become quite difficult to identify who really has power. Globalization seems to be a process dominated by impersonal factors and hidden protagonists, affecting, of course, in very different ways, all states and actors, whose responsibility and power cannot be easily (or at all) ascertained and attributed (Susan Strange, 1996). Even at the level of the international system, power seems to be everywhere, but its detection and its analysis have become and remain extremely complicated tasks. And, of course, when dealing with events taking place at the level of the international system, there are scholars who believe that most events are affected by one player, the United States, and scholars who believe that the situation is extremely complex and that there are a plurality of actors, including several international organizations, affecting the distribution and the exercise of power in the international system.

There has always been another important sector of power research, identified mainly in Europe in the late 1960s. It is less ideologically loaded than the debates among U.S. scholars and more aimed at a historical and sociological understanding of the functioning above all of totalitarian regimes in the past. This research has been focused on regime types—democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian, roughly—and on the formal and informal rules presiding over all the processes from the acquisition to the transmission of political power. Especially noteworthy in the three regime types must be considered the relationship between power and the existence of organized groups and their competition and transformation through time. The dispersion of power among several competing groups is a crucial feature of democratic regimes. Limited, not competitive, and not responsible pluralism, as defined by Juan Linz (1964), is the hallmark of authoritarian regimes, while the power monopoly of one actor, the single party, characterizes totalitarian regimes.

With reference to the Nazi regime, M. Rainer Lepsius (1968) has analyzed the structure of intermediary groups and its relation to charismatic leadership. The process the Nazis called *Entmachtung*

(de-powerization) “meant a double process of reducing and relocating social power in society” (p. 297). Powerful interest groups were destroyed, and the remaining less powerful ones transformed into agencies of the Nazi party competing with each other for their survival. Under the condition “that there exists an atmosphere of competition and suspicion” (p. 63), no bonds of solidarity between the different power groups were created, thus leaving a space of direct control to the charismatic leader. The combination of a fragmented and weak power structure on the intermediary level with the centralization of power on the top level of the regime was the structural precondition for the excessive and arbitrary (mis)use of power by Hitler.

When looking at more complex chains of power structures on the international level, an interesting observation has been made by, among others, John Gerard Ruggie (1998). Along with the formation of international regimes, the role of power has changed. In international regimes, the capability to cooperate and to make compromises has become more important in making politics than the capability to mobilize power resources and to exercise power. Accordingly, power research has been integrated into game theory, bargaining theory, and theories of rational choice. This is why it may seem that power research has disappeared from the social-scientific agenda. But with the change of the role and the appearance of power, social-scientific research on power also has changed its theoretical approach and conceptual labels. The more power is spread worldwide into “multiple overlapping and intersecting socio-spatial networks of power” (Michael Mann, 1986, p. 1), the more also power research is spread into multiple overlapping research areas. The question “Who has how much power over whom?”—which had dominated power research in the last decades of the 19th century—has been replaced by the questions: “Which intended and unintended effects does power have?” and “Which functions does power fulfill for the development of complex, interrelated supranational regimes?” The integration of nation-states into supranational systems can have the effect of neutralizing the power the nation-state has over its citizens. This is, for example, the case when the European Court of Justice intervenes in the domestic legal practices of its member states. The principle

of “subsidiarity” can be understood as the member states’ attempt to institutionalize counterpower against what Christopher Booker (1996, p. 203) polemically has coined the “new totalitarianism” of the European Union (EU). This principle is, however, overruled by the European Court of Justice. With the increasing importance of supranational systems, power research is confronted with the demanding task of analyzing two- and multiple-level power games (Andrew Moravcsik, 1996, p. 299). What is gained in terms of power on one level can be lost on the next level and vice versa. The possibility of binding allocation of power may get lost in multilevel power games. Moreover, the example of the history of the formation of the EU shows that successful bargaining power can produce unintended consequences and even paradoxes. In this sense, Fritz Scharpf has coined the concept of the “joint-decision trap”: “What is missed is the possibility that authority might not be allocated, in zero-sum fashion, to either one or the other level of government, but it might be shared by both” (1996, p. 271). The institutional development of the EU is, according to Scharpf, blocked by joint-decision traps. Although Parsons did not develop his idea of power with relation to the empirical case of the institution building of the EU, his insights about the positive function of power can be applied to this example. If the institutional context fails to allocate power in a binding way, power cannot function as a mechanism to reduce action alternatives and to speed up the decision-making process.

The study of power on and between levels of complex political regimes makes it possible to liberate the notion of power from its negative normative bias, which characterized the debates in the 1970s. Power was mainly seen under the perspective of its threatening potential for democratic institutions. There is no doubt that power research under this critical perspective is necessary if social scientists desire to fulfill their task and to detect violations against the institutionalized norms and values of democratic rule. But it is equally important for social scientists to investigate the conditions under which binding power allocation fails and prevents the working power and development of institution building.

One must recall Max Weber’s realist definition of politics: “He who is active in politics strives for

power either as a means in serving other aims, ideal or egoistic, or as ‘power for power’s sake,’ that is, in ‘order to enjoy the prestige-feeling that power gives’” (Hans Gerth & Charles Mills, 1948, p. 78). A realist approach to the study of power should take into consideration the multiple functionality of power for complex political regimes. This is especially urgent under the conditions of globalization. Curiously, the processes of globalization have seemed to suggest that economic and political power exists and manifests itself in significant ways and doses but that it cannot be precisely located and assessed. The truth of the matter is that the power of power consists also in being and remaining quite, if not substantially, elusive.

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See also Balance of Power; Legitimacy; Power and International Politics

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POWER AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Different aims inform the study of power. Simplifying somewhat, power plays a role in two distinct, if related, domains. In the field of political theory as understood here, the purpose of analyses of power is to capture the nature of the polity in which questions of the organization of (organized) violence, the common good, and freedom are paramount. In these studies, power stands for “government” or “governance” and political “order,” as well as personal “autonomy.” The logic in the field of explanatory theories, on the other hand, is to think of power in terms of a theory of action first and a theory of domination subsequently. Here, power is central to the explanation of behavior and the outcomes of social action. It refers to “agency” and “influence,” if not “cause,” and to rule or domination. This entry considers various conceptions of power in international relations, including the realist, institutionalist, structuralist, and constructivist views, and discusses how they approach the nature of the polity and the explanatory use of the concept of power.

Classical realists argue that because there is no mechanism for controlling the competition among sovereign states, power is simply the possession of

resources and their use to exercise control at the international level. For classical realist thinkers in international relations (IR), the particular context of world politics suggests that these domains could be fruitfully merged—if there is no governance at the international level, the first description of power as a political order can be merged with a theory of action. With no world government, the international system seems to lack not only an ordering authority but a polity altogether. In a sense, therefore, it is possible to think of world politics as the simple aggregation, and balance, of agent capacities to influence, such that no further theory was needed. In the explanatory domain, power then becomes a central variable in a double causal link. Power understood as resources or capabilities is an indicator of the strength of actors and, consequently, of the capacity to affect or control events. Likewise, a general capacity to control outcomes has been used as an indicator for the ruling of the international system. Rather than seeing the two domains as separate, the special nature of world politics could combine them in an explanatory sequence: By knowing *who can be expected to win conflicts*, we would also know *who or what governs international politics*, which, given the absence of a world polity, is all there is to know about power as order and government.

Power analyses in recent decades have challenged these tacitly assumed links and ultimately also the neglect of the concerns of political theory. Criticizing realism's "lump" concept of power (according to which all the elements of power can be combined so that the degree of a state's power can be measured by a single indicator), neo-institutionalism has tried to redefine the link between resources and outcomes. Similarly, with regard to the understanding of "rule" and "governance," different structural power approaches have demonstrated the need to conceive of more encompassing power concepts so as to capture important but otherwise neglected facets of international rule. Poststructuralist and constructivist approaches focus on power as authority and legitimacy, established not through an open social contract but in the habitual working of discourses and practices that disempower/empower agents. When aiming at an understanding of the world polity, they also refer back to the domain of political theory. But by starting from a historical reconceptualization of politics and order, they do

this by stepping altogether outside an analysis in terms of these two tacitly assumed links.

The Concept of Power in Realist Theories

Although classical realism does make strong political assumptions about human nature and the role of power in politics, the two-step analysis of power mentioned above, which is driven by the explanatory domain, has become dominant. There, on the macrolevel, realist theory relies on the concept of the balance of power. This presupposes a common denominator for power in which all its aspects can be coherently aggregated. On the microlevel, realist theory relies on the idea that states are interested in relative gains in power. Each of these concepts presupposes that power is measurable. Indeed, such theories require a concept of power akin to the concept of money in economic theory. In this analogy, the striving for utility maximization expressed and measured in terms of money parallels the national interest (i.e., security) expressed in terms of (relative) power.

This central assumption has been challenged by early realist critiques and more recent institutionalist approaches. In an early argument that also anticipates and implicitly criticizes the economic analogy in neorealist theory, Raymond Aron opposed this aggregated concept of power and the underlying power–money analogy. The different degrees of the fungibility of money and power resources make this impossible. The term *fungibility* refers to the idea of a moveable good for which another good in the same class can be freely substituted. Fungible goods are universally applicable or convertible, in contrast to those that retain value only in a specific context. Whereas fungibility seems a plausible assumption in monetarized economies, it is not so in world politics; even apparently ultimate power resources such as weapons of mass destruction may not be of great help in getting another state to change its monetary policies.

Aron recognized that economic theory can be used to model behavior on the basis of a variety of conflicting preferences. But for him, with the advent of money as a general standard of value within which these competing preferences can be situated on the same scale, compared, and traded-off, economists were able to reduce the variety of preferences to one utility function. Because power

in world politics lacks a real-world fungibility, it cannot play a corresponding role as a standard of value. Therefore, power cannot be the currency of world politics, and national security in terms of power is not equivalent to a utility function.

In response, realists insisted that diplomats had repeatedly been able to find a measure of power, and hence, the difference is just one of degree, not of kind. Yet even if actors can agree on some approximations for carrying out exchanges or establishing power rankings, this is a social convention that by definition can be challenged and exists only to the extent that it is agreed on. Power resources do not come with a standardized price tag.

With the link between resources and outcomes forgone, the realist chain of causes for understanding the international structure is broken, for a single international power structure relies either on the assumption of a single dominant issue area or on a high fungibility of power resources—neither of which are realistic.

Neo-Institutionalism: Redefining the Link Between Resources and Outcomes

When the United States lost the war in Vietnam, some scholars tried to explain this power paradox away by identifying the lack of “will” on the part of the United States to use its resources—that is, so-called conversion failures. According to such an explanation, the war did not indicate the relative weakness of the United States (in spite of its military capabilities) but simply its inability to use its strength. Obviously, such an explanation can reinterpret any outcome *ex post* to suit any power distribution. Often, the trouble with this type of power analysis is not that it is wrong but that it cannot go wrong. Neo-institutionalist analysis offers two responses.

One conceptual way out consisted in accepting the apparent lesson of the Vietnam War. Consequently, control over resources, even issue area-specific ones, does not necessarily translate into control over outcomes. Power no longer functions as a determining cause. In Robert Keohane’s analysis, for instance, determinacy in the explanation shifts from interests defined in terms of the distribution of power to rational choice made on the basis of given interests defined in terms of power, expectations, values, and conventions. Hence, only

predictions of a very limited kind are possible, with a secondary role for power.

Another solution to the paradox of unrealized power has been proposed by David Baldwin, who has taken the issue of power fungibility most seriously. His approach keeps a strong causal role for power by further specifying the relational and situational context that defines which policy instruments can count as actual power resources in the first place. Baldwin’s conception is shaped by his relational understanding of power. If power is about the capacity to get someone else to do what he or she would not have otherwise done, then threatening a suicide candidate with a gun implies that the person holding the gun has no power. In other words, power resources have no intrinsic value or effect but depend on the actual value systems of human beings in their relations with each other.

Hence, the major difference from utilitarian action theories is that personal value systems cannot be simply assumed in the empirical power analysis. Instead, the researcher has first to analyze the value systems of the interacting parties in order to establish whether there are any power resources in the first place. For this reason, Baldwin insists that one can only study power if understood as a causal variable in well-circumscribed policy contingency frameworks. Any assessment of power independent of such situational factors is erroneous, and any generalization beyond such cases is contingent and has to be established separately.

The price for this, however, is that power analysis must potentially be very narrowly confined to particular instances, where no prediction is possible. Whereas Keohane’s institutionalist move retained, in a limited way, the predictive capacity of a theory based on rational choice and not on power, Baldwin’s move saves a central causal role for power at the price of predictability in IR/IPE (international political economy). Keohane’s solution points to the direction of a rationalist neo-institutionalism and Baldwin’s to a less generalizable, contingent, and situational solution to historical institutionalism.

Structural Power in the Global Political Economy

With the link between resources and control weakened, the micro–macro link between control over

outcomes and international rule might not be worthwhile studying at all. Yet this is where international political economy (and constructivism and poststructuralism; see below) have made their most important contributions to the analyses of power. In fact, concepts of structural power redefine the context within which strategic interaction takes place, the resources considered important for assessing capabilities in the first place, and the outcomes that should be included in power analysis. Their common claim is that the *sole* reference to the first link, as made by neo-institutionalists, is insufficient, if not biased, for understanding rule in the international system. It is the second link, between outcomes and rule, that becomes the starting point in analyses of power.

A first version of structural power might be called *indirect institutional power*. This refers to the conscious manipulation of the institutional setting within which bargaining relations take place. Many important issues are decided before they reach the bargaining stage—indeed, often because they never reach it. For understanding the distribution of power, it is as important to see who prevails in decision making as it is to analyze which “nondecisions” were made. Despite occasional claims to the contrary, this version is perfectly compatible with neo-institutionalist approaches.

Structural power has also been conceptualized as *nonintentional power*. Susan Strange’s concept of structural power stresses both the diffusion of the origins of power (and the variety of power resources) and the diffusion of its effects. Here, there is no reason to exclude from power analysis all those crucial effects that might not have been intended. As an old Chinese saying has it, it makes little difference to the trampled grass beneath whether the elephants above it are making love or war. This analytical shift from intentions to effects diminishes the importance of the neo-institutionalist approach for understanding power based on resources, interests, and rationality. It focuses on the systematic and structural aspects of power, not on the chosen ones.

Third and finally, structural power can also be understood as *systematic bias* or *impersonal power*. This refers to an impersonal “mobilization of bias” whereby social structures systematically favor certain agents. Such an understanding of power is common currency in both Marxist and

non-Marxist writing on dependency, as well as in neo-Gramscian approaches; it also applies to constructivist and poststructuralist approaches that emphasize nonmaterialist structural biases (see below). Such a conceptualization has been criticized for deducing power from rewards, the so-called benefit fallacy of power. We usually do not consider a free rider powerful because the free rider typically has no control over the systematic arrangement that makes free riding possible. But the benefit fallacy exists only within a causal framework. To say that a system systematically benefits certain people does not mean that they have created that benefit or that they control it. It simply means that to understand power in a social system, we need to take into account the links between rules and outcomes that systematically benefit some actor.

Structural power analysis in international political economy tries to overcome the difficulty of conceiving power along the resource–outcome–rule line by starting from the other end. These approaches run into two types of problem, however. First, they tend to overplay the causal strength of their analysis. Moving backward from rule to outcomes faces similar problems to moving from resources to outcomes. “The United States won because of its structural power” faces the same translation or conversion questions as classical resource-based analysis. It often appears to offer an answer when in reality it begs the question. The second risk is related to this. IPE approaches tend to understate the nonmaterialist aspects of rule or governance, particularly values and beliefs, and, indeed, the extent to which structures affect events only through the meaning given to them.

Rule in World Politics: The Social Construction of Legitimacy and Order

Still staying with IR’s emphasis on the explanatory domain of power analysis, constructivism redefines power at the systemic and agent levels in IR. Its systemic analysis of power often looks at the origins of consent in terms of practices of tacit legitimacy. It is therefore close to power concepts of the family of “authority.” But rather than looking at formal or institutional authority, constructivism is interested in the intersubjective *practices* of

power—not in the position of authority, therefore, but rather in what “authorizes,” “legitimizes,” or “empowers” it. Moreover, it is not necessarily looking at intentional or agent power but at the impersonal effects of discourses and/or habits for the production and reproduction of order, particularly in cases where practices go without saying, appear natural, and are therefore, perhaps, the most effective power relations there are.

At the actor level, such a view implies an emphasis on the process of interest formation as a primary locus for power relations. For constructivists, interests cannot be understood outside their intersubjective contexts in terms of shared constitutive norms, of shared knowledge and understandings, and also through the effects that practices have on self-understandings or identity. For constructivists, what we want follows from who we are (or want to be).

One larger power research agenda therefore concerns the background knowledge or constitutive “rules of the game” that mobilize certain biases and define the competent players and their effective moves. Naturalized understandings evoke certain actions and empower certain agents. Understanding an event as analogous to “Munich” mobilizes a collective memory that authorizes some actions and undermines the legitimacy of others. Whether or not the end of the Cold War has ushered in a “clash of civilizations,” such an understanding mobilizes and is empowered by pre-existing Cold War scripts in which totalitarianism has been replaced by fundamentalism in security discourse. It gives it the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Just when the security sector started to be demilitarized, the increased use of private military companies such as Executive Outcomes gave them “epistemic power” because their practices shape the understanding of security and the self-understanding of its actors. These practices have the effect of authorizing an increasingly technical and military understanding of the field while being, in turn, authorized through them.

With regard to their focus on identity, constructivist scholars have looked not only at the impersonal effect of discourses and/or practices on self-understandings but also on the “power politics of identity.” If identity is crucial for interest formation, then it is only a small step to analyzing

how diplomatic practices, sometimes intended, can be used for blackmailing actors by profiting from the contradictions in the actor’s self-representations.

As a result, some constructivist research agendas converge with Foucauldian approaches in their understandings of order as diffused practices of rule rather than as clear and/or formal hierarchies. Such convergences can be seen, for instance, in the analysis of how international standards, which are often established by private actors, are practices of rule once they become accepted convention and interact with the actors and issues they were supposedly only neutrally measuring (e.g., credit rating).

But at the same time, such analyses link power in explanatory theory back to political theory or, particularly in the post-Foucauldian vein, actually put the latter first. The understanding of power is not primarily about cause and effect, or influence and outcomes. Instead, it embeds power in a historical analysis of the changing nature of the modern and liberal order, which, so the thesis goes, increasingly works by making the subjects of order active subjects of their own ordering. Ole Jakob Sending and Iver Neumann, for instance, analyze the role of nonstate actors in this vein, understanding them not so much as civil society in opposition to the political power of states but as part and parcel of a decentralized and self-disciplining logic of a global order (i.e., governmentality).

The Politics of Power Analysis

Even if careful scholarly discussion can discard some conceptualizations of power, there is no one root concept that we can unravel simply by digging deeper, neither in the domain of political theory nor in explanatory theory. Power concepts derive their meanings from the theories in which they are embedded, and there they meet the metatheoretical or normative divides that plague and enrich our theorizing. At the same time, the debate has come full circle. Initially, realist writings combined the domains of political theory, centered on the understanding of order in the polity, with the domain of explanatory theory by assuming that in the absence of a genuine world polity the analysis of capabilities and influence was all there could be. By attacking the double link between agent influence and the balance of power, later studies redefined a more or less causal role for power, be it at the

agent or the structural level. Hence, they stressed the explanatory domain of power at the expense of the political theory of power. But this can work only so far, since the two domains intrude into each other; structural power is necessary to understand not only outcomes but also autonomy in a polity; inversely, the analysis of the changing nature of global governance and order provides the background against which the very processes of power can be understood in the first place. So, to close the circle with the poststructuralist and constructivist turn, the analysis of power returns again to show the links between the two domains. But contrary to early realism, it does so by assuming the existence of a genuine world polity within which power has to be understood. Yet so far it cannot pretend to have a theory of power capable of combining the two domains.

Finally, power analysis is not only tied to the understanding of politics; it is itself political. The reason is that concepts such as power have a special status in our political discourse. They are used for a variety of purposes. For power, two are particularly important. Power is used in practical contexts in which we are interested in what we can do to others and what others can do to us. It is also important in moral and legal contexts where it functions as an indicator of effective responsibility: If actors could not have done an act (if they did not have the capacity to do so), they cannot be found guilty of it. The first indicates the realm of action: Power becomes an indicator of politics as the “art of the possible.” The second assesses possible blame. Since power is often conceived of as a counterfactual—that is, about things that could have been otherwise—invoking power is to call for a justification of why things were done the way they were. As a result, choosing concepts of power that are relatively narrow diminishes the realm where “something can be done” and in which action needs to be justified; unintended effects, for instance, are handled as regretful but unavoidable collateral damage. Inversely, wider concepts of power suggest realms for action even where there may be none. The fundamental point for such a *performative* analysis of power—not what it means but what it does—is that invoking the presence of power *politicizes* issues.

This also explains a curious paradox. Scholars and practitioners often engage in debates about where power “really” lies, for example, whether it

is hard or soft. By doing this, they must appeal to an underlying idea that we can know this in a somewhat objective manner. If power were measurable, however, such debates would be quite pointless. Precisely because power is not as fungible as money and its understanding is to some extent conventional, observers try to shape the common understanding and fix the meaning of what power is and where the power really lies: For such understandings have authoritative effects on national security and foreign policy doctrines when used to define the national interest, as well as on actual political rank and standing when an actor’s main potential power resource comes to be considered insignificant.

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See also Balance of Power; Bargaining; Behaviorism; Bipolarity and Multipolarity; Causality; Common Goods; Concept Formation; Constructivism; Constructivism in International Relations; Institutions and Institutionalism; Interdependence; International Political Economy; Legitimacy; Measurement; Power; Realism in International Relations

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PREDICTION AND FORECASTING

Political forecasting and prediction refers to any effort to anticipate events that will occur at a future point in time, usually with the intention of determining actions that will either exploit or mitigate the effects of those events. Forecasting is implicit in almost all political decision making, but the techniques vary widely in their level of explicitness, ranging from simple intuition to detailed historical analogies to elaborate statistical models. This entry discusses the sources of regularity in political behavior; conditional and unconditional forecasts; the concepts of forecast horizons, windows, and specificity; modes of traditional (nontechnical) forecasting; and simulation and statistical approaches to technical forecasting.

Evidence for the importance of forecasting to political elites can be found in some of the earliest available records of organized human behavior, such the biblical story of Joseph interpreting the dreams of an Egyptian Pharaoh found in Genesis 41. A wide variety of divination methods—for example, augury, astrology, dream interpretation, and consultation with oracles—were nearly universal across cultures in premodern times, and practitioners in these fields often enjoyed high official status. These supernatural techniques were gradually supplemented with the use of historical analogies and collections of aphorisms or “wisdom literature,” but prediction techniques remained nontechnical until relatively recently.

The prospect of systematic forecasting of political behavior became attractive following the

development of highly accurate forecasting models of physical phenomena, particularly the example of Isaac Newton’s laws of motion in the 17th century, and the next 2 centuries saw the production of a number of works on “laws” of political and economic behavior that were effectively forecasting models. However, the systematic development of reasonably accurate numerical forecasts did not occur until the development of modern statistics in the early 20th century. With the increase in communication and computing power, accurate technical forecasts in some domains, most conspicuously election outcomes, were common by the late 20th century, and the methods are now being extended to other types of behavior, notably forecasts of political instability.

Forecasting in Political Decision Making

Forecasting is ubiquitous in political decision making for the simple reason that to decide between multiple courses of action, a decision maker must have some sense of the likely outcome of each option. These outcomes are rarely deterministic—that is, entirely determined at the time the choice is made—and predictions are further complicated by the fact that many political decisions occur in a context where actors are working to achieve opposing objectives (a topic explored in detail in game theory). Political forecasting may be dispersed throughout an organization, with every agent responsible for assessing the likely consequences of policy choices, or there may be specialists in forecasting, for example, intelligence agencies projecting the future behavior of other states or the emerging commercial field of political risk analysis, which assesses the possible economic impacts of political changes (e.g., whether a country will default on a loan).

Because humans exhibit free will and are capable of a wide range of behaviors, human behavior (political or otherwise) will always remain less predictable than the behavior of a closed physical system such as an object travelling through the vacuum of space, which can be predicted to a high level of accuracy decades in advance. However, political behavior tends to be constrained in ways that makes it considerably more predictable than, for example, deciding what a randomly chosen household will be having for dinner.

Three factors are particularly important in establishing predictability. First, most political activity is strongly constrained by material circumstances. For example, an unemployed plumber deciding to run for mayor has a considerably different set of options than does a billionaire running a third mayoral campaign. Second, political forecasts frequently deal with mass behaviors, and these have a substantially lower probability of changing rapidly than does the behavior of a single individual: If a candidate is leading by 20% in the polls, the probability of a set of individual decisions (or polling errors) that would cause a loss is considerably less than if they are leading by 0.5%. Likewise, the likelihood that a critical mass of individuals will decide to rise in rebellion against a democratically elected government with a stable economy is considerably less than the probability of rebellion against an aging ruler in the midst of an economic crisis. Finally, many political institutions that are stable over long periods of time—notably bureaucracies and legal systems—are explicitly designed to produce predictable behavior: A set of given inputs to the organization is expected to produce a consistent outcome.

Unconditional and Conditional Forecasts

Forecasts can be divided into “unconditional” and “conditional” forecasts. An unconditional forecast is one that assumes nothing important in the information used to make the forecast will change. The nature of that information may or may not be explicitly specified in nontechnical forecasts; it is usually explicit in the variables and equations found in technical forecasts. A conditional forecast, in contrast, assumes that certain things will change: The most common use of conditional forecasts is for what-if analyses of the possible changes projected to occur if a specific policy is adopted. For example, a model might attempt to predict the change in unemployment in a city if the city does or does not receive funding for a job training program.

The accuracy of conditional forecasts is closely linked to the issue of causality. The high degree of accuracy of Newton’s laws of motion is due to the fact that within a known set of boundary conditions (e.g., Newton’s equations break down for an object travelling near the speed of light), they completely specify behavior. In contrast, forecasts of

political behavior usually have a much higher level of uncertainty than that found in *simple* physical systems, though not necessarily less than the uncertainty of *complex* physical systems; for example, many political forecasts are considerably more accurate than weather predictions at comparable time horizons.

Three key factors affect this accuracy. The first is the well-known observation that correlation does not imply causation: The fact that two variables covary does not mean that one necessarily causes the other. If both are caused by a third variable, the correlation may be very useful for prediction—that is, the existence of the correlation supplies information that increases forecast accuracy—but unless there is a true causal linkage, changing one of the variables will not change the other. For example, for a number of years the linkage between cigarette smoking and lung cancer was dismissed as simply correlation; both were assumed to be linked to other lifestyle issues (e.g., individuals working in polluted industrial environments were more likely to be smokers), and only after extensive research isolated smoking as a near-certain causal factor were changes made in public policy.

A second issue is the degree to which the projected change is within the range of prior experience with the system. A forecast for the effects of increasing the funding of a job training program in a city that has previously had a series of such programs at a variety of levels of funding is more likely to be accurate than the forecast for a city where no job training programs had ever been tried.

A third source of error is the possibility that the human object of the prediction will change its behavior to either reinforce or negate the prediction, a possibility not occurring in physical systems. Such situations are generally known as “self-fulfilling” and “self-negating” predictions. Consider the case where an intelligence agency makes a widely publicized prediction that the government in a country is likely to fail. If, as a consequence, allies of the government withhold aid and rebel groups inside the country are emboldened and increase their activity, the government may fail in part because of the prediction itself: a self-fulfilling prediction. This makes the prediction conditionally accurate, but not unconditionally accurate, since in the absence of the prediction

itself, the government might have survived. Conversely, in response to the prediction, the threatened government might change its policies and, as a consequence, not fail: a self-negating prediction. In this case, the prediction appears incorrect, even though unconditionally it may have been correct.

The possibility of predictions influencing outcomes is particularly critical in election forecasting, where predictions can have the effect of suppressing or increasing turnout, increasing the amount of campaign contributions to the projected winner, or decreasing the vote for candidates who are likely to lose. As a consequence, many democracies prohibit the publication of polling results during some period prior to an election or on polling day. Similarly, intelligence projections of possible instability in other states, particularly allies, are often considered politically sensitive and thus classified.

Forecast Horizons, Windows, and Specificity

All forecasts—either implicitly or explicitly—have three characteristics: a horizon (how far ahead in time the forecast is being made), a window (the period of time for when the forecasted event will occur), and specificity (the extent to which an exact prediction is made). In general, the accuracy of forecasts will decline with longer forecast horizons because insufficient information is available on the effects of current variables on the future, and unanticipated events may occur to substantially change the projected outcome. For example, the accuracy (and specificity) of an election forecast typically will be lower 6 months prior to the election than the day before the election, and even a short-term forecast could become irrelevant if the projected winner dies before the election. Many statistical forecasting models provide explicit estimates of this uncertainty.

For some forecasting problems—notably elections—the time horizon is simply determined by the known date of a future event. In some other domains—for example, policies affecting long-term public health or the environment—the horizon may be on the order of decades. However, the typical policy-relevant time horizon is on the order of 6 months to 5 years: Shorter times are irrelevant because a policy will not have had time to be implemented and take effect, and longer times tend both to accumulate uncertainties and may be

beyond the professional interests of those concerned with the forecast (e.g., elected officials).

The forecast window is only relevant in situations where there is uncertainty as to when an event might occur. Predicting the term of office for a prime minister in a parliamentary system, predicting whether a government will be overthrown in a revolution, or predicting when a country will suffer a major currency crisis would be examples. In some cases, a change is inevitable—no prime minister is immortal—and in others, the projected event may never occur.

Finally, predictions differ widely in their specificity. The predictions of oracles and astrologers were notorious for their lack of specificity: The classical Greek historian Herodotus reports the Delphic Oracle advising the Lydian king Croesus that if he attacked the Persians, “a great empire will be destroyed.” On this advice, Croesus attacked, but the Persians destroyed *his* empire: The oracle showed good accuracy, but from the perspective of Croesus, the advice was less than optimal in terms of specificity.

Beyond this extreme, many nontechnical forecasts are relatively vague as to exactly what has been predicted, because of the informality of the techniques and the use of natural language in reporting the predictions. Technical forecasts, in contrast, are usually much more precise, with complete probability distributions across a range of possible outcomes, whether a numerical range such as forecasting the percentage of votes for a candidate or the range of probabilities across a fixed set of categorical outcomes, such as whether or not a government will remain in power. This precision does not necessarily translate into accuracy but at least allows competing technical forecasts to be unambiguously compared and, after the time of the forecast horizon, their accuracy to be calculated.

Nontechnical Forecasting

Nontechnical forecasting predominantly takes three forms: (1) intuition, (2) the use of rules of thumb or aphorisms, and (3) the use of narrative archetypes and historical analogies. Intuition is the use of subcognitive mental processing—the brain is engaged in a great deal of work, typically pattern recognition, but this occurs in a manner that the

thinker is not consciously aware of (much as an uneducated native speaker of a language will have perfectly mastered the complex grammar of the language but cannot systematically articulate its rules). A typical explanation for an intuitive forecast is “I have a feeling . . .” or “I know it when I see it.” While social pattern recognition in humans and other primates is highly developed and hence frequently accurate, the disadvantage of the intuitive forecast is that it is dependent on the skill and experience of the individual making the forecast, and only the forecast itself, not the process of determining the forecast, can be shared and evaluated. To the extent that they were successful in making unambiguous forecasts, oracles, astrologers, dream interpreters, and other premodern forecasters were probably good at intuitive methods.

Aphorisms and rules of thumb are a form of succinct and very general if-then models that link specific observable situations with outcomes and summarize frequently observed regularities; all cultures have a large number of these for dealing with common social situations. Unlike intuition, aphorisms are explicit, though the evidence backing them is usually not. The disadvantage of aphorisms is that multiple aphorisms frequently contradict each other—for example, the common English-language aphorisms “Birds of a feather flock together” and “Opposites attract”—and aphorisms are often vague in both their antecedents and their consequences.

Narrative archetypes and historical analogies are the most sophisticated of the nontechnical forecasting methods and are very commonly (if often implicitly) found in policy analysis and political rhetoric. In both approaches, a set of observed events and circumstances is matched to a set of events and circumstances in a series of idealized narratives or historical cases, and a prediction is made on the basis of the outcome that occurred in the best matching case. Historical analogies use situations that actually occurred in the past (perhaps with adjustments for technological and cultural changes); with an archetypal narrative, the comparison is with a hypothetical event that has the general characteristics of a large number of historical cases (e.g., “peasant revolt,” “populist electoral campaign”) or a counterfactual that seems plausible but has never actually occurred (“crisis leading to a nuclear missile exchange”).

Nontechnical forecasting is widespread and prior to the availability of statistical methodologies and computers was virtually the only form of forecasting used in political analysis. Systematic research has shown, however, that it is not particularly accurate: Many “experts” do barely better than chance on difficult forecasting problems, and the expert’s self-confidence and public reputation is sometimes negatively correlated with their accuracy. These failings have long been recognized, and a wide variety of methods have been suggested for improving the accuracy of nontechnical forecasts, particularly by gaining improved accuracy through aggregation of the forecasts of multiple experts. Among the better known of these are the Delphi method, devil’s advocate, brainstorming methods, and, recently, prediction markets.

Simulation

Simulation is a method of forecasting that bridges the nontechnical and technical approaches. In the earliest versions, pioneered by the war games of the Prussian military in the 18th and 19th centuries, individuals play the roles of various actors, constrained by an oftentimes elaborate set of rules. These “games” can be as simple as those played on a table or as elaborate as extended field exercises involving real persons and equipment. The method is still widely used, although now it usually combines training and experimentation with specific tactics rather than being used for strategic forecasting.

From the 1960s forward, computer simulations have been used: The two most common methods are (1) systems dynamics, where equations are specified for the aggregate behavior of key variables in the system, and (2) agent-based models, where equations or algorithms are specified for the behavior of simulated individual actors in the model, and the behavior of the system as a whole is derived by simulating a large number of these. Both forms of simulation usually involve multiple runs with different values for random variables so that a full probability distribution of the predicted outcomes can be obtained. The advantage of simulation is that systems of almost unlimited complexity can be specified and evaluated; the disadvantage is that determining the appropriate values of the parameters of the equations is very difficult, and in some

simulations those results are largely determined by a small set of key parameters.

An important type of sensitivity that affects dynamic simulations containing nonlinear interactions is the effect of chaos theory, where the predictions of a model can be highly sensitive to values of critical parameters and to the initial values of some variables. In such models, some combinations of parameter values and initial conditions can differ by arbitrarily small numerical amounts—differences far more precise than could ever be estimated from actual data—and yet produce widely divergent outcomes. Even chaotic systems, however, may provide some level of predictability—these usually exhibit multiple “basins of attraction” where the system is likely to find a long-term equilibrium—and systems that are chaotic for some parameter values can be well behaved and predictable for other values.

A comparable problem can be found in agent-based models when the simulated agents continually adapt their behaviors to the strategies of other actors, and consequently patterns of behavior found in one period of time may be completely different from those found in another because of the different strategies being used. This phenomenon has been observed empirically in stock market trading strategies and in military strategies—a new technique that is highly successful when first introduced will become less effective over time as other actors adapt to it. In evolutionary biology, this is known as the Red Queen hypothesis—named after the eponymous figure in Lewis Carroll’s fantasy *Through the Looking Glass*—whereby organisms continually have to adapt their strategies to maintain the same level of fitness vis-à-vis their competitors. Such systems may be predictable in the short term—some adaptations are more likely to be successful than others—but the nature of the regularity can change substantially at longer horizons.

Statistical Forecasting

By far the most common form of technical forecasting involves the use of statistical models. Models used in political forecasting were originally borrowed from basic mathematical statistics and then adopted from economics, and now increasing use is made of models originally developed for the prediction of medical outcomes, as

well as some models developed specifically for political and policy analysis. A wide variety of statistical methods are now in use, and many can be estimated using standard statistical packages, though some require specialized time-series analysis software. Among the more commonly used methods are

- autoregressive time series, which predict future values of a variable based on a linear combination of past values—common approaches include autoregressive moving average (ARMA) and autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models;
- autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models, which predict the future *variance* of an indicator rather than specific values—these are useful in predicting future uncertainty;
- event history or survival models, which predict the probability of a specific event as a function of time—variables are assessed on the degree to which they are risk factors that raise or lower these probabilities;
- vector autoregression (VAR), which predicts the response to specific numerical shocks to the system; and
- cross-sectional time series, which takes into account variation both across time and within groups of cases.

The advantage of statistical models is that they are completely transparent in their specifications, they are replicable, and they are grounded in a formal theory of statistics and probability. Statistical models also provide forecasts with a high level of detail—for example, probabilities of a specific numerical or categorical outcome at a specific point in time. The disadvantage is that they may require a great deal of data (which may vary in quality and availability) to be accurately estimated and they are completely dependent on the appropriate specification of both the mathematical form of the model and the variables used as input to the forecast.

Three other issues are relevant to statistical time-series models. First, the accuracy of a model on the data used to estimate the model—the in-sample accuracy—is usually higher than the accuracy on new data—the out-of-sample accuracy.

Furthermore, raising the in-sample accuracy to account for all of the idiosyncratic data points—fitting the error—will usually decrease out-of-sample accuracy. Consequently, the development of robust statistical models may require a great deal of experimentation, and determining the “best” model for forecasting the out-of-sample future requires elements of art as well as science.

Second, many political variables are strongly autoregressive—their values change little (or change very predictably) from time point to time point. This means that the models are very accurate, but departures from the autoregressive pattern—for example, a sudden swing in public opinion or unemployment—are difficult to predict. Such changes, however, are likely to be of greatest interest to analysts. Granger causality analysis, for example, looks at the effects of variables only after the autoregressive factors have been taken into consideration.

Finally, in some domains, particularly those involving major political or economic crises, the number of observations of the event of interest is very small—this is referred to as a rare-events estimation problem—and it is difficult for a statistical model to extract sufficient information to predict such occurrences. Because of the importance of rare events, this is an active research area and mathematical methods can be modified to at least partially adjust for this, but the problem is not fully solved.

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See also Causality; Election Research; Event History Analysis; Game Theory; Granger Causality; Policy Analysis; Political Risk Analysis; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian; Time-Series Analysis

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PREEMPTIVE WAR

The concept of preemptive war refers to a legitimate anticipatory war waged by a state in order to counter a threat emanating from an adversary. Like many other notions used as much by politicians as by scholars, preemptive war is an essentially contested concept, all the more so as it cannot easily be dissociated from the concept of preventive war.

The idea of a legitimate anticipatory war goes back to the founders of the modern just-war tradition in the 17th and 18th centuries. Writing about the lawfulness of wars, Hugo Grotius and Emer De Vattel claimed that natural law as well as the law of nations permitted states to repel force by force in order to defend themselves against danger. They acknowledged two types of danger: First, a state is in danger once it has been attacked, and in this case resorting to arms is legitimate for the sake of self-defense; second, a state is in danger when an attack against it is imminent, and in this case resorting to arms is legitimate to forestall the intended attack. The criteria put forward by Grotius and De Vattel introduced a breach in the then prevailing Hobbesian conception of international politics—considering any war to be justified per se and postulating that a danger, and an ensuing right to prevent such a danger, existed as soon as there was a real or a perceived increase of another state's power capacities. During the so-called Caroline incident opposing the United States

and the British empire at the Canadian border in 1837, the criteria put forward by Grotius and De Vattel were revisited by U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster; according to Webster, an anticipatory war could be considered to be legitimate on the condition that it was undertaken as a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no time for deliberation.

From that time on, it has been generally acknowledged that a distinction must be made between legitimate anticipatory wars, called preemptive wars, and illegitimate wars, called preventive wars. Although both relate to the same better-now-than-later logic and designate an anticipatory and winnable war waged by a state eager to forestall a threat at time t in order not to have to wage a riskier war under less favorable circumstances at times $t + 1, t + 2, \dots, t + n$, the material dissimilarity of the threat concerned induces a normative difference between them.

Concerning the material dimension, the first difference lies in the temporality of the threat countered by an anticipatory war; a preemptive war is undertaken to confront a threat perceived to be imminent, whereas a preventive war aims at forestalling a threat likely to become effective only after a certain period of time. In other words, a preemptive action is a tactical riposte to a short-term threat, while a preventive action is a strategic reply to a long-range threat, such as a future imbalance of forces. The second material difference, complementary to the first one, relates to the source of the threat. In a preemptive war, State A faces an irresistible threat: It attacks at the point in time t when an adversary, State B, is about to mobilize actual military capacities against A, whereas a preventive war launched by State A seeks at time t to impede State B from building up military capacities that might be mobilized against A at times $t + 1, t + 2, \dots, t + n$. In other words, a preemptive war aims at countering a real threat, whereas a preventive war strives to forestall a hypothetical threat.

A normative opposition ensues from these material differences. In the legalist paradigm underpinning the United Nations (UN) Charter, resort to war is permitted only under two narrow conditions. The first is the traditional—both individual and collective—self-defense principle according to which a country that is attacked has the right to defend itself in a defensive war in order to repel its

attacker and to secure its security and survival, either alone or with the help of other states joining in such a defensive war to guarantee the respect of the prevailing norms of appropriate international conduct. The second type of legitimate resort to arms refers to preemptive war, considered to be the only kind of legitimate anticipatory war precisely because it is a war launched in response to a threat that is at once overwhelming and so imminent as to allow no time for deliberation and no choice of means. Conversely then, resorting to preventive war is viewed as illegitimate, as was made clear by the diverging reactions in the world to Israel's air strikes against Iraq's Osirak nuclear plant in June 1981 and against Egyptian and Syrian military airports in June 1967. The 1967 attack was considered to be a legitimate preemptive strike, because the Israeli government knew with certainty that the Egyptian and Syrian military air forces were about to bomb Israel's territory: Tel Aviv could not afford to rely on diplomatic negotiations; the only option at its disposal was to destroy its enemies' bombers on the ground before they could take off. The situation was totally different on June 19, 1981, when the Security Council of the United Nations in its Resolution 487 condemned the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the norms of international conduct. Though Iraq was allegedly building a nuclear facility that might one day be used to produce nuclear weapons likely to threaten Israel's security, such a threat was neither imminent nor overwhelming at the time the Israeli government decided to launch its bombing campaign.

This consensus was broken on the occasion of the decision by the United States and some of its allies to go to war against Iraq in 2003. In September 2002, the National Security Strategy of the United States claimed that the United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to its national security; it also announced its intention to act preemptively in order to forestall hostile acts by its enemies. In March 2003, the United States undertook such an action, launching Operation Iraqi Freedom, which it justified as a preemptive war, given that the only course of action against terrorists was to defeat them abroad before they attacked America at home. The vast majority of scholars reacting to the military action against Saddam

Hussein's regime, however, refused to label Operation Iraqi Freedom as a preemptive war. In September 2002, Michael Walzer wrote that a possible war undertaken by the United States against Baghdad would be a preventive rather than a preemptive war. Commenting on the war in 2008, Michael Doyle asserted that the so-called Bush Doctrine of preemption actually was a doctrine of prevention.

In light of the values shared by the members of contemporary international society, there is little doubt, among the majority of scholars as well as international observers, that Operation Iraqi Freedom did not match the criteria of a preemptive war. On the one hand, the United States faced no instant or overwhelming threat emanating from Iraq, neither against itself nor against its regional allies. On the other hand, it could have chosen other means to cope with Iraq's revisionist behavior, such as a vigilant containment strategy. After all, inspections by agents of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were taking place on the Iraqi territory to find a pacific solution to the problem of the possible weapons of destruction possessed by Baghdad, and the pursuit of diplomatic negotiations within the legal UN framework was favored by many states, including the allies of the United States. The Bush administration, while eliding the differences between preemption and prevention, did not ignore the criteria defining a legitimate anticipatory war, all the more so as Jeane Kirkpatrick, its UN ambassador during the Osirak crisis, had voted for the resolution condemning Israel's air strike and as in 1986 the International Court of Justice had refused to consider that the United States had acted in collective self-defense of El Salvador when it had used force against Nicaragua, accused of providing weapons to Salvadoran rebels. Actually, the United States consciously proposed a new conception of preemption, based on the idea of the necessary adaptation of the concept of imminent threat to the objectives and capacities of unpredictable rogue states and terrorist networks likely to target civilian populations and to use weapons of mass destruction rather than to resort to those conventional means enumerated in the traditional preemption doctrine, that is, visible mobilizations of armies, navies, or air forces.

Beyond the Iraqi Freedom case, what is at stake today in the preemption versus prevention debate

is the potential emergence of new norms of state conduct. Such an evolution would not merely be tantamount to a departure from the prevailing just war tradition because of the weakening of moral restraints. It would also break with those *realpolitical* considerations that in the past led policymakers such as Otto von Bismarck to equate preventive war with suicide from fear of death and to reject it as a rational means of foreign policy given that it is impossible to know things beforehand. If indeed the Bush Doctrine were adopted universally, it would probably permit any state to resort to arms by invoking its own definition of imminent threats. International instability would be the logical result of a universal diffusion of Bush's unilateral way of foreign policy making.

This said, international norms are not laid down once and for all; their meaning is fixed by usage. While ultimately reflecting power distribution, they are what states, and actors shaping states' behavior, make of them. Many researchers believe that international adoption of a new doctrine of legitimate anticipatory war will require that such a doctrine be revisited and accepted within the United States.

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See also Collective Security; International Law; International Society; War and Peace

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PRESIDENTIALISM

Presidentialism is one of the three major organizational models for government institutions in contemporary representative democracies. This entry discusses its conceptualization, reviews its origins and diffusion, summarizes its different varieties, provides an outline of the debates about its advantages and disadvantages, and evaluates its current relationship with democracy.

Definition

Presidentialism can be defined by the simultaneous presence of three characteristics. The first is the existence of two agents of the electorate: a chief of government—known as president—and a legislative assembly—usually known as congress—both of which are elected separately and by popular vote. The second characteristic is that both the president and members of congress are elected for preestablished fixed terms, which means that each agent's survival does not depend on the other's confidence. The president cannot be removed by a legislative vote of no confidence on political grounds. While the president can be removed through impeachment proceedings, impeachment is intended as an exceptional response to illegal or improper presidential behavior, and it requires the support of a qualified congressional majority. Likewise, the president cannot dissolve the legislative assembly and call for parliamentary elections at his or her discretion.

The third characteristic of presidentialism is the blending of the roles of head of government and chief of state in the same institution, the presidency. As the head of government, the president has authority over the overall direction of government, appoints cabinet ministers and the upper echelons of public bureaucracy, may influence the legislative process through the introduction of bills, and has veto and decree powers. As head of state, the president is also the symbolic representation of the state, signs international treaties, commands the armed forces, and has the authority to grant pardons.

Under parliamentarism and semipresidentialism, the chief of government is not directly elected and does not serve a fixed term. Rather, the chief

of government is chosen by a legislative majority and remains in power subject to maintaining the confidence of such a majority. In addition, in these two systems the government can dissolve (or ask to dissolve) the parliament and call for legislative elections before the legislative term ends. The combination of these mechanisms functionally provides that the party or coalition that enjoys a parliamentary majority is also the one in charge of government. In contrast, under presidentialism, situations of “divided government” can exist, in which the party (or coalition) of the chief of government—the president—does not enjoy a majority in congress. Under divided government, cooperation between the executive and the legislative majority is crucial to avoid deadlock and stalemate.

In addition, both parliamentarism and semipresidentialism are dual-executive systems. Under both arrangements, the prerogatives of the executive are divided between a chief of government (usually called a prime minister) and a chief of state (a monarch or a president with limited and/or symbolic powers under parliamentarism and a president with extensive powers under semipresidentialism).

Origins and Diffusion of Presidentialism

Presidentialism's origins can be traced to the constitutional convention that took place in Philadelphia and produced the U.S. Constitution of 1787. The main theoretical underpinnings, motives, and aspirations of the constitution were expressed by the writings of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, published as *The Federalist Papers*.

The most important elements of this institutional design were novel at the time: a written constitution that aimed at defining and limiting political authority, a government based on popular sovereignty, a chief of state named “president” instead of a hereditary king, and a system of checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches designed to guarantee order and security and avoid tyranny.

The inspiration that grew from the origins and characteristics of the U.S. Constitution legitimized later ruptures with other premodern monarchical regimes that came soon after the American struggle for independence. Indeed, the presidential model

expanded widely throughout Latin America with the end of Spanish rule, the advent of wars of independence (1808–1824), and the process of state formation that followed. Outside the Americas, presidentialism never found the same conditions to expand and thrive. In fact, Latin American is really the continent of presidentialism today; there are only a handful of non-American countries employing the system, including Benin and Nigeria in Africa and the Philippines and South Korea in Asia.

Types of Presidentialism

The term *presidentialism* does not necessarily imply that the executive is always and in all cases the most powerful of the branches of government. Researchers have identified different types of parliamentary governments depending on the primacy of the government or the parliament (i.e., cabinet government, *Kanzlerdemokratie* [chancellor democracy], or assembly government). A similar distinction can be made between at least two types of presidential systems: those based on “equilibrium among branches” and those based on “executive dominance.” Three variables differentiate these categories: (1) the powers of the president vis-à-vis congress, (2) the role of the Supreme Court as an arbiter of executive–legislative conflict, and (3) how parties and the party system are structured. The United States is the paradigmatic example of presidentialism based on “equilibrium among branches,” while most of the other cases fall into the “executive dominance” category.

The U.S. president faces a powerful legislative branch with significant legislative and oversight prerogatives and complete autonomy with respect to its agenda and its session calendar. On the other hand, the majority of the remaining presidential constitutions establish a more powerful president and a weaker legislature than exists in the United States. In contrast to the U.S. president, Latin American presidents not only enjoy reactive powers (such as veto power) but also proactive and agenda-setting powers. Among the latter are the following: (a) power to legislate through emergency decree powers, (b) exclusive right of legislative initiative in some areas (such as the budget or the organization of public administration), (c) ample powers over the budgetary process, (d) authority to initiate a referendum on general topics or specific laws,

(e) authority to convene congress for special sessions, and (f) authority to ask congress to prioritize executive initiatives. Notwithstanding these powers, Latin American legislatures are not mere rubber stamps. They do exercise their legislative and oversight powers but to a lesser extent than their U.S. counterpart.

In addition, the Supreme Court historically has played a crucial role in the working of U.S. presidentialism, acting as arbiter in conflicts between the executive and the legislature. The combination of the Court’s recognition as an arbiter of interbranch conflict and its significant institutional prestige has resulted in the Court operating as a third branch of government. This is distinct from other presidential countries where Supreme Courts have often been unable to adequately exercise their role as arbiter due to undue influence from the executive.

Historically, in executive-dominant presidential systems, the usual way of limiting presidents’ power has been through the adoption of non-reelection clauses (either lifelong or nonimmediate). These measures produce presidents with ample ruling powers but without the ability to extend their terms of office. In spite of term limits, a number of Latin American presidents have attempted to remove these clauses, provoking an increase of executive–legislative conflict, a weakening of the mechanisms of horizontal accountability and oversight, and, more generally, increased levels of political instability.

The nature and structure of parties and party systems also differentiate the types of presidentialism in functional terms. Two-party systems with low internal party discipline such as that of the United States not only provide the president a wider margin to rule under divided government conditions but have also contributed to limiting the power of presidents who enjoy a majority in congress. In any case, while the existence of a two-party system with weak parties might allow presidents to more successfully push their agendas, it also obliges presidents to pay careful attention to congressional autonomy, power, and will.

On the other hand, presidential forms of government that coexist with multiparty systems or two-party systems with disciplined parties, as is the case in much of Latin America, have produced both cases of executive dominance and cases of compromise between executive and congress.

Clear examples of dominance situations include those cases in which presidents, supported by a disciplined legislative majority, take full advantage of the situation and push their own agendas without seeking agreements with opposition parties. Presidents who lack congressional majorities may also decide to use (and abuse) their proactive powers and rule alone, circumventing congress. Alternatively, presidents facing a minority situation can build coalitions to avoid deadlock and stalemate, offering cabinet positions to parties with legislative representation in exchange for legislative support for executive initiatives. This is an example of consensual interbranch relations.

Criticisms and Debate

During the 1980s, a large number of countries (first in Latin American and then in Eastern European) moved toward democracy, requiring them to restore, modify, or even create constitutions and rules for political competition. This context provided an opportunity to discuss different government designs, to compare the advantages and disadvantages of presidentialism and parliamentarism, and to revise and eventually modify how political institutions were organized. The political scientist Juan Linz occupied a prominent position in this debate as he took the lead in a fierce scholarly criticism of presidentialism, basing his criticism on the numerous presidential democracies in Latin America that underwent institutional crises and eventually broke down during the 1960s and 1970s. In short, critics argued that presidentialism was less efficient than parliamentarism in guaranteeing political stability and democratic governability. They identified four perils or problems inherent in the logic of presidential design.

First, the dual legitimacy created by presidentialism is prone to deadlock and stalemate. Under presidentialism, both the agents of the popular vote (the president and the legislature) have a legitimate claim to power and popular support without an official procedure to solve conflicts between the two. Situations of divided government constitute a serious difficulty as opposition parties in congress have few incentives to cooperate if credit for success is not attributed to them, while at the same time they will likely bear the cost of failure. Presidents may even encounter problems in

marshaling support from their own parties, as legislators of the president's party can resist or reject bills from the executive, risking neither their positions nor the dissolution of congress. This problem does not exist under parliamentarism, where governments can maintain themselves in office only if they enjoy legislative support.

A second problem with presidentialism is, according to its critics, the rigidity implied in fixed terms. Fixed terms make institutional responses to critical situations much more difficult. The possibilities for replacing an unpopular or moribund president (e.g., resignation, impeachment) are complicated, and the mere intention of applying them might result in further complications and a deepening of the crisis. On the contrary, under parliamentary arrangements, the replacement of government and the call for anticipated elections are normal institutionalized political solutions that are always available and easy to use in times of crisis.

The third shortcoming of presidentialism is the majoritarian and zero-sum character of presidential elections: Elections with only one winner generate strong political tensions. What makes the zero-sum nature of presidentialism even more serious is that under certain electoral rules, a candidate with little popular support or one who is strongly deviant from the median voter can win, potentially generating crises of legitimacy and situations of conflict, polarization, and/or crisis. Critics of presidentialism invoke as the quintessential example the Chilean elections of 1970: The leftist candidate Salvador Allende won the presidency with only 36.2% of votes against the center-right candidate Jorge Alessandri with 34.9% and the Christian Democrat candidate Radomiro Tomic with 27.8%. Despite this close margin of victory, and facing a hostile congress, Allende began to carry out radical policies. In a context of increasing political polarization, the government of President Allende was overthrown by the military in a coup d'état on September 11, 1973.

The last shortcoming that critics note is the dual character of the presidential office, generated by the system's fusion of the roles of head of state and head of government. The symbolic and/or ceremonial duties of the chief of state often collide with the tasks of a head of government. To its critics, the symbolic functions of a chief of state are less legitimate when carried out by an individual who

is the leader of a party and therefore involved in partisan power struggles.

The contributions of Linz and other critics of presidentialism sparked a revival in interest in governmental institutions and their effect on stability and democratic performance as well as several responses that challenged Linz's argument. For example, scholars like Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, while admitting some difficulties associated with presidential systems, presented counterarguments noting some of the advantages of presidentialism over parliamentarism.

First, according to these scholars, presidentialism offers more electoral options to voters, who can cast votes for both the legislature and the executive and can decide to split their vote, a possibility parliamentarism precludes.

Second, presidentialism offers citizens more opportunities to exercise accountability and express their preferences in public policy neatly. Under presidentialism, citizens can choose between at least two clearly different alternatives (the incumbent and the opposition) for president and a number of alternatives from among which they can select the candidate closest to their preferences for congress. In contrast, in Westminster-type parliamentarisms, government and opposition are clearly defined and it is possible for voters to determine governmental responsibility for policies, but there is no room for minority representation. Under multiparty parliamentarism, the exact opposite takes place: Citizens do not know in advance how their vote will reflect on the final composition of government. In these cases, changes in the partisan composition of the ruling coalition can take place even between elections, and parties originally in the opposition might be invited to join the government.

The third argument in favor of presidentialism is that it better facilitates legislative control over lawmaking and oversight of the executive. As the survival of government is not at stake, members of congress enjoy wider margins of maneuver to adequately analyze bills and look for broader support for an initiative, ultimately having a greater effect on legislation.

Fourth, presidential fixed terms generate higher democratic stability in countries with governability problems due to weak parties or highly fragmented or polarized party systems, where it would be difficult to form coalitions in a parliamentary context.

Finally, some scholars argue for caveats to the notion of the zero-sum nature of presidentialism. The existence of two agents of the electorate results in the possibility of more than two winners. A party that does not win the presidency but obtains a considerable number of seats in the assembly can limit the executive and block its initiatives, especially if the president possesses only reactive legislative powers (or limited proactive and agenda-setting powers). In contrast, Westminster-style parliamentarisms are good examples of one party taking a dominant position in both branches of government and exercising power with few limitations.

Presidential Democracies Today

For many years, the combination of presidentialism and democracy only succeeded in the United States. In no other place did presidentialism coexist with a stable democratic regime. For example, at the beginning of the 1980s, only three Latin American countries were ruled by presidents elected in competitive elections: Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. The remaining countries were ruled by different varieties of nondemocratic regimes, including hegemonic party systems (Mexico) or military dictatorships (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay).

In 2010, however, presidential democracies prevailed across the Americas. Many of them have suffered periods of political crisis and instability, but all of them have shown unanticipated resilience in recent years. There have been major setbacks, such as the *autogolpes* (self-inflicted coups by ruling presidents to close the congress) by the Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori in 1992 and by the Guatemalan president Jorge Serrano in 1993. In other cases, presidential democracies survived thorny circumstances including presidential impeachments, as was the case in Brazil (1992) and Venezuela (1993), or presidential resignations amid usually violent social protest and uprisings, as in the case of the Paraguayan president Raúl Cubas Grau in March 1999, the Ecuadorian Jamil Mahuad in February 2000, the Argentinean Fernando de la Rúa in December 2001, and the Bolivian Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in October 2003.

In spite of scholarly suggestions and initiatives by some politicians to modify presidential arrangements, all the constitutional conventions convened throughout Latin America since the late 1980s

have maintained or strengthened presidentialism's basic logic and tenets. As a consequence, today the combination of presidentialism and democracy is not an oddity but a common feature of the political systems of a large number of countries.

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See also Constitutionalism; Government; Parliamentary Systems; Semipresidentialism; Separation of Powers

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PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY

Principal-agent theory (PAT) was developed in the field of economics in the 1970s to understand the prevailing problems that appear every time Person A (the “principal”) asks Person B (the

“agent”) to do something on his or her behalf for a given price. The basic assumption of PAT is the existence of a double asymmetry between the principal and the agent, since they have different preferences (e.g., the customer/principal wants healthy teeth, while the dentist/agent wants to receive good pay) as well as different levels of information (e.g., the customer/principal can observe the outcome but not the costs of the action that the dentist/agent takes). The solution to this double asymmetry is an outcome-based contract in which it is stated that the agent receives a bonus in case a certain outcome is reached. PAT explores how these contracts should be designed according to the variations in the informational asymmetries between principals and agents in different settings.

Similar to many other economic tools, PAT has been incorporated into political science with the general aim of creating more parsimonious models. Ironically, PAT has only marginally been used for understanding one of the most important principal-agent relationship in politics—the one between citizens, or constituencies (as principals), and elected politicians (as agents). The reason is that the nature of this relationship differs too much from the basic premises of PAT, in which the principal holds a dominant position and is endowed with all the bargaining power. As a consequence, the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent, which becomes the main object of study for the standard PAT. On the contrary, in the central political delegation chain, the citizen/principal has a subordinate role vis-à-vis a politician/agent, who can single-handedly write or, at least, substantially modify the terms of the “contract” between them. In simple words, governments are the only agents in the world that tell their principals what to do.

PAT has nevertheless been applied extensively for understanding the second delegation chain in a polity—that of politicians as principals and bureaucrats as agents. The main reason is that bureaucracy is one of the fields in political science that has resisted more theoretical progress, and PAT offers a useful tool to develop highly analytical models with clear testable propositions. In addition, PAT seems particularly well suited to address one of the most long-lasting puzzles in bureaucratic politics: the so-called Weberian asymmetry. As Max Weber indicated, a profound problem of

democratic polities is that “political masters” find themselves in the position of dilettantes who stand opposite of expert bureaucrats. This asymmetry has initiated recurrent scientific and ideological debates—most notable among them being the discussion on “state failures.” For the public choice literature in general, and for William Niskanen in particular, bureaucracies are too big and too inefficient.

Since it was imported from economics in the early 1980s, PAT has offered creative answers to these debates surrounding public bureaucracies and, while answering them, has also undergone an important evolution. This entry surveys the main aspects of this transformation of a fundamentally economic PAT into a more political theory.

From *Ex Post* to *Ex Ante* Theories

The first setting in which PAT flourished was the American literature on congressional control of bureaucracy. Prior to PAT, the prevailing view was that of an unresponsive bureaucracy—based on the fact that Congress devoted only a small fraction of its resources to the direct oversight of bureaucratic actions. Against this perspective, PAT authors argued that the lack of monitoring activity was actually a signal that control was working properly. It is the possibility of *ex post* sanctions (e.g., hearings, investigations, limited budgetary appropriations) that acts as an effective incentive for the bureau to serve congressional interests. Similar to how a car lot owner’s properly designed commission system can ensure that a car sales agent performs well without any need for direct monitoring, Congress may possess sufficient *ex post* rewards and sanctions to control public bureaucracies.

This “congressional dominance” approach contributed to the bureaucratic literature by providing numerous empirical tests derived from rigorous theoretical predictions—mostly showing the congruence between federal regulatory agencies and changes in congressional ideological preferences. The ultimate empirical proof that bureaucratic agents follow legislators’ preferences would be the latter’s high incumbent reelection rate (more than 90% in the U.S. House of Representatives, according to some calculations/estimations).

Nevertheless, many authors have cast doubts about the usefulness of *ex post* PAT sanctions in the political sphere. Unlike what happens in the private sector, where the principal may openly expose an agent’s misbehavior, a politician who denounces bureaucratic noncompliance runs the risk of being accused by the electorate of lack of previous monitoring zeal. Since politicians cannot credibly rely on *ex post* controls, they may develop *ex ante* mechanisms of bureaucratic oversight, such as imposing detailed administrative procedures that “stack the deck” in favor of congressional constituencies. For example, members of Congress can establish transparency requirements or order the bureau to consult some interest groups before entering into any relevant decision. That would also be the PAT explanation of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act that was burdened with multiple requirements that limited *ex ante* bureaucratic discretion. In general, PAT arguments, based on politicians’ electoral interests, challenged the prevailing view in the law and economics literature that had traditionally explained administrative procedures as being the result of normative concerns for fairness and equity. This shift of focus from *ex post* to *ex ante* mechanisms represents the first step away from economic orthodoxy in the political evolution of PAT models of bureaucracy.

From Dyadic to Complex Theories

PAT, as directly imported from economics, initially focused on the dyadic relationship between Congress and bureaucracy. Nevertheless, from the mid-1980s onward, more realistic models of political control of bureaucracy were developed in which the dyadic relationship became a more complex one, with Congress sharing, and frequently competing for, bureaucratic oversight with other principals, such as the presidency, federal and state courts, and interest groups.

The main picture that is emerging from these complex models—some of them involving up to 14 principals—is more pessimistic than the one from the early dyadic PAT models of congressional dominance. In general, political control of bureaus is poor because they can play some political principals (e.g., a Republican Congress) off against others (e.g., a Democratic president). In addition,

the political control hypothesis seems to fail even in the most favorable conditions, which has been demonstrated by the case of the probusiness Reagan administration and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Despite that all possible political control tools were mobilized, the Reagan administration was unable to significantly reduce EPA's activities.

From Control to Organizational Theories

Most public administration scholars agree that while PAT has successfully explored the issue of political control of bureaucracies, it has been at the expense of treating bureaucracies as black boxes that mysteriously transform inputs into outputs. The (extremely varied) organizational characteristics of bureaucracies have been mostly left out. One reason is that PAT, which emerged in the congressional control debate, initially became more of a theory of legislatures than a proper theory of bureaucracies. Nevertheless, researchers started to acknowledge that the study of the political control of bureaucracies presents serious problems of scientific validity, chief among them being the dilemma of "observational equivalence." The same empirical observation, the lack of political monitoring and sanctions for bureaus, may be an indication of bureaucratic independence and, at the same time, of its exact opposite—that is, a bureaucracy so compliant that there is no need for supervision.

Accordingly, in what has been considered to be the most important single development in the modern theory of bureaucracy, PAT scholars have increasingly shifted their attention from how politicians control bureaucrats to how politicians design bureaucratic organizations. One of the most explored organizational features is the variance in the autonomy of public employees: why some public bureaucracies are like their private counterparts—that is, the principal (government) is free to choose its agents (public employees)—and, on the contrary, other (most, but far from all) public bureaucracies have autonomous civil service systems that limit the capacity of government to choose the public employees that are working for it. The study of this puzzle has forced PAT scholars to seriously question the source and nature of the problems that exist in a principal-agent relationship.

From Agent-as-the-Problem to Principal-as-the-Problem Theories

The canonical-economic PAT had focused on the problems created by the agent, who may take advantage of his or her "hidden information" and "hidden actions." The credible commitment problem of a car lot owner (principal) not paying the promised commission to a salesman (agent) is quite unrealistic in the private sector, given the existence of an external third party (public institutions) with the ability to enforce contracts. Nevertheless, in politics, the principal is at the same time the third party—or, at the least, may be able to affect the third party's behavior through legislative measures. As numerous scholars have shown, the problems of credible commitment created by all-powerful principals may overshadow the traditionally explored informational advantages of agents. One of the most significant examples is monetary policy, where governments, no matter how benevolent they may appear, face an unavoidable problem of credibility in the eyes of investors. Just before elections, governments will *always* find an advantage in granting opportunistic short-term benefits to their constituents.

A more political strand of PAT has explored how different mechanisms, such as the delegation of monetary policy to an agent that is *known* to have different monetary preferences, may mitigate this inherent problem of credibility. One paradoxical result of this literature is that multiple principals overseeing a bureaucracy, considered as a recipe for disaster by the standard economic PAT, actually have beneficial effects for monetary policy because a safe "core" of economic policies is protected from politicians' opportunism. The loss of political control over the bureaucracy—at least over bureaucracies dealing with potentially time-inconsistent policies—can thus be a socially desirable outcome.

All in all, two main patterns emerge from this review of the influence of PAT in political science. First, the parsimonious models of PAT have revolutionized the study of politics and particularly of public bureaucracies, illuminating numerous empirical puzzles. At the same time, the study of politics has also changed the core assumptions and predictions of canonical PAT. In sum, thanks to the importation of the economics-born PAT, political science has evolved into a more economic

discipline, but economics has also become more political. As a result, the accumulated knowledge in both disciplines has benefited extensively.

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See also Autonomy, Administrative; Bureaucracy; Politicization of Bureaucracy; Politicization of Civil Service; Rational Choice; Responsiveness of Bureaucracy

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PRISONERS' DILEMMA

The prisoners' dilemma (PD) is usually presented with the following narrative. Two men are arrested after committing a crime. Only a confession by one or both of them can lead to a conviction for the crime. If both of them remain silent, each will be charged with a lesser offense and serve a light sentence. If one confesses while the other remains silent, the one who confesses will be set free in exchange for his testimony against the other, and the one who remains silent will be convicted of the crime and receive a full sentence. If both confess, both of them will be convicted of the crime but will receive a reduced sentence. The *dilemma* here is that regardless of what the other chooses to do, it will be better for each of them to confess.

However, if they both confess, they will be worse off than they would have been if both of them had remained silent. In this entry, various game-theoretical strategies and possible applications in political science are discussed.

The basic structure of the game is presented in Table 1, a 2×2 matrix that specifies the payoff each player receives, where $T > R > P > S$.

The game, thus, has a unique equilibrium in which both players defect and receive payoff P . They would have received a higher payoff, R , had each of them chosen "cooperate," but this is not possible since each of them has a *dominant strategy* to "defect."

In a repeated PD, the choices made today not only determine today's outcome but can also influence the choices made in the future. If the players were to repeat the game for a finite and known number of times, backward induction would imply that both players defect in every round. In the last round, neither player fears the consequences of current choices, so they will both choose "defect." As a result, both players end up choosing "defect" in each round, expecting the other player to "defect" in the following round. However, if the players were to play an infinitely repeated PD or a finite repeated PD for an unknown number of times, backward induction no longer applies. When a game is repeated infinitely or repeated for a finite but unknown number of times, players use weighted-average payoffs to determine which strategy to choose. To calculate the weighted-average payoffs in a given round, future payoffs are multiplied by a *discount factor* q , either to reflect that future payoffs are valued less than present payoffs or as a probability that there will be another round in the future. The value of cooperation in a given round depends on the value of q , increasing as q approaches one. As long as q is not zero, both players are better off if they both choose "cooperate" in every round.

Table 1 Prisoners' Dilemma

		Player 2	
		Cooperate	Defect
Player 1	Cooperate	R, R	S, T
	Defect	T, S	P, P

Source: Axelrod, R. (1984). *The evolution of cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.

There is an equilibrium in which both players defect in every round because each player chooses a strategy to “always defect” and such an equilibrium exists for any value of q . However, it is no longer the only possible equilibrium outcome for both players to defect in every round because players can play reciprocal strategies that condition their choices in a given round on the course of the game. For instance, players can choose to play a grim trigger strategy, which punishes the defector by playing defect for all future rounds of the game. This reciprocal strategy can produce an equilibrium in which both players cooperate in every round for certain values of q . In fact, according to the Folk theorem, a wide range of payoffs can be supported in infinitely repeated games or repeated games with finite but unknown number of rounds as long as q is not zero, and consequently, the set of strategies that support mutual cooperation in every round can be quite large depending on the value of q . There exists as yet no consensus with respect to the reasons that may be invoked for favoring one reciprocal strategy over the other when any of them can support mutual cooperation in every round.

Games of incomplete information offer another scenario in which players might achieve mutual cooperation even in a repeated PD with a finite and known number of rounds. For instance, suppose there is a probability z that Player 2's payoffs are different from those depicted in Table 1 and that his dominant strategy is a tit-for-tat strategy. A tit-for-tat strategy player cooperates in the first round and then does whatever his or her opponent did in the previous round. When this uncertainty is introduced, a “cooperate” by Player 2 in a given round may be interpreted as a sign that Player 2 is a tit-for-tat strategy player. If Player 2 is a tit-for-tat strategy player, Player 1 is better off if he or she chooses “cooperate” in the following round and achieves mutual cooperation in future rounds. There is a chance that the “cooperate” choice by Player 2 is a mistake and that Player 2 will choose “defect” in the following round. Then, Player 1 will receive S , which is worse than the P that he or she would have received if he or she had kept on playing “defect.” However, if z is high enough and there are enough rounds left in the game, Player 1 will be willing to risk this possibility. At the same time, there is an incentive for Player 2 to pretend

to be a tit-for-tat strategy player even if he or she is not when Player 1 faces such an uncertainty because then both players can achieve mutual cooperation and receive payoff R for some rounds. As they near the last round, they will be less willing to choose “cooperate” since the fact that they will both choose “defect” in the last round has not changed. They will not be able to achieve mutual cooperation in every round, but they will be able to achieve mutual cooperation in some rounds.

Since Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher devised PD as part of a RAND Corporation experiment on game theory, experiments have been a major part of PD literature. The most frequently examined dependent variable in PD experiments is the number of mutual cooperations achieved relative to the number of games played. However, the results will vary depending on the specific environment of the experiment. It has been established that that share is never zero, but it is never 100% either. The fact that observations of real people have shown that people usually manage to achieve mutual cooperation even in repeated games with a finite and known number of rounds motivated the research on finitely repeated PD with uncertainty, which appears to be more consistent with the experimental results.

Computer simulation is another way researchers experiment with PD games. They are particularly useful in exploring the evolutionary aspect of repeated PD, such as the best strategy for players' survival, the change in strategies among populations, or the stability of strategy composition. Robert Axelrod's computer tournaments conducted in 1980 are part of a study on the emergence of cooperation. A number of strategies were submitted to a tournament of repeated PD, in which each strategy was matched against all the other programs submitted, against itself, and against a program that chooses cooperation or defection randomly. Axelrod tallied how well each strategy did, and the winner was a tit-for-tat strategy.

The PD is generally applied to demonstrate the difficulty involved in achieving cooperative outcomes when there exists an incentive to cheat and take advantage of the other. International politics has been an area in which PD has been applied actively because states engage in bilateral interactions without a formal enforcement mechanism. For example, it is difficult for two states in an arms race to make and implement an agreement to stop

the arms race, although they will be worse off than if they are able to cooperate and stop it. Each state fears that it will be taken advantage of should it stop while the opponent continues. Each state is also tempted to take advantage of the opponent that stops by continuing to accumulate arms. The same logic applies to any international relations in which states can achieve favorable outcomes through international agreements but will be tempted to cheat on implementation. It can also be applied to civil conflict situations.

Although PD is generally applied in the context of a two-player game, games with the payoff structure of PD have been applied in the context of an n -player game (i.e., $n > 2$). For example, some have interpreted a game of common-pool resources with n players who have PD incentives to be what Garrett Hardin referred to as the *tragedy of the commons*. All the people in a community have a collective interest in sustaining common resources. However, as people are self-interested, each will be tempted to overexploit the resources. The tragedy arises because, at any point in time, each individual finds it in his or her interest to exploit the common resources (i.e., “defect”) no matter what the others do. This can be seen to explain the need for and the emergence of a formal enforcement device, government or a government agency in most cases, to provide public goods or to enforce contracts among individuals. Work by the Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom and her collaborators explore other, private ways in which individuals can solve the common-resources problem.

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See also Arms Race; Cooperation; Game Theory;
Tragedy of the Commons

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PRIVATIZATION

According to Stuart Butler, one of its chief advocates, privatization can be thought of as the shift of a function in whole, or in part, from the public sector to the private sector. This can refer to a variety of policies, including the sale of state assets, the contracting out of public services to private providers, the deregulation of various market-based activities, or even the affixing of user fees for places that might earlier have been open access (parks, museums, schools, or highways). This entry discusses alternative conceptions of privatization, assesses the arguments for and against privatization, and examines some attempts by governments to withdraw from involvement in some aspects of their economies.

Alternative Conceptions of Privatization

Privatization is not a new phenomenon. While most economists have normally assumed the private sector to be something like a default position, with government activities being invented, added on, and often at the expense of the private sector, in fact the reverse is the case. Oliver Letwin, a British conservative theorist, observed that the private sector had to be invented. This occurred with the creation of the great European trading companies, such as the British and Dutch East India companies, founded in the 17th century. Notions of property before the Renaissance assumed that different actors had different relations to the same property. Manorial estates were, true enough, the domain of the local lord, but he was required to provide security, order, and justice to the inhabitants of the domain, while they

had certain rights to the usufructs of the property and owed the lord fealty and obedience. The lord in turn owed fealty to the king. This changed slowly. For example, only with the rise of the enclosures of common pastureland did Britain develop modern notions of property. Private property did, of course, exist in earlier eras, and much of its modern conception is owed to the rediscovery of Roman law, which had a well-articulated set of rules governing such property. However, as the economic abuses associated with the collapse of communism demonstrate, private property cannot exist without a political system that defines its existence, its use, and the conditions of its exchange. That is, private property is defined by and exists only because of politics.

Although state asset sales occurred in many European countries during the 1950s, when conservative parties took over from left-of-center parties, these were relatively limited in scope. Privatizing government assets and services became a major policy fashion in the 1980s and continued through the first decade of the 21st century until the financial crisis of late 2008, when many of the conservative policy trends of the late 20th century were called into question. This is not to say that only conservatives advocated privatization. Regimes as different as Margaret Thatcher's Britain, Bill Clinton's United States, and François Mitterrand's France all actively pursued privatization policies. They often had different reasons for pursuing such policies, and these are explored as follows.

At the end of the 20th century, the privatization movement was rooted in the collapse of Keynesian economics in the late 1970s. The oil crises of 1973 to 1974 and then 1979 were followed by periods of economic stagnation and high inflation. Keynesian orthodoxy saw employment and price levels as trade-offs, described by what was called the Phillips curve. Keynesians thought that inflation only occurred in economies experiencing full employment and had no explanation for the stagflation that followed the oil crises. Their inability to explain the behavior of the economy created a window of opportunity for neoclassical economists to step in and stipulate that these problems were due to public sector distortions that had accumulated over the postwar years. The solution to economic stagnation was, they asserted, less government. These were the advocates of privatization.

Arguments for and Against Privatization

Belief in the superiority of markets became widespread as the best way to organize not only the production but also the allocation of all goods and services, with "market failure" being considered rare and the only justification for public intervention. Even governments were thought to work better if they were organized using market principles. This latter version of privatization became known as "the new public management." Here government was to be organized as a private enterprise, while citizens were to be treated as "customers."

While privatization was something of an international trend in the late 20th century, it was not adopted everywhere for the same reasons. Harvey Feigenbaum, Jeffrey Henig, and Chris Hamnett (1998) argued that privatization was essentially a political phenomenon and that one could distinguish three types of privatization policies. The types of privatization were differentiated by the motives and intentions of the policymakers. The least political kind of privatization might be called "pragmatic." Pragmatic privatizations fill immediate needs without political motives, such as selling a state asset to fill an immediate budgetary shortfall or contracting out to a private provider because the government simply lacks the expertise. "Tactical" privatizations serve short-term political goals, such as rewarding supporters by awarding a no-bid contract or offering discounted shares in a public enterprise privatization to allies of the party in power. "Systemic" privatizations are intended to permanently transform the political landscape: The sale of public enterprises to create a nation of share holders was intended to create new and enduring constituencies for the Conservative Party in Britain, while "shock therapy," the rapid sale of public enterprises in Russia, was intended to permanently block a return to socialism by selling off most of the state's assets. In developing countries, the impetus for privatization often comes from international aid and lending institutions that require the policy as a prerequisite to aid. These institutions usually favor privatization because they are staffed by neoclassical economists or influenced by large, conservative contributors such as the United States. In other cases, international lenders are simply seeking to pragmatically avoid nepotism and other inefficiencies in recipient countries.

Often, of course, privatizations are supported by different groups for different reasons. Bureaucrats might favor a particular privatization for pragmatic reasons; the ruling party might see political advantages, while outside consultants based in think tanks might be motivated by ideology. Thus, the typology offered above might be better thought of as Weberian ideal types rather than hard and fast categories in the real world.

Government Attempts to Withdraw From Economic Involvement

Whatever the motives of the privatizers, the impact of privatization has also been quite varied. The goals may have been, as stated by Daniel Golden, a one-time administrator of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “faster, better, cheaper!” However, realistically, privatization policies could at best accomplish two out of the three. While there were some successes at the municipal level, cost savings due to privatization were rare. Where they were achieved, this was often because the private providers had hired lower-wage workers. Hence, privatization policies have normally been opposed by labor unions.

In a number of cases, privatization policies drove up costs and reduced service. The privatization of British Rail led to significant reductions in service, though part of this was because the Conservative government had anticipated privatization and necessary investments in infrastructure were not made before the railroad was sold. Privatization of water utilities in Britain followed a similar pattern. Perhaps the most spectacular increases in cost were associated with privatization in the military. Profiteering often accompanies military contracts and is alleged to have reached spectacular proportions in the case of U.S. contracts during the Iraq War. It should be noted that privatization of the military may be pursued not because the governments have any illusions about efficiency but because the use of private contractors is an expedient way to expand unpopular military activities.

Experience with privatization since the 1980s suggests that there is less abuse where privatization leads to a genuinely competitive market, where private service providers are carefully supervised by public authorities, and where well-articulated

systems of accountability are in place. Even when these conditions obtain, privatization does not necessarily result in greater efficiencies or cost savings, although this is a matter continually under debate. It also seems clear that privatization policies frequently have serious distributional consequences. Thus, cost savings due to new efficiencies are frequently negated by the need for new subsidies to those citizens adversely affected.

In recent times, privatizations have not had the popularity that was evident in the 1980s and 1990s. This is partially because there is now significant experience with privatization and the promised savings and efficiencies have not been realized. Moreover, the shocks occurring in financial markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 have led to a serious reevaluation of the philosophy that underpinned the privatization movement.

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See also Economic Policy; Neoliberalism; New Public Management; Property

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PROCESS TRACING

Process tracing is a key method of qualitative analysis of case studies. As discussed in this entry,

it is defined as the empirical analysis of the hypothesized observable implications of alternative theoretical processes that purport to explain the outcome of a single case. As such, it is a method of within-case analysis that can be used to develop and test a historical explanation of an individual case, although it can also be used together with cross-case comparative methods to assess whether similar or different processes are at work in different cases. This entry reviews the epistemological and methodological context of process tracing, discusses standards of doing it well, and identifies its limitations as a means of causal inference.

The Epistemology and Methodology of Process Tracing

As outlined by Alexander George and others, process tracing can be used to develop and test historical explanations of a single case. George and other proponents of process tracing often use the metaphor of detective work to illustrate the technique. Just as a detective assesses alternative suspects' potential means, motives, and opportunities to have committed the crime under investigation, a social science researcher can use evidence to assess the alternative explanations proposed for the outcome of a historical case. This involves close attention to the hypothesized causal mechanisms, processes, and sequences that alternative theories predict must be evident in the history of a case if these theories are to explain the outcome of the case.

The emphasis that process tracing places on causal processes and mechanisms makes its epistemological assumptions similar to those of the scientific-realist school of thought in the philosophy of science. As Fred Chernoff has noted, there are many variants of scientific realism. Most self-identified scientific realists agree, however, that there are entities in the world with causal powers and that these entities act through causal mechanisms to generate the phenomena that we observe. In this view, although causal mechanisms are ultimately not directly observable, our hypotheses about how these mechanisms operate generate observable implications that we can test against actual observations to make (potentially fallible) inferences on the validity and scope conditions of our hypotheses. The observable implications of

hypothesized causal mechanisms and processes may concern predictions on population-wide patterns, which can be assessed through statistical means. According to Henry Brady and David Collier, this analysis involves inferences from "data set observations" or from measurements of variables across many different cases. The observable implications of hypothesized causal mechanisms may also involve detailed predictions about processes and sequences of events within individual cases. It is these within-case observable implications that process tracing assesses through what Brady and Collier term *causal process observations*, or evidence on sequences and events within a single case.

Process tracing proceeds through a combination of deduction and induction, with the mix varying depending on the state of development of theories on the phenomenon under study and the availability of relevant evidence. Deductively, the researcher uses extant theories to generate observable implications within a case, which can then be tested against the evidence. In this mode, the researcher asks questions such as "Who should have known or who did what, where, when, and how if this explanation of the case is true?" Inductively, the researcher develops detailed knowledge of the sequence of events in a case and uses this knowledge to generate additional potential explanations of the case. These inductive explanations, once translated into more rigorous and deductive theories, can generate additional testable implications within the case or within other cases, thereby helping the researcher guard against confirmation bias. Even when the outcome of a case is already known, there are usually many details about processes and sequences within the case that are unknown to the investigator prior to undertaking process tracing. These previously unknown details can provide an independent check on the investigator's theoretical assumptions.

Process tracing also proceeds through both affirmation of theories that prove to be consistent with evidence from the case and eliminative induction of theoretical explanations that prove to be inconsistent with the evidence. In this sense, process tracing is similar to Bayesian analysis, in which the analyst uses evidence to update prior expectations on the relative likelihood that alternative theories or explanations are true. As in

Bayesian analysis, a single piece of evidence might be consistent with one explanation of a case while simultaneously disproving many alternative explanations. The more an observable implication is likely to be true if one explanation is true, and the more unlikely it is to be true if any of the alternative explanations is true, the more this evidence, if found, would increase our confidence in the one theory it fits and decrease our confidence in the alternatives. Thus, whether an instance of process tracing is convincing and determinate in narrowing the field to one explanation of a case depends not on the number of cases, pieces of evidence, or alternative explanations but on the probative value of the evidence regarding the alternative explanations.

Thus, even though it involves only one case and potentially includes many variables and explanations, process tracing does not raise a “degrees of freedom” problem, which arises in statistical analysis when there are too many variables and too few cases to assess alternative explanations with any confidence. Process tracing does face the more general problem of indeterminacy, of which the degrees of freedom problem is one variant, as process tracing may be indeterminate if several incompatible explanations are equally consistent with the evidence of a case. This is an inherent problem because there are always potential additional explanations that the researcher may not have conceived of or examined, a challenge that Bayesians refer to as identifying the “catchall factor,” or the probability one should place on the possible truth value of *all* alternatives to the explanation of interest. For these reasons, many researchers who use process tracing would agree with Bayesians that one should never put 100% confidence in a theory or explanation.

Although it is a within-case method of analysis, process tracing can supplement cross-case comparisons and compensate for some of the limits of such comparisons. For example, a most-similar case comparison involves the comparison of two cases that are similar in all but one independent variable and that differ in their outcomes. A standard challenge in this research design is that cases are never perfectly matched on all but one independent variable. Process tracing can help determine whether the difference in the independent variable of interest is related to the outcome, and it can also help assess whether the residual differences between

the two cases might also, or instead, contribute to the differences in their outcomes.

Two contentious issues are whether process tracing can lead to generalizable knowledge and whether it is suited to interpretivist or constructivist epistemological assumptions. Nathaniel Beck has critiqued process tracing for producing only explanations of individual cases rather than generalizable knowledge. Defenders of process tracing respond that the explanation of cases of historical significance is an important goal in its own right and that inferences based on statistical inferences are more convincing if they can be shown to be consistent with the mechanisms and processes of individual cases. Moreover, they argue that while the explanation of an individual case may not generalize to other cases, it is also possible to use a combination of induction and deduction to uncover explanations via process tracing that may prove widely generalizable. Charles Darwin’s detailed examination of a few species, for example, led to hypothesized causal mechanisms on evolution and natural selection that should apply not just to the species he studied but to all living things. It is nearly impossible to know whether an explanation of a case will prove generalizable, however, until one has first developed and tested that explanation through process tracing.

Coming from another perspective, Jeffrey Checkel has critiqued process tracing as being too neo-positivist and insufficiently attuned to the recursivity of social agents and social structures. Proponents of process tracing would respond that it has much in common with some forms of narrative analysis, event history analysis, and discourse analysis but that it does aspire to verifiable and generalizable explanations. If one believes that agents and structures are inherently recursive and mutually constitutive “all the way down,” no matter how finely one slices time or space, then one is likely to remain skeptical of process tracing and all other forms of inference that aspire to causal explanations.

Standards of Good Process Tracing

There are many excellent examples of process tracing in the social sciences, a number of which are discussed in the Further Readings. Good process tracing shares several characteristics. First, it

considers a wide range of the potential explanations of a case proposed by theorists, historians, journalists, and participants, and it gives a balanced assessment of the evidence for each. Second, it provides a fairly continuous explanation of the major events in the case, with a convincing explanation of each important turning point. It is both impossible and impractical, of course, to give a *fully continuous* account of *everything* in a case, and even on important turning points, the relevant evidence may be inaccessible, but the more the critical steps and potential anomalies can be convincingly explained, the better it is. Third, good process tracing weighs the probative value of evidence relative to alternative explanations and takes into account the potential biases of the sources of that evidence. Fourth, and similar to Bayesian analysis, diversity of evidence—analogueous to a detective's search for evidence on means, motives, and opportunities—helps provide more convincing explanations via process tracing. Finally, the use of evidence that has “use novelty,” or evidence that was not known or observed by the investigator prior to deductively predicting its expected value or measurement, provides protection against confirmation bias.

The Limits of Process Tracing

Like all forms of causal inference, process tracing is potentially fallible. A researcher can never be fully confident of having thought of all the relevant alternative explanations. Process tracing also usually requires a great deal of information and research and can be intensely time-consuming. Even with the most diligent research, there may be gaps and biases in the availability of information on key steps in a hypothesized process, especially on sensitive political issues on which actors have an incentive to hide their actions and motives. The results may be indeterminate if incompatible explanations are equally consistent with the evidence. Extant theories are often not sufficiently developed to make detailed predictions on the processes we should expect to find in individual cases, and different theorists might predict different processes within a case using the same theories. The results of process tracing may not be generalizable beyond the individual case in any particular study, and whether the results will prove generalizable cannot

be known with confidence at the outset. Finally, there is no simple answer to how much process tracing is enough. How detailed should one be in explaining a phenomenon, or how far back should the researcher go in time? Only a pragmatic Bayesian answer is possible: One stops when one is confident that the currently accessible additional evidence would not markedly change one's confidence in the alternative explanations.

Conclusion

All methods of causal or explanatory inference, including process tracing, are potentially fallible. Despite its limitations, process tracing remains an important method for developing and testing explanations of individual cases. As methodologists continue to develop techniques of process tracing, they might focus on three areas. First, they might work out more fully the similarities and differences between process tracing and Bayesian inference. Second, they might address more fully critiques on whether and how the results of process tracing can be generalized and how process tracing relates to interpretivist and constructivist methods. Third, they might work out more specific guidelines on the kinds of evidence to look for to assess and adjudicate among different kinds of explanations, including rational choice, social-constructivist, power, institutional, and psychological explanations.

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See also Comparative Methods; Constructivism in International Relations; Event History Analysis; Qualitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian

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PROPERTY

If for more than 2 centuries the concept of property appeared to be understood, it is no longer possible to act as if this were the case. In common language as much as in the language of jurists and economists, the term *property* was associated with the notion of *the absolute and exclusive right of a person over a material thing*. This definition is no longer accepted by experts, a fact that led Thomas Grey to formulate the hypothesis of the *disintegration of property*.

Therefore, the notion of property has presumably suffered a rapid philosophical decline. Until recently, it was considered essential to the relevance of public and political institutions, a core component of the debate surrounding the legitimacy of capitalism—so central that the origins of the main ideologies and schools of thought that still largely structure our political world could be traced back to it. Today, however, property rights are not seen as central to issues such as the legitimacy of liberal democracies and the institutions of mature capitalism; instead, protection of individual rights and of the rule of law is seen as a primary concern in establishing such legitimacy.

It seems hardly questionable that the notion of property as the absolute right of a person over a material thing has lost both its technical relevance and its philosophical importance. But it is equally incontestable that the contemporary evolution of large legal systems tends toward *proprietaryization*, a term that describes the expansion of the range of objects that can be owned, the spread of ownership mechanisms, and the strengthening of legal protection offered to owners. If the aforementioned

notion of property has indeed disappeared, property itself remains central, although in new forms, to how institutions of mature capitalism function.

History of the Contemporary Notion of Property

The history of the contemporary notion of property can be divided into three stages: (1) rise, (2) triumph, and (3) fall. The emergence of the notion of property can be traced back to the Second Scholastic, which took place during the 17th century following and commenting on the Renaissance. Its final definition as the natural, absolute, and exclusive right of a person over a material thing was formulated by modern natural law theorists, especially by Thomas Hobbes and Samuel Pufendorf. A more legal, less philosophical genealogy could recount the slow rejection of the divided-ownership theory (which distinguishes between direct and eminent owners) and would put forward the ideas of French jurists such as Francois Hotman, Jean Donneau, or Charles Dumoulin. In any case, the idea of property as an absolute right nourished physiocratic writings and, at the end of the 18th century, became a truism of legal thinking, made famous by Robert-Joseph Pothier or William Blackstone's well-known phrase in Book 2 of the *Commentaries on the Laws of England*: "the right of property . . . that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."

An individual's subjective property rights are acknowledged by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights ("No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation"), by Article 17 of the Declaration of Human Rights of 1789 ("Since the right to property is inviolable and sacred, no one may be deprived thereof, unless public necessity, legally ascertained, obviously requires it, and just and prior indemnity has been paid"), and by Article 544 of the Napoleonic Code ("Property is the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute way, provided this usage is not prohibited by laws or regulations"). In 19th-century Europe, Article 544 became the symbol of a unitary and centralized conception of property. After 1804, the

consensus about property, at least in continental law, was broad enough to raise this notion to the level of a legal dogma. On that basis, a general theory of property was progressively constructed, defining property as a subjective, unitary, complete, and perpetual right over material goods that gives the owner, directly and without any personal mediation, the power to exclude anyone else and to use those things both physically and legally. Moreover, this dogmatic consensus was coupled with a very large political consensus about the legitimacy of the institution of property.

Not until 1840 and Pierre Joseph Proudhon's famous pamphlet *What Is Property?* did this political consensus collapse, quickly giving rise to a violent dispute—which turned into civil war—between the supporters and despisers of property. This dispute concerned the origins (natural or conventional), limits, distribution, and legitimacy of property but was based on the same dogmatic definition of this institution. In his pamphlet, Proudhon himself wrote that property was the “*absolute, exclusive, autocratic domain of a man over a thing*.” The political dispute did not weaken the prestige of the legal dogma.

It was only at the end of the 19th century that the canonical definition of property was finally put into question because of the evolution of property law itself. Although this evolution is quite complex, some of its aspects should be highlighted:

- *The strengthening of statutory and judicial limitations related to property law*—the concept of the abuse of right, the development of urban regulations, the expansion of state powers of expropriation and regulatory takings, and so on. This evolution leads some authors to conceive of property as a social function more than a subjective right.
- *The emergence of so-called corporate properties or large companies' collective properties, especially after World War I*—recorded by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in a well-known book *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, published in 1933. According to the authors, the switch from individual property belonging to physical persons to social property belonging to legal bodies leads to a dissociation between the owner and the manager—the property and the power of control that it bestowed.

- *The dematerialization of property*—forcing legal theorists to conceive of property as an intangible object. Gradually, the rights of authors and inventors over their creations and inventions have come to be characterized as a “property right.”

Evolutions specific to mature capitalism have in fact jeopardized the property dogma. At the end of the 20th century, it became obvious that this dogma did not reflect the reality of property rights “in action.” Or is it that we no longer know what property is?

Theories of Property

In law, a theoretical definition is self-fulfilling only if it slowly brings about a consensus. Equally, a theory of property will be empirically validated only if it is commonly accepted and applied by political representatives, judges, lawyers, and academics. As of today, we do not have such a theory at our disposal. Reconstruction projects are numerous, often ingenious and exciting (the work of Charles Reich, Richard Posner, Margaret Radin, Jeremy Waldron, and Stephen Munzer, among many others, should be mentioned here), but none of these projects has succeeded in imposing uniform beliefs and practices on legal actors, and some researchers such as Duncan Kennedy doubt that it is even worth trying.

However, the term *property* has not completely lost all significance, even among experts. Its meaning can be established by enunciating the specificities of property rights according to their (a) contents, (b) characteristics, (c) object, or (d) holder.

Contents

Property is frequently associated with the triptych *usus, fructus, abusus* (use, enjoy the fruits of, abuse) in Continental law or still sometimes with the right to occupy, exclude, transfer, or transmit, to refer to one of Jeremy Bentham's expressions. Even more frequently, a Hohfeldian nomenclature has been used to enable the contents of the rights to be analyzed according to the following four fundamental legal relationships of opposition and correlation:

1. claim-rights ($\neq$ no-rights) and duties,
2. privileges ($\neq$ duties) and no-rights,

3. powers ($\neq$ disabilities) and liabilities, and
4. immunities ($\neq$ liabilities) and disabilities.

Having a claim-right means being able to demand something from another, with the latter having a duty to meet the demand; a privilege exists where there is no duty; a power refers to the capability of creating legal relationships (e.g., marriage); and a person has immunity when he or she has no duty to follow a command from another.

Property should therefore be considered as a *bundle of rights*, a defined set of rights and duties, privileges and no-rights, powers and liabilities, and immunities and disabilities. Thus, according to Wesley Hohfeld, with absolute ownership over land (*property in fee simple*), the owner has the *right* to exclude anyone else, as well as some legal *privileges* (e.g., the right to use the land) and the legal *power* to alienate his or her property or some of its uses by giving legal privileges to third parties (e.g., by giving temporary access to a neighbor). Finally, he or she benefits from legal *immunities* (e.g., the property cannot be expropriated except through a specific procedure).

This nomenclature reveals the difficulty of giving a general definition of property, since it is impossible to specify rights, privileges, powers, disabilities, and immunities that could be universally and necessarily stated in every relationship characterized by legal actors as a property relationship. The best one can do is to note that the composition of the bundle of rights varies considerably according to situations and the objects concerned. Certainly, it might be useful to try to identify “types of bundles” in similar legal situations—“forms” of property—but to date, no theoretical proposition has succeeded in establishing, in a largely convincing way, one of these forms as an ideal type (as defined by Max Weber) of the institution of property.

Indeed, the notions of property and exclusivity are frequently associated. But there are good reasons to doubt that this association is both universal and necessary. First of all, exclusivity is sometimes only relative (some collective properties exclude third parties but not co-owners). Some rights of ownership are *inclusive* (the holder of these rights is given a no-right to exclude any third party): for example, in French administrative law, public property of things assigned to free public use or

even creative commons licenses—share-alike or free software—that allow the creator of the initial software to give third parties the right to access and transform the initial software, coupled with a no-right to forbid access to and transformation of the upgraded version (this amounts to giving the creator of the upgraded version a no-right of exclusion for this version, even though he or she owns it).

Similarly, property and free use are often associated. Generally, property rights are composed of legal privileges, including the right to use the thing, to benefit from it, and so on. However, there are numerous forms of ownership that do not include free use and even sometimes exclude it. In French law, this is the case when a private body owns something that belongs to the public domain and is either open to free public use or assigned to a public service holding a no-right to use the thing in a way contrary to its intended purpose (e.g., Paris airports). It is then possible to conceive of a form of private ownership that would be applied to things that are strictly inalienable.

Characteristics

In Richard Posner’s version of the economic analysis of legal rules, the focus shifts from their contents to the conditions that they must fulfill for a system of private property to function efficiently—these conditions being the exclusivity, universality, and transferability of property rights. This position is under debate, and some questions have been raised about the real efficiency of such a system, the relevance of the efficiency criteria, and the benefit to be derived from the widespread use of such a model, given that the model only applies to certain specific situations in which ownership rights meet the required conditions and that—after all—those situations might not be so frequent.

Object

The impossibility of defining property according to the rights it confers or these rights’ specificities leads some authors, such as Charles Donahue, to state that what distinguishes property law from all other jural relationships is that property law deals with things. This statement has been criticized on the basis that almost anything can legally

qualify as a “thing.” Depending on legal systems and existing laws, manpower, ideas, the moon, traditional dances, and human DNA are, could be, or are not “things,” which results in a “thing” being *legally* a thing only when it is owned. Therefore, the object of a property right is a thing but a thing defined, according to the terms of the law, by the fact that it is owned.

This was not always the case. There was a time when things were considered things *by nature* and what distinguished them was the fact that they were tangible. But slowly, jurists have designed complex legal mechanisms for the ownership of intangible objects—rights (e.g., stocks ownership has been a constitutional right in France since 1982), status (e.g., a person owns his or her retirement pension according to the European Court of Human Rights), and even, in memory of the late Jeremy Bentham, future things or legitimate wishes (which have been recognized as things by the European Court in its 2004 decision in the *Kopecky v. Slovakia* case). If even a purely “imaginary” thing can be owned, anything that can be somewhat useful to someone can be the object of property rights. This approach brings to an end the property “dematerialization” process that started in the 19th century and in fact amounts to replacing the notion of “thing” with the notion of value. But since it is truly possible to own a thing without value, this distinction does not help advance a new and satisfactory definition.

Holder

A strong philosophical current associated with the political tradition of “possessive individualism” has tried to equate subjective freedom, personal identity, and self-ownership, property rights being consequently the proper expression of individual freedom. During the first half of the 19th century, it was even common to consider that ownership of property, beyond being a right, was a real political and moral status that gave access to active citizenship (the right to vote) and privileges before the courts (“The master is believed on the basis of his own affirmation,” Article 1781 of the Napoleonic Code).

In contemporary law, the full legal ability, the right to have rights, including the right to property, constitutes the freedom of the subject. But

legal theory and legal practice have created mere rights holders, meaning subjects capable of enjoying rights that they are unable to exercise (minors, the mentally disabled, animals, corporate owners, etc.). Legal imagination has even produced properties without owners through the notion of patrimony of affectation (patrimony dedicated to a specific legal entity/*Zweckvermögen*), invented by the German doctrine during the second half of the 19th century. Therefore, we cannot make the distinction between private, public, or collective forms of ownership by only taking into account the jural character of the rights holders.

At most, we can say that the notion of property is frequently associated with exclusivity and free use, even with universal opposability and transferability; that the definition of its object refers to the notions of thing and/or value; and that it is often presumed to take root in the subjective freedom of owners. It is also possible to try to pinpoint the coexistence, within the same legal system, of several contradictory conceptualizations of property, all of which are used by legal actors simultaneously (and often implicitly) in their reasoning and argumentation, or even more generally to link certain forms of property to certain trends (unitary ownership and the unlimited power of wealth accumulation, private property and selfishness, collective property and inefficiency, etc.), although these associations are quite often disputed because of their ideological bias.

We might then conclude that property is not a purely technical notion (neutral and objective) but rather a “floating” concept whose applications are always both technical and ideological. From this point of view, the expression *bundle of rights* is helpful because it expresses the various types of rights that the term *property* can imply. It might then be advisable to stop wondering *what property is* and instead try to determine *the purpose of calling certain legal prerogatives “rights of property.”*

Why Do We Talk About “Property”?

Legal actors who make abundant use of the word *property* have goals that are simultaneously technical and ideological, as shown by the history of copyrights (but there are other examples such as modified living organisms, material cultural goods, human body parts, etc.).

Since the 18th century, it has been acknowledged that authors own an exclusive right to reproduce their scientific and literary productions and that this right can be transferred to a third party at the will of the author—for example, to distributors for a percentage of the income generated by the sales of these copies. Copyright is limited in time as far as the commercial applications are concerned; its object is intangible (the work is an “original expression”), and multiple holders have simultaneous rights over it (the author owns the copyright and, in continental law, the moral rights; the public enjoys its intellectual utilities). In the past, this has led some to conclude that copyright was not a property right, the latter being an exclusive and perpetual right over a material object (Augustin-Charles Renouard defends this position in his *Traité des droits d’auteur, dans la littérature, les sciences et les beaux-arts* [Treaty of copyright, in literature, science and fine arts], Paris, 1838–1839)—or even that it was an imperfect property right that could be perfected by granting authors a copyright for perpetuity, as suggested by Charles Comte in his *Traité de la propriété* [Property treaty] of 1834. That copyright should be characterized as a “property right” was therefore not a benign transformation; it tended to integrate legal copyright rules into the general system of property, as it was understood by most legal actors. In the 19th century, this general system included rights in perpetuity.

Since today it is quite possible to conceive of temporary property rights, the designation of copyright as “intellectual property” is no longer related to the question of unlimited duration but rather to a willingness to increase the level of legal protection for copyright holders to the level of protection enjoyed by owners of tangible things, to slowly unify all the legal rules pertaining to various intangible creations (works of arts, inventions, trademarks, etc.), and to extend the scope of these rights to new objects (publicity rights, business methods, etc.)—in other words, to reinforce third-party exclusion mechanisms, to add new legal privileges for owners, and to expand the range of intangible things that can be owned. Moreover, using the term *intellectual property* when referring to copyright helps promote a political belief in the legitimacy of property. Property being a prestigious

institution that is commonly associated with individual freedom, the “property of authors” is an easier cause to defend than the cause of their “temporary monopoly.” In turn, some experts refuse to talk about property when it comes to copyright, either because they reject the conception of law that supports those rights or because of the collective character of works and the public’s right to access them freely.

The strength of these critical trends has reignited the “property dispute” by reintroducing the notion of “positive community,” which has theological origins. It has contributed to the creation of legal settings of “nonownership,” even of “anti-ownership,” as is the case for some software with *freeware* or *creative commons* licenses.

Today, property law is characterized by the disintegration of the idea of an absolute right of a person over a tangible thing and by the number of definitions used to designate the institution of property and the diversification, expansion, and spreading of ownership mechanisms. Is there a link between the destruction of the dogmatic framework that stands around the notion of property and the current growing trend of proprietarization? As long as it was collectively impossible for legal actors to imagine the ownership of intangible objects, property was limited to material things. As long as property was conceived of as a unitary right, concentrated in the hands of a single owner, legal ownership mechanisms remained basic and did not allow the ownership of intangible or future things. Today, the ownership of any object is legally imaginable; what might be difficult to imagine are the limits of this proprietarization trend. For some, this might be good news, and they may welcome the advent of a broad and efficient private property rights system. For others, this might be unfortunate and may require the design of a new dogmatic framework to stop the expansion of ownership. A third position may be that if the legal imagination has largely played its role these past few years in inventing original ownership mechanisms, it may work to conceive and establish a large number of human activities outside the legal preserve of property.

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See also Capitalism; Common Goods; Communism; Liberalism; Natural Law; Public Goods; Redistribution; Rights; Socialism

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PROSPECT THEORY

This entry discusses the most prominent psychological theory of decision making under conditions of risk, called *prospect theory*. It was developed by the psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky to explain decision making under conditions of risk, originally published in 1979 in *Econometrica*. Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002 for the work he conducted in this area with Tversky, who died in 1996. This work represents the apex of models of cognitive psychology in both timing and importance. The model has been imported into a number of fields and has been used to analyze various aspects of

political decision making, especially in international relations.

Prospect theory was developed in explicit opposition to theories of rational choice based on more normative assumptions. The intuition that guided the original work grew out of insights into the nature of bounded rationality and a desire to explore the nature and limits of those constraints. Prospect theory was based on a series of experimental empirical demonstrations of actual human choice behavior; it was explicitly developed to present a descriptively accurate model of human decision making. Nevertheless, the domain in which prospect theory explored human decision making was primarily based on choices among a series of financial bets and gambles. It was not originally intended to provide wider generalization beyond that domain, although it has subsequently been invoked to explain a wide variety of phenomena across many fields, including law, political science, and economics.

Prospect theory states that decision making depends on choosing among options that may themselves rest on biased judgments. Thus, it built on earlier work conducted by Kahneman and Tversky on judgmental heuristics and the biases that can accompany assessments of frequency and probability. Such judgments involve evaluations of the external world; decisions involve more fundamentally internal choices across values. Thus, the essence of decision making involves a trade-off between values. Prospect theory encompasses two distinct phases: (1) an editing phase and (2) an evaluation phase.

The editing phase refers to the way in which individuals characterize options for choice. Most frequently, these are referred to as framing effects. Framing effects demonstrate the way in which, contrary to the axiomatic assumptions of expected utility models, which argue that choice should remain invariant, the substance of people's choice can be affected by the order, method, or wording in which it is presented. The classic demonstration of this effect took place in the so-called Asian flu paradigm, in which people were asked to make a choice among public policy plans for responding to an endemic disease. Although the actual statistical probabilities remained identical, the percentage of people supporting a given plan changed dramatically based on whether or not the outcomes were

presented in terms of the number of people who would live versus the number of people who would die. In perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of this effect, real-world patients suffering from cancer made different choices of whether to undergo surgery or chemotherapy for treatment of their illness based on whether the outcome percentages were presented in terms of survival or mortality. Once people are presented with both choices side by side, they can easily see that the substance of the decision remains the same, even if the psychic pull to perceive them differently remains.

Once choices are framed for decision, prospect theory enters its second, evaluation phase. This phase involves two component elements, similar in function, but not identical in conception, to the notions of utility and probability in expected utility models. The first element is graphically represented by the value function. This function differs from standard normative models by including a left-hand side to the graph that represents how people respond to loss. In this way, prospect theory differs from standard economic models that always encourage prudence as the better part of valor. Regardless of the normative imprimatur of such advice, this does not accurately characterize how most people make decisions. There are three important aspects to the value function that effectively distinguish it from expected utility in particular. First, the model examines the way in which value is related to the original reference point, or the start of action or choice. In most situations, this reference point is assumed to refer to the person's current status quo position, but this is not necessarily required within the confines of the model. Rather, the operative reference point can be defined by some future level of aspiration or some kind of social comparison. But the key insight of the model is that the hedonic value of choice options is assessed by the way in which people evaluate change, movement, distance, or difference between where they are, or where they want to be, and the outcome offered by a particular choice. In other words, relative outcomes matter more than absolute outcomes. This intuition clearly reflects the realist world of international relations over, for example, the more cooperative image supplied by neoliberal models.

The second important insight offered by the value function relates to the central prediction of

the model. People tend to be more risk-averse when in a domain of gains, where things are going well and appear to be likely to continue to improve or where actors confront primarily opportunities for gains. Simultaneously, actors tend to be much more risk seeking in the realm of losses, where they are much more likely to take risks in order to recoup previous losses or to recover from a loss in order to revert to a previous position.

The last important element of the value function recognizes that losses hurt more than equal gains please. Loss aversion has indeed become the most robust finding in the entire model. In general, people have to be offered about two and a half times as much as a loss in order to prove willing to take a risk for the chance of a gain.

The second element of the evaluation phase is characterized by the weighting function. This function contains two critical insights. First, people treat outcomes that are deemed to be either certain or impossible very differently than those whose changes take place in the midrange of probability. In other words, people simply assign more psychological weight and importance to outcomes that they can characterize with greater certainty. While this is not justifiable from a normative perspective, most people treat quite unlikely events as though they were impossible and quite likely events as though they were certain to occur. Second, people tend to overweight, or attribute more importance than normatively justified, to low-probability events. They simultaneously apply less psychological weight to medium- and high-probability outcomes than are normatively warranted.

The interaction of the value function and the weighting function lead to some very interesting and counterintuitive explanations and predictions for phenomena such as insurance (taking a sure loss against the small possibility of a larger loss) and lotteries (taking a sure loss against the even smaller possibility of a large gain). Because people overweight small-probability events, the main prediction of prospect theory reverses close to the reference point as individuals become risk seeking in gains (lotteries) and risk-averse in losses (insurance).

Applications in Political Science

Prospect theory has been applied to a number of cases in political science, particularly in the area of

international relations, and also in the realm of comparative politics. In international relations, the theory has been invoked to try to explain decision making involving seemingly irrational risks, such as continuing to engage in sunk costs. In this way, prospect theory has been invoked to help explain the rescue mission of the hostages in Iran and the Cuban missile crisis, among other cases. In addition, in comparative politics, it has been used to explain the nature of risk in economic restructuring in Latin American countries.

The primary criticisms of prospect theory in political science regard the failure to provide an adequate theory of framing that explains how and why actors generate, seek, and employ the frames they use. Additional concerns relate to the external validity of the original experimental paradigm. This point would certainly find agreement among the original designers; Kahneman, at least, did not intend the work to be applied more broadly outside the narrow economic domain in which it was originally investigated. More recent critiques within psychology have focused on the way in which prospect theory provided a limited representation of human emotional and affective responses. Kahneman's more recent work has delved more heavily into the more hedonic aspects of human decision making, emphasizing well-being and happiness.

Some work has attempted to compare the predictions offered by rational choice and prospect theory models to anticipate the outcome of real-world political events, such as the outcome of the Northern Ireland Good Friday peace accords. Other recent work has attempted to synthesize and integrate the more cognitive approach advocated by prospect theory with a more evolutionary understanding of the sources of risk-variant preferences. Based on risk optimal foraging theory, subsistence goals may indeed be maximized by pursuing a strategy that prioritizes risk seeking under conditions of threat to survival in particular.

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See also International Relations, Theory; Political Psychology; Political Risk Analysis; Psychological Explanations of International Politics; Risk and Public Policy

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PROTECTIONISM

Protectionism refers to trade policies that attempt to restrict the inflow of foreign goods into a domestic market. These policies generally fall into two categories: tariff and nontariff barriers (NTBs) to trade. Protectionism diverges from the logic of maximizing economic efficiency characteristic of classical economic liberalism, instead focusing on advancing individual national interests more characteristic of classic mercantilism.

Historically, protectionism has been the norm in the international political economy. Most early-modern European states followed the principles of mercantilism, starting in the 16th century by attempting to maintain positive balances of trade with their trading partners, most readily reflected in their gold reserves. A large stockpile of gold meant that the state was a winner, while others were losers in this zero-sum approach to trade and national power. Great Britain's repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 is often seen as the first significant step toward free trade. Thereafter, protectionist policies waxed and waned, often in response to economic crises such as the Great Depression or the need by late industrializers to catch up in the development of their economies. The use of tariffs declined significantly after World War II, as the

United States and its allies launched the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) treaty framework, which would eventually become the World Trade Organization (WTO). The GATT and WTO have successfully reduced tariffs in most areas of trade and now concentrate on combating the rise of nontariff barriers to trade.

Theories of Protectionism

Most theories of protectionism focus on the demand for protection raised by pressure groups. In pressure group models, groups seek protectionism from the state to increase their incomes. The task for scholars has been to try to explain more specifically which groups will seek protection and under what conditions they will be successful in getting it. The theoretical basis for the source of trade preferences is usually traced to one of two models: Heckscher-Ohlin or Ricardo-Viner. The Heckscher-Ohlin model argues that factors of production (land, labor, capital) have very low specificity—thus, they move freely among sectors. If a country moves from free trade to protectionism, the income of factors in which a country is relatively scarce will rise, while the income will decline for factors in which a country is relatively abundant. According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, scarce factors will then demand protectionism, while abundant factors will oppose it. The Ricardo-Viner model posits that factor specificity is very high, thus factor income is industry or sector specific. The factors involved in import-competing sectors will therefore lose from free trade, while those attached to export-oriented sectors will gain income from free trade. Unfortunately, neither model explains how trade policy preferences are actually translated into political action.

Pressure group models require more than similar interests in increasing income to overcome the collective action problem associated with securing protectionism. If collective action were not a problem, then consumers who largely gain from free trade should easily organize to defeat any movement toward protectionism. Olson has suggested that small groups with specialized interests are easier to organize to secure rents from the state than large groups with diffuse interests, such as consumers. Geographic concentration and firm concentration are sometimes seen as useful proxies

for collective-action costs, since spatial proximity may reduce the costs of organizing to secure protectionism.

The supply of protectionism from the state is also a crucial piece of the puzzle, since it may help identify the conditions under which pressure groups may be successful in obtaining protection. Institutional features of the state along with policymaker preferences also affect the supply of protectionism. Studies have shown that policymakers' beliefs or ideas are critical in determining whether they will pursue protectionist policies. Others have shown that the state of the economy is critical in influencing the supply of protection from policymakers. A number of institutional aspects of the state may also influence the supply of protectionism, including the size of electoral districts, whether a country has a proportional representation or a majoritarian system, and whether a country has a parliamentary or a presidential system. Large electoral districts, proportional representation, and parliamentary systems are thought to insulate policymakers from protectionist pressures. The nature of the party system may affect changes in the status quo on trade policy as countries with highly fragmented or polarized party systems may be unable to initiate trade reform. Protectionism may also be more likely in presidential systems characterized by divided government—when one party controls the legislature and another, the executive. The administrative capacity of a state may affect its proclivity toward protectionism, as developing countries with poor capacity to extract direct taxes from their populations often rely heavily on trade taxes, which are much easier to collect from limited ports of entry. Some have also argued that democratic and autocratic regimes may have different proclivities for protectionism, though empirical studies are mixed.

Adherents of strategic trade theory argue that the state need not accept the dictates of comparative advantage under conditions of free trade. States might try to manipulate comparative advantage to produce a competitive advantage in a certain industry. This could involve the formulation of an industrial policy and the use of protectionism to support domestic producers in an imperfect market such that they will reap the benefits of production and yield spillover effects in the domestic economy. This type of policy falls under the general category

of neo-mercantilism, with the state taking an active role in selecting industries, often so-called infant industries, that need protection as they mature to compete in global markets. Many developing countries experimented with import substitution industrialization (ISI). The logic was to produce a domestic industry in some sector where one did not previously exist in any meaningful way. The main problem faced by these neo-mercantilist approaches is that it is often hard for a state to know how to pick an industry that will eventually be competitive. Many ISI ventures ended in mounting government debt and inefficient industries that never could compete on the world market. Once protectionism is supplied to support such ventures, the demand for them also tends to be locked in place, since they will be reluctant to relinquish the economic benefits.

Types of Protectionism

Despite the decline in the number and costs of tariffs due to multilateral efforts organized under the GATT/WTO, a number of other forms of NTB protectionism remain, including subsidies, quotas, exchange rate manipulation, and labor, health, and quality control protections. Despite the general reduction in tariffs, countries are often still able to enact policies to protect their own nation's industries from foreign competition.

Tariffs

Tariffs are the most common and best known form of protectionism. A tariff artificially increases the cost of a good. The most common form of tariff is an import tariff. Import tariffs put an additional price, either a percentage of the good's value or an absolute amount, on foreign imports. This increases the costs of foreign goods and provides domestic firms with an advantage in cost production. Since domestic products do not face this tax, they are able to sell products at a lower price and for more profit than foreign competitors.

Subsidies

Subsidies can also be used as a form of protectionism. The two basic forms are direct or indirect subsidies. Direct subsidies are payments from the

government directly to producers. Indirect subsidies include government price guarantees, tax exemptions, and other forms of payment that are not direct subsidies. This allows producers to sell products at a lower price than foreign competitors, making them artificially competitive.

Quotas

Quotas are quantitative limits to the number of items that are permitted to be imported by a country. Quotas can be compulsory or voluntary. Compulsory quotas are enforced by government officials. Actors who attempt to exceed the quota are smugglers. Voluntary quotas are agreements between a government and foreign manufacturers of a specific number of goods that are to be sold within a country. Foreign producers may agree to this in order to extract large rents from the limited quantity of goods or in order to have access to the market for fear of even greater protectionist policies. Domestic interests may agree to quotas to limit the overall competition. Voluntary quotas are sometimes known as voluntary export restraints (VERs).

Exchange Rate Manipulation

Countries that do not have floating currencies can artificially depress or inflate the value of their currency. Long-term attempts to depress currency make it more difficult for foreign competitors to compete with the low costs of domestic goods while at the same time increasing the costs of foreign goods.

Labor, Health, and Quality Controls

Labor, health, and quality controls can also be used as a form of protectionism. These standards are sometimes used as ways to restrict foreign competition from entering a domestic market. Claims of mistreatment of labor can be used by domestic labor groups to pressure the government to restrict the importation of goods. Health standards may be employed even when there is dubious scientific risk associated with the imported products. Quality control measures can be similarly employed. In addition, quality control units may be understaffed, protracting the length of time

between a product's arrival and its sale. While each of these reasons can be used by countries in a justifiable manner, it can often be difficult to parse out the difference between such instances and the occasions when states create artificially high standards or requirements to restrict or eliminate foreign competition.

Many of these different types of protectionism are quite controversial. As was stated with labor, health, and quality controls, it can sometimes be quite difficult to differentiate between malicious and virtuous intentions. Furthermore, different countries have differing values; standards or assistance at a level that is acceptable in one country may be perceived as clearly subversive among trade partners. As such, each of these is a major point of contention in trade negotiations.

Last, differing types of protectionism may be employed in different sectors. Nearly all countries limit foreign competition in areas of national interest. What those national interests are varies by country. These can include, but are not limited to, areas related to national defense, agriculture, resource extraction, and others.

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See also Mercantilism; Trade Liberalization; World Trade Organization (WTO)

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PROTEST MOVEMENTS

See Social Movements

PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Psychological explanations of international politics focus on the impact of cognition and emotion on choice. Through the analysis of decision making, political psychologists have explored a wide range of topics that are central to international politics: the onset of war, nuclear strategy, deterrence and reassurance, signaling and bargaining, conflict management and conflict resolution, and peace. Recent neuroscientific research on emotion is changing the analysis of foreign policy decision making and rational choice. This entry looks first at psychological theories of decision making. Second, it examines the consequences of new understandings of decision making for strategic models of interaction. Third, the entry looks at the contribution of psychological explanations to the analysis of collective beliefs and moods on international political issues.

Cognition and Emotion in Decision Making

The Cognitive Revolution

Forty years ago, psychologists started a “cognitive revolution” as they rejected simple behaviorist models and looked again at the way cognition shaped the choices people make. Although this was not its original purpose, the cognitive revolution can be understood largely as a commentary on the limits of rational choice. Much of the early work accepted rational choice as the default position and then demonstrated its boundaries. Research has now cumulated to show that people rarely conform to the expectations of the rational model and that these deviations are not random but systematic.

Cognitive psychology has demonstrated important differences between the expectations of rational decision models and the processes of attribution, estimation, judgment, and choice that people

frequently use. It explains these differences by the need for simple rules of information processing and judgment to make sense of environments that are both uncertain and complex. People have a preference for simplicity; they are averse to ambiguity and dissonance; and they misunderstand fundamentally the essence of probability. And people have risk profiles that depart from what models of rational choice would expect; according to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, we are far more averse to loss than we are to gain-seeking. Together, these attributes compromise the capacity for rational choice.

Robert Jervis posits that political leaders making decisions about the world need to order their world and make a very complex world somewhat simpler. When they look to the past to learn about the future, political leaders tend to draw simple one-to-one analogies without qualifying conditions. In 1991, President George H. W. Bush called Saddam Hussein “another Hitler,” with little attention to what was different either about the two men or about Iraq in 1990 and Germany in 1938. Yet fitting Saddam into an existing frame through the use of analogical reasoning gave the president a readily accessible script about how to respond to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

Cognitive psychologists have produced robust evidence that people strongly prefer consistency, that they are made uncomfortable by dissonant information, and that they consequently deny or discount information that is inconsistent with their beliefs to preserve them. This drive for consistency impairs the processes of estimation and judgment. The well-established tendency to discount inconsistent information contributes significantly to the persistence of beliefs. Political leaders in the United States were generally resistant to changing their beliefs about the Soviet Union after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power with a reform agenda. Three years after he became the general secretary, senior policymakers were arguing that his strategy was to lull the West while the Soviet Union recovered.

Cognitive processes of attribution can also confound policy making. One of the most pervasive biases is the fundamental attribution error, where people exaggerate the importance of dispositional over situational factors in explaining the disliked behavior of others but explain their own behavior

by the situational constraints that they face. When explaining behavior that they like, they simply reverse the pattern of inference. When the government of North Korea makes a concession in the talks about its nuclear program, leaders in Washington see that concession as a function of the situational constraints Pyongyang faces but explain their own willingness to participate in the talks as evidence of their disposition to search for a peaceful compromise. The double standard in reasoning is clear.

Cognitive psychology has generated robust evidence that loss is more painful than comparable gain is pleasant. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky found that leaders tend to be risk-averse when things are going well and relatively risk acceptant when things are going badly, when they face a crisis in which they are likely to lose or have lost something that matters to them. Leaders are also likely to take greater risk to protect what they already have—the endowment effect—than to increase their gains. They are also likely to take greater risk to reverse losses, to recapture what they once held, than they would to make new gains. And when decision makers suffer a significant loss, they are far slower to adjust to these losses than they would be to incorporate gains. These general findings apply directly to foreign policy choices. President Sadat of Egypt, for example, never “normalized” for the loss of the Sinai to Israel in 1967. Even though Israel had an obvious advantage in military capabilities, Sadat was undeterred and highly motivated to recapture the Sinai; thus, he launched a high-risk war in 1973, which was designed to begin a political process of negotiation with Israel that would restore the Sinai to Egypt.

Emotion, Cognition, and Choice

New research in neuroscience is revolutionizing the understanding of the relationship between emotion, cognition, and decision. Two results stand out. First, many decisions seem to be the result not of a deliberative thought process but of preconscious neurological processes. Second, emotion is primary and plays a dominant role in choice.

Emotions are adaptive programs of action that have evolved over time to ensure survival and then

reproduction. A useful way of thinking about emotion and cognition is to see affective processes as those that address the go/no-go questions, while cognitive processes are those that answer true/false questions. Choice clearly invokes both kinds of processes. Establishing truth claims about states of the world is usually not enough for people to make a choice. What people value is an emotional as well as a cognitive process, and both are important in whether they decide to approach or avoid making a choice. Hence, emotion carries utility. The new field of neuro-economics is beginning to conceive utility as something one experiences subjectively.

There is an ongoing and vigorous debate among psychologists, neuroscientists, and behavioral economists about the relationship between affect and cognition. Three approaches are particularly relevant. The first is the somatic marker hypothesis, the second is the affect-as-appraisal hypothesis, and the third is affect-as-information. Each understands the relationship between emotion and cognition differently.

The first argues that the information people receive through their senses, which they experience physiologically, creates emotions that then cue decision and action. These physiological experiences, or somatic markers, create learned emotional responses that allow people to decide quickly what should be approached and what should be avoided, notes Antonio Damasio. In the early stages of decision making, emotions are primary.

The appraisal approach to emotion is quite different. It reflects the long-standing view that cognition precedes emotion. It is thoughts that evoke feelings. The cognitive process of appraising—a treaty, a leader, a new institution—as good or bad elicits an emotion. This approach is inconsistent with that of neuroscientists who see emotion as primary and as the carrier of value.

A third approach, presented by Gerald Clore and Karen Gasper, treats affect as information. Emotions carry information to people about their unconscious processes, which then become conscious thoughts and feelings and an input into the decisions they face. In this sense, emotion does not follow cognitive appraisal but creates appraisals through the information it provides.

Affective and cognitive processes can collaborate or compete. At low levels of intensity, affect appears to play a largely “advisory” role; it

provides information about cognitive processes. At intermediate levels of intensity, people begin to become conscious of a conflict between cognitive and affective inputs and the struggle for self-control. At high levels of intensity, affect can be so powerful that it short-circuits thought and moves to action. Emotion precedes cognition and can swamp cognition. Only after the fact can people reflect on the choices that they made.

Emotion and Cognition as Explanations of Strategic Interaction

Emotion is a core driver in theories of decision making, with significant consequences for the understanding of foreign policy decision making. Psychological explanations of foreign policy choice have been extended to strategic interaction in international politics. The credibility of signals, an essential component in theories of deterrence, compellence, and bargaining, is not only a property of the sender, as some formal models of signaling suggest, but also a function of the beliefs of the receiver, notes Jonathan Mercer. These beliefs are not only cognitive but emotional as well. The emotional cues that signals evoke—such as fear and anger—matter insofar as these emotions then prompt beliefs and action in turn. Research demonstrates that fear prompts uncertainty and risk-averse action, while anger prompts certainty and risk acceptance. Threats that evoke fear are likely to prompt hesitancy and a risk-averse response; that is the purpose of most deterrent threats. Frightening threats are less likely to be successful, however, when they are designed to compel adversarial leaders to act. And threats that humiliate are likely to evoke anger and provoke the risk-acceptant response that a threat-based strategy is designed to avoid. Threat-based strategies consequently become much more complex and dangerous to design and implement.

Research also demonstrates that credibility, a fundamental component of theories of action in international politics, is emotional as well as cognitive. Credibility is not simply a function of either the cost of the signal or past behavior, as some theories of bargaining claim. It is an emotional belief that is held by its intended receiver. Russia's credibility is not only a function of what its leaders say and do, or have said and done, but what

Georgia's leaders believe Moscow will say and do. Psychological explanations call into question reputational models based exclusively on the past behavior of states or on the costliness of signals. They give theoretical weight to the pattern of inference leaders make and build in emotion as the primary driver of assessment in the early stages of decision making.

Emotion, Cognition, and Collective Beliefs

Psychological models explain not only leaders' choices and the interactive sequencing of these choices across a range of domains in international politics but also collective beliefs and moods. Epidemiological and viral models help explain the diffusion of emotion from an individual to a larger group. The spread of emotions from one individual to another is similar to other contagious processes.

Trust and confidence are central to workings of the international order. Confidence and trust are emotional states, an indicator of optimism about the future. They are also cognitive, one person's sense of how confident others are and their perceptions of how confident still others are. An individual's mood is in part a function of the mood of others, and in this sense, it is as reasonable to speak of a collective mood as it is to speak of shared norms. Psychological models speak to both collective beliefs and collective moods. Emotions, political psychologists argue, constitute feelings and moods that can be powerful spurs to action in international politics or can lead to panic and withdrawal.

Nationalism is an emotional belief, an attachment to one's society that is evoked by emotional cues and expressed through emotional identification with the collective. Mobilizational appeals to nationalist loyalty for both constructive and destructive purposes are emotional, phrased as "love of the motherland [or fatherland]." Slobodan Milosevic's appeal to Serb nationalism, for example, invoked past humiliations and grievances in an effort to mobilize anger and support for action. The onset of ethnic war in the former Yugoslavia cannot be understood without referencing the "emotional entrepreneurship" of the Serbian political leader.

Psychological models explain both individual and collective behavior in international politics.

Research in neuroscience is bringing emotion back into the analysis of international politics across a wide variety of issues. The research challenge will be to connect psychological processes to political and institutional streams and to identify and explain the amplifying feedback loops.

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See also Bargaining; Credible Commitment; Experiments, Laboratory; Foreign Policy Analysis; Judicial Decision Making; Nationalism; Nationalist Movements; Nuclear Proliferation; Prospect Theory; Rational Choice; Rationality, Bounded; Utilitarianism

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PUBLIC BUDGETING

Public budgeting allocates public resources. This allocation function means that budgeting lies at the very heart of politics. Who gets what and when from the government in financial terms is what politicians and publics alike care about. It is distinct from "private" budgeting in several respects. First, in all but one-person dictatorships, public budgeting is a collective decision. The processes

used to make decisions vary. Second, decision makers do not spend their own money. They must raise these funds somehow. The most common device is taxation. Governments may also make money from the management of public property, such as land or firms, as well as from profits that arise from the sale of public resources, such as copper or oil. They may also borrow money to fund current expenses. Finally, the question of whether budgeted funds are being used in the public interest is an ongoing theme that a private individual or firm does not usually confront.

Decision Making in Public Budgeting

The fact that public budgets arise from a collective decision presents several challenges. First, consider the lessons from the formal theory literature about the multidimensionality of a policy space. A policy dimension, to be clear, is simply one line on which one can rank a given option. The traditional dimension used in many studies is a simple left-right one, but in budgeting, one can imagine many such dimensions that correspond to spending on a given subject. One person may want the government to spend a lot on health care but only a little on defense, for example. The formal theory literature tells us that when one can line up the preferences of actors along one dimension, there is a stable outcome that arises from a simple majority vote. When one has multiple dimensions, however, several outcomes are usually possible. Moreover, these outcomes are not “stable”; that is, they will lose to one or more other feasible outcomes, which in turn are not stable either.

All this means that the rules that structure the way decisions are taken on the budget are crucial. If the rule is to stop consideration of the budget after just one vote, then one would want to know who gets to decide the content of that vote. This “agenda setter” will have the ability to select an outcome closest to his or her preferred outcome even though there may be other outcomes that can beat it in a one-to-one majority vote. To move beyond this rather abstract discussion to practical implications, a student of public budgeting will want to know who has the right to propose a given budget, what the rules are to change the budget, how high the threshold is to pass the budget, and what happens if the institutions fail to pass the

budget. For example, the president may propose the budget, a congress will then consider the budget, and the budget may then have to be passed with only a simple majority to become law. In a country such as Chile, the president does propose the budget, the congress does not have the right to make amendments that raise aggregate spending beyond what the president proposes, it takes a simple majority in congress to pass the budget, and the president’s budget simply becomes law if the congress cannot pass it. In this case, the president is easily the most important player in the budget process. This contrasts with a country such as Paraguay, where the congress can make whatever amendments it wants to the president’s budget and where the default budget is the previous year’s budget rather than the one the president proposed. In this case, the congress has a stronger hand to play.

The decision-making rules have additional importance when one considers that government is spending not its money but someone else’s money. Assume that politicians do a simple cost-benefit analysis for the people who support them. The politician cares about the benefits of additional spending and the costs of additional taxation only with respect to his or her constituency. Assume as well that taxes go into a common revenue pool and do take the form of “user fees” so that there is a direct correspondence between spending and costs. Under such conditions, one can imagine a situation where a given constituency receives the benefits of spending but pays only a tiny fraction of the costs. For example, consider an agriculture minister who worries only about the interests of farmers. The government provision of subsidies to the farm industry may equal \$1 billion, but the total additional tax the farmers pay for this is only \$10 million. In the literature, this situation is known as a “common pool resource problem.”

Once again, the decision-making process is crucial. If the agriculture minister determines spending programs for farmers, he or she will allocate more spending than in the case where he or she considers the full tax implications of his or her decision. If the budget is then simply the sum of the requests of ministers who worry only about narrow constituencies, spending will be higher than the ministers themselves would want if they could make the entire budget on their own. One can imagine a different outcome if there is an actor

in the process whose job is to worry about the entire tax burden and not just the burden on a specific constituency. In practice, this person is usually the finance minister. But it is not strictly necessary to give all budgetary power to a finance minister. Negotiations among decision makers can also lead to full consideration of the tax burden so long as they do not take the form of “logrolls” of different proposals, that is, so long as the parties involved consider the full burden of their spending decisions and do not simply vote for each others’ proposals.

One technique to centralize the budget process that one sees increasingly is top-down budgeting. The idea is that one should first vote on a total amount of spending before deciding on the distribution of that amount according to different spending categories. This is in contrast to bottom-up budgeting, where one votes on each item and then simply aggregates them all to get the total budget. The top-down system, for example, was instituted in the Swedish parliament in the mid-1990s for all budget votes. Whether this procedure really leads to lower spending and—as a consequence—better aggregate fiscal discipline is open to question. In an influential theoretical article, John Ferejohn and Keith Krehbiel illustrate that the combination of preferences among the relevant voters decides whether the top-down or the bottom-up process leads to a smaller aggregate budget.

There is less controversy about the desirability of budget transparency. When it is easy for the public to follow what the government is doing, it is difficult for policymakers to use “tricks” to make figures appear rosier than they really are. It is also easier to cut spending if one knows about it. James Alt and David Dryer Lassen indicate that the way states provide information on the budget, whether there is independent verification of budget figures, whether there is use of arbitrary language, and whether there is required text that justifies different parts of the budget, are connected to fiscal outcomes. Countries with more transparent budget systems have higher levels of fiscal discipline.

Public budgeting also involves a temporal element where institutions also play a role. For example, it is common for politicians to promise immediate spending but to delay the “pain” of the costs. One way to do this is through public borrowing. The government in this case runs a budget

deficit and carries debt on its books that it will have to repay later. Another way the temporal element matters is when a benefit is promised to a specific group that is small at first but that is projected to grow over time so that the costs also grow. Public pensions are a prime example of this dynamic. Many countries have populations that are aging. The number of people who will be entitled to a public pension will increase while the number who will be paying into a given system will decline. Such a scenario is one where the pension system is designed as “pay go,” where workers pay for a benefit that is given today in the expectation that they will receive that same benefit at some future date. Public budgeting involves decisions about how to structure such systems. Australia, for example, created a type of sovereign wealth fund that invests public money today in the expectation that it will be able to cover the pensions of an increased number of retirees tomorrow.

An increasingly important part of budgeting therefore involves multiannual planning. Annual budgets with no planning encourage shortsightedness and overspending for the reasons given above. They also tend to make a government fairly conservative in its assessment of what it is doing—one cannot recognize the future impact of today’s incremental changes. There are also types of spending that are inherently multiannual. Capital expenditures, for example, are often on items that take several years to build. There may also be contingencies, such as loan guarantees or bank recapitalizations, that do not appear in an annual budget but that should be included in decision making. The traditional way to plan would be to set multiyear plans with fixed projections. The plan in this case is indicative only; that is, it forecasts what will happen if there are no changes in current spending obligations.

Trends in Public Financing

A trend in the public finance field is to move planning toward medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs). One first determines an overall constraint for the period that is based on anticipated revenues. One then looks at the expected spending at the agency/ministerial level. There should be a clear distinction between ongoing and new programs. There should also be measures to

produce savings in low-priority areas that can create fiscal “space” for ministries to reallocate funds where appropriate. A good example is that of the Australian government, which begins with a baseline projection and provides forward rolling estimates of spending for the next 3 years. The country’s Department of Finance then updates these plans. While the goal is to get decision makers in government to consider the temporal implications of their actions, the law also requires the government to provide an update of this framework to voters 3 months before an election.

While several international economic organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, have suggested that countries adopt such medium-term expenditure frameworks, one should also be aware of the prerequisites for such planning. A country needs to have enough macroeconomic stability so that revenue and expenditure predictions can be made with some accuracy. Politicians have to agree to use the frameworks. There also has to be core capacity in different ministries to do the planning.

The focus so far has been on the decision-making process that is involved in making the public budget, but how the money is spent is another important topic that is increasingly making its way into even the initial decision-making stages. This brings us to the standards that one uses to make the evaluation. The first standard is usually a fiduciary one, namely, whether the budget upholds fiscal discipline and, ultimately, whether the state is solvent. The second standard concerns allocative efficiency. Does the state budget reflect government priorities? The third standard is operational efficiency. The state should not pay too much for the services and goods it provides its citizens.

This then begs the question of what one should evaluate. One can assess a budget according to its inputs, or how much is spent on each budget category, but increasingly governments are assessing budgets according to their outputs, or even outcomes. The examples here illustrate the differences among the three concepts. The amount of money a city spends on its police force is an input. The number of police personnel would be the output, while the overall crime level would be the outcome. Concerns about fiscal discipline usually focus on inputs and discuss the budget balance as well as the debt burden of the state. Here are some

of the questions regarding fiscal discipline that one may need to answer: Who finances any debt that is generated? How much interest does the state pay on that debt? Is the government credible enough to be able to repay it at some point in the future? Discussions of allocative efficiency can also look at inputs, but generally, a detailed discussion of both forms of efficiency requires some knowledge about both outputs and outcomes.

“Performance budgeting” is perhaps *the* hot topic in budget circles these days, and countries have in practice adopted different techniques under this heading to get at output and outcomes. The simplest form of this technique is when information on targets or results is included as part of the budget documentation, but it is really only background information in practice. Performance-informed budget, in contrast, means that information enters the budget process but it does not have any real effect on how resources are allocated. A true direct-performance system allocates future resources depending on the achievement of specific goals. For example, there may be an expectation that a school district educate a minimum number of students, and if it does not, it will lose funds to districts that educate more students.

A historical example illustrates how the system can work. In the 1950s, the different branches of the U.S. military generally decided how many tanks, aircraft carriers, and other equipment they needed. President John F. Kennedy’s defense secretary, Robert McNamara, instituted a new budgeting system known as the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). It extended the planning horizons from 1 to 5 years. It also instituted planning that asked what the threat was the U.S. military was supposed to address, what the appropriate force mix should be given the threat, and what funding should be allocated to develop that force mix. While there has been some retrenchment on this system, it had a practical political effect of moving some of the “power” from the joint chiefs of staff, which was composed of the heads of each branch of the military, to the civilian leadership in the Department of Defense.

Some variation of performance budgeting has appeared in many countries over the past 2 decades, and their experiences have raised a series of challenges. One issue concerns the information that is needed to do performance budgeting. It is often

costly to generate, and some items are easier to assess than others. Moreover, one would ideally like to have information that allows one to estimate whether different levels of expenditure generate different levels of results, and such information is hard to get. Finally, there are monitoring issues. If it is in the best interests of a given school to project good performance, for example, and the school authorities collect the information themselves, how can one be sure that the less flattering information is indeed passed along to policymakers?

The number and type of output- or outcome-based targets can also overwhelm policymakers. Richard Hughes indicates that the United Kingdom (UK) had more than 300 performance targets and more than 600 specific targets when it introduced the Labour government's version of performance budgeting in 1998, and politicians and bureaucrats alike were overwhelmed. Prime Minister Tony Blair decided to focus on the 35 he found the most important, and in practice, the number of targets has declined after each spending review to only 30 in 2007. While France included more than 1,000 targets in its first budget after it adopted performance-based budgeting in 2006, one suspects that the number of targets ultimately will decrease in this country as well.

Finally, to collect all the data necessary to do performance budgeting, to evaluate performance, to adjust spending given that performance, and to update targets takes a professional, and competent, bureaucracy. Countries that have adopted performance budgeting and that have generally found the approach worthwhile have had some of the best bureaucracies in the world. As Allen Schick notes, such countries generally have decent budgeting systems anyway and are probably the least in need of performance budgeting in the first place. According to Salvator Schiavo-Campo, Ghana is one country where such budgeting techniques may have been doomed from the start. The African country set more than 2,500 targets in the late 1990s, or several times the number of accountants in the public sector, and the most important item in the budget, personnel expenditure, was not included at all.

Joining performance budgeting are other trends, such as private finance initiatives, that blur the difference between "public" and "private" budgeting. Consider who should pay for the construction

and maintenance of a bridge. Traditionally, the government would build the bridge, maintain it, and—if it chose to charge a toll—receive any revenues. This meant that the government was responsible for raising the money for bridge construction. It also bore any risks associated with the bridge, be they bad weather that delayed the finish date to the effects of saltwater on the durability of the materials used. The government faces a constraint from its revenue base on how many investment projects it can build and maintain. In recent years, private finance initiatives have brought the private sector into such projects. Generally, the private sector arranges the financing from private capital markets. It also bears the risks from the construction phase onward. Many such arrangements also assign the maintenance of the investment to the private sector. In exchange, the private part of the arrangement gets the revenues from the investment for a fixed amount of time.

Such private finance initiatives have become widespread in the UK, but one also finds them in other countries, such as Germany. Because the arrangements do require fairly large-scale private financing, they depend on stable, and liquid, capital markets. The financial crisis that began in 2007 put some of these arrangements in jeopardy, and in the UK, the state had to bail out the private sector and assume the remaining risk from a given project. This development begged the question about how "private" such initiatives are in practice.

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See also Agenda Setting; Budgeting, Rational Models; Performance Management; Tax Policy; Tragedy of the Commons; Voting Rules, Electoral Effects of

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PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

Public employment has many aspects depending on the level one is considering. It has a role in national economy and national employment, in the public sector generally, and at the level of public institutions such as ministries and agencies. This entry describes the nature of public employment and its significance in government and society.

Public Employment in the Economy

The role of public employment varies substantially depending on the role of the state in society. In countries following the model of a welfare state, such as the Nordic countries, the share of public sector and public employment can be quite high—30% of the national economy or even higher. Any numerical estimation of the size of public employment involves a number of assumptions. For example, it is important to know what percentage

of public employment is composed of those employed by the armed forces, because this share of employment is considered to be outside the working force. Also, given the complex relationships now involved in the delivery of many public services, it has become more difficult to determine who is in the public sector and who is outside.

In less developed countries, the role of public employment in the national economy is usually much smaller, in part because it fulfills different functions. On the one hand, the public sector plays a more significant role in development functions such as education and in social and health policy. On the other hand, the limited resources available to the public sector do not permit these countries to employ many public servants. Also, patronage and clientelism in many of these systems may prevent hiring of employees through the merit systems that are more typical of industrialized democracies. The politicization of public service creates both management problems and difficulties in providing equitable public services.

Public Employment in the Political System

The structure of the public sector determines where the bulk of public employment will occur. In federal states, the central government may be relatively small compared with that found in unitary systems. For example, in Germany, the central government has small policy-making ministries. On the other hand, in a centralized regime such as France, central government employees include elementary and secondary school teachers.

Public employment reflects the internal structure of the policy sectors in the public sector. Under each ministerial sector, there are agencies, regional units, and local units, which together form administrative sectors. For instance, under the Ministry of Interior, there are the police forces, the front guards, and different kinds of organizations that are responsible for the security of the country. These organizations have employees, such as police and fire personnel and the like, who belong to the public employment sector. The number of ministries and associated functions vary among countries, but typically, the number of ministerial sectors ranges from 10 to 20. The size of employment varies greatly from sector to sector. In welfare states, the largest sectors are social affairs, health care affairs, and education

(schools and universities). As each country has developed, the size of its ministerial sectors has also changed as a result of the modernization or development process. For instance, during the initial period of rail and public road construction, the number of public employees in the traffic and communication sectors was very high, but today it has decreased. Thus, public employment to some extent can be used as an indicator of the priorities of government and the desire of the public sector to control important policy sectors.

General rules and steering systems within the public sector and governments have organized public employment into a common system. These public employment systems generally contain several categories of public employees, which are more or less governed by formal rules. In these systems, civil servants play a major role. These employees tend to be in a defined career and to be governed by laws that are distinct from other labor laws in the society. Unless they fail woefully in their tasks or are guilty of malfeasance, civil servants in particular may have secure employment for a lifetime. In many civil service systems, rewards for office are also strictly defined by law. This more secure position of the civil servant follows Max Weber's model of neutrality of civil servants.

Additionally, there are other public employees whose position in the public employment system is not as legally formalized as that of civil servants. School teachers, nurses, and doctors usually belong to this group of public employees. These employees may have some of the protections of civil service law but often are employed either as professionals or under ordinary labor law. Furthermore, many of these employees have only a tenuous relationship with the public sector because the institutions for which they work (e.g., hospitals, universities, etc.) are managed as autonomous organizations rather than as components of the public sector per se.

Since the 1970s, in modern national states such as most European countries and many others around the world, national-level steering systems have been created to tackle public employment policy issues. In the most developed countries, the formal rules of public employment may be controlled by both legislation and negotiation systems. These systems, which include rules for negotiating salaries and other work conditions of public employees, complement civil service laws that fix the legal

position of public employees. These systems help develop better relationships between public employer organizations and trade unions for negotiations. In many countries, such negotiation systems have provided not only public employees but also civil servants the right to strike. Traditionally, civil servants did not have the right to strike.

Especially since the 1980s, new public management (NPM) has created a more flexible framework for public sector employees. The number of ordinary civil servants has decreased, while at the same time, greater numbers of public employees have been hired on contracts, following private sector labor laws. In many countries, with more people moving in and out of the public sector, there is a decline in the number of people opting for a career in civil service. This has meant increasing similarities and closer contacts between public and private working life, which has resulted in a better understanding of the obligations of public employees.

In fact, a small core group of civil servants, and the legislative systems built around their position, provides a national profile for public employment. In developed countries, there are competing profiles of the core civil servants. The British system is famous for its civil servants, who are politically neutral but are increasingly being managed by rules more similar to those in the private sector. The French system is widely known for its career civil servants, who are educated in the best Parisian lycées and universities and have received training at the publicly run *École Nationale d'Administration* (ENA). One can also distinguish the German profile, in which a legal education and the organization culture of *Rechtsstaat* have played a prominent role. In the Nordic countries, the neutrality and legal basis of civil servant activities are emphasized, but recruitment and career development are moving toward open hiring, by which anyone who has the necessary qualifications can be appointed to the civil service.

In addition to the issues of politicization in public employment mentioned above, the issue of representativeness also can undermine the effectiveness of the public sector. Especially, for street-level bureaucrats in contact with clients, the extent to which the public bureaucracy is representative of society in social and gender terms will influence the success of government in delivering programs as well as the legitimacy of the political system.

Administrative Traditions and Public Employment

Public employment systems vary from continent to continent. The traditional system in Europe has, however, had a wide impact on the general development of public employment traditions all over the world. Colonialization has also had a role in spreading European public employment systems, especially in the African and Asian countries that once belonged to the British Empire or had been under the regime of France. The British tradition of civil service, however, had a wide impact in countries that have similar or related administrative traditions, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

In today's world, the development of public employment is often identified with the British (including that of the British Empire and its former colonies) and the continental European traditions. In wider historical consideration, one must not forget the Chinese mandarin tradition, the traditions of Egypt, and those of ancient Greece or Rome. Historical traditions of France, traditions from the Great Revolution and the so-called Napoleonic tradition, have also had a great impact in the development of modern public employment traditions. The fundamentals of modern public employment from cameralistic administrative arts to Weberian *Rechtstaat* are derived from German traditions. The Nordic welfare state ideal has brought into the public employment tradition the demands of public service orientation and the role of civil servants as service-oriented staff responsible for high-quality public services in social and health care and in education.

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See also Political Culture; Representative Bureaucracy

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PUBLIC GOODS

Unlike private goods, which the market can produce and sell, public goods are ones that people can freely use and share with others. A pure public good is nonexcludable (people cannot be excluded from its use) and joint in consumption or nonrival (use by one person will not reduce its availability to others). This entry describes the nature of public goods and contrasts the approaches to them taken by economists and political scientists. When allocating public or semipublic goods by means of the coercive powers of the state—legislation, budgeting, and taxation—governments have to handle the problematic of these goods, including tax evasion (free riding), oversupply (rent seeking), and undersupply (preference distortions), as well as allocation and distribution in trade-offs. The entry examines these phenomena and concludes with a look at the allocation of common goods in a global context.

Public Goods and Public Finance

Since the identification and conceptualization of this special set of goods or services by Italian public finance scholars in the 19th century, public goods have attracted a lot of theoretical interest from both economists and political scientists. Whereas in economics the question of the optimal supply of public goods has dominated the concern with these goods and services, which differ from private goods as conceptualized in market theory, political scientists have looked at how goods and services with the characteristics of public goods are allocated in domestic as well as international political systems. The political preoccupation with public goods has led to inter alia theories of collective action, free riding, and transaction costs.

The theory of public goods offers an economic approach to public policy making and implementation, suggesting criteria that public programs should fulfill, derived from conceptions of market failure and collective-action difficulties. It targets the allocation of public services as well as the regulation of the economy, disregarding distributive aspects. Although its basic model of an optimal supply of public goods offers an ideal-type construction bypassing transaction costs, opportunism, and

bounded rationality, it still captures the essence of the state as the guardian of law and order, financing its operations with taxation.

Nature of Public and Semipublic Goods

A pure public good is characterized by nonexcludability and jointness in consumption, or “lumpiness,” meaning that people can enjoy it without paying for it and share it whole with others. The two properties of nonexcludability and lumpiness create market failure, as pure private goods are excludable by the price mechanism and completely appropriable. Impure or mixed public goods have either nonexcludability or nonappropriability but not both. Nonexcludability is also called externalities (external effects), and nonappropriability involves economies of scale (natural monopoly). Public safety and defense are pure public goods, whereas environmental resources (“common pool” goods), such as water in a river, which are open to all but can be depleted by use, are semipublic goods, as are those supplied through infrastructure (“common club” goods), such as toll roads—individuals must pay for access, but use does not deplete such goods. According to Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler (1996), there are both positive and negative externalities, and the extent of scale economies varies, as one speaks of global, national, regional, and local public goods.

Problematic With Public Goods

No single person has any incentive to supply public goods, since he or she cannot internalize all its benefits. And once a public good has been supplied, the best strategy for an individual is to free ride on it. Since the allocation of public goods faces market failure, they invite government intervention. The key question is “How and in what form should government support or manage the allocation of public goods?” Government tends to allocate pure public goods through its bureaucracy, in order to regulate the externalities by agencies and to undo natural monopolies by policies of deregulation, privatization, and leveling the playing field. However, when government corrects for market failures, then the risk of government failure arises, as the public good is captured by rent-seeking actors.

Optimal Supply of Public Goods

Efficient allocation of public goods requires that the willingness of people to pay for the lumpy good cover the cost of its provision. This can be achieved only by summing individuals’ willingness to pay through some process of aggregation. A voluntary supply of public goods is theoretically imaginable (by way of demand revelation schemes, through which people indicate their desire for a good by indicating how much they are willing to pay for it), but when the number of people demanding the public good increases, then transaction costs quickly become prohibitive. To avoid free riding and preference distortion as well as delaying tactics, government replaces the voluntary mechanism with state authority. One may argue that the first theoretician of public goods was Thomas Hobbes, who regarded safety as a country’s most important public good.

Real-Life Distortions With Public Goods

The allocation of public goods—pure or impure—is in practical terms at the core of the political process, as government at various levels in the political system engages in policy making and implementation of programs having the characteristics of public goods. The aggregation procedure for summing up the willingness to pay for public goods is in reality the democratic procedure, or elections as well as legislative budgeting and taxation. Thus, party politics and coalition politics basically provide the set of possible demands for public goods, whether pure or impure.

In democratic politics, the allocation of public goods may be combined with distributional policies, with policy combinations that are conducive to fiscal illusions involving the over- or undersupply of public goods. The rational strategy for the citizen is to free ride on the supply of public goods, minimizing as much as possible his or her contribution to covering their costs. The efficient prices for public goods—“Lindahl tax prices”—are not feasible due to preference revelation distortions and free riding. Thus, government imposes taxes and borrows money as needed to pay for the lumpy goods allocated to the entire political community. There is no guarantee that what a citizen is willing to pay will equal what he or she is forced to pay—the Lindahl tax price. The allocation of public

goods has distribution consequences with regard to both their benefits and their costs. Thus, public goods involve more political than strictly economic concerns. This is true for both supply and demand.

On the supply side, public goods contracts tend to be lucrative for private entrepreneurs. Deciding how to allocate these contracts, worth millions or billions of dollars, involves a tendering/bidding process that is very difficult to fully institutionalize in accordance with a transparent competition regime. Politicians are easily “captured” by various enterprises, looking for rent in the construction of lumpy goods—see, for example, Robert Caro’s (2002) descriptions of Lyndon Baines Johnson’s rise to power and Senate dominance. Charles Rowley, Robert Tollison, and Gordon Tullock’s (1988) theory of rent seeking suggests that government contractors are willing to pay almost all of the economic rent captured in campaign contributions and the like.

Externalities (Nonexcludability)

External effects call for public policies, demoting negative ones and promoting positive ones. Since the social benefits or costs are not captured by market prices, there is market failure and thus a reason for government intervention. The key question is how much should government spend on generating social benefits, and how much should it impose as social costs? The theory of cost–benefit analysis was intended as a rational answer to this query, but it has proven difficult to target policy making so that social benefits or social costs are handled in an efficient manner. The problem is that there may be no limit to what government should do using externalities as the criteria. However, specific measures such as vaccination or control of contagious diseases are clearly defensible public goods policy. Externalities may be promoted as national public goods or local public goods depending on the size of the community involved.

Club Goods (Jointness)

The theory of clubs is an attempt to devise a rational approach to the problem of dividing competences between various levels of government, taking into account the capacity of a political

community of a certain size to internalize externalities as much as possible, especially when benefits taper off or congestion arises. Federalism is one version of such a club theory about creating jurisdictions that are capable of internalization of as many externalities as feasible. It has received a novel interpretation in the theory of multilevel governance, including new regional organizations such as the European Union (EU).

Infrastructure (Scale Economies)

The public goods aspect of infrastructure used to be analyzed as natural monopoly regulation with a call for government intervention. However, with the deregulation and privatization starting in the late 1970s, both monopoly regulation and antitrust policy have lost some of their credentials. Again, it is capture theory in one version or another that favors a level-playing-field policy orientation with maximum open entry in enlarged markets beyond national borders. Today, regional competition policies, such as the EU regime with its commissioners, are considered appropriate to undo monopoly and invite competition. The occurrence of economies of scale is no longer considered a natural phenomenon but a market-related one. Increasing the size of the market is a better response to this type of market failure with club goods than entry regulation and price setting. The size of the market is a function of the extension of the law or common legal institutions between countries, such as EU law.

Global Public Goods and Commons (Rivalry)

Governments may handle the collective-action problems that arise concerning the allocation of public goods in their own domestic countries. Instead of relying on a voluntary mechanism for the supply of national or local public goods, governments employ state authority to make budgets, laws, and taxes. But the problems with a voluntary supply of public goods resurface on the global scene, where externalities such as global warming, carbon emissions, and the environmental destruction of common pools such as the oceans and endangered species call for a global ecology policy. Kyoto I was meant to set up such a global common pools policy, but it ran

into the typical collective problems of preference misrepresentation, free riding, and reneging. Negotiating a new global policy runs up against the tremendous transaction costs typical of a voluntary approach to public goods provision. Elinor Ostrom (1990) has argued that small groups may overcome the collective-action difficulty of protecting a commons, but in most such examples, the state helps the groups reduce transaction costs by somehow or indirectly enforcing the rules allocating the common pool goods. In the global arena, there is no world government or voluntary coordination scheme to do just that.

Political Relevance of Public Goods

While economists analyze the question of a voluntary supply of public goods and its optimality, political scientists know that such schemes will hardly be practical. Thus, they concentrate on understanding the allocation of public or semipublic goods by means of the operations of state institutions. In a representative democracy, political parties handle the demand and supply of public and semipublic goods. Due to bounded rationality, opportunism, and voter myopia, the political process will not arrive at an optimal allocation of these goods, where each individual's marginal benefit equals his or her marginal cost (Lindahl equilibrium). It is widely recognized that the allocation of public goods does have distributional implications and that it is the mixture of allocative efficiency and justice in distribution that makes public or semipublic goods inherently political.

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See also Collective Security; Implementation; Policy Process, Models of; Transaction Costs

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PUBLIC OFFICE, REWARDS

The term *rewards* refers to any kind of tangible income and intangible compensation or honor attached to public office. Rewards are relevant in political science because they link the adequate compensation of our rulers with their performance. On the one hand, in democratic systems, proper compensation includes the reward level and the transparency of the reward structure for public scrutiny. Concerns of transparency, corruption, and public trust in rulers are relevant for creating a proper reward system. On the other hand, the performance of public officials relates to achievement at the individual and organizational levels, which in turn are linked to the legitimacy of democracy. These dimensions have been tackled by normative and positive political theories.

Normative theories prescribe what political choices ought to be made according to some philosophical values, such as representativeness, competitiveness, and functionality of rewards for public officials in relation to the rest of society. Positive theories try to explain the particular political choices made for rewarding public officials. Different theories emphasize the role of institutions and past legacies, cultural values, or the rent-seeking strategies of individuals in accounting for the achieved reward level, visibility, and value of the different parts of the reward structure.

The structure of rewards covers financial (salary), material (with monetary value), and intangible elements. The combination of these elements varies among different categories: countries; public officials from the legislative, the judiciary, or the executive; the legal nature of institutions (regulatory agencies, independent national banks, bureaucracies);

or policy areas (public safety, education, health, etc.). Managerial public sector reform trends and the role played by democratic values are likely to have an impact on how the structure of rewards changes for different public officials.

This entry is further developed into four sections. First, the main normative and positive theories are described. A second section shows the elements of the reward structure. The third section is devoted to the recent emphasis on managerialism and performance-based pay. The final section links rewards to transparency.

Political Theories on Rewards

Normative Theories

Normative theories of the 18th and 19th centuries define how public officials should be rewarded. Three different sets of values have been promoted. First, individualistic values have been fostered more frequently. Adam Smith (1723–1790) advocated for the exclusive link between payment and performance, although he did not propose a specific reward system. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) devised a more nuanced system for rewarding performance, indicating the degree of transparency required in defining the whole reward package, how potential corruption practices should be avoided, and the like. Frederic Taylor (1856–1915) also supported the idea of paying for performance when advocating his “scientific method” of work in mass production. Second, Georg Hegel’s (1770–1831) view on rewards was more functionalist, suggesting a level of pay that would make neutral and expert public servants focus on the general interest rather than the interest of a few. Sufficient pay was needed to avoid corrupt practices. A similar view was held by Max Weber (1864–1920). Third, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) hypothesized that the strengthening of democracy would result in a decline in the rewards of public officials, thus making them more representative.

These normative prescriptions coincided with the initiation of macroprocesses such as industrialization, the consolidation of modern public bureaucracies, recognition of individual universal rights, and the introduction of democracy. These disparate movements, with different emphases across countries, are likely to have led to the emergence of the aforementioned criteria on rewards. The

introduction of mass production systems brought about a concern with performance and private sector benefits. Unlike in aristocratic times, the advent of democracy introduced issues of public accountability and representativeness, with the growth of the bureaucracy creating problems. The consolidation of public administration and its neutral competence entailed the implementation of a merit system to fight politicization practices, derived from democratization. Around the same time, the Northcote-Trevelyan report (1854), the Pendleton Act (1883), and other such regulations in Western societies tried to abolish the favoritism of political appointments and to replace them by merit systems.

At present, normative issues concerning rewards are ingrained in empirical research. The work of Christopher Hood and Guy Peters in the 1990s offered three different criteria, as expounded in earlier philosophical texts, against which the level of rewards and their contents could be decided on. First, a more egalitarian approach recommends that rewards of public officials, especially those holding high office, be representative of the population at large, that is, they should take into account the composition of the population according to the most obvious criteria (e.g., race, language, ethnicity). A second, more functionalist approach advocates paying a sufficient reward to prevent officials from engaging in corrupt practices. Finally, a market approach suggests that the level of rewards should be on par with the salaries for similar positions in the private sector. None of the approaches can be found in its pure form in any country, although some countries seem to have more representative rewards, while others use the functional principle of sufficient compensation. In any case, the introduction of managerial practices in the executive during the 1990s and 2000s has apparently caused a shift toward more individualistic and market-based practices.

Positive Theories

Since the early 1990s, political theories focusing on rewards have developed explanatory arguments trying to decipher why some systems have made particular choices when deciding reward levels for public officials and to describe the particular composition and the transparency of the reward structure. Christopher Hood and Guy Peters have fostered

several publications in which three types of explanations have been considered: (1) institutional, (2) political economy, and (3) cultural theories.

Institutional theories claim that formal and informal rules account for the particular evolution of reward systems. Rules define whether pay is determined through collective bargaining, independent review, market mechanisms, or specific regulation. Rules also set the level of pay at national, sectoral, or agency levels. Moreover, the proportion of the salary structure is decided by rules considering the basic pay and other allowances and the degree of transparency. Institutional theories are designed to explain the continuity in the working of certain institutions but have more problems in identifying when a change takes place, because the institutions by themselves, without the contribution of actors, are noncredible energizers of institutional change.

Economic theories of politics consider the constrained institutional settings of individual strategies, but they focus on individuals as benefit maximizers, that is, making their rewards as large as possible. Those theories are normally crafted as games for which two sets of actors have different preferences and strategies. To study rewards, games can be modeled to confront the (dis)trust strategies of citizens in relation to the strategies of public officials, who are more or less transparent in getting their rewards. Games can also model to what extent senior civil servants have more or less individualistic pay strategies than civil servants of lower hierarchical levels. Although embedded in institutional settings, political economy theory tends to consider the preferences of individuals as exogenous to the institutions and somehow universalistic—that is, shaped outside the institutional context in which they operate.

Cultural theory, dismissing this universalistic view of exogenous preferences, goes beyond the classic idea that national cultures matter in anchoring political phenomena to cultural views. Christopher Hood, either alone or with others, has contributed extensively to apply cultural theory to the evolution of rewards pattern over time. This theory is based on the “grid group” concepts of Mary Douglas. “Group” refers to what extent individual choices are determined by the groups in which individuals are incorporated. “Grid” indicates the role of external rules and prescriptions in

determining the life of individuals. The combination of high–low grid and high–low group offers four dominant cultural types: (1) hierarchical, (2) individualistic, (3) egalitarian, and (4) hazardous.

Hierarchical systems are based on the predictability and automaticity of rewards progression within organizations. Individualistic systems are characterized by the rent-seeking behavior of public officials, which normally operates on the variable parts of the salary or on other perks of substantial monetary value, discarding the automaticity of rewards. In egalitarian systems, monetary rewards are accommodated at lower levels than what the individualistic behavior would predict because other intangible rewards are obtained. Hazardous cultural patterns imply the introduction of chance elements in the way in which promotion and rewards happen, making them nonautomatic and unpredictable.

Comparative work has used a combination of the three “lenses,” as they are not entirely alternative explanations of how rewards evolve. Most country case studies have a predominant institutionalist bias, which accounts for the creation of reward systems following traditional models. The introduction of changes in this account is normally referred to as a minor adaptation of traditional practices. In any case, institutionalists have difficulty explaining why there are shifts within the same society from more egalitarianism (or hierarchy) toward more individualism over time in the rewards of senior civil servants or why the salaries of lower level civil servants erode over time, while the monetary rewards of senior civil servants increase. Political economy theorists were not able to explain the erosion of the wages of politicians in several countries, in spite of them trying to maximize their rewards. Cultural theory seems to explain the shifts throughout time, using both institutionalist and political economy reasoning. Further research is needed to test these theoretical lenses.

The Structure of Rewards and Its Level

The list of components of a reward system is considerable and varies across countries and types of public officials. The first distinction is between financial rewards, material rewards with monetary value, and intangible rewards. Financial rewards constitute the pay received by public officials. They

can be classified into basic pay and other fringe benefits. Basic compensation is the salary paid for a position that includes insurance, tax deduction, and deferred compensation. Fringe benefits include considerations pertaining to the level or grade of the post, risk or abnormal working conditions associated with the post, acknowledgment of seniority, special duties or responsibilities, and performance bonuses. These allowances are directly linked to the job performed. However, the particular amount is not included in the basic pay in some cases because they compensate the job particularities associated with a particular post. In other cases, these allowances are not consolidated in the basic pay so as not to be included in the calculations of the future pension, which will burden the public budget.

Material rewards, or in-kind benefits, that have direct and substantial monetary value include varied items such as promotion, inter- and/or intramunicipal transportation, housing, meals, travel, tax deductions, and private health insurance, to list the most popular items across countries. In most cases, these rewards are tax free.

Some rewards such as promotion, pension, and employment in a better paid job in a private or (semi)public corporation are deferred in time and enjoyed in the future. Traditionally, public officials were compensated for good performance by promoting them to higher positions with a hike in salary. As there are now not enough positions to promote high-performing officials, good performance is rewarded with extra compensation. Employment in a more lucrative position may constitute a typical path in the system but is at least subject to some kind of ethical code.

Finally, public recognition, delegation of authority, social respect, job security, some social privileges, or reputation are typical examples of intangible rewards. They are subjectively and contextually defined. Individuals bestow subjective recognition on some potential rewards, and the context may deem some rewards very important or irrelevant. For instance, in some countries, civil servants have high status and are well respected, while in other countries, this is not so. Unless they are misused, these rewards are not a matter of concern for public accountability.

Compensation for public officials includes many different financial supplements and other benefits, also colloquially known as perks, that make its

analysis complex. The various financial rewards and in-kind tangible benefits, presently enjoyed by public officials or deferred to the future, belong to items subject to more or less transparency and individual negotiations. The managerialist trend in the public sector in the past 30 years has also introduced the relevance of performance bonus.

Managerialism, Rewards, and Performance

Managerialism implies more pay flexibility, that is, the ability of public sector organizations to match market rates, to compete for scarce skills and good candidates, and to reward individual efforts. The managerial reforms that started in the 1980s, inspired by private sector practices, have stressed the value of more flexible pay arrangements as well as the use of performance pay. The creation of agencies and organizations with a management ethos that is different from that of traditional ministerial departments and the possibility of hiring personnel under distinct contractual conditions has allowed for the introduction of a more managerial culture in some parts of the public sector. In these organizations, where direct entry from the private to the public sector has been possible, several countries have tried to match private sector rewards, although unsuccessfully.

Apart from uniform pay scales, performance pay is another flexible means of compensating individual or group productivity. When properly done, performance pay is not consolidated in the salary. Extra performance is explicitly recognized either through the comparison of achievements against predefined targets or through the appraisal negotiations between managers and subordinates. This financial bonus is said to motivate workers to higher levels of performance, according to normative theories.

Expectancy and reinforcement theories have been associated with performance pay. Expectancy theory predicts that employees' motivation is led by their belief that making an effort will affect organizational performance. This increase in performance will lead to an increase in the monetary benefits of the employee, who specially values these benefits. In a nutshell, higher performance-related salary motivates employees. Reinforcement theory states that individuals are likely to choose responses associated with positive outcomes of the past. In positive reinforcement, valued behavior

will be preferred and repeated over time because it yields positive results, such as higher salary.

Managerialism, present in many countries, influences differently systems and groups of public officials. Its practices have likely resulted in greater pay differentials between civil servants and politicians, agency chief executives and senior civil servants, and senior civil servants and lower level civil servants. However, empirical research has often found a mismatch between the potential benefits of performance pay for individuals and for the organization and staff motivation. An overwhelming majority of studies reviewed by James Perry do not show evidence of positive effects of performance pay, especially for organizational performance and for higher managerial posts, where jobs are complex and tasks are not normally routinely defined. Positive effects in the more routine jobs are due to the easiness of establishing clear goals against which performance can be measured.

Several reasons explain this mismatch. First, civil service laws and procedures try to be uniform, while individual performance pay implies exceptions to uniformity. Second, budgetary allocations for performance pay cannot grow at the pace of performance. Unlike the private sector, higher performance does not necessarily mean concomitant higher financial benefits for the organization. Third, organizations do not invest much energy in performance appraisals, which results in unsatisfactory performance assessments. Fourth, individual performance cannot be properly rewarded if organizational goals are not clearly defined, as is the case in many public sector bodies with multiple stakeholders. Finally, transparency apparently makes performance pay less workable in the public sector, as there are some indications that secrecy in private organizations is helpful for performance schemes to succeed. Furthermore, transparency does not allow for a substantial increase of performance bonuses as this may cause a public outcry. In sum, performance pay does not seem to have increased greatly staff motivation. Therefore, public service motivation is analyzed by including other nonfinancial components. Success stories of performance pay have been more prevalent when individual and organizational goals were aligned.

In any case, there has been a general shift away from the fixed scales advocated by the functionalist approaches, which believe in the principle of adequate compensation and the need for a uniform

reward system across the board for similar levels of public employees. This general shift has represented more individualization of salaries for senior civil servants in the executive, but not so much in the legislative and the judiciary. In spite of the limited success of pay for performance, pay differentials among groups have materialized. Civil servant salary levels have surpassed parliamentary salaries in many countries, and the differences in compensation between senior civil servants and civil servants at lower levels have widened.

Rewards and Transparency

Transparency refers to the publicity and availability of data on rewards of public officials for public scrutiny. The gradation of transparency depends on the number of components of the reward structure that are open to scrutiny, the degree of publicity of this information without being demanded, and, alternatively, the availability of the data on request by individuals.

Lack of transparency is related to at least two different sets of practices. First, while basic pay may be frozen or pegged to annual inflation rates, other variable parts or perks may be kept away from public scrutiny. Second, there may be a potential for unethical behavior by claiming expenses that are unrelated to the incumbency of a public office, as the mass media are occasionally revealing in different countries.

Normative criteria for the level of transparency of a system are similar to the three different visions of the cultural theory. For egalitarians, rewards should have maximum visibility, and the amount of hidden perks should be kept to the minimum. Functionalists suggest that rewards should reflect the activities pertaining to the position. If travel or special risks are associated with the job, these should be paid separately in tax-free allowances. There would then be a certain justification for less visible rewards. Finally, a market approach would link reward to performance. Workable individual performance pay seems to be better adapted to non-transparent organizations, as in the private sector.

Empirical research in Western societies shows that the levels of transparency seem to be declining over the years. Transparency level differs for distinct types of public officials. While rewards for parliamentarians seem to have become more transparent with time, the availability of data for civil

servants, especially senior civil servants, seems to be decreasing. Furthermore, the analysis of salaries in Latin American and Australasian countries does not support the functional theory that high rewards for public officials entail lower levels of corruption in the system. Further research is needed, as it is difficult to find meaningful connections between aggregate figures of corruption levels and the general levels of rewards. This hypothesis should be tested for specific groups of public officials (local officials, security forces, teachers, etc.).

Managerialism and decreasing levels of transparency might have caused the increase in civil servants' rewards compared with the reward levels of parliamentarians. There seems to be an implicit trend whereby in democracies, the rewards for politicians tend to be more representative or reflect the ideals of representation, with few possibilities of being rewarded for performance, except for the intensive use of per diems as a consequence of being appointed to different commissions, whose attendance, away from their constituency, allows for extra perks. Civil servants, especially senior civil servants, have found different functional and homogeneous ways to raise their salary level. In some countries, a senior civil service category has been created, separate from the rest of the civil servants. Further, individual performance pay has been introduced, although its success has been questioned, and the creation of arm's-length agencies has fostered higher rewards for their managers. Despite a general increase of salaries in the executive, salaries of private sector enterprises have not been matched, even in those countries where such efforts have been more persistent.

Research on public sector rewards has been fostered in the past 20 years in political science, but further analysis is required. Comparative country studies should give way to other comparisons, especially among public officials working for agencies of different types (hospitals, regulatory agencies, independent banks, bureaucracies) and from different policy sectors (safety, education, health, etc.). The differences and similarities across countries within these sectors could yield further results and inputs for political theories.

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See also Individualism; Institutional Theory; Normative Political Theory; Pay for Performance; Performance Management; Political Theory

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PUBLIC OPINION

Public opinion is a notion that is frequently invoked, not only in everyday parlance but also in political and scholarly discussions. Yet it is a concept that is extremely ambiguous and difficult to define—indeed, it seems that a common definition does not exist. When the scholar Harwood Childs

attempted to reconstruct the principal meanings of public opinion in the 1960s, he identified more than 50 different definitions. Since then, the frequency of use of the concept has grown substantially, together, probably, with the number of meanings attributed to it. This diversity of meanings—or polysemy—is implicit in the denomination of the concept, which associates two distinct, and somewhat conflicting, ideas. “Opinion” refers to the individual sphere, to reputation, evaluation, and judgments of value; hence, it is open to question, or debatable. “Public” refers to the collective dimension, to subjects and places accessible to all, of common interest, adopted by recognized and, therefore, “public” authorities. And here arises the question at the very heart of the debate that has always surrounded the topic: how to render compatible, consistent, and coinciding aspects that are both individual and collective, singular and common, subjective and objective. The question is further complicated by the increasingly widespread and entrenched tendency to consider public opinion as a unitary concept—an “objective” and “natural” basis for political choices and/or institutional decisions, in competition with the electoral response—and the tendency to consider public opinion as an indication of, or even synonymous with, the “will of the people.” This entry discusses these various meanings and their implications for contemporary democracies.

Definitions of Public Opinion

Looking beyond the meanings attributed to public opinion, it is important to note that the concept is linked to democracy and its affirmation. Democracy becomes a condition of public opinion, a component and a method. Democracy affects and characterizes the viewpoint, the language, and every discussion surrounding public opinion. Consequently, its definition in some measure also involves democracy.

Among the various definitions of public opinion that have developed and intersected over time, three prove particularly significant, in that they allow one to delineate the main interpretive elements, which are substantially distinct and competing.

The first approach takes its inspiration from the Enlightenment and first and foremost identifies public opinion with the “public sphere” (the theory of Jürgen Habermas), the area in which the “enlightened classes” exercise criticism of and

provide a check against the action of power. In other words, the public sphere is the open debate around the decisions and issues of public interest. Public opinion accompanies the formation of bourgeois society and mediates the separation of the state from the publicly important “private sphere” of “civil society.” It promotes the advent of the “market,” of rational thought, and of “liberty” and is a necessary condition of democratic systems that have been established in the West alongside the great economic and national revolutions. According to this reading, public opinion is not the sum of individual opinions, as other interpretive currents sustain; rather, it is a context of relationships and communication that develops at the collective level (as several authors, from the Chicago School to Herbert Blumer, argue). It is a “public” discussion about emerging problems that involves different actors and arrives at producing a common shared position.

The second approach considers public opinion as an effect of the influence exercised by actors and agencies that control the channels of information and the formation of ideas. Consequently, the prevailing opinions in society, the images of reality that people express, actually would not correspond to reality; they do not emerge from free discussions and from debate among intellectuals but would instead depend on the pressure exercised by the media and by propaganda. Public Opinion (which Walter Lippmann writes in capital letters—and not by chance), hence, is fueled by stereotypes and prejudices. It evokes a sort of conformism: the adaptation by the masses to prevailing thought. To a certain extent, this interpretation is echoed in the model of the spiral of silence proposed by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, based on the analysis of electoral behavior in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. The study reveals that large segments of the electorate who did not express their preferences during the electoral campaign in the end aligned themselves with the positions of the candidates and parties favored to win and voted accordingly. In other words, their silence reflected not only uncertainty and indifference but also the fear of deviating from what was considered to be the predominant orientation. Interviewed by the polling agencies, they preferred to remain silent rather than contradict the beliefs expressed by the majority and emphasized by the media and in the public debate. That is, to

use the language of Noelle-Neumann, they preferred to conform to the “climate of opinion” that characterizes society during that time period. This explanation evokes the idea of *common sense*, this being another polysemic term possessing very deep historical and cultural roots. It is discussed and thematized by, among others, Antonio Gramsci, who cites *The Betrothed* by Alessandro Manzoni, observing that “there was even someone who didn’t believe the plague-spreaders, but couldn’t support his opinion against widespread popular opinion,” because, as Manzoni writes, “good sense was there, but it remained hidden in fear of common sense” (or general—i.e., public—opinion) (Gramsci, 1975, p. 216).

For some authors, however (in particular, Niklas Luhmann), public opinion constitutes a functional necessity, put into action by the political (sub)system to reduce social complexity. In this case, it is an area that is structured around relevant and important themes, conditioned and/or imposed by public communication. This reasoning appears exactly symmetric, and in many ways contrary, to that of Habermas, who holds that public opinion coincides with the public sphere generated from “below,” by civil society and by intellectuals. Instead, this reasoning stresses the role of the institutions of power, political actors, and the media, which aim to influence and direct public opinion.

The third interpretation is defined by some as populist and by others as methodological. It does attribute great importance to people’s popular opinions and at the same time to the possibility of studying them through the technologies of public opinion research (polling). Public opinion, in this case, is made to correspond with the sum or collection of individual opinions gathered and analyzed by means of surveys conducted on representative samples of the population. The first and most influential exponent of this position is George Gallup, who began conducting his public opinion polls in the 1930s in the United States, correctly predicting the outcome of the 1934 presidential elections. Gallup felt that polls are useful—and reliable—instruments that measure the will of citizens and are in some ways better than voting for discovering and understanding citizen demands, because surveys are able to articulate issues and demands, taking into account individual, social, cultural, and ecological characteristics. The only

problem is to construct a sample that is truly representative of the population and to perform surveys through well-formulated questionnaires and well-conducted interviews. Public opinion, in this way, is traced back to the empirical sampling of aggregated individual opinions, whose meaning is summed up according to a majoritarian logic, as in elections where the popular will is deduced from the vote of a fraction. This may be majoritarian but is not necessarily the majority—and is often far from the totality of the population and/or voters.

Normative Orientations

The three ideas that orient the conception of public opinion are summarized by three different normative orientations that aspire to prevail as descriptive or real. They reflect three different ways of understanding the relationship between citizens and power, between society and institutions, in representative democracies. In the first case, public opinion is conceived of as a *jury*, an instrument by which the informed citizen judges decisions and those who make the decisions. In this case, public opinion is a space that renders “public” the exercise of authority, opening up to all those who so wish the chance to supervise and participate. In the second case, public opinion is conceived of as a *consensus*, the method by which to conform the orientation of citizens to the values and wishes of those who govern, or as a climate of opinion, or common sense—an assemblage of stereotypes and prejudices that inhibit critical thought and push the less aware and informed members of society to conform to dominant beliefs. In the third case, public opinion is considered truly as such, which is to say, as a *fact*, a given, an actual entity that coincides with society, voters, and citizens, without any distinctions. And it sums them up according to their individual opinions into an undifferentiated aggregate, recognized as having the value of “reality” because it is observed and observable, measured and measurable, by using polling technologies.

These three ways of understanding public opinion continue to coexist and interact over time. Media and public opinion agencies compete to shape public opinion from above. Influenced or commissioned by the centers of the political and institutional system, they seek to conform citizens’

opinions to the prevailing values and to strengthen consensus with the view of the elite.

In the same way and at the same time, public opinion is a critical space. It intervenes via groups, newspapers, social movements—and, in more recent times, through the web, via Internet blogs and social networks—to counter and affect public choices. In addition, public opinion also takes on an active role itself in forming individual opinions to shape the general beliefs.

Undoubtedly the public opinion polling and populist conception of public opinion is that which has progressively won out and today tends to dominate over the others, thanks in part to the contribution of the media—especially newspapers and television. The media have amplified and legitimized polls and have presented and imposed them as “reality.” In turn, the media and other actors that participate in presenting the polls—the pollsters, journalists, political commentators, and politicians themselves—have gained and continue to gain legitimization from the surveys, which additionally offer the chance for a “show,” while the political scene itself appears more and more spectacular, as we will see further on.

Public Opinion and Democracy

At this juncture, it is useful to shift our reflection to the relationship between public opinion and democracy. As we have already mentioned, this is a close and inextricable relationship. Public opinion gains importance with the establishment of democracy. First of all, it is considered as a condition, in that it is an area of control and also of public discussion. It is also an arena for the conquest of consensus, a field in which different actors compete and clash as they aim to impose their issues and dictate the agenda of problems to tackle, to influence the priorities and preferences that characterize the vision of life and society among voters and citizens. Ultimately, public opinion becomes a functional equivalent of the electorate, a synonym for the people, to be systematically polled so as to understand fundamental orientations and to constantly verify the degree of consensus enjoyed by politicians and their policies. It could almost be considered an election that takes place each and every day.

Therefore, the connection with democracy seems to be strong—a sort of symbiosis that in

recent decades has become systematic and constitutive. In this regard, we can cite Bernard Manin’s analysis of the principles of representative government. In proposing a periodization, Manin indicates how the “democracy of the public”—or of the audience—has been established in the most recent phase.

Wherever communication takes the place of organization and participation, people assume greater importance than political parties—or they become the main reference of the parties—where the mechanism of the internal relationship among the different levels of the party and the relationship between the state and society is specifically and especially entrusted to the polls. The voters become “the audience” as they react to political propositions that escape their control; citizens become public opinion. Manin notes that public debate remains a condition of representative government. However, in reality, public opinion is ordinarily evoked to legitimize and measure the consensus—or dissent—concerning political actors. It is forced to coincide with the practically inseparable duo of the media and the polls. This brings about the problem of not taking for granted what actually cannot be—of not accepting the idea of public opinion that is dominant among such limited social components as the only possible public opinion.

Conversely, if public opinion is summed up through surveys communicated by the media, then it is impossible to avoid confronting the fundamental criticisms expressed in this regard. First and foremost among these criticisms is that expressed by Pierre Bourdieu in his noted 1973 essay, with the absolutely explicit title “L’opinion publique n’existe pas” [Public opinion does not exist]. The target of his unequivocal critique of the concept of public opinion is the presumption of forming it on the basis of surveys, which are imperfect tools for numerous reasons. However, his strongest criticism was of the claim, considered epistemologically untenable, of producing a “general” vision based on “individual” opinions: individual reactions to questions posed by strangers (the interviewers), during interviews dealing with mostly “unfamiliar” subject matters, posed to people who are for the most part not very interested or who may be completely extraneous to politics and the issues of the public debate. For this very same reason, it is considered improper to use

an aggregate of opinions to replace something that should instead emerge from public debate and the initiatives of social actors.

It is considered arbitrary—or even worse, deviant—to treat the responses of interviewees as equivalent, without distinctions that take into account the differing degrees of involvement or expertise of the people surveyed. It is as if everyone were an expert in all matters; as if there were no people who possessed a greater degree of expertise; and, most important, as if some people were not more involved and influential—over the “opinions” of others—on certain specific topics.

Polling as a Basis for the Concept of Public Opinion

Limitations of Polling

We can better articulate the limits imposed by a concept of public opinion—and by a democracy—based on polls by referring to a number of technical, methodological, and substantive problems. First, there is the question of the limits of representativity of the survey samples, which increasingly include fewer numbers, are stratified by quotas, and are distorted by the process of acquiring the information where the share of people who refuse to be interviewed is growing larger and larger. The techniques of weighting the data, during the data analysis phase, should serve to adjust the sample to the “real” makeup of society. However, these techniques tend to distort the representativity yet again, to the point of transforming the conclusive data into artificial products of sophisticated mathematical models.

The second problem to contend with is the methods and instruments of the interview. Surveys are now conducted mainly by telephone, to reduce time and costs. Thus, the interviews are conducted in an impersonal way, often by specialized marketing centers with little expertise in the subjects being considered. Furthermore, the home telephone, or landline, is becoming less and less popular, and so other means are used to conduct surveys—for example, by Internet, through the use of e-mail and social networks, or via mobile telephones. These new means create new problems that are difficult to resolve. Surveys conducted using the Internet are still not able to reach “representative” samples of the population, for the simple reason that the

population segments that use the Internet are still quite specific—despite the fact that they are large and continue to grow. Certain segments of the population, in particular the elderly and those with less education, are largely excluded. Telematic interviews pose problems with interpretation (they are not conducted directly, nor do they take place in a shared conversation). And last, with regard to mobile telephones, complete lists of numbers are difficult to obtain (given the numerous providers) and even more difficult to use (as access to the numbers is rightfully limited by strict privacy laws). Furthermore, interviewing people via mobile telephone brings with it certain inconveniences (the locations and conditions in which the interview takes place are unpredictable). And in any case, the responses are obviously conditioned by the questions asked, by the style of the interview, and by the length of time required of the interviewees. To sum up, it is very difficult to consider the results of surveys as “faithful” and representative of the population’s beliefs.

The third problem raised is that the methods of data elaboration and analysis naturally and inevitably influence the results. The methods of weighting the data, as previously mentioned, increase the discretion of the researcher and the statistician. Furthermore, adequate attention is not always given to the absence of responses or the reticent responses that often affect the “valid” interviews to a great extent. Finally, in reading the results, there is the tendency to present the distribution of the responses according to a majoritarian logic, which is to say that the beliefs expressed by the majoritarian segments are emphasized, though they may not be those of the majority of the population. For example, an issue favored by one third of a sample, when other issues are chosen by lesser shares of interviewees, risks being amplified by media communications as the will of the people.

Methods for Addressing Technical Problems

To limit these technical problems that invalidate the claims of representativity and significance of polling, certain methods of weighting have been proposed, as well as specific and alternative means of conducting the polls.

To begin with, there is the practice of introducing some questions at the end of the interview or

after a few questions, in order to determine the expertise or, at least, the significance interviewees attributed to the issues and questions posed. It was James Fishkin who elaborated a different method of conceiving and conducting surveys, known as *deliberative polling*. It entails that surveys are constructed in such a way that the “sample” of those interviewed can actually be informed about the subjects of the research and takes into consideration the different theories and interpretations that relate to it. The polling is carried out in such a way that those being interviewed can dialogue and discuss among themselves, which permits the “raw” opinion to be registered, as well as the “refined” opinion (following the process of information and discussion). This method seeks to reconstruct the foundations of public opinion at its origins, recognized by Habermas as the bourgeois public sphere and by others as the Athenian Polis in the age of Pericles.

However, the correctives proposed have only been employed conservatively and episodically. In the case of the techniques of self-verification, this has been true more out of carelessness and methodological negligence than for problems related to time and cost. Inserting qualitative questions to clarify the significance and the motivations of the quantitative responses would complicate polling. This is even more so the case following the widespread use of computerized techniques in telephone interviews. As for deliberative polling, it has been carried out in close relationship with experiences of deliberative democracy, therefore, where discussion with citizens is valued in decision making, especially at the local level. But the same critical principle that inspired this design at the same time constitutes a limit inasmuch as deliberative polling is a means of forming opinions, in a conscious way. Those who conduct and commission surveys, however, are interested in finding out everyone's opinions rapidly—especially the opinions of the less well-informed.

All in all, polls are imperfect methods of learning individual opinions, which assume greater value and general importance. Polls serve and are used to “objectify subjective opinions.” For this reason, polls are important in democratic play. They are important not so much—or not only—because they define public opinion, but because they help (a) orient individual opinions, (b) impose

a version of reality, and above all (c) establish the myth of a public opinion that actually exists, is scientifically based, and is therefore measurable. They assume and impose a substantial equivalence between opinions and people, between opinions and voters, and between opinions and votes.

Polling, Media, and the Market

However, polls and the surrounding media, unlike traditional methods of propaganda entrusted by mass parties to functionaries and internal specialists or to those with political affinities (militants and sympathizers), are conducted by professionals who operate in the market and who consequently respect, and are subject to, the rules of the market. This means that they are sensitive to the needs of their employer. Polling agencies and the media are businesses that are often under the control of economic groups or influenced by political entities of the government (and others).

Thus, public opinion based on the media and their polls is very different from the public opinion to which social and political actors contribute, in that it does not constitute an arena, or the result of the potentially conflictive interaction between different and distinct parties. Rather, it aims to coincide with reality, to represent and measure the real situation, because it is produced by technologies and technicians (who in turn, however, are the focus of pressures and involved in political and economic relationships).

Consequently, the field of public opinion is complex and cannot be traced back to a single subject. The interests of political and economic actors in particular are in competition and often in contrast with those of the media, cultural and scientific actors, polling professionals, political scientists, and journalists—who, in turn, derive economic compensation, prestige, and power from their roles as “experts” and witnesses of public opinion. At times, it is difficult even to determine the different interested parties and their roles: The politicians need—and at the same time fear—the polls and the media; just as the media and polling professionals need the politicians to be able to exercise their influence in order to reach their audience and achieve legitimacy. In this way, they themselves also become political actors.

Public Opinion as a Social and/or Political Construct

This suggests a further, and different, phenomenological interpretation, which holds public opinion as a social and/or political construct, whose purpose is not so much to guide the opinions of citizens but rather to impose a representation of public opinion that is recognized as true. This happens by fixing fundamental references around which it is structured: personal or social uncertainty, fear of others, and the vulnerability of the economy or employment. Thus, the political contest becomes a contest between differing and competing models of public opinion, which are proposed and even more so imposed as the only ones possible. These ways of creating a vision of reality, taken for granted as such, in turn influence relationships with power, relationships with institutions, and political and electoral choices.

The game played around public opinion is thus complex, and the number of players participating in the game contributes to the complexity. It suggests that in the era of democracy of the public, the political struggle is primarily a symbolic struggle, in which the fight is to prove a specific vision (or “narration”) of reality, inspired by specific values and by specific images. The weapons employed are marketing and communication techniques, which use the media and polling to erase the distance between everyday life and public life.

It suggests, finally, that the issue at stake is not only public opinion but also the very meaning of democracy. On the other hand, democracy has become personalized, and communication with citizens happens more and more through the media, which transforms them into an audience, into spectators. The understanding of social demands and orientation happens not so much through participation but through polls, which convert people into opinions. Therefore, it becomes difficult to isolate the discussion—and criticism—around the prevailing definition of public opinion,


without involving democracy itself, whose prevailing “version,” in this phase, uses public opinion as a base, a constitutive principle—as a “fact.”

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See also Media, Electronic; Media, Print; Policy Framing; Political Communication; Survey Research

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QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) was first introduced to the social sciences by Charles Ragin to identify complex patterns of causation by processing social science data with Boolean algorithms. By conducting a formalized comparison, QCA introduces the logic of qualitative research to the study of a larger number of cases than are usually examined with qualitative methods. QCA usually is employed with a middle-sized number of cases (10–30).

The approach taken by QCA has been described as a middle course between case-oriented and variable-oriented methods. In his initial presentation, Ragin (1987) argues that variables should not be examined detached from the cases, as this is done in purely variable-oriented approaches. Based on the assumption that a causal explanation of social phenomena always must include considerations about contextual factors as well as the possibility of conjunctural combinations of relevant conditions, QCA does not process individual variables but includes cases as configurations in the analysis to arrive at causal explanations. Described here is how QCA seeks to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions of a specific phenomenon (“outcome” in QCA terminology) as well as to achieve the most parsimonious explanation for all instances of the phenomenon.

Since the publication of *The Comparative Method* (Ragin, 1987), a series of techniques

based on the ideas of QCA have been developed, which can be subsumed as “configurational” comparative methods. This entry first focuses on the ideas of the original crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) technique based on binary data and then briefly introduces recent developments.

Crisp-Set QCA

Originally, QCA performed calculations on Boolean, that is dichotomized, data only. In terms of set theory, this means that QCA deals with “crisp sets” as opposed to “fuzzy sets.” All data included in a csQCA analysis must therefore be coded dichotomously, which means that it has to be considered for each case whether the case fulfills the condition or not. The outcome has to be coded dichotomously as well. By convention, in csQCA, an uppercase notation indicates the presence of a condition, whereas a lowercase notation signifies the absence of this condition. By using Boolean algebra, the configuration for a case can then be written by concatenating the values for all the conditions included in the analysis. For example, in a study concerning the conditions of development of new ecological parties in Western democracies in the 1980s, it is theoretically feasible that the success of these parties depended on conditions such as the electoral system (proportional representation or not), a high level of socioeconomic development (measured by gross national product [GNP]), the construction of nuclear power plants, and the density of the population. In the case of

Norway, for example, a high level of socioeconomic development can be observed, as well as a system of proportional representation; these two conditions are met, but there are no nuclear power plants, and the density of the population is low. Thus, for Norway, the configuration can be written as *VOTING * GNP * nuclear * density* (* indicating the Boolean AND).

In the first step, all cases with the same configuration are grouped together. For each configuration, the outcomes of the cases included are compared. If all cases show the same outcome, the common value (positive or negative) is assigned; if not, the configuration is marked as contradictory. In the second step, for all configurations with the same outcome, the minimization rule is used to identify conditions that are not relevant for the outcome to occur: "If two Boolean expressions differ in only one condition yet produce the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined expression" (Ragin, 1987, p. 93). So if, for example, all cases with the configuration *VOTING * GNP * nuclear * density* and *voting * GNP * nuclear * density* show the same outcome, the condition *VOTING* can be considered to be superfluous. The minimization rule is applied iteratively to the identified simpler expression, minimizing the included logical expression as far as possible. This produces a number of "prime implicants," each explaining only cases with the outcome examined.

To exemplify the use of the minimization rule, a data set with three conditions *a*, *b*, and *c* and an outcome *o* is used here. Each possible configuration is found in exactly one case, producing the truth table (Table 1).

To obtain the prime implicants for cases with Outcome 1, the minimization rule is applied to all pairs of configurations with this outcome. Each configuration in Table 1 with Outcome 1 is represented in the left column of Figure 1. For each pair of entries in this column, the minimization rule is applied, and if the two expressions differ in the value of only one condition, the minimized expression resulting from the minimization step is listed in the middle column (the minimization steps are indicated by the arrows). This procedure is iteratively repeated for the shorter expression that is

Table 1 Exemplary Data Set

Case	A	B	C	O
C1	0	0	0	0
C2	0	0	1	0
C3	0	1	0	1
C4	0	1	1	1
C5	1	0	0	0
C6	1	0	1	1
C7	1	1	0	1
C8	1	1	1	1

produced. *B* is the only prime implicant consisting of one condition. Prime implicants are finally identified in Figure 1 as implicants that have not themselves been included in a minimization step (as *aB* and *AB* have generated *B*, they are not prime implicants). Here, *AC* and *B* are the prime implicants for Outcome 1.

When only configurations with empirically existing cases are included in the minimization, the limited diversity found in comparative research can pose a problem. A large number of logically possible configurations may exist, which are not included for either outcome. To allow more parsimonious results, csQCA can include such logical remainders in the minimization process, which makes further minimization possible. Such logical remainders must, however, be included with caution, as doing so implies the assumption that this configuration does not contradict the examined




Figure 1 Minimization Steps

outcome; see Charles Ragin and Benoît Rihoux (2004) for possible strategies on how to deal with this problem.

In the next step, csQCA arrives at a solution covering all configurations with their respective outcomes by combining prime implicants with a logical expression that is as parsimonious as possible. This provides a short logical explanation for all cases found in configurations with an unambiguous outcome but does not include cases with contradictory configurations.

In the example, the solution for Outcome 1 would include both prime implicants and would be written as $B + A * C \rightarrow O$, where $+$ indicates the Boolean OR and $*$ indicates the Boolean AND in Boolean algebra. The solution is read as “the presence of B or the presence of A combined with the presence of C leads to the outcome O .”

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

One key feature of all QCA procedures is the identification of necessary and sufficient conditions. A condition is considered necessary for an outcome if the condition is present in all configurations showing the outcome and does not occur in any configuration without this outcome. A condition is sufficient for an outcome to occur if the outcome occurs in all configurations with this condition. Nonetheless, other conditions may produce the outcome, too, so a sufficient condition does not have to occur in all cases with the same outcome. The analysis of the conditions of success of green parties in the 1980s, for example, produces the csQCA solution:

$$SUCCESS = VOTING * NUCLEAR * GNP \\ + VOTING * DENSITY.$$

This means that the presence of proportional representation combined with the construction of nuclear power plants and a high GNP are conditions that did lead to the presence of a successful green party, as did the presence of proportional representation combined with the presence of high population density. Here, the presence of proportional representation can be identified as a necessary condition, as all configurations of cases with successful green parties share this condition. In the solution for countries with no successful green

parties, a number of sufficient conditions for the failure can also be identified:

$$NO\ SUCCESS = voting + gnp \\ + density * nuclear.$$

Here, the absence of proportional representation *or* the absence of a high GNP *or* the absence of high population density combined with the absence of nuclear power plants did lead to the absence of green parties. Thus, the absence of proportional representation as well as the absence of a high GNP was sufficient to explain the absence of successful green parties; see Lasse Cronqvist (2007) for details.

Although sufficient and necessary conditions can be identified with csQCA, many conditions found in csQCA solutions are INUS conditions, which are insufficient but necessary parts of a condition, only contributing to the explanation of an outcome together with other (INUS) conditions.

Within groups of cases with the same configuration, due to the deterministic procedure used to create truth tables, csQCA is sensitive to single cases that conflict with the outcome of the other cases within the group. As a configuration is defined as contradictory even if only one case differs from the outcome of the other cases, larger data sets may contain a greater number of contradictions, though only a small proportion of cases may show a different outcome. Here, the minimization process still produces a solution, but it includes only relatively few cases. These contradictions, therefore, should be reduced by adding more conditions or employing more refined procedures such as multivalued qualitative comparative analysis (mvQCA) or fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA).

Further Developments

Another problem related to the use of csQCA is the compulsory dichotomization of data. A condition with interval-scale raw data can only be dichotomized by the use of an often artificial threshold. Two approaches have been developed that share the main ideas of csQCA but allow the use of nondichotomous data: Whereas fsQCA seeks to identify necessary and sufficient conditions by applying measurements of coverage and

consistency to the relationships between interval-scale conditions and also allowing for the analysis of larger data sets, mvQCA changes the minimization procedure used for csQCA to allow the use of multivalued conditions but retains the main features of csQCA.

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See also Boolean Algebra; Comparative Methods;
Configurational Comparative Methods; Fuzzy-Set Analysis

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QUANTITATIVE METHODS, BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

The use of quantitative methods in political science generally means the application of a statistical model to political science data, and a statistical model is simply a set of compatible probabilistic

assumptions. Fundamentally, assumptions are modeling choices made by a researcher concerning the distribution of the data to be modeled, how the parameters of that distribution change over observations or time, and the dependence of one observation on another. The assumptions serve the dual purpose of reducing the number of parameters in the model that must be estimated and imbuing potential estimators with certain properties. The goals of the modeling process are description and inference, and how well a model accomplishes these goals is a direct function of how appropriate its assumptions are for a particular data set.

The structure of the entry proceeds as follows. First, the relationship between assumptions, models, and estimators is discussed. Second, the assumptions of the linear regression model are discussed in detail as more complex models are often defined as departures from this set of assumptions. Particular attention is paid to the assumptions necessary for attaining correct coefficient estimates and standard errors. Threats to these core assumptions are assessed in terms of their effects, both in theory and in practice. A brief discussion of possible remedies follows. The final sections discuss the degree to which the assumptions of the linear regression model are modified for use in the generalized linear model (GLM) and how the assumption of a random sample is dealt with in a discipline where random samples are rare.

Assumptions, Models, and Estimators

A statistical model is a mathematical representation of the actual process in the world that generated the data (known as a data-generating process, or DGP). The point of creating a statistical model is both to describe the data produced by the DGP and to make inferences about features of the DGP that are unknown. As noted above, the model itself consists of a set of assumptions. This account makes it clear that assumptions are characteristics of models and not characteristics of data, and the question to ask of a model is not whether it is true or false but how descriptively useful is it. Models are more or less useful in describing a given data set, and when an assumption fails to be useful in the

process of description, the error lies with the model, not with the data.

Once a model has been selected, then an estimator (a function of the sample data that provides an estimated value for an unknown parameter) is chosen. Many common models can be estimated by any number of estimators, and the choice among estimators is driven by the model's assumptions, which imbue the estimators with various properties. An estimator with good (or better) properties under the assumptions of the model is chosen over an estimator with bad (or worse) properties under the assumptions of the model. The reference to "good estimators" and not to "good estimates" is by design. In frequentist statistics, a good estimate, by definition, is one produced by a good estimator. Properties of estimators that are considered good include unbiasedness (the estimator is on average neither high nor low), efficiency (the estimator has a small variance around the true value), and consistency (the estimator is near the true value almost all the time when the sample size is large). Often these properties are assessed in the aggregate, as a slightly biased estimator with a small variance may be preferred over an unbiased estimator with a larger variance.

The practice and art of data analysis lie in understanding which assumptions, and therefore which models and estimators, are appropriate for a given data set. This understanding comes from three sources: (1) the data themselves, (2) theory, and (3) substantive knowledge. Some assumptions can be tested, but such tests are often inconclusive, work only under specific conditions, and rarely provide anything more than vague recommendations. Information drawn from theory and substantive knowledge of the process being modeled are far more reliable guides. The discussion that follows necessarily abstracts from the particulars of a specific data set, but the importance of using information from outside the data should be kept in mind.

Assumptions and the Linear Regression Model

Most discussions of model assumptions begin with the linear regression model. Although linear regression is no longer the workhorse of political science—pride of place goes to the GLM—the linear regression model serves as a good starting point as the various

roles that the assumptions play in the model are clear and some simple results can be established.

The discussion of the linear model centers on the equation

$$y = X\beta + \varepsilon,$$

where y is a $n \times 1$ vector of observations on the dependent variable, X is an $n \times K$ matrix of regressors (including a constant), β is a $K \times 1$ vector of coefficients, and ε is an $n \times 1$ vector of disturbances. The data represent a random sample from a population of interest.

The discussion also centers on the most common estimator of the linear regression model, the least squares estimator. Replacing the vector of unknown coefficients β with an estimate $\hat{\beta}$ defines a vector of residuals

$$\hat{\varepsilon} = y - X\hat{\beta}.$$

The least squares estimator is found by choosing $\hat{\beta}$ to minimize the sum of squared residuals, or $\hat{\varepsilon}'\hat{\varepsilon}$. The first step in this process is to take the derivative of the sum of squared residuals with respect to $\hat{\beta}$:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \hat{\varepsilon}'\hat{\varepsilon}}{\partial \hat{\beta}} &= \frac{\partial (y - X\hat{\beta})'(y - X\hat{\beta})}{\partial \hat{\beta}} \\ &= \frac{\partial (y'y - 2\hat{\beta}'X'y + \hat{\beta}'X'X\hat{\beta})}{\partial \hat{\beta}} \\ &= 2X'X\hat{\beta} - 2X'y. \end{aligned}$$

The second and final step is to set the derivative equal to 0 and solve for $\hat{\beta}$:

$$\hat{\beta} = (X'X)^{-1}X'y.$$

On its own, the result of the least squares procedure has no properties; it is simply a method for fitting a line to data. The least squares method produces an estimator when paired with a statistical model that makes certain assumptions. Five assumptions commonly make up the linear regression model:

1. No exact linear relationships exist among the regressors (X has full column rank).
2. X is nonstochastic (the regressors are fixed in repeated samples).

3. The expectation of the disturbance term is zero ($E[\varepsilon] = 0$).
4. There is homoskedasticity but no autocorrelation (spherical disturbances, $E[\varepsilon\varepsilon'] = \sigma^2 I$).
5. The disturbances are normally distributed ($\varepsilon \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$).

The linear regression model makes these assumptions not because they are substantively likely to describe a data set (more on this later) but because they imbue the least squares estimator with certain properties that are considered good, namely, unbiasedness and efficiency. The technical reasons for these assumptions are discussed first to reinforce the point that this particular set of assumptions is driven by the choice of the estimator and not by the demands of the data.

Technical Reasons for the Assumptions

The five assumptions of the linear regression model are chosen for technical reasons, but they also have substantive implications. This section describes what part each assumption plays in deriving the good properties of the estimator, and the next details the substantive commitments their use demands.

The first assumption, that no exact linear relationships exist among the regressors, allows the computation of the least squares estimator:

$$\begin{aligned} X'X\hat{\beta} &= X'y \\ \hat{\beta} &= (X'X)^{-1}X'y. \end{aligned}$$

If an exact linear relationship did exist among the regressors, it would be impossible to solve for $\hat{\beta}$ by premultiplying both sides of the above equation by the inverse of $(X'X)$. The inverse of a square matrix exists only if the columns and rows of that matrix are linearly independent.

Assumptions 2 and 3— X is nonstochastic and the expectation of the disturbance term is zero—allow the claim that the least squares estimator is unbiased (technically, the expected value of the estimator equals the parameter, or $E[\hat{\theta}] = \theta$). To see this, substitute $X\beta + \varepsilon$ for y in

the estimator above, and write it in the following form:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\beta} &= (X'X)^{-1}X'y \\ &= (X'X)^{-1}X'[X\beta + \varepsilon] \\ &= \beta + (X'X)^{-1}X'\varepsilon. \end{aligned}$$

The estimator is unbiased if the second term above goes to zero. Taking the expectation of the estimator gives

$$E[\hat{\beta}] = E[\beta + (X'X)^{-1}X'\varepsilon].$$

The expectations operator passes through β because it is a constant. Assumption 2 allows the operator to pass through X as well, giving

$$E[\hat{\beta}] = \beta + (X'X)^{-1}X'E[\varepsilon].$$

Finally, Assumption 3 causes the second term above to be zero, and the claim that the least squares estimator is unbiased follows, $E[\hat{\beta}] = \beta$.

Assumption 4—homoskedasticity and no autocorrelation—allows estimation of the estimator's variance. As variance is defined as $E[(X - E[X])^2]$, it is necessary to get the estimator in this form. Begin with the estimator in the form above, and move the parameter to the left-hand side of the equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\beta} &= \beta + (X'X)^{-1}X'\varepsilon \\ \hat{\beta} - \beta &= (X'X)^{-1}X'\varepsilon. \end{aligned}$$

Square both sides (remembering that the inner product is the sum of squares and the outer product is variance/covariance matrix), and take the expectation (remembering that X is nonstochastic):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Var}(\hat{\beta}) &= E[(\hat{\beta} - \beta)(\hat{\beta} - \beta)'] \\ &= E[(X'X)^{-1}X'\varepsilon\varepsilon'X(X'X)^{-1}] \\ &= (X'X)^{-1}X'E[\varepsilon\varepsilon']X(X'X)^{-1}. \end{aligned}$$

The expectation on the right-hand side includes n variances and $n(n - 1)/2$ covariances:

$$E[\varepsilon\varepsilon'] = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_1^2 & \sigma_{12} & \cdots & \sigma_{1n} \\ \sigma_{21} & \sigma_2^2 & \cdots & \sigma_{2n} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \sigma_{n1} & \sigma_{n2} & \cdots & \sigma_n^2 \end{bmatrix},$$

as $E[\varepsilon_i^2] = \sigma_i^2$ and $E[\varepsilon_i \varepsilon_j] = \sigma_{ij}$. It is not possible to estimate this many variances and covariances with only n observations. Assumption 4, however, reduces the number of items that must be estimated from $n + n(n - 1)/2$ to one, making estimation possible. Assumption 4 states that the variances are uniform, $E[\sigma_i^2] = \sigma^2$, and that the covariances are zero, $E[\varepsilon_i \varepsilon_j] = \sigma_{ij} = 0$. The expectation above then simplifies to

$$E[\varepsilon \varepsilon'] = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma^2 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & \sigma^2 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \cdots & \sigma^2 \end{bmatrix} = \sigma^2 \mathbf{I},$$

and the expression for the variance is then

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Var}(\hat{\beta}) &= (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}' E[\varepsilon \varepsilon'] \mathbf{X} (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \\ &= (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \mathbf{X}' \sigma^2 \mathbf{I} \mathbf{X} (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1} \\ &= \sigma^2 (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1}. \end{aligned}$$

These four assumptions are enough to prove the Gauss-Markov theorem, which states that the least squares estimator is the most efficient estimator among the class of linear and unbiased estimators. The theorem does not say that the least squares estimator is the most efficient estimator; there exist estimators that are more efficient, but they happen to be biased or nonlinear, or both.

Finally, Assumption 5—normally distributed disturbances—allows derivation of the sampling distribution of the least squares estimates. Because the estimated coefficients are linear combinations of normally distributed disturbances, the estimated coefficients are normally distributed:

$$\hat{\beta} \sim N(\beta, \sigma^2 (\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{X})^{-1}).$$

Correct t tests, F tests, and χ^2 tests follow.

Substantive Implications of the Assumptions

While the five assumptions discussed above are primarily used to imbue the least squares estimator with good properties, the same assumptions have

very specific substantive implications for the data being modeled. Rarely, however, do these assumptions accurately describe the data used by political scientists.

The assumption that no exact linear relationships exist among the regressors means that no regressor or set of regressors can be a linear combination of any other regressor or set of regressors. Not violating this assumption is mostly a matter of asking meaningful questions of the data. Problems with this assumption most often result from the careless use of dummy variables. As an example, consider a regression of the difference in votes obtained by two presidential candidates in a district on an intercept and a set of independent variables. The regressors include a dummy variable for districts in southern states and a dummy variable for districts in nonsouthern states. The regression, in part, asks the question “How do districts in southern states and districts in nonsouthern states differ from other districts?” The substantive problem, of course, is that there are no other districts (all districts have to be in the South or the non-South). The question is not a meaningful one. (The technical problem is that these dummy variables would be collinear with the intercept.)

The assumption that the regressors are fixed in repeated samples is equivalent to assuming that the analyst has performed an experiment where she has control over the inputs to the experiment. Thus, the experiment could be rerun many times with exactly the same values for the regressors, but with new values for the disturbances and therefore new values for the dependent variable. Each time the regression is rerun, the different values for the dependent variable would produce different estimated coefficients. Discussion of the distribution of the estimated coefficients is therefore possible.

The “fixed $\mathbf{X}$ ” assumption fails to describe all but a very few political science data sets. The assumption can easily be relaxed, however, either by assuming the regressors to be exogenous and conditioning on them or by assuming stochastic regressors. What is important is how the “fixed $\mathbf{X}$ ” assumption interacts with the assumption that the expected value of the disturbances is zero, $E[\varepsilon] = 0$. Combined, the two assumptions imply that the regressors are uncorrelated with the disturbances. The lack of correlation between the regressors and

the disturbances is the key assumption in regression analysis. When the assumption holds, the least squares estimator is unbiased. When the assumption does not hold, the least squares estimator is biased. Unfortunately, there are a variety of substantive reasons why this key assumption is unlikely to hold. The three biggest concerns—measurement error, omitted variables, and simultaneity—are discussed in depth in the next section.

The assumption of homoskedasticity and no autocorrelation is perhaps the assumption least likely to describe a political science data set. The assumption implies that all the unmeasured factors in the disturbance affect different observations in exactly the same way. It implies that observations drawn from physically adjacent areas are no more alike each other than observations drawn from nonadjacent areas. It implies that political processes that are observed over time are not sticky or sluggish. Finally, the assumption implies that the model has not been misspecified in important ways. Few of these implications accurately describe the majority of political science data sets. A detailed discussion follows.

Getting the Coefficients Right

When estimating a statistical model, political scientists are concerned with getting the estimated coefficients right. That is, a researcher would like his or her estimated coefficients to be close to the population parameter values. Unfortunately, there is no way to know whether an estimate is close to the true parameter value (short of adopting a Bayesian perspective, which is yet to be done by the majority of political scientists). All that can be done is to ascertain whether the estimator is good—and then assume that a good estimator produces a good estimate.

As noted above, there are two ways to think about a good estimator in this sense. One way is to say that an estimator is good if it is on average neither high nor low, a property that is known as unbiasedness. Formally, an estimator is unbiased if its expectation is equal to the population parameter, $E[\hat{\beta}] = \beta$. The other way is to say that an estimator is good if it is near the true value almost all the time when the sample size is large, a property that is known as consistency. Formally, an estimator is consistent if its probability limit,

or plim, is equal to the population parameter: $\text{plim } \hat{\beta} = \beta$.

Of the two definitions of the term *good*, the latter is closer to what political scientists actually mean. An unbiased estimator only gives information about the average estimate, not the estimate actually calculated. Consistency, on the other hand, is the minimum requirement for any estimator; with a large sample size, the calculated estimate should be close to the truth.

A definitive statement choosing between unbiasedness and consistency is not necessary, however, as the major condition for achieving both is the same. The key assumption is that the disturbances have mean zero and are uncorrelated with each regressor or $E[X'\varepsilon] = 0$. (This condition is weaker than assuming the independence of X and ε . Independence implies a correlation of zero, whereas a correlation of zero does not imply independence.) Given the importance of this assumption, it would seem that testing this assumption would be the first step in marshaling evidence for the statistical adequacy of a proposed model. The unknown disturbances, ε , could be estimated with the least squares residuals, $\hat{\varepsilon} = y - X\hat{\beta}$, and then correlated with each regressor. Unfortunately, this test is uninformative. The least squares residuals are, *by construction*, uncorrelated with the regressors. A simple manipulation of the least squares estimator demonstrates the point. Multiply both sides of the least squares estimator by $X'X$, and then substitute $X\hat{\beta} + \hat{\varepsilon}$ for y on the right-hand side:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{\beta} &= (X'X)^{-1}X'y \\ X'X\hat{\beta} &= X'(X\hat{\beta} + \hat{\varepsilon}) \\ X'X\hat{\beta} &= X'X\hat{\beta} + X'\hat{\varepsilon} \\ X'\hat{\varepsilon} &= 0.\end{aligned}$$

As this critical assumption is not directly testable, we need to consider the ways in which the assumption could be violated. The three most common violations include measurement error, omitted variables, and simultaneity. We will examine each in turn.

Measurement Error

Measurement error in political science arises from the difficulty of measuring the theoretical

constructs to which political scientists often refer in their work. Concepts such as power, democracy, and ideology can be measured in a variety of different ways, but each measure is an approximation of an abstract idea. Good measures include significant parts of the construct of interest, but invariably, they also include parts of other constructs (systematic bias) as well as random error. Measurement error is likely the rule, and not the exception, in most political science data.

Theory. Let the DGP include a single regressor:

$$y = x\beta + \varepsilon.$$

Assume that the single regressor has been measured with some error. That is, the variable that is actually available to us is not x , but w :

$$w = x + u,$$

where u is the random error and w thus comprises the true value, x , plus an error component. In addition, assume that u has mean zero, is uncorrelated with ε , and is uncorrelated with the single regressor, x . If we write x as a function of w and u , the model we actually estimate is

$$\begin{aligned} y &= (w - u)\beta + \varepsilon \\ &= w\beta + \nu, \end{aligned}$$

where $\nu = \varepsilon - u\beta$. The least squares estimator for this model is

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\beta} &= (w'w)^{-1}w'y \\ &= \beta + (w'w)^{-1}w'\nu. \end{aligned}$$

The problem here is that w and ν are both functions of the random error, u . Thus, w and ν are correlated, which violates the assumption that guarantees consistency and unbiasedness.

In the special case just discussed (a regression with a single mismeasured regressor), the effect of measurement error is straightforward. w consists of a systematic part, x , and a random part, u . The random part of w is uncorrelated with the dependent variable by construction. The larger the variance of the random part grows relative to the systematic part, the closer the estimated

coefficient is to zero. This effect is seen in the expression for $\hat{\beta}$'s inconsistency,

$$\text{plim}(\hat{\beta} - \beta) = -\frac{\beta\sigma_u^2}{\sigma_x^2 + \sigma_u^2}.$$

The inconsistency is negative, which accounts for the bias toward zero. The inconsistency is small only if σ_x^2 is large relative to σ_u^2 . As the latter term increases in size, the greater is the attenuation.

Practice. The case just discussed is highly stylized and is unlikely to be encountered in practice. The comforting conclusions of these kinds of theoretical discussions—for example, that the effects are attenuated—generally do not hold in more realistic situations. First, most regressions are likely to include multiple regressors, with some subset being measured with significant error. In this situation, it is difficult to know the effects of measurement error. Even if the measurement error is confined to one variable, it affects the estimated coefficients of the variables measured without error. Second, the error in the above discussion is random error; it is uncorrelated with the disturbance, ε , and uncorrelated with the lone regressor, x . Actual measurement error is far more likely to be systematic. Any operational definition of a difficult to measure theoretical construct, such as power or democracy, is likely to pick up elements of other, unwanted constructs. The problem can be severe. It has been demonstrated, for example, that correlated measurement error between two variables can lead to an incorrect sign on an estimated coefficient. Including long lists of unevenly measured control variables in a regression, therefore, makes little sense. Third, measurement error can also appear in the dependent variable. This case is often ignored, as random error in the dependent variable is simply added to the error component of the model, and consistency is unaffected. Again, systematic error that is correlated with the included regressors is more likely, and the result is inconsistency and bias.

Omitted Variables

Hidden within the assumption that the regressors must be uncorrelated with the error term is

the claim that we have all the important variables that affect the dependent variable accounted for in the model. More specifically, the claim is that the model includes all the important regressors that are correlated with the other included regressors. Omitted variables, like measurement error, are probably the rule rather than the exception in political science research.

Theory. Let the true DGP be

$$y = X_1\beta_1 + x_2\beta_2 + \varepsilon,$$

where X_1 is an $n \times k - 1$ matrix of regressors and x_2 is a single regressor. Assume that x_2 is omitted from the model either because it cannot be measured or because it is unknown. The model actually estimated, then, is

$$y = X_1\beta_1 + \varepsilon^*,$$

where $\varepsilon^* = x_2\beta_2 + \varepsilon$. This expression makes the problem clear. The new error term, ε^* , includes x_2 . If that variable is correlated with the included variables, X_1 , the assumption that the regressors are uncorrelated with the disturbances no longer holds.

To see this, begin with the least squares estimator of the misspecified model, and substitute the right-hand side of the true model for y :

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{\beta}_1 &= (X_1'X_1)^{-1}X_1'y \\ &= (X_1'X_1)^{-1}X_1'(X_1\beta_1 + x_2\beta_2 + \varepsilon) \\ &= \beta_1 + (X_1'X_1)^{-1}X_1'x_2\beta_2 + (X_1'X_1)^{-1}X_1'\varepsilon.\end{aligned}$$

Taking the expectation under the assumption that the included variables are uncorrelated with the disturbance term, the result is

$$E[\hat{\beta}_1] = \beta_1 + (X_1'X_1)^{-1}X_1'x_2\beta_2.$$

Thus, the difference between the expectation of $\hat{\beta}_1$ and the truth depends on two kinds of values. The first are the coefficients from the regression of the excluded variable on the included variables, $(X_1'X_1)^{-1}X_1'x_2$. The second is the true effect of x_2 , β_2 . Using this information, it is possible to identify the direction of the inconsistency and bias.

Including irrelevant variables in a regression is considered a lesser problem. Let the true DGP be

$$y = X_1\beta_1 + \varepsilon$$

and the estimated equation be

$$y = X_1\beta_1 + X_2\beta_2 + \varepsilon.$$

The variables in X_2 are irrelevant and thus have no effect on the dependent variable. When this equation is estimated, least squares correctly estimates $\hat{\beta}_2$ as zero, and the estimator of β_1 is consistent. The only downside usually noted is that the variance of β_1 in the estimated equation,

$$\sigma^2(X_1'M_2X_1)^{-1},$$

where $M_2 = I - X_2(X_2'X_2)^{-1}X_2'$, is always as large as, or larger than, the true variance,

$$\sigma^2(X_1'X_1)^{-1}.$$

This increase in the variance is considered to be a fair price to pay for the promise of avoiding inconsistency and bias caused by omitted variables.

Practice. As is true for measurement error, the theory and practice of omitted variables diverge, and comforting conclusions regarding the direction of the bias or inconsistency apply only in very special cases. For example, it is unlikely that a single variable is omitted from a regression. A set of omitted variables is more likely, making the expectation above

$$E[\hat{\beta}_1] = \beta_1 + (X_1'X_1)^{-1}X_1'X_2\beta_2.$$

Even more likely than a set of omitted variables is the situation where the researcher is deciding whether to include a known group of previously omitted variables while still omitting a group of unknown or unmeasured variables. This situation can be expressed using the following DGP and two misspecified models. Let the DGP be in scalar notation:

$$Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1X_{t1} + \beta_2X_{t2} + \beta_3X_{t3} + \varepsilon_t$$

and the two misspecified models be

$$\text{Model 1: } Y_t = \beta_{01} + \beta_{11}X_{t1} + \varepsilon_{t1},$$

$$\text{Model 2: } Y_t = \beta_{02} + \beta_{12}X_{t1} + \beta_{22}X_{t2} + \varepsilon_{t2}.$$

Model 1 omits both X_2 and X_3 , and Model 2 omits just X_3 . The prevalent view in political science is that the bias on $\hat{\beta}_{11}$, the estimated coefficient on X_1 in model 1, is always greater than the bias on $\hat{\beta}_{12}$, the estimated coefficient on X_1 in model 2. Letting the bias on $\hat{\beta}_{11}$, $E[\hat{\beta}_{11}] - \beta_1$, be denoted as $b(\hat{\beta}_{11}, \beta_1)$ and the bias on $\hat{\beta}_{12}$, $E[\hat{\beta}_{12}] - \beta_1$, be denoted as $b(\hat{\beta}_{12}, \beta_1)$, the mathematical argument is that

$$|b(\hat{\beta}_{11}, \beta_1)| \geq |b(\hat{\beta}_{12}, \beta_1)|.$$

This conclusion, however, does not hold in general. It can be demonstrated that the inclusion of additional relevant variables can increase or decrease the bias on the X_1 coefficient. Without knowing the effects of the still omitted variables on the newly included variables, it is impossible to know whether the newly included variables increase or decrease the bias and inconsistency.

Simultaneity

Simultaneity is the third major way in which the key assumption necessary for unbiasedness and consistency—the regressors and the disturbances are uncorrelated—can be violated. The problem of simultaneity arises when one of the right-hand-side regressors is determined simultaneously with the dependent variable.

Theory. Let the true DGP consist of two equations with two dependent variables, y_1 and y_2 , each of which is a function of the other. The equations also include two exogenous regressors, x_1 and x_2 , and two sets of disturbances, ε_1 and ε_2 ,

$$\begin{aligned} y_1 + \beta_{12}y_2 + \gamma_{11}x_1 &= \varepsilon_1, \\ y_2 + \beta_{21}y_1 + \gamma_{12}x_2 &= \varepsilon_2. \end{aligned}$$

To see the problem in estimating these equations consistently, rewrite the first equation as

$$y_1 = Z\delta + \varepsilon_1,$$

where $Z = [y_2 \ x_1]$ and $\delta' = [-\beta_{12} \ -\gamma_{11}]$. The usual ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is

$$\hat{\delta} = (Z'Z)^{-1}Z'y_1.$$

Substituting $Z\delta + \varepsilon_1$ for y_1 into the above equation and taking expectations, it is easy to see that the expected value of $\hat{\delta}$ does not equal δ :

$$E[\hat{\delta}] = \delta + E[(Z'Z)^{-1}Z'\varepsilon_1].$$

The expected value on the right-hand side of the above equation does not approach zero because Z contains an endogenous variable y_2 , which is jointly determined with y_1 and thus is correlated with ε_1 . The result is bias and inconsistency because the main condition for achieving unbiased and consistent estimates, that the columns of Z be uncorrelated with the disturbance, ε_1 , is violated.

Faced with the above situation, it is possible to estimate an equation known as the reduced form by rewriting the original two equations as

$$By + \Gamma x = \varepsilon,$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} B &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & \beta_{12} \\ \beta_{21} & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \\ y' &= [y_1 \ y_2], \\ \Gamma' &= [\gamma_{11} \ \gamma_{21}], \\ x' &= [x_1 \ x_2], \\ \varepsilon' &= [\varepsilon_1 \ \varepsilon_2]. \end{aligned}$$

Provided B is nonsingular, the equation can be solved in the following way:

$$\begin{aligned} y_t &= -B^{-1}\Gamma x_t + B^{-1}\varepsilon \\ &= \Pi x + \nu, \end{aligned}$$

where $\Pi = -B^{-1}\Gamma$ and $\nu = B^{-1}\varepsilon$.

Most of the time, however, political scientists are interested in obtaining estimates of the original coefficients, not of the reduced-form coefficients. The big question is whether estimates of the original coefficients can be recovered from the reduced-form estimates. Consider the model given above, but this time premultiplied by a nonsingular matrix G :

$$GBy + G\Gamma x = G\varepsilon.$$

Solving this equation for the reduced-form coefficients produces exactly the same coefficient estimates

as the model that is not premultiplied by the G matrix:

$$\begin{aligned} y_t &= -B^{-1}G^{-1}G\Gamma x_t + B^{-1}G^{-1}G\varepsilon \\ &= \Pi x + \nu, \end{aligned}$$

where $\Pi = -B^{-1}\Gamma$ and $\nu = B^{-1}\varepsilon$.

It is impossible, then, to recover estimates of the original coefficients because both models produce exactly the same reduced-form coefficients. The equivalence of these two models is known as the identification problem, and much of the practice of simultaneous equations is devoted to solving it. Systems of equations where estimates of the original coefficients can be recovered from the reduced form are identified. Systems where recovery is not possible are unidentified.

Practice. In the context of simultaneous equations, the identification problem concerns the ability to recover estimates of the coefficients of interest from the reduced-form coefficients. Ensuring that a system of equations is identified generally requires the use of a priori nonsample information. Such information most frequently comes in the form of exclusion restrictions—a specification that certain endogenous variables and certain exogenous variables do not appear in certain equations. The point is to make it harder, and eventually impossible, to find a G matrix that produces the same set of reduced-form coefficients as the original model. If no such matrix is found, then the system of equations is identified.

Where does the nonsample information come from? As the necessary information cannot be deduced from the data, it has to come from theory. Unfortunately, little theory in political science is detailed enough to provide justifiable exclusion restrictions. Decisions about restrictions, then, are often made on ad hoc grounds. The consequences of making false exclusions are the familiar ones of bias and inconsistency.

Finally, it should be noted that the three major sources of endogeneity—measurement error, omitted variables, and simultaneity—do not occur in isolation from one another. Systems of equations use more variables than single-equation models and are therefore more likely, *ceteris paribus*, to suffer from measurement error. The use of false exclusion restrictions leads to omitted-variable

bias. Any real-life data analysis situation is likely to suffer from all three problems, making any attempts to determine the direction of bias futile.

What Does Not Need to Be Assumed

Getting the coefficients “right” requires one major assumption, the disturbance has mean zero and is uncorrelated with each regressor, $E[X'\varepsilon] = 0$, and one minor assumption, no regressor or set of regressors is a linear combination of any other regressor or set of regressors, or X has full column rank. The list of assumptions that do not need to be made is much longer. For example, it is not necessary to assume normality of any variables, dependent or independent. It is not necessary to assume that the independent variables are uncorrelated with one another or correlated at low levels. It is also unnecessary to assume anything about the variance/covariance matrix of the disturbances. Neither heteroskedasticity nor autocorrelation affects the bias or consistency of the estimator.

Getting the Standard Errors Right

Getting the standard errors right is not necessary for getting the coefficients right. The reverse, however, is not true. The problems that can plague estimates of the coefficients—measurement error, omitted variables, and simultaneity—can affect the standard errors. When trying to get the coefficients right, it is often difficult in practice to know the direction of the bias or inconsistency. The same is not true for the standard errors, however. In most cases involving endogeneity, the estimated standard errors are too narrow, leading to overconfidence in the results of the analysis.

Consider the omitted-variable case. When the true DGP is

$$y = X_1\beta_1 + X_2\beta_2 + \varepsilon,$$

the true variance of β_1 is $\sigma^2(X_1'M_2X_1)^{-1}$. If the variables in X_2 are omitted from the estimated model, the variance of β_1 is $\sigma^2(X_1'X_1)^{-1}$, which is always as small as, or smaller than, the true variance. A similar demonstration can be made in the case of measurement error. As the amount of random error in x increases, the estimated standard error on the coefficient of x decreases. The problem is that

the analyst thinks he has more information than he actually does.

The discussion that follows assumes that endogeneity problems do not exist, so that the other issues that lead to incorrect standard errors can be examined. It is important to remember, however, that the estimated standard errors are likely to be too small even before these additional problems are discovered.

Getting estimates of the regression coefficients right is a matter of making a single, albeit very important, assumption: $E[X'\varepsilon] = 0$. Getting the standard errors right requires making another very important assumption involving the disturbances. This time the assumption is that the squared disturbances are uncorrelated with each regressor, its square, and all cross-products. Formally, the assumption is that $E[\varepsilon^2 X'X] = \sigma^2 E[X'X]$, where σ^2 is the expectation of ε . This assumption is implied by the more common assumption that the expectation of the squared disturbances is constant $E[\varepsilon^2] = \sigma^2$. Under this assumption, as well as the two previous assumptions— X has full column rank and $E[X'\varepsilon] = 0$ —the OLS estimator of β is normally distributed, and the standard errors, t statistics, and F statistics are asymptotically valid.

As with the previous big assumption, however, violations of the new assumption are both common and likely.

Heteroskedasticity

The assumption of homoskedasticity means that each of the disturbances is drawn from a distribution with the same variance as the other disturbances. In conjunction with previous assumptions, the homoskedasticity assumption is $E[\varepsilon_i^2] = \sigma^2$. Violations of this assumption can occur in one of two ways: as a result of misspecification or as a result of the data themselves.

Misspecification. Heteroskedasticity due to misspecification can arise in a number of different ways. If the true DGP is

$$y = X_1\beta_1 + X_2\beta_2 + \varepsilon,$$

and the analyst omits the variables in X_2 from her model,

$$y = X_1\beta_1 + \varepsilon^*,$$

then the error term is a function of the omitted variables, $\varepsilon^* = X_2\beta_2 + \varepsilon$. As the omitted variables vary, so does the error variance.

An incorrect functional form can also cause heteroskedasticity. If the true DGP is nonlinear,

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_i^2 + \varepsilon_i,$$

and the analyst estimates a linear model,

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_i + v_i,$$

then the disturbance is again a function of x , $v_i = f(x_i^2, \varepsilon_i)$. As x varies, so does the error variance.

A coefficient that varies across observations can also be a source of heteroskedasticity. Consider a data-generating process where

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_i x_i + \varepsilon_i$$

and β_i varies randomly around some fixed β : $\beta_i = \beta + v_i$. Application of OLS estimates the model:

$$\begin{aligned} y_i &= \beta_0 + (\beta + v_i)x_i + \varepsilon_i \\ &= \beta_0 + \beta x_i + (v_i x_i + \varepsilon_i), \end{aligned}$$

and once again, the error term is a function of x .

A multiplicative error term and an incorrect data transformation are other specification issues that could cause heteroskedasticity.

Data. The data can also be a source of heteroskedasticity. In the simplest case, an influential outlier can cause heteroskedasticity. By the same token, a heavily skewed regressor can also cause a nonconstant error variance.

Specific kinds of data can be a source of the problem. Aggregate data are a common source of heteroskedasticity. If the dependent variable is an average or a proportion, the variance is a function of the number of observations being aggregated in the different units. If the estimated model is based on an average,

$$\bar{y}_j = \beta_0 + \beta \bar{x}_j + \bar{\varepsilon}_j,$$

where $\bar{\varepsilon}_j$ is an average for the j th unit over i individuals, the variance of the error term is

$\text{Var}(\bar{\varepsilon}_j) = \sigma^2/N_j$. The error variance, then, clearly varies with the size of the group. A similar demonstration can be performed for a dependent variable based on a proportion.

Finally, heteroskedasticity most commonly occurs with cross-sectional data where units of different sizes, whether they be individuals, firms, industries, or states, are taken together. It is easy to imagine larger units having larger absolute error terms. A \$900 billion economy is more likely to see an absolute error of \$10 billion than a \$100 billion economy.

Autocorrelation

The assumption of no autocorrelation means that the disturbance associated with one observation is unrelated to the disturbance associated with any other observation. Formally, the assumption is $E[\varepsilon_i \varepsilon_j] = 0$ for $i \neq j$. As is the case with heteroskedasticity, violations are the result of misspecification of the data themselves.

Misspecification. Like heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation can be the result of omitted variables, incorrect functional form, or data manipulation. An omitted variable that happens to be autocorrelated causes the disturbances to be autocorrelated. A special case of this result occurs when the omitted variable is the lagged value of the dependent variable. Autocorrelation arises in this case due to the influence of the lagged value on the current value. If a linear functional form is used to model a nonlinear relationship, there will be sections of the relationship where the estimated regression line consistently underestimates or overestimates the relationship. Finally, smoothing techniques such as moving averages can induce a periodicity in the disturbances that did not exist prior to the smoothing.

Data. Autocorrelation is, somewhat obviously, most likely to occur in data that are observed over time. Such variables often display a “stickiness” and only change in small increments over time. State budgets, for example, only change marginally from year to year. Successive observations, then, are likely to be correlated. Similarly, random shocks to a system, such as war or a market crash, have prolonged effects across time periods, leading to correlated disturbances.

A more subtle form of autocorrelation arises from cross-sectional data. Spatial autocorrelation can occur when observations are taken from units that are physically adjacent to one another, such as states or countries. The behavior of individuals from adjacent West European countries is likely to be affected by similar unmeasured factors, which leads to correlated disturbances.

What to Do

The conclusion to draw from the discussion above is not that regression can never be trusted. All the problems that have been detailed have solutions that are examined elsewhere in this encyclopedia. The discussion that follows outlines a few broad approaches to addressing the common assumption violations encountered by political scientists using the linear regression model.

Endogeneity problems can often be dealt with through the use of instrumental-variables regression. Mismeasured variables, for instance, can be replaced with “instruments,” which are alternative variables that are uncorrelated with the disturbance term and yet are still correlated with the mismeasured regressors. Any regressor that is uncorrelated with the disturbance term can serve as its own instrument.

Let the matrix of instruments be Z , which has at least as many columns (regressors) as the original matrix of regressors, X . Next, premultiply the usual linear regression equation by Z' ,

$$Z'y = Z'X\beta + Z'\varepsilon,$$

where the variance of $Z'\varepsilon$ is $\sigma^2(Z'Z)$. The instrumental-variables (IV) estimator is, then,

$$\hat{\beta}_{IV} = (X'Z(Z'Z)^{-1}Z'X)^{-1}X'Z(Z'Z)^{-1}Z'y,$$

with variance $\text{Var}(\hat{\beta}_{IV}) = \sigma^2(X'Z(Z'Z)^{-1}Z'X)^{-1}$. Estimates are easily calculated by noting that $\hat{X} = Z(Z'Z)^{-1}Z'X$ are the fitted values from the regression of X on Z . The instrumental-variables estimator, then, is just

$$\hat{\beta}_{IV} = (\hat{X}'\hat{X})^{-1}\hat{X}'y.$$

It can be easily shown that the instrumental-variables estimator is consistent and, therefore, it

is possible to get correct coefficients. The trade-off for this gain in consistency is loss of precision.

Problems relating to the error term, such as heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, can be dealt with either through feasible generalized least squares or through calculation of robust standard errors. In the case of heteroskedasticity, the challenge is to estimate the correct variance/covariance matrix, which is

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Var}(\hat{\beta}) &= (X'X)^{-1}X'\sigma^2\Omega X(X'X)^{-1} \\ &= \frac{1}{n} \left(\frac{1}{n} X'X \right)^{-1} \left(\frac{1}{n} X'[\sigma^2\Omega]X \right) \left(\frac{1}{n} X'X \right)^{-1}.\end{aligned}$$

Estimating $\sigma^2\Omega$, the dimensions of which are $n \times n$, is impossible with n observations. Estimating $\left(\frac{1}{n} X'[\sigma^2\Omega]X \right)$, however, is not impossible, as its dimensions are only $K \times K$, where K is the number of regressors in X . It can be shown that this expression is equal to

$$\frac{1}{n} \sum \sigma_i^2 x_i x_i',$$

and the above can be consistently estimated by

$$S = \frac{1}{n} \sum \hat{\varepsilon}_i^2 x_i x_i',$$

where $\hat{\varepsilon}_i$ is the residual for the i th observation. The correct variance/covariance is consistently estimated by

$$\text{Var}(\hat{\beta}) = n(X'X)^{-1}S(X'X)^{-1}.$$

It is important to remember that these techniques bring with them their own sets of assumptions, which may or may not be more plausible than the assumptions of OLS. The key assumption of the instrumental-variables procedure is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the disturbance. This assumption cannot be tested, and the use of “quasi instruments,” instruments that are only approximately uncorrelated with the disturbance, can produce incorrect inferences. Strong theory is required to make such assumptions plausible.

Assumptions and the Generalized Linear Model

As noted in the introduction to the linear regression model discussion, GLM replaced the linear

regression model as the workhorse of political science. A GLM is one that assumes a distribution included in the linear exponential family. These distributions include, among others, the normal, the Bernoulli, the exponential, and the Poisson. These models are estimated by maximum likelihood, and their good properties only hold asymptotically.

GLMs require very strong distributional assumptions. In addition, they require many of the same assumptions as the linear regression model. Some of these assumptions, however, work very differently in this setting. Consider the probit model. The model is derived by assuming that a latent or unobserved variable y^* is a function of some regressors and an error term:

$$y^* = X\beta + \varepsilon.$$

All that is observed of the latent variable is whether it is greater than zero:

$$y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } y_i^* > 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } y_i^* \leq 0. \end{cases}$$

Given the above, the probability of observing a one is

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(y_i = 1) &= \Pr(y_i^* > 0) \\ &= \Pr(x_i\beta + \varepsilon_i > 0) \\ &= \Pr(\varepsilon_i > -x_i\beta) \\ &= \Pr(\varepsilon_i < x_i\beta) \\ &= F(x_i\beta),\end{aligned}$$

where $F()$ is the cumulative distribution function of ε . The probit model comes from assuming that ε is distributed normally.

The probit model makes the same key assumption that the linear regression model does: ε and the regressors must be uncorrelated with one another. Unfortunately, not all the lessons learned in the linear regression case are applicable to probit models. For example, the linear regression model does not require normality for consistency. The probit model, however, does. The ε_i must be drawn from independent and identically distributed normal distributions. For the linear regression model, the OLS estimator is unbiased and consistent when a

relevant variable is omitted from the regression, provided that the omitted variable is uncorrelated with the included variables. This result does not hold for probit models. When a relevant variable is omitted from a probit specification, the estimated coefficients on the included variables are biased and inconsistent whether or not the omitted variable is correlated with the included variables. By the same token, robust standard errors are often a useful way of dealing with heteroskedasticity in the linear regression model. Robust standard errors, however, make little sense for the probit model. If the model is correct, so are the standard errors. If the model is seriously misspecified, use of robust standard errors provides asymptotically correct variance estimates on wrong coefficient estimates. Robust standard errors, then, are of little help in this context.

The lessons learned from the linear regression model have, at best, heuristic value when it comes to more complex models such as GLMs. New assumptions have to be made, and old assumptions often have to be revisited and reevaluated. Solutions to problems that work for the linear regression case may not work for GLMs. It is important to remember that complex models are more than just fancy linear regressions.

Assumptions and Inference

Of the two goals of quantitative modeling in political science mentioned in the introduction—description and inference—the latter is more difficult to achieve. The reason for this inequity is that inference depends on assumptions that are far stronger than the assumptions on which consistency and unbiasedness rest, and as argued above, these assumptions rarely hold in political science data sets. Although these assumptions can be relaxed with the use of more complicated statistical models, the fact remains that the model has to be nearly right for correct inference, and that is a tall order in political science.

Of all the assumptions needed for correct inferences, the most fundamental is yet to be discussed. When introducing the linear regression model, a random sample of size n from a population of interest was assumed. This assumption is standard in statistical analysis and allows traditional statistical inference to work. In very few situations, however,

do political science data sets resemble anything even close to a random sample drawn from a population. The question then becomes “To what are political scientists making inferences?” Whether the data comprise a set of international wars, American states, or Western European democracies, there is no actual population to make inferences to, and these samples are rarely treated as populations in and of themselves. Political scientists pay little attention to this issue, and most articles that make use of quantitative modeling in the discipline make no mention of the population of interest, how the sample was generated, or to what the statistical inferences refer.

The real question that needs to be addressed concerns the source of the randomness in the data. In what is known as design-based inference, the population is seen as fixed, and the sample is the result of a stochastic process such as simple random sampling or stratified random sampling. Inferences are made in traditional fashion from the sample to the population from which it was drawn. In what is known as model-based inference, the observed values are seen as realizations of random variables and therefore constitute realizations of a random process. Most political scientists practice model-based inference as true random samples from known populations are relatively rare in the discipline.

Model-based inference comes in two versions. Political scientists, when asked what population they are making inferences to, often respond by talking about a superpopulation. A superpopulation is an imaginary population from which the data could have been randomly drawn had the imaginary population existed. A researcher first assumes the existence of an imaginary population (the superpopulation) and then assumes that the sample at hand is drawn randomly from the imaginary population. There are situations in the sciences where assuming a superpopulation makes sense. To borrow an example, it might be sensible to consider the hurricanes generated in the Atlantic Ocean in a given year under certain meteorological conditions as a random draw from the population of hurricanes that could have been produced in the Atlantic Ocean in that year. There is, in such a circumstance, a real stochastic process that generates the observations. The same cannot be said of, for instance, election data. Political scientists are fond of saying that the world could have turned out differently,

and thus, the data are like a random draw from the superpopulation of elections across different worlds. Unlike the process that generates Atlantic hurricanes, however, there is no actual stochastic process that could generate these imaginary elections.

The second version of model-based inference is closer to what political scientists actually do. In this version, there is no population, and no pretense is made about making inferences to a population. Instead, a model is proposed that accounts for the way nature produces the data. Inferences are then made back to features of the model. The sample design is irrelevant under model-based inference, which is why it fits well with political science. The downside of model-based inference is its dependence on a model, which may be misspecified in any of the ways discussed earlier. If the model is bad, so are the inferences based on it. An awareness on the part of political scientists that they are engaged in model-based inference is important because it highlights just how fundamental models and their constituent assumptions are to the practice of data analysis in political science.

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See also Categorical Response Data; Data Analysis, Exploratory; Epistemological and Methodological Foundations; Factor Analysis; Logit and Probit Analyses; Maximum Likelihood; Measurement; Misspecification; Models, Computational/Agent-Based; Sampling, Random and Nonrandom; Simultaneous Equation Modeling; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian; Statistics: Overview; Time-Series Analysis; Variables, Instrumental; Weighted Least Squares

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QUANTITATIVE VERSUS QUALITATIVE METHODS

Perhaps no division in the social sciences is so persistent, nettlesome, and poorly understood as the division between quantitative and qualitative ways of knowing. The cleavage can be traced back to the first applications of statistics within the disciplines of economics, political science, and sociology, and it became increasingly acute in the late 20th century as quantitative approaches gained in stature, grew in complexity, and pushed qualitative empirical analysis out of the limelight. During this period, the division between qualitative and quantitative methods became associated—perhaps inappropriately—with the rival epistemological positions of positivism and interpretivism. Charles Smith (1989) summarizes the now familiar standoff:

On the one hand, there are those who argue that only through the application of quantitative measurements and methods can the social sciences ever hope to become “real” sciences; on the other hand, there are those who claim that the subject matter of the social sciences is simply not amenable to quantification and all attempts to impose such measures and methods upon social behavior is just so much nonsense. (p. 29)

This entry looks at the strengths and weaknesses of both positions in terms of their contributions to the *comparability* of findings.

Debate Positions

While there have been many attempts to shed light on this persistent division in the social sciences, work on this question is generated primarily by writers who occupy one of the two camps. These

writers tend to be either strong partisans or visceral opponents of the quantitative worldview. A chronic dualism besets many of these debates, in large part because the distinction between quantitative and qualitative forms of descriptive and causal inference has been folded into the much larger and more “philosophical” debate between positivism and interpretivism. Positivists (or naturalists), usually identified with quantitative methods, present their perspective as hegemonic: There is, or ought to be, only one logic of inference. The conclusion of these scholars is that either there are no important distinctions between qualitative and quantitative work or, to the extent that such distinctions exist, they are to the detriment of qualitative scholarship. “When possible, quantify” is the motto of this camp. Where quantification is not possible, this camp encourages qualitative scholars to follow the logic of quantitative reasoning. Defenders of qualitative work typically emphasize the limits of quantification and the insights that can be gained through an interpretive approach to social action. Rather than a unified logic, interpretivists suggest that there might be multiple logics at work in the social sciences. These multiple logics stem from epistemological or ontological commitments, which may themselves be culturally prescribed and political or historical in origin.

A third position runs orthogonal to this debate. According to this view, the qualitative/quantitative division is inherently ambiguous and, hence, a distraction from the real work of social science. In this spirit, a recent lexicon focused on qualitative inquiry notes, in the entry for “Qualitative,” that “the adjective does not clearly signal a particular meaning” (Thomas A. Schwandt, 1997, p. 129). Rather, it is used as a “blanket designation for all forms of [hermeneutic] inquiry including ethnography, case study research, naturalistic inquiry, ethnomethodology, life history methodology, narrative inquiry, and the like.” In sum, concludes the author of this dictionary of qualitative methods (with no apparent sense of irony), “‘qualitative research’ is simply not a very useful term for denoting a specific set of characteristics of inquiry” (Schwandt, 1997, p. 130). The inherent fuzziness of the concepts “qualitative” and “quantitative” thus prompts some scholars to argue that the so-called debate must be a red herring, that is, a distraction from the real issues of social science methodology.

Thus, one finds three well-articulated positions: (1) naturalism (one logic of inquiry, based implicitly on the quantitative template), (2) pluralism (multiple logics of inquiry, with qualitative and quantitative work founded on different epistemologies), and (3) agnosticism. Many scholars are sympathetic to the naturalist goal of a single, unified logic of inquiry; only in this fashion can the scientific objective of knowledge cumulation be achieved. However, others are dubious whether the quantitative template provides an adequate framework for work across the social sciences. While the agnostic position is attractive, it seems to be mostly rhetorical. Scholars continue to divide themselves into camps—for example, departments, journals, editorial boards—and these camps are often classifiable as predominantly qualitative or quantitative. These two concepts refuse to be banished, suggesting that there must be something somewhere.

As a way of cutting into this subject in a new fashion, this entry proposes a new way of thinking about these issues: The principal factor separating qualitative observations from quantitative observations is the assumed *comparability* of the evidence at hand. Quantitative observations presume a population of things that can be readily measured, counted, and hence compared. Qualitative observations, in contrast, presume an empirical field where individual pieces of evidence are not directly comparable with one another, at least not to the extent that they can be precisely measured. In this sense, quantitative work is appropriately labeled “nomothetic” and qualitative work, “idiographic.” The key point is that the difference between these two kinds of observations rests on the presumed comparability of adjacent observations, not (at least not directly) on the size of the sample, the style of presentation (numbers or narrative), epistemology, ontology, or the formal structure of the method.

The purpose of this entry, it should be stressed, is not to reinforce existing cleavages in the social sciences. Rather, it intends to draw attention to an important underlying issue in these debates, an issue that has not received much recognition in the literature. This is not the only issue underlying the qualitative/quantitative divide, but it is a fundamental issue. If analysis is based on comparison, the central methodological question is what

researchers can reasonably compare and how precise those comparisons can be. In this case, there are legitimate differences of opinion, and they are not the sort that can be empirically proven.

Comparability

Comparable observations are understood as members of the same population and therefore potential members of the same sample. They are examples of a similar phenomenon. They are apples and apples, rather than apples and oranges, to use the time-honored metaphor. Note that comparing apples and oranges is not prohibited; however, to do so one must adopt a higher-order concept—such as fruit—according to which apples and oranges are similar. This commonsense meaning of comparability is widely understood and agreed on. But what does it mean for items to be comparable within the context of social science research? Surely, it is more than shared membership in an arbitrary linguistic category.

First, comparable observations must share a set of relevant descriptive attributes (dimensions). This is what makes them comparable. The observations need not demonstrate the same values for those attributes. Each observation in a sample may “score” differently on each attribute in either quantitative or qualitative terms—high/low, present/absent, and so on. But each observation must be *scaleable*, and the attribute must have the same meaning (roughly or precisely) across the contexts in which it is being compared. This can be labeled *descriptive comparability*, suggesting that it is a fundamental feature of conceptual validity. The defining attributes of a concept must be valid across the designated observations. Otherwise, the concept is being “stretched.”

A second kind of comparability refers to the interrelationship of two factors in a causal analysis, the cause (or vector of causal factors) *X* and the outcome *Y*. The specified *X/Y* relationship must hold across the chosen observations. This is labeled *causal comparability* (a looser version of *unit homogeneity*).

Thus, there are two kinds of comparability: descriptive and causal. The first is presumed in the second. If a sample of observations is assumed to be causally comparable, then it must also be descriptively comparable. In statistical research,

the assumption of unit homogeneity makes this explicit, but it must also be true more generally, for causal comparability can exist only in the presence of descriptive comparability.

Precision and Explicitness

The underlying issues in the enduring qualitative/quantitative debate are tethered to the problem of comparability, as defined above. To “quantify” an observation is to formulate it in terms that can be *explicitly* and *precisely* compared across a large number of observations, that is, where a concept can be expressed on a numerical scale, a metric, or a variable (herein these three words are used interchangeably). Quantitative observations combine natural-language words (nouns, verbs, or adjectives) with numbers according to some preassigned metric. It is a question of measurement, which can be regarded as the assignment of numbers to phenomena in accordance with some uniformly applied rule.

Let us begin with a discussion of the concept of precision. Note that to simply recode a dichotomous natural-language category as a series of binary numbers does not make it any more precise. Thus, 0/1 is no more precise than pregnant/not pregnant. However, numerical scales offer the possibility of greater precision when the number of categories surpasses the categories inherent in natural language, as well as in circumstances where these categories can be understood as positions on a continuous (interval) scale. To say that one room is warmer than another is comparative, but it is less precise than saying that one room is 21 degrees Celsius and the other is 16 degrees Celsius. Thus, in many situations, the use of a quantitative idiom allows for more precise comparisons across units. In all situations, the use of a scale is *at least as* precise as natural language (in the sense that no precision is lost in the translation of words to numbers). Again, to use a quantitative idiom does not entail great precision; it entails the *possibility* of great precision (as well as a more explicit set of comparisons).

Precision should not be confused with *certainty*. Quantitative or qualitative statements may be uttered with more or less confidence. For example, one might say, “I would guess that the room is 21 degrees Celsius” or “I would guess that the room is warm.” With quantitative statements,

a mathematical indicator of uncertainty may accompany the point score. The statement that quantitative observations are more precise refers to the point estimate, not the degree of uncertainty (or dispersion).

Quantitative statements are both more precise (at least potentially) and more *explicit*. This is because the very act of creating a numerical scale requires a set of explicit comparisons and an explicit comparison set—a domain. Scales cannot be developed in highly specific contexts. Suppose that we classify the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, as a single event consisting of four jointly organized attacks. If we treat the attacks of September 11 as a single event rather than four separate events, the idea of developing a barometer for 9/11 is nonsensical because there is nothing to which to relate it—scales make sense only relative to classes of events (unless, of course, that event is being used as a metric for understanding other events, in which case it becomes a comparative metric). Weather can be measured precisely because, for one thing, there is lots of weather to measure, and temperature is thought to have the same general meaning in many different contexts. Granted, all scales are bounded; there is no universal scale (a scale applying to everything). Some things, such as metaphysics, have no temperature; the concept of temperature (and whatever scale might be used to measure it) does not apply in this domain. The point is that relative to words, which are only loosely and implicitly comparative, scales are precisely and explicitly comparative, and their range is usually quite broad (otherwise, why bother to develop a systematic scale?).

Now, it is true that some natural-language adjectives, such as *warm*, are explicitly comparative. But most words are more ambiguous. This is apparent in the extra locutions that are necessary to render ordinary language comparative. One must clarify “warmer than,” “more chairlike than,” and so on; whereas, to append such judgments to a numerical scale is redundant. (One does not say, “The temperature is 21 degrees Celsius, warmer than 18 degrees Celsius.”) Numerical scales are already comparative, and no matter what one does with a numerical observation, it cannot lose its precise, explicitly comparative quality.

To be sure, if one labels an object with a noun—for example, *chair*—one is implicitly (if not explicitly) comparing it with other objects: *nonchairs*.

Language has this universal aspect; if we call something X, we imply that other things are not X, or less X or more X. However, the comparisons are vague. It is unclear, for example, where a chair leaves off and a stool begins, for few words—and very few key words in social science—have crisp boundaries. More important, most words are multivalent; they have more than one attribute and, consequently, can mean more than one thing. Thus, to say that an object is “not A” could mean a number of different things, depending on the attribute(s) that is intended by the author or understood by the reader. Moreover, a word usually gains meaning by its context, and this context is undefined in settings other than what the author is studying. Additionally, the other objects that are not X are typically not defined, in which case the larger population of cases (the domain of the inference) remains implicit. Finally, words are contingent on a particular natural language, and this imposes another sort of contextual boundary against comparison. (In contrast, the numeral “5” and the operator “=” mean the same thing everywhere—since the adoption of a uniform language of mathematics—and they also mean the same thing in all the contexts that they might be employed.)

Frequently, natural-language comparisons are without any obvious comparative reference point. The statement “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” is comparative in so many possible ways that it might be considered noncomparative: He did not cross it, he did not cross the Tiber, it was not Brutus who crossed the Rubicon, and so on. If this is comparative, it is so in the most minimal sense. Yet it is important for the purposes here to recognize that comparison is a matter of degree. Qualitative observations can be more or less comparative, but quantitative observations are almost always more precisely and explicitly comparative.

One final clarification is in order. This entry has stated that all quantitative statements about the world invoke a class of events; these form the basis for the metric. However, it does not follow that quantitative statements about the world are necessarily broader in scope than qualitative statements. Indeed, the very fuzziness of natural language gives us the license to generalize—for one can avoid saying anything very specific—while the exactness of quantification may rein in the temptation to generalize. It

follows that qualitative statements can be either very restricted in scope (as in the previous example about the singular event of 9/11) or extremely broad. Saying something in words does not affect the scope of the inference. Saying something with a metric, however, presupposes a class of referents, which is to say it must make reference to more than one discrete event (and these reference points must be fairly precise and explicit).

Trade-Offs: Thick and Thin Description

In principle, any qualitative observation can be converted to quantitative form, as attested by the plethora of methods and software designed to perform this function, for example, NUD*IST software, Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), and various narrative-based methods, as well as more generic forms of content analysis. There is no such thing as a non-quantifiable observation because any single statement that can be made about one phenomenon could also be made about another phenomenon, thus providing the possibility of some sort of scale.

Yet it is not clear that one would always want to make this transposition from words to words-with-numbers (variables). Indeed, there are usually costs associated with this conversion. The trade-off may be understood in terms of precision and explicitness on the one hand and depth (or richness) on the other. More concisely, the analyst has the option of describing *thinly* (with less depth) or describing *thickly* (with more depth). The fact is that words are usually multivalent; they generally carry a variety of attributes, some of which may not even be logically consistent. This is particularly true of key words in social science—for example, democracy, justice, corporatism, political party. When one of these words is converted to a measurable variable, which is to say to a precise scale, the researcher is generally forced to drop one or more of its attributes. For not all these attributes will be precisely applicable to the class of phenomena that the concept is now (quite explicitly) intended to cover. This does not necessarily refer to an expansion in scope, for natural language can reach as far as mathematical variables. But in making the comparison precise and explicit, it is usually necessary to narrow the definition of the natural-language concept. It could be that the intensification of the natural-language concept is also quite a

bit narrower than the full set of attributes normally (in ordinary language) associated with the term. An author is free to define a term as he or she sees fit; qualitative work is not wedded to ordinary language. The point is, in creating a variable, one is forced to make explicit choices about which definitional attributes apply properly to a class of phenomena and which do not. This is likely to prompt some narrowing of the semantic options. And this is why the choice to quantify a concept is considered a move toward thin description. More explicit comparisons can be made, but they are narrowed down to one or several dimensions (the chosen attributes of the core concept).

Similarly, if one chooses to particularize rather than to generalize, natural language is the obvious vehicle of choice. As previously pointed out, it is inappropriate to construct a scale when the class of instances under investigation is one or several. A scale presupposes a population. In contrast, a word can be used in a highly specific context; it does not presuppose an explicit comparison with other instances. This means that in describing the singularity of an event, one is drawn toward the implements of natural language. The lack of perfect commensurability between words used in one context and the same words used in another context allows the researcher the facility to elucidate what is different—categorically (qualitatively), not marginally (quantitatively)—about that phenomenon. A very high score on some scale can be (indeed, must be) indicated with a quantitative metric. But a very different kind of score requires a word, perhaps a series of words.

In short, there are gains and losses in the transposition of words to numbers, and vice versa. What is interesting about this classic debate is that both may be described as “reductionist.” Quantitative studies are often accused of reducing reality and, in the process, distorting that reality to fit the austere requirements of the quantitative format. Each piece of reality must be sliced up into variables, and these must be comparable across all observations. Qualitative studies are accused of a different kind of reduction, in which a subject is shrunk down to a highly particular context—the country, neighborhood, or event of special interest.

These contrasting notions of reduction and expansion are best understood as arguments over comparability. Scholars inclined toward the tools

provided by natural language are often keen to explore a wide variety of different aspects in a particular setting. They wish to explore multiple dimensions of one thing. (*Dimension* is employed as a synonym for *variable* in this context.) Qualitative analysis is thus often focused inward, like a vast funnel. Many comparisons are made, but they are all understood as features of the same general topic, existing in one time and place. Natural language is adept for this purpose, for it is rich, textured, context specific, and multivalent. It elucidates a wealth of details about a person, event, or situation. This is why some scholars find a natural affinity between qualitative tools and ethnographic, historical, and—more broadly—interpretivist styles of research. In contrast, scholars inclined to a numerical understanding of the world are drawn to comparisons that are broad and thin. They intend to explore one particular dimension of many things.

The interesting aspect of this familiar contrast is that both qualitative and quantitative scholars perceive their work as conforming to the natural bend of the universe. Qualitative scholars usually assume a *case-centered* approach. Different aspects of the same cases are grouped; they go together. Quantitative scholars are drawn toward a *dimensional* approach to comparability. A single aspect (dimension) of an entity is assumed to be comparable across multiple cases. This is sometimes referred to as *variable-centered* analysis. While for a qualitative scholar it would seem natural to explore everything about A, for a quantitative scholar it would seem more natural to explore one thing about A, B, and C. Underlying scholars' choices of method are certain assumptions about cross-case comparability. The tools scholars choose—words or numbers—are, in part, the expression of their relative confidence in the ability to compare across entities in a given research context. This is not to deny that many scholars use both words and numbers. The point is that, within a given context, the likelihood of choosing one or the other strategy is influenced by assumptions about case comparability.

Construing Meaning Versus Analyzing Behavior

The importance of comparison is illustrated in one of the most common defenses of qualitative work

in the interpretive mode. It is often said that qualitative analysis focuses on human meanings, while quantitative analysis focuses on the behavioral components of human reality—that is, actions, institutions, or events. From the interpretivist perspective, the business of social science is one of construing meaning, not analyzing behavior. Yet one might reasonably inquire, why not study human meanings quantitatively—that is, with scalar measures—in addition to studying them qualitatively?

One rationale is that human meaning is constructed through language (which establishes the categories by which we understand the world); therefore, it makes sense to study these linguistic categories through other linguistic categories rather than the (somewhat alien) categories of numbers. Herbert Blumer (1969) concludes,

The crucial limit to the successful application of variable analysis to human group life is set by the process of interpretation or definition that goes on in human groups. This process, which I believe to be the core of human action, gives a character to human group life that seems to be at variance with the logical premises of variable analysis. (p. 132)

The problem, though, is not that the analysis of linguistic phenomena must be carried out with linguistic tools; after all, the contemporary discipline of linguistics is heavily quantitative. Indeed, quantitative observations are necessarily rooted in language because all scales must be expressible in a linguistic category; every variable must have a name. What is it, then, that seems so problematic about collecting quantitative observations about semantic realities? Why is there no quantitative hermeneutics?

The problem is at the core of the qualitative/quantitative dispute: the problem of representing human meaning across diverse contexts in an explicit and precise fashion. It is a problem of comparability, not of language per se, that is at issue. And what makes it so problematic is a basic feature of human life. The ways in which we make sense of our lived experience are extraordinarily diverse—through time, across cultures, and across individuals. It is difficult to reduce this complexity to standard categories, as quantitative knowledge requires.

Consider the question of human happiness (variously understood as welfare or quality of life), which has attracted increasing attention on the part of psychologists, sociologists, and economists. The following scale was developed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census to measure the quality of life: (a) *terrible*, (b) *unhappy*, (c) *mostly dissatisfied*, (d) *mixed*, (e) *mostly satisfied*, (f) *mostly pleased*, (g) *delighted*. The question we might ask ourselves is whether human happiness is accurately captured in these categories. This is to say, does a person who answers b = *unhappy* have a lower quality of life than a person who responds with d = *mixed*? There are potential problems of conceptual validity, and the issue is not simply a lack of sophistication on the part of researchers. More fundamentally, the problem is that human meanings—such as happiness—are resistant to uniform comparisons across diverse subjects. One feels much more comfortable with imprecise comparisons expressed in the looseness, and contextual specificity, of natural language. We might say, for example, that “Smith is happy,” implying that across some undefined population, Smith’s level of happiness is, let us say, somewhere above the mean. However, we are probably reluctant to assign a precise score to Smith’s happiness, because such a score would presume a precise comparison with all others in the population.

This is not meant to imply that all human meanings are unquantifiable. Nor is it meant to imply that social scientists should abstain from quantifying difficult and ambiguous emotions such as human happiness. There may be much to learn from the quantification of abstract concepts that summarize a great deal of information about human experience. The point is simply that the profitability of quantifying varies with the topic, and the core issue is the comparability of the phenomena across the chosen population. Certain topics are more recalcitrant, and these tend to be tied up with the generation of meaning (values, ideas, intentions) rather than observable behavior. It is noteworthy, for example, that some human intentions seem to be more quantifiable than others, and these tend to be those where a high level of comparability across individuals or across cultures can be assumed. Thus, scholars routinely measure the concept of “economic voting” because the notion “pursuing material interests” seems

comparable, and hence valid, across individuals and populations. In contrast, the measurement of religious influences on voting behavior is much more difficult to quantify because it is more difficult to compare.

Conclusion

Approaches in the social sciences are often understood as qualitative or quantitative. Scholars differ in their opinions about the utility of this distinction. Some dismiss it as a red herring; others feel that there is good justification for the division. Still others suggest that there is no plausible way of discarding the distinction but that it is greatly misunderstood, and the key to this misunderstanding is to be found in assumptions about comparability.

There is indeed a difference in basic-level assumptions between statements that are quantitative (i.e., understood through a numerical scale, a metric, or a variable) and those that are qualitative (i.e., expressed in natural language). Quantitative descriptive statements presuppose a class of cases that can be compared in an explicit and precise manner. To measure phenomenon X is to impose a very specific metric on it, one that is explicitly comparative (since other phenomena in this same category are assumed to be scoreable). Qualitative descriptive statements do not make any such presuppositions. There may or may not be an identifiable class of comparable cases that can be measured along some set of dimensions. Often, the assumption is quite the reverse—particularizing rather than generalizing. Thus, to quantify something is to compare in an explicit and precise manner. To qualify is to leave such comparisons open; one may or may not engage in explicit comparisons with adjacent cases, and any comparisons made are unlikely to be very precise. While this might seem to indicate a distinct advantage for quantitative work, this entry also shows that there are costs to assuming a quantitative idiom. Not only must the cases be (actually) comparable, but there is usually some loss of information since words are usually multivalent and metrics are usually unidimensional (or at most combine several dimensions). It is not clear that scholars always gain in analytic leverage by moving from words to numbers. They do, however, make different sorts of comparisons.

The choice between math and natural language as tools of social science is, therefore, a highly consequential choice. Methodological tools help us reconstruct the empirical world; they are not theory neutral. In this respect, the division between math and language is akin to the influence that the early anthropologists and linguists assigned to language. Different languages divide the world into different packages; they encourage us to visualize things in different ways. So, arguably, do the different “languages” of mathematics and ordinary speech. Quantitative tools help us compare and, hence, generalize; qualitative tools encourage us to differentiate.

It is quite another thing, however, to disentangle the causal priority of methodologies and ontologies. Do cultural anthropologists use qualitative tools because they envision a lumpy universe, or do they see a lumpy universe because they perceive it with qualitative tools? About all one can say with any degree of confidence is that there is a strong synergy between methods and ontologies. One can presume that they are, at the very least, strongly reinforcing. This may help account for the virulence and endurance of this central cleavage in the social sciences today.

It is not merely a matter of numbers versus words or a debate about what can or cannot be quantified. More fundamentally, the venerable debate represents fundamental disagreements over how precise, explicit, and extensive social science comparisons ought to be. Those who resist numerical analysis are dubious about the validity of comparisons. They see no need to enhance the precision or explicitness of comparisons because they do not seek to compare in the first place, or they seek a more restricted ambit of comparative reference

points. Those who embrace quantification are more comfortable with such comparisons. This debate has been engaged at many levels—across individuals, levels of government, cultures, and time periods—and over many years. It shows no sign of dissipating.

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See also Comparative Methods; Epistemological and Methodological Foundations; Hermeneutics; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions

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QUASI-EXPERIMENTS

See Experiments, Natural

R

RACISM

Racism is a set of beliefs, practices, and social structures that treats groups of human beings socially defined by unalterable, often physical, attributes (races) as inherently unequal. Racism is a form of subordination and exclusion. It is a part of the power structure of institutions and social relations. Racism is sustained by coercion and consent, and it is expressed in prejudice, discrimination, oppression, violence, or, in some extreme cases, genocide. This broader perspective on racism, epitomized in the work of William Edward Burghardt Du Bois (1868–1963), is dominant in political science, sociology, and social anthropology.

In social and political psychology, the term is used more narrowly to describe a set of beliefs or attitudes. William Graham Sumner (1840–1910) took such an approach, identifying racism as a specific form of ethnocentrism related to the perception of ingroup/outgroup relations. Racism is a set of prejudices that enables and legitimates exploitation and scapegoating based on the “over-generalization” that the different capacities and characteristics of a human being are determined by his or her belonging to a group. This standpoint is often associated with the work of Gordon Allport (1897–1967).

In everyday life, the term *racism* is often used loosely with respect to subordination or hostility toward a group.

From a historical perspective, racism is considered as a modern phenomenon. Besides the

discussion on the existence of “proto-racism” in ancient Greek or Rome, the emergence of modern racism is connected to the Enlightenment and the appearance of scientific theories of the evolution of humankind. The search for the biological foundation of human behavior led to essentialist interpretations of the differences between groups of human beings, although the analytical distinction between biology and culture was increasingly used: One of the characteristics of racism is that the cultural characteristics and potentials of groups are seen as basically determined by biological differences.

Politically, racism is associated with conquest, colonialism, enslavement, and genocide. With the emergence of nationalism, racism became part of the social construction of national homogeneity. The emphasis on the cultural uniqueness of a nation-state led to certain types of culturally based exclusionary ideologies—for example, in romantic nationalism, often associated with the ideas of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803). The democratic revolutions on both sides of the Atlantic led to the first attempts at emancipation of Blacks from slavery and Jews from the ghettos. Contrary to those efforts at emancipation, racism as a system of beliefs became further elaborated, as exemplified in the work of Arthur de Gobineau (1816–1882). He combines the idea of there being essential differences between human “races” with the legitimization of the political subordination of one group to another and the idea that “race mixing” contributes to the decline of humankind.

At the turn of the 20th century, scientific racism became an accepted part of academia, associated

with new sciences such as eugenics (Francis Galton, 1822–1911) and the development of intelligence tests. Especially, newly developed statistical methods were used to “prove scientifically” the worth of different races. At the same time, racist political regimes stabilized, such as the institutionalized system of racism embodied in the “Jim Crow” laws of the U.S. South. The cruel climax of such racist political regimes was Nazi Germany, with its legally implemented idea of “race purity” (Nuremberg Laws of 1935; German: *Nürnberger Gesetze*) and the attempt to exterminate an entire part of the German population.

The word *racism* came into use in English in the 1930s; at first, it was used mainly to describe the Nazi regime. After World War II, it was increasingly used to describe colonial relations, especially between Africans and Europeans, and Black–White relations in the United States and South Africa. During the period of moral revulsion against racism after World War II, scientific racism was finally largely disavowed. International organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) started to mobilize against racism. In 1950, UNESCO declared in the statement “The Race Question” that it is one of the central goals of the organization to fight racism and suggested abolishing the term *race* altogether:

National, religious, geographic, linguistic and cultural groups do not necessarily coincide with racial groups; and the cultural traits of such groups have no demonstrated genetic connexion with racial traits. Because serious errors of this kind are habitually committed when the term “race” is used in popular parlance, it would be better when speaking of human races to drop the term “race” altogether and speak of ethnic groups. (UNESCO, 1952, p. 99)

As noted by Ashley Montagu (1998), this report was influenced by the work of the anthropologist Franz Boas (1858–1942), who defined race as a purely social construct. Antiracism became an integral part of social movements such as the anticolonial Black liberation movement and the anti-apartheid movement. The disaggregation of the American South and the abolition of apartheid were important victories in the anti-racist struggle.

Contemporary Approaches to Racism

Today, the following four different foci in political research on racism can be seen:

1. The changing faces of racism entrenched into the global order constitute an important topos. Racism as a transnational process has been a common theme in political analysis since the 19th century. Today, global communication and economic networks, together with the heritage of colonialism, contribute to the diffusion of what is sometimes called the “American model of race relations.” In this model, races are seen as stable internal differentiations of the nation-state, a structure in the United States famously called by David Hollinger (1995) the “ethno-racial pentagon” (Blacks, Whites, Asians, Hispanics, and Native Americans). This model is often associated with neoliberal ideals. Its emphasis on individual responsibility contributes to phenomena such as “color-blind racism.” Color-blind racism sustains racist structures through the denial of the importance of racism for social inequality. The concept of symbolic racism is used in political psychology to denote the opposition to policies designed to support specific racial groups.

2. Although scientific projects such as the human genome project emphasize the genetic unity of humankind, new types of biologically based benevolent racism have emerged—for example, in the advertising on drugs for assumed racial groups and the interrogation of these groups for the betterment of medical treatments. Connected with the rapid advances in genetics, we have reached a new phase of research on the biological bases of human behavior, strands of research that can be easily incorporated into racist ideologies. Further, as pointed out by Nadia Abu El-Haj (2007), new questions are raised on the very notion of “nature” in its relation to culture.

3. A disturbing facet of racism today is that it works as an ideology and practice often without legal or institutional support, expressed, for example, in ongoing segregation or discriminatory employer practices. These topics, together with investigations into the political successes of right-wing parties and right-wing movements, are an ongoing important line of discussion. Research here is based on a long tradition of attempts to measure racial prejudice and right-wing political attitudes, starting with the famous work of

Theodor W. Adorno (1903–1969) and a group of social psychologists on the “authoritarian personality” and continued in works such as Bob Altemeyer’s study of right-wing authoritarianism in the 1980s. Today, as noted by Leonie Huddy and Stanley Feldman (2009), the concept of racial stereotypes is one way to conceptualize more clearly the relation between racism and politics.

4. The analysis of racist beliefs, practices, and social structures has led to studies of whiteness and the different dimensions of identity politics. In this context, racial prejudices are also taken into account but more as hidden or subtle forms of racism. The concept of “unconscious racism,” advanced by Hart Blanton and James Jaccard in 2008, is one promising attempt to measure these types of beliefs. The mechanisms of social and political exclusion are interrogated in the intersection of different dimensions of inequality, such as class, gender, and nationality. The complexities of racism ingrained in modern institutions, giving unequal access to goods, services, and opportunities, are thematized under the rubric of “institutional racism.” So one of the central questions in current political research is how racism and racial discrimination are reproduced on the national and the world level irrespective of the intentions of the actor.

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See also Colonialism; Culturalism; Equality; Ethnicity; Justice

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RADICAL ATTITUDES

Like many other concepts in political science, the notion of radicalism dates back to the political conflicts of the late 18th and early 19th century. Even then, its content depended on the political context and was far from well defined. Consequently, being “radical” has meant different things to different people at different times in different countries. Moreover, radicalism is closely related, if not identical to, a number of (equally vague) concepts, such as extremism, fundamentalism, and populism. As of today, there is no universally accepted definition of radicalism and, by implication, radical attitudes.

There is, however, a core meaning of radicalism: Radicals are willing to challenge the ground rules of politics to get to the root (Latin: *radix*) of what they perceive to be the most pressing political problems. In any given context, radicals will confront the political establishment and will support policies whose implementation would trigger systemic change. In this entry, the various historical contexts and attempts at measurement of this concept are discussed.

Radicalism in the 18th and 19th Centuries

In the last third of the 18th century, a heterogeneous group of philosophers, writers, and politicians began to campaign for a thorough reform of Britain’s political system. Among the goals of this

movement were abolition of slave trade, reform of the electoral laws, and better protection of citizens' rights. They soon gained support from the emerging middle and working classes. The parliamentarian Charles James Fox is often credited with coining the name for this new movement when he demanded a "radical reform" of the electoral system in 1797, and by 1819, the "radicals" had established themselves as a separate political force that inspired the Chartist movement and played an important role in the creation of both the Liberal and the Labour parties.

Similarly, after the restoration of the monarchy in 19th-century France, supporters of republican principles called themselves "radicals." Over the last third of the century, they drifted to the left and were instrumental in the foundation of the country's first modern left-wing party, the Republican, Radical and Radical-Socialist Party, in 1901.

In Germany, *radical* was initially a political label chosen by those liberals who, in the spirit of the French Revolution, demanded civil liberties, universal male suffrage, and parliamentary representation. In the second half of the 19th century, this label was applied to those members of the workers' movement who favored a revolutionary change of government (i.e., the end of the authoritarian monarchist regime). In a similar fashion, in many other European and Latin American countries, "radicalism" became shorthand for a sub-type of liberalism that could be located either to the left or to the right of the political center. To the present day, "radical" parties exist in many countries, including Argentina, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Italy, Paraguay, and Switzerland. Most of them are today classified as either liberal or socialist/social-democratic.

Radicalism in the 20th Century

The gradual spread of liberal democracy and its crisis during the interwar period changed the meaning of the concept of radicalism. In the wake of the events in Germany, Italy, Russia, and many other European countries, radicalism became a collective term for the forces at the poles of the political spectrum, which had formerly been known chiefly as "ultras" and had threatened to overthrow liberal democracy: Communists on the one side, Fascists and National Socialists on the other. Consequentially,

radicalism was transformed into a primarily spatial term (location on the left-right axis) with a connotation that was directly opposed to its original meaning. While the original radicals had been champions of freedom and democracy, the radicals of the 20th century were, by virtue of their ideological preferences, opposed to these values. Under the postwar consensus of the 1950s, this perspective on radicalism became dominant.

However, less than 2 decades after the end of World War II, Seymour Martin Lipset challenged the prevailing view of the connection between centrism and support for democracy. In his seminal study *Political Man*, Lipset (1960) claimed that fascism and national socialism were neither left-wing nor right-wing ideologies. Rather, they constituted an "extremism of the centre." While this statement is problematic if interpreted in purely sociological terms—fascism and national socialism appealed both to the middle and to the working classes—it reflects the ambiguous location of these regimes on the traditional left-right spectrum. On the one hand, they violently suppressed the left-wing unions and parties. On the other hand, they were hardly champions of a free market economy: Fascism and national socialism insulated farmers and small businesses from competition, engaged in large-scale economic planning, and raised government spending on welfare to unprecedented levels.

More generally, Lipset argued that attitudes toward the economy and attitudes toward democracy could vary independently. In his view, any position on the left-right spectrum—radical or centrist—can be combined with "the repression of difference and dissent, the closing down of the market place of ideas" (Lipset & Raab, 1970, p. 6). This "tendency to treat cleavage and ambivalence as illegitimate" (p. 6) is what Lipset called *extremism*.

Lipset fruitfully applied this concept to right-wing extremism in the United States. In his view, the insistence on free market principles makes this particular breed of extremism "right-wing," whereas anti-Semitism, homophobia, racism, religious intolerance, and xenophobia are simply manifestations of the same underlying generic phenomenon. Indeed, in a separate work, he convincingly demonstrated that these traits are also prevalent among members of the working class, whose criticism of free market principles marks them as left-wingers.

Lipset's notion of extremism is so broad that it resonates with the even more general concepts that were developed around the same time by psychologists such as Hans Jürgen Eysenck ("tough-mindedness") and Milton Rokeach ("closed-mindedness," "dogmatism") and refer to a tendency to unconditionally accept norms, prejudices, and authorities. Like Lipset, Eysenck, and Rokeach, many other scholars treat political preferences in general and political radicalism in particular as an essentially two-dimensional phenomenon. However, while Lipset argued that left-right ideology and support for democratic values and institutions can vary independently, other authors disagree.

In work that was partly inspired by Lipset, Uwe Backes and Eckhard Jesse claim that there is a U-shaped link between ideological radicalism and antidemocratic extremism. Although they acknowledge that radicalism and extremism are conceptually different, they argue that radical ideological positions have implications that render them incompatible with liberal democracy as defined by the core values of the French Revolution: liberty, equality, and fraternity. According to Backes and Jesse, left-wing radicalism (communism) overemphasizes equality to the detriment of freedom, whereas traditional European right-wing radicalism (fascism) as well as American right-wing radicalism disregards equality in favor of either fraternity or liberty. In Backes's and Jesse's view, centrism is conducive to liberal democracy, while radicalism is a necessary and sufficient condition for extremism. In a sense, the 20th-century view of radicalism has come full circle in their work, which has influenced many European scholars directly or indirectly. However, empirical evidence for the U-shaped link between radical ideological positions and opposition to liberal democracy is sparse.

Measurement Issues

If radicalism is interpreted in a purely spatial sense, it simply refers to the end points of the ideological spectrum. The most common instrument in this context is the general left-right scale employed in countless comparative and single-country studies. Since the left-right scale is still interpreted chiefly in economic terms, other, more specific scales that refer to the appropriate degree of government

intervention in the economy, state control of prices and wages, or the importance of trade unions have also been used. On the other hand, more inclusive attempts at measuring radicalism include preferences on "postmaterialist" issues such as the environment, minority rights, and direct democracy.

The logical implications of extreme positions notwithstanding, most researchers would agree, however, that a position at the end points of any policy scale is in itself of little importance because people frequently hold inconsistent and contradictory attitudes. Therefore, a number of items and scales have been proposed to directly capture support for liberal democracy.

Arguably, the most influential among these were developed by Herbert McClosky in his work on democratic values. In his 1964 article, McClosky distinguishes between three subdimensions of democratic values: respect for the "rules of the game" and support for freedom of expression as well as support for political, economic, social, and ethnic equality. McClosky's first dimension primarily refers to formal compliance. As long as a majority of citizens have internalized these rules, they will support democratic institutions even if their grasp of the underlying principles is patchy. His second and third dimensions, however, refer precisely to these principles.

A model (liberal) democrat would subscribe to both the principles and the rules, whereas an anti-democrat would despise both. Real-world citizens usually find themselves somewhere in between these two poles: They agree with the rules and abstract principles but sometimes struggle with their application. Some items on McClosky's scale were specifically designed to capture these conflicts. For instance, 90% of his respondents believed in "free speech for all no matter what their views might be," yet 50% agreed that books containing "wrong political views" did not deserve to be published and 25% were ready to suspend due process for "dangerous enemies like the Communists."

To the present day, McClosky's work has had a tremendous impact on the field, but there are some basic problems with his and all subsequent attempts to measure support for democratic values. First, the items inevitably reflect the political and historical context within which they were devised. For McClosky and many of his successors, communism was the main threat to liberal democracy.

With the advent of new ideological challenges such as Islamism and right-wing populism, this is obviously no longer true. Second, the rules and sometimes even the principles that constitute liberal democracy are bound to change gradually over time. Political behavior and issues from the New Politics agenda that were considered “radical” in the 1960s—minority rights, the environment, sit-ins and human chains—are now well within the political mainstream. Therefore, finding items that work well in all countries at all times is conceptually and empirically next to impossible. Third, even if these attitudinal scales generate measurements that are valid across time and space, they lack a natural cutoff point. At best, they are able to identify the most radical persons in society. Where the boundary lies between democrats and radicals, however, is an entirely different question.

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See also Communism; Democracy, Theories of; Democracy, Types of; Fascism; Fundamentalism; Ideology; Islamist Movements; Liberalism; Peasants' Movements; Populist Movements; Postmaterialism

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RANDOM SELECTION BY LOT

See Election by Lot

RATIONAL CHOICE

Rational choice, or *rationality*, has two meanings. First, in a technical sense, rationality implies that an individual's preferences over choices possess two properties: completeness and transitivity. The first property holds that the individual's preferences are well defined for any two possible alternatives in the set of available choices: Given any pair of alternatives x and y , the individual prefers choice x over y , prefers choice y over x , or is indifferent between them. The second property maintains that if the individual prefers alternative x to y and y to z , then the individual prefers x to z .

Most commonly, when scholars mention rational choice, they refer to the broad set of work—the rational choice school—that builds on this technical definition of rationality. Although derived, at the core, from this single technical definition of rationality, the rational choice school is commonly associated with a number of additional views about human behavior. Notably, rational choice is commonly associated with self-interested behavior. This association reflects a common set of assumptions about the structure of individuals' preferences, such as that people care only about their own personal welfare, not the welfare of others. This orientation leads many critics to juxtapose rational choice with theories in which individuals behave in other-regarding ways—for example, a Rousseauian citizen who strives for the common good. This, of course, puts aside the thorny issue of how to define or determine the “common good.”

Second, rational choice is closely associated with the idea of human interdependence and with a subfield of economics known as game theory. Game theory provides a set of tools for studying the interactions among people. Crucially, game theory recognizes that one individual's choices often depend on the behavior of other individuals. For example, if an individual is stopped at a four-way stop sign, his or her decision of whether to wait or to proceed depends on whether he or she expects the other cars stopped at the intersection to wait or to proceed.

Rational Choice: A Social Theory of Human Behavior

Although rational choice theory builds on *individual* decisions, it is fundamentally a *social* theory

of human behavior. Indeed, part of the reason for simple assumptions about individuals is to build tractable models of social interaction. Rational choice theory is social in its approach to understanding individual decisions, contending that we condition our behavior on the anticipated behavior of other people. In addition, it is social in that it allows us to understand how groups of individuals reach collective decisions and produce social outcomes.

Human Behavior Is Interdependent

Most rational choice theories emphasize the interdependence of individuals: The behavior of one individual depends on how this person expects other people to behave. This fundamental insight has been applied by scholars to a wide range of questions in economics and political science, from the entry of firms into new markets to agenda setting and voting in Congress.

Charles Cameron, for example, studied the presidential veto in a rational choice framework. As an empirical fact, American presidents rarely veto legislation from Congress. This observation led many scholars to view the veto as unimportant to the legislative process. Congress, they argued, dominates the legislative process, and the president has little say over the content of any legislation. However, Cameron saw that the veto often has a profound influence on legislation. Members of Congress, he observed, anticipate that the president will veto a bill if it is too far from his preferred policy. Members of Congress design legislation so that it is sufficiently close to the president's preferred policy to avoid a veto. Using rational choice theory, Cameron demonstrates how the veto influences public policy outcomes, even if the president rarely exercises the veto.

In another application, scholars study the policy-making behavior of executive agencies in the American separation-of-power system. The statutes passed by Congress often delegate to agencies—such as the Food and Drug Administration or the Environmental Protection Agency—considerable discretion in implementing the law. Some observers have called such delegation of power to agencies an abdication of power by Congress, leading them to question policy making by unelected bureaucrats. In contrast to this conventional perspective on

agencies, rational choice scholars such as John Ferejohn, Charles Shipan, and Mathew McCubbins observe that agencies must anticipate the behavior of Congress. Just as Congress delegates authority to agencies, Congress can trim this authority, transfer it to another agency, withhold budgets, or invalidate the statute wholesale. If the agency implementation of a statute is sufficiently unsatisfactory to Congress, it is likely to override the agency. To avoid costly interaction with Congress, agencies must anticipate the possible reactions by Congress, adjusting policy to avoid negative treatment by the parent institution.

This example of congressional delegation is an instance in a broader class of interactions studied by rational choice scholars, known as *principal-agent problems*. This type of interaction is characterized by a principal (e.g., Congress) attempting to induce an agent (e.g., the executive agency), which often possesses divergent preferences from the principal, to perform some task (e.g., implement a statute). Principal-agent problems have wide applications in political science, including delegation of authority by citizens to elected officials, by officials to bureaucrats, and by the military to subordinates.

Social Outcomes as Products of Individual Choices

One of rational choice's most important contributions is the idea of a *social dilemma*. Individually rational decisions often have unintended social outcomes; paradoxically, individual maximization often leads to socially suboptimal outcomes. Rational choice has been instrumental in identifying and clarifying these social dilemmas as well as in proposing solutions to them.

Scholars have long recognized the problems inherent in aggregating individual preferences into social outcomes. In the 18th century, the Marquis de Condorcet noted that decisions made by majority vote “cycle”; that is, they display intransitivity. Consider a simple version of this cycling. Suppose a polity exists with three voters, 1, 2, and 3, and three policy alternatives, A, B, and C. The voters have the following preferences: Voter 1 prefers A to B to C, Voter 2 prefers C to A to B, and Voter 3 prefers B to C to A. As an initial social choice, consider a vote between Alternatives A and C. In

this case, Voter 1 votes for A, and Voters 2 and 3 vote for C, giving Alternative C a majority vote. Thus, on the basis of majority vote, the polity appears to favor C to A. Now consider a vote between B and C. Given these alternatives, Voters 1 and 3 prefer B, and Voter 2 prefers C. A majority, therefore, appears to favor B to C. Finally, consider a vote between A and B. With this choice set, Voters 1 and 2 prefer A, and Voter 3 prefers B; the polity prefers A to B.

These votes result in an intransitive social preference ordering. A majority prefers C to A, B to C, and A to B. This roughly equates to saying that C is greater than A, B is greater than C, and A is greater than B. This social intransitivity occurs despite the fact that the individuals in the polity have well-defined preferences over the alternatives. Technical studies of voting show that this example is not an aberration but typical. As William H. Riker explains, it is difficult to discuss the “democratic will,” for example, if the social preference ordering cycles through alternatives.

As troubling as it is, Condorcet’s cycling result is derived purely from the structure of individuals’ preferences and a simple voting rule. His result does not depend on individuals’ *strategic* behavior.

In contrast, a large number of other rational choice applications derive social dilemmas on the basis of strategic interdependencies. We will consider four canonical examples of such social dilemmas illustrating strategic interdependence.

The prisoners’ dilemma is perhaps the longest-recognized strategic dilemma, recorded by Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century. As a simple example, consider an environment with two individuals, A and B, who face two choices, to farm (F) or to defect (P). The value for Individual A of farming or preying on the other person depends on whether Individual B farms or predates (and the reverse). Using numbers to simplify the example, we have the following:

		Player B	
		F (x, y)	P (x, y)
Player A	F (x, y)	(3, 3)	(0, 4)
	P (x, y)	(4, 0)	(1, 1)

where (x, y) represents the payoffs for Players A and B, respectively.

Each player must decide between F and P. If both players farm, they both receive a payoff of 3, maximizing social output. However, both players face a unilateral incentive to *defect* from farming: While the other player does the hard work of farming, the first player preys on his crops. This unilateral defection produces a payoff of 4 for the player who predate and a payoff of 0 for the player who is victimized. Because both players face the same incentives, neither will farm. The only stable outcome of the prisoners’ dilemma is where both players predate and both receive a payoff of 1.

In Hobbes’s view, the prisoners’ dilemma modeled a world in which life is short, nasty, and brutish, in which all prey on all. One productive way to think about the prisoners’ dilemma is in terms of the ability to *commit* to a certain course of action. Both players prefer to live in a world in which both members farm, but they cannot commit to farming in the face of incentives to prey on the other player.

The social outcome—a world of all preying on all—differs from the social outcome that every individual wants to occur. Nevertheless, the social outcome is a product of individually rational decisions: Each member acts in his or her best interest yet produces a social outcome that is not in his or her best interest.

The *common pool problem*, first articulated by William Foster Lloyd in the 19th century and sometimes referred to as the tragedy of the commons, is another social dilemma. Consider a common resource, such as land for grazing cattle, available to a society. Each individual unilaterally decides how many cattle to graze on the land, receiving some benefit for each animal he or she grazes. But individuals pay only part of the cost of grazing each animal: The cost of maintaining the land is divided among all members of the society. This structure of costs and benefits provides strong incentives to exploit the common land, grazing as many cattle as possible. When all the individuals do so, however, overgrazing occurs, which depletes the quality of the land. Common-pool problems have an enormous range of applications, including the growth of government, pollution, population growth (Lloyd’s initial concern), and the overuse of public roads.

Another class of dilemmas, known as *collective action problems*, studied by rational choice theorists focuses on public goods, or goods that are not excludable (no one is prevented from benefiting from them) and are nonrival (one person's consumption does not influence the ability of another person to consume). "Common goods," such as grazing land, differ from "public goods." A public good is characterized by nonrivalry—for example, clean air. In the case of common goods, one person's consumption influences the ability of others to consume the good. Grazing land, for example, becomes depleted.

Examples of collective action problems include national security and clean air. The fundamental difficulty in a collective action problem is that the ability of an individual to consume the public good is not linked to any effort to provide the good. For example, regardless of whether an individual pays taxes, he or she benefits from the national security provided by the standing army. This decoupling of benefits and costs creates an incentive to *free ride* off the contributions of others.

Collective action problems, therefore, represent another type of social dilemma. One implication of collective action problems is that societies often face shortages of public goods. Even though almost all members of a society would benefit from these public goods, such as stronger border security, preventing raids from the neighboring society, the incentive to free ride results in an underfunded, anemic security apparatus. The problem of an underdeveloped security apparatus was endemic for most of human history. Only recently, with the development of the institutions of the modern state, have security forces become well funded—too well funded in the eyes of some.

As a final example of a class of problem studied by rational choice theorists, consider *coordination problems*. In this type of problem, the members of a society benefit from acting in concert and suffer when they fail to do so. A classic example of a coordination problem is the choice of whether to drive on the right or left side of the road. If we all drive on the left, then we move about safely; the same holds if we all drive on the right. However, if people fail to drive consistently on the left or the right, driving becomes extremely hazardous.

Political science has applied the coordination problem to a wide range of political questions.

Consider the choice of whether to protest or actively work against an authoritarian regime. If all the citizens who dislike the regime act simultaneously, they can overthrow the regime. However, if they act at different times, with only small groups on the street at any time, the police will suppress their movement. The group of discontented citizens faces a *coordination problem*. If they coordinate on a time and location, they benefit from a political transition to democracy; if they fail to coordinate, they receive a beating by the police.

Although we have focused on the problems that rational choice theory has helped us understand, this perspective has also generated a wide range of solutions. Studying collective action problems, Mancur Olson observed that members of groups have the incentive to free ride off the hard work of others. As a partial response to the problem of free riding, Olson argues, some groups provide "selective benefits"—benefits to those who provide their share of the collective good. Elderly people, for example, have a shared interest in lobbying Congress to pass laws that promote health care and various other forms of public policy beneficial to older Americans. However, due to free riding, older Americans benefit from these lobbying efforts even if they make no effort to support them, such as paying dues to the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), a principal interest group for the elderly. To combat the incentive to free ride, the AARP offers a number of benefits that accrue only to AARP members who pay dues, such as newsletters, discounts on medication, magazines, and other consumer products. Thus, selective benefits offer a partial solution to some collective action problems.

In another example, constitutions can help resolve coordination problems. As noted above, the choice of whether or not to protest against a regime is fraught with danger: Coordinate on a time, and the protestors often win; fail to coordinate, and the protestors often face suppression by the police. The rights enumerated in a constitution serve as a *coordinating mechanism*. When a regime violates a constitutional right, the citizens collectively understand that a transgression has occurred, and this triggers coordinated action to reverse the transgression. Without the enumerated rights, citizens will have difficulty determining what counts as a

transgression, and they will face the real possibility of coordination failure and all its attendant dangers.

Objections and Limits to Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory is subject to several criticisms, which fall into three categories. First, critics suggest, rational choice theory is unsuitably restrictive because it typically assumes that people behave in a narrowly self-interested way. Critics observe that, in contrast to this common perspective, human motivations are often far more complex, reflecting a concern for other people.

A second criticism holds that rational choice theories are not sufficiently constrained. After an initial set of assumptions about the structure of preferences and the interaction between individuals, rational choice theories contain rigorous, highly constrained, internally and logically consistent analysis. However, scholars have discretion in their assumptions about the preferences and how they model the interaction between individuals. For example, altering the sequence of the interaction—allowing Player A to move before Player B, say—often appears innocuous, but it can have profound implications for the results of a rational choice theory. Similarly, the structure of individuals' preferences—not only what they care about but also how their payoffs respond to increases or decreases of what they care about—can dramatically influence the predictions of a theory. In this way, despite the appearance of rigor, rational choice theories have arbitrary elements.

A third common criticism notes that rational choice theories cannot explain important elements of human behavior. Voter turnout, for example, is exceptionally difficult to explain in terms of rational choice theories. Each voter has only a trivial influence over the outcome of an election: If any single voter decides not to turn out to vote, the probability that the outcome of the election will be altered is impossibly small. And yet, regardless of whether or not an individual's vote can influence the election outcome, each voter pays some cost for voting—the time and effort it takes to vote. The combination of highly uncertain benefits with certain costs suggests that voter turnout is a rare event. Yet people clearly vote in elections. Thus, rational choice theories fail, in this criticism,

because they cannot account for important aspects of human behavior.

In response to these criticisms, rational choice scholars often provide two observations. First, although it is common to assume the narrow self-interest of individuals, this assumption is not necessary. Rational choice theory can also assume that part of an individual's welfare depends on the welfare of other people. For example, many people value a measure of equality in the distribution of wealth, and this preference often induces people to give to charity or to support programs that redistribute income. Donations to charity and other apparently selfless acts do not necessarily represent irrational behavior. Similarly, the rational choice perspective easily models these settings where people attach some value to being viewed as good citizens or value the welfare of their fellow citizens.

The second point is methodological. The goal of rational choice theory is to provide a way of understanding human interaction and social outcomes. Models are useful because they capture important elements of human behavior in a parsimonious way. Creating a useful model necessarily involves focusing attention on certain motivations to the exclusion of others. As the examples discussed above indicate, rational choice theory helps us understand problems of social importance. This contribution is possible because of—not in spite of—the narrow focus of rational choice theories. Moreover, as rational choice theories matured, they gradually expanded the focus to include less restrictive assumptions. The core insights, however, almost always derive from the study of a highly *modeled* environment that is unrealistic in a variety of ways.

The most serious criticism of rational choice theories is that they are not sufficiently constrained. As suggested above, modeling choices about preferences or the structure of interaction crucially affect the model's implications. The strongest rational choice models, therefore, are those that build on others, by which a consensus emerges on how to study a given problem, such as the assumption that elected officials maximize the probability of reelection.

Frontiers

Rational choice scholars extend this approach in a variety of new and exciting directions. For example,

an important literature focuses on problems related to information—who knows what and when they make a choice as well as the incentives for a player to misrepresent himself. In the interest of space, we focus on just one important innovation: behavioral choice.

Students of behavioral choice attempt to combine insights from psychology with standard rational choice theory. They question whether it is possible for humans to process information in the way implied by traditional rational choice theories or whether emotions or cognitive constraints systematically bias choices away from purely rational ones. Rather than calculate every contingent possibility, for example, behavioral choice scholars suggest that people use heuristics and rules of thumb to reach decisions. Similarly, the way in which a choice is presented to individuals appears to influence their ultimate choice. For example, whether people are asked to opt in or opt out of a program can control whether they join the program, a finding that is difficult to square with conventional rational choice theory. This approach remains in its infancy, but it promises important extensions and generalizations of the rational choice approach.

Conclusion

Rational choice theory relies on simplifying assumptions about individuals in large part because it is a theory of social interaction. Assumptions of individual rationality, as we have seen, lead to many important and unobvious conclusions about the behavior of groups of individuals or societies. As illustrated by various social dilemmas, maximizing individuals do not imply social maximization.

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See also Cooperation; Coordination; Credible Commitment; Game Theory; Principal-Agent Theory; Public Goods

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RATIONALISM, CRITICAL

Critical rationalism is a school in the philosophy of science and in political philosophy centered on the works of the Austrian-English philosopher Karl R. Popper. The Social Democrat Popper fled from Vienna and the Nazis in the late 1930s to New Zealand and established himself in London after the war. Critical rationalism is characterized by the method of trial and error, applicable in all scientific disciplines, philosophy, or politics according to its adherents. In a problem situation, a tentative theory is advocated to solve the problem. Thereafter, all efforts should be directed toward demonstrating the falseness of this theory (falsification, error elimination), and when this has been done, we are in a new problem situation but with increased knowledge. We have learned from our mistake. This optimistic belief in the possibility of the growth of knowledge justifies the label “rationalism.” Moreover, this rationalism is “critical,” since a prevailing theory should always be exposed to a maximum of criticism. This is a particularly demanding requirement for the theory constructor; however, it is a crucial purpose of critical rationalism to depersonalize research and its theories. This entry presents the basic tenets of critical rationalism, reflecting the mainstream of contemporary social science and beyond.

In a political science perspective, critical rationalism is crucial both from a methodological viewpoint and as a substantial political philosophy.

Moreover, critical rationalism indicates how the political scientist can make himself or herself useful to society. Although it is a challenge to follow them in actual research, the prescriptions of critical rationalism have become mainstream in political science or social science methodology textbooks, even if they are occasionally contested. Further, Popper's work on the "open society and its enemies" is an important ingredient in the political philosophy of the 20th century, known mainly for its attacks on the prophecies and societal utopias of Plato, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Karl Marx. It is actually in the spirit of critical rationalism that not even a classic Greek philosopher like Plato, normally over and above criticism, is spared. Subjecting his thought to criticism is a way of taking it seriously, according to critical rationalists. No historical or spatial barrier should protect against criticism. This side of Popper's work belongs to normative political theory. As shown below, these two aspects of Popper's philosophy, even though dealing with widely different matters, are well integrated in his own thought as they follow from a few basic assumptions.

It is not unreasonable to structure 20th-century philosophical debates around Popper: Popper versus the positivists (empiricists), Popper versus the relativists (the idealist philosophy of language or Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science), and Popper versus the Marxists and Neo-Marxists. Critical rationalism encompasses not only Popper's philosophical followers (e.g., J. W. N. Watkins, David Miller, Hans Albert, William Bartley, and Imre Lakatos) but also many natural scientists and social scientists. Seven theses of critical rationalism are formulated below and put in their proper context. Their relevance for political science and its debates are then briefly discussed.

1. Reality exists "out there" (philosophical realism). Philosophical realism asserts that reality exists independently from our language and theories about it. A corollary of realism is the correspondence theory of truth: Truth means a statement's correspondence with reality (as opposed to the coherence theory of truth, which stresses its coherence with previous knowledge, and the pragmatic theory of truth, which emphasizes its practical usefulness). This conception of truth is very commonsensical: Statements are *about* something, and if

they fit with this something, the statements are true; otherwise they are not. This theory of truth makes it meaningful to compare theoretical expectations with observations of the relevant segment of reality, meaning that theories can, in principle, be evaluated and compared mutually as to how well they match reality. Therefore, some theories can be seen as better than others; one theory may represent progress in relation to another. This is a privilege compared with epistemologies, according to which theory and reality cannot be disentangled and therefore do not allow for any confrontation between them.

Occasionally, the school of realism in international relations, focusing on states and their relative power, is mistaken for philosophical realism as described here. Some international relations realists are indeed philosophical realists, whereas others are not, and for still others it is hard to tell. It is more obvious, however, that linguistically oriented schools such as poststructuralism, postmodernism, or constructivism are nonrealist in the philosophical meaning of the term. Studying the narratives of different political actors, the issue is not which of them is most "true" but their pragmatic functioning in the actors' respective contexts. Analysts may have their own narratives in the name of science, but decoding their pragmatic or political agendas is crucial. Objective "truth" is uninteresting, if it exists at all. Relativism prevails.

2. Life is too short to quarrel about the meaning of words or concepts (anti-essentialism). A consequence flowing from the above disentangling of language and reality is that words or concepts can be defined by the analyst. They are decisions, although they are not arbitrary. Research strategic considerations may decide how to define a concept. Concept essentialism is thereby discarded: There is no such thing as what a concept "really" means. Popper did not want to quarrel over words. Assertions about reality are important and should be disputed—not the meanings of words or concepts. In other words, the theory that poverty causes revolution is significant and should be discussed and disputed, not the meanings of the concepts of "poverty" and "revolution." What is the essence of poverty or the real meaning of revolution are fruitless questions. These definitional questions should be decided relatively quickly as a

preliminary step toward the interesting discussion concerning the causal *relation* between poverty and revolution.

Whether and how politicians use a concept is a part of political language and thereby reality. However, that should not affect whether and how political scientists use the concept for analytical purposes. For instance, it may be reasonably argued that the concept of “security” is worn out for analytical purposes. There is no deeper meaning in such an argument, only the practical consideration that the concept has been used in so many different senses that it no longer conveys any clear meaning but rather spreads confusion. Politicians’ use of this concept should be seen as political language with other purposes than analytical ones (things can be done with words [performatives], but that requires that they be spoken from a position of power and responsibility). Such use is interesting as an empirical object of study, but it is irrelevant for the analyst’s conceptual equipment. This thesis of critical rationalism stands in direct opposition to the “linguistic turn” of political science, including international relations, that took place from the 1990s onward in the form of post-structuralism, postmodernism, or constructivism.

3. *Even though reality exists, it is difficult to grasp; there are no “facts” in themselves (antipositivism or anti-inductivism).* Although reality exists independently of our theoretical constructs (Thesis 1), it can be grasped, according to critical rationalism, only through our conceptual lenses (critical rationalism thereby belongs to the philosophical tradition of Immanuel Kant). This means that there is no such thing as facts in themselves—apart from trivialities such as the numbers in a telephone directory. All interesting observation is theory impregnated. A good many of Popper’s philosophical efforts have been directed against the positivist quest for certainty, that is, that theory should be built inductively “from below” on a secure foundation of indisputable facts (this includes naive realism, i.e., that things are what they look like and that truth is manifested through them). Knowledge cannot start from nothing, from a tabula rasa, or yet from observation. The growth of knowledge consists mainly in the modification of earlier knowledge. Such knowledge should not be understood in any puristic sense. Even if political science

hardly encompasses established theories, there are general explanatory principles at our disposal, such as role, rationality, or inertia, that can be integrated into theoretical constructs. The main thing is that the expectations that we attempt to falsify (cf. Thesis 5) are theory derived, that is, derived from explicit sets of general justifications. In other words, a priori reasons should be formulated as to *why* we believe in the expectations.

In political science epistemological debates (positivism vs. the neo-Marxism of the 1970s and 1980s or, more recently, positivism vs. poststructuralism or other linguistic orientations), Popper has often been lumped together with the positivists. As should be apparent, this is erroneous. His criticism of inductivism obviously hits correlationally oriented branches of political science. For instance, a major problem with U.S. comparative foreign policy studies was their lack of explicitly formulated reasoning as to why various hypotheses deserved to be tested. Such explicitness would have increased the opportunities for learning from falsifications.

4. *Theories should be parsimonious; among two theories with equal explanatory power, the simpler one should be preferred (the virtue of simplicity).* Theories should preferably be simple (parsimonious): They should be able to explain much by little—by one or a few unifying explanatory mechanisms (be it rationality, role, or a unitary actor). We need a relatively simple starting point for inquiry into the “world of chaotic variety” (Marx’s formulation). Parsimony urges one to include only those factors in a theoretical construct that a priori seem able to account for a considerable part of the empirical variance. Critical rationalism demands bold conjectures in relation to what we already know (our background knowledge); in other words, science should aim at interesting truth rather than just truth. This demand follows from the virtue of simplicity: What is usually called the simplicity of a theory is associated with its logical improbability and, hence, its boldness.

In the field of international relations, the preference for parsimonious theory characterizes the work of Kenneth Waltz, for example, who is one of its most influential authors. However, as emphasized by Waltz’s critics, his assumptions do not correspond sufficiently to reality (Thesis 1), and

the falsifiability of his theory is questionable (see Thesis 5). Climbing down the “level ladder” in foreign policy explanation is also based on respect for parsimony: starting out with the simplest systemic or geopolitical explanation, which—if unsuccessful—is supplemented by factors of domestic politics or, if necessary, by factors in the decision-making process. In other words, if the most parsimonious explanation does not sufficiently account for reality, one proceeds—with some resignation—toward less simple modes of explanation.

5. Theories, to be scientific, should in principle be falsifiable (falsificationism). It is not important how a theory is invented or discovered by a researcher; it may be inspired by societal developments or by specific academic colleagues, or it may be dreamt at night. Therefore, research psychology and the sociology of knowledge are redundant disciplines from the viewpoint of distinguishing good from bad theories or scientific from nonscientific ones. Only one thing counts: the theory’s falsifiability. It is easy enough to find “confirming” instances of almost any theory. If it is to be considered a scientific theory, however, it should run the risk of being false—unlike Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis, for instance; in short, it should be falsifiable. This thesis is probably the most famous in the methodology of critical rationalism. The bolder the conjectures (Thesis 4), the greater the a priori likelihood that they are mistaken and, hence, the more falsifiable they are. Science should progress through a series of falsifications, each time leading to the formulation of a better theory incorporating what has been learned from previous falsifications—that is, learning from past mistakes.

The doctrine of falsificationism was developed in opposition to the positivists’ verificationism and, as the latter failed, their skepticism toward the growth of knowledge. Whereas it is impossible to verify the law “All swans are white” on the basis of the observation of a finite number of swans, it is possible to falsify it by observing only *one* colored (nonwhite) swan. Of course, the supporter of this law may object, for instance, that the swan in question has been painted; such auxiliary hypotheses, however, should be used with the utmost restraint and only in the most obvious cases. Even though followers of Popper such as Imre Lakatos have refined falsificationism, it has

faced criticism in philosophy, the natural sciences, and the social sciences. Not surprisingly, theory constructors often advocate a more lenient course vis-à-vis theories than that of falsification. Rather than consciously seeking to kill theories at the first occasion, they should be given a fair chance of “peaceful development,” at least at the outset. The prevailing view in political or social science today seems to be that a certain initial “protectionism” of theories is justified.

6. The development of society should be explained neither on the basis of traits or motives of individuals or groups within it (reductionism) nor on the basis of emergent properties of society as a whole (holism). Instead, revealing unintended consequences is the way forward for social and political science. Reductionism means that unit-attributes are used to explain developments of the whole, the system. A special version of it is psychologism, meaning that attributes or motives of individual human beings are used to explain societal developments. Conspiracy theories are reductionist. Popper repeatedly warned against conspiracy theories that claim to explain various unfortunate societal developments on the basis of the characteristics or motives of individual human beings or a specific group, functioning as scapegoats (the Jews, immigrants, the Communists, etc.). However, we should not, according to critical rationalism, jump to the opposite extreme and seek to explain social phenomena solely on the basis of emergent properties of the whole (holism). The target here could be functionalism in sociology or political science, explaining developments on the basis of societal “needs” or “functions.” Instead, the preferred explanation of outcomes in the social sciences should refer to mechanisms producing consequences that were unintended by the individual or societal actors involved (as distinct from conspiracy theories dealing with the intended consequences of “evil” actions). For instance, rational choice theory or game theory, often used in international relations, may be an excellent instrument to understand such unintended consequences in the interaction of nation-states. Each state in a conflicting dyad proceeds from its own situational logic and wishes to safeguard its own security. An expensive arms race, further threatening the security of both sides, is the unintended consequence of

each actor following its own situational logic in order to be “safe.” Or, to take another example, international organizations may persist, although their original good purposes have been fulfilled or are no longer relevant. This is because some nation-states have vested interests in the persistence of these organizations, typically unintended at the time of their creation.

Both Popper and Hans Albert took up a fight on these issues in the so-called *Positivismusstreit* in German sociology in the late 1960s. The opponents were primarily the Neo-Marxists of the Frankfurt school, including Jürgen Habermas, but it was likewise seen as vital to keep a distance from positivism.

7. Belief in historicist laws is the basis of modern totalitarianism, be it of a Marxist or a fascist nature. In contrast, reform of the open society should be guided by piecemeal social engineering. Even worse than functionalism, holism may lead to historicism, the view that the whole develops deterministically according to its own immanent law of historical development (in contrast to scientific laws of the if-then type). A process law exists for the solar system because there are few, if any, factors disturbing the system. A human society, however, is a much more complex system, which cannot be explained by such a historicist law. There will always be disturbing factors, be they external or internal. From this methodological reasoning, Popper develops his political philosophy. Its target is totalitarianism operating within stages of human society, through which a determinist development will allegedly lead to a final utopia (such as the classless society or Hitler’s Thousand-Year Reich). Characteristically, *The Poverty of Historicism* (Popper, 1957/1972), the book in which these thoughts were formulated during World War II, was dedicated to the “countless men and women of all creeds or nations or races who fell victims to the fascist and communist belief in inexorable laws of historical destiny.” Perhaps it was unfair to ascribe this determinist belief to Marx personally in *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Vol. 2). However, it can in any case be ascribed to much of the political Marxism that prevailed in the 20th century.

Popper, in the preface to *The Poverty of Historicism*, has added a further argument that should refute historicism: The course of human history is

strongly influenced by the growth of human knowledge. Since we cannot predict, by rational or scientific methods, the future growth of this knowledge (then we would already have it!), it is impossible to predict the future course of human history.

The “closed society” is held together by “semi-biological ties—kinship, living together, sharing common efforts, common dangers, common joys, and common distress” (Popper, 1945, chap. 10, para. 1). It is a semi-organic unity, to which the “so-called organic or biological theory of the state can be applied to a considerable extent” (Popper, 1945). The closed society is characterized by elite rule and the belief in magical taboos, including dreams of a future utopia, while the open society is one in which men have learned to be, to some extent, critical of taboos and to base decisions on the authority of their own intelligence—after discussion. The change from the closed to the open society is a step from tribalism, xenophobia, and nationalism to humanitarianism.

The open society is modeled after good science, with its free and critical discussion. Rather than a belief in process laws, reform of the open society should be based on “piecemeal social engineering.” (This label turned out, of course, to be a public relations failure: Few social or cultural scientists or debaters like to be associated with such a “simplistic” activity as engineering.) The role of social or political science would be to provide the inputs to this engineering. Notably, knowledge of unintended mechanisms would be valuable in the process. It is less important in the big picture, which specific ideological shading Popper’s open society should have. With his emphasis on social engineering, however, it seems to be social democratic or social liberal rather than liberal or conservative. The unique feature of critical rationalism is probably the link between sophisticated epistemological reasoning and a forceful political philosophy. Distinct from his positivist colleagues in the Vienna Circle, with whom he also had serious epistemological disagreements, Popper wished to connect his reasoning to the ominous political developments taking place outside the seminar room.

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See also Constructivism; Epistemological and Methodological Foundations; Positivism; Postmodernism in International Relations

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RATIONALITY, BOUNDED

Bounded or limited rationality is a term coined by Herbert Simon in his theory of decision-making processes in administrative organizations. It focuses on the different types of limitations that actors or decision makers in formal or administrative organizations have when they make decisions. Decision makers have to make a selection of decision premises—goals, preferences, problems, solutions/alternatives, and potential consequences—to cope with these limitations when making decisions. The concept of bounded rationality relates to what kind of limitations actors have, how they can cope

with these limitations, and what the effects of bounded rationality are. Bounded rationality is connected to the concept of “administrative man” and can be seen as a critique of and modification of the concept of “economic man”—in other words, the theory of full rationality. Bounded rationality relates to the concept of “satisficing,” meaning that decision makers are choosing decision premises that are “good enough,” while economic man is about maximizing or choosing the “best possible” action.

Many studies of decision making show quite clearly that decision-making processes are characterized by actors not having all goals and preferences available or unambiguously defined, not having all potential problems exposed, not having all alternatives or solutions lined up, or not having all potential consequences defined. Actors in the real world seem to decide based on a few selected goals/preferences, problems, solutions/alternatives, and consequences. Actors, according to the concept of bounded rationality, intend to be rational, although they are constrained in these efforts by limited cognitive capability and incomplete information.

Limitations on Decision Making

One important type of limitation on actors is *problems of attention*. Decision makers have problems related to time and capabilities. They have too many decision signals to attend to from internal and external sources; too many tasks to work with; too many strategies, plans, and policies to attend to; and too many contacts to cope with. And some information and decision-making premises are not ready available, so they have to search for them. Therefore, how they allocate their scarce resources is a critical factor. They are often part-time participants in many decision-making processes because they move around between decision opportunities depending on what is brought to their attention. And when they focus on some problems, solutions, and decisions, they have to defocus on others because of limited capacity. All these limitations indicate that decision theories should be centered more on theories of attention and search than on theories of choice among readily available goals, preferences, alternatives, and consequences.

Another set of limitations concerns *problems of memory*. Both individuals and organizations may

have problems in storing and retrieving information. Individuals may forget or may have problems of capacity concerning keeping records of actions and experiences, or their memories may be distorted. Organizations may have problems in systematically collecting information, interpreting and storing it, and retrieving information or making it fully available throughout the organization because of lack of capacity and competence or organizational barriers.

A third set of limitations is *problems of comprehension*. Individual actors and organizations may have problems of capacity concerning aggregating, organizing, using, and inferring from information. It's therefore often difficult to learn from history about the relationships between actors and events, not to mention predicting further development. The information may be there, but actors may fail to put it together in a comprehensive way. The more complex the society and the organizations themselves, the more prevalent such problems will be. Actors may also compete in defining and learning from history, partly because they have experiences from different parts of an organization or see their experiences through different lenses of norms and values—for example, related to higher education and professions. There may also be some wishful thinking or superstitious learning going on. Actors may think that what happened had to happen or that all good things in their organization are related to their own actions and all bad things to the actions of other actors.

A fourth set of limitations deals with *problems of communication*. The more complex and specialized information and knowledge are, the greater the problems of communicating information. It's difficult to share information and knowledge across generations, cultures, organizations, levels, tasks, professions, and organizational units. Specialized formal structures may be good at handling information internally but not at communicating and sharing their experiences externally. Different units or groups in an organization may use different information or different methods to simplify the world surrounding them.

March's Dynamics of Decision Making

A key to understanding bounded rationality is to understand that decision makers are selecting

decision premises to simplify the decision situations and make them easier to cope with, so a major question is how they are able to make such a selection. James G. March, in interpreting several psychological studies of individual decision making, says that there seem to be several ways to react to cognitive limitations and constraints. One is to use stereotypes to interpret actors and events. Decision makers construct patterns of attitudes or traits and accordingly interpret other actors' behavior based on the typologies. They imagine and define intent based on observing other actors' behavior or the consequences of that behavior. They define certain aspects or elements of a problem as crucial and ignore the other elements. Their understanding is based on socially developed theories, scripts, and schemas, where missing information is filled in based on interpretations of events, and they tend to ignore inconsistencies in their models of thought and action. All this makes it easier to comprehend information and to act systematically.

The simplified interpretations of problems, solutions, and actors that decision makers have is often path dependent, because their search for information is often biased and limited, meaning that they search where they recently have found problems and solutions. In this way, they save resources and modify their capability restraints. They see what they like to see, and like what they see, and overlook information and events that do not fit into their simplified world. In that respect, they often get their image of the world confirmed.

March summarizes the studies on simplification processes by describing four types of simplifications that decision makers use. One type is *editing*, meaning that actors tend to edit and simplify goals, preferences, problems, alternatives, and effects before entering into a decision process or making decisions, leaving only a small number of premises or decision elements left, which are combined in a simple way. Some information is overlooked or not processed, decision premises and alternatives are attended to in a sequential way, or decision elements are weighted unequally. Sequential attention may solve problems of consistency in the short run but increases long-term consistency problems.

The second simplification method is *decomposition*, meaning that actors decompose complex

problems and alternatives into simpler elements that are easier to cope with. The expectation here is, of course, that attending to the separate elements will eventually lead to an acceptable common outcome. One way of decomposing is to work backward, because some problems are easier to solve that way as it gives actors the opportunity to define an end state and come up with reasons for that to happen; that is, they can reconstruct history or make a rationalization afterward. Decomposing is often easier to enact in a loosely coupled world where actors, problems, and solutions are mostly separate—for example, when organizational units are semi-autonomous, as in a large university.

The third method is labeled *heuristics*, meaning that decision makers see patterns in a decision situation and apply rules or procedures for appropriate behavior that match those situations. Heuristics are rules of thumb that are related to calculating probabilities in complex decision situations, and the more differentiated this calculation is the more easily actors may cope with limitations of cognition and information.

The fourth of March's types is called *framing*, meaning that decisions are framed by ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that define problems to focus on, information to collect, and dimensions to attend to. Actors have paradigms that focus and simplify preferences and options, something that makes sense of the decision situation. A problem may be framed in a narrow and local way, with limited trade-offs, to find a set of sufficient conditions for solving it. Frames of beliefs and cognition are part of both the conscious and the unconscious repertoires of decision makers. Frames are also path dependent and have a tendency to be used again and again, something that increases the competence of an actor and often the actor's ability to convince other actors.

Effects of Formal Structures on Decision Making

Decision makers operate inside formal organizations, and the formal structure is an important element in understanding the existence of and coping with bounded rationality. The formal structure both helps and limits decision makers at the same time. It helps them look at the world in a simplified

way but at the same time limits their ability to see connections and complexities, which would make them better equipped to have a broader perspective on their own tasks and roles. So where decision makers are situated in a formal organization determines what kind of limitations they are experiencing. Leaders are supposed to design the formal structure not only to use specialization to limit cognitive problems but also to have a more holistic perspective on how the specialized roles and units fit together to achieve collective goals.

Luther Gulick, in his seminal work on the design and organization of the federal governmental apparatus in the United States, pointed to the fact that there are two major principles of formal organizations, namely, specialization and coordination, two factors that are in a dynamic relationship. Specialization has a vertical and horizontal dimension and also an intra- and interorganizational dimension. Combining the two dimensions gives us four types of specialization: (1) intra-organizational vertical specialization means the hierarchy inside an organization and the way authority is allocated among leadership levels, (2) interorganization vertical specialization is exemplified by the specialized relationship between ministries and agencies in the public sector, (3) intra-organizational horizontal specialization denotes the specialization of roles and tasks/functions on each level inside a formal organization, (4) and interorganizational horizontal specialization is exemplified by the specialization among ministries or agencies.

Organizational Levels and Bounded Rationality

The relevance of this typology for bounded rationality should be evident. As regards the first type—*intra-organizational vertical specialization*—James Thompson makes a distinction between three levels in an organization: (1) the institutional or leadership level, characterized by much discretion because of many partly competing or ambiguous formal and informal norms and values; (2) the middle-managerial level, characterized by cross-pressure between demands from both the leadership level and the grassroots level; and (3) the operative or grassroots level, characterized by street-level bureaucrats often following formal

rules. On the top level, leaders have both more discretion and more authority to define their own roles than on the other levels, but at the same time, there are often more acute constraints on their rationality because of their having to attend to a more complex set of goals, preferences, problems, alternatives, and consequences. On the middle level, leaders have less discretion to enact their roles than at the top level but more than for actors at the operative level. But their limitation of rationality may be rather problematic to cope with because they are in a cross-pressure between the top and lower levels. The operative bureaucrats occupy a role with much less discretionary space. This makes their rationality limitations much easier to cope with, even though they may have problems seeing their roles in a more holistic perspective.

Vertical interorganization specialization, as exemplified by specialization between ministries and agencies, may also illustrate bounded rationality. Studies of such public organizations have shown that ministries, being on the highest hierarchical level, have the broadest and most comprehensive tasks, such as strategic and policy-oriented tasks, meaning that they, like Thompson's institutional-level leadership, will have to cope with the combination of wide discretionary space and challenging limitations on their rationality. Agencies have more of narrow and technical tasks, based on highly specialized professional competence, making their discretionary space narrower but probably their rationality limitations less challenging.

Gulick defines four principles of horizontal specialization—based on (1) purpose (e.g., education or defense), (2) process (e.g., specialists in part of a process or coming from a particular higher-education group), (3) clientele (e.g., patient groups in hospitals), or (4) geography (certain levels or areas). In each case, the different principles afford both certain rationality constraints and opportunities. Civil servants working with a specialized policy will have advantages concerning cognitive limitations, because they are defined as specialists in, for example, education, defense, health, or social services. Civil servants such as jurists working on rule development will have the same advantages, as will professionals catering to certain client groups. And bureaucrats attending to control tasks on lower levels or to developing certain geographical areas will also operate under the same type of

logic. The limitation problems for all these specialized bureaucrats may, of course, be related to having an overly narrow perspective when there are demands for a wider perspective and collaboration across tasks and sectors. Specialization among ministries and agencies also exemplifies the same logic.

According to Gulick, coordination is related to either formal organization or ideas. Organized coordination could be divided into hierarchical and collegial coordination, both having intra- and interorganizational features. Hierarchical coordination is the mirror image of vertical specialization; that is, what is vertically specialized must also be coordinated to secure superior central control and steering. With respect to cognitive capacity and eventual limitations, the advantage of leaders on a central level is that they can see how the different organizational levels, roles, and tasks are fitting together. The limitations are, of course, related to capacity and knowledge about what is going on at the lower levels; the more complexity there is across levels, the larger are the challenges of rational calculation. Related to new public management (NPM) as a reform wave, there has, for example, been a lot of discussion on the delegation of authority and functions/tasks to lower levels. Such delegation may potentially threaten the information basis of higher-level leaders and therefore increase their cognitive challenges, something that may limit their collective efforts. Delegation of autonomy increases the participation of lower-level actors and may change the patterns of influence to the disadvantage of the top leadership.

Collegial coordination poses other challenges. Here, there is no hierarchical tension and knowledge distance, but there is the problem of heterogeneity and different interests horizontally inside or across organizational units. The challenges concerning rationality limitations and constraint are greater across than within organizations, and the larger the organization, the more heterogeneity there is in tasks, roles, and professional expertise. The different ways to reach a decision under such circumstances also give insight into bounded rationality. One way is to vote, making winners and losers, or majorities and minorities. This may create unambiguous solutions but also more problems of legitimacy, thereby resulting in problems of implementation, so the solutions will be bounded

accordingly. Compromise may lead to increasing support but also to more ambiguous solutions, making for cognitive challenges to implementation. Sequential attention to goals and solutions, and quasi solution of conflicts, may solve pressing and current problems of consistency, but it will also create long-term challenges of consistency, probably posing the largest problems of cognitive limitations for leaders.

Role of Organizational Culture

Coordination through ideas may mean a strong organizational culture, as illustrated by Herbert Kaufman's seminal book on forest rangers in the United States, which described how rangers in different geographical locations held approximately the same cultural views, norms, and attitudes. The cultural part may imply that information and cognitive limitations are modified, because actors intuitively know how to act in a culturally appropriate way. A strong culture may imply "trained incapacity," a lack of ability to adapt to new conditions, as well as potential tension with norms related to formal structures. In a modern setting, however, a culture may appear strong because of the prominence of myths and symbols that bind members together, while in fact these elements may be superficial rather than actually influencing behavior and decisions. Myths or symbols have the advantage as rules of thumb to simplify the world, as shown in NPM concerning scripts such as competitive tendering, benchmarking, marketization, or privatization. Scripts or concepts may result in real problem solving but often function as window dressing, creating images of the organization.

Organizational Slack

Theorizing about bounded rationality has something to do with slack in formal organizations, with slack defined as the distance between available resources and demands. High slack means that performance exceeds goals; that is, demands are satisfied, and the organization has still more resources to use. This means often that the search for new alternatives is modest, slack is increasing, and aspiration is decreasing. But in such situations, slack can be used for innovation or experimentation, which makes it easier to respond to later crises

without severe problems related to cognitive limitations. Low slack, meaning that performance is worse than expected, will stimulate a search for alternatives and new solutions, but the resources available for the search are few, increasing the possibility of severe information and cognitive limitation and eventually failure.

Bounded rationality may also be related to whether leaders and formal organizations are experiencing routine situations or crisis, turbulence, and unexpected events. In routine situations, the pressure on information and cognitive limitations is rather low, and traditional procedures and solutions can be used without too much use of resources. But crises and turbulence impose much more pressure on rational calculation. Leaders can try to use procedures and solutions developed for emergencies to simplify the challenges but will often have to improvise because the fit between ready-made solutions and the crises is problematic. In improvising, they can choose from a repertoire of alternatives and solutions, which is better than starting from scratch, but there is no guarantee that the responses will reflect successful adaptations to the turbulent conditions.

In political-administrative decision processes, it is often the case that saliency is important, meaning that political and administrative leaders will use more resources and expertise to attend to some processes and issues rather than others. This often means that the challenges of information and cognitive limitations are better attended to. But what is politically and administratively important may vary over time, and it is challenging to refocus on issues and cases that have been defocused. This returns to the question of slack and whether the organization has the resources to face such challenges.

Effects of Using Bounded Rationality

What are the effects of using bounded rationality as an important principle or logic in formal organizations? First, bounded rationality has the potential for increasing both efficiency and effectiveness, because preferences, goals, problems, solutions, and effects are framed in such a way that these can be handled satisfactorily. And bounded rationality may imply that one is going to the core of policies and issues in a complex world, without wasting resources on unimportant factors and aspects.

Second, bounded rationality may be related to developing a logic of appropriateness and a certain cultural path. Leaders participate in defining the appropriate aspects of a matter, which sets the stage for other actors to behave accordingly in an appropriate way.

Third, bounded rationality may also make it easier to use symbols and myths to enhance the legitimacy of leaders, institutions, and processes. The simplification and selection of decision-making premises may make the “pedagogical challenge” less severe when relating to other actors or a wider audience.

Three critical remarks could, however, be added. In fact, bounded rationality may lead to ineffectiveness and inefficiency. The reason for this may be (a) lack of enough knowledge to make the selection of the “right” preferences, goals, solutions, alternatives, and potential consequences or (b) that such elements are more the result of a negotiation process than an analytical process, making it harder to handle the decision processes and implement policies. The focus may be more on certain minor or deviant aspects of a complex problem and not on the core, which may lead to reruns of the processes and a lack of stability in solutions. In addition, if this is the case, the developing logic of appropriateness may lead to dysfunctions or increasing tension and conflicts with the environment. Moreover, a “failure” in the process of selection and modification of limitations on rationality may be covered up with extensive use of symbols, thus potentially eroding popular support for the leaders and making the followers more critical and cynical. A counterargument to these three critical points would, of course, be that there is no such thing as objectivity concerning the selection of decision premises in the logic of bounded rationality.

Garbage Can Theory

Bounded rationality is the central part of instrumental decision-making theory and is often contrasted with a more economic man-oriented rational theory. One can, however, also make another and different connection for the relevance of bounded rationality. Garbage can theory, developed by Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen in the early 1970s, stresses that decision makers are part-time participants and

decision situations represent diverse and ambiguous stimuli, resulting in unpredictable decision-making processes with participants, problems, solutions, and decision opportunities coming and going, selected and coupled in unexpected ways. This type of theory could be seen as an extension of the cognitive parts of bounded rationality; that is, the rationality of actors may be so bounded or limited that “organized chaos” is the result. Whereas bounded rationality stresses the importance of formal structure for the views and thoughts of actors, garbage can theory focuses more on the relative lack of such structures, creating more of an “organizational irrationality.”

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See also Administration Theory; Logic of Appropriateness; Organization Theory

Further Readings

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REALISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The concept of realism was developed in the 1930s and 1940s as an alternative to attempts to

understand and conduct international relations based on international law. Its founders, Nicholas J. Spykman, Edward Mead Earle, Frederick Schuman, E. H. Carr, John Herz, William T. R. Fox, and Hans J. Morgenthau, asserted the realism of their power-based approaches to foreign policy, in contrast to what they described as the dangerous idealism of their predecessors. Writing in response to the appeasement of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, which they held responsible in large part for World War II, realist arguments had great resonance.

In the United States, realism appeared to offer intellectual justification for the Cold War and a range of policies pursued by the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations that were otherwise at odds with proclaimed American values. By the mid-1950s, realism had become the dominant paradigm in international relations and remained so until the Berlin Wall came down. Since the end of the Cold War, realism is at best *primus inter pares*, as liberalism, constructivism, feminism, philosophical realism, and poststructuralism have all become more prominent. Realism arguably remains the dominant frame of reference for policymakers, although even here, liberalism especially has made important inroads.

Three Waves of Realism

Looking back on the post-World War II era, we see three waves of realism, each with important implications for the study and practice of international relations and foreign policy.

The First Wave: Hans Morgenthau

The first wave, represented by the writings of the realists mentioned in the paragraph above, was far and away the most influential. Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*, its principal text, was first published in 1948 and went through six editions, the last two published posthumously in 1985 and 2006. Within the United States, and to a lesser extent in Europe, it became a core reading in undergraduate international relations courses. Morgenthau became a prominent public figure in the United States and achieved a certain notoriety for his early support of the civil rights movement and opposition to the Vietnam

War. In "The Purpose of Political Science," Morgenthau (1966, p. 77) lamented that the makers of American foreign policy had "overlearned" the lessons of realism and lost sight of the appropriate moral and legal limitations on the use of power.

In the first edition of *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau (1948) maintained that power is the currency of politics and should be the first concern of states. He divided the world into status quo, revisionist, and prestige-seeking states (pp. 21–25). Status quo states were intent on maintaining existing territorial divisions and revisionist states on overturning them. Prestige-seeking states sought to demonstrate their power to gain more influence. Morgenthau insisted that state goals were not essentialist but changed over time and were not always apparent to outside observers. He thought that peace was most likely to be preserved when status quo powers were more powerful than their revisionist challengers and that the power of either group could be enhanced through alliances. Morgenthau, and realists more generally, speak of the balance of power, which can mean the distribution of power in the system at any given moment, the balance between status quo and revisionist states, or an advantage in favor of the former. Morgenthau used it all three ways, to the consternation of his critics.

The balance of power assumes some capability of measuring power and its distribution. This has proven difficult for realists of all persuasions. Morgenthau conceived of power as an intangible quality that had diverse material *and* political components, among them territory, population, national resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, national character, morale, and the quality of diplomacy and government. None of these attributes translated directly into power because power was "a psychological relation[ship]" that gave those who wield it control over certain actions of others "through the influence which the former exert over the latter's minds." In *Politics Among Nations*, first edition, Morgenthau (1948) asserted that "of all the factors which make for the power of a nation, the most important is the quality of diplomacy" (p. 14). The other attributes of national power are the raw materials out of which the power of a nation is fashioned. Diplomacy "combines those different factors into an integrated

whole, gives them direction and weight, and awakens their slumbering potentialities by giving them the breath of actual power" (p. 105).

Morgenthau described his theory as scientific, but his description of the nature of power and the balance of power indicates that the measurement and exercise of power and the construction of a successful balance of power is more art than science. This is most evident in his analysis of bipolarity and its consequences. The term *bipolarity* was coined by William T. R. Fox in 1944 to describe the domination of the postwar international system by two "superpowers": the United States and the Soviet Union. Morgenthau recognized the world as bipolar in the mid-1950s because the power of these two states had become so "overwhelming" in comparison with allies and third parties that "through their own preponderant weight they determine the balance of power between them." The balance of power could no longer be "decisively affected" by changes in the alignments of their allies, at least in the foreseeable future. Nor could lesser powers easily defect from alliances, because "the two giants" had the power to "hold them there even against their will" (Morgenthau [*Politics Among Nations*], 1948, pp. 270–274; 1951, pp. 48, 52–54). The flexibility of the balance of power and its restraining influence on the power aspirations of the main protagonists had disappeared. The superpowers were free to define their respective positions as vital interests and engage each other with every means at their disposal in every arena in which they competed. In this novel situation, "the give and take of compromise becomes a weakness which neither side is able to afford" (*Politics Among Nations*, 1962 edition, p. 285).

Morgenthau was clearly uncomfortable with the pessimistic implications of his analysis and sought to hold out a ray of hope for the future. In the first edition of *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau (1948) argued that "the changed structure of the balance of power has made the hostile opposition of two gigantic power blocs possible, but it has not made it inevitable." Bipolarity has the potential for "unheard-of good as well as for unprecedented evil" (pp. 285–286). In the last resort, peace does not depend on the nuclear balance but on the moral quality of leaders and their willingness to place the common goal of

survival above the pursuit of unilateral advantage. Morgenthau's theory, in contrast to those of his neorealist successors, stresses the independent power of agency.

In the third, 1962, edition of *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau recognized additional incentives for superpower restraint. He speculated that the experience of the Korean War may have taught Moscow and Washington that they have to adapt their policies to the wishes of their allies "if they wanted to draw the maximum of strength from their support" (pp. 351–352). The emergence of a number of newly independent and unaligned states might also serve the cause of restraint. The third edition continued to describe bipolarity as on the whole inimical to peace (pp. 362–363). In the fifth edition, published in 1972, Morgenthau expressed cautious optimism (pp. 355–356). Détente, explicit recognition of the territorial status quo in Europe, a corresponding decline in ideological confrontation, the emergence of third forces (e.g., Japan, China, West Germany), and the damaging effects of the Vietnam War on American power had made both superpowers more cautious and respectful of the status quo. For all practical purposes, the de facto acceptance of the postwar division of Europe had ended the Cold War.

For Morgenthau, the success of the balance of power for the better part of three centuries was less a function of the distribution of capabilities than it was of the underlying values and sense of community that bound together the actors in the system. When the European value consensus broke down, as it did from the first partition of Poland through the Napoleonic Wars, the balance of power no longer functioned to preserve the peace or integrity of the members of the system. The consensus broke down again in the 20th century, with even more disastrous consequences. At midcentury, Morgenthau was deeply pessimistic about the future. The balance of power was at its nadir. There were two great powers instead of many, Britain no longer had the capability to play the role of balancer, the colonial frontier had disappeared, and one of the principal powers rejected the very premises of the international order. International politics had been reduced "to the primitive spectacle of two giants eyeing each other with watchful suspicion" (Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, first edition, 1948, p. 285).

Morgenthau's theory is descriptive and prescriptive. "Realism," he insists, is superior to "idealist" approaches on both counts. It is more rigorous because its axioms are logically derived from its starting assumptions. It is empirically valid because "the facts as they are actually lend themselves to the interpretation the theory has put upon them" (*Politics Among Nations*, 1962 edition, p. 1). Morgenthau has been accused of making contradictory claims: He justifies his theory on the grounds that it provides a better description of reality, but at the same time, he criticizes French and British policymakers in the 1930s, and their American counterparts in the 1960s, for acting in sharp violation of its principles. He dismissed this criticism as beside the point. *Politics Among Nations* did not aim at an "indiscriminate description of political reality" but was an attempt to develop a "rational theory of politics." The balance of power was "an ideal system," and in his more pessimistic moments, Morgenthau was willing to admit that it was "scarcely found in reality." Realism provided a benchmark against which actual policies could be understood and evaluated. For the same reason, it contained a strong normative element. It was a "theoretical construct" of a fully rational and informed foreign policy that "experience can never completely achieve" but that can be used as a guide for making and assessing policy (p. 8).

The Second Wave: Neorealism

Neorealism or structural realism, developed by Kenneth Waltz (1979), represents an attempt to purge the tensions and contradictions of Morgenthau and other realists of his generation to construct a more scientific theory based entirely at the system level. The starting point for Waltz is the alleged anarchy of the international system, which makes it a "self-help" system. Anarchy requires states not only to make the acquisition of power their first goal but, as Waltz's disciple John Mearsheimer (2006) insists, to accumulate sufficient economic and military capabilities "to make sure that no other state sharply shifts the balance of power in its favour" (p. 72). For Neorealists, the yardstick of power is relative not absolute power because states must assess their power relative to that of other political units.

Drawing on Nietzsche and Weber, Morgenthau attributed conflict at every level of social aggregation

to human nature: People were driven by a desire to dominate others (*animus dominiandi*) and to use them for their own ends. This behavior was less constrained at the international level due to the relative absence of institutions, rules, and mechanisms for channeling this drive into more socially acceptable channels. Neorealists find the explanation for interstate conflict entirely at the system level. They invoke the "security dilemma," a phenomenon first described by John Herz, another prominent first-generation realist. The uncertainty of the international environment encourages states to seek a margin of safety in their military power. Their buildups and deployments threaten other states, who respond the same way. Because of the security dilemma, international conflict would arise even in a system in which every power had only benign intentions. Unlike Morgenthau, for most neorealists, regime type and regime goals are irrelevant. As the system itself causes conflict, actors, in the words of Mearsheimer (2006), can be treated as "black boxes."

For Waltz (1979), the number of actors and the distribution of the power in the system are the key variables for understanding international relations as they determine the polarity of the system. Unipolar systems, dominated by a single hegemon, are the most stable because the hegemon has enough power to enforce order, as Rome did for centuries throughout the Mediterranean basin. Bipolar systems also have a degree of stability because each of the two dominant powers is strong enough to protect itself against any possible combination against it and is accordingly less worried about the addition or defection of allies than great powers in a multipolar system. Multipolarity is the least stable system because there is not that much difference in strength among the leading powers, making alliances, and additions to and defections from them, critical to the balance of power. The balance between opposing alliances is also much more difficult to calculate because it requires estimates of the strength and intentions of multiple powers. Miscalculation becomes an additional source of war in a multipolar system.

Neorealism is not monolithic. Its adherents differ in important respects. In contrast to Waltz's commitment to a parsimonious system-level theory, Steven Walt (1987) maintains that states balance against perceived threats, not power. The United States, he contends, never worried about

British or French nuclear arsenals, only about Soviet and Chinese arsenals because both were considered as adversaries. Mearsheimer (2001), author of his own theory of international relations, builds on the distinction between offensive and defensive realism. Traditional realists, whom he describes as defensive realists, maintain that other powers will balance against any state that becomes relatively too powerful. Mearsheimer advocates offensive realism on the grounds that other powers often bandwagon (make an accommodation with the dominant power) or buck-pass (sit on the sidelines) in preference to joining a balancing coalition. This behavior and offensive dominance—the likelihood that states who start wars will win them—create strong incentives for aggression.

Realists and neorealists disagree about the implications of nuclear weapons. Whereas Morgenthau recognized that they had revolutionized warfare, and with it, international relations, Waltz (1981) regarded them as an unalloyed benefit as they had a powerful deterrent effect. Other realists, such as Scott Sagan, stressing the problems of command and control and the fear of being the victims of a first-strike attack, saw them as potentially destabilizing.

Critics have identified numerous conceptual and empirical problems with neorealism. Alexander Wendt (1992) argued that anarchy does not automatically lead to a self-help system; the character of the international system depends very much on how states respond to anarchy. Richard Ned Lebow (1994) argues that neorealism's definition of power is as problematic as Morgenthau's. Waltz (1979) offers a definition of power almost identical to Morgenthau's. He then asserts the overwhelming importance of material capabilities, especially military capabilities, because "force remains the final arbiter" of international affairs (p. 131). The superpowers are "set apart from the others . . . by their ability to exploit military technology on a large scale and at the scientific frontiers" (pp. 180–181). He insists that the determination of polarity can be answered by "common sense" and that the world was bipolar in 1945. Efforts by scholars to determine when bipolarity began range from Waltz's 1945 estimate to Morgenthau's mid-1950s estimate, as well as assertions by some that the postwar world was never bipolar. The end of the Cold War has created a similar

controversy, with Waltz (1990) arguing that the world is still bipolar, Mearsheimer (1990) that it has become multipolar, and other realists (e.g., Charles Krauthammer, William Wohlforth, and Michael Mastaduno) contending that it is now unipolar.

The most fundamental problem with Waltz's theory is that it is, by his own admission, a theory of international relations, not of foreign policy, and thus says little to nothing about how individual states will behave. Its principal substantive proposition is that multipolar systems are less stable (enduring) and more prone to war than bipolar ones. Such a proposition is not testable because we would require a large sample of both kinds of systems and there have been very few bipolar systems in history. It is also meaningless because what anyone is really interested in is the likelihood of war in a particular system, and no inferences can be made about single cases from statistical distributions.

Mearsheimer's theory, elaborated in his 2001 book, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, has also encountered strong criticism. Offensive dominance has little empirical support. According to the critics, it is simply not true, as Mearsheimer claims, that initiators win most of the wars they have begun. Lebow shows that in the 30 wars fought since 1945, the initiators won only 7. Mearsheimer's (1990, 2001) predictions that NATO would not survive the end of the Cold War and that Germany and Japan should and would acquire nuclear weapons have (fortunately) not come to pass.

Third Wave: Classical Realism

The third wave—classical realism—was ushered in by the peaceful end of the Cold War, which appeared to contradict the expectations of neorealism. Classical realism was also a response to the widespread recognition that problems of identity, globalization, justice, and world order were at least as important as the balance of power for understanding contemporary international relations. Scholars have accordingly revisited the works of Thucydides (Lebow, 2003), Hobbes (Michael Williams, 2006), and Morgenthau (Lebow, 2003; Williams, 2007) in search of insights relevant to these problems.

Lebow's *The Tragic Vision of Politics* (2003) is perhaps the most extensive attempt to reconstruct

the wisdom of classical realism through hermeneutic readings of the texts of Thucydides, Carl von Clausewitz, and Morgenthau. He contends that all three authors wrote in the aftermath of destructive wars and sought to reconstruct order by drawing on the best of old practices and the most promising new ideas. In sharp contrast to neorealists, they recognized that the principal threat to world order came from dominant powers who succumbed to hubris and overreached themselves. Such powers were more effectively constrained by domestic restraints and external practices and institutions than by the balance of power. Support for this contention also comes from Stuart Kaufman, Richard Little, and William Wohlforth's comprehensive 2007 study of the balance of power in the ancient world and non-Western systems. They find that it rarely worked to preserve the peace as most realist theories suggest.

Lebow further contends that classical realists were more interested in influence than in power. They recognized that material capabilities were only one component of power and power was only one source of influence. Influence is relational, and the least efficient way of exercising it is through threats and rewards. Rewards consume resources, and threats generate antagonism because they make other actors aware of their subordination. Influence is most effectively exercised through common projects that respond to common needs and build common identities. Influence of this kind is limited to projects considered to be in the common interest, and repeated efforts to advance common interests can earn honor for dominant powers and the corresponding willingness of others to accept their leadership. In a more recent work, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, Lebow (2008) explores the role of honor and develops a constructivist theory of international relations, but one that incorporates the key tenets of classical realism.

Morgenthau (1962) thought that nuclear weapons and environmental degradation were problems that could not be addressed by nation-states acting unilaterally. To address them, the world required "a principle of political organization transcending the nation-state and commensurate with the potentialities for good or evil of nuclear power itself" (p. 76). While Waltz and the neorealists sought to explain the status quo, Morgenthau looked beyond it. The principal task of international relations

theorists was to facilitate the research by laying the groundwork "for a new international order radically different from that which preceded it" (p. 76). Thucydides, Morgenthau, and Herz are attractive to classical realists above all because of their concern for justice and the transformational nature of their projects.

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See also Anarchy; Arms Race; Balance of Power; Bipolarity and Multipolarity; Cold War; Containment; Diplomacy; Foreign Policy Analysis; Geopolitics; International Relations, Theory; International System; National Interest; Nuclear Proliferation; Power and International Politics; Security Cooperation; Security Dilemma; Sovereignty; Strategic (Security) Studies; Superpower; War and Peace

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valuable assets in a given society. In the narrow sense used in political science, it refers to the value-driven, commanding intervention of the state in society to extract resources from some groups (mainly in the form of taxes) in order to give them to other groups (using public expenditure and other redistributive mechanisms). Thinkers on the left of the ideological spectrum argue that the state should play an active role in this process, while those on the right hold that interaction in a free market is the most efficient mechanism of distribution. In what follows, there are clarifications on the scope and scientific usage of the term *redistribution*, an account of the historical evolution of the concept, a classification of political science's main theories on the role of the state and the dynamics of competition among groups, and a brief discussion of the empirical indicators of redistribution.

The Concept of Redistribution

In the social sciences, the concept of redistribution refers both to the normative questions about the ideas, values, and criteria of justice that ought to illuminate the pursuit of fairness in a given society (from whom to collect? to give to whom? why?) and to the practical question about the means by which authorities should reallocate resources and valuable goods (the most common mechanisms being tax exemptions, public expenditure, cash transfers, subsidies, and social programs). The comprehensiveness of the term cannot be separated from the meaning of its predecessor, *distribution*. While distribution is an economic concept that refers to the allocation of resources that occurs in society as a result of the free interaction between private agents (mainly in the market but also by means of philanthropy, community organization, international cooperation, etc.), the term *redistribution* indicates the intervention of the state, as a public authority, in the sanction of the criteria to redistribute and in the administration of the mechanisms of redistribution. In the narrow usage of their respective disciplines, economists tend to focus on the distribution of monetary income (salaries), while political scientists and sociologies adopt a broader approach, looking at the redistribution of wealth, including not only material assets but also other opportunities in life such as health and education as well as entitlements and rights.

REDISTRIBUTION

The term *redistribution* refers to the criteria and the mechanisms shaping the authoritative allocation of

Another conceptual distinction between these two terms is that distribution occurs when there are changes or there is reallocation of resources within the existing rules of the game (e.g., compared with retailers, farmers obtained more income than they did in 2009), whereas redistribution takes place when there are changes in the rules of the game (e.g., Congress passed a law granting tax exemptions to farmers).

Explaining Redistribution

Concerns about establishing norms for the redistribution of valuable goods have accompanied humanity since agriculture replaced nomadic hunting as the principal food source, calling for an unprecedented level of organization of tasks including the division of labor, accumulation of stocks, and redistribution of the benefits. Formulas for fair distribution of goods and concern for the weakest are present in the foundational writings of all religions, placing the judgment of fairness on the will of a divine god and offering detailed instructions to mortals on how to implement that justice. The return to humanism and the emergence of the secular state in the Renaissance period put both the judgment and the responsibility of redistribution in human hands, setting the stage for a debate that would prevail throughout modernity: the discussion between those arguing for active intervention of the state in the redistribution of wealth and those arguing that the state should have a limited role. Philosophers and economists such as Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and Karl Marx led the scholarly debates on distribution and redistribution during the birth of the Western nation-states, which were built on the foundations of the egalitarian beliefs consecrated by the French Revolution of 1789.

The initial success of the communist alternatives in the Soviet Union and China in the early 1900s, the horror of World War I, the emergence of authoritarian regimes in Central Europe, and the economic crises of Western capitalism in 1929 prompted questions about the political and institutional dimensions of human organizations. New covenants of coexistence and new models of interaction between the haves and the have-nots were needed to redress the previous concentrations of wealth resulting from the aristocratic governments

of the 19th century at the domestic level and by the colonial exploitation of Africa, the Americas, and Asia at the international level. The development of the welfare state can be situated between the late 19th century and the 1980s, with the most archetypical examples located in the Nordic countries of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland. Finns, for instance, enjoy state-funded education, health, and welfare services, as well as unemployment insurance and retirement benefits, at no cost for the families other than the general taxes. The long-lasting impacts of these universal provisions are still evident. According to World Bank's 2002 World Development Indicators, at the beginning of the 21st century, 48% of the national income in Brazil was concentrated in the richest 10% of the population, while the figure was 30.5% for the United States and 21.6% for Finland. The presidency of Ronald Reagan in the United States (1981–1989) and the prime ministership of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain (1979–1990) marked the return of a neoliberal ideology that attacked the welfare state, denouncing its overspending and inefficiencies and shrinking it in favor of privatized and market-like social services.

The early 20th century marks the starting point for defining a specific political science approach to redistribution, the use of systematic scientific research to address the impact of power, politics, and institutions on the redistribution of public resources or "who gets what, when and how," as Harold Lasswell put it in 1936. The New Deal implemented in the United States by President Franklin Roosevelt as a response to the economic crisis of 1929 represents a paramount object of study for those interested in the dynamics and outcomes of public redistribution of wealth. More specific questions on redistribution address the allocation of the annual budget to different governmental programs; the redistribution of revenues among subnational governments (states or provinces); the redistribution of resources across demographic, ethnic, religious, or tribal lines; and the way in which different groups in society use their power to influence the outcomes of those redistributions in their favor. To describe these processes of redistribution, political scientists have looked at forms of governments (Are they democracies or authoritarian regimes?), constitutional and legal frameworks (Is it a republic, a

constitutional monarchy, or a popular republic?), organization of the territory of the state (Is it a federal or a unitary system?), tax systems and laws (Are they progressive or regressive?), electoral provisions and enfranchising (Who is entitled to stand for election and to vote?), groups' strategies of influence and lobbying (How permeable is the political system to the organized pressure of interest groups?), the welfare state and public expenditures (How much is spent on social programs?), the aim and scope of social programs (Are they universal or focalized? who are the beneficiaries?), and so on.

There are three major theories in political science on the role that the state plays in redistribution. The first group of theories derives from the neoclassic economists of the 17th and 18th centuries (e.g., Adam Smith, David Ricardo) and argues that free agents pursuing their self-interests in free markets will achieve the best possible distribution of resources, therefore the state should limit its intervention to guarantee national defense, respect for private property, and the administration of justice. On the other hand, a group of theories in the tradition of Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau argue that the market is full of imperfections that justify broad intervention by the state in the economy, including the planning, regulating, and implementing of large-scale economic plans. While liberal thinking prevailed in the 18th and 19th centuries, the 20th century was dominated by the broad intervention of the state both at the domestic and at the international levels; after World War II, most European nations and the United States engaged in state-sponsored recovery plans, centralized planning, rigid regulation and intervention in the most productive economic sectors, and comprehensive social programs to help the poor—in other words, the welfare state. A third voice in this debate was contributed by the early utopian socialism of Henri de Saint-Simon and Charles Fourier and later on by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who saw the history of humanity as a permanent class struggle and proposed the abolition of private property, termination of the state, and its replacement with the commons, in an ideal communist society in which the guiding principle of redistribution would be “from each according to his abilities, to each according to his need.”

Another set of theories in political science focuses on competition between groups to influence

redistributive outcomes in their favor, to get a bigger portion of the pie. The iron law of oligarchy, as formulated by Robert Michels, affirms that no matter how many laws or institutions are in place to regulate access to public decisions, there will always be a small group of rich and resourceful people who will manage to access key decision points and bias public policy outcomes in their favor. An alternative interpretation, called power resources theory, championed by Gøsta Esping-Andersen and others, suggests that the level of inequality and the redistributive outcomes in a given society are the result of the organizational resources of the working class and its mobilization. A third argument on the accessibility and dynamics of redistribution is offered by Philippe Schmitter's theory of corporatism and its American variation, pluralism, initiated in the writings of the Founding Fathers of the United States and most recently reformulated by Robert A. Dahl; these theories hold that the greatest influence on the redistributive outcomes of the state are exerted neither by the people nor by the elites but by the organized activity of interest groups and factions. A fourth proposition is advanced by the institutionalist (Karl Deutsch and David Easton) and neo-institutionalist (Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio) approaches, which combine rational choice theory with institutional analysis to conclude that there is a dialectic influence between society and its political institutions so that the latter mirror the balances of power of the former but at the same time limit its freedom.

Even when the most fertile studies on redistribution combine cultural, economic, and political approaches, cross-disciplinary efforts have been scarce, due to the difficulty of defining solid indicators, the scarcity of reliable and comparable data, and the excessive specialization of the disciplines. The Gini coefficient and Theil index of inequality are used as proxies to analyze the results of the redistributive outcomes of the state, but more accurate indicators of redistribution are the share of income and consumption of the richest (or the poorest) deciles of the population and indicators of the health (life expectancy and infant mortality) and levels of education (literacy rate and school attendance) of the poorest social groups. Political scientists also look for indicators of political participation (voting, petitions, participation

in rallies, and involvement in advocacy groups) as proxies to deduce the capacity of citizens for influencing the state and, conversely, the share of public resources that they obtain from it.

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See also Class, Social; Common Goods; Equality; Inequality, Economic; Justice; Social Exclusion; Social Movements

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REFERENDA

A referendum is a device of direct democracy by which the people are asked to vote directly on an issue or policy. It differs from an election, which is a vote to elect persons who will make decisions on behalf of the people, or a recall, by which citizens are given the opportunity to remove from office an elected representative. Although this distinction between issue voting and person voting is apparently clear, it may be questioned, such as when the referendum is, formally or de facto, a vote of confidence or about the accession or permanence in power of a person. This is often the case in authoritarian regimes, but it also happens in democratic contexts (e.g., the use of referenda by de Gaulle in France). Such referenda are often qualified as “plebiscites,” although the word, which goes back

to ancient Rome, literally means “a law enacted by the common people” (*plebis scitum*). Because a plebiscite is commonly regarded as highly manipulative, the term has a negative connotation. The use of a plebiscite is sometimes extended to all government-initiated referenda, especially if ad hoc, insofar as they would automatically trigger a vote of confidence. But the word has also traditionally been used in a more neutral way, to refer to popular votes on sovereignty issues (e.g., the plebiscites proposed by the League of Nations after World War I to settle boundary disputes). The word *referendum* appeared much later, possibly in 16th-century Switzerland, to indicate the procedure by which delegates to cantonal assemblies submitted certain issues to their constituents for ratification (*ad referendum*).

Typologies

A distinctive feature of the referendum is the great variety of forms that it can take. This introduces problems of comparability and makes general statements about the device difficult. Among the numerous modalities of the referendum, the one called *initiative* is considered to be the most important, as it indicates the maximum extent to which legislative power is delegated to the people. Most typologies of referenda are indeed based on this criterion and distinguish between mandatory (also termed compulsory or obligatory) referenda, on one side, and optional (or facultative) referenda, on the other, with a fundamental divide within the latter category between referenda initiated by institutional actors such as the executive, the legislative branch, or a parliamentary minority and popular initiatives. Many authors use the word *referendum* for mandatory referenda and referenda initiated from within institutions, while votes demanded by popular minorities are referred to as *initiatives*. Others use *referenda* for votes on legislative texts (current or pending legislation), whether they are initiated by institutional actors or by popular minorities, and *initiatives* for popular initiatives that are propositional (i.e., dealing with proposals for future legislation). The formal object of the referendum (current, pending, or proposed legislation), the category of legislative act it deals with (e.g., ordinary legislation, constitutional reform, international treaty), the subject (e.g., institutional,

territorial, moral, economic), the legal consequences of the vote (consultative—also termed *advisory*—or binding), and the territorial level at which it is organized (e.g., local/regional/national) are other frequent variables included in the typologies, creating numerous designations for the referendum. Here, we use the word *referendum* in a general sense, which includes all types of popular votes bearing formally on an issue. This entry does not consider agenda initiatives, whereby a number of citizens can submit a proposal that must be considered by the legislature but is not necessarily put to a vote of the electorate.

History

The history of the modern referendum is generally associated with three countries. On one side are Switzerland and the United States and on the other, France. In the first two, the practice of referendum has its roots in a tradition of direct democracy by popular assemblies at the local level (the American town meetings and the Swiss cantonal *Lands-gemeinde*), dating back to the Middle Ages in the case of Switzerland. In America, the referendum experience was initiated with the submission of state constitutions to the people (the first case was the rejection of the Constitution of Massachusetts by the people in 1778) and the introduction in many states of the obligatory referendum on constitutional amendments proposed by the legislature. But it was never extended beyond the state level, neither in the federal constitution nor in practice. In Switzerland, the first major development of the referendum occurred at the cantonal level, under the impulse of the democratic Liberals in the 1830s, although early forms of referenda were found before this period (as mentioned above). At the time, it appeared as an acceptable substitute for the direct democracy assemblies, which had become impractical. In addition, the examples of the United States and France were very influential in promoting the constitutional referendum (the first nationwide referendum had actually been held in Switzerland in 1802 to approve the Napoleonic constitution). During these years, all cantonal constitutions, with the exception of Friburg, were approved through referenda, and provisions for popular initiatives, on constitutional or legislative matters, were introduced in many of

them. The 1848 federal constitution was also submitted to the people in a majority of cantons, which included the obligatory referendum for amendments to the constitution as well as the constitutional popular initiative for total revision of the constitution. In both countries, a decisive extension of the referendum was achieved under the influence of political reform movements in the second half of the 19th century: the Democratic Movement in Switzerland (the 1860s) and the Progressive Movement in the United States (1890–1920). As a result of these movements, provisions for popular initiatives were enhanced in the Swiss federal constitution (1874: the initiative on laws within 90 days of their publication; 1891: the constitutional initiative for partial revisions) and introduced in many American states, especially in the west (more than 80% of the 24 states that have the popular initiative adopted it during the Progressive era). In the two countries, these movements drew support from the popular dissatisfaction with representative democracy, with politicians being accused of corruption and of fostering the interests of only the richest sections of the population. France has a different story as it had no tradition of direct democracy. Nevertheless, its referendum experience started much as it did in the United States, with referenda on the revolutionary constitutions of 1793 and 1795, following the end of monarchic rule. Moreover, the 1793 constitution greatly advanced democratic principles by introducing universal male suffrage and a popular initiative on laws within 40 days of their adoption. This constitution was actually a great source of inspiration for Switzerland. Ultimately, however, it was never applied, and the only form of referendum that found its way into France was the constitutional referendum. Overall, France would soon take a different road with the plebiscitary use of the referendum by Napoleon I and Napoleon III, to some extent perpetuated by the presidential use of the referendum under the fifth republic.

Constitutional Provisions

As suggested by existing data sets on referenda (see IDEA and c2d), in 2008, only a small minority of countries (about 20% of the 193 countries deemed independent by Freedom House) had no provision at all for referenda at the national or subnational

level; these were mostly in Asia (e.g., China and India), the Middle East, and Central America. Provisions for nationwide referenda are much more widespread (80% of the countries) than provisions for subnational referenda (40% of the countries). At the national level, mandatory referenda and optional referenda (the latter category including in our data set citizens' demands on existing or pending legislation) are much more prevalent (54% and 60% of all countries, respectively) than citizens' initiatives for future legislation (16%). Twenty percent of the countries have popular initiatives (either citizens' demands or citizens' initiatives). As may be expected, more free countries (by Freedom House ranking) have provisions for referenda (only 13% have no provisions of any kind at any level) than the other countries (24% have no provisions for referenda). This is partly due to differences with regard to popular initiatives: 23% of free countries provide for them compared with only 15% of not free and partially free countries (at the national level). It is remarkable, however, that such a device to challenge political authorities can be found in the constitutions of countries such as the Russian Federation, the Asiatic republics of the former USSR, Togo, or Uganda, although it is never used. But the major difference concerns provisions for subnational referenda, which are much more prevalent in free countries (55%), where they have tended to increase in recent years, than in the other countries (26%).

Practice Around the World

It is much more difficult to assess the effective practice of referenda, especially at the subnational level, for which no exhaustive data set exists. However, over the 1980 to 2008 period, it is possible to classify countries according to the intensity of their practice of national referenda. A preliminary observation should be that frequent use of the referendum is associated with the popular initiative and its practice on a wide range of issues (not strictly constitutional or of special importance). A first group of very frequent users includes Switzerland (246 referenda), with Italy (60), Liechtenstein (38), Ecuador (33), and Micronesia (31) far behind. All these countries have provisions for popular initiatives, which represent the bulk of the practice in Switzerland, Italy, and Liechtenstein. The second group consists of frequent users, such

as Ireland (21), with its practice of mandatory constitutional referenda, Palau (19), Colombia (19 since it became free in 1990), and Lithuania (18 referenda since independence), the latter two showing occasional use of the popular initiative. The third group, consisting of medium-frequency users (7–13 referenda), has 16 countries, among which are some occasional practitioners of the popular initiative (e.g., Bolivia, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, New Zealand) and a more frequent user (Uruguay). Unlike the previous groups, this set of countries also includes not fully free countries (6), such as Egypt, Belarus, and Morocco. Nonfree countries are more prevalent in the next two groups of occasional users (23 countries with 4–6 referenda) and rare users (71 countries with 1–3 referenda), which include only a small minority of free countries (and only 3 countries with some practice of the popular initiative: Venezuela, Latvia, and Macedonia). This suggests that the sporadic use of the referendum often has to do with the quest for popular acclamation of authoritarian policies. It should be added that it is often difficult in the case of nondemocratic countries to assess whether a referendum has been mandatory, optional, or *ad hoc*. A prevalence of authoritarian regimes is not, however, found in the last group, consisting of nonusers (70 countries), which has comparable proportions of free countries and partially free or not free countries. Among the most prominent nonusers of the referendum are the United States, Germany, China, India, Japan, and Israel. The United States and Germany, however, have an intense practice of referenda, especially popular initiatives, at the state level, albeit with important differences from one state to another. Regarding subnational referenda, it should be noted that federal countries and decentralized countries actually have a major propensity for them (Switzerland being an exemplary case). It is also probably true, at least in democratic countries, that the decrease in territorial level (from nation to region or from state to city) will likely correlate with a higher number of referenda. From a dynamic perspective, a general trend toward an increase in the practice of referenda is clearly observable. The number of nationwide referenda between 1980 and 2008 (close to 900 referenda) is almost three times the number registered for 1950 to 1979 (362 referenda). Moreover, the use of referenda dramatically

increased during the 1980 to 2008 period. As a matter of fact, in the postwar period, there was a twofold increase in the use of referenda, and in the 1970s and 1990s, it more than doubled (compared with the previous decade). This does not mean that the referendum has become more frequent in every country or is practiced with the same intensity everywhere. For example, in Western Europe, the increase in referendum use has been much more marked in Switzerland, Italy, and Ireland than in other countries. Nonetheless, the referendum has become more prevalent in many countries where it had never been practiced before (e.g., Great Britain, the Netherlands), where it had not been practiced since 1940 (e.g., Finland, Luxembourg, Norway), and where it had not been practiced in a democratic context (e.g., Austria, Greece, Portugal, Spain). Much of this has had to do with the submission to the people of the different steps of European integration or of new, cross-cutting issues such as civil, nuclear, or so-called moral questions. Clearly enough, from a world perspective, the increase in referendum use in the 1970s and 1990s also reflects the rise in the number of independent countries and the use of the referendum during the process of nation-building in these countries, as well as the spread of democratic regimes around the world.

Empirical Evidence: Causes, Democratic Quality, and Effects

Why referenda are held and why their use has spread around the world, however, are matters for which no general theory has been articulated up to now. Only partial theories regarding specific countries or types of referenda (e.g., government-initiated referenda) have been formulated. For sure, the reasons for the use of referenda are different in democratic and in nondemocratic countries, and they are also not the same in new and in old democracies, where the recent increase has more to do with the crisis of representation and the rising expectations of democracy than with the legitimization of the new state or political regime. The absence of a general theory also characterizes more traditional concerns of the literature, like those pertaining to the democratic quality of referenda or their policy and political effects. Thus, the extent to which and the conditions in which referenda can

be democratic, that is, promote policies that accurately reflect the popular will on the question raised, remain problematic. Some authors believe that representative democracy would be better than direct democracy at producing such policies, or at least better than semidirect democracy, to which, strictly speaking, the referendum belongs, as it is only a mechanism of popular decision, not of collective elaboration of policies (unlike citizens' assemblies). Because of this, people would almost inevitably approve legislation reflecting the views of a few policymakers rather than their own preferences. Social choice theorists also point to inherent structural problems that would dispose referenda to produce only arbitrary majorities, while others believe that such a limitation is generic to all voting procedures and so affects representative democracy as much as direct democracy. From a different point of view, it is often argued that referenda result in minority decisions because of abstention, which has proved to be high when their use becomes frequent; because of manipulation by minorities; or simply because voters answer to a different question from the one formally asked, as typically occurs when they express a vote of confidence in the incumbents. To a large extent, the capacity of the referendum to produce true majority decisions is related to the level of interest and competence of voters on the issue, which itself depends on the frequency of referenda (or the number of propositions on the ballot), the type of question (its complexity, saliency, importance to daily life, etc.), or the fairness and quality of the campaign. But there is no articulated empirical theory on the influence of these variables. Studies on voting behavior at referenda, which form the bulk of the empirical works, rarely go beyond the assessment of voting motivations or the influence of party recommendations at specific polls. Research on the effects of referenda is even less developed. Little is known, beyond particular country cases, about their policy effects. Do referenda favor the status quo and hinder change, as is often argued with reference to the Swiss experience? Do they have a structural bias in favor of the "No" votes, for they would more easily aggregate dissents than create consent? Similarly, does the referendum harm minorities, and is it bound to do so because it "knows nothing about compromise," as Max Weber pointed out? Those who believe so

generally also doubt that referenda can lead to more legitimate decisions and solve conflicts. Rather, referenda are believed to enhance divisions. Finally, do referenda lead to incoherent and incompetent policies, as their opponents most prominently denounce? The political effects of referenda are no better ascertained. A classical argument against them is that they weaken representative democracy by undermining the role and responsibility of political parties and elected representatives and that when used too frequently, they generate voter fatigue and low electoral participation. Moreover, it is argued, popular initiatives would overload the political system by continually introducing new demands. Supporters of referenda, on the contrary, view them as usefully complementing representative institutions, by making them more democratic and more legitimate. Referenda would enhance both citizens' participation, in a large sense, and citizens' education. Moreover, popular initiatives provide an alternative channel for raising issues and, as the example of Switzerland shows, encourage representatives to be more responsive and more accommodative in the preparation of laws, which would result in creating a stronger attachment of the people to the political system. Altogether, the debate on referenda remains largely inconclusive, due to the lack of a truly comparative study dealing with a sufficient number of cases and variables. Admittedly, such a theory is difficult to formulate because of the great variety of the forms of referenda and the contexts in which they are held, which stands as an impediment to any kind of generalization. For the present, it should be noted that the prevailing view among political scientists is not very favorable to referenda. This is explained by the fact that they are criticized by both elitists, in the name of representative democracy, and "participationists," in the name of pure direct democracy, which is regarded as superior because it allows the collective elaboration of policies as well as more compromise and deliberation, leading to more enlightened decisions. Proponents of the referendum argue that it should not be evaluated against the ideal of direct democracy but against the actual performance of representative democracy, which can be more severely criticized on the same grounds as referenda. In conclusion, further research on referenda is all the more needed since they have become more frequent,

and the issue is raised today of whether they should or should not be part of the current development of participatory mechanisms. In such a perspective, recent efforts by think tanks and institutes specializing in the improvement of democracy to advance referendum "best-practice" proposals that incorporate particular institutional designs and rules for their implementation deserve to be mentioned. Ultimately, as with elections, the correctness of referendum practice is to a large extent a matter of rules and of the democratic quality of the regime in which it occurs.

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See also Democracy, Direct; Democracy, Quality; Democracy, Types of; Participation

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REFORM

Modern societies are highly dynamic. Unlike static traditional societies, they constantly evolve, and

progress is the principal goal. Consequently, a central concept in these societies is that of *reform*, meaning an intended change of institutions or policies designed to overcome perceived deficits or to achieve particular goals. If successful, the change leads to a positive development: improvement of an existing situation or better performance. Reforms can refer to a government as a whole or its institutions and policies, but political science is also interested in the restructuring of nongovernmental organizations such as associations or firms. In all these settings, modernization is tantamount to reform.

The concept of reform is used to designate extraordinary political decisions, as distinguished from ordinary decisions, by the degree of change involved. Moreover, reforms break with routine. As a rule, political leaders announce a reform to gain public attention and prove their ability to govern. In this way, they exploit the positive connotations of the term for political gain. In view of the dynamics of modern societies and technologies, even conservatives no longer defend the status quo but propose reforms to avoid negative developments. The ability to reform has become an indication of effective governance, while stalemate and stagnation are commonly identified with governance failure. Nevertheless, an analytical distinction between reform and ordinary decisions is difficult. If *blockade* is used as the antonym for reform, the concept is too broad for analytical purposes, because not all policy change can be construed as reform and not all opposition to such change can be construed as obstructionist. For this reason, reform should be defined as a policy that is particularly ambitious with regard to change, that is highly relevant for the promoters or affected actors, and that attracts special attention, often among the general public and the media.

In contrast to revolutionary change, reform policies maintain a legitimized system of governance. Institutions or policies are not abolished but transformed in a more or less incremental process. This process follows existing rules, which usually stipulate the participation of actors that have a stake in the reform. As a consequence, the intended change causes conflicts, and every reform is confronted with the resistance of actors interested in maintaining the status quo or expecting to lose power. On the other hand, actors who push for change may

veto a reform if they are not satisfied with the outcome. For these reasons, the challenge of a reform is to find sufficient supporters and arrive at decisions on change, whereas revolutions generate a self-enforcing dynamic that is difficult to control.

Reform is an intended change effected by explicit decisions and actions of responsible policymakers. Usually, reformers pursue a design of renewed institutions or policies; at least they have ideas about the direction of change. Thus, a reform, concerning the formal institutions, rules, or procedures, differs from changes driven by ongoing interaction or interpretation of existing norms and practices. However, emergent patterns of interaction and interpretation influence the outcome of reforms. In political systems, as in the private sector, reform policies are often guided by designs derived from theories or copied from those of other governments or organizations. But more often than not, these plans fail due to open opposition from actors attempting to maintain their powers or due to the endogenous dynamics of collective action interfering with the intentions of reform policies. It is the interplay of intended and unintended change that explains the outcome of reforms.

Depending on the specific situation or the desired objectives, the challenges and difficulties of reforms vary. Comprehensive constitutional reforms rarely meet with complete success. As the theories of historical institutionalism explain, changes in complex institutional settings are “path dependent”; that is, they are constrained by previous decisions on constitution making or creation of political systems. Moreover, because reforms affect the allocation of power in political systems, they give rise to intense conflicts and provoke strong resistance by actors who want to maintain their position or who profit from the existing rules. Rules of constitutional amendment require decisions with qualified majorities either in parliaments or through referenda, if not both. These rules favor coalitions of actors opposing a reform. According to institutionalist reasoning, we can expect “implicit change” of constitutional norms through court decisions or reinterpretation of rules by governments. Also possible are limited amendments designed to adjust constitutions to the development of prevalent values or power structures in a society. But major constitutional reforms should be regarded as unlikely events.

Reforming an organization gives rise to similar problems, even if a reorganization can be planned and enacted by political leaders. Administrative reforms, for example, often are initiated by governments or parliaments. By using their power to decide on competences, procedures, personnel, and the budget of administrations, they are able in principle to control reform processes. However, radical intervention in existing structures can destroy standard operating procedures or undermine the motivation of civil servants. Reforms enforced from above often thwart the collective "spirit" or culture of an organization, which is key to maintaining its performance. In this case, those affected by the change may resort to subversive activities or react by work-to-rule. At the end, governments may bring about changes to formal organizations but may fail to achieve the expected improvements.

Reforms related to policies face resistance from affected interest groups, but mostly, they get the support of groups profiting from the change. Whether they succeed or not depends on the comparative power and influence of these groups in the political system. As George Tsebelis has argued, intended policy change can be explained as a bargaining process the outcome of which is determined by the status quo, the preferences of the actors or coalitions involved, and their veto powers. Simply put, reforms are more likely to succeed in changing an existing policy the lower the number of veto players.

Although institutionalist and actor-centered theories often explain the failure of reforms, they do not tell us much about the conditions of change. Empirical research on organizational change has shown that the powers and preferences of actors and the history of institutional development play an important role in reform processes, but no less important are the ideas promoted by the advocates of change. As a rule, reform processes start with discussions leading to new perceptions of problems and new goals and proposals for renovating institutions or policies. If the different opinions merge into a new "paradigm," or ideas shared among the players in the politics of reform, change in the proposed direction is likely. Moreover, strong "advocacy coalitions" or "change agents" are critical to trigger reforms.

The variables emphasized by different theories have impacts on reforms at different stages of the process. This is why we regularly can observe a cyclical development. Reforms are triggered by new ideas, elaborated and communicated by advocates of change. Public discussions in the concerned policy area cause a shift in perceptions, which tend to exaggerate the problems. Further, they generate concepts for new designs and create positive attitudes for change. Attention from the media and discourses in science have strong impacts at this stage of the reform process. If responsible reformers exploit the opportunities provided by this development with bold initiatives, they can achieve significant formal changes. However, such decisions provoke reactions by those actors that oppose the change; and the more ambitious the agenda, the more intense is the response. This stage of the process is characterized by conflicts, bargaining, politicking, and increasing negative assessments of the consequences of a reform. As the media begins losing interest in the issue at stake, reformers revise their ambitions, reduce their engagement in reform policies, and shift their attention to other tasks. At the same time, the actors defending their interests or positions gain influence, obstructive behavior increases in organizations or policy areas, and the formal changes are adjusted to emergent rules and patterns of interactions. This reform cycle can end in the restoration of former structures and policies, but in most cases, it results in moderate changes.

In view of this up-and-down nature of reform processes, scholars have debated on appropriate strategies of reforms. According to one opinion, successful reforms require strong leadership, clear goals and designs, bold strikes shaking up existing structures of powers and routines, and fast action in favorable situations. Others argue that good preparation of reforms, a broad consensus, participation of the affected actors, initiatives from inside organizations, and perseverance in long-lasting processes are decisive factors. Presumably, the strategies of reforms have to be adjusted to institutional frameworks and situations. Moreover, comparative studies have yielded ample evidence for the assumption that majority democracies can achieve more change through policy reform while consensus democracies tend toward incremental adjustment. Whether this finding also holds for

institutional or constitutional reform is still an open question. There is also debate as to whether crisis situations favor or constrain reforms. In fact a severe crisis increases the need for change and even can turn into a “critical juncture” if existing institutions break down or existing policies no longer work. But it also reduces the leeway for reform policies due to the pressure for immediate action. Experiences and comparative studies in administrative reforms have revealed that fiscal crises limit the opportunities to reform organizations. On the other hand, an abundance of resources reduces the need for change and can lead to increasing conservatism. Competition between governments or private organizations may stimulate reform processes, in particular if policymakers enter into an exchange of best practices. Nevertheless, the transfer of reform blueprints or abstract concepts can have negative consequences on the reform process if the particular conditions or cultures of governments or organizations are ignored by promoters of change. Again, the administrative reforms of the past decades provide examples of such developments.

Regardless of these debates, in modern states and in complex organizations, reforms evidently arrive within limits. Hardly any reform follows its initial aims or ideas. However, in view of the interplay between change of formal rules and the dynamics of emergent interaction, what reformers intend cannot be taken as an adequate standard for evaluation; rather, it is the way they manage conflicts and turn initiatives into a process of collective learning among affected actors. In the end, reforms can be regarded as successful if they balance change and stability and if the cyclical development leads not to restoration of the *status quo ante* but to ongoing evolution. Every reform is embedded in the dynamics of institutions and policy making. It never determines change.

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See also Administration; Advocacy; Change, Institutional; Institutional Theory; Institutions and Institutionalism; Organization Theory; Path Dependence; Reorganization; Revolution; Veto Player

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REGIME (COMPARATIVE POLITICS)

Regimes are the various types of political systems found in the sovereign countries of the world. These can be defined as specific individual regime types or as contrasting types. In comparative politics, the concept of a political regime refers to the formal and informal structure and nature of political power in a country, including the method of determining office holders and the relations between the office holders and the society at large. These relations could or could not involve accountability of office holders to the *demos* and likewise could involve various freedoms granted to society or, conversely, none at all. The distinction as to whether a country is a democracy or not is thus a regime distinction—and indeed (as we shall see) the central regime distinction.

The first use of the concept in modern political science was by David Easton. Easton contrasted the regime with the ongoing political community (the country), emphasizing that there can be and have been fundamental changes to a political system (producing a different regime) even while the political community remains basically constant. This entry defines a regime; discusses the key distinction within a regime, that is, if it is a democracy or not (or how much democracy it has); and presents more generally the cases of ambiguity.

What Is a Regime?

Regime is a midrange concept, falling between the concept of specific governments (of individuals) and the concept of the state (the broader administrative-legal structure that has sovereign control over a country and the power to extract resources from it). That is, governments may vary (e.g., the shifts back and forth between Conservative and Labour governments in the United Kingdom), or presidential administrations may change (e.g., from George W. Bush to Barack Obama in the United States), but these are not changes of regime; the democratic regimes in each case remain. Thus, over time a given regime may involve many governments. Following from the above, for there to be a regime change, the political “rules of the game” must change in a systemic way, not merely the winner of the game. Thus, South Africa in 1994 underwent a regime change from a racial oligarchy to a liberal democracy; since then, there have been several presidents, starting with Nelson Mandela, but the regime has remained the same. Conversely, a change of regime may occur in a specific state, but the state itself normally remains the same (of course, states do get formed and dissolved, but the point here is that over the very long haul, a stable state is likely to experience multiple regime types). Key state institutions and actors (the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the military, etc.) thus tend to carry over from one regime to another, for example, from Imperial Germany to the Weimar Republic—in this example posing problems for the latter. Sometimes, though, a regime change will involve the creation of entirely new state structures, such as with the creation of the Soviet Union (the new communist bureaucracy, the Red Army instead of the Imperial Army, etc.). Finally, one must distinguish between public policies that speak to the nature of the regime (such as the extent of civil liberties) and more general socioeconomic policies, such as economic policy, health care, or same-sex marriage—the latter types of policies can change (and may well change with different governments) but do not involve regime change.

It should be noted that the word *regime* is sometimes used as the equivalent of “system,” for example, a parliamentary regime versus a presidential regime. However, this is too broad a use of the concept of regime. Thus, if a democracy changes from, say, a parliamentary system to a

presidential system, as Gambia did in 1970, it is *not* a regime change. A similar point can be made about unicameral versus bicameral systems or unitary versus federal systems.

The Key Regime Distinction: Democracy or Not (or How Much of It)?

There are many different specific political regimes in the world, but the initial assessment of a regime normally begins with whether or not it is democratic. In the contemporary world, a democratic regime has three basic aspects: competitive elections, more or less universal suffrage, and a responsible government—that is, those elected in competitive elections both are accountable to the people (the voters) and have the actual power to govern, as opposed to effective power being in the hands of a monarch, the military, or a clerical figure. (Implicit in this definition of democracy is some sort of functioning state.) The opposite reality here is that of an autocratic regime. That said, since there are key differences among autocratic regimes, these are normally identified more precisely, as specific regime types. The main types of autocratic regimes are totalitarian regimes (involving a ruling ideology, mass mobilization, and total state control), such as Nazi Germany; posttotalitarian regimes (involving less emphasis on ideology and somewhat greater freedoms), such as the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev; sultanistic regimes (involving the personal rule of an individual and his or her family), such as Iraq under Saddam Hussein; traditional authoritarian regimes (involving rule by a monarch), such as Imperial Russia; military authoritarian regimes, such as the one ruling Myanmar; theocratic authoritarian regimes, such as the one in Iran (at least through 2009); and electoral authoritarian regimes (more on this type below). There are some autocracies, however, that straddle these specific regime types; for example, Cuba and North Korea have elements of both totalitarianism and sultanism.

Viewed as a simple dichotomy between a democratic regime and an autocratic regime, a clear majority of the 194 or so countries in the world today have democratic regimes. However, a standard further distinction is made between electoral democratic regimes and liberal democratic regimes. Electoral democracies have the three basic features

given above. Liberal democracies have these as well (and thus all liberal democracies are also electoral democracies), but they additionally have the liberal features of broad civil liberties, a strong rule of law (e.g., an independent judiciary), horizontal accountability of elected officials to other state actors (e.g., ombudsmen and state auditors), and a well-functioning state with limited if not minimum corruption. There are, thus, many democratic regimes that are electoral but not liberal. This is especially true in Africa and Latin America. The fact that the liberal democratic regimes of the world are overwhelmingly found in Europe, European settler societies, and the former Anglo-American colonies has led to the criticism that this is a Western rather than a universal concept.

By placing liberal democracies ahead of electoral democracies (which in turn are ahead of autocracies), the dichotomy between regimes has been transformed into a continuum. Indeed, most scholarly and related analyses use some sort of continuum of regimes. In terms of global assessments, Freedom House (an international nongovernmental organization that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, human freedom, and human rights) distinguishes among free, partly free, and not free regimes, based ultimately on 7-point scales for each of political rights and civil liberties. (Freedom House also has a separate dichotomous list of electoral democracies.) The Bertelsmann Transformation Index uses a 10-point scale that ultimately produces a continuum of five categories: democracies, defective democracies, highly defective democracies, moderate autocracies, and autocracies. However, it classifies failed states separately (within the broader autocratic area).

Continua can also be used for the submeasures of democracy. There are various measures of the rule of law, including that of the World Bank. Transparency International, a nongovernmental organization, publishes a Corruptions Perception Index. Yet these measures do not claim to make a clear distinction among regimes, perhaps because they deal with aspects of liberalism rather than democracy. Regime distinctions can be made based on the extent of the right to vote; this would lead to pre-World War II Belgium and France, for example, being classified as male democracies due to the absence of female suffrage. Of course, in the

contemporary world, the vast majority of countries have more or less universal suffrage for both genders, so suffrage is now a limited measure for defining regimes. In terms of responsible government, scholars have produced measures of the extent of monarchical control, and especially of military control. There are potential gray areas here, especially with situations of monarchical or military tutelage; normally these are seen as being democratic regimes, but just so.

Without a doubt, however, the one submeasure of democracy where there are specific continua leading to regime classification is the extent of free and fair elections. By “free and fair elections,” one means many things: the ability of most, if not all, people and parties to run for election; access of candidates to voters; equal treatment of candidates and parties by state actors such as the police and courts; media pluralism so that opposition candidates have media access (as opposed to the media being controlled by government); secret ballot; no coercion of voters; neutral and transparent ballot counting with independent monitors allowed; no major or “mysterious” delays in reporting the full results; and impartial resolution of disputes. In a democratic regime, these factors exist sufficiently to allow a real opportunity for the government to be defeated; in contrast, in an autocratic regime, the government will tilt the playing field so that it has an insurmountable advantage and/or will simply fabricate the results (as presumably happened in Iran in 2009). Yet the dividing lines here are not always clear and decisive. Certainly if a government is defeated and hands over power, then one assumes that the elections were fair and the regime is democratic. However, if a government or president is reelected, does that reflect unfairness or simply the voters’ desire to reelect them? One point here is whether the opposition cries foul or accepts the results as legitimate. However, in some cases, the opposition may not bother to cry foul if it sees no point in protesting.

Even if the opposition is not allowed to win by the powers that be, they may still have some electoral success. At a minimum, they are allowed to exist. This gave rise to the concept of an electoral authoritarian regime, which conceptually is a relatively new regime type. In such a regime, multi-party/multicandidate elections are held but with no chance of the incumbents losing power due to

the lack of fairness and perhaps freedom as well. Yet it is the very reality of election “victory” that is used to give legitimacy to the regime, if not indeed to claim it as a democracy. Singapore is a classic case here. These electoral authoritarian regimes can be contrasted with fully closed regimes, where no opposition is allowed to exist (e.g., totalitarian and sultanistic regimes or certain traditional authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia). On the other hand, in some autocratic regimes elections are not just a rubber stamp, and election outcomes are of concern to the government. Opposition forces may win a significant minority of the seats or even some control of regional/local governments. Even if the playing field is not level enough, or fair enough, for the government to be defeated overall, it can still experience a worse or better result from election to election. Malaysia for decades (through the time of writing) fits this situation. Thus, scholars have developed the concept of a competitive authoritarian regime that, although clearly authoritarian as opposed to democratic, allows much more competition and pluralism (including media freedom) than (hegemonic) electoral authoritarian regimes, not to mention fully closed regimes. The concept of a competitive authoritarian regime thus overlaps with the Bertelsmann Transformation Index’s notion of a moderate autocracy. It is thus possible for such competitive authoritarian regimes to become competitive enough to produce a transition to democracy, as happened to Ukraine when the amount of vote rigging needed to produce victory for the regime’s presidential candidate in 2004 led to the Orange Revolution and the ushering in of a democratic regime.

These distinctions among democracies, competitive authoritarian regimes, hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes, and fully closed regimes essentially or ultimately reflect the electoral success of the opposition. To repeat, in democracies the opposition has a realistic chance of defeating the government (and if this does not happen in an individual election, it is the result of voter preferences and/or poor opposition strategies rather than an unfair playing field), in competitive authoritarian regimes the opposition is able to win a reasonably large number of seats (and thus also hold the government to some account in the legislature), and in hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes

the opposition wins only a tiny and largely irrelevant number of seats (but it still exists, unlike in fully closed regimes). These differing regime classifications thus draw heavily on election outcomes, but the general level of freedom in a country (such as its Freedom House score) usually is related reasonably well to this specific indicator of election outcomes. There are also liberal autocratic regimes where the civil rights are much greater than the effective political freedoms, such as Monaco and Tonga; that said, in these countries the autocracy stems from a lack of responsible government (and thus “relevant” elections) rather than unfair elections *per se*.

All of this also raises the question of whether empirically there is a maximum level of support for a government/incumbent beyond which the result is not credible and the regime cannot be considered a democracy. Usually, something like 70% of the vote is suggested here. Yet in countries broadly considered to be democratic, such as Botswana and Namibia, incumbent parties have won over 70% of the vote in elections (however, in South Africa the African National Congress has never reached this level of support, its best result being 69.7% in 2004). In part, this may reflect the exceptional support given to parties that led the nation’s struggle for independence. Certainly in Western democracies, parties (or presidential candidates) competing in national elections never get much more than 60% of the vote, even in the most successful cases. Indeed, presidential elections in the United States are interesting in this regard, since there does appear to be an effective “ceiling” just above 60% of the vote. In descending order, the largest vote shares in such elections have been 61.1% (Lyndon Johnson in 1964), 60.8% (Franklin Roosevelt in 1936), 60.7% (Richard Nixon in 1972), and 60.3% (Warren Harding in 1920)—all very close values. Outside the United States, one can note the vote share of 64.7% that José Figueres got in Costa Rica in 1953—an undisputed outcome in a democratic regime. Consequently, it seems clear that a result of 90% or 80% cannot be consistent with democracy. That said, many dubious/nondemocratic outcomes are based on much less lopsided “official” results, such as 63% for President Ahmadinejad in Iran in 2009, 51% for President Salinas in Mexico in 1988, and 47% for President Kibaki in Kenya in 2007—all of

which were nevertheless (at best) competitive authoritarian regimes.

Ambiguous and Hybrid Regimes

Regardless of how many categories there are in a continuum of regime types, one needs to ask whether this continuum could be collapsed into two categories—democracies and autocracies. In other words, is every country ultimately considered to be a democracy or an autocracy, or is there some unclear middle ground? Scholarly and related research differs as to whether or not there is ever any such unclear middle ground. There are two rather different problems here. First of all, a country could have a fluid or unstable political system, making it hard to pin it down. In this case, one option is the concept of a transitional regime. Conversely, the previous regime could be deemed to remain in place (and the country be classified as such) until there is a clear shift to a new regime. Second, there could be genuine scholarly disagreement about the political reality in a country, with independent analysts having differing opinions as to, say, the level of competitiveness. This divergence is most common where the government/incumbent is reelected, and seems to be genuinely popular, but where there are (serious) procedural issues—for example, Russia under Vladimir Putin or Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. Such polities could be considered ambiguous regimes, at least until there is a reasonable consensus on their regime classification (which incidentally tends to be that they are authoritarian, leading to a related debate as to the point at which democracy broke down). A variant of this dilemma is where a country just places into a category. For example, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index refers to highly defective democracies as barely meeting its minimum criteria for democracy. It also acknowledges a gray area between democracy and autocracy.

These situations all involve ambiguity in classification. The resulting notions of ambiguous regimes or transitional regimes are meant not to be precise categories but rather to reflect the inability to be precise. Conversely, the notion of a hybrid regime involves combined aspects of democracy and autocracy in a fairly stable, ongoing way. This concept is more likely to be used if more aspects are included

in the assessment. Narrow(er) assessments that focus on just competition and responsible government are likely to place every country on one side or the other of the divide—that is, as either a democratic or an autocratic regime. However, if there are multiple criteria—and if these are weighted equally—then the reality arises of countries that are democratic in some aspects and autocratic in others or that average out as being in the middle. This is the reality of, for example, the Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy, which has five aspects including political participation and political culture—indeed, what this really seeks to measure is consolidated democracy. Consequently, a substantial number of countries fall into its hybrid regime category, defined as having a score from 4.0 to 5.9 out of 10. Decomposing their components would categorize the vast majority of these countries as either (unconsolidated) electoral democracies or competitive authoritarian regimes, with a few countries scoring as they do because of a lack of sufficient stateness.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Democracy, Types of; Hybrid Regimes; Parliamentary Systems; Totalitarian Regimes

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REGIMES

See International Regimes

REGIONAL INTEGRATION (SUPRANATIONAL)

When examining the macrostructure of the global system, three observations appear highly salient. Politically, the world is organized into 200 or so sovereign nation-states, each an aspiring zone of exclusive authority. Economically, there is a single though differentiated world economy, especially since the decline of the global socialist bloc. What lies in between these states and the world economy are numerous international institutions, many of them organized on a regional basis. *Regional integration* refers to the process of increasing political and economic cooperation among states in close geographic proximity to each other. The growth in the number of regional organizations is dramatic. While numerous regional organizations were reported to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the 4½ decades after World War II, an even more dramatic growth spurt has taken place starting in 1992. While the number of new regional organizations leveled off, that level remained very high in comparison with all years prior to 1992.

This worldwide trend toward regional integration presents two important puzzles. First, scholars debate the reasons for this tendency toward regionalism in an era of globalization. Economic theory pushes in the direction of larger units, while the

demand for sovereignty and identity suggest smaller units. Second, why does one experiment in regional integration, the European Union (EU), stand out, distinguished not so much by the level of economic integration as by the breadth and depth of its political institutions? The distancing of Europe from other regional organizations has had the unfortunate consequence of compartmentalizing scholarship. Today, comparative studies of regional integration with the EU as one case are rare.

The New Regionalism in a Comparative Perspective

The New Regionalism

Regional organizations and agreements are proliferating all over the world, and more than 50% of international trade is now conducted within preferential trading agreements organized at the regional level. Regional integration has proceeded in waves, the most recent of which began in the wake of the Cold War in the early 1990s. The EU's single market was completed in 1992, and the treaty at Maastricht that year set the timetable for achieving economic and monetary union by 1999. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed by Canada, Mexico, and the United States in 1992. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established in 1989 with the goal of becoming a free trade area (a goal not yet realized), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), though established in 1967, created a free trade area in 1992. It expanded its membership and its integration activities in the 1990s, and since the East Asian financial crisis of 1997. The three regional powers—China, Japan, and South Korea—have been included in regular ASEAN summit meetings.

These three sites of economic regionalism—Europe, North America, and East Asia—are home to the majority of the world's intraregional trade and the most robust regional institutions, but steps toward regionalization have been taken elsewhere as well. There are regional organizations among states in the Middle East (Gulf Cooperation Council), Africa (South African Customs Union, West African Economic and Monetary Union), and South America (Southern Common Market [Mercado Común del Sur, MERCOSUR], Andean Community), and there are free trade agreements in

regions all over the world. As of July 2010, more than 474 regional trading agreements had been reported to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Of the agreements already in force, over 90% are free trade agreements. Almost every WTO member is party to at least one regional trade agreement, and these agreements often intersect in complex ways. At the same time, the depth and scope of regional integration are highly diverse, with the EU representing a level of both economic and political integration not seen elsewhere on the globe, while many regional agreements are little more than symbolic acts that have not generated any meaningful regional economic or political cooperation.

Given the institutions already in place at the global level to facilitate multilateral trade, and the widespread membership of states in these institutions, the “new regionalism” of the early 1990s is an interesting puzzle, for which scholars have provided several explanations. At the international level, some scholars point to the end of the Cold War as a catalyst for the sudden rise in the number of regional agreements signed by states in the early 1990s. According to these arguments, the move from a bipolar world characterized by stark political divisions to a multipolar world characterized by increasing global economic competition removed many of the constraints that had once operated on states’ foreign policies, both politically and economically. The end of the bipolar division restored regional sovereignty and allowed regional powers to develop. Asia, for example, had been geographically split along ideological lines, and with the end of the Cold War, countries such as China and Vietnam have been gradually integrated into regional institutions. The prospect of a more multipolar world and fears of “Fortress Europe” encouraged states to organize regionally to counter the growing economic weight of the EU and NAFTA.

Another line of argument focuses on the role of hegemony. Some theorize that the primary role of a global hegemon is to provide public goods; in the post-hegemonic international system, states began turning to regional organizations to overcome collective-action problems. As a hegemon, the United States influenced economic relations all over the globe, and it traditionally encouraged bilateral trade relationships in Asia, whereas in Europe, it supported multilateral integration efforts. The relative decline of U.S. hegemony in

certain regions since World War II has afforded these regions more freedom to pursue their own integration projects. For example, in the early 1990s Japan overtook the United States as the leading provider of foreign aid in Asia, and it began to challenge U.S. dominance in trade and foreign direct investment within the region. With the strong economic linkages formed during this time between Japan and the newly industrializing economies in Asia, the door was opened for the development of stronger regional cooperation.

The third reason why states may have been motivated to pursue regionalism was difficulties reaching agreement in multilateral trade negotiations in the early 1990s. The GATT Uruguay Round is the most comprehensive trade agreement negotiated to date, and it was extremely frustrating for the participants, taking 8 years to complete and leaving many developing states unsatisfied. During this same time period (1986–1994), NAFTA, MERCOSUR, APEC, and the EU’s single market were initiated and completed in less time than it took to complete the Uruguay Round. These agreements were not only achieved more quickly, but also they provided solutions to issues that had come to a standstill in the GATT negotiations.

Comparative Regional Groupings

While regionalization is a process taking place all over the globe, there is considerable variation in the institutional design of regional agreements, in the depth of integration they achieve, and in the success with which they meet their stated objectives. The EU is exceptional for its high level of both economic and political institutionalization. In North America, the three parties to NAFTA succeeded in creating a free trade area that is wide-ranging in its trade liberalization agenda; deep in its level of institutionalization, especially with regard to dispute resolution mechanisms; and prominent as a focal point for other subregional agreements that have sprung up among Latin American countries. MERCOSUR is the largest South American trading bloc, but it remains largely intergovernmental in nature, with weak implementation of basic integration measures and a continued preference for bilateralism among some of its members. There are many subregional trading agreements in place among African states, although the low level of

economic development and the absence of large cost differences in tradable goods across much of the continent make successful regional economic cooperation exceedingly difficult.

East Asian Regionalism

One of the world's most important economic regions, East Asia, has been a relative newcomer to the process of regionalization. Until very recently, scholars commonly described this region as "under-institutionalized" when compared with the other two regional economic heavyweights, North America and Europe. While the EU is known for its robust multilateral and supranational institutions, in East Asia cooperation has taken a more bilateral and intergovernmental form in both economic and security areas. ASEAN has played an important role in relations among Southeast Asian countries since its founding in 1967, but it wasn't until the late 1990s that ASEAN expanded to meet regularly with China, Japan, and South Korea, the three regional powers. The other prominent regional organization in Asia, APEC, has 21 member states from both sides of the Pacific Ocean, but its efforts at trade liberalization have stalled in recent years and left it largely on the sidelines. In addition, Asian countries have been notably reluctant to create supranational political institutions at the regional level. Instead, cooperation is largely limited to the economic realm, and it is informal, often led by transnational business networks. This informal, business-led form of economic cooperation in Asia has come to be known as the "ASEAN Way."

Some argue that the diversity among East Asian states in their levels of economic development and government capacity to implement integration measures have hindered meaningful cooperation efforts at the regional level. Still others contend that the delayed regionalization in East Asia reflects the traditional U.S. preference for bilateral cooperation in this region. While the United States supported multilateral integration in Europe in the postwar period, it pushed the development of bilateralism in Asia, partially as a way to maintain its hegemony in the region. In the post-Cold War period, the continued political heterogeneity across East Asia has made integration difficult. In addition, Japan, a potential regional leader in the early 1990s, prioritized its relationship with the United

States over the pursuit of a multilateral integration agenda with its neighbors. Bowing to U.S. pressure, Japan neither led integration efforts nor lent its full support to proposals by other Asian states for greater integration in East Asia.

The situation in East Asia dramatically changed after the crippling economic crisis in 1997. The crisis made it clear to Asian political leaders just how vulnerable their economies were to the flight of global capital. Further, there was deep disappointment with the response of the United States and U.S.-led international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund. The United States continued to promote neoliberal reforms in the wake of the crisis, despite the long-standing resistance to these reforms from East Asian governments, many of whom believed that such reforms had been a cause of the crisis. Japan's proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund that would help maintain regional stability in the future was opposed by the United States, a move widely viewed in East Asia as a U.S. attempt to maintain its influence in the region, despite the cost to stability. Since 1997, the focus has shifted away from integration at the Southeast Asian or Pacific-wide level to wider integration across East Asia.

Process of Regional Integration in Europe

Limitations of space preclude a comprehensive review of regional integration theories, let alone of the wealth of regional experiences around the world. This section reviews functionalism and neo-functionalism (collapsing most distinctions) and liberal intergovernmentalism as the two dominant approaches. The section concludes with some comments on new departures in regional integration theory concerning the EU, departures that signal a break with the questions posed by existing theoretical frameworks.

Functionalism

The causal factors emphasized by functionalism fit into three categories: (1) the fertile postwar environment, (2) the initial integrative successes, and (3) the interconnected nature of modern capitalist societies, which in turn leads to the expansion of these initial successes. The fertile postwar environment was characterized by late capitalism

(industrial and postindustrial), specialized and partly autonomous interest groups, and democratic forms of governance. In telling the story of European integration, it is easy to downplay Europe's early postwar history, when major political problems (how to incorporate Germany, how to provide for European security) were addressed and resolved, and focus only on the economic side of the picture. The economic recovery of Germany, aided by a multilateral structure set up by the Marshall Plan, and the subsequent integration of Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955 provided the necessary preconditions for further integration. Analysts attempting to compare Europe with other areas of the world should keep these salient facts in mind.

The second explanatory factor offered by functionalism has to do with the hoped-for initial successes of the integration project. One could argue that the initial successes were contingent rather than a predicted outcome of functionalist theory. However, the success of the initial attempts to integrate was endogenous in the sense that the practitioners and analysts believed that by focusing on the less controversial sectors, they would stand a better chance of succeeding. In good measure, they were right about this prediction. The free trade area, the customs union, and much of the common agricultural policy were in place by 1968. There is little doubt that these successes paved the way for further integration, even though there was little movement on the policy front between 1968 and 1985.

Third, functionalists argue that the modern capitalist society is interconnected and these interconnections all but ensured that the initial success implied further integration. Several kinds of linkages are theorized. There are linkages among sectors (e.g., trade and monetary), linkages from the economic to political spheres (e.g., market participation generates citizenship rights), and purely tactical linkages. This last category offers negotiators the possibility of linking sectors that are not inherently connected; for example, market expansion may be linked to regional aid for the purpose of making the former more attractive to suspicious participants. These linkages are mechanisms that perhaps will lead to further integration, once the initial foundations are in place. In functionalism jargon, the secondary integrative processes set in motion by these mechanisms are spillover processes.

The preceding discussion can be thought of as dealing with the demand side of integration. But the demand for integration does not automatically lead to integration. Political market failures may occur. Inadequate institutional structures or weak leadership may thwart the process. For integration to occur, even when key social actors want it to occur, collective-action problems have to be overcome. For this reason, functionalists assigned a central role to supranational institutions, from the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to the Commission and European Court of Justice of the EU.

In the able hands of first-generation scholars such as Ernst Haas, Philippe Schmitter, and Leon Lindberg, the basic analytics of regional integration theory were put into place. A second generation of neo-functionalist scholars (e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz, Paul Pierson) extended the basic research program to account for deeper processes of integration, including the completion of the single market, economic and monetary union, and subsequent treaty revisions (Amsterdam, Nice, Lisbon). In a 1998 work, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz increased our institutional understanding of the EU. Their work on the European Court of Justice takes pains to link active interest groups with the structure of litigation and legislation. The Commission, Council of Ministers, and European Parliament are all integrated into one comprehensive picture of triadic dispute resolution.

At the same time that Stone Sweet was building his model of triadic dispute resolution, Sandholtz was questioning the assumption of exogenous preferences. Sandholtz argued that preference formation was partly endogenous to membership within the EU itself. In his 1996 work "Membership Matters," Sandholtz reasoned that attitudes were not formed in an insulated domestic context and then transported to Brussels, where officials acted on them. Instead, the experience of member states working together in the EU, solving problems collectively through EU institutions, was expected to contribute to the formation of preferences, along with the forces emanating from the domestic and international political economy. Sandholtz's contributions should be seen as part of a longer line of research on socialization and the formation of preferences.

Finally, with regard to the extension of neo-functionalism, the theory gets a more rigorous dynamic dimension by reframing some old questions within a principal-agent framework. Of what importance are unintended consequences? Under what conditions do they occur? What accounts for the discrepancies between the incentives and information available to principals (national executives) and agents (their appointees in Brussels)? Pierson was able to provide a sounder theoretical foundation to neo-functionalism, giving some previously theoretically unanchored propositions a home.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism

The major rival of neo-functionalism is liberal intergovernmentalism (LIG). With a series of articles published during the early 1990s, culminating in his 1998 book *The Choice for Europe*, Andrew Moravcsik set out the foundations of a state-centric theory of the integration process, one that relies on the preferences of the member states, formed by processes external to member (socialization) pressures. Moravcsik theorizes that the formation of preferences of state actors is due mostly to the pressures emanating from the domestic and global political economy.

In Moravcsik's "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental Approach" (1993), he identifies a two-stage theory of integration in which the first stage is preference formation by state leaders and the second stage is intergovernmental bargaining. A third stage is added in *The Choice for Europe* (1998), in which bargained outcomes are institutionalized in an attempt to prevent them from being overturned. At the core of the model lie the social and economic interests of key producer and commercial groups.

After the preferences of state actors are formed, governments engage in international bargaining. Here, state power (oddly absent from much integration theory) plays a role. The relative costs of non-agreement, in particular the ability to revert easily to the status quo, are the main source of power. Countries that can do without an agreement, for example, Germany in the case of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), can hold out for favorable bargaining outcomes.

LIG has come in for its share of criticism. It limits itself to grand bargains, those momentous occasions when states confront each other over high-stakes outcomes. This focus misses the way in which small things may accumulate and create pressure leading to an important international negotiation. Indeed, this is a central functionalist point, namely, that relatively mundane and nonsalient events can become transforming if viewed in the long run. LIG and functionalism are seen as two separate theories, but they may actually be linked through a tissue of events tying together grand bargains.

A second criticism is that pressure for renewed change need not come from exogenous or endogenous change in the domestic or global economy. It may come from a disequilibrium present from the moment a grand bargain is struck. If state actors can bring about a bargain, and if they vote by consensus (which they do), then by definition they are satisfied with the bargain. But this may not be the case for institutional actors, for example, the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Court of Justice, or the European Parliament. Each has its own institutional interests, which are different from the interests of national executives. These actors may agitate for change the moment the grand bargain is struck.

New Departures, Europeanization, and Approaches Based on the Social Purpose of Integration

While functionalism and LIG occupy most of the debate regarding regional integration theory, some new approaches have appeared that ask different questions and introduce novel directions in our research. Significant new directions are provided by the Europeanization and Gramscian approaches. Space constraints allow only a brief word about each.

The Europeanization approach already claims a substantial following. In some sense, the Europeanization framework was a logical outgrowth of the success of European integration itself. When regional institutions were weak and policy was decided at the national level (in the early stage), the natural question was "How do we account for delegation of authority to the regional level?" When regional institutions became much

more developed, the problematic shifted to how these institutions functioned to make policies (hence “Europe as a polity”). And when Europe was sufficiently established as a polity, it became natural to ask, “How do its institutions and policies feed back onto the very political systems that compose it?” In a sense, the Europeanization approach closes the conceptual circle.

A final approach—labeled Gramscian—is singled out because of the novelty of the questions asked. The main departure from the other approaches is that it asks a question that is astonishingly absent from the functionalism/LIG debate. This debate centers mostly on the questions of how much authority is delegated to the supranational level (and under what conditions) and which actors are influential in the process. The Gramscian approach asks about the social and political content of integration. What goals are served, and what groups or class fractions are dominant? These questions are approached not as a pluralist battle among all organized interest groups but as a rivalry among the various “fractions” of productive and financial capital. A key advocate of this line of analysis is Bastian van Apeldoorn (2002), whose work on the role of classes and business groups charts out new directions in integration theory. Others, such as Fritz Scharpf (1999) and James Caporaso and Sidney Tarrow (2009), adopt a slightly broader emphasis. All of these researchers ask about the content of the integration project rather than the level, scope, or depth of regional integration.

The future of regional integration is likely to be increasingly involved with attempts at liberalization of international trade, especially in non-European settings. Efforts to find the “right” membership to pursue regional goals will be salient, especially in the Asian setting, where ASEAN, APEC, and ASEAN + 3 all compete for regional leadership. In Europe, the functionalist/intergovernmental debate will continue, though in muted form, but it will share the stage with newer theories based on Europe as a polity, Europeanization theories, and theories emphasizing the social purpose of European regional integration, including the relationship among integration, the welfare state, and democracy.

As shown, regional integration processes are vibrant across the globe. It is hoped that the gap between academic theories of integration in Europe

and in other parts of the world will be bridged by the continuing research on comparative regional integration.

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See also Globalization; Institutionalization; International Political Economy; International Trade; Multilateralism; Political Integration; Regionalism; Regionalization; Trade Liberalization

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REGIONALISM

Regionalism refers to the political and cognitive idea of forming regions. It is usually associated

with a formal program, and since the mid-1980s, there has been an explosion of such regional programs on a global scale. The broadening and deepening of the European Union (EU) is perhaps the most obvious example, but regionalism is also evident in the revitalization or expansion of many other regional projects around the world, such as the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Southern Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur, MERCOSUR), and, more recently, the Union of South American Nations (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, UNASUR).

Today's regionalism is closely linked with the shifting nature of global politics and the intensification of globalization. Regionalism is characterized by the involvement of almost all governments in the world, but it also involves a wide variety of nonstate actors. This results in a multitude of formal and informal regional types of governance and regional networks in most fields of politics. This pluralism and multidimensionality of contemporary regionalism gives rise to a number of new puzzles and challenges in today's politics.

This entry first defines the terms *region*, *regionalism*, and *regionalization*. Second, it provides an overview of the continuities and discontinuities between the early and the more recent debates on regionalism. Finally, it presents a brief discussion of regionalism and world order.

Regions, Regionalism, and Regionalization

The concept of a region evolved historically to mean the space between the national and the local within a particular state. This meaning may be captured by the term *microregion*, or subnational region. The concept may also be used to refer to *macroregions* (the so-called world or international regions), which are larger territorial units, as opposed to nonterritorial units or subsystems. They exist between the state level and the global system level. The macroregion has been the most common object of analysis in international relations, while microregions have more commonly been considered in the study of domestic politics.

A conventional definition of a macroregion, originally suggested by Joseph Nye, is a limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence. Historically, a plethora of opinions have been advanced regarding which mutual interdependencies matter the most: economic, political, and social interrelationships or historical, cultural, and ethnic bonds. It has been argued that the definitions of what constitutes a region may vary according to the particular issue under investigation. This may lead to the identification of overlapping types of regions, such as economic regions, security regions, environmental regions, and cultural regions.

The overwhelming majority of studies in the field of political science and international relations have focused on predefined regions in the form of state-led and interstate regional organizations and frameworks. The AU, ASEAN, EU, SADC, and ECOWAS are examples. The argument that the composition of regions should not be limited to regional intergovernmental organizations has been stressed in recent constructivist and poststructuralist scholarship. From this perspective, all regions are deemed to be socially constructed and hence politically contested. Emphasis is placed on how political actors perceive and interpret the idea of a region and notions of "regionness." According to this school of thought, there are no "natural" regions; all regions are (at least potentially) heterogeneous, with unclear territorial margins. The focus is often on the processes of region building and regionalization, which implies that the distinction between regionalism and regionalization is emphasized.

Regionalism means the body of ideas, values, and objectives that contribute to the creation, maintenance, or modification of a particular region or type of world order. It is usually associated with a formal policy and project and often leads to institution building. Further, regionalism ties agents to a specific project that is limited spatially or socially but not in time.

Regionalization refers to the process of region formation. It implies a focus on the process by which regions come into existence and are consolidated, their "becoming" so to speak. In its most basic sense, the term may imply no more than the concentration of goods, services, investment, peoples, and

ideas at the regional level. This interaction may lead to the emergence of regional actors, networks, and organizations. When they are active at the regional level, regional actors bring about regionalization, so-called region building. Regionalization may be caused by regionalism, but it may also emerge in the absence of a regionalist project and ideology. Hence, regionalism may not always have much practical significance for the reality of regionalization.

Early and Recent Debates on Regionalism

Experts on the subject often distinguish between the “old” and the “new” regionalism, or what is more appropriately labeled the early and the more recent debate on regionalism. The early debate covers research undertaken between the 1950s and the 1970s, and the key term was *regional integration*. These studies generally viewed regional integration as an endogenous process, that is, a development that arose from conditions internal to and specific to each region in question. With some exceptions, particularly studies conducted in Latin America and Africa, most early research dealt with European integration, as there were few other regional experiments to theorize about at that time. The dominant approach was neo-functionalism, which mainly considered the “spillover” from the economic integration of Western Europe to its political unification. Among the leading authors who wrote on such early regionalism were Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch.

The 1970s was a period of “Eurosclerosis” within the European Community, but the 1985 white paper on the internal market and the Single European Act resulted in a new, dynamic process of European integration. This was also the start of what has often been referred to as the “new regionalism” on a global scale. To some observers, regionalism was “new” mainly in the sense that it represented a revival of protectionism or neo-mercantilism. However, most observers highlighted the fact that the closure of regions was not on the agenda. Indeed, one of the characteristic features of the more recent debate on regionalism, especially within the field of international relations, is its focus on the conditions related to globalization. The recent debate is to a large extent generated by the transformation of the Westphalian nation-state,

the erosion of national borders, and the urgent question of how to find an alternative post-Westphalian order in the context of globalization. Perhaps the richest literature in this regard is on the role of regionalism in the context of multilateral trade and security.

One prominent scholar of the recent debate, Björn Hettne, stresses that regionalism needs to be understood from both an exogenous perspective (outside in) and an endogenous perspective (inside out). The former perspective refers to the fact that regionalization and globalization are intertwined articulations of global transformation, whereas the latter implies that regionalization is shaped from within a region by a large number of different actors. The exogenous perspective has developed primarily in the course of the recent debate, whereas the endogenous perspective finds continuity with functionalist and neo-functionalist theorizing about integration (of Europe), the role of agency, and the long-term transformation of territorial identities. In contrast to Haas, Deutsch, and the early regional integration scholars, today’s scholars identify many regionalisms, which provides a very different base for comparative studies of regionalism. It is apparent that neither the object of study (ontology) nor the way of studying it (epistemology) has remained static. One indication of this is the emergence of a variety of theoretical frameworks for the study of regionalism, such as constructivism, liberal institutionalism, regional security complex theory, governance approaches, the new regionalism approach (NRA), and the region-building and regional network approaches. Indeed, current regionalization may be seen as a new political landscape in the making, characterized by an expanding cast of actors (state and non-state) operating in the regional arena and across several interrelated dimensions: security, development, trade, environment, identity, and so on.

Historically, the study of regionalism and regional integration has emphasized states as actors and focused on sovereignty transfer or political unification within interstate regional organizations. Since the late 1990s, research has placed greater emphasis on “soft,” *de facto* or informal regionalization, acknowledging the fact that a range of nonstate actors has begun to operate at the regional level, within as well as beyond state-led institutional frameworks. For instance,

not only are business interests and multinationals operative in the global sphere, but they also tend to create regionalized patterns of economic activity. Oft-cited examples include the regional production systems in East and Southeast Asia and South African business expansion in Southern Africa. Similarly, the role of civil society is often neglected in the study of regionalism, despite the fact that its impact is increasing, as is evident in the transnational activist networks and processes of civil society interaction emerging at the regional level around the world.

The causal relationship between regionalism and regionalization (or formal and informal regionalism as it is sometimes called) has attracted considerable attention in the recent debate. Key issues are whether or not formal regionalism precedes informal regionalization and the ways in which state, market, and civil society actors relate and come together in different formal and informal coalitions, networks and modes of regional and global governance. Consequently, the study of regionalism is inseparable from the study of globalization and world order.

Regionalism and the World Order

Many regionalists contend that regions have become critical to contemporary world politics. As Peter Katzenstein (2005) points out, "This view is in stark contrast to those who focus on the purportedly stubborn persistence of the nation-state or the inevitable march of globalization" (p. 306). It is generally agreed that globalization challenges the Westphalian nation-state. However, political intervention, or at least some form of governance, is still needed. One way in which "the political" may return is as a reformed neo-Westphalian order (i.e., building on the nation-state system), governed either by a reconstituted state-driven multilateral system or by a more loosely organized global "concert" of the regional hegemons of the world, such as Germany, Japan, Brazil, and South Africa.

Regionalism may also be part of a post-Westphalian governance model (i.e., transcending the nation-state system) of coexisting regional communities. By comparison with economic and market-led globalization, regionalism is more anchored to territorial domains. By comparison with multilateralism, it is

a more exclusive relationship based on conscious political strategies, potentially guided by world order values such as multiculturalism and interregional dialogue and cooperation.

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See also European Integration; International Organizations; Regional Integration (Supranational); Regionalization

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REGIONALIZATION

Regionalization is the program or process of forming regions. This implies the reorganization of a territory according to various criteria or dimensions and with different aims. Considering a state or any political entity with a unitary essence, regionalization can be viewed as the process of rearranging or subdividing its territory into smaller administrative and/or political units. These would acquire powers and competences previously held by the superior unit. Hence, regionalization is a decentralized reorganization of territorial interests and political positions. Normally, both subnational entities (in the case of unitary states) and substate entities (in the case of federal states) are called regions; however, the same reasoning could

be applied at lower levels of decentralization, although in this case the term used to refer to these entities might be a different one. Nonetheless, under this common thread and with a wide range of terminology, many different realities, dynamics, and political or cultural traditions can be found: France's *Départements*, Spain's *Comunidades Autónomas*, Italy's *Regioni*, and many other denominations that are rooted in the local traditions. This entry points out the key dimensions of the phenomenon, the various approaches to territorial politics, and the varieties of regionalization. The last section clarifies the ways in which different state policies unfold into different types of regionalization processes.

Dimensions of the Regional Phenomenon

The regional phenomenon took a leading role in politics, economy, and spatial planning—especially in the case of the more developed unitarian states—during the second half of the 20th century. Many states, mainly in Europe, underwent regional and decentralizing reforms, which are among the most important political and institutional innovations of the past decades. In these regional facts, at least three meaningful dimensions can be identified: First, there is the sociopolitical and/or economic dynamics underlying these regionalizing reforms, which change even the structure of the relationship between the state and the local entities. Second is the impact that globalization and other dynamics that promote suprastate integration—especially the European one—can have on this regionalization progress. Finally, there are cultural aspects that surround or impel regionalization, either rediscovering or reasserting territorial or regional identities, mainly in those arenas where regionalist and/or nationalist forces play an important role.

From another point of view, there are three other elements not to be ignored. First, the political and administrative decentralization created by regionalization affects the institutions and their relationships at the territorial level. Next, there is the socioeconomic ingredient of spatial planning, with an impact on uneven development and on interterritorial balance and cohesion. Last, there is a cultural or identifying element, which can be more or less challenging and self-assertive and

which may in varying degrees constitute a mobilization in defense of territorial claims.

Approaches to Territorial Politics

All things considered, if territory is seen as an essential part of the state and the authority or political sovereignty the latter has over it, the way such territorial authority is managed and organized becomes territorial politics, and regionalization develops within this frame. Regionalization as territory management is, above all, a way to retain and renovate the state's sovereignty, mainly in those contexts where there are identity conflicts or peripheral nationalistic demands. In these cases, regionalization can even go as far as secession, with a territory demanding a redrawing of territorial boundaries and instituting a different form of territorial authority.

The issue has been approached from different perspectives within political science, which reflect various theories about the formation and consolidation of states. Salient among these is the *diffusionist* approach, which dominated the paradigm for decades with its “center-periphery” model. (Modernization and integration theories consider the irreversibility of the homogenization process more plausible.) The key concept of this paradigm is the formation of societies and states around a dominant center that radiates its hegemony to the periphery, absorbing it and thus forming a common social, economic, and political system—we are referring here to *state-building* and *nation-building* paradigms. This hegemony builds on the values of the elites within the different public spheres, hence legitimizing the distribution of power in all domains—political, economic, social, cultural, educative, and so on. Obviously, this approach is not limited to a narrow geographic conception of the core-periphery relationship but is linked with an enlightened vision of economic and social development as well as social modernization. A strong socioeconomic determinism underlies many of the different versions of this diffusionist approach. This determinism maintains that the politics of the state are shaped by economic and social forces. The orthodox Marxist version of this conception does not question this core idea but instead corrects it from the point of view of historical materialism, in which the class

struggle is the power behind social and political transformation. Therefore, its state-centrism point of view dominates to the detriment of any territorial differences or identities, which are relegated to a second-tier status. Nonetheless, the center-periphery model has been revised mainly in its deterministic component. The processes that states undergo during territorial unification can be very different, and the same applies to the modernization of societies. As a consequence, we find asymmetric territorial development, territorial conflicts, and, in all, territorial differentiation, which can be more or less chronic or more or less acute within national states. Therefore, the territorial politics or matrix leading to regionalization is the result of the combination of the different factors that participate in the process of state unification.

However, some authors question the center-periphery paradigm due to its state centrism: There are states with more than one center, such as the United States and Canada; others may not have any clear center or periphery, such as the Federal Republic of Germany and the Swiss Republic; further, there are states where the peripheries relate to more than one center, such as Northern Ireland and its relation with London and Dublin, or the Basque Country, with Madrid and Paris. From this new point of view, and considering the existence of strong territorial identities that have been politicized and activated by nationalist and/or regionalist movements, a new paradigm can be found based on societal fragmentation, territorial asymmetry, and centrifugal politics.

Varieties of Regionalization in Territorial Politics

Regionalization processes vary depending on the characteristics of territorial matrixes and the integration processes of national states, as well as whether there are nationalist or regionalist peripheral demands, which can be more or less powerful. States undergoing regionalization take account territorial differences, even if these are, on the one hand, objective or material ones or, on the other hand, subjective or sociocultural ones.

The former, socioeconomic dissimilarities, are the result of uneven development and the dependence dynamics stemming from the processes of modernization and industrialization of societies.

They can generate interregional geopolitical discordances, as well as other disparities among the central and peripheral elites—political, economic, social, and cultural.

The latter, subjective or sociocultural dissimilarities, are normally due to the contradictory perceptions that national and territorial elites have of the process of integration and homogenization at the nation-state level. These differences can generate tensions and conflicts of identity, especially when there are regionalist or nationalist movements in the periphery that claim their own signs of identity—their own history, ethnic or religious differences, linguistic struggles, and so on—and are responding to the centralization and homogenization process at the nation-state level. Therefore, the regional differentiation underlying the regionalization process can be due to political, economic, or sociocultural reasons, or even a combination of all these, and always seek to better the governance of the nation-state territory.

On the basis of this varied matrix, the different forms and strategies of the regionalizing politics that state-nations (territories that have undergone regionalization at the state level) apply under this new governance are the result of the characteristics that define and homogenize their regions, whether real or potential. These policies always aim at developing and improving the process of national integration and cohesion. They also seek to ensure the maintenance of territorial sovereignty of the state, which is endangered either by an excess of centralized homogenization or by the inefficiencies and limitations distinctive of economic and societal modernization processes. Hence, depending on those state policies, different types of regionalization processes can be found.

First, there is the sheer arrangement or management of the territory—applying economic and administrative criteria—by means of the creation of homogeneous regions. These regions assume the decentralized administrative management of the state's responsibilities, in the interest of a better interterritorial balance. The unitary character of the state is not questioned at any point, nor is the symmetry of the new regional division, which is limited to the amount of state decentralization achieved.

The second type of process goes a step further in decentralizing institutions of a national character

within the region, as well as government functions that are recognized as properly subject to local sovereignty. This type answers the political claims of regional elites and politicians, following a type of federalizing dynamic—either symmetrical or not—that does not question the unitary nature of the state. The British and Spanish examples are a good illustration of this second type of regionalization.

Finally, we find federal or confederal structures, either symmetrical or not, with shared sovereignty. Here, Belgium is the most recent example. The extreme case is always territorial secession, when coexistence under the roof of the same nation-state becomes untenable for all elites, even after other forms of advanced regionalization have proved to be impossible. The former USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia are good examples of this impossibility.

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See also Autonomy, Subnational; Decentralization; Ethnicity; Federalism; Nationalism; Regionalism; Secession; Self-Determination

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While regression analysis can be defined in many different ways, it is a tool for describing the relationships among variables. Regression is generally used for two complementary purposes. First, it measures the effects of one or more independent variables on a single dependent variable. Second, it can be used to predict the values of a dependent variable that can be expected to occur at specified levels of the independent variables. In the former capacity, regression is a useful tool for theory testing. In the latter capacity, regression is a forecasting tool that is useful for decision making. These two uses are closely connected. Theories are evaluated by their ability to predict as yet unobserved phenomena, and forecasting is carried out most effectively when predictions are based on a substantive theory. In the following, the major features and applications of regression analysis are discussed.

If there is one independent variable, the analysis is commonly called a *simple* or *bivariate regression*. If there is more than one independent variable, it is called *multiple regression analysis*. In traditional nomenclature, the dependent variable is generically represented as Y and the independent variable is designated as X . If there are multiple independent variables, the X s are given subscripts, say $X_1, X_2, \dots, X_j, \dots, X_k$ for k variables (note that the specific order of the X_j s generally does not matter). For the moment, we will assume that all variables are relatively continuous and measured at the interval level.

The immediate objective of a regression analysis is to show how the conditional distribution of Y varies across the values of X (or across the values of the X_j s in a multiple regression). Attention is usually focused on the conditional mean of Y rather than the entire conditional distribution. If the conditional Y distributions (and, specifically, the conditional Y means) do, in fact, differ systematically across the X values, then Y is said to be related to X . If the conditional Y distributions do not vary across the X values, then X and Y are unrelated to, or independent of, each other.

REGRESSION

Regression analysis is, by far, the most commonly used statistical technique in political science.

Bivariate Regression

There are several ways in which a regression analysis can be carried out. For example, a graphical approach would simply plot Y against X and

superimpose a curve that traces out the conditional Y means across the range of X . While this strategy is often useful for exploring bivariate data, it becomes much more difficult in the multiple regression case. And there are some practical limitations in using a graph as the final output of the analysis in any context. Further, the sample estimates of the conditional Y means are likely to be somewhat unreliable and unstable since there are usually only a small number of observations at each distinct value of X .

An alternative approach would be to specify a function that describes the hypothesized relationship between Y and the X s. The empirical analysis then estimates the parameters of this function and determines how well the function actually represents the data at hand. Probably the simplest function for relating the variables is linear in form. In the bivariate case, a linear function would be shown as follows:

$$Y_i = a + bX_i.$$

The subscript, i , that appears with Y and X in the preceding equation is an index for the observations; it ranges from 1 to n (the total number of observations) and is used here to indicate that the values of the two variables are different from one observation to the next. The other two terms, a and b , are the coefficients; they do not have subscripts, indicating that their numerical values are constant across the n observations in the data. Notice how this function provides a simple rule for starting with any observation's value on the X variable and producing the observation's Y value. If this function actually did provide an accurate description of a bivariate data set, then a scatterplot of Y versus X would produce n points arrayed along a straight line.

The b coefficient is often called the *slope* of the line. The absolute value of the number associated with b gives the *steepness* of the line. The sign of the number (plus or minus) indicates whether the line runs from lower left to upper right (a positive relationship) or from upper left to lower right (a negative relationship). The slope shows the difference in the values of Y that is associated with a single-unit increase in X . This is generally interpreted as Y 's *responsiveness* to the X variable. The a coefficient is often called the *intercept* of the line.

It gives the value of the Y variable that occurs when $X = 0$. The intercept determines the vertical position of the line within the scatterplot of Y versus X . But the intercept usually does not have a substantive interpretation.

The simple linear function depicted above is not very useful by itself because empirical data seldom (if ever) conform to such a clear-cut pattern. But a scatterplot of Y against X may show an approximately linear orientation that might be usefully summarized by a linear function. In that case, the previous equation would be modified as follows:

$$Y_i = \hat{Y}_i + e_i,$$

where $\hat{Y}_i = a + bX_i$.

Hence, the full regression equation is

$$Y_i = a + bX_i + e_i.$$

In the preceding equations, $\hat{Y}$ is a new, "imaginary" variable, created as part of the analysis. Unlike Y itself, $\hat{Y}$ is perfectly linearly related to X . The other new term on the right side of the equals sign, e_i , is a residual, indicating that the value of Y_i generally does not fall exactly on the line. If the value of the residual for observation i is a positive number, then the point representing i in the scatterplot falls above the line relating $\hat{Y}$ to X . If the residual is negative, then the point falls below the line. If the residual is zero, then $\hat{Y} = Y_i$, and the point falls exactly on the line.

The immediate analytical objective in the regression analysis is to define $\hat{Y}$ (i.e., select numeric values for the coefficients, a and b) such that the line relating $\hat{Y}$ to X passes through the middle of the point cloud in the scatterplot, coming as close as possible to as many of the points as possible. Here, "closeness" is defined as the vertical distance from each data point to the line; hence, it corresponds to the residual for each observation. But residuals can be either positive or negative in value, so they are typically squared to provide positive quantities for each observation. Then, the line is fitted such that it produces the smallest possible sum of squared residuals across the n observations in the data set. This is called the *least squares criterion* for fitting the regression line, and the mathematical procedure that is typically used to find the line is called *ordinary least squares* (OLS).

If the point cloud in the scatterplot really does conform to a linear pattern, then the line produced by the OLS method can be used as a model, or abstract representation, of the data. It provides a succinct summary of any systematic linear structure that exists within the observations. But it is important to develop a measure of how well the OLS line summarizes the observed data. To do so, we begin with the fact that $\hat{Y}$ and the residual term will be uncorrelated with each other (this is a consequence of the OLS procedure and our requirement that the fitted line runs through the middle of the point cloud in the scatterplot). Therefore, the variance of Y can be broken down neatly into the sum of the variance of $\hat{Y}$ and the variance of the residual, e . A goodness-of-fit measure, called R^2 (this term is used because R^2 is equal to the square of the correlation r_{xy} between X and Y), is defined as the ratio of the variance of $\hat{Y}$ to the variance of Y . R^2 is often interpreted as the proportion of variance in Y that is “explained” by X , since it represents the part of Y ’s variance that is linked to X through $\hat{Y}$. Since R^2 is a proportion, it varies between zero and one. The value of R^2 indicates the degree to which the data conform to a linear pattern. If $R^2 = 0$, then there is no linear relationship at all between the variables; an R^2 of 1.0 occurs only when all of the observations fall perfectly along a single line within the scatterplot of the bivariate data.

Multiple Regression

The idea of fitting a linear function to data can be generalized very easily to situations with more than one independent variable, producing a *multiple* regression equation. Once again, we begin with

$$Y_i = \hat{Y}_i + e_i.$$

But now, $\hat{Y}$ is defined a bit differently than in the bivariate case:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{Y}_i = & a + b_1X_{i1} + b_2X_{i2} + \cdots + b_jX_{ij} \\ & + \cdots + b_kX_{ik}.\end{aligned}$$

Here, the $\hat{Y}$ variable is a linear combination of k distinct independent variables. The precise value of

k is determined by the number of variables the researcher believes to be influencing the dependent variable, Y . The coefficient associated with each independent variable (i.e., b_j for X_j) shows the difference in $\hat{Y}$ that occurs when X_j is increased by one unit. The coefficient a is once again an intercept; it represents the value of $\hat{Y}$ that occurs when all of the independent variables are equal to zero. The full multiple regression equation is formed by combining the preceding two equations:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{Y}_i = & a + b_1X_{i1} + b_2X_{i2} + \cdots + b_jX_{ij} \\ & + \cdots + b_kX_{ik} + e_i.\end{aligned}$$

As in the bivariate case, e_i is a residual, indicating that Y is not a perfect linear function of the X_j s.

Once again, the least squares criterion is used to estimate the coefficients in the multiple regression equation. The value of k must be smaller than the number of observations; otherwise, there will not be enough information to calculate numeric values for the coefficients. But if that is the case, the OLS methodology can be generalized in a straightforward manner to produce the set of coefficients, $a, b_1, b_2, \dots, b_k$, that minimize the sum of the squared residuals across the set of n observations. Analogous to the regression *line* in the bivariate case, OLS for multiple regression produces a flat *surface* in the multidimensional scatterplot with axes formed by the k independent variables and the dependent variable. Once again, the OLS coefficients position this surface so that it comes as close as possible to the data points. Closeness is still defined in terms of the squared vertical distances from the regression surface to the data points. The overall fit of the multiple regression equation to the data is still measured with the R^2 statistic. The latter is defined as before: the ratio of the variance in $\hat{Y}$ to the variance in Y itself. This gives the proportion of Y ’s variance that is related to (or explained by) the independent variables through the regression equation. R^2 is equal to the square of the correlation between Y and $\hat{Y}$; therefore, it is sometimes called the *squared multiple correlation coefficient*. The interpretation of specific R^2 values remains the same as in the bivariate case.

In the multiple regression equation, the b_j s are often called *multiple regression coefficients* or *partial slope coefficients*. They are generally interpreted

as measures of each independent variable's unique linear effect on the dependent variable, after the linear effects of the remaining $k - 1$ independent variables have been statistically "removed." The OLS procedure estimates all $k + 1$ coefficients (i.e., the k partial slopes and the intercept) simultaneously; therefore, the value of each coefficient typically is affected by the values of the remaining coefficients. The only exception occurs when the independent variables are perfectly uncorrelated with each other—a situation that seldom (if ever) exists with nonexperimental data.

Political scientists typically use a regression equation as a model of the structural relationships among theoretically relevant variables. Substantive theories usually specify multiple causal agents for any given dependent variable. And there are often mediating factors that affect the relationships between variables. Such phenomena need to be incorporated into the empirical analyses that test theoretical propositions. For this reason, multiple regression is employed more frequently than bivariate regression in substantive applications. In addition, theories are broad statements. Therefore, researchers are often concerned with statistical inference. Rather than using the regression equation as a tool to describe the structure within a given data set, the objective usually is to generalize from the observed data to the larger, but unobserved, population of interest.

Statistical Inference

Statistical inference begins with a set of assumptions about the processes that generated the observed data. First, it is assumed that the regression equation accurately mirrors the structural relationships that exist within the population. So for a context in which Y is affected by k independent variables, the population structure is assumed to be

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_{i1} + \beta_2 X_{i2} + \cdots + \beta_j X_{ij} + \cdots + \beta_k X_{ik} + \varepsilon_i.$$

The variables in the preceding equation are identical to those in the regression equation presented earlier (although they now encompass all objects in the population, not just a limited sample of n observations). The coefficients (α and the β_j s)

are interpreted as before; but now, they are fixed population parameters rather than statistics whose values vary from one sample to the next.

The last term on the right-hand side of the equation, ε_i , is the *error* or *disturbance* term. This can be interpreted as the sum total of all influences on Y that are not explicitly included in the equation (i.e., apart from $X_1, X_2, \dots, X_k$). The disturbance term is usually assumed to consist of random "noise." That is, its distribution is assumed to have a mean of zero and a variance that is fixed across all possible combinations of X_j values. The disturbance is also assumed to be uncorrelated with all the variables (including itself). The X_j s are assumed to be independent of each other and measured without error. For convenience, they are also usually assumed to comprise fixed values for the n observations, meaning that they do not vary across repeated samples drawn from the same population.

When all of the preceding assumptions hold, the OLS coefficient estimates possess some useful statistical properties. First, the multiple regression coefficients are *unbiased* estimates of the corresponding population parameters; that is, b_j will not systematically over- or underestimate the corresponding β_j . Second, the OLS estimates are *consistent* in that sampling variance decreases as sample size increases; in other words, larger samples generate more precise estimates of the population parameters, and with large enough samples, this precision becomes almost perfect. And third, the OLS estimates are *efficient* in that their sampling variances usually are smaller than those of alternative estimators of the β_j values. A result called the Gauss-Markov theorem proves that the OLS coefficients are the most efficient of all linear unbiased estimators (i.e., unbiased estimators that are a linear combination of the data).

The OLS coefficients are linear combinations of the sample Y_i values. Therefore, a generalization of the central limit theorem implies that the coefficients are normally distributed. Student's t distribution can be used with the estimated standard errors to construct confidence intervals for and test hypotheses about the population values of the respective regression coefficients. One can also test the null hypothesis that the variance of $\hat{Y}$ equals zero; this is often interpreted as a test of the statistical significance of the overall regression equation. In other words, it is the functional equivalent of testing

the null hypothesis that $R^2 = 0$ in the population and that any observed nonzero regression coefficients are due to the effects of sampling error alone.

Statistical tests of the joint effects of several independent variables can be carried out in several ways. For example, a t test can be performed on a linear combination of regression coefficients. Or an F test can be used to determine whether adding additional variables to an equation significantly improves the fit to the data. And, more generally, the F test can be used to test hypotheses about sets of linear combinations of regression coefficients. This flexibility in the strategies used for statistical inference is one of the most attractive features of OLS estimates in regression analysis.

Applications

Another reason for the popularity of the linear regression model is its adaptability to different research situations. For example, categorical independent variables (in which observations are distributed across m discrete categories) can be incorporated into an equation by creating $m - 1$ dummy variables representing all of the respective categories except one (which is designated the “reference” category). And curvilinear relationships can often be modeled by applying transformations to the independent or dependent variables or by incorporating polynomial terms. Similarly, multiplicative terms between two (or more) independent variables can be used to represent conditional effects, wherein the impact of one independent variable on the dependent variable is itself affected by the value of another independent variable.

Since regression analysis is used primarily as a theory-testing tool, there is often great attention paid to the question of exactly which independent variables are included in the regression equation. While there are stepwise procedures that select regressors for inclusion from a pool of potential independent variables, they are not typically employed in political science because of their data-driven, “atheoretical” nature. Instead, substantive theory is usually regarded as the appropriate guide for the specification of regression models. This is a critical issue. If theoretically relevant variables are excluded from the equation, then the coefficients of the included independent variables are likely to be biased estimates of their associated population

parameters. This occurs because the included variables “pick up” some of the effects on the dependent variable that properly should be attributed to the omitted independent variables. Alternatively, including extraneous variables in the regression equation (i.e., X s that have no real effect on Y) will decrease the precision of the coefficient estimates since they introduce error into the estimation process.

In addition to theory testing, there are situations in which regression analysis is used as a forecasting tool, to predict the value of the dependent variable under specified conditions. When the various assumptions about the model and the disturbance term hold, the predicted value for a given observation, $\hat{Y}_i$, can be interpreted as an estimate of the conditional mean of Y . So the analyst can make predictions about the average level of the dependent variable that will occur when the independent variables are held at specified values. Further, a standard error for the conditional mean can be calculated very easily. So the precision of the prediction can also be estimated, using a confidence interval or a hypothesis test. This makes regression analysis a useful tool to provide formal guidance for decision making in a wide variety of substantive contexts.

As mentioned earlier, regression analysis typically is used with nonexperimental data. Therefore, nonzero correlations will almost always exist among the independent variables. This situation is called *multicollinearity*. Multicollinearity makes it impossible to identify the specific effects of each independent variable because to the extent that any two independent variables are correlated, they will exert a nonseparable, shared impact on the dependent variable. In practical terms, multicollinearity makes the coefficient estimates less precise and increases the standard errors. Multicollinearity is a condition that exists in the data; it is not a feature of the statistical model. There are diagnostic tests that can indicate the degree to which multicollinearity exists in a regression equation. But there is no way to “fix” or eliminate its effects. Fortunately, multicollinearity really does not cause serious problems in most research contexts. The regression coefficients remain unbiased, and the inflation in the standard errors is usually not large enough to compromise the process of statistical inference.

Valid interpretation of the results from a regression analysis is only possible if the assumptions

about the model and the disturbances reflect the actual conditions that exist in the data. Therefore, it is critical to employ tools called *regression diagnostics* to check the veracity of the assumptions. This often involves examining a graph of the residuals against the corresponding $\hat{Y}_i$ values. This scatterplot shows the spread of the observations around the fitted regression surface. If the regression assumptions hold, then the residuals are similar to the disturbances, and they should appear to be random noise with no systematic structure. To the extent that the researcher can perceive patterns or shapes in the residual plots, it indicates that the regression model is “missing” some type of structure that exists within the data. It is also important to identify outliers, or observations with particularly large residuals; in certain situations, such observations can be highly influential in determining the values of the regression coefficients. When such problems are diagnosed, there are usually corrective actions that can be taken to alleviate their effects on the model’s parameter estimates; this is yet another strong feature of regression analysis.

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See also Analysis of Variance; Causality; Interaction Effects; Multicollinearity; Nonlinear Models; Statistical Inference; Statistical Significance

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REGULATION

Regulation is a key component of the systems that make up our political, social, and economic lives.

It is also one of the least visible and transparent components that shape our governance systems. To regulate is to legislate in public and private organizational arenas, that is, under indirect and often ex post judicial and parliamentary controls. In democratic and pluralist societies, all aim to regulate all, and thus, all contribute to “regulatory creep.” The amalgamation of these regulations defines our liberties, privileges, opportunities, and life plans in ways that challenge our conventions about politics and about the locus of democratic controls and accountabilities. In addition to defining the concept and the phenomenon, this entry discusses regulation as a key activity of administrative agencies, regulation beyond the state, the governance of regulation, and the phenomena of both the regulatory state and regulatory capitalism.

Meaning and Empirical Content

Like many other political concepts, regulation is hard to define, not the least because it means different things to different people. The term is employed for myriad discursive, theoretical, and analytical purposes that cry out for clarification. It is also a highly contested term. For the Far Right, regulation is a dirty word representing the heavy hand of authoritarian governments and the creeping body of rules that constrain human or national liberties. For the Old Left, it is part of the superstructure that serves the interests of the dominant class and frames power relations in seemingly civilized forms. For progressive democrats, it is a public good, a tool to control profit-hungry capitalists and to manage social and ecological risks. For some, regulation is something that is done exclusively by government, a matter for the state and law enforcement, while for others, regulation is mostly the work of social actors who monitor other actors, including governments. State-centered conceptions of regulation define it with reference to state-made laws, while society-centered analysts and scholars of globalization tend to point to the proliferation of various forms of civil and business-to-business regulation.

For legal scholars, regulation is often a legal instrument, while for sociologists and criminologists, it is yet another form of social control. For some, it is the amalgamation of all types of laws—primary, secondary, and tertiary legislation—while

for others it is confined to secondary legislation. For economists of the Chicago school, regulation is usually a strategic tool used by private and special interests to exploit the majority. For institutional economists, regulation is less a strategic tool and more a constitutive element of the market; for them, it is often understood as the mechanism that constitutes property rights or even as a source of national competitiveness. The French Regulation School seems to have developed a similar institutional perspective but with a more critical tone and without the functionalist orientation of some English-speaking economists (Robert Boyer, 1990). Whereas scholars of public administration seem to perceive it with direct and in-depth reference to the scope of state authority and formal regulatory organizations, scholars of global governance tend to focus on standards and soft (nonbinding) norms. While some seem to think of the rise of regulation as yet another indication of the advance of neoliberalism and the retreat of the welfare state, others tend to see it at as a neo-mercantilist instrument for market expansion, high modernism, and social engineering. In European parlance, for most of the 20th century, regulation was synonymous with government intervention and, indeed, with all the efforts of the state, by whatever means, to control and guide the economy and society. This rather broad meaning of the term seems to have faded, and scholars now make an effort to distinguish rule making from other tools of governance and, indeed, from other types of policy instruments, such as taxation, subsidies, redistribution, and public ownership.

Regulation not only is a distinct type of policy but also entails identifiable forms and patterns of political conflict that differ from the patterns that are regularly associated with redistribution and distribution. In addition, while other types of policy such as distribution and redistribution are about relatively visible transfers and direct allocation of resources, regulation only indirectly shapes the distribution of costs in society. Government budgets include (relatively) visible and clear estimations of the overall costs of distribution and redistribution but hardly any of the cost of regulation (with the exception of the administrative costs of fact finding, monitoring, and implementation). The most significant costs of regulation are compliance costs, which are borne not by the government budget but

mostly by the regulated parties. The wide distribution of these costs and their embeddedness in the regulatees' budgets make their impact, effects, and net benefits less visible and therefore less transparent to the attentive public.

For some, regulation is a risky business that is prone to failure, but for others, the business of regulation is the business of risk minimization. Some contend that regulation comprises mostly rule making, while others extend it to include rule monitoring and rule enforcement. For some, regulations are about the rules and functions of the administrative agency after the act of delegation; for others, as already observed, regulation includes every kind of rule, including primary legislation and even social and professional norms. The extensive literature on regulation in the United States and the extensive attention paid to regulation could have resulted in a consensual definition of regulation. Yet this is not the case. The American Administrative Procedure Act defines the term *rule* but not the term *regulation*, and what it defines as rule is confined to the scope of the act itself.

Regulation and Administrative Agencies

One important aspect of any discussion of the different connotations and characteristics of regulation is the relation between regulation and the existence of an administrative agency. Rule making and rule-making agencies are closely connected. An emphasis on the workings, characteristics, failures, and merits of regulation by administrative agencies is prevalent in the literature on regulation. Indeed, these aspects are expressed in one of the most widely cited definitions of regulation, namely, as "sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by the community" (Selznick, 1985, p. 363). Not only does this definition include an explicit reference to public agencies, but it also stresses the sustained and focused nature of regulation, which requires a continuous action of monitoring, assessment, and refinement of rules rather than an ad hoc operation. Implicit in this definition is also the expectation that *ex ante* rules will be the dominant form of regulatory control. The definition is apt also in the sense that it recognizes that many, perhaps the most important, regulations are exercised not by

“regulatory agencies” but by a wide variety of executive organs. This definition is less successful, however, in other respects. It recognizes regulation only as a public activity by a public agency and thus excludes business-to-business regulation as well as civil regulation. It also does not clarify which kinds of focused control the public agency applies (is it rule making only or also other forms of control such as arbitrary commands?); and the definition unnecessarily limits regulation to those actions that are valued by the community.

Regulation Beyond the State

The focus on administrative aspects in the study of regulation might be less useful for scholars who emphasize the limits of “hard law” and who are aware of the importance of social norms and other forms of “soft law” in the governance of societies and economies. A wider definition of regulation that captures regulation as soft law would suggest that regulation encompasses all the mechanisms of social control, including unintentional and nonstate processes. Indeed, it extends to “mechanisms which are not the products of state activity, nor part of any institutional arrangement, such as the development of social norms and the effects of markets in modifying behavior” (Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott, & Christopher Hood, 1998, p. 4). Thus, the notion of intentionality in the development of norms has been dropped from this definition of regulation, and anything producing effects on behavior may be considered regulatory. In addition, a wide range of activities that may involve legal or quasi-legal norms, but without the mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement, might also come within the definition. This definition connects widely with the research agenda on governance, “the new governance” and the “new regulatory state,” where elements of steering and plural forms of regulation are emphasized in an effort to capture the plurality of interests and sources of control around issues, problems, and institutions. This rather wide definition of regulation also allows us to “de-center” regulation from the state and even from well-recognized forms of self-regulation. De-centered approaches to regulation emphasize complexity, fragmentation, interdependencies, and government failures and suggest the limits of

the distinctions between the public and the private and between the global and the national.

Scholars of regulatory systems often point to the growth in the number of civil and business actors that invest in regulation and accordingly also to the growth of civil and business-to-business regulatory institutions and instruments. At the same time, there are indications of the transformation of the politics of interest groups and nongovernmental organizations. Civil actors are often associated with advocacy (e.g., lobbying) and service provision (e.g., replacing the state in the provision of welfare), but in our areas of study they also produce, monitor, and enforce regulation. The concept of *civil regulation* aims to capture this evolving feature of civil politics. The term, as noted by David Vogel (2005), refers to the institutionalization of voluntary global and national forms of regulation through the creation of private (nonstate) forms of regulation intended to govern markets and firms. Civil regulations attempt to embed international markets and firms in a normative order that prescribes responsible business conduct. They include old and traditional forms of self-regulation but go beyond them to include regulatory techniques such as third-party accreditation and certification, gatekeeping strategies, metaregulation, enforced self-regulation, self-regulation, and league tables. Business-to-business regulation is another form of a nonstate source of regulation. Here, the growth of regulation is driven by the ability of some businesses (most often big business) to set standards for other businesses (most often smaller ones). One relevant example is the ability of big supermarket chains to set standards for food manufacturing, processing, and marketing all over the world.

The Governance of Regulation

Much of the academic and public discussion of regulation nowadays deals with the governance of regulation itself (or regulating regulation) rather than governance via regulation. The expansion of regulation represents two major challenges: of effectiveness and of democratic control.

Effectiveness

The first challenge focuses on the alleged weakness of command-and-control systems with

prescriptive rules that tell regulated entities what to do and how to do it. These prescriptive rules tend to be highly particular in specifying the required actions and standards and are usually backed up by state sanctions. Peter J. May (2007, p. 9) observes that when compared with the alternatives, principles and norms, regulations are characterized by clear-cut lines of responsibility and, thus, accountability. Yet clarity, the ability to sanction, and direct lines of accountability all come at a price. Six shortcomings of regulation are important to note:

1. expensive and ineffective regulatory strategies;
2. inflexible regulatory strategies that encourage adversarial enforcement;
3. legal constraints on the subjects, procedures, and scope of regulatory discretion;
4. regulatees' resentment, which leads to noncompliance or "creative compliance";
5. strict regulation, which often presents an obstacle to innovation; and
6. regulation that often serves to set a lowest common denominator for regulatees to follow rather than supplying incentives for improving standards.

According to Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky (1998), and Steven P. Croley (2008), there are five major strategies of response to these weaknesses. The first and the most controversial is to deregulate existing regulation and to constrain new rule making. These "ossification" strategies might result in a race to the bottom, or degradation of economic and environmental performances, unmitigated risk, and immoral economies and societies. The second is to turn to "lite" and management-based regulation and to harness economic incentives as much as possible toward politically determined public goods. The third is to promote responsive forms of regulation. The fourth is to improve the regulatory arsenal (e.g., by employing auctions and using benchmarking) as well as the quality and training of the regulators and the quality of the regulatory design. The fifth is to institutionalize regulatory impact analysis and cost-benefit techniques. These control measures are becoming increasingly popular, and some countries have

even established regulatory agencies to regulate regulation itself (e.g., the British Better Regulation Executive, and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the United States).

Democratic Control

The second governance challenge that regulation represents is derived from the democratic qualities (or, more accurately, weaknesses) of regulation. The belief that the legislator should legislate, the judiciary should adjudicate, and the executive should govern via the bureaucracy takes regulation to be, at best, a "necessary evil." Yet this necessary evil is expanding and diversifying to an extent that raises important challenges for democratic theory and practice. First, regulators are not elected and are accountable to the people only indirectly, hence the arguments about the democratic deficit of regulatory systems. Second, while it is a fundamental idea of law that people should be subject to fixed, known, and certain rules, the sheer numbers of rules and the frequency and the process with which they are changed create a situation where it is beyond the capacity of most, if not all, individuals to act without legal advice. The sheer volume of regulations represents a challenge for democratic, judicial, parliamentary, and administrative systems of control. Third, the growth of international administrative law makes supposedly sovereign polities into rule takers rather than rule makers. Regionalization, internationalization, and globalization of regulation all raise issues of legitimacy and may lead to new and innovative forms of democratic control over regulatory systems. Fourth is the emergence of "private regulatory regimes" and "private governments," which may weaken democratic legitimacy and may change the balance of power between corporations and states. To deal with these democratic challenges, it is necessary to develop and strengthen three systems of control over bureaucratic legislation: parliamentary, judicial, and participatory.

The Regulatory Agency and the Regulatory State

One of the most important indicators of the growth in the scope and depth of regulatory activities in modern society is the proliferation of

regulatory agencies as the administrative and intellectual core of national and global systems of regulatory governance. Regulatory agencies are not a new feature of modern systems of governance, but they have become a highly popular form of regulatory governance since the 1990s. A regulatory agency is a nondepartmental public organization mainly involved with rule making, but it may also be responsible for fact finding, monitoring, adjudication, and enforcement. It is autonomous in the sense that it can shape its own preferences; of course, the extent of the autonomy varies with its administrative capacities, its ability to shape preferences independently, and its ability to enforce its rules. The autonomy of an agency is also constituted by its establishment as a separate organization and by the allocation to this agency of a policy space where it is expected to operate by way of exercising its functions and responsibilities. Note that while rule-making, fact-finding, monitoring, adjudication, and enforcement capacities are the defining characteristics of regulatory agencies, other organizations, both within and outside the state, can also acquire and successfully deploy these characteristics.

The expansion in the number of regulatory agencies, and arguably also in the scope of regulation and in the policy capacities of these agencies, has been manifest since the 1990s in the popularity of the notion of the regulatory state. In its most straightforward form, the term *regulatory state* “suggests [that] modern states are placing more emphasis on the use of authority, rules and standard-setting, partially displacing an earlier emphasis on public ownership, public subsidies, and directly provided services” (Hood et al., 1999, p. 3).

As noted by David Levi-Faur and Sharon Gilad (2004), three elements are especially useful in characterizing the regulatory state. First, the bureaucratic functions of regulation are being separated from service delivery. Second, the regulatory functions of government are being separated from policy-making functions, and thus, the regulators are being placed at arm’s length from their political masters. In this way, regulatory agencies became the citadels that fortify the autonomous and influential role of the regulocrats in the policy process. We are witnessing the strengthening of the regulators at the expense of

politicians on the one hand and of the managerial elite on the other. Third, and as a result of the first two elements, regulation and rule making emerge as a distinct stage in the policy-making process. Accordingly, regulation is emerging as a distinct profession and administrative entity. Professional affiliation to global networks of experts is becoming a major source of innovations, worldviews, accountability, and legitimacy.

From the Regulatory State to Regulatory Capitalism

The term *regulatory capitalism* denotes the growth in the scope, importance, and impact of regulation at the national and global levels and the growing investments of political actors in regulation in general and regulatory strategies in particular. It suggests that regulation and rule making are the major instruments in the expansion of global governance. The notion of regulatory capitalism takes regulation theory analysis beyond national boundaries (hence beyond the notion of the regulatory state) and beyond formal, state-centered rule making (therefore toward civil regulation and de-centered analysis of regulatory systems). It also denotes a world where regulation is increasingly a hybrid of different systems of control: Statist regulation coevolves with civil regulation; national regulation expands with international and global regulation; private regulation coevolves and expands with public regulation; voluntary regulations expand with coercive ones; and the market itself is used or mobilized as a regulatory mechanism.

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See also Policy Instruments; Self-Regulation

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RELIGION

Any investigation into the interdependencies between religion and politics first of all calls for a definition of the subject matter and hence for a definition of religion. However, such a definition faces considerable difficulties because religion historically is a universal phenomenon and encompasses today an enormous variety of experiences, convictions, and practices the religious character of which is far from being unequivocal. The distinction between religious phenomena and other social phenomena is found in religious sociology and anthropology, mostly with regard to specific contents or functions. As to content, the experience of or interaction with superhuman, preternatural, or transcendental creatures, powers, forces, or orders often is defined as a universal characteristic of religion. Functionalist approaches use functions such as the individual

coping with contingency or a collective foundation of identity. Content criteria, however, often prove to be too exclusive and functionalist definitions, too inclusive. The attempt to determine criteria for the identification of religion as a unique area of activity clearly to be differentiated from other societal or cultural spheres of action is also highly selective from an intercultural point of view, because it refers to a large extent to Western Christianity, with its characteristic notion of a differentiation between the worldly and spiritual spheres. Nevertheless, the category “religion” has established itself as a global concept of reference even for non-Western religious traditions, and it has admittedly been rephrased and revised in the course of its global reception. Because of this global, pluralistic, and contextualized debate about the term *religion*, James A. Beckford recommends a constructivist approach to its definition. Constructivist approaches assume that the concept of religion, like other concepts, is the result of conflictual definition processes and advocate following this everyday practice when defining social science terms. This entry sketches the role of contemporary religion in politics and discusses some issues of current research and their different perspectives.

Religious traditions and religious actors have been highly relevant in politics and hence also in political science. After all, religious traditions have at their disposal specific notions about the constitution of the self and the world as well as about proper conduct in one's individual and collective life. These concepts and moral guidelines have also left their mark on the political orientations of individual and collective religious actors. However, not only do religious politics exercise an influence on the constitution of the political community, but religious actors and traditions, symbols, and practices in nearly all historical and contemporary societies have also been instruments and objects of political action and control. Often, the specific dynamics of the religious–political complex result from the interaction of religious politics and the politics of religion. The interactions between religion and politics are currently of particular interest because since the end of the 1970s, a (re)vitalization of religious traditions and the politicization of religious actors can be observed in many parts of the world.

The current practice of researching the interactive relationship between politics and religion is also due to its rediscovery by political science. At least since the 1960s, religion was regarded in large parts of the discipline as a social complex whose historical destiny had been settled. The reason for this was the underlying conviction of secularization theory that, in the course of processes of modernization and functional differentiation, religious traditions had lost many of their former societal and political functions as well as their attractiveness and persuasiveness. They would, therefore, be relinquished to the private sphere if not disappear altogether. Even the normative issues about the relationship between politics and religion seemed to be settled. Many traditions of political theory, such as liberalism and republicanism, agreed on the basic tenet that religion had to be limited to the private sphere because neither was it suitable for forming a universally acceptable normative basis for democratic political communities nor was it able to supply arguments or justifications for political decisions that could be universally agreed on. Moreover, large parts of the social sciences were shaped by a "methodological atheism," according to which experiences with or interactions with supernatural powers are illusory. This methodological atheism led to reductionist patterns of explanation that regarded and reconstructed religion as a mere epiphenomenon of social or political processes. Based on these underlying convictions, religion was found interesting at best in the sense of a relic of religious influence on politics, which could be found in political cleavages, voting behavior, party systems, or types of welfare states.

The relative neglect of research into the interaction of religion and politics started to change with the globally observable (re)vitalization of religious traditions and the mobilization and politicization of religious actors since the late 1970s.

(Re)Vitalization, Mobilization, and Politicization

Phenomena of (re)vitalization have become discernible in nearly all religious traditions. The number of followers of Islam as well as of Catholicism and Protestantism outside the Western Hemisphere has increased considerably. Even the Orthodox Church in Eastern Europe has seen an unexpected

renaissance following the breakdown of the communist regimes. Moreover, new religious movements are forming in many parts of the world, especially in Asia. Phenomena of politicization also can be found in nearly all religious traditions. First and foremost among them is the formation and political mobilization of fundamentalist or conservative religious movements. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the phenomenon of religiously motivated terrorism has increasingly entered the public consciousness. Also, since the 1990s, the number of religiously motivated or influenced violent conflicts and civil wars has increased.

Particularly in the Western world, with its increasing religious pluralism, the traditional institutional arrangements for the relationship between state and church, politics and religion, have become the cause for and object of political debate and the mobilization of religious actors. But religious actors, organizations, and movements have also played an important, even decisive, role in the processes of democratic transition. All over the world, an increasing political activity of Christian churches and organizations can be registered. This increasing presence of religious actors in the public sphere is also an effect of the transformation of politics itself. In the course of the comprehensive politicization of current societies, almost no societal situation is exempt from becoming the object of political decisions and regulatory actions. Due to this fading distinction between the public and the private sphere, the formerly guaranteed areas of a self-determined religious way of life are further reduced. Another case in point is that due to cultural pluralization and technological progress, more and more value-oriented conflictual issues, such as the relationship between the sexes, sexual identity, and biomedicine, have been put on the political agenda. These are questions touching the religious beliefs of many citizens. Finally, globalization leads not only to the internationalization and transnationalization of religious actors but also to an accelerated diffusion of political activity patterns and problem perceptions.

Issues of Current Research

The first reaction by political science to the (re)vitalization and politicization of religion consisted in the research of religious fundamentalism. Similarly, in political theory, a new debate began

about the principles of determining the relationship between religion and politics. Now as in former times, the classic liberal and republican positions of a strict separation between religion and politics and the referral of religion to the private sphere are being defended. Alternative approaches do uphold a minimum necessary mutual autonomy of politics and religion, but with regard to religious and cultural pluralism, they no longer consider the exclusion of religious points of view from politics as mandatory. At the same time, they grant politics considerable leeway in determining the relationship between religion and politics. This debate has also led to an increase in comparative empirical research into the genesis, mechanisms, and effects of different models for representing the relationship between religion and politics.

Another important focus of political science research into the interrelationship of religion and politics concerns the compatibility of democracy with specific religious traditions, especially Islam. The starting point of this debate is the finding that the majority of current democracies have a predominantly Christian population, whereas the majority of Islamic countries have nondemocratic constitutions. One explanation of this finding is that only in Latin Christendom has there been the concept of the fundamental distinction between the worldly and the divine. Critics of this argument refer to the variety and changeability of religious traditions, citing among others the example of the Catholic Church, which only after the Second Vatican Council changed into an important promoter of democracy. The nondemocratic constitution of many Islamic countries is ascribed instead to specific historical, regional, or cultural factors. However, there are still considerable deficits of research, for example, regarding the instruments and strategies, and also the opportunities and limitations, of religious actors exerting a political influence at the national and international levels. This concerns, for example, research into the religious conditioning of welfare states or on the effects of religious influences on public policies.

Perspectives for Future Research

Research into the interaction of politics and religion is a current trend. The dynamics of the religious-political complex will—together with

the competitively organized national and international research in political science—open up new issues and debates. It can be expected that existing gaps in this research will soon be filled. But what will also be necessary is a stronger reflection on the term and the phenomenon of religion as well as on the discipline's underlying convictions about religion and its interrelationship with politics. The debate about the concept of religion is irrefutable for two reasons. On the one hand, the discipline is also conducting research into phenomena such as civil religion and political religion, which share a number of characteristics with religions without being religions in the classic sense of the word. On the other hand, the religious field is changing due to the formation of new individual and syncretistic forms of religiosity and spiritualism. Reflecting on the underlying convictions is necessary because the latter predetermine not only the selection of issues but also the interpretation of findings. That is especially true for assumptions about the capability of the religious field for transformation, change, and adaptation; for the concept of religion as a (latent) threat to the peaceful integration of societies; and also for methodological atheism and the reductionist strategies of explanation usually associated with it.

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See also Christian Democratic Parties; Church-State Relationships; Fundamentalism; Religiosity; Secularism

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RELIGIOSITY

Religiosity refers to the strength and scope of religious activity among faith-based communities. Although “religion” and “religiosity” are often used synonymously, there is a considerable difference between these two terms. Whereas religion sociologically denotes beliefs and practices in relation to the sacred, religiosity encompasses a variety of representations that symbolize religious involvement. Within the religions of the Abrahamic traditions, for example, there exist monotheistic belief systems involving a multitude of practices that adhere to the teachings of literary texts. However, the religiosity of these traditions would be found within any number of activities including patterns of religious involvement, forms of religious expression, manifestations of religious structures, and the like. This entry discusses some historical and contemporary political implications of the different manifestations of religiosity.

In the international political climate of the 21st century, for example, religiosity has become a crucial feature in discourses concerning global security. In a controversial assessment of religiosity’s role in global politics, Samuel P. Huntington’s (1996) book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* attributed the potential for post–Cold War conflict to religious and cultural clashes between nations and differing civilizations. Despite Huntington’s classification of some eight civilizations based on cultural lines, these civilizations are largely bound by the demarcations of religiosity. Given this type of reasoning and categorization, religiosity represents a critical position in transnational conflicts.

Notwithstanding some other factors, the conflicts of the early 21st century generated by religious groups suggest that Huntington’s thesis is supported by a considerable amount of evidence. Demonstrated through the violent incidents of September 11, 2001, the 19 hijackers can be said to have been defending their religiosity through a type of aggression that they felt would stem the spread of Western values and ideologies. Western encroachment in this way on what Huntington called “Islamic civilization” may, perhaps, engender the greatest amount of conflict.

When one’s religiosity becomes systematically threatened, contentions appear to be elevated to another level. Mark Juergensmeyer, in his 2000 book *Terror in the Mind of God*, coined the term *cosmic war* to describe a situation where battles between perceptions of good and evil emerge. In this case, a person’s or group’s religiosity becomes the basis for at least one side of such a cosmic conflict. For example, the indifference that the West often displays toward the contradictory interplay between modern customs and traditional sacred beliefs and practices creates an atmosphere where religious expression marks a quasi-ideological status. In this way, dealing with religiosity in a culturally insensitive manner is detrimental to the resolution of conflicts of this magnitude.

Given the importance of religiosity in global affairs, measuring its attributes is particularly useful. Religiosity is often measured in terms of practices that indicate the religiousness of a population, including prayers, worship, service attendance, adherence to established principles of faith, commitment to belief, and any number of other activities that suggest an interaction with religious institutions. Basic examples of the results of such measurements may yield quantitative data such as correlations between the frequency of church attendance and physical well-being or qualitative data that suggest, for example, that the social mobility and economic success of an individual is linked to his or her commitment to a particular set of religious beliefs. One of the most well-known examples of studies pertaining to religiosity is Max Weber’s ([1904/1905] 1998) book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Weber focused on an insightful finding about the relationship between religiosity among the Calvinist branch of Protestantism and the emergence of modern capitalism. As Weber noted, the religious doctrine of predestination led to an ethic of hard work combined with an innerworldly asceticism that indirectly resulted in an early accumulation of capital.

In one of the most widely cited pieces of literature on the topic of religiosity, a group of Utah-based researchers created a model for measuring religiosity among members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. M. Cornwall, S. L. Albrecht, P. H. Cunningham, and B. L. Pitcher (1986) used the components of religious belief, religious commitment, and religious behavior,

combined with two modes of personal and institutional types of religious practice, to construct a cross-classification for measuring religiosity. This schema generated six dimensions of religiosity: (1) traditional orthodoxy, (2) particularistic orthodoxy, (3) spiritual commitment, (4) church commitment, (5) religious behavior, and (6) religious participation. Through the analysis of these six dimensions, the categories of cognition, affect, and behavior were established as components used in measuring religiosity.

Such a multidimensional approach to classifying religiosity suggests similar multidimensional approaches to the more general study of religiosity. Rather than creating standardized models for all religious activities, much of the literature suggests a movement toward case-by-case assessments of what constitutes religiosity in different cultures, including its significance and meaning.

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See also Buddhism; Christianity; Hinduism; Islam; Islamist Movements; Judaism; Religion; Religious Movements; Zionism

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RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

A religious movement is an organized effort that intends to bring about religious reforms. Many religious movements also have political goals because the kinds of reforms they want appear

possible only by altering, sometimes fundamentally, political and/or social contexts and arrangements in which they operate. This entry discusses some major manifestations of such movements in contemporary politics.

In recent years, social scientists have consistently noted that religion can influence politics. Three decades ago, the Iranian revolution showed that an Islamic religious movement could overthrow a regime once seen as a key example of the modernizing effects of secularization in the Middle East. More recently, the rise of the Christian Right (CR) in the United States demonstrated how religious movements can evolve as a result of changing political circumstances. Further, the emergence and consolidation of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India was made possible because of the party's foundations in Hindu religious movements. Similarly, Jewish fundamentalist movements have emerged in Israel with plenty to say about the Israel–Palestinian issue.

All these examples point to the inadequacies of modernization and secularization theories, which predicted that the importance of religion in politics would decline. Although secularization has clearly occurred in many countries, especially in Western Europe, this has taken place at the same time that religion has exhibited sustained presence—some would call it a resurgence—in many parts of the world. Overall, the impact of religion on politics has not declined but instead changed in complex ways, including the political involvement of some religious movements.

Until recently, such issues were judged to be remote from central political questions. The explanation for this neglect lies in a key assumption embedded in the social sciences. One presupposition, especially evident in theories of modernization and political development, was that the future of the integrated nation-state lay in secular participatory politics. The assumption was that nation building would be ill served by perceived “obscurantist” beliefs—such as religion. Nearly everywhere, it seemed, secular political leaders dominated, displacing once powerful traditional and religious figures from prominence. The implication was that, to successfully build nation-states, political leaders would have to remain as neutral as possible from the entanglements of particularistic claims, especially those derived from religion. It is hoped that

this would avoid dogmatism and encourage citizens' tolerance, a crucial prelude to building viable nation-states and democracies. Decades of apparently unstoppable movement toward increasingly secular societies in many parts of the world reinforced the assumption that religion and piety would inevitably become private matters everywhere. Consequently, in political analysis, religion was often regarded as an increasingly minor problem of little or no significance in the search for national unity and political stability.

Such a view is, however, problematic. If it were correct, how could we explain and account for many religious movements' current political significance? Consider again the examples mentioned above:

- In officially secular India, the Hindu nationalist BJP came to power in the mid-1990s after staging a 10,000-kilometer march that sought to destroy an ancient mosque at Ayodhya, alleged to have been built on the remains of a temple dedicated to Lord Rama.
- In the United States, where the principle of separation of church and state is incorporated in the nation's constitution, the organized CR—a religious movement with social and political goals—has become very influential.
- The continuing conflict between Israel and Arab neighbors encouraged the emergence of Jewish fundamentalist movements and settlers in occupied territories after the 1967 war.
- The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is a religious movement that emerged in Egypt in the 1920s, becoming politically and socially prominent from the 1970s, with the aim of establishing an Islamic state.

These cases obviously differ greatly, and this entry does not offer a comprehensive theory of politics and religious movements. Instead, it briefly examines religious movements in four countries (India, the United States, Israel, and Egypt) from four religious traditions: Hinduism, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. We will see that in each case, religious movements from different religious traditions engage significantly and consistently with politics, seeking to achieve various goals that relate to the nature of the state and the moral and ethical universe that informs it.

Hindu Religious Movements in India

At independence in 1947, the victorious Congress party reluctantly accepted partition (between India and East and West Pakistan) but decisively rejected the ideology of Hindu nationalism (known as *Hindutva*). From the 1980s, India saw tensions increase between Muslims and Hindus, leading to the political rise of the BJP.

In officially secular India, an explosion of militant Hinduism focused on, but not confined to, the incident in which the Babri Masjid mosque at Ayodhya was demolished by a Hindu mob in 1992, served to transform India's political landscape. Hindu nationalists, concentrated in the BJP, achieved significant political gains in the 1990s and early 2000s. They were reacting against the secular visions of the country's nationalist founders, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. They used various strategies to bring about change in political structures and processes. What was especially striking was how consistently they aimed at political targets not only to solve religious problems but also to try to bring about the consolidation of religious identities and values.

The rise of the politics of religious identity in India underlines a central problem: How can religiously plural India survive the creation of a powerful sense of identity based on religion? Of the population of 1 billion Indians, 82% are Hindus, while about 11% are Muslims, 2.5% are Christians, and around 1.6% are Sikhs. There are also small numbers of Buddhists, Parsis, Jains, and followers of tribal religions. This religious diversity encouraged Indian nationalists to pursue a development path firmly located within a secular sociopolitical and cultural milieu.

Over time, the issue of Hindu-Muslim relations became a key political topic, a concern emphasized by the rise of the political ideology of *Hindutva* (Hinduness). *Hindutva* is a Hindi word, a neologism first used by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, a politician and independence movement activist, in his 1923 pamphlet *Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu?* The term now generally refers to Hindu movements that advocate Hindu nationalism in India. The leading Hindu nationalist political party, the BJP, which dominated Indian politics for a decade from the mid-1990s, is *Hindutva*'s political focal point. Its foundations are in a number of Hindu movements, collectively promoting *Hindutva*,

known as the Sangh Parivar (meaning “family of associations”). Leading organizations within the movement include the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the Bajrang Dal, and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad.

The overall aim of the Sangh Parivar is to increase the predominance of Hinduism in India, in relation to its societal, political, and cultural presence. It seeks to pursue this goal through various means, including violence and terror. The Hindutva agenda includes attempts to suppress or drive out Muslims and Christians. This is because, for the Sangh Parivar, they were alien faiths, historically introduced to India by external conquerors. Islam was patronized by the Muslim Moghuls in the 16th century and Christianity by the British, mainly from the 19th century onward.

The Christian Right in the United States

The CR is an influential religious movement with social and political goals, which emerged at the time of the presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977–1981). The CR shared many of the ideals and goals of Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan (1981–1989), facilitating its development into a significant and influential entity. The election of George W. Bush in 2001 saw a resurgence of the CR. Conservative Christian leaders were able to arrange sessions with senior White House aides. This was widely understood to reflect an ideological empathy between leaders of the CR and prominent government insiders, including the President himself.

The CR has key concerns, including what form of Christianity should take precedence in America, reshaping American society according to their understanding of Christian values, the importance of “family values,” and the relationship between these values, public education, and public policy generally. After George W. Bush’s first term (2001–2005), CR leaders were emboldened by their role in reelecting him and galvanized by their success in campaigning for constitutional amendments to ban same-sex marriage, eventually passed in 18 states. The aim was to organize and build on these early successes, to solidify their agenda-setting role, and to help elect sympathetic public officials.

It used to be said that every 4 years at the time of the U.S. presidential elections American and foreign journalists rediscover religion. This was

the periodic occasion when the media scented the electoral possibilities of the influence of the CR, a significant domestic political lobby group, on electoral outcomes. Initially, the CR comprised mainly Protestant conservative evangelicals. Over time, however, its makeup became more eclectic, referring to a broad community of mostly Christian religious conservatives. Prior to the 1970s, the CR had been a subculture, largely keeping its distance from electoral politics. But with a new focus on social conservatism, around the time of the presidency of Ronald Reagan, Republican Party strategists—together with neoconservatives and other right-wing ideologues—encouraged the politicization of CR members as part of a “New Right” fusionism that saw Ronald Reagan elected as president in 1981 and reelected 4 years later.

Despite ideological and political differences among the different organizations that make up the CR, many members share a belief that secularism poses a serious threat to liberty, democracy, and pluralism. The CR is “radical” in that it advocates dramatic changes in society and “religious” in that its members and leaders tend to base their ideologies on religious doctrines drawn from the Bible. In the mid-2000s, it was estimated that those claiming identification with the ideas of the CR comprised around 20% (some 60 million people) of the adult population of the United States. Today, the CR seeks to uphold and perpetuate “Christian values,” regarding as anathema manifestations of “excessive liberalism,” including legal abortion, absence or downgrading of prayers in public schools, and science teaching that adopts a rationalist, rather than a “creationist,” perspective.

Jewish Religious Movements in Israel

Since Israel’s founding in 1948, state policy has traditionally favored the political middle ground. This implies that neither religious nor secular political ideas have on their own been able to dominate the political agenda. Over time, religious Jews organized themselves through a number of religious movements and became an increasingly significant political voice. They were especially vocal in opposition to the policy of conceding parts of Biblical Israel to the Palestinians, especially the West Bank of the River Jordan. The topic is a subject of intense controversy that divides the

country. It has dominated the political agenda since the early 1990s, focused in the divisive Oslo peace accords of 1993, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's assassination in 1995, and, following pressure from the government of the United States, handing over control of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinians in 2005.

In addition to various religious political parties, including Shas and United Torah Judaism, Israel's political landscape also includes a number of influential Jewish movements, including Edah Haredit (God Fearful Community), Neturei Karta (Guardians of the City), and Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful). One of the most influential is Gush Emunim, founded in 1974 in the West Bank settlement of Kfar Etzion. Gush's main aim is to achieve conquest and settlement of what it regards as the Biblical land of Israel (*Eretz Yisrael*). During the 1980s, the movement grew rapidly, especially after the 1978 Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt that led to the return of the latter to the Sinai desert—grabbed by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War. Along with Gush, other extremist religious movements, such as the late Rabbi Meir Kahane's organization, Kach (meaning "Thus") and Kahane Chai ("Kahane Lives"; founded after Kahane was assassinated in 1990), argue on religious grounds against giving back territory not only to Egypt but also to the Palestinians or any other non-Jewish entities. This is because they regard such a policy as a contradiction of God's will expressed in the Torah.

Organized in movements such as Kach and Kahane Chai, Jewish religious zealots seek to be the voice of the mostly religious Jewish settlers, who try to influence Israeli policy in relation to both Egypt and the Palestinians so as not to hand land back to non-Jews. Following the 1993 Oslo peace accords with the Palestinians, involving the latter receiving autonomy in the Gaza Strip from August 2005 and an area around the West Bank city of Jericho, religious opposition to the accord with the Palestinians was manifested in mass murder. A Jewish religious zealot, Baruch Goldstein, linked to both Kach and Kahane Chai, murdered 29 people and injured approximately 100 more in a dawn attack on a mosque in the West Bank town of Hebron in February 1994. Following the massacre, the Israeli government, as a sign of its commitment to crush Jewish extremist groups that

systematically used violence to try to achieve their objectives, banned both Kach and Kahane Chai.

The political significance of religious parties and movements on policy making in Israel is unlikely to fade soon for several reasons. First, the basis of both nationality and the creation of the state of Israel remains a sense of religious identity, making the issue consistently vulnerable to the influence of religious Jews, some of whom are also political extremists. Second, there has been strong growth in the numbers of religious Jews since the early 1970s, including recent immigrants. Now, it is claimed that up to half of Israeli Jews "respect the religious commands," while 1 in 10 belongs to the *haredi* (ultra-orthodox) community. Around 60% of the *haredi* population is younger than 25 years of age—and the proportion of the ultra-orthodox will grow because many have large numbers of children. Many such people form the core support and activist base of the—sometimes extremist—religious movements and parties. Third, the latter will continue to have major political influence because of the nature of the country's political system, which is based on proportional representation and a very low minimal threshold of 1.5% of the vote to be represented in the Knesset (Israeli parliament). As a result, such parties have the ability to acquire political rewards in return for supporting the main secular political parties, including Kadima, Likud, and Labour, in the context of the formation of coalition governments. Finally, in recent years, there has been a dovetailing of secular security concerns (concerned with Israel's regional national interests and power) and religious interests (an aversion to handing over land to the non-Jewish Palestinians, as it is believed to be against God's will). Overall, the Jewish movements are a powerful coalition of interests, often able to apply significant pressure on Israel's government via both the ballot box and civil society.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949) established the MB in Egypt in 1928 as an organization providing welfare services, aiming to encourage and defend morality. The aim was to Islamize society "from below." Initially, the MB was just one of a number of small Islamic associations engaged in charity work among the poor of the country's fast-growing

cities. MB built mosques, schools, and clinics, providing an Islamic welfare framework by which Muslims could live without reference to the Western and secular influences around them. However, the MB was soon drawn into politics. It developed explicit political goals, involving a radicalization of its philosophy and tactics and the creation of an armed wing. Nonetheless, the MB's main focus remained education from below and the infiltration of Egypt's political and social institutions. The combination of its welfare services, its religious credentials, and the government's increasing authoritarianism combined to make the MB Egypt's largest religious movement, with tens of thousands of followers, which also pursued explicitly political goals.

It is important to understand that the brotherhood, despite its own rhetoric, is not a manifestation of "traditional Islamism." Instead, the MB is a key example of a *modern* social movement: mass based, populist, supported mainly by the urban middle and lower classes, using a cell-based structure, and embracing religious reformism. In addition, the MB focuses explicitly and primarily on Egypt's domestic situation: It wishes to reform the country, not the universal Islamic community as, for example, the transnationalist group Al Qaeda aims to do. Like Egypt's secular nationalists, the MB struggles primarily for Egyptian independence, with a rallying cry that reflects this aim: "Egypt for the Egyptians."

After al-Banna's assassination in 1949, the MB became close to the revolutionary government of Gamal Abdul Nasser, following its accession to power in 1952. By the mid-1950s, however, relations had soured following an unsuccessful attempt on Nasser's life. As a result, the MB was proscribed, thousands of members were imprisoned, and its leader, Sayyid Qutb, arrested. He was executed in 1966. During his captivity, Qutb produced a comprehensive commentary on Islamic history, arguing that Egypt was not an Islamic country, as it was in a state of *jahilya* (religious ignorance). Muslims could not live a proper religious life in such circumstances. It was therefore necessary to overthrow the existing political order by any means.

Qutb's ideology was deeply influenced by the revolutionary radicalism of a contemporaneous Indian Islamist, Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi (1903–1979). Qutb's ideological development fell into two distinct periods: before 1954 and from

1954 until his execution. During his second, radical phase, Qutb declared "Western civilization" the enemy of Islam, denounced leaders of Muslim nations for not following Islam closely enough, and sought to spread the belief among Sunni Muslims that it was their duty to undertake jihad to defend and purify Islam.

Following President Anwar Sadat's accession to power in 1970, the brotherhood enjoyed improved relations with the government—because it was anxious to cultivate the MB's support in the state's fight against secular leftists. Taking advantage of Sadat's overtures, the brotherhood built mosques, schools, and clinics. Its financial position improved following the founding of a range of profitable companies and financial institutions. Such entrepreneurial flair was not, however, appreciated by all brotherhood members, and the movement split into two sections: the "radicals" and the "moderates." The latter believed in a gradualist approach, to Islamize society slowly by increasing the brotherhood's influence as a popular movement, while the former wanted a speedier, more radical action. Later, after Sadat's assassination in 1981 at the hands of Islamists, moderate MB members entered electoral politics. Since then it has consistently won seats in parliament, in line with President Mubarak's goal of "limited democracy" in Egypt.

The radicals were too impatient for change, too opposed to what they perceived as a sham democracy to join in such a program. Breaking away from the moderates, several new Islamist movements—including Takfir wal-Hijra and al-Jihad—were founded. Together they were the core of a shifting set of religious-political movements under the general title of al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Groups). Stimulated by the writings of Qutb, they were characterized not only by a denial of conventional electoral politics but also by the use of terrorist tactics to achieve an Islamic state. Members of Takfir wal-Hijra were responsible for a number of political assassinations, while the al-Jihad group not only killed President Sadat but also tried to kill two government ministers and the parliamentary speaker at the same time. The state then decided to crack down on the radicals. More than 300 members of al-Jihad were arrested and some executed, specifically for their alleged involvement in the murder of members of the state security forces in the town of Asyut in the early 1980s.

The divisions between the secular nationalists and the MB in Egypt developed in the 1980s into a conflict between two different conceptions of society and two different ideas of what are desirable social and political changes. The conflict spilled over from the religious sphere into the fields of politics, economics, and social affairs. The goal of the MB—to build an Islamic state—was an attempt to transform the language of politics, to build as broad as possible a coalition of opposition forces, and to deliver welfare benefits, especially to the underprivileged urban poor. More generally, the Islamists of the MB wanted to reverse what they saw as a cataclysmic slide into godless modernity, exemplified by a secular society.

Conclusion

As this discussion of the relationship between selected religious movements and politics has shown, religious movements have specific aims and objectives that differ according to their specific contexts, backgrounds, and history; however, they share an overt disavowal of the desirability of secularization and associated modernization that highlight state attempts to restrict religion to the private sphere. Religious movements work at the level of civil society. Their aim is not usually to enter conventional electoral politics and try to achieve the changes they want to see by involvement in political society. Instead, their focus is on the community or grass-roots level, where they seek to build mass support, whether working alone or in coalition with other like-minded groups. The intention is to change both the status quo and the prevailing power equation, so as to build a society with more involvement of religion in everyday matters that affect the well-being, norms, and values of the mass of the people.

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See also Christianity; Hinduism; Islam; Judaism; Religiosity; Secularism; Social Movements

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REORGANIZATION

This entry discusses the meaning of the term *reorganization* in the public sector, the targets, the argument, and the models for reorganization and concludes by assessing the consequences of these changes.

The Meaning of Reorganization

In political science and public administration, reorganization usually refers to government reorganization. But one can talk about legislative reorganization and judicial reorganization as well. Reorganization refers to the imposition of a new way of organizing, or “to organize differently,” which often involves an extensive alteration of the structure of government.

Any such reorganization or “shake-up” introduced must by definition produce extensive and drastic changes to government; minor changes in government are not considered to be an act of reorganization. In addition, there may be a wide range of goals in reorganization, but the assumption is that these goals—efficiency, effectiveness, and changes in policy—are all being addressed through structural changes in the public sector.

The expression “government reorganization” has a neutral connotation. It does not directly praise or condemn the Old System as being good or bad. The emphasis is on the introduction of a different way of organizing government. On the other hand, the word *reform* is value laden. Reform refers to a change for the better as a result of correcting

abuses, as in the common statement, "Corruption in government is rampant, so there is an urgent need to reform government." So the words *government reorganization* and *government reform* are different, although at times they tend to be used interchangeably.

Recent developments in the field of political science and public administration have emphasized "reform" over "reorganization." The new buzzwords are, for example, "administrative reform," "government reform," "governance reform," "NPM reform," "reinventing government," and "revitalizing government." One reason why the phrase word *government reorganization* is being replaced by these new words has to do with the beliefs among practitioners and scholars that the old government machines are in an urgent need of being changed drastically. This has been true in both the developed and the less developed countries. The phrases *administrative reform* and *government reform* are very broad and do not specify the intended nature of reform. In fact, *administrative reform* is a broader term than government reform because the latter focuses on the reform of government, while the first covers broader areas such as the public sector and civil society. Meanwhile, the terms *governance reform*, *new public management (NPM) reform*, and *reinventing government* are driven by specific doctrines or principles of reform. We will return to this topic later in the entry.

The Targets of Government Reorganization

There are many ways to implement programs for government reorganization. The most common kind of government reorganization is structural. For example, government reorganization may involve the creation of new ministries and departments, the merging of several lower level units into a higher one, and the structural expansion of a government agency. The assumption is that the manipulation of structural variables is the key to improving how the system operates. Other targets of reorganization are more focused on procedures. For example, one of the common targets for reorganization has been budget processes. Other targets have included personnel policy in government, policy making, ethics, and strategic management.

Changing the structure of government organization involves, for example, choices between

pyramid or flat organizations, centralization or decentralization, strong or weak leadership, small or big government, the variety of forms of public organizations in government, the size of the public sector in relation to the private sector, the role of the civil society and citizens in public affairs, and the configurations of multilevel governance. One of the most common structural reforms during the past several decades has been the creation of executive agencies that have responsibility for a limited number of functions and enjoy a good deal of autonomy from direct controls by the rest of government. The contrary pattern of reorganization has been to create very large cabinet-level departments that are designed to coordinate a wide range of public functions and provide more coherent packages of services to the public.

The systemic choices for reorganizing public budgeting are, for example, line item budgeting, performance budgeting, program budgeting, or zero-based budgeting; nonintegrated or integrated budget; and annual or multiyear budget. In personnel reorganization, the system choices have been, for example, spoils or merit system; for recruitment; position classification system or contract system; and performance appraisal or seniority for internal promotions. An example of the reorganization of the policy process may involve the extent to which government mechanisms facilitate citizen participation in the policy decision-making process and implementation. Attempts to change the nature of personal morality, professional ethics, organizational ethics, and social ethics can also be seen as a reorganization of the agency's normative system that is used to control the behavior of individuals within government. Reorganization in strategic management may involve the implementation of strategic tools such as best practices, benchmarking, and balanced scorecards. Again, these represent attempts to control the behavior of individuals within the public sector.

The Arguments for Government Reorganization

The most common reason given for carrying out government reorganization is to improve the efficiency of the government machine. Government officials responsible for reform will usually justify a major bureaucratic reform by claiming that such

institutional change will bring in better services to the people and savings to government. Efficiency is defined as the ratio between input and output: More output is obtained from the same amount of input. There are, however, hidden agendas in every reorganization effort.

Scholars have pointed out that there are vested interests involved in any attempt to reorganize government. Reform, as a matter of fact, *is* politics. After government reorganization, there are always those who gain and those who lose in the reform process. For example, the splitting off of a new ministry from an old one opens up new opportunities for senior government officials to fill in new higher positions, and there may be a better "target" for interest groups attempting to influence policy. As a separate entity, the new ministry can also demand more allocation of budget. New laws, rules, and regulations are issued to provide legitimacy and authoritative power to the officials in the new ministry. Another example is that reform proposals put forward by central agencies such as the Civil Service Commission, the Budget Bureau, the Ministry of Finance, and the Government Reform Commission have tendencies to consolidate power and tighten control over the entire bureaucracy. Such organizations will claim that central executive control was necessary to promote bureaucratic responsiveness, especially from line agencies. Proposals by a single department such as the national police or a regulatory organization usually contain clauses to increase their autonomy and authoritative power. In short, more positions are requested, new suborganizations are proposed, new legal power is justified, and bigger budgets are requested.

Further, most proposals for government reorganization designed by government officials involve suggestions for bureaucratic structural expansion and power aggrandizement. Scholars (such as Anthony Downs, 1967) have pointed out that, in fact, all organizations have inherent tendencies to expand. C. Northcote Parkinson's famous law states that "work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion" (quoted in Downs, 1967, p. 16). Downs summarized the reasons why bureaucracy inherently seeks to expand as follows: (a) an organization that is rapidly expanding can attract more capable personnel and more easily retain its most capable existing personnel than one

that is expanding slowly, stagnating, or shrinking; (b) the expansion of any organization normally provides its leaders with increased power, income, and prestige; (c) growth tends to reduce internal conflicts in an organization by allowing its members to increase their personal status without lowering that of others; and (d) increasing the size of an organization may also improve the quality of its performance (per unit of output) and its chances for survival (p. 17). Subsequent analysts have pointed out that increasing the size of an organization may create more managerial problems than it creates benefits, but many bureaucratic organizations persist in seeking expansion.

Launching a major government reorganization plan also can be good publicity for the government. It creates the impression that the problem lies in the government machine, not the political executive and that the elected government is seriously addressing the problem of inefficiency and corruption in the bureaucracy. This kind of bureaucratic bashing pleases the public voters, who are bored with and frustrated by their bitter experiences with government bureaucrats. Indeed, when governments have few opportunities to address a policy problem directly, they often reorganize government in order to appear to be doing something.

The experiences of countries at reorganization indicate that despite all the publicity on government reorganization, at the end, the bureaucrats are often able to outsmart the political executive. In many cases, not much has been achieved from government reorganization. Instead, the reform commissions have produced mountainous piles of reports and studies on the ideas and reform plans that never got implemented. Not much bureaucratic reform was actually undertaken, and the "ugly old bureaucracy" remains as inefficient and venal as ever. Again, reorganization and reform are as often as not symbolic policies rather than effective means of solving public problems.

Another reason why government reorganization is needed is the argument of the turbulent environment. Government reorganization is needed because of the volatile, unpredictable, and rapidly changing environment. For example, the Minnowbrook Conferences, held by Syracuse University in 1968 and 1988 for scholars in public administration, were organized to bring in new ideas about government reorganization and

improvement. In the age of rapid globalization, there is an urgent need to reorganize government in line with this new international system. Another factor in support of government reorganization is the revolution in information technology that is drastically changing the way governments work. Most recently, the economic crisis of the early 21st century is forcing substantial rethinking of the role of government and of the means of organizing the public sector.

Reorganization in the public sector can also be used to alter the policies adopted and implemented by government. While efficiency may be difficult to attain, given the numerous barriers that exist within the public sector, reorganization may be more effective in altering policy, simply because of the different priorities that may be involved when an organization is independent or when it is contained within a different department or ministry. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard moved from the Department of Transportation to Homeland Security after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. After that move, the agency shifted its priorities toward security and away from safety on waterways.

The Models of Government Reorganization

Thinking about how to implement government reorganization leads us to making choices about centralization and decentralization, big or small government, strong or weak leader, pyramid or flat structures, the extent of citizen participation, the power relations between superiors and subordinates, the appropriate values and culture, and the nature of environment one is facing. All these variables are important for defining how government will function and the type of choices that the organizations have on which to base their decisions.

B. Guy Peters (1992) proposes a theoretical analysis of "government reorganization." According to him, reform and reorganization is one of the most common activities in government. He pointed out three sets of approaches to reform: purposive model of reform, environmental dependency, and institutional models of organization change. First, purposive-action approaches assume that one or more actors in the reorganization process have a particular end state in mind for the public sector when they propose the reform or reorganization.

The need to reorganize government may come from perceived inadequacies of existing arrangements, a sense of "overload" and "ungovernability" in public organizations, and the desire of the rational individual bureaucrat to maximize his or her personal utility. Second, the environmental-determinism approach assumes that changes occur as a function of the relationship of the administrative structures to their environment. The need to reorganize comes from the reaction of government to innovations in their environment that provide them with the opportunity to exploit the new situation. Another explanation is from contingency theories, which argued that "the internal structuring of organizations will, over time, come to reflect the characteristics of the task environment" (Peters, 1992, p. 206). The population ecology models assume that the best way to understand government reorganization is to look at the evolution of entire populations of organizations. Third, institutionalism approaches assume that reform requires to some extent altering the internal values of the organization, which includes the modification of the operative values of organizational members. Institutional models in political science "stress the durability of organizational values, or cultures, and therefore the extreme difficulty that may be encountered in attempting to produce any rapid or significant changes in performance through reorganization" (Peters, 1992, p. 211).

The traditional model of government organization, and perhaps reorganization, often follows the classic ideal-type bureaucracy of Max Weber. The characteristics of bureaucracy are as follows:

1. There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by rules—that is, by laws or administrative regulations.
2. The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones.
3. The management of the modern office is based on written documents (the files), which are preserved in their original or draft form.
4. Office management, at least all specialized office management—and such management is

distinctly modern—usually presupposes thorough and expert training.

5. When the office is fully developed, official activity demands the full working capacity of the official, irrespective of the fact that his obligatory time in the bureau may be firmly delimited.
6. The management of the office follows general rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive and which can be learned.

The literature in public administration is marked by efforts to find a more suitable way to reorganize government than Weberian bureaucracy. Peters (1996) proposes four alternative models: the market model, the participatory state, the flexible government, and the deregulated government. Michael Barzelay and Barbak Armajani (1992) observed the shifting from the bureaucratic paradigm to the postbureaucratic paradigm as a movement away (a) from the public interest to the benefits for individual citizens, (b) from efficiency to quality and value, (c) from control to winning adherence to norms, (d) from enforcing responsibility to building accountability, and (e) from justifying costs to delivering value.

In many parts of Europe and the Antipodes, the reform movements are loosely called the NPM. Christopher Hood (1991) summarized the doctrines of NPM as consisting of (a) hands-on professional management in the public sector, (b) explicit standards and measures of performance, (c) greater emphasis on output controls, (d) shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector, (e) shift to greater competition in public sector, (f) stress on private sector styles of management practices, and (g) stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use.

The NPM model was not, however, widely adopted in Southern Europe because of the emphasis on administrative law as the means of controlling within the public sector.

In the United States, the use of private sector styles of management came to be known as the reinventing government movement. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler (1992) attacked the “sluggish centralized bureaucracies” as unfit for the rapidly changing, information-rich, knowledge-intensive society and economy of the 1990s. They proposed,

instead, “the entrepreneurial government,” consisting of 10 principles:

1. catalytic government (steering rather than rowing),
2. community-owned government (empowering rather than serving),
3. competitive government (injecting competition into service delivery),
4. mission-driven government (transforming rule-driven organizations),
5. result-oriented government (funding outcomes not inputs),
6. customer-driven government (meeting the needs of the customer, not the bureaucracy),
7. enterprising government (earning rather than spending),
8. anticipatory government (prevention rather than cure),
9. decentralized government (from hierarchy to participation and teamwork), and
10. market-oriented government (leveraging change through the market).

This style of reform was more compatible with governing in the United States because of the long-standing emphasis on management within the public sector.

Another emerging framework for reorganizing government is “governance.” At the abstract level, as noted by Bidhya Bowornwatana (1996), governance in public administration refers to a reform model that advocates the following principles: a smaller government that does less, a flexible and global-vision government, an accountable government, and a government that is fair. From the government’s experience in the United Kingdom, R. A. W. Rhodes (1996) concludes that governance is about managing networks that are self-organizing and autonomous. The governance approach has involved the use of social actors through networks as a means of providing public services, as well as a means of shaping public policy. These social actors have tended not to be market actors but more often represent a variety of civil society organizations and interests.

For some, mostly practitioners, government reorganization meant the introduction to government of management tools such as the balanced scorecard, strategic planning, the learning organization, reengineering. Many scholars have criticized such practices as being part of management fads and fashions that do not really improve government performance and that the management tools applied will soon go out of fashion.

The Consequences of Government Reorganization

The study of government reorganization cannot be complete without considering the impact of government reorganization. What are the intended and unintended consequences of government reorganization? Who gains? Who loses? Have the power relationships in a ministry or department been changed? Have public services delivery been improved? What are the positive and negative unintended consequences? Several observations can be made about the results of reorganization. First, important consequences of government reorganizations take a long time to materialize. The time span of such an impact bypasses the time in office of the policymakers. Second, the question of who is responsible for any negative consequences of reform can get very complicated, as during the course of time (e.g., 10 years) several actors may have been involved with the reorganization policy. New policies may be introduced one after another, with the effect that it is almost impossible to trace accountability.

Third, the immediate gainers and losers of government reorganizations are the political executives and subordinate bureaucrats. Some actors are promoted to newly established positions. Some others are reshuffled to less important positions. The political executive in the short run gets political points from their publicity of the reform plans. Fourth, the success of reorganization efforts to change the values and cultures of government programs, and of the system more generally, cannot be easily proven. They are not easily visible, and change takes a long time. As Frederick Mosher (1967) pointed out, a reorganization effort is not a one-time thing but a step in progressive history. Fifth, the majority of reorganization efforts tend to fail in meeting their proclaimed goals. Although

new positions have been created and more money spent, efficiency has not improved.

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See also Administration Theory; Bureaucracy; New Public Management

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REPRESENTATION

Political representation is a basic institution of Western modernity. Put simply, it exists so that those governed can govern indirectly. It thus creates a minimum level (considered to be the only realistic one) of self-government. Under the systems of modern representation, the governed choose those who will govern through elections and authorize them to do so in their name, thus

granting representatives a mandate to look after the interests of the governed.

In its original Latin form, the word *representatio* covered a vast semantic field, and this has been further widened over time. To represent means to portray, describe, narrate, and duplicate—to *make present* something that is not and cannot be so. Hence, the problems begin with the very word, and circumscribing its significance by talking about “political” representation does little to resolve this.

Even if, officially, they do not bear this name, forms of representation—or, at least, institutionalized communication between the governed and the governing—can be seen even within those political regimes not commonly classified as representative. Further, theoretically, no collective body can exist without some form of (even symbolic) representation. A people, nation, political party, class, interest, or religious belief needs to be represented—and have its own spokespersons—so that it can be recognized by both its own members and everyone else. However, if representation is a constituting element of a collective body, this raises the key question of how the wishes of that body can be transmitted to its representatives.

Belying modernist rhetoric regarding the individual, a collective body in the real world of politics is effectively the aggregation of preexisting collective bodies. A plurality of collective bodies—territorial communities, associations, organized interests, political movements and parties, and so on—decides to constitute a unitary political body with representatives who lead them and act as their spokespersons. It is thus represented to the external world through these spokespersons, and a plurality of wills is thereby transformed into a collective will. We might ask, however, how can representatives perform this task? If the collective body consists of heterogeneous parts, willing or induced to cohabit, but possessing different and often conflicting desires, what will these representatives effectively represent?

Of course, no form of representation is ever a perfect replication of the original concept. To represent means to interpret, and interpretations are inevitably arbitrary and distorting. To represent something—and political representation is no different from literary, pictorial, photographic, cartographic, or any other form of representation—can

also signify improving and embellishing it. However, this can never be a perfect replication, especially so in the case of a collective body. Here, to represent implies generalizing, abstracting, and, basically, manipulating, especially when the mandate is reduced to such a simplified and stylized act as voting—in other words, a mark on a ballot paper. Allegiance is therefore a constant, theoretical, and political obsession for political representation. What defines it and to what degree this mirrors the original is another fundamental issue of the debate.

Some theorists even deny the idea of a mandate conferred on representatives and/or of representation itself. Two illustrious authors—Hans Kelsen and Joseph A. Schumpeter—crudely define representation as being nothing more than a “fiction,” which, according to Kelsen, is useful for its legitimizing role since it convinces those governed that they are governing, while, in Schumpeter’s view, this fiction is inevitably damaging because electoral mechanisms force those governing to be opportunistic rather than to pursue the collective good. Therefore, what is conventionally called a representative government is merely a device legitimizing the division of work between the governed and the governing, transforming electoral consensus—which is often fictitious given the workings of electoral systems—given by voters to a political party, a coalition, or a leader, into the will of the collective body. Rather than hereditary or other principles, representation is the mechanism that modern societies have adopted to validate their governors. This is not without its complications, beginning with the fact that representative regimes not only authorize the representatives of the majority party obtaining electoral success to govern but also give a voice, again through representatives, to the defeated minorities, thus enabling and encouraging them to interact with the representatives of the majority. It is then expected that everyday politics will establish in what way and to what degree this takes place.

However, even if what we call “representation” is not really representative, it still offers a series of extremely valuable advantages: Mandates (at least in the West) are limited over time, there is the opportunity to replace governments, and the electoral procedure allows citizens to voice—individually or

collectively, peacefully or otherwise—their opinions and interests. Above all, representation creates for both the governed and the governing the not inconsiderable opportunity of communicating fairly regularly with each other. The process is anything but linear, and the equality of citizens is a myth; however, representation establishes an incentive structure that enables the governing to govern and to minimize conflict with those governed. Of course, these incentives do not always work because the governed are a heterogeneous body with variegated interests, and satisfying the wishes of all is thus inconceivable. However, to date, representation has generally worked, albeit with some notable accidents along the way.

Experience tells us that representation also considerably reduces the costs of cultural, political, and social conflicts. These do not disappear, but the electoral and parliamentary procedures of representation increase the chances of their being managed peacefully. A represented interest is an acknowledged interest and, once it has accepted representation (and is allowed to be represented), its explosive potential is attenuated. It may not happen: Some interests transcend the boundaries of representation and maintain a position of rejecting it and refuting the rules. While there are many such examples, these only serve to confirm the fact that representation and representative government are inevitably somewhat imperfect.

Given the number of controversial issues and questions surrounding the topic of “representation,” it is no surprise to discover that, for the past 3 centuries, theoretical work has attempted to give form to the necessarily provisional device of representation. The great challenge facing representation at the outset is what could be defined as the challenge of pluralism. This is a challenge, which, to date, aside from momentary defeats, representation has generally won. However, it is a challenge that is not yet over. It has been (and continues to be) very demanding, and it is interesting to observe how theory has approached the issue.

What can be defined as the “pure” theory rejects pluralism outside the political arena, based on the logic that there is a fundamental unity of the collective body and its representatives and that representation essentially aims to legitimize the representatives’ authority. Representation denotes

the population as a whole, and any mandate dictated by the represented to its representatives—who are, therefore, “trustees”—is to be discouraged because it would prejudice the independence and ability of representatives to transcend specific interests when in pursuit of what the theory solemnly defines as the common good.

Alongside this pure theory, however, there is an “impure” or pragmatic theory, which over time has undermined the former. This enjoys a more relaxed relationship with pluralism since it acknowledges the composite nature of the collective body and comes to different conclusions. From this perspective, there is nothing wrong with seeing the representative as a delegate or a spokesperson for particular interests, but it is to be hoped that such representatives will be capable of rising above these interests to have a more farsighted view. The synthesis effect is achieved through the interaction, whether through negotiation or conflict, between different interests within the representative body. The outcome is not necessarily more modest than what was promised but is effectively something not quite achieved by the pure theory.

Obviously, under these conditions, no government is sufficiently representative (not least because the objectives are very unclear), and this insufficiency has been a recurrent issue within public debate. There is always someone ready to denounce the lack of representation and to look for reparation. There is always some political force that claims to be more representative than its competitors. This is still happening at the dawn of a new millennium when representation is clearly encountering considerable difficulties.

In recent decades, the decisions taken by authorities not based on any electoral mandate, or that have minimal representative links to those affected by their decisions, have multiplied. As an example, it is sufficient to consider the deterritorializing processes of political authorities provoked by globalization. Moreover, in large part, thanks to the media, the sophisticated manipulative methods with which electoral competitions are now held shape (and distort) communications between the governed and the governing. Democratic regimes have recently tended to enhance the role of the executive power to the detriment of the elected assemblies. The executive is always a representative

body, as is its leader, because it is chosen by the electorate. But what is the level of representation of an individual and the limited committee working with them in relation to the complexities of contemporary democracies? If representation implies interpretation, will what contemporary democracies propose be all too simplistic and dismissive? Finally, according to current theories, there are also those who want to remove representation from the political vocabulary, acknowledging the possibility both of forms of representation not supported by a popular mandate and of forms of democracy not founded on representation.

Put simply, it is possible to divide representation as occurring in three main periods:

1. individual representation, in which the representatives were chosen from a minority of notables, a limited group based on wealth and culture; social prestige was thus the decisive element in electoral competition;
2. collective representation, organized through political parties; and
3. post-political party collective representation—that is, the current era, which is fairly uncertain and complicated.

The outlines of these three epochs will be described below as we disentangle the key (pure and impure) theories relevant to the definition and social construction of representation.

Pure Representation Theory

Modern political representation was invented in Great Britain in the 17th century by reusing and renewing long-standing institutions. Needing to replace a monarch who ruled by divine right and was, therefore, the representative of God on earth, parliament had the idea to designate itself as the representative of the people. The problem was that while God is abstract and remote, the people are rather closer and more concrete. Although it is not entirely clear who and what “the people” were, representation had a precedent in that of the *ancien régime*.

From the time that large territorial, political entities began to organize themselves around a central power, the problem arose for sovereigns of

persuading civic and religious potentates, collective bodies, and lower level territorial units to acknowledge their authority and cooperate with them. The solution adopted was that of consultation through agreements and reciprocal recognition of powers, privileges, and rights. This practice also had the advantage of assembling in a single place, and at the same time, the entire collective body, whose unity was thereby “represented” while at the same time “representing” (since it was frequently impossible for the existing potentates to be directly present).

However, both the transition to modernity (which eroded the old centers of power and established new ones) and the growing monarchical ambitions of unifying and governing the territory required a change in representation methods. The dispersion of power over a multiplicity of potentates, which had been confirmed by *ancien régime* representation, had become intolerable for large territorial states. There were two main alternatives available to such states. The first was that the monarchy should limit the competing powers without formally annulling them, as would be the case in the French model: The States General ceased being convened in 1614. The second was that of unifying the competing powers in a single body representing the whole of collective society, as was the case in England.

The extraordinary theoretical move devised by Hobbes was that of representing the entire collective through an artificial figure and imagining it to be constituted no longer by preestablished powers but by a crowd of autonomous individuals who renounce their powers through a social contract. However, history ignored his preference for an individual as the representative of the multitude and the owner of sovereignty, and in the 1640s, following the conflict with the King (although the Malmesbury philosopher had not excluded this second possibility), England opted for a parliament, which, according to Hobbes, is nonetheless also a single artificial figure constituting the unity of the people rather than the dispersion of the crowd.

Once it had liberated itself of power by divine delegation, the elite sitting in parliament pursued the following logic: It was prepared to represent the people but was little inclined to hand over the power conquered in the people’s name. On the contrary, it wanted to concentrate this power,

monopolistically, among its members. However, if “the people” is an invention of parliament and if it exists only in so much as it is represented, the constraints of representation are, obviously, different from those of the ancien régime. Not only are the people unified by a single mandate but the mandate holder also receives a mandate that is no longer bound by the instructions of a preexisting power. Modern representation thus requires that the representative is not a delegate but a trustee who looks after the interests of the collective as a whole.

As frequently occurs, practice struggles to correspond to the ideal prescriptions of theory. If “the people” is an invention, there nonetheless exists a scattered population of aggregated interests that want to have a voice. Further, as representation is materially based on a formal act such as elections through which the mandate is manifested, it is sufficient that elections are minimally competitive so that, on the one hand, the electorate (even when carefully selected through requirements of property and wealth) may advance requests in exchange for their vote and, on the other, those aspiring to the mandate may encourage such requests. This raises the question, however, given the stiff competition for a parliamentary seat, of how candidates can be expected to merely display their personal merits and capacities and appeal to generic superior values and interests, thus renouncing the attempt to attract voters through the offer of some specific advantage.

The debate surrounding the nature of the mandate thus immediately became entangled. Among those who attempted to unravel the knots, the name of Edmund Burke leaps to mind. He stressed the idea that, over and above what he considered the legitimate pluralism of particular interests, the role of parliamentarians is not to satisfy the desires of this or that representative but to pursue, with full independence of judgment, what they consider to be the interests of the nation. The electorate is mandated by the nation, which is a much more vast and noble entity than those holding the vote. Burke’s parliament, in his famous 1774 *Speech to the Electors of Bristol*, was not a convention of ambassadors representing opposing interests but a representative assembly of a single nation sharing the same interests in a common good. As a consequence, representatives should not receive any

binding mandate but should simply and solely obey their own judgments and conscience.

Given that they had a number of illustrious precedents, Burke’s pronouncements were not intended to formulate a new theory of representation. Rather, he wanted to persuade voters that elected representatives would, first, provide the best possible service without receiving their instructions or having generalized aims and, second, would subsequently account for their actions. Since political circumstances are always the stimulants of theory, Burke was very familiar with the Whig ideas that opposed those of the Tories, according to whom it was the monarch who represented the nation—while parliament should content itself with transmitting local demands and partial interests.

In practice, the impact of Burke’s ideas was limited. An indication of this was possibly the fact that his speech was followed by a resounding electoral defeat. However, his arguments had been established as part of the theory of representation, reappearing on the other side of the Channel where revolutionary political theory, and, above all, Emmanuel Sieyès, laid down a fairly similar but much more linear and decisive path. The French situation in 1789, however, was different possibly because history did not allow it to update and adapt preexisting institutions but required it to found and construct new ones and possibly also because there were different challenges against which theory and practice were measured.

Rejecting Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s praise for democracy and condemnation of representation as incompatible with modern society, Sieyès not only argued that society should request that the principles of the division of labor be applied to politics and representative government, but, with revolutionary resolution, he also called for the autonomy of representatives. However, recalling Hobbes’s lessons, his solution, despite initially being similar to Burke’s, was rather more drastic. Sieyès’s concept of society was a compact, homogeneous, and unified space without any of the asymmetries of ancien régime society against which the Third Estate had arisen. Indeed, given that such a society did not exist in reality, rather than being discouraged, Sieyès invented his own. He promoted the nation to the role of a third, virtual actor, standing between the people and its representatives, hence

averting the possibility that one would assume a superior role in relation to the other since the nation could only be constituted through the legislative body. The nation was, therefore, a unitary and indivisible body but, equally, so too was the assembly as its exclusive spokesperson.

According to Burke, society and its articulations were not without political relevance. Worried by memories of the ancien régime and concerned with liberating at all costs the actions of the elective body and, therefore, the state, from claims by partial interests, Sieyès indicated the nation as the only alternative to the state. As for the citizens, they would express themselves only at the moment of voting. Pluralism was dissolved in the representative body, the single mind and voice of the nation, together with any inequality or diversity between individuals. According to Sieyès, it was not even important whether the assembly was divided into majorities and minorities: The singleness of the nation's intents allowed the will of the majority always to coincide with the common interest.

Among all the inventions, and all the hypocrisies, of modern political theory, the latter appears to be one of the most prized and persistent. It is assumed that the individual choices made by majority choice are based on a "unanimous will of the associates," equipped with the means—such as a majority principle—to allow the collective body to function and pursue its own ends. Underlying the majority principle—Sieyès was not lacking in common sense—there was also an indication of method: There should first be a division into majorities and minorities. The elected had the honor of debating issues together and, therefore, according to an expression that has recently come back into fashion, to "deliberate"—to discuss, negotiate, persuade, change opinion, and make compromises in order to arrive at a common will. Further, Sieyès perfected these arguments by formulating a plan of social and cultural engineering (which the French revolutionaries and their successors earnestly cultivated) and establishing a related model destined to be successful. We refer, of course, to the nation, which, according to Sieyès, in addition to its role as a virtual political actor, should also be established as a collective identity in which the material articulations of society could truly be transformed.

Impure Theory and the Revival of the Pure Theory

Burke and Sieyès transformed representation. Members of a class of notables, selected by census suffrage (a system in which votes are not equal but are weighted according to the social rank of the voter), wanted to entrust government to an assembly of notables, isolating it from its environment and thereby reducing eventual conflicts to differences of opinion. However, there was also an alternative model. The fathers of democracy in the United States had previously come up with a more pragmatic solution in relation to social and political pluralism, possibly because the constituting process took place under different conditions. First of all, they had no ancien régime to exorcize. Second, only a handful of colonies sought self-government and these contractually decided to unite, giving themselves a constitution along with common bodies of representation and government.

The authors of *The Federalist Papers*, and James Madison in particular, were well aware of the threat of factions. Nonetheless, since their existence was seen as inevitable, they also believed that any attempt to eliminate them would be a threat to liberty. Undoubtedly, as proposed by Burke, filtering them through an assembly that brought together a wise, enlightened, and patriotic minority ready to sacrifice its particular interests for the good of the nation would help reduce any potential threat (*Federalist Paper* No. 10, 1787). However, it seemed better to focus on the possibility of applying a representative government to a state with broad dimensions, which contained a numerous and diverse population among whom interests would be not only multiplied but also dispersed and balanced against one another in representative institutions.

In other words, representation was a risk, but it would have been senseless to pretend to ignore it like Sieyès by creating a virtual people. Given the presence of an established and peaceful tradition of self-government, of citizen and village assemblies, it was considered preferable to focus on the confrontation of opposing interests and on the capacity of a representative government to create equilibrium. The U.S. doctrine, more realistic than that in Europe, was thus not scandalized by the idea of sectoral interests and constituency service (harshly stigmatized in Europe as clientelism) since

it was felt that solutions would always be found for large collective issues.

The United States was still a distant province, unable to influence significantly representation in Europe where, for a further century, representative theory would continue along the path traced by Sieyès, convinced of the need to exclude any particular interest from the sphere of *stateness*. Moreover, circumstances were such that, just as the requirements of wealth and ability that limited access to the vote were beginning to weaken, a new and more rigorous version of the pure theory was created by those who were not political but were, instead, a new category of public law scholars formed under the shadow of the state. These scholars claimed that only the state has an autonomous life since nothing precedes it and nothing can oppose it—neither society nor the people, even less so the forces of social or political pluralism.

This area of reflection was inaugurated by a German doctrine, of which an emblematic exponent was Paul Laband. He disputed the concept of representation, resolutely rejecting the notion that the Reichstag's members were representatives of the people or even that they represented anyone at all. According to Laband, the electorate did not confer any mandate nor did it govern through its representatives. Once voting had ended, public participation definitively ceased.

Laband's sentiments were soon echoed in other European countries. In France, Raymond Carré de Malberg similarly reduced representation to a mere technical device for the recruitment of the ruling political class. According to Malberg, the representative represented the nation—considered as a unitary body, distinct from its individual and collective parts and even from the state itself. The members of parliament are hence the organ of the state, while voters only exercise nominal power and do not confer any mandate.

In reality, what this generation of jurists was pursuing was another goal that was much more important than the independence of those elected. In Germany, the aim was to reduce any possibility of competition between elected bodies, the monarch, and the executive's power. In France and Italy, the purpose was to rescale the parliamentary regime within the state—that is, the parliament, the political parties, and representation itself, in addition to the pronouncements of the electorate.

Nonetheless, a radical criticism of the representative regime was needed to address the enigma of representation based on electoral mechanisms. This was the task taken on by Gaetano Mosca, who, finding in this a confirmation of his theory of the political class, contrasted the normative structure of the pure theory with empirical observation: Not only were candidates and the elected subject to even the most modest private interests, but, to gain consensus, they flattered the electorate and actively encouraged particular interests. Voters, according to Mosca, prefer representatives who look after the interests of the voters. However, it is not just the voters who elect the representatives but the representatives who persuade the voters to elect them, by raising expectations and making commitments regarding their future work.

Further, Mosca believed that the impending intervention of political parties was destined to increase such disadvantages. His key idea, however—in truth, previously advanced by *The Federalist Papers*—was, above all, that political representation would be unable to comply with the prohibition of an imperative mandate. Theoretical work had denied this at length but should have been aware of this. Indeed, according to Mosca, it was perhaps precisely because theory had in reality always known this that it continued to deny it with such vehemence. Hence, it was an illusion to deny the existence of a pluralism of interests outside the state, essentially because political-electoral competition multiplies the number of candidates, making them spokespeople and, at the same time, transforming politics from a mission reserved for an elite identified with the state into a set of opportunities facilitating the social ascent of individuals and groups seeking to obtain favorable political measures.

In discussing representation, Mosca thus outlined an entrepreneurial concept of politics that was destined to last. Max Weber further developed this by identifying the existence of the “party enterprise,” which competes to obtain votes and public roles. This idea was then perfected, in the early 1940s, by Joseph A. Schumpeter, who definitively dismantled the myth of representation (and democracy) and reread politics as a marketplace. Schumpeter's ideas, inspired by U.S. democracy, saw the problem as lying in how democratic politics was constructed. He considered there to be a vast

range of latent interests that the political representative brings to light, puts into a form, and exploits to his or her own advantage. The political entrepreneur thus transforms latent questions into significant political interests to be used in mobilizing the electorate to his or her own advantage. The risk that follows from this is that government actions may become a mere subproduct of electoral competition. In other words, if the transformation by candidates of the latent preferences of voters into political demands is a key strategy within the competition for power, it therefore constitutes not only a resource but also a handicap for political representation, which is thereby more inclined to favor particular interests to the detriment of general interests.

Representation and Political Parties

The great novelty of the 20th century, as Mosca had perfectly understood, consisted in the advent of mass political parties whose success was strictly linked to the introduction of universal suffrage (which they enthusiastically promoted). Mass political parties were imposing machines with millions of members and solidly organized apparatuses. Never before, within national boundaries, had there been such a dangerous challenger to the authority of the state. This produced apocalyptic pronouncements by theorists, of which Mosca's was only the precursor. The reaction of one of the most sophisticated exponents of antiparlamentarianism between the two World Wars, Carl Schmitt, was exemplary as regards its catastrophic overtones: He imputed no less than the destruction of representation and liberal parliamentarianism to the intrusiveness of political parties and organized economic interests. According to Schmitt, once the elected had become party delegates, parliaments could do little other than ratify decisions made elsewhere.

It is difficult to deny the fact that, with the advent of mass political parties, a demanding intermediary imposed itself between the electorate and the elected. Compared with the parliaments of notables in which the elected were linked to each other only by fragile bonds of association, the introduction of party discipline hardened both parliamentary confrontation and political lines of division. However, Schmitt's depiction of a situation

whereby the intervention of political parties deprives democratic parliaments of the possibility of rational discussion while unrestrained centrifugal dynamics lacerate society and irreversibly prejudice the primacy of the state and its capacity to pursue the general interest was dictated, above all, by his own authoritarian leanings. In fact, if anything, political parties constituted a formidable reducing and reordering element as regards the pluralism of ideas and interests.

This was the view expressed by Max Weber in 1918, following World War I. Political parties, seen as large mass associations, served to discipline the conflict and, due to their preferred method of establishing leadership, were a precious antidote to the "iron cage" of instrumental rationality. It was not even true that the advent of political parties destroyed the possibilities for discussion and deliberation but merely moved their location to within the parties themselves. Schmitt's catastrophist ideas were challenged, again during the tempestuous Weimar years, by another illustrious jurist, Hans Kelsen, who, far from reprocessing liberal principles, attempted to reconcile representation with pluralism in order to recreate a credible form of political synthesis in place of that originally offered by the liberal state.

According to the Kelsenian critique, the use of the expression "representation" can even be considered abusive as it serves only to foment the illusion that the people really govern. However, when linked by party political mediation to universal suffrage, what is commonly called representation could be invigorated and given new meaning. Kelsen's thesis was that the combination of representative institutions and universal suffrage creates a renewed structure of political opportunities that in turn encourages old and new political entrepreneurs—previously concerned only with cultivating a limited electorate or securing entry into the political marketplace—to mobilize large numbers through political parties. Thus, not only can individual citizens, in association with others, overcome the conditions of marginality to which they would otherwise be condemned, but even the weakest interest groups are offered the opportunity to join together, demonstrate, and influence political decisions. According to Kelsen—an intellectual with social-democratic leanings—representation may well be a fiction, but, thanks to political

parties, it at least allows the governed to communicate with the governing, in addition to balancing society's inequalities. Refuting the idea that mass political parties prejudice every political synthesis, Kelsen argued that it would ultimately be elected bodies and the interactions between parties that would recalibrate the pluralism that the latter have previously reordered.

Kelsen's view was revived after World War II when political parties obtained official recognition, in some cases in the newly established Western European constitutions. Whether based on an illusion or not, political parties renewed and revitalized representation, receiving an exemplary recognition—but obviously not the only one—from another German jurist, Gerhard Leibholz, who had originally shared Schmitt's position. At the end of World War II, Leibholz pleaded the case for the official recognition of political parties and also raised a question that would soon backfire on them. If political parties are, he asked, rightfully incorporated into the constitutional structure, why not fully ratify this inclusion with all its consequences? In other words, he raised the extremely delicate subject of the internal party democracy.

While this, of course, has long been a thorny issue, political parties can effectively represent it, among other things, by adopting a "descriptive" method of representation—the driving force behind "substantive" representation. While promoting the social classes they represent to elected office and broadening the recruitment pool for political leadership, the premise is that, by sharing the same life experiences of the represented, representatives will become more sensitive to the former's needs. This understanding of political parties was, above all, symbolic. However, the argument on which descriptive representation is founded is not to be underestimated. So much so that it has recently been revived through propositions (albeit often unsuccessful) for the introduction of quotas benefiting segments of the population considered to be underrepresented.

However, the fundamental novelty that political parties embodied in the European experience was something different. They undertook the responsibility for a large part of the representative relationship. They received a mandate from citizens to represent them and became the repositories of their collective hopes (and therefore their trustees),

while representatives in elected assemblies were party delegates. As ever, of course, reality is more complex and often belies the image both of parliament as the exclusive place for negotiations between parties and of parties as an irremovable obstacle between the elected and the electorate. Mass political parties were more complex, and less disciplined, machines than those described in abstract models. They were the site of bitter internal conflicts and interacted in very different ways with the various segments of the electorate: For example, the middle classes were treated differently than the working classes, and confessional parties were represented in a different way from socialist parties. Even the most disciplined parties allowed space for direct contact between the elected and their electors—clientelism was frequently practiced—and party discipline was also considerably softened at times in elected assemblies. Thus, while in theory political parties (especially ideologically based parties) were trustees, in reality they were much more adaptive.

The equilibrium achieved by representation, thanks to political parties, was called into question by their transformation due to exogenous reasons: social change, political competition, and the intrusion of the media. Within a generation, the social transformations created by the great postwar developments, the erosion of class cleavages, the demise of ideologies, and the downsizing of political competition, on the one hand, made parties less attractive as large collective associations and, on the other, encouraged them to dilute their policy offer, to differentiate between electorates, and to concentrate mainly on their leadership. Already by the mid-1960s, Otto Kirchheimer had indicated the new political technology of the catch-all party and, 15 years later, when public financing of political parties was introduced, the concept of the cartel party (a party that uses the resources of the state to maintain its position within the political system) served to highlight the restrictions imposed on party competition. As a result of these changes, party machines have increasingly specialized in election campaigns and the selection of political personnel while simultaneously ceding a consistent part of their representative functions to interest groups.

Previously, traditional mass political parties had nurtured the grand ambition of covering the needs

of society as a whole. At the height of its development, sectors within society would disperse in all directions in the search for new methods of representation and new instruments to make themselves heard by public authorities. The political scene would be rapidly crowded with actors and organizations offering representation in competition with the parties: entrepreneurial associations, trade unions, and territorial communities. At the same time, a multiplicity of forms would emerge that, technically, must be considered representative but that would claim legitimacy on the basis that they offered possibilities for direct citizen participation: We refer, of course, to the associations and collective movements making up the galaxy of organizations that has become known as civil society. In various ways, therefore, the pluralism of interests and opinions has spilled out over the sides of the "political party as container," running down new paths. As a result, the geometries and landscapes of representation known to date have been overturned.

Representation After Political Parties

Overcoming liberal prejudices toward them, political parties adapted representation to mass democracy. However, toward the end of the 20th century, ancient anti-political party prejudices reappeared, presenting themselves as the defense not only of representation but also of democracy. The criticism was paradoxical. Political parties were simultaneously accused of being both an excessively permissive and an overly rigid filter of society, of representing too much and representing too little. They were accused of allowing themselves to be led by electoral opportunism and of being too amenable to partial interests (with highly damaging consequences for government performance). They were also charged with being intrusive bureaucracies concerned with the interests not of those they were supposed to represent but of their executives and managers. Parties sought, it was said, merely to optimize vote shares and public positions, to the detriment of technical competencies, the public purse, and the spontaneous generosity of civil society. None of these of course is an unfounded criticism.

As we know, political parties are anything but defunct. Nonetheless, they have been profoundly changed: From large collective associations, they

have become mainly political enterprises. The cartel party (as described by Robert S. Katz and Peter Mair) is a very different machine from the traditional mass political party, having ceded a large part of its representative capacity to other institutions. Parties are also hotly pursued by the media, which, through its extensive and obsessive use of surveys, claims to represent public opinion. Thus, the great concern that stimulated the pure theory of representation has resurfaced, as we can see in the work of the U.S. academic Hannah Pitkin, who effectively illustrated in *The Concept of Representation* the atmosphere of uncertainty surrounding representation and elaborated an essentially normative, but empirically based, response that recalled the lessons of *The Federalist Papers*.

When Pitkin's book came out in 1967, the demise of conventional mass political parties in Western Europe had only just begun. However, in the United States this had taken place some time earlier. As a consequence, Pitkin returned to the argument (dear to those in the United States) of the representative as delegate, along with that regarding the systemic effects of representative government. The representative, according to Pitkin, must demonstrate the qualities of a delegate *and* a trustee (and, even better, of a leader). That said, a delegate's role is far from easy. What is he or she a delegate of? Of the constituency from which he or she was elected? Of a group? Of a particular interest? Or of the party that has facilitated and sponsored his or her election? Appearing at the dawn of the era of collective movements (and the rediscovery of civil society), Pitkin's book constituted a detailed and updated inventory of the classic dilemmas of representation. It primarily confirmed that the vote is an approximate tool for identifying the electors' preferences, as well as directing the electorate's choices. Among the issues repropounded, or raised, by Pitkin, in addition to those concerning *delegates* and *trustees*, the most striking are those about *standing for* and *acting for* and "descriptive" and "substantive" representation. However vital political representation may still be, Pitkin argues, it is a problematic tangle from which it would be an error to expect too much. What counts, above all, is the overall performance of representative government. Representation requires the presence of the people in government activities, even if it does

not permit them to act directly and/or individually. To this end, representatives must know how to act, when required, based on what they believe in good faith to be the interests of the represented. The latter, in turn, will need to monitor the actions of their representatives—with both sides seeking to avoid conflict between the preferences of the represented and the decisions of the representatives. Representation, therefore, must be not only responsive but also accountable.

This formula does not preclude representatives from making decisions independently of preferences expressed by the citizenry; however, this can happen only in those cases where representatives provide public, credible justifications that allow the public to assess and sanction the choices made in their names. Government ceases to be representative, Pitkin concludes, when the contrast between the work of the representatives, general interest, and public opinion becomes systematic. The plurality of the representatives and the possibility of them not only deliberating together but also reciprocally controlling one another combine to reduce the risks.

An heir to the “impure” theory of political representation, Pitkin seeks to reconcile democracy and representation. She acknowledges the intrinsic difficulty of their cohabitation, admitting that the balance between the two will always be somewhat precarious. However, as she recently emphasized, it is not necessarily a foregone conclusion that the marriage between democracy and representation is a thing of the past. Rather, it could yet be saved by strengthening the role of citizens and injecting representative institutions with a more substantial dose of self-government and participation. Indeed, the latter consideration is one of the most frequently raised issues in the theoretical and political debates of the past decade.

The Last Metamorphosis?

The transformation and repositioning of political parties have had enormous effects on representation. Being unable to herald a return to the liberal model of representation, typical of a society of notables, it has led instead to the rediscovery of a double circuit of representation. The official circuit, in the main, connects the electorate, parties, parliament, and the executive, where, due to the

much discussed “presidentialization” of politics, the mandate conferred by voters has been significantly strengthened, making the head of government its direct consignee. Thus, a “lengthening” of the representation relationship—hinged on the personalization of government action—has occurred. Moreover, this relationship is often tinged with strong plebiscitary tones.

While political parties appear to have specialized in the selection of leadership candidates as well as electoral marketing, this does not exclude them from every representative activity. They remain as gatherers of interests, and great conflicts of interest still take place within them. However, the “presidentialization” of democratic regimes has created a more rigid filter than was the case in the past. The position and status of the representative institution *par excellence*—that is, parliament—is decidedly less certain, however. It would be wrong to say that parliaments have become marginal institutions, given that they still provide for the preparation of legislative norms and their members generally maintain constant contact with the electorate. However, they are now usually far more subordinate to the executive’s power than was previously the case.

Rejected by political parties, interests have managed to establish a second unofficial and nonelectoral path that stands in competition with the official one. This phenomenon had already assumed importance thanks to neo-corporate negotiations (involving collaboration between unions and the government), but it has become even more crucial thanks to the social changes brought about by post-Fordism and globalization. Representation of interests, as a result, has been separated from electoral representation: For example, in Europe, the phenomenon of lobbies, well-known in U.S. politics, has taken root and appears to be flourishing. So much so that it has been fully recognized and validated by the European Union (EU). Further, the unofficial path has been widened to embrace advocacy groups, nongovernmental organizations, and social movements.

What conclusions can we draw about these innovations? Not that official representation has become optional for democratic regimes. This is confirmed both by the debate about quotas for both elected and nonelected positions—to help

disadvantaged social groups—and the debate on political rights for immigrants. Representation is thus still a decisive condition of existence and recognition. It still implies that the people (despite the problems surrounding that term) must be taken into consideration. Nonetheless, we can see a swinging back of the pendulum toward the pure theory, thanks to the prominence given to representatives, whether official or unofficial.

Ultimately, it is no coincidence that theory has sought to replace the rhetoric of representation as responsiveness with that of retrospective judgment. Accountability is the new parameter against which the quality and legitimacy of democratic regimes are measured. The concept of accountability is discussed elsewhere in this encyclopedia; but, in general terms, we can say that accountability is the link created between the performance of representatives and the expectations placed on them. Their degree of receptiveness with regard to the preferences of the governed is left to the judgment of the governing. It is up to representatives to establish whether it is opportune or not to accept the suggestions of voters—evaluated alongside indications from opinion polls, the media, and pressure from organized interests and civil society. In return, the right of citizens to assess political performances is legitimized and bolstered. Further, a horizontal, less asymmetric accountability of government activity also takes place, thanks to both the separation of powers and private power. It goes without saying that what is thus offered at the end is a rather different interpretation of representation than that which previously prevailed.

Above and beyond the rhetoric surrounding it, representation implied an impulse from below (the represented) to above (the representatives). The rhetoric of accountability casts those governing as trustees, who, from their lofty position, decide which policies should be adopted, interpreting the needs of the governed and, above all, leaving to the latter the possibility of sanctions afterwards. The motives that necessitate such a change are the dissolving of the large collective bodies of reference (class and religious affiliations, etc.), the very evident growth of cultural pluralism, the difficulties that political parties have encountered in reconstructing themselves, the tendency of the media to dramatize issues while also influencing the political agenda, and the preeminence assumed

by rather *sui generis* institutions such as those governing the EU.

The rules established by theory for accountability are neither hurried nor superficial. It remains to be established, obviously, if and to what degree they are effective, and there are solid reasons for supposing that if representation is a fiction, then so too is accountability. Since representation, despite being a fiction, has produced effects that continue to be appreciated, the same reasoning could hold true for accountability.

However, the difficulties of representation encourage other innovations. Alongside the unofficial circuit of interests, a third one has been created, which, to varying degrees, repropose direct democracy—not as an alternative to the representative form but as a complement—to foster and promote greater citizen engagement in decision making. An established product of similar attempts is that denoted by the term *governance*. Located at the crossroads of interest representation and citizen participation, governance claims that policies are the product of partnership negotiations conducted by stakeholders and public institutions, with the latter no longer viewed as a consistent and hierarchical system pursuing the general interest, but as a varied constellation of agencies (and other kinds of interests) performing particular services.

Combining the representation of interests and participation, governance appears to be very insubstantial (particularly as a form of direct democracy). It is no surprise therefore that attempts are continuing, both in theory and in practice, to graft forms of direct democracy onto the trunk of representative government. Through neighborhood democracy, citizen juries, participative budgets, and associative and deliberative democracy, representative democracy continues to call on ordinary citizens to assist it, while the features of elected assemblies—discussion, confrontation between different points of view, and reciprocal persuasion—appear to be enjoying a second youth beyond the confines of such assemblies among the citizenry.

The effectiveness of these forms of course is also questionable. It is not a given that, as promised, they can indeed serve to transcend particular interests and bring ordinary citizens closer to politics. One could argue that deliberation appears limited to the periphery of the system and that citizens are

only periodically given a voice, with grassroots representatives, probably carefully selected by public authorities, taking the floor. However, as often is the case with innovations, the process is open-ended. By way of conclusion, we might finish with another question: Thanks to this double movement of political representation—on top toward personalized leadership and below toward direct democracy—is it the case that, after almost 4 centuries of resurrections, the phoenix of representative government is rising from the ashes, or are these innovations simply diversions accompanying the definitive burial of representation?

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See also Accountability; Accountability, Electoral; Accountability, Interinstitutional; Democracy, Direct; Democracy, Theories of

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REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY

The central tenet of the theory of representative bureaucracy is that passive representation, or the extent to which a bureaucracy reflects or mirrors the demographic characteristics of the population, leads to active representation, or the pursuit of policies reflecting the interests and desires of represented groups. The theory is premised on the belief that such attributes or characteristics lead to certain early socialization experiences that in turn give rise to attitudes, values, and beliefs that ultimately

help shape the behavior and decisions of individual bureaucrats. The theory of representative bureaucracy is based on the idea that the demographic composition of bureaucracy should reflect the demographic composition of society. Supporters believe that a bureaucracy that reflects the diversity of the general population implies a symbolic commitment to equal access to power and that shared personal characteristics of distinctive group members will offer a shared voice in the policy process. When members of identifiable groups, such as a specific racial or ethnic group, become public officials, they become legitimate actors in the political process with the ability to shape public policy and implementation. A representative bureaucracy provides a means of fostering equity or at least the perception of equity in the policy process. If the bureaucracy reflects the demographic origins of society, the theory implies that government will be more responsive to the public interest by better ensuring that all politically significant interests and values are represented in the formulation and implementation of public policies and programs. This entry continues with a discussion of the existing three main research streams on such a theory (passive representation, active representation, and linkage between passive and active representation) and concludes with remarks on possible future developments.

Research on Representative Bureaucracy

For more than 50 years, scholars have been interested in both the normative and empirical study of representative bureaucracy. Three important streams of research have emerged. First, researchers have focused on passive representation or the extent to which public bureaucracies reflect the demographic composition of society. Second, scholars have explored whether passive representation affects active representation. Third, scholars have explored factors that moderate the linkage between passive and active representation.

Passive Representation

Studies dating back to the 1960s examine passive representation or the extent to which women and racial and ethnic minorities are employed in the public sector. Researchers in the United States

first focused primarily on race and ethnicity as the demographic characteristics of interest, but similar approaches were later applied to examine the representation of women in public organizations. Because of the marked social, cultural, and economic differences among different minority groups, research on representation in the United States moved from combining minorities into one category to splitting minorities into four groups—African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Asian Americans. Researchers have examined a number of other demographic factors, such as age and disabilities and the interaction between race/ethnicity and gender. In the U.S. context, race, ethnicity, and gender are considered the most salient characteristics because numerous politically relevant attitudes and values are defined along these two dimensions.

In early works, scholars examined aggregate public employment trends to ascertain the extent to which women and minorities were broadly represented, but to understand the phenomenon better, subsequent studies segmented the employment figures by organizational level and occupational category. While women and some minorities appear to be reasonably well represented in terms of presence in public organizations (penetration), they tend to be overrepresented in the lower echelons of bureaucracies and underrepresented in the managerial and executive ranks (stratification). *Penetration* refers to how well minorities and females are represented in total numbers, while *stratification* is concerned with how well these groups are represented throughout the career ladder, particularly in senior executive positions. Thus, penetration examines the quantity of employment, and stratification provides information about the quality of the employment.

Mary Guy's work shows that while American women have found great success entering public service, they lag behind men in their ability to advance to the highest ranks and tend to be disproportionately located in certain agency types. Similarly, African Americans and Hispanics have had difficulty advancing to the highest levels of public service. While women and minorities have gained greater access to positions in government in the past several decades, a key challenge facing public organizations is advancing women and minorities into positions of greater responsibility and power.

Active Representation

Students of representative bureaucracy also suggest that bureaucracies broadly representative of the general public should produce policy outputs that meet the needs of all citizens. Here, scholars have examined the relationship between employment of minorities and women and agency outputs and outcomes affecting these groups. Specifically, research has examined the relationship between demographic representation and disciplinary actions and ability groupings in school systems, charges or complaints of discrimination filed by a regulatory agency, child support collection, housing loan eligibility determinations made by a federal agency, federal procurement decisions, and student educational achievement.

The evidence is largely supportive of the linkage between passive and active representation for minority groups. In the first study, linking demographic representation and policy outcomes, Kenneth J. Meier and Joseph Stewart found that the increased presence of African American street-level bureaucrats (e.g., schoolteachers) had a significant effect on policy outcomes favoring African American students. In a similar approach, John Hinderer found that as the employment of African Americans in the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission increased, discrimination charges filed on behalf of that group also increased. Sally Coleman Selden's research demonstrated that as the employment of African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians Americans increased in the Farmers Home Administration, the percentage of rural housing loan eligibility determinations favoring each group increased. Craig Smith and Sergio Fernandez found that increasing minority representation at the senior executive levels resulted in increased contracting with small minority-owned businesses.

The evidence for women is mixed. Early studies did not find that increased representation of women results in policy outcomes favoring women. However, Lael Keiser and her colleagues outlined several conditions that moderate the linkage between passive and active representation for women. Specifically, they note that the following three conditions facilitate the linkage between passive representation and representation of women: (1) the policy decision needs to directly benefit women, (2) the issue needs to be defined as gendered or

salient for women, and (3) the gender of the administrator making the decision fundamentally changes the relationship or interaction between the administrator and client. Kenneth J. Meier and Jill Nicholson-Crotty found that women file more sexual assault reports when there are more women officers in police departments.

Factors That Moderate the Linkage Between Passive and Active Representation

As noted above, implicit in the linkage between passive and active representation is the expectation that civil servants will hold similar attitudes to citizens with similar backgrounds and experience and that attitudes, in turn, will influence policy decisions. This expectation is founded on the following logic: Civil servants from a particular demographic group experience similar socialization patterns and therefore hold similar values and beliefs with members of that particular demographic group. Scholars have taken several approaches to examine whether conditions and attitude moderate the link between passive and active representation. Research has demonstrated that active representation is more likely to occur when administrators have considerable discretion, or at least the perception of discretion, in decision making and when policy decisions are meaningful or salient to a particular group. Bureaucrats need to have enough discretion to translate their value preferences into actions that will improve policy or program outcomes benefiting represented groups.

Some scholars have examined attitude congruence between minority and women bureaucrats and citizens. Recently, Mark Bradbury and J. Edward Kellough found that African American administrators hold attitudes very similar to those of African American citizens. Moreover, they found that White administrators exhibit very different attitudes from African American citizens. There are a few studies that demonstrate that attitudes shape role perceptions, which subsequently affect behaviors or produce policy outputs favorable, at least for minorities. Selden found that minority status is largely mediated by the adoption of a minority representative role. That is, active representation is driven by the degree to which minority bureaucrats perceive of themselves as minority representatives. Bradbury and Kellough's study showed that African American

bureaucrats are more likely to adopt a minority representative role than White bureaucrats. Because the research examining attitudes is less clear regarding women, Julie Dolan proposes that scholars measure and examine the linkage between gender consciousness and active representation of women in the population.

Another factor that moderates the linkage between passive and active representation is organizational socialization. Depending on the nature of how an organization socializes its members, it may either hinder or promote active representation. In one of the few studies that examine this factor directly, Vicky Wilkins and Brian Williams find that an organization's structure and processes can hinder representation. African American police officers revealed that they felt pressure to conform to the norms of their departments, which affected both their attitudes and their actions.

Future Development

Scholars interested in representative bureaucracy have much opportunity. In the United States, most of the existing research focuses on African Americans or minorities, generally. Future studies need to focus on the observed patterns of representation of Hispanics, Asian Americans, Native Americans, and women. Internationally, scholars need to examine further factors that affect the ability of administrators to translate their values into actions and factors that influence the adoption of a representative role.

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See also Bureaucracy, Street-Level; Implementation; Representation; Responsiveness of Bureaucracy

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REPUBLIC

The word *republic* is derived from the Latin *res publica*, meaning “the common thing” or “the public good.” Cicero, among other Latin writers, translated the Greek *politeia* into *res publica*, and, in 55 BCE, he wrote his famous political treatise *De Re Publica*. Although the term *republic* has been used in a variety of ways and historical contexts, we can distinguish two main meanings, “substantive” and “formal.” In the substantive sense, “republic” refers to a government in which the supreme power resides not in a monarch or a king but in a body of citizens entitled to vote. Thus, in a republic, power is exercised by elected officers and representatives governing according to law and accountable to the people. In this sense, Cicero refers to *res publica* as *res populi*, a thing or good that belongs to the people, or the public. Referring in turn to the Greek city-states, the Roman republic, the American republic, the French one, or the Dutch one, various authors from Cicero to Niccolò Machiavelli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, James Madison, and Hannah Arendt have understood “republic” as a political model (formal). This model is based on the absence of the oppressive rule of a monarch and the establishment of rule of law and mixed government, as well as a concern for the public good and virtue. The different versions of the republican model of public virtue and collective liberty have been opposed to liberalism, as being one-sidedly focused on individual liberty and private interest. In addition, the term has referred, in recent times, to a government having a chief of state who is not a monarch but, as a general rule, a president. In this minimal sense, it has been applied at a global scale. Sovereign political units such as Romania,

Bulgaria, or Iran (as an Islamic republic) have embraced this form of government. A republic can also be a constituent political and territorial unit, as seen in regimes such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or Yugoslavia.

The Roman republican model, with its respect for rule of law and results of elections, complemented by the alliance between the rulers and the ruled and sealed in victorious military combats, has been revered from the Renaissance until the present day. This entry traces the different meanings and realities of the republic through medieval times and the beginnings of modernity, the American and French revolutions, and into the contemporary period when it has continued to capture the political imagination.

The Middle Ages and the Beginning of Modernity

During the Middle Ages, *res publica* generally designated the political community in opposition to the church. It was composed of a body politic whose head was the prince or the king. In the late Middle Ages, new republics (e.g., the Swiss confederation) appeared in Europe when a number of small states or city-states embraced republican principles of government. Generally, these were small states or city-states in which the merchant class had risen to prominence. In Italy, given the absence of a powerful central government, prominent towns gained considerable independence and adopted communal forms of government (e.g., the Republic of Venice and that of Genoa). In Florence, the memory of the Greek city-state, the Roman republic as well as of the successful restoration of the republic between 1494 and 1512 inspired an exceptional generation of Florentine republicans. Machiavelli, its most outstanding representative, served as second secretary in the Chancellery of the restored Florentine republic between 1498 and 1512. Machiavelli's reinterpretation of the political legacy of antiquity was based on the notion of *virtu*—common liberty and love of the country—and inspired antiroyalist, republican literature in 17th-century England (e.g., James Harrington's republican tract *Oceania*). The republican revolts in Britain and the Netherlands were linked to the formation of a large merchant class who prospered from the trade. The Dutch Revolt, beginning in

1566, saw the Dutch republic reject the rule of Hapsburg Spain in a long conflict that would last until 1648. The Dutch republic resisted the greatest military power of the day and was the wonder of 17th-century Europe. In contrast to the Roman republican model centered on military virtue, the Dutch republic was centered more on mild commercial virtues. The Dutch commercial republic brought together the values of republicanism with those of democracy and tolerance. However, in a world of emerging large absolutist monarchies, the defense of the liberty of small republican governments was short lived. It was the modern revolutions in America and France that would leave a definitive scar on the "system" of absolutist monarchies. The actions of both nations marked the beginning of the Democratic Age and brought about a historical reversal of balance in favor of the republican *and* the modern democratic model of government.

American and French Revolutions and Their Aftermath

The American and French Revolutions did not start as antimonarchical movements, but they both led to the establishment of influential republican regimes. The American Founders drew inspiration from the history of the republics. Whereas the term *republic* does not come up in the Declaration of Independence, it appears, for instance, in Article IV of the Constitution, which "guarantee[s] to every State in this Union a Republican form of Government." The American Constitution established a federative republic, whose justification is to be found in *The Federalist Papers*. Using Publius as their common pen name, the authors of *The Federalist Papers* gave a novel meaning to the term *republic*. In contrast to a long-standing tradition of thinking epitomized by Rousseau, they argued that a republican regime is also possible in a large territory and population. In addition, in the influential *Federalist Paper* No. 10, James Madison opposes "republic" to direct democracy, but in the name of the democratic-universalistic principles of liberty and equality. The term referred to a government indirectly controlled by the people—in other words, what we call representative democracy. The United States developed into a federative republic through a system of indirect representation and the

dispersal of powers in the republic out of the concern, famously voiced by Madison, to avoid centralized despotism.

In contrast to the American case, the French Revolution resulted in a state of permanent instability and the gradual creation of a centralized republic. The model of the French republic, while centralized, was based on the democratic-universalistic principles of *liberté, égalité, et fraternité* (liberty, equality, and fraternity). Surely, Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire were initially more interested in the notion of constitutional monarchy than that of republic, arguing that republics tended to fall into anarchy or tyranny. Such thinkers quoted Montesquieu who had claimed that a city-state should ideally be a republic and had maintained that a limited monarchy would be better suited to a large nation. In fact, the 1789 *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen) and the new constitution promulgated in 1791 were not antimonarchical in principle, as the Revolution looked initially for a redefinition of the terms of monarchy—for instance, the 1791 constitution acknowledges the king to be the representative of God and of the nation, the instrument “from which all powers emanate.” The French Revolution turned “republican” only after Louis XVI’s “flight to Varennes,” which resulted in his condemnation as a traitor. The subsequent radicalization of the political climate led to the King’s eventual decapitation, the declaration of France as a republic, and the infamous Reign of Terror. Radicalization led France to a state of war both at home and abroad. Between 1792 and 1815, there was a permanent war between France and the European monarchies. The success of France in the Revolution pitted republican France against the European monarchies and saw republics spread by force of arms across much of Europe as a series of client republics were set up across the continent. The rise of Napoleon marked the end of the First French Republic, and his eventual defeat allowed the victorious monarchies to put an end to many of the oldest republics on the continent, including Venice, Genoa, and the Netherlands. Napoleon aimed to build a French continental Europe but stumbled especially in front of the British monarchy. The consequence was the strengthening of the grip of the European monarchies that crushed the

Revolution of 1848 and the awakening of nationalist feelings. Outside Europe, the Napoleonic Wars allowed some of the states of Latin America to gain their independence (e.g., Venezuela under the leadership of Simón Bolívar). These movements, despite their ambiguities, carried on the echo of emancipation and universal message of the democratic revolutions, gradually leading to the association between the concept of “republic” and the modern democratic principles of equality and liberty.

The 20th Century and Beyond

At the beginning of the 20th century, republics in Europe were but a few. This situation would radically change with the two World Wars. In both wars, political mobilization was, by and large, not driven by the monarchical principle. The aftermath of World War I was marked by the dismantling of empires: The Austro-Hungarian Empire, the German Empire, the Russian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire were turned one by one into republics. The most violent conversion occurred during the Russian Revolution of 1917, in which the czar and his family were brutally executed. In Eastern Europe, Asia, and Cuba, the communist regimes brought to power—often by means of force—meant the abolition of the existing monarchies. The resulting communist republics (e.g., China, Romania, and Albania) proved in practice to be authoritarian or totalitarian regimes.

The formation of new republics was also linked to the process of decolonization. The years after World War II saw most of the remaining European colonies gain their independence, and many of them became republics. France, for example, encouraged the establishment of republics in its former colonies. However, in the Middle East, Britain installed local monarchies in several colonies and mandates, including in Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, and Libya. In the following decades, revolutions and coups overthrew a number of monarchs and installed republics. For instance, in Iran, the Iranian Revolution overthrew the monarchy and created an Islamic republic. Several monarchies remain, and the Middle East is the only part of the world where several large states are ruled by monarchs (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco).

The fall of the Berlin Wall did not mean a return to the monarchical form of government. Today, *republic* is one of the most widespread terms designating existing states. But the popularity of the term came at the cost of its losing its explicative power. It has been applied to different and even opposing regimes, from liberal democracies to authoritarian and even totalitarian governments. Overall, the opposition between republic and monarchy has become less salient. Especially in the West, the monarchy has mainly a symbolic value (e.g., in Great Britain, Spain, and Norway). Some formal republics (Syria, North Korea) act like absolutist monarchies, totalitarian regimes, or a combination of both. In general, the tension that existed between the republicans and monarchists has lost its impact in many places in the West, as well as in Latin America or Asia, even if it remains a divisive issue in some Islamic countries. The decreased relevance of the opposition between monarchical and republican regimes is, however, only a part of the story. In the past decade, there has been a revival of the interest in the substantial meaning of *republic*, in relation to the Roman, Dutch, American, or French historical experiences. The republican emphasis on common good, rule of law, and public virtue has become even more relevant in a time of consumer individualism and disaffected democracies.

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See also Democracy, Theories of; Monarchy; Republicanism

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REPUBLICANISM

In the realm of political concepts, republicanism appears as the doctrine favoring the prevalence of the republican regime, whether this prevalence is the outcome of some activism (eager to see the achievement of the republic considered as the best regime) or of intellectual considerations (the republic encapsulates valuable political ideas and ideals). A more anecdotic subset of acceptations is linked with the existence (as is the case in the United States) of “republican” parties: Republicanism is no more than the fact of belonging to them. *Republicanism* is anything but a recent lexical creation: According to English dictionaries, the word made its grand debut in the language in the wake of civil troubles in 17th-century England. Its conceptual and semantic roots go back even further than its 3-centuries-old existence. Coined from the word *republic* (and the adjective derived from it, *republican*), the idea of “republicanism” encapsulates one of those long intellectual histories that are the privilege of only a handful of modern political concepts. It refers to a concept inherited from antiquity: the Roman *res publica* (which resulted in the modern *republic*). As such, it has this rare supplementary specificity among political concepts of having an authentic Roman origin: Classical Greece, which has influenced in so many ways the political history of the West, has only indirect equivalents for the Latin *res publica*. The success of the concept is all the more remarkable because, and is sufficiently measured by the fact that, in the 2 millennia of its history, the word has hardly changed in many European languages. The Latin *res publica* is still easy to retrieve from the French *république* (from which the English *republic* was imported), the German *republik*, or the Italian *repubblica*.

The meaning of the word has probably known more significant changes than its phonetics. *Res publica* means literally in Latin “the public thing.” *Public* in its turn (*publicus* in Latin) derives from *populus*, which means “people,” and thus, as Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BCE) puts it in his *De Republica*, “The public thing is the thing of the people”: “*res publica, res populi*.” This is why the traditional translations of *res publica* as “commonwealth” or even “state”

(when it is not just “republic”) are not totally satisfactory as they do not spell out what was evident for the Romans when they talked about the republic: the dimension of the collectivity, the dimension of the people.

This meaning is equally lost in contemporary acceptations of the word *republic*. It has eventually specialized in characterizing a type of political regime, where, basically, the head of the state is not a monarch. Roman conceptions do include this aspect: The end of the monarchy and the instauration of republican institutions by Marcus Junius Brutus after the destitution of Tarquin the Proud is an important part of the political mythology of Rome. But it is a secondary aspect compared with the role of the people, which receives the real emphasis in the Latin expression. Being a notion defined by what it is not, the modern conception of the republic is even vaguer. It is not surprising that it applies to a large variety of situations, from the proudly secular French one (with a history of no fewer than five different “republics” in the span of nearly 230 years) to the “Islamic Republic of Iran,” created in 1979, where there is no separation between religion and the state.

“Republicanism,” as the derivative of the already protean notion of the republic, reflects its many understandings. In English as well as in many other European languages, the suffix *ism* develops the root of the word to mean a doctrine or a norm, and most modern English dictionaries follow these lines in their definition of *republicanism*. The two first (and main) acceptations screened by the *Oxford English Dictionary* are “the spirit characteristic of a republic or republican ideas; support for or adherence to republican principles; republican government or institutions” and “the principles and policies of the Republican Party. Also: support for or membership of this party.” However, as a concept of political theory or thought, “republicanism” has retained many of the original traits of the Latin *res publica*. It refers to the crucial importance of the part of social life that is appropriated by the form of collectivity called a “people.” This sector is not to be understood as a material one (the republic is not principally the public real estate, so to say) but as something more immaterial: It is the common interest of the people in participating in the decisions that affect their lives. Republicanism, as the sets of

values involved in this conception, largely draws on a conception of the people as citizens and of liberty as the supreme political value.

History

In its most neutral conception, *republicanism* refers to the doctrine of those who, in established monarchies, want to suppress the monarchic system. It is the case of the “republicans” in England or Luxembourg, for instance: They want to put to an end to the monarchy in the United Kingdom or the Grand Duchy and have them replaced with republics. By this token, republicanism would not really exist in republics, where the goal that “republicanism” ascribes to politics has already been reached. But other acceptations prove to be richer, when they qualify something specifically ideological: the idea that the republic is not a fact but an ideal of governance that has to be deepened or protected even in existing republics. In this conception, republicanism is less a doctrine than a doctrinal agenda for pursuing the attainment of political goods considered as crucial in a political collectivity defined by the preeminence of the people. It ultimately defines the shaping of a specific *political togetherness* far beyond the mere question of the republican form of the regime.

Such a conception of the republic can be called normative as it entails the consideration of norms (i.e., representations of the world from the standpoint of ideal, regulating behaviors). It can trace its origin back to classical Rome. It is true that the Romans did not know the word *republicanism* (or rather did not have any equivalent to it). But they linked their idea of the republic with specific values and virtues; they were convinced that politics was about the norms and collective ideals that republican forms of collective life reflected and helped achieve. To them, the republic did not correspond solely to a form of governance (such as democracy, aristocracy, or monarchy) but to the hope for better governance. They thought of the republic as a specific regime, an inherently superior one, a desirable one; in this sense, the Romans could not separate the republic from what we now call “republicanism.” This conception obviously lost its preeminence with the rise of the Empire, which followed the fall of the Republic. The expression *res publica* gained the more neutral

meaning of a political collectivity without precise reference to the values attached to it. It is the acceptation retained in medieval Latin, and the evolution of Roman languages, that even led to legitimate talk of a monarchy as a “republic.”

It was only at the dawn of modernity, mostly at the beginning of the 16th century, that the concept of the republic regained some of its original specificity. Since then, authors have considered more and more often that even if the term means something broader than what the Romans had in mind, it could not refer to all types of governance. For them, despotism is mostly the kind of governance that cannot be considered as a republican one. We see it ruled out by Étienne de La Boétie (1530–1563), the French author, in his *Discourse About Voluntary Servitude* (1549): He insists that one could hardly call an absolute and tyrannical political organization a “republic.” Two centuries later, Jean-Jacques Rousseau is still undecided in his *Social Contract* (1762/1997). When in the second book he notes that “any legitimate government is a republican one” (II 6), he seems to consider that republics include monarchies that comply with his standards of legitimacy. But in the third book, he places the “monarchic government” “under the republican one” (III 6), thus indicating that, in his opinion, a monarchy should eventually not be considered as a republic. In 1788, when James Madison writes in the 39th release of *The Federalist Papers* about the “Republican Principles” of the American Revolution, it is done with hesitation. That diverse regimes have been called a *republic* is only an “impropriety” and only shows “the extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been used in political disquisitions.”

The reticence in completely identifying the word *republic* with any kind of political collectivity, and the subsequent specialization of the word at the end of the 18th century in different languages, illustrates the progressive rediscovery of classical republican ideals and the rebirth of republicanism. Since Hans Baron’s *The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Republican Liberty in an Age of Classicism and Tyranny* (1966), it is often considered that the Italian Renaissance was the time and place of the rediscovery of these republican ideals. The “humanist” movement of the time would have seen a growing interest in civic action and participation in public life. Baron and his followers, such as John G. A.

Pocock, in his *Machiavellian Moment* (1975/2003), insist on the reestablishment of the republican tradition inherited from antiquity under the form of a “civic humanism.” In this intellectual tradition of the Renaissance, the value of the individual, his (political notions were still strongly gendered) enlightened opinion, and his culture, nourished by the reading of the great ancients, are reflected in a civic engagement based on the commitment to defend one’s collectivity and its rights and liberties. This is the basis for what Pocock calls the “Atlantic republican tradition,” which drags on at least until the 18th century in America. His work, focusing on the English-speaking world after the Italian Renaissance, neglects in quite a spectacular fashion the prominent French republicanism of the 18th and 19th centuries as well as the continental republican ideologies of the 19th and 20th centuries. But it provides a historiography that, though contended, has the merit to indicate how—and when—the influence of classical Rome found its way back into modern politics.

The People

The reengagement with the model of republican Rome during the Renaissance period is crucial for modern republicanism. Even if the details of the “Machiavellian moment” in Western history might be challenged, and the role of the Florentine ideology of the Renaissance is nuanced, it is difficult to deny that with the Renaissance, and the role played in it by Italy, a shift in the conception of the relation between humanity and the world is perceptible. This change influences the conception of legitimate politics, laying the ground for modern conceptions of republicanism.

As Baron, and then Pocock, underline it, the Renaissance was characterized by a new conviction that it is necessary to be involved in the life of the city. According to these authors, this contrasts sharply with the tendency in the Middle Ages to emphasize among clerical elites the superiority of contemplation. The substance of what Baron calls “civic humanism,” which has become an iconic expression for studies on republicanism, is precisely the alliance between a new vision of humanity promoted by intellectual elites and the sense that the natural outcome of this vision is involvement in state affairs. Such an involvement is obviously at

odds with traditional monarchic ideologies, where political decision making and actions are concentrated at the level of the reigning monarch. The Renaissance transformed this core conviction of the Middle Ages. In a way, it reinforced it strongly with the rise of absolutism and the progressive debasement of traditional aristocracy, which gave the figure of the monarch an increasingly central role. But at the very same time, the dawning of capitalism, a new critical culture influenced by the reading of the ancients and the taste for new ideas, challenged the authoritarian grounds of absolutism. Modern republicanism is an inherent part of these changes.

The pivotal concept in this reinvention of republicanism is the rediscovery of the “people” considered as a “public.” Indeed, the “people” played its role in medieval conceptions of politics, as the monarch was supposed to govern for the common good. However, this role was mostly the passive one of a recipient of good politics consenting to the action of the leader. On the contrary, in the republican tradition inherited from classical Rome, the “people” is an active subject of politics, and the role of the leader (the prince) is significantly transformed. If, as republican ideologies claim, politics is “public,” then it is not a “private” thing, owned by private tenants such as kings, who would “have” the collectivity as one of their belongings. The contrast was already familiar to Roman thinkers. Tacitus, for instance, opens his *Annals*, which retrace the beginning of the empire after the fall of the republic, with a remembrance of the early Roman kings, evoking this period when “Rome was ruled by kings,” as the English translation stands. In fact, Tacitus’s Latin is more precise. He writes literally that “kings had the City of Rome.” What he has in mind is the contrast between the king, who “has” the power, and the republican magistrate, who “exerts” power—exerts it in the name of the Roman people. This distinction between the public exercise of power, which should include the popular will, and monarchy as a form of privatization of politics is one of the strongest elements of differentiation in the Roman experience of politics. In the late history of Rome, the most powerful emperors carefully avoided taking the title of king, only using the title of prince for this reason.

Modern republicanism did not have, in its early stages, a notion of the people as thoroughly formed as was the case in classical Rome (after all,

Machiavelli, one of the heroes of Pocock’s “republican tradition” wrote a book about the prince and not about the people). But it still proved to be averse to absolute monarchy: The English republic in the 17th century—when the word *republicanism* entered the English vocabulary—was the first illustration of the fact, with the execution of Charles I. In the 18th century, the “people” gained a still stronger presence in political affairs and started to play a role as a prime actor of political life in an evolution that finds its ultimate formulation in the American and French revolutions. The American constitution, which grants in its Article IV, Section 4, a “Republican Form of Government,” opens with the legendary formula: “We the people. . . .” The first French Republic (1792), in its turn, states in its 1793 constitution that “there can be no constitution but [that] accepted by the people.”

The sense that the republic is public in that it involves the people is one of the most stable features of republicanism. This is how Madison (1788)—18 centuries after Cicero—still defines the republic:

We may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. (*The Federalist Papers*, No. 39)

This definition undoubtedly adds to the classical idea a democratic sentiment that was not always present in ancient conceptions. Rome, for instance, was not a democracy, no more than the “Florentine” republics were, which serve as an early model for modern republicanism. Politicians and theoreticians were very aware of this fact, and in Rome, they even took pride in not being democrats. Cicero, in the *De Republica*, insists on a conception of the republic that illustrates Aristotle’s theory of the “mixed” government: According to Cicero, the republic combines a regal element, an aristocratic one, and a democratic one, seeing in them the qualities of “affection,” “talent,” and “liberty.”

The difference between a republic and a democracy is probably one of the oldest debated issues as regards republican matters, and to a certain extent,

it has remained the same: In a democracy, the people that rule are in fact a majority, whereas in a republic, it is considered as a whole. This could be the basic difference between a *public* instance of politics and a *popular* one. In the public conception, decisions are not necessarily unanimous. But there is the idea that they should be made in the interest of the people as a global entity. This conception of the republic is akin to the concept of “general will” that Rousseau designs to explain how a public decision (about law) integrates all the differences expressed by individuals. In such a model, each individual has a voice, but everybody should recognize his (and later in the history of republics, her) best interest in the final decision even if it is not the one initially favored by the individual. In this case, Rousseau adds, it is just that the individual was wrong about what he thought was best for himself.

Rousseau’s outlook cannot be considered as encompassing all sorts of republicanism. Moreover, his thought is not solely dedicated to spelling out republican ideologies but also tries to embrace the source of political legitimacy. However, both undertakings are eventually the same in his mind, as “a legitimate government is a republican one” (*Contract*, II 6), and this is how Rousseau’s paradigm can serve as a general model for the republican conception of the people. It allows understanding of what is at stake in the republican idea: the attempt to articulate individual wills and rights in a collectivity that would not be dependent on individual behaviors but would aggregate them.

This model is a powerful one when it comes to understanding how the republican and democratic conceptions of the people might diverge. This is not always the case, however. Many prominent figures of modern republicanism of all periods have not differentiated between the two. The politician-thinker Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826) in the United States, where he was recognized informally as the leader of a “democrat-republican party,” and the republican intellectual Alain (Émile-Auguste Chartier, 1868–1951) in France do not really imagine that republican ideals can limit the role of the people in politics. However, other authors lean toward qualifying republicanism as a specific way to consider democracy or even, like Auguste Comte (1798–1857), as a way to avoid democracy. This conception of the republic as

separate from a democracy promotes a vision of the *demos* (“the people” in Greek) as standing united by showing a superior capacity to silence its internal divisions. This tendency is often critical of “liberal” conceptions of democracy, for which the division of interests is legitimate. It is even sometimes dangerously at odds with a proper liberal state: the first French republic (1792–1804) slid into “the Terror” precisely when its leaders, following Maximilien Robespierre (1758–1794), considered that any kind of opposition was the seed of a division that had to be suppressed. Because republican ideals emphasize the “agreement about justice” that Cicero talked about, they can end up, in radical practices of the republic, legitimizing the elimination of dissenters within.

The Citizen

The radicalization of terror is neither an accident in the history of republicanism nor its fate. It is not an accident in the sense that the promotion of the unity of the people in republican ideologies has often been linked with the necessity of defending the preeminence of the country. This is why nationalism, or at least a jealous affirmation of one’s sovereignty, is a frequent trait of republicanism in its modern versions. It might favor a strong communitarian and possibly violent reaction against dissent. One can see it in the history of the Roman republic, which has constantly suffered from coups, exiles, and brutal evictions. The Renaissance republicanism, which serves as a paradigm for Baron and his successors, also corresponds to the dark history of the Italian republics, and Machiavelli’s indifference to political violence is a symptom of this rather rough republican history.

The privilege given to the collectivity also encourages bellicose behavior toward outsiders for the sake of defending the integrity of “the people.” Since classical Rome, war is often considered as a sign of the strength of true republics. The rationale for such an attitude is easily understandable. If the unity of the people is the supreme reference for republican politics, whatever threatens this unity is regarded as the most lethal menace, whether the threat comes from the inside or from the outside.

At the same time, it would be wrong to assume that republicanism is limited to an authoritarian affirmation of the people without tolerance for

diversity. On the contrary, if republicanism has been rediscovered in the early stages of modernity, it is because it makes room for another value of political modernity: the individual.

The question was already raised by Cicero, who noted that a people is not “any junction of men united in any fashion” but “the junction of a multitude, which associates on the grounds of an agreement about justice and a commonality of what is useful” (I 25). The collectivity is not a collection of persons, and the people is not a multitude but its “junction” due to shared principles and interests. Hence, a way of considering the people as a *public* consists in paying attention to its composition. If the people is a collective entity, the public is also made of *individuals* who belong to the common sphere of deliberation—what Cicero calls the “agreement about justice.” For this reason, republicanism cannot be unilaterally associated with a communitarian approach of politics. Cicero, and with him more largely the Roman conception of the republic, was keen on differentiating between the people in the sense of the republic and the people in the sense of a mass that would dissolve individualities. The distinction between what is public and what is “popular” parallels the distinction between a collectivity of individuals reasoning about their common interest and an indistinct crowd often suspected to be prey to momentary passions, leading to anarchy and disorder. It also parallels the opposition between politics as the outcome of rational decisions made by individuals and politics as influenced by the spread of passions through the mob. This value of republicanism has been particularly important for the reflection on French republicanism. Authors such as Jules Barni (1818–1878), Edgar Quinet (1803–1875), and Alain insist on the value of individual reasoning to achieve a more efficient republic. The people is worth what each part of it is.

This individual that republicanism celebrates as the vivid part of the people is not the one lost in his (and later, her) special interests; it is the individual who is able to understand the common good and reflect on it. This individual is the citizen. For this reason, the republican prominence of the individual does not solely reflect the rise of modern individualism, though it is obviously compatible with it. Rome also promoted the individual citizen as an important aspect of

its “republicanism.” But in modern times, the figure of the citizen is a practical solution that republicanism offers to solve the delicate equation of contemporary politics, for which the necessity to govern, the voice of the governed in public matters, and the place of the individual in a social life that is by necessity a collective one are as imperative as they are contradictory.

The major device in this configuration is the role of the law. The republican tradition considers that law is the product of the collective reasoning of the citizens, the citizen being defined since Aristotle (384–322 BCE) as the one who has the right to participate in the life of the city. Hence, law is a testimony to the appropriation of politics by the people, who can recognize themselves in the ruling of their country, and hence ensures that the republic is truly public—that is, a product of the people’s will. This is why the citizen, as we have seen with Rousseau, does not decide from a personal point of view. He makes his decision in view of what he thinks best for his country. This kind of abnegation is both integrative and exclusive: By deciding the rules that are applied to the whole political body (or, in a representative government, by choosing those who make or apply the law), the citizen extends his real sphere of influence to the coalescence of his vote with those of his peers in a ballot. This is a particularly strong way of integrating each individual into a collectivity that he can grasp. At the same time, this very integration has been the reason why republicanism has often supported the exclusion of those who were considered unable to participate in the elevated sense of the public sphere because they were too tied to private interests—slaves in antiquity and, until the 20th century, women, whom many republics, such as the French or the Helvetic republics, have adamantly excluded (until 1944 in France and until 1971, even until 1990 at the local level, in Switzerland).

This elevated sense of the public good is often linked, in the republican literature, with the theme of a specific virtue on which republicanism depends. The virtue of the citizen is not solely moral. It is also an important political device, as this virtue consists in being able to see beyond one’s immediate benefit and to favor the collectivity over oneself. This attitude regularly leans toward a sacrificial rhetoric, in which the individual must be

ready to forgo his personal interests for the sake of the public good. The Romans had a particularly rich mythology of citizens sacrificing their life or their well-being for Rome. This bold conception of virtuous devotion resurfaced in the Italian Renaissance and continued to feed republicanism during the American and French revolutions in the 18th century. During World War I, the theme of the sacrifice of the soldier for the homeland is constant in the French republican propaganda, for instance.

There is another important aspect of the republican conception of the law: the equality of citizens before the law. This allows differentiating between the individual engaged as an equal to any other individual in the public sphere and the same individual in the private sphere, where inequalities dominate and where the individual is limited to local interests and constraints. The law is thus placed between the citizen and the wider public collectivity in which he still recognizes himself. Republicanism thus promotes a universal conception of politics, in the sense that everybody is supposed to be integrated in this equal sense of the common good that translates into laws.

Liberty

From a republican standpoint, the rule of law is thus not only a way to govern the people. It is also a way to preserve and reinforce a central political value: liberty.

While liberty is not solely a republican concept, it is not possible to imagine, whichever period we consider, a republican ideology that would not favor liberty as the most important aspect of its public values. This, once again, is linked with the centrality of the people in the conception of politics that republicanism develops. Maintaining the integrity of the people means that it must not be subject to any foreign law. To that extent, liberty concentrates all the functions of politics from a republican standpoint.

Freedom is first linked with the absence of tyranny. This aspect explains how suspicious monarchical regimes look in a republican conception; there is the deep fear that the personal sovereign might turn into a despot. But republican freedom is more than just protection from the evils of personal subjection; it is also perceived as a function of the law. As the French republican Jules Barni

(1872) underlines it in his *Manuel républicain*, law in a republic has as

its object to regulate the reciprocal relations of citizens, in order to insure both the respect of their individual rights and the well being of society as a whole. . . . Instead of hindering individual freedom, laws must . . . protect its legitimate usage. (II 6, 36)

Barni's analysis is a significant illustration of republican principles; he sums up many of the values of late-modern republicanism, for which law is a means to protect freedom and not to "hinder" it. If the people is the foundation of the republic, the law made by this people is its own expression of freedom, and the republican tradition as a whole could illustrate the proud aphorism of Rousseau (1762/1997): "Obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty" (*Social Contract*, I 8).

However, this conception of the law is at odds with a more pessimistic outlook that states that any form of law is a limitation of somebody's liberty. This analysis, developed by Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997) in his famous article "Two Concepts of Liberty," leads to the idea of "negative freedom," which is based on noninterference: One is free inasmuch as nobody interferes with one. This conception of liberty is often labeled as the "liberal" one. Berlin opposes this conception and puts forth a "positive" understanding of liberty, which claims that freedom is the participation of the people in the making of the law, as one cannot be self-oppressed. These categories, originally crafted after Constant's remarks (1767–1830) in his 1819 lecture "On the Liberty of the Ancients Compared With That of the Moderns," provide an easy contrast between a liberal conception of freedom based on noninterference and a republican conception that takes its roots in collective participation in the public sphere. Contemporary republicanism contends that the former allows the retreat of citizens from the public sphere to enjoy private freedom and insists on the necessity for citizens to engage in the public sphere in order to preserve their liberty.

The two positions are not incompatible. Constant, and then Berlin, emphasize that political freedom is a combination of private enjoyment and political mobilization to promote and defend freedom. This

does not entirely satisfy the requisites of republicanism, and the contemporary republican thinker Philip Pettit insists that the aim is less a “combination” of positive and negative liberties than “a third alternative.” This alternative would be “the conception of freedom as non-domination.” This, Philip Pettit (1997) writes, “requires that no one is able to interfere on an arbitrary basis—at their pleasure—in the choices of the free person. This is the conception espoused in the long republican tradition” (chap. 1). Such a conception is for him the path to a renovated republicanism that can accommodate both the republican tradition of an engaged people developing a strong sense of the autonomy of its community and a modern sense of freedom that makes room for differences in lifestyles and values the private sphere, without forgetting that the pursuit of happiness is thoroughly hampered in a world devoid of true political freedom.

Conclusion

Republicanism, beyond its venerable antique origins, has undoubtedly proven to be a dynamic way of addressing the questions of political modernity. By providing political theory with an integrative conception of the law and by highlighting a conception of freedom that respects individual rights and the necessity to build a strong collectivity, republicanism is able to frame a particularly efficient conception of modern democracy. Its ambition is also to avoid the less favorable outcomes of the latter while retaining its most valuable inspiration. The balance is neither always easy to maintain nor always favorable to republican conceptions. Republicanism also contains, not solely as a theory but also as a political reality, the seeds of authoritarian behavior and the temptation of conservatism and of elitism. Liberal democracy might be criticized, and efficiently so from a republican standpoint, for its propensity to comply with the rule of a changing, superficial majority. But republicanism might not give a fully satisfying response to these evils when it pretends that majorities rule legitimately not on the grounds of their numerical superiority but because they are or should be the voice of the people as a whole. If, as republicanism contends, liberalism is never completely immune from the temptation of relativism and indifference, republicanism is also never fully above the

suspicion of desiring, as Rousseau put it, to force people to be free.

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See also Citizenship; Equality; Liberty; Participation; Revolution; Rights; Rule of Law

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RESPONSIBILITY

Responsibility is one of those big political words that are commonly used but whose precise meaning is often left obscure. Responsibility is a concept that implies a value judgment, but the values it embodies can differ according to the context, the discourse, and the views of the speaker. Responsibility is a state of affairs—more precisely, as the Oxford and Webster's dictionaries define it: the state, quality, or fact of being responsible. However, one can be responsible in a variety of ways, which signify various usages of the concept of responsibility.

Usages of the Concept of Responsibility

Responsibility as Agency, Cause, or Capacity

The concept of responsibility can be used to indicate that someone or something has had the power to cause a particular event to happen. In a mere descriptive sense, responsibility, in this sense of agency, coincides with *causality*. "Responsible for" can be replaced by "caused," or any other expression that suggests a causal connection. Not only human agents but also things, situations, or circumstances, can be said to be responsible—for example, "a virus was responsible for the outbreak of the epidemic." In a moral sense, however, responsibility can be ascribed only to human agents, who moreover must have the *capacity* to act responsibly. This implies that they must have had the possibility to act otherwise—that is, they must not have been compelled by external forces and they must have possessed sufficient mental capacities to have realized the consequences of their actions and to direct their will. This is a major issue in criminal law and moral philosophy and has sparked legal and philosophical debates about mens rea and about determinism versus free will.

Responsibility as Task, Duty, or Obligation

The concept of responsibility can also be used to indicate the tasks, duties, and obligations that flow from a social role, position, or office. For example, "The president is responsible for appointing the heads of federal agencies," or "It was his

responsibility to coordinate the crisis response." Often the plural "responsibilities" is used, as in "She has many responsibilities." Responsibility in this sense is often followed by the preposition "for." This meaning of responsibility is often at stake in administrative law and is relevant in determining the width and extent of political accountability.

Responsibility as Accountability, Answerability, and Liability

Very often "being responsible" is used to indicate moral, political, or legal *accountability* for a sorry state of affairs. In the first instance, this may amount to simply having to provide an account to a forum, such as parliament, a congressional committee, or a legal court, and to provide information about one's conduct. Second, this can involve *answerability*. The forum may ask questions and the actor will be asked to provide justifications or excuses. Finally, this can involve *liabilities*. The forum may pass judgment on the conduct of the actor—it may approve of an annual account, denounce a policy, or publicly condemn the behavior of an official or an agency. Judgment also implies the imposition of formal or informal sanctions on the actor in case of malperformance or, for that matter, of rewards in case of adequate performance. Responsibility as accountability is often followed by the preposition "to." This sense is highly relevant in politics, for example, with regard to the doctrine of ministerial responsibility in parliamentary systems.

Responsibility as Virtue

"Being responsible" can also be used to indicate a positive moral attitude, a desirable character trait, or praiseworthy conduct. We can say of someone that she or he is a "responsible administrator," "behaves responsibly," in short, that she or he is a person with a "sense of responsibility." What these various usages have in common is that they see responsibility as a desirable quality in officials and organizations. Responsibility is used as a normative concept, as a set of standards for the behavior of actors, or as a desirable state of affairs. Often, in this type of discourse, the adjective "responsible" or the adverb "responsibly" are used, as in "responsible government," "the responsible administrator,"

or “we want public officials to behave responsibly.” In these usages of the concept, responsibility is seen as a *virtue*, as a positive feature of institutions or officials. It is used to positively qualify a state of affairs or the performance of an actor. It comes close to “responsiveness,” considerateness, and a willingness to act in a transparent, fair, and equitable way. This sense is often used in discussions about political morality and administrative ethics.

Historical Roots

The noun *responsibility* is relatively modern. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the first references date back to the end of the 19th century. It appears, for example, in *The Federalist Papers* and in the work of Edmund Burke, where it refers to both capacity and obligation. The adjective “responsible” is found much earlier, for example, in the work of both Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, as being liable and virtuous, respectively. Responsibility used in the sense of virtue can be found in modern Christian ethics from the 19th century onward. Both the English “responsibility” and the French *responsabilité* can presumably be traced to the word *responsabilis*. This term, meaning having to answer, does not occur in the classic Latin vocabularies and probably dates from the legal jargon of the late Middle Ages.

Active and Passive Responsibility

In the realm of politics, with its multiple and often evocative uses of the word *responsibility*, it can be helpful to distinguish between active and passive responsibility. This distinction more or less amounts to the distinction between responsibility as a virtue on the one hand and as accountability or a liability on the other.

When responsibility as a virtue is at stake, the focus is on action in the present, on the prevention of undesirable situations and events. Active responsibility is about taking responsibility *ex ante*, about *behaving* responsibly. The central question is “What should be done?” An example of such a proactive use of the concept of responsibility in the realm of politics is Max Weber’s famous distinction between an ethics of principle and an ethics of responsibility. According to Weber, a strictly

deontological approach to politics, in which all that matters is adherence to political principles, is highly irresponsible. The truly responsible politician takes the foreseeable consequences of his own decisions into account when deciding on a course of action.

In the case of passive responsibility, the focus is on determining accountabilities and liabilities after the fact. Passive responsibility is retrospective in nature, it is about responsibility *ex post*, about *holding* someone accountable for a given state of affairs. The central question is “Who is to blame?” Passive responsibility has both a practical dimension—who is to be held accountable?—and a normative dimension—who is to bear the blame and suffer the consequences? In the realm of politics, a major issue in this regard is the *problem of many hands*, which was first coined by Dennis Thompson. Because many different officials contribute in many ways to decisions and policies of government, it is difficult, both practically and in principle, to identify who is responsible for political outcomes.

Political Responsibility

In most Western democracies, the problem of many hands has led to introducing a kind of vicarious liability for ministers, heads of departments, and other political officials. They are, at least in principle, accountable to parliament or congress for anything that goes wrong under their guidance, whether or not they were actually in a position to do anything about it. In political practice, however, political leaders often accept complete responsibility only *in rhetoricis*, without accepting further consequences. Political responsibility is often limited to giving an account and to answering questions from journalists or political representatives and does not extend to resignation.

In Westminster parliamentary systems, this vicarious liability is known as the *doctrine of ministerial responsibility*. Ministers are accountable to parliament not just for their own conduct but also for any acts or omissions of their civil servants. The traditional view of ministerial responsibility holds that in the case of serious mistakes of civil servants a minister should not only give an account to parliament but should also take the blame and resign, regardless of whether he himself or she herself was

personally to blame. This is also known as the Carrington doctrine—after Lord Carrington, the British minister of Foreign Affairs, who resigned because his intelligence service had presumably not foreseen the Argentinean invasion of the Falkland Islands. However, the practice of ministerial responsibility does not extend nearly as far as this broadly conceived doctrine. If ministers resign at all, they usually do so only because they have failed in personally supervising their civil servants or in their conduct toward parliament. (Even the resignation of Lord Carrington came to be seen by many as less noble than it seemed, because years later it turned out that he himself had decided not to pass on the information about the pending invasion of the Falklands.)

An important advantage of this rather narrow view of ministerial responsibility is that cabinets will not lose very capable ministers as a result of unfortunate incidents. A major disadvantage is that this weakens the political control of the civil service, as there is no direct political accountability of civil servants in most Westminster systems. This is different in the United States, where senior public officials can be asked to give an account before congressional committees.

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See also Accountability; Agencies; Virtue

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RESPONSIVENESS

The most general connotation of the notion of *responsiveness* pertains—as a noun—to reactivity or sensitivity. Descriptively, it denotes the quality of being responsive to stimulation: as a dynamic process of reacting quickly. The adjective *responsive* refers to “answering, replying, and responding” as well as being “susceptible to the feelings of others.” In technology, the term is used to describe how quickly the system responds to user input. This entry analyzes in greater depth the meaning of the notion, points out the components of responsiveness and its foci, and discusses what its “causal links” are.

Meaning

The political meaning of *responsiveness* is rather faithful to all the foregoing meanings. Responsiveness in political science is closely related to concepts such as “representation,” “accountability,” “delegation,” and “representative government.” Many scholars consider the stable responsiveness of a government to the preferences of its citizens to be a fundamental feature of a representative democracy.

Before disentangling the concept of *responsiveness*, let us concentrate on the other aforementioned notions and phenomena. *Accountability*—reads one of the political science dictionaries—has two major meanings, which partly overlap. First, the more common and standard one is that those who hold power are, in a broad sense, stewards and must be able to manifest the fact that they exercise power and fulfill their duties properly. (It is precisely the issue of fulfilling their duties that is at the crux of the concept of responsiveness.) Second, accountability refers to arrangements that secure conformity between the values of a delegating body and the person to whom the powers and responsibilities are delegated. In contemporary democracies, governments are accountable to the people through the process of election. This means that political

accountability confines the use of power and, if need be, sanctions its abuse. Institutionalizing accountability means de facto binding the use of political power to specific, clearly defined, and publicly accepted standards.

The hidden dimension of these relationships pertains to the phenomenon (and concept) of *delegation*. Governing and political decision making in large entities, such as contemporary democratic states, entails the delegation of authority. The right to make decisions is designated—in agency relationships—to an *agent* by a *principal*. However, this task is conditional; it continues only if the principal is satisfied with the deeds of the agent and the former is satisfied when the agent performs in accordance with the principal's wishes and interests. It may be withdrawn, however, if the principal's evaluation is poor. This very conditionality, coupled with the possibility of withdrawal, is the essence of accountability mechanisms. This threat of withdrawal need not materialize; as a confidence procedure, accountability works even when the principal is not trying to replace the agent with an alternative. Yet she or he has the potential and means to do so. Consequently, "governments are *accountable*"—as the classic volume on the topic puts it—"if voters can discern whether governments are acting in their interests and sanction them appropriately, so that incumbents who act in the best interests of citizens win reelection and those who do not lose them" (Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, & Bernard Manin, 1999, p. 40). The single macromechanism behind this, approximating the phenomenon of responsiveness, is the one that forces the incumbents to choose policies that enhance their chances of reelection. In the same volume, one finds yet another proposal of a linkage between accountability and responsiveness: "Accountability is . . . a property of institutional structures, whereas responsiveness is a consequence of interaction within such structures. . . . Responsiveness is a measure of how much accountability an institutional infrastructure permits" (Przeworski et al., 1999, p. 131).

The notions introduced here might be better understood if approached from a policy process perspective. A simplified model of policy process assumes that it starts with the commonsense premise that what drives politics are people's interests

and values, which are translated into preferences; these preferences are then aggregated and signaled (via elections, demonstrations, and opinion polls) to respective politicians. In contemporary representative democracies, "mandates" are the essential form of such "signals" sent out at elections, constituting, in fact, a choice between the different political programs offered by competing parties. Once elected, politicians implement policies, which result in certain political outcomes. It is these outcomes that are evaluated—one criterion of which is their congruency with voters' preferences; if the evaluation is positive, it is very likely that the incumbent will remain in office; if it is negative, the likelihood of replacing one camp of politicians with another is high. In short, representation is a relation between interests and outcomes; the essence of responsiveness is in the relationship between "signals" and "policies" as well as between "mandates" and "policies."

A responsive government is one that takes into account the preferences of the citizens and acts according to these preferences. The key purpose of the mechanism of accountability is guaranteeing that agents do not depart from the expressed or tacit, though objective, interests of their principals. In a way, accountability is a means to a political end, which is responsiveness. Put differently, one may state that accountability is the property of an institutionalized relationship in which the exercise of power by one actor or set of actors is constrained and subject to some requirement of responsiveness to those over whom the power is exercised.

Defined in such a way, accountability can be further divided into two functional dimensions: Transparency in the exercise of power and enforceability of the principle of responsiveness via the establishment of some means by which sanctions can be imposed on representatives in case they misrepresent constituents or violate commonly accepted standards.

Unfortunately, citizens at large cannot participate in all decisions that affect them; however, accountability mechanisms assume that representative responsiveness requires a certain level of citizen competence and participation in controlling representatives. Obviously, political systems differ; one of the fundamental domains of empirical research concerns exactly this—what kind of political institutions provide incentives for representatives to be

responsive. The main distinction in this respect lies either between presidential versus parliamentary systems or between two visions of democracy, one coined the “majority control vision” and the other the “proportionate influence vision.” The major difference between the latter two is whether the government ought to be responsive to the majority of people, as the first Westminster majoritarian design assumes, or to as many people as possible, which is the underlying political logic of proportional, consensus-type democracies. Many empirical studies confirm theoretical expectations and indicate that different visions of democracy, manifested by the relevant institutional infrastructures, have an impact on the type and quality of responsiveness in an anticipated direction. At the same time, the intricacies within responsiveness are sensitive to representational role orientations (i.e., party role, pressure group role, and constituency-representational role).

General politics is divided into issue packages or policy areas. Responsiveness is not an unmitigated virtue. In some areas, we expect politicians to be responsive; in others, more complex and specialized, we believe that politicians and their advisers should decide on our behalf without great attention to our preferences (e.g., monetary policy, defense spending). As a result, how much accountability there should be is a difficult issue to resolve and can be decided only in view of to what extent popular responsiveness is desired.

Components of Responsiveness

Responsiveness ought to be viewed as a complex, multidimensional phenomenon composed of a variety of targets in the relationship between the representatives and the represented. Most commonly, responsiveness pertains to policy congruence. However, there are at least three other components, which result in service responsiveness, allocation responsiveness, and symbolic responsiveness. It is only when all four components are taken into account simultaneously that one can truly cover the representation phenomenon.

Policy responsiveness refers to the relationship between a district’s or electorate’s stance on a policy issue, determined by some measure of central tendency, and the policy orientation of the representative and, consequently, to his or her decisions

concerning its implementation. This concerns the congruence or fit between the two sides of the representational bond; one expects a meaningful link between the policy preferences of the electorate and the deeds of their representatives, be they attitudinal or behavioral. To claim that policy responsiveness exists, one must ensure that both the representative and his or her constituents agree on a particular policy. Many problems arise: (a) some scholars point to the alleged incompetence of the constituents, (b) others indicate that in many policy areas they usually prove incompetent, (c) another problem derives from responsiveness to the long-term interests of the constituents versus their immediate wishes, and (d) still another problematic issue concerns biased information that the representative has about either the wishes or the interests of the constituents.

Service responsiveness covers a wide range of activities performed by the representative, often dubbed “pork barrel politics” or “case work.” This concerns the benefits a representative can secure for the constituents outside his or her legislative work. At the individual level, this ranges from responding to letters and inquiries to interventions on behalf of citizens in state or local institutions. On a more collective, macrolevel, the representative might embark on the role of an advocate or lobbyist for local interests.

Allocation responsiveness is relatively similar to the “service” type, except that in this case the initiative is rather on the side of the representative and the scope of activity is broader. Allocation often concerns what is usually called “public goods” and is related to the development of the welfare state and expansion of the state’s role in society and the economy. Usually, such allocations benefit entire regions as a whole and, in reality, this very much depends on the representative’s future orientation and his or her ability to anticipate the prospective needs and developments of a given area. Seen from another angle, this means she or he invigorates local entrepreneurship, animates local communities, and stimulates people’s needs.

Symbolic responsiveness is less behavioral and more psychological. It is also more vague and diffused in its manifestations. Symbolic responsiveness pertains more to diffused trust and support caused by how the representative’s role is performed and is less related to the particular,

instrumental satisfaction derived from acquiring some material goods or profit. It more often concerns fundamental values, confidence in political procedures, and the way a politician behaves; it concerns his or her integrity. What matters most in symbolic responsiveness is that voters feel represented, which is at the crux of the legitimacy of the general political system.

Consequently, because of the relative independence of these four forms of responsiveness, there is no reason to assume that good, effective responsiveness in one domain ought to be accompanied by equally effective and sound responsiveness in another domain. Particular voters and social groups might be unsatisfied with the performance of their representative in some policy area, but at the same time, they may be relatively satisfied by the way he or she delivers services.

There are, however, certain patterned relationships regarding the frequency of the occurrence of particular forms of responsiveness. If politicians—for whatever reason—are oriented toward local interest, what follows is the high priority given to “service” and “allocation” responsiveness. If, however, they are focused on the party role, they are more likely to give precedence to “policy” or “symbolic” responsiveness.

A frequently debated issue within the political representation domain is the extent to which, on the one hand, the “will to represent” and, on the other, the problem of the district’s or electorate’s heterogeneity are important for the quality of representation. The former—the will to represent—is at the crux of the responsiveness phenomenon, although in the classical formulation of the “standing for” descriptive representation, the will is not necessary. The representative might simply look responsive because he or she is from the constituents’ geographical district. Moreover, even if the representative has a distaste for representing the will of the people, he or she might nevertheless deliver high-quality representation—that is, look responsive—because his or her values, attitudes, and preferences are similar to the constituents’, notwithstanding a knowledge or willingness to follow their expectation of principals. In a nutshell, it is important to know where such unintentional and accidental responsiveness occurs and what are its long-term effects—for instance, for the reelection of the representative. It is worth noting that

the mainstream classical approach to political representation and responsiveness assumes the will to represent as an important point of departure for deciding to whom exactly, what precisely, and by what means the representative is intentionally attempting to be responsive.

The latter—the issue of the district’s or electorate’s heterogeneity—is even more acute for the quality of responsiveness. In an ideal world, which is rarely the case, the existence of a perfectly homogeneous constituency would allow the representative to—at least potentially—become an ideal representative, achieving perfect responsiveness vis-à-vis a constituent’s preferences. In fact, the extent to which his or her representational merits approximate perfection depends completely on him or her, assuming that the representative has access to reliable information about the district’s sentiments and the will to familiarize himself or herself with them. The world is, nevertheless, much more complicated, and the usual state comprises complex heterogeneous constituencies coupled with a limited ability of the latter to effectively communicate its preferences. In such an instance, what a “willing to be responsive” representative can do is offer issue stances and enact policies that minimize the unsolvable problem of representing conflicting interests. The best the representative can do is to follow the majority, more precisely; learn about some central tendency in his or her constituency; and follow the preferences of such a majority. If, however, there is no clear majority, or—worse—the district preferences are highly polarized, the representative can either decide to be responsive to one end of the spectrum or offer some “central” policies that will rarely represent the sentiments of anybody but will at least minimize the discrepancy between the representative and the constituency at large. One should note, however, that such a far-from-unique situation regarding significant district heterogeneity is a sound excuse for the representative to follow his or her own considered judgments or conscience when having to make ultimate legislative decisions, which are often supported by details of competent deliberation among peers.

Focus of Responsiveness

Another method of depicting the multidimensionality of responsiveness is through the foci of the

representation relationship. Briefly stated, the foci can be organized into three baskets. The first is a geographical focus; both representatives and constituents may think that the crucial representative bond is between the representative and the constituency defined in terms of region, state, city, or district. Second, the representation focus can be viewed by means of a classical functional approach, conceiving what is to be represented in terms of class, professional group, ethnic or religious group, or ideological camp. Third, the focus of responsiveness can be individuals, be they socially important and influential local celebrities, or rank-and-file citizens, or unknown clients in need of assistance.

The Causal Link

Some scholars mistakenly assume that responsiveness by its very nature is always a dependent variable. The representation relationship is far more complex: Transactions between the represented and representative are dynamic, top down and bottom up, and their very essence depends to a large degree on both the exact component and the focus of responsiveness. *Responsiveness* and *response* are not the same. In fact a “purely reactive” representative is a far cry from the ideal role model assumed in contemporary democracies.

This is a relevant place to check the classics. Hanna Pitkin, in her now classic 1967 work on representation, does not define the concept of responsiveness. The responsiveness phenomenon features, however, in the chapter on the mandate-independence controversy. Following Burke’s famous opposition, Pitkin also asks many detailed questions related to the issue of whether a representative ought to do what the constituents want, and be bound by mandates or direct instructions from them, or be free to act as he or she chooses based on his or her skills, knowledge, and competence to guarantee their welfare. To precisely grasp and conceptualize the responsiveness phenomenon, it is extremely important to decide at which point we lie between the two poles of the ideal model of the mandate-independence controversy. On the one hand, one may assume that “good representation” occurs only when the representative acts on direct and explicit instructions from his constituents, and any deviation from them is considered unacceptable. At the other end of the

scale, good representation means complete independence and full discretion; consequently, constituents have no right even to assess the fulfillment of campaign promises; in this stance, once the representative is elected, he or she must be completely free to use his or her own judgment and competence. Of course, there are solutions that fall in between: One might expect a “good representative” to act as he or she thinks the constituents would want, unless he or she receives instructions from them, which then must be obeyed. Whatever the precise understanding of good representation is assumed to be, it has direct consequences on the way we conceive the notion of responsiveness.

An additional requirement for clarifying this paradox is that it is expected that the represented must reveal the ability to be active. Pitkin highlights throughout the book that “the represented must be both present and not present” to talk logically of the very sense of representation. The representative must, of course, act and be independent; however, the represented must be in some sense acting through him or her. Moreover, the relationship between the two becomes meaningful only if the represented is capable of action, and has and is ready to present a will, judgment, or a preference on his or her own. If this capability and readiness to act is missing, the whole idea of representation as substantive activity is questionable. Acting on behalf of someone who is completely helpless, has no idea of what his or her preferences are, or is totally incompetent is not representing. As a consequence, the process of representing consists of supporting and achieving the interests of the represented, assuming that the represented is capable of judgment and action, but at the same time, it does not act and does not object to what is done on his or her behalf by the representative.

What [italics added] the representative does must be in his principal’s interest, but *the way* [italics added] he does it must be responsive to the principal’s wishes. . . . Responsiveness seems to have a kind of negative criterion: conflict must be possible and yet nevertheless not occur. (Pitkin, 1967/1985, p. 155)

The reasons for either following the will of the people or promoting their interest is crucial from

yet another perspective—the cognitive ability and mobilization of the citizenry at large. Numerous methodologically sound empirical endeavors show that a very small proportion of the public can actually articulate their interests; moreover, even fewer people can manifest coherent belief systems that allow their values and preferences to be translated into comprehensive rational policies. In such a situation, the dilemma of the representative, whether and to what exactly he has to be responsive, is extremely complicated. If no conflict between citizens' wishes and their interests is visible, the role of the representative is relatively simple, but on rare occasions, this does occur. Obviously, the representative need not follow the wishes of the represented, but he or she must consider them, especially when they are in conflict with what he sees as the constituent's interests, because the reason for this discrepancy must be found and clarified. This stipulation is at least true for democracies. In other words, if a representative behaves and acts contrary to the publicly known wishes of his electorate, some explicit rationale is required. Such behavior calls for explanation and justification. It is precisely at this point that the issue of responsiveness comes into play. The representative has to explain why he or she is *unresponsive*; and not any explanation will do, and only certain clarifications will be legitimized by the people. On the other hand, accepted justifications boost the chances of the representative's reelection.

Throughout this classic volume, one finds a convincing picture of political representation that is impersonal and institutional. Whenever we refer to a system or government as "representative" we are in fact describing an institutional arrangement and its mechanisms. The representation, and its quality, emerges not from an individual will to represent, but from the logic of the structure and functions of the system. Political representation comes about when the system is effectively looking "after the public interest and is responsive to public opinion except insofar as nonresponsiveness can be justified in terms of public interest" (Pitkin, 1967/1985, p. 224). These traits of representation—its "public" and "institutional" character—contrary to many assumptions about the individualistic, dyadic nature of responsiveness, can emerge independently from any deliberate interactions between voters and representatives. It is because of the very

mechanisms of free media, separation of powers, regular fair elections, and other inventions of liberal democracies that responsiveness is likely to emerge even from a political system in which particular individuals, voters, and representatives are pursuing quite other goals.

This problem—to what extent responsiveness is a systemic property and to what extent it should be treated as emerging from individual deliberate interactions—remains a question open to empirical inquiry.

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See also Accountability, Electoral; Accountability, Interinstitutional; Competition, Political; Democracy, Quality; Equality; Freedom; Participation; Representation; Rule of Law

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RESPONSIVENESS OF BUREAUCRACY

Responsiveness is one member of a family of related and positively valued concepts such as

responsibility and answerability that have to do with the accountability of bureaucrats. There is, at first glance, generally, little controversy about the proposition that bureaucrats should be responsive to the (elected) politicians or their appointees at the top levels of governments. This seems obvious, or it would be impossible to hold politicians accountable for the actions of the governments they lead. However, beneath these simple statements lurks a minefield of complications.

Responsive to Whom or to What?

How responsive do we want bureaucrats to be to those at the top levels of government? Might we also want them to answer to those they serve, their “customers,” in the language favored by recent reformers? Or to the norms and traditions of the organizations they serve? Or to external expectations that come from their professions—to the standards and norms of their roles as scientists, engineers, social workers, or related professionals? Or to some moral standards that are widely shared in the society? Or to the desires of those in the legislative branch of government, especially if they work in a separation-of-powers system, such as that of the United States?

When there is a clash between the demands of the many forces that affect bureaucrats and the orders of those at the top of governments, the situation becomes complex. The most extreme and, in a sense, the most straightforward to deal with is when government leaders demand actions that clash with common morality—mass killing, torture, depriving people of basic rights, and the like. There bureaucrats are looked on, at least after the fact, as heroes when they are not responsive.

Most situations are not so clear, even in retrospect. Bureaucrats in agencies responsible for protecting the environment may be pressured by scientific evidence on the one side that suggests the need for strict regulation of pesticides or of factory emissions and on the other by political leaders who oppose such regulation and interpret the laws in these areas in a way that preclude strict regulation. Customers or constituents of organizations may have preferences that differ from those at the top of governments, and they may be in a position to make life very uncomfortable, now or in the future, for those who do not respond to them.

Bureaucrats who have been trained as scientists, engineers, or social workers may face demands from political leaders who would rather please an important constituency than follow a course recommended by scientific findings or the standards of a given profession. Legislators, especially in systems with strong legislative committees, may have different perspectives than executive leaders on what should be done, and these legislators may be quite influential because of longevity in office or the related possibility that they will be there long after executive leaders have departed.

Responsiveness Problems

Bureaucrats, especially those at or near the top levels of their organizations, have numerous resources that they bring to the relationship with politicians. They have the expertise gained through long service in a given area, supplemented often by specialized training prior to entering the civil service and training on the job and in programs designed to increase their knowledge. Max Weber, perhaps the most famous theorist of bureaucracy, put a great deal of emphasis on the power this expertise brought, and though those who study bureaucracy may debate the level of bureaucratic influence under various circumstances, few would deny it. Senior career civil servants have a great deal of knowledge about the history of their programs, the proposals that have been made in the past to change their programs, the constellation of forces that stand in support or in opposition to their programs, and what has worked or failed to work in the past. This is useful information to politicians, and they ignore it at their peril, but it also permits bureaucrats to help shape the agenda and to exert control over what is or is not done. In a real sense, bureaucrats responding to requests for information may make their nominal masters responsive to them rather than the other way around. This is a consistent dilemma for executive politicians seeking change.

A related problem is that leaders may be reluctant to give clear signals to their subordinates about policy changes because too much clarity can be a source of political opposition or embarrassment after proposals have been compromised to secure adoption. This ambiguity gives civil servants opportunities to shape their responses in

ways that insert their own preferences or those of supporters of their programs into the mix without seeming to act in an unresponsive manner.

Civil servants can also act in a passive-aggressive manner, withholding information that would be very useful to their superiors. Political leaders should want to avoid this, but if they distrust or ignore civil servants, they may inadvertently encourage such behavior.

On the other side of this problem is the dilemma bureaucrats may face when they deliver advice or analyses to politicians based on what they believe in good conscience are the facts or are reasonable conclusions based on experience. Politicians, motivated by their ideologies—and research shows that they are generally more motivated by ideologies than bureaucrats—may react harshly to such information if it does not fit their predilections and may blame the messenger for what they are told. The easy way out for bureaucrats is to avoid providing such information or advice, or even to distort what is communicated to fit the predilections of political superiors, though one can make a strong argument that such a course is not the responsible way for a professional to be responsive.

Finally, as mentioned above, in real political systems, especially in separation of powers systems, there are multiple authorities with some say over what civil servants do. How to deal with conflicting demands from these authorities can be a big problem for those who see it as their role to be responsive and an opportunity for those with their own agendas.

Exit, Voice, or Loyalty?

The most famous book relevant to this general subject is *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, by Albert Hirschman. Hirschman argues that an organization's customers or employees have three basic things they can do when they are dissatisfied with the policies or actions of those who head the organization. One option is exit. Civil servants, the focus of this essay, can resign in protest. This may be a futile gesture, but it may also—if handled astutely—result in much negative publicity for the organization or policy that is the target of the resignation. A problem for a career civil servant is that he or she may not have the resources to cope effectively with the aftermath of exit. In addition,

the gesture may be futile. The organization may be able to simply shrug off the resignation and continue doing what it did before with relatively little problem. On the other hand, a dramatic resignation may cause the organization a good bit of trouble; indeed, even the threat of resignation may be adequate from the standpoint of the civil servant. Whatever the ultimate outcome, exit is a way to avoid responsiveness.

A second option is voice. Here, the civil servant stays in the organization and gives voice to his or her concerns. At one level, this is an expression of loyalty because the civil servant stays and expresses what he or she believes should be done (or what the available evidence suggests should be done), but it may be greeted with hostility by those at the top of the organization. The civil servant who gives voice may be relegated to an unimportant job, not receive promotions, or be the target of other acts of recrimination. Evidence indicates that there is a cultural dimension to voice—that is, how appropriate people think it is as a means to express dissent. For example, in a comparative study done in the mid-1980s, 82% of West German civil servants felt that they should support their government's policies even if they personally disagreed and found them "very undesirable or ill considered," whereas only 42% of U.S. civil servants felt the same way.

A more aggressive form of voice, especially attractive if exiting is not a readily available choice, is sabotage. Here the civil servant remains in the organization but gives voice by passing information to those in a position to use it against the organization. Ironically, those who feel extremely attached to the organization may find this the best course of action. So-called whistleblowing has become more and more institutionalized in U.S. organizations, with formal protections in place to protect the whistle-blower, but the simple leaking of information that can compromise the direction of an organization by the current leadership is a time-honored practice in bureaucracies. Research findings in the United States indicate that civil servants would prefer to give voice within the confines of the government, resigning if persuasion does not work and the disagreement is severe. Leaking, then, may be thought of as something between voice and exit.

The final option is loyalty. Here the civil servant sticks with the organization and follows its

directives no matter what he or she might think of what is asked. This is responsiveness that may be attractive to organizational leadership because what it wants will be implemented no matter what the people in the organization's bureaucracy might think or prefer. But there is a cost, and the cost can be significant if the leadership's goals are unattainable, extremely costly, extremely unwise, or some combination of the above. Bureaucratic voice, at a minimum, is often in the interest of the leadership; abject submissiveness may be much regretted after the fact.

Conclusion

Bureaucratic responsiveness is important in a governing system where top decision makers are ultimately held accountable for the policies and actions of the governments they lead. We would not want politicians to say credibly that while the law permitted alternate actions, the career bureaucracy was unresponsive and there was no way because of that to change programs or policies. On the other hand, we also should be wary of a totally submissive bureaucracy. Bureaucrats carry with them the expertise and experience to help make policy decisions viable and policy implementation effective. They know a great deal about what has worked in the past, what has failed for technical or political reasons, and what course might be best for accomplishing what political leaders would like, though this may require changes and compromises that political leaders would prefer to avoid. Ideally, bureaucrats also adhere to a code of personal and professional conduct that makes them valuable servants of the nation, leading them to resist the worst impulses that might seize national leaders. An "unresponsive" civil servant who refused to send victims to concentration camps or to help organize torture sessions would deserve the thanks of his or her nation. It is hoped that cases where this is necessary will be extraordinarily rare. In between that extreme and abject obedience is found a complicated world where bureaucratic responsiveness is much sought after but, for the most part, not fully attainable or even fully desirable.

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See also Bureaucracy; Cabinets; Democracy, Theories of; Executive; Governance, Good; New Public Management; Parliaments; Policy Advice; Principal-Agent Theory; Responsiveness

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REVISIONISM

As a term of art, *revisionism* surfaced in the late 1800s and has since steadily gained in scope. Its meaning may be either critical or assertive, but its purpose is always to probe the intellectual validity and the political legitimacy of a dominant orthodoxy. The notion typically implies an ongoing attempt to revise, revisit, or reconsider an official, mainstream, well-established, or at least widely accepted tenet, brought forth by the history of political thought and events that claims ethical authenticity and prescribes normative conduct in public affairs. For regular criticism to qualify as revisionism, it should challenge canons of interpretation of facts, processes, and/or ideas that are conducive to the configuration (or are the intended outcome) of a system of power relations in the international arena, national politics, or academia. Revisionism deserves its name to the extent that it remains a failed orthodoxy and its proponents are singled out as deviationists not only from a prevailing construal of truth but also from

the social administration of it. Hence, revisionism and revisionists are often subject to coercive interventions from the incumbent orthodoxy: sanctions in international relations, purges and trials in nondemocratic national settings, and marginalization and exclusion in the academic sphere. Revisionism itself, especially when manifested—as is frequently the case—in the realm of arts and letters, is sometimes inclined to prize such an imposed peripheral position in the production of values emphasizing negation and evasion as creative hermeneutical forces. At any rate, *revisionism* could be the name of a contentious politics of practical knowledge. This entry is especially focused on the variety of revisionisms and the ambiguities of the concept.

Variety of Revisionisms

Three authoritative interpretations of intellectual and political history, and the political arrangements that accompany them, have engendered the main versions of revisionism. They are related to Marxism, the Great War, and the Holocaust. As a strong and recurrent political label, revisionism was used aggressively in 1908 by Vladimir Lenin with the explicit intention of defining a canonical brand of Marxism against what he deemed to be the nonrevolutionary reformist trend gaining sway over German and Austrian social democracy. The evolution of Marxism as the official ideology of state socialism could be read from then on as a narrative of orthodoxy enforcing its speculative outlook and political command by permanently exposing and overcoming present or suspected revisionisms. In the history of international relations, revisionism is a descriptor of the foreign policies of the former Central Powers that stood in defiance of the status quo established in 1919 by the Treaty of Versailles. The classic example would be Hungary, a polity traumatized by severe territorial losses and insulated in a culture of denial of its new identity as a diminished European actor. The normative elusiveness of the international order presided over by the Society of Nations allowed Japan, albeit a victor of the Great War, to adopt a revisionist language, critical of Western supremacy, and to embark on revisionist operations in East Asia and the Pacific; in the process, the democratic-oriented Japanese governments of the 1920s were replaced

by a military-driven direction of national politics in the 1930s. German revisionism was rooted in the 19th-century *völkisch* (ethnic) movement and related to previous forms of national revanchism (a term used since the 1870s to describe a political manifestation of the will to reverse territorial losses incurred by a country, often following a war) and irredentism (any position advocating annexation of territories administered by another state on the grounds of common ethnicity or prior historical possession, actual or alleged). The initially progressive, then turned “Old Right” American scholar Harry Elmer Barnes (1889–1968), perhaps the most prominent and prolific revisionist historian, echoed the German style in his work. In his book *The Genesis of the World War* (1929), Barnes argued against what he described as “court historians,” that the Great War (World War I) was by no proper historical account a just one, and that all the powers concerned share responsibility for its causes and course of events. He extended his argument after World War II, theorizing against the “black-out” of mainstream historiography, which he denounced as a myth factory working for political purposes and under political command. Expanding his prior analyses, Barnes maintained that Nazi German war crimes and the extermination of the European Jews were to be considered at best unproved facts, anyway matched by the treatment imposed by the Allies to the vanquished Germans.

The legacy of Barnes is twofold. On the one hand, he remains a source of inspiration for many libertarians connected to the Mises Institute, among whom Murray N. Rothbard (1926–1995) stands out. According to them, revisionism should be construed as a teacher of freedom of speech and thought, of truth and rationality in a world subdued by propaganda, and of indoctrination and spectacular mythologies taking advantage of the gullibility of a misinformed general public. On the other hand, Barnes’s work is used as a cornerstone by the massive body of literature displaying a diverse array of conspiracy theories, efforts of revision of national canonized histories, the explicit or implicit denial of the Holocaust, and other varieties of negationism. This last form of revisionism aims not only at questioning and raising doubts as to the veracity and the scale of the Hitlerian genocide but also, and most important, at leveling the guilt of all parties, civilians included, involved in the two

conflagrations of the 20th century and their respective aftermaths. Had abjection been evenly distributed, there would ultimately be no irrational aggressor and no defender of just causes, no victim to be remembered, and no executioner to be held responsible. In the negationist view, the politics of retribution and memory are but tools of control of the public mind employed by conspiring minorities ruling over markets, the media, and some governments. This literature, networking across Western cultures and the Middle East, manifests itself as an alternative type of historical writing and habitually addresses marginal but committed audiences associated with extreme Right and fundamentalist political persuasions. Fostered by the language of history and doctrine, revisionism is always pleading, if only by implication, for a transfiguration of a domestic political regime or the international order.

Ambiguities of the Concept

However miscellaneous its major historical shape, *revisionism* emerged in normative terms as a word of no certain meaning. Its first uses point to this built-in ambiguity. The earliest revisionists appear to have been, rather technically, the advocates of the judicial review of the notorious Dreyfus affair that stirred political passions in 1894–1895 France. After the exculpation of Alfred Dreyfus, the notion itself was inverted by conservative voices denouncing not a mere reversal of justice but a *revision of history*. The case may provide a pattern for understanding the very fabric of revisionism: It is almost never an intellectual controversy about how reason could restore facts to their pristine historical state but rather a political contention on how a society should form its beliefs about what facts ought to stand for and who is entitled to expound their position. This indistinct word turned into a concept at about the same time in Marxist German thought. Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932) authored between 1896 and 1898 a series of articles devoted to *The Problems of Socialism*, instantly arousing a long-lasting controversy as to how Marx's entwined theories on capitalism and proletarian revolution, coined in the mid-1800s, should be empirically tested for the political use of the working-class movement. Bernstein's critique of the inaccuracy of the Marxian predictions about the inevitable

collapse of capitalist economy, the accelerated impoverishment of the working class, the evaporation of the middle class, as well as his reshuffling of the labor theory of value and the dismissal of class struggle as the privileged venue of social change were initially rejected by his fellow socialists (Karl Kautsky, August Bebel, and Rosa Luxemburg) only to lay a few years later the foundations of the enduring orthodoxy guiding the policies of the Western and Central European Socialist and Social Democratic parties. What emerged as orthodoxy in Germany, France, and later Britain was dubbed revisionist by the Bolsheviks even before they seized power in Russia. Lenin wrote it clearly: To amend Marx is blatant proof of hostility toward Marxism (even if a Fabian anecdote has it that the elderly Marx did not consider himself a Marxist). Hence, revisionism grows to be the elaborate but standard crime of betrayal of the communist project. After October 1917, Lenin's triumphant party imposed itself as nothing less than revolutionary (i.e., genuine) Marxism incarnated in one country and organized globally in the Communist International. By way of consequence, to tell apart orthodoxy from reformism was no longer the task of a "professorial science" of Marxism (to quote Lenin) but the public policy of a political regime that raised "scientific socialism" to the dignity of a practical philosophy able to have recourse not only to means of persuasion but also to instruments of coercion. Plain intellectual criticism (expressed, suspected, or attributed) deserved to be qualified as revisionism as soon as a sociological dimension was tactically attached to it: Prone by definition to *embourgeoisement*, revisionists were "objectively" doomed to the condition of "social fascists," promoters of state capitalism, elitists, and agents of imperialism. Henceforth a matter of bureaucratic decision and penal sanction, revisionism multiplied its facets and materializations as the Soviet leadership moved to provide a Marxist/Leninist-certified interpretation of international and domestic political events and social processes. As long as he was in command, Stalin's thinking and actions embodied orthodoxy for all seasons: Yesterday's orthodox might have easily been unmasked as today's revisionist, as in the case of Trotsky and many others. Or else, an orthodox at home could look from abroad like a revisionist. For instance, in 1957, the Polish leader Władysław Gomułka, while

formally charging Leszek Kołakowski with revisionism (alongside other Marxist philosophers who were experiencing the Khrushchev report as an intellectual liberation), was himself accused of revisionism by his Romanian communist counterparts. In the early 1960s, Nikita Khrushchev was in turn denounced as a “modern revisionist” by Mao Zedong. Two decades later, Mao himself was labeled as one by the Albanian communists, proud to proclaim themselves antirevisionists. The term was briefly revived in 1989 by the Romanian hardliners as a causal explanation for the roundtable talks through which Hungarian or Polish ruling parties were contemplating free and fair elections and eventually a transition to political pluralism and unplanned economy. After the demise of communism, revisionism (self-styled, imaginary, or indisputable) still lends itself to a variety of uses in international and domestic politics or in academia but seems to have exhausted its career as a concept. As a moral and political language, it still can map the hermeneutical and ethical encounters of politics and history.

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See also Communism; Hermeneutics; Historical Memory; Marxism; War and Peace

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REVOLUTION

Social scientists have provided two alternative definitions of revolution. Some theorists articulate

a political definition of revolution characterized by the forcible transfer of state power. Charles Tilly defines revolution as forcible transfer of power in the course of a struggle involving at least two distinct blocs of contenders that make incompatible claims to control the state with some significant segments of the population supporting the claims of the rival contenders. Others developed criteria that incorporated significant social outcomes. Theda Skocpol is interested in social revolutions—that is, alterations in both the political and economic structures of society. Skocpol's definition requires a rapid, basic transformation of the state and class structures that are carried out in part through class-based revolts from below. Social revolutions, though rare phenomena, have produced the most fundamental changes in the modern world and social life. For this reason, this entry will focus on the causes, processes, and outcome of social revolutions and will review alternative theories, namely, class analysis theories, state-centered theories, political-conflicts theories, and theories that stress the role of ideological transformation in accounting for revolutions.

Revolutions have played a significant role in the rise of the modern world and, over the past few centuries, have transformed the political and economic systems of social life and at least partially altered the nature of social relations. In the West, modern revolutions have been produced by conflicts over the distribution of material resources, the allocation and extent of political power, and the essence of social relations. These revolutions, in turn, eventually gave rise to modern capitalism, democracy, and various social movements, including the abolition of slavery, socialist and labor movements, civil rights, women's equality, and gay and lesbian rights. In the developing world, national liberation movements and revolutions have produced independence, nationalist regimes, and, in a few cases, socialist transformations.

Revolutionary movements and transformations have also stimulated scholarly debates about the causes, processes, and outcome of revolutions and large-scale social conflicts. Indeed, 18th- and 19th-century European revolutions and revolutionary movements influenced Karl Marx's analysis of capitalism, class conflict, and revolution, which in turn influenced generations of 20th-century social scientists.

Causes of Revolutions

Modernization and Political Instability

Modernization theorists claim that rapid economic development and social change in developing countries can be destabilizing as large-scale social transformations such as commercialization, industrialization, and urbanization dislocate and uproot large segments of the population. These changes, in turn, may generate some measure of confusion and anomie, leading to antisocial activities and destructive violent behavior. In the absence of integrative forces within the existing order, the uprooted may join revolutionary movements to integrate into the new social system. Other versions of the theory emphasize the political dimension of rapid modernization, which may extend political consciousness, expand political mobilization, and instigate demands for political participation. These developments, in turn, may undermine traditional political authority and complicate the creation of new political institutions, which may result in disorder and political instability.

Class Conflict and Revolutions

Class analysts of revolution claim that the key to understanding revolutions lies in the conflict over the distribution of material resources. These theorists often point to economic polarization, concentration of wealth and income, and rising disparities in promoting conflicts and revolutions. Under highly polarized economic conditions, the dominant and lower classes may not find common ground for compromise and peaceful coexistence but instead may adopt extremist political positions leading to conflict and revolution.

Marx was a leading proponent of the class conflict model. He viewed the contradiction between the forces and relations of production within a single mode of production to be pivotal in generating class conflict and revolutions. He claimed that class exploitation and domination within the economic sphere would generate shared interests within the working class, which would lead to class solidarity, consciousness, and organizations. Market competition and endemic economic crises under capitalism continuously undermine the position of the petty bourgeoisie and force them into the ranks of the proletariat, the industrial working

class. According to Marx, these transformations would expand the proportion of the working class in advanced industrial societies and convert them into a giant force capable of disrupting the social structure. Marx expected that class conflict would inevitably find expression in the political sphere. In times of economic crisis, when the capitalist system is most vulnerable, industrial workers armed with revolutionary ideology would target the state whose policies generally support the interests of their class enemy, the capitalist class. Given the ever-expanding size of the working class and recurrent capitalist crises, the working class would ultimately be able to overthrow capitalism and establish a socialist system.

Although Marx's predictions on revolutions in advanced capitalist countries never materialized, his class analysis inspired a number of scholars to undertake studies of revolutions and large-scale social conflicts in a wide variety of countries. In a seminal work, Barrington Moore, Jr. demonstrated the ways in which alternative coalitions of urban and agrarian classes produced a constellation of 20th-century revolutions that determined the nature of the modern political systems of capitalist democracy, fascism, and communism. Moore also employed class analysis to explain conditions that produced peasant uprisings and revolutions. Other scholars, such as Jeffery Paige and Eric Wolf, also used class analysis in different ways to explain 20th-century peasant revolts and agrarian revolutions in developing countries.

State-Centered and Structural Theories of Revolution

State-centered theories of revolution shift the focus of analysis away from class conflict and toward the power structure, notably the state, which is regarded as relatively autonomous. State-centered theorists locate the state within the international political system and examine the political and military pressures that may render it vulnerable. According to Skocpol, a leading proponent of this model, military pressures and defeat in wars may undermine the state's coercive apparatus and lead to revolution. In agrarian bureaucracies, external pressures combined with state efforts to promote industrial development may generate schisms between the state and the dominant class,

with each sector competing to extract greater resources from the peasantry. In such conflicting situations, dominant classes may be able to block state policies and frustrate government attempts at economic transformation. Such conflicts between the state and the dominant class may result in state breakdown, paving the way for revolutionary upheavals. Peasants may be able to revolt and bring about a revolution if they have communal solidarity and strength.

In another view of state-centered revolution in developing countries, Misagh Parsa points out that state autonomy does not prevent states in the developing world from serving the interests of the privileged. Interested in promoting development, state policies often serve the economic interests of large capital, often adversely affecting the interests of the rest of the population and providing favorable conditions for coalition formation.

In particular, highly centralized, exclusive, and hyperactive states may be vulnerable to attack in times of crisis. Such states contract the scope of the polity, use repression to block access to the state, and thus undermine support for the regime, increasing the likelihood of polarization and revolution. In Parsa's analysis, the relationship between the state and the economy has significant implications for the nature of social conflicts. The level of state intervention in capital accumulation can affect the nature and outcome of social conflicts. In regulative states such as market economies, the low level of state intervention in capital accumulation reduces the probability that the state will become the direct target of collective action and thus diminishes the likelihood of revolutionary conflicts. Capital allocation and accumulation are determined by an abstract, decentralized, depoliticized, and "self-regulating" market system, which tends to defuse and privatize conflicts, confining them to the civil society. Because markets are abstract, decentralized, and depoliticized, they cannot be attacked or overthrown. As a result, the regulative state is unlikely to attract direct attacks or challenges because class conflict remains confined within the economic sphere and the civil society. Should such conflicts escalate, aggrieved groups may clamor for the regulative state to intervene on their behalf rather than attacking it, increasing the likelihood of a reformist, nonrevolutionary outcome. Where state intervention is low,

the regulative state may be perceived as an autonomous entity that serves general, societal interests. In such cases, the regulative state may actually become an integrative rather than a divisive force. Alternatively, low state intervention in capital accumulation may increase the likelihood and intensity of class conflict, which can remove the regulative state as the principal target of attack and thereby reduce the likelihood of revolution.

Hyperactive states, in contrast, intervene greatly in the economy and, as a consequence, can become vulnerable to challenge. Hyperactive states tend to be major economic actors, control abundant economic resources, and intervene extensively in capital allocation and accumulation. High levels of intervention entail significant political consequences for these states. As they become direct producers and financiers, the abstract, decentralized, and depoliticized market mechanism is replaced by a visible, concrete social entity, which can be attacked during conflict or crisis. High state intervention expands the extent of political conflicts in times of economic crisis, as economic and political conflicts converge in the political arena, when the hyperactive state rather than market forces are held accountable for failure and mismanagement. Finally, hyperactive states that employ sizable segments of the workforce tend to become the target of workers' economic conflicts. Workers' attacks against the state may reduce the intensity of class conflict and, in turn, increase the likelihood of coalition formation. Broad coalitions and disruption of the social order are very important in Parsa's theory of revolution. In the absence of broad coalitions, revolutionary challengers might be repressed and rendered ineffective.

Jeff Goodwin articulates another version of state-centered revolutionary theory in contemporary developing countries. Although class interests and economic grievances are important, Goodwin argues that the roots of revolutionary movements are to be found in the political context in which class relationships and economic institutions are embedded. Revolutionary movements in the periphery have been inadvertently facilitated and encouraged by the formation of violent, exclusionary, authoritarian governments that are also organizationally incoherent. Despotic regimes provide a visible focus of opposition for groups and classes that may have different grievances but come

together in a broad coalition. Exclusionary, repressive states render political moderates and reformists relatively impotent and inconsequential. Thus, revolutions often take place in countries that reject peaceful attempts to redress social and political grievances through elections and organizing and instead resort to blatant fraud and violent repression. Revolutionary movements may attract broad popular support where states sponsor or promote unpopular economic or social arrangements, repress or exclude mobilized social groups, and alienate the elite through corruption and arbitrary personalistic rule. Even moderate and predominantly middle-class political parties and voluntary associations can join in broad alliances that effectively support radical movements waging armed revolutionary struggles.

Tilly argues that a natural history of revolutions that could specify necessary and sufficient conditions for revolutions is not possible because as regimes vary and change historically, they also alter conditions for the violent seizure of state power. Nevertheless, Tilly does provide a state-centered explanation of revolution, analyzing a state's vulnerability to revolution as determined by its capacity to control resources and the activities of its population and the extent to which the public enjoys equal rights and is able to influence governmental affairs and policies. He reasons that high-capacity democratic regimes are not vulnerable to revolutions because they are popular, and high-capacity nondemocratic states are unlikely targets for revolution because their rulers are able to impose strict controls on the people. Low-capacity nondemocratic regimes likewise do not produce revolutionary outcomes because once the revolutionaries seize power, the state apparatus tends to fragment and create difficulties for forming a new state. Thus, in Tilly's model, medium-capacity nondemocratic regimes are the most likely to foster revolutionary outcomes.

Ideology and Revolutions

Some theorists attribute independent power and dynamics to ideology in the analysis of revolutions. Maintaining that ideology has a central, even independent role in any existing social structure and in its transformations, they argue that class, economic, and political conflicts by themselves could

not lead to revolutions and that only revolutionary ideologies can convert social discontent into revolutionary crisis. Using the example of the Iranian revolution, some theorists emphasize the role of the Shi'a culture of martyrdom that inspired devout Iranians to oppose the Shah in the face of repression and death. Proponents of this perspective maintain that without a revolutionary ideology and culture of resistance, revolutions are highly unlikely.

Theorists who stress the role of ideology in revolutions are correct in one important sense: Ideologically driven challengers have been in the forefront of revolutionary struggles in developing countries. In the 20th century, intellectuals and students adopted revolutionary ideologies and struggled to transform their societies. Ideological shifts among students and intellectuals not only fostered solidarity and cohesion among these vanguards of revolutionary struggles but also provided an analysis of the causes of the conflicts and provided a formula out of those conditions. Although these revolutionaries fought for their ideology, they were also aware of the need to form broad coalitions to bring down the ruling powers. To minimize ideological conflicts, revolutionary challengers often adopted alternative public approaches to ensure coalition formation. To attract those who did not share their ideologies, revolutionary leaders were sometimes circumspect about their ideologies. In Iran, for example, Ayatollah Khomeini never told the Iranian people about his theocratic goals, but instead, he borrowed significant aspects of the nationalist ideology of the 1950s and attacked the Shah's regime for failing those aspirations. In the case of Nicaragua, the Sandinistas compromised and modified their program to ensure a broad coalition that was able to overthrow the government in 1979.

Revolutionary Processes and Outcome

Modern revolutionary conflicts often begin with the rise of a revolutionary challenger or coalition of challengers that attempt to gain exclusive control over state power. These challengers are often ideologically driven intellectuals and students inspired in part by the success of revolutionaries elsewhere and antagonized by domestic economic structures and political systems. Revolutionary challengers may emerge in many societies, but

most fail due to government repression and/or lack of popular backing. Those revolutionary challengers that do survive are successful in gaining the support of dissident intellectuals and students who contribute resources and new recruits. Revolutionary challengers become serious contenders for power when they acquire adherents among major classes or collectivities such as workers, peasants, or segments of the middle class.

Revolutionary situations emerge when popular backing for revolutionary challengers becomes substantial and rulers are incapable or unwilling to suppress the challengers. It is important to note that revolutionary situations often arise as a result of certain societal characteristics and major economic and political crises, not because of the actions of revolutionary challengers, who often constitute a very small segment of the population. Specific characteristics render certain societies more vulnerable to revolutionary situations. Countries marked by high levels of inequality in the distribution of wealth and income are vulnerable to economic and political crises. Further, countries that are highly dependent economically on other countries tend to be more susceptible to economic crises. Vulnerability is especially acute for developing countries that rely heavily on exports of one or a few raw materials and primary commodities. Fluctuations in the world market and falling prices for their goods, combined with an economic downturn, can be devastating. The impact may threaten broad segments of the population, contributing to a decline in support for the government and a rise in popular backing for revolutionaries. In revolutionary situations, states lose popular support, and rulers may become isolated and be abandoned even by the dominant classes who are not generally given to supporting revolution or radical social change.

Revolutionary outcomes result when members of the polity defect from the regime or when challengers successfully neutralize or defeat the armed forces and seize control of the state apparatus. Where the core of a regime refuses to relinquish power in a revolutionary situation, challengers may have to resort to large-scale disruptive tactics and armed struggle to overthrow the government. Certain states are especially vulnerable to revolutionary outcomes. States that are highly exclusive, repressive, and corrupt often have a narrow base

of support and may be quickly abandoned by members of the polity, facilitating a revolutionary outcome. States that depend on external support are also vulnerable to a revolutionary outcome. Such dependent states may lose their external support for various reasons, including an interest in preventing deteriorating conditions and further radicalization of politics. These shifts in international alignment and the withdrawal of external support may expedite the overthrow of the government, producing a revolutionary outcome.

Complex processes affect the immediate political outcome of revolutions. In most revolutionary situations, alternative contenders such as radical and moderate challengers compete against each other for state power. Generally, in economically polarized situations of the developing world, where income inequalities are high and growing, liberal and moderate political organizations do not gain a great deal of strength and popular support. But the political ideology and organizational strength of challengers do not always affect their likelihood of seizing power. In fact, the immediate political outcome of revolutions is not easily predictable at the outset of revolutionary struggles. The mobilization options that are available are central in determining which challengers will be victorious. For example, in Nicaragua, state policies under the ruling Somoza family marginalized the moderate opposition for decades. When the government refused to hold free elections in 1978, any chance for peaceful change was blocked, and the opposition became radicalized, thereby narrowing the mobilization options. This improved the position of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, a small, militant guerrilla organization who had already launched an armed struggle to overthrow the regime and was eventually able to seize power. In Iran, the majority of the opposition fought for independence, freedom, and social and economic justice, but the Shah's policies had severely repressed the secular political organizations and closed all mobilization options. As a result, mosques remained the only public spaces that enjoyed some measure of autonomy from the state and provided relatively safe places for the people to gather and mobilize. Mobilization through the mosque enabled Khomeini and a small segment of his clerical supporters to lead the struggles in the final stages of the conflicts and seize

power. In the Philippines, radical leftist revolutionaries, the most powerful political organization in the 1980s, failed to seize power in part because their radical ideology threatened the privileged classes and prevented the formation of a broad coalition. When the radicals boycotted the fateful election in 1986, moderates were able to take the lead in the struggles against Marcos, and in the end, the reformist elite was able to take power. Thus, it is reasonable to say that the revolutionary process itself exerts a great deal of influence on the eventual outcome of the revolutionary struggle.

Once the state is overthrown, revolutionary coalitions generally break down. Although revolutionary challengers need broad coalitions to seize state power, these coalitions become superfluous once the revolutionaries control the instruments of coercion. The new revolutionary regime is often more centralized and sometimes more repressive than the old one and may not fulfill all its prerevolutionary promises. The long-term structural outcomes of revolutions are often determined by complex factors and not easily predictable. The interest and ideology of the revolutionary regime only partly determine the structural changes pursued by the new government. Other internal forces, from both within and outside the polity, can mobilize to realize their interests, thus affecting the structural outcome of revolutions. The overthrow of the state's repressive apparatus often leads to reduced repression and provides an opportunity for various classes and collectivities to mobilize and demand change. Additionally, international political and ideological conditions may also influence the internal development of post-revolutionary societies, particularly where the country's economy depends on external sources and the state requires outside support.

Future analyses of social revolutions would benefit from perspectives that synthesize and analyze large-scale social transformations, class analysis, states, ideologies, and role of global forces. It is important to understand the large-scale social changes that often precede social revolutions. They can affect major interests and the capabilities of various actors and set the stage for social conflicts. Changes in the class structure are also critical in understanding social revolutions. While class conflict may prevent and delay revolutions, class coalitions seem to have played a very important role in

revolutions in developing countries by disrupting the social structure and facilitating the overthrow of the government. State-centered theories of revolution can contribute much by specifying state vulnerabilities and conditions that may result in the isolation of the state and its abandonment by broad segments of the population. Finally, analyses of ideology can contribute immensely to explanations of social revolutions by analyzing the causes of the rise of revolutionary challengers and explaining why large segments of the population shift their support to such challengers.

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See also Civil War; Conflicts; Marx, Karl; Peasants' Movements

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RIGHTS

Modern political theory locates the notion of “rights” at the center of its debates. The liberal state and constitutional theory have emphasized rights as fundamental building blocks of the social order. In political thought, after a long lull, rights are once again a renewed focus of interest. Political theorists now commonly opt to articulate social demands in terms of rights rather than (for instance) as a general utility or integrity of the body politic. In this vein, several theorists—above all, those with liberal roots—have adopted the Lockean vision of the just political order whose primary obligation is to respect the moral rights of its citizens.

However, there is a broad spectrum of definition for the concept of rights. In its older, objective usage, a right means “what is just” or “what is fair.” Aristotle, for instance, used *dikaion* to indicate that a society is rightly ordered. However, this “objective” sense of right is not equivalent to our modern, subjective notion of rights, which originates, according to historians, in the thought of John Locke in the 18th century—or perhaps even further back, in late-medieval European thinking. In this subjective sense, rights are sometimes defined as “normative attributes” that pertain to persons. Other approaches see rights as entitlements to choose, entitlements (not) to perform certain actions, or entitlements to expect that others will (not) perform certain actions.

This entry defines a right as a legal or moral recognition of choices or interests to which a particular weight is attached. It proceeds in three steps. The first section elucidates the different types of rights and the second section the forms and functions of rights. The final section delivers a brief overview of the major theories of rights.

Types of Rights

Any study of rights should begin with an elucidation of the multiple categories of rights. In the realm of politics, one can distinguish between legal and moral rights, between rights as such and “human rights,” and between civil, political, social, and cultural rights.

Legal and Moral Rights

Legal rights describe a type of institutional arrangement in which interests are guaranteed legal protection, choices are guaranteed legal effect or goods, and opportunities are provided to individuals on a guaranteed basis. Assertions that X has a legal right to Y are tested according to whether the law does in fact recognize and implement X’s right to Y.

Moral rights express the justified demand that such institutional arrangements should be implemented, maintained in the name of a fundamental principle that accords importance to certain basic individual values such as autonomy or moral agency. The assertion that X has a moral right in the absence of any legal recognition of this right may take the form of a demand for the law to be changed.

Natural rights can be considered as a subclass of moral rights. These are fundamental rights, derived from nature or divine authority, and enjoyed by all men and women regardless of their beliefs and position in society. They pertain to human beings in the state of nature, prior to the institution of society. Natural rights are thus considered to precede civic rights held in the political order. They are therefore universal, inalienable, and indefeasible: They cannot be contested by political authority, and indeed, it is the responsibility of those who govern to protect them. Consequently, the concept was used to justify the revolutions of the 18th century on the grounds that the existing law infringed on individuals’ natural rights. In the United States, for instance, the Declaration of Independence (1776) against the British colonial state was based on an appeal to the natural rights of all Americans. The *Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen* (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789) also refers to certain “natural rights” of mankind.

Rights and Human Rights

This distinction between moral or natural rights and legal rights leads to another difference: the difference between rights and human rights. One agrees with Michael Freedman (1991) that human rights are the most basic prerogatives pertaining to what is essentially human, while other categories of rights are more specific, limited, and normally

derivative. Freedman defines human rights as a “conceptual device, expressed in linguistic form, that assigns priority to certain human or social attributes regarded as essential to the adequate functioning of all human beings” (p. 7).

The promulgation of the French Declaration in 1789 gave an impetus to the debate about the rights of man. In his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), Edmund Burke attacked the abstract, metaphysical, and simplistic character of human rights, which he contrasted with the “real rights”—related to their particular history and circumstances—of “Englishmen.” In reaction, Thomas Paine published *Rights of Man* (1791) in which he argued that having been created rational and equal, man had natural rights including those to liberty, property, and security, as well as the right of resistance to oppression. Two other major critics of human rights were Jeremy Bentham and Karl Marx. For the former, the term *right* should be confined to its legal sense, since the demand for a right is no more a right in itself than a hungry man’s plea for bread. Marx claimed in *On the Jewish Question* (1843) that there was an inherent contradiction in the French Declaration. Whereas in the “political community” man regards himself as a “communal being,” in “civil society” he acts as a private individual who regards other men as a means. Marx therefore concluded that “not one of the so-called rights of man goes beyond egoistic man, man as a member of civil society, namely, an individual withdrawn into himself, his private interest, and his private desire and separated from the community.”

Civil, Political, Social, and Cultural Rights

In a seminal essay published in 1950, Thomas Marshall divided the development of citizenship in England into three parts: civil, political, and social. The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom/liberty of the person: freedom of speech, thought, and faith; the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts; and the right to justice. These so-called first-generation rights were most prominently proclaimed during the revolutions of the 18th century, particularly in the French Declaration of 1789 and the 1791 Bill of Rights in the United States. The institutions most directly associated with civil rights are courts of

justice. In theory, civil rights exist independently of state action, protecting the freedom of the individual against potential encroachments by state power. They are often called “liberty rights” since they are based on a “negative” conception of freedom.

The political element means the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. These so-called second-generation rights developed principally over the course of the 19th century, and their corresponding institutions are parliaments and local government councils.

The social element ranges from the right to a modicum of social welfare and security, to the right to share fully in the social heritage, and to live the life of a civilized human being according to the standard prevailing in society. These rights, which represent a continuation of several claims made by 19th-century socialist movements, came to fruition in the 20th century in the framework of the welfare state. The institutions most closely associated with social rights are the educational system and social services. These rights are also known as “claim rights” on the grounds that they represent “positive” freedoms—that is, concrete rights that individuals and groups can expect to enjoy a decent standard of living. They rely on state intervention to guarantee societal solidarity and equality. Codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), social rights have also been formalized in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (United Nations, 1966).

The International Covenant of 1966 also recognizes “cultural rights,” which can be defined as the body of rights guaranteeing respect, protection, and promotion of cultural references and expression—that is, the ensemble of values, convictions, beliefs, language, and knowledge—through which individuals identify themselves, communicate with each other, forge a shared sense of belonging, and consider themselves to be recognized with dignity. Sometimes known as “fourth-generation,” cultural rights were recognized in the second half of the 20th century, particularly in North America. “Multiculturalist” authors interpret cultural rights as being clearly individual and not collective since their ultimate purpose is the protection of the individual. Indeed, cultural rights such as the freedom

to speak one's native language are intimately linked to other individual rights such as dignity or freedom of expression.

Forms and Functions of Rights

An analysis of rights can be divided into two parts: a description of the internal structure of rights and a description of what rights do for those who hold them.

Forms of Rights

The most famous legal analysis of the form of a right is that of Wesley Hohfeld (1879–1918). Hohfeld argued that the proposition “X has a right to do R” could mean four things:

1. First, it could mean that X has a *privilege* to do R. In this case, Y (or anyone else) has “no rights” toward X, and X has no duty to perform that action. Singing in your bath or painting your bedroom blue would be examples.
2. X has a *claim* (or a right) against Y. Consequently, Y has a duty toward X to do R. For instance, an employer has the duty to pay wages to employees or a parent has a duty to provide food to his or her child.
3. X has a *power* to do R, which alters the legal rights and duty of Y. For instance, a police officer has the power to ask to see the license of a speeding driver.
4. X has an *immunity* with regard to R. In this case, Y (or anyone else) lacks the power to bring about a certain consequence for X. For instance, witnesses in court have a right not to be obliged to incriminate themselves.

However, Hohfeld's categorization makes no attempt to clarify what the function of a right is. There are two broad accounts of the special relation between duties and right bearers that have been proposed: the choice theory of right and the interest (or benefit) theory of rights.

Functions of Rights

The “choice theory” (or will theory) singles out the rights bearer. It holds that when I have a right

to do something, what is effectively protected is my choice of whether or not to do it. It accentuates my freedom and my self-fulfillment. In a famous article, Herbert L. Hart argued that if there was one natural right, it was the equal right of all men to be free. In addition to this right of freedom, Alan Gerwith establishes a right to well-being. John Rawls, too, assumes in his theory of justice that rights pertain to primary goods that rational and moral individuals would regard as necessary to the functioning of a just constitutional framework. In all cases, the end is to ensure the conditions without which autonomy is impossible and without which human agency cannot be realized.

The “benefit theory” maintains that the function of a right is to further the interests of the individual who enjoys it. An owner has a right not because owners have choices but because ownership makes the owner better off. To have a right is, then, to be the intended beneficiary of someone else's duty. In other words, rights and duties are correlative. A less strict version (the “interest theory”) maintains that individuals have rights whenever an interest that they hold is regarded as sufficiently important in itself to justify obliging others to promote that interest in some way. In this interpretation, rights thus generate duties.

Theories of Rights

Richard Tuck has correctly pointed out that the meaning of a term such as *right* is “theory dependent.” In other words, the elucidation of a complex notion such as rights requires an account of the possible theories about politics that employ the concept.

The Natural Rights Paradigm

According to Freeden, the theory of natural rights includes four elements. First, it argues simply that human beings are born with such rights, that they are part of our initial equipment in the same ways as our bodies are. A common core of human nature is thus defined by encircling it with a succinct list of natural rights. They are innate, inalienable, and indefeasible. Second, natural rights are presocial. They are not the product of any social artifice; rather, political societies are created for the very purpose of ensuring the recognition and

implementation of natural rights. Third, natural rights are absolute; they prevail over any other consideration that might deny their validity, applicability, or range. Fourth, such rights are universal; all human beings, irrespective of time and space, enjoy them. Historically, appeal was made to natural law or the law of God. The primary exposition of natural law is to be found in the writings of the Dominican St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) who defined natural law as the participation of divine law—discoverable by reason—in God’s rational creatures. For John Locke (1632–1704), since we are all creatures of God, we have inalienable rights. The modern age, however, is more skeptical about revelation as a basis for political morality. Recent theories have attempted instead to identify the deep moral values and principles that underlie the idea of rights. John Finnis (1940–), for example, has revived some of the central tenets of natural law: If the overriding rationale of natural law is to establish what is truly good for human individuals, it follows that one needs some conception of human good—of individual fulfillment in a form (or in a range of forms) of communal life that fosters rather than hinders such fulfillment. This might include, among other things, the right not to be tortured, not to be deprived of one’s capacity to procreate, the right not to be lied to, and so on. Finnis insists that the first principles of natural law are not deductively inferred from any speculative principles or metaphysical propositions about human nature. To discover what is naturally right is to ask not what is in accordance with human nature but what is in accordance with reason.

Legal Positivism

This central claim of natural law is rejected by legal positivists who deny that the legal validity of a norm depends on its substantive moral quality. Bentham (1748–1832) attacked natural rights in his *Anarchical Fallacies* as “rhetorical nonsense—nonsense upon stilts,” calling rights in general “fictions,” before distinguishing between the “bad” fiction of natural rights and the “good” fiction of legal rights. He analyzed rights as a rational human contrivance necessary for political and social life. Rights could exist only within this framework and were not anterior to law: “From real laws come real rights, but from imaginary

laws, from laws of nature . . . come imaginary rights” (*Principles of Legislation*, Chapter XIII). Together with his disciple John Austin (1790–1859), Bentham laid the foundations of legal positivism, which rejects the conception that rights exist independent from human enactment. The validity of any right can always be traced to an objectively identifiable source—be it the command of a sovereign for Bentham and Austin, the rule of recognition for Hart, or a basic norm that validates the constitution for Hans Kelsen. Consequently, legal positivism establishes a clear distinction between “ought” (what is morally desirable) and “is” (what actually exists). It does not follow, however, that they subscribe to the proposition that an unjust law must be obeyed. Both Austin and Bentham, for instance, acknowledged that disregard for unjust laws is justified if it promotes change for the good. According to Hart, rights are distinguished from other moral considerations by the fact that they protect and promote the specifically human interest in freedom.

Rights as Trumps

In the 1970s, the foundations of legal philosophy were shaken by the vision of law advanced by American jurist Ronald Dworkin (1931–). Dworkin’s attack on legal positivism and utilitarianism is founded on his concern that the law ought to “take rights seriously.” Rights are best understood as “trumps” over some background justification for political decisions that state a goal for the community as a whole. For instance, if someone has a right to publish pornography, this means that it is wrong to act in violation of that right even if there are some reasons to believe that the community would be better off without pornography. Dworkin’s thesis is grounded in the conviction that no government may impose any constraint on a person that this person could not accept without abandoning her or his sense of equal worth. Utilitarianism—which identifies the notion of average or collective welfare as the goal of human action—should be replaced by a rights-based theory centering on individual independence. However, this liberal conception of rights differs from a libertarian conception such as that advocated by Robert Nozick. While the latter is concerned with preserving individual choice

(limited only by the rights of others to the same good), the former insists on an equal treatment of all members of society. Dworkin's conception of political morality includes three elements: (1) justice, which incorporates both individual rights and collective goals for treating citizens with equal concern and respect; (2) fairness, which designates the procedures that give all citizens equal influence in decisions that affect them; and (3) procedural due process, which relates to the correct procedures for determining whether a citizen has violated the law.

This metaphor of rights as "trumps" raises the question of whether there is any absolute right. According to Gerwith, a right is absolute when it cannot be overridden by any circumstances, can thus never be justifiably infringed, and must be fulfilled without any exceptions. Gerwith asserts that there is at least one such absolute right: All innocent persons have an absolute right not to be the intended victims of a homicidal project.

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See also Citizenship; Civic Culture; Civic Participation; Democracy, Quality; Equality; Human Rights, Comparative Perspective; Human Rights in International Relations; Individualism; Judicial Review; Judicial Systems; Justice; Liberalism; Liberty; Locke, John; Multiculturalism; Pluralism; Positivism; Utilitarianism

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RISK AND PUBLIC POLICY

The relationship between risk and public policy goes back to the 17th-century Prussian origins of scientific enquiry into policy and state science, as part of cameralist *Policeywissenschaft* (German for "public policy"). The systematic study of policy was to ensure the well-being of the local state and its subjects. There has been little change to that understanding since. Risks include not only threats to health through environmental, economic, or social processes but also risks to actors arising from political processes themselves. In terms of definition, the literature usually follows the economist Frank Knight in suggesting that risks are associated with events whose probabilities are known. Consequently, three sets of linkages between risk and public policy can be distinguished: (1) related to the substantive analysis of risks, (2) the context of policy making related to risk, and (3) the policy instruments employed in addressing risk.

Substantive Analysis of Risks

The relationship between risk and public policy can be defined in a *substantive* sense. Accordingly, the interest here is how public policies deal with particular types of risk. Within this discussion of substantive risks, three separate but overlapping concerns can be identified.

Risks to Individual and Collective Health

One key consideration over the past 3 decades has been the interest in risk as a result of environmental and technological developments, namely,

the risks to individual and collective health that public policies are supposed to protect against. The field of science and technology studies has considered how organizations deal with uncertainties (potential events to which probabilities cannot be assigned) and risks (potential events to which probabilities can be assigned). Significant attention has been paid to the socially constructed nature of expert decision making, such as regarding the specifications of nuclear reactors or civilian aircraft. Further, there has been significant interest in organizational processes, whether relating to the “normalization of deviance” as part of (interorganizational) processes; the inevitability, as discussed by Charles Perrow (1999), of things going wrong; or the avoidance of such errors in so-called high-reliability organizations. This interest has moved into the field of environmental and civil contingency-related risks, especially given the concern over the impact of climate change (e.g., flooding) and security. A related category of interest has concerned itself with how changing values among the population have led to a growing distrust of large technical systems, especially those associated with risks of catastrophic consequence, for example, nuclear reactors. But attention has not merely been paid to high-tech or catastrophic large-scale risks. In a comparative study of nine risks (e.g., air pollution, dangerous dogs, and pesticides), Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein, and Robert Baldwin (2001) found significant differences in risk regulation regimes that could not be explained by a purely functional “risk profile” explanation. Related to this, Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge (2005) found institutional similarities in regulatory responses to one particular risk, namely, dog bites in public, across significantly different national institutional contexts. Regardless of the political system, regulatory responses to media pressure in the wake of fatal dog-bite attacks was remarkably similar.

Risk and the Political Process

A second key consideration relates to how actors deal with risk affecting them as part of the political process. Such substantive issues of risk to actors are at the heart of the public policy literature on regulation, in particular regarding the regulation of infrastructures. Here, the key interest

is in understanding the institutional conditions that accentuate so-called political risks. In contexts in which developmental outcomes (such as investment in infrastructure modernization and expansion) depend on private investors, as governments lack budgetary resources, private investors will adjust the levels of their investment according to the risk of their being expropriated through administrative-regulatory means. The risk of such expropriation is particularly high following the initial investment in fixed assets (such as infrastructure). As a result, private investors seek regulatory devices that reduce political and regulatory discretion. Therefore, policies need to be devised that reduce administrative discretion in the context of specific political institutional constellations. At the same time, the literature has also been interested in reducing the risk of “capture” and “drift”—that is, the risk that private parties will not fulfill their mandate or rather redirect the goals of regulation away from oversight toward advocacy of their own interests. Following a period in which the literature assumed a near inevitability that “agents” would escape oversight, more recent literature in institutional analysis has pointed to devices to hardwire regulatory regimes in order to reduce problems of political and “private” risks.

Risk and Responsibility When Things Go Wrong

The third area of concern is the risk of being blamed when things go wrong. This literature links to the long-established interests in explaining why politicians delegate certain tasks to agencies rather than maintain decision-making authority (the “blame-shift” hypothesis that has not received much empirical support) as well as other strategies by which politicians seek to avert or divert the risks of being blamed, such as strategies of presentation (relying on spin and other communication devices) or on policy strategies. The latter can be either explicit by abandoning particular public activities or less explicit in the sense of frontline abandonment. For example, street-level bureaucrats, such as police forces, withdraw from particular activities that have caused public backlash. It has been suggested that an increasingly adversarial and legalistic environment has accentuated the trend toward frontline abandonment.

The Context of Policy Making

Looking at the contextual setting of risk and public policy indicates the ways in which either the *context of policy making* has shifted or the specific conditions under which policies associated with particular risks arise. Again, three literatures can be distinguished.

In the first understanding of a changing context, the key environmental change is associated with Ulrich Beck's "risk society." According to Beck, societies are not just organized by risk but are also confronted with risks that are generated through processes of modernization itself. Whereas in the past, risks were associated with exogenous (or external) events (rain, asteroids), contemporary society is faced by endogenous (or manufactured) risks, such as industrial and automotive emissions. Importantly, the nature of these endogenous risks leads to a redistribution of positions within society in which wealth no longer directly insures against risk exposure. Instead, position is defined by knowledge and access to information, as risks are largely "invisible."

Further, the risk society is also characterized by increased skepticism, if not hostility, toward traditional sources of authority and expertise. Moreover, as noted by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (1982), accounts informed by grid group cultural theory highlight value conflicts and shifts within society and therefore stress the importance of risk perceptions, thus challenging the supposedly neutral technologies of risk assessment.

A further literature considers how risks provoke "moral panics." Heightened public attention translates into pressure (transmitted by the media) for something to be done to which politicians seek to respond. Their knee-jerk reactions are regarded as suboptimal, not just because decision making under pressure is said to reduce information flows but also because uncertainty regarding cause and effect is prevalent. Consequently, inappropriately designed responses emerge that are made even more problematic by agencies seeking to regulate for the "last 10%," thereby incurring substantial costs.

Risk and Policy Instruments

A third type of linkage between risk and public policy is particularly interested in *instruments*. Indicating a fundamental divide between normative

assumptions, the literature is divided into two key areas. One focuses in particular on the importance of deliberative and proceduralized solutions to questions of risk, pointing in particular to the societal context, as described by Beck. In light of inherent value conflicts within society, it is argued that deliberative processes are likely to narrow rather than widen differences and that therefore procedural devices need to be established to allow such deliberation to take place. A key example of this literature has been the rise of the *precautionary principle*, a policy approach that has gained considerable attention, with accusations that it invites "capture" and "populism" as it suggests (depending on exact definition) that the burden of proof can be reversed if considerable doubts regarding safety exist. Particular activities or products are no longer innocent until proven guilty; instead, they are assumed to be guilty unless proven otherwise.

In contrast to the deliberation-oriented literature, a separate strain argues the case for improved "risk analysis" instruments—that is, attempts at rationalizing decision making by enhancing the quality of information used. Such instruments and technologies have garnered substantial interest, especially since the 1970s and the rise of the "cost-benefit state" in the United States. Subsequently, such instruments have gained increased currency in other jurisdictions, for example, in the form of regulatory impact assessments or the advocacy of diverse "risk management" tools. These tools supposedly improve decision making and reduce "irrationality" among politicians and civil servants alike. Whereas the attraction of these instruments is partly to reassert authority in decision making and prevent "hasty" decision making (and thus "over-regulation"), it is less evident that these instruments have actually reduced the impact of interest groups and heightened public attention on public policy. In contrast, they appear to have themselves become part of contested policy making, given that their performance in terms of controlling risks has proven to be less than satisfactory. Indeed, Michael Power has suggested that such attempts at rationalizing risk in policy making is likely to accentuate rather than reduce risks. Not unrelated to contributions that seek to "rationalize" decision making regarding risk, there have been debates about instruments to insure against actualized risks and

their potentially redistributive consequences. This relates, for example, to debates regarding flood or crop insurance schemes, their funding, their private or public status, and the degree to which such systems are mandatory or not.

The Field of Risk and Public Policy

Risk and public policy is a field populated by contributions from across the social sciences. The transdisciplinary nature of these contributions has only increased in recent years as the rise of interest in civil contingencies, both before and after crises (as noted by Arjen Boin, Allan McConnell, & Paul t'Hart, 2008), as well as the growing importance of climate and demographic change demand such cross-disciplinary approaches. While the focus on substantive risks remains critical, other research agendas are developing that focus particularly on the failure of instruments to identify risks and the need to understand and explain variations between jurisdictions and domains, especially in terms of variations in enthusiastic endorsement of risk policy instruments or perceptions of risk across different contexts.

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See also Administration; Audit Society; Governance, Administration Policies; Regulation

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RITUALS

Rituals are a challenge for political science. They can be found in a great variety of forms and are multifunctional to such an extent that science has been unable to find an unambiguous definition up to now. Already the term *ritual* was used in antiquity in a double sense—with a primarily religious meaning (religious cult) or modally (the type and manner of carrying out the ceremonies of the cult). In Roman religion, *ritual* denotes an ordered ceremonial activity. Theology and religious studies adhere to this day to the concept of *ritual* as a collective term for religious ceremonies as well as for individual sequences therein. It includes the cults and worshipping customs of Jews and Christians as well as those of various peoples in different times and places, from the Egyptian Isis cult or the Roman priestly authority of the Vestal Virgins to the religious forms of contemporary Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Islam. Early on, Confucian philosophers investigated the legitimate role of ritual (in Chinese, *li*) in the guidance of a society. This entry will discuss the impact of such traditions on recent developments in the social sciences and the renewed importance of the study of rituals.

From the perspective of religious studies, ritual is a matter of cultic actions that follow fixed rules for the purpose of worshipping God, the gods, or figures considered to be holy. Religious rites express explicit wishes for propitiation, solace, recognition, and order. They refer to a transcendental power. Their rules, texts, and notes are gathered in Christian churches into official liturgical books. For instance, in the Roman Catholic Church they are described in the *Rituale Romanum* dating from 1614 (Pope Paul V), which in 1918 became obligatory for all dioceses. Anthropology, ethnology, anthropological religious research, sociology, and psychology attach great significance to the conceptual-theoretical recording, collection, and classification of religious and profane ceremonies.

The founder of anthropological religious research, Edward Burnett Tylor (1873), distinguished religious rites as an expressive-symbolical gestural language of theology from those that serve for communicating with and influencing

spirits. With his investigation of the religion of the Semites, William Robertson Smith created an initial foundation for the systematic investigation of rituals. He developed the thesis that religions essentially consist of beliefs and rites, with rites and practical customs being dominant. Arnold van Gennep's *Les Rites de Passage* recognizes the rhythm-creating function of rituals as a reflection of natural rhythms. A phase pattern serves for classifying rites or individual sequences. Transitional rites are intended to allow individuals and groups to transcend spatial, temporal, and social borders. For Gennep, rites are "compelling actions." Thus, the acceptance of a gift has an obligatory effect on the recipient. Gennep's conceptualization gained lasting recognition for the anthropological investigation of initiatory rites.

The social sciences speak of rituals as a collective designation with which, however, individual scientists relate different categories and theories. *Ritual* and *rite* are frequently used as synonymous terms. Émile Durkheim and his students Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss developed, with regard to the sociology of religion, a theory later taken up by social anthropology and French structuralism. Durkheim defined religion as a system of beliefs and practices that are united in a single moral community. For the Durkheim school, rituals bring about social integration; they are mechanisms that produce social conformity and solidarity. Whenever people come together, there is, according to Durkheim, a natural tendency to coordinate, standardize, and repeat their actions. Durkheim designated the feeling of participating through group activity in something transcendent as "the sacred," which is represented in symbols.

With Max Weber, too, rituals can have the function of creating identity, based on common interests and the "ritual qualification" of membership, as he demonstrated with early religions or the cultic communities of the polis. Subsequently, in Chinese Confucianism and Taoism, those well versed in writing and literature (ritually trained scholar-politicians) occupied high political offices. According to Weber, rituals can mark the social differentiation of a society. Thus, caste societies are based on the ritual separation of occupations and professions. Social scientists at the turn of the 20th century focused mainly on the rituals of traditional, preindustrial societies. They linked them

closely to religion and magic and excluded other (profane) manners of behavior. Social rationalization, however, caused religions and rituals to diverge more strongly. The tendencies of Western societies toward rationalization, which were analyzed by Weber, are capable, through a "disenchantment" of the world, of relegating religious rituals to the margins of public and private life, or of situating them in the political and social domains.

Political Rituals

Terminologically, the concept of ritual cannot be limited to religious and magical rituals, for the conceptual core consists of ritual acts. These are omnipresent in modern and postmodern societies, additionally and especially in political life: from ceremonies in parliaments, inaugurations of presidents, jurisprudence, diplomatic protocol, and electoral campaigns all the way to debates in the mass media. Political leaders endeavor by means of rituals to shape a political reality for their followers. Revolutionaries seek new paths for the legitimation of a political regime. Through their participation in rituals, citizens identify themselves with political parties and social movements that are comprehensible only in symbolic form. The political elite live amid rituals that regulate the interaction among its members and with the public at large.

Edward Shils found that ritual still had a bad reputation among utilitarian-thinking intellectuals in the 1960s; the advance of rationalization and secularization had caused it to be considered as no more than a relic. There are, however, good reasons to treat it as a contemporary phenomenon *sui generis*. Political rituals have been noted, but their empirical investigation is only now getting underway. Impulses for research came from three directions: (1) from the debate concerning symbolic policy and politics of symbols (as discussed by Murray Edelman, 1971), (2) from analyses of fascist and communist dictatorships (such as that of Charles Lane, 1981), and (3) from political culture research such as that of Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. Attention shifted from religious to symbolic rituals. Inasmuch as symbols imbue actions with meaning, rituals allow persons and groups to develop their own worldviews. Politics is then the art of understanding and further developing (in

accordance with one's self-interest) the predominant symbols of an era.

Symbolic politics are capable of simply feigning political activity before a mass audience and of providing benefits for an elite. But as a rule, they are structured so as to include the audience in political activities. They refer to the symbolic and cultural capital of individuals (as noted by Pierre Bourdieu), which determines social prestige through the use of language, education, and culture. Symbolic politics are engaged in an unswerving struggle over the designations, concepts, and interpretations of the agenda of public life. When successfully used, they become a communicative power for the purpose of promoting interests. In repressive regimes, rituals can be used to stifle contradiction and to destroy regime opponents, as, for example, in the Moscow purges of the 1930s.

In addition to the interest in the ritual activity of integrated groups in the tradition of Smith and Durkheim, questions arise as to the function of rituals in conflicts within and between groups and societies or with regard to the establishment of social and political borders. Civil wars, ritualistic terrorism, and failed states demonstrate the political relevance of ritual. They help represent political power openly inasmuch as, for example, constructed traditions and myths are ritualized. In the heterogeneous global society, nationally or culturally based rituals may appear to be dangerous—for instance, in the Western world, the rituals of honor and disgrace. But rituals can also have a pacifying effect, such as the ritual of recurring world conferences, or they can symbolize the concept of peace, as in the sit-ins and human chains of the peace movement during the 1960s and 1970s. Consideration is also given to the biological bases of social behavior that influence the fundamental forms of politics: hierarchy, peer groups, authority, fear, and competition. The ethologist Julian Huxley introduced the term *ritualization* for the stylized, repetitive gestures and postures of animals. Proceeding from this perspective, ethnological sociology understands this term as a mechanism for regulating social behavior, with which intimacy, formality, territoriality, hierarchy, or difference in age can be expressed, and which simultaneously fosters self-identification. Rituals thus are multifunctional, open processes. The anthropological and literary-critical mainstream regards ritual

phenomena as symbolic, expressive activity. Anthropologists such as Victor Turner (1969) applied the concept of ritual to industrial societies, and political scientists such as David I. Kertzer (1988) argued for an application to modern politics. It is basically a matter of inquiring into how symbolic processes enter into politics and why they are important.

For a long time, political scientists tended, through their belief in ongoing secularization, to overlook the phenomena of ritual and concomitantly of the body as carriers of communication. Later, in the 1980s, in the United States, a cross-disciplinary investigative approach was established around the *Journal of Ritual Studies*. Sociologists, political scientists, jurists, media and communications scholars, art theoreticians, dramaturgists as well as literary and cultural scholars united in the investigation of ritual aspects in the subsystems of postmodern societies. The political, social, cultural, and religious dynamic since the end of the East–West conflict has sharpened the awareness of ritual forms in the political sphere. In parallel, religion has been rediscovered as a crucial social-political factor. Samuel P. Huntington's 1996 study *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* became an important point of reference. Initial analytical steps brought to the fore, out of existing microstudies and theoretical outlines, a series of attributes or attributive dimensions. Jan Platvoet (1955) suggests distinguishing between 13 characteristics or functions with which rituals may be identified. He argues that rituals are interactive, collective, a habit, a traditionalizing innovation, expressive, communicative, symbolic, multimedial, a performance, performative, aesthetic, strategic, and integrative. Proceeding from the experiences of participants in various ritual acts, Ronald L. Grimes (1995) formulated a typology that endeavors, under the generic term of ritual, to classify the entire area into six types: ritualization, rules of propriety, ceremony, magic, liturgy, and celebration.

Communication, Performance, Political Performance

The three key concepts of communication, performance, and political performance are characteristic

of various social-scientific approaches toward explaining ritual processes. The widespread conception of rituals as communicative activities is related, on the one hand, to the theory of action that goes back to Max Weber and Talcott Parsons and, on the other hand, to the shift toward language as activity accomplished in the 20th century by philosophy and by the theory of science. According to the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, speech is an activity guided by rules. The ritual as text, as script, determines sequences of actions and those engaged therein. Its symbols refer to certain systems of belief or knowledge. Rituals are thus a special genre of communication within the communicative repertoire of a social unit.

Alongside stands an application of philological methods to the study of human activities that is derived from structuralism (e.g., the work of Leonard Bloomfield, Claude Lévi-Strauss, etc.). The speech acts of a ritual or of other forms of activity are segmented into repetitive parts whose distribution is classified with the goal of comprehending the synchronous coaction as a structured semiotic system. The analysis is text related and without contextualizations, for example, of a social-historical, geographical, or economic type. The primary object of investigation consists of the frequently unconscious ritualizations of everyday speaking (performance). There are significant investigations into rituals of transition (e.g., by van Gennep) or rituals of accessibility (e.g., by Erving Goffman) on entrance into a new situation, a new office, an assembly, or a segment of life and into the changes in status and roles that are contained therein. The accent of these investigations is on social borders.

The terminology of performance that has spread from the artistic program of "action art" to the analysis of ritual should draw attention to the fact that activities embody and construct meaning. Clifford Geertz and others have included this realization in the term *cultural performance*; Turner speaks of social drama. The analysis thus reacts to social upheavals during the 1970s that were triggered by new social and political movements, by a sensitization to spiritual ideas and foreign traditions (New Age), and by the liturgical renewal (Second Vatican Council) of the Roman Catholic Church. Inasmuch as the processes and transformative power of theatrical dramaturgy and ritual prove to be interrelated, it is expected that rituals

will be able to help channel social crises into the reconstruction and renewal of societies.

Above all, the mass media have taken over the role of staging reality for a worldwide audience through the ritual formats of the news broadcast, talk shows, and political events such as inaugurations, parliamentary hearings, conferences, and wartime reports. The holders of political office have at all times made use of a broad repertoire of symbols to create solidarity among people and to impart to them—in Durkheim's sense—a group or community identity: flags; hymns; insignia of power such as coats of arms, the throne, the crown, ceremonial clothes, and reserved colors; political symbols of above and below, good and evil, or left and right; and certain animals (e.g., lions, eagles), key words, sounds, and images, as well as buildings.

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See also Durkheim, Émile; Political Communication; Political Culture; Religion; Symbols, Political; Weber, Max

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ROBUST STATISTICS

Traditional methods for estimating regression models can be unduly influenced by a small subset

of the data. For example, using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to model economic growth in 15 industrialized democracies, Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett find that the interaction between Left governments and organized labor is positively and significantly correlated with economic performance. In his analysis of the data, however, Bruce Western illustrates that these findings are largely determined by the Norwegian case. Using robust estimation techniques to account for this observation reveals much greater uncertainty about the influence of the interaction effect on economic performance. OLS estimation minimizes large residuals at the expense of degrading the fit of the remaining observations. The coefficient estimates it generates can thus be strongly influenced by even a single large residual, as was the case in the model estimated by Lange and Garret. Like OLS estimation, unusual points may also influence traditional maximum likelihood methods. The likelihood often depends on means and variances, whose estimated values can be largely determined by points lying outside the majority of the data. Thus, when implementing any regression method based on the mean and variance, the analyst must be wary of unusual observations. In this entry, various ways of dealing with this problem are discussed.

Observations can be unusual in two important ways: First, an observation may be an outlier if the value of the explanatory variable is typical of the sample but the value of the outcome variable is atypically large or small; alternatively, an observation may be a leverage point if the value of the explanatory variable(s) is demonstrably different from the rest of the data. An influential observation refers to either an outlier or leverage point whose inclusion in the analysis substantially alters the estimates of the statistics of interest, including parameter estimates and predictions, the estimated variance of these values, and the goodness-of-fit statistics. These influential observations can result from “bad” data (such as data that have been recorded incorrectly), improper modeling of an outcome variable with a heavy-tailed distribution, or models that fail to describe the data well for certain values of the predictor.

Even if only a small fraction of the data—or even a single observation—is influential, estimation strategies that assume all data are modeled

correctly may produce erroneous results. To avoid producing incorrect estimates, regression analyses must account for influential observations. A popular strategy for dealing with these observations is the diagnosis and removal of these points before the estimation of a regression model to the remaining “good” data. This technique is acceptable if the observation has been recorded incorrectly and the true value cannot be recovered, if the observation arises from a different population than the other data, or if there is a theoretical justification for excluding the observation from the analysis. It is problematic, in contrast, if the influential point emerges because of heavy-tailed distributions or inadequate models. In these cases, an observation cannot be discarded simply because it fails to fit the model, as removing this data point provides unwarranted support to the incorrect model. Instead, robust regression provides a compromise between deleting influential observations and allowing them to violate the assumptions of traditional regression estimators. When data conform to conventional assumptions, robust and nonrobust methods provide similar estimates of statistics of interest. Robust estimators, however, are resistant to the effects of influential observations and retain their efficiency when data are nonnormal.

Diagnosing Influential Points

To determine if a robust regression approach is necessary, the analyst must establish whether there are influential points in the data set. Before fitting a regression model, the investigator often conducts exploratory data analysis such as visualizing the variables in scatterplots and box plots. While a visual examination of the data can sometimes be used to detect outliers and leverage points, it cannot determine whether these points are influential, nor does it capture all potential influence points. Another popular strategy for detecting outliers is a post hoc examination of the residuals from the regression analysis. Though a large residual indicates that an observation is an outlier, this outlier may not be an influential point. Moreover, leverage points can exhibit small residuals while altering the estimates of the statistics of interest. Given the limitations of these techniques, it is necessary to examine influence statistics before assuming that there are no influential observations in the data set.

The three most popular measures of influence rely on regression deletion diagnostics that examine the effect of removing a given observation on the estimated quantities of interest. The most commonly used diagnostic for influential cases is Cook's Distance (Cook's D), which measures the impact of an unusual observation on the slope coefficients. Unless the observation is an influential point, the coefficient estimates calculated when observation i is removed from the analysis should be similar to the estimated values when this case is included. The Cook's D is usually assessed by comparing its value with an F distribution, and while there is no universally acknowledged cutoff, a percentile value greater than 50% demonstrates that the i th observation has a significant effect on the estimated slope coefficients.

While Cook's D measures the influence of the i th observation on all slope coefficients, the $DFFIT$ provides the actual changes in the prediction estimates caused by the deletion of each case through a measure of the influence of the i th observation on the fitted value for y_i . The resulting statistic represents the number of estimated standard deviations that the fitted value increases or decreases with the inclusion of the i th observation in the model. Any observation with $|DFFIT| > 2\sqrt{(p+1)/n}$, where p is the number of linear predictors and n is the number of observations, should be investigated.

Finally, the $DFBETA$ is an analogous statistic for examining an observation's influence on a particular coefficient. It is obtained by calculating the difference between the coefficient estimated with and without the i th observation. The resulting statistic measures the change in the number of standard deviations for these two estimates of the coefficient. A large $DFBETA$ value may indicate that the i th observation has a large influence on this regression coefficient. The cutoff value for $DFBETA$ statistics is $2/\sqrt{n}$.

These three deletion diagnostics are used to uncover individual observations that are influential. It can be possible, however, for a case that is not individually influential to become highly influential when grouped with other observations. This is known as the *masking effect*, because the influence of the observation is masked by the presence of a neighboring case. Single-case deletion diagnostics can be extended to assess the changes caused by the deletion of more than one observation at a

time. Although this strategy may be effective for small subsets of the data, if all possible subsets of cases are considered multiple-case deletions, diagnostics become computationally burdensome. Thus, measures of influence employing cluster analysis may have to be implemented in order to detect subsets of influence points.

Robust Regression

After diagnosing the presence of influential points in the data, an appropriate regression method must be selected to mitigate the effect of these points. In selecting a modeling strategy, an important factor to consider is the breakdown point of the method. The breakdown point is the proportion of incorrect observations that an estimator can support before giving an arbitrarily erroneous result. A breakdown point cannot exceed 50%, because if more than half of the observations are problematic, it is impossible to differentiate the underlying distribution from the contaminating distribution. In the context of estimating the center of a distribution, the mean has a breakdown point of 0, as it can be made arbitrarily large by changing a single observation. The median, in contrast, exhibits the maximum breakdown point.

Resistant statistics are those with breakdown points near 50%. There are three main robust regression techniques that generate resistant statistics: M -estimators, least median estimators, and likelihood modifications. Each of these strategies approaches robust regression differently. M -estimators can be used to weight observations to reduce the effect of influential points. Least median estimators, in contrast, are naturally resilient to influential points due to a high breakdown point of the median. Finally, likelihood modifications allow the investigator to model the distribution of the influential points. While all three techniques are superior to regression models that do not account for influential observations, each method has theoretical and computational strengths and weaknesses that must be considered when choosing a modeling strategy.

M -Estimators

Most fitting criteria find parameter estimates that minimize (or maximize) an objective function

of the observed data and the parameters. Minimizing the sum of squared residuals is an example of a broader class of estimators, known as M -estimators, which provide statistics that minimize an objective function of the form $\sum_i w_i \rho(r_i)$, where r_i is the residual of the i th observation. The function ρ represents the type of error that the investigator wishes to minimize, such as the squared error, the absolute value of the error, and so on. Many robust regression methods are based on iteratively reweighted M -estimators, where weights (w_i) are used to diminish the effect of influential points. Because these weighted M -estimators have a higher breakdown point than traditional regression estimators, they are more resistant to influential observations.

The estimates of the parameters ($\hat{\beta}$) are easy to calculate (though the standard errors can be obtained only through the use of bootstrap methods). Iteratively reweighted M -estimators are estimated using the following algorithm:

Step 0: Assign weight 1 to each data point.

Step 1: Find the value of $\hat{\beta}$ that minimizes y_i .

Step 2: Compute the new residuals (r_i).

Step 3: Redefine the weights w_i using the residuals r_i by the prescribed weighting scheme.

Step 4: Return to Step 1, substituting the new residuals and weights into the objective function.

Step 5: Repeat the iterations until the values of $\hat{\beta}$ have converged.

When using M -estimators, the most important consideration is prescribing a weighting scheme that down-weights influential points in a reasonable way. Since the weights depend on the values of the residuals, plotting w_i as a function of r_i shows how large residuals are treated by the weighting scheme. Deletion methods have a weighting function that is 1 on an interval until the residual exceeds the cutoff point determined by the method, and the weighting function immediately drops to 0. A continuous weighting function, in contrast, gradually decreases the weights as the residuals increase.

A popular continuous weighting scheme is Tukey's biweight method. This iteratively

reweighted least squares M -estimator assigns weights between 0 and 1 to all observations, decreasing from 1 to 0 as the residual becomes larger. This method results in the removal of observations whose residuals are too large, but in contrast to deletion methods, a residual that is close to the cutoff point receives a weight that is close to 0, rather than a weight of 1. Like other down-weighting M -estimators, Tukey's bi-weight method adequately accounts for influential outliers. Under certain circumstances, however, both Tukey's method and the broader class of M -estimators can be susceptible to high-leverage observations.

Least Median Estimators

In contrast to the reweighting methods, it is also possible to define objective functions that are already robust in some sense. In place of $\sum_i \rho(r_i)$, functions of the form $\text{median}_i \rho(r_i)$ give rise to least median regression. The intuition behind this method is straightforward. Since the median is a statistic that is naturally robust to extreme values, minimizing the objective function allows one (or several) influential points to take a large value of $\rho(r)$ while the remaining observations have a value of $\rho(r)$ that is small. The few large values have little or no effect on the estimate of the median, and the values of $\hat{\beta}$ that are obtained best fit the majority of the data.

One theoretically appealing choice is least median squares (LMS) regression, which arises from choosing $\rho(r) = r^2$. The breakdown point of LMS regression for $p > 1$ is

$$\frac{n - 2p + 4}{2n},$$

which is 50% in large data sets. Although both this method and M -estimation techniques handle outliers in a satisfactory manner, LMS regression is more robust to leverage points. For this reason, it is preferable to other robust regression techniques. However, an exact solution to a least median squares estimation problem necessitates searching over a space of size $\binom{n}{p+1}$ and inverting a $(p+1) \times (p+1)$ matrix at each step, which is infeasible for large n and moderate p . Random subsampling must therefore be used to achieve a good estimator with high probability.

Likelihood Adjustments

In contrast to minimization techniques, the effect of influential points can be reduced using likelihood methods. OLS regression is equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation when the errors are assumed to be independently and identically distributed from the same mean 0 Gaussian distribution. To account for influential points, the sampling distribution of the data can be changed from a Gaussian to a heavy-tailed distribution. This allows for more large residuals to be observed without greatly modifying the estimated mean structure of the regression. A natural choice of heavy-tailed distributions is the Student's t family. These distributions have polynomial decay, which is slower than the exponential decay of the Gaussian, and as $\nu \rightarrow \infty$, the Student's t with ν degrees of freedom converges to a normal distribution. In contrast to the other techniques, the confidence bounds on parameter estimates, and predictions can be easily obtained from the likelihood function. However, while this likelihood method accounts for influential outliers, like the M -estimator, it remains susceptible to leverage points. To account for leverage points in the likelihood framework, it may be necessary to fit a mixture model. This approach acknowledges that the observations may arise from multiple data generating processes, each of which must be modeled.

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See also Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions;
Regression; Statistics: Overview

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ROUSSEAU, JEAN-JACQUES (1712–1778)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau is a unique figure in the history of political thought whose legacy spans literature and political philosophy with equally outstanding creativity. As a political thinker, Rousseau helped formulate with the greatest rigor the normative standards of modern Western politics. Many ideas and convictions now considered fundamental to modern democracy originated with Rousseau or were revisited by him—sovereignty of the people, the role of the individual, the requisites of fair governance based on respect for the voice of the collective, and the revolutionary dimension of these aspirations. All are to be found in Rousseau's works. Although not literally a democrat himself (he notes in his most important treatise of political philosophy, *On the Social Contract*, that only a "people of gods" could govern itself under such a regime), Rousseau sketched many of the concepts on which modern democracy rests. In the 18th century, when philosophy contributed new ideas to radically reshape the norms of what is acceptable and desirable in politics and when new classes came to power, Rousseau was seen by many as the soul of his era and a major inspiration for the future. This entry reviews first his life, then his career as a philosopher, and finally his works.

Rousseau's prominence as a political philosopher should not eclipse his eminent position as a writer. A gifted stylist, Rousseau rightly ranks as one of the most revered authors in the French literary tradition. His literary influence has been of no less importance than his political heritage. Rousseau's daring *Confessions* (published after his death in 1782) made him the inventor of the major modern autobiographical genre. In the *Confessions*, as well as in other personal narratives, Rousseau does not gloss over the minutiae of his character or its flaws, thus reflecting a new interest in the depiction of the self without any self-aggrandizing descriptions of one's virtue. In texts such as his *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, Rousseau also set the tone for the early French romanticism—something like half a century ahead of its time—where admiration for nature, recognition of the power of feelings and

emotions on moral behavior, and the taste for solitude and the sentiment of isolation predominate.

Early Life

Born in 1712 in Geneva, Switzerland, to a modest watchmaker who had married the daughter of a pastor, Rousseau belonged neither to the traditional aristocracy nor to the rising bourgeoisie, from which many of the intellectual elite arose. Nothing in his early years or his family background seems to have predestined him to produce the most influential works in political philosophy.

Rousseau's childhood is like that of many others of his time, a story of multiple separations and loose family links: His mother died soon after his birth, he hardly knew his only brother, and his father had to flee Geneva when Jean-Jacques was 10. Rousseau was left in the custody of a pastor, who oversaw his formal education. Despite these separations, Rousseau considered that he had a happy childhood until age 13, when he became an engraver's apprentice, suffering the violence of a particularly brutal master. Three years later, this caused him, for fear of being beaten once more, to leave Geneva, after he had found the doors of the city closed because of a curfew. Rousseau began a vagabond lifestyle, traveling to France and Italy, returning at some point to Switzerland, all mostly by foot. For all his life, Rousseau loved walking, eventually giving his last (unfinished) book the title *Reveries of a Solitary Walker*.

In a few years, Rousseau had travelled across many countries, eventually settling down in France. He became a Catholic (converting back to Protestantism in 1754). He discovered the minor provincial nobility with his first patroness, Mme de Warens, who oversaw his conversion to Catholicism. Until his mid-30s, he was employed in a series of positions of domestic service, from lackey to embassy secretary in Italy and from steward (as well as lover) to Mme de Warens to singer and music master or private tutor. All his life, Rousseau resented his dependence on powerful protectors and made sure that he could make an independent living with a modest employment as music copyist. In 1744, he met Thérèse Levasseur, a seamstress and chambermaid, with whom he had at least

three children, whom he would abandon. He married her secretly late in his life.

Literary Career

Rousseau's literary career started in the 1740s, when he met Denis Diderot and the team of the *Encyclopedia* through one of his patronesses, Mme d'Epinay. The *Encyclopedia* was a collective endeavor to present systematically the sum of knowledge of the time. Rousseau contributed several articles on music and also an important text on political economy. He was acquainted with some of the brightest minds of the time, the philosopher Etienne de Condillac and the mathematician and philosopher Jean le Rond d'Alembert, and was in communication with Voltaire. Fame came to him following the publication in 1750 of his *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, which he had submitted to the Academy of Dijon in competition for a prize. His work received the award despite an audacious central claim that the development of sciences and arts (in the parlance of the time, *technique*) contributed not to the development of man but to his regression. His well-crafted paradox satisfied not only the religious conservatives, who were critical of the idea of progress founded on the development of reason and science, but also the modernists, who could see in his text a critique of the building of prejudices through misguided reasoning and a praise of natural reason. It also attracted enough polemics to draw flattering attention to itself.

The *First Discourse*, although certainly not Rousseau's strongest work, nevertheless inaugurated his systematic reflections on politics. The second discourse—*What Is the Origin of Inequality Among Men, and Is It Authorized by Natural Law?*—written in 1754, clarifies his position. A radical manifesto in favor of equality among men (and, to a certain extent, women), the *Second Discourse* purports to show that inequality is not a social fact but the sign of corruption in society. Rousseau's position is situated, in the wake of the contractarian theories that had dominated political thought for over a century, in time with Samuel von Pufendorf, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke: Social bonds are not natural but constructed, and any rational explanation of politics has to justify

precisely why it has been built. But Rousseau added one consideration that radically changed the meaning of the social contract: Why should human beings accept a contract that is obviously to the detriment of those being oppressed?

To answer this mystery, Rousseau sketches a new anthropology of the individual, insisting on the rupture between the state of nature and civil society. Rousseau notes the inconsistency of the contractarian theories before him, which suppose that society starts with individuals but assume, like Locke, that they are tied by the rules of natural law. He is equally critical of Hobbes, who reduces the natural links between men to the “battle of all against all”: Conflict is still a social relation. Only people who can relate to one another can fear each other. The informal cooperation imagined by Locke, just like the perpetual strife pictured by Hobbes, already presupposes society and so cannot provide a true outlook on the natural state of man and, thus, any explanation of the beginnings of society.

Maturity and Isolation

The *Second Discourse* opens up many major themes for modern political thought. The first is the economic dimension of social links: Only the invention of property—which for Rousseau is not natural—and the necessity to protect it make crucial the guarantees that society offers. Second, the book is characterized by a fundamental pessimism about the origins of society, which could be described as a *soft-power coup* of the wealthy against the poor: Society was established when the wealthiest convinced the poorest that they both had a similar interest in becoming engaged in the bonds of society, thus making the strongest stronger with the help of the weaker. But this pessimism is balanced with a sort of optimism about the very nature of society. Since men engaged themselves in the bonds of society freely and equally to seek protection, any legitimate social organization should respect this equality and this freedom. Equality and liberty are not solely natural rights; with Rousseau, they have also become legitimate political claims.

With the publication of two major works in 1762, *On Social Contract* and *Emile*, Rousseau develops his thought, insisting that people’s sovereignty derives from the necessity to grant

freedom and equality and thus denying any rule by divine law. In the *Second Discourse*, he directly opposes the notion of original sin, or rather the idea that it was a justification for inequalities. In *On Social Contract*, he refuses the justification of domination in the name of religion. Hence, his praise of religious tolerance and, in a famous section of *Emile*, the idea of a *natural religion* that would be the heart’s call for faith versus the artificiality of established religions.

With such claims, Rousseau would confront again the religious conservatives (be they Protestants or Catholics). But he also opposed the “philosophers” who, in a liberal tradition, considered after Montesquieu that the people could not be the direct source of law. For Rousseau, on the contrary, law was solely the translation of the will of the people—the “general will.” There was to be a direct link between the existence of a people and its actual organization as a political body expressing itself in laws. Otherwise, it was all too clear to Rousseau that the Age of Enlightenment was not a grand solution if it meant continuing dispossession of the people from their rights.

Within a few years, Rousseau came to be isolated (his illicit relationship with Levasseur was publicly condemned, and he was accused of abandoning his children), while his support in the intellectual community grew thin as former friends like Diderot turned into enemies—the most venomous being the powerful Voltaire—and hostility turned to persecution (Rousseau’s views on religion led to his condemnation by both Catholics and Calvinists). Rousseau was threatened with imprisonment and had to flee to England. Although he returned to France during his last years, he was a deeply unsettled man whose mood was darkened by what he considered to be plots against him.

Conclusion

The richness of Rousseau’s thought makes its interpretation difficult. Countless disputes have arisen about meaning. For the longest time, Rousseau appeared as a radical individualist, belonging to a certain tradition of liberalism in the context of contractarianism. But he also has been reproached for his insistence on the collective power of the people, to the point of being portrayed as a “proto-socialist.”

His influence on the French Revolution also has been discussed heatedly. Rousseau, perhaps more than any other thinker, encapsulated in many aspects of his work the contradictory meanings of political modernity. For this reason, he is probably best understood as a political philosopher at the crossroad of ideologies that would diverge only after him, for they hardly existed before.

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See also Hobbes, Thomas; Individualism; Locke, John; Natural Law; Political Philosophy; Republic

Further Readings

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RULE OF LAW

The phrase *rule of law* is commonly understood to mean the method of government of a sociopolitical system featuring the following properties:

1. Conflicts among actors—individual and collective—are governed by means of rules that are impartial and equal for everyone.
2. Rules are enacted by means of a “limited government” that wields its own functions within the confines of the same rules (supremacy of rules over the rule of men).
3. Compliance with such rules is rooted in a legal and political culture (*nomos* as a sociolegal order).

This entry first explores the meaning of the concept and how it has evolved historically, as a basis for a comprehensive definition of the concept. It then considers the relationship between the rule of law, sovereignty, and democracy and distinguishes between the formal and substantive/normative aspects of the rule of law. The various dimensions of the rule of law as it is realized in particular cultural contexts are then discussed. The entry then examines empirical research on the rule of law in relation to political action and the implementation of the rule of law, and it also describes recent research agendas, touching on the way the rule of law contributes to the quality of democratic processes. The entry concludes with a look at directions for future research, including the way the rule of law is transformed by the transnationalization of law and politics.

Historical Roots of the Concept

Prima facie, the institutional ideal of the rule of law pivots on the meaning of impartial and abstract rules, on the foundations of the *nomos* (order). The origin of the concept of rule of law dates back to classical Greece. By emphasizing the importance of relations among equals, Plato's *Laws* and Aristotle's *Politics, Book III* elaborate a vision of *nomos* whose rules transcend the subjective will and men's protean proclivities. A *nomos* is the rule of laws, which is in contrast with the rule of men. The relevance of cogent laws for the entire political community became one of the pillars of Roman civilization, within which the law (*ius*) split into *ius gentium* (the Roman law that is in force for other populations) and *ius civilis* (the ensemble of laws deriving from legal experts, assemblies, and emperors' rule-making activities). Part of the *ius civilis* was constituted by laws in the strict sense of the word or, more precisely, by those laws adopted by assemblies (*lex*). As Charles McIlwain (1940) stressed, the difference between the concepts of *ius* and *lex* can be summarized against this background in classicism, from which the term *rule of law* inherited a semantic ambiguity, being understood as both rule by *ius* and rule by *lex*.

The Middle Ages grafted on this first form of ambiguity (law vs. enacted law) the seed of a second element of criticality. In the Middle Ages, the

political order was legitimate to the extent that it reflected the rationale (*ratio*) of a transcendent order, the divine one. From this viewpoint, formal legitimacy and substantive legitimacy could only converge. As noted by James Blythe (1992), a political order, such as the Holy Roman Empire, that emanated from divine investiture (and from obeying the behavioral precepts mandated by the religious tradition) had to derive from that investiture the pledge of its own “fairness.” The appearance of modernity on the institutional scene, and with it the separation of the moral system from the political and legal system, created an irreparable split between the formal and the normative understandings of the rule of law.

How could the convergence between formal legitimacy and substantive legitimacy be guaranteed within the political order? A possible response comes from the Age of Enlightenment, which accepted that the rules of the political order were legitimized by their relationship with the natural order (natural law). Nevertheless, since the link between natural laws and government rules is created by human activity, either by jurisprudential law or by statutory law, the passage from the first to the second is influenced by a human motivational and value-laden predisposition. As noted by Herbert Hart (1961), the rule of men, with their different moral and value-laden positions, seems to go back therefore to the rule of rules.

If these questions seem to be imbued with exquisitely philosophical considerations, no one can deny their bearing on empirical research. What do we measure when we use the concept of rule of law? The form of government? The content of governing rules? To what level of reality does the unit of analysis belong? To what extent do recent institutional changes affecting both law and politics exert an influence on the semantics of the concept of rule of law? The remainder of this entry presents a critical overview of the knots that were left hanging by the secular debate around the concept of rule of law and offers an overview of the main findings from empirical research conducted in political science. Historical and analytical arguments are presented to delimit the meaning of the concept of rule of law. Finally, a multidimensional conception of the rule of law is analyzed in relation to two main approaches adopted by political scientists: the first focusing on rule of law as a *precondition* for

unfolding political processes and the second on rule of law as the *outcome* of unfolding political processes.

Given its polysemy, the definition of the concept of rule of law needs to be based on its historical foundation and on both the consideration of organizational forms exemplifying the rule of law in the history of Western political institutions and the philosophical meanings that this concept has acquired in Western legal and political thought.

The first meaning of *rule of law* has its historical roots in the Anglo-Saxon experience of common law: the ensemble of legal rules created through the jurisprudential elaboration of ordinary courts within the territory of the Kingdom of England (Albert Dicey, 1915). With regard to the original nucleus, which remains bound up with the legal tradition of common law, as suggested by Gianfranco Poggi (1978), European institutional experiences have induced a modification and extension of the meaning of the concept in light of the emergence of the modern state during the 16th and 17th centuries.

With the emergence of the state as a center of power, the concept of rule of law deviated from the initial conception, which had been grounded in common law. The first deviation arose out of the new vision of the *Rechtsstaat*—the state as a rational organization of society originating from the foundational act of a sovereign entity, to which the legal system should conform. The second deviation draws attention to the correspondence between legal rules and the orientation of the popular will as expressed by the legislative body—the parliament—first pointed out by Emmanuel Sieyès in 1789. The postrevolutionary French experience advanced the idea of *état de droit* (rule of law) and the belief that “popular sovereignty” is the source of the legitimization of the rule of rules.

Only vaguely does this look like the United States’ formulation of constitutionalism. Across the Atlantic, the creation of a republican form of government centered on political and institutional liberal-constitutional principles, introducing the idea of a “rule of rules” based on the supremacy of “constitutional rule,” as pointed out by John Ely (1980). This is conceived in contraposition to the rule of men, as stated in *The Federalist Papers*, where “Publius” (the public) justifies the need for

limited government by referring to the intrinsic fallibility of human nature:

If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. (Hamilton, Jay, & Madison, 1787–1788, No. 51)

If in postrevolutionary France the supremacy of the rule of rules is to be understood as supremacy of the legislative rule (of the law), American constitutionalism pivots on the supremacy of the constitutional rule and the Bill of Rights. Alexis de Tocqueville saw this difference as rooted in the fact that the two constitutional orders have different historical origins. Only the French constitution was born out of a breaking point with the ancien régime, which implies the search for a foundational act—namely, a constitutive moment of the state. This is the fundamental distinction for understanding the difference between the ways in which the French and American democracies work.

During the 20th century, the historical experiences of European totalitarian regimes highlight a critical aspect of the continental version of the rule of rules. When by “rule of rules” one means rule of laws—that is, of legislative rules—one can run into the following perverse effect. Laws can comply with all formal criteria of legality and procedural correctness and yet can undermine individual rights on the substantive plane. In extreme cases, they can (as it happened in totalitarian systems) transform themselves into instruments of domination and violence. The debate on Gustav Radbruch’s dilemma of unfair law is the apogee of a cultural and legal process that puts emphasis on the substantive aspects of the rule of rules, especially if they exemplify themselves as the *état de droit* and the *Rechtsstaat*.

As Ronald Dworkin (1978) points out, this is the start of the constitutionalism of rights, of the

constitutional charters and catalogs of fundamental rights built into constitutions. The constitution, and to a larger degree the activity of constitutional courts in charge of interpreting the constitution and controlling the constitutionality of laws, become instruments used to anchor democratic political regimes and ensure the legitimacy of legislative norms (valued not only in terms of procedural correctness but also for substantive coherence with a superior normative order, that of fundamental rights). The introduction of the requirement of a qualified majority or referendum to modify the constitution formally ratifies the assurance or the persistence of such an anchorage.

Studies conducted on the different forms that the democratization process has taken in areas of Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe emphasize the role of the rule of law as capable of granting stability for democratic transition. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) maintain that the rule of law is a necessary condition for the good functioning of those dimensions or “arenas” whose development is required to construct a democratic regime. In particular, noncompliance with the rule of law forecloses any possibility of developing an independent civil society and a pluralist and competitive political system.

Since the 1990s, the contribution of political scientists has been enriched by experiences and reflections drawn from policies intended to promote the rule of law. As Daniela Piana (2010) has noted, it is precisely because of their orientation toward crafting interventions for countries in the democratization stage that such policies have contributed to identifying the institutions and capacities necessary for the emergence and maintenance of the rule of law. In many cases, the same meaning of the concept has been operationalized to comprise the ensemble of institutions to which the promotional politics of the rule of law point.

In general, these contributions draw attention to the political-institutional dimension of the rule of law. In a different way, Russell Hardin (1999) interprets the rule of law as a rule of rules that spontaneously emerges to solve problems of social coordination where conditions of pluralism of values and preferences exist. According to Hardin, the concept of rule of law denotes those systems of collective action where power asymmetry exists. He thus puts emphasis on the importance of the

social fabric that underlies institutions, on a par with what political science studies on social capital have pointed out.

History teaches us that the institutional configurations adopted to implement the principle of the rule of rules can vary according to the cultural context, although they all tend to vouch for the legality and legitimacy of political power. For this reason, it is possible to identify a common thread among the different exemplifications of the concept of rule of law, referring to the way in which the form of government ensures that rules (laws) do not become a mere instrument of domination. It is in this vein that, as noted by Gianluigi Palombella (2010), the history of liberal constitutionalism gives flesh to an institutional ideal, the rule of law, whose meaning is determined in relation to the nature (source, form, and content) of government rules. The organizational form of power—the form of government that substantiates an architecture where powers are separate or are mutually accountable—cannot but operate by virtue of the institutional ideal of the rule of law, never being the rule of law itself.

Rule of Law, the Sovereign State, and Democracy

As the concept of the rule of law has evolved, it has become a polysemic one, with multiple meanings that allow its application in a variety of contexts. However, this polysemy also makes it challenging to conduct empirical research on the rule of law. Despite the internal variability of the concept, it is useful in such empirical research to maintain a distinction between the rule of law and other aspects of modern liberal political systems, such as state and democracy. Although there is a strict relation between these two concepts and the rule of law, the relation cannot be reduced to a relation of either causal necessity or synonymy.

Rule of Law and the Sovereign State

With the concept of the sovereign state, the rule of law entertains a relation of semantic inclusivity. In other words, the rule of rules, under specific historical and cultural conditions, has become, as Joseph Raz (1996) notes, the rule of statutory laws and regulations, both expressions of the modern

state. Conceived as the state of law, the rule of law prompts empirical research focused on the formal correctness with which the law is applied. The state of law contributes to legitimize the use of power because it ensures the following:

- *Formal legitimacy*: Actions are predicated on formalized rules that are clear, ratified, and neutral in terms of their values.
- *Consistency over time*: The actions of centralized decision-making bodies conform to such rules, making possible the orderly operation of the state.

In this respect, the presence of the state of law, understood as a form of government pivoting on the logic of synoptic rationality, based on written law, and codified in a systematic and coherent fashion is a condition of democracy as we conceive it today. However, this does not exhaust the meanings of the concept of rule of law. If the rule of law were to be defined as the rule of rules, not of men, then the presence of the state conceived as a modern state—much less as a nation-state—is not a necessary dimension of the rule of rules. It becomes, though, a necessary part of it if the concept of “rules” is intended to refer to “statutory laws.”

This point is important for understanding the process of adoption and implementation of the principles of the rule of law in cultural contexts where the formation of the state has not taken place. As noted by Leonardo Morlino (2009), hybrid regimes exist in which some embryonic forms of rule of law mingle with a territorial administration that lacks some fundamental features of the state of law, the proceduralization of the application of the law. In this regard, it is appropriate that the two concepts of rule of law and of the state are kept separate, since it is possible that there is a state without rule of law, and in some case even vice versa, or that the second appears as a mechanism capable of applying laws in a formally correct way without, however, ensuring that such laws comply with citizens’ fundamental rights.

To conduct empirical research, one needs to observe how the machinery of the state embodies legality in its legislative and regulative law-making processes. As stressed by Poggi (1978), since the state is a bureaucratic legal order, founded on laws

that define and ratify—in a constitutive fashion—the spheres of action of all the areas of the public machine, from the individual (public sector employees) to the collective (the branches and departments of the public administration), it is in addition appropriate to study how far the obedience of legality is not only an objective property of rules (laws) but also a cognitive feature of public sector actors (how far the obedience of legality is a guiding principle of public action).

Rule of Law and Democracy

The rule of law does not necessarily imply a democratic form of government. This theoretical premise has influenced a large part of the Western literature on the rule of law and on democracy. As noted earlier, the meaning of the rule of law does not emerge historically in relation to the construction of a democratic regime. To be sure, the rule of law requires merely that government functioning obey some fundamental constraints, represented by rules that, even in a monarchy, first the sovereign and next the executive must follow. The introduction of democracy in sociopolitical systems where the rule of law is in force happens in the second instance, after the consolidation of the modern state and the party function of political representation.

The union between the rule of law and democracy brings with it an intrinsic tension. If, as a matter of fact, the rule of law provides for rules that constrain political power, democracy makes it possible that through lawmaking one can wield political power, the latter made legitimate thanks to its stemming from democratic consensus. Therefore, between the two forces, one that limits government via rules and the other empowering a democratic government by means of rules, it is necessary to find a point of equilibrium. The balancing of the democratic principle and the constitutional principle takes on different forms according to which countries one takes into account. Broadly speaking, Robert Dahl's (1971) position should apply. Starting from a minimum concept of democracy, Dahl speaks of obedience to the rule of law, provided that polyarchies are characterized by conditions of equal access to public offices, respect for individual freedom, and valid rules *erga omnes* (for all). Yet this condition is necessary but not

sufficient to ensure a fair union between the rule of law and democracy. Indeed, Dahl is concerned with the rule of law in its formal meaning. The existence of formal legality, as Dahl describes it, does not guarantee the implementation of the rule of law. Formal legality leaves open the relationship between the value system of legislative majorities and the value system of a normative order regardless of the majority's will. The rule of law in a system that is formally a democracy does not determine whether such a system recognizes and protects the fundamental rights of citizens; thus, we need to distinguish between the broad and narrow senses of the rule of law—the substantive versus the formal or procedural.

Adam Przeworski (1991), who does not dismiss a purely formal vision, claims that the rule of law clears up two sets of problems: the "Madisonian" dilemma, which is the need to set limits to the potential capacity of the state to overwhelm citizens' rights, and the "Hobbesian" dilemma, namely, the need to protect individual rights from the potentially predatory actions of other private actors. He identifies two dimensions of the rule of law: One pertaining to freedom, which has to do with the capacity of the state to protect citizens' rights, and the other pertaining to safety, which has to do with the capacity of the state to protect citizens from other citizens. While to perform the first function one needs mechanisms that constrain the public hand, the execution of the second requires mechanisms that make the public hand sufficiently powerful and effective to maintain social control. Such conditions define the minimum requirements to say that a democracy is subject to the rule of law.

If, however, one wants to broaden these conditions and integrate the substantive dimensions of the rule of law, the systems of democratic governance should give rise to an implementation of rules so that the fundamental rights can be fulfilled in a comprehensive and enduring fashion. In this regard, rule of law and democratic principles—that is, the legitimacy of rules that constrain the power and legitimacy of the objectives pursued through the power of the majority—must therefore be made compatible through a vision of the constitution that is not an *ex ante* given (guaranteeing the formal conditions of the democratic game) but that stems from the same democratic

game *ex post*. Concretely, each Western liberal democracy has configured itself along an axis where the different forms with which history has changed the principle of rule of law and the democratic principle have been located. Yet since the beginning of the 20th century, the majority of contemporary democracies have included such principles in their constitutional charters. Together with the rules that define the democratic institutional system, these constitutions ratify even lists of fundamental rights unavailable to political majorities. Such constitutional principles entail that parliamentary will, even when pursuing collective objectives legitimized by majority consensus, cannot compromise the fundamental rights of citizens. The constitution defines at the start of political processes those areas where ordinary politics can be legitimately practiced according to democratic practices and in compliance with fundamental rights. These are established and arranged once and for all in the constitutive rules of political order. In this regard, a constitutional democracy sets forth the form the government must take, the rights guaranteed to citizens, and the procedures by which such rights are implemented.

In addition, written constitutions provide for institutional devices with which it is possible to protect the constitution from both attacks by parliamentary majorities and possible drifts of executive power. Among these, the most common, as noted by Mauro Cappelletti (1989), is the inspection of constitutionality that constitutional courts can perform against primary and secondary legislation and against the norms of international law. The growth of politics aimed at safeguarding one's rights is an additional feature of the Western democracies that emerged in the second part of the 20th century as a reaction to the totalitarian and authoritarian drifts that prevailed over the democratic majorities at the beginning of the century. The history of the 20th century revealed that the constitution is not only an initial given of the political process. Rather, it should be conceived as the aggregate effect of the interaction between the demand for and the supply of justice, such interaction taking place not only through the dialogue between the judiciary and the legislative but also through the dialogue between jurisdictions and individuals or social groups.

Dimensions, Units, and Levels of the Rule of Law

Beyond the different forms of instantiation of the rule of law, the concept of rule of law can also refer—at a more abstract level—to a system where the rule of rules is in force, intended as an institutional ideal available in different organizational forms (administrative-legal structure and government standard procedures) according to the source, form, and content that rules gain (jurisprudential, legislative, and administrative-regulative). Concept formation should then follow the path of all multidimensional concepts, whose advantage stems from being able to incorporate into their semantics different aspects related by juxtaposition—conjunction—rather than by disjunction. The rule of law is many things together, all of them combined into a real instantiation in different patterns.

The extension of the rule of law is, thus, composed of a combination of five dimensions:

1. *Civil order*: a focus on the right to life, freedom from fear and torture, personal security, and right to own property, guaranteed and protected throughout the country; low rates of crime and social conflict; a persistent and durable culture of legality
2. *Independent judiciary and a modern justice system*: a focus on mechanisms establishing an independent, professional, and efficient judiciary system that allows equal access to justice, free of undue pressures and with enforcement of decisions
3. *Capacity of the sociopolitical to formulate, implement, and enforce the law*: a focus on a governance system (legislative and executive branches) capable of ensuring the production of high-quality legislation and its implementation throughout the country; a transparent policy-making process allowing for the participation of the civil society; and the presence of a professional, neutral, accountable, and efficient state bureaucracy
4. *Low if not nonexistent rate of corruption, illegality, and abuse of power by state agencies*: a focus on the internalization of the law by public officials and social actors; the existence of self-constraint mechanisms of public ethics

and, in case these mechanisms are ineffective, effective policies for fighting corruption and abuses of power

5. *Security forces that are respectful of citizens' rights and are under civilian control*: a focus on the mechanisms of civilian control over security forces as well as on efficient, uncorrupted, and disciplined police forces respectful of human and political rights

This strategy enables research to encompass different ideal types or forms of government, provided that the nature of rules whose supremacy is suggested by the phrase *rule of law* is specified. The concept of rule of law here takes on a precise meaning and can be operationalized once the origin of jurisprudential, legal, and administrative-regulative rules has been determined. The term *rules* is meant in a broad sense, not restricted to positive law. Rules consist of jurisprudence, doctrine, and the interpretative principles that judges of different rank and jurisdiction refer to, as well as the social rules that stem from institutional tradition and are implicit in the very fabric of political community. This is a fundamental point. It emerges as a “thick” formulation of the rule of law that redefines what has been stated by scholars of democracy and in particular by authors such as Guillermo O'Donnell (2004), who have highlighted that the legality and formal correctness of rules (the “thin” vision) are not sufficient to ensure that a country is subjected to the rule of rules.

If one narrows the field of observation to democracies, the rule of law is not only a *necessary condition* for achieving a high degree of quality of democratic governance but also the *effect* of the interaction among different factors, including both social and political aspects. This distinction does not entirely cover the previously mentioned dichotomy between formal and substantial rule of law—which belongs more properly to the realm of normative theories—nor can it be considered as a way to reword the relationship between rule of law as an end and rule of law as a means to an end. Both these second distinctions belong as a matter of fact to a normative, prescriptive discourse, whereas the distinction between rule of law as a precondition and rule of law as an outcome is phrased in terms of the empirical analysis of a democracy.

This double vision finds its own reference even within the contemporary debate developed by the supporters of the rule of law, namely, law or administrative science experts, who together with policy-makers, diplomats, and bureaucrats are committed to the diffusion of the principles of the rule of law in developing countries or those countries in transition toward democracy. According to Rachel Belton (2005), all these options fall within two broad concepts, which are not necessarily in opposition to each other: the first focused on the rule of law as an *end* of the political order and the second on the rule of law as an *instrument* of the political order. The rule of law as an end in itself means limited government and a guarantee of fundamental rights. This is the definition of constitutionalism. According to Morlino (2009), the rule of law as an instrument means an independent legal system, a transparent and efficient public administration, and an ensemble of police forces and law enforcement agencies subject to civil control. However, the distinction between rule of law as a means and rule of law as an end does not provide any profitable way to conduct empirical research. Indeed, it presupposes by *petitio principii* that actors who comply with the rules that underlie the very basis of the institutions to which the five dimensions listed above refer—civil rights, the judicial system, the administrative system, military force, and the police—are pursuing an end or are using their compliance as a means to a different end. One may argue instead against such a teleological view of the rule of law. Rule of law has been unveiled by empirical research as a complex process imbued within political institutions, whose direction and whose main rationale cannot be grasped simply on the basis of the means–end dichotomy. Rather, it may be of some interest to distinguish between strategies of research and empirical analysis, being fully aware that reality is ontologically unified and this distinction serves only human cognitive goals.

Empirical Research on the Rule of Law

Rule of Law as a Source of Opportunities for Political Action

This scholarship is framed in a neo-institutionalist approach and ultimately restored to the social sciences the primacy of agency as the source of social processes. Law as a condition of action basically

entails that research should focus on the way actors interact under the conditions set down by the law and on the way actors take advantage of the existence of laws and institutions believed to instantiate the principle of the rule of law—as, for instance, the judicial branch. Two types of actors have been taken into account: (1) institutional actors, in particular with regard to the use of the constitutional courts as clearinghouses for institutional conflicts, and (2) social actors, in particular with regard to legal mobilization.

When law is thought of as an opportunity to apply pressure, the organizational and cognitive resources handled by social and political actors become of utmost importance in transforming an opportunity for political pressure into an effective instrument for the exercise of power. Non-governmental organizations and citizens associations that can take cases before the courts and make their actions visible by any means may bring about a major change in the legal and the constitutional system of a country, achieved through pressure from below.

A large body of scholarship has been developed over the past decade in the field of European studies by devoting energies to cast light on the use of European Community law to make policies or to enact new ways of enforcing traditional rights. The so-called supranational rule of law that has been identified in European legal norms and judicial institutions—for instance, the European court of justice and the European court of human rights—has been thought to be a promising arena that actors endowed with resources and capacities can enter to push forward their own interests and values. European scholars are vigorously debating the type of rule of law used by the European Union (EU) (in the context of the constitutional debate developed over the past years). As a matter of fact, the EU seems to be more intelligible as a rule of law in process—rule of law as an outcome—than as a rule of law as a precondition for democratic processes. To phrase it differently, European constitutionalism, thought of as a complex and multilayered system of rights enforcement, is not given *ex ante* but instead is made up as a political, social, and cultural construction.

Rule of Law as Outcome of Political Processes

The rule of law may be thought as a social system in which interactions, both social and political,

are ruled and shaped according to fundamental, impartial, stable, and predictable rules, some of them of *longue durée* (long term). Rule of law as outcome is highlighted by nonformalist and non-positivist scholars such as Hardin (1999) and Morlino (2009), who have devoted time and energy to restore to the field of research the study of how rules are implemented.

Some research has been developed to bring political processes to light, both at the macrolevel and at the mesolevel. A major point related to the study of the rule of law as an outcome impinges on the capacity of a society for settling disputes on the basis of the law. An extensive scholarship has revealed the importance of cultural and cognitive conditions, which exist alongside, and sometimes even in opposition to, structural conditions.

These studies have observed that the legitimacy of legal rules and political institutions is key to maintaining, in the long run, the rule of law. Civic engagement and a civic culture have been pointed out by scholars working on political culture and related matters as a cornerstone of a well-functioning democracy and *ipso facto* of a system based on the rule of law. The argument put forth about the positive correlation that should exist between civic culture and the rule of law is as follows: Civic culture helps maintain a low level of social conflict, and as a consequence, it reduces indirectly the need to use rules to foster social behaviors based on common principles of peaceful social life.

Empirical research has recently pointed out the role played by factors that stand outside the political system, for instance, the existence of the supranational networks in which standards of rule of law are set down, promoted, and disseminated internationally. In a way, this fairly new phenomenon is associated with the increasing importance of the interplay of domestic and supranational factors in making the rule of law a multilayered configuration of rules and principles rather than the epiphenomenon of a hierarchical system of rules enacted exclusively by domestic actors. International scholars and comparative political scholars have joined in exploring the mechanisms that work in the interstices of the two-level games played by domestic and supranational institutions nowadays. The result has been a spectacular growth of normative production, pursuing the implementation of the rule of law that transcends the usual traditional, domestic, judicial, and legislative arenas.

Empirical Research on Democratic Quality

Complexity and polysemy can be handled effectively if the rule of law is meant to be a multidimensional, conceptual tool covering different aspects of sociopolitical systems. This approach appears promising when framed in a broader context, as the empirical analysis of the quality of democracy. Democratic-quality assessment appears today to be the contemporary way of phrasing an old and perennial question cutting across all Western political experiences, namely, the search for good government. Democratic assets address the issue of expanding the spectrum of political participation, injecting the principle of political competition under conditions of formal equality and given the primacy of the law. However, although formal designs may perfectly satisfy abstract criteria, in practice democratic institutions work differently in different countries and may deliver different types of services and goods, resulting in differing levels of citizen satisfaction despite being designed similarly. In brief, what matters in reality is how democracy works and what puts into motion the formal institutional designs. This point is fully accepted by the comprehensive and empirically oriented approach to democratic quality that has recently been developed by Morlino (2004). Following this approach, one refers to the *qualities of a democracy*. These qualities are grouped into three types:

1. qualities associated with the procedures of the political system,
2. qualities associated with the content of the policies, and
3. qualities associated with the products of the political processes.

The first comprises rule of law, interinstitutional accountability, electoral accountability, competition, and participation. The second relates to the responsiveness of the democratic processes. The third concerns the equality and solidarity that are in reality offered to citizens.

Accordingly, the rule of law is not only a procedural dimension of the democratic regime—one of the qualities it is expected to feature. It is also one of the crucial dimensions on which many other aspects—or qualities—of democratic governance depend. As a matter of fact, the rule of law enters

into patterns of regular interaction with other procedural dimensions. First among these is interinstitutional accountability. In those cases in which legislative oversight of the policies enacted by government proves to be weak and ineffective, judicial institutions—for instance, the constitutional courts—can perform a subsidiary function and put into motion an alternative mechanism of checks and balances. In a different setting, the rule of law may specifically interact with the participants and thereby contribute to the enforcement of the rules that govern a society. One way for this to happen is through legal mobilization. Civil society organizations and rights advocacy coalitions may help enforce or deepen the fundamental freedoms of citizens, thereby bringing about a change in the political system. Judicial arenas may become in this view an opportunity to act, of which social actors may take full advantage if they have the resources to mobilize and bring a case before the courts.

A further point that deserves to be emphasized is that the empirical approach to democratic-quality assessment illustrates and reveals the several different ways by which the law enters into a combination and intertwines with the extralegal norms of a society. In a way, the wide range of policies and programs put into motion to promote the rule of law in nascent democracies has provided scholars with a formidable experiment of institution building, something that in old and consolidated democracies would have never been possible. Such an experiment creates quasi-optimal conditions to detect and disentangle the relative weight of prelegal dimensions incorporated into the daily life of social communities and to assess the role such dimensions play in transforming formal legal rules into effective social practices. Drawing lessons from these experiences of social and legal engineering, a comprehensive democratic-quality assessment exercise considers the interaction between the procedural aspect of the rule of law and the degree to which legal norms and jurisprudence match the diffuse legal culture (an aspect referred to by the notion of responsiveness). By focusing on the prelegal dimension of the rule of law, a scholar may be accused of naive optimism. If on the one hand rule of law proves to be a fairly vague concept, on the other hand prelegal aspects show resistance to empirical investigation. Indeed, for social scientists, this exploration is forced to deal

with a never-ending puzzle, namely, the intangible nature of unobservable forces, whose effects we can measure and whose intrinsic ontology we can only guess. However, by denying the importance of the prelegal aspects of rule of law, one does not get very far either in understanding the way society functions or in providing policymakers with sound frameworks to set their agenda for legal and judicial reforms. According to Leonardo Morlino and Wojciech Sadurski (2010), a way out would be to refer to the democratic rule of law in order to incorporate those aspects that refer directly to the prelegal dimensions of social enterprise. In this way, as Palombella (2010) has observed, rule of law would mean simply the primacy of rules, whereas the determinacy of what these rules are, where they come from, and where they are going remains an open question, to be addressed empirically. As a matter of fact, rules used in a society to deal with an inescapable part of social life—disagreement—might have different sources and different formats. By endorsing this view, scholars are able to appreciate the delicate intertwinement that exists among democratic qualities and, more specifically, between the rule of law and the different components that characterize a democratic society.

A valuable aspect of the way the democratic-quality assessment addresses the rule of law comes from its pluralist theoretical stance. As mentioned before, the rule of law is a “thick” concept, in which traditionally normative and descriptive aspects are mingled in a complex interlacing of mutual influences. Democratic-quality assessment accepts this plurality of views and interprets them as a variety of configurations in which the rule of law as an institutional principle can be instantiated into a democratic regime. In countries in which the rule of law is grounded in a vibrant civil society and the extension of the public sector is limited because of historical reasons, democratic-quality assessment does not endorse an evaluative position; that is, it does not assess this specific configuration as a better or a worse one than others equally represented by Western institutional experiences. It simply recognizes that each configuration of a democracy is characterized by the specific way in which each quality participates to determine the whole of democratic governance.

Beyond the Rule of Law?

A further development witnessed by contemporary scholarship concerns the way legal and political reality challenges traditional definitions and conceptions of rule of law. Despite its being a concept with a long history, the rule of law does not cease to be subjected to a steady and permanent confrontation with reality and, thereby, to restlessly readapt its meaning and its normative value. In fact, this complex and polysemic concept mirrors the multiplicity of the institutional and cultural experiences that are observed by the numerous and different models of organization of power—both in the Western tradition and nowadays outside it—and by the many different models through which individuals have managed to accommodate selfishly oriented behavior in a collective setting of predictable and stable rules of interaction. In a way, this is a sign of the state of good health of the concept, because it bespeaks its capacity to accommodate different instances of the same general principle, namely, the idea of constraining power through rules, legal and extralegal.

However, in recent decades, new institutional phenomena and new ways of thinking and practicing law making and law enforcement have come to light. The diffusion of democratic institutions and the emergence of regimes that combine nondemocratic features with elements of the rule of law have added richness and complexity to an already large spectrum of empirical cases to which the concept of rule of law have been applied both in the presence and in the absence of the democratic conditions in which politics takes place.

One can mention at least three new developments undergone by political institutions that call for a rethinking and a reconsideration of the meaning of the rule of law and, consequently, the way the concept is operationalized in empirical research design.

1. *The unpredicted growth of the production of legal norms, which is currently being experienced in many advanced democracies.* The idea of constraining power through rules that are “law” seems to encounter some difficulties, due to overproduction of legal norms. In this respect, too much regulation shadows the magic glamour of the rule of law as a limit to the rule of men. When the legal norms are persistently changed, the

intervention of the will of men becomes dominant and even overrules the “rule of rules.”

2. *The uncontrollable process of transnationalization of the rule of law.* This is related to the multiplication and fragmentation of the sources of law. Laws, quasi laws, and so-called soft laws are produced at the subnational, national, and supranational levels. In practice, they mix together. In reality, they offer to social and political actors the possibility of moving between different normative systems, in a way that owes much more to a contingent and strategic logic than to a stable, predictable, and valid *erga omnes* logic.

3. *The increasing hybridization of legal, judicial, and institutional practices and procedures.* Social and political systems have deployed extensive processes of mutual imitation, which have transferred practices and procedures from other systems where they had once been adopted or invented. This occurs at all levels of the organization of the state, in new and advanced democracies as well as in nondemocratic and hybrid regimes.

These comprehensive changes entail a number of important consequences for the political science research agenda. When the rule of law is studied as an outcome—as rule implementation—it should be considered a radial concept, composed of semantic building blocks radiating outward from a center. Not all the blocks have empirical meaning in all instantiations of the rule of law. They can even have different relative weights in different empirical contexts. This may allow researchers to accommodate the large variety of different forms of rule of law, without stretching the concept to the point of emptying it of value.

It is of paramount importance that typological studies are used. When the rule of law is studied as a precondition, it is extremely useful in analytical terms to start from ideal types, which feature a specific way of combining law, politics, and society. The rules that constrain power are produced not only by making laws but also, over the long run, by social processes. History has provided us with experiences that took different paths through law, politics, and society. Once developed as an abstract typology, the research then can go in depth and see to what extent each real case instantiates the features presented in the ideal types.

Generally the rule of law seems to carry an intrinsic dilemma, which is mirrored in the way it has been used as a concept in empirical research projects. Basically and substantially, it has been thought of as a way to steer and control social processes on the basis of general, abstract rules that are able to remove the unavoidable discretionary power from the process of resolving social and political conflicts. However, these general rules must be implemented by the actions of individuals, and thus, the rule of law does not eliminate the inherent tension between the rules and those who make them.

It is important that dialogue continue to develop between those whose chief concern is concept building and observation of reality and those concerned with broadening the theoretical base of the rule of law, thereby accounting more fully for the different aspects of democracy with which the rule of law interacts. For these reasons, empirical research in all the social sciences—and particularly empirical research using a comparative methodological approach—deserves more than ever to be elaborated on and intensified by future generations of social scientists.

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See also Corruption; Democracy, Quality; Democracy, Theories of; Hybrid Regimes; Judicial Independence; Judiciary; Security Apparatus; State

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SAMPLING, RANDOM AND NONRANDOM

In its most general form, a sample is simply a subset of a larger population or group. In scientific applications, the purpose of sampling is to be able to draw conclusions about a larger population. There are many reasons to sample rather than attempt to collect data on the full population. They include the following:

- *Cost:* It is often cost prohibitive to collect data on the entire population.
- *Speed:* To collect data on the entire population would take an excessive amount of time.
- *Feasibility:* Often the complete set of population elements is unknown. Most populations do not have centralized lists of their members. Even when such lists exist, it is usually impossible to collect data on every single member.

This entry discusses the major types and problems of sampling procedures.

The sampling procedure can be described using the following terminology.

Population Unit. The population unit is the unit at which the data are collected. In survey research, population units are typically people, although they can also be at other levels, such as households. Other types of research designs may look at larger units of analysis, such as nations, cities, organizations, or institutions.

Target Population. The target population is the group of elements that the sampling procedure aims to represent. For example, a public opinion survey may attempt to represent all adult Americans or may limit the population to individuals with certain qualifying characteristics, such as parents of school-age children, voters, people with heart disease, or residents of South Carolina.

Sampled Population. In contrast to the target population, the sampled population refers to the portion of the population from which the sample is actually drawn. In an ideal world, the sampled population and the target population are nearly the same thing, but for a number of reasons drawing a sample from the target population is usually not feasible. For example, survey data collected using random digit dialing is unable to include respondents who do not possess telephones. Low-incidence target populations exacerbate these issues. For instance, if a researcher wants to do a representative study of people who run for local office, using a random digit dialing technique would be enormously expensive, as many contacts would need to be made to get a single eligible respondent. For this reason, studies of low-incidence populations are often conducted on prescreened individuals (e.g., those from membership lists or clinics). In all cases, it is important to consider any systematic differences between the target population and the sampled population.

Sampling Unit and Sampling Frame. To select the sample from the population, the population must

first be divided into sampling units, or elements that are subject to being selected. The collection of the list of sampling units is referred to as the sampling frame. In a simple random sample design, the sampling frame may consist of a list of individuals who belong to an organization, with the sampling units being each individual. Cluster designs may have a more complex relationship between the sampling frame and the sampling unit, as described in the next section.

Types of Sampling

Sample selection can be broadly defined as being random or nonrandom—that is, as either probability or nonprobability sampling. The primary difference between these two approaches is that nonprobability samples require some judgment on the part of the researcher as to which cases should be included, while probability samples are selected such that any member of the population may be included (although not necessarily with equal probability). Additionally, self-selected samples have no sampling frame in the traditional sense.

There are numerous approaches to random and nonrandom sampling. The next section describes some of the most commonly used designs.

Random Sampling

- *Simple random sample (SRS)*: In a simple random sample of size n in a population of size N , every possible subset of size n has an equal probability of selection, and the probability that an individual unit is selected into the sample is n/N .
- *Systematic sampling*: In a systematic sample of size n of a given population of size N , the first step is to pick a random starting point R between 1 and k , where k is the next integer after N/n . Next, R and every k th element after R in the population are selected into the sample. One risk of using systematic sampling is that if there is any periodicity in the list, the sample variance may be large.
- *Stratified sampling*: The stratified sampling procedure first divides the population into subgroups, called *strata*, and then selects an SRS from each stratum. One potential downside of using an SRS design is that simply due to chance, certain groups in the population may be

underrepresented, especially when smaller sample sizes are used. One way to guard against this is to use stratified sampling on measures of interest. For instance, when conducting a survey of political attitudes in a U.S. state, one might want to ensure that urban, suburban, and rural areas are adequately represented. To achieve this, the researcher can stratify the state into levels of urbanicity and then sample within each urbanicity level. Stratified sampling improves efficiency if within-strata units are relatively homogeneous and most of the variance in the survey measurements is between strata.

- *Cluster sampling*: Often, SRS designs are not feasible because the total list of elements is not known. For example, if one wanted to conduct a study of restaurant workers in a city, there is no centralized list of these employees. However, it would be relatively straightforward to find a list of restaurants in a city. In a cluster sampling design, the first step would be to take an SRS of the restaurants in the city and then take a subsample of the employees in each restaurant. In this design, restaurants are the *primary sampling units*, and employees are the *secondary sampling units*. Cluster samples are more efficient if there is little variation between clusters and more variation within clusters.
- *Multistage cluster sampling*: A variation on the previous design is multistage cluster sampling, which effectively is a series of nested clusters. Taking the previous example, suppose the same researcher wants to interview a representative sample of restaurant workers at the state level. While one could sample from the list of restaurants in the state, to do so may be an inefficient use of limited resources and time. For that reason, it makes sense to first take a random sample of the regions in the state (e.g., counties), with the probability of selection proportional to the population in the region; then a random sample of cities within the selected counties; followed by a sample of several restaurants in each city; and finally of employees in the selected restaurants.

Nonrandom Sampling

Nonrandom sampling comprises a broad category of approaches that are similar primarily in

that subjective criteria are used in case selection rather than randomization. While nonrandom samples lack the statistical properties that random samples have, there are often compelling reasons to use them, ranging from feasibility to convenience to specific criteria tailored to the research design. Some examples of nonrandom sampling are as follows:

- *Quota sampling:* Quota sampling resembles stratified sampling in that strata are created with target numbers for each group. Where quota sampling differs from stratified sampling is that the elements within each strata are not chosen at random. Quotas can be based on marginal distributions of individual variables or by the joint distribution of a number of variables. The main risk in using quota sampling is that the selected elements are subject to bias, including the following:
 - Judgment:* The respondents are selected by the interviewer, which introduces the interviewer's preferences as to whom to interview within the quota groups.
 - Self-selection:* The respondents opt into the study. While these respondents may fill the quota groups, they may be qualitatively different from members of the group who do not opt in.
 - Nonignorable bias:* The factors defining the quota groups are insufficient to explain the differences between the respondents in the quota groups and the population in those groups.
- *Convenience sampling:* A convenience sample contains a group of participants who select themselves into a study. Clinical trials for medical treatments frequently use this type of design. Because it is impossible to sample patients at random, these studies rely on the willingness of patients to volunteer for a clinical trial. Once in the clinical trial, patients are assigned at random to receive the drug being tested or a placebo.
- *Purposeful sampling:* Other types of nonrandom sampling rely on case selection by the researcher. In these situations, cases are selected based on a cluster of characteristics that allow the researcher to test a theory. Generally, these designs are used when a relatively small number of cases are to be examined in depth. There are many types of

purposeful sampling. Some examples are as follows:

Typical cases: Cases are selected by virtue of not being unusual or exceptional with respect to the larger population.

Most similar/most different: Cases are selected based on having very similar or very different characteristics. For example, two nations with a similar set of policies but very different outcomes may be examined.

Critical cases: In critical case sampling, cases are selected that are considered to be particularly important to understanding the logic behind a causal phenomenon. Critical cases are often used to make the argument that if an outcome is true for that case, then it is likely true for all cases.

- *Snowball sampling:* Snowball sampling builds a sample in stages by starting with a (generally small) group of subjects who are considered to be good sources of information, who then recruit additional subjects from their own social networks. The new recruits then find more recruits, and so on, until a "snowball" of recruits is built up. While the resultant sample may not be representative of the population at large, snowball sampling is especially useful for collecting data on populations that are hard to reach (e.g., people engaging in illegal activities).

Sampling and Nonsampling Errors

Samples are often used to obtain estimates of population parameters of interest. A population estimate obtained by a sample estimator may contain errors that can arise from many sources. The total error can be decomposed into two pieces: sampling error and nonsampling error.

Evaluating Sampling Measurements and Errors

Sampling error is the random error that arises as a result of selecting a sample of a population. In a random sample with no bias present, an individual sample may differ from the true population parameter, but many repeated estimates from a sample will on average cover the true population parameter. The degree of uncertainty that is introduced by sampling error is quantified by the standard error

of the estimate or the margin of error of a sampling procedure. This section discusses the characteristics of sample estimators in general and the characteristics of estimators derived from simple random sampling in particular.

Sample Measurements

Given a sample of $i = 1, \dots, n$ units from a population of N units, measured with respect to characteristic χ , the *sample mean* of an attribute is given by the sum of the values of χ over all the units in the sample, divided by the sample size:

$$\bar{y} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_n y_i.$$

The sample mean is considered to be an estimate for the population mean.

The precision of this estimate can be described using the *sampling distribution*. The *sample variance* is a measure of the spread for a given attribute χ , calculated as the average squared deviation from the sample mean:

$$s_y^2 = \frac{1}{n-1} \sum_n (y_i - \bar{y})^2.$$

The *sample standard deviation* is the square root of the sample variance:

$$s_y = \sqrt{\frac{1}{n-1} \sum_n (y_i - \bar{y})^2}.$$

The statistic that is typically reported to quantify the amount of sampling error is the *standard error* (SE), or the standard deviation of the sampling distribution:

$$SE_{\bar{y}} = \sqrt{\left(1 - \frac{n}{N}\right) \frac{s_y^2}{n}}.$$

The standard error can be used to generate the *confidence interval* of the sample mean. Because the distribution of all possible sample means is approximately normal, the 95% confidence interval of the sample mean is

$$\bar{y} \pm 1.96 \times SE_{\bar{y}}.$$

Nonsampling Errors

Nonsampling error refers to any error introduced into the sample estimate that is not attributable to sampling variation. If these errors are systematic, then they introduce bias into the sample estimate. In probability sampling where the selection probabilities are known, unbiased estimates of the population parameters and their standard errors can be calculated. For nonprobability samples, or probability samples where the selection probabilities are not known, this is not always the case, and at a minimum, a model of sample inclusion is necessary. For both random and nonrandom sampling designs, however, nonsampling errors are often present.

Nonsampling errors can systematically bias parameter estimates to a greater extent than the deviation caused by random sampling errors. These errors can be due to *selection bias*, where some set of the target population is systematically not included in the sample. For instance, *coverage error* results when units in the target population are not included in the sampling frame (undercoverage) or when some units in the sample do not originate from the target population (overcoverage).

Additionally, errors in the survey instrument can lead to bias from *measurement error*. Measurement error can be introduced into a survey instrument in several ways. Not all are preventable, but a carefully constructed survey design can minimize these errors.

- Question wording, order, and context can introduce bias into the survey instrument. The respondent may be “primed” to provide a particular response, or a question may not be neutrally worded.
- An imprecise measurement device may prevent respondents from expressing their actual opinions.
- Respondents may provide inaccurate answers to survey questions unintentionally, because of poor questionnaire design or simple mistakes.
- With sensitive material and when sampling human subjects, the researcher also has to consider the possibility that respondents are deliberately misrepresenting information in the survey responses. For example, respondents may lie when asked about their yearly income or when asked whether they voted in the previous

general election. Respondents may also forget details when answering questions about activities in the past and may provide guesses in response.

- Human errors can also be introduced into the survey when coding the responses for analysis.

Nonresponse error can create significant bias in samples. Often, the characteristics of non-responders are systematically different from the characteristics of those who do respond. This problem is especially significant if the measurement of interest is affected by nonresponse. For example, in a study of political participation, if people who participate are more likely to respond than people who do not, then estimates of participation rates will almost certainly be affected. In cases such as these, nonresponse is *non-ignorable*. There are two basic types of nonresponse.

- *Unit nonresponse* occurs when an entire sampling unit is missing from the sample. A respondent who refuses to answer any of the questions in a survey is an example.
- *Item nonresponse* occurs when a single or multiple survey items are missing, but not all of them, for a single unit. For example, a respondent who skips a question about income level but responds to the rest of the survey exhibits item nonresponse.

In cases where the probability of response is affected only by observed variables rather than survey measurements, the data are considered *missing at random*, and the effects of nonresponse can be considered ignorable, as a model can adjust for any effects of nonresponse. Using a different participation example, suppose women were more likely to respond to the survey than men were. If the participation rate among the women surveyed is the same as it is for the population of women and, similarly, the participation rate among the men surveyed is the same as it is for the population of men, then survey weights can correct for the effects of unit nonresponse.

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See also Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian; Statistics: Overview; Survey Research

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SANCTIONS

Originally conceived by Woodrow Wilson as a key component of the post–World War I order within the League of Nations, the effective application of economic and other sanctions did not develop unilaterally until after World War II and developed multilaterally only after the post–Cold War era. Despite some examples of punitive sanctions taking an economic toll when imposed unilaterally, such as the United States against Cuba and Iran and the former Soviet Union against Armenia, multilateral sanctions have become the norm as they have both the greatest legitimacy and chance of success. Thus, they constitute the main focus of this entry.

Since 1990, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has imposed sanctions against 19 nations and entities, while regional organizations, most notably the European Union and the British Commonwealth, have increasingly resorted to sanctions as well. The legal authority for United Nations (UN) sanctions appears in Chapter VII, Article 41, of the UN Charter, which provides that the Security Council may call on states to impose nonmilitary measures, such as interruptions of economic and diplomatic relations, to protect international peace and security. In its first 45 years of operation, the Council imposed sanctions

measures in just two cases: in Southern Rhodesia in 1966 (S/RES/232) and in South Africa in 1977 (S/RES/418). The end of the Cold War removed the political roadblocks preventing collective action, while the dynamics of economic globalization convinced nations that they derived little benefit from cheating on the enforcement of sanctions. Instead, nongovernmental actors and criminal networks have tended to be the major sanctions busters.

UN multilateral economic sanctions have been imposed for a diverse set of reasons: to promote democracy and human rights, to enforce international law and resolutions of the UNSC, to prevent military aggression and armed conflict, to encourage military demobilization and postconflict reconstruction, to counter terrorism, and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The list of the sanctions imposed by the UNSC from 1990 to 2009 reveals a substantial set of cases where sanctions are not imposed against a government but rather against nonstate actors or militia forces operating within a particular country. Examples of this trend include the cases of UN sanctions against actors in Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Côte d'Ivoire. In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, sanctions initially were imposed against governments, but after the U.S.-led overthrow of these governments, the Security Council measures were redirected against individuals and entities associated with the former regime and/or insurgent/terrorist groups. Sanctions imposed in Iraq, Somalia, Liberia, and Afghanistan have changed significantly over the years, in line with changing political conditions within the targeted regime.

Of all UNSC sanctions, only those imposed against Southern Rhodesia (1966), South Africa (1977), Iraq (1990), Yugoslavia (1991), and Haiti (1993) included comprehensive trade sanctions as part of a larger set of coercive techniques. Controversies regarding the devastating humanitarian impact of such sanctions in Iraq led to a reevaluation of general trade embargoes and prompted the adoption after 1994 of more selective and targeted measures—the so-called smart sanctions. Smart sanctions are aimed exclusively against wrongdoers rather than entire economies. These include individuals holding specific government positions, economic elites, and entities who

provide significant support to—or benefit from—the sanctioned government or who have violated international law or Security Council resolutions on their own accord. Smart sanctions seek to control, capture, or restrict the movement and use of financial assets, specific products—such as luxury goods, arms, or particular commodities—that often are critically necessary for the supply and financing of armed conflict or that are being moved illegally to aid an illegal action or actor. Smart sanctions include

- financial sanctions, which freeze the assets (including property) of and block financial transactions with designated individuals and entities, including restrictions on dealing with specific banks;
- arms embargoes, which ban the supply of weapons, military-related technology, and other forms of military assistance;
- travel sanctions, which deny visas and ban the travel of designated individuals or prohibit travel on designated airlines or to the airspace of targeted regimes;
- commodity sanctions, which prohibit imports or exports of specific materials or goods, such as diamonds, oil, timber, and selected stones and metals; and
- diplomatic sanctions, which deny national participation in international events or organizations or withdraw the diplomatic privileges of designated individuals or regimes.

To implement these focused, targeted financial measures, the UN has relied on state implementation and enforcement through banks and major financial institutions. Most international hard-currency transactions are screened through name detection software, which provides an effective means of interdicting illicit transfers. Many nations also have financial intelligence units that assist law enforcement officials in detecting and thwarting financial crime and sanctions violations.

The Security Council has also created sanctions committees and authorized them to establish lists of designated individuals and entities whose assets are to be frozen. In most cases, those listed are also subject to travel and visa restrictions as well. The Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee (UNSCR [UNSC Resolution] 1267) has the largest

and most contested list, with approximately 500 names. Designation lists also exist for the sanctions in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan and for the sanctions against insurgents and supporters of the former regime in Iraq. As of 2009, the total number of individuals and entities on UN sanctions committees lists was more than 900. The procedures for designating and removing names from these lists have proven to be highly controversial, especially for the Security Council's consolidated list of alleged supporters of Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Arms embargoes are the most frequently employed forms of sanctions, but in many ways, they are the least successful. The enforcement of arms embargoes requires a high degree of international cooperation. Arms smuggling networks are highly sophisticated and pervasive and are often able to circumvent interdiction that is poorly enforced in some borders. Only in the sanctions against Iraq has international cooperation been sufficiently strong to make Security Council restrictions on the supply of arms and the advanced weapons technologies relatively effective.

Commodity sanctions are a means of preventing militia and criminal actors from exploiting natural resources to finance and sustain armed conflict. Commodity sanctions have also helped facilitate more effective governance by newly emerging postconflict regimes in the wake of the UN-approved peace settlements. The Security Council imposed oil embargoes as part of the sanctions against Iraq, former Yugoslavia, and the other countries in the 1990s. An embargo on the export of logs was imposed in Liberia in 2003. The most significant and successful commodity sanctions came against the so-called blood diamonds. Beginning in 1998 with the case of Angola, and continuing with the sanctions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Security Council prohibited the import of diamonds from territory controlled by rebel groups. This effort spurred the creation of the Kimberley certification system that, in turn, has helped shrink the financial base used by criminal groups and militias in armed conflict.

UN smart sanctions have also been used as a means of controlling nuclear proliferation. The end of these efforts will depend on the intelligent integration of incentives, sanctions, and security assurances as part of a diplomatic bargaining process.

Sanctions can be imposed and implemented by the UNSC, but security assurances and inducements are the purview of individual nations, particularly the United States and other major powers, acting on their own or in concert beyond the UN framework.

Scholars have engaged in contentious debate regarding how to evaluate the effectiveness of sanctions generally and UN sanctions in particular. The most authoritative empirical study is that by Gary Hufbauer and colleagues, which examines 204 cases from 1914 to 2006. Their data set includes a large number of cases of unilateral sanctions, mostly imposed by the United States. Their conclusion is that sanctions contributed to policy change in 70 of the cases studied, for an overall success rate of 34%. Other scholars have found that sanctions are most effective when economic costs are high for the target but low for the sender, when the gross domestic product of the sender is much larger than that of the target, and when the target and the sender have extensive trade relations. To these results, Daniel Drezner has added the "sanctions paradox," noting that sanctions are most likely to be effective when the sender and the target are interdependent economically and have cooperative political relations, yet coercive measures are rarely necessary under such conditions and in fact are often imposed when political relations and interdependence are low. David Cortright and George Lopez found the 1 in 3 success rate noted by the Hufbauer study replicated for the UN sanctions as well, especially when the Council maximized the use of expert panels, monitoring groups, and aggressive sanctions committees.

Many analysts would consider the current state of sanctions a mixed success. On the one hand, the diversity of global economic relations has made it possible for the UNSC to institute many refinements in the design and implementation of targeted economic sanctions that have some success in curtailing violent conflict and enforcing international norms of counterterrorism and counterproliferation. The record of success for multilateral sanctions is mixed but no less so than for the use of military force.

On the other hand, concerns about the lack of due process rights in the listing and delisting procedures for smart, targeted sanctions have created a political backlash against UN sanctions. A number of European states, longtime supporters of

sanctions, have both criticized the Security Council procedures and redrawn some of the boundaries of sanctions imposition as a result of court rulings and administrative decisions.

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See also Diplomacy; Human Rights in International Relations; International Law; Intervention; Multilateralism; Power and International Politics

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SCALING

Scaling methods used in the social sciences typically are statistical procedures that take observed data and extract latent (i.e., abstract) dimensions

on which the objects or subjects are ordered. In political science, the primary focus has been on issue/public policy and/or ideological scales using individuals' judgments or observed voting behavior. One important example is the estimation of ideological dimensions for all of congressional history by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal. Below, the development of these techniques and their applications in political science are discussed.

Scaling methods used in political science for the most part have their origins in psychology. The original work on scaling in psychology done at the turn of the 20th century was aimed at measuring general ability or intelligence. The pioneers were Karl Pearson and Charles Spearman. Spearman in 1904 used factor analysis to analyze a correlation matrix between test scores of 22 English high school boys for Classics, French, English, Math, Pitch, and Music. Spearman computed a form of rank-order correlation between each pair of skills across the 22 school boys and then extracted a common or general factor (g factor) from the matrix. His method of computing pairwise correlations and calculating the g factor was quickly supplanted by later work.

In particular, Pearson invented the product-moment correlation coefficient that is universally denoted as r , and he should also be credited with the invention of principal components analysis (what we now would think of as straightforward eigenvalue/eigenvector decomposition). Pearson in 1901 called it "the method of principal axes" and stated the problem quite succinctly: "In many physical, statistical, and biological investigations it is desirable to represent a system of points in plane, three, or higher dimensioned space by the 'best-fitting' straight line or plane" (p. 559). Remarkably, this also describes the essence of the famous Eckart-Young theorem (1936), which is the foundation of general least squares problems.

Lewis Leon Thurstone thought that Spearman's one-factor theory of intelligence was wrong, and he succeeded in developing a method for extracting multiple factors from a correlation matrix. Thurstone's theory of intelligence postulated seven rather than one primary mental ability, and he constructed tests specific to the seven abilities: verbal comprehension, word fluency, number facility, spatial visualization, associative memory, perceptual speed, and reasoning. Thurstone also developed the law of comparative judgment. Thurstone's law is

more accurately described as a measurement model for a unidimensional subjective continuum. Subjects are asked to make a series of $n(n - 1)/2$ pairwise comparisons of n stimuli. It is assumed that a subject's response reflects the momentary subjective value associated with the stimulus and that the probability distribution of these momentary values is normally distributed. It is then possible to recover the underlying continuum or scale by essentially averaging across a group of subjects. If the variances of the stimuli (the *discriminal* dispersions) on the underlying scale are the same (Case 5 of the model), the requirement of the parallel-item characteristic curves in the Rasch model is satisfied. Case 5 of Thurstone's method should yield essentially the same results as the Rasch model for dichotomous data.

In the decade after World War II, Thurstone's scaling work inspired the development of what became known as Guttman scaling and multidimensional scaling (MDS). These methods represent measurements of similarity between pairs of stimuli as distances between points in a low-dimensional (usually Euclidean) space. The methods locate the points in such a way that points corresponding to very similar stimuli are located close together, while those corresponding to very dissimilar stimuli are located farther apart. Warren Torgerson showed a simple method of MDS based on the Eckart-Young theorem. However, Torgerson's method assumed that the similarities were measured on a ratio scale, which is very unlikely in most cases.

Roger Shepard argued that the relationship between the true distance between a pair of stimuli and the observed distance was exponential. This led him to develop nonmetric multidimensional scaling in which distances are estimated that reproduce a weak monotone transformation (or rank ordering) of the observed dissimilarities. Shepard's program worked, but the key breakthrough was Joseph Kruskal's idea of monotone regression that led to the development of a powerful and practical nonmetric MDS program. By the early 1970s, this was known by the acronym KYST (Kruskal, Young, Shepard, and Torgerson) and is still in use today.

MDS methods can be seen as evolving from factor analysis and Thurstone's unidimensional scaling method with the key difference being that MDS methods are applied to *relational* data—that

is, data such as similarities and preferential choice data that can be regarded as *distances*. At the same time that MDS methods were evolving, Louis Guttman developed scalogram analysis or what is more commonly known as Guttman scaling. A Guttman scale is the basis of all modern skills-based tests. It is a set of items (questions, problems, etc.) that are ranked in order of difficulty so that those who answer correctly (agree) on a more difficult (or extreme) item will also answer correctly (agree) all the less difficult (extreme) items that preceded it. Rasch analysis (more broadly, item response theory [IRT]) is essentially a sophisticated form of Guttman scalogram analysis. These are techniques for examining whether a set of items is consistent in the sense that they all measure increasing/decreasing levels of some unidimensional attribute (e.g., mathematical ability, racial prejudice).

At the same time when Torgerson was developing classical scaling and Guttman was developing scalogram analysis, Clyde Coombs developed unfolding analysis. Coombs came up with the idea of an ideal point and a single-peaked preference function to account for the observed rank orderings. The idea was to arrange the individuals' ideal points and points representing the stimuli along a scale so that the distances between the ideal points and the stimuli points reproduced the observed rank orderings. Coombs called this an unfolding analysis because the researcher must take the individuals' rank orderings and "unfold" them.

Unfolding analysis deals with relational data and is therefore an MDS method. Both unfolding analysis and scalogram analysis deal with individuals' responses to a set of stimuli. But Guttman's model is very different from the unfolding model. In terms of utility theory, unfolding analysis assumes a single-peaked (usually symmetric) utility function. That is, utility (the degree of preference) declines with distance from the individual's ideal point. In contrast, Guttman scaling is based on a utility function that is always monotonically increasing or decreasing over the relevant dimension or space. Above some threshold, the individual always responds with a Yes/Correct, and below the threshold, the individual always responds with a No/Incorrect. The counterpart to an ideal point is the position on the scale where the individual's responses switch from Yes/Correct to No/Incorrect.

Interestingly, these two very different models are observationally equivalent in the context of parliamentary voting. In the unfolding model, there are two outcomes for every parliamentary motion—one corresponding to “Yea” and one corresponding to “Nay.” Legislators vote for the option closest to their ideal points. In one dimension, this forms a perfect scalogram. Hence, Guttman scaling methods and their IRT parametric descendants can be used to analyze parliamentary (binary choice) data.

In the 1970s and 1980s, political scientists began to combine techniques from econometrics and statistics with approaches developed by psychometricians. John Aldrich and Richard McKelvey in 1977 developed a unidimensional scaling method for 7-point scales. This method uses the respondents’ perceived locations of the political stimuli to recover an underlying latent configuration. It also will recover the respondents’ self-placements on the same latent scale. Henry Brady made contributions to the statistical foundations of nonmetric MDS as well as methods for and problems with the analysis of preferences. Poole and Rosenthal combined the random utility model developed by economists, the spatial model of voting, and alternating estimation methods developed in psychometrics to develop NOMINATE, an unfolding method for parliamentary roll call data.

In the 1990s and the early 2000s, the availability of inexpensive and fast computers made simulation methods for the estimation of complex multivariate models practical for the first time, and these methods were fused with long-standing psychometric methods by political scientists. Specifically, Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation within a Bayesian framework coupled with the IRT model can be used to perform an unfolding analysis of parliamentary roll call data. Political scientists have successfully blended methods from statistics and econometrics with psychometrics to produce unique scaling applications. The coming decades should see even greater advances due to the availability of ever-faster parallel computing methods and the increasing sophistication of political science methodological training.

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See also Measurement; Measurement, Scales; Scaling Methods: A Taxonomy

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SCALING METHODS: A TAXONOMY

Scaling methods germinated in the pioneering work of Karl Pearson and Charles Spearman, who in the first decade of the 20th century developed methods to describe relationships between variables. Pearson created the correlation coefficient for metric data, while Spearman introduced the rank order correlation and an algorithm designed to document the existence of a general factor in intelligence research. Since then, these ideas have been extended to permit an (in theory) unlimited number of factors obtained from data ranging from crude categorical to refined metric and permitting the imposition of a variety of constraints on the variables. What all scaling methods have in common, however, is that they can be used to transform a set of observed variables to a smaller number of latent variables or factors (dimensions).

Scaling methods differ with respect to the type of input data for which they are most appropriate. Principal component analysis (PCA) and factor analysis (FA) make the assumption that the data are metrically scaled. If the data are ordered categories, such as Likert-type responses, categorical (or nonlinear) principal component analysis (CATPCA) is probably the best choice. Multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) is particularly suited for the analysis of unordered categorical (or nominal) data. For paired-comparison data, the proper choice would be multidimensional scaling. Rasch scaling or the unfolding model are proper choices when the response options are dichotomous (Yes/No) with an implicit item difficulty order, which usually means that they have a one-dimensional solution. The following documents the similarities and differences of the most popular scaling methods in the political and social sciences, namely, PCA, CATPCA, and MCA.

To demonstrate these methods, we chose seven variables on national pride from the U.S. portion of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2003. To avoid a lengthy discussion on missing data, possible imputation techniques, and their impact on the solution, we use listwise deletion, which reduces the sample from 1,216 cases to 1,148 cases. The seven variables (identified with the abbreviations that will be used in subsequent figures) are as follows:

- A. I would rather be a citizen of [Country] than of any other country in the world.
- B. There are some things about [Country] today that make me feel ashamed of [Country].
- C. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [Country Nationality].
- D. Generally speaking, [Country] is a better country than most other countries.
- E. People should support their country even if the country is wrong.
- F. When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be [Country Nationality].
- G. I am often less proud of [Country] than I would like to be.

Five response options ranging from *agree strongly* (1), to *neither agree nor disagree* (3), to *disagree strongly* (5) were made available for all items. Five of the seven variables have a positive formulation, such that *agree strongly* implies a favorable attitude toward the country. The remaining two items (2 and 7) have a negative formulation, requiring respondents to (strongly) disagree to express a favorable attitude.

Principal Component Analysis

Assume that there are m observed variables with n respondents each. In PCA, these m observed variables are reexpressed without any loss of information by m latent variables; that is, when the number of factors equals the number of variables, the original observed scores can be recaptured. However, the usual aim is to reduce the dimensionality of the data by using a substantially smaller number of m^* factors. Specifically, each observed variable (z_j) can be expressed through its association (α_{jk}) with each latent factor (f_k), resulting in

$$z_j = f_1\alpha_{j1} + f_2\alpha_{j2} + \dots + f_{m^*}\alpha_{jm^*} + \dots + f_m\alpha_{jm}.$$

Here, z_j is a vector that contains the z -transformed categories of the j th variable for all n respondents, f_k contains the categories from the k th latent variable of all n respondents, and α_{jk} is the correlation between the j th observed and the k th latent variable.

In matrix notation and for the full solution (i.e., where the number of observed variables is equal to the number of factors), $\mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{F}\mathbf{A}^T$, with $1/n\mathbf{F}^T\mathbf{F} = \mathbf{I}$. $\mathbf{I}$ is an identity matrix, which by definition has ones in the main diagonal and zeros in the off-diagonal elements; in other words, the factors are orthogonal (uncorrelated) with each other. Because $z_{1i} = (x_i - \bar{x})/s_x$ and $z_{2i} = (y_i - \bar{y})/s_y$, it follows that $r_{12} = (1/n)\mathbf{z}_1^T\mathbf{z}_2$, and in matrix notation, $\mathbf{R} = (1/n)\mathbf{Z}^T\mathbf{Z} = (1/n)\mathbf{A}\mathbf{F}^T\mathbf{F}\mathbf{A}^T = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{A}^T$, which is known as the fundamental theorem in FA. Since the idea is to reduce the set of m observed variables to m^* factors, with $m^* < m$, it follows that $\mathbf{Z} \approx \mathbf{F}_{m^*}\mathbf{A}^T$ and $\mathbf{R} \approx \mathbf{A}_{m^*}\mathbf{A}_{m^*}^T$.

Applying canonical decomposition produces $\mathbf{R} = \mathbf{B}\mathbf{\Delta}\mathbf{B}^T$, where $\mathbf{B}$ is the matrix of the eigenvectors and $\mathbf{\Delta}$ is the diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues, with $\lambda_1 \geq \lambda_2 \geq \dots \geq \lambda_{m^*} \geq \dots \geq \lambda_m$. From

$\mathbf{R} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{A}^T$, it follows that the correlations between any two variables (j, l) can be recomputed from the corresponding factor loadings: $\sum_{k=1}^m \alpha_{jk} \alpha_{lk} = r_{jl}$. The factor loadings (α_{jk}), ranging between -1 and $+1$, can be interpreted as correlations between the latent and observed variables. The communality (h_j^2) describes the proportion of the variance in variable j explained by those m^* factors that were used to construct the reduced space.

Several possibilities exist for deciding on the number of dimensions to be included in an interpretation. The eigenvalue (or Kaiser) criterion, which is the default in many statistical packages, is most often applied in the social and political sciences. The rationale for this criterion is that a latent variable should explain more of the variation in the data than an observed variable. Since each observed variable has an explained variance of 1.0 (the correlation of a variable with itself), the eigenvalues of the factors to be considered in the solution have to be greater than one—that is, $\lambda_{m^*} > 1$. This is an arbitrary criterion that nevertheless is sometimes useful. An alternative criterion is the so-called scree test: The eigenvalues are plotted in successive order; the factor that forms an elbow (i.e., a substantial change in magnitude in the increasing/decreasing list of eigenvalues) will be the first one that is not considered in the solution. Finally, it is sometimes preferable to consider just those factors for which one can provide a substantive interpretation.

After choosing the number of factors to be retained in a solution, scholars often rotate the solution to obtain a better interpretation; varimax rotation is most commonly applied. In an iterative procedure, the coordinates of variables and cases in the m^* -dimensional latent space are changed in a way that maximizes the sum of the variances of the squared loadings on each factor. Using this technique, median loadings become either smaller or larger and are therefore more clearly associated with a single factor. While varimax rotation keeps the orthogonality of the factors (i.e., the factors remain uncorrelated), other rotation methods such as oblimin allow the factors to be correlated after rotation.

The literature sometimes confuses PCA and FA. The difference between these methods is that PCA does not incorporate any error term, since $\mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{F}\mathbf{A}^T$ and $\mathbf{R} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{A}^T$. In contrast, in FA, it is assumed that

each variable has an item-specific error term ($\mathbf{v}_j$); from this, it follows that $\mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{F}\mathbf{A}^T + \mathbf{V}$ and $\mathbf{R} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{A}^T - \mathbf{V}^T\mathbf{V}$. If the errors are uncorrelated, only the main diagonal elements of the correlation matrix $\mathbf{R}$ (which are by definition one) have to be reduced iteratively to correct for the item-specific error. The manner of estimating these error terms differentiates the various methods of FA. The aim of structural equation modeling (SEM) is to allow for correlations between the error terms and for correlations between the latent factors themselves and to classify observed and latent variables as dependent and independent ones. While PCA is used to explore the structure of the data, SEM is used to test whether the data are consistent with the models developed on the basis of the literature.

Input for PCA and FA is usually the matrix of product-moment correlation coefficients, which assume metric data. Hence, the PCA of categorical variables such as the 5-point Likert items in our example is problematic. Nevertheless, such variables have often been treated as if they were metric. In the following, we apply PCA to the ISSP data described above to show the solution that one would typically find in the literature. Using the seven variables on national pride as input data, Table 1 shows that the first and second eigenvalues are 2.631 and 1.086, respectively; together, they explain 53.1% of the variation. After varimax rotation, the two eigenvalues are 2.227 and 1.490 (Table 1).

According to the eigenvalue criterion, the solution is two-dimensional since only the first two eigenvalues are greater than one. However, the difference between the first and the second eigenvalue is large, while there is only a small difference between the second and the third eigenvalues. By the scree test criterion, the solution would be one-dimensional. With respect to the factor loadings (Table 2), all variables are associated with Dimension 1: Positive loadings are found for the positively formulated items and negative loadings for those of reversed polarity. Substantively, this factor appears to reflect the extent to which respondents report feeling national pride. On the second dimension, all variables have positive loadings, regardless of the content or polarity of the item. This latent variable might be interpretable as a methodological artifact known as acquiescence (the tendency to

Table 1 Principal Component Analysis, Eigenvalues, and Explained Variances

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Initial Eigenvalues</i>			<i>Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings</i>			<i>Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings</i>		
	<i>Total</i>	<i>% Variance</i>	<i>Cumulative %</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>% Variance</i>	<i>Cumulative %</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>% Variance</i>	<i>Cumulative %</i>
1	2.631	37.586	37.586	2.631	37.586	37.586	2.227	31.818	31.818
2	1.086	15.519	53.105	1.086	15.519	53.105	1.490	21.288	53.105
3	0.805	11.505	64.610						
4	0.771	11.018	75.628						
5	0.666	9.511	85.139						
6	0.543	7.760	92.900						
7	0.497	7.100	100.000						

Source: Data from International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), National Identity II (2003). Distributor: GESIS Cologne Germany, ZA No. 3910.

agree with statements regardless of their content). By the scree test criterion, as well as that of substantive meaning, the solution is one-dimensional. However, since most scholars use the eigenvalue criterion, we tentatively follow this procedure, keeping the two-dimensional solution and performing a varimax rotation.

After varimax rotation, the loadings of the positively formulated items remain almost unchanged on the first dimension, while the loadings of the negatively formulated items move to the second dimension to define their own factor. Therefore, the rotated solution suggests a two-dimensional structure mirroring just the polarity of the items: Positive-polarity items form Dimension 1, and negative-polarity items define Dimension 2. Findings such as these have sparked a lively debate about whether the underlying structure consists of two unipolar concepts or one bipolar concept. Regardless of which position is taken, it is insufficient to base it just on the rotated solution and the eigenvalue criterion.

A more appropriate technique for analyzing ordered categorical variables is CATPCA, in which the categories are replaced by optimal scores. The optimal scoring process allows order constraints to be imposed so that ordered categorical variables get increasing, or at least nondecreasing, scores as the category levels become increasingly severe. Responses inconsistent with the implied ordering manifest themselves in tied optimal scores for two or more

successive categories. In contrast to PCA, the number of dimensions m^* to be used for the fit must be specified in advance, and the solutions for m^* and $m^* + 1$ dimensions are not nested. Once the optimal scores have been calculated, they replace the category codes, and the remainder of the analysis can be regarded as (classical) PCA. In short, CATPCA is an appropriate technique to display relationships between cases associated with a set of ordered categorical variables. Like PCA, the method produces eigenvalues and explained variances, factor loadings, and factor scores with mean zero and unit standard deviation. Essentially, CATPCA can be regarded as PCA applied to ordered categorical data. An additional advantage of CATPCA is that the solutions can be visualized with the help of biplots. It is possible to impose linearity on the optimal scores, in which case the biplots can be expressed as vectors. John Gower and David Hand (1996) simplified this approach by showing that biplot axes can be interpreted just like other coordinate axes—that is, by projection and by reading a value off a scale. The closer two biplot axes are to each other, the stronger the association of the corresponding variables in the m^* -dimensional space.

Running CATPCA on the ISSP data described above and restricting the solution to two dimensions, the first factor explains 38.2% of the variation and the second an additional 15.6%. Comparing the CATPCA with the PCA solution

Table 2 PCA and CATPCA Factor Loadings, Before and After Varimax Rotation

	PCA, Unrotated Solution		PCA, Rotated Solution		CATPCA	
	Dimension 1	Dimension 2	Dimension 1	Dimension 2	Dimension 1	Dimension 2
Item A	.647	.090	.602	-.253	.651	.068
Item B	-.556	.612	-.165	.810	-.558	.605
Item C	.646	.346	.732	-.033	.643	.363
Item D	.719	.287	.764	-.121	.724	.289
Item E	.554	.222	.590	-.093	.563	.236
Item F	.601	.148	.592	-.180	.614	.132
Item G	-.549	.656	-.136	.845	-.551	.659


Source: Data from International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), National Identity II (2003). Distributor: GESIS Cologne Germany, ZA No. 3910.

Note: CATPCA = categorical principal component analysis; PCA = principal component analysis.

shows a small increase in the explained variation. An increase in explained variation is always the case since CATPCA does not restrict the items to have constant distances between successive categories as does PCA. The differences in the explained variances can be interpreted as one indication of the quality of the data: The smaller the difference between the solutions, the better the data. Comparing the factor loadings of the unrotated PCA with the CATPCA solution (Table 2) reveals only trivial differences. Dimension 1 reflects the difference between positive and negative formulations, while all items have positive loadings on Dimension 2.

Figure 1 shows the biplot axes of the seven variables, with tick marks to symbolize the category-level points and with labels affixed to the *agree strongly* end point. The factorial axes are excluded since they are not useful in the biplot presentation. Two sets of items are distinguished, corresponding to the positive and negative formulations. As numerically shown for PCA via varimax rotation, the two sets of items could be described as separate factors. Inspecting the distances between all successive categories on each item shows that there are no ties—that is, there are no two single categories measuring the same level of agreement/disagreement to a certain item. However, the distances between the categories are quite unequal. Take Item A as an example: The first category (*agree strongly*) is relatively far from the second

category (*agree*); in fact, the first category is located in the negative parts of Dimensions 1 and 2, while the second category is already located in the positive parts of those dimensions (i.e., on the other side of the mean, which is the point where the lines for all items cross). In other words, the midpoint of the latent concept behind Item A is not “3”; rather, it is a point between “1” and “2.” Furthermore, the categories *neither agree nor disagree* and *disagree* are relatively close to each other, indicating that these two responses are rather similar for the average respondent.

**Figure 1** Biplot Presentation of National Identity Data

Source: Data from International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), National Identity II (2003). Distributor: GESIS Cologne Germany, ZA No. 3910.

In the final step, we perform MCA on the same data. While PCA restricts the data to be metric (i.e., all distances between two successive categories are equal), and while CATPCA keeps the ordinality of the successive categories, MCA makes no assumptions about the measurement level of the variables. In sum, MCA can be regarded as PCA with (unordered) categorical variables. In contrast to PCA and CATPCA, the visualization of the data is usually of primary interest in MCA.

Figure 2 presents the visualization of the seven variables with its total of 35 categories. In this figure, the successive categories of the individual variables are connected by trajectories. Projecting the categories from all variables onto the first

dimension shows that all items retain the ordinality of their categories. Dimension 1 reflects the substantive meaning, which is the level of national pride, with the negatively formulated items running in a direction opposite to the positive ones. The second dimension shows the horseshoe (or the Guttman effect), with extreme values in the negative part and moderate values in the positive part. This effect is methodologically induced; for the given example, it has already been suggested that these are due mainly to acquiescence. It is precisely to exclude methodologically induced variations of such kinds in ordinal data that Jan de Leeuw (2006) proposed the use of CATPCA.




Figure 2 Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) Presentation of National Identity Data

Source: Data from International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), National Identity II (2003). Distributor: GESIS Cologne Germany, ZA No. 3910.

It should be noted that CATPCA also allows a combination of metric and categorical (ordered and unordered) data within a single analysis. In such situations, the metric variables are restricted to a metric scale with equal distances and the ordered categorical variables to their implicit successive order of categories, while no order is imposed on the categories of the unordered categorical variables.

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See also Correspondence Analysis; Factor Analysis;
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Structural Equation Modeling

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SCHEMA

A schema (plural *schemata*) in the field of social science represents a person's mental structure

used to organize current knowledge about the world and to guide cognitive processes and behavior. In this way, we use schemata to categorize objects and events, based on their elements and characteristics, to interpret and predict the world. While evaluating the world, new information is being processed according to how it fits into the mental structures, or rules. In the field of social science, and particularly in cognitive science, we retrieve knowledge from various areas, such as artificial intelligence, with the main goal of developing simplified mental structures about our knowledge to draw conclusions about missing or nonevidential information, such as during decision making or political evaluation. Examples of schemata include rubrics, social roles, stereotypes, and worldviews. This entry discusses meanings and the use of schemata, as well as their application to social science.

The Concept and Its Application

Schema as a concept was first introduced into psychology by the British psychologist Frederic Bartlett (1886–1969) through his learning theory. Bartlett perceived organized knowledge as an elaborate network of abstract mental structures that represent our understanding of the world. Bartlett's main studies concentrate on the impact of our cultural background in rephrasing and memorizing certain events. For example, in one of his most well-known studies, Bartlett examined whether subjects could recall events that strongly deviate from their own environmental background, and he showed that the more culturally deviated one's own background was from that of the presented story, the less likely it was that participants could remember the story. Bartlett concluded that the participants distort the presented story in favor of their own cultural stereotypes, and details that were difficult to interpret were omitted because they did not fit in with the participants' own schemata.

In general, the learner in schema theory actively builds schemata and revises them in light of new information. Here, it is important to mention that each schema is unique and depends on an individual's experiences and cognitive processes.

David Ausubel (1968), in his meaningful learning theory, argues that there exists a hierarchical organization of knowledge where new information will be added to the already existing hierarchy. In contrast, Jean Piaget shows that there is more than one body of knowledge available to learners. Piaget claims that there exists a network of context-specific bodies of knowledge and according to specific situations we apply a specific body of knowledge. Piaget's definition of schema is useful for interpreting information in which situation-specific schemata are useful in distinguishing between two types of categories of interpretation of knowledge: the expert and the novice. Experts are more complex and developed schemata that function better in any given domain, and the novice has no schema or inadequate schema to help interpret new information. Since schemata are perceived as context specific, they depend on the individual's experience with the subject.

Beside interpreting information, the literature also suggests that schemata are crucial for decoding how that information is presented to oneself. One possibility is reflection in text structure. This means that readers use their systematic representation of text to help them interpret the text. Also, as Robert Kaplan (1966) points out, it is important to note that an essay style is culturally determined.

Moreover, schemata have two types of hierarchies that concentrate on the relationship between the part and the whole. It shows that on the basis of partial information structures, we are able to perceive the whole picture of an event. This reference is possible because each schema has a main category, a so-called slot that connects different semantic networks and provides us with a whole picture of an event or object. For example, in the main slot "house," we store the information "wall," "roof," and "floor," among others. Within the context of part-whole relationships, we can therefore infer that a house has a wall, a roof, and a floor. Moreover, each schema is developed in a way that helps us simplify drawing conclusions of a represented concept. For example, if we know that an object is a door, then according to the definition of a schema "door," we can assume that it has a lock, a handle, and hinges, which shows that we apply all the attributes of a door.

Moreover, William Brewer and James Treyns (1981) studied the effects of schemata in human memory. They conducted a study in which 30 subjects were brought into the office of the principal investigator and were told to wait there. After 35 seconds, the subjects were asked to leave the room and to list everything that they could recall being in the room. Brewer and Treyns showed that the subjects could recall all those objects that fit into their schema of "office room," and they had a much more deviated memory of those items that were not a part of their schema. For example, 29 of the 30 subjects recalled that the office had a chair, a desk, and walls; however, only 8 could recall the anatomic skull or a writing pad. Interestingly, 9 subjects mentioned that they had seen books, when, in fact, there were no books in the office. Being able to recall books when books were not among those objects present shows that our memory of the characteristics of certain locations depends on schemata that we associate with those types of locations.

Schemata can also contain so-called event concepts, which can be defined as a conceptual structure. Roger Schank and Robert Abelson (1977) developed one version of an event concept that they defined as "scripts." If we define an event, for example, as a "restaurant visit," then we are able to determine stereotypical sequences of action that define a restaurant visit. A study shows that different subjects recalled different sequences from the same event. Among the total number of 32 subjects in their study, there was no consistent recall of the sequences of actions. In fact, in an overlap of 73% of all subjects, Schank and Abelson found that only a stereotypical sequence of "taking a seat," "ordering food," "eating," and "paying" was the same.

Applying Schema Theory

Applying a schema to social science represents our common understanding about an event or a concept. Hence, each individual has his or her own understanding of this event, which depends on the characteristics that he or she associates with the object, content, or location, which, in turn, depends on his or her cultural and political background. Several misrepresentations of an actual event

described in social science arise from our own particular cultural-political background. Many areas in political science apply schemata when decision making occurs—for example, during peace negotiations or United Nations summit meetings, where a vast variety of cultural-political backgrounds are represented. It can be inferred, therefore, that the more detailed the description of an event, the more likely are larger proportions of members to reach agreement.

The literature on schemata concentrates primarily on strategies that focus on how different representatives with a defined set of schemata communicate and interpret the events. Here, abstract theories and exemplary theories apply to how schemata are actually used by distinct learners. Abstract theory works through the usage of a prototype that represents a certain category, and exemplary theories work through the individual comparison with the prototype. In the exemplary theory, we do not store concepts in our schema but individual examples, and the schema functions through comparisons rather than representation, as in abstract theory.

Certain strategies of simplifying schemata include stereotypes and archetypes that drive our decision-making process. Here, the literature suggests that numerous strategies follow from schema theory. Sharon Widmayer (2007) acknowledges the role of prior knowledge in cognitive processing and shows that already existing schemata related to the new information need to be activated. This is described in the literature as “stimulating recall of prior knowledge.” Teachers, for example, activate student’s prior knowledge through reading the heading and the title before starting a new subject related to it. Another teaching strategy is using analogies and comparisons to activate the learner’s existing schema in particular to help learners draw connections among already existing schemata. Here, it is crucial that teachers use the most realistic familiar scenarios instead of conventional abstract methods. With regard to the familiarity of already existing schemata, the literature points out that with highly familiar scenarios, the learner will activate the already existing schemata more successfully, and the strongest connections among schemata will thus be achieved. To support this conclusion, Edward Price and Marcy Driscoll showed in their 1997 study that around 11% of the subjects could solve

a particular problem in an unfamiliar context, while around 58% of those participating in the study could answer a very similar problem in a familiar context.

In conclusion, schemata help us represent our knowledge of how characteristics of certain events are recalled. However, there remain limitations such as the applicability of schemata across knowledge domains that are relevant. Here, one’s self-knowledge as well as one’s cultural-political background are crucial determinants.

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See also Attitude Consistency; Attitudes, Political; Script; Values

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SCRIPT

The notion of cognitive scripts, closely related to schema theory, became especially important in the 1970s, when cognitive psychologists (e.g., Robert Abelson, 1981; Roger Schank & Robert Abelson, 1977)—and, later, scholars of international relations—began to explore the role of cognitive shortcuts in information processing and decision

making. According to Abelson, one of the leading advocates of this approach, scripts are “conceptual representations of stereotyped event sequences.” Put more simply, a script may be thought of as a particular kind of schema or “mental box” that provides the typical default values for an event of some kind or an act that we are accustomed to performing, such as watching a movie or eating out at a restaurant. We usually experience little difficulty dining at a restaurant we have never visited before, for instance, since we simply rely on the default values stored in our memory to guide our behavior; we wait to be seated by the host or hostess, a server presents us with menus, we pick what we want to eat, we eat it when it arrives, and so on. By the same token, if a friend informs you that she went to see a movie last night, you can easily use the default values you keep in your head for typical visits to the cinema to guess how her evening probably went. Scripts can help decision makers assess the nature of a situation quickly but can sometimes be a source of cognitive error, a fact that has not been lost on students of foreign policy decision making. The notion of scripts has been broadly accepted within international relations, but it has also been subjected to various criticisms (as discussed below).

The concept of a script clearly draws itself on the cognitive image of a movie or theatrical script in which events are played out one after the other, and it can also be compared to a cartoon strip. This idea is consistent with the more general notion that human beings are “cognitive misers,” and the approach may be viewed as part of the bounded rationality tradition within political science, which stresses the ways in which individuals depart from “pure” or comprehensive rationality. Rather than considering everything we experience *sui generis*, according to this view, we are usually far more economical in our information processing. We commonly fit new sensory data into established mental categories, both because this requires little effort and because it allows us to make sense of the outside world quickly and expeditiously. This is particularly the case under conditions of high uncertainty and ambiguity, when the individual is being bombarded with too much information, or when he or she possesses too little. As well as helping us make sense of what has happened in the past or is happening now, scripts

often play a strong predictive role in decision making, allowing us to ascertain in advance with a reasonable degree of confidence what is likely to occur in the future (or at least what we *think* is likely to occur).

Scripts can also be a major source of cognitive error, however. Because they contain information about things that are only *typically* true, at least in that individual’s experience, there is always the potential for oversimplification of a novel stimulus. We may make assumptions based on the typical or prototypical behaviors that may be entirely misleading or false. Scripts can also compete with one another in our minds in situations where it is unclear what is actually happening. Two or more scripts may seem relevant to the case in hand, and the decision maker may grapple with uncertainty as to which best suits the issue in question.

Scholars of foreign policy decision making such as Deborah Larson (1985) and Michael Shapiro and G. Matthew Bonham (1973) were quick to pick up on the political relevance of scripts in international relations. “Balkanization” and “the Trojan Horse,” for instance, are two scripts often used in international relations, and as noted by Yaacov Vertzberger (1990), scripts appear to play an especially prominent role in the analysis of strategic threats. In American foreign policy, the “Munich script” and the “Vietnam script” have frequently influenced the deliberations of decision makers, both during the Cold War and since. This provides a useful political example of the ways in which rival scripts can compete for a decision maker’s attention and of the manner in which scripts are used to predict future events. The generation of policymakers who had experienced World War II were particularly attuned to the memory of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain after the Munich conference of 1938, where he famously waved a piece of paper on which Adolf Hitler had agreed not to invade Poland and Western Europe in exchange for part of what was then Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain famously emerged from the conference promising “peace in our time.” When this attempt at accommodation failed and was followed by World War II, many policymakers (especially in the United States) drew the wider lesson that any effort to “appease” a dictator was bound to lead to disaster. The widespread use of the domino theory by

U.S. decision makers during the Cold War, for instance, was clearly based on the cognitive appeal of this script. From this perspective, attempts to appease an adversary inevitably lead to well-intentioned but empty negotiations; verbal or written promises are followed by betrayal, causing a nation to fight a war against an enemy it should have confronted much earlier using its military might.

During the Cuban missile crisis, John F. Kennedy appears to have had the World War I script in mind, urging his advisers to read Barbara Tuchman's book *The Guns of August*; he was determined not to allow events to spiral out of control in 1962, as they had in 1914 prior to the onset of World War I. The Munich script was evoked on far more numerous occasions during the Cold War, however, and it was perhaps most famously used by President George H. W. Bush after Saddam Hussein's troops invaded Kuwait in 1990. Bush argued that if Hussein's aggression was not confronted early on—if the Iraqi leader was appeased, in other words—events similar to those of the 1930s would play out, albeit in the Middle East rather than Europe and with Hussein as the antagonist rather than Hitler. This cognitive image remains highly potent in American political discourse today, despite the passage of (to date) more than 70 years; during the 2008 presidential election in the United States, for instance, the then candidate Barack Obama was accused by Republicans of appeasement for advocating direct talks with Iran over the issues of nuclear weapons and terrorism. The Vietnam script—which remains equally potent—stresses, on the other hand, the dangers of confrontation rather than accommodation. Recalling the military and political errors that cost the United States so much blood and treasure, one popular interpretation of Vietnam suggests that a nation should exercise extreme caution when contemplating the use of military force. Images of “body bags,” “getting bogged down” in enemy terrain, and mass protests are all evoked by the Vietnam script, as well as the considerable human and political costs of a military intervention that effectively destroyed Lyndon Johnson's presidency.

The prominence of the Munich and Vietnam scripts in the United States illustrates the perils of “overlearning” the lessons of a single event. The former illustrates the dangers of overgeneralizing one set of historical events into a script that

purports to predict what will usually happen when a ruthless or expansionist leader is appeased (or, taken to its extreme, when any form of diplomacy is used). Equally, one can argue that the Vietnam script has often led American leaders to be overly cautious in responding to genuine threats, creating a sometimes inappropriate reluctance to use military power. As a young antiwar activist, Bill Clinton had been strongly influenced by the costs of Lyndon Johnson's decision to escalate American involvement in the Vietnam War. As president, he was consequently often slow to use military force, most notably when the former Yugoslavia began to break up in the early 1990s. Eventually, U.S. firepower was used against the Serbs in 1995, helping to bring the parties together at a peace conference in Dayton, Ohio, but not before hundreds of thousands had perished in the conflict. Similarly, Clinton may also have been reluctant to intervene in Rwanda when major acts of genocide erupted there in 1994, because he was relying on what might be termed the Somalia or “Black Hawk Down” script; the latter suggested that military interventions and/or attempts to “nation build” in Africa are fraught with danger, drawing on the cognitive image of the disastrous 1993 attempt by U.S. forces to capture the Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid during which 18 American soldiers died and 73 were wounded (the death toll among Somalis was much higher). Although the similarities between the Somali and Rwandan cases were arguably superficial, Clinton administration officials later admitted that the dangers of committing troops to intervene in the slaughter of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda dominated their thoughts as a result of what had happened the previous year in Somalia.

While the notion that leaders use cognitive scripts has been generally (if perhaps grudgingly) accepted by most scholars within international relations, a number of potential problems within this area should also be highlighted. The first is simply that there has been relatively little development of the script idea within international relations or political science since the 1980s. For good or bad, the rational choice or game-theoretical tradition—which makes the “as if” assumption that decision makers possess pure rationality—has in general proven more attractive to many political scientists for modeling purposes than the admittedly messy

notion that policymakers employ a variety of cognitive shortcuts (not the least because the latter assumption renders decision makers somewhat idiosyncratic). Indeed, one of the scholars who originally helped popularize the idea of scripts and schemas within political science—Robert Axelrod—joined the rational-choice tradition some years ago. Second, many scholars of foreign policy decision making have preferred to use the competing but obviously related notion of analogical reasoning in their work, a now well-established tradition that covers the same ground as early work on scripts but has generally proven itself to be somewhat more popular among scholars of foreign policy analysis. Third—and in a related vein—there has been a general failure in the literature to disentangle the notion of scripts from strongly related concepts such as schemas and analogies. If scripts are simply “event schemas,” do we really need the former label? Are scripts merely the same thing as historical analogies, or are they something analytically distinct? Last, there has also been an overemphasis, perhaps, on the “cold” information-processing tradition from which the focus on scripts derived, and some political psychologists are themselves turning away from the computational analogy on which much of the original literature of schemas and scripts was based.

Nevertheless, whatever terminology we use, scripts will remain highly relevant to the study of politics because both elite decision makers and ordinary voters must often make decisions with only incomplete information about the situation at hand. Political actors can and do make incorrect inferences by fitting individuals or events into the wrong categories or scripts, based on their observable but all too frequently superficial similarities.

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See also Foreign Policy Analysis; Game Theory; Genocide; Historical Memory; Policy Process, Models of; Rational Choice; Schema

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SECESSION

Secession is the formal withdrawal from an established, internationally recognized state by a constituent unit to create a new sovereign state. This entry analyzes the meaning of the notion, its empirical dynamics, and its justification and finally addresses the key question on the reasons why there are not a higher number of secessions in the world.

The decision to secede represents an instance of political disintegration, when the citizens of a subsystem withdraw their political activities from the central government to focus on their own center. To the observer, secession may appear irrational as it often entails the sacrifice of economic opportunities and the endurance of social upheaval. Because of the state's opposition and monopoly of coercive force, secessionist struggles frequently become violent and protracted. Thus, secession is disintegrative in the most fundamental sense: It involves not the overthrow of the existing government but rather its territorial dismemberment.

The breakup of the Soviet Union and Ethiopia and the fragmentation of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia have created some 20 new states through secession, which has grudgingly received international recognition and legitimation. Indeed, from 1776 onward, secession has been one of the most frequent ways of creating new states. With the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires after World War I, numerous new states were created through secession. Given the countless unresolved cultural and territorial disputes and the many unsatisfied aspirations of

nations in Africa, Asia, and even in the West—for example, Quebec, Catalonia, the Basques, Flanders, Scotland, and Wales—secession continues to be a force to be reckoned with in international politics.

Dynamics

The dynamics of secession rest on four preconditions: nation, territory, leaders, and discontent. Secession demands must be presented by an identifiable community that is smaller than the state and that threatens to withdraw if not satisfied. Questions of identity underpin this community of people, or nation, who perceive the characteristics that distinguish their members from other groups, who feel a commitment to each other, and who then undertake the challenge of changing their circumstances. This community must be associated with the territory on which it would establish its newly independent state. Without effective leadership to translate community needs into demands, threats to the nation might merely degenerate into social unrest as pent-up frustrations are vented. Discontent with the current circumstances motivates the community's demands for change. Often a nation is bound together, and perhaps even defined, by common claims of discrimination, neglect, exploitation, or repression in economic, political, cultural, linguistic, or religious terms. The U.S. Declaration of Independence points to the "unbearable tyranny of the state" as both the reason, in the sense of providing the motivating force, and the moral justification for secession.

Embedded in any secession lies the perceived justice of the community's cause. The debate surrounding the "right of secession" and its close relative, "the right of national self-determination," revolves around (a) the argument that secession may be justifiable either in circumstances where state rule over a nation is particularly oppressive and tyrannical or when a majority of a territorially concentrated community desires secession and (b) the argument that secession may be desirable due to the benefits it provides for nations to organize themselves according to their own values.

Justification

Those seeking to justify secession extend the argument that if a society may overthrow an unbearable

government, then a segment of the population may also remove itself from a particularly objectionable government. John Stuart Mill acknowledged that freedom and liberty may not be possible when the state is an artificial amalgamation of two or more distinct nations with one dominating the government and, thus, conceded that secession may be a necessary alternative to promote liberty. One need only think of the experiences of the Armenians, Jews, Kurds, and people from many other nations facing government-sponsored slaughter to understand how nations would believe that they could guarantee their safety and even survival through possessing their own state. For revolution or secession, thus, the underlying principle of protest is the same.

President Woodrow Wilson extended the argument from when secession may be justifiable to when it may be desirable. Above all else, Wilson sought peace based on justice. He believed that the subjugation of one nation by another was unjust and would lead inevitably to a threat to peace. Implicit in Wilson's approach lies the belief that secession was a desirable way to create states coterminous with nations. Every historic nation should possess the same right to organize its communal affairs according to its own values, not simply those who through foresight, geography, or luck gained their own independent states. Some have even argued that a more peaceful world may not be possible without the completion of the international system of states through continued secession based on national aspirations.

Low Incidence of Secession

Given these arguments, one might reasonably question why there have not been a larger number of successful secessions. According to one account, the world possesses approximately 8,000 different languages and cultures but fewer than 200 independent states. The forces arrayed against secession—both domestic and international—go far beyond simply the philosophical difficulties surrounding the "right of secession."

Secession, by its very nature, presents the international territorial system with instability and chaos. The potential conclusion for the logic of secession would be the infinite division of existing political entities. More often than not, given their legitimate monopoly of force within a territory,

most states have effectively opposed secession attempts. And even if the secessionist community were to win on the battlefield, it stands to lose the diplomatic contest. The principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity function as fundamental norms of post-1945 international relations, thereby effectively limiting secession as a means of altering existing borders. Article 2(4) of the *United Nations Charter* states,

The Organization and its Members . . . shall act in accordance with the following Principles: . . .
(4) all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

As a consequence, the international community has consistently withheld diplomatic recognition from secessionist entities.

The comparative study of secessions and separatist movements from Western liberal democracies, former communist states, and developing countries reveals that a nation's decision to secede can be thought of as a function of its appraisal of its circumstances. Whether or not to attempt secession depends on the costs and benefits associated with the nation's political alternatives: continued membership within the existing state or secession. This appraisal is dynamic and continuous and can be affected both by policies of the central government and by developments in the international system. Indeed, although the road to independence is frequently a long one, the actual decision to secede only arises when government action or international developments change the community's view of the balance among these costs and benefits. A nation's decision to seek independence can change with circumstances; in some instances, sensitive government policy can convince a secessionist community to accept greater autonomy within the existing state, while in other cases, evolution in the prevailing international climate can outweigh domestic factors in the dynamic of secession.

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See also Nationalism; Self-Determination

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SECRET SERVICES

From an academic point of view, there is no canonical definition of secret services. The word *secret* qualifies the most apparent characteristic, even if hidden, of these services' *modus operandi*. Obviously, unlike other administrations, the secret services are discreet and their activities are hidden, but the term *secret* gives no indication of their exact role. The secret services' function is first to gather information. The two main areas in which they specialize are intelligence and counterespionage. They are also responsible for a third mission, referred to as "covert actions." In most countries, these three activities are implemented by several intelligence agencies. However, this kind of definition only insists on a functional dimension.

Nature and Function of Secret Services

In 1966, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency analyst and academic historian Sherman Kent wrote a short, seminal book in which he defined the three dimensions of intelligence services: (1) these services are *organizations*, (2) they undertake *activities*, and (3) they produce *knowledge*. This approach is very helpful for scholars insofar as it shows that intelligence agencies are not merely the tools of executive authorities. The very nature of secret services means that they try to escape from all kinds of external scrutiny and especially from academic analysis. As a result, current literature concerning the secret services is influenced, on the one hand, by journalistic bias (the need for scoops and permanent suspicion

toward what is hidden) and, on the other, by conspiracy theories. Today, this lack of academic literature is problematic especially since the assessment of “global” threats and the so-called war against terror have increased the role played by intelligence organizations. During the Cold War, most countries, apart from the former USSR and the United States, had only limited means. In recent years, most intelligence services have seen their size, budget, and means increase considerably. They are no longer an insignificant part of the state, a weak side of public policies. That is one of the reasons why governments in liberal democracies have tried to improve accountability and oversight.

Most intelligence agencies now publish some of their reports and documents and edit their own official histories (usually written by academics), and the parliamentary committees in charge of overseeing their activities edit the annual reports on the agencies. It is surprising, then, to note the paucity of academic literature considering the ever-increasing available material (the current published official documents and declassified archives). For a long time, intelligence has been described as the “missing dimension” in the study of international relations, but the same could also be said of domestic policy studies. Despite the criticism of intelligence activities by its detractors, the first academic works were published in the 1970s by “practitioner-scholars” like Sherman Kent. Academic scholars began to work on the topic in the 1980s. Today, intelligence studies is an authentic scientific research field with its own research centers, departments in college and universities, and journals and series. Different stakeholders meet regularly at conferences and contribute to journals. The majority of academic literature comes from English-speaking political scientists specializing in international relations and from historians. This would indicate that intelligence is not yet entirely recognized as a bona fide subject by all social sciences: The same can be said of sociologists and scholars working on politics while not taking intelligence into account. The situation is worse in continental Europe, where the first works only appeared at the very beginning of the 21st century.

Despite this doubtful state of affairs, it is possible to pinpoint some truths in the field. The specialization of a part of the state in the gathering of

information illustrates the existence of a specific function in the contemporary state. Secrets function like a veil: They hide the fact that intelligence services are organizations—that is, one part of the bureaucracies in our liberal democracies. Indeed, these secret bureaus have to cope with special rules—essentially concerning information and law—yet they are nevertheless a growing part of states. The activities of the secret services, whose aim is to provide governments with intelligence, sometimes of a strategic nature, make them powerful. Despite the progress of civil liberties and transparency, this core of the state remains hidden for the most part. In this secret area, the state finds more autonomy and, theoretically, more power. Intelligence agencies are an important part of what could be called the *secret state*. In fact, the study of secret services leads us away from the view that the state has become more transparent and has less influence on citizens in the long term. Nowadays, the existence of secret states in liberal democracies could restimulate studies on the current nature of states.

The Political Dimension

One can also consider the existence of intelligence agencies in the state from a political perspective. Despite the theory of the law-abiding state, whereby the entire state has to comply with the law and implement neutral policies, the existence of the secret services linked to the political authority would indicate that some part of the administration is not a neutral tool for high-ranking officials but, conversely, that its nature is profoundly political. Politics in intelligence operates at three different levels.

1. The secret services are located within the state but are very close to political authorities. The sensitive dimension of intelligence often transforms the agencies into advisors or think tanks. This means that the agencies can be used to elaborate political agendas or they can themselves influence them.

2. Then, intelligence is, of course, a tool for political authority when it implements policies at home and abroad. Many public policies are not neutral. Here, scholars face a problem. The fact that the most important parts of these policies are

not publicized diminishes the capacity to assess them, and at the same time, it automatically suggests that they are more efficient and powerful than they perhaps really are. It is impossible to go beyond this limit, except for scholars working on archives or historical material.

3. Politics in intelligence is not only linked to the position of the agencies within the state; being civil servants or contractors, their members are sometimes in a situation where they can express their political opinion through their professional occupations. The politicization of agencies is a common case.

Finally, intelligence activity is one part of public policies and one part of politics. This implies that the very essence of the state remains close to politics. It means that the Weberian illusion of a neutral state preoccupied only with efficiency must be left aside when studying the secret state.

Recent Developments and Future Directions

Most agencies first appeared in the 20th century. At this time, their staff was composed of civil servants and military officers. The fact that the agencies served the state was indubitable. However, the nature of the intelligence services has considerably evolved in recent decades because of a significant transformation in the conception of their work and their management. Now, more and more agencies have recourse to contractors or to people coming from the private sector for short missions. Furthermore, retired officials from agencies often work for private intelligence firms that become contractors for the agencies. The classical borders between private sector and public administration are vanishing slowly. This has an effect on the way we define the secret state, which remains secret in its process but has become less public. Finally, the transparency/secretism tandem seems to be more prevalent than the private/public one.

If a sociological study of the state could help demarcate the nature of the secret state and outline its real borders, empirical works would be necessary to delineate the limits of the notion of intelligence community that is often used by scholars and also by officials. The fact that people working in or for the agencies are subjected to clearance processes and use sensitive information isolates

them from other professionals. This does not mean that intelligence careers avoid the traditional features of other professions. The notion of an intelligence community produces a false feeling of cohesiveness that is reinforced by the secret dimension of its activity. A sociological study of the different stakeholders and professions inside the agencies could enable us to study them from a more impartial point of view in order to understand the relationship between the different agencies and within each agency in each country.

If this could be helpful to understand what intelligence is today, its study is also useful to approach the features of secrecy in contemporary democracies. Indeed, the secrecy of agencies is not only something that is not submitted to publicity; throughout the 20th century, the state enacted special regulations to protect what it judged to be most sensitive. These regulations became the borders of the emerging contemporary secret state, and the first written judicial rules were in fact the first rules to hamper the agencies in their being a part of the secret state. The creation of official secrecy through regulations and classification processes was a major step in the secret state-building process, but it also refers to its features in the shadows of liberal democracy. This shows that democracy accepts and adjusts to a special area where transparency and liberalism are ineffective. The fact that a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was passed in the United States and in the United Kingdom (UK) is a landmark in this evolution. Today, the FOIA is a lawful weapon against public secrecy, even if not all-powerful.

Finally, it is important to understand that the comprehension of intelligence needs both comparison and a historical approach. There is no single model of a secret state or of an intelligence agency. The building of the agencies is the result of a long process that began in the 19th century. Wars and international crises have played a major role in this evolution. However, despite these common features and the current expansion of agencies after the end of the Cold War, the essence of intelligence agencies is very different depending on the country. If we can talk of a U.S.–U.K. model in so far as most agencies aspire to have the same position in the state as in these countries, the reality is very different. The means accorded to the agencies, the role of the law, the kind of states into which the agencies

fit, and their influence on public policies are not the same. This emphasizes once again the need for more social science studies to understand what intelligence really is.

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See also Administration; Agencies; Diplomacy; Police; Politicization of Bureaucracy; Politicization of Civil Service; Security and Defense Policy; State

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SECULARISM

The term *secularism* has different senses. It is used to refer to secular humanism and atheism; the social process of secularization; and political, state-driven projects. This entry is concerned solely with the third sense, which is most frequently used in political science.

What Is Political Secularism?

Broadly speaking, secularism, anywhere in the world, means the advocacy of a separation of organized religion from organized political power (the state) that is inspired by a specific set of values. In

this general sense, secularism is a normative doctrine that pretends to be universal, although it is applied in different cultures that are more or less compatible with it. Secularism can be understood in its strict meaning of separateness between political power and religion or, more broadly, as bearing several values such as toleration, equal religious liberty, and freedom of religion. Sometimes these two definitions may be in contradiction, as illustrated in France over the issue of Muslim women wearing the veil. However, its constitutive elements can be differently interpreted, giving rise to multiple forms of secularism.

Secular states are disconnected from religion at three distinct levels: (1) ends, (2) institutions and personnel, and (3) law and public policy. This distinguishes them from theocracies and states that establish single or multiple religions. In a theocracy, a deep connection between state and religion exists at all three levels. A priestly order directly administers the state by reference to what it believes are ends inscribed in divine laws (e.g., the Islamic Republic of Iran as Ayatollah Khomeini aspired to run it). In states with established religions, in which one religion is accepted as the official one, a priestly order does not govern directly, and a large measure of institutional and personnel differentiation exists. This disconnection, at Level 2, also referred to in some contexts as church–state separation, goes hand in hand with an overall ideological connection. Religion and state share common ends. The state is subordinate to religious ends even though it has its own function, power structure, and internal norms. Thus, in states with an established religion, because of this primary connection at Level 1, there is an automatic connection at Level 3. For example, the revenue collected by the state is available for religious purposes.

A secular state is nontheocratic and has no established religion. Disconnection from religion at this level distinguishes secular states from both theocracies and states with established religion. A secular state has its own secular ends. The second-order disconnection, church–state separation, demarcates it only from a theocracy.

Given that ethical reasoning is best when it is contextual and comparative, what are the positive and negative aspects of secular and nonsecular states? Historically, nonsecular states have

recognized a particular version of the religion enunciated by the dominant church as the official religion, compelled individuals to participate in only one church, punished them for failing to profess a particular set of religious beliefs, and levied taxes in support of one particular church. Nonsecular states embody a regime of inequality between religions (e.g., between Christians and Jews) and also among the churches of the same religion. Societies with such states were either wracked by inter-/intrareligious wars or have persecuted minority religious groups. States with substantive establishments have not changed with time: such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Israel. Opponents of theocratic states and of those with an established religion argue that such states perpetuate inter- and intrareligious domination and are incompatible with the values of freedom and equality.

Secular States and Religion-Centered States

Are all secular states better than religion-centered states? This does not follow. As mentioned above, a secular state must have secular ends. However, these ends themselves may be of two kinds. The first are amoral. Amoral secular states are so called when their entire purpose is to maximize power, wealth, or both. But just as without separation there is no true secularism, a value-less separation does not add up to secularism. A state may separate itself from the ethics and morality of religions for wealth and power, as we can observe in plutocracies (government based on wealth) or in totalitarian regimes that are based on material ideologies. Such a state is secular but does not instantiate the normative perspective of secularism and in fact is incompatible with it.

Value-based secular states are distinct from amoral states. Several values are constitutive of secularism: prevention of cruelty, toleration, equal religious liberty, the freedom to exit from religion and to profess no religion, and equality of both passive and active citizenship rights (equal distribution of benefits such as protection of life, availability of health care, emergency services, welfare benefits, and education and nondiscrimination in the distribution of the right to vote, to stand for public office, and to deliberate on the public good). Furthermore, some of these values can be

interpreted both individualistically and nonindividualistically (the right to worship or education can be given to both individuals and communities—that is, to maintain their religious practices or to set up their own schools).

These values-based secular states differ from one another in the selection and combination of values and the weight assigned to each, but most important in how they unpack the metaphor of separation at a third level, concerning laws and public policy. One type of secular state conceives of disconnection at the third level in a wholly one-sided manner. To disconnect is then to exclude religion from its affairs but without setting any limits on its own interventionist powers in the affairs of religion. Such states (e.g., the former communist states, Kemalist Turkey, and to some extent France) exclude religion to regulate, control, or sometimes destroy it in the name of a single value such as equality. This may help states deal with aspects of intrareligious domination (e.g., anticlericalism in France) but not to address interreligious domination—that is, when members of one religious community discriminate against, marginalize, or even oppress members of another religious community.

The explanation of this contradiction is to be found in history: Issues of radical individual freedom and citizenship equality arose in European societies *after* religious homogenization. The birth of confessional states was accompanied by the massive expulsion of subject-communities whose faith differed from the religion of the ruler. Such states found a place for some toleration in their moral landscape, but this was consistent with the deep inequalities and the virtually invisible, marginalized existence of members of religious minorities. The liberal democratization and the consequent secularization of many European states have helped citizens with non-Christian faiths acquire most formal rights. But critics of secularization and advocates of pluralism and consociative order may argue that such a scheme of rights neither embodies a regime of interreligious equality nor effectively prevents religion-based discrimination and exclusion. Indeed, it masks majoritarian, ethno-religious biases. This is evident in the different kinds of difficulties faced by Muslims. For example, in Britain, a third of all primary school children are educated by religious communities. Yet applications for state

funding by Muslims have been frequently turned down. This is also manifest in demands by the Muslims that they be allowed to build mosques (as in Germany, Italy, and Switzerland) or have proper Muslim burial grounds of their own (as in Denmark). Another ongoing area of controversy, especially in Western European states such as France, concerns policies that restrict the wearing of the hijab (headscarf), niqab (face veil), or burka.

A second type of values-based secular state conceives of this third-level disconnection as mutual exclusion. Such a state maintains a policy of strict or absolute separation in which religion is excluded from the affairs of the state but the state too is excluded from the affairs of religion. The state has neither a positive relationship with religion—for example, there is no policy of granting aid to religious institutions—nor a negative relationship with it; it is not within the scope of state activity to interfere in religious matters, even when the values professed by the state are violated. This noninterference is justified on the ground that religion is a private matter, and if something is amiss within the private domain, it can be mended only by those who have a right to do so within that sphere. This, according to proponents of this view, is what religious freedom means. When a state is disconnected from religion at all three levels in this particular way, then we may say that a wall of separation has been erected between the two. American political secularism could exemplify some aspects of this model.

It is now increasingly clear that both forms of Western secularism have persistent difficulties coping with community-oriented religions such as Roman Catholicism, Islam, and Sikhism, which demand a greater public presence and even official recognition for themselves—particularly when they live in the same society. Moreover, they were not designed for societies with deep religious diversity. Both of these versions developed in the context of a single-religion society and to solve the problems of one religion, namely, Christianity. Both understand separation as exclusion and make individualistically conceived values—individual liberty or equality between individuals or both—as the ground for separation.

India provides another model of secularism, with multiple religions being a part of its foundation. Indian secularism is inextricably tied to deep religious diversity. It has a commitment to multiple

values—liberty and/or equality—not conceived of narrowly as pertaining to individuals but interpreted broadly to cover the relative autonomy of religious communities. While there are boundaries between the state and religion, these boundaries are porous. Thus, the state may intervene to inhibit some practices, just as it respects and lends support to other practices, of a religious community. India's commitment to multiple values and principled distance means that the state tries to balance different, ambiguous, but equally important, values. Thus, its secular ideal resembles a contextual, ethically sensitive, politically negotiated arrangement that evolved to deal with tensions generated continuously by deep religious diversity.

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See also Equality; Religion; State

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SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

The term *security policy* denotes the aims and means that are needed to protect a state from both external and internal threats. *Defense policy* has a

narrower extension, usually confined to the aims and means against external military threats.

Security and defense policies have always been at the center of international politics, but their nature has changed due to the advent of nuclear weapons and their proliferation, economic interdependence, the end of the Cold War, environmental problems, technological advancements and vulnerabilities, as well as other material and cultural developments typically linked to globalization. These phenomena have also brought about conceptual changes and competing terminological usages.

Traditional and Contemporary Views

It is widely assumed that every state must have a security and defense policy if it wants to survive in the anarchical international system. Security is seen as the key national interest of states, and that is why defense is needed. Security and defense policy is thus seen as belonging to high politics, which implies that it occupies a superior hierarchical position among state activities and ranks higher in importance than other fields of foreign policy.

These traditional views of security and defense policy are, however, in many ways challenged in today's world politics. Both terms, *security* and *defense*, have been widened and are broadly applied in various ways. Also, the assumption that security and defense must be given priority (a normative claim) or are given priority (an empirical claim) among various policy issues is seen as questionable. Alternative views of security have been put forward by critical security theorists, environmentalists, and proponents of "human security."

Security is a difficult concept, because it can refer both to the objective absence of threats and to a subjective feeling of security. It is also debatable whether security means an absolute absence of threats or whether security refers to a state of affairs where the likelihood or "risk" of major threats is low.

The traditional view links defense and security to military affairs. It starts from the assumption that there is a security dilemma in world politics because of the anarchical nature of the international system. Because there is no central authority, states need to be prepared for defending themselves. International security has been associated with balance of power and stability.

Against this background of traditional security thinking, it can be suggested that "defense" and "security" are actually euphemisms for war and military. States used to have ministries for war; after World War II, they were renamed ministries for defense. Military officers are "security professionals," and "private security companies" conduct war operations. "Security studies" is often another name for strategic or war studies. If security and defense policy are understood in this way, the term denotes all military activities regardless of whether they have to do with security as a goal and whether they are defensive or offensive. This definition, however, reflects quite a common usage that emerged after World War II.

Security policy is often seen as a combination of foreign and defense policy. The administrative utility of adopting the concept of security was in tightening the link between defense and foreign offices, for example, in the United States through the establishment of a National Security Council. In some countries, the concept of security policy implies that foreign policy goes (or should go) ahead of defense policy. According to this view, defense policy is a subset of security policy, whereas parts of foreign policy, such as development cooperation, can, but do not necessarily, fall outside the realm of security policy.

There is no agreed definition of security policy partly because there is no agreement on the notion of security. The narrow notion of security emphasizes military threats, but a broader notion of security, *comprehensive security*, includes all kinds of "new" threats, such as financial instability, climate change, environmental risks, natural catastrophes, energy shortage, organized crime, piracy, drugs, technological hazards, international migration, and epidemic diseases. Moreover, a security policy can also address internal threats, such as political opposition, social unrest, famine, aging, or street violence. These days, one of the meanings most often used for "security policy" deals with the security of information systems.

The problem with the wider understanding of security is that the concept lacks focus. For example, one important border to uphold is the difference between intentional and unintentional threats. Moreover, although a wider concept of security has become widely accepted also by many state authorities, this has not necessarily led to notable

changes in practices. The role of the military in understanding security and defense has not disappeared; it has just been framed within a larger view of security.

In particular, after the terrorist attacks of 2001 in the United States, the internal aspects of security policy have become more salient. Administratively, therefore, ministries of interior and other agencies such as ministries of justice have become much more active agents of security policy than before. At the same time, technical methods of producing security through control and surveillance have dominated the discussion about how to manage various security problems.

The concept of defense policy can also be related to actions other than military. Like "security," "defense," too, has a larger broader definition that includes all measures that are taken to defend a country or an organization against all sorts of threats. It can thus denote the economic, civil, and psychological aspects of defense in addition to the military aspect and covers activities during both war and peace. Such a concept of "total defense" has been adopted in particular in small countries such as Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Singapore. Peace movements have also proposed other alternative understandings of defense, laying emphasis on civilian resistance and nonviolent means.

Among the alternative paradigms to the traditional notion of security, proponents of human security suggest that human needs should be at the center of security concerns and that this would put emphasis on development as well as on health issues and the economic, social, and political rights of individuals. Advocates of critical security studies are generally dissatisfied with the traditional, realist view of security. They also want to broaden the understanding of security and emphasize the potential of overcoming security problems through emancipation. Postmodern approaches to security regard security discourses as essential in creating state identities in the first place.

The theory of securitization developed by the so-called Copenhagen school of security also subscribes to a broader view of security consisting of various sectors, such as military, political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors. It also stresses that labeling something as a security threat is a speech act, which means that there are no

security threats before they are made into such in the political discourse. Because securitization means lifting security issues above normal politics, often justifying emergency measures and exceptions, it could hamper open political debate and have negative effects on the policy-making process.

Characteristics and Implementation of Security and Defense Policies

States are usually seen as principal actors that adopt and implement security and defense policies, partly because they are seen as legitimate holders of means of violence. However, in particular, if the military aspect of security and defense is downplayed also, international organizations, regional actors, international companies, and other human groupings can have a security or defense policy.

The object of security or defense can also vary. It can be the state, its government, critical infrastructure or territory, society, population or individuals, or principally anything that is seen as worth securing and defending. It is also possible to talk about global, common, or international security and to defend the existing world order or the ecosystem.

Many countries and institutions have their own specific definitions for the terms *security* and *defense*. After the terrorist attacks of 2001, the United States adopted the concept of "homeland security" to deal with military, terrorist, and other threats inside the territory of the country. For example, when launching the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the European Union adopted its own conceptual scheme, according to which security and defense policy deals with crisis management and not with common defense.

Security and defense policies have traditionally been surrounded by a realm of secrecy, information gathering through intelligence, and a lack of democratic control by parliaments. Many states, however, lay out their doctrine on security and defense in the form of a "white book" or a public statement on security or defense. Such governmental documents create transparency, promote public discussion and legitimacy, and enable long-term strategic planning.

A nation's defense can take various forms even when restricted to the traditional military meaning

of the term. One basic choice, for example, deals with offensive and defensive defense strategies. Another choice is whether to acquire nuclear or other nonconventional weapons. A state relying on conventional forces has to find the right balance between air, naval, and land forces. States can also choose whether to emphasize territorial defense or intervention forces. Furthermore, states can choose between conscription and a professional army or a mixed system and can decide whether to use private security companies. Finally, defense policy also covers various other political and social issues such as civil–military relations and democratic control of the military, defense economics, and gender and sexual equality within the military.

States also face security policy choices and can develop different security strategies. Besides choosing between a narrow and broader concept of security for the basis of their security policy, states can choose whether or not to securitize certain threats. Furthermore, states can try to seek security within an alliance, in a multilateral framework of collective security, or alone, for example, on the basis of a policy of neutrality. The classic security strategies in world politics are balancing, bandwagoning, and buck-passing. Balancing means gathering strength against the opponent either by domestic mobilization or with external alliances; bandwagoning leads one to accommodate and join the opponent; and buck-passing refers to shifting the responsibility for resisting the opponent to other actors.

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See also Arms Race; Collective Security; Democratic Peace; Strategic (Security) Studies; Terrorism, International; War and Peace

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SECURITY APPARATUS

The concept of security apparatus builds on distinct yet functional elements with dynamic and structural value. This entry examines security as the state of being—or at least feeling—secure and considers, in particular, the meaning of security defined as the safety of a state or an organization against criminal activities such as terrorism or espionage and other potential dangers. The security apparatus is considered as a complex structure, usually a segment of a larger organization, as well as the equipment required for a particular purpose. The structures responsible for providing security to a society and its population reflect the contemporary values held by a country or any other human organization. As such, the security apparatus also provides the state of affairs of the underlying cultural, social, and political elements and, in addition to its primary function, allows a “health check” of a society that can help assess its status and predict its future. This entry first considers various ways in which security and security threats have been defined and then describes various types of threats to security at the national, regional, and global levels. A centralized national approach to security (e.g., the U.S. Office of Homeland Security) is contrasted with the decentralized European approach, in which responsibility is distributed among various agencies. Descriptions of the security apparatus in Italy and France illustrate two ways in which nations may implement security policy. Last, the role of international security organizations is considered.

Evolving Definitions of Security

The geopolitical, social, and economic developments that have occurred since the last decade of

the 20th century have made the distinction between internal and external security increasingly blurred, thereby influencing both the concept and the structure of security apparatuses throughout the world. The rise in independent states and in worldwide travel and exchange, for example, and a more open communication society have greatly influenced the strategic thinking underpinning national and international security affairs.

Whether geared toward facing risks, threats, or actual dangers, the security apparatus will require several basic elements to meet its challenges, as it would normally be triggered by an asymmetric scenario where the attacker would have at its disposal a range of targets to strike through different tactics. Hence, a security strategy will represent the basic framework of any security apparatus, one encompassing all the elements that may need protection as well as the tools and measures available to provide such protection. The key to any strategy is accurate information and skilled users who are able to receive it and take appropriate action. Therefore, information gathering and processing also need to be assessed in view of their value and meaning for a security apparatus.

A list of what must be protected and the corresponding security measures may be only tentative due to the dynamic character of the security environment; nonetheless, the broad categories of internal and external security may generally be broken down into elements such as resources, infrastructures, and civil protection; natural and man-made disasters; policing, intelligence, military, and diplomatic sectors; nongovernmental and intergovernmental cooperation; and low-intensity conflict and state of war. An open-ended list may be further developed through an examination of issues of concern to national security, including "megaprotection" in conventional, strategic, and nuclear deterrence; serious and organized crime, including illicit arms and drugs trafficking, and terrorism; commercial, industrial, financial, and economic competitiveness; environmental decay; and cultural and ethical values.

The range of security concerns that may come to the forefront of public concern is matched by the depth of the apparatus called on to ensure the security, safety, and well-being of individual societies. The traditional divide between external and

internal security has normally reflected the distinction between conventional and emerging threats, which largely fell within the mandate of the military and the civil infrastructures, respectively. The evolution toward a multipolar and multidimensional environment contributes to giving a new shape to the security concept and relevant apparatus, particularly as it concerns domestic security.

Threats to Security

The structure of the security apparatus is influenced by the threats affecting security, whether at the domestic, regional, or global level. Since World War II, the Western Hemisphere, particularly the Western European countries, has known an unprecedented period of peace and stability mostly due to their cooperation through common institutions such as the Council of Europe, the European Communities, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Still, Europe, just like other major international actors, including the United States, Russia, China, India, or Japan, faces security threats and challenges that originate both within and beyond the regional borders. As a matter of fact, the 2003 European Security Strategy was premised on the consideration that, while large-scale aggression against any member of the European Union was unlikely, Europe faced new threats of a more diverse, less visible, and less predictable fashion.

Terrorism and its complex social, cultural, religious, and developmental causes constituted the first security threat on the European agenda, because of the then still fresh memory of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States; the bombings in Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004; and the bombings in London, United Kingdom, on July 7, 2005. European countries have been and continue to be both a target and a base for terrorism, whether politically motivated or linked to religious extremism. This continuing threat raises questions about the integration of foreign communities; it also draws attention to the stark contrast between modernization and secularism, on the one hand, and strict observance and religious zeal, on the other.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was assessed as potentially the greatest threat to European security given the risks implied in an arms race in bordering regions, especially in the

Middle East, and the increased potency of weapons facilitated by advances in the biological sciences, which could be supported by the spread of missile technology. The deadly scenario of a terrorist group armed with weapons of mass destruction and able to inflict damages previously available only to state actors demonstrates the equation produced by the combination of convention and emerging threats, which requires a uniform reaction.

Regional conflicts were also listed as top security concerns for they threaten stability, destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures, and challenge fundamental freedoms and human rights. Furthermore, regional conflicts may lead to extremism, which facilitates and provides opportunities for two other strategic security issues: state failure and organized crime.

The collapse of the state not only entails domestic threats such as bad governance, corruption, weak institutions, and a lack of accountability but also has international resonance. Failed states also risk providing a home for terrorist and organized criminal groups, thereby undermining regional stability and global governance.

Finally, organized crime represents an internal security threat with an important external dimension through its activities, particularly cross-border illicit trafficking and its possible links with terrorist activities.

Most recently, the international economic and financial crisis affecting all national systems has added to the list of security threats in view of its implication for, among other things, the growth of extremist and antisystem movements that can destabilize weak societies and the increased geopolitical tensions between countries that are struggling to defend critical national assets such as the banking or the industrial sector. The economic crisis may affect peace and stability in countries and entire regions that have emerged from or are still struggling with conflict and tension, thereby affecting their own security as well as the security of their neighbors with increasing risks for the national financial systems, including the security of sovereign financial viability. Security risks may become opportunities for political movements or criminal organizations seeking to exploit weak or unstable governments through social unrest, predatory financial practices, or common criminal activities.

The security apparatus builds on prevention and law enforcement and intelligence efforts to ensure domestic security, combating terrorism and protecting the public, infrastructure, and historical and cultural sites. Recent terrorist attacks have led to suggestions for strengthening legislation and other measures dealing with border control, illegal immigration, and related criminal activities such as trafficking in human beings, transport security, and terrorism financing; however, countries with a multiagency approach normally assign complementary tasks to the different agencies. The Italian and the German security apparatuses are examined as they typify the European system for security protection, while each represents a specific subsystem, namely, the central approach and the federal approach, respectively.

Organization of the Security Apparatus: Contrasting Approaches

Two clear approaches emerge among those countries that have been confronted with serious natural and man-made disasters over the past decade. On the one hand, the United States, following deadly terrorist attacks on its soil, attacks against its interests abroad, and natural disasters, underwent a thorough reorganization of its national security and security apparatus, which led to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. At the other end of the spectrum, countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom have elected to preserve the existing organization of their security apparatuses where responsibilities are allocated through different public agencies and levels. The different philosophies behind the choice between a unified, central department and a system of central and local agencies reflect historical, cultural, and political considerations, chiefly the debate over the protection of civil liberties and the need to ensure protection against deadly dangers, which involves a proper balance between increased security and the adequate safeguarding of personal freedoms.

While the U.S. Department of Homeland Security builds on a concept of security that includes border protection, transport security, emergency preparedness, and the protection of critical infrastructures, European countries have mainly invested in law enforcement efforts and

have sought to integrate counterterrorism and preparedness programs into emergency management efforts with a view to greater flexibility in responding to security challenges with often limited personnel and resources. Regardless of the security apparatus elected to ensure the safety and well-being of the nation, a consistent pattern has recently emerged whereby increased investments are made in intelligence and law enforcement initiatives, and often a combination thereof, to fight against organized crime and terrorism.

At a time when the traditional distinction between foreign and domestic threats is blurring, the ability to plan and carry out devastating attacks—particularly through cyber warfare or chemical, bacteriological, radiological, and nuclear agents—enables relatively small groups of terrorists or criminals to challenge state actors and their defenses. Even those countries with experience in terrorist attacks and counterterrorism policies need to improve their security apparatus in a way that allows for ready information exchange among disparate government agencies that, by their very nature, professional culture, or legal requirements, have been used to create organizational barriers, with the consequent segregation of duties and knowledge.

The vexing question concerning the exchange of information among law enforcement and intelligence agencies brings with it, as related issues, the balance between strategic and tactical intelligence; data collection, its exploitation, and dissemination in view of the intrinsic need to maintain secrets, methods, and sources; a review of the classification methods that would allow sharing information with other agencies nationally and abroad; the exploitation of intelligence data in the framework of law enforcement operations intended to investigate crimes for prosecution and adjudication; and the need to improve security while respecting civil liberties.

Two European Models

Italy

In Italy, the government (Council of Ministers), comprising the head of the government and the ministers, is the collective decision-making body, and it coordinates the efforts made by governmental ministries and agencies to protect domestic security.

The Ministry of Interior is the lead government ministry on public order and security, immigration and border controls, and civil protection. The Public Security Department manages the national police force and is responsible for implementing the public order and security policy; the Civil Liberty and Immigration Department sets immigration and asylum policies; and the Fire Brigade, Public Aid, and Civil Defense Department leads efforts in emergency preparedness and response policies.

The activities carried out by the Ministry of Interior are normally supported by several other government ministries with responsibility over particular aspects of national security, including the Defense Ministry, the Health Ministry, and the Infrastructure and Transport Ministry. Customs and financial policies are under the responsibility of the Economy and Finance Ministry.

To coordinate the various efforts, interministerial bodies are usually set up to bring together department ministers and officials. The Public Order and Security Committee examines issues related to the protection of public order and security and to the organization of the police forces. The committee is chaired by the interior minister and comprises the chief of police/director general of public security and the undersecretary entrusted by the prime minister with special responsibility for the intelligence services. The heads of the other police forces also take part in the committee, and additional ministers may be involved depending on the issue at hand. The Interministerial Committee for Intelligence and Security, which provides advice and makes proposals on the general direction and fundamental objectives for intelligence and security policy, is chaired by the prime minister and comprises the ministers for the Interior, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Economy and Finance departments, while the heads of the intelligence services and other government officials may also be invited to participate. Finally, the security apparatus includes the Politico-Military Unit and the Department of Civil Protection of the Prime Minister's Office, which have, each in its own respect, responsibilities for drawing up and implementing emergency plans to deal with any chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents; transport safety and bioterrorism; and civil and military preemptive measures against major incidents or attacks. The

Department of Civil Protection coordinates and works with a tight network of central, regional, provincial, and local administrations as well as other public agencies and voluntary organizations, thereby forming a “national service” operating on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity.

The Interior Ministry has responsibility over the State Police (*Polizia di Stato*) through the Public Security Department, which coordinates police tasks and activities at the central level and hosts the Anti-Terrorism Strategic Analysis Committee (*Comitato per l'analisi strategica del terrorismo*, CASA). At the provincial level, the top public security authorities are the prefect, who is appointed by and answerable to the central government, and the *questore*, the State Police's senior provincial officer with operational control and jurisdiction in the field of public order, security, and criminal and intelligence matters. The State Police includes different specialist units that may play a role in protecting various aspects of domestic security: The antiterrorism police have primary responsibility for investigations aimed at preventing and fighting terrorism, including information collection and analysis; the traffic police patrol roads and highways; the railway police ensure the security of travelers and their belongings, the security of railway stations, and the control of dangerous goods transported by rail; the immigration and border police are responsible for the entry and stay of foreign nationals and immigrants in Italy, as well as the prevention and control of illegal immigrants; and the postal and communications police seek to prevent and tackle the illegal use of communication technologies. Other specialist units may be deployed to perform high-risk interventions, for example, in the case of a hostage incident, or to provide rescue services in areas affected by natural disasters.

The Italian security apparatus also has a military corps (*Carabinieri*) that carries out police duties among the civilian population, not unlike units in other European countries, such as the French *Gendarmerie* or the Spanish *Guardia Civil*. The *Carabinieri*, which are empowered to gather intelligence, investigate terrorist and organized crime organizations, and respond to high-risk situations, are institutionally accountable to the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. A third police force with responsibilities over financial, tax, and customs issues is the *Guardia di Finanza*, directly

attached to the Minister of Economy and Finance, with a structure resembling the *Carabinieri*, although its specialized tasks make it a prime actor in the prevention, investigation, and disruption of money laundering, fraud, tax evasion, and illicit financing.

In addition to the law enforcement agencies, the Italian security apparatus also includes intelligence and security services with distinct responsibilities for the defense of the state's independence and integrity against any danger on the military front with counterespionage and counterintelligence duties (*Agenzia informazioni e sicurezza esterna*, AISE) and for the defense of the democratic state and its institutions against all forms of subversion (*Agenzia informazioni e sicurezza interna*, AISI). The AISE and AISI work under the authority of the prime minister, or an undersecretary with due delegation of authority, who exercises the relevant functions through the Department of Information for Security.

Germany

Germany, like Italy, has no department or ministry for “homeland security.” Its long-established organization for protecting security and responding to emergencies within the national borders is defined by the 1949 Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*, i.e., the Constitution), which involves ministries and agencies at the federal, state (16 *Länder*), and local levels. The German approach to dealing with incidents, whether natural disasters or terrorist acts, is bottom-up, beginning at the local level, involving state authorities if necessary, and relying on federal agencies if needed.

Since September 11, 2001, the German government has assessed terrorism as the most immediate threat to national security, although Germany's experience with terrorism dates back to the 1970s, when both domestic and international terrorism were a cause of serious concern. At the federal level, security functions are the responsibility of several ministries, including the Interior, Justice, Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Finance departments, as well as other departments and agencies. The German security apparatus relies on intelligence, law enforcement, and judicial prosecution to prevent terrorist acts and to identify and neutralize potential terrorists.

The most important intelligence authorities are the Federal Intelligence Service (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*, BND), which is responsible for gathering intelligence abroad under the Federal Chancellery; the Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*, BfV), which gathers domestic intelligence and is placed under the Ministry of the Interior; and the Military Counterintelligence Service (*Militärischer Abschirmdienst*, MAD), which is under the Ministry of Defense. The federal law enforcement agencies include the Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigations (*Bundeskriminalamt*, BKA); the Federal Police (*Bundespolizei* [BPOL], formerly *Bundesgrenzschutz*), which has responsibility over border protection and aviation security and carries out the screening of border traffic (BKA and BPOL are placed under the Ministry of the Interior); and the Federal Public Prosecutor General (*Generalbundesanwalt*, GBA).

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the BKA has been given authority to lead its own investigations without a formal request from the BfV, as had been previously required. Furthermore, since 2004, the federal and state ministers of the Interior have introduced measures to improve coordination, which include a central database regarding religious fundamentalists suspected of terrorism and a coordination center under the Ministry of Interior comprising BKA, BND, BfV, and MAD, as well as state and local agencies. These coordination initiatives prompted the debate over the need for greater centralization of security activities, which, however, faces opposition from the state and local authorities and finds obstacles in the constitutional laws and arrangements. The German structure for civil protection and emergency response is also a joint responsibility of both the *Länder* and the federal republic and their local jurisdictions and the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Response (*Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe*, BBK), which was established in 2004 under the Ministry of the Interior, is called to support state and local authorities in the event of significant disaster and damage situations.

Germany's history, geographical location, and its industrial and economic prominence have greatly affected the shape of its security apparatus. On the one hand, strong emphasis has been placed on the protection of the civil rights and liberties of

all those residing in Germany, including noncitizens; on the other hand, its position in the heart of Europe and its economic strength have made Germany attractive to millions of immigrants, thereby calling for the need to protect its borders and introduce robust security controls.

International Security Organizations

The external dimension of security issues has triggered the establishment and development of institutions forming an embryonic international security apparatus supporting domestic activities. Two organizations deserve a closer scrutiny as they facilitate cross-border police cooperation and support national services and authorities whose missions is to prevent and combat crime.

The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), established in 1923, is the world's largest international police organization and currently has 188 member countries. INTERPOL operates through its General Secretariat (Lyon, France) and a network of National Central Bureaus located in each member country. Its core functions cover secure global police communication services through a system (I-24/7) that enables national police services to request, submit, and access police data instantly and the management of operational data services and databases with information on known criminals, wanted persons, fingerprints, DNA profiles, stolen or lost travel documents, stolen motor vehicles, child sex abuse images, and stolen works of art. Support to police services is provided in six priority crime areas: corruption, drugs and organized crime, financial and high-tech crime, fugitives, public safety and terrorism, and trafficking in human beings. While mostly devoted to operational police assistance and support, INTERPOL's mandate may also extend to civil protection activities such as disaster victim identification in case of a terrorist attack or a natural disaster; following the tsunami that hit Thailand and Sri Lanka in December 2004, INTERPOL took an active role in the international effort to identify the victims of the disaster.

A notable example of what may be considered a regional security apparatus is the European Police Office (EUROPOL), established by the member states of the European Union with the mandate to handle criminal intelligence and

improve cooperation in preventing and combating serious international organized crime and terrorism. EUROPOL supports the member states' competent authorities by facilitating the exchange of information with and among Europol liaison officers, seconded as the representatives of the national competent services to the headquarters (at The Hague, the Netherlands), and by providing expertise, technical support, and criminal intelligence analysis in support of operations. EUROPOL also produces strategic reports, notably the yearly Organized Crime Threat Assessment and the Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, as well as crime analysis on the basis of information and intelligence provided by the member states and third parties and assessed through different information, index, and analysis systems.

Conclusion

The structures responsible for providing security to a society and its population reflect the contemporary values held by a country or other human organizations. As such, the security apparatus also provides the state of affairs of the underlying cultural, social, and political elements and, in addition to its primary function, allows a "health check" of a society that can help assess its status and predict its future.

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See also Collective Security; Police; Secret Services;
Security and Defense Policy; Security Apparatus;
Security Cooperation; Strategic (Security) Studies;
Terrorism, International

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SECURITY COOPERATION

This entry deals with security cooperation in a classical sense: It focuses on state security and cooperation. This does not imply that other actors are not subjects of security or do not participate in related cooperation; it pays just tribute to the fact that states are still the main actors in both domestic and external security activities, including cooperation. It is worth noting that international and nongovernmental organizations, substate actors, companies, and others are involved in these activities as well.

International security cooperation is counterintuitive to the notion of "international anarchy." To entrust a part of the responsibility for state survival to other actors thus sounds far-fetched; neorealism has expressed this skepticism distinctly. Yet in everyday international life, security cooperation is found in ever more varied forms: It is an ubiquitous pattern in world and in regional politics.

Cooperative strategies in security policy accept the notion of *anarchy* but view it in a more relaxed way than neorealists do. These strategies see states as security seekers. Security interests have become interdependent owing to the penetrability of national borders and the impossibility of perfect defense, and national interests in general have become interdependent through globalization. Competing interests are mitigated by common interests. States can signal effectively benign intentions. "Predators" and sincere partners can be distinguished. Common security institutions supply reliable information about present and future capabilities and intentions, and common norms channel the goals, interests, and actions of states in a mutually agreeable direction.

This entry provides a typology of security cooperation in today's world. It distinguishes between *exclusive* security cooperation, where entry rights are limited and controlled and which

coordinates policies toward the nonmembership, and *inclusive* security cooperation, which is open and which regulates the policies of the members toward each other. Exclusive institutions contain a strong element of realism, though they are by no means exclusively rooted in realist theory. Inclusive institutions have stronger relations to liberal-institutionalist, constructivist, and normative-idealist theories. The following sections describe the basic structure, advantages and disadvantages, and theoretical underpinnings of each type.

Exclusive Security Cooperation

Coalitions of the Willing

Today's "coalition of the willing"—a short-term association of states that ally for a single strategic purpose at a certain point in time and space—was the standard type of alliance in the classical Westphalian world. In this type of coalition, the alliance does not define the mission, but the mission defines the alliance. Coalition partners are selected for their particular capabilities to achieve the specific purpose, not by more intrinsic attributes and considerations.

Coalitions of the willing contain no legal obligations, develop no institutional structure, have no common staff, entertain no common ideology or culture, elaborate no grand strategy, and refrain from integrating military forces. Their members have only a short-term time horizon. Since the strongest member or a few core members select the partners, they are exclusive.

Because of its short time horizon, the coalition of the willing cannot mitigate the security dilemma: No long shadow of the future reduces the remaining distrust among its members; no expectations are created over how relations might evolve after the short-term objective has been achieved. As an example, the "coalition against terror" includes even long-term enemies (e.g., India and Pakistan). However, with regard to nonmembers, high uncertainties emerge over whether such coalitions might turn against other states in the future. Being exclusive and unilateralist, coalitions of the willing might stimulate "coalitions of the unwilling," or even "counter-coalitions of the threatened."

For the leading great powers, several advantages emerge. In the absence of institutional structures,

customary, political, or legal rules exist; symmetries translate directly into influence; and the command of the strongest is unchallenged. Burdensome consultation procedures are absent (e.g., Kosovo 1999 vs. Afghanistan or Iraq 2003). Because the coalitions are shaped for a single purpose, unity of political will is granted—no opposition force within the coalition must be expected. Also, transaction costs are very low, no future obligations ensue, and freedom of action remains unconstrained. For smaller states, coalitions of the willing are a cheap way of bandwagoning, enhancing their security, and sharing the eventual spoils without the burden of enduring dependence.

On the downside, smaller coalition members have little influence on the coalition's politics, which are dominated by their powerful partners. They bear the consequences of actions decided and conducted unilaterally by others. These, in turn, are helpless against any moves of the smaller allies to desert the coalition. Coalition performance is thus uncertain because of the lack of predictability within the coalition.

Hence, coalitions of the willing appear fit to achieve short-term, straightforward objectives. If circumstances are complex and problems enduring, these advantages fade in comparison with more stable and reliable structures.

Alliances

Today, the notion of "alliance" has been shaped by the model of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), even though its longevity and institutional complexity constitute a historical singularity.

Alliances are a corollary of international anarchy. Each ally's security is enhanced against potential enemies by the pooling of resources. To rely on the promises of somebody else goes beyond a common sense notion of "self-help." Within the realm of neorealist theory, the puzzle is all the larger as the problem of "relative gains" affects allies as well. Because of this problem, distrust is not uncommon in alliances, and a lot of symbolic politics is deployed to deal with this destructive factor.

Realists dispute which variable triggers an alliance. According to the classical view, states ally against the biggest power in their environment. Another perspective has gained increasing support in the past 2 decades: States ally against the biggest

perceived threat in their environment. This amendment modifies basic neorealist assumptions. "Threat" resides in the behavior of the threatening actor and is a unit-level attribute. Assessment of threat depends on subjective (or collective-cultural) factors. Finally, according to neoclassical realism, in a system without "predators," alliances will evaporate, as predators are the only threats that can emerge and without them, allying would be a waste of resources.

Alliances, once formed, face several dilemmas. Allies do not necessarily hold identical security interests. As a consequence, they must expect two opposite types of behavior from each other. First, one ally's security guarantee for the other ally may embolden that ally to engage in brinkmanship, provoking an armed conflict one does not want (entrapment risk). Otherwise that ally might switch sides and desert to the erstwhile enemy (risk of abandonment). By reassuring one's ally of one's own loyalty, one is reducing the danger of abandonment, but only to enhance the risk of entrapment as the ally will take one's loyalty for granted no matter what. If one keeps a distance from one's ally, the ally might be less emboldened to practice brinkmanship, but disappointment might drive that ally toward the enemy.

An alliance between a great power (as protector) and a couple of smaller powers (as protected) contains a specific dilemma. The protector worries about the risk of the guarantee it is giving to the small allies. Individually, they may not amount to much, but together, they may be geopolitically important. But is the value of each single one worth marching into a war with another great power? For the smaller allies, the reliability of the alliance guarantee can also be a reason to be nervous: Will the protector risk a war against the threat I am facing?

Vast distances exacerbate the alliance dilemma: Geopolitics is not the same for all allies; vital interests differ. Politically, the allies are at pains to agree on the threat and on the trigger that triggers the "alliance case." Physically, the allies struggle hard to devise a strategy, a posture, and logistics that make the alliance's promise credible. The enhanced risks of the nuclear age have exacerbated this dilemma.

Asymmetric alliances quarrel about burden sharing. The biggest member makes the decisive

contribution. Assets of the smallest allies add virtually nothing at the margin. Smaller allies have thus an incentive to contribute less than their "arithmetic" share—they are up for a free ride, while the larger member produces most of the public good alliance security.

Many alliances in history were weakly institutionalized. With the growing speed of, and the stakes involved in, modern warfare, alliances try to achieve greater effectiveness and to mitigate the defection problem by higher institutionalization. NATO has been the first fully institutionalized alliance with a headquarters, a bureaucracy, a general staff, a council, an agreed strategy, and a far-reaching military integration. Institutionalization enhances alliance efficiency, trust, and stability. "Sunk investment costs" motivate members to keep the alliance under changed circumstances: Enduring collaboration creates social bonds. As a consequence, NATO has survived the loss of its enemy.

Clubs

International club governance is on the rise. Clubs are less institutionalized than alliances but more so than coalitions of the willing. They are distinct in that they are not necessarily confined to rendering security services to their members alone but deliver "security products" to a broader community, including nonmembers.

"Clubs" in the security field are, for example, the export control regimes (e.g., Nuclear Suppliers Group [NSG]), the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the G8 [Group of Eight]). They do not rest on treaties and have an exclusive membership that is enhanced by consensual co-optation. They are meant to be permanent. All have a flat institutional structure: some agreed rules and norms, even in written form (e.g., the export guidelines of the NSG). And they all have established decision-making structures (usually consensus rule).

The form of "club" permits members to escape from the constraints of legally regulated cooperation. It allows for an opaque style of proceeding that might be helpful to achieve consensus on politically difficult issues (e.g., export control) while creating mutual confidence that the partners are sincere. This might be a condition to establish cooperation in controlling the export of weapons

of mass destruction (WMD) between potential political rivals. It might also facilitate substantial coordination in areas of high-security salience, such as G8 antiterrorism collaboration. And it allows for greater flexibility than formal treaties. The guidelines for clubs are easy to change and amend, namely, by simple agreement of the executives and without the often cumbersome ratification procedures. The downside is a lack of accountability.

Concerts

Concert is a mechanism to coordinate great power policies. The historical model, the Concert of Europe, was established at the end of the Napoleonic wars, and it kept the peace between the European great powers from the Vienna Congress (1815) up to the Crimean War (1853), contained the ensuing wars of Italian and German unification, and provided an arena for conflict management afterward until the breakdown in 1914. It was a tool to provide security for its members against each other, to prevent third parties from disturbing stability, to offer the public good of broad conflict management, and to mitigate the consequences of inevitable political change.

The classical concert relied on a combination of behavioral and procedural norms. Great powers guaranteed each other's existence and territorial integrity and recognized each other's vital interests. They committed not to change the status quo by force. They accepted restraint on their right to intervene unilaterally in other states' internal affairs. Crisis management was to be conducted jointly (with the option to opt out when vital interests were not at stake). A rough balance of forces was maintained. The overarching norm was to avoid a devastating major war in Europe. The concert maintained an elaborated system of conferences, meetings of ambassadors, and occasional encounters between monarchs. Consultations were intensified when an international crisis arose.

The strength of the concert was based on the common experience of large-scale, enduring war after the French Revolution and on a similar social basis of largely aristocratic or great bourgeois leaderships and diplomatic corps. These commonalities permitted collaboration despite value differences between the more liberal Britain and France,

on the one hand, and the much more conservative Russia, Prussia, and Austria, on the other. When the memory of the wars faded, extended suffrage in Britain and France brought new social forces to the seats of power, and nationalism led to higher political mobilization everywhere, it became harder to achieve a consensus. The concert suffered also from the shortcomings that a Russian attempt failed to place arms control on its agenda and that extra-European issues remained largely outside its concerns, but it influenced the balance of power and mutual perceptions of the members. Interests of small states or national movements were not generally ignored—the concert helped with the independence of Belgium, Greece, and Romania and managed the transfer of the province of Neuenburg from Prussian possession to Swiss sovereignty—but smaller states had a voice only if the concert granted it occasionally.

The concert realized security cooperation among major powers of different ideological orientation in a phase of great change, and it worked for an impressively long period of time. It combined realist (balance of power), normative, and institutional features; this might be a hint that successful real-world security cooperation has to rely on paradigmatic synthesis rather than purism.

Inclusive Security Cooperation

Collective Security

The concept of collective security has never been realized in pure form and with resounding success. It aims to establish a system of generalized deterrence and reassurance, which relaxes the need for self-help efforts. An operating system of collective security would reduce the security dilemma for everybody tremendously.

The basic principle of collective security is “all for one, one for all”: Members commit to assist an attacked partner. Collective security is an inclusive provisional alliance without a predefined enemy. The aggressor is supposed to be one of the partners who, by attacking, defines himself as the enemy of the rest. The basic feature is thus the marshaling of overwhelming defense in the moment of aggression (which assumes that no member has more power than the rest together).

The difficulties start with the question of who the aggressor is. Escalatory processes leading to

war can be interactive and incremental, making it difficult to identify an aggressor unambiguously, as at the outset of World War I. Countries may feel compelled to engage in preemptive defense, as Israel claimed in 1967, in which case the one who fires the first shot does so for defensive purposes. Those who are assessing an aggression claim may suffer from biases as they feel friendlier to one party than to the other. The next hurdle is an assessment of which measures are to be taken and which forces should intervene on the basis of what strategy and under whose command. Once a war for collective security is under way, when and on what conditions it should be terminated and what the postwar settlement should look like are divisive issues. Collective security can fail on each of these choices.

A public good problem arises because the utility of collective security is enjoyed by all, while the burdens in the hour of truth are more likely to fall only on a part of the membership. Geostrategic interests differ, as do military resources. Few countries can project and maintain power over long distances. The more powerful an aggressor is, the riskier a collective military counteroperation will be. A further complicating factor is the enormous risk of escalation into gross destruction should the aggressor be a nuclear weapons state.

For these reasons, realists have shrugged off collective security as inferior to self-help security systems. Nevertheless, the disruptions emerging from unfettered self-help in an increasingly interdependent world have led analysts repeatedly to reconsider collective security. It is at least possible to define some conditions that would enhance the chances that it might work: (a) if the great powers are not in existential conflict and share an interest in stability, (b) if nuclear weapons are not in the hands of would-be aggressors (or could be reasonably defended against), and (c) if efficient joint assessment capabilities and procedures are available to steer parties through the difficult choices to be made. In other words, collective security assumes the existence of concert-like features as its basic condition.

Security Regimes

Security regimes offer a more modest form of cooperation. They aim at regulating policy subfields rather than security at large. Regimes exist,

for example, in subfields of arms control and non-proliferation, in curbing terrorist financing, or in the United Nations (UN) routine for peacekeeping operations. As other international regimes, they consist of four different levels: (1) *principles* state what the objective of the regime is and how cause-and-effect relations in the specific field are seen by regime members; (2) *norms* contain general guidelines for the behavior of members; (3) *rules* consist of specific prescriptions and proscriptions, specifying selectively the meaning of the norms; and (4) *procedures* establish how decisions are taken.

Regimes might be treaty based or informal. They might be supported organizations that administer the regime and perform services for members, such as verification or technical assistance (e.g., the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW] in the chemical weapons regime).

Regimes perform valuable functions in the security sector. Specific rules for behavior create precise expectations for the future, reducing the uncertainty that is at the root of the security dilemma. Transparency, verification, and procedures for the clarification of ambiguous information give insight into the faithfulness of regime members. Moreover, arms control regimes that curb seriously the opportunities for surprise attacks and comprehensive offensives suggest the benevolent intentions of all partners, in addition to providing information about their capabilities. A dense network of such regimes might help transform relations of mutual distrust into mutual confidence and help overcome the security dilemma: In the end phase of the Cold War, progress in arms control and political change reinforced each other.

This effect, however, is not determined. The overall interstate relationships and the opportunities for progress in arms control are connected. If a conflict is harsh and mutual distrust high, field-specific regimes might be too piecemeal to help. Either party in the conflict might request such fundamental changes in the position of the other side as a precondition for negotiations that the whole cooperation process falters. The failure of arms control and regional security talks between Israel and its Arab neighbors during the 1990s is a telling example. Likewise, arms control is vulnerable to domino effects if something else in the relationship goes wrong; For example, U.S. concern

about a Soviet army brigade on Cuba sealed the fate of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) ratification in the Senate in 1979, even though the two issues were not substantially related.

Regional Organizations

Regional organizations are increasingly important in security cooperation. Only a few regions are lacking in related structures (the Middle East and South Asia). A great number of war-driving factors are most likely to occur in regional settings: territorial conflict, enduring rivalry, contiguity, and overlapping transborder ethnicities. Neighbors are most prone to face the risk of war, while, on the other hand, they might be more similar in terms of historical experience or cultural traits than countries far away and may also harbor a considerable potential for mutually beneficial cooperation. Thus, while the security problem is particularly virulent, remedies are also more easily available.

International organizations, regional ones in particular, have potential effects that make them fit for conflict management and security production. They create permanent contact among officials, leading to greater familiarity and, eventually, more mutual confidence. They provide information and enhance transparency, reducing the uncertainty problem behind the security dilemma. They create the expectation of further cooperation, lengthening the "shadow of the future." In these functions, they are similar to international regimes. But they can address interstate conflicts among their members more comprehensively. They offer communication channels that facilitate talks about conflict solutions. And embedding rivals in the same organization offers other actors opportunities for mediation.

Some regional organizations have been created with an ostensible focus on nonsecurity issues but perform important roles for regional security or have evolved their agenda to include security explicitly (e.g., the European Union [EU], Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or the Economic Community of West African States). Others have been created for security collaboration, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. It might also be that a setting is created ad hoc with the specific mission

to manage a particular project but evolves into a broader multilateral institution. This might be the future of the six-party talks in East Asia, which came into being to contain the regional risks emerging from North Korea's nuclear activities.

The success of these organizations appears to depend more on specific regional conditions and on leadership and practice and less on prefixed structural conditions. It requires fundamental political willingness and truly shared objectives. Where these conditions are absent, regional cooperation does not take off at all (e.g., in the Middle East) or with limited success (e.g., the OSCE).

Security Communities

In security communities, cooperation reaches such a level that the security dilemma evaporates altogether: The specter of military conflict is replaced by the expectation of peaceful change. While security communities may start from utility motivations for working together, in their mature state, they are transformed. The key change is the development of a shared identity. This identity makes the idea of warring "against one's own kin" out of the question. Military contingency plans against each other and related preparations do not exist. The EU is the most outstanding example.

Mature security communities contain a tight interrelationship between material (utilitarian) and ideational factors. Close relations provide collateral utilities: enlarged freedom of movement for citizens, economic benefits, scientific collaboration, and so on. Common values and the observation of established behavioral norms, instantiated in everyday practices, keep the community tightly linked. Close-knit elites serve as "community entrepreneurs"; they may compensate for a less determined popular commitment. Communities tend to develop more elaborate organizations and communication channels. Military collaboration might grow into partial integration. This evolutionary perspective on security communities should not be confused with a eufunctional bias: If environmental circumstances change drastically or if domestic upheaval produces new attitudes, communities may decay.

While the main thrust of security communities is the pacification of intracommunity relationships, they may also create outside effects. They might

erect a joint defense against a common threat, like an alliance, and offer security services for third parties (e.g., capacity building for export controls, the transfer of counterterrorism-relevant information, and providing troops for peacekeeping). While the “alliance” function can have destabilizing effects for excluded parties, security services might transfer the pacifying effects.

Security communities are ambiguous as to inclusiveness/exclusiveness: Inclusiveness applies only to countries that share criteria of membership; the procedure for entry is co-optation. On the other hand, security communities bind themselves to welcome everybody fulfilling these criteria; in that sense, they are inclusive. Uncertainties about EU boundaries illustrate this ambiguity.

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See also Alliances; Collective Security; Cooperation; Institutions and Institutionalism; International Organizations; International Regimes; Regionalism; Security Dilemma; War and Peace

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SECURITY DILEMMA

A security dilemma is a situation in which the actions taken by a state to increase its own security cause reactions from other states, which leads to a decrease rather than an increase in the state's security. Some scholars of international relations find that the security dilemma is the most important source of conflict in international relations. They argue that in the international realm, there is no legitimate monopoly of violence—that is, there is no world government—and as a consequence, each state must take care of its own security and survival. For this reason, the primary goal of states is to maximize their own security. Even if states focus solely on this goal and have no intention of harming others, many of the actions taken by states to increase their own security—such as weapons procurement and the development of new military technologies—will decrease the security of others. Decreasing the security of others does not automatically place the state in a dilemma, but because of the anarchic structure, other states will follow suit if one state arms. They cannot know whether the arming state will use its increased military capabilities for attack in the future. For this reason, they will either choose to increase their own military capabilities in order to reestablish the balance of power or they will launch a preemptive attack to prevent the arming state from upsetting the balance in the first place. If they choose the first option, the result may be a security spiral. A security spiral is an action–reaction process, where two states are tied in an armaments race with each state responding to increases in weapons procurement and defense expenditure by the other state, leading them both to arm themselves more and more heavily. This may lead to war in the long run. If they choose the last option, military conflict will be imminent.

The logic of the *security dilemma* was first described by Herbert Butterfield in 1949. The term itself was coined by John Herz in 1950. Although

the logic seems to fit particularly well with the security competition between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, proponents of the term do not see it as tied to a specific historic era. Rather, it reflects the fundamentally tragic nature of international life: State actors strive for peace and stability but end up in military conflict. Thus, even if all states are status quo powers wishing only peace and security, war may occur because of the fear and insecurity following from the anarchic structure of the international system. This focus on the effect of international anarchy on the behavior of states is typical of so-called structural realism—sometimes termed *neorealism*—which posits that the international system is a self-help system, where states must focus on their own interests to maximize their chance of security and survival. In particular, the security dilemma logic is central to so-called defensive realism. Proponents of defensive realism argue that states seek to maximize their chance of security and survival by maintaining their position in the international system, not by expansion. Still, scholars working within alternative theoretical traditions have discussed how the security dilemma logic looks from their perspective and have used their own theoretical insights to suggest how we might move beyond the security dilemma logic and create a more peaceful world.

A large number of international relations scholars have applied and developed the logic of the security dilemma. Some of the most prominent security dilemma scholars are Robert Jervis, Barry Posen, and Charles Glaser. From a more critical stance, the security dilemma logic has been explored by, among others, Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler. Recent research on the security dilemma has applied the logic to most regions of the world, and it has resulted in a proliferation of more fine-grained distinctions between different types of security dilemmas.

Some scholars of international relations argue that all states face a security dilemma all the time, but most of them agree that the intensity of security dilemmas tends to vary over time and space. The literature on international relations points to different sources of variation in the security dilemma. Security scholars such as Stephen Van Evera argue that the intensity of the security dilemma depends on the ease of conquest. If conquest is easy, states

will typically face an intense security dilemma, because the risk of military defeat is raised every time a competing state adds to its military capabilities. Conversely, if conquest is difficult, the security dilemma is ameliorated, because other states may add to their military capabilities without posing a direct offensive threat. If we are able to tell the difference between offensive and defensive weapons, states may even signal their benign intentions by deploying defensive weapons. Other states will know that they have acquired weapons not to attack but to defend. Offense and defense dominance vary over time and space depending on a number of factors, including geography, military technology, and military doctrine.

Also, regime type may affect the intensity of the security dilemma. Although democracies often go to war, they rarely go to war against other democracies. When two autocracies face each other or when a democracy and an autocracy face each other, security spirals sometimes spin out of control, because each side interprets the move by the other side as potentially threatening. But this is rarely the case when two democracies face each other. Two characteristics of modern, stable democracies explain why. First, the policy processes in liberal democracies is fairly transparent, even when viewed from outside the country. Parliamentary debates are usually open to the public—sometimes even televised—and political parties outside government, mass media, and interest groups ensure that few government decisions of any importance are taken without scrutiny and public debate. Second, democracies usually have rules and regulations preventing them from rushing into war. Some policies are made extraordinarily difficult, thereby binding the policymakers and signaling to the outside world that decisions cannot be taken without prior warning. Both of these characteristics of modern, liberal democracies reduce uncertainty and thereby ameliorate the security dilemma. As summed up by Charles Lipson (2003), “Because democracies have more accurate perceptions of each other, they are better able to cooperate, build trust and avoid war” (p. 72).

Other scholars argue that the security dilemma is largely irrelevant, because international conflict is not the result of status quo powers seeking to maximize security but of revisionist powers

seeking to maximize power. If all states are status quo powers, these critics argue, then military conflict would be extremely rare, because the world would consist of status quo powers eager to signal their benign intentions. But this is not the case: States wishing to expand their power at the expense of others are the most important source of military conflict in international relations, not the uncertainty and insecurity of status quo powers.

Today, military conflict between states is less frequent than throughout most of the world's history. At the same time, conflict related to weak and failed states is now a major source of instability in many parts of the world. Some scholars argue that even though this development seems to fit uneasily with the idea of unitary state actors stuck in a security dilemma in an anarchic international system, the basic logic of the security dilemma may still be applied. For instance, Barry Posen, analyzing ethnic violence between ethnic groups in a collapsing Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, found that the Serbs and Croats experienced a security dilemma in an emerging anarchy where each group had to take care of its own security. Brian Job extends the applicability of the security dilemma even further by discussing how a similar logic applies to weak Third World states unable to provide security for their own citizens and sometimes even constituting a threat to parts of their own population.

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See also Arms Race; Balance of Power; Realism in International Relations; Security and Defense Policy; Strategic (Security) Studies; War and Peace

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SELECTION BIAS

Selection bias refers to the inaccurate estimates that can occur when a sample of data is nonrandomly selected for study. Samples may be purposefully nonrandomly selected by researchers. More often, however, nonrandom (also called “selective”) samples result from choices made by the actors being studied or by others whose choices affect them. This entry discusses the importance of such biases and the ways to avoid them.

The samples available for studying political processes often are selective. For example, to learn about the escalation or resolution of international disputes, one must study a sample of states involved in disputes. These countries have made or been the recipients of demands or threats. To learn what leads citizens to vote for particular parties or candidates, one must study a sample of persons who have registered to vote and decided to go to the polls. To learn what makes economic sanctions or peace-building missions effective, one must study a sample of cases in which sanctions have been applied or civil wars have ended, respectively. To learn about public opinion, one must study persons who have consented to respond to surveys and to do so informatively. In each of these cases, the sample available for study is not a random sample from the population of interest; instead, it is a sample that has been nonrandomly selected or self-selected.

The economist James Heckman was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 2000 for his

work on methods for analyzing selective samples without bias. Heckman popularized these methods and applied them extensively to the study of labor economics. Christopher Achen was the first political scientist to develop methods for analyzing selective samples. Achen explained how nonrandom selection often affects analysts' attempts to evaluate public policy. For example, an analyst might wish to evaluate a pretrial release system: Are appropriate criteria used to decide which defendants will and will not be released? One criterion that judges use in determining whether or not to release a defendant is the seriousness of the accusation; those accused of serious crimes are less likely to be released. The analyst might therefore wish to know whether those accused of serious crimes are more likely to flee or commit additional crimes if released; if not, perhaps judges would want to release more defendants accused of serious crimes. This question is difficult to answer, because the sample of released defendants is selective. When judges do release those accused of serious crimes, it is because they have some additional information (e.g., exemplary courtroom behavior) indicating that these defendants are unlikely to be rearrested. Thus, in the sample of released defendants, everyone is unlikely to commit additional crimes—in some cases because those accused of more minor crimes are unlikely to do so and in some because those who are released after being accused of serious crimes are exceptional. For this reason, a study of released prisoners will show little or no relationship between the seriousness of the accusation and the chance of rearrest, even if such a relationship truly exists. However, methods that correct for selection bias show that those accused of serious crimes are more likely to flee or be rearrested if they are released without regard to courtroom behavior. Failure to correct for selection bias might lead judges to release more defendants accused of serious crimes and to regret this decision when those defendants go on to have a higher rearrest rate.

In statistical terms, selection bias can lead to biased or inconsistent estimates, depending on the model. Stated more formally, selection bias refers to the biased and/or inconsistent estimates that may

occur as a result of nonrandom selection. To see the problem, consider a researcher's attempt to test the hypothesis that pairs of states are more likely to go to war when their military strength is nearly equal (they have power parity); one rationale behind this hypothesis is that leaders are less likely to know which side would win a war when states are more evenly matched, and so the ultimate loser is willing to fight. Assume, for example, that whether or not two countries are roughly equal in power determines their likelihood of being in a military dispute (selecting into the sample) as well as their likelihood of escalating a dispute to war (the outcome of interest). Assume further that an unobserved variable, the interests at stake in the dispute, also affects both initiation and escalation. Pairs of countries enter the sample of militarized disputes in one of three ways. Some pairs are involved in disputes because they are roughly equal in power, some because one or both of the states has strong interests at stake, and some for both reasons. Informally, the problem is that in the sample of disputing dyads, pairs of countries that do not have equal power contain at least one country with particularly strong interests at stake, while pairs with equal power may or may not contain a country with strong interests at stake. For this reason, dyads in the sample with equal power are likely to go to war, and dyads with unequal power also are likely to go to war. When we use the countries involved in disputes to estimate the effect of power parity on whether or not states go to war, parity appears to have little effect—even though it has a strong one. In other words, the estimate of the effect is inaccurate.

This problem can be represented formally. In the equations that follow, the importance of the issues is one component of the error term in the selection equation (u_{1i} in Equation 1) and also one component of the error term in the outcome equation (u_{2i} in Equation 2), so that the two error terms are correlated:

$$U_{\text{select}_i} = \alpha_1 = \gamma_1 \text{parity}_i + \gamma_2 X_{2i} + u_{1i}, \quad (1)$$

$$U_{\text{war}_i} = \alpha_1 = \beta_1 \text{parity}_i + u_{2i}. \quad (2)$$

In this example, the observed dependent variables are dichotomous; the country has some

unobserved utility of being in a dispute, and we observe that $Y_{1i} = 1$ (the observation is in the sample) if $U_{\text{select}_i} > 0$ and $Y_{1i} = 0$ (the observation is not in the sample) otherwise; similarly, the country has some unobserved utility of going to war, and we observe that $Y_{2i} = 1$ (the case goes to war) if $U_{\text{war}_i} > 0$ and $Y_{2i} = 0$ otherwise. The variable X_2 is another variable that influences selection but not the outcome of interest; it is called an *exclusion restriction* (see below). Since by assumption power parity has a positive effect on selection and on escalation to war in the example, γ_1 and β_1 are positive. If the states have roughly equal power (parity has a value of 1), the observation is more likely to have a high value of U_{select_i} and select into the sample, even if the error term, u_{1i} , is small or negative; but if the states have unequal power (parity has a value of zero), the observation will only select into the sample if the other independent variable (X_2) leads it to do so or if the pair has a large value of the error term in the selection equation, u_{1i} . Thus, observations with parity that get involved in disputes can have any value of u_{1i} , and observations without parity that get involved in disputes more often have large values of u_{1i} .

The selection process and the correlated error terms in Equations 1 and 2 lead power parity, the independent variable of interest in the outcome equation, to be correlated with the error term in that equation. Because of the correlation between u_{1i} and u_{2i} , the sample of dyads available to estimate the impact of power parity on whether countries escalate their disputes to war includes (a) pairs of countries with equal power ($X_{1i} = 1$) that may have large or small error terms in the outcome equation (values of u_{2i}) and (b) states with unequal power ($X_{1i} = 0$) that have large error terms in the outcome equation (values of u_{2i}). Thus, power parity is negatively correlated with the error term in the equation of interest, and the researcher's estimate of its effect (β_1) using standard techniques (probit or logit) is inconsistent.

The problem of selection bias often is given short shrift by researchers, who ignore selection because they believe that the estimates are accurate for the sample in which they are interested. However, without modeling the selection process, the researcher cannot obtain an accurate estimate of the causal effect of the independent variables of interest on the dependent variable in the equation

of interest, even for the sample under consideration. The reason is that the independent variables of interest are correlated with the error term in the selected sample whether or not they were correlated with the error term in the selection equation; the selection process creates the correlation. In the power parity example, power parity is not associated with a greater probability of war in the sample of disputes. However, power parity does have a causal effect on war for states involved in disputes; this causal effect is hidden by the fact that among disputing dyads, those with uneven power are more likely to have serious disputes due to the selection process.

Fortunately, the problem of selection bias can be surmounted, given appropriate data. Heckman showed that when the dependent variable in the selection equation is continuous, the problem described here leads to what is known as *omitted-variable bias* in the outcome equation. He further devised an easy, two-step estimation technique that avoids the bias. Other researchers have developed techniques for avoiding selection bias with different types of data. Techniques to avoid selection bias almost always require a valid exclusion restriction (X_{2i} in Equation 1 on previous page), which is a measured variable that influences whether or not the observation is selected into the sample but does not affect the outcome of interest. Critics of selection methods have argued that appropriate exclusion restrictions often are difficult to obtain; without a valid exclusion restriction, evidence from computer simulations suggests that selection methods may be more misleading than estimates obtained with standard techniques.

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See also Causality; Matching

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
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SELF-DETERMINATION

Self-determination is a highly contentious concept that encompasses a variety of meanings and political claims. Each of these claims is based on the theory that particular population groups possess an inherent right to control their own political institutions. The term has been used in at least three different ways. First, *self-determination* can refer to the collective right of a defined ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or religious community to create and administer their own state. This is often the foundation for an argument in favor of secession or irredentism, the doctrine that populations should live under the sovereignty of the country to which they are ethnically or culturally related regardless of existing juridical borders. Second, it can refer to the right of a population to decide how they will be governed and who will represent them in government, the bedrock of democratic theory. Finally, the concept of self-determination also represents the claim that all states and societies have the right to determine their own political, economic, and social institutions. In this sense, it is synonymous with the principle of sovereignty and nonintervention, reflecting one of the most important concepts in diplomatic practice and international law. More specifically, the principle of self-determination has been advanced by populations challenging the role of foreign powers in influencing their governments and its political structures. This claim has long been associated with anticolonial resistance movements and, following decolonization, with efforts by popular movements to challenge intervention by foreign powers in their internal affairs.

Although all of these approaches are viewed as paths to liberation, in practice they are often competing doctrines. Because there are often competing claims over who the “self” is in self-determination, the concept has been the source of both civil and international conflict. This occurs on a number of levels.

First, the liberal principle of popular sovereignty de-emphasizes social distinctions within the population as the political foundation of the state. Since all citizens are juridically equal, the principle of democratic decision making gives priority to the will of the majority. On the other hand, national sovereignty is based on the will of the nation and

gives priority to the needs of the national community. It has been common over the past century to have competing claims of self-determination based on these differences. Whereas a national community may claim the right to secede or amalgamate to create a new state out of at least some of the territory of existing states, the principle of popular sovereignty holds that the entire population should decide whether to break up the country. Thus, although a plebiscite or referendum would reflect the popular will and likely result in a vote against creating a new sovereignty, the principle of national autonomy would demand that each community be given the right to decide for itself with whom it wishes to associate. Moreover, the principle of territorial integrity as the foundation of the modern nation-state system is inconsistent with secession except in the most extreme circumstances.

Second, what constitutes the national community that can legitimately evoke the principle of self-determination? There is no objective definition of nationality that can be applied in all circumstances. Nationalists have alternatively defined themselves in terms of culture, ethnicity, language, religion, and political association. Thus, since nations are usually self-defined, their composition is subject to contestation and even redefinition. It is therefore not always clear who gets to define what constitutes the community. In the face of competing claims, at least one group's assertion of self-determination will inevitably be denied. Moreover, there is not even agreement around the foundation of nationhood. Some, such as the German romanticists and their followers, argue that nationality is primordial—that is, it reflects the long-standing natural divisions inherent in human societies. Individuals are born into their national communities, and therefore, one's national identity is not a matter of personal choice. Constructivists like Benedict Anderson, on the other hand, argue that nations are imagined communities that reflect mental images of an affinity that its members create rather than any natural grouping based on actual historical or physical properties. This construction of nationality, Ernest Gellner adds, is primarily a product of industrialism and the alienation from the community that it produces.

Third, the liberal notion of popular sovereignty is built on the assumption of a common citizenry, and therefore, ethnicity and religion had little to do with the definition of either the state or the

nation. John Stuart Mill, for example, argued that democratic institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Without a fellow feeling, a unified public opinion, which he argues is necessary for the working of a representative government, cannot exist. If this is the case, then the only way to resolve the issues raised above is through a policy of ethnic cleansing. Thus, as Eric Hobsbawm holds, the ideal of the national state advocated by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in 1919 is one that could only be attained by barbarians.

Self-Determination in Practice

The revolt of the American colonies against British rule in the late 18th century was the first successful assertion of the right to self-determination against an external ruler, although the frequent but unsuccessful Irish revolts against English rule predated the American Revolution. However, though the American War of Independence was waged against a colonial ruler, the cry for independence by the colonists was not based on claims of nationalism, nor did the revolutionaries specifically challenge colonialism *per se*. Rather, the Declaration of Independence was based on the democratic principle that the consent of the governed was the only legitimate foundation for government. The challenge to British taxation, which provided the initial spark for the revolution, centered on the arguments that the colonists were not represented in the British Parliament and, moreover, that British rule itself did not reflect the will of the colonial population. For revolutionary leaders like Thomas Jefferson, self-determination meant self-government and popular sovereignty. In this sense, the right to self-determination was held individually by each citizen. This idea of popular sovereignty was also the foundation of the 1789 French Revolution and its radical conception of citizenship.

During the 19th century, the concept of self-determination shifted to collectivist claims advanced by European nationalist movements seeking to create national states out of the large multiethnic empires that ruled Central and Eastern Europe. Such movements argued that all national groups were entitled to a state of their own and that national self-determination was the only legitimate criteria for statehood. This

philosophy provided the foundation for the creation of Italy and Germany, as well as for the claims advanced by dozens of ethnic groups living within the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. This conception of self-determination saw the right as one that was held collectively by a self-defined national, ethnic, linguistic, or religious community. Sovereignty, then, was held not by the people *per se* but by the nation as a whole. Self-government, defined as one that reflected the individual wills of the population, was not a requirement for the fulfillment of this ideal.

These movements reached their peak around the time of World War I. Both U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and the Bolshevik leader Leon Trotsky voiced strong support for the concept of self-determination as the foundation for a just peace. Wilson's original concept of self-determination was synonymous with self-government. However, he later adopted the nationalist perspective, advocating a reorganization of the Hapsburg, German, and Ottoman territories along national lines after the collapse of the three empires during the war. He was particularly influenced by the political pressures created by the publication of the Bolsheviks' peace program and by the agitation for national independence that swept the Czech, Hungarian, Polish, and South Slav territories. The core of the Bolshevik platform for the settlement of the war was the realization of national self-determination for peoples throughout Europe, a proposal that drew particular favor with the nationalist movements challenging the Hapsburg monarchy. The allies knew that they needed to develop a program of their own if they hoped to compete for the hearts and minds of the public and forestall the spread of Bolshevism among the disaffected populations of Eastern and Central Europe.

Wilson responded to these events by reframing the war as one for national self-determination. There could be neither justice nor order, Wilson argued, so long as national (i.e., ethnic) communities were denied the right to choose their own political affiliation. His solution would be a readjustment of borders and a redistribution of territory based on the ethnic composition of the population. He articulated this political vision for the new European order in a series of speeches known as the Fourteen Points Address, the Four Principles, the Four Ends, and the Five Particulars.

At the same time, although the reorganization of Central and Eastern Europe provided for the creation of a dozen new states, the postwar settlement did not abolish the practice of colonialism, nor did it provide for political independence for those living under the former Ottoman Empire. It was not until the aftermath of World War II that millions of people living in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East were granted the right to form their own states. Following World War II, the institution of colonialism quickly collapsed. In some cases, the colonial powers determined that colonialism was no longer either feasible or sustainable and granted independence to their colonies. This was the case in much of Africa. In other cases, however, colonial powers such as France and Portugal refused to do so, sparking anticolonial rebellions and wars of national self-determination. These challenges were particularly acute in Vietnam, Algeria, Angola, and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).

Yet even voluntary decolonization produced problems of its own with regard to the ideal of self-determination. First, the European powers did not facilitate decolonization in Africa and the Middle East by creating national states based on the composition of the ethnic, religious, linguistic, or tribal populations living there. Rather, they built new states from the existing colonial boundaries that had been established almost a century earlier at the Congress of Berlin. The self-determination principle would be based on political independence, not on national or cultural autonomy. While this was probably the most practical method for transferring sovereignty to the native populations, it violated the principle of national self-determination by creating states that failed to coincide with the distribution of the traditional political communities on the continent. This not only forced the populations to reconceptualize their identities from tribal or clan-based affinities to "citizens" of a new abstract state that was alien to their cultures and histories, it also created significant internal conflicts among groups over who would dominate the new states. Thus, conflicts over self-determination erupted between various communities within many of the new states, sparked by resentment from those peoples who felt that they were being oppressed by a dominant tribal or ethnic group.

In addition, both the former colonial powers and the emerging U.S. superpower began to exercise a

significant amount of influence in the economic and political development of the new states. As newly formed weak states, the new formations were highly susceptible to external pressure, and the great powers emerged as dominant forces within these states. The governments of such states tended to be authoritarian and often worked closely with these great powers in defiance of the popular will. This led to new types of movements for self-determination, popularly known as "anti-imperialist," often escalating into decades-old civil wars. The resolution of these conflicts is still partial at best.

The revolutions in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s did not only bring down communist governments allied with the Soviet Union. They also reopened questions of national identity that had been settled for almost half a century. Lacking the secular identity that the communist governments had provided to the population, the emerging authorities viewed liberation as synonymous with ethnic nationalization. As such, they asserted that their states would reflect the will of their dominant nations, often in the face of large, newly oppressed national minorities. Using the popular sovereignty principle of majority rule, many imposed the dominant nationality on the entire population, often resulting in ethnic conflict and civil war. This was most pronounced in the breakup of Yugoslavia, a political entity that had been formed after World War I on the principle of Pan-Slavism. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, parochial nationalism emerged as the dominant political principle, encouraging the Serbian, Bosnian, and Croatian authorities to assert their autonomy and reject a common Slavic culture. This resulted in the worst political violence and gross human rights violations since the 1930s.

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See also Colonialism; Democracy, Theories of; Liberalism; Nation Building; Nationalism; Nationalist Movements; Sovereignty

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SELF-REGULATION

Self-regulation describes the way a specific group controls and supervises any or all aspects of its own activities in terms of public interest. It is an extraordinarily fluid concept. The term bleeds into neighboring ideas, such as voluntary regulation, self-policing, self-governance, corporate social responsibility or coregulation. Self-regulation applies to institutions ranging from local sports clubs, to professions, to global industrial networks, leaving out little of what lies in between. Self-regulation covers myriad activities and comes in various organizational guises. Consequently, the idea is the subject of some controversy. This entry defines the notion, shows the past traditions, discusses professional self-regulation with its issues and criticisms, and finally presents its recent evolution.

Definition and Background

The term *self-regulation* implies two dimensions, as emphasized by Anthony Ogus (1999). First, regulatory regimes differ in the amount of control they have over the supervision they give the group, that is, the extent of *self-regulation*. Some forms of self-regulation are handled entirely by the group in question, such as self-regulation of the medical profession. In other instances, notably industry technical standards, self-regulation may rely on third-party oversight, such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Second, regulatory approaches may differ in the capacity to enforce regulation, that is, the ability to *self-regulate*. Some self-regulatory regimes have legal or quasi-legal

status, for example, for law or accountancy. Others are little more than a set of normative aspirations, such as the nonbinding industry codes of conduct in, for example, the tobacco industry.

Historical antecedents of self-regulation go as far back as ancient Rome. In medieval and Renaissance Europe, largely self-governing guilds regulated trades and crafts. According to Philippe Dollinger (1998), the Hanseatic League, a politically autonomous alliance of trading cities and their guilds, was probably the culmination of trades-based self-governance in premodern Europe. In Asia, there are records of associations of craftsmen and trades, called *shreni* in India or *hanghui* in China. In general, premodern forms of self-regulation contributed to the broader goal of self-governance. With the rise of the modern state and its monopoly on political power, self-regulation evolved into an alternative to direct state oversight, albeit an alternative that was to complement rather than replace the general regulatory legitimacy of the state. Particularly in the English-speaking world, self-regulation of this kind is most commonly associated with the oversight of professions, most prominently of medicine and law. In Europe and the United States, as noted by Donald Irvine, much of the legal basis for professional self-regulation was established in the 19th and 20th centuries. Symbolizing the status of an independent profession, professional self-regulation has become the gold standard for aspiring vocations.

Professional Self-Regulation

Proponents of professional self-regulation contend that it solves the problem of information asymmetry between the state and the professions. Professions, not only medicine and law but also accountancy, have traditionally argued that effective regulation requires a level of expert knowledge found only within the profession itself. Regulation by peers, so the argument goes, creates the trust and reciprocity crucial to supervising a highly complex, knowledge-intensive, and dynamic field of activity. Since expertise, trust, and collegiality lead to fewer regulatory errors, proponents point out, the costs of self-regulation to the taxpayer are lower than in the case of external regulation. For this reason, professional regulation typically is independent and equipped with considerable

enforcement capacities, for example, the barring and disbaring of legal practitioners.

In the past, social scientists have viewed professional self-regulation with suspicion. For schools of thought committed to methodological individualism, such as Public Choice, self-regulation puts the lunatics in charge of the asylum. This distorts market mechanisms in a number of ways. First, by issuing licenses to practice, professionals tend to keep the supply low to inflate prices—a claim that resonates well with the fact that, for example, U.S. health care costs have consistently made up about 14% of the gross domestic product. Second, professional trust and collegiality—articulated in jargon and reproduced through impenetrable hierarchies—blur the lines of accountability between individuals within professions and between the professions and society. In this way, professional self-regulation becomes a system of private law (or, literally, *privilege*) that, in the view of critics, eludes democratic accountability and legitimates the violation of consumer rights (Ogus, 1999). Third, self-regulating institutions, such as the American Automobile Association (AAA) in the United States or the Law Society in the United Kingdom, occupy a privileged position in the policy process. Equipped with requisite independence and legal clout, thinkers have argued, institutions of self-regulation invariably bring about self-serving policy. In sum, economists have concluded, the practice of professional self-regulation ensures that whenever professional self-interest is incongruent with the public interest, the interests of the professions prevail. Suspending market competition, so the argument goes, creates opportunities for rent seeking that no rational individual could, or indeed should, let pass. Typically, economists such as Milton Friedman have suggested that the market be allowed to allocate professional resources and services. Market competition would then regulate all else.

In the past 3 decades or so, self-regulation has departed from its traditional home within the professional services. Partly in response to shifting beliefs about the role of the state in regulation and partly in response to emergent global trends, productive and extractive industries the world over have experimented with self-regulation. Here, the justification has been cast in terms of efficiency by pointing out, as Richard Andrews (1998) has done, that so-called command-and-control regulation has

proven unwieldy, ineffective, and expensive. What is more, particularly for environmental regulation, as Andrews notes, new, more diffuse forms of environmental degradation—climate change or stratospheric ozone depletion—elude conventional end-of-pipe regulation. Self-regulation of this kind is believed to work with the grain of the market by allowing competition to determine and diffuse best industrial practices. Unlike traditional professional self-regulation, industry self-regulation takes place in widely varying degrees of independence. Significantly, as both Richard Andrews and Virginia Haufler (2001) have observed, very few self-regulatory regimes for industry can demonstrate the enforcement capacities of the traditional professions

This too has been the object of criticism. For these commentators, including Denis Smith and Steve Tombs (1995) as well as Andrews (1998), industry self-regulation, however dressed up, is almost synonymous with no regulation and is unable to protect the public interest. First, critics argue that effective market-based self-regulation often requires rather specific industry or socio-political conditions. For example, best practice models are important in industries that rely on reputation. In markets driven predominantly by price, such as the garment industry, best practice usually equates to cost minimization. Similarly, political and socioinstitutional cultures based on consensus and cooperation, such as the Nordic countries, favor effective industry self-regulation more than countries where industrial relations are characterized by animosity and competition. In industries where these conditions do not hold, classical collective-action problems, such as free riding, undermine self-regulatory regimes. Second, even under ideal conditions, so the argument goes, self-regulation by itself is unlikely to address the social, environmental, or health-related external costs of industry activities. Yet it is precisely these costs to the environment, society, and human health that legitimate regulation in the first place (Haufler, 2001). Third, state regulation has in the past been a reaction to the lack of enthusiasm on part of industry to voluntarily rein in harmful activities (Andrews, 1998; Smith & Tombs, 1995). Critical observers argue that empirical evidence offers no reason to believe that this has changed. Similarly, proponents claim, evidence suggests that lack of institutional

distance between regulator and industry often leads to agency capture and, as a consequence, rent-seeking behavior. The upshot of the argument is that industry self-regulation amounts to a *carte blanche* for industry to pursue profits with little or no regard to social, environmental, and health-related costs. The pressures of highly competitive global markets, so the argument goes, ensure that even well-intentioned firms are forced into the “race to the bottom.” The solution here is to install external, preferably public, instances of oversight.

Despite coming to opposite conclusions, both critiques consider self-regulation primarily as a strategy for pursuing individual self-interest through public institutions. Recently, however, researchers have started thinking about self-regulation as a process of institutional evolution. Ongoing social, political, and environmental changes around the globe, so the argument goes, have profoundly transformed the environment for regulation in ways that are not always straightforward. On the one hand, globalization blurs organizational and ideological boundaries, say, between nation-states or the political Left and Right. On the other hand, it (re-)creates powerful new divisions at global level, for example, between the rich and the poor or between the advocates and skeptics of climate change policy. New opportunities, argue these thinkers, go hand in hand with new problems. For example, firms today can operate in “governance voids” where regulation is light and costs are low. On the other hand, these very same firms face highly discerning consumer citizens who demand ethically, environmentally, and socially sound business practices, all this at a time when fragmentation of national polities into highly specialized policy subsystems—often spilling over national boundaries—erodes public sector regulatory capacities.

The Future of Self-Regulation

For institutionalists, the variety of self-regulatory practices suggests an open-ended process of institutional evolution. Thus, they argue, it would be a mistake to dismiss out of hand either the potential or the risks of self-regulation. Instead, self-regulatory regimes need to be assessed as social systems that define norms, create organizational structures, and generate patterns of (recursive)

practices. The complexity and uncertainty of contemporary regulatory challenges rule out a priori assessments of regulatory effectiveness. Today, effective self-regulation has become “responsive regulation” that evolves according to the requirements of the specific policy subsystems. Consequently, institutionalists argue that setting up regulatory choices in terms of polar opposites—market versus state versus civil society—is likely to yield no benefit. Instead, regulation requires the tailor-made interplay of skills and knowledge found throughout society. Effective self-regulation, then, is about a finding a robust public/private/civil society mix. The precise ingredients of this mix—the relative roles and functions of contending policy actors—will depend on the institutional circumstances in which regulation takes place.

Therefore, institutionalists contend, self-regulation requires openness: of institutions, of networks, and, not the least, of minds. While traditional self-regulation was about closing off professions to external scrutiny, “responsive” regulation entails encouraging experimentation and debate. On this view, self-regulation is an integral part of a larger process of “coregulation” in which all social sectors, including the state, play a vital, if constantly changing, role.

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See also Governance; Regulation

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SEMPRESIDENTIALISM

Semipresidentialism is a constitutional type that combines a popularly elected head of state with a head of government who is responsible to a popularly elected legislature. Semipresidentialism is therefore a mixed regime form that combines features of parliamentarism, which prescribes a fusion of powers and mutual dependence between executive and legislative powers, and presidentialism, which is, in contrast, characterized by a separation of powers and mutual independence of executive and legislative powers. Semipresidential systems thus maintain a dual power structure in which the head of state shares executive power with a prime minister and his or her cabinet.

Semipresidentialism as a Mixed Regime

The concept of *semipresidential* government was coined during the 1970s by the French political scientist Maurice Duverger in an attempt to investigate and appraise the constitutional uniqueness of the French Fifth Republic. In 1980, in what is by now a classic article, Duverger introduced his model to the greater international public and defined semipresidentialism as a combination of three elements: (1) the president is elected by universal suffrage, (2) the president possesses considerable powers, and (3) the president has opposite him or her a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament is not in opposition to them. Applying this definition, Duverger identified seven semipresidential regimes, in Austria, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, and the Weimar Republic in Germany (1919–1933). More recent identifications come up with much larger numbers, and a 2008 survey by

Robert Elgie lists no less than 54 semipresidential regimes in existence. To mention just a handful of cases in addition to those identified by Duverger, the list includes countries such as Angola, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Mongolia, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Tajikistan, and Timor-Leste. Several of these more than 50 countries have nondemocratic regimes being run under the cloak of semipresidentialism, but a good 30 or so are partial or full democracies.

The remarkable increase in the number of such regimes reflects two partly intertwined circumstances. First, this type of regime has gained much ground in recent years. For instance, the dualistic logic of semipresidentialism having much in common with the previous communist system of government, varieties of semipresidentialism have frequently been adopted in constitutional developments following the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR. Second, the increase also reflects deviations by authors and analysts from the criteria laid down by Duverger, which are, admittedly, contestable and anything but transparent. For example, the criterion that the president is elected by universal suffrage is interpreted by some to mean a direct election and by others to mean election by a popular vote, either direct or indirect. While the first interpretation excludes elections in an electoral college, the second does not. To give another example, when and if the criterion is that the president must possess considerable powers, authors may differ in their view of what set of powers is to be regarded sufficient to satisfy this criterion. Also, how the powers are divided between president and prime minister vary greatly between countries, and this variation carries problems of classification and interpretation in its wake.

Furthermore, while some classifications rely on institutional criteria only, others employ in addition criteria that relate to actual or political power. Clearly, this adds to the confusion, as constitutions that are relatively similar may still be applied differently. Duverger was certainly very much aware of this, as he maintained that the constitutions of Austria, Ireland, and Iceland are semipresidential, while political practice in these countries is parliamentary. In fact, according to Duverger, the very purpose of the concept of semipresidential government was to explain how it was the case that a

similarity of rules may still result in a diversity of games. The differing views and interpretations of semipresidentialism have even come to concern the very status of the concept. According to one school of thought, the alternation between presidential and parliamentary power that is inherent in this form of regime implies that semipresidentialism is a hybrid form or a synthesis between parliamentarism proper and presidentialism proper. Others maintain, however, that semipresidentialism is rather a specific and separate regime form. Having like presidentialism two sources of popular legitimacy, namely, presidential elections on the one hand and legislative elections on the other, semipresidentialism, the argument goes, is a regime form closer to presidentialism than to parliamentarism.

Given that the concept of semipresidentialism has been and still is a source of confusion, it is only natural that most listings of semipresidential regimes tend to come up with divergent findings, at times including cases that may only with hesitation be referred to as semipresidentialism. For instance, the small African island state São Tomé and Príncipe often figures in lists of semipresidential regimes; in this country, however, the directly elected president is charged with dismissing the prime minister. In fact, according to the constitution, the government is politically responsible before the president as well as the assembly. Clearly, this constitutional order is some distance away from the basic idea of semipresidentialism. Finland, to mention another example, was earlier regarded by many as a model case of semipresidentialism. However, presidential powers were much reduced in the new Form of Government Act from the year 2000, and they now boil down to a statement in the Finnish Constitution that foreign policy is led by the president in cooperation with the cabinet. Given that trends toward internationalization and globalization have much blurred the distinction between foreign and domestic policy, the correct interpretation of this vague constitutional statement has become a source of much political dispute in the country. The point to be made here, however, is that Finland nowadays represents a much weaker variant of semipresidentialism than before. Indeed, future inclusion of Finland in the semipresidential camp may even be seriously questioned.

Empirical Findings on Semipresidentialism

From the difficulties of definition it follows that the empirical findings concerning the politics and impact of semipresidentialism are in like manner indistinct and even contradictory. In practice, however, semipresidential systems tend to oscillate between two forms. On the one hand, the president gains in power if the legislative majority is of the same party as the president. On the other hand, if the legislative majority is of divergent parties, it will strengthen the position of the prime minister. This second form is named cohabitation and may result in a formally or informally agreed-on division of labor between the two heads of government. For instance, in France during the cohabitation period of 1986 to 1988, President François Mitterrand retained responsibility for foreign affairs, while Jacques Chirac as prime minister was responsible for domestic affairs. Such inoffensive solutions are not always obtainable, and findings suggest that cohabitation creates political tension in times of crisis and may in some cases even be responsible for the collapse of democracy. Of course, if authority is fragmented in the legislature, with no party or coalition enjoying a substantive majority, the outcome may be that the president resorts to executive decrees and emergency rule. Further findings from the study of the new democracies that have resorted to semipresidentialism are that the dual executive is in general likely to generate conflict; however, systems that accentuate the position of the prime minister are likely to maintain better democratic performance than systems that emphasize the position of the president. If both the president and the prime minister have significant powers, the situation becomes complex and perhaps even risky to newly democratizing regimes.

The main lesson to be learned from the confusion of definitions and from the less than consistent research findings concerning semipresidential politics is that there is not one kind of semipresidentialism but many. In consequence, as the manifoldness brings forward operationalizations that are muddled and easily contested, the concept of semipresidentialism should not really be used as such as an independent or dependent variable in attempts to chart the consequences or the determinants of regime choice. True, the fact that semipresidential regimes operate in different ways may

be accounted for by reference to historical and contextual factors and to factors that relate to the operating of electoral and party systems, but the differences also follow from the simple fact that the regimes in question are not all alike. Reformulations of the term are therefore called for, and in recognition of the analytical difficulties, attempts have been made to establish more finely differentiated categories. A volume from the early 1990s by Matthew Shugart and John Carey (1992) has emerged as a landmark publication in this respect, as it replaces the semipresidential category with a distinction between premier-presidential systems and president-parliamentary systems. The former type comprises cases in which the prime minister exerts greater executive power; the latter is about cases in which the president wields greater authority. Attempts have also been made at a further division of premier-presidential systems; these attempts build on the significance of the nonlegislative powers vested in the presidency.

Future Directions

Efforts at promoting the future use of the semipresidential category should probably advance further along these lines. Semipresidentialism has often been conceptualized as a sort of umbrella model, intended to cover somehow the terrain between parliamentarism and presidentialism. When strictly and narrowly defined and applied, the concept of semipresidentialism no doubt brings analytical rigor and capacity to the study of political regimes; at the same time, however, precisely because it is strictly and narrowly defined, the concept fails to cover all the varieties and the diversified arrangements of checks and balances that have been introduced in many contemporary constitutional frameworks. As these varieties have been incorporated into the semipresidential frame, the frame has become fuzzy and difficult to fit into the practices of research. Obviously, future efforts need to depart from the ambition to preserve conceptual clarity while advancing the capacity of the concept to cover and manage an expanded field of empirical observations. In these efforts, one is well advised to consider that as there are subtypes of semipresidentialism, there are subtypes of parliamentarism and subtypes of presidentialism as well. At some point these latter subtypes merge

with the subtypes of semipresidentialism. Recognizing this, constitutional political science needs to work out and adopt in future research a full-fledged typology that describes by including also semipresidential subtypes the relative levels of parliamentarism and presidentialism in political regimes.

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See also Constitutional Engineering; Parliamentary Systems; Presidentialism; Separation of Powers

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SEPARATION OF POWERS

Governmental powers are separated for several reasons. This entry analyzes the notion and its rationale, discusses the concept of mixed government, assesses the influence of Montesquieu, reviews the American experience, and shows how the separation of powers is actually implemented.

Nations may decide that it is necessary to separate functions that are considered unique and exclusive in nature, such as the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Another motivation is to divide the functions of government to ensure that no one body can accumulate sufficient power to

violate the individual rights and liberties of citizens. The first reason is analytical and based largely on experience and practicality. The second is more theoretical and value laden, especially because it involves making judgments about the human tendency to abuse power. To check that inclination, powers are kept separate. The U.S. system of separation of powers draws from both sources.

The Notion in the Classic Literature

The concept of separation of powers is found in the works of political analysts from the time of the Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle. Misinterpretations and misconceptions about separation of powers are perennial problems. If there is no separation of powers, one branch of government might acquire too much influence and threaten other branches and the people. With too much separation, government does not function properly, creating conditions that invite a dictator to appear in order to restore order and efficiency.

The constitutions of 1791 and 1848 in France represented concerted efforts to establish a pure separation of powers. The first experiment resulted in the Committee of Public Safety, the Directory, and the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte. The second led to Louis Napoleon, reaction, and the Second Empire. Professor M. J. C. Vile (1967) observed that “this last flirtation with the pure doctrine ended in the same way as others had ended in France—in absolutism” (p. 207). The framers of the American Constitution attempted to avoid those violent swings. Justice Joseph Story (1905) said that the framers accepted a separation of powers but “endeavored to prove that a rigid adherence to it in all cases would be subversive of the efficiency of the government, and result in the destruction of the public liberties” (p. 396).

The Concept of Mixed Government

The framers of the American Constitution were familiar with efforts over the centuries to combine different political interests to provide for balanced government. The principle of mixed government, as a method of stabilizing a political order, can be traced back to Greek philosophy. In Book III of his *Laws*, Plato combined monarchy and democracy

to form a well-governed city. Aristotle, in Book IV of his *Politics*, mixed different types of oligarchies and democracies to create a stable state. He also divided government into separate departments: the deliberative, executive, and judicial.

In an effort to ensure balance and stability in a political order, Polybius, a Roman historian of the 2nd century BCE, studied different types of constitutions to prevent ideal forms from degenerating into perverted ones. In Book VI of his *Histories*, he settled on a mix of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy: The force of each being neutralized by that of the others, neither of them should prevail and outbalance another, but the constitution should remain for long in a state of equilibrium like a well-trimmed boat. Niccolò Machiavelli, in his *Discourses*, adopted a similar method of avoiding the risks of a pure form of government. It was better to pull out portions from each form, so that there is combined under the same constitution a prince, a nobility, and the power of the people—then these three powers will watch and keep each other reciprocally in check.

John Locke studied the bloody civil wars in 17th-century England, which pitted the monarchy against Parliament and brought ruin to the people. What system of government could check against those misfortunes? He concluded that what was needed was not a balance among political classes but rather a division among political institutions: legislative, executive, and federative, with the latter representing external affairs. As he explained in Book II of his *Two Treatises of Civil Government* (1690), men discovered methods of restraining any exorbitances of those to whom they had given authority over them and of balancing the power of government by placing several parts of it in different hands. It was a mistake to entrust government functions to a single department: It may be too great a temptation to grasp at power, for the same persons who have the power of making laws to have also in their hands the power to execute them.

In dividing the departments of government, Locke did not attempt a pure separation. The legislative branch could punish the executive for maladministration of the laws, and the executive was empowered to assemble and dismiss the legislature. Locke did not provide for an independent judiciary. Under his system, the judicial function was placed largely under the executive. In 1701, a

decade after the appearance of his political treatise, the Act of Settlement in England helped secure judicial independence by guaranteeing tenure to judges as a reward for their good behavior.

From these studies, one can appreciate how the doctrine of separated power evolved. For early writers on the mixed state, stability came from dividing the sovereign power among three social classes: (1) the king, (2) the nobility, and (3) the common people. In later developments of political thought, authority is allocated by assigning power to three different governmental bodies and expecting them to check one another.

Montesquieu's Influence

There have been frequent claims that the French political theorist Baron de Montesquieu had a profound impact on the American framers and their reliance on separation of powers. Woodrow Wilson (1908) wrote that the framers of the Constitution "followed the scheme as they found it expounded in Montesquieu, followed it with genuine scientific enthusiasm" (p. 56). James Bryce concluded that the U.S. Constitution was created "*de novo*, on the most slender basis of pre-existing national institutions," relying in large part on Montesquieu's seminal work, *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748). According to Bryce (1891), "no general principle of politics laid such hold on the constitution-makers and statesmen of America as the dogma that the separation of these three functions is essential to freedom" (pp. 20, 26).

The American framers did indeed refer to Montesquieu favorably and with great respect. In *Federalist No. 47*, James Madison spoke of "the celebrated Montesquieu" as the "oracle" who was also cited on the separation doctrine (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, & John Jay, 2002, p. 337). There are similarities between Montesquieu's theory and the U.S. Constitution, but the evidence is persuasive that the American framers relied on their practical experiences in the colonies and state government after their break with England. Also, Montesquieu anticipated a far greater separation between the branches than exists in the U.S. Constitution, and he misperceived the British form of government at the time of his study.

In providing for the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, Montesquieu selected the British Constitution as his model and visited London from 1729 to 1731 to study its distribution of powers. As one of several critiques, Frederick Maitland wrote that it was "curious that some political theorists should have seen their favourite ideal, a complete separation of administration from judicative, realised in England; in England of all places in the world, where the two have for ages been inextricably blended" (Kenneth Davis, 1951, p. 28). To Walter Bagehot (1895), the English system represented the "close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers" (p. 78). Montesquieu's model was highly theoretical and failed to pick up political developments in England. Power began to rest in the hands of the Cabinet and leading ministers such as Robert Walpole from 1721 to 1742.

The concept of an independent judiciary, coequal with other branches, owes little to Montesquieu. He did not view the judiciary as a permanent branch. It was to be drawn from the body of the people at different points of the year, as had been the custom in Athens during the time of Socrates. Compared with the legislative and executive branches, Montesquieu called the judiciary to some extent "next to nothing." This framework for the judiciary had little application to the U.S. Constitution, which creates a Supreme Court with permanent jurisdiction and grants its members life tenure.

Montesquieu captured well the tension and checks among the three branches. To form a moderate government, it was necessary to combine the several powers; to regulate, temper, and set them in motion; to give, as it were, ballast to one, in order to enable it to counterpoise the other. Again he stressed how the experience shows us that every person invested with power is apt to abuse it and to carry his or her authority as far as it will go.

The American Experience

Much of what the American framers discovered about the structure of government came from what they learned during the colonial period, their break with England, and efforts under the Continental Congress to develop a form of government that would be both effective administratively

and protective of individual rights. Even during the colonial period, with political power theoretically centered in London, Americans created legislative bodies and assemblies that exercised the rudiments of representative control. When London decided on a stamp tax in 1765 to help pay for the costs of the French and Indian wars, colonial opposition was so intense and bitter that the British government decided to repeal the statute within a year. America had its first taste of political independence and democratic rule.

After declaring their independence from England in 1776, many of the American states wrote into their constitutions explicit provisions for a separation between the branches of government. New Hampshire, the last of the 13 states to form a constitution, recognized that separation could not be so extreme to prevent effective government. The three departments were to be kept

as separate from the independence of each other, as the nature of a free government will admit or as is consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of union and amity. (Francis Thorpe, 1909, p. 2457)

After the break with England, America operated under a single branch of government at the national level: the Continental Congress. Delegates gathered to pass laws, sat in committees to handle administrative duties, and sat on other committees to settle adjudicatory disputes, especially those involving questions of admiralty. By 1781, the burdens were so great that the Congress decided to create a single executive to carry out administrative matters and set up a court of admiralty. Those bodies were not independent. They were creatures of the Congress and subject to legislative control. But more from practicality than theory, the Congress had evolved separate bodies to carry out the functions of government (Louis Fisher, 1972).

By the time of the constitutional convention in Philadelphia in 1787, there was broad agreement among the arriving delegates that the new charter of government must have three branches of government. The structure and operation of the Continental Congress had been thoroughly discredited. It was well said by the historian Francis Wharton (1889) that the Constitution “did not

make this distribution of power. It would be more proper to say that this distribution of power made the Constitution of the United States” (p. 663).

After the convention had drafted the Constitution and adjourned, James Madison confided to Thomas Jefferson that the boundaries between the three powers “consist in many instances of mere shades of difference.” In *Federalist No. 47*, Madison upheld the maxim that tyranny resulted whenever three branches were concentrated in the same hands. However, he charged that the principle had been “totally misconceived and misapplied” (Hamilton et al., 2002, pp. 336–337). Neither in Montesquieu nor the British government were the three powers separated in any pure sense. In turning to the state constitutions, the same pattern of overlapping powers emerged. The intent of Montesquieu, Madison said, could be no more than that in cases where the *whole* power of one department is exercised by the same hands that possess the *whole* power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.

When the draft constitution was released for public discussion and ratification by the states, critics condemned the intermixture of the branches. By 1788, however, the doctrine of separated powers in any pure sense had lost ground to the concept of checks and balances. One contemporary pamphleteer called the separation theory a “hackneyed principle” and a “trite maxim” (Vile, 1967, p. 153). Madison and Hamilton had to contend with those who objected that the branches of government were not separate but blended. The impeachment process, for example, was attacked for combining legislative and judicial powers in the same department. In *Federalist No. 66*, Hamilton argued that the true meaning of the separation maxim was “entirely compatible with a partial intermixture” and that overlapping was “not only proper but necessary to the mutual defence of the several members of the government against each other” (Hamilton et al., 2002, p. 431). For those who objected that the treaty process mixed the executive with the Senate, Hamilton responded wearily in *Federalist No. 75* to “the trite topic of the intermixture of powers” (Hamilton et al., 2002, p. 475).

During the ratification debates, three states (North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) insisted that a separation clause be added to the

national bill of rights. Different proposals were advanced to keep the branches separate and distinct. Among the other items to be included in a bill of rights, the House and the Senate debated the merits of a separation clause. It was finally omitted. Had it been adopted, it would not have affected the blending of departments and powers already sanctioned by the Constitution (Fisher, 1972).

Separation in Practice

The framers of the U.S. Constitution offered general guidance to the structure and operation of government. Much of their efforts could not have anticipated how the three branches would exercise their powers or how the national government would grow in size and dominance. An early dispute concerned the president's power to remove executive officials. In 1789, when the first three executive departments were being created, Madison argued successfully that the president possessed an implied removal power over department heads who prevented him from fulfilling his constitutional duty to see that the laws were faithfully exercised. At the same time, also in 1789, Madison insisted that certain officials who carried out what he considered duties of a "judiciary" nature should not serve at the pleasure of the president, especially when those officials were responsible for determining that federal funds were being spent in accordance with law.

Another restriction on presidential control over the executive branch concerned the distinction between two duties. Some executive officials owed allegiance to the president. Those were political duties. Other responsibilities were to the statutory direction from Congress. Those were legal duties, referred to as "ministerial acts." Over time, courts understood that they could not order officials to fulfill political duties but could compel the discharge of legal duties. Through this development, both legislative and judicial branches became involved in directing the administration of law within the executive branch.

The Constitution does not expressly provide for the power of judicial review, allowing courts to strike down as invalid the actions of the states, Congress, and the president. Judicial review evolved as another implied power, invoked in the

1803 case of *Marbury v. Madison*. A sentence in that decision later came to be interpreted as "judicial supremacy," meaning that a U.S. Supreme Court ruling had finality and could not be challenged or overridden by the other branches. Yet nothing in the sentence implies any level of finality: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." This means that courts decide cases, not that what they say is the "last word."

In studying other governments and constitutions, the framers concluded that single executives had involved their countries in wars not for the national interest but for reasons of personal fame and ambition. In *Federalist No. 4*, John Jay warned,

It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting any thing by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military glory.

Those motivations led a ruler "to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people" (Hamilton et al., 2002, p. 101).

The framers understood that British theorists such as John Locke and William Blackstone vested the responsibility for foreign affairs and war with the executive. The U.S. Constitution assigns none of those powers to the president (foreign commerce, making treaties, appointing ambassadors, declaring war, or issuing letters of marque and reprisal). They are either assigned exclusively to Congress or shared between the president and the Senate (treaties and appointments). From 1789 to 1950, all major wars were either declared or authorized by Congress. The president had no independent authority to take the country from a state of peace to a state of war. However, President Harry Truman in 1950 ordered U.S. troops to Korea without ever coming to Congress for statutory authority. Since that time, other presidents have also claimed the right to engage the country in war without legislative authority, seeking "authority" instead from the United Nations Security Council or from countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Truman was also the first president to use not only express, implied, and emergency power but what has been called “inherent” authority—powers that somehow inhere in the nature of an office and supposedly are not subject to checks and balances from other branches. In claiming that power in 1952 when seizing steel mills to prosecute the war in Korea, Truman was rebuffed by the federal judiciary. Other presidents, including Richard Nixon and George W. Bush, cited inherent authority to justify their actions but typically encountered defeat in both the courts and Congress.

Over the past 6 decades, Congress has often failed to defend its constitutional powers over war and spending. It has repeatedly deferred to presidential initiatives. In this manner and others, the three branches have not had what the framers assumed they would: the incentive to fight off encroachments and protect their institutional powers. When checks and balances are weak, political institutions gain powers that exceed constitutional limits and threaten individual rights and liberties. To the framers, individual freedoms depended mainly not on courts acting as guardians or the president acting in the “national interest” but on the structural checks supplied by the separation of powers.

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See also Democracy, Theories of; Executive; Judiciary; Locke, John; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Parliamentary Systems; Parliaments; Representation

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SIGNALING GAMES

See Game Theory

SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION MODELING

Ordinary least squares (OLS), along with its cousins such as probit, is the workhorse method of empirical political science. Starting with, as usual, the linear model,

$$y = a + \beta x + \theta z + \varepsilon, \quad (1)$$

OLS is a fine way of estimating β and θ as long as x and z are exogenous. An explanatory variable is exogenous if whatever statistical process determines it does not depend on the statistical process that determines either the dependent variable or the error term. If an explanatory variable is not exogenous (and so is said to be endogenous), then OLS has severe problems. These problems are typically worse than for other forms of misspecification and do not disappear as the sample size grows. Endogeneity issues cannot be fixed by the usual tweaks to OLS (generalized least squares); different estimation methods are required.

Predetermined socioeconomic characteristics are, by definition, exogenous. Beyond a few simple variables (physical characteristics of people or

countries), the argument that a variable is exogenous must be made theoretically and must be made relative to the dependent variable of interest. Thus, for example, if we believe that democracy is exogenous to economic development, a regression of economic development on democracy yields meaningful results; but we need some theory to know that democracy is exogenous—that is, that it is not the case that increased wealth leads to more democracy. Empirical results are conditional on this assumption; the assumption of exogeneity *cannot* be tested empirically.

Suppose, for example, that we are interested in explaining attitudes toward political candidates. Let y be a measure of how much one likes a political candidate and x be a measure of how close the candidate is to the voter on various issues. It may be the case that voters who like a candidate more are more likely to perceive the candidate as being close to them on issues, so x may not be exogenous. If x is endogenous to y , it is well known that OLS can be badly biased, and these problems persist even with huge sample sizes (i.e., OLS is not even consistent). The solution, worked out in the 1940s by various Nobel Prize-winning econometricians associated with the Cowles Foundation, is to estimate a series of simultaneous equations for both x and y .

Thus, for two equations, if x determines y but y also determines x , we can write

$$y = \beta x + \theta z + \varepsilon \quad (2)$$

$$x = \gamma y + \kappa w + \zeta, \quad (3)$$

where z and w are exogenous and ε and ζ are error terms that may well be correlated with each other (but separately satisfy the usual Gauss-Markov conditions). One issue is what method is best for estimating the various model parameters; but a more fundamental issue is whether it is even possible to estimate these parameters. The latter is called the identification problem.

Identification

The identification issue is critical, and dealing with it comes before any estimation issue. The basic question is whether more than one set of parameter estimates is *equally* consistent with the data; almost

always, if more than one set of estimates is consistent with the data, an infinite number of estimates are consistent with the data. In such cases, the model is not identified. In this situation, even if we were sure we had ideal estimates of the parameters, someone else could have equally ideal but different parameter estimates. This problem does not arise with models typically estimated via OLS (but only because we assume away the problem by assuming that all explanatory variables are exogenous) but is always a potential issue with simultaneous equation models. A simple example shows the problem.

Suppose we have an infinite amount of data, so there is no statistical uncertainty. Consider the model where x determines y and vice versa but nothing else. We run our favorite computer program and obtain, say,

$$y = 2x + 3 + \varepsilon \quad (4)$$

$$x = -y + 2 + \zeta. \quad (5)$$

Nothing can prevent us from adding the two equations together, giving, after simplification,

$$y = \frac{x}{2} + \frac{5}{2} + [\varepsilon + \zeta]. \quad (6)$$

Since the compound error in brackets looks like a perfectly good error term (remember that the errors in the equations may be correlated), if we are sure that $\beta = 2$, we are just as sure that $\beta = 1/2$, and similarly for the second equation. This is the unidentified situation, and no amount of fancy estimation will help.

If both equations contain the same additional exogenous variables, there is nothing to prevent adding of the two equations together to mimic the original equation but with different coefficients. But suppose that theory tells us that there is some *exogenous* z that belongs in the first equation but not in the second equation, and the opposite for a different exogenous w . Then, we cannot add the equations together without making either y depend on w or x depend on z . These conditions must be given by theory, since if they are not correct, the system is not identified and so estimation cannot proceed.

For our example, we might have liking for a candidate depend on whether one shares one's ethnicity with that candidate (but where theory

tells us that ethnicity does not affect how close the candidate is to the voter on the issues, a very strong assumption) and closeness on the issues affected by the voter's occupation (which would not be expected to directly affect how much the voter likes a candidate but might affect issue positions). These are strong assumptions, but without these or similar assumptions the system is not identified and empirical research cannot proceed. Sometimes the correct conclusion is that theory is inadequate for identification; other times theory allows further empirical work. (Resorting to OLS does not solve the problem, since this would imply, incorrectly, that x is exogenous.)

We can check to see if a system is identified by counting the number of exogenous and endogenous variables in each equation. An exogenous variable is excluded from an equation if it is used in the system but does not appear in that equation. An equation is identified if it has at least as many excluded exogenous variables as it has included endogenous variables. If this condition is met exactly, the system is said to be exactly identified; if there are more excluded exogenous variables than included endogenous variables, the system is said to be overidentified. It is possible that some equations are identified, some overidentified, and others not identified. Obviously, we can say nothing about the parameter estimates of the unidentified equations. For the others, we can proceed to estimation.

It is possible to test where the restrictions that overidentify a system are valid, but the restrictions to test where a system is just identified must be justified purely theoretically. It is possible for a system to be weakly identified, where the excluded exogenous variables in an equation have only a weak effect in equations where they are theoretically included. This leads to problems similar to those of underidentification. Weak theory is inadequate for identification purposes.

Two-Stage Least Squares

There are many good ways to estimate a system of simultaneous equations, but by and far the most common is two-stage least squares (2SLS). 2SLS works because we can always solve the system of equations to get each endogenous variable to be a linear function of all (included and excluded) exogenous variables. This is called the reduced

form of the system. Each of the equations of the reduced form can be well estimated by OLS, since all the explanatory variables in each equation of the reduced form are exogenous.

The first stage of 2SLS estimates the reduced form. Each of these OLS estimations (one for each endogenous variable) is used to predict the values of the endogenous variables as a function of the exogenous variables in the usual way. These predicted values then replace the endogenous variables in a second OLS regression (equation by equation). This provides good estimates of the coefficients of the system of equations. If we just do two OLS regressions, the estimated standard errors will be wrong, but any computer package will automate the process and provide the correct standard errors. There are other ways of estimating simultaneous equation models, but none are great improvements over 2SLS.

Simultaneous Equations Today

After the initial burst of enthusiasm, the estimation of systems of simultaneous equations in political science (and in social science, in general) is today rarely done. While there are a number of reasons for this (including the rise of other research methodologies for assessing complex causal situations), probably the main one is that it is hard to find strong theory to allow for the identification of the entire system.

Over the past decade or so, there has been a huge increase in the use of instrumental variables. This focuses attention on a single equation of interest where one or more explanatory variables of interest are endogenous. Researchers then look for instruments that are simply exogenous variables that explain the endogenous explanatory variables but do not explain the dependent variable directly. This method is identical to 2SLS, except for the focus on only one outcome variable. Often it is easier to find variables that we believe explain one or more endogenous explanatory variables but do not explain the prime dependent variable of interest. Thus, 2SLS has again become a critical tool but one that lives on under another name. Note that instrumental variables have exactly the same identification issues as do simultaneous equations (except that we are interested in only one equation, not the whole system), and the

estimation method is exactly the same as 2SLS. The various issues discussed above thus continue to be critical.

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See also Causality; Misspecification; Model Specification; Statistics: Overview; Variables, Instrumental

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SOCIAL CAPITAL

The central premise of social capital is that social ties have value. The term *social capital* refers to the collective value of all social networks and the inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each other. In other words, social capital refers to the people we know and the norms of reciprocity that exist between us. The notion of social capital, therefore, emphasizes a wide variety of specific benefits that flow from the trust, reciprocity, information, and cooperation associated with social networks. In this way, value is created for people who are connected and, at least sometimes, for bystanders as well. This entry reviews the concept of social capital by unpacking its perspectives and components as well as assessing its implications in social, economic, and political arenas.

This simple definition of social capital serves a number of purposes. First, rather than focusing on the consequences of social capital, it concentrates on the sources thereof and recognizes that the features of social capital, namely, trust and reciprocity, are developed in an iterative process. Second, this definition includes the different dimensions of social capital and acknowledges that communities can have varied access to each dimension. Third, it

identifies community as the primary unit of analysis, while conceding that individuals and households can appropriate social capital. As a result, the notion of social capital has become an influential theoretical concept in the analysis of contemporary social and economic development, and change and cohesion in various societies, communities, and groups. In addition, social capital is related to the description and explanation of social action. While it features in much academic and interdisciplinary discourse, including political science, economics, sociology, and social anthropology, it also has parallels with political agendas, social and economic development and, more recently, social policy development. This has to a large extent become visible in the influence of international bodies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in defining research areas as well as structuring the debate surrounding social issues related to the analysis of social capital.

Social Capital: Different Types and Perspectives

The wide variation of interest in the concept of social capital is partly evident in early works by Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman and was popularized by the most widely recognized proponent of social capital, Robert Putnam. The focus of social capital for each of these authors lies on networks and relationships as a resource; however, they have done so in different ways. This conceptualization of the role of social relationships in development marks a significant departure from earlier theoretical approaches and as such has direct implications for contemporary development research and policy. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish between the four perspectives on social capital, which identify the types of social capital in different ways.

The Communitarian View

The communitarian perspective equates social capital with mostly informal and local horizontal associations, such as clubs and civic groups. The focus of this perspective lies in the number and density of these local organizations and associations within a community. The basic premise for communitarians is that social capital is essentially good and the more social capital that is present in

a given community, the more positive its effect on that community's welfare. Critics of this view, however, have pointed to *perverse* social capital, which exists in communities that are isolated or parochial. Furthermore, this perspective implicitly assumes that communities are homogeneous and strive to achieve the society's collective interest; however, racial and ethnic exclusion, inequality, and gender discrimination are only a few examples that suggest otherwise. This downside of social capital has the potential to hinder development.

The Networks View

The networks view is a more nuanced perspective on social capital as it stresses the importance of vertical and hierarchical as well as horizontal associations between people and also attempts to account for relations within and among organizational entities such as community groups and firms. This view also distinguishes between two types of social capital, namely, *bonding* and *bridging* social capital. The former refers to strong intracommunity ties that provide families and communities with a common purpose and a sense of identity, while the latter refers to weak intercommunity ties, namely, those that cross social and cultural ties such as gender, class, race, ethnicity, religion, and socioeconomic status, which can form the basis for sectarian interests.

The networks view has two key propositions. The first proposition is that, although social capital can provide a range of services for the members of a community, there are potential negative economic consequences resulting from the costs that these ties can place on the noneconomic claims of a member's commitment. The second proposition is that a distinction needs to be made between the sources of social capital and the consequences derived from them. Thus, to make claims with regard to the efficacy of social capital, the network view acknowledges the necessity of both strong intercommunity ties and weak extracommunity networks and that the range of outcomes associated with social capital are attributable to the different combinations of these two dimensions. The strength of this view lies in its ability to engage in policy discussion based on empirical evidence and assessments of contending explanations. A clear challenge, however, lies in retaining the integrity of

the many positive aspects of bonding social capital while trying to ensure increased access to formal institutions and facilitating a diverse stock of bridging social capital.

The Institutional View

The third perspective on social capital builds from the first two perspectives, adding formalized national structures to the mix. The basic premise of this view is that the legal, institutional, and political environment facilitates the strength of civil society and community networks and that social capital is regarded as a dependent variable—in contrast to the communitarian and network views, where social capital is regarded as an independent variable. The institutional approach stresses two points: first, that social groups' capacity to act in accordance with collective interests depends on the quality of their formal institutions and, second, that the performance and effectiveness of the state and firms are dependent on their internal credibility and competence as well as their external accountability to civil society.

There are two primary approaches to research from this view. The first approach employs case studies that are based on comparative history and postulates that civil society is only able to thrive to the extent to which the state encourages it. The second approach adopts quantitative cross-national techniques to measure the impact of social divisions and government performance on economic performance. The ability of this view to address macroeconomic policy concerns is its greatest strength as well as its weakness in that it fails at a microeconomic level.

The Synergy View

The fourth and most recent perspective on social capital, the synergy view, encompasses an integration of the work from the networks and institutional views and focuses primarily on conditions that may foster developmental synergies. This approach identifies *complementarity*—mutually supportive relations between various private and public actors that are embodied in legal frameworks—and *embeddedness*—the nature of and the extent to which ties connect citizens and public officials—as the basis for synergy between government and citizen action. In

other words, this approach can only work when the actions of public officials are embodied by performance-oriented organizational environments that are credible and competent.

The synergy view can be used for three fundamental functions: (1) to identify the nature of a community's social relationships and formal institutions as well as the extent of the interaction between them; (2) to develop institutional strategies on the basis of these social relations, with particular reference to the two types of social capital—namely, bonding and bridging social capital; and (3) to determine the ways in which the positive manifestations of social capital can counteract isolationism, sectarianism, and corruption.

The four perspectives on social capital thus differ in terms of the unit of analysis that each focuses on; their treatment of social capital as a dependent, independent, or mediating variable; and the extent to which they integrate state theory. However, the four perspectives on social capital also have a number of common features: They all link the social, economic, and political spheres; they all recognize that social relationships can improve development outcomes and that these outcomes are dependent on the horizontal versus hierarchical relationships and broader political and legal context; they all recognize how the formal and informal organization of the relationships between economic agents can improve economic activities; and all infer that desirable social relationships and formal institutions have positive externalities.

Components of Social Capital: Networks, Norms, and Trust

Definitions of social capital vary considerably, and this becomes problematic when trying to establish a set of indicators for measuring social capital or in reaching a consensus on the best ways of measuring the concept. To date, census data of groups and associational memberships in a given society and survey data measuring levels of trust and civic engagement have been the two broadest approaches taken. Producing anything similar to that of a census of a society's stock of social capital could be described as practically and logistically impossible because it would rely on the multiplication of numbers that are nonexistent or subjectively estimated. Surveys on trust and civic engagement are the

other source of data that has been widely used as a proxy for social capital.

Social capital exists in two methodological dimensions: one qualitative and one quantitative. The quantitative dimension is simply the number of social contacts that people within a society have. The more the social networks to which people have access, and the more extensive those social networks are, the more social capital a society has. Extensive and varied networks are an asset in almost all situations, and such social contacts need not be strong or deep on the personal level. As noted previously, there is also strength in organizations and societies distinguished by extensive weak ties. However, this quantitative dimension alone is inadequate for the analysis of social capital and its components. In addition to the sheer number of social contacts, we need to add the quality of those contacts. The reason for this is obvious: It cannot be an asset to know a lot of people whom you cannot trust or tolerate. Networks alone thus do not have value. Instead, the value of contacts and networks depends on the quality of relations—trust and tolerance—within these networks. The concept of social capital can be measured by a wide range of indicators. Most empirical researchers have made contributions with regard to three of the core elements or components of social capital, namely, the number of voluntary organizations (networks) that individuals are actively engaged in, tolerance, and trust.

Networks

Two approaches have been used to measure social networks, the most common of which has been a structural analysis whereby the focus rests on formal associational membership as opposed to informal social ties. Most empirical research has relied on data from longitudinal surveys tracking the trends in associational membership; however, these are often limited to a small number of sectors, such as religious organizations (church, etc.) and labor unions. Subsequently, the official records of membership in voluntary organizations such as sports and social clubs and humanitarian societies have been the focus of most historical institutional studies.

The importance of associational membership, for some authors, rests with its capacity to act as a

proxy indicator for both the structural features and the cultural norms of social capital—that is, social networks as well as trust and cooperation. Macrolevel trends, or trends at the societal level, are often investigated among a number of voluntary organizations such as sports or recreation clubs, arts and cultural societies, and professional associations; however, the challenge has been to measure the extent to which associational membership in these organizations is able to generate and facilitate tolerance, reciprocal cooperation, and social trust, which are the components of social capital.

Although earlier works regarded formal associational membership as proxy indicators of social networks, the significance and value of informal social ties as a means to generate and facilitate the norms of reciprocity, mutual trust, and tolerance, as opposed to card-carrying membership, are widely recognized and gaining momentum. In other words, although formal associational membership is regarded as a strong indicator of societal networking, it is only one such indicator and not necessarily the most important.

Tolerance

Tolerance is consistently related to perceptions of threat and one's willingness to put up with others who are perceived as the least liked. To tolerate is to allow something from which one recoils, which one considers unacceptable and would prefer not to identify with, and is a disposition directed at an object of aversion or dislike. Tolerance entails the forbearance to admit, to accommodate, to put up with, and to overcome the hostility generated by dislike. Intolerance emerges when revulsion finds expression in prejudice and hostility.

In a democracy, tolerance requires one to accept that one's political opponents, even one's enemies, have the right to participate in a contest for power under the principled assumption that they might win the contest and assume power, albeit limited and constrained by the rule of law. Within a multicultural context, it is to accept as fellow and equal citizens those people who hold cultural beliefs and practices rooted in values that may be unfamiliar, and even incompatible with, and offensive to one's own cultural beliefs. Such allowance may take the

form of *negative* tolerance, which amounts to forbearance by way of ignoring, avoiding, and disengaging with the object of tolerance. In this case, tolerance entails having to grit your teeth and to “grin and bear it.” *Positive* tolerance, by contrast, is based on the principled assumption of being able “to agree to disagree,” which allows opponents to engage with rather than shun one another.

Tolerance is considered an essential requisite for democracy as it is required for the effective functioning of the competitive processes of representative democracy, as well as the effective maintenance and deepening of a doctrine and practice of human rights. Representation is achieved through elections by organized political parties, who compete for the popular vote. Competition occurs as parties present different campaign promises to the voters and vie for the voters' preference by showing their policy positions to be superior to those of others. This is a process of comparative evaluation that can be stressful, as personalities and the personal virtues and weaknesses of candidates become easily enmeshed with ostensibly dispassionate policy differences.

Policy differences themselves can also become matters of intense contestation when high interest-based stakes are involved in the election outcomes. Tolerance is needed in such intense contests, as the liberal model of democracy prescribes that all such actions be conducted within the boundaries of law and the rule of law. Opponents are to be defeated at the ballot box, not eliminated from the political arena. Winners must bear with losers, and both need to be prepared to face up to one another again and again in subsequent contests. And the arena of contestation itself, with its constraining laws, has to be maintained.

The functioning of human rights doctrines also requires tolerance from citizens. Rights, as special claims against the state or other civic bodies or other citizens, function alongside one another, and unless a clear hierarchy of rights is established, such rights hold equal claims against one another. The advancement of any right by a citizen then becomes contingent on its not being infringed on by the claims advanced by other rights holders. Constant litigation becomes one way of dealing with rival claims, but for the effective functioning of society on a regular basis, tolerance becomes essential as an operating norm.

Trust

Trust in any person emerges from a prior conviction that that particular person holds no malevolent intentions toward one and is not intent on willful exploitation of or doing harm or damage to oneself. Trust is a disposition toward others that follows from their reputation for reliability, honesty, and integrity. A person is trusted by others to the extent that these others have confidence in the commitments made by the said person—that is, when predicted, expected, and promised outcomes do in fact materialize accordingly. Such trust can be directed or dispersed. If dispersed, it is referred to as generalized trust and is indicative of an individual's overall worldview of other people. If directed, trust is a disposition that addresses clearly demarcated categories of people.

Democracy requires both political trust and interpersonal trust. Political trust is directed at institutions of power. In a liberal democracy these are, in the first instance, the institutions of political representation, which elected representatives occupy after having contested free and fair elections. In electoral contests, promises are made thick and fast, and trusting voters cast their ballots on the expectation that such promises will be kept and duly executed by the newly elected rulers. But liberalism limits the kinds of promises politicians can offer to the electorate. For example, human rights doctrines proscribe promises to exterminate one's opponents after the election or even to limit their human rights. On the contrary, an inbuilt, implicit promise of each and every politician has to be that the rule of law, the doctrine and practice of liberal rights, and the procedural as well as substantive commitments entailed therein are going to be upheld. Without a certain threshold level of trust in politicians that such system maintenance will take place, the legitimacy of the entire liberal democratic regime is open to question.

Interpersonal trust is also of vital importance to the maintenance of democratic regimes. As is the case with political trust, interpersonal trust entails the confidence that certain expectations about the behavior of others will actually materialize. In interpersonal relations such a reputation for reliability is usually vested in the knowledge that people have of one another and of the personal traits that are attributed to others on the basis of such knowledge or are explicitly or implicitly

derived from it. It is, therefore, not a generalized but a directed form of trust. People who know one another personally and meet on a daily basis have the best opportunity to gain the knowledge necessary for establishing trustworthiness.

Family, friends, and community relations form this inner core of interpersonal relations, from which reputations for reliability can be established and from which so-called thick trust can be established. Slightly less intimate relations in the form of shared values and cultural practices (such as religion) as well as presumed kinship relations that together form the basis of ethnic identities provide another source of knowledge for thick trust. *Thin* trust, by contrast, is established between strangers and may even be typified by the very absence of overt socially shared denominators such as language, religion, or heritage. Such trust is established on the basis of ongoing joint engagement in projects and/or more formally shared identities, such as corporate membership or, at the national level, citizenship. Both these kinds of trust are required for the maintenance of a liberal society. Thick trust cements families and households, the core social units from which overall social cohesion is constructed and the primary units of general and political socialization. Thin trust is needed to bridge larger social divisions in society and is required for very large projects of collaborative endeavor such as socioeconomic development, which typify modernizing societies.

Both kinds of interpersonal trust, as well as political trust, are ultimately established under conditions of imperfect information, albeit at varying levels, and require an element of risk taking. The trusting person is always vulnerable to exploitation. The classic liberal conviction argues that such risk taking is warranted because of the presumed reasonableness of people and of their ability to sense that they can pursue their own interests in collaboration with others rather than in perpetual opposition to them. And liberals assume reciprocity—that is, that other citizens will calculate likewise. One way of minimizing such risk in emergent liberal societies, and the attendant vulnerability of trusting citizens, has been to establish an extensive set of explicit rules within which to construct the liberal “open society.” The fundamental rules are those found in human rights charters, usually

embodied in a rigid formal constitution and backed up by an independent judiciary within a constitutional state to oversee its maintenance and implementation.

Conclusion

In essence, social capital is a multidisciplinary concept that has a growing influence over ideas in health science, urban studies, regional studies, social policy, criminology, business studies, and social and economic geography and history. It is a concept that has captured the imagination of policymakers and professionals in many fields and has influenced research and theory right across the social sciences.

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See also Civil Society; Networks; Social Cohesion; Tolerance; Trust, Social; World Bank

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SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY

The theory of social choice aims to explain collective outcomes as derived from individual decisions and institutional rules. The founding contributions in the 1950s and 1960s eroded a previously unquestioned confidence in the capability of certain common aggregative procedures, including majority rule, to guarantee consistent social choices satisfying individuals' preferences. According to several "impossibility" theorems, no decision procedure can guarantee social choices fulfilling some apparently simple requirements of fairness, but all of them are vulnerable to strategic manipulation and may produce arbitrary or unstable results. This entry discusses the history, problems, and current applications of social choice theory.

The problem of aggregation of individual preferences into a social welfare function or a collective decision by voting led to revisions of certain traditional utilitarian assumptions in welfare economics and democratic theory. The study of institutions, decisions, and voting rules became of paramount interest to explain inefficiencies and undesirable collective results. In more recent developments, social choice theorists have also contributed to distributive justice theory by approaching classical topics such as auctions, negotiations, fair division, and other resource allocation procedures. The explanation of unsatisfactory social choices provides room for normative concerns of better institutional and mechanism design.

In a foundational theorem, Kenneth Arrow proposes a set of normative conditions to make a social choice acceptable. They include, for individual preferences, (a) transitivity or internal consistency (if somebody prefers A to B and B to C, he must prefer A to C) and (b) universal domain, or admission of all preferences without previous restrictions. For social choices, his conditions are (a) monotonicity, or the requirement of a consistent relation between individuals' preferences and the social choice (which contains the Pareto criterion favoring unanimous decisions); (b) independence of the social choice from individual preferences regarding irrelevant alternatives that cannot win; and (c) "no dictatorship," or the nonexistence of an automatically decisive actor. According to Arrow's

theorem, no decision rule can fulfill all these conditions all the time.

A typical example of inconsistency and instability is the so-called Condorcet cycle. Assume that three voters, A, B, and C, have different preferences over three alternatives, X, Y, and Z, as shown in these profiles:

A: $X > Y > Z$

B: $Y > Z > X$

C: $Z > X > Y$,

where “ $>$ ” means “is preferred to.”

If we apply majority rule to comparisons of the three alternatives by pairs, we find that X is socially preferred by majority to Y (because a majority formed by A and C prefers X to Y), Y is preferred to Z (because A and B prefer Y to Z), and Z is preferred to X (because B and C prefer Z to X). Thus, we have a cycle of successive social choices: $X > Y > Z > X$. Even if the individual preferences are complete and transitive, the social choice by majority rule is not transitive but is unpredictable—in practice, any choice would be arbitrary and potentially unstable.

However, this and other paradoxes do not mean that all social choices made by majority or any other rule are never fair or always arbitrary and, thus, vulnerable to instability. They mean that no decision rule can guarantee that, under any distribution of individuals’ preferences, the social choice will always fulfill a set of normative conditions. In particular, the distribution of preferences in the above example is prone to haphazard results because it implies that the alternatives are located on two “dimensions” (since some of the preferences are and some are not consistent with the alphabetical order). Generally, it is not the case that social choices are always unstable but that they can be unstable. In further developments, certain conditions regarding individuals’ preferences have been identified that guarantee consistent and stable social choices. Many exercises to test instability have used simulations in which an “impartial culture” or “random society” involving an equal probability of each conceivable individual order of preferences is assumed. This assumption, however, maximizes the probability of inconsistent and unstable social choices.

An alternative is to relax the founding theorems’ prescription that no restrictions should be imposed on individuals’ preferences (or “universal domain”). Specifically, a sufficient (although not necessary) condition for social choice stability is the single-peakedness of individual preference curves, which is formally equivalent to the condition that all individuals’ preferences can be ordered along a single linear dimension (e.g., the left–right axis). More in tune, it has been found that arbitrary and potentially unstable social choices are more likely the higher the dispersion of individuals’ preferences (the proportion of multipeaked individual curves or the number of issue dimensions) and the dispersion of alternatives (the number of alternatives and the distance between them).

These contributions suggest the advantages of relatively harmonious societies in producing consistent and stable social choices, even with potentially manipulable procedures. Yet the restriction of relevant preferences may also result from the decision process itself, ultimately depending on the institutional rules of the game.

Institutional Rules

A subsequent line of research promoted by social choice theory attempts to evaluate the relative performance of different institutional and decision rules in satisfying individuals’ preferences and producing acceptable social choices. The impossibility theorems tell us that it is impossible to guarantee fair and stable social choices with any rule. But certain rules tend to produce inconsistent choices more frequently than others. In a world of uncertainty, the likelihood of consistency and stability may be a useful guide to institutional evaluation and design.

With these lenses, some decision procedures based on the majority principle can be reviewed. The spatial theory of voting shows that if there are only two alternatives along a single issue or value dimension (e.g., the left–right axis), majority rule tends to make the alternative closer to the median voter’s preference the social choice. By definition, the median voter—that is, the voter whose preference is located in an intermediate position with less than half of the voters on each of the two sides—is always necessary to form a consistent majority on a single dimension. Since the median position has

the property of minimizing the sum of the distances from all other positions, the winner by majority rule in a two-alternative contest can not only be stable but also minimizes aggregate distance from all individual preferences and thus maximizes social utility.

However, this model relies on two strong assumptions: only two alternatives and a single-dimensional issue space. If the set of alternatives submitted to majority decision is not bound, interested actors can manipulate the social choice by the introduction of new alternatives—such as a party or candidate's platform that includes a “package” of proposals on several issues—or new issue or value dimensions. If there are more than two alternatives, even in a single-dimensional space, no alternative may obtain more than half the votes, thus making majority rule indecisive and unable to produce a social choice. In a multidimensional space, even with only two alternatives, the majority winner can be unpredictable, depending on which issue or value takes higher salience in voter choice; in the long term, there can be a series of successive winners relying on different salient issues and values, with no foreseeable “trajectory.”

Several procedures loosely related to the majority principle can then be adopted. With plurality or relative majority rule, the winner is the alternative that obtains a higher number of votes than any other alternative while not requiring a particular proportion of votes. It guarantees a winner (except for a tie), but it may imply minority support. For example, the winner by simple plurality rule among three alternatives may be the one most rejected by an absolute majority of voters having split their votes among the other two alternatives. From a social choice perspective, simple plurality is usually considered the least desirable decision rule.

The procedure of majority runoff requires an absolute majority of votes in the first round of voting, while in a second round the choice can be reduced to the two alternatives receiving the highest number of votes in the first round, so as to secure majority support for the winner. Majority-preferential or instant-runoff voting also requires an absolute majority of voters' first preferences, while successive counts of further preferences are made to find an alternative with majority support. In contrast to what can happen with plurality rule, these procedures prevent the most rejected alternative

from winning, since if it has not been eliminated at the first round, it will be defeated at the second round.

However, with both plurality and majority-runoff rules, the median voter's preference can be defeated or eliminated in the first or successive rounds. This implies that the nonmedian winner by any of these procedures might be defeated by another alternative by absolute majority if the choice between the two were available. These procedures are, thus, dependent on irrelevant alternatives; they encourage strategies aimed at altering the number of alternatives, such as “divide and win” and “merge and win,” as well as nonsincere or strategic votes in favor of a less preferred but more likely to win alternative.

Additional voting procedures based on the majority principle were invented by several Christian philosophers and enlightened academics. The 13th-century Catalan philosopher Ramon Llull and the 18th-century French Marquis de Condorcet almost concurred in proposing variants of pairwise comparisons. By these procedures, an election requires multiple rounds of voting between all possible pairs of alternatives. In Llull's version, the winner is the alternative having won the greatest number of pairwise comparisons, while in Condorcet's version, an alternative is required to win all pairwise comparisons—that is, the majority winner is the alternative able to win by majority against every other alternative. When the alternatives are perceived by the voters as ordered along a single linear dimension, the winner by Condorcet procedure is always the one preferred by the median voter. The Condorcet winner can be considered highly satisfactory for the electorate and can be used as a positive reference for comparison with the results obtained with other procedures. However, in multidimensional spaces, such an alternative may not exist, as shown with the example at the beginning of this entry.

Another sophisticated procedure, known as rank order count, was devised independently by both the 15th-century German Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa and the 18th-century French academic Jean-Charles de Borda. This procedure requires that the voter order all the alternatives and award them 1, 2, 3, and more points, ranking them from the least to the most preferred. The winner is the alternative that has collected the highest sum of

points. The “Borda winner” can also be considered highly satisfactory for the electorate and can be used as a normative reference. Yet this voting procedure can be manipulated because some voters can award lower points to rival alternatives than would actually correspond to their sincere preferences in order to prevent their victory. For this reason, Cusanus warned that electors should “act according to conscience,” and Borda remarked that his procedure was conceived “only for honest men.” Nevertheless, the likelihood of making a sincere loser a strategic winner is lower the higher the differences in votes and ranks between the two alternatives, as had already been shown by the Spanish mathematician Joseph Isidoro Morales in Seville in the late 18th century.

Approval voting has also remote origins in medieval times. It allows the voters to vote for those alternatives that they consider acceptable, from a minimum of one to a maximum of all minus one, and the alternative with a plurality of votes becomes the winner. Approval voting tends to produce broadly consensual social choices. Yet it is still vulnerable to strategic manipulation since voters with information regarding others’ preferences and whose preferred alternatives have wide support can concentrate their votes on one or a few alternatives and present their intermediate preferences as unacceptable.

Finally, according to classical utilitarian assumptions about cardinal utilities, as presented by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham in the early 19th century, range voting gives voters the opportunity to give different numbers of votes (or scores) to alternatives. As voters have both the incentive and the opportunity to provide detailed information about their preferences, this procedure may produce the most satisfactory outcome for the greatest number of voters. All in all, the aforementioned procedures tend to produce results that are more consistent with individuals’ preferences than plurality rule.

Certain formal findings in voting theory can also enlighten performances of institutional formulas implying different degrees of fusion or division of powers. According to spatial theory, the “single-package” social choice in a policy “space” formed by multiple issues and dimensions can be highly unpredictable, as mentioned. This may correspond to single-party parliamentary regimes, as well as presidential regimes with a president’s party majority in the assembly, where a single election may become decisive for all the multiple policy issues that may enter the government’s agenda. These institutional frameworks tend to produce relatively changing and unstable policies.

By contrast, in multiparty elections producing coalition cabinets, different issues, roughly corresponding to different portfolios, can be dealt with separately on single-issue spaces. Also, in regimes of separation of powers, each separate election for a different office can focus on one or a few issues and favor the consistency and stability of social choices. In these institutional frameworks, each issue can be the subject of a broad multiparty or interinstitutional agreement around the median voter’s position, which can preclude drastic changes and induce policy stability in the mid- or long term.

A Model of Social Choice

A simple geometrical model can illustrate the relevance of social choice models for the analysis of institutions and their performance. Let us use the simplest case of an electorate composed of three voters with different preferences (or three voters’ groups with the same preferences and a similar number of members). If the voters’ preferences can be located on a single-issue dimension, such as A, B, and C on the horizontal axis in Figure 1, the median voters’ preference, B, may win any election by majority rule against each of the other alternatives.




Figure 1 A Single-Dimensional Electorate

If, alternatively, there are two issue dimensions, the three voters, A, B, and C, can hold different preferences on Issue 1 (a_1 , b_1 , and c_1) and on Issue 2 (a_2 , b_2 , and c_2), as presented in Figure 2. Then different institutional formulas involving separate and joint elections can produce different social choices. Let us assume, first, that there are two separate elections for different offices, such as congress and presidency or two chambers in parliament, dealing with different sets of issues or issue dimensions. On each separate election, the intermediate alternative close to the median voter is advantaged and may win. In Figure 2, b_1 wins in the election on Issue 1, and a_2 wins in the election on Issue 2. The social choice is represented by the intersection point of the winning positions on each issue, b_1 - a_2 . As can be seen, the social choice of separate elections on different issues under the above assumptions is a somewhat centrist point located inside the minimal set containing all voters' preferences, or the Pareto set (the triangle ABC in the figure).

Now, let us assume, alternatively, that the social choice on all the issues is made in a single election, as would correspond to a simple institutional

framework, such as a unicameral parliamentary regime by plurality rule. The institutional setting forces the voters to choose, not between alternatives on separate issues but between packages of alternatives on all the issues at the same time. The set of possible winners, or win set, in such a joint election depends on the status quo. Let us adopt the hypothesis that the status quo is the social choice previously produced by two separate elections, the point b_1 - a_2 in Figure 2. The set of possible winners in a single, two-dimensional election from this point is represented by the multipetal shaded area in the figure. This is formed by circular indifference curves around the voters' preferences and crossing the status quo. It is assumed that every voter prefers the alternatives that are closer to the voter's preference and in particular prefers those inside the indifference curve to those outside. Accordingly, the set of possible majority winners in a joint election is formed by all the points at which a majority of voters (any majority of two voters out of three in the example) is more satisfied than they would be in the status quo; that is, the win set is formed by the intersections of pairs of indifference curves.




Figure 2 Joint and Separate Elections

As can be seen, the set of possible winners in a joint election is relatively large, which makes the prediction of results difficult. A number of possible social choices are located outside the Pareto set and even beyond the rank of voters' preferences (e.g., the set includes some points located beyond the extreme preference, b_2 , on Issue 2). The possibility that many different alternatives can win may generate instability in a series of successive social choices, since any winning point can be further beaten by some other point in the corresponding win set. This analysis allows us to state that a joint election on a multidimensional set of issues, as a model for the typical single election in a simple regime, can be more uncertain and unstable over time than separate elections on different issues, such as elections for different offices in regimes with division of powers.

How to Choose

The analysis of the relative successes and pitfalls of different institutional rules has moved social choice theorists to study how institutions are chosen and how they ought to be chosen in order to favor fair and stable developments—or the problem of choosing how to choose. Game theoretical models have also been used for the analysis of strategic behavior in such a field. In consistency with the assumptions regarding human behavior within institutional constraints, it can be assumed that people may prefer, choose, and support those institutional formulas producing satisfactory results for themselves and reject those making them permanently excluded and defeated. As a consequence, institutions producing widely distributed satisfactory social choices should be better able to develop endogenous support and endure. In general, widely representative social choices should feed support for the corresponding institutions, while exclusionary, biased, or arbitrary outcomes might foster rejection of the institutions producing such results. These findings have led to the establishment of a positive relation between institutional pluralism, social efficiency, and democratic stability.

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See also Democracy, Theories of; Economic Theories of Politics; Electoral Systems; Fair Division; Institutional Theory; Voting Rules, Electoral, Effects of

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SOCIAL CLEAVAGES

See Cleavages, Social and Political

SOCIAL COHESION

In the work of the founders of sociology, society was conceived of as an organism that needed to respond to the main challenge posed by modernity: How do societies marked by social differentiation and distinct social groups create mechanisms to live together? The concept of social cohesion features prominently in the work of its originator, Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), for example, and was later revisited, though not always under the

same name, in the functionalist tradition. However, Durkheim, in his major work on the subject (1893), used the notion of solidarity to describe ways in which social integration is achieved. Solidarity is a “force” that binds the different parts of a whole, creating bonds and relations of reciprocity between individuals.

Progressively, and more so in recent times, and far removed from the initial analytical use that Durkheim gave to the concept of solidarity, social cohesion has become increasingly intermingled with normative and policy-making purposes. Therefore, the current literature reflects two different visions of social cohesion. The first perspective is policy oriented and part of the political discourse; it strives to put in place a battery of objective indicators for assessing the *degree* of social cohesion observable in a society. The second, by contrast, a sociological perspective, interrogates the *nature* of social cohesion, focusing on social dynamics and the cultural and political mechanisms that bind society. The following presentation focuses on both visions.

The Policy-Making Concept of Social Cohesion

The concept of social cohesion adopted by the European Union (EU) is an excellent example of the first strategy. It is essentially a normative reference associated with operational criteria revolving around indicators (e.g., employment, health) that are selected by public debate, politicians, and technocrats. This predominant concept of social cohesion in the current international debate was developed in the 1990s by the EU as part of a political discourse imbued with an essentially normative-evocative meaning that seeks to define a desirable horizon for society. The concept of social cohesion is defined as

the capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding polarisation. A cohesive society is a mutually supportive community of free individuals pursuing these common goals by democratic means. (European Committee for Social Cohesion, 2004, p. 3)

The notion of social cohesion is believed to represent the central values of solidarity and equality

that are the original features of the “European model.” It is contrasted sharply with the so-called Anglo-Saxon (English-speaking countries) model, which is regarded as steeped in more individualistic values and less concerned with distributive aspects or the state’s role as guarantor of the common good (European Commission, 2007).

According to Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Duncan Gallie, Anton Hemerijk, and John Myers (2002), explicitly underlying the EU’s concerns with social cohesion are the changes in its economy and demography in recent decades, particularly its inclusion in the globalization process and the subsequent impact on job creation/unemployment and distribution of wealth, and the resultant challenges to its welfare state. These changes provoke social tensions, which, in turn, jeopardize social cohesion. The EU concept of social cohesion has to do with an effort to maintain the (idealized) standard of the immediate past that it would like to preserve.

As the concept of social cohesion became increasingly central to the EU’s discourse, criteria and indicators were developed to measure it. Known as the Laeken indicators, they deal mainly with distributive variables (employment, income, access to public services). In this way, the notion of social cohesion, a normative framework, became operational and, therefore, a target for public policies intended to influence the indicators. In sum, the concept of social cohesion is associated with a specific political context that evokes what is regarded as a desirable state of affairs relative to the status quo ante.

This use of the concept of social cohesion has tended to be disseminated in recent years among international agencies. To do so, they have separated the concept from the concrete European context in which it originated, producing an abstract and ahistorical concept of social cohesion. For example, according to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social cohesion is “the dialectic [relationship] between instituted social inclusion and exclusion mechanisms and the responses, perceptions and attitudes of citizens towards the way these mechanisms operate” (2007, p. 18) and implies a previous theory and an empirical analysis of what is meant by “citizens” and “inclusion/exclusion mechanisms” in the Latin American context.

The included–excluded dichotomy produces a preconceived vision of society that fails to take into account the different and complex processes differentiating society that are far broader than a single cleavage. Of course, limited access to social services, income, and opportunities in the labor market is frequently the cornerstone in the construction of a sense of social exclusion. But concrete situations are mostly in the gray areas, and most citizens feel simultaneously included and excluded.

Analysis of social cohesion can neither be dissociated from the category of relative deprivation (e.g., the expectations and feelings of inclusion or exclusion of a recent migrant originally from a rural setting are not the same as those of a generation born and raised in the city), nor can it overlook the fact that feelings of exclusion, frustration, and social anomie may be even stronger among sectors with a better state of social well-being. In general, analyses of social cohesion guided by the included–excluded dichotomy tend to consider economic mechanisms (usually employment and social policy) as the main, or even the only, factor of integration, against which individual leanings are juxtaposed. This vision does not consider other social processes of solidarity formation that are extremely important to preserve social cohesion, such as religion or the mass media.

Societies whose cohesion revolves around egalitarian values can intensify feelings of exclusion among individuals and groups that would be considered acceptable in other contexts. In certain cases, greater economic inclusion can increase feelings of symbolic and political exclusion, and conversely, greater symbolic inclusion can intensify feelings of economic exclusion. In sum, the objective and subjective dimensions of inclusion/exclusion are complex and require theoretical and empirical analyses sensitive to the historical formation of values systems in each society.

The Analytical Concept of Social Cohesion

As social theory teaches us, all societies generate some form of cohesion. Otherwise, they would not exist. But the mechanisms for maintaining social cohesion vary according to the historical formation of each society. In complex societies, this is reflected in the existence of universes of beliefs and

values shared, to varying degrees, by all members of society and by systems of authority rooted in consensual norms and coercive systems that ensure the functioning of the established order. Mechanisms of social disintegration are also many and varied. They may be the product of exclusion, anomic violence, or authoritarian ideologies. Social cohesion in modern times cannot be dissociated from social change and from social conflict. Modern societies are in constant mutation, which means that some forms of sociability are always disintegrating and giving way to new mechanisms for integration in which citizen participation and demands play a critical role.

If every society has, by definition, some form of social cohesion, then what is at stake from an analytical standpoint is the understanding of the mechanisms by which social cohesion is produced and absorbs the processes of change and social conflict, as well as the mechanisms through which these are expressed and resolved. This means expanding the horizon of analytical and normative social cohesion beyond (but inclusive of) public policy to encompass the functioning of political and cultural systems. Social cohesion has not only to do with the most adequate or effective public policies, but it also requires us to ask ourselves about the mechanisms for the symbolic and political mobilization of citizens, which are a prerequisite for the possibility (or impossibility) of public policies and state reforms.

In this view, the concept of social cohesion requires more sensitivity to, and the effective inclusion of, social, political, and cultural issues, an interdisciplinary dialogue that incorporates the required contributions of the various disciplines in the social sciences. This means bringing together economists, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, and historians in an effort to discover the many nuances evoked by the concept of social cohesion (societies that value democracy and equity and transmit a sense of belonging and dignity to their citizens). Broadly speaking, cohesion is not so much a matter of developing a theory of social cohesion as of placing this concept at the service of a multidisciplinary examination of the social processes under way in contemporary societies.

The challenge, in particular, is to make sure that sociocultural dynamics are not overlooked in the reports of governmental and international agencies.

One of the reasons for this absence is that when handled in an intellectually responsible manner, sociocultural dynamics require a sensitivity to, and acknowledgment of, the diversity of national values and histories in which values acquire specific symbolic meanings that are hard to quantify and generalize. This ultimately conspires against the analyses developed by international organizations whose vocation is to come up with generalizable and quantifiable solutions, sometimes at the expense of the complex webs and the particularities of national histories. This also means accepting social conflict as a legitimate and critical component of the construction/transformation of mechanisms for social cohesion in democratic societies.

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See also Cleavages, Social and Political; Conflicts; Political Culture; Political Socialization; Solidarity; Symbols, Political

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SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

Social democracy (sometimes used synonymously with *democratic socialism*) refers to a political tendency resting on three fundamental features: (1) democracy (e.g., equal rights to vote and form parties), (2) an economy partly regulated by the state (e.g., through Keynesianism), and (3) a welfare state offering social support to those in need (e.g., equal rights to education, health service, employment, and pensions). Very often, socialist democratic parties are members of the “Socialist International,” an organization of social-democratic, socialist, and labor parties that pursues mutual cooperation. This entry discusses social democracy’s roots and its fundamental characteristics and modern development.

Origins

Inspired by the 19th-century German economist and sociologist Karl Marx (1818–1883), social democrats traditionally deemed total equality the final goal of efforts to remedy the plight of the working class. They regarded the capitalist economic system as the cause behind society’s ills. With close ties to the then budding labor movement, social-democratic political parties began, toward the end of the 19th century, to form and organize themselves. A key demand was public ownership of the means of production as a way to transform society into a socialist economic system, thus ending the exploitation of the working class by the bourgeoisie and creating true democracy. Very soon, different groups began to debate the means by which to reach the end. Could and should what was regarded as capitalism’s inner contradictions be passively allowed to develop, or

should the final collapse be speeded up by resorting to violent revolution? Others instead suggested “revisionist,” peaceful, and gradual reforms of the system launched through liberal democracy via political parties in parliament, including cooperation between social classes. Soon, the nature of the end itself became a bone of contention. Could and should the entire capitalist economic system really be thrown overboard? Or rather, were reforms of the economic system preferable, so as to sustain its ability to create wealth? Were not welfare state measures sufficient to alleviate the system’s perceived unfair wealth distribution effects? Led by the German socialist Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932), the revisionist camp evolved into the social-democratic movement. The other camp opted for more revolutionary, far-reaching solutions including “dictatorship by the proletariat,” culminating in the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the first communist state. Subsequently, most social-democratic parties began reorienting themselves from being solely the political branch of the working class to becoming “catchall” parties.

The issues of how extensive the transformation of society should be and by what means it should be achieved did not end with the social democrats’ break with the Communists. Applying the commonly used “left–right” ideological continuum to two analytical aspects, “public ownership” and “social policy,” many researchers would certainly place social democracy slightly left of center regarding public ownership and perhaps a little further to the left on social policy. However, consensus is less solid when “left” and “right” are to be defined. Normally, left would signify more public enterprises and more dirigiste state involvement in the economy, but the actual mix of socialist and capitalist policies differs considerably between parties and between different time periods. Actual ownership of the means of production has seldom formed a vital part of policies. As to the social policy dimension, the left would stand for a more extensive welfare state in terms of covering more people with more generous support at higher cost and with fewer if any market-emulating characteristics.

Postwar Developments and the “Third Way”

Social democracy evolved after World War II into a political ideology that focused on working inside

the overall framework of a mixed-market economy while trying to protect and make life decent for all those who were economically the most vulnerable. Although often critical of aspects of the market economy, social democracy accepted its fundamentals. The exact policies were always a balancing act between “planning,” “steering,” and “control” on the one hand and “efficiency,” “profit,” and “competitiveness” on the other. Rather than putting the economy in the hands of politicians, most parties chose the welfare state as the primary step to “decommodifying” society, although few would argue for complete decommodification. The status of equality is a moot point. Originally, most social democrats defined equality as a situation in which most people enjoyed roughly the same standard of living. To attain this condition, redistribution from the haves to the have-nots would be necessary. Later, the meaning underwent a shift to signify equality of opportunity rather than of outcome, thus lessening the emphasis on redistribution through transferring resources from one group to another. Although the focus was no longer specifically on retribution, measures were advocated to ensure that no one fell below a decent or minimally acceptable standard of living.

Once there, the welfare state had to be protected. Generating fresh resources for the welfare state became imperative. The parties increasingly came to rely on the efficiency of the market economy to create those resources. Gradually, the idea of abolishing the market economy was pushed into the background. Indeed the mixed-market economy became core social-democratic ideology—with public policies, for example, through so-called Keynesian countercyclical policies and through active labor market policies and sometimes through corporatist solutions, to help the economy function even better than if left on its own.

However, occasionally, parts of social democracy have contemplated further steps toward a more socialist society. Yet any concrete plans about real planning institutions have only rarely emerged. A peak of ideological revival occurred from around 1970 to 1983, when some groups in some parties began questioning whether the welfare state alone would suffice to create the desired society. The ownership issue reemerged with force as an internal issue in many parties. Some—for example, certain groups in the British Labour

Party—advocated the return to older policies in which state nationalizations of major, if not all, businesses would take center stage. Others—for example, in the German and the Swedish Social Democratic Parties—suggested extended union influence over business decision making as the way forward. Perhaps the most innovative and controversial of the new policies were plans for “economic democracy” through so-called wage earner funds put forward by sections of the Swedish social democracy. In their original, blue-collar union draft proposals, the funds were designed to tax major parts of businesses in order to create funds that would soon be able to take economic control of private companies. However, the social-democratic leadership was far less enthusiastic about any takeover plans and considerably watered down the final version that was adopted in 1983. A number of nationwide funds were set up much like pension funds. A special business tax funneled off resources to the funds for buying shares on the regular—private—stock market with an overall ownership cap set at about 10%. When a nonsocialist government was formed in 1991, the funds were abolished and have not since reappeared in social-democratic policy making.

No doubt social democracy has been a very successful ideology. Some would even stress that after World War II many Western societies became more or less permeated by social-democratic ideas. Although support varies, social democracy has enjoyed remarkably stable parliamentary strength over the decades. This is a movement optimistic about the possibilities of modernizing society through technological advances and prepared to use an array of policies with which to improve people’s lives by correcting the market economy’s inequitable effects. However, in practice, several other political tendencies, such as Christian democracy and social liberalism, also propose far-reaching public sector measures including welfare states and other regulations designed to correct the adverse effects of an unregulated market economy. These parties strive to establish socially beneficial societies too. Still, even though similarities with Christian democracy and social liberalism are strong, many researchers would agree that social democracy is more ambitious in its quest to eradicate unfairness rather than just alleviating the effects of social

injustices, although the differences may not always be easy to pinpoint.

Toward the turn of the millennium, many social-democratic parties began to feel concern about some perceived tendencies, all of which basically had to do with the financial burden of the welfare state. It was always evident that the expansion and even maintenance of welfare states would be expensive. Therefore, public incomes were of the essence. Taxes were essential not only as a means to narrowing down real-income gaps between the different strata in society but also as a means to create budget incomes. A growing tax base was deemed equally important to support public sector budgets. As the welfare states grew, further expansions would entail not only higher taxes but also heavier reliance on ever-growing economies. Even though many voters have accepted high taxes in countries where welfare state measures have been universally enjoyed, some resentment toward high marginal taxes was beginning to be felt during the 1980s and 1990s. Many parties began debating whether taxes had perhaps reached their ceiling. If so, welfare state programs would have to rely even more on a growing tax base and, thus, on an ever more efficient market economy. Whether real or not, the perceived effects of economic globalization and the ensuing constant structural changes at the same time caused many parties to reconsider how far the market economy could in fact be regulated without negative efficiency consequences. Simultaneously, mounting criticism of welfare state bureaucracy, planning inertia, and lack of citizenship choice led many parties to try new policies, including lower taxes, deregulation of financial markets, and various public–private combinations including elements of competition inside the public sector.

Soon, social democracy was criticized for being “neoliberal,” unacceptably diluting true social-democratic ideals, and finally closing the door to more genuine reforms of capitalism. Others fervently defended new policies as a “Third Way” between socialism and capitalism. It has been suggested that “equality” was replaced by “fairness,” “collective rights” by “individual rights,” “redistribution” by “individual chances,” and “the state as a provider” by “the state as enabler.” How drastic the changes have actually been is a recurring academic theme. No doubt a change of rhetoric has

taken place, but there is a case to be made for substantial policy continuity with the past. Aiding the market and enabling citizens to overcome changes were vital parts of the golden age (roughly 1945–1980) of social democracy. Socialism “today” was never on the agenda. Efficiency, full employment, and an element of equality took center stage. Sometimes policies such as these were described as corresponding to a “planned” society. However, they closely conformed to a mixed-market economy but—and this is the key to social democracy—where the economy is regarded as the means to a higher end, a decent society.

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See also Capitalism; Christian Democratic Parties; Communism; Economic Policy; Equality; Globalization; Ideology; Labor Movement; Liberalism; Market Economy; Marx, Karl; Neo-Corporatism; Neoliberalism; Revisionism; Revolution; Socialism; Solidarity; Tax Policy; Welfare State

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SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION

Social dominance orientation (SDO) is a concept developed in social dominance theory (SDT) to describe an individual-level value structure that prefers inequality and stratified categorization among social groups. Individuals with high SDO desire a society marked by stratification and are thus inclined to accept such social structures as warranted. They differentiate between groups on the basis of superiority and subordination, which, in political practice, often leads to attitudes and behavior that entail discrimination and segregation.

Insight into the existence of SDO emerged from growing interest in the group-based aspects of human life. SDT, of which orientation forms an integral and crucial part, was first developed by Felicia Pratto and Jim Sidanius in the early 1990s and since then has been frequently used in psychology and social psychology research, mostly in journals focusing on personality or experimental psychology. As issues of multiculturalism, integration, and assimilation due to increasing migration and societal diversity have risen on the political science agenda, the SDO concept has begun to make its way into parts of the discipline. This entry defines SDO in greater detail, including how it is measured and what is known of its distributional pattern. The important matter of how SDO relates to authoritarianism will also be touched on. Finally, some political and practical implications of SDO are introduced.

SDO is defined as a personality trait that predicts certain attitudes, a basic structure that in turn translates into several more concrete perceptions. In research into values and culture, “orientation” refers to basic cognitive structures and beliefs, of which we as individuals possess relatively few. Orientations tend to be stable, formed in a process of early-childhood, adolescent, and young-adulthood socialization and experience. Attitudes, in contrast, are more numerous and malleable and emanate from orientations. Individuals with SDO are characterized by strong perceptions of their own ingroups as hierarchically and justifiably superior to other groups, most prominently so in relation to immigrants, people of other ethnicities, and the opposite sex. SDO has a number of attitudinal consequences, all of them favoring hierarchy over equality. Concrete expressions of SDO include ethnic prejudice, nationalism, cultural elitism, sexism, and a belief in meritocracy (i.e., people with superior competence or skill should occupy favored positions in society). SDO has been claimed to be a personality variable on par with what are known in personality psychology as the “Big Five” traits: extraversion, agreeableness, openness, neuroticism, and conscientiousness.

The SDO concept has developed in the interface between personality and social psychology, and experimental studies have demonstrated that it can successfully predict prejudice. Through measuring SDO, one can differentiate individuals based on

their level of SDO inclination. The South African nationalists, who introduced apartheid and openly defended it with arguments of hierarchy and superiority, exemplify SDO. Anti-Black racism in the United States is yet another well-known example of the orientation, as is India's caste system, as it is a social order based on human hierarchy.

Authoritarianism has been related to socializing experiences in childhood—for example, dominating parents—which in adulthood are translated into an individual desire to dominate others. SDO is not believed to originate from formative experiences but from a combination of socialization and personal temperament.

SDO is measured using a scale developed by Felicia Pratto, Jim Sidanius, Lisa Stallworth, and Bertram Malle (1994). The various items constituting the scale all concern perceptions of hierarchy (e.g., "Some people are just more worthy than others" or "It is not a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others") as opposed to equality (e.g., "If people were treated more equally, we would have fewer problems in this country"). The original seven-step scale runs from "very negative" to "very positive."

SDO and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)

SDO is often studied and analyzed in relation to another neighboring, yet different, individual value structure, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). Both SDO and RWA predict prejudiced action that is discriminatory and could be perceived as intolerant, for example, supporting the persecution of immigrants and other "outgroups." However, the RWA scale, which grew out of the research of Theodor Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and Nevitt Sanford (1950) into the authoritarian personality (measured using a scale originally developed by Robert Altemeyer), is driven by conformity bias (as opposed to autonomy), submissiveness to authority figures, ethnocentricity, and aggressiveness toward outgroups. SDO, in contrast, is motivated by concern for social hierarchy between groups (as opposed to egalitarianism). RWA has been demonstrated to be preoccupied with relationships between the individual and the group (i.e., intragroup relationships), whereas SDO is concerned mostly with

relationships between groups (i.e., intergroup relationships). Individuals guided by RWA support assimilationist practices for immigrants and marginal groups, which lessens these outgroups' potential to introduce change. For people with high SDO, assimilationist practices are instead viewed as threatening, because they conflict with and even blur social boundaries. There is a distinct difference between the more individual-oriented RWA and SDO, which focuses on the collective, group level. SDO and RWA are thus complementary but only partly overlapping in predicting prejudice. RWA is related to uncertainty reduction in various respects: High-RWA people tend to be religious and to desire order, structure, security, and tradition—desires that generally do not characterize those with high SDO. It has been argued that SDO represents a more modern kind of prejudice than the conformist and traditionalist RWA. Differentiating between SDO and RWA, as done, for example, by Sam McFarland and Robert Altemeyer, has advanced and fine-tuned our understanding of individual preference and value structures. Because of their similarity at an aggregate behavioral level, as evident, for example, in anti-immigration rhetoric and prejudiced perceptions of groups such as Jews, homosexuals, African Americans, and women, it is easy to miss their different bases of such sentiments and policy preferences.

Gender and SDO

SDO is claimed to have evolutionary roots. Most research has found systematic variation between the sexes in the level of SDO and that men, almost regardless of cultural context, have higher SDO than women. A few studies of homosexual men have concluded that they have lower SDO than heterosexual men or women. Although absolute levels of SDO vary among cultural settings, due to differences in distributional policy and economic system between, for example, the United States, India, Sweden, or Ukraine, men always have relatively higher SDO than do women. In SDT, this is called the "invariance" hypothesis, explained by the different reproductive patterns of the sexes, which leads women to be more selective in choosing mating partners to ensure reproductive success (defined as raising a sexually mature second generation). Consequently, females choose higher

status men, making men competitively involved in a status struggle for the more selective women, a struggle, a desire, and even a need to dominate other men and groups of men that could threaten their access to fertile women. As a behavioral consequence of their higher SDO, in professional contexts, men are more often found in hierarchical social milieus, such as the military, and politically are more inclined to support intolerant political parties. The cross-cultural similarities in SDO distribution between the sexes have thus been explained by biological predispositions in mating selection. This gender bias in SDO allows an analysis in which worldwide male dominance in society as well as in politics and economics could have some evolutionary explanations.

A second major hypothesis in SDT is called the “interaction” hypothesis, predicting that among “arbitrary set” groups (e.g., class and ethnicity), SDO levels will vary between the groups depending on the hierarchical structure of a society. In low-hierarchy cultures, the level of SDO will be more similar throughout a range of groups, while the differences will be much greater in highly hierarchical societies. Evidence has been found to support both the interaction and the invariance hypotheses.

Implications

Research has identified important behavioral implications of SDO. These concern the roles of both the private person, who may be highly prejudiced and aggressive toward outgroups, and the citizen, who may vote for anti-immigration, xenophobic, and intolerant parties. Individuals with high SDO are inclined to move into jobs and institutions that maintain or increase social hierarchy, and they prefer policies that support social separation rather than integration or assimilation.

Are there ways to modify SDO at the aggregate or individual level? Knowing that societies with more equal relationships display more similar levels of SDO between high- and low-status groups, we could single out redistributive welfare policies as one such way. Since SDO is focused on group relationships, relaxing group rhetoric and sentiment and instead emphasizing individual aspects has been proven in experimental research to have some beneficial effects. Similarly, empathizing

with members of the outgroup could reduce high levels of SDO too.

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See also Attitudes, Political; Discrimination; Ethnicity; Groupthink; Multiculturalism; Racism; Values

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SOCIAL EXCLUSION

Distinct from, and typically broader than, the traditional concept of poverty, social exclusion is a contested, broad concept that can take very different meanings from one policy setting to another. A central aspect of most definitions of social exclusion available in the literature is the lack of adequate work opportunities, which can lead to unemployment or underemployment. But reducing social exclusion to employment-related issues would be a mistake, as the concept refers to issues

ranging from gender and ethnic discrimination to housing problems and limited access to health and social care, among other things. Another central aspect of social exclusion is its complexity. According to Hilary Silver and S. M. Miller (2003), for example, social exclusion appears as

- (1) *multi-dimensional* [italics added] (...);
- (2) *dynamic*, [italics added] denoting a process, movement or trajectory from full integration to a condition of multiple exclusions; (3) *relational*, [italics added] in that exclusion entails social distance or isolation, rejection, humiliation, lack of social support networks and denial of participation; (4) *active*, [italics added] in that people and processes do the excluding; and (5) *relative* [italics added] to context. (p. 8)

Although analytical remarks such as this have done much to clarify the meaning of this concept, social exclusion remains contested, and some social policy scholars reject it altogether, claiming that it is overly vague or, even worse, misleading. Consequently, there is no consensus in the social science literature about the analytical usefulness of this concept. This entry elaborates the history and meaning of this concept and examines its role as a central idea in contemporary social policy.

History and Meaning of the Concept

The French writer Jean Klanfer published a book (*L'Exclusion Sociale: Étude de la Marginalité dans les Sociétés Occidentales* [Social Exclusion: The Study of Marginality in Western Societies]) in 1965 that defined social exclusion in terms of irresponsible behavior and economic marginalization. In the mid-1970s, another French writer, René Lenoir, helped popularize the concept of social exclusion in his country. According to him, social exclusion was the product of factors such as poverty and disability, which prevented some citizens from fully participating in the French economy and society. However, in France, it is only during the 1980s and early 1990s that social exclusion became a major policy idea. A number of issues contributed to this situation. First, long-term unemployment became a permanent feature of the French economic landscape. Second, the debate on immigration and the status of ethnic minorities increased

interest in the concept of social exclusion, which can refer to the negative effects of racism and discrimination. From a political standpoint, however, *social exclusion* became a major term in French public discourse partly because centrist politicians referred to it to reinforce their reputation as compassionate actors who care about the fate of the nation's less privileged citizens. In general, fighting social exclusion is a source of legitimacy for the state and for political actors who seek to fight what is widely perceived as a social evil.

Beyond France, the concept of social exclusion has become a key policy idea, even if the emergence of this concept at the forefront of international policy debates is relatively recent, as it was only during the 1990s and 2000s that it became a permanent feature of international debates about social inequality and the future of the welfare state.

Since the 1990s, the concept of social exclusion has become increasingly popular across Europe. For instance, in the United Kingdom (UK), after taking office in 1997, New Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair depicted himself as a crusader against social exclusion. A major symbol of this emphasis on social exclusion was the creation of a state unit devoted to this issue in late 1997. As in France, although a powerful rhetoric surrounded social exclusion, critics noted that the resources allocated to fight this set of social ills remained quite modest in scope. From a political standpoint, the rhetoric about social exclusion helped the Blair government reinforce its social policy credentials at the same time as it was pursuing a broad liberal economic agenda. Importantly, however, significant resources have been allocated to the struggle against social exclusion, which has become a legitimate public policy concept, both in government and in academia. In comparative terms, the political discourse around social exclusion in the UK was based more on moral and behavioral issues than in France; however, in both cases, social exclusion has become an enduring aspect of policy debates in a way that makes it difficult to reduce it to a short-term political fad.

Beyond France and the UK, social exclusion has become increasingly influential in many other European countries, largely through the platforms and initiatives of the European Union (EU), which

has explicitly embraced this concept as part of an attempt to increase its policy legitimacy. Although the EU discourse about social exclusion can be traced back to the late 1980s and 1990s, the concept only emerged as a central EU policy concept in 2000, as the main legacy of the European Council conference held in Lisbon. At that meeting, member states agreed to transform the fight against poverty and social exclusion into a core aspect of the EU's employment and social policy strategy. Articulated around the idea of a "European social model," the EU approach to social exclusion is based on the "open method of coordination," which is based on the interaction between EU-defined goals and national policy initiatives. Substantively, the EU stressed the central role of employment policy in the struggle against social exclusion. From this perspective, social exclusion is closely related to the quest for activation and the European Employment Strategy. As stated in a European Commission document titled *Fight Against Poverty and Social Exclusion* (2000), "Employment is the best safeguard against social exclusion. In order to promote quality employment it is necessary to develop employability, in particular through policies that promote the acquisition of skills and life-long learning" (p. 3). Additionally, income maintenance programs such as social assistance schemes and pension programs are depicted as major tools in the fight against social exclusion.

A Central Idea in Contemporary Social Policy in Europe and Beyond

Since 2000, social exclusion has remained a prominent aspect of EU policy debates. According to Even Nilssen, the popularity of this concept within the EU is related to fact that it has been defined mainly in economic rather than in moral terms. By focusing mainly on employment and economic issues, the EU has largely reduced social policy to labor market regulation. From this perspective, the EU push to transform social exclusion into a major policy issue reinforces its economic focus while creating the sense that the "social question" has become a political priority, which may not effectively be the case. Overall, although social exclusion has become a major component of EU discourse and policy guidelines since 2000, there is no

consensus about the true impact and the long-term policy consequences of the various EU initiatives launched in the name of the struggle against social exclusion.

Outside Europe, since the 1990s, the concept of social exclusion has been increasingly debated in other parts of the advanced industrial world. This is the case in countries such as Australia and Canada, for instance. Although social exclusion is perhaps not as central a policy concept in these two countries as it has become in Europe, it is now part of mainstream international policy debates. Considering this remark, one country within the advanced industrial world where social exclusion remains a relatively marginal policy idea is the United States. As critics have pointed out, this is puzzling considering the comparatively high levels of poverty and social inequality in U.S. society. Clearly, the phenomena that are described as social exclusion in Europe and other parts of the world are widespread in the United States; however, terms such as *inequality* and *poverty* remain largely used due to the fact that social exclusion and ways to deal with it are explicitly associated with social policy and redistribution in some sense. Thus, in the United States, the concept of social exclusion is best known among students of comparative social policy and largely remains a terminology for academic discourse. A more likely explanation for the absence of a widespread social exclusion discourse in the United States is the fact that, in contrast to the situation prevailing in the EU and in other parts of the world, prominent U.S. political actors have rarely embraced this concept as part of a broader electoral and/or policy strategy. Only time will tell if this concept has a political future in the United States.

Finally, the concept of social exclusion as formulated in Europe and other parts of the advanced industrial world is known and debated in developing societies. Yet, as Ruhi Saith notes, the concept of social exclusion cannot be transposed from the wealthiest to the poorest regions of the planet without substantial analytical adjustments being made. For instance, because the concept was first adopted in a European society characterized by a formal labor market and large welfare state programs, it takes a different meaning when used in the context of much poorer countries, where the informal sector can be larger than the formal one and where

public social programs do not adequately cover very large segments of the population. This situation has led scholars, policy experts, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to adapt this concept to the realities of the developing world. Thus, in the developing world, concerns over social exclusion have taken the form of poverty reduction programs sponsored mainly by international financial institutions and designed to address the negative social impacts of previous macroeconomic adjustments as well as to provide some basic protection for the most vulnerable members of society.

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See also Cleavages: Social and Political; Discrimination; Gender; Immigration Policy; Inequality, Economic; Racism; Social Cohesion; Solidarity; Welfare Policies; Welfare State

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SOCIAL IDENTITY

See Identity, Social and Political

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

In a comprehensive sense, the concept of social movement refers to (a) mostly informal networks of interaction, based on (b) shared beliefs and solidarity, mobilized around (c) contentious themes, through (d) the frequent use of various forms of protest. This entry begins with a discussion of the elements of this definition. Next, specific forms of (nonconventional) participation, mobilization, and organization of social movements are identified. Their impact in recent decades on political systems, democratization, public policies, and even the international sphere is then highlighted. Finally, the consequences for normative political theory and deliberative or direct forms of democracy are discussed.

Social movements are constituted by *networks of informal relations* between a plurality of individuals and groups, which are more or less structured from an organizational point of view. While political parties and pressure groups have relatively well-defined organizational boundaries, such as card-carrying members of specific organizations, social movements are composed of scattered and weakly connected networks of individuals who feel they are part of a collective effort. While organizations that refer to movements exist, movements are not organizations but rather networks of relations between diverse actors that often also include organizations with formal structures.

These networks of relations are considered as constituting a social movement when their members

share a system of beliefs that nourish solidarity and collective awareness. In fact, one characteristic of movements is the elaboration of alternative world visions and value systems that differ from those dominating at that time. For this reason, movements have been considered as protagonists of social change.

These emerging values form the basis of the definition of *conflicts* around which actors mobilize. In particular, from the 1970s onward, new social movements were defined as actors in new conflicts. While Marxist analyses traditionally posited the centrality of capital-labor conflicts, the transformations that followed World War II stressed the relevance of social criteria—such as gender or generation—that were not based on class position. Scholars of the new movements, such as the French sociologist Alain Touraine, agree in highlighting the declining relevance of the conflict between capital and labor. As Alberto Melucci has observed, in complex societies, which require increasing integration and extend their control even over the motivations for action, new social movements (e.g., ecological, feminist) try to oppose the penetration of the state and the market into social life, reclaiming individual identity and the right to shield one's private and romantic life from the omniscient manipulation of the system.

Finally, social movements are characterized by their adoption of "unusual" forms of political behavior. Many scholars pinpoint the fundamental distinction between movements and other political actors in the use by the former of protest as a form of exerting political pressure. *Protest* is defined as a nonconventional form of action that interrupts daily routine. Protestors generally address their actions to public opinion over elected representatives or public bureaucracies. In fact, movements are characterized by their fundamental critique of representative democracy, and they challenge institutional assumptions about conventional ways of doing politics in the name of participative democracy.

Over the past few years, the analysis of social movements has been approached through the concept of contentious politics, defined as episodic, public, collective interaction among claims makers and their targets (when at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claim and the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants). Doug

McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly developed a broad research project that addressed the similar mechanisms at play in social movements, revolutions, democratization processes, and ethnic conflicts. Advocating a dynamic use of concepts, the scholars involved in this project have tried to single out general mechanisms of contention. Although social movement studies first developed in the field of sociology, they have also contributed, as will be discussed below, to the main disciplinary subfields of political science.

Nonconventional Participation

The first pieces of research on social movements in the field of political science were carried out within the solid research tradition on political participation. While this field of research was initially focused on conventional forms of participation, underlining the unequal participation of various social groups, from the 1970s onward, scholars began to observe a rapid growth of new, *nonconventional* forms of political participation, such as petitions, sit-ins, boycotts, the occupation of buildings, and the blocking of traffic. This led them to investigate the different *styles of participation* of different social groups, generations, or nations and the conditions that would provoke the development of new forms of participation.

In an important piece of comparative research carried out in the 1970s on different Western democracies, Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase observed that, with respect to laws and decisions seen as unjust or illegitimate, ever-wider groups of citizens are ready to resort to forms of action characterized by their nonconventionality. Yet we cannot speak of a real split between those who use "orthodox" participatory tactics and those who use so-called direct-action tactics. In fact, conventional participation is often accompanied by nonconventional participation, indicating that those interested in politics and competent in the field tend to use a range of the various available instruments for exerting pressure on governments. If there are individuals who prefer one or the other type of strategy, there are nonetheless many who combine the two types. The conclusion is that the increase in nonconventional participation is not an indicator of the decline of the legitimacy of liberal democracies, where, on the contrary, a growth in

political competence has been observed, in particular among young people. It is instead an expression of a lasting enlargement of the strategies available to citizens.

Later pieces of comparative research (among them work by Russell Dalton and Pippa Norris) have revealed that while levels of traditional types of political participation have remained stable or (in some forms) declined in the 1990s and the new millennium, levels of noninstitutional participation have increased enormously. This growth concerned all of the countries analyzed, and inside the single countries the differences in levels of participation linked to gender, age, and educational level had lessened, leading some to speak of a "participatory revolution."

Research on social movements has made a particularly rich contribution to the analysis of political participation in work on repertoires of protest. Charles Tilly has defined a *modern repertoire of collective action* as formed by the set of means a group has at its disposal for making collective claims. Tilly has, in particular, identified the differences in the types of contentious action in particular historical periods. Protest was certainly not unheard of prior to the formation of the nation-state: Peasants burned down mills in protest against increases in the price of bread; subjects dressed up to mock their superiors; and funerals could be turned into occasions for denouncing injustices. The tactics adopted by protestors varied from the use of irreverent symbols and music (as in the custom of charivari or shivaree) to field invasions and grain seizures. However, they all were parochial in scope, addressing local actors or the local representatives of national actors; moreover, they relied on patronage, appealing to local power holders to convey grievances or settle disputes. In the 19th century, however, forms of collective action began to change, as the old parochial and patronage-dependent repertoire was replaced by one that was national and autonomous, involving actions such as strikes, electoral rallies, public meetings, petitions, marches, insurrections, and the invasion of legislative bodies. This transformation in the form of protest was the result of the creation of the nation-state, the development of capitalism, and the emergence of modern means of communication. The new repertoire, therefore, responded to a new situation in which politics was

increasingly national in character, the role of communities diminished, and organized associations spread, particularly among the working class.

Resource Mobilization and Organizational Approaches

Another significant contribution from scholars of social movements is found in organizational theory, from research on organizational populations to the most recent neo-institutionalist approaches. In particular, placing itself within the open-system approach (which maintained the relevance of interactions between organizations and their environments), research on social movement organizations, carried out by scholars such as Mayer Zald and John McCarthy, has underlined the role of organizational entrepreneurs in the mobilization of resources in the organizational fields of single groups.

Until the 1960s, studies on social movements were dominated by a functionalist approach that interpreted them as reactions to systemic malfunctions, thereby reducing them to purely reactionary, pathological phenomena. Criticizing this representation, throughout the 1970s, the resource mobilization approach considered social movements as a normal part of the political process, focusing analyses on the mobilization of those resources necessary to collective action. According to the resource mobilization approach, social movements act in a rational, prognostic, and organized manner. Protest actions derive from a calculation of costs and benefits, influenced by the presence not only of conflicts but also of the resources that are required to be mobilized around those conflicts. In a historical situation in which unease, contrasts, conflicts of interests, and ideological clashes appear ever present, the rise of collective action cannot be explained on the basis of these elements alone, begging the study of the conditions that permit the transformation of discontent into action. The type and extent of available resources explain the tactical choices of movements and the consequences of collective action for the social and political system.

In this sense, the mobilization capacities of groups vary enormously, and this reinforces the inequalities present in society. As far as the so-called weak interests—of those poor in resources—are concerned, their organization often depends on

the mobilization of influential patrons and/or strong organizational structures. Organization, aided by solidarity links, can therefore compensate for the absence of material resources.

Unlike the “mass society” theories, which had presented some forms of political aggregation as effects of the uprooting of individuals from primary groups and of the social disaggregation stemming from modernization, the resource mobilization approach instead explains mobilization through both the moral gratification intrinsic to the pursuit of a collective good and the existence of horizontal (i.e., internal to the collective) and vertical (i.e., between different collectives) solidarity links. The density of relations between people who share some cultural characteristics tends to facilitate the construction of solidarity. Social movement activists are in fact well integrated within various types of social networks, both formal and informal. It is above all due to these links that the potential activist develops a particular vision of the world and acquires the information and skills necessary for collective action. Given that social environments (and groups) are differentiated on the basis of the density of the networks that characterize them, this gives rise to different capacities for participation. Charles Tilly has argued that the mobilization of groups is influenced by their level of *catnet-ness*, a synthesis of characteristics linked to social *categories* and the density of social *networks*. Indeed, the passage from a category (an aggregation of individuals who share determined characteristics) to a social group (a community capable of collective action) is facilitated by the simultaneous presence of specific categorical traits and networks of relations that link the subjects shared among those traits.

That opportunities for participation grow for those social groups characterized by similar structures and intense social relations is indicated by numerous studies on the labor movement. This was linked in particular to the presence of large masses of workers who carried out similar tasks and tended to spend not only their working hours but also their leisure time together, living in socially homogeneous areas found close to the factories. The presence of socially homogeneous networks characterized by intense social relations favored the choice to cooperate. Collective action then reinforced the awareness of holding common interests—causing the growth of what Karl Marx

called class consciousness. Socialist ideology would then politicize many social struggles, proposing a wider vision of the world.

Modernization has on the whole increased organizational capacities. Above all, technological developments have increased the quantity of resources available in the environment. In an imposing piece of research spanning the past 4 centuries, Charles Tilly has uncovered an evolution from decentralized and informally coordinated movements to centralized and formal movements—that is, from solidarity or community groups to proactive and prolonged actions, organized on a grand scale by associations constituted with the aim of gaining specific ends. This development was rendered possible by the expansion of means of communication (today, in particular, of communication via computer). Economic progress too had a generally positive effect on the associative capacities of individuals, increasing the quantity of resources available for collective action. In particular, the diffusion of education and the proportional upward shift in socioeconomic class heightened propensities to associate, since more people are able to subscribe and give money. In addition, together with education, faith in one’s own ability to influence the outside world tends to increase, and with it the motivation for collective action.

Identities and History

Research on social movements has also contributed to the debate, an increasingly relevant one in political science, on the development of collective identity. According to Alessandro Pizzorno, a characteristic of politics is its reference to solidarity systems that form the basis of the definition of interests. Those who are mobilized defend certain interests, which are recognizable only with reference to a certain value system. Interest in one’s own material welfare is not, for example, absolute or innate but linked to a certain conception of the world. Value options lead us to identify with larger groups, to which we feel a sense of belonging and in the interests of which we are disposed to act. The process of participation thus requires the construction of sympathetic collectives inside which individuals consider one another as equals.

Identity as the awareness of belonging to a collective “we,” or to a class, thus facilitates political

participation. If the construction of an identity is a precondition for collective action, it is at the same time a product of it. In fact, participation transforms the identity of individuals, reinforcing the feeling of belonging to some groups and weakening identification with other roles. In the evolution of collective action, identity is produced and multiplies. The barricades of the revolutionary movement, the strikes of the labor movement, and the occupations of the student movement are all forms of action oriented toward influencing public decisions. But they also have an internal effect, creating solidarity between participants, making them feel part of a collective effort. It is the same action—participation—that then reinforces the sense of belonging in a sort of virtuous circle.

For collective action to occur, it is necessary that those who act elaborate a definition of themselves, of other social actors, and of the content of the relations that connect them. They must identify not only a “we” with whom to sympathize but also a “they” to attribute blame to for the conditions they wish to change. The construction of identity requires not only a positive definition of who is part of a certain group but also necessarily a negative definition of who is excluded. For interaction to occur it is necessary, on the one hand, that the identities of diverse actors be recognized by external actors, so that a part of the mobilization is oriented toward this search for recognition, inseparable from identity itself. On the other hand, collective action itself contributes to building and consolidating identity through the definition of boundaries between actors involved in a conflict.

Political Opportunities and Comparative Political Systems

The analysis of social movements has been particularly lively in the field of comparative politics. Although concentrating mostly on liberal democracies, studies of social movements have systematized their observations on the relations between institutional political actors and protest. As challengers to a given political order, social movements interact with the actors that enjoy a consolidated position in that order. The characteristics of these interactions affect both the form that collective action takes and its probabilities of success. In the study of social movements, the most widely used

concept for defining the characteristics of the external environment relevant to the development of social movements is the *political opportunity structure*, developed in particular by the American political scientist Sidney Tarrow. Integrating various empirical observations into a theoretical framework for his study of protest cycles in Italy, Tarrow considered the degree of openness or closure of formal political access, the degree of stability or instability of political alignments, the availability and strategic postures of potential allies, and the political conflicts between and within elites as the main categories of political opportunities for social movements.

With the increase in interest in social movements by political scientists, European scholars, including Hanspeter Kriesi, Dieter Rucht, and Donatella della Porta, started to use the concept of political opportunities in cross-country research projects. Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous contrast between a “weak” American government and a “strong” French one is usually the implicit or explicit starting point for analyses linking institutional factors with social movement development. Some criticism notwithstanding, the idea that a state’s strength or weakness influences social movement strategies remains central to the literature on collective action in general and on revolutions in particular. In Europe especially, this approach resonated with a focus on the cross-national comparison of different types of European democracies, based on different institutional assets and cultural traditions. In general, an institutional system has been considered more open (and less repressive) the more political decisions are dispersed (through functional differentiation of power, territorial decentralization, and direct democracy). The prevalent belief is that the greater the number of actors who share political power (the greater the checks and balances), the greater the chance that social movements will gain access to the system. However, while a weak executive may ease access to the decision-making process, it will have little hope of implementing policies to meet the demands of social movements. Formal institutions do, however, interact with informal strategies to deal with opponents, with either inclusive or exclusive historical traditions that tend to reproduce themselves.

Beyond the comparison of different institutions, the political process approach also stressed the role

of institutional allies for social movements. A more dynamic set of variables—susceptible to change in the short term and the object of pressure from social movements—included aspects such as electoral instability and elite divisions. Attention to allies such as trade unions and political parties also resonated with the relevance assigned to these actors.

One of the reasons for the spread of the political opportunity approach in Europe may have been the interest, well developed in European political science and sociology, in cross-European comparisons. In the 1990s, in particular, this interest produced large comparative research projects, singling out and exploiting different dimensions of comparison among European countries, such as citizens' regimes in research on mobilization, migrant rights, welfare regimes, or issues of unemployment. Historical comparisons, looking at long-term evolution, singled out a trend toward an increasing diffusion of protest repertoires and social movements.

The Effects of Social Movements on Public Policies

Another area to which research on social movements contributed is the analysis of public policies. A growing number of studies have addressed the effects of protest on the policy process. In one of the first and most influential studies on social movement effects, William Gamson identified the factors contributing to success as a minimalist strategy ("thinking small"), the adoption of direct action and a centralized and bureaucratic organization. Other scholars of collective action have, however, challenged this vision. In particular, it has been noted not only that violence can sometimes appear as a winning strategy but also that when organizations, including social movements, become bureaucratized, the desire for organizational survival comes to prevail over declared collective objectives. According to Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, the effort to build organizations could be not only futile but also damaging. The search for material resources to ensure organizational survival leads inexorably toward cooptation and the taming of protest. However, it has been remarked that no particular strategic element can be evaluated in isolation without taking into

account the conditions within which social movements must operate as well as the presence of alliances or opponents in power. Most important, movements are never the sole actors to intervene on an issue; rather, they are part of alliances including political parties and sometimes even public agencies.

The attribution of credit for obtaining substantive successes is in fact complex. The presence of a plurality of actors makes it difficult to attribute success or failure to any one particular strategy, and whether the results of protest should be judged in the short or the long term represents a further problem. While social movements demand long-term changes, protest cycles instead tend to stimulate immediate "incremental" reforms. Policy development is characterized by steps forward and backward, moments in which public policy approaches the demands made by social movements and others in which the situation deteriorates. Factors peculiar to social movements, such as their distance from the levers of power, the heterogeneous definition of their objectives, and their organizational instability, further complicate matters.

These difficulties notwithstanding, social movements have had relevant effects on different stages of public decision-making processes. Generally, social movements are formed to express dissatisfaction with an existing policy in a given area. Although it is usual to make a distinction between political and cultural movements, the first following a more instrumental logic, the second more symbolic, all movements tend to make demands on the political system: Environmentalist groups have demanded interventions to protect the environment; pacifists have opposed the culture of war; students have criticized selection and authoritarianism in education; the feminist movement has fought discrimination against women; and the world social forums have criticized neoliberal globalization.

The definition of specific policy claims is often relevant for the very self-definition of a social movement. Frequently, a particular demand becomes *nonnegotiable*, being the basis for a movement's identity. In many countries, for example, the feminist movement has been constructed around the nonnegotiable right of women to "choose" concerning childbirth; the halting of the installation of nuclear missiles in the countries of

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) fulfilled a similar role for the peace movement. In the first case, mobilization was proactive, seeking to gain something new, the right to free abortion; in the second, it was reactive, seeking to block a decision (to install Cruise missiles) that had already been taken. One of the founding organizations of the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and for Civic Action (Association pour la Taxation des Transactions financières et pour l'Action Citoyenne, ATTAC), emerged around demands for a tax on transnational transactions; also present in Porto Alegre, the debt relief campaign asked for the cancellation of foreign debt for poor countries. Demands whose symbolic value is very high, such as the Equal Rights Amendment in the case of the American feminist movement, remain central for a movement even when their potential effectiveness is questionable. The importance of such nonnegotiable objectives is confirmed by the fact that, although activists may be willing to negotiate on other demands, even partial victories on these issues, such as a woman's right to voluntarily interrupt pregnancy, are considered as defeats. While nonnegotiable demands are particularly important in the construction of collective identities, social movements rarely limit themselves to these. In fact, they tend to articulate specific requests for reforms.

The changes brought about by social movements may be evaluated by looking at the various phases of the decision-making process: the emergence of new issues, the writing and applying of new legislation, and the analysis of the effects of public policies in alleviating the conditions of those mobilized by collective action. Various levels of responsiveness to collective demands within the political system can be distinguished: from the availability of the authorities to listen to the protestors, to their willingness to put an issue on the agenda, and, then, to adopt and implement specific policies. Research on social movements initially concentrated on the production of legislation, with quantitative and qualitative analyses of the responses of parliaments and governments.

More and more, however, research has developed also on the implementation of decisions demanded by social movements as well as the cultural transformations they produce. Although

movements tend to request legislative change, it is also true that this is neither their only nor perhaps even their primary objective, as movements are in fact carriers of *symbolic messages* by influencing bystanders and spreading their own conception of the world and alternative values. Typically, new ideas emerge within critical communities and are then spread via social movements. While the capacity of social movements for reaching their general aims has been considered low, their capacity for *thematization*, the introduction of new issues into public debate, and their long-term cultural influence have been considered high.

Local Protest and Urban Policies

From the 1990s onward, research on social movements and public policies has also focused on protest campaigns against large-scale public works in urban and semirural contexts. If the presence of territorial conflicts is certainly not a new phenomenon, the 1990s saw a growing analytical focus on new forms of protest, which have been portrayed as limited and localized. It has been observed that those seeking to defend the quality of life in a limited territory tend to oppose public works that are seen as compromising either the ecological equilibrium (e.g., refuse incinerators) or public security (e.g., the insertion of unwanted social groups in their territory). The presence of localized conflicts has met with great concern, given the multiplication in both these types of protest against locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) in recent years.

Local conflicts are usually seen in the social science literature (and more generally) as being motivated by a "not in my backyard" (NIMBY) syndrome, associated with conservative behavior and an egotistical resistance to social change. In public policy analysis, local opposition is often associated with "free riderism"—that is, the refusal to pay the necessary costs to attain public goods. This interpretation of the NIMBY syndrome has, however, been disputed. In fact, empirical research on local oppositions has indicated a complex reality, with committees characterized by a diverse capacity or will to present their particular claims within a more comprehensive framework.

In contrast to a NIMBY reading of the situation, sociological research has often interpreted LULU conflicts as an expression of different types

of social movements. In the discourse of those who protest, the defense of local natural resources is often accompanied by a more general defense of natural resources. From this point of view, local conflicts can be interpreted as an evolution in the ecological movement, characterized not only by the growth (in numbers, resources, and legitimacy) of environmental organizations but also by the diffusion of environmental awareness into public opinion as well as an extension of collective action beyond traditional organizational networks or environmental discourses. In contrast to the 1970s and 1980s, the main role in the mobilization of the protest is now played by citizens' committees—that is, organized but weakly structured groups of citizens that unite on a territorial basis and use forms of protest to oppose interventions that they claim to be damaging for the quality of life in their territory. Additionally, although previously framed mainly as a “postmaterialist” concern, shared by a “new bourgeoisie” with high levels of education, environmental conflicts now tend to involve more and more underprivileged groups, above all in degraded areas, where projects with high environmental impacts (e.g., incinerators) are often executed. In these conflicts environmental associations are usually present, but they often cooperate and conflict with other organizations based in the territory.

Local conflicts are also discussed in the light of earlier research on urban “growth machines,” defined by formal and informal networks between public and private actors oriented toward increasing investment for economic growth. Against these networks, social movements, groups, and associations opposed to the reduction of welfare resources destined for marginal social groups, as well as residents' associations who see themselves as damaged by projects for urban transformation, propose a different model of development.

To overcome the NIMBY label, social movements mobilized in these local conflicts tend to bridge the opposition to specific land use with frames of social justice. Faced with those who accuse them of protesting on behalf of the individual interest (rather than the common good), they develop a “not on planet Earth” (NOPE) discourse. Moreover, they often define their protest through a procedural rhetoric that defends their action as opposition to the abuse of power

and lack of transparency in public decision making, as well as the collusive alliance between government and entrepreneurial interests.

Social Movements and Democratization

Reflections on social movements are also relevant for the analysis of democratization processes. The role of social movements for democracy has been discussed with very different expectations. Initially, social movements were considered either as marginal (*vis-à-vis* political parties) to democratic development or as dangerous for democracy, promoting excessive levels of societal mobilization. Later on, however, these assumptions have been contested, and more and more attention has been paid to the development of civil society organizations.

It is true that some movements have refused democracy altogether (e.g., fascist and neo-fascist movements), while others have the unintended effect of producing a backlash against democratic rights. Additionally, identity politics, often seen in ethnic conflicts, have sometimes ended in religious war and racial violence. However, since the 1970s in particular, the assessment not only that social movements flourish in democracies but also that most, albeit not all, social movements support democracy has become widespread. Pushing for wider suffrage or the recognition of associational rights, social movements contributed to the first waves of democratization and the development of democratic public spheres. Later on, the labor movement has contributed to the enlargement of citizens' rights, and social movements have played a fundamental role in the struggles for democratization as well as in democratic consolidation.

The social science literature on regime transformation has stressed that social movements contribute to democratization under certain conditions. In particular, only those movements that explicitly demand increased equality and protection for minorities actually promote democratic development. In fact, looking at the process of democratization, it may be observed that collective mobilization has frequently created the conditions for the destabilization of authoritarian regimes and can also lead to the intensification of repression or the collapse of weak democratic regimes, particularly where social movements do not stick to democratic conceptions. While labor, student, and ethnic

movements brought about a crisis in the Franco regime in Spain in the 1960s and 1970s, the worker and peasant movements and the fascist countermovements contributed to the failure of the process of democratization in Italy in the 1920s and 1930s. Moreover, social movements have often formed transnational alliances to overthrow an authoritarian regime. In Latin America, as well as in Eastern Europe, social movements have asked for (different forms of) democratization, producing a final breakdown of neo-fascist as well as real-socialist authoritarian governments.

Research on various transition processes has stressed that the first steps toward democratization include a demobilization of civil society and the development of more institutionalized political actors following the opening of institutional opportunities, or the “pacted” strategy of the elites’ settlement, as in Spain after Franco and toward the end of the Pinochet regime in Chile. In recent democratization processes, the availability of public and private funds in the Third Sector contributed to an early institutionalization of movement organizations. This does not, however, necessarily seem to be the fate of social movements in phases of democratic consolidation: The presence of a tradition of mobilization, as well as movements that are independent from political parties, can facilitate the maintenance of high levels of protest during transition and consolidation—as the shantytown dwellers’ movement in Chile, the urban movement in Brazil, or the environmental movements in Eastern Europe illustrate.

In turn, consolidation fuels the development of social movements. Resources for collective action tend in fact to increase over time, as movements become institutionalized, construct subcultural networks, create channels of access to policymakers, and form alliances. This organizational continuity means that the experiences of “early-riser” movements represent both resources and constraints for those that follow. Processes of imitation and differentiation, and enforced repetition and learning take place simultaneously. Movement activists inherit structures and models from their predecessors. The social movement sector grows with the diffusion, during each wave of mobilization, of the capacities required for collective action. In fact, mobilization is facilitated by the presence of networks of activists willing to mobilize around

new issues, where these are seen as compatible with their original identities. Moreover, the substantive gains made by one movement can have beneficial consequences for the demands of other movements, and their success can encourage further mobilizations. It can be concluded, therefore, that the importance of social movements tends to grow insofar as there is an ever-increasing amount of resources (both technical and structural) available for collective action.

International Relations and Transnational Movements

Social movement studies, like other areas of the social sciences, have been late to address the phenomena of transnationalization and are still in search of adequate methods, concepts, and theories to explain them. There are several reasons for this. First, most scholarship has time and again confirmed the relevant role that national political opportunities play in influencing social movement mobilization, its dimensions, duration, and forms. The modern repertoire of protest emerged with the creation of the nation-state, and social movements have played an important role in the development of (national) citizenship rights. So it is at the national level that they fought for access, suffered state repression, and found allies. Second, social movement studies focused on Western (and Northern) democracies. Furthermore, research in international relations has long considered the states as the only relevant actors.

In the field of social movements as in others, phenomena of transnationalization were first, and not by chance, addressed within the fields of international relations and international sociology. Bringing “transnational relations back in,” Thomas Risse, Kathryn Sikkink, and others have pointed out the role of transnational environmental and human rights campaigns in developing international normative regimes. In doing this, they took into account the role of nonstate actors, as well as emphasizing cooperation over competition. Research on human rights regimes or peace and war also stressed the emergence of international norms that challenged the vision of international politics as an anarchic system of states.

At the same time, research emerged on the development of international governmental organizations

(IGOs) and, in parallel and related to these, on a population of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), often taking the form of transnational social movement organizations. Over the past 2 decades, these nongovernmental actors have grown enormously in terms of numbers, membership, material resources, public resonance, and institutional access. This research also recognizes the interplay of actors at different geographical levels, going beyond disciplinary borders between internal and international politics. In human rights campaigns, national actors, suffering repression in authoritarian regimes, found allies abroad in epistemic communities, involving IGOs, national governments, experts, and INGOs.

Focusing on the interactions between social movements and IGOs, in the first studies from a social movement perspective, Hanspeter Kriesi, Dieter Rucht, Sidney Tarrow, and Donatella della Porta emphasized the capacity of transnational social movements to adapt to IGOs' rules of the game, with a diplomatic search for agreement over democratic accountability, discretion over transparency, and persuasion over mobilization in the street. In this, they found some resonance in the more normatively oriented literature on civil society seen as the beginning of a *global* civil society.

Research on transnational processes and social movements first developed around reflections on multilevel opportunity structures. In this sense, two main paths of transnationalization were singled out: (1) social movements with domestic political concerns (especially in authoritarian regimes) searching for external, international allies and (2) social movements addressing their own governments to influence international political decisions.

Attention was also paid to the resource exchanges between transnational social movement organizations and IGOs. Exchanges of knowledge as well as a potential reciprocal legitimization were singled out along with the capacity of transnational social movements to sensitize public opinion to global problems. At the same time, the difficulties in protesting beyond national borders were stressed by looking at different data on protest events, which generally seemed to remain anchored at the national level. Some studies also pointed out the cognitive effects of globalization, for example, in the intensification of relations beyond borders

in terms of the cross-national diffusion of movement frames and strategies for maintenance of public order. Here as well, attention is paid not only to the potential for increasing exchanges but also to their limits.

With the development of campaigns addressing various and diverse IGOs, more reflections were developed concerning the different opportunities that different international assets offered to different social movements. Opportunities such as a consensual culture and a reciprocal search for recognition were available, for example, for the United Nations (UN) but not for (the much more closed and hostile) international financial institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, which became the targets of lively protests. In fact, more recent research has indicated that there are as many types of institutions at the transnational level as there are national ones. The social movements that target them, therefore, have to find specific leverage, for example, in the unanimity rules of the WTO, which make alliances with some states particularly relevant, while international experts and formal channels of consultation are exploited in interactions with the ILO. Additionally, in recent research, IGOs have emerged as complex and fragmented institutions, made of different bodies that provide external actors with differentiated opportunities. Looking at the European Union, the European Council, Commission, Parliament, and courts are all targeted by social movements, but protest strategies vary with the different characteristics of these specific bodies. Furthermore, different movements can have a more difficult or an easier life in terms of gaining access to specific (sympathetic) Directorates General in the European Commission or opposing powerful ones.

Different opportunities require different strategies. If previous research had stressed the moderation of social movement tactics when addressing IGOs, with a move from the street to the lobbies, recent studies have rediscovered protest. In fact, going beyond the specific experiences of the parallel summits organized by the UN on environmental or women's issues, many interactions between social movements and IGOs have involved protest. With time, the frustration over the results of more moderate forms of interaction brought about the

development of broader coalitions, including religious groups, unions, and social movements, which combined pressure with petitions, marches, and even direct action. Since the 1999 protests during the WTO meeting in Seattle, the 2000s have seen an escalation of interactions between protestors and the police during the contestation of international summits. Even though transnational protests remain a rare occurrence, the few transnational protests that have taken place (whether in the form of global days of action, countersummits, or social forums) emerge as particularly “eventful” in their capacity to produce relational, cognitive, and affective effects on social movement activists and social movement organizations themselves.

Finally, at the cultural level, a global language developed together with intense interactions during the transnational events mentioned and indeed a growing acknowledgment of the roles and responsibilities of IGOs. Social movement activists started to present their actions as part of a global justice movement, calling for global justice and global democracy. Although still deep-rooted in national political systems and movement families, cosmopolitan activists tend to bridge the local with the global and vice versa. In doing this, they are contributing to the development of a transnational political system, as well as transnational identities.

Social Movements, Democracy, and Normative Theory

Although mainly addressed within the empirical subfields of political science, social movement studies have recently begun to interact with political theory, more specifically the branch reflecting on participatory and deliberative conceptions of democracy.

Social movements often do not limit their interventions to single policies but challenge the ways in which political institutions work. Movements demand, and often obtain, the decentralization of political power, the consultation of interested citizens on particular decisions, or appeals procedures against decisions by the public administration. They also interact increasingly with public administrations: They ask to be allowed to testify before representative institutions and the judiciary, to be listened to as counterexperts, and to receive legal

recognition and material incentives. In fact, social movements increase the possibilities for access to the political system, both through ad hoc channels relating to specific issues and through institutions that are open to all noninstitutional actors. In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, social movements have indeed been able to introduce changes that move toward greater grassroots control. They have produced a change in political culture, in the whole set of norms and reference schemes that define the issues and means of action that are politically legitimate. Repertoires of collective action, which were once condemned and dealt with simply as public order problems, have slowly become acceptable, and new policy arenas have been created on issues of major concern for social movement activists (see, e.g., environmental or gender rights agencies). Not only were some public bureaucracies established under the pressure of movement mobilizations and movement activists regarded as potential allies, but also movement activists have been co-opted into specific public bodies as members of their staff. The public administrators working in these institutions mediate particular social movement demands through both formal and informal channels and frequently ally themselves with movement representatives to increase the amount of public resources available in the policy areas over which they have authority. They tend to have frequent contacts with representatives of the social movements involved in their areas, with the movements taking on a consultancy role in many instances. In addition, they sometimes develop common interests.

Social movement activists also maintain direct contacts with decision makers—participating in epistemic communities, made up of representatives of governments, parties, and interest groups of various types and persuasion. Nongovernmental organizations critical of neoliberalist globalization have, in particular, resorted to bringing pressure to bear at both the national and the international levels, cultivating specific expertise. From human rights groups to environmentalists, advocacy networks—composed of activists, bureaucrats belonging to international organizations, and politicians from many countries—have won significant gains in a number of areas, such as the protection of the environment or human rights violations. Some social movement organizations have, indeed, been

highlighted as having not only increased in number but also strengthened their influence on the various stages of international policy making.

Most important, so-called participatory and deliberative institutional experiments have developed over the past 2 decades, especially at the local level. They are based on the principle of participation by “normal citizens” in public arenas of debate, empowered by information and rules for high-quality communication. Actors associated with social movements have intervened in the development of some of these experiments, sometimes as critical participants, sometimes as external opponents.

More generally, social movements have developed a fundamental critique of conventional politics, affirming the legitimacy (if not the primacy) of alternatives to parliamentary, liberal democracy. Especially since the 1960s, many social movements have supported the direct participation of citizens in public decision making, criticizing the delegation of decision making to representatives who can be controlled only at the moment of elections. Moreover, they seek to switch decision making to more transparent and controllable sites. In the social movement conception of democracy, the people themselves (who are naturally interested in politics) must assume direct responsibility for intervening in the political decision-making process. More recently, the normative debate on deliberative democracy has found resonance in some social movement organizations that have developed norms and practices of consensual decision making, stressing the need to improve the quality of communication. Some attention on the part of political theorists has also been focused on the role of social movements in the creation of alternative public spheres, free from state intervention.

In the global justice movement, in particular, several organizations have experimented with participatory, discursive models of democracy both in their internal decision making and in their interactions with political institutions. Internally, social movements have—with a greater or lesser degree of success—attempted to develop an organizational structure based on participation (rather than delegation), consensus building (rather than majority votes), and horizontal networks (rather than centralized hierarchies).

As far as the social movement critique of existing democracy is concerned, their search for an alternative cannot be considered as over. Not all students of social movement organizations agree that they have overcome the risk of producing oligarchies and personalistic leadership, the very problems at the center of their critique of traditional politics. Although it maximizes responsiveness, the direct democracy model has weaknesses as far as representation and efficiency are concerned. Problems of efficiency affect the success of movement organizations themselves; problems of representation concern the legitimization of new forms of democracy. The refusal by social movements to accept the principles of representative democracy can undermine their image as democratic actors, particularly when they begin to take on official and semiofficial functions within representative institutions, assuming the form of parties or public interest groups. Social forums, by bringing together heterogeneous actors, pay great attention to the quality of internal communication but with unequal results. These limitations notwithstanding, social movements have helped open new channels of access to the political system, contributing to the identification, if not the solution, of a number of democratic problems.

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See also Advocacy Coalition Framework; Civil Society; Conflicts; Democracy, Theories of; Feminist Movements; Labor Movement; Mobilization, Political; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Participation

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SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

Social stratification refers to the positions held by individuals and groups in the structures of inequality existing in a society. Specifically, it denotes the classification of individuals and groups into different categories on the basis of the amount of one or more privileges enjoyed by the members of each category and/or the intensity of power that they

are able to exert over other people. In contemporary advanced societies, based on democratic political regimes and market economies, these categories are usually referred to as strata or classes, depending on the criteria chosen to identify them. Strata and classes are groups based on factual inequalities—that is, disparities produced by the workings of societies with legal systems stipulating the equality of all citizens before the law. Hence, strata and classes are open groups that individuals can enter or leave according to the acquisition or the loss, during their lives, of the characteristics defining membership of a specific class or stratum. By contrast, in most traditional societies, social inequalities were based on legal and/or religious rules that led to the formation of closed groups—such as castes, orders, or estates—to which people belonged from birth and for their entire lifetimes, with no chance of escaping from their initial condition. In this entry, the major factors determining social positions and various ways to group them into broader categories of strata and classes are discussed.

Social Stratification Systems of Advanced Societies

From an analytical point of view, the advanced societies comprise a plurality of institutional orders characterized by distinct systems of social stratification. For instance, within the political sphere, heads of states, prime ministers, and ministers of central governments perform more crucial roles and hold superior positions compared with those performed and held by members of parliaments, mayors, members of city councils, and the like. The latter, in their turn, are politically more influential than simple citizens. Indeed, even mayors and members of city councils can (a) take decisions regarding the needs and interests of different people and the whole community and (b) frame these decisions in legal rules. No simple citizen has this authority. However, some simple citizens can hold commanding positions in the economic sphere, such as chief executive officers of big corporations or proprietors of medium- and small-sized firms. Chief executive officers and entrepreneurs can determine the goals of their companies and firms, their organizational features, and the tasks undertaken by their managers and professionals. In their

turn, managers and professionals are responsible for organizing the work of routine nonmanual employees, foremen, and skilled and unskilled manual workers. Obviously no white- or blue-collar worker can take any decision regarding the firm's economic strategies and organizational arrangements. As a consequence, they are placed at the bottom of the stratification system of the economic realm. Yet even national politicians have no direct role to perform in this sphere, and in no sense can they be considered as holding top positions in the relevant stratification system. Similar situations can be observed in the cultural and educational sphere, in the religious realm, and so on.

Though largely independent, the main institutional orders of contemporary advanced societies are not reciprocally disconnected. On the contrary, they are functionally interdependent. Educational systems and universities are required to produce not only intellectuals but also skilled workers for the economy. Moreover, a high level of schooling can be a useful asset in the political and economic arenas. In their turn, the workings of the economy, besides being dependent on the availability of suitably skilled labor, depend closely on infrastructural interventions, trade and tax policies, labor market regulations, and welfare and educational measures decided by central and local governments. Politics can take even more incisive action in the economic realm by determining specific financial support in favor of individual sectors or firms to prevent unemployment episodes or to guarantee the survival of economic activities considered as crucial national or local assets. In parallel, the economy, through taxation, supplies politics with the financial resources needed to develop public policies and to pay the costs of political assemblies, related bureaucratic bodies and administrative staffs, the army, and so on. Furthermore, companies, firms, and actors with higher positions in the economic sphere can influence the workings of the political realm by selectively funding parties and politicians.

Owing to the functional interdependence among institutional orders, those who perform superior roles and hold higher positions in one such order can influence both their counterparts in other orders and, even more so, those occupying subordinate roles in them. As a consequence, the incumbents of higher positions in the political system, for

instance, are usually able to secure advantages for themselves, civil servants, and related social groups. In a similar way, people in higher positions within the cultural sphere are frequently able to obtain sizeable material and symbolic privileges. Moreover, they are quite often able to use these advantages and their cultural capital to achieve desirable standings in the political or economic sphere. Obviously, the same holds for the incumbents of higher roles in the economic or other institutional realms. These people may also use their power and privileges to obtain social acknowledgments and honors and to pursue political careers. By contrast, people occupying lower positions within an institutional order can only with difficulty compensate for their disadvantages by exerting some kind of influence in other social realms. It is decidedly more likely that they will play subordinate roles in the latter as well.

It is precisely because advantages and power linked to one specific structure of inequality can be transformed into advantages and power linked to other forms of social disparity that most social scientists maintain that there exists a general system of stratification in contemporary advanced societies. This general system is thought to be much more important than those existing within each individual institutional order: first, because it involves all members of a society, and second, because it concerns the overall living conditions of persons and groups. The roles underlying the positions held in specific systems of stratification are usually made up of occupations. This is all the more so in the case of a general stratification system. Obviously, occupation is not the sole feature conditioning the allocation of persons and groups in specific and general systems of stratification. Gender, generation, race, ethnicity, educational credentials, level of technical skills, type of social competencies, and so on can operate as factors generating several specific forms of inequality and hence influence the positions of individuals in the relevant stratification systems. Yet the vast majority of social scientists maintain that, in advanced societies, several inequalities—and hence the overall social positions of persons—mainly depend on the occupation that they (or the members of their household) perform. Indeed, crucial aspects of the disparities observed in people's living conditions—such as income, consumption, prestige, health,

psychological well-being—are deeply affected by occupations. As a consequence, all the schemes developed by social scientists during the past 50 years to represent the main features of general stratification systems have used occupations as their observation units.

Despite this basic similarity, the stratification schemes and measures developed by social scientists differ substantially. A fundamental distinction can be made depending on which aspect of social inequality—distributional or relational—is the main concern. Distributional disparities refer to the amount of a privilege, or a set of privileges, enjoyed by different groups of people. Relational inequalities concern power disparities occurring between these groups and their capacity both to condition the conduct of other groups and to successfully fulfill their interests and choices. These two aspects of inequality are connected. Power is a means to achieve social advantages, while advantages can be used to achieve power. However, precisely because they are conceptually distinguished, the distributional and relational aspects of social inequalities can be studied separately.

Social Strata and Occupational Stratification Scales

Some scholars focus on the distributional aspect, arguing that it is more directly linked to the disparities among the living conditions of individuals and groups. As a consequence, they maintain that general stratification systems are made up of strata. Indeed, a social stratum can be defined as a set of individuals and families who share similar living conditions because they enjoy similar amounts of one or more advantages. Strata form a linear hierarchy in which each of them (except the highest and the lowest) is adjacent to two other strata: one standing above and one standing below. The reason why strata form a completely ordered hierarchy is that privileges are gradational properties. For instance, it may happen that the poorest family in a country does not possess anything. But it is not true that the wealthiest family possesses the entire national wealth. It possesses only a part of it. Moreover, between the poorest and the wealthiest families lie numerous other families who own intermediate amounts of wealth. In principle, one may say that each individual person or family

possesses a different amount of wealth and hence that the number of strata identifiable on the basis of the distribution of this characteristic is virtually infinite. Yet social scientists tend to identify a discrete and reasonably small number of positions by grouping together persons and families with similar amounts of privilege(s) and hence rather similar living standards.

Usually, individuals and families are grouped in each social stratum by means of statistical procedures that lead to the specification of stratification scales, where each stratum is given a specific score (and hence a rank). In their turn, the scores are intended to measure the entire range of inequality underlying the distribution of one or more privileges, to define the distances (in terms of strength of inequality) between the various strata, and to express the specific position occupied by a given stratum in a stratification system. Social scientists have developed stratification scales of various kinds. A first distinction differentiates between analytic and synthetic scales. The former refer to just one privilege, whereas the latter pay attention to (more or less formally specified) combinations of several privileges. Analytic scales mainly regard income and prestige. Income scales are intended to identify the economic disparities among socio-occupational strata, while those based on prestige (in the strict meaning of the term) are intended to identify status groups and the amount of honor, deference, respect, and social consideration they receive. Synthetic scales intend to measure the overall social standing of socio-occupational strata by combining two or more privileges—for instance, income level, amount of social prestige, intensity of psychological gratification, degree of autonomy in performing job tasks—typically associated with the occupations belonging to a stratum.

Besides their synthetic or analytic character, socio-occupational scales can be distinguished on the basis of the information used in their construction. Objective scales rely on data sets recording factual properties of occupations (e.g., the amount of salary or wages, the intensity of unemployment risks) or their incumbents (e.g., education level, technical skills, the occupations of friends and spouses). Subjective or reputational scales are based on surveys that collect popular evaluations of the overall social standing of occupations. It is to be noted that, despite their subjective foundations

and the considerable changes that the occupational structures of advanced societies have undergone, these scales prove to be rather stable over time and across countries. This indicates that the mechanisms underlying the generation of socio-occupational strata are similar in most countries with a market economy and a democratic political regime and that the new occupations produced by technological progress do not alter the basic features of individual strata and the related stratification system.

Social Classes and Class Schemes

Class schemes furnish representations of social stratification alternative to those based on socio-occupational strata and scales. A class can be defined as a social category made up of individuals and families who possess the same power assets and hence hold the same positions in the overall system of social relations of domination and subordination existing in a society. The reason why some scholars prefer to represent social stratification in terms of class schemes is quite simple. They argue that distributive inequalities ultimately depend on relational disparities.

Most class schemes envisage stratification structures based on a rather small number (5–15) of different positions—in other words, different classes. This is so because power resources (or effective combinations of some of them) are rather scarce and the control exerted over each of them by individual classes is either (almost) complete or (almost) nonexistent. Indeed, if a power resource were gradually distributed between classes, no class could dominate another. As classes are rooted in relational inequalities, they do not necessarily form a linear hierarchical order. It may happen that two or more classes, controlling different power resources, stand in a position of reciprocal equilibrium. Nonetheless, classes give rise to a partially ordered social hierarchy in which higher classes dominate the remaining ones and in which middle classes are dominated by higher ones but in their turn dominate lower classes.

Because the amount of the power assets controlled by members of a given class can vary, as well as their ability and opportunities to exploit it, classes are internally stratified. However, according to scholars who adopt a class perspective, the inequalities in living standards that may occur

within classes are markedly smaller than those observed between classes. Despite the unavoidable internal heterogeneity of classes, the boundaries among them are far less conventional than those drawn among strata. Indeed, it is the control, or the lack of control, over power resources, rather than the decisions of scholars, that automatically define the class positions and the class memberships of individuals and groups.

Most class analysts maintain that, in advanced societies, the process of class formation is mainly influenced by power relations in the economic sphere. In their turn, these power relations depend on the power assets controlled by the members of individual classes. Four types of power assets are usually identified:

1. means of production,
2. educational qualifications and technical skills,
3. labor power, and
4. control over organizations exerted by top and middle managers and civil servants.

Power resources, however, are not equally effective. Control over the means of production and organizations furnishes greater power than that afforded by the possession of educational credentials or technical expertise, and all of these guarantee greater influence than that furnished by simple labor power. It is essentially this inequality of effectiveness that engenders the specific relations between classes. Power assets can be combined, and the social position of some classes is defined precisely by their combinations. This is typically the case of self-employed workers owning very small firms and frequently labeled the *petty bourgeoisie* (shopkeepers, plumbers, electricians, mechanics, stockbreeders, vinedressers, etc.). Indeed, they possess their own means of production, have specific technical expertise, and directly contribute with their own labor to the operation of their small firms. A similar case can be made for self-employed professionals (lawyers, financial consultants, architects, and medical doctors). Their class position is based on the possession of both high educational credentials and means of production. Obviously, numerous people are equipped with high educational credentials or technical skills, and everybody is endowed with his or her

own labor. But in many cases, these assets are intangible and can be ignored. The class positions of entrepreneurs and chief executives entirely depend on their control of means of production. Indeed, an entrepreneur remains an entrepreneur even though she or he may be in poor health and does not possess any educational qualification.

As in the case of socio-occupational stratification scales, social scientists have developed several definitions of classes and numerous class schemes. However, those linked to the Marxist and Weberian traditions are still the most influential. Neo-Marxist scholars maintain that classes are rooted in the social relations of production and the related processes of exploitation. However, they acknowledge that the social stratification of advanced societies is much more complex than envisaged by Marx in the mid-19th century. They state that, besides the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, there are classes whose members are simultaneously exploited by the owners of means of production and are exploiters of the working class. These middle classes are distinguished according to the amount of educational and professional credentials possessed by their members and the control that they can exert over the organizational arrangements of firms and public bureaucracies. Moreover, neo-Marxist authors maintain that the owners of means of production do not form an entirely homogeneous class, and they split them among the bourgeoisie (i.e., entrepreneurs and chief executive officers of large- and medium-sized firms), small entrepreneurs (owners of firms with a small number of employees), and the petty bourgeoisie (i.e., the self-employed with at most one or two employees).

Authors who adopt the neo-Weberian perspective draw up their class schemes by considering both the work and the market situation of individuals and groups. In their opinion, the process of class formation does not revolve solely around the social division of labor; it also revolves around the economic life chances of individuals and groups. In their more recent developments, neo-Weberian representations of class structure first separate employers from the self-employed and employees and then group employers into three classes: large employers, small employers not in agriculture, and small employers in agriculture. The same sectoral distinction is performed for the self-employed.

Finally, employees are allocated to different classes mainly according to the employment relations between them and their employers. Two main dimensions underlie the forms of employment contracts usually available in the labor markets of advanced societies: the (high or low) specificity of the human assets possessed by employees—that is, their level and kind of technical and social abilities—and the (high or low) difficulty of monitoring their work by employers. The combination of these two dimensions produces three basic types of contract: (1) service relationship, (2) labor contract, and (3) mixed forms of service relation and labor contract. These contractual categories are then internally subdivided according to the usual organizational roles of the relevant employees and/or the economic sector (industry and services vs. agriculture) in which they work.

Recent Developments

In recent years, the two standard approaches to the study of social stratification have progressively converged, and currently, several lines of empirical inquiry on social inequalities are carried out using class schemes or socio-occupational scales indifferently. This convergence has been produced by the increasingly detailed information about interviewees' occupations collected by socioeconomic surveys, the progress achieved in the statistical techniques used for the relevant analyses, and the conviction that both ways to express social positions of individuals and groups can be useful in clarifying the effects of these positions on specific inequalities and the mechanisms underlying them.

The convergence of the class and stratum perspectives has not increased their popularity among social scientists, however. On the contrary, both have been challenged by authors who maintain that strata and classes are disappearing, or have already disappeared, from contemporary advanced societies. In the opinion of such authors, social inequalities are becoming increasingly fragmented on an individual basis. Two main arguments are put forward to support this thesis. First, advanced societies have undergone a long process of institutionalization of individualism: that is, a process that places personal rights and personal independence at the center of cultural, political, economic, and juridical

arrangements. As a consequence, collective entities, such as professional associations, local communities, classes, strata, churches, and even families, are increasingly less able to shape the life trajectories and destinations of individuals. Second, the globalization of the economy exposes everybody, no matter how privileged in their current social positions, to increasing risks of suddenly lapsing into unemployment, financial hardship, poverty, multiple deprivation, and similar distressful situations.

Social stratification scholars react to the thesis of the individualization of social inequalities by maintaining that it has not yet received convincing empirical support. These scholars admit that advanced societies are experiencing a secular trend toward emancipation of individuals from the strict social control exerted in the past by different communities. But they also point out that a large body of empirical analysis has shown that several different expressions of crucial inequalities—such as those regarding educational opportunities, intergenerational mobility and career chances, risks of unemployment, level of income and wealth, and health conditions—and even the mating selection process are still linked to the class and stratum of origin and current belonging. Authors supporting the thesis of the crystallization of inequalities around classes and strata recognize that the latter are less socially visible than they were at the beginning of the industrialization process. Moreover, they acknowledge that contemporary advanced societies are becoming somewhat more socially fluid and open. But they stress that this movement toward greater social fairness is feeble and slow, so that most of these societies still exhibit highly effective processes of social closure structured around strata and classes.

Indeed, as shown by the experience of the Nordic countries, only systematic and long-lasting policies aimed at increasing levels of social equality can guarantee a stable reduction of social disparities. In the past 10 years, however, these policies have been weakened everywhere by both the increasing popularity of market-oriented economic thought and the more recent negative effects of economic recession.

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See also Capitalism; Class, Social; Inequality, Economic; Social Exclusion

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SOCIALISM

By the final third of the 19th century, socialism had emerged in Europe, both as a critique of liberalism and as the only comprehensive alternative to it. In this sense, socialism was an intellectual reckoning with the world created by the British industrial revolution and the French Revolution of 1789, and it was initially confined to dissident groups within these two countries. But like its main ideological rival, socialism came in many competing, dynamic varieties. Uniquely, socialism in all of these varieties was concerned with understanding the world both as it is and as it might be or would become. As such, it represented an alternative socioeconomic system to capitalism based on principles of egalitarianism and collectivism. The main currents of socialism also became champions of democracy.

Origins and Early Development

Socialists and liberals drew on a common stock of Enlightenment assumptions. In this view, humankind had struggled successfully to control nature

by the application of reason. History was an ascent, though one in which irrationalist forces had obstructed the march of progress and were yet to be swept away completely. Reason applied to human affairs could in principle produce the same advances as science had already made possible in the effort to understand and subdue nature. The social world was the work of humanity, and human beings could understand its evolution and promote their self-improvement in the process.

Radical and dissident opinion within the Enlightenment pointed beyond mainstream liberalism and inspired future socialists. Thomas Paine, for example, had shown the imagination and audacity to advocate old age pensions, land nationalization, more liberal marriage and divorce laws, family allowances, free education, and a host of other reforms that became part of the social-democratic program in the 20th century. Jean-Jacques Rousseau contradicted his Enlightenment peers in the mid-18th century by identifying civil society (and the division of labor) as the source of inequality, which the political superstructure merely legitimated and protected. He also stressed the iniquities of private property, the multiplicity of artificial wants and the dependencies they generated, and the growth of invidious distinction, base rivalry, and competition that emanated from the same quarter. Where mainstream liberalism saw only progress, Rousseau saw also “an assembly of artificial men and factitious passions.”

Rousseau blamed these discontents on the whole course of civilization, whereas the socialists accepted that industrialism, its most recent phase, was here to stay. It was capitalism that would have to be reformed or overthrown. For large sections of the population, the first industrialization (in Britain) was experienced as a social and economic catastrophe—the destroyer of community, family, environment, and the quality of life in general. The motivating force behind this “great transformation” was individual profit. The socialists did not deny that wealth and technological advances were associated with this change, but they were also concerned with understanding and overcoming its destructive and divisive features. A new language was developed. It gave us terms such as *working class*, *industrialism*, *capitalism*, and *middle class*. In November 1827, the word *socialism* appeared in print for the first time in the *Co-operative*

Magazine in Britain. The argument was now set forth that the problems of the new society were not attributable to industry as such but to capitalism in particular.

Robert Owen, himself a factory owner, had for 10 years previously argued that the source of problems such as poverty lay in unrestrained competition. The answer lay in the principle of cooperation. Owen was a firm believer in social engineering; human beings would improve as their environments were altered to induce desired changes in behavior, health, morals, educational attainment, and so on. He thus believed that the suffering created by capitalism was avoidable. He changed his factory regime at New Lanark in Scotland to demonstrate in practice that pauperism, squalid housing, chronic ill health, and unemployment were unnecessary evils. In 1813, he published an account of these changes in *A New View of Society*. At first, Owen argued that profits would improve rather than be damaged by such enlightened reforms. Later, as his ideas developed, he denounced property, religion, and the family—forefeiting his respectability in elite circles in the process. He turned to funding egalitarian and communitarian experiments in the United States, such as the one at New Harmony in Indiana, begun in 1826. After the Great Reform Act of 1832 failed to enfranchise the working class in Britain, Owen, who had returned to London, associated himself with both the cooperative movement and the creation of the Grand National Consolidated Trade Union. His followers in Britain strengthened their critique of capitalist exploitation by developing the argument that labor was the source of all wealth—a doctrine inspired by the labor theory of value expounded by David Ricardo in *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1817).

Meanwhile, in France, the radical reconstruction of society was an ambition promoted and legitimated by the revolution of 1789. The principles of this revolution—expressed in the name of “the people”—included the “rights of man” and “liberty, equality, and fraternity.” These ideas had international resonance and were opposed internationally by the counterrevolution of the aristocracy and monarchy. France was involved in a virtually continuous war between 1792 and 1815. In 1793, the most radical wing of the revolutionary leadership, the Jacobins, seized power in Paris in circumstances of French military reversals. The Jacobin

dictatorship itself was overthrown a year later, and a process was begun that promoted the army and the person of Napoleon Bonaparte. The most extreme radicals in the Jacobin milieu began to conclude that the revolutionary dynamic had been stopped at the point where it benefited only the bourgeoisie. They now formulated demands of economic as well as political equality. This Society of Equals, a Parisian political club led by Gracchus Babeuf, was suppressed by Bonaparte himself. But before Babeuf and the leaders were executed in May 1797, the Society of Equals had laid the foundations of a communist political current stressing abolition of private property in land, the need for social planning, the provision of state-supplied basic necessities to ensure a national minimum standard of life, communal living arrangements, the universal obligation to work, and the abolition of divisions of rich and poor.

After Napoleon's final defeat, the principal object of the victors at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 was to suppress "the Revolution." But the Jacobin and Babouvist traditions were kept alive in France by men such as Filippo Buonarroti (1761–1837), Etienne Cabet (1788–1856), and Louis-Auguste Blanqui (1805–1881), who stressed the need for a revolutionary dictatorship to complete the unfinished business of 1789 in the creation of a new social order based on a radical egalitarianism. These doctrines commanded support within the urban working class, as the insurrections of 1830 to 1848 in cities such as Lyons and Paris showed. The secret societies of the French communist tradition, though they envisaged a world without class distinctions, were less successful in elaborating theoretical alternatives to bourgeois society. This was better accomplished by socialist reformers such as Charles Fourier (1772–1837) and the Comte de Saint-Simon (1760–1825), who separately elaborated detailed schemes—many of them frankly fantastic—and seminal ideas that others (including Karl Marx and Auguste Comte) would take forward in different ways.

Saint-Simon and his followers believed that they were developing a science of society that disclosed the centrality of production and consumption. They argued that scientists and producers must be at the top of any rational hierarchy of merit and should play a major role in the government of the future, committed as it would be to

the scientifically planned improvement of humanity. Saint-Simon's vision of progress imagined such elites—including the propertied elite—exercising an enlightened self-interest by solving conflicts of interest with the improvement of the poor in mind. This was the way to avoid violence and increase the security and prosperity of the propertied, as well as to promote the good of society as a whole. In elaborating his doctrines, Saint-Simon parted company with liberal individualism, embraced feminism and pacifism, and imagined pan-European structures of cooperation. He also inaugurated forms of Christian socialism (in his *Nouveau Christianism*). His ideas spread across Europe in the years up to 1848, thanks to the work of followers such as Barthélemy Enfantin, Amand Bazard, and Pierre Leroux, who systematized the chaotic original.

Charles Fourier's (1772–1837) thoughts were even more detailed and confused than Saint-Simon's but no less original and provocative. Fourier championed feminism and cooperation as keys to, and measures of, social progress. He proposed and set up model communities, which he called *phalanstery*, based on assigning individuals to jobs for which they were suited. In describing these communities, Fourier ignored no detail of social organization. But his big ideas centered on the relationship between environment, education, and character. From a competitive, selfish, exploitative system could come only greedy, dishonest people. The influence of Rousseau is evident, as indeed it is in Saint-Simon's thinking. Fourier's best known follower, Victor Considerant (1808–1893), also championed the "right to work" and was prominent in the 1848 revolution in Paris as well as the First International Working Men's Association, established in 1864.

Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen were known to later socialists by the collective name given to them by Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels—the Utopian Socialists—largely because their schemes depended on methods of persuasion, education, and example, which the founders of "scientific socialism" deemed impractical. Marx and Engels were nevertheless converted to socialism through the work of these pioneers and their German followers (e.g., Wilhelm Weitling and Moses Hess). In 1842, an observer such as Lorenz von Stein could associate socialism in France with peaceful reform

and detailed thinking about the nature of reform, whereas *communism* signified, according to the same author, a revolutionary rejection of existing society, with proletarian roots, stressing the need for practical actions to overthrow the status quo. The French Revolution had bequeathed both the Jacobin model of the dictatorial, insurrectionist vanguard—kept alive by the secret societies—and the ideal of a republican democracy. Louis Blanc (1811–1882) became the best known exponent of the latter, arguing that any social change to socialism had to be democratic. But the insurrectionary tradition survived not the least because the urban working class was everywhere a small minority except in Britain, and it was far from clear that a “democratic revolution,” as suggested by Blanc and the German émigré Moses Hess, was possible. Even in Britain, the remarkable campaign of the Chartists (1837–1848) for male suffrage came to nothing, and socialism itself disappeared from view in that country until its revival in the 1880s. From the perspective of Europe in the 1840s—a continent still consisting predominantly of peasants and autocracy—socialism as a reforming movement of the working class was a nonstarter. Yet the work of Marx and Engels made this very connection.

Marx and His Legacy

Marx came to socialism via German philosophy, especially the work of G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) and the critiques of Hegel associated with Ludwig Feuerbach and the Left Hegelians. He shared Hegel’s idealization of the Greek *polis* and the conviction that the modern world was scarred by fragmentation and alienation. He also adopted Hegel’s dialectical method while giving it a materialist foundation not found in Hegel’s own philosophy. In Paris from 1843, Marx encountered the proletariat for the first time and studied the works of the mutualist socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as well as those of the Utopians. He learned more about the working class through Engels’s *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*, the product of the author’s investigations in Manchester since 1842 and his knowledge of Owenite, Chartist, and trade union circles. Together, Marx and Engels were active in German communist émigré circles in Brussels between 1845 and 1848, and it was here that they were

commissioned to write a manifesto for the clandestine Communist League. Their involvement in the revolutions that swept across Europe from Paris in 1848 led Marx to permanent exile in London a year later. He devoted his studies from this time to the critique of capitalist political economy, culminating in the publication of the first volume of *Das Kapital* in 1867.

Marx’s intellectual revolution effected the single most important development of socialist thought. He argued that the economic basis of society—its mode of production—determined its social and political structures. On this foundation, social classes arise, and it is conflict between classes that generates historical change. In capitalist society, the basic classes in conflict were those of the bourgeoisie—the owners of capital—and the proletariat. Marx regarded his greatest insight as the theory of surplus value, which showed the way in which capitalists exploited their workers. Such exploitation was an integral structural feature of capitalism and would persist for as long as capitalism existed. But the development of capitalism would lead to class polarization, periodic crises of overproduction, and opportunities for the emergence of proletarian class consciousness. Eventually, when objective conditions and subjective class consciousness were aligned, the proletariat—the vast majority in a mature capitalist economy—would overthrow the system of exploitation and the political institutions that served to legitimate and defend it. This is how socialism would emerge as the successor to capitalism in the march of human progress.

Most of what Marx and Engels wrote remained unpublished or unread outside the small groups of British and German socialists with which they had contact in the 1840s, 1850s, and 1860s. During this period, their thinking moved emphatically against the mentality of the secret societies in favor of revolutionary change as the product of open, mass struggles arising from conditions generated by capitalism itself. When the First International was formed in 1864, with Marx as a foundation member, it brought British trade unionists, French Proudhonists, German Communists, and anarchist followers of Michael Bakunin together. Marx failed to convert the trade unionists to his vision but succeeded in marginalizing the anarchists, Blanquists, and Proudhonists, even at the cost of relocating the International to New York City in

1872 and thereby effectively terminating it. But there were other, more important indications that Europe was moving in the direction Marx expected, such as the spread of industrial capitalism, the growth of trade unionism and class conflict, and the creation of nation-states in Italy and Germany, which Marx believed would pave the way to the formation of united workers' movements. The German Workers' Association had already been set up by Ferdinand Lassalle in 1863 to press for universal suffrage and socialism through the existing state machinery. Marx's own followers were involved with those of Lassalle in creating the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1875. Throughout this period and up to Engels's death in 1895, the "Marxists" in Germany were guided by the doctrine's founders, such that the SPD as a whole could be called a Marxist party by the 1880s. After Marx's death in 1883, Engels did what he could to systematize and codify the doctrine for the widest dissemination, establishing contacts throughout Europe as he did so, watching as the SPD moved from strength to strength and new Marxist parties were created across the continent, coming together in a new federation of national parties in 1889 as the Second International.

Socialism nevertheless lost none of its capacity for disputation and dissent. In part, this was because it continued to display a dual temporal existence, being both an account of the world as it was as well as an account of the world as it might be. On both counts, there was enormous scope for disagreement. There was the question of how the transition would come. Would it be revolutionary or by incremental reform, would the transition be peaceful or violent, and would it be dependent on skilled leadership or the result of blind economic forces or some combination of the two? One important variable in providing answers to these questions was national. The Marxist parties themselves were noticeably more committed to an insurrectionist reading of Marx the more one travelled east across Europe and into the zones of autocracy, censorship, and political intolerance. In Russia, Marxists argued among themselves about the need for a prior bourgeois-democratic revolution and their role in relation to it. But there was no argument that they had to organize clandestinely and that any political work that they did was necessarily illegal. By contrast, socialism in

England, when it came back to life in the 1880s, developed in circumstances of emerging parliamentary democracy and a strong liberal tradition that accommodated currents sympathetic to state-sponsored social reform. In Germany, the most successful socialist party of them all, the SPD, was practically divided and ideologically challenged from within by "revisionism" as the century came to an end. Meanwhile, in the United States of America, it was noticed in the first decade of the 20th century that the most powerful industrial nation on earth had failed to produce a socialist movement of corresponding size and significance. Thus began enquiries into "American exceptionalism," but even in the heartland of socialism, there were well-developed doubts about the Marxist analysis of capitalism and its inevitable demise.

In theoretical terms, it was Eduard Bernstein, a protégé of Engels himself, who questioned whether the evidence supported Marx's vision of class polarization, working class immiseration, capitalist breakdown, and the necessity of a revolutionary rupture. Instead, he pointed to the persistence, even growth, of multiple class strata, the need for class allies, the evidence of improvements in living standards, and the prospect of further gradual change via the ballot box. In practice, sections of the SPD—notably the Reichstag *Fraktion* and the trade unions—were already home to strong reformist currents. Though the "revisionism" debate (1898–1903) was concluded with apparent victory to the revolutionaries, events soon showed how misleading this was. In August 1914, the major powers of Europe went to war, and the SPD initially supported Germany's war effort with as much enthusiasm as the avowedly reformist Labour Party supported Britain's. The immense strains engendered by the war in all the belligerent countries eventually brought revolutionary Marxists to power in Russia in November 1917. Lenin's Bolsheviks moved quickly to establish a rival Third (or Communist) International in 1919, and by 1921, communist parties had been formed in most European countries.

The Russian Revolution and Its Aftermath

Ideologically, the consequences of World War I and the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia were immense. Lenin was able to argue persuasively

that the war signaled the beginning of “an epoch of wars, civil wars and revolutions” in which bourgeois democracy would wither and the prospects for meaningful reforms recede. The empirical evidence of the interwar years—economic dislocation, the world crisis sparked by the Wall Street Crash, and the rise of fascism—did not contradict this reasoning. Nor did growing conflict in the colonial world, for which the Bolsheviks claimed a special relationship as the first revolutionaries to embrace anti-imperialism as a foundation value and permanent project. In these circumstances, Communists were persuaded to model themselves on Lenin’s Bolsheviks. A party once justified as a necessary adaptation to Tsarist persecution was now the model for all Communists, whether in England or China. The Jacobin tradition was restored, not the least in the dictatorial way in which the Bolsheviks purported to represent the workers and peasants of the old Tsarist Empire.

World interest in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), as it was known from 1922, massively increased after 1930 when the global capitalist economic crisis coincided with the apparently successful inauguration of Soviet Five-Year Plans. Socialism became increasingly associated with the idea of state-centered planning. Soviet prestige was also enhanced by its role—real and imagined—in the struggle against fascism and Nazism, culminating in the expansion of the Soviet sphere as far west as central Europe in 1945. Thereafter, the Soviet Union was perceived as a model of how conscious economic planning could transform a backward, peasant society into a modern, industrialized, technologically advanced state, free of foreign domination. Throughout the Third World, socialism and the Soviet Union exercised this appeal almost until the final dissolution of the USSR in 1991. Socialism was equated with modernization, social progress, and various forms of unity in the first decades after World War II, giving rise to claims for specific forms of African, Arab, Islamic, and Third World socialism. In postcolonial Africa, in countries marked by “poverty, ignorance, disease and illiteracy,” as Kwame Nkrumah itemized the legacy of imperialism, leaders arose such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who pointed to precolonial forms of collectivism and egalitarianism on which an indigenous socialism could be built. There was no disguising, however, that

socialism appealed because the high road to prosperity and real independence was thought to lie with industrialization and rapid modernization under the direction of the Plan.

In the advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe, the reformist parties that regrouped as the Labour and Socialist International in 1923 were led by men who emphatically denied the socialist credentials of the Bolsheviks precisely because of Lenin’s violent and undemocratic methods. The dictatorship of Lenin’s successor Stalin provided gruesome support for their insight. But it was not until the long period of full employment and prosperity following World War II that they could boast a coherent alternative to Soviet socialism. This “Keynesian” alternative depended on the belief that democratically elected governments could steer economies to ensure annual economic growth. By this means, the goals of socialism could be obtained: full employment; an egalitarian distribution of income, wealth, and opportunity; the elimination of poverty; and the end of economic crises and their destructive consequences. Social-democratic Sweden was the shining model of this approach as late as the 1970s, though the left wing of the social-democratic parties continued to insist on the need to further reduce private economic power.

The Crisis of Socialism

In the years 1970 to 2000, socialism in all its varieties entered a profound crisis. Economic stagnation and authoritarianism in the communist world led eventually to the collapse of these regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and finally the Soviet Union itself as the communist leaders failed in their attempts to reform the system from within. Socialism as an alternative system lost its powers of attraction because of this failure, coming as it did on top of the moral calamity of communism, with its death toll of millions, which some socialists had forecast shortly after the Bolshevik seizure of power but which others had ignored for as long as they could. Meanwhile, social democracy entered a period of ideological retreat as the Keynesian approach broke down in the 1970s, and the future of the welfare state was called into question by long-term changes in the structure of societies and markets. The term *globalization* was often invoked as a shorthand for these subversions

of the old social-democratic paradigm. Though radical ideas of left-wing provenance continued to develop after 1970, socialism had ceased for the foreseeable future to provide them with a coherent vision of an alternative social system.

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See also Communism; Globalization; Marxism; Social Democracy

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SOCIALIST PARTIES

Socialist and social-democratic parties are the main and the most electorally successful party family of the Left. The first socialist parties appeared in Europe during the last quarter of the 19th century as a result of the politicization of the class conflicts generated by the Industrial Revolution. The formation of socialist parties was one of the outcomes of the cleavage between capital and labor and of the political mobilization of the working class. This entry discusses the origins, programs, and political role of these parties.

Prior to World War I, there were socialist or social-democratic parties or candidates in almost every European country and in some states in other regions of the world (Australia, New

Zealand, the United States, and some Latin American countries). In some cases, they were part of a subculture milieu in which a socialist mass-party organization was linked to a trade union and to a network of ancillary groups. In its early years, the European socialist or social-democratic parties emphasized some core ideas concerning the transformation of capitalist societies into more egalitarian ones built on solidarity, cooperation, and social justice. These parties, many of them Marxist, postulated the end of human exploitation, class divisions, and economic inequalities. The 1940s witnessed the expansion of socialist parties to places distant from their European origins, as some anticolonial organizations adopted socialism as their ideology in Asia and Africa. However, this phenomenon resulted in the formation of parties that—from the ideological point of view—could only partially be considered socialist given their combination of a socialist ideology with anticolonial and nationalist ideas.

The socialist movement experienced, almost since its birth, divisions over its program and policies for the transformation of capitalism (e.g., concerning the role of the state in the management of the economy) and over the best strategies to achieve it (e.g., divisions between reformists and revolutionaries). These debates among parties and leaders were already present in the First (1864) and Second (1889) International Working Men's Associations. In his analysis of electoral socialism, Adam Przeworski argues that the early socialists confronted three choices: (1) whether to achieve socialist goals from within or from outside the political institutions of capitalism, (2) whether to trust exclusively in the working class as the agent of socialist change or whether to appeal to other social classes as well, and (3) whether to transform society through partial reforms or to devote all efforts to the final abolition of capitalism. The responses to these three choices caused internal strife, shaped the evolution of the socialist parties, and contributed to differentiate them from other left-wing organizations.

The socialists decided to participate in elections. In doing so, socialist parties tried to take advantage of the political rights that capitalist societies accorded to the workers as a means to achieve improvements in their life conditions. This option clearly differentiated socialist parties from “abstentionist” streams

of the workers' movement, such as the anarchists. Despite the acceptance of the electoral process to win political power, within the socialist parties, there was a certain ambivalence about the need to eventually use revolutionary means to conquer political power or to defend it once attained by peaceful means. However, democracy eventually became not just the main path to socialism but the parties' very goal. In a certain sense, the ideal defended by socialist parties consisted in the extension of democratic political principles to the economic and social domains. The abandonment of revolutionary roads to gain power differentiated socialist and social-democratic parties from other groups of socialist and Marxist origin, such as the Communists.

Socialist parties originally opted for the electoral route to obtaining improvements in the living conditions of their electorate and to extend its influence among working class voters, but they were also convinced that this path would give them political power relatively easily. They believed that they would win elections in the short to medium term, given the unstoppable growth of the working class inherent in capitalism. However, the working class did not grow to become the social majority in most capitalist societies, and in any case, it never voted as a single cohesive electoral bloc as socialist leaders and intellectuals had hoped for. Under these circumstances, the socialist parties were confronted with the decision either to appeal to other social groups, if they wanted to maximize their votes and their possibilities to form governments in Western countries, or to remain a minority party appealing to an exclusively working class constituency. They decided to build a multiclass electoral coalition that reflected the evolution and differentiation of the social structure of capitalist societies. This wider electoral coalition—at least in class terms—blurred many socialist goals. In any case, the socialist project, regardless of the class orientation of its appeals, hardly attracted the support of a clear majority of the electorate in many countries during the first decades of its development. Hence, socialist parties rarely had the opportunity to implement their program without incorporating other political allies.

The socialist program was characterized by its reformist nature. This feature also differentiated socialist parties from other revolutionary and radical

groups. In its original implementation, these reformist policies were understood as steps in the path toward the complete and future transformation of capitalist society, following the socialist ideal. Therefore, socialist parties originally believed that the accumulation of economic and social reforms would eventually produce a radical transformation of the social order in a socialist way. But what was far from clear was what these reformist economic socialist policies should exactly be. The socialist parties were formally favorable to the nationalization or socialization of the means of production. However, once the socialist parties were in government during the end of the 19th and first third of the 20th centuries, hardly any overarching policy of nationalization took place in Western Europe. Despite their electoral successes, socialist parties did not gain enough political and electoral support to promote their own programs. Furthermore, they did not want to risk their political prestige in a policy they were unsure how to implement and that could find strong resistance. In the absence of a well-defined and differentiated socialist economic policy, socialist parties promoted public policies directed toward the expansion of social welfare through different plans on housing, health, salaries, unemployment, and so on.

In the 1930s and 1940s, some West European socialist parties began to defend and to implement Keynesian policies to regulate the economic crisis and to reduce unemployment. The socialist parties defended an active role of the state in the economy, anticyclical policies, public investment, and public debt, aiming to maintain jobs and to revitalize the economy. After World War II, socialist parties generally adopted Keynesian policies to regulate the economy; the projects of nationalization or socialization were almost forgotten, nationalizations were rarely implemented (although some took place during postwar economic reconstruction), and the parties assumed a non-Marxist program for the increase of equality and social justice within the limits of capitalism. Consequently, the possibilities of an advancement of equality were linked to the expansion, inclusiveness, and redistributive efforts of state intervention and of social welfare programs. However, in the view of the socialist parties, the state should limit itself to the provision of public goods, compensating through these policies the inequalities generated by the market. Given that

this program should be developed within a capitalist economy, social welfare policies were very dependent on the evolution of the free market economy, of its efficient management, and of its growth rate. The socialist economic and social policies, welfare state programs, state investment, and state fiscal revenues through direct taxation that would make possible all these policies were subject to sustaining a growing and full employment economy that ensures private sector returns.

This bundle of socialist policies encountered a benign economic environment for its implementation from the end of World War II until the 1970s. This period has been sometimes described as the golden age of West European social-democratic parties and policies. In any case, in spite of the influence of non-social-democratic parties and governments in the creation of West European welfare states, some elements of the social-democratic program became a crucial component of the West European policy status quo after the postwar period.

However, what could be termed as the social-democratic *settlement* faltered in the 1970s, when the economic context worsened notably. The Keynesian and economic redistribution policies did not seem to be feasible under the new economic circumstances. The principles that guided the policies of the socialist parties were challenged: The role of the state in the management of the national economies, its role in the regulation of the market dynamics, and the welfare state policies suffered from economic and financial crises, decreasing growth rates, rising unemployment, and growing internationalization of the economy. Later on, the social-democratic orthodoxy—that rising social expenditure, together with state intervention and regulation, ensured better functioning of the market—was severely challenged by economic globalization.

In the 1980s and 1990s, not only did socialist parties confront important challenges coming from social, cultural, economic, and institutional changes that made their platforms less appealing than the neoliberal or neoconservative ones, but they also confronted new competition from New Left parties. In this context, the socialist parties began a yet unfinished search for a new program that could provide them with a new identity adapted to the changes in the socioeconomic environment and in the patterns of electoral competition. During this

period, social democracy underwent a substantial programmatic change that in many cases has meant an abandonment of the previously traditional social-democratic concerns, moving toward more centrist and promarket policy positions, sometimes called the *third way*.

In the long term, socialist parties have successively abandoned their original anticapitalist and Marxist positions of the late 19th century, have adopted Keynesian policies compatible with the efficacy of macroeconomic management in the context of a capitalist society, and finally have moderated their reformist impulses to match the strongly market-oriented political environment that has existed since the 1980s. Although they still have more favorable policy positions than other party families toward social justice, income redistribution, and state social expenditure, a policy convergence between socialist parties and right-of-center party families has taken place in Western Europe.

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See also Communism; Marxism; Social Democracy; Socialism

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SOCIALIST SYSTEMS

Socialist systems are those regimes based on the economic and political theory of socialism, which advocates public ownership and cooperative

management of the means of production and allocation of resources. These include states described as socialist, communist, or Marxist, all of which claim to be based on efforts to achieve social justice and equality. The best term for these regimes may be *state socialism*, which has gained wide currency in the political science literature. In response to the crisis and collapse of state socialism at the end of the 1980s, many analysts have emphasized that the universalistic goals of socialism were not thereby invalidated, since many other currents of socialism, for instance, social democracy, have been vigorously developing around the world.

According to the classical Marxist approach, socialism is only the first stage of the postcapitalist society, followed by communism as a second stage in which people receive “according to their needs.” Marxist theory was elaborated for, and based on, the most developed countries of the world. Although the state socialist project originated from Marxist theory, it was, however, a deviation from the original theory of Karl Marx. The application of this theory in backward countries, starting with Lenin’s Russia, can be considered as turning it to the other extreme—that is, to a revolutionary theory for the poorest countries of the world. This trend reached its peak under Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong and, later, was embraced by Fidel Castro of Cuba and by other local leaders in the developing countries. What is more, there have been two basically different paths to state socialism. Along the above-mentioned lines was a series of internal revolutions and subsequent transformations, as in Russia, China, and Cuba, leading to state socialist regimes on different continents. In the second case, there were also some repressive impositions of communist rule on some countries by conquest, as for instance in Poland and Hungary. This second path to state socialism has usually been distinguished from the first, since these state socialist regimes were to a great extent alien in terms of the historical course of the countries concerned.

The following sections briefly describe the history and main features of state socialist systems, the political science models that account for their emergence, and their historical trajectories from their origins, through phases of industrialization and social transformation to their abrupt collapse in response to the global economic and political crises of the 1970s and 1980s.

Characteristics of Socialist Systems

The main features of state socialist systems are the following:

One-Party System. Political rule is based on the unified power of partocracy or on the concentration of power in the Communist Party as a super-state. In state socialism, there is no division of power because the party represents the dictatorship of the proletariat and builds a bureaucratic system of political control. Democratic centralism, first in the party and then in all political institutions, became the general organizational principle for state socialism. In the constitutions of the countries concerned, the leading role of the party in state and society is stipulated.

Command Economy. This is an economic system with central planning (Five-Year Plans) in the state-administered economy. There can be no private ownership of the means of production, since these are nationalized and state owned. Directive planning as instructions from above is the method of economic management in an economy based on state property, in which the State Planning Agency (*Gosplan* in Russia) acts as a superministry. But planning was a bargaining process between/among various actors and organizations, with centrally determined prices, heavily subsidized products, and huge subsidies for the heavy industries. Command economy is accompanied by the coercive collectivization of agriculture, which produced a general scarcity and low quality of agricultural goods.

Personality Cult of the Leader. A cultural system based on the ideological monopoly of “Marxism–Leninism” and on the “charisma” of the number one leader was followed. This ideological monopoly means that the official ideology penetrated all spheres of cultural life, demanding ideological conformity and uniformity. State socialist systems had a future-oriented legitimacy; that is, they tried to legitimate themselves in these backward countries as the means for catching up with the most developed Western states. However, this legitimating device was more and more eroded in the 1980s in the European “socialist” countries by the slowing down of economic growth and by the growing attractiveness of the Western world with its abundance of goods and services.

The chief actor in state socialist countries was the *nomenklatura*. It meant that the Communist Party was involved in the appointment of people to all senior posts in society. The *nomenklatura* principle was the main instrument for the exercise of democratic centralism. It was applied not merely within the party itself but also in the state administration, the police, the military, the judiciary, education, the economy, and social organizations such as the trade unions and the people's fronts—in short, it involved total control over appointments in all major organizations. The party structure was highly hierarchical; the real power was in the hands of a larger central committee and a smaller politburo controlled by the almighty leader. The party congress and/or the party conference were only legitimizing devices for democratic centralism and the official communication platforms for the economic and political decisions of the party leadership. The Communist Party was also a mobilizing instrument since there was a rather large party membership—between 6% and 10% of the adult population—as a “transmission belt” to the population as a whole to implement party decisions.

The emergence of state socialist systems was one of the most important historical developments of the 20th century. In the 1980s, at its peak, 40% of the world's population lived in the socialist world (i.e., in countries run by communist parties), and one third of the global industrial output was produced by the various state socialist systems. The core state socialist countries were military allies and economic partners of the Soviet Union in two major organizations: the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or Comecon, 1949–1991) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (1955–1991). These organizations were instruments of the great power efforts of the Soviet Union for global dominance. The Warsaw Pact and Comecon were the two pillars of Soviet global power as the basic military alliance and economic organization in the bipolar world on the side of the Soviet-dominated state socialist countries. Comecon was organized in January 1949 as a reaction to the Marshall Plan (1947), and it was extended beyond Europe with the entry of Mongolia (1962), Cuba (1972), and Vietnam (1978). The Warsaw Pact as a reaction to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was also an instrument of

the coercive control of the Soviet Union over its allies. The major principle of the Warsaw Pact was formulated in the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty (December 1968) after the Soviet Union's crushing of Czechoslovakian reform efforts in the “Prague Spring.” The state socialist countries in general had a network of multilateral treaties, but there were also a series of bilateral treaties between the core state socialist countries modeled after their contacts with the Soviet Union.

Varieties of State Socialism

The socialist world system embraced four continents with many countries for shorter or longer periods, reaching its largest territorial extension in the mid-1980s. However, these countries claiming to be “socialist” were not homogeneous at all, nor did they form a real “world system,” since they were split by serious tensions and deep cleavages, first of all by the adversarial competition for dominance between the Soviet and Chinese models. The state socialist countries were usually allies of one of these two big powers that tried to extend their respective spheres of influence, even against each other. Given their diverging and conflicting approaches to the one-party state, command economy, and personality cult of the leader, the state socialist countries were sometimes fierce enemies of each other in different historical periods. First, after World War II, a conflict emerged between the Soviet Union with its allies and Yugoslavia and, parallel with it, between Yugoslavia and Albania; then in the 1960s between the Soviet Union and China (and their allies); and finally between China and Vietnam. China and Vietnam fought a real war in 1979, but the Soviet Union and China also had a series of border clashes. As state socialism spread in the world, so the controversies became deeper between its leading powers; therefore, in fact, no unified socialist world system ever existed.

One can distinguish the following territorial groupings of state socialist countries in the 1980s:

European group: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia

Asian group: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, China, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea, and Vietnam

Latin American group: Cuba, Guyana, Nicaragua, and Surinam

Arab socialist group: Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen

Black African group (usually called socialist orientation): Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Congo, Madagascar, Mozambique, Somalia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe (These countries were fragile, nondurable systems, and it was very difficult to define their “socialist” character beyond official declarations.)

Three models have been offered in political science for the explanation of the emergence and transitory survival of state socialist countries:

1. *Totalitarianism:* This involved the state penetration of society for its total control. This theory was very fashionable after World War II and also after the collapse of the Soviet-dominated socialist world system. Totalitarianism is an ideological label for modern tyranny. It is simplistic but is still very popular as a journalistic term. However, this theory fails to answer two basic questions: first, how totalitarian control over the society can work at all, and if it is so, then second, how political change can be explained according to this static and rigid model. No doubt, this theory makes some contributions to the partial understanding of the worst and most repressive period of Stalinism, between 1949 and 1953, or the current history of North Korea, for instance. But it is unable to explain the state socialist project as a whole in its historical dynamism from the October Revolution in 1917 to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, with its internal fights, oppositions and counterelites, and increasing social resistance. The totalitarian form of state socialism is a unique phenomenon in world history as a worst-case scenario of historical blind alleys.

2. *Radical revolution:* This is the “Bolshevik”-type seizure of power by the working class or the poor peasantry through a long internal war or “permanent revolution.” These transitory societies have been in between, or have combined elements

of, capitalism and socialism. The internal revolutionary potential of these poor countries has played a dominant role in the fight against dependency on world capitalism and for national independence, so “socialism” and “nationalism” have also been combined. According to this model, the fate of these revolutions supposedly remains open. They may develop toward a “real” socialism, toward communism, or toward the capture of power by the state bourgeoisie as *nomenklatura*, leading to the bureaucratic deformation of state socialism. For the theory of radical revolution, state socialism is a historical hybrid, a combination of “genuine” socialism or anticapitalism and dependent capitalism in the guise of revolutionary nationalism, that has survived nowadays mostly or exclusively in the Third World.

3. *Modernization:* This refers to the catching-up exercise of a modernizing elite organized in the form of a communist party to establish an industrial society belatedly. The repressive state apparatus is in fact acting as an instrument of state capitalism to carry out the process of capital accumulation through the forcible extraction of surplus from the working class and the peasantry. In the last analysis, this modernization exercise leads to the convergence with world historical development, if the catching-up effort proves to be successful. Thus, in the final analysis, state socialism is just one of the more peculiar ways of reaching the stage of modern capitalist society. For modernization theory, state socialism is not an aberration or “hell on the earth” but only one of several transitory and controversial routes that early industrial societies take to converge finally with mainstream global development.

Historical Trajectory of State Socialism

The usual descriptions follow only the historical trajectory of communist ideologies from the theoretical foundations by Marx and Engels through Lenin and Stalin to Mao Zedong and Castro. Lenin indeed elaborated the revolutionary theory for a backward Russia with the basic principles of the Bolshevik party as its democratic centralism. He emphasized the revolutionary potential of Russia as the weakest part of the imperialist world system. After the victory of the October Revolution and the failure of the “world revolution,” Stalin

introduced the principle of “socialism in one country.” To consolidate the state socialist system, Stalin exercised a high level of political repression to overcome social resistance and to complete the state-building process in the early stage of industrialization. He completed the building of the repressive one-party state and a command economy with the personality cult, reducing the Russian populace to infantile dependence on the state. The vigorous development of industrial society led to the growth of Russia as a great power after the victory in World War II. Mao Zedong and later Castro extended the state socialist ideology more and more to the peasantry as the main revolutionary force. These ideological forms have been in fact a combination of the class struggle theory with the rise of nationalism in the (post)colonial world, where large peasant masses were dislocated.

Behind these ideologies, the “existing socialism” had to cope with real, not only ideological, obstacles and controversies. State socialism emerged after World War I as an alternative to world capitalism, and it vanished in the early 1990s as a meaningful alternative. It came to an end as an important social formation, even if some of its hybrid forms have survived in China and Vietnam; in some other archaic forms with traditional authoritarianism, as in North Korea; and with some vague postcolonial variants elsewhere. There were some basic internal and external built-in obstacles that were responsible for the vanishing of state socialism or the “really existing” socialism as a major type of development by the end of the 20th century. The previously noted catching-up exercise from inside as well as underdevelopment and external dependence were the domestic and international reasons that emerged, but a combination of internal and external built-in obstacles caused its abrupt demise at the end of the 20th century. If, and when, state socialism generated development, it also produced some economic factors and sociopolitical forces that turned against it. As extensive industrialization came to an end, the problems of economic management were aggravated, and the command economy proved to be unable to achieve economic integration and steer the structures created by intensive industrialization. Therefore, the economic crisis cycles were integral parts of this system of recurring imbalances. The historical trajectory presented different

models from war communism to market socialism, but the policy of perestroika failed, and the reforms instituted by Premier Mikhail Gorbachev were the last attempt at a revival. At the same time, the external obstacle of world capitalism proved more and more that the economies of state socialist countries were not competitive in the world market. They were suitable only for the first and most drastic phase of industrialization, followed in the 1980s by economic decline in the core state socialist countries during their second phase of industrialization, although at the same time, state socialism had spread to the world’s poorest countries, where early industrialization was still taking place. State socialism lost the economic competition with the West in the 1980s, when the Soviet Union had become the world’s largest industrial society of the late-19th-century type, with an obsolete socioeconomic structure and a high level of militarization and also with an economy of shortage that would lead ultimately to mass discontent and full delegitimation of the socioeconomic system.

Although all state socialist countries had a legacy of authoritarianism from their previous history, the new type of repressive state soon became itself an internal obstacle to their socioeconomic development. Political reforms were always high on the agenda because it was clear that the political system could not work properly, since it continually created new obstacles to its own working—the new industrial and educated classes that had arisen as a result of socioeconomic development could not fit into the political system. When the urbanized strata, including the new working class, began to demand more human rights and freedoms, they were confronted with the implacable tenets of state socialism as a one-party state. Thus, they turned against the ideological monopoly of the party and demanded an open society.

In the core state socialist countries, a series of grave political crises in 1956 (Hungary), 1968 (Czechoslovakia), and 1988 (Poland) finally culminated in a deep crisis of political legitimacy at the end of the 1980s. Two factors—economic and political—produced a combined internal pressure at the end of the 1980s, when the democratic erosion was strengthened by the external pressure of globalization. As global telecommunication penetrated to these countries, the advantages of the Western economic order and world market were

displayed in much more detail than before and resulted in the spread of democratic ideas through the new types of media. All in all, the year 1975 may be considered as a turning point for both internal models and external competition:

1. Until the mid-1970s, the core state socialist countries developed much more quickly than the Western states; thus, the future-oriented legitimacy of the catching-up model seemed to work. But the global crisis in the 1970s caused the economies of the state socialist countries to slow down, and owing to this deceleration of socioeconomic development, state socialism in the most developed core countries lost its legitimacy step by step. The development model of state socialist countries was shifted to the poorest countries, so as a result of this qualitative failure, state socialism was significantly weakened in the core countries, but paradoxically, it became attractive in the poorest countries, and it began its largest quantitative territorial extension in the Third World.

2. During their industrialization process, the state socialist countries looked externally competitive for a long time; therefore, even the Western modernization models suggested that they were successful industrial societies. But they could not adapt to the structural changes in the world economy during the 1970s; their obsolete structures remained and, increasingly, were lagging behind in the global competition. At the peak of détente in 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe; OSCE)—with the participation of the United States and Canada—became instrumental in the erosion of state socialism through the permanent campaign for human rights (Helsinki Watchdog groups for human rights in Central and Eastern Europe).

3. There was also an imperial overstretching of Russia's resources, both externally and internally. To sustain such an empire and its full apparatus of oppression demanded vast energy and expenditure, creating an internal obstacle for Russian society from the combined effects of full militarization, the economic burden of producing military hardware, and the social-ideological burden of suppressing human freedom. In the end, the Soviet Union was too weak economically to maintain

such a world empire, which was very costly and diverted resources from Russia's own socioeconomic development (around one third of its gross domestic product). Consequently, the system's eventual collapse was not only a political failure but also an economic necessity.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Marxism; Postcommunist Regimes; Totalitarian Regimes; Totalitarianism

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SOFT LAW

Although law is often thought of as binding on those to whom it applies, and sanctions are associated with breaking the law, some legal rules are voluntary and not coercive. Particularly in international law, legal rules are not legally binding, and legal sanctions cannot be used in cases of noncompliance. *Soft law* refers to those legal rules that are not legally binding and for which legal sanctions cannot be used in cases of noncompliance. These rules can be guidelines, codes of conducts, standards,

and other voluntary rules. In contrast to hard law, soft law can be decided by a variety of actors, public and private. Making hard law is the prerogative of legislative assemblies, national parliaments, and the European parliament, with a few exceptions. Soft law can be created by governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the business community. It should be noted that the distinction between hard and soft law is hard to make in practice. Legally binding law often contains references to standards and other non-legally binding rules, and soft-law rules often contain references to legally binding legislative rules. The two types of rules are therefore ideal types that cannot easily be found in their pure form empirically. This entry defines soft law, contrasts it with other forms of public sector intervention, and discusses its applications in the European Union (EU) and elsewhere.

Definition

Ulrika Mörtz defines soft law as legitimate rules that may have political and legal effects, although the rules are not legally binding. This means that not every voluntary rule can be regarded as soft law. In cases of noncompliance, the sanctions are social and political rather than legal. A good example of how these social sanctions might look is the peer pressure mechanism in the international body the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). OECD lacks competence to issue legally binding laws. However, it is often argued that the organization has had important influence on the policies of member states, as these concern, for instance, reforms in the public sector, often labeled as the new public management reform. Social and political pressures are put on the member states by “naming and shaming” countries that do not follow the OECD recommendations. The soft law-making processes in the OECD are also characterized as social processes in which there is confidence building, exchanges of experiences, identity building, and socialization among the national officials; this can explain why the member states implement the OECD recommendations.

A classic and often used definition of soft law is that by Francis Snyder, in which he states that they are rules that have no binding force but that they may in any case “have practical effects” (Snyder,

1993, p. 198). A more thorough definition is presented by Karel Wellens and Gustaaf Borchardt (1989). Soft law is

the rules of conduct that find themselves on the legally non-binding level (in the sense of enforceable and sanctionable through international responsibility) but which according to the intention of its authors indeed do possess legal scope, which has to be further defined in each case. Such rules do not have in common a uniform standard of intensity as far as their legal scope is concerned, but they do have in common that they are directed at (intention of the authors) and do have as effect (through international law), that the conduct of States, international organizations and individuals is influenced by these rules, however without containing international legal rights and obligations. (p. 274)

The essence of these three definitions is that soft law is defined in a procedural way, that it consists of non-legally binding rules, and that it comes in many varieties. What Mörtz’s definition adds to the traditional ones is thus the aspect of legitimacy.

Forms of Public Sector Intervention

The phenomenon of soft law has for a long time been used in global organizations, in the EU, and in nation-states, but it was not until the 1970s that the very concept of soft law was established. One explanation for why the concept started to be used by scholars and others was the fundamental changes in international politics. The oil crises in the 1970s changed how students of international politics defined international power. They changed their power perspective from a state-centric one to a more pluralist view on power in a globalized world. The increased awareness in the 1970s of globalization has since given rise to a vivid literature on the need for global rules in a globalized world. Studies of international regimes, as a way of analyzing the new international landscape, have argued that international cooperation consists of private and public actors and that non-legally binding rules are sometimes the only ones possible. Indeed, many international organizations use soft law because they have no other alternative. The absence of a world government that can decide on

supranational and legally binding rules makes voluntary rules the only viable alternative. Even coercive rules, which can be decided by the United Nations Security Council, are sometimes viewed as soft because of the lack of credible legal sanctions in cases of noncompliance. There is an illusory expectation that legally binding rules are more efficient when it comes to compliance in a globalized world, which lacks the authority of and democratic system found within nation-states.

Applications in the European Union

The use of soft law has increased in the EU, which seems to contradict the explanation mentioned above that soft law is often the only alternative for international organizations. Indeed, the EU has the legal competence to decide on hard law. One explanation of why soft law is used more is the increased need for flexibility when there is a concern about the possibility of noncompliance. Soft law is preferable when you are dealing with problems that are complex and diverse and characterized by uncertainty. Thus, rule making concerning highly controversial issues is politically the only way of moving forward in the European integration process because the member states want to retain national sovereignty in these areas. These controversial questions often go beyond the issues on the domestic market and other issues, such as economic policy, taxes, pensions, and other welfare topics, that are decided within the EU member states. The alternative to soft law is in practice never hard law. This is so because of the unwillingness of EU member states to delegate supranational decision-making powers to the EU with respect to politically controversial welfare state issues. By deciding on soft law, the national governments can argue to their EU-skeptical citizens that as these rules are voluntary, they have not delegated national sovereignty to the EU.

Nonstate Actors

So far, we have only discussed the use of soft law by international organizations. Legitimate rule making is not only a prerogative of intergovernmental organizations or of states. Private actors, both for-profit and nonprofit actors (nongovernmental organizations), are sometimes also seen as legitimate rule makers. Soft law is often linked to

nonstate actors and to their participation in national, European, and global rule making. The private actors are not formally part of the hard-law legislative process that one finds in nation-states or in the EU. If they want to set up rules that regulate their activities, they have to use soft law. Voluntary rules are often the preferred alternative for the business community, which wants to preempt any state interference. One telling example is the emergence of corporate social responsibility, which consists of various codes of conduct that regulate how a socially responsible firm should behave. Whether these soft rules are complied with or not is often monitored by various nongovernmental organizations and not by states or other public actors. What is interesting with the emergence of corporate social responsibility is that it seems to support the idea that we are living in a time when soft law is the most readily available regulatory mode not only for private actors but also for states. States are less prone to use their hierarchical authority and so become advisory rather than directing. This change from hierarchical authority to a more horizontal steering is sometimes characterized as a move from *government* to *governance*. The steering mode of governance has empowered private actors and given them an authority that traditionally belonged to the state and the public sector. The spread of codes of conduct, standardization, and other voluntary rules indicates that a range of actors other than public ones strive to establish regulation through innovative mechanisms. The recent trends in making private firms more socially responsible suggest that we are dealing with a cross-sectional phenomenon. It is a reflection of transformed boundaries and relations across societal sectors—business, state, and civil society. These transformed boundaries can partly be explained by new demands on the three sectors and spheres. Modern society places many demands on private companies and on public actors. States are placing more emphasis on regulation instead of on public ownership and directly provided services. The state has a regulatory role and a contracting role in agreeing on rules between the public and the private spheres. These rules are increasingly soft or a complex combination of hard and soft law in which one may also find legally binding rules that are decided not by legislators but by the contracting partners. This

mixture of actors and rules seems to blur the border between private and public actors. A new public domain emerges in which there are actors and rules from the state, from business, and from civil society. This public domain is transnational rather than national or international. Soft law makes boundaries less relevant and important. From a democratic point of view, this state of no borders between the public/private and the national/international could be a problem. Democracy is often practiced in terms of representative democracy, which means that elected politicians are the hard law legislators. They are accountable for the laws and for the decisions that they make. The use of soft law broadens the possibilities for who the legitimate rule makers may be and extends rule making to actors other than elected politicians. This means that the realm of the rule-making sphere expands but the democratic realm only concerns some of the actors. This, in turn, could lead to a situation in which those who have power are not democratically accountable for the decisions they make and that those who can be democratically accountable have no power.

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See also Accountability; Regulation

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SOLIDARITY

Solidarity is a feeling of being connected to and responsible for others. This experience of connection and obligation is a key aspect of the life of any collectivity and its members. Solidarity has therefore received much attention in political thought concerning both premodern and modern politics. In the context of democratic culture, it has been one of the celebrated ideas and ideals, although perhaps not as much as liberty and equality, among others. This has to do with the central, yet difficult, nature and role of solidarity. Hence, the two questions that this entry strives to answer are “What are the general characteristics of solidarity?” and “What are the challenges it entails?”

Characteristics of Solidarity

Solidarity refers to the type of relation in which people feel that they have an obligation to help others, for instance, because they experience a connection and “we-ness” with them based on a community of interest and values—to help others so that they are empowered and can stand on their own feet. Obviously, the modalities of this feeling of solidarity and of obligation, including its level of intensity, vary with the configuration of the environment in which it takes place. In this perspective, solidarity can be organized and analyzed according to three categories. Although these categories can overlap in reality, we present them separately for the sake of clarity. They concern the structural character of solidarity, its scope, and its subjective dimension. From this, we can infer that solidarity has a strong connection with responsibility and justice.

Structural Solidarity

Solidarity, understood and defined as structural, alludes to the social role that it plays in a collective entity, whatever this collectivity is (group, community or society, public or private, etc.). This role suggests that a collectivity cannot progress and develop if its members are not working together to achieve the common goal(s) with which it identifies or if they do not feel and act on a sense of solidarity toward one another and the

collectivity. This structural aspect of solidarity is why solidarity tends to be seen as the expression, instrument, and result of a commitment to the group, its members, and their well-being. Even the emergence and sustainability of cooperation, so essential socially because it epitomizes mutually beneficial interactions and the collective good, would be quite impossible if people did not think that they can count on the help of others—on their sense of solidarity—when needed.

Because solidarity as a structural phenomenon is about the possibility of collective life, it implies that each individual existence is social; that is, it relies in crucial ways on the sense of solidarity with others. This comes down to the fact that people cannot be and do much on their own. To a large extent, all people—no matter how capable—depend on the care of others to grow and flourish. Hence, at most junctures of their life, mundane or fundamental, individuals are the recipients of multiple actions of solidarity. The final stage, when the end has come, is no exception. It is a deep sense of human and spiritual solidarity that allows us to be buried with dignity and remembered after we are gone.

The structural character of solidarity and the modalities of the social dimension of each individual existence are not fixed forever. They differ according to the type of social group in which they unfold. Regardless of whether his analysis and classification of solidarity is correct, Émile Durkheim had this in mind when he distinguished mechanical solidarity from organic solidarity. For him, mechanical solidarity was characteristic of the relatively undifferentiated social structures of premodern societies, where, in his view, members are bound together by shared values, beliefs, and customs and are generally engaged in the same activities. In contrast, he saw organic solidarity as more typical of modern, industrial societies, where people are bound together by a high degree of functional interdependence based on a complex division of labor.

The Scope of Solidarity

A second way of analyzing solidarity is related to its scope: In other words, to whom does it apply, and how deeply does it apply? Or to what extent is the realm of solidarity and of those who are in it wide or narrow, closed or open, and to

what extent are the benefits it brings about thick or thin? To illustrate this point, it is helpful to recall the distinctions that have often been drawn between traditional and modern solidarity.

In traditional forms of social organizations, solidarity connotes a tight bond among people, frequently based on kinship. The sense of solidarity runs deep and permeates the collectivity's internal relations. The flipside of this "thick" inward solidarity tends to be its exclusive character. The translation of the "us" versus "them" divide into the "in" versus "out" difference has a heavy bearing on who is a recipient of solidarity and who is not. In comparison, modern solidarity in its various forms, springing from democratic values, tends to be wider than the ties of family. The norms of universality and equality at their core introduce and call for a connectedness among people. This connectedness goes much beyond the boundaries of the immediate communities in which individuals live. As a result, these norms have historically worked in favor of a widening and deepening of solidarity at the national and, subsequently, international levels.

This is not to say that the disparities between traditional and modern solidarity necessarily amount to absolute differences of scope. For example, although premodern solidarity has the tendency to be exclusive, it contains significant cosmopolitan orientations fueled by philosophical (e.g., the Stoics) and religious (as represented by Saint Paul and Christian universalism) beliefs. Not surprisingly, modern humanism and democratic culture built on these to develop their own brand(s) of solidarity. As for modern solidarity, although it was meant to be wide, it is also inclined to be thin. As universality and equality expand the circle of human solidarity, relating to people and offering real solidarity becomes abstract, fragile, and attenuated. Moreover, democratic considerations do not eliminate the existence of priority and hierarchy in any social setting and its selective and limiting impact on the projection of solidarity. How could it be otherwise considering that priorities and hierarchies are a part and parcel of human life, because without them, there are no particular guidelines to allocate the always limited resources at hand? Furthermore, when solidarity takes place within the framework of nationalism, a product and expression of modern democratic culture, it

can conceive of and implement inclusiveness in an exclusive manner. This may happen both among countries where nationalist solidarity may be pursued without regard for the welfare of other states and within countries where dominant groups may deny the legitimacy of minorities and their right to observe their own traditions.

Subjective Solidarity

The third characteristic of solidarity, subjective solidarity, refers to the requirement that individuals carry out actions that create the structure needed for solidarity. They depend on the collaboration of people to function and, therefore, need to be activated by people. The negative effects accompanying actors' disengagement best illustrate this. Once people feel that there is no point in upholding a sense of solidarity, particularly due to a lack of expected reciprocity, structural solidarity is in danger of disappearing. Exit strategies develop, each of them amounting to a "desolidarization" from others and from the collectivity with which the individual had previously identified.

But subjective solidarity is not limited to its contribution to structural solidarity. It can be at work in the absence of structural solidarity or against it. For instance, cosmopolitanism and the sense of solidarity it extends to all individuals certainly exceed the realms that solidarity has socially shaped, be it within the primary communities (e.g., the family) or at the national level. This is where solidarity is more—or less, depending on how we see it—than organized social reality and can become a product of individual initiative and, as such, dependent on subjective morality and solidarity. The individual decides that solidarity is owed to someone regardless of the existing collectivities of allegiance and the discriminations of solidarity they entail. In his own way, Emmanuel Levinas defends a radical version of this form of solidarity when he argues that our fundamental moral situation as people is not one of autonomy but of heteronomy, or obedience to the voice of the other.

Solidarity, Responsibility, and Justice

From these elements of solidarity, we can infer that it is closely connected to the notions of responsibility and justice. Concerning solidarity

and responsibility, one of the highlights is that to experience solidarity is also to experience responsibility. In addition, since responsibility calls for action, if not leadership, solidarity as responsibility is neither simply theoretical nor an end in itself. It is geared toward action, toward helping others in a concrete manner and, if the gravity of the situation demands, with the commitment of an activist. Short of this, professing solidarity and doing next to nothing is destined to be no more than hypocrisy.

Such a letdown is all the more damaging since, ultimately, solidarity is a requisite of justice, in four principal ways. First, solidarity serves as a trigger mechanism vis-à-vis the concerns of justice. If there is no identification and connection and, consequently, no solidarity with others, experiencing and calling for justice is not likely to happen. Second, the fact that solidarity toward others presupposes that they have rights and that these have to be fulfilled is another illustration of the strong link between justice and solidarity. Third, as solidarity stresses the social conditions of possibility of a collectivity and the social nature of each individual's existence within it, it necessarily asks for the interests of each to be taken into account and looked after. Hence, the distributive characteristic at the core of justice is at the center of solidarity as well. Fourth, while solidarity underlines what is owed to others in general, similar to justice, it pays special attention to the less fortunate and to the one who has been victimized.

Challenges of Solidarity

The challenges that solidarity has to confront are not to be ignored. Its importance makes them all the more daunting. Among them is the pressure that solidarity can put on human agency. There is also the difficulty of handling the conflicts among solidarity traditions. Finally, there is the problematic future of solidarity.

Solidarity and the Question of Agency

Although solidarity is essentially viewed as a positive phenomenon, what makes it an asset for the collectivity and its members can make it a liability. This Janus-faced nature applies to premodern and modern solidarity.

As noted earlier, solidarity tends to be about both inclusion and exclusion. Another problem is related to this perhaps unavoidable ambiguity and limitation of solidarity—the fact that solidarity has had difficulty finding a balance between too much and not enough and, in the process, endangering the sense of human agency—a somewhat paradoxical turn of events, since solidarity's goal is empowerment.

Regarding the existence of too much solidarity and not enough agency, the constraining aspects of primitive forms of solidarity have at times led anthropology, sociology, and political science, for example, to stress that in these primitive forms, people have no room for a life of their own. To a lesser degree, a similar assessment has been put forward concerning how long-established traditions fix collective and individual existences in more or less unquestioned and difficult-to-change patterns. From the 18th century onward, criticisms of the social role of religion have frequently taken place in this context.

A classic charge against modernity has been that it leads to a very thin and perhaps inadequate solidarity, with debilitating effects on human agency. Two kinds of shortcomings have been underlined in particular. Connected and standing at the intersection of democracy and capitalism, they point to the fact that modern culture strengthens individual and collective agency in some ways but weakens it as well.

The first alleged shortcoming of modernity arises from the individualism of modern democratic solidarity. Although its values originate from a commitment to universality and equality, which engineers empowerment, at the same time, it encourages individual and anomic tendencies. From this perspective, many have argued that the liberal branch of democratic culture, especially in its celebration of individual liberty, is more prone to this than the republican one, which stresses the dynamics of rights and duties among individuals. In any case, in the worst circumstances, individuals can end up being loyal to and in solidarity with no one. As such, they can be deprived of the social anchoring with, and belonging to, the world and others that is so important to feeling and being at home in one's life.

A second shortcoming arises when those in charge politically and economically are eager to

minimize the sense of obligation associated with democratic values. What is interesting is that the principle of responsibility and its individual and social virtues are often put forward both as a justification for a decreased sense of responsibility and as an alternative to redress the ills that this may produce. An example of this shortcoming of modernity can be seen at the national level in the United States. There, a cultural tendency toward self-reliance is at times instrumentalized by self-serving economic forces to discredit the idea that institutions have a duty to make possible and underwrite social solidarity. The debates on health care, in 2009 and later, provide a case in point. But the reduction of solidarity to a bare minimum is taking place internationally as well, as the state of international human rights indicates. To be sure, conventions calling for their defense in their various dimensions create a framework of international solidarity. However, this sense of solidarity is not imperative. Despite the costs incurred by people beyond their borders, countries never fail to give preference to their national interests and those of their citizens. Their reluctance to act decisively to address the humanitarian crisis of the 1990s and the insufficient policy efforts at the global level to overcome widespread poverty, to say the least, are part of this story. The absence of international mechanisms of accountability to tackle these limitations only expresses and reinforces the lack of commitment.

Conflicts Among Traditions of Solidarity

The difficulty of accommodating and reconciling the variety of solidarity traditions is another major challenge. Conflicts between these competing traditions concern access to and distribution of resources, on the one hand, and redefinition of identities, collective and individual, on the other.

The different forms of solidarity of the past and the present and those constituting the diverse layers of social life show that solidarity comes in many shapes and sizes. In addition, as each of them orients people and collectivities in set ways, it is not easy to find a constructive middle ground between status quo and change.

Already in the West, it has been difficult. Most of the economic, political, social, and cultural battles related to the evolution of Western countries

have taken place in connection with tensions among visions of solidarity. The conflicts surrounding the various welfare state models of the European continent and even more so between them and the American model are the latest illustration of this situation. That being said, no matter how formidable these struggles and the pain of accommodation have been, they appear relatively benign compared with the ones generated by the clash of Western and non-Western traditions of solidarity since the West started its worldwide expansion at the end of the 15th century. Over time, to formulate and advocate their claims of individual and collective rights in support of their emancipation, non-Western countries have borrowed extensively from the values and structures of modern democratic solidarity. Therefore, not all is bad. Still, the non-West has paid a heavy price for the hegemonic domination of the West.

National alliances with the West have often led to the elimination of local forms of solidarity, with no replacement by other forms. Furthermore, although countries may have gained nominal independence, in fact, the majority of citizens have often been relegated to second-class status. In the worst case scenario, with the local elite playing the double game of being Westernized and yet fixated on preserving their ancestral privileges and regular people left with no place to go, the types of solidarity that had glued people together can disintegrate. In the process, it can open the gates of radicalization and violence within and across national boundaries. While gradually, non-Western communities have had, *nolens volens*, to forge hybrid and workable new identities, the trauma and resentment generated by cultural dislocation and alienation have been deep, with subsequent success in development, when it took place, easing but not erasing these.

The West has been equally effective in imposing its vision of solidarity internationally. At this level, too, non-Western countries have made the best of the Western culture of solidarity expressed in the norms of human rights, self-determination, and sovereign equality of states, in particular to liberate themselves from the shackles of colonialism. Nevertheless, beyond this, it has been an uphill battle. Although Western powers have been to some extent willing to bring on board non-Western traditions and concerns of solidarity in

the negotiation, conceptualization, and implementation of international norms of regulation, their worldview and interests have prevailed and continue to prevail. This dominance could be seen in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights when the United Nations was created. Today, the battles concerning development and climate change indicate how developed countries, essentially the West, continue to concede very little to the developing countries—by and large, the non-West.

The consequence of this somewhat one-sided story of solidarity is not simply that it undermines or even expels non-Western traditions of solidarity but that the message of solidarity, and of the democratic solidarity projected by the West, also becomes a contradictory one. It is made of and oscillates between predatory and humanistic orientations. This is not new, since this has been the trademark of Western relations with the rest of the world during more or less the past 5 centuries. Critics of Western solidarity call attention to several issues. First, they ask, what kind of solidarity, especially one that claims to be democratic, offers the spectacle of people being consistently inclined to overlook the interests and rights of others? Second, if the solidarity is geared toward monopoly and exclusiveness, the risk is high that this will result in a world without options and reflexivity. If only for this, it is at odds with the commitment to pluralism at the core of modern democratic solidarity. Finally, these critics argue that at a time when societies are increasingly not self-sustainable because they are increasingly not self-contained, these are counterproductive ways to conceive and implement solidarity. It engenders more disintegration than integration.

The Future of Solidarity

Part of the solution for this problem, and the future of solidarity, lies in establishing relations and systems of dependencies among individuals and collective actors that are more positive and inclusive than negative and exclusive, as is presently the case. This will not eliminate all the dilemmas of solidarity, particularly when these have to be addressed in the context of the democratic demands of pluralism, universality, equality, and liberty now serving as benchmarks of legitimacy,

nationally and internationally. But at least it shows a path for winning not at the expense of others but with and through taking account of others. From this perspective, inequalities should never be so profound and entrenched that they deny countries and individuals who suffer from them the possibility of overturning them and achieving at some point a threshold of decent empowerment.

Solidarity, one of the oldest notions of social life and political thought, far from being a thing of the past, is at the center of the future of individuals and collectivities. Its relevance endures.

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See also Anomia; Cooperation; Durkheim, Émile; Empowerment; Individualism; International Solidarity; Responsibility

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SORTITION

See Election by Lot

SOVEREIGNTY

In practice, sovereignty is one of the most contested concepts in political science, although it is conventionally used to connote supreme authority within a given polity. The meanings of sovereignty vary widely depending on the context, as well as on its inferential connections to other concepts. Although long crucial to modern political science and international relations, the concept of sovereignty is notoriously ambiguous and thus hard to define with any precision. During the past decades, it has been argued that the concept of sovereignty has lost some of its analytical purchase due to the intensified exchange and increased interdependence between political communities. This entry examines issues related to the definition of sovereignty, traces its historical evolution since the Middle Ages, and considers its relevance to political science today.

Issues of Definition

The proper *source*, *locus*, and *scope* of political authority have been subjected to constant debate in the history of political thought. From where does such authority derive its legitimacy? With whom should it reside? What are the proper limits of its exercise? While these are some of the questions that any account of political authority must confront, most modern definitions of sovereignty imply that such authority—quite irrespective of the sources of its legitimacy and its exact locus—must be both *indivisible* and *absolute* to qualify as properly sovereign and nothing else. While being indivisible implies that it must—at least in theory—reside with a single agent in a given polity, being absolute entails that this agent either is sovereign or not but nothing in between. These formal characteristics distinguish sovereignty from related concepts such as autonomy and independence, both of which are thought to be matters of degree. Insofar as sovereignty is defined in terms of

authority, it is also thereby distinguished from mere power, since the latter concept does not normally carry the same connotations of acceptance, obligation, or obedience as does authority. Taken together, these defining characteristics have raised the question whether sovereignty is best understood as a *rule* or as an empirical *fact*. In analogy with grammatical rules, we could say that the concept of sovereignty contains both descriptive and prescriptive elements. Sovereignty thus not only refers to a state of affairs but also implies that this state of affairs constitutes a norm to which political life ought to conform in order to be intelligible. Finally, there is a *performative* dimension to the concept of sovereignty, insofar as it is frequently used by various agents to claim supreme authority in different contexts.

Modern theories of sovereignty frequently distinguish between the *internal* and *external* aspects of sovereignty. Internal sovereignty is attributed to the governmental institutions of a state by virtue of fulfilling some or all of the above criteria, while external sovereignty is attributed to the state as a whole by virtue of being recognized as such by other states. Since the terms of recognition are dependent on the internal attributes of sovereignty, the requirements of external sovereignty have varied considerably over time. Recognition has been granted on different grounds, ranging from principles of dynastic succession, via national self-determination and territorial integrity, to the more recent requirement that states should be governed according to democratic principles to merit international recognition.

Historical Evolution

Although quintessentially a modern concept, the history of sovereignty can be traced back at least to the political theology and feudal practices of the late Middle Ages. At this point in time, supreme authority was vested in the person of the prince, who derived his authority both from theological sources and from his relative ability to protect his subjects from internal and external enemies. The subsequent articulation of modern conceptions of sovereignty followed a series of cumulative steps.

The first step toward the articulation of a recognizably modern conception of sovereignty was

taken when claims to supreme authority were *territorialized*. This took place in sharp contrast to prevailing views of imperial authority, which emphasized its universal and boundless character. While the idea of imperial authority implied no restriction on the scope of temporal power, rulers who contested such imperial claims during the 13th century did so by asserting that individual kings ought to enjoy the same political and legal status within their domains as does the emperor within the empire. A decisive break with the imperial order occurred when the rulers of the medieval kingdoms of France and Naples refused to recognize the authority of the emperor Henry VII over matters considered internal. In support of their claims, they could draw on the doctrines of jurists such as Andreas de Isernia and Bartolus of Sassoferrato, who argued that temporal authority ought to be territorially delimited.

A second, and largely simultaneous, step toward a modern conception of sovereignty was taken with the gradual *depersonalization* of political authority. During the Middle Ages, authority had often been conferred on the physical person of the prince through anointment and other acts of liturgy that established his divine right to rule. Depersonalization meant that supreme authority was relocated to the fictitious person of the crown and then transferred to the royal domain or to the body politic as a whole. This transition culminated in the creation of an abstract state concept during the 17th century, to which sovereignty could be attributed independently of the physical person of the prince.

The third step toward a modern conception of sovereignty was taken during the 16th and 17th centuries, when sovereignty was defined in terms of *indivisibility* and *absoluteness*. Legal theorists such as Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and Thomas Hobbes argued that sovereign authority could not be divided within one and the same polity and that it is either attributable to a given agent or not. The consequence of these conceptual mutations was that the modern concept of sovereignty came to connote supreme, indivisible, and absolute authority within a given territory, while the questions of its proper locus and scope within each state was left to succeeding generations to handle. This shift implied that the very identity of the early-modern state, along with the emergent international society

of states in Europe, became dependent on the existence of sovereign authority and its recognition by others.

The fourth and final step toward a fully modern conception of sovereignty was taken when sovereignty was *popularized* by being relocated from kings to the people. From Rousseau onward, the will of the people was regarded as the source of sovereignty. Yet the rise of popular sovereignty did little to challenge the underlying requirements of territoriality and indivisibility, which left modern political theory with the problem of accounting how the sovereignty of the people could be justified in democratic terms. The final outcome of this transition was the modern nation-state, governed according to the principles of popular sovereignty. Toward the end of the 19th century, this entity became the main object of inquiry for modern historiography and political science.

During the 20th century, the concept of sovereignty became increasingly controversial within political science. Whereas many *pluralists* argued that the concept of sovereignty was redundant to understand how modern democratic societies are governed, *Marxists* argued that sovereignty was but a fiction designed to conceal the uneven distribution of power and wealth between classes in capitalist societies. Still others argued that the concept of sovereignty should be banished from the vocabulary of political science because of its opacity and ambiguity.

The Contemporary Debate

More recently, the usefulness of the concept of sovereignty has been contested on other grounds, however. At the heart of this debate, we find the question whether sovereignty is a permanent condition of political order or whether it is likely to be replaced by other forms of political authority in the near future.

Many political scientists today dispute whether it is meaningful to speak of political authority as being absolute and indivisible since the processes of European integration and globalization have brought relocations of political authority to levels below as well as above that of the state. Today, political authority appears to be both relative and divisible in character. Consequently, many political scientists argue that the concept of sovereignty

has to be either redefined to fit present conditions better or, more radically, abandoned altogether in favor of other concepts such as autonomy. Other critics have contested the usefulness of the concept of sovereignty on more philosophical grounds, questioning the ontological status of this concept and its ideological functions in justifying abuses of power and international warfare. Many of these critics have argued that sovereignty has been reified by modern political science and international relations theory. Rather than simply referring to a legal norm or an empirical fact, *constructivists* and *poststructuralists* have argued that the concept of sovereignty has been constitutive of the modern political order through its usage in political discourse. By implication, sovereignty is believed to be historically contingent and hence mutable, rather than a necessary condition of political order.

Such a diagnosis of course begs the question of available alternatives. Like many earlier attempts to contest the concept of sovereignty, the recent critique of sovereignty presupposes what it sets out to criticize, namely, that there is, or at least has been, something like indivisible and absolute political authority. The concept of sovereignty, along with all its traditional connotations of supremacy, territoriality, indivisibility, and absoluteness, nevertheless continues to exercise a powerful influence on the contemporary political imagination, to the point that alternatives either seem out of reach or carry features similar to that of the good old sovereign state.

This should be evident from contemporary attempts to justify a relocation of sovereignty to the global level, which despite their aspirations often remain premised on the notion that political authority needs to be both bounded and centralized for a political community to be viable. Hence, symptomatically, the present contestation of sovereignty seems to be what keeps this alive within political science and international relations theory. By focusing on sovereignty and the question of its endurance, recent critics have left some more basic questions of political authority—questions that the concept of sovereignty once was invented to address—unanswered. To answer these questions without presupposing that political authority needs to be indivisible, or that political communities have to be bounded, remains one of the main challenges

to political science and academic international relations today.

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See also Autonomy; Subnational; Legitimacy; Natural Law; Power; State; Territory

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SPATIAL MODELS OF POLITICS

Spatial models are widely used by political scientists to analyze decision making in a wide range of settings, from elections and legislatures, to government formation, to international organizations, to the U.S. Supreme Court, and many other things. Spatial models provide what has proved to be a fruitful way to think rigorously about politics, grounded in a simple intuition with a reach far beyond the narrow confines of professional political science. At least since the days of the French Revolution, indeed, references to “left” and “right” and to changing policy “positions” have been a part of day-to-day political discourse. The general public generally understands what it means to talk about politics using “spatial” language, as such language is not just a conceit of political scientists. In this entry, mathematical and empirical approaches to spatial modeling and

their applications to various forms of political decision making are discussed.

The words *left* and *right* refer in this context to directions along a “dimension” of political preference. But one dimension is rarely enough for a good description of how real people think in a given setting. It is easy to imagine two people who are both on the economic right, with similar views about government intervention in the economy, who nonetheless have very different views about government intervention in matters of personal morality. One can think of views on matters such as abortion and same-sex marriage, for example, in terms of a liberal-conservative dimension that is quite independent from—in spatial language orthogonal to—the left-right dimension. If economic and social issues are all that concern political scientists, then they can consider political preferences to be well described using a two-dimensional space, spanned by a left-right economic policy dimension and a liberal-conservative social policy dimension. Building systematically on this spatial metaphor for describing political preferences, a metaphor that does seem to be deeply rooted in real politics, political scientists tend to take one of two distinct but related approaches when they analyze political decision making. These approaches can be thought of as mathematical and empirical.

Mathematical and Empirical Approaches

One can, as a mathematical construct, think of an abstract space of possible outcomes. An integral part of the formal definition of individual rationality is having preferences that rank such outcomes in a transitive way: Preferring outcome A to B and preferring B to C implies preferring A to C. Many cost-benefit calculations involve specifying “how much” A is preferred to B, relative to how much B is preferred to C. Information or assumptions about such matters can be expressed as perceived “distances” between A, B, and C in an assumed “metric” space comprising a set of possible outcomes and a measure of the distance between these.

One key distinction between mathematical and empirical approaches to spatial modeling arises as soon as the metric used to measure distances between outcomes is considered. A typical approach by mathematical modelers is to assume a

distance measure that is analytically tractable. By far, the most common assumption is the Euclidean metric, familiar to all who know elementary geometry. The Euclidean metric uses Pythagoras's theorem to measure the distance between two points in a multidimensional space as the square root of the sum of the squares of interpoint distances on each dimension. If individual i , with ideal point x_{id} on dimension d , evaluates outcome j , perceived as having a position x_{jd} on dimension d , then i 's perceived Euclidean distance from j , D_{ij}^E , is

$$D_{ij}^E = \sqrt{\sum_d (x_{id} - x_{jd})^2}.$$

While Euclidean distances are often implicitly treated as being "natural," they make a key empirical assumption about how real people trade off distance from their ideal points on one dimension against distance on other dimensions. For example, if important issues to be decided concern abortion and public spending and if some voter is evaluating two policy packages, the Euclidean assumption is that this evaluation is not the aggregate distance between packages on abortion and public spending but rather the square root of the sum of the squares of these distances. This is an empirical assumption about how real people think. There is, furthermore, consistent psychological evidence that if two dimensions are separable—that is, if a person's evaluations of outcomes on one dimension can be described without knowing his or her evaluations on the other dimension—then decision making by real humans is more realistically modeled using the city block metric. This assumes that the perceived distance between two outcomes is the simple sum of their distances on each dimension:

$$D_{ij}^{CB} = \sum_d |x_{id} - x_{jd}|$$

Notwithstanding the evidence that a city block metric may generate a more realistic empirical representation of the preferences of real humans, it is far less tractable analytically. Thus, most published formal analyses of spatial models in a multidimensional setting assume a Euclidean metric or some generalization of this that is convenient for manipulation using calculus. This is an aspect of a

more general distinction between mathematical and empirical approaches to spatial modeling.

The empirical approach uses a space as a way to describe the real preferences of real people in real settings, not as a formal scheme for characterizing the possible preferences of possible agents in possible settings. In the empirical approach, in stark contrast to the mathematical approach, dimensions of difference in the outcome space have substantive meaning. As opposed to a horizontal or x dimension, left and right may be described, for example, in terms of economic policies; similarly, a second dimension may be described in terms of specific social or moral issues. Much more important than the words used to describe dimensions, however, the structure of the space is defined in terms of structures of preferences in real populations. For example, political scientists may be able to predict attitudes on same-sex marriage in a given population from attitudes on abortion, gun control, and capital punishment; indeed, they may be able to predict attitudes on any one issue in this bundle from attitudes on the other issues. In this event, they can think of attitudes on same-sex marriage, abortion, gun control, and capital punishment as if, in this population, all correlate with an unobservable "latent" dimension. And they can give this latent dimension a name, such as liberalism versus conservatism. This is an empirical description of how real people think in this population—not an abstract mathematical characterization of how possible people might possibly think. Thus, while it is theoretically possible to envisage vegetarians who favor capital punishment for humans, if, indeed, most real vegetarians oppose capital punishment, then we think of vegetarianism and capital punishment as if they are both predicted by a single underlying dimension. The same set of issue areas may thus generate different empirical spaces for different human populations if attitudes correlate in different ways.

This focuses attention on the dimensionality of policy spaces, which are fixed by assumption in mathematical spatial models but are the primary focus of interest for empirical models. Empirical policy spaces are estimated from data on real attitudes (or assumed from assumed data on these). One way or another, this estimation involves data reduction; information on a large number of specific matters on which real people do, or might, have preferences is summarized in terms of their

positions on a much smaller number of latent dimensions with substantive interpretations.

There are many ways to do this. One way is to analyze manifest behavior, such as voting in legislatures. A political scientist might think, for example, that legislators' voting records reflect their real preferences and that people who typically vote on the same side of a set of motions in a legislature have more similar preferences than people who typically vote on different sides of these motions. Observed behavior on legislative voting can be used to derive a matrix of interlegislator differences; the political scientist can then seek a low-dimensional space that represents these differences reasonably well. Alternatively, he or she can use surveys to ask politicians directly about their preferences on a range of issues. Expert surveys can use country specialists as surrogates, in essence asking them how politicians would answer a set of questions on the issues if they were asked and if they were to answer honestly. Speeches and texts generated by real politicians can be analyzed for content about the authors' preferences by human interpretative coders or by automated computational algorithms. There are many potential sources of raw data on the preferences of real political actors.

Having collected raw data on preferences, a high-dimensional data space can be reduced using some scaling technique to a low-dimensional summary space that is taken as the most efficient description of preferences of many different people on many different matters. The most detailed possible description of preferences is always high-dimensional—everyone is different from everyone else in some way. For a given substantive problem, therefore, there is always a trade-off. Analysts ultimately seek a spatial description of preferences that is a parsimonious (low-dimensional) summary of relevant similarities and differences between people yet does not miss something that is both substantively important and critical to theoretical conclusions. This means that there is no such thing as the abstract dimensionality of the structure of preferences in a given setting. In this sense, there is no “one true space” to be discovered if only political scientists could find it. For any substantive problem, there are high-dimensional background data that can be collected on “raw” attitudes in the real population under investigation. There are also “metadata,” which cannot be collected, on potential attitudes on

matters that have yet to arise and cannot yet be conceived. Given the data on attitudes, there is a best estimate, d , of the dimensionality of the relevant policy space (with d lying somewhere between zero and infinity) that is the most useful low-dimensional summary of preferences for the problem at hand. Once the problem is specified, scaling techniques that reduce high-dimensional data spaces to low-dimensional summaries typically have measures of “fit” that show how much variation in the raw data is captured by a given low-dimensional description. Such measures help the analyst make substantive judgments, for example, that the best spatial representation in a given setting is two-dimensional—in the sense that a two-dimensional representation fits the data much better than a one-dimensional representation but adding a third dimension does not yield much improvement in fit in relation to a given problem. Notwithstanding this, the ultimate decision on the dimensionality of an empirical space is a judgment call for the analyst, who in a sense is always an activist in imposing some low-dimensional representation on high-dimensional data about preferences.

Implications

The dimensionality of a given policy space, a fundamentally empirical matter, has profound implications for abstract mathematical models. This is because logical inferences derived from formal spatial models of political decision making, and especially of voting, depend critically on the dimensionality of the assumed outcome space as well as on other detailed assumptions about the preferences of real humans. One well-known reason for this arises from the possibility of voting cycles over outcomes in multidimensional spaces, whereby A beats B, B beats C, and C beats A in majority votes. While the famous formal proofs of this are known as the *chaos results*, the substantive implication in such settings is not “chaos” but that “something else,” over and above unconstrained majority voting, is needed before models can make unambiguous predictions about outcomes. Mathematical models of voting in multidimensional outcome spaces, therefore, tend to be very sensitive to precise substantive assumptions about the local institutional setting under investigation—assumptions that may drastically narrow both

their formal generality and their empirical applicability—and hence their susceptibility to scientific testing.

Spatial representations of preferences over outcomes, whether assumed arbitrarily or estimated empirically, are not of course models in themselves; they are key inputs to such models. Thus, there is no such thing as “the” spatial model of voting, of legislative behavior, or of government formation. There are many different spatial models of these important political phenomena, each model building on some spatial characterization of preferences by making precise behavioral assumptions about decision-making agents and the institutional setting in which their decisions are manifested. What makes all these very different models spatial is that the utility functions of key agents, which may of course include many different things, all include terms that compare expected utilities deriving from different points in the outcome space. Relative utilities of pairs of outcomes are described in terms of perceived distances between these points and an additional assumption about how the agent feels about “policy loss.” Let U_{ij} be the utility derived by agent i from outcome j and A_{ij} be some vector of other sources of agent utility, perhaps the charisma of some political candidate or a bribe paid, that have nothing to do with policy preferences. It is conventional to assume that agent utilities decline as a function of increasing policy distance between an ideal point and the outcome being evaluated. This function is often assumed to be linear ($U_{ij} = A_{ij} - D_{ij}$) or quadratic ($U_{ij} = A_{ij} - D_{ij}^2$). As with the choice of metrics, the choice of loss functions is often made on the basis of analytical convenience rather than empirical evidence about how real people actually think. The assumption of quadratic loss is the more common and is occasionally justified as an empirical assumption that real humans are risk-averse, though hard evidence about risk aversion in the real world typically concerns economic decision making, and there is very little evidence one way or the other concerning whether real people tend to be risk-averse when making political decisions. It seems equally plausible to argue that voters, for example, are more sensitive to policy differences between two parties whose policies are close to their own ideal points than they are to the differences between two parties whose policy positions are

very remote, yet this runs counter to the assumption of quadratic loss. For this reason, a number of spatial models of political decision making assume linear rather than quadratic policy loss in the agent utility functions that they specify, although justifications for this, when explicit, tend to be casual.

Model Types

Within the general spatial modeling framework set out above, there is huge variation in the type of model one encounters. One famous application, associated with the name of Anthony Downs, though predating his work, concerns voting in elections. A spatial model of voting in elections might assume an exogenously fixed institutional setting of an election to one single-seat district with a simple plurality formula for mapping votes cast into seats won. It might assume two species of agents—politicians and voters—with an exogenously given set of politicians assumed to prefer winning the support of as many voters as possible and with voters assumed to prefer voting for the politician who promotes the policy package that seems to them to be closest to their own ideal policy. These assumptions define premises for one of many possible spatial models of electoral competition—in this case, one possible model of presidential elections under plurality rule. If voters’ preferences on all relevant issues can be represented using a single latent dimension and if politicians have good information about these preferences, then such a model generates the well-known implication that, in the absence of some other assumption, the policy positions of both candidates will tend to converge on the ideal point of the median voter, who in this sense will be pivotal in deciding the election result. The reader will have noticed a lot of *ifs* in this informal statement of the model, however, hinting at the many possible spatial models of this one single political process.

Quite different spatial models may be generated by different institutional settings. Such models might allow the strategic “entry” of new candidates into the competition. They might assume a diverse set of single-seat districts, in which candidates from the same party must all set the same policy position. Given some assumed structure of political communication, they might assume that politicians can set different policy positions in different

districts. They might also assume the following: a diverse set of multiseat districts, with exogenous or maybe endogenous boundaries, and various, maybe endogenous, electoral formulae used to translate votes cast into seats won. Different models may make different behavioral assumptions about politicians—for example, that politicians are motivated to enact policies rather than maximize votes or have some specified trade-off between these objectives. Also, it may be assumed that voters are motivated to have an impact on the composition of the eventual government rather than supporting their closest party, or some trade-off may be assumed between these objectives. There is thus no limit to the number of possible spatial models of voting in elections. A particular model is identified by its explicit (and often implicit) assumptions about agent behavior and the institutions structuring this.

Moving beyond voting in elections, characterized by elite–mass interactions between a small set of candidates and a large set of voters, spatial models have also been applied to elite–elite interactions such as voting in committees and legislatures and in the U.S. Supreme Court as well as bargaining between party leaders over government formation in parliamentary democracies. Such high-stakes settings with interactions between small numbers of sophisticated agents may well imply different empirical assumptions about the following: how much each agent knows about the preferences of all others, whether all agents perform the same type of complex strategic calculation about matters that may or may not be important to them, and how much agents focus on optimizing decisions on the problem under investigation, such as voting on some issue, when they must in reality make many decisions on many different matters. Voting in elections may be important, but not that important, for voters, whereas bargaining between seasoned politicians over who becomes the prime minister is likely the most important deal they ever do.

In each of these cases, there remains a sharp analytical distinction between spatial models that make the assumption that real-world preferences on all important matters can be well represented by a single latent dimension and those that assume that more than one dimension is needed for a realistic representation of preferences. One-dimensional spatial models tend to be analytically tractable, even if they can sometimes be difficult to resolve.

They are thus appealing to formal theorists, who would be the first to acknowledge that the assumption of a one-dimensional preference structure is substantively unrealistic. Many published spatial models are, for this reason, one-dimensional, and the claim is typically that, even when patently unrealistic, they are in some sense aids to intuition. Multidimensional models, while of their essence offering greater potential realism with regard to descriptions of how real people think, tend to be analytically intractable. One response to this is to constrain the model with further strong institutional assumptions that make it tractable while at the same time reducing its generality. The other solution is to investigate the model using carefully designed suites of computer simulations.

Conclusion

Spatial modeling is a general approach to analyzing political decision making. The more abstract and formal the approach, the more the resulting models are about decision making in general. The more empirical the approach, the more they are about decision making by human beings in settings where data could possibly be collected. Within this general approach, there is no single spatial model of decision making, by either abstract agents or real humans, in any specified setting. The considerable intellectual attraction of the spatial modeling approach is that it offers a conceptual language that allows different modeling assumptions to be compared in relatively explicit ways. The spatial modeling approach thus provides a set of building blocks for different models of important political processes but leaves all important substantive assumptions firmly in the hands of the modeler.

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See also Voting Rules, Electoral, Effects of

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STABILITY

Political stability is an elusive concept, one that is difficult to define and operationalize. In simplest terms (and, as will be seen, the concept *simplest terms* can itself be misleading), stable political systems are those in which governance and the transfer of power occur in regular, predictable ways. When we think of stable political systems, therefore, we think of those that hold regular elections and incumbents who vacate offices and allow opponents to take over those offices. We also envision systems in which protests are not widespread, especially violent, or challenging to the basic system of governance. As is evident from this definition, however, stable systems that are not democratic would seem to be excluded from it. Yet dictatorships can last for decades and, thus, in this sense, are stable. Consequently, we must acknowledge that the proposed definition is problematic, and so we need to think more deeply about the topic. This entry is consequently focused on the three questions that should be addressed when dealing with this topic: how to define, how to achieve, and how to measure stability.

Defining Stability

Two primary difficulties confront us when we think more deeply about the meaning of political stability. First, while most journalistic and some academic accounts treat stability as a dichotomous variable, meaning that a given political system is either “stable” or “unstable,” on-the-ground reality is quite different. Only at the most basic level is such a dichotomy justifiable. For analytical purposes, however, there is widespread recognition among experts that political stability in the real world covers a very broad continuum. There are some political systems that are chronically unstable, with elections occurring irregularly (if at all), and in which the outcome of elections is often contested and likely to lead to mass protests, elite

subversion, or both. On the other hand, there are systems in which regular, predictable political processes are almost always the norm. Finally, there is a wide range between these two extremes and cases of nations that fluctuate between stable, unstable, and everything in between.

Political science has recognized the continuous nature of political stability and as a result has accepted the wide variation in degrees of stability as an important variable to be studied in comparative politics and international relations. Indeed, there often exist regions within a given country that exhibit more stability than others. Far less consensus emerges on the normative benefits of stability, which leads to the second and more vexing challenge in coming to grips with the term *stability*.

Is stability a good thing, and if so, is more of it always better? Consider the argument in favor of a state of continual instability. This position was perhaps most strongly and dramatically argued by China's Mao Zedong. From Mao's perspective, China (and indeed all Marxist regimes) benefited from a state of constant revolution; in the absence of such revolution, bourgeois forces could threaten to reinstate capitalism. As a result, Mao plunged China into the Cultural Revolution in 1966, producing social unrest, violence, and purges. From Mao's point of view, however, and from that of the intellectual leadership of the Red Guards who held sway during this period, instability was to be institutionalized as the new “normal” in order to prevent the communist revolution from being extinguished. Only with the death of Mao and the arrest of the so-called Gang of Four in 1976 did this protracted, nonstop “revolution” come to an end.

Whereas for Maoists political instability was a cherished ideal, for other regimes, whether on the right or the left, instability of any kind has been seen as an existential threat. Cases on the left include Cuba under Fidel Castro, a country ruled for nearly 50 years by one man until his health failed, and the case of North Korea under the rule of Kim Il-sung, who ran his country from 1948 until 1994. At the opposite extreme, are the cases of Alfredo Stroessner, who ruled Paraguay from 1954 until 1989, and the Somoza family dynasty, which controlled Nicaragua from the 1930s until their fall in the Sandinista Revolution in 1979. These and similar regimes see any form of instability as

threatening and have routinely imprisoned and/or killed anyone who has challenged them. In these cases, then, extreme stability is clearly not a positive state from most normative perspectives.

Even when we move away from such cases of extreme stability or extreme instability, it is unclear how much stability is normatively ideal. From an instrumental point of view, however, it does seem clear that the extremes are highly dysfunctional in a variety of ways. At the most basic level, human life is often threatened when instability is high. The great famine that affected China from 1958 to 1961, in which at least 15 million people are said to have died, is an illustration of the negative impact of such instability. Beyond death from famine, instability also affects health more generally, as well as education, since schools and universities are often shuttered in conditions of permanent revolution. On the economic side, financial investment is almost certainly attenuated in countries that exhibit high levels of instability, as the risk premium is too great for all but the most risk-tolerant investors. In addition, political careers are hard to shape and plan for when instability is high, since the rules of the game are constantly in question and subject to change. Young people who aspire to a political career can find themselves with their political parties banned or the political office to which they aspire eliminated.

Extreme political stability, on the other hand, produces other costs. Dictatorships discourage investors because, although the regime itself may be stable, its decisions are often unpredictable, since they depend on the whim of a single individual or clique of noncompetitively selected rulers. Investors can find themselves with their factories, farms, or banks expropriated virtually overnight. Recourse to the courts is futile, as the rule of law is no more than what the dictator declares it to be. Innovation is stifled in such regimes, since there are few incentives for individuals to be creative. Indeed, dictatorships inculcate fear in those who wish to accomplish any sort of change, since such change will be seen as a challenge to the status quo. Political careers are often truncated by purges, as parties or families fall out of favor.

In sum, it would appear that as one moves to the extremes of stability or instability, the costs grow exponentially, suggesting that the gains for stability may conform to a quadratic form with the highest

returns of all kinds (human, economic, and political) lying at the top of an inverted U curve. In effect, it would appear that the ancient Greek philosophers had got it right—Aristotle criticized Sparta in the *Politics* for its exclusive focus on making war and its lack of attention to making peace.

Achieving Stability

The key question in the literature of contemporary political science is how to achieve stability. Much of that literature has focused one way or the other on the link between political legitimacy and political stability. Most modern theorizing goes back to Max Weber in his classic work *Politics as a Vocation*. Weber saw three types of legitimacy: charismatic, traditional, and rational-legal, only the last being a stable form. In *Political Man*, Seymour Lipset drew on Weber and hypothesized that stable democracies are achieved when political systems are seen by their citizens as being effective at delivering public services and are held accountable for their actions. Lipset as well as David Easton realized that regimes that achieved these goals would produce citizens uninterested in violent or radical change. Moreover, such systems would be better equipped than others to weather the storm of periods of especially poor performance. Hence, legitimate systems can overcome sharp economic downturns because they have built up a reservoir of political support, and citizens are prepared to grant them significant degrees of freedom to “fix up the mess.”

Beyond legitimacy, stability also seems to depend on reasonable equality in the distribution of wealth. Considerable literature, beginning with Aristotle and continuing into modern political science, has linked instability to inequality. Academic disputes have emerged, however, as to how to measure inequality and whether scholarly attention should be focused on income inequality, wealth inequality, or land inequality (see, e.g., the works of Manus Midlarsky, and Edward Muller and Mitchell Seligson listed in the Further Readings).

Measuring Stability

Stability has been measured extensively by databases in political science that have counted the number of coups, revolutions, insurrections, violent protests, and so on. Debates center on the

significance and weighting of each of these events: Do 10 violent protests add up to the equivalent of one attempt at insurrection, and how can one measure these events? The empirical work on factors related to legitimacy, which in turn would lead to stability, has been extensive, but much of it has suffered from a narrow empirical perspective. Here, as Arthur Miller notes, the “trust in government” paradigm has held sway, in which a small number of items in surveys measure the extent to which citizens trust their government “to do the right thing.”

More recently, the conceptualization of legitimacy has been broadened considerably. One approach, as noted by Bruce Gilley, includes measures based on public opinion (from the World Values survey) as well as objective indicators, such as tallies of protests. Another approach argues that legitimacy is fundamentally an attitudinal construct and looks at it as the extent to which citizens express various degrees of their support for their political systems. Surveys are ideal for measuring this notion of legitimacy. A six-dimensional system developed and tested by John Booth and Mitchell Seligson (2009) in a number of countries was found to powerfully predict political stability. This approach, rather than making stability part of the legitimacy phenomenon itself, makes legitimacy a predictor of it.

Important research frontiers lie ahead. We do not know if there are important worldwide trends in stability. The widespread movement toward democracy with the end of the Cold War has produced some stable regimes, but it has also been associated with expanding conflicts in others. It remains to be seen if the world as a whole is moving toward more stable or less stable polities.

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See also Democracy, Theories of; Equality; Legitimacy; Political Systems, Types; Support, Political; Weber, Max

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STAGES MODEL OF POLICY MAKING

A common method of examining the operation of a policy process is to break it down into several stages and substages. Each of these can then be analyzed separately, and commonalities across stages can also be identified. Over the course of the history of the policy sciences, several distinct models of the policy process were put forward before the current five-stage model of agenda setting, policy formulation, decision making, policy implementation, and policy evaluation was settled on. The evolution of these models and their advantages and disadvantages as analytical and empirical constructs are set out below.

One of the most popular means for simplifying public policy making has been to disaggregate the process into a series of discrete stages and substages. The resulting sequence of stages is referred to as the *policy cycle* or *stages model of policy*. This simplification has its origins in the earliest works on public policy analysis but has received somewhat different treatment in the hands of different authors.

The idea of simplifying the complexity of public policy making by breaking the policy-making process down into a number of discrete stages was first broached in the early work of Harold Lasswell, one of the founders of the policy sciences. Lasswell divided the policy process into seven stages: (1) intelligence, (2) promotion, (3) prescription, (4) invocation, (5) application, (6) termination, and (7) appraisal. In Lasswell's view, the seven stages described not only how public policies were actually made but also how they should be made. The policy process began

with intelligence gathering—that is, the collection, processing, and dissemination of information for those who participate in the decision process. It then moved to the promotion of particular options by those involved in making the decision. In the third stage, the decision makers actually prescribed a course of action. In the fourth stage, the prescribed course of action was invoked; a set of sanctions was developed to penalize those who failed to comply with the prescriptions of the decision makers. The policy was then applied by the courts and the bureaucracy and ran its course until it was terminated or cancelled. Finally, the results of the policy were appraised or evaluated against the aims and goals of the original decision makers.

Lasswell's analysis of the policy-making process focused on the decision-making process within government and had little to say about external or environmental influences on government behavior. It simply assumed that decision making was limited or restricted to a presumably small number of participants staffing official positions in government. Another shortcoming of this model was its lack of internal logic, especially with reference to placing appraisal or evaluation after termination, since policies are usually evaluated prior to being wound down rather than afterward. Nevertheless, this model was highly influential in the development of a policy science. Although not entirely accurate, it did reduce the complexity of studying public policy by allowing each stage to be isolated and examined before putting the whole picture of the process back together.

Lasswell's formulation formed the basis for a model developed by Gary Brewer in the early 1970s. According to Brewer, the policy process was composed of six stages: (1) invention/initiation, (2) estimation, (3) selection, (4) implementation, (5) evaluation, and (6) termination. In Brewer's view, invention or initiation referred to the earliest stage in the sequence when a problem would be initially sensed. This stage, he argued, would be characterized by an ill-conceived definition of the problem and suggested solutions to it. The second stage of estimation concerned calculation of the risks, costs, and benefits associated with each of the various solutions raised in the earlier stage. This would involve both technical evaluation and normative choices. The objective of this stage is to

narrow the range of plausible choices by excluding the unfeasible ones and to somehow range the remaining options in terms of desirability. The third stage consists of adopting one, none, or some combination of the solutions remaining at the end of the estimation stage. The remaining three stages consist of implementing the selected option, evaluating the results of the entire process, and terminating the policy according to the conclusions reached by its evaluation.

Brewer's version of the policy process improved on Lasswell's pioneering work. It expanded the policy process beyond the confines of government in discussing the process of problem recognition and clarified the terminology in use to describe the various stages of the process. Moreover, it introduced the notion of the policy process as an ongoing cycle. It recognized that most policies did not have a definite life cycle—moving from birth to death—but rather seemed to recur, in slightly different guises, as one policy succeeded another with only minor or major modifications. Brewer's insights inspired several other versions of the policy cycle to be developed in the 1970s and 1980s, the most well-known of which were set out in popular textbooks by Charles Jones and James Anderson.

To avoid a plethora of models of policy stages and their variants, it is necessary to clarify the logic behind the cycle model. In the works of Brewer, Jones, and others, the operative principle behind the notion is the logic of applied problem solving. The stages in applied problem solving and its corresponding stages in the policy process are depicted in Table 1.

In this model, *agenda setting* refers to the process by which problems come to the attention of

Table 1 Five Stages of the Policy Cycle and Their Relationship to Applied Problem Solving

<i>Phases of Applied Problem Solving</i>	<i>Stages in Policy Cycle</i>
Problem recognition	Agenda setting
Proposal of solution	Policy formulation
Choice of solution	Decision making
Putting solution into effect	Policy implementation
Monitoring results	Policy evaluation

governments; *policy formulation* refers to the process by which policy options are formulated within government; *decision making* refers to the process by which governments adopt a particular course of action or nonaction; *policy implementation* refers to the process by which governments put policies into effect; *policy evaluation* refers to the processes by which the results of policies are monitored by both state and societal actors, the result of which may be reconceptualization of policy problems and solutions.

The most important advantage of the policy cycle model as set out above is that it facilitates the understanding of public policy making by breaking the complexity of the process into any number of stages and substages, each of which can be investigated alone or in terms of its relationship to any or all the other stages of the cycle. This aids theory building by allowing numerous case studies and comparative studies of different stages to be undertaken. Another advantage of the model is that its breadth permits examination of the role of all actors and institutions dealing with a policy, not just those governmental agencies formally charged with the task.

The principal disadvantage of the stages model is that it can be misinterpreted as suggesting that policymakers go about solving public problems in a very systematic and more or less linear fashion. This is not the case in reality, as the identification of problems and the development and implementation of solutions are often an ad hoc and idiosyncratic process. Decision makers often simply react to circumstances and do so in terms of their interests and preset ideological dispositions. Another problem with the model is that while the logic of the policy cycle may be fine in the abstract, in practice, the stages are often compressed or skipped, or they are followed in an order unlike that specified by the logic of applied problem solving. Thus, the cycle may not be a single iterative loop but rather a series of smaller loops in which, for example, the results of past implementation decisions have a major impact on future policy formulation, regardless of the specifics of the agenda-setting process in the case concerned. In short, there is often no linear progression of a policy as conceived by the model. Third, and perhaps most important, the model lacks any notion of causation. It offers no pointers as to what or who drives a policy from

one stage to another, a matter of crucial interest to scholars working on the subject.

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See also Policy Process, Models of

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STALINISM

The term *Stalinism* in its proper sense denotes the essence of a specific social system that emerged in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s under the leadership of Premier Joseph Stalin. The term is also used to refer to (a) a specific way of behavior and thinking dominant in Soviet politics from the late 1920s to the mid-1950s or influenced by and similar to it, (b) a corresponding ideology or class of ideologies justifying Stalin's policies, or (c) constitutional arrangements and institutional designs typical of or similar to those developed under Stalin's leadership.

One of the first, if not the first, documented usage of the word *Stalinism* appeared in an article by Karl Radek published in December 1934 in *Pravda*, where he introduced the expression *Marxism–Leninism–Stalinism*. This initiative was short-lived. Neither Stalin himself nor party ideologists used the word, preferring *Marxism–Leninism*

as the title of their ideology and *socialism* as a typical description for the social order developed in the Soviet Union. Since the mid-1950s, *Stalinism* essentially has become a derogatory term. Even its champions—with very few exceptions (see Sergeev's 1999 apology for "mystical Stalinism")—avoid using the word. Furthermore, a word *Stalischina* emerged in Russian with essentially the same meaning as *Stalinism* but with much more offensive connotations.

Traditionally, interpretations of Stalinism vary between a limited focus on highly specific characteristics of Soviet politics, often attributed to Stalin's weird personal impact, and a shallow explanation of related phenomena as mere instances of totalitarianism. A more balanced view requires a combination of a still broader perspective with adequate reference to precise historical particulars and conditions of political developments.

Origins and Characteristics

By the beginning of the 20th century, the spontaneous development of European countries and their overseas colonies extended over great expanses and held sway over civilizations and cultures hardly ready to adjust to the modes and models of modern behavior. The world became integrated into a single interstate system of territorial rule that was internally divided by imperialist rivalry and structural disproportions. Political leaders had no institutional and intellectual resources to manage such development even on national levels, to say nothing of an international one. The worldwide expansion of modernization coupled with the imperialist enclosure of the entire surface of the globe into a single interstate system made the issue of control of development critical. The inability to adequately respond to that great challenge provoked World War I.

Postwar reconstruction implied a grand project to meet the challenge. The Entente winners relied on national self-determination and the creation of a universal quasi polity in the form of the League of Nations. This project proved too simplistic and straightforward, however, to be adequate. It immediately provoked an alternative one. During World War I, radical Marxists had called for transforming

an imperialist war into a world revolution through a series of civil wars. The October Revolution and the civil war that followed seemed to prove the underlying logic. Thus, Soviet power and the Comintern emerged as an alternative grand project. This was the historical context for the first wave of democratization and the Soviet experiment that evolved into Stalinism, as well as for a number of national alternative projects that produced a variety of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.

Soviet power was highly ambivalent. On the one hand, it relied on mass participation and thus had a clear democratic calling coupled with an institutional form of direct democracy of Soviets—Councils of Workers and Peasants Deputies. On the other hand, the emergent system could only be run by a highly integrated and disciplined new-type vanguard party. Lenin, in his seminal book of 1920, *"Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder*, clearly fixed a hierarchy of power: leaders → party → working class → masses.

Further development reshaped the initial combination of democratic conceptual and institutional insights with authoritarian and repressive trends into a highly contradictory pattern of rule known as Stalinism. Its core was the "totalitarian democracy" (Jacob Talmon, 1952) that prevailed during the civil war (1918–1920) and successive postwar periods (1920–1922, 1924–1927). This nascent system was gradually made more and more effective by institutional and ideological innovations. Some of those innovations could be attributed to Stalin personally, but many were developed by his counterparts and would-be political rivals. The first decade after the October Revolution saw a successive accumulation of traits that could be considered attributes of Stalinism, particularly through an increasing authoritarianism. Correspondingly, the years and decades after Stalin's death may be seen as a gradual de-Stalinization or a series of structural and substantive changes that had a very profound effect despite the claims of radical anti-Soviet critics that "the system is untransformable."

The dating of Stalinism and its specific periods is problematic. Widespread attribution of Stalinism to the period between the respective deaths of Lenin (1924) and Stalin (1953) seems to be inaccurate, greatly exaggerating agency factors at the expense

of structural ones. Rather, it is the congresses of the new-type party that should be considered critical junctures. Thus, all the years of profound internal political struggle within the party up to the 15th Congress in December 1927 could best be seen as a period of *nascent Stalinism*.

The age of Stalinism proper could be divided into a number of periods. They include emergent Stalinism, up to the 16th Congress of July 1930; early or initial Stalinism, up to the 17th Congress of January to February 1934 and the subsequent death of Sergey Kirov in December 1934; the complete or full-fledged Stalinism of 1934 to 1941; the World War II interlude; the advanced Stalinism of 1945 to 1952, the year of the 19th Congress; and the late Stalinism of 1952 to 1956, concluding with the 20th Congress.

Some essential characteristics of Stalinism, however, had started to be elaborated much earlier.

The core of the new political system was a new type of party. Initially, it was a highly disciplined and motivated clandestine vanguard party organized and molded by Lenin on the basis of the principle of democratic centralism. After the October Revolution, in a number of realignments, Communists managed to keep dominant positions and after the Civil War emerged as the only commanding power. At the 10th Party Congress of March 1921, internal party factions were banned, but policy options could be discussed on the basis of alternative platforms. Soon after, in the first purge (*чистка*, meaning “cleansing”), about a third of the membership was expelled from the party. Launching campaigns against oppositions of various kinds and using purges, Stalin managed to consolidate the party by its 15th Congress. Only then was it possible to start its transformation from a party proper into the core of a party–state totalitarian system.

The conception of building socialism in a single country was another cornerstone of the Soviet experiment. Already in his 1915 article “On the Slogan for a United States of Europe,” Lenin had declared that uneven economic and political development made the victory of socialism possible, first in a few countries or even in a single country alone. Lenin’s criticism of left Communists in 1920 and his subsequent playing down of the idea of permanent revolution, as advanced by Leon Trotsky, marked a significant departure from the

orthodox Marxist vision of world revolution. By the end of 1924, Stalin recognized that “the proletariat can and must build a socialist society in one country” in the second edition of his book *Foundations of Leninism*—the statement was missing in the first edition earlier in the same year. Soon after, Nikolai Bukharin elaborated on the issue. He argued that the existing economic base of the Soviet Union was sufficient for socialist construction in case its security could be militarily provided. By the time of the 15th Congress, the idea was a fully accepted cornerstone of official policy.

After coming to power, the Communist Party made consistent attempts to control appointments to most important posts. Stalin himself did a lot to establish special departments in regional party committees that would oversee the most important appointments. As Secretary-General, beginning in 1922, he personally handled similar control in the center. That practice foreshadowed the future system of *nomenklatura* (described below in the discussion on complete Stalinism).

Historical Development

Emergent Stalinism (1927–1930) was primarily linked with the beginning of industrialization and collectivization as well as the launching of the so-called 5-year plans. With all the economic importance of those policies, their social aspects were far more crucial. A highly heterogeneous economy and society were radically transformed. The economy became state controlled and planned. Society was first atomized and then reshaped with imposed homogenization. All those steps seemed highly modern, but in fact, such radical and one-sided modernization would turn out to be dysfunctional.

The second general party purge of 1929 to 1930 was a major event of the period. About 100,000 Communists, or some 10% of the membership, were purged. At the same time, a significant number of new members—industrial workers—joined the Party.

Early or initial Stalinism (1930–1934) was marked by further consolidation of party control. During that period, a theory of aggravation of the class struggle in the process of building socialism was advanced. In his speech on the results of the

first 5-year plan in January 1933, Stalin (1951) began as follows:

Eradication of classes is accomplished not by cooling down the class struggle but by its heating up. Withering of the state would be achieved not by weakening of state authority but by its maximal strengthening, necessary to crush the remnants of the dying classes and to organize a defense against capitalist encirclement, which is not yet destroyed and would not be destroyed soon. (p. 211)

This argument supplied a theoretical basis for the claim that ongoing repression of political opponents is necessary.

The third general party purge was performed during 1933. This time, during the period of the purge, new memberships were temporarily suspended. About 400,000 Communists, or some 18% of the membership, were purged.

Complete Stalinism (1934–1941) was marked by the growth of the personality cult of Stalin and the fastening down of a full-fledged *nomenklatura* system. The term *nomenklatura* (from the Latin *nomenclatura*, or “list of names”) denotes a practice of advance nomination of candidates to various important positions by respective party committees. For example, important positions at the union level were staffed by the Central Committee of the Party, at the republican level by each republic’s Central Committee, at the regional level by regional committees, at the local level by local committees, and so on. Nomination implied that a person’s name appeared in the list of names, or *nomenklatura*. The person was controlled, replaced, promoted, or disgraced within that system. One could have access to significant positions only by virtue of joining the *nomenklatura*.

Nomenklatura is often interpreted as a new class (e.g., by Milovan Djilas and Michael Voslenski). Strictly speaking, it was not so. *Nomenklatura* itself was highly stratified. It was more a system of control and rationalization of government by and through the party than a social grouping, much less a class. In fact, it was nothing but a central link between the party as a core of the Soviet totalitarian system and administrative infrastructure integrated into the system. In fact, its development was coupled with the reduction of the state to an administrative arrangement.

From 1936 onward, purge campaigns were replaced by the “struggle with traitors of the people.” This struggle culminated in what came to be known as *Yezhovshchina*. The worst of the repressions occurred while the People’s Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Narodnyy komissariat vnutrennich del*, NKVD) was headed by Nikolai Yezhov from September 1936 to August 1938. Stalin made him responsible for the repressions. Yezhov was subsequently arrested and executed. The very term *Yezhovshchina* was coined to integrate the campaign of criticism.

The World War II period created a new reconfiguration of world politics that influenced many aspects of Stalinism. The idea of building socialism in a single country was reinterpreted, putting the Soviet Union at the center of capitalist states, ranging from its most reactionary fascist foes all the way to its allies. Intensification of the class struggle was linked to this picture. While the totalitarian party–state formation proved effective and instrumental, it was supplemented by the traditional great-power apparatus of the Russian imperial autocracy; thus, Stalin’s personality cult was greatly boosted and became more deeply entrenched.

Advanced Stalinism (1945–1952) saw a further transformation of the theory of building socialism in a single country. People’s democracies in the countries that fell into the sphere of Soviet geopolitical control formed the so-called socialist camp. Consolidation of the new system gave impetus to the idea of intensification of the class struggle. Stalinism made claims to global domination. Its conceptual basis of Marxist scientific teaching was extended to integrate all science. The natural sciences were supposed to elaborate dialectical materialism, while social scholarship was to be informed by historical materialism. Several public campaigns on specific sciences were launched, with Stalin himself publishing a book on linguistics.

All in all, the system of advanced totalitarianism became too complex and complicated to be run by simple principles of total control. The system was bound to change.

Late Stalinism (1952–1956) saw a series of reforms begun by Stalin himself, finishing with the thaw initiated during the premiership of his successor Nikita Khrushchev. The 19th Congress, organized after a 13-year interval, signaled the beginning of the process. It was Georgy Malenkov, not

Stalin, who made the main speech (report on party activities). The speech highlighted the need for criticism and self-criticism. The theme was developed by Stalin himself and most of the speakers. Many historians interpret this as preparation for a new wave of purges. This was probably true, but it also signaled the coming reforms. They followed, coupled with a power struggle after Stalin's death in March 1953. Several projects of de-Stalinization emerged, ranging from strengthening state structures and emancipating them from the party (Lavrentii Beria, Minister of the Interior) to revivalism of Leninist principles, including totalitarian democracy (Khrushchev).

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STATE

The three sections of this entry examine the very complex and controversial political phenomenon commonly referred to as *the state*. The first section presents a conceptual statement that takes as its point of departure the ideal-typical treatment of the state presented at the beginning of the 20th century by the German scholar Max Weber (1864–1920). This choice reflects the significant influence that treatment exercised, over the remainder of that century, within the disciplines of law, political science, and sociology. (Note that Weber's arguments, while markedly original in parts, echoed and elaborated theoretical views widely shared within the

juridical and social science literature of his time, both in Germany itself and elsewhere. However, neither at the time nor later were they universally accepted as valid.). Included here are comments that support, qualify, and modify Weber's own treatment. The next section of the entry summarizes the major historical developments that in the course of Western modernization imparted to the political institutions of certain European countries the distinctive features emphasized in Weber's state concept. They turned the state itself into the model arrangement for the generation and management of large-scale political power, first in other European countries and then in other parts of the world. The third section of the entry considers very briefly the major events that, since Weber wrote, have markedly affected the institutional physiognomy of the state itself and its position within the larger society and highlights some aspects of the contemporary discussion about "the state of the state."

A Conceptual Portrait of the State

Weber's understanding of the state is most often recalled in a definition he proposed in various texts: "The state is a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence* [italics added] within a given territory" (Gerth & Mills, 1946, p. 78). But a more elaborate definition may provide a better start to our own discussion:

The primary formal characteristics of the modern state are as follows: It possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system of order claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens, most of whom have gained membership by birth, but also to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only insofar as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it. (Weber, 1978, p. 56)

Although Weber here as elsewhere uses the expression "the modern state," in his own view,

the qualifier *modern* is largely superfluous. While his best known work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1905/2002), investigates (famously and controversially) a religious aspect of the economic component of Western modernization, Weber views state formation as the most significant political component of that same, broad-ranging, universally significant historical phenomenon. By the same token, the state constitutes a distinctive, relatively recent moment within the historical career of a universal but highly varied phenomenon—that of *Herrschaft* (an expression often translated as “authority” or “domination,” which below we generally refer to as “rule”).

Conceptually speaking, rule itself is a variant of an even broader phenomenon—that of political power. In the Weberian construction of it, political power exists in a situation where given two parties (individual or collective) pursuing incompatible interests, one can overcome the resistance of the other to its own pursuits by engaging or threatening to engage in violent action and thus putting at stake the other’s physical vulnerability. The resulting inequality between the two parties can be more or less marked, more or less durable, and wide-ranging. It can become sharper and more stable, involve greater numbers, and affect a broader spectrum of social affairs when the superior party no longer needs to exercise or threaten violence in order to get its way but establishes and manages a relation where its own command routinely engenders the other party’s obedience. To the extent that this happens, we can say that political power has become institutionalized into rule.

Weber’s greatest contribution to the study of the institutionalization of political power lies in his emphasis on its legitimation; indeed, he views rule as legitimate political power. This is the case to the extent that the inferior party is not subjectively induced to obey by its sheer, unquestioning habituation to its own position or by a calculation of the material costs and rewards it can expect respectively from granting or denying obedience. Rather, its obedience expresses the belief it entertains in the superior party’s entitlement to issue-binding commands and in its own corresponding moral duty to obey them. This is of course an ancient insight, but Weber develops it most creatively. First, he argues that the beliefs in question, for all

the historical variety in their content and in the situations that engender them and that they sustain, can all be subsumed under three basic, ideal types of legitimacy: traditional, charismatic, legal-rational. Then, he shows that this tripartition is correlated with other significant distinctions concerning diverse aspects of systems of rule.

Building to an extent on this and other contributions of Weber’s, the contemporary German sociologist Heinrich Popitz (1925–2002) developed a broader theory of the institutionalization of political power and of its development into rule. There are three components to this process:

First, power relations become de-personalized. Power is no longer undistinguishable from the particular individual who at a given time is in a markedly advantageous position, but increasingly appears to be connected with functions and positions which transcend the individual. Furthermore, a formalization of power takes place, in that its exercise is more and more oriented to rules, procedures, and ritual practices. (This does not exclude its arbitrary use; but one can talk about this, or about undue favor, only when arbitrary or favourable acts are contrasted with what happens in most situations.) The third aspect of the institutionalization of power is the growing integration of power relations within a broader order. Power gears itself into the pre-existent situation. It becomes part of and is encompassed within the social edifice, which it supports and by which it is in turn supported. (Popitz, 1992, pp. 38–39)

The French social theorist Jean-Yves Calvez suggests that we characterize the state as a polity where institutionalization is particularly thorough and advanced. This proposal is significant but considers expressly only the extent to which institutionalization is realized in state building and disregards the question of how it is institutionalized. In some systems of rule—for instance, in the classical Chinese empire—a very extensive and penetrating institutionalization process was carried out largely by means of what Popitz calls ritual practices, both those of an expressly religious nature (the emperor was supposed to have a mandate from Heaven) and others that we might call *ceremonial* and *etiquette*. Here, political and administrative practices were

standardized primarily by reference to values and norms perceived as sacred, stylized in ways chosen for their symbolic appropriateness, conveying and instilling a respect for tradition and a commitment to its protection.

Although in the West ritual and similar practices have also been used in constructing and managing political power, already in ancient Greece and Rome, it was institutionalized and managed by means of rather different practices, both originally unique to the West. On the one hand, significant political and administrative decisions came to depend, more or less, on express, legitimate, public deliberation over alternative views of what policies to adopt. On the other, those polities structured themselves by means of law—that is, of general commands that articulated the polity itself into organs and offices with distinctive faculties and responsibilities.

Furthermore, the formation of policy itself and (as far as possible) its subsequent implementation were also regulated by law, which the Greeks and Romans increasingly understood as a body of principles and rules of secular nature, capable of being taught, learned, and rationally interpreted and applied. Its bearing on a huge variety of contentious matters could be determined by means of a distinctive form of legal discourse—highly literate, sophisticated, intellectually prestigious (especially in Rome)—which, in principle, could produce choices demanding rational assent between alternative solutions to a given practical problem.

Thus understood, law is much better than ritual at confronting open-ended situations and at handling and generating contingency. Now, contingency itself—the understanding that much (perhaps all) that is the case in the world is not so of necessity but merely because it *is* the case, often (not always) as a result of human agency—is a central aspect of modernity. On this account (among others), one may understand why law played a large role in the building of the typical polity of Western modernity and in the formation and implementation of its policies. For while legal decisions are occasioned by the possibility of alternative choices, they settle for one or the other via a work of interpretation intrinsically open to contestation and reconsideration. This is all the more so when they draw on principles and modalities of argument not perceived as divine or supernatural in nature and,

thus, not endowed with absolute and utterly unchallengeable validity.

Later Western polities, particularly during the Middle Ages, maintained a close relationship between law and rule. But here, law itself was seen chiefly as the product of long-lasting, spontaneous social and cultural processes, mainly embodied in locally evolved customs; these expressed widely shared moral convictions, often interpreted and inculcated by priests as constituting religious commandments. Rulers related to the law, so understood, chiefly as its (more or less effective and reliable) custodians and enforcers.

A rather drastic change in the relation between rule and law associated with (indeed, constitutive of) the advance of modernity (though oddly enough, it finds a significant precedent in the Gregorian reform of the Church in the 11th century) was associated with the emergence and development of so-called positive law. Here, lawmaking comes to be seen as a distinctive and exclusive prerogative of rule, turning law from a framework of policy into an instrument for it. It has become possible to make law(s) in order to confront the situation and change it by selecting and mandating new policies.

This “positivization” of law, by making it depend on express, deliberate, time and place-bound human decisions (rather than on its presumed agreement with the supreme religious and moral dictates of the divinity or of nature itself, or with the folk’s jural traditions), makes it relevant to a distinctive feature of the ideal-typical, Weberian state—its rationality. The system of rule can treat law as one instrument for optimizing the relation between the costs and benefits of its own activities. This, in principle, is not possible where the system’s prevalent mode of institutionalization relies on ritual, where the connection between activities and intended results is chiefly symbolic, not intrinsic.

But turning law into a political instrument raises a threatening problem: how to secure the third aspect of the institutionalization of political power, its integration into the larger society—a balance between what a society is induced (or indeed compelled) to do for the state and, vice versa, what the latter does for the former. States generally deal with this problem by establishing a hierarchical distinction between different sources

of law—between a state's constitution and its statutes or between these and the authoritative acts applying them (judicial sentences, ministerial decrees). Legal commands at lower levels are valid only if, while in principle their content is open-ended, they can be discursively shown to be consistent with higher level commands. These come to represent, so to speak, a more deep and abiding commitment of the polity to the protection and fostering of some societal interests. But the formation and execution of commands at each level can be expected to reflect, once more, a preoccupation with rationality, a sustained effort to attain optimal results in the face of changing circumstances while minimizing costs and risks. Thus understood, legal commands can both confront and generate a great deal of contingency.

When it is thus “positivized”—that is, rendered contingent on express, deliberate, and time and place-bound human decisions—the making and application of law empowers the state. Instead of closely monitoring multiple, diverse, and changing circumstances to issue commands that activate specific responses from specific individuals, the state can address abstractly formulated, general commands to an open-ended plurality of individuals, both those actively involved in its own operations and those at the receiving end of them; it can program and make predictable their response to those commands. It can evoke in them not just ad hoc responses but lasting and broad-ranging dispositions to act, frame their activities within an environment of sanctioned expectations, and structure both their private relations to one another and those they entertain with the state itself. And it can do this not only by ordering, authorizing, or forbidding specific activities of individuals but also by enabling them to produce valid, actionable legal effects in their own open-ended, selective pursuit of their interests.

Insofar as it does this, the state recognizes as differentiated from, complementary to, and autonomous of itself (though to some extent controlled and empowered by its own activities) a whole realm of social and cultural processes that we can label *civil society*. This exists insofar as individuals and collectivities subject to the state's law also hold under it rights of their own, that is legally recognized and protected claims—private rights, which they exercise in their dealings with one

another, and public ones, the exercise of which concerns their relations to the state itself and asserts some entitlements vis-à-vis it. The complementarity between the state and civil society is the state's characteristic mode of integration—the third aspect of the institutionalization of rule mentioned by Popitz.

All this presupposes the peculiar and historically rare juridical development whereby the center of political power to some extent, in some fashion, binds itself to the observance of rules of its own making. To quote Popitz (1992) again,

Only rarely, in the history of society, has one found it possible even just to pose systematically and consequentially the question, how to lay boundaries on institutionalized violence. Essentially, one has accomplished this only in the Greek polis, in republican Rome, in a few other city-states, and in the history of the modern constitutional state. The answers to that question have remained strikingly similar: the postulate of the supremacy of the law and of the equality of all before it (*isonomia*), the idea of delimiting in principle all legislation (basic rights), procedural norms (decisions taken by organs, publicity, appeals to higher authorities), norms on the attribution of offices (turn taking, selection), and norms of the public sphere (freedom of thought and of assembly). (p. 65)

Nothing less than that is at stake in the state-law relation—but also, nothing more. An excessive emphasis on that relation may obscure the sheer factuality of other aspects of the state's operations—not just its ultimate grounding on violence but also the question of whether it does or does not at a given moment possess the material resources required for those operations, be these once more of a violent kind or of a peaceable kind. (The saying *C'est l'argent qui fait la guerre*—it is money that makes war—suggests that the two kinds are closely connected.) Much of Weber's political theorizing has to do with the arrangements whereby under different kinds of rule those resources are gathered, managed, and committed, thus, with administration. The administrative arrangements typical of the state are bureaucratic; this means (in Weber's own famous ideal type of bureaucracy) that administration is carried out on the basis of

various forms of knowledge—juridical, military, fiscal, managerial, statistical, geographical, all of which are perceived as different from (and superior to) purely factual information and practical know-how. When deployed in the course of express deliberation, they are expected to yield decisions that command assent and that activate and orient the conduct on the ground of merely executive activities. The state's capacity to apply such forms of knowledge via its bureaucratic apparatus further qualifies it as a distinctively rational kind of political enterprise, purposefully seeking both effectiveness (the maximal achievement of its own ends) and efficiency (the optimal relation between means and ends). It can use its bureaucratic staff to monitor changing circumstances; identify and forecast dangers and opportunities; maintain, suspend, or modify existing arrangements; and make appropriate dispositions to confront (and to generate) contingent situations.

The diversity in the contents of the knowledge that the state can mobilize is paralleled by the diversity in other resources at its disposal—guns and gallows, sophisticated financial instruments, buildings, various means of communication, specific juridical faculties, moneys. Both diversities (and the consequent one in the vocational identities within the staff) reflect themselves in the varied nature of the tasks the state can take on itself in managing a society's political affairs. In turn, the diversity in the *savoirs*, the materials, and the personnel available to the state finds visible expression in the organizational design of the state itself. It is in the first instance articulated functionally, that is, into units that are each normally engaged in different activities, reflecting the varied nature of the tasks those activities must accomplish and of the relative bodies of knowledge and of relevant material resources. Again, in matching as far as possible its structures to its functions, the state expresses its rationality. (The familiar image of the state as a machine best conveys this principle.)

The second mode of articulation is instead hierarchical. The performance of the various state activities by diverse personnel on the ground—soldiers, teachers, diplomats, policemen, judges, tax collectors, and social workers—is controlled by personnel higher up, who activate the personnel under them and instruct them on how to operate, monitor, and if necessary sanction those operations.

Here, the telling image is that of the pyramid, where the base is provided by the personnel on the ground and the apex by the controlling bureaucratic elite. In this way, the state secures its unity and the uniformity or, at any rate, the consistency in the way its activities are carried out over time and in various locales. Furthermore, the higher levels not only can mandate and thus constrain the local, time-bound exercise of the same activities at lower levels, but they can also merge and coordinate diverse activities and effect the convergence of different bodies of knowledge and of personnel.

Both in their functional and in their hierarchical arrangements, bureaucratic systems embody the first two dimensions of institutionalization according to Popitz:

1. *Depersonalization*: The basic components of bureaucratic units are offices, ensembles of resources, entitlements, and responsibilities to which the physical individuals appointed to each office are expected to orient their activities. To guarantee this expectation, officials do not own the facilities they use, and in using them, the officials are expected to serve the interests of the office, not those private to the occupants themselves.
2. *Formalization*: The activities of the occupants are imputed to the offices themselves and rendered valid only insofar as they implement certain rules, both of a technical and of a legal nature, both substantive and procedural.

The state can produce such rules directly, by means of positive law that at successive levels—a statute turned into bylaws, a bylaw into concrete ordinances—can activate the discretionary capacity of the administrative personnel. It can also produce such rules indirectly, by authorizing activities that mobilize the bodies of nonlegal, professional knowledge, which have qualified individuals for entering that profession. In both ways, it can program the conduct of the office-holders, on the one hand, making it predictable and, on the other, making it respond to the particularities and contingencies of the *hic et nunc* that the officials confront.

A system of administration that mobilizes very diverse resources and articulates itself into a variety of units permits the state to exercise rule in a

continuous and intensive manner. It can thus match the demands and opportunities presented by the increasingly complex and changing societies of modernity and acknowledge their growing preference for a rational and secular orientation to action, individual and collective, and the particular significance they attach to economic affairs.

This conceptual portrait of the state has expressly considered only the ways in which rule is structured and carried out within it. But the modern political universe is constituted by a plurality of states and characterized also by the relations that typically exist among them, for the monopoly of legitimate violence constitutive of each state refers to a specific portion of the globe, at the boundaries of which it encounters the monopoly vested in other states. Together, they make up the states' system, the critical feature of which is that the units making it up are not empowered and controlled by an overarching power center. They are equal to one another in some respects: Each is territorial, being bounded by the portion of the globe over which it exercises the monopoly of legitimate violence; each is sovereign, in the sense of constituting the overriding fount of all legitimate political authority; and each is expected and entitled autonomously to define its own interests and to pursue them by committing its own resources at its own risk.

This elementary view of international affairs, and the decisive role unavoidably played in them by sheer relations of might between the participating states, is grounded on the principles laid down in the Treaties of Westphalia (1648). The extent to which these still hold is a key issue within the discipline of international relations, given the number and magnitude of events that have occurred since that time in the relations between states. Weber himself seems to have held a Westphalian view of these matters, perhaps because many of the aforementioned events (such as the development of certain kinds of international organizations or the advent of nuclear weapons) occurred after his death. In fact, his theoretical writings are largely silent on these matters, but some of his political ones, especially from the times of World War I and immediately afterward, throw some light on them.

There is thus a marked contrast between the import of state building within the state itself and its import between the states. At the first level,

state building is typically associated with pacification, since the state monopolizes legitimate violence and commits it to sanction the activities of an extensive, differentiated but at the same time unitary system of law and administration. All this, it might be said, has an ordering effect, reducing the contingency in the relation between the parts. At the second level, contingency is instead increased, since the states take their own initiatives vis-à-vis one another (including the recourse to violence) in light of their own autonomous definition of their own interests. For each, chief among these is its own security, but a state of affairs that secures one state may desecure another. Under these conditions, for each, the pursuit of security must take the form of increasing as far as possible its own might.

Major Phases in State Development

An overview of "the state's story" is possible only by means of considerable oversimplification. This discussion reduces it to three phases, each comprising institutional developments that varied considerably from one context to another in their timing and in their concrete manifestations.

Consolidation of Rule

The first phase can be labeled *consolidation of rule*; it took place in Europe between the 12th and the 17th centuries. During this phase, a number of locally based rulers sought to extend the territorial reach of their political control. Naturally, this engenders between them a competitive process whose outcome favors a few rulers and compels a considerably larger number of others to remain in the business of rule (if at all) only in a subordinate position, their own territories being subsumed under the larger ones now controlled by the successful competitors. As a result, the political map of the continent becomes simpler and simpler, comprising fewer distinct areas, now mostly geographically more continuous and historically more stable ones—unless, of course, they become themselves objects of further processes of consolidation.

Sometimes, these are peaceful. For instance, the scions of two dynasties ruling over different parts of Europe marry, and the territorial holdings of one spouse become soldered with those of the other. Or a political center temporarily hands over

to another a part of its own territory as security for a loan but then defaults and surrenders that security. But mostly, consolidation is the more or less direct outcome of open conflicts between two centers of rule over which one will control which territory. Such conflicts are mostly settled by war, which leads to conquest and forcible annexation of all or a part of the loser's territory to the advantage of the winner. "States make war," as Tilly (1992) has memorably put it, "and wars make states" (p. 42).

Thus, a decisive role in the consolidation of rule is played by military resources. But these in turn require the "sinews of war," that is, the financial capacity to muster those resources—troops, officers, and material—and deploy them against opponents with the intent of prevailing over them in the clash of arms. Very often, military innovation confers an advantage to armies and fleets that are larger, for these can wage war on more than one front and become internally differentiated into "services," which can effectively perform distinct, complementary tasks in warfare. But only rulers who marshal larger resources can afford such armies and fleets, and to this end, they need to raise troops from larger populations, tapping the wealth produced by larger territories. This premium on bigness is a strong inducement to what we call consolidation.

When weapons are silent, however temporarily, resources of a different nature also come into play. Often, political centers intent on consolidating rule do this in response to an appeal to peace that recurs most frequently in European history, being often voiced by religious leaders. Each center seeks to prove that by establishing its control over a larger territory, it can put an end to tensions between rivalrous lesser powers, which would otherwise occasion war or other violent disorder. This does not always involve prevailing over those powers in battle. Diplomatic action, the game of alliances and coalitions, the ability to isolate opponents or to make them accept a degree of subordination, and sometimes the recourse to arbitration by the empire or the papacy also play a role.

In addition, military activity itself requires and produces rules of its own, the very core of an emerging body of law seeking, more or less effectively, to regulate aspects of the relations between states. Another significant part of such law makes conflict over territory less likely by laying down

clear principles for succession into vacant seats of power, mostly by making legitimate descent the exclusive entitlement to rule. Other developments contribute to the same "pacification" effect. For instance, thanks to the remarkable advances in geography, in the measurement of terrain, and in cartography, the physical reach of each center of rule comes to be clearly delimited by geographical borders, in turn often determined by features of the terrain. It remains true, as Thomas Hobbes puts it, that states adopt toward one another, even when they are not fighting, "a posture of warre [*sic*]." But they partition the continent of Europe, and later other continents, in a clear and potentially stable manner. (There are also rules concerning the seas.)

Rationalization of Rule

Consolidation of rule produced larger, more visible and stable territorial containers for the next phase in the "state's story," which can be labeled rationalization of rule. Postmedieval Western modernization entailed a thorough-going institutional differentiation between diverse spheres of social existence and cultural practice. This allowed the rationalization of each sphere, for it allowed the efficiency and effectiveness of the workings of each to be verified with reference to distinctive criteria of success and failure. This also happened, in highly varied ways, as concerns the relation between the political and the other societal spheres. Rulers increasingly sought to place themselves in charge of *all* political concerns of society and *only* those. One expression of this was the successful (though contested) enthronement of the idea of *state reason* as the distinctive, imperious standard and polestar of their action. Much more significant was the secularization of the state—the protracted, controversial process whereby, so to speak, the state got out of the business of sending souls to heaven, in which previously it had been much involved.

Less visible, but in the long run at least as significant, was a process that found early expression in a formula adopted by absolutist rulers. They claimed for themselves all the *imperium*—that is, all faculties and facilities related to the political management of society—but left to the "particulars" (which at the time meant chiefly the landowning

estates and various city-based corporate bodies) the *dominium*, that is, the property of most economic resources. In due course, this led to an increasing institutional autonomy of the economic sphere. The progressive marketization of the production and distribution of wealth would progressively limit some of the economic policies pursued by the absolutist rulers themselves and replace them as far as possible with legal frameworks within which the private initiatives of individual market actors could display their peculiar, powerful dynamics.

This process of differentiation and mutual autonomization of parts (which can be characterized as the progressive matching of structures to distinct societal functions) was carried out also within the political sphere itself through what came to be called the separation of powers (legislative, jurisdictional, and executive) and, as noted above, through the increasingly complex structure of the state's administrative apparatus. Here, the rationalization of rule finds further expression in the emergence of a professional body of administrators. These, in the name of their competences (assumed to be proved by the possession of degrees and by success in open competitions for public appointment), displace and replace (without depriving them of their economic advantages and status privileges) the members of traditional elites who had previously exercised various political, administrative, judicial, and military functions as a matter of right. Increasingly, those functions come to be exercised instead as a matter of duty by expressly selected, appointed, and promoted individuals. The consequent rationality gain is obvious, for instance, in the ease with which their activities can be programmed, coordinated, monitored, and sanctioned from the political center.

Expansion of Rule

Having strengthened and rationalized their administrative apparatus, states can embark on a third phase of their development, which can be called the expansion of rule. This phenomenon has that apparatus as its protagonist (and, in some interpretations, its main beneficiary). But it has roots also in other institutional processes, including some pertaining to the relation between state and society itself.

The latter increasingly constitutes a complex and changing environment, set in motion by modernizing processes such as increasing literacy, the first printed media, incipient processes of urbanization and industrialization, and the formation of new social groupings and new elites.

In certain political contexts, the rationalized administration seeks to take charge of those processes on behalf of the ruler. Consider a statement on *Polizey* from 18th-century Prussia, a state with a marked tendency to authoritarian rule and a particularly advanced administrative system:

Police, in the broad understanding of the term, refers to all those measures in the internal affairs of a nation through which the wealth of the state may be more permanently established and maintained. . . . Police, in the narrow sense of the term, refers to all that which is required for the proper condition of civil life, and in particular for the maintenance of good order and discipline among subjects. (Charles Maier, 1997, p. 110)

In other contexts, however, the developments mentioned above generate new forms of social, cultural, and economic power in the hands of groups that resist and sometimes openly oppose the political practices of the *ancien régime*, such as the privileged roles it reserved for members of the aristocracy; the *arcana imperii*, which excluded the processes of policy formation from the observations and the inputs of an increasingly informed and sophisticated public; or extensive censorship of printed materials. Where such groups are successful, the result is the emergence of the liberal public sphere. Here, private individuals and spontaneously formed groupings can address each other regarding matters of common interest, formulate claims and critiques concerning their handling by the authorities, generate bodies of opinion, and eventually form expressly political alignments, which compete for electoral success within increasingly broad and active constituencies and thus for the formation of governments.

By establishing a liberal public sphere, a state can project itself as to some extent mandated and empowered by its population, committed to serving its needs. The involvement in the public sphere of broader and broader strata of the population and the fact that normally the outcomes of public

decisions are accepted also by those whose proposals are not successful increasingly legitimize and strengthen the state.

However, since a liberal public sphere operates as a hinge between civil society and the state and transmits to the latter impulses from the former, it unavoidably also reveals the divided nature of the society itself, the cleavages (political, socioeconomic, cultural, and regional) that traverse it, and the contrast between the interests activating its different components. The mechanisms of political representation increasingly map these antagonisms onto the legislative organs, all the more so as the suffrage is broadened. Policy formation becomes largely adversarial; the policy proposals and critiques of government and opposition advocate contrasting demands; and the elites guiding the parties commit themselves, if put in control of government, to preserve or modify the current distribution of economic advantage within the population.

Adversarial policy formation confirms and emphasizes a characteristic of the state we have already mentioned: the contingent, open-ended nature of political initiatives. By the same token, however, it threatens the state's abiding commitment to its own unity, its claim to represent and pursue the general interest and to override those of a sectional nature that divide civil society and, within the public sphere, articulate intrinsically controversial issues.

There are two basic responses to this threat, both of which in different ways promote the expansion of rule. The first is the promotion of citizenship. Here, only the most antagonistic and subversive claims conveyed in the public sphere are (more or less openly) suppressed, while others are allowed expression and a measure of realization, thus institutionalizing the related conflicts and making them less divisive. In this way, contrasting proposals can be moderated and made the object of compromise. Policies of this nature are generally associated with progressive parties but were sometimes undertaken by conservative governments—for instance, Bismarck initiated in Germany some of the early provisions characteristic of what would later be called the “welfare state.”

The other response confronts in a different fashion the threat to state unity generated by some aspects of political modernization. Oriented to the promotion and the fostering of nationhood, it

consists in evoking within the population an emotionally compelling sense that it shares politically significant commonalities, expressing a single political identity and a single political destiny. These commonalities supposedly transcend and relativize all existent cultural and socioeconomic divisions within the society and are focused on the state itself, investing its unity and its might with value in everybody's mind. The promotion of nationhood, in a sense, attributes to the early-modern notion of reason of state—originally conceived as the exclusive concern of a very narrow political elite, the object of deliberations and machinations covered by the *arcana imperii*—a broader and deeper resonance and makes it attain significance in the hearts and minds of the masses.

At any rate, in the prevailing political rhetoric, the notion of *national interest* becomes the lodestar of the most important forms of policy making. The state itself acquires a new justification as the political instrument of the nation itself, conceived as a social entity grounded on prepolitical commonalities, which generate in its components a shared belonging. Among other things, nationhood entails that the population has a close, abiding, intensely meaningful relation with the state's territory and construes it as the very body of the nation. When this relation cannot be attained or maintained, their frustration feeds nationalist complaints and aspirations.

There are significant differences between these two positions, revealed among other things by the style and content of the respective flows of political communication. *Citizenship*, as indicated, aims to moderate and, to an extent, reconcile differences revealed by the public sphere; *nationhood* aims to transcend them. The latter does so by focusing on the fact that, as already emphasized, each state exists next to others and together they constitute an unstable and threatening environment, whereas the promotion of citizenship addresses in the first place a state's internal conditions. The politics of nationhood are *high* politics, focused on the pursuit of collective destiny chiefly through might; the politics of citizenship are sometimes labeled *low* politics, for typically, they address humdrum issues of distribution of the domestic product by increasing or abridging the rightful claims of different sections of the population. What we may call the discourse of citizenship

tends to be conducted in a relatively factual, cognitively oriented manner, largely to establish what contribution various groups make to the economy and whether they are properly rewarded for it. The discourse of nationhood is largely intended to evoke and celebrate shared sentiments; its content is highly symbolic and is often the product at least as much of creative intellectuals and literati (musicians, poets, and novelists) as of experts and specialists. (Characteristically, the book that in late-19th- and early-20th-century Italy did the most to generate nationalist feelings among schoolchildren bore the title *Cuore* [Heart].)

For all this, the two responses do not differ radically, and there are affinities between them. For instance, the expansion of suffrage has been historically associated with the increasing rate of military participation required by the modernization of warfare; other rights of citizenship have sometimes expanded to reward subaltern groups of the population for efforts made and sacrifices borne in times of war on behalf of national interests. Policies to remedy some extremes of socioeconomic inequality within the population, particularly those associated with regional differences, have often been considered necessary for the promotion of nationhood. More generally, both citizenship and nationhood project, in somewhat different ways, the same view of the population as the constituency of the state, and both may be considered as different but overlapping aspects, on the one hand, of progressive democratization of the state and, on the other, of the expansion of rule.

Vicissitudes of the 20th-Century State

Both the previous sections have had as their focus (the first in conceptual terms, the second via a schematic narrative) the “state story” as it developed up to Weber’s times. Only some of the most significant later developments can be treated here, and that too only briefly, with an emphasis on the more problematical ones.

First, the late 19th and 20th century witnessed what could be called the state’s success as *the* universally recognized institutional arrangement for constructing and managing large-scale polities with a territorial base. By the end of the 20th century, almost every part of the world had fallen under the jurisdiction of one state or the other.

(The major exception, not discussed here, is that of extraterritorial waters.) This drastic extension of a model that originally had a regional basis in Western Europe took place over a few centuries but was accelerated by phenomena such as nationalism (which in a sense challenged and inverted the sequence proposed earlier “first state, then nation”), decolonization, the position of unique visibility and legitimacy gained after World War II by the United Nations and a few other international organizations (mostly with states as their constituents), and the breakdown of empire-like polities such as the former USSR and Yugoslavia and the establishment of numerous new states on parts of their territory. However, the state model can be interpreted and implemented in various ways, some of which hardly qualify as states in the meaning of the expression we derived from Weber. There are in any case strong states and weak states, and the current expressions *failed states* and *rogue states* point to further dimensions of variability.

Furthermore, arguably, no contemporary state entirely possesses a key characteristic of the classical state: territorial sovereignty. The territorial component has been weakened by some aspects of economic and cultural globalization; by ecological phenomena that ignore territorial boundaries; by massive, uncontainable migration flows; and by forms of warfare the protagonists of which have no distinctive territorial bases. The sovereignty of many states has been compromised by their more or less open surrender of various jurisdictional faculties and resources to international organizations of various kinds. The development of nuclear weapons has called into question a basic component of “Westphalian” territorial sovereignty—the right of states to assert interests they deem critical by waging war—because the “ascent to the extremes” characteristic of warfare has acquired the potential to visit utter and final doom on both parties and, possibly, the rest of humankind as well.

The domestic dimension of the state’s institutional mission—its relationship to civil society—also has seen massive developments in the 20th century. The most significant of these can be seen in the development of totalitarianism. This happens in some states when unbounded political power has not just modified that relationship to the state’s advantage but in a sense abolished it by denying any autonomy to the institutions and processes that

structure civil society itself: the family, organized religion, the market, public opinion, education and science, and social and cultural movements. If some complementarity with civil society is conceptually essential to the state itself, totalitarianism can be seen, paradoxically, as abolishing the state itself. In fact, it has been suggested that in totalitarian systems, ultimate political power lies not with state institutions proper but with a single party and its supreme leadership—sometimes a single individual. Only these can activate and direct the powers vested in state institutions.

Even in states committed to liberal democracy, the expansion of rule has continued powerfully into the 20th century, generally shifting the boundaries between state and society by allowing the former greater leverage over the latter. This is an “overdetermined” phenomenon, produced by a number of diverse and often not otherwise related causal influences. Schematically, these can be seen to arise either from the state or from the society side of the boundaries.

On the state side, expansion has been produced in the first place by the states pursuing those distinctively political interests related to each state’s position in the international order. This holds particularly for the great increase in state involvement in societal management occasioned by the two world wars. More sustained and equally significant in the long run is the impulse that involvement received as a result of the fact that, under liberal democratic rules, adversary politics is the main matrix of policy. However, it is not the only matrix, for a further impulse has come from the state administrative apparatus’s own interest in gaining a greater and greater capacity for authoritative oversight and regulation of social affairs, with the result that there has been an increase in its own size and complexity, the entity of the resources it extracts and manages, and the related degree of discretion.

A look at society’s side, however, suggests that the often evoked imagery of an increasingly invasive, interfering, and greedy state has serious limitations. In the first place, societies may witness structural developments (e.g., new forms of communication or financial innovations) or cultural developments (e.g., those inspiring “identity politics”) that displace existing forms of legal and administrative regulations. Often, the resultant

vacuum can only be filled by the state modifying previous regulations and adding new ones; if this does not occur, large-scale social and economic disaster may take place. Furthermore, state-ruled societies are all characterized by persistent and significant divisions, some of which can only be tempered or accommodated by the state’s distributive policies and the related forms of administrative intervention. The social demand for this is generally expressed through adversarial politics and/or by alignment with the state’s administrative apparatus to establish new units and acquire new faculties and resources.

The most visible product of this phenomenon is the great 20th-century expansion of the welfare state. But seeing this as the product chiefly of “the politics of envy” is facile and ignores multiple demands for state intervention and spending that originate instead from powerfully entrenched economic groups, seeking public support for their financial needs, their technological innovations, and their search for secure markets at home and abroad. In other terms, there is a welfare state also for the rich, not just the poor.

The continuing and intensified expansion of state rule in the 20th century engenders, as we have suggested, the tendency of the administrative apparatus to grow in size and complexity. In turn, this makes it more and more difficult for the state’s political summit to coordinate the activities of that apparatus across its multiple, diverse, and often-times competing units to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations.

The widely used notion of state overload explains these problems but should be complemented by other considerations. To some extent, the bureaucratic mode of organization of the state itself, as Weber presented it by way of the ideal-typical method, is rendered problematical by the increasingly diverse, changing, dynamic, open social and cultural environments characteristic of contemporary advanced societies. One senses that, in such a context, that model can no longer deliver on its promise of continuing rationalization of existence. Although the state is by no means the only sphere in which the bureaucratic model asserted itself in the course of modernization, that model appears to have been successfully revised, improved, or to an extent supplanted in other spheres, especially the economy. In the political

sphere, it seems to suffer from an additional degree of rigidity, of a denial of its own difficulties as it were, although here too there are attempts at transcending those limitations: Consider the late-20th-century slogan “reinventing government.” But by and large, it is not unfair to call attention to the contradiction between, on the one hand, the state’s increasing attempts at intervention and regulation of societal affairs and, on the other, the intrinsic clumsiness and costliness of its *modus operandi*.

But this critique should not be taken entirely at face value. In most of its formulations, it is an ideological aspect of a phenomenon that warrants some suspicion—the deliberate, self-interested offensive against the state of large accumulations of economic power characteristic of the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st. Essentially, the dominant units of the contemporary economy have been seeking to take over more and more aspects of general societal management; and while doing so in the pursuit of their own interests, they have appealed to what they claim to be the undeniable, intrinsic, across-the-board superiority of “the market” over “politics/the state.”

The most visible aspect of this offensive is constituted by so-called economic globalization. But this, in the words of Vincenzo Roppo (2001), an Italian legal scholar, is in essence “a gigantic process whereby state functions are transferred to markets” (p. 531). The arguments for the legitimacy and necessity of the process are the core of neoliberal ideology, and their *pars destruens* consists largely in denouncing the intrinsic, unavoidable weakness and wastefulness of rule itself as the only alternative mode of societal management.

The vast resonance imparted to such arguments by media of all kinds (including academic literature) has put the state (and politics) on the defensive, under charge, especially, of inefficiency. There are serious grounds for the charge, but the arguments present them as uniquely valid, whereas the criterion of efficiency itself should be recognized as not being unmistakably and universally valid and paramount but as constituting an arguable value preference and thus, unavoidably, as itself entailing a political choice.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Democracy, Theories of; Legitimacy; Regime (Comparative Politics); Totalitarian Regimes

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STATE, VIRTUAL

A virtual state is a country unit that, like a virtual corporation, has largely transferred its production

overseas. This occurs for two reasons. First, the industrialization process itself stresses manufacturing production but ultimately locates greater value in the output of high-level services. Thus, every industrial economy goes through this shift from an emphasis on the products of land, to manufacturing, and then to services. Second, even if manufacturing output is still critical for the corporation, it can best be produced in countries with low-wage but technically competent labor supplies. The virtual corporation, in this way, abets the development of the virtual state. This entry reviews small states, large states, and the impact of “virtuality” on peace.

Small and Large States

Initially, small-island or littoral countries such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Holland produce goods at home. Then, they discover that these goods may be produced more economically on the Chinese mainland, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, or Bangladesh. Shares of gross domestic product (GDP) in the various virtual states shift increasingly toward services, with Hong Kong ultimately having little or no home production at all. Foreign direct investment rises as a consequence, and production takes place in areas that the home country does not control. Guaranteed economic access to that region then becomes the necessary substitute for imperial governance.

The process is not confined, however, to small or island nations. Even major and large states experience “virtuality” as they shift away from home manufacturing to technical services such as research and development. Japan still retains 30% of its GDP in manufacturing, but in the United States, the figure is less than 20%. European countries are moving in the same direction, and India, a developing country, has grown particularly because of the value of its service industries. It follows, of course, that some nations must do the manufacturing that is outsourced to them from overseas. Brazil, China, Mexico, Poland, Hungary, and the East European states have benefited from this shift. In this sense, there is a distinction between “head nations”—countries that decide what shall be produced and do the design, financing, and marketing—and “body nations,” which perform the manufacturing tasks. This is not a hard-and-fast distinction; however,

many erstwhile body nations such as South Korea and China are now in the process of becoming head nations. Nor do head nations fail to do manufacturing for others. Taiwan has devolved many manufacturing functions on China, but it also acts as a “foundry” to produce goods to order for client head countries. In this way, even the United States has acted as a body nation for Japanese, German, French, and even Chinese production located within its borders. Countries that produce abroad may seek to have their production sold in those markets, and they thereby escape the tariff walls between them and their market. As Robert Mundell has shown, the movement of factors of production abroad can compensate for limits on export trade. In the 1930s, however, this process did not occur, and nations seeking raw materials and markets believed that they had to conquer territory to retain access to both. The military conflict that followed was in part the result of economic restrictions.

In theory, the virtual state, a model to which many states are tending, carries with it a new system of international politics. In the past, when military conflict and the irrepressible desire for territory determined relations among states, the main flow between countries consisted of armies. If the virtual model holds, future flows will be largely economic as capital, technology, labor power, and information move rapidly among states. In the long term, national access to mobile factors of production (capital, technology, and labor) can replace the need to control or own additional land.

Transferring the bulk of their home production overseas and shifting most of their economy to high-level services, virtual states reshape both productive and international relationships. They inaugurate a world based on mastery of flows of production and purchasing power rather than on stocks of goods. They emancipate labor from routine mechanical tasks and offer new employment in technical or creative services. They usher in a world based on education and human capital rather than on machines and physical capital. They offer nations the opportunity to forge international links of production that are difficult if not impossible to break. (Some believe that the relation between the United States and China in both political and economic terms is reaching an important level of

“unbreakability.”) Like the headquarters of a virtual corporation, the virtual state determines overall strategy and invests in its people rather than amassing expensive production capability. It contracts out other functions to states that specialize in or need them. Imperial Great Britain may have been the model for 19th-century practice, but Singapore may be the model for the 21st century. The state no longer commands resources as it did in mercantilist yesteryear; rather, it negotiates with foreign and domestic capital and labor to lure them into its economic sphere and to stimulate its growth.

The virtual state, however, is not equal to the small state. Even large states undergo the economic transition from land, to manufacturing, to services. Like larger states, small states can shift their production overseas only if they are protected in doing so. They therefore depend on guarantees of freedom of the seas and open trade routes to carry on their business. Some larger power or powers have to provide these protections, and it is not surprising, therefore, that, to continue to exist, small virtual states need to have either alliances with, or *de facto* support from, much larger and stronger powers. The small virtual state depends on a single Great Power protector or on a balance of power internationally. In addition, if tariffs rise or even if they fail to fall, virtual states are in jeopardy. This is because capital moves much more quickly than goods. An indebted country cannot quickly send new cascades of exports abroad and hope to finance a looming deficit. The first moves slowly; the second instantaneously.

In recent years, small virtual states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea have needed “spare tires.” They have required access to “spare finance” to tide them over periods of economic crisis. In 1997–1998, Thailand could not meet payments on its international obligations, and speculators withdrew their money. The Thai currency—the baht—had been overvalued for some time. It began to lose parity with the dollar and the yen. Since Thai borrowings were in foreign currency, Bangkok needed more local currency to compensate for it. When this was printed, it inevitably caused inflation. When Thailand devalued, it did not have enough foreign currency to cover its obligations. It needed money from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or other lenders to cover its losses, but these sources would only help if

Thailand put on high interest rates and threw its economy into recession, cutting imports. After Thailand devalued, speculators attacked the currencies of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea, all of which were (in relation) overvalued. All three were thrown into recession to meet the demands of international investors. Small virtual states, thus, needed access to much larger stores of capital. They were too small financially to stand on their own feet. At the same time, Japan and China, much bigger economies—with greater hoards of foreign capital—breezed through the 1998 crisis without a tremor. Economic size began to tell the tale.

As larger states become virtual, they establish production chains that save on labor costs and that link them to distant markets. Few links in this chain remain within the home country. The Hong Kong firm Li & Fung, experts in fashion textiles, illustrates this point:

Li and Fung work with 10,000 suppliers in 48 countries to source materials and makers for clients. So a fabric from India that gets dyed in China will go to Thailand to be embroidered (with sequins made in Korea and rhinestones from Brazil) and then return to China to be cut into garments. The firm adheres to a “30/30” principle; it guarantees that it will purchase at least 30% of the business from each supplier, but it will not exceed 70%. . . . And it requires that suppliers have to go outside the network to survive—and thus be in a position to bring in new ideas from the outside. The results are impressive. In terms of asset productivity, Li & Fung earns 30–50% return on equity. Regarding personnel productivity, it earned \$1 million per employee per year. And it scales elegantly. The firm took in \$11 billion in 2004. (Kenneth Cukier, 2007, pp. 22–23)

The Impact of “Virtuality” on Peace

The United States, Germany, France, and Japan became almost equally dependent on overseas production chains, units of which, however, did not work for one corporation or even one country. They were available for many headquarters firms in different parts of the world.

Production chains make warfare among participating units difficult, expensive, and perhaps ultimately self-defeating. No such chains existed in

1914 or 1939. Aggressive states will have to choose, geographically, between trying to capture the headquarters of the virtual state or its production links with other countries and firms. In an era of capital and labor mobility, the first suggests a loss of capital and headquarter talent overseas. Whether the in-house experts will work with foreign occupiers is doubtful, and international sanctions will in any event likely occur. If an aggressor seeks to capture one or more links in an overseas production chain, it may also be disappointed. Will car chassis separated from engines, transmissions, wheels, tires, and shocks serve much of an instrumental or even financial purpose? Units can, of course, be sold off but at diminishing prices, because the links with headquarters and research and development have been severed. To guard against nationalization, recent research shows that multinational corporations investing in developing countries have tried to avoid placing full assembly or component manufacture in one place. The effect is equally marked in deterring foreign seizure. The effect is redoubled for corporations in states that enjoy economies of scale in production.

Software, finance, autos, long-haul civil aircraft, insurance, microprocessors, and pharmaceuticals are monopolized in a small number of states. Aggression that strives to engross such industries will fail unless Europe, Japan, and the United States are captured simultaneously, a very difficult task. And even then, in all three cases, the economies are gained by major production chains overseas that would not be seized coincidentally with headquarters nations.

The greatest long-term advantage of virtual states is not just economic; it is also pacific. By linking with countries and economic capabilities overseas, such states achieve their competence and power through a form of hard interdependence with others. These essential ties did not exist in 1914 or 1939, but they are becoming characteristic in recent years. Not only that: As “virtuality” comes to attach itself to large states and Great Powers—such as China, the United States, Japan, and Europe—it provides an insurance against major war that did not exist before in human history.

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See also Capitalism; Interdependence; International Political Economy; International Trade; War and Peace

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STATE COLLAPSE

State collapse represents a rare and an extreme level on a continuum of state decay, when a weak state becomes unable and/or unwilling to fulfill its task as the provider of public goods. Although there is no consensus on a precise definition of the term, still there are several traits that collapsed states share. The first is the disappearance of state authority as grantor of security and welfare of its citizens. The second is the appearance of subnational leaders, mainly in the form of strong warlords, who control several hundred armed militias that rob, rape, and pillage to finance their war efforts. Third, the national identity is replaced with subnational identities, including those of ethnic group, religion, and race. Finally, the territorial integrity of the collapsed state becomes compromised when all other state and nonstate actors, especially neighboring states, intervene. This entry analyzes the causes and consequences of state collapse and the possible remedies for avoiding it.

The phenomenon of state collapse is a recent addition to the political science parlance that came with the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. In this

period, the number of internal wars around the globe began to rise, with deadly consequences in places like Rwanda and Bosnia. Many of these conflicts have been described as “ethnic conflicts”; nonetheless, ethnicity is only one aspect of political violence. While violent conflicts must be considered as a failure of the state to perform some of its fundamental tasks, one must also pay attention to the formation of the state, especially in most of the developing world such as Africa. The foundation of these states is colonialism, which made use of clan-based divide-and-conquer tactics in addition to their military superiority. Furthermore, state formation in places such as Africa did not begin on a contractual basis; rather, predatory powers conquered the land, created state institutions, and imposed taxes and forced labor intended only to facilitate the extraction of wealth, mainly in the form of raw materials, in these territories.

The postcolonial state in areas like Africa began with divided societies and economies that rely heavily on rent from the sale of commodities. Since the 1960s, however, many economies in the region have witnessed a decline in their livelihood as a result of unstable political regimes and diminished commodity prices that shattered the ability to adequately provide public services. Many of these states went through an initial phase of ethnic group federation as a substitute for the lack of essential services to all their citizens. Often, a just system of redistribution within and among groups is the key to creating solidarity among citizens, and its breakdown often triggers deadly political violence. Thus, in most of the conflict-ridden countries, nepotism and favoritism were practiced rather than a fair and just redistribution system.

With the end of the Cold War, two reforms, heavily promoted by the West, further undermined the already weak states in many parts of the developing world. The first one involved structural adjustment programs grounded in neoclassical economics, which promoted privatization, discouraged subsidies, and devalued currencies and which were complemented by the reduction of the amount of aid; together, these measures led to heightened inflation and reduced many government services. The second is the imposition of political reform based on the idealization of representative democracy, which had been promoted as the only ingredient for stability and development.

However, as has been proven, a sudden democratic transition in the midst of economic devastation facilitated the widespread internal wars and cases of subsequent state failure and collapse of the 1990s. During this period, state after state in Eastern Europe and Africa experienced deadly internal wars that claimed (and still claim in places like Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo) many lives, created thousands of refugees and internally displaced populations, and eventually redrew the map of Eastern Europe. Moreover, with the absence of superpower involvement, states began to intervene in neighboring conflicts, which led to the widespread availability of arms and mercenaries, especially child soldiers.

Nevertheless, since the beginning of the 21st century, the overwhelming majority of collapsed states are in the continent of Africa. According to Fund for Peace, 7 out of the top 10 failed states are in the African continent. The remainder of this entry examines the factors behind the collapse and what actions, if any, can be taken to reverse their status.

The Process of Collapse

A strong state can be described as a state in control of its territory and able to deliver a full range of political goods to its citizens. Conversely, weak states are incapable of controlling their territories and unable to adequately provide public goods. Such states become weak either as a result of inherent factors, including geographical, physical, and fundamental economic constraints, or because of internal antagonisms, greed, or despotism. Weak states typically harbor ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other tensions, which may be transformed into all-out conflict between contending groups. Their ability to provide adequate political goods becomes diminished. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and similar indicators fall, corruption becomes widespread, and the rule of law is hardly practiced.

In some instances, weak states turn into failed states as they are no longer able to provide essential political goods. They progressively forfeit their role as the preferred national suppliers of political goods, which in turn impels warlords and other nonstate actors to fill the vacuum. Its institutions are flawed where both legislature and

judiciary, if they exist at all, ratify the decisions of a strong executive rather than being independent. The bureaucracy loses its sense of professional responsibility. Failed states exhibit deteriorating infrastructures where telephones fail, water supplies dry up, and power falters. Educational and medical facilities crumble, resulting in increased illiteracy, infant mortality, poverty, food shortages, and hunger. Failed states are insecure and cannot project power much beyond the capital city. However, failed states offer unparalleled economic opportunity for a privileged few, mainly those within the ruling class. These faltering state failures become obvious even before, or as, rebel groups and other contenders arm themselves, threaten the residents of central cities, and overwhelm demoralized government contingents, as in the cases of Liberia, Nepal, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Côte d'Ivoire.

Nevertheless, many states recover as they open the political space to other concerned parties and move toward inclusive and stable polity. Unfortunately, some states progress toward more decay and eventually collapse. As argued, collapsed states are rare and extreme versions of a failed state. They exhibit a vacuum of authority and mere geographical existence, where the forces of entropy have overwhelmed the state and its ability to provide some semblance of order. Political goods are obtained through private means. Security becomes the rule of the strong, where warlords take over. However, parts of the collapsed state may exist and function, albeit unrecognized and in a disorderly manner.

The collapse of states is a combination of two processes of decay that simultaneously work from inside and outside the country, weakening and eventually destroying the state. The primary force of the inside-out process is the prevalence of bad leadership. These leaders over the years weaken their states through kleptocracy, neopatrimonialism, corruption, and politicization of elements such as ethnicity, religion, and race. Often, state property becomes the private property of the ruler, thus making the control of the state zero sum. The collapsed state is not only unable to develop a stable political system but lacks the administrative capacity to govern the territory effectively and ignite sustainable economic development. The

weakness of the state is most apparent in the periphery, while all services and facilities are concentrated in urban areas. Thus, while the core of the state weakens through mismanagement, pressure from the periphery becomes emboldened. Finally, competition for the control of state functions ensues between different forces in the country, and in the end all of them lose.

Nonetheless, the decay that leads to state collapse also simultaneously occurs from outside in. As noted, it is in Africa that, with devastating impact, the largest concentration of collapsed states is found. The external influence began with slavery, which caused millions of casualties, dehumanization, and massive depopulation, followed by colonialism, which resulted in artificial borders and economies that currently depend on rent from commodity and foreign aid. Finally, the conflicts in many collapsed states are fueled by the latest weaponry, and the warlords receive support and legitimization, which further delays any hope for ending the political violence.

Possible Remedies for State Collapse

The revival of a collapsed state is like putting together a broken pot. Unfortunately, systematic analyses and comparative studies in the field of peaceful conflict settlement are largely underresearched. Nevertheless, the reconstruction of a collapsed state initially requires reliable conflict mediation and facilitation. The term *mediation* entails activities requiring a dynamic influence by reputable individuals and groups as go-betweens. *Facilitation* involves activities such as inviting the warring parties to talk to each other and providing conditions for talks. The focus of facilitation and mediation should be on long-term prevention of violent conflict rather than on producing short-term, "bandage" solutions. Therefore, it is imperative that efforts be made to enhance the capacity of the middle and local levels rather than concentrate on the warlords. Additionally, the warlords must at the same time be disarmed, isolated, and eventually punished for their crimes against humanity.

In addition to the facilitation and mediation efforts, there is also a need for genuine efforts to rebuild state institutions. While there has been success in the rebuilding of many collapsed states,

mainly in Eastern Europe, others remain in a collapsed condition, especially in Africa. Many states in Africa continue to face great challenges in the reconstruction of their state institutions and establishment of rule of law in their territories. Collapsed states, as argued, require strong support to rebuild legitimate institutions, which in turn will bring law and order, create trust among the combating groups, and revive the destroyed economic infrastructure.

In the past few years, international efforts have been mainly focused on achieving cessation of hostilities and signing of peace agreements while neglecting other, more pressing factors, especially creating favorable political and economic conditions. As a result, the conflicts, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, tend to be longer and deadlier, mainly due to lack of international finance and capital to curb humanitarian disasters and, more important, help in reconstruction after peace settlements. The donor countries continue their abandonment, and the critical help needed to reconstruct the political and economic institutions is usually not provided. Finally, collapsed states can only backtrack along the path from collapsed to failed to weak status, which is only possible if sufficient security is restored to rebuild the institutions and strengthen the legitimacy of the revived state. This backtracking can only be realized through a strong and genuine intervention force, as in the case of Lebanon with Syrian security and Sierra Leone with British intervention. Finally, the citizens of collapsed states must be educated and empowered to demand their rights and become active in rebuilding their broken state.

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See also State; State Failure; State Formation

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STATE FAILURE

State failure is composed of two elements: the failure and the state. This entry first examines the diverse notions of failure, including their definition, their components and processes, some examples, and rehabilitation. It then addresses divergent conceptions of the state, with particular attention to ideas about the non-Western state that impinge on an understanding of failure and associated processes. State failure is the basis of a large array of concepts, starting with a rare and narrow concern, already containing certain ambiguities of definition, measurement, and remedy, and expanding into nearly the entire field of comparative politics, democracy, development, and interstate policy.

Failure

Failure refers to several overlapping concepts, unfortunately often confused with each other: collapse, failed, failing, fragile, and weak.

The most narrowly defined category is that of collapsed states. Collapse, the most extreme form of damage, occurs when states can no longer perform their basic functions, defined as enforcing internal and external security, extracting and allocating resources, and providing social services, for some time or where the structure, authority (legitimacy), law, and political order have fallen apart. There are few unambiguous modern cases of the disappearance of a state (Ghana, 1979–1981; Chad, 1979–1985; Lebanon, 1983–1987; Haiti, 1986–1991; Sierra Leone in the mid-1990s; Afghanistan, 1992–2002; and Liberia, 1989–1997—although none have done so as lengthily

and conclusively as Somalia since 1990). State collapse can occur because of but also without civil war, although the collapse of law, order, and legitimate authority does create a security vacuum that opens society to lawlessness. I. William Zartman (1995) has identified some signs of the process of collapse: conflict at the political center, decision failure, a narrow central clique, defensive policies, and privatization of state agents. But there is no notion of any sequence, of necessary and sufficient components, or of the nature of the process. These conceptual weaknesses are present in all other types of state failure analysis.

Equally uncertain is the process of rehabilitation after collapse. Unsolved issues include the need to rehabilitate *the* state versus *a* state, the priorities of the process, the relation between security and institutionalization, the role of welfare, the role of the international community, the relation between state building and nation building (see below, under “States”), and the need for a Man on a White Horse or a strongman. Again, these conundrums will appear with regard to other types of state failure, although, there, they are more specifically addressed.

Failed states constitute the next larger circle. The immediate problem with the concept is that it is not clear whether it refers to states that have failed as states—hence being closer to the collapsed category—or to states that have failed in one or more of their functions while still holding onto their state status. In the latter case, how many functions must have failed before the state itself can be termed a failure? Furthermore, some cases of state failure often cited, such as Yugoslavia or old Pakistan, refer to constituted units (states) discarding an overarching federal framework (state) to take over geographic pieces of the formerly larger unit and are scarcely cases where some institutional framework was ever completely absent. Another problem with the concept of failure is its geographic reference: Frequently, states continue to be effective, often strongly effective, in a given part of their territory, leaving the rest beyond their control to a more or less effective opposition; thus, they fail in their duties as rulers of their assigned territory but succeed in ruling a part of it while leaving the rest as a proto- or counterstate. Examples include Colombia and the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), Sudan and the SPLA/M (Sudan Peoples

Liberation Army/Movement), and Sri Lanka and the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam).

These problems do not invalidate the concept but rather indicate its complexity and the difficulty of applying it to a multifaceted reality. In most works on failed states, it is the components of failure that drive the analysis, so that analysis can pinpoint at what the state has failed, if not at “everything.” These functions can be classified in many ways, but according to Stuart Eizenstat and colleagues (2004), an effective categorization is in terms of security, capacity, and legitimacy. The striking fact is that there is little overlap between the three types of failure: conflicted states, neglecting states, and illegitimate states. One measure gave two overlaps on all three (Congo-Brazzaville and Afghanistan), with 25% appearing on two columns; another gave none, with 10% on the listings appearing in two columns. Listings vary substantially over a span of several years. Immunization rates were used as indicators (proxies) for capacity, battle deaths for security, and a composite measure of “political freedom” for legitimacy, but other measures can give very different results.

When analysis turns to individual cases, not only the component concepts and indicators but also the paths to failure can be seen to vary enormously, indicating that the causes of failure only coincide at a high level of abstraction that is often circular. Rapacious concentration of power, and hence resources, in a small, often ethnically and/or geographically concentrated clique, to the neglect of the general population—the “privatization” of states—is a frequent characteristic. Thus, for example, behind the capacity gap lies a political rather than a resource failure; states do not fail because they are poor but are poor because they fail, although poverty admittedly makes good governance more difficult.

Failing states is the next largest circle, both broader and softer. It refers to states that show signs of doing badly in some crucial sector or function but that have not necessarily reached an end point of failure in that function. Again, definition and measurement problems arise: It is not clear how failing a state has to be on how many sectors to qualify for the general category, particularly since most states can be said to show weakness in many policy areas. Most treatments have handled this problem by avoiding it with a sliding scale and

a complex set of indicators, taking the analysis closer to bumpy reality and further from implications of clear-cut categorization. An understanding of the paths of sectoral failures and then their relation to each other both causally and in creating a whole picture of “failing-ness” is still underdeveloped, although some work, such as that of Robert Rotberg (2003), has been undertaken to disregard the causational problem and address sectorally the rehabilitation problem.

The name of the condition measured also varied. One index, that of the Fund for Peace, measures instability using 12 indicators: demographic pressures, refugees and internally displaced persons, group grievance, population flight, income inequality, economy, legitimacy, welfare/services, human rights, security apparatus, elite factions, and foreign interventions. Another index, by Susan Rice and Stewart Patrick (2008), seeks indications of weakness with a more complex set (only partially overlapping with the previous set) of measures, divided into four baskets (as opposed to the previously mentioned three gaps), with five subindicators in each: (1) economic (per capita gross national income, GDP growth, income inequality, inflation, and regulatory quality), (2) political (state effectiveness, rule of law, accountability, corruption, and freedom), (3) security related (conflict, human rights, conflict territory, coups, stability, and absence of violence), and (4) welfare related (child mortality, water and sanitation, undernourishment, primary schooling, and life expectancy). Only 15 of the top 20 states were on both lists, in very different rankings. The instability study puts a causal emphasis on poverty, particularly in the more failing states, although Paul Collier et al. (2003) found structural weakness to correlate only distantly and indirectly to cause political instability. The study also indicates that remedies vary according to levels of instability: Failed states need greater attention to security first, whereas states of middle-range failures need to give targeted attention to specific sectoral weaknesses.

It is not clear how much significance lies in the difference between instability and weakness. However, another study (for the Central Intelligence Agency), which started out as a task force on state failure and used rigorous statistical analysis, was led by its data and correlations to focus instead on political instability. The report found failure and

collapse to be new labels for a kind of severe political crisis and reduced their cause to three basic variables: child mortality, trade restrictions, and lack of democracy—variables so distant from the effect as to suggest a complex causal chain.

Other concepts such as *fragile*, *vulnerable*, and *weak*, even broader than failing, constitute the focus of the broadest research, appearing in the end as a variable characteristic of all 140 to 160 developing or non-Western countries. Studies focus on the economic functions of the state, with more than 100 indicators; on weakness in authority, capacity, and legitimacy, using 74 indicators; on fragility, measured through effectiveness and legitimacy in the economic, social, political, and security spheres, using 33 indicators, as does the USAID Fragile States Strategy of 2006; or, as in Paul Collier and colleagues' 2003 study, simply on conflict prone-ness, among others. Different indicators of different dimensions lead to strongly different diagnoses. However, even though the terrain is uneven and slippery, they do permit a debate over causes, relations among causes, and remedies, which is useful both for understanding state failure and for policy making. On the other hand, the analysis has moved away from a single identifiable concept that can be explained and also away from consensual understandings of even a broad condition that can form the basis of comparative analysis.

As a result, rehabilitation—measures to overcome or, in a preventive manner, to avoid the subject condition, that is, state failure—has also been the subject, or at least the end purpose, of some attention. Most work on state failure, in all its forms, ends with prescriptions for rehabilitation and specifically for third-state—usually Western—interventions. The compass, which once headed toward institutionalization, now seems to be turning to antipoverty measures, reviving an old leitmotif of the World Bank and also a constant interest of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United States Agency for International Development, and the UK Department for International Development. A third compass point, which continually reappears, is security, often seen as the precondition of poverty reduction and institutionalization. In the end, these three foci correspond, of course, to the three disciplinary baskets of economy, polity, and security, totally interdependent but fighting for precedence. When

states fail, everything must be corrected at once, and waiting for one sector to be completed before starting another means that failure will not be overcome. That said, aid missions and state builders will agree that security comes first, even though it may well end last.

States

Beyond this analytical and remedial disagreement lies uncertainty about the nature of the state. The state, as we know, is “a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory,” in Max Weber’s restrictive terms. A similar definition with force only subsumed terms a state “the authoritative political institution that is sovereign over a recognized territory” (Zartman, 1995, p. 5). Weber’s name is also associated with the idea of a Weberian state, distinguished by the bureaucratic, institutional nature of its routinized, performance-based legitimacy. By this definitional complex, therefore, the state’s functions include internal and external security, internal and international legitimacy, territorial control, institutionalization, and by some extension services, possibly welfare-oriented programs. To some, a state is a state, so defined; the definition is highly abstract and can be used to judge performance or other characteristics such as failure or collapse. It is not a phenomenon of all times and places; although the state as defined took some centuries to emerge in Europe and then was transferred to the Western Hemisphere, it has been slower to take root across other parts of the world, despite earlier isolated instances. Probably the most widespread alternative to the state, as defined, is the nonterritorial polity, which has exercised many of the functions of the territorial state while also extending sovereignty over a people, wherever they may be at the moment. Notions such as the Muslim *umma* ([mother] community), expressed in the diverse ideas of Muammar al-Qadhafi of Libya and Osama bin Laden of Al Qaeda, are contemporary examples, constrained in practice by the existence of territorial states.

To some, however, it is inappropriate to talk of a state in some parts of the contemporary world, notably in Africa. There, states are not in a condition of shortfall with regard to a claimed or aspired condition (statehood) but are simply not there

because they are not native to the land and its people. Hence, attempts to analyze the causes of a shortfall would be pointless, although it is also sometimes suggested that new entities should be established (by someone) that would be more natural to the terrain. To these arguments, the notion of state failure or failings provides a useful alternative, indicating how states are doing on various measures and functions on the ladder to effective statehood.

This evaluation is based on the working assumption that a broad category such as *state* is applicable, even if not fully attained, around the contemporary world. While historical, geographical, and cultural peculiarities affect the ability of the polity to climb the ladder, it is considered a ladder that applies to functions that are universally required and desired.

One element not explicitly covered in either of the definitions of *state* (although perhaps implicit in Weber’s reference to a community) is the notion of a *nation*, the identity community contained within the state. Since the end of the 19th century, customarily associated with the French Revolution, state and nation have been assumed to be coincident, although not synonymous, as the nation-state. The term *state* has two meanings, both relevant to state failure. One is that sovereignty lies in the identifying population, rather than in an elevated figure such as a monarch (or a deity). The other is that the population of the state coheres in a shared identity. However, again there are ambiguities in reality. The first meaning is assumed to be symbolically true, but in practice, the ruler can often take decisions on his or her own without any reference to popular will. The matter is usually covered in accountability measures in many failing-state indices. This element edges state failure or nonfailure toward considerations of democracy, a concept that is not directly associated with most aspects of failure but that slips in measures of legitimacy. Confounding the two notions opens up a great debate. The second meaning also carries a significant assumption: Many developing states and even some developed states can be far from failure, even though there is no effective sense of national identity coherence. Even before the notions of failure became current, new states looked to the needs of national coherence and sought to create a nation to fit the state, or state-nation. The imposition of a new identity drew critical reactions from traditional

or ethnic nations and in turn contributed to state failure. "Nation-ness" is not covered in most evaluations of failure, although it is a critical underlying variable in matters such as the measurement of internal conflict.

Whatever the evaluation of a particular state's position on the ladder, *state building* becomes the prescription for improvement. The term is not to be confused with *nation building*, which is often mistakenly used as a synonym; nation building refers to the policy of building the identity unit and can only be conducted indigenously within the state, whereas state building can be contributed to by external assistance, at least to a limited extent. In a specific sense, state building refers to *institutionalization* and *good governance*, terms particularly important to international financial institutions and their policies toward low-income countries under stress or fragile and conflict-affected countries. In policy terms, whether state building is an internal or external exercise is an important aspect of the debate, basic to decisions on specific policies and measures. The answer that it is both does not solve the kernel of the debate over proportions. Too much international attention removes the element of ownership and responsibility from the failing state, an element that is at the core of the failure question: A state must overcome failure itself; by definition, it cannot be "unfailed" from the outside. However, states in failure, like those in conflict, need help; their very condition removes elements that are needed for its correction. State building is a topic of particular focus specific to the post-World War II era but especially to the post-Cold War world. During both periods, the dominant focus was on the limitation of overpowering, totalitarian states, whereas the contemporary focus is on building state capacity; inclusion of the notion of good governance, which contains a notion of restricted effectiveness, is a corrective to the danger of overwhelming state power.

Finally, one of the most important questions with regard to state failure, which is still unresolved, is the relation between state failure and *civil society failure*. While it has been suggested that state collapse is made possible by the concomitant collapse of civil society, which is unable to promote candidates to fill the gap, other work indicates that civil society expands to fill the functional gap. Like other questions with regard to the

topic, the relationship is fraught with conceptual ambiguities. A useful definition, but by no means the only one, considers civil society to cover civil organizations independent of government. The functions civil society can fill the range between none and all, either extreme constituting a contribution to state failure. The more functions civil society can perform, the less the state has to perform, beyond some (undetermined) degree of regulation of civil society performance. Yet some functions, such as security (policing and military defense) and national adjudication, are uniquely state functions and relegation to civil society (as to external contractors) weakens the state rather than strengthening its functional performance.

The Challenge of State Failure

In sum, state failure is a serious problem in contemporary politics. The topic of state failure faces a double challenge. On the one hand, as a problem, it calls for correction of conditions of state weakness to varying degrees. On the other, the topic itself and its component concepts are all ambiguous and open-ended. The first runs up against the limited capabilities of external support to help deal with the situation and to do so without the further weakening of effective foreign involvement. The second calls for more detailed conceptual measurements and indicators, involving further concepts related to more specific aspects and unrealistic precision. Yet both challenges are inherent in the paths to greater effectiveness and understanding.

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See also State; State Collapse; State Formation

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STATE FORMATION

State formation refers to the processes leading to the centralization of political power within a well-defined territory. These processes are not historically and geographically uniform, and there is no single explanation for them. There have been a variety of paths to statehood. This entry deals with the most general question of state formation concerning the historical origin of states as such as well as with more specific questions connected to the development of the modern states system and to state formation in the contemporary world. State formation in early agrarian societies, in the early capitalist West, and in the era of decolonization and imperial dissolution display different processes and institutional features and will also be analyzed.

There are at least three major theoretical perspectives on the state and state formation. The *pluralist* view describes the state as a set of various interest groups, an arena for contending actors. The state developed, accordingly, through bargaining processes between interest groups. The

Marxist view is instrumentalist, with the state as a committee for managing the common interests of the ruling class. Here, the state was established as an instrument of domination. The *statist* perspective implies that states have emerged as distinctive structures with institutions and modes of operation that cannot be derived from interest group maneuvering or class structure. The latter perspective is particularly associated with Max Weber and even with neo-Marxist critiques of orthodox Marxism. In empirical accounts of state formation, the major theories are rarely employed one-sidedly or spelled out explicitly, but they are often combined into a more compound analysis.

The Origin of the State

State formation requires cooperation and rule within a unit far greater than a kinship group or a community based on face-to-face recognition. A possible explanation for cooperation on a grand scale is population pressure and scarce resources, particularly the shortage of soil. Increasing population density and scarce resources stimulate more intensive food production. Thereby, social complexity increases because agriculture requires division of labor and specialization. Early state formation emerged after the establishment of agricultural societies.

The basic idea here is that societies organized as states will be more efficient externally and internally. Externally, they are stronger, better organized, and more competitive in relation to less well-organized societies. Internally, big units with intensive production may serve the population with services and conditions of life that are unavailable for small groups or individually. Conflict and common defense abroad may also support social integration at home. The inhabitants of a state are in the same boat, sharing threats from the outside.

State formation has not been a linear historical process. States and empires have disintegrated, collapsed, and disappeared, while others have thrived and enlarged over long periods. If the authorities are unable to supply the population with a minimum of services and security, legitimacy and support will erode. This has happened in failed states as well as in many former empires and colonial territories.

States and empires may also disintegrate due to a principal-agent problem. The central authority delegates power and responsibility to the local and regional representatives. The representatives in the periphery may then exploit the derived resources in a quest for autonomy. Imperial erosion and state failure have various elements of these mechanisms.

Population pressure as a state-building factor is accompanied by division of labor and social inequality. Agriculture and other modes of intensified food production allow for the emergence of a rent-collecting upper class. In a state, there is a vertical division of labor into social classes with differentiated access to land and other productive assets. In contrast to the roaming gangs and bandits in an anarchy, the stationary rulers in a territorial state will benefit from more limited surplus extraction whereby the productive capacity of the people—and thereby the tax basis—is upheld in the long run. Here is a source of support from below, whether or not government is representative.

From another perspective, the increased productivity in agricultural societies could hardly be handled by relatively egalitarian tribal communities. With increasing productivity, the available surplus was distributed on the basis of power. State organization was an organization of command whereby inequality and legitimacy could be combined in new ways.

More specific accounts of the processes of state formation have introduced religious, technical, and geographical factors. Religion is a mode for the legitimation of social stratification and command, conducive to state formation at the early stages. The evolution of script made possible the centralization of information and the spread of precise, long-distance messages. Variation in geography, soil, and climate, certainly, had crucial consequences for the ways and means of state formation. Island states and states surrounded by high mountains were relatively easy to defend, compared with states with borders in open, continental areas.

One specific hypothesis of early state formation is the *irrigation hypothesis*, which states that the organization of states on a large scale started with big hydraulic constructions in the drylands of the Middle East, Asia, and Meso-America. The theory of a *hydraulic society*, made famous by Karl Wittfogel, has been opposed by references to numerous

early state formations prior to large-scale irrigation, to societies where irrigation was organized locally, and to state formation in areas of the world where complex hydraulic systems were out of the question.

Numerous states have been born by conquest. When agricultural communities are conquered by nomadic tribes or nomadic tribes establish control over large territories, state organization is the stabilization of command. The productive capacity of an agrarian society is fused with the political interests of nomadic conquerors. Generally, however, the expansive Eurasian nomadism is younger than the first high cultures with organized state power. States have been established and enlarged by conquest, but this is not the prime mover in historical state formation. Morton Fried differentiated between the endogenous factors that were prevalent in *primary* state formation in the Middle East, Meso-America, and the Far East and the exogenous factors—such as conquest and pressure from the outside—in *secondary* state formation.

Externally, war supported the internal mechanisms in early state formation. In the rivalry between states, the more efficient and powerful polities survived either by their own mobilization of force or by protection in powerful alliances.

The Modern States System

The modern states system arose in Europe with the development of international law. The turning point in legal terms was the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, after 30 years of unruly war between principalities and religious authorities. Roman Catholic emperors fought against Protestant kings and Roman Catholic kings against Protestant princes. The treaty stated that the individual principalities could choose their religion freely, independent from imperial or papal control—*cuius regio eius religio*. This was a long step toward the idea of autonomous territorial states, sovereign and formally equal. The idea implied that the system of governance, public religion, and economic principles could be shaped without external interference. This idea of state sovereignty was elaborated in the theory of international law by 18th-century writers like Christian Wolf and Emmerich de Vattel; it has been confirmed in a series of international treaties right up to the still valid United Nations (UN)

convention of 1945. The long-term effect of the Treaty of Westphalia was the contemporary delineation of the globe into constitutionally sovereign states.

The legal formalities of European state formation was substantiated by technological and socioeconomic transformations. The building and centralization of the states was served by technological innovation. The development of firearms and cannons in the early-modern epoch made local fortifications inefficient. Political centralization was a prerequisite for the economic extraction necessary for the finance of standing armies.

The modern state has been characterized by Max Weber as a monopoly of legitimate force and by Joseph Schumpeter as a monopoly of taxation. Modern state building may thereby be described as increasing territorial control by force—army, police, and bureaucracy—on the one hand and effective taxation on the other. New resources are then controlled by the central authority. A specialized state bureaucracy is a prerequisite for this kind of control, and it is in turn reinforced by it.

Weber's idea of the modern state combines the monopoly of physical violence with legitimacy and territoriality. Without these characteristics, anarchy would ensue. The fundamental ambition of the state authority is to legitimate the structure of domination. In this context, Weber developed the categories of *traditional*, *charismatic*, and *legal* types of legitimation. In specific instances of state formation and state power, there is a variable mix of these pure types.

Warfare was revolutionized with the development of standing armies, field weaponry, and heavy artillery. The central state power was strengthened, while the earlier feudal warrior aristocracy lost their military advantages. Armored cavalry became obsolete, local fortifications were no longer defensible, and hired troops and enlisted armies were beyond the financial means of the local nobility. The war technology undermined the position of the feudal aristocracy to the advantage of monarchic centralization.

Financial resources are the nerves of government, as Jean Bodin noted toward the end of the 16th century. Taxation upheld the preindustrial states, but public financial means were chronically in short supply with increasing expenditures. Low productivity, inefficient markets, and arbitrary tax

burdens resulted in tax riots and political setbacks as the fiscal pressure increased. On the other hand, the crises of legitimacy brought about by increasing taxation led to administrative buildup and reform to cope with tax resistance.

The monarchy acquired a tax monopoly and a control with central banking. Schumpeter argued that the concentration of state power was linked to the development of early capitalism. The market economy led to increased economic growth, while the central authorities acquired an increasing part of the economic surplus through taxation and state enterprise. Capitalist growth could not proceed without a rational bureaucracy for public administration and a rational system of law for stable transaction rules and predictable frameworks for entrepreneurship. In Max Weber's view, these bureaucratic and legal conditions were unique to the European trajectory, in contrast to the charismatic, patrimonial, or traditional modes of rule elsewhere.

With political centralization and economic expansion, the capacity for warfare increased accordingly. The perspectives of Weber and Schumpeter are echoed in Charles Tilly's famous dictum that *war made the state, and the state made war*.

An absence of government would have been disastrous for economic growth. Anarchic conditions would breed disorder, localism, and infrastructural defects. The development of communications, certified knowledge and expertise, legal frameworks for market transactions, justice, and order would all suffer. State formation was favorable for the development of trade and industry.

On the other hand, an overdeveloped state—a self-serving power structure alienated from civil society—would also be hostile to economic development. The state bureaucracy as a new ruling class could easily degenerate to kleptocratic and corrupt practices. Predatory governments are systematically exploiting society rather than being responsive to it. Arbitrary and predatory rule drain the surplus away from long-term investment and undermine the stable conditions of law and predictability. This is the liberal account of state power.

The liberal perspective on early-modern state formation has been tied up with the advantages of political fragmentation in the early-modern epoch. Whereas the empires of antiquity were characterized by administered trade and a coalescence of

economic system and territorial control, capitalist expansion and industrial growth thrived with an economic market system beyond the borders of state polities. The economic division of labor gained vitality from a more open space than a single political unit. The economic system was wider than any single state before the emergence of the modern states system. The plurality of states stimulated economic growth and provided their inhabitants with an escape system that served as a barrier to arbitrary government. The importance of the multipolarity in Europe was considered already during the Enlightenment and developed at length by Edward Gibbon in his monumental study of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire.

At closer range, there is a variety of reasons for the specifics of modern state formation in different parts of Europe. While Britain emerged as a centralized polity in the early-medieval epoch, Italian and German lands were not unified until the second half of the 19th century. Above the specifics of individual states, Perry Anderson has drawn a major line of division between the East and West in Europe. The absolutist state in the West emerged on endogenous lines of development, through antiquity and feudalism, while the Eastern variety of statehood was a response to external challenges. Western absolutism was erected above an emerging urban network and a relatively free peasantry, while Eastern absolutism built on small, subordinate urban societies and rural serfdom. Thus, the socioeconomic forms of the West were dynamic and adapted to a modernized state, while the Eastern institutions remained economically stagnant with the state as a response to exogenous military pressure.

Historically, state formation in Africa, Asia, and the Americas has taken a variety of forms. Precolonial chiefdoms in Africa were centralized polities with large territories and often with hundreds of thousands of inhabitants, some of them intact right up to the onslaught of European colonization. The Asian empires evolved in a continuous rivalry between nomadic and sedentary societies; even the long history of Chinese dynasties was highly dependent on the border fortifications and challenges from the outside. The indigenous realms in Meso-America and South America were unified in defense against hostile tribes until the technologies and diseases of European conquerors brought them down.

These instances of early state formation did not lead continuously into the contemporary world. The political trajectories were broken by revolution, as in China, or by colonial occupation and control, as in Africa and—earlier—in the Americas. Postcolonial state formation is a complex mix of endogenous and exogenous change, with new international conditions as a crucial factor.

Recent and Contemporary State Formation

Modern statehood has expanded throughout the globe in four major waves during the past 200 years: first the formation of independent republics in the Americas from the late 18th century, then the dissolution of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires during World War I, followed by the process of decolonization—with the dissolution of the European empires overseas—from about 1960, and finally the emergence of new states in the wake of the collapse of the communist regimes and the dissolution of the Soviet Union from 1991.

These waves of state formation were orchestrated by the victory of rebellious movements, the collapse from above, and the withdrawal of external control. The key to state formation here was different from the processes in the neolithic revolution or the emergence of postfeudal absolutism in the West. Still, the European postfeudal and post-Renaissance state provided a formal model toward which recently acquired states gravitated.

In terms of international law, as a formalization and codification of the modern states system, there were approximately two dozen entities within this system at the end of the 19th century; they included the European states, the former American colonies, the Ottoman empire, and other entities recognized by treaty with European powers—Persia, Siam, China, and Japan. In the 19th century, however, it was unclear what state formation and statehood really were. There have been shifting criteria for the definition of a sovereign state. International power relations have been crucial in modern state formation, as illustrated by the attempt by the Western powers to establish Kurdistan and Armenia as independent states in 1920, withdrawn 3 years later under Turkish pressure.

The states system of the 19th century was based on a constitutive theory of state formation. The status as an independent state was derived from

diplomatic practice—through treaties and the exchange of ambassadors—without explicit criteria or formal registration. The states system had no clear borders, and the exact number of states was uncertain.

This lack of formal criteria became increasingly awkward with international conferences and treaties, including the League of Nations after World War I. Which political entities were qualified for admission? General recognition required standardized and universally accepted criteria for statehood. The League of Nations Treaty circumvented the problem by stating that any fully self-governed state, dominion, or colony could be voted in as a member, but this left the field open for diplomatic maneuvering and power politics.

The problem was addressed at an inter-American conference in Montevideo, Uruguay, in December 1933. The final treaty defined a state according to objective criteria in a way that is still the current view according to international law. To be a state, a political entity has to have a permanent population, well-defined borders, a government, and a capacity to honor international obligations. This was called a *declaratory theory* of statehood, whereby an effective government was a prerequisite for international status and recognition. As statehood no longer hinged on recognition as such, it was not abolished by the withdrawal of recognition. The fact of statehood was moved from recognition to the empirical prerequisites for recognition.

Furthermore, the League of Nations soon codified the prevalence of the territorial integrity of established states above the right of secession, whatever the composition of the population or the public opinion in the contested areas was. How was it possible to adapt post-World War II decolonization to the idea of territorial integrity? There were 51 original members of the UN in 1945, increasing to 127 member states in 1970, 157 in 1981, and 191 in 2004. This is a fast and radical process of *state formation*, within an international states system where the established polities were eager to protect their territorial integrity and avoid secessionist dismemberment.

The eventual solution was pragmatic and finite, with a doctrine of decolonization that limited the new states to colonies overseas and prohibited further secession from these new sovereign states.

According to the doctrine, decolonization should proceed in one step across salt water, without further legitimate challenges to the integrity of old and new states. This principle was accepted by governments throughout the Third World, in defense of the new state order. When the former USSR and the federation of Yugoslavia dissolved after the Cold War, sovereign states were established within the borders of the former republics, without further secessions or border revisions. The contested independence of Kosovo in 2008 is the only exception here.

The postcolonial states and their borders are the result of exogenous processes. State formation is based, first, on arbitrary colonial delineations and, second, on diplomatic principles. Due to the combination of a colonial past and a postcolonial lack of national integration and legitimacy, many postcolonial states have been bureaucratically overdeveloped, predatory, and inefficient. Robert Jackson has called them *quasi states*, lacking the institutional qualities of the Weberian state. The modern state proper, after a long historical evolution, developed institutions by sailing between the Scylla of anarchy and the Charybdis of predatory rule. The quasi state, on the other hand, was fully recognized abroad, but it was predatory or partially anarchic internally.

In Max Weber's terms, many postcolonial states are neopatrimonial in the sense that the public bureaucracy is mixed up with clientelism, kinship relations, and personal dependency. In the neopatrimonial state, political support is either for sale or based on kinship obligations. Moreover, neopatrimonial features are a matter of degree, on a scale from the Weberian ideal type of formal rationality to the failed state.

War may have been a prime mover in early-modern European state formation, but this explanation is not generally valid in the non-European world. War and waves of conquest contributed to state formation in some parts of Asia, such as Vietnam, but were hardly relevant in the African context. In many cases, formal independence was followed by territorial disintegration, ethnic strife, and civil war.

Postcolonial state formation has been a process against heavy odds. Early-modern war in Europe unified the states against external threats, while modern wars in the non-European world have

been mostly domestic. External powers may continue to exploit the economic weaknesses of post-colonial states, in contrast to the centralization of surplus extraction in the early-modern epoch. Weak institutions and deficient leadership contribute to the failure of state formation in many post-colonial areas.

State Formation as a Nonuniform Process

State formation takes place in a historical context. There is only a superficial similarity between the origin of the state in neolithic times, the evolution of the early-modern state in Europe, and the variety of geopolitical and socioeconomic conditions behind state formation in the modern era. It is the outcome of a certain class of phenomena—the centralized political structures within relatively large territories—that bind these processes together. *State formation* is a generic term. The state and the mechanisms behind it cover a wide range of political forms and experiences.

No single explanation can explain state formation in general—during the neolithic, the early-modern, and the contemporary epochs. Nor can a single explanation adequately deal with modern state making in, for instance, Britain, France, Germany, or the United States. We have to combine the more general preconditions with those mechanisms that are specific to the emergence of the individual state.

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See also Capitalism; State; State, Virtual; State Collapse; State Failure; Statism

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STATISM

The English word *statism* and its equivalents in other languages denote an idea of the supremacy of the state and the corresponding principles, ideologies, policies, institutions, and even specific instances of state intervention in personal, social, or economic matters.

Origins

As a vague and contested term, *l'étatisme* emerged in France and then spread throughout Europe in the late 19th or early 20th century, either as a transliteration (German *Etatismus*, Polish *etatyzm*, and Swedish *etatism*) or in the form of a calque (Italian *statalismo*, Spanish *estatismo*, Portuguese *estadismo*, Turkish *Devletçilik*, and Finnish *Valtiojohtoisuus*), or as both transliteration and calque (Russian *этатизм, государственничество*; English *etatism, statism*; and Dutch *etatisme, statisme*). Later, there emerged transliterations of the English term (e.g., Lithuanian *statizmas*).

The idea of the supremacy of state emerged much earlier than the term *l'étatisme*. Soon after Niccolò Machiavelli and Francesco Guicciardini coined the word *stato* in early 16th century, signorial or kingly supremacy over a territorial polity was gradually depersonalized and conceptualized as a core notion of political order. In the mid-17th century, Thomas Hobbes identified the state as “Mortal God, to which we owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defence” (*Leviathan*,

chap. 17) or as the ultimate and supreme authority. He claimed that there was no power on earth to be compared with the *Leviathan*—“*Non est potestas Super Terram quae Comparetur ei*” (There is no power on earth that can be compared with him). Accordingly, the state was to be a departure point for all political thinking and practice.

Historical Evolution

Further development of statism in the 17th and 18th centuries was challenged both by its repersonalization by absolute monarchs (as in Louis XIV of France’s declaration “L’Etat c’est moi”) and by attempts to usurp state prerogatives by political factions of all kinds. At the same time, the viability of the idea of state supremacy was confirmed by “public policy science” (*Polizeiwissenschaft*) and constitutionalism. They highlighted the transition from “state of estates” (*Ständestaat*) to “good-policy state” (*Polizeistaat*), and then to various forms of limited monarchy, and finally to constitutional ones.

A major problem was posed by a lack of clarity about the source or sources of state authority. A conflict of alternative viewpoints ranging from divine to popular mandate made the idea of state supremacy highly contestable. It was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel who tried to develop a decidedly abstract perspective that would justify philosophically the supremacy of the state. In his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (*Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*), he further developed the Hobbesian idea of the state as Mortal God:

The state is the march of God through the world. Its foundation is the power of reason that implements itself as will. To pursue the idea of state one has to consider not specific states but the idea for itself or the actual God. (sec. 258 addendum)

In other words, the idea of the state could not be reduced to specific instances but should be enhanced to the higher abstraction of transhistorical development. The state was made a part of the divine strategy, not a mere product of human endeavor. To this day, Hegel’s claim remains the purest expression of the philosophical justification of statism.

In the postrevolutionary era of the 19th century, statism was challenged by its many rivals. It was opposed by individualism, anarchism, socialism, communism, and radical brands of liberalism, to mention only the most important ones. Marxism advanced a “scientific” theory of universal development according to which the state was supposed to wither away. It was the most radical and clear expression of antistatism at that time.

It was in the 19th century that the word *statism* acquired its pejorative or derogatory sense, which is still widespread in ideologically motivated discourses. But it was also the moderate liberalism and particularly the constitutionalism of the 19th century that helped clarify many aspects of the idea of the supremacy of state as the crucial framework for international and national political order.

The Second Empire periods in France (1852–1870) and in Germany (1871–1919) were the main vehicles of statism. The term *welfare state* (*État providence*) was originally coined by Émile Ollivier, a deputy in the National Assembly, in 1864. He used it to identify a new system of social solidarity (*système de solidarité nationale*).

In Germany, statism was not only related to strengthening the traditional aspects of state power (military might, administrative capabilities, etc.) but also marked by the intrusion of the new imperial state into areas that previously were the domains of nonstate agencies. The policy of culture struggle (*Kulturkampf*) allowed the German state to promote effective secularization and to play down the authority of the Catholic Church. As a result, the state gained control over certain functions that hitherto had belonged exclusively to the church, such as education, marriage ceremonies, and so on. The church was forbidden from participating directly in political affairs. The state assumed responsibility for the training and appointment of clergy. Under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s May Laws of 1873 and 1874, the state assumed responsibility for the training and appointment of clergy. (In 1886, however, this policy was relaxed, returning education of clergy to the seminaries.)

Bismarck’s policy of social insurance (*soziale Fürsorge*) meant a more direct and decisive intrusion of the state into the private sphere. It helped introduce health insurance, accident insurance, disability insurance, and old-age retirement pension in the 1880s. The policy helped further

develop the German tradition of the welfare state (*Wohlfahrtsstaat*) that dated back to the “good-policy state” (*Polizeistaat*) of the 18th century and paved the way for the “social state” (*Sozialstaat*) of the 20th century. In fact, Bismarck himself identified his policy first openly as practical Christianity and then informally as “state socialism” (*Staatssozialismus*). Both identifications were correct since the traditional church domain of care-taking for the poor and needy was taken over by the state to forestall socialist claims on the issues of well-being of working people.

At the turn of the 20th century, statism was provided with sound intellectual justification by a prominent Swedish political scientist, Johan Rudolf Kjellén. He advocated that only states as main political units made domestic and foreign politics possible. States collectively provided the arena of international politics; each individual state comprised a framework for national politics. He identified states as a “life-form” (*livsform*), stressing their organic unity with the life stories of respective peoples in their natural environment. Thus, Kjellén secularized the Hobbesian “Mortal Gods” into “life-forms” subject to scientific investigation.

World War I led to a major breakthrough of statism. All the belligerents were forced to develop state-controlled wartime economies. Both political thinking and institution building were greatly influenced by this development. At the same time, this also provoked a reaction, boosting antistatism of various sorts, ranging from serene pacifism to revolutionary communism. The clash of statist and antistatist pressures further complicated the political developments. In the setting of postwar reconstruction, state agencies, corporations, trade unions, cooperatives, and social movements were making overlapping efforts.

The October Revolution posed a major challenge to statism, launching an alternative form of direct “workers’ and peasants’ democracy of Soviets.” A supposedly antistatist drive soon led to the adoption of the Stalinist policy of a “socialist state in a single country” and the creation of a totalitarian “party-state” (*партия-государство*).

Policies of self-determination swept many countries in the wake of the World War I. To a great extent, this trend depended on state efforts and promoted various kinds of statism. For example, in Turkey, statism, or *Devletçilik*, became one of

the six “arrows” or principles of Kemalism (the political philosophy of Mustafa Kemal, founder of the modern Turkish Republic). According to that principle and policy, the state was to direct the country’s economic development. It was also to engage in areas where private enterprise had proven to be inadequate, or where national interest required direct state involvement. In promoting *Devletçilik*, the Turkish state emerged as the owner of the major industries of the country.

Statism was also one of the cornerstones of Italian fascism. At a meeting in October 1925, Benito Mussolini formulated the guiding motto of his regime: “Everything in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State” (*Tutto nello Stato, niente al di fuori dello Stato, nullo contro lo Stato*; Karl Bracher, 1973). Such verbiage incited resentment. Soon the fascist brand of statism was labeled *statolatry* (*statolatria*). In his encyclical *Non Abbiamo Bisogno* of June 29, 1931, Pope Pius XI denounced fascist attempts to monopolize completely the young, from their most tender years up to manhood and womanhood, for the exclusive advantage of a party and of a regime based on an ideology that clearly resolves itself into a true and genuine pagan worship of the state (“*in una vera e propria statolatria pagana*”)—statolatry. Later, the term *statolatry* was widely used by a staunch critic of statism, Ludwig von Mises.

Such claims to total control were beyond the capabilities of fascist Italy to sustain. Instead, it developed a state structure known as the corporate state with the ruling party acting as a mediator between “corporations” making up the body of the nation. Similar designs were quite popular elsewhere in the 1930s. The most prominent examples were *Estado Novo* in Portugal (1932–1968) and Brazil (1937–1945), the Austrian *Ständestaat* (1933–1938), and authoritarian experiments in Estonia, Romania, and some other countries of East and East-Central Europe.

Much more consistent attempts to develop totalitarian versions of statism were undertaken in the German Third Reich and the former USSR. Still, the “success” was fairly ambiguous and self-defeating since the emergent models actually integrated state structures into a more inclusive system of total control, in the form of the Hitlerite “movement-state” (*Bewegungsstaat*) and the Stalinist “party-state” (*партия-государство*). Thus, the

state in the proper sense of the term was actually eradicated.

Liberal versions of corporate statism of the 1930s developed into welfare states. The most notable examples are the United States, Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Uruguay, Sweden, and other Nordic countries.

The advancement of the American welfare state was highlighted by the New Deal, a series of economic programs President Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration initiated between 1933 and 1936. The First New Deal, of 1933, was aimed at short-term recovery programs to combat the effects of the Great Depression. The Second New Deal (1935–1936) included labor union support, the Social Security Act, and programs to aid farmers and migrant workers.

In Sweden, a policy of taking over the system of parish welfare by the state and the development of additional state-controlled social services was introduced in early 1930s. It is known as *people's home* (*Folkhemmet*), a very telling term introduced already in 1928 by the Social Democratic Party leader Per Albin Hansson, with inspiration presumably coming from Kjellén.

Recent Developments

In the later part of the 20th century, the welfare state and statism had their ups and down. Emergence of new states, economic crises, social unrest, and revolutions were typically accompanied by an upsurge of statist policies and thinking. Periods of relatively steady development tended to incite withdrawal of the state from economic and social spheres. The most prominent examples are Thatcherism and Reaganomics.

Statism's influences on political science are mainly found in the traditions of normative and legal studies of states. Far more outspoken are antistatism traditions related to liberal and Marxist sources of inspiration. In a more general context, both the behavioral approach and structural functionalism helped play down elements of statism from the 1950s to the 1970s, introducing concepts of political systems and political culture. Reaction followed and "brought the state back in" (see Theda Skocpol, Peter Evans, & Dietrich Rueschemeyer, 1985). The globalization debate reintroduced expectations of the state "withering away."

Currently, a more balanced approach seems to prevail. It is generally recognized that the system of states is indispensable as a kind of reference grid for world politics and the respective territorial units are vital institutional frameworks for internal policies.

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See also Liberalism; Socialism; State; Welfare State

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STATISTICAL INFERENCE

See Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian

STATISTICAL INFERENCE, CLASSICAL AND BAYESIAN

Statistical inference is a form of induction and can be broadly defined as “learning from data.” The two dominant forms of statistical inference are “classical” (or “frequentist”) inference and Bayesian inference.

Briefly, classical inference assesses the plausibility of a hypothesis by asking *how frequently* we would see results like the one actually obtained in repeated applications of the data generation mechanism, assuming the hypothesis to be true. If a statistic $\hat{\theta}$ computed with the observed data is judged to be sufficiently unusual relative to its expected value under the hypothesis, then the hypothesis is considered falsified. The assumed hypothesis is often a “null” or “no effects” hypothesis; if this hypothesis is rejected (in the sense given above), then we usually say that we have a “statistically significant” finding. The assumptions here are that statistics vary randomly across repeated applications of the data generation mechanism (e.g., random sampling, say in the case of the analysis of survey data), while the objects of interest—population parameters θ —are constants. Repeated applications of the sampling process, if undertaken, would yield different y and different $\hat{\theta}$. The distribution of values of $\hat{\theta}$ that would result from repeated applications of the sampling process is called the *sampling distribution* of $\hat{\theta}$; the standard deviation of this distribution is the *standard error* of $\hat{\theta}$. For many statistics, asymptotic theory gives the form of the statistic’s large-sample sampling distribution (e.g., normal, χ^2). The sampling variance of a statistic is often also easy to estimate; for instance, if $\hat{\theta}$ is the maximum likelihood estimate, then $V(\hat{\theta})$ is often estimated with the inverse of the information matrix (minus the second derivatives of the log of the likelihood function with respect to θ , usually evaluated either at $\hat{\theta}$ or at a hypothesized value θ^*). This approach is by and far the most frequently taught and frequently deployed framework for statistical inference in the social sciences.

By contrast, Bayesian inference uses Bayes rule (we will drop the apostrophe in “Bayes’ rule”) to compute the conditional probability of hypotheses

given the data at hand, without any explicit reference to what might happen over repeated applications of the data generation mechanism. Bayes rule states that if A and B are events then

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(B|A)P(A)}{P(B)}, \quad (1)$$

where $P(A|B)$ is the conditional or posterior probability of A given that event B has occurred, $P(A)$ is the prior probability of A , and $P(B)$ is the marginal probability of B . This proposition—an uncontroversial result given the conventional definition of conditional probability—can be restated more provocatively as

$$P(H|E) = \frac{P(E|H)P(H)}{P(E)}, \quad (2)$$

where $P(H)$ is the prior probability of a hypothesis and $P(E|H)$ is the likelihood of “evidence” (or data) E under hypothesis H . This form of Bayes rule underscores its relevance as a tool for statistical inference. In the case of a finite set of competing hypotheses $H = \{H_1, \dots, H_J\}$, the law of total probability implies that $P(E) = \sum_{j \in H} P(E|H_j)P(H_j)$. Note that the resulting posterior probabilities constitute a proper probability mass function over the set H ; that is, $\sum_{j \in H} P(H_j|E) = 1$. For the case of a continuous parameter $\theta \in \Theta \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ and data $y \sim p(y|\theta)$, Bayes rule becomes

$$p(\theta|y) = \frac{p(y|\theta)p(\theta)}{\int_{\Theta} p(y|\theta)p(\theta)d\theta} \propto p(y|\theta)p(\theta), \quad (3)$$

or (in words) the posterior density for θ is proportional to the prior density for θ , $p(\theta)$, times the likelihood for the data given θ , $p(y|\theta)$. The integral in the denominator in Equation 3 ensures that the posterior density integrates to one and thus is a proper probability density.

Note that Bayesian inferences do not rely on how $\hat{\theta}$ might vary over repeated applications of random sampling. Instead, Bayesian procedures are geared toward answering a simple question: What should I believe about θ in light of the data available for analysis, y ? The quantity $\hat{\theta}(y)$ has no

special, intrinsic status in the Bayesian approach, although a statistic such as a least squares or maximum likelihood estimate $\hat{\theta}$ is a feature of the data that may be helpful in computing the posterior distribution for θ . In the Bayesian approach, the roles of θ and $\hat{\theta}$ are reversed relative to their roles in classical, frequentist inference: θ is random, in the sense that the researcher is uncertain about its value, while $\hat{\theta}$ is fixed, a feature of the data at hand. An example will help make the distinction clear.

Example: Attitudes Toward Abortion. In the 1994 General Social Survey (GSS), 1,934 respondents were asked, “Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if the woman wants it for any reason.”

Of the respondents, 895 reported “yes,” and 1,039 said “no.” Let θ be the unknown population proportion of respondents who agreed with the proposition in the survey item—that a pregnant woman should be able to obtain an abortion if the woman wants it for any reason. The question of interest is whether a majority of the population supports the proposition in the survey item.

Under the assumption that the survey responses are independent (not an unreasonable assumption for a survey such as the GSS), the binary survey responses can be modeled as binomial process; that is, the likelihood has the binomial form

$$p(y|\theta) = \binom{1,934}{895} \theta^{895} (1 - \theta)^{1,934-895}. \quad (4)$$

Frequentist Approach. The maximum likelihood estimate of θ is $\hat{\theta} = 895/1934 \approx .46$, the approximation coming via rounding to two significant digits. With this large sample, the normal is an excellent approximation to the sampling distribution of $\hat{\theta}$. Interest focuses on whether the unknown population proportion, θ , is equal to .5. A typical classical approach to this question is to test the null hypothesis $H_0: \theta = .5$ against all other alternatives $H_A: \theta \neq .5$ or, say, a one-sided alternative $H_B: \theta > .5$. We would then ask how often we would see the value of $\hat{\theta}$ actually obtained, or an even more extreme value if H_0 were true, by centering the sampling distribution of $\hat{\theta}$ at the hypothesized

value. The variance of $\hat{\theta}$ under H_0 is given in the usual way, computed as minus the inverse of the second derivatives of the log-likelihood function evaluated at the hypothesized value of θ . In turn, the standard deviation of the normal sampling distribution (the standard error of $\hat{\theta}$) under H_0 is

$$\begin{aligned} \text{se}(\hat{\theta}|H_0) &= \sqrt{\frac{\theta_{H_0}(1 - \theta_{H_0})}{n}} \\ &= \sqrt{\frac{.50 \times (1 - .50)}{1934}} \approx .011. \end{aligned}$$

The realized value of $\hat{\theta}$ is $(.5 - .46)/.011 \approx 3.64$ standard errors away from the hypothesized value. Under a normal distribution, this is an extremely rare event. Over repeated applications of random sampling, only a small proportion of estimates of θ will lie 3.64 or more standard errors away from the hypothesized mean of the sampling distribution. This proportion is

$$2 \times \int_{3.64}^{\infty} \phi(z) dz = 2 \times [1 - \Phi(3.64)] \approx .00028,$$

where $\phi(\cdot)$ and $\Phi(\cdot)$ are the normal PDFs and CDFs, respectively. Given this result, most (frequentist) analysts would reject the null hypothesis in favor of either alternative hypothesis, reporting the p values for H_0 against H_A as .00028 and for H_0 against H_B as .00014.

Bayesian Approach. The unknown parameter is $\theta \in \Theta = [0, 1]$. Suppose that we bring little or no prior information to the analysis, assigning θ a uniform prior over Θ . Applying Bayes rule, we seek the posterior density $p(\theta|y) \propto p(\theta)p(y|\theta)$. The uniform prior is constant with respect to θ and is absorbed into the constant of proportionality. With a binomial likelihood and a uniform prior on Θ , the posterior density of θ is a Beta density, which is well approximated by a normal density for samples of even moderate size. That is, our working approximation to the posterior density for θ is a normal density centered on the maximum likelihood estimate of .46 with standard deviation .011; that is, $p(\theta|y) \approx N(.46, .011^2)$. Note that most of the posterior probability mass lies below

.5, suggesting that the hypothesis $\theta > .5$ is not well supported by the data. In fact, the posterior probability of this hypothesis is

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(\theta > .5|y) &= \int_{.5}^{\infty} p(\theta|y)d\theta \\ &= \int_{.5}^{\infty} \phi\left(\frac{\theta - .46}{.011}\right)d\theta = .00014.\end{aligned}$$

Note an apparent symmetry between the frequentist and Bayesian answers. In both instances, the “answer” involved computing the same tail area probability of a normal distribution, with the probability of H_0 under the Bayesian posterior

distribution corresponding with the p value in the frequentist test of H_0 against the one-sided alternative H_B (see Figure 1). But this similarity really is only superficial. The Bayesian probability is a statement about the researcher’s beliefs about θ obtained via application of Bayes rule, and is $\Pr(H_0|y)$, obtained by computing the appropriate integral of the posterior distribution $p(\theta|y)$. The frequentist p value is obtained via a slightly more complex route and has a quite different interpretation from the Bayesian posterior probability since it conditions on the null hypothesis; that is, the sampling distribution is $f(\hat{\theta}|H_0)$, and the p value for H_0 against the one-sided alternative is the proportion of $\hat{\theta}$ less than .46 we would see under repeated sampling with the sampling distribution assumed under the null hypothesis.




Figure 1 Attitudes Toward Abortion: Posterior Density of θ Contrasted With Sampling Distribution of $\hat{\theta}$ Under $H_0: \theta = .5$

Source: Jackman, S. (2009). *Bayesian analysis for the social sciences* (Figure 1.10, p. 35). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Note: The top right panel shows the posterior density in the neighborhood of $\theta \approx .5$, with the shaded region corresponding to the posterior probability $p(\theta > .5|y) = \int_{.5}^{\infty} p(\theta|y)d\theta = .00014$. The lower right panel shows the sampling distribution in the neighborhood of $\hat{\theta} = .46$, with the shaded region corresponding to the proportion of times one would observe $\hat{\theta} \leq .46$ if $H_0 : \theta = .5$ were true, corresponding to .00014 of the area under the sampling distribution.

Relevance of the Classical/Bayesian Distinction to Social Science

The distinction between the classical/frequentist and Bayesian approaches to statistical inference is important in at least three ways: (1) although the frequentist approach is ubiquitous in social science training and practice, it is unclear whether its premises apply in many social science contexts; (2) many social scientists often give Bayesian interpretations to the outcome of classical procedures and (3) since parameters are considered random variables in the Bayesian approach, extensions such as multilevel or hierarchical modeling are straightforward, as is inference for latent variables, missing data, and so on.

Inference Without Random Sampling

Consider the analysis of cross-national data in economics, political science, or sociology, say using national accounts data from the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). Alternatively, consider researchers in American politics analyzing all trade votes in the U.S. Senate in a given period or an analysis of the determinants of civil war, using an authoritative, comprehensive listing of all civil wars in the world since World War II.

In what sense do data such as these comprise a sample from a population? Repeating the data collection exercise would not yield a new sample from the population, but rather, save for coding error or errors in transmission or transcription of the data, “repeated sampling” would yield exactly the same data set and statistics, $\hat{\theta}$. In cases such as these, *there is no uncertainty due to variation in repeated sampling from a population*. Nonetheless, one can feed data of this sort to a computer program and have standard errors and significance tests reported for various statistics (e.g., means, correlations, regression coefficients) as usual. But what do those standard errors *mean* in this context? What do we mean when we say a result is “statistically significant” in this setting?

Several possibilities come to mind. Coding error might see the numbers changing over repetitions of the data collection process, say, if the data were being manually transcribed from archival sources into a database. But this form of measurement error may have quite different operational characteristics from classical sampling error: For example, what is

the population of possible data sets that might be generated via transcription error, and how do we (randomly) sample from that population? Are those transcription errors distributed randomly and, if so, via what distribution? In short, does a central limit theorem apply to the resulting estimator and standard errors? Almost surely not: As $n \rightarrow \infty$, frequentist sampling error vanishes (and, for independent data, at a rate of $\sqrt{n}$), but this hardly seems likely for coding errors.

Nor is it satisfying or particularly helpful to say, “The data are just one of many possible data sets that could have been generated if history were to be replayed many times over.” What is the sampling mechanism that selected the history we happened to observe? No one knows, or can know. Adhering to a frequentist conception of probability in the face of nonrepeatable data seems dubious.

Moreover, it is not clear how to attach frequentist probabilities to past or nonrepeatable events about which one may be uncertain (e.g., the probability that an asteroid impact caused the K-T mass extinction) or to future events (e.g., the probability that Democrats will hold a majority of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives after the next election). That is, there is a large class of events of interest to social scientists for which the frequentist notion of probability is inappropriate. In these situations—quite common in the social sciences—the Bayesian approach provides a coherent basis for inference.

What Is a Confidence Interval?

The stark contrast between classical and Bayesian inference is also particularly evident when we consider a staple of statistical practice, the confidence interval. To illustrate this, consider the abortion attitudes example again. Using a large-sample, normal approximation, a 95% confidence interval for θ is $\hat{\theta} \pm 2 \times \text{se}(\hat{\theta}) = .46 \pm 2 \times .011 = [.438, .482]$. But what exactly is the interpretation of this confidence interval? Many social scientists in this situation would say, “There is a .95 probability that θ lies between .438 and .482.”

But this is not the correct classical interpretation. In the classical approach, parameters are fixed characteristics of populations, so either θ lies in the interval, or it doesn't. The correct interpretation of a classical or frequentist confidence interval depends on the repeated sampling characteristics of a sample

statistic. In the case of a 95% confidence interval, the correct frequentist interpretation is that 95% of the 95% confidence intervals one would draw in repeated samples will include θ . This leads us to wonder if the 95% confidence interval that one constructs from the data set at hand is one of the lucky 95% that actually contain θ . No one knows.

This example highlights how the repeated sampling, frequentist notion of probability is simply not about how many researchers use and understand the term *probability*. From the frequentist perspective, the statement “There is a .95 probability that θ lies between .438 and .482” is valid, since for frequentists “probability” is, at least tacitly, understood to mean “relative frequency in repeated sampling.” But this is not how most practitioners understand confidence intervals. Rather, subjective statements of the sort “I am 95% sure that $\theta \in [.438, .482]$ ” are quite typical. The correct frequentist interpretation is the less helpful statement about the performance of the 95% confidence interval in repeated sampling. On the other hand, the statement “Having looked at the data, I am 95% sure that $\theta \in [.438, .482]$ ” is produced by a Bayesian analysis, a characterization of the researcher’s *beliefs* about a parameter in formal, probabilistic terms rather than a statement about the repeated sampling properties of a statistical *procedure*.

Hierarchical Modeling

The prior density $p(\theta)$ plays a key role in Bayesian inference. Some critics of Bayesian inference point to the arbitrary, subjective nature of the prior density as a weakness of the Bayesian approach. But the prior density also provides a way for model expansion when working with data pooled over multiple units and/or time periods. Data of this sort abound in the social sciences. Individuals live in different locations, with factors that are constant for anyone within that location but that vary across locations; students attend different schools; voters live in different constituencies; firms operate in different types of markets; politicians compete under different sets of electoral rules, and so on. Understanding the relative weight of microlevel variables and macrolevel or “contextual” variables—and critically, the interaction between them—is central to many research programs in the social sciences. A key question in research of this type is how the

causal structure that operates at one level of analysis (e.g., individuals) varies across a “higher” level of analysis (e.g., localities or time periods).

The Bayesian approach to statistical inference is extremely well suited to answering this question. Recall that in the Bayesian approach parameters are random variables. Thus, it is not difficult to replace the prior $p(\theta)$ with a richer model to allow for the way the parameters θ might vary across groups $j = 1, \dots, J$, perhaps as a function of the characteristics of the groups: For example, $\theta_j \sim f(z_j, \gamma)$, where γ is a set of unknown *hyperparameters*. That is, the model is now composed of a nested *hierarchy* of stochastic relations: The data from unit j , y_j , are modeled as a function of covariates and parameters θ_j , while cross-unit heterogeneity in the θ_j is modeled as a function of unit-specific covariates z_j and hyperparameters γ .

Models of this sort are known to Bayesians as *hierarchical* models but go by many different names in different areas of the social sciences depending on the specific form of the model and the estimation strategy being used (e.g., models with “random” or “varying” coefficients models, “multilevel” or “mixed” models). It is no exaggeration to say that hierarchical modeling is one of the great successes of the Bayesian revival of the past 20 years. Simple models of causal heterogeneity—in which parameters are assumed to vary in a non-deterministic way across units—are substantively attractive and yet nontrivial enough to estimate in a classical setting. A suite of models known as Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) made Bayesian computation for these models rather simple.

Feasibility of Bayesian Inference via MCMC

As recently as the 1980s, applications of Bayesian inference were limited to a relatively small set of problems in which the posterior density for θ can be expressed in closed form; even a problem as simple as logistic or probit regression models for binary data was mathematically intractable, and so Bayesian inference was more a philosophical position than a practical strategy for data analysis. But throughout the 1990s, there was something of an explosion of interest in Bayesian approaches, almost entirely driven by the fact that cheap computing power made it feasible to do simulation-based, Bayesian statistical data analysis. The MCMC made the Bayesian approach not just a theoretical curiosity but a

practical reality for applied researchers. Briefly, MCMC works by using Monte Carlo methods to generate simulation-based characterizations of posterior densities; the results from Markov Chain theory show that the stochastic explorations of posterior densities typically generated by MCMC algorithms nonetheless yield “simulation-consistent” summaries of the posterior density.

MCMC algorithms have proven themselves amazingly powerful and flexible and have brought wide classes of models and data sets out of the “too hard” basket. We have already mentioned hierarchical models. But other examples include data sets with a lot of missing data, models with many parameters, models with many latent variables, mixture models, and flexible semi- and non-parametric models. Thus, whatever one’s view of the intellectual or philosophical virtues of Bayesian inference, by adopting a Bayesian approach to inference, researchers can avail themselves of MCMC algorithms, an extraordinarily powerful set of techniques for estimation and inference.

A Historical Note

The result that we now refer to as Bayes theorem appeared in an essay attributed to the Reverend Thomas Bayes and communicated to the Royal Society after Bayes’s death in 1761. This famous essay has been republished many times. Several authors have noted that there is some doubt whether Bayes actually discovered the theorem that was named after him. Nor is it clear that Bayes himself was a “Bayesian” in the sense that we use the term today.

Apparently unaware of Bayes’s work, Pierre-Simon Laplace stated Bayes theorem in a more general form. Perhaps because of Laplace’s work on the subject, Bayes’s essay went unnoticed until after 1780 and played no important role in scientific debate until the 20th century. This said, Bayesian inference was the dominant mode of statistical inference until the early 20th century, although it was known at that time as the “method of inverse probability.”

The adjective *Bayesian* did not enter the statistical vernacular until the 20th century. The first use of *Bayesian* as an adjective was by Ronald Fisher, in his introduction to a paper originally written in 1921. Not surprisingly, Fisher’s use of the term was not flattering, since he was at pains to contrast

his approach to statistical inference from the subjectivism he disliked in the Bayesian approach.

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See also Mixed Methods; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Statistical Significance

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STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE

Political scientists use the concept of statistical significance to validate theoretical assertions about statistical relationships. In the most basic sense, statistical significance means that the hypothesized statistical relationship is probably true. That is, the hypothesized relationship is not due to random

chance. When a result is highly significant, it is very unlikely to be due to chance. But this does not mean that the hypothesized relationship is strong. Statistical significance is not to be confused with substantive importance. A research finding may be strongly validated but not very important. Moreover, significance tests in political science, and social science in general, do not directly test the significance of the researcher's belief about the statistical relationship between the variables of interest. Instead, statistical significance relates to how likely the findings are, given the assumption that there are no differences in the subgroupings of the population. This entry is presented in four parts: (1) it discusses the relationship between the significance test and the research hypothesis, (2) it presents the elements of the significance test, (3) it explains the relationship between statistical significance and the power of the significance test, and (4) it briefly discusses the relationship between statistical significance and sample size.

The Significance Test and Hypotheses

A hypothesis is a statement about an underlying population that may be true or false. Relationships in political science are generally probabilistic rather than deterministic, and this fact has major implications in the design of attempts to prove the existence of hypothesized relationships between variables. In political analysis, researchers are often interested in establishing a causal relationship between variables. Establishing this causal relationship involves meeting three conditions: (1) establishing association between variables, (2) establishing an appropriate time order between variables, and (3) eliminating alternative explanations. Statistical significance is most related to establishing association between variables and is only tangentially related to the other two conditions.

Establishing statistical significance involves testing a hypothesized statistical relationship. Ronald A. Fisher is credited most with the development of the statistical significance concept. Fisher proposed a procedure that produces significance levels from the data about a single hypothesis with a known distribution and a specified test statistic (such as z , t , F , and χ^2). Meanwhile, Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson proposed a procedure that tests the probability of a null or restricted hypothesis against a research (alternative) hypothesis. As political science has matured as a discipline, political scientists

rely more and more on quantitative data and statistical methods to test hypothesized relationships. Over time, the fusion of Fisher's significance test procedure and Neyman-Pearson's hypothesis test procedure produced the null hypothesis statistical test, which is now the dominant procedure for determining statistical significance in political science and in social science in general.

An important aspect of significance tests is determining whether to use a one-tailed or two-tailed test of significance, and this decision is related directly to the form of the paired hypotheses. The null hypothesis (H_0) is the hypothesis to be tested and is usually a statement of a parameter value, say θ , that corresponds to a parameter value of no effect, say θ^* . In turn, the null hypothesis takes the form $H_0: \theta = \theta^*$. In many political and social research applications θ^* is zero. Meanwhile, the form of the alternative hypothesis determines whether the significance test is one-tailed or two-tailed. The two-tailed test takes the form $H_a: \theta \neq \theta^*$. This means the alternative hypothesis includes values falling below and above the value of θ^* listed in H_0 . Conversely, one-tailed alternative hypotheses have the directional forms of $H_a: \theta < \theta^*$ or $H_a: \theta > \theta^*$. The alternative hypothesis $H_a: \theta < \theta^*$ refers to detecting whether θ is smaller than the particular number θ^* . The alternative hypothesis $H_a: \theta > \theta^*$ refers to detecting whether θ is larger than θ^* . In short, the researcher predicts deviation in H_0 in a particular direction. It is generally safest to use a two-tailed test, but there are some situations in which the one-tailed test is more appropriate.

Elements of Significance Tests

All significance tests have five elements: assumptions, hypotheses, test statistic, p value, and conclusion. The concept of significance relates most directly to the p value, which contains information concerning the probability of observing a result like the researcher observes if there is no difference in the corresponding groups in the population from which the sample is drawn. A significance test involves comparing a test value that the researcher has calculated with some critical value for the statistic.

Assumptions

Significance tests require certain assumptions for test validity. These include the type and scale of the

data, the form of the population distribution, the method of sampling, and the sample size. Data may take quantitative or qualitative forms. Additionally, data may be collected from different research sources: attitude surveys, governmental documents, historical records, newspaper files, voting statistics, or other stored data. These types of data collected from various sources suggest different distributional forms. Typical parametric distributional forms include the normal, Student's t , gamma, binomial, and chi-square. Additionally, some data may preclude the use of parametric testing procedures (e.g., count or rank data). Assumptions must also be made concerning the type of sampling that is required for the conclusions drawn from the sample to be applicable to the specified population. Many significance tests require a minimum sample size, and the validity of most tests improves as the sample size increases. Sample size is an important factor in statistical significance, which is discussed in greater detail as follows.

Hypotheses

Significance tests generally examine two hypotheses about the value of a parameter: the null hypothesis and the alternative or research hypothesis. The investigator designs the research to determine the amount of evidence that exists to support the research hypothesis. That is, evidence against the null hypothesis is evidence in support of the research hypothesis.

Test Statistic

Test statistics generally follow the normal, Student's t , F , or chi-square distributions. The formation of the test statistic usually involves a point estimate of the parameter to which the hypotheses refer. Commonly used test statistics include the z score for large sample means ($\bar{y}$) and proportions ($\bar{\pi}$), the t statistic for small-sample means and proportions and individual coefficients in linear regression models, the F statistic to test the significance of multiple linear regression models, the *chi-square statistic* (χ^2) to test independence of variables and goodness of fit for generalized linear models (GLMs), the *likelihood ratio test statistic* ($-2 \log L$) to test nested GLM models, and the *Wald statistic* (z^2) to test the significance of parameters in GLM models.

p Value

The p value provides a means to interpret the evidence provided by the test statistic on a probability scale. The p value is the probability of obtaining a test statistic value as large as the one obtained, conditioned on the null hypothesis being true. The smaller the p value, the more strongly the data contradict the null hypothesis. Conversely, a moderate to large p value indicates that the data are consistent with the null hypothesis. The p value is the summary of the evidence in the data about the null hypothesis.

Conclusion

Significance tests are designed to minimize Type I error, which is the error of rejecting the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is true. To establish the minimization of Type I error, the investigator sets the predetermined and small α level at which H_0 is rejected. The α level of .05 has become the conventional level of statistical significance in social research. The .05 level provides that only 5 times out of 100 the null hypothesis will be rejected when the null is true. The researcher is interested in the range of values of the test statistic for which the null hypothesis will be rejected. If the statistic produces a p value that is smaller than the critical alpha level, the researcher has fairly strong evidence against the null hypothesis (H_0). In the case of a two-tailed test, α is divided by 2 so that half of the .05 probability is in the left tail of the distribution and half of the probability is in the right tail of the distribution.

Significance and Power of the Test

The Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test approach yields the idea of the power of the test. Type I error can only be made when the null hypothesis is true. Conversely, Type II error can only be made when the null hypothesis is false and is defined as the probability of failing to reject the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is false. Type II error is usually referred to as beta (β). Power ($1 - \beta$) is related to statistical significance in that it is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis conditioned on the fact that the null hypothesis is false. In other words, power is the probability of detecting an association (effect) given that there is indeed an association (effect). Under the power rubric, the researcher seeks to develop and employ the test that has the highest power for a given

predetermined α level through sample size, desired significance level, and the research hypothesis.

Statistical Significance and Sample Size

There are two misunderstandings related to the relationship between statistical significance and sample size: (1) statistical significance in large samples translates into substantive importance and (2) p values associated with larger samples are more reliable than identical p values in smaller samples. In the first misunderstanding, as sample size increases, the researcher is increasingly likely to detect a significant effect. Additionally, as sample size increases, it is more likely that the investigator will detect smaller population effect sizes progressively. This means that large sample sizes are more likely to reveal statistical significant relationships, but these statistically significant effects may relate to small substantive effects. In the second misunderstanding, a p value derived from a larger sample is *not* more reliable than an identical p value produced by a smaller sample. Two studies that reject the null hypothesis with the same p value are equally likely to make Type I errors. This statement holds true even if the sample sizes are dramatically different.

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See also Hypothesis Testing; Sampling, Random and Nonrandom; Statistical Inference

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STATISTICS: OVERVIEW

Empirical work is about estimating the relationships among variables and then, based on the values of and confidence in those estimates, discussing their substantive implications. These relationships are expressed as a model relating some outcome or set of outcomes, the endogenous variable or variables, denoted by Y , to a set of explanatory variables, conventionally denoted by X and referred to as the exogenous or causal variables. The models may be explicitly referred to as causal models, but the term *causal* is frequently treated as implicit.

The current commonly used definition of causation, referred to as the Neyman-Holland-Rubin (NHR) model, is based on how one might expect Y to be different if there were a different value for X in an otherwise identical world. A second view is that causation is a process of interactions that connect values of X to values of Y and that this process depends on the context being studied. For example, being female might be the “cause” of women’s wages being lower than wages for men with the same education and experience because of the chain of actions that occur in the labor market, not because an additional X chromosome affects wages. An important research objective is elaborating and examining empirically the components of this chain in their sequential order. All views of causation imply a temporal sequence, where a change in X must occur, or have a very strong likelihood of occurring, prior to the change in Y even if the time lag is smaller than the intervals at which one observes X and Y . An important requirement for models and empirical work is that they improve our understanding of this causal process.

Causal models and thinking are a central part of our personal and professional lives. If you hit your thumb with a hammer, it will hurt and you will at a minimum get a bad bruise. More abstractly, social scientists talk regularly in causal terms: Will mailings increase voter turnout? Will reducing class size improve student learning? Will more on-the-job training raise wages? Will economic sanctions bring a nation to the bargaining table? These examples involve a chain of reasoning underlying the causal statement connecting the change in one variable to the change in the other. The hammer hitting a thumb does not directly cause the bruise,

pain, and swelling. Post cards, smaller classes, job training, and sanctions per se do not cause voters to turn out, students to get higher test scores, wages to increase, or countries to bargain, but we proceed as if we believe they do.

Causal statements vary in the confidence one has in the causal logic or in the chain of events linking Y to X and therefore in the prediction of how Y is likely to be different if X is different. For example, one can confidently predict that your thumb will hurt, swell, and turn purple if you hit it with a hammer. There is less confidence in the prediction that turnout will increase if all potential voters receive a mailing or a phone call before election day. And there is far, far less confidence in the prediction that economic sanctions will lead a rogue state to negotiate. This entry provides a brief introduction to the types of data and statistical methods used in the social sciences to try to reduce this uncertainty about causal arguments and to estimate the magnitude of the relationship between Y and the X .

The entry begins with a very brief discussion of the common models representing causal statements. This is followed by a discussion of the different strategies for designing empirical studies, of the types of data that are frequently available in these studies, and of some of the common statistical methods used to evaluate and estimate the causal model. The entry concludes with some cautions about the types of conclusions that can be reached in these different circumstances and with a plea for modesty in any empirical study.

Models, Empirical Analysis, and Causal Inferences

Models facilitate predictions of how an outcome is likely to differ if some other variable is changed, represented as $\Delta Y = F(\Delta X)$. Since the social sciences discuss outcomes probabilistically, the expression should refer to the expected change in Y , or if Y is a discrete variable, the change in the probability that Y changes its state—that is, $E(\Delta Y) = F(\Delta X)$ or $E[Pr(\Delta Y)] = F(\Delta X)$. For the purposes of this discussion, the origin of the model, be it mathematical deduction, previous empirical results, or conventional wisdom, is not important. What is important is that there be a set of logical and consistent statements about how or why changes in X cause changes in Y .

In some instances the model may be extremely simple. Consider Harold Gosnell's pioneering field study of whether pre-election mailings increase voter turnout. Here the outcome variable Y indicates the probability that a subject votes. The variable X indicates whether the person received the mailing and is a binary variable—the person did or did not receive the mailing. The model is

$$Y = B_0 + B_1X_1, \quad (1)$$

where B_0 is the probability of voting among those who did not receive the mailing, $X_1 = 0$, and B_1 is the increase in that probability among those who received the mailing, $X_1 = 1$. In the NHR model, B_1 is the magnitude of the counterfactual of what would have been the outcome if a person who did not receive the mailing had received it.

The purpose of the study was to estimate the magnitude of B_1 . It was not just enough to know that the mailing increased turnout, it was also important to estimate by how much, as that would determine whether it was worth the costs in money and time to use mailings in future elections. Although Gosnell does not refer to this as an explicit model, there very definitely is a causal model in his study. Other models often relate continuous variables in the same manner. Studies of educational achievement use Equation 1 to relate the expected performance on standardized test scores, Y , to class size, X_1 , both of which are continuous variables. Here, B_1 indicates how test scores are expected to change with each reduction in class size, with the expectation that B_1 is negative. Again, the magnitude of B_1 is important as it is central to any benefit-cost analysis for hiring more teachers. Though models rapidly became more complex, this simple model is the basis for much empirical work.

Models often include multiple causal variables because of what is being modeled and because of the model's purpose. Most outcomes of interest to social scientists are not the result of single causal factors, so it is important to understand and to compare the influence of the various factors. Voter turnout, for example, can be stimulated by personal contacts, X_2 ; phone calls, X_3 ; media promotions, X_4 ; and same-day registration, X_5 , as well as mailings, X_1 . Decisions are often based on the relative influence, cost, and side effects of these factors: Are personal contacts more cost-effective at stimulating turnout than mailings, than phone

calls, than same-day registration? These interests lead to multivariate models—for example,

$$Y = B_0 + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + B_3X_3 + B_4X_4 + B_5X_5. \quad (2)$$

One may conduct an empirical study where only one X is varied to isolate the effect of changes in that X on Y , but ultimately the analyst will want to know the magnitude of all the coefficients.

Increasingly, models are featuring nonlinear specifications, which add to their richness as well as to their complexity. The simplest nonlinearities are introduced with algebraic transformations, such as logs, powers, roots, and trig functions, of continuous variables. Such transformations make the relationships between Y and the X s nonlinear and nonseparable. Many studies of educational achievement, for example, model the log of test scores as a function of the logs of the various explanatory variables. This specification allows for increasing or decreasing as well as constant returns to each input and indicates that the marginal effect of any one input depends on the levels of the other inputs. This property contrasts with that of the linear and separable model, where the marginal effect is constant and independent of the values of the other variables.

Models may also be nonlinear in the values of the parameters, which may vary randomly or systematically with time or as functions of other explanatory variables. This general form is

$$Y_i = F(X_i, B). \quad (3)$$

Note that Equation 2, which is linear in the coefficients, is a special case of Equation 3. The nonlinearities add greatly to the ability of the models to represent complex phenomena, including the possibility that some coefficients may vary systematically among potential observational units. In the linear model in Equation 2 this could mean that the B coefficients are denoted with an i subscript, indicating that they vary across cases. While being more general in form, the nonlinear models present estimation challenges.

Models may also encompass multiple outcomes, which are both the consequence and the cause of other variables. An early form of such a model is Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan's hierarchical model of U.S. occupational status attainment. An individual's occupation at time t is modeled as a

direct function of his or her father's occupation, the person's education level, and the first job; while the latter two variables are themselves related, both are related to father's occupation. In this model, status attainment entails the interrelationship among several endogenous variables. A more complex example is Patrick Brandt and John Freeman's model of the U.S. macropolitical economy, which uses nine interacting variables, each with its own equation. As discussed in the section on multi-equation models, models with multiple endogenous, or outcome, variables present challenging data and estimation problems. These are a consequence of the model and the phenomena being represented, and a single endogenous variable and equation would be inadequate.

The discussion of models and their uses is an important introduction to empirical estimation. The empiricist's task is twofold. One objective is to provide evidence about the model's credibility—how consistent the model is with empirical evidence, in how broad a set of contexts, and when compared with other possible explanations. Arthur Stinchcombe, in 1968, made the still relevant point that most empirical studies do not refute theoretical propositions but demonstrate their consistency with observable data. The more frequent and broader the contexts in which this consistency is observed, the more credible the model. This increased credibility then raises one's confidence in the model's predictions about what change in Y to expect from a specified change in X . The second empirical task is to estimate the magnitude of the model's parameters. This enables one to say what change in Y is expected from a change in X , or in different X s, and something about the uncertainty in this expectation.

A second reason for this brief summary of models is that empirical researchers must have a clear understanding of the model prior to any study. A model's content and structure determine the most appropriate empirical strategy, including the design of the study, the types of data, and the statistical methodology. The linear model in Equation 1 or 2 can be estimated with a range of methods and data that would be inappropriate or unavailable for models with nonlinear coefficients or extensive interactions among the explanatory variables. Models that emphasize dynamic adjustments may require time-series data with stringent stability and equilibrium properties. Many important phenomena are not amenable to explicit manipulation as is done in experimental studies, so the models must be

examined with observational data. And the list goes on. It is critical for a credible empirical study that the design, data, and methods match the properties of the model, a requirement that must be met before any data are collected and any numbers crunched.

The Experimental Method

The textbook lab or field experiment is often cited as the gold standard for empirical work. The model in this case is Equation 1. In a well-designed and conducted experiment, the values of X are determined by the researcher and randomly assigned to subjects, and neither the subject nor the individuals measuring the outcomes know the values of X for each subject. We refer to these conditions as exogeneity, randomization, and double-blindedness, respectively. If these conditions are met, a simple linear regression will give unbiased estimates for B_1 with both binary and continuous variables. And as the number of subjects becomes larger, the balance between the control and treatment groups with respect to unobserved variables becomes better, meaning that estimated results become more accurate estimates of the true causal relationship. An experiment may also be conducted under very controlled conditions so that other factors that might influence Y are constant. It is worth examining these conditions and their contribution to accurate estimates as these conditions become important in developing other methods.

The fact that the researcher determines the values for X precludes the possibility that these variations are the result of changes in Y or of some aspect of the data collection process, both of which will prevent accurate estimates of B_1 . This can be a major problem with observational data. Consider the positive correlation between media attention and turnout. Does hearing more political information lead one to vote, or does an intention to vote cause one to pay more attention to media coverage of the campaign? If the researcher determines each person's media exposure within the experiment, it rules out the latter explanation.

Randomization is critical in any experiment. Subjects will not be identical on all factors other than the variable of interest. Gosnell's mailing would reach people of different ages, education levels, genders, political interests, and so on. All these, and many more, factors will be associated with differences in turnout. These excluded factors

are represented in the model by adding a stochastic term denoted by U to Equation 1:

$$Y = B_0 + B_1X_1 + U, \quad (4)$$

where U represents all these factors and how they affect the observed value of Y . Now suppose that the mailings happened to be sent to, or read by, those more disposed to vote. Then comparisons of turnout between those receiving and those not receiving the mailing would badly bias the estimate of the effect of the mailing. Formally, the values of U , which include the effects of predispositions, would be correlated with X_1 .

Randomization, if done properly and if the sample is large enough, ensures that the composition of the group receiving the mailing is identical to, or balanced with, the composition of the group that did not receive the mailing. Turnout will be higher among those predisposed to vote, but because each group has an equal proportion of such people, differences in turnout between the two groups would not be the result of one group having more committed voters than the other. More formally, X and U are uncorrelated. Randomization, when done properly, makes the reliability of experiments far greater than that of observational studies and greatly simplifies the statistical analysis, as one only needs to estimate the coefficients in Equation 4, which can be done with ordinary regression or comparisons of means if X is binary.

Any factor that does not vary in the sample can be ruled out as an alternative explanation for the observed variations in Y , lending greater credibility to the variations in X as the cause. If Gosnell had sent mailings only to people under 25 who had not voted before and compared their turnout with that of 25-year-old nonvoters who did not get the mailing, then age and past voting behavior would not explain any differences in turnout between the two groups, increasing one's confidence in the conclusion that turnout differences are related to receiving the mailing. In some research, it is possible to design or select observations such that possible confounding factors are constant within the sample, greatly reducing the possibility of bias.

If Equation 1 accurately models the substantive question and an experiment is feasible, then a well-designed and executed experiment will provide very credible estimates of the effects of X on Y . Much of political methodology, however, addresses

situations where the model of interest does not conform to Equation 1 or where an experiment was not or could not be conducted according to the requisite standards, though there has been a dramatic increase in the development of creative experimental designs in the social sciences. The remainder of the entry discusses the procedures analysts use to deal with these shortcomings. The detailed discussion of the experimental method is important in understanding these procedures as many of them are designed to reproduce what can be accomplished with a proper experiment. It is also important to see the experimental approach as being consistent with one, but not all, models.

Observational Studies

Many substantive areas of interest in political science are not amenable to experiments, despite recent expansions in the use of experiments. In some instances, the manipulations required by the model are technically possible but are prohibited on ethical grounds. More often, X cannot be controlled and varied by the researcher. Astronomers cannot create black holes or alter galaxies, medical researchers cannot force people to engage in risky behaviors, and political scientists cannot create economic depressions, randomly assign representatives to districts, start or stop wars, and so on. All rely on observational studies, meaning data that are generated by the world outside researchers' control. Observational studies question the randomization and exogeneity conditions. Considerable attention is devoted to addressing these questions. The types of data generated by observational studies also increase the uncertainty of the causal interpretations one can draw from the analysis of these data.

Nonrandomization

The classical response to the lack of randomization in observational studies is the multivariate regression shown in Equation 2. The problem with estimating the model in Equation 4 is that the stochastic term, U , contains factors other than X_1 that are related to Y and that are correlated with X_1 . (Random assignment in an experiment, when achieved, means that they should be uncorrelated.) If one can specify and construct variables for these factors, they can be included in the

multivariate regression shown in Equation 2, expanded to include the stochastic term and as many explanatory variables as necessary:

$$Y = B_0 + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + B_3X_3 + \dots + B_KX_K + U. \quad (5)$$

The additional variables are included not to assess their relative influence on Y , though this may be an important result, but to include potentially confounding factors in the analysis. The interpretation of Equation 5 is that B_1 indicates the change in Y expected for a unit change in X_1 ; holding X_2 through X_K constant. If one has been successful in including all those factors that are causally related to Y , meaning their true coefficient is different from zero, and that are correlated with X_1 in the sample, then U is uncorrelated with X_1 and the estimate for B_1 obtained with an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is unbiased, as it was in the experimental setting.

In some applications, OLS is not the most appropriate estimator because of the limited nature of the outcome variable. Examples are when outcomes are observed as dichotomies, such as turnout; discrete categories, such as votes in a multiparty election; event counts, such as the numbers of conflicts in given time periods; or durations, such as the likely length of governments formed under different conditions. The latter example is also directly related to hazard models, which estimate the probability of failure at some time t , given survival up to that time, and event history models, which examine the length of time between events. These outcome measures, which are not continuous, unbounded, interval variables, violate the conditions assumed in OLS regressions. The form of the relationship between the observed variables is unlikely to be linear, and it is even unlikely to be linear in the coefficients, precluding the conventional transformations that might create such a linear model. Furthermore, the form and distribution of the stochastic term, U , in Equation 5 will not meet the requirements of the OLS estimator. Taken together, these difficulties are likely to lead to biased estimates of the coefficients if OLS is used with the observed data.

These problems have stimulated the development of a vast array of estimation methods tailored to the specific distributional properties of the

resulting stochastic term. These have the popular names of probit and logit, with their various modifiers; Poisson and negative binomial; Weibull and Cox hazard models, and so on. They have a common approach, which is to specify a distribution for the stochastic term and to use this distribution to derive an expression for the likelihood of observing the data. This description of the data is referred to as the data-generating process, and the expression is referred to as the likelihood function, which measures the likelihood of the data for specific values of the parameters. (The value of the likelihood function is directly proportional to the probability of observing the data given the model and parameters.) Estimation proceeds by finding the values for these parameters that maximize this likelihood function—or, in most instances, the log of the likelihood function—hence the name maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). If, for example, the stochastic term in Equation 5 is normally distributed, the maximum likelihood estimator is OLS. If the data-generating process is described properly, the MLE-derived estimates will have desirable statistical properties if the sample size is large, and in most applications, they are easily computed. These methods' statistical properties only hold in large samples and usually require stricter distributional assumptions about the U s than the more straightforward uncorrelatedness of X and U required in OLS estimation.

Unfortunately, what is straightforward in theory is quite difficult in practice. There are no statistical tests to determine if U is uncorrelated with each X or if one has the correct data-generating process. The U s are not observed and for individual observations are not well approximated by the residuals in the regression. Furthermore, by construction the correlation between these residuals and each X is zero, so that result cannot be used to argue that U and the X s are uncorrelated. One must use the available theories and detailed knowledge of the context in which the data were collected to argue that the uncorrelatedness condition is met. Simply adding more variables in the hope that U will eventually become uncorrelated with the X s is not a remedy as this process introduces its own problems and errors. Such “kitchen sink” regressions may not reduce bias and certainly run the risk of increasing the coefficients' standard errors and thereby increasing the coefficients' mean squared errors.

Mimicking Experimental Methods With Observational Data

Deep skepticism about the ability to meet the conditions for unbiasedness using linear regression models has led to an extensive, growing, and sophisticated literature on alternatives for situations where only observational data are available. This section briefly reviews three of these alternatives. Readers wanting more detail are referred to other survey articles.

Natural Experiments. Though this would seem to be an oxymoron, there are instances where “nature” randomly assigns treatments to one set of observations and not others, creating balanced treatment and control groups. If these assignments are truly random, then analysis of the resulting data using comparisons of means and simple linear models can proceed as if the data were generated by an experiment. An example of research based on a natural experiment are studies assessing the effect of additional income on a range of behaviors, such as political attitudes or consumption, by studying lottery winners. The assumption is that lotteries are random events, so that the amount of money won is equivalent to random assignment and thus is uncorrelated with other factors that are related to the behavior being studied.

Natural experiments are also useful in creating continuous variables that are correlated with outcomes of interest but uncorrelated with other measures of behavior because of nature's randomness. The value of such variables is discussed in a subsequent section on endogeneity and instrumental variables (IVs). Studies of the ability of U.S. federal disaster relief aid to buy support for incumbent administrations and of the effects of past vote patterns on its distribution rely on the randomness of hurricane paths in Florida. The destruction caused by a hurricane can eventually cover a wide area, but its exact path over local areas is random. This randomness means that the local variations in a hurricane's severity are unlikely to be correlated with the community's characteristics, such as income or support for the current government in previous elections. A variable measuring this severity can then be used to predict what aid levels would be independent of economic and political considerations.

Regression Discontinuity. This strategy, which is a more elaborate version of the natural experiment, takes advantage of the natural random assignment of observations to treatment and control groups. The term *discontinuity* arises because these natural experiments occur around some exogenously given threshold. The outcomes for the two groups can then be compared to assess the effects of the natural treatment. For example, a study of the electoral advantage of incumbency uses this method to compare the vote share of incumbents who won their previous election with less than 52.5% with that of the freshman representatives who replaced incumbents who lost with more than 47.5% of the two-party vote. The proposition is that election outcomes are sufficiently random within this band (around 50%) so that incumbency is effectively a random treatment. This randomization is used to justify the comparison of the vote shares of these two groups as a measure of the incumbency advantage. Regression discontinuity designs have a relatively long history, coming into and out of favor in different disciplines. They are currently generating considerable interest in economics and, more recently, in political science.

Matching. This method stems from the work of Donald Rubin and Paul Rosenbaum, separately and jointly with others. It does not try to create random assignment but compares observations in the treatment group with observations selected from the control group that have similar characteristics. A logical difficulty with the NHR causal model is that it is impossible to answer the counterfactual of what an untreated subject would have done if she or he had been treated because both states cannot be observed for the same individual. The ideal next step is to have identical cases of those receiving treatment and those who do not. The statistical exercise called matching finds those appropriate matches, meaning the most similar untreated and treated observations, among the observed data. This process gets complicated when one has to match on a multidimensional set of variables, some of which may be continuous, such as age. There are a number of procedures for measuring similarity and for deciding which observations to compare.

If certain conditions are met, then matching methods have very desirable statistical properties, including reduced bias and smaller mean squared errors relative to other multivariate methods.

Comparisons of results from experiments with randomization with results from analysis of non-randomly assigned groups using matching report comparable results with both methods. This gives further credence to the efficacy of the matching strategy, when done properly.

The design in these methods is to re-create statistically the advantages of a true experiment by either controlling potential confounding variables through the matching process or randomizing them through the natural setting or the discontinuity. The causal model in each instance is still the one represented in Equation 1, in which the effect of the treatment is separable from and additive to any other factors.

Observational Data and Causal Interpretations

Observational data limit in a number of ways one's confidence in the causal interpretations given the model and the empirical results. Causal arguments have an implied time frame, with changes in X preceding changes in Y . In an experimental setting, this condition is met as the researcher controls for each case the change in X prior to observing whether Y changes. Often with observational data, the information on X and Y is not observed within the necessary time frame, making it hard to determine if a change in X preceded a change in Y and by how much Y changed as a result.

Observational data come in several forms. Some data may be from a cross section of the population, meaning the cases are observed only once; from a panel, meaning the same units are observed multiple times; from a time series, where units are observed at regular intervals; and from pooled time series and cross sections, where multiple units are observed at regular intervals. The distinction between panel data and a time series is the number and frequency of the temporal observations. Event history data, which are commonly used in some subfields in sociology and political science, are a form of time series that provides data for an individual's, an organization's, or a country's history.

Causal inferences with cross-sectional data and the model in Equation 5 require several conditions. Assume that the adjustment process for any cross-sectional observation i from $Y_0 = X_{i0}B + U_{i0}$ to Y_1 for a new value of $X_{i1} = X_i^*$ is

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{i1} &= \rho Y_{i0} + (1 - \rho)X_i^*B + U_{i1} \\ &= X_i^*B - \rho(X_i^* - X_{i0})B + \rho U_{i0} + U_{i1}. \end{aligned}$$

If X_i^* is stable for at least t periods, the equation for Y_{it} is

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{it} &= \rho Y_{i,t-1} + (1 - \rho)X_i^*B + U_{it} \\ &= X_i^*B - \rho^t(X_i^* - X_{i0})B + \sum_{s=0}^{t-1} \rho^s U_{i,t-s}. \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

If each U_{it} is independent of X_i^* for all units, the randomization condition, and if t is large and/or ρ is small so that the term in Equation 6 involving ρ^t becomes ignorable, the regression estimates for B will become unbiased. The estimates will also be unbiased if the change in X is uncorrelated with X_i^* , but this is a more sample specific and stricter condition. Accurate estimation of Equation 6 also requires that the values of B for each observation be constant over the period encompassed by t . Subsequent sections discuss appropriate methods to use if the values of B vary among the cross-sectional units and conditions for accurate estimation if the observed units are not independent.

Panel data offer substantial advantages over cross-sectional data in that one can observe ΔY and ΔX_k for the same unit for the interval between waves, permitting a more direct estimate of B_k . Results from the analysis of panel data increase confidence in the original model, but limitations remain. Consider Equation 6 with Y_{it} denoting the observations of Y at the second wave, with t indicating the number of time periods between the second wave of interviews and when X first equaled X_i^* . Subtracting $Y_{i0} = X_{i0}B + U_{i0}$ from both sides of this equation gives

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta Y_i &= \Delta X_i B(1 - \rho^t) + (U_{it} - U_{i0}) \\ &\quad + \sum_{s=1}^t \rho^s U_{i,t-s}. \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

Unless ρ is small and/or enough time has elapsed between when X changed and the second wave, as measured by t , regressions of ΔY on ΔX will underestimate B . Again the relationship between Y_i and X_i , the estimate B , must be constant over the interval of the panel. Panel data have a distinct advantage if there are fixed individual effects, as part of the stochastic term, the first difference in the U s, will eliminate most of their effects. Multiple-wave panels provide even greater advantages in estimating these relationships and in assessing their stability.

The informationally richest data that enable the most reliable estimate of the time sequences relating changes in Y to changes in X are those with a long time series, including event history data, and particularly pooled time-series and cross-sectional data. As discussed in subsequent sections, time-series data permit more extensive modeling of whether and how Y reaches a new equilibrium following changes in X . This modeling can also include heterogeneity in equilibrium and in how fast units might reach that equilibrium. If one's substantive interests and the model developed to represent those interests include temporal dynamics and heterogeneity, then time-series data are required to estimate and evaluate the model.

A Model-Based Approach to Empirical Analysis

A limitation of the work described so far lies not just in whether the data and/or analysis constitutes or mimics a well-designed experiment by meeting the randomization condition. The limitation is in the structure of the model being estimated. This model will be an appropriate representation for the phenomena being analyzed in some circumstances, particularly those that resemble medical trials, where these techniques have been used extensively. In many instances, however, the separable and additive expression in Equation 4, or even its multivariate form in Equation 5, will be an inadequate representation of the causal structure. This brings us back to some form of Equation 3. Some examples of such models and possible estimation strategies will be described in the following sections.

Models With Variable Relationships

The simplest form for Equation 3 are models where the relationship between Y and X is conditional on the value of the other variables. These propositions are increasingly common in political science, where many theories are about the magnitude of the effect of an X on Y . These propositions lead to models with interaction terms of various forms and various degrees of complexity.

Interaction Terms. The simplest model with varying relationships is a straightforward interaction term,

the product of two variables. Consider Ted Brader's experimental study of the effects of TV ads. A major proposition is that ads that cue enthusiasm reinforce prior decisions while ads that cue fear reduce this relationship and increase the reliance on current evaluations. A simple but accurate expression of Brader's model is $\text{Choice}_t = b_0 + \alpha \text{Choice}_{t-1} + \text{Eval}_t \beta + U_t$, where $t-1$ and t refer to the pre- and post-treatment periods, respectively; Choice_t is a participant's candidate choice at t ; and Eval_t is a set of issue and candidate trait evaluations. Brader's propositions about the effects of different TV ads are that they alter the values of α and β , not that they have an additive effect on Choice :

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Choice}_t &= b_0 + (\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 * T_e - \alpha_3 * T_f) * \text{Choice}_{t-1} \\ &\quad + \text{Eval}_t * (\beta_1 - \beta_2 * T_e + \beta_3 * T_f) + U_t \\ &= b_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Choice}_{t-1} + \alpha_2 (T_e * \text{Choice}_{t-1}) \\ &\quad - \alpha_3 (T_f * \text{Choice}_{t-1}) + \text{Eval}_t \beta_1 + (T_e * \text{Eval}_t) \beta_2 \\ &\quad - (T_f * \text{Eval}_t) \beta_3 + U_t, \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

where T_e and T_f indicate the type of treatment, that is, an ad that cues enthusiasm or fear, respectively. Brader uses a well-designed and executed experiment to collect the information to estimate this model. The estimation is done with a probit version of the MLE estimator because of the dichotomous nature of the Choice variable. The important point here is not one of experimental or observational data. It is the need to be clear about the model, about what evidence can be used to evaluate or enhance the credibility of the model, and about the most appropriate statistical procedure given the model and the evidence.

Equation 8 is a straightforward example of the broader group of models that feature propositions about systematic variations in the relationships between Y and X , which are represented by the interaction terms. Many central propositions in political science relate to systematic variations in the influence that one or more variables have on some outcome of interest. For example, central bank autonomy affects the influence central governments have on inflation. The bank's autonomy does not contribute directly to inflation but alters the ability of incumbent governments to manage the macroeconomy in accord with its preferences. William R. Clark suggests that most studies of the effects of institutions, of cultural differences, and of applications of game-theoretic models require

models with interaction terms. The need to model systematic variations in coefficients is evident in sociology as well. Parameters describing important aspects of the intergenerational transmission of occupational status are expected to vary nationally and temporally.

Estimation of the simplest models with interaction terms have been the subject of considerable and long-standing discussion in political science. In models such as Brader's, the interaction terms constitute another explanatory variable, and the model remains linear in the parameters, which justifies the use of a linear model such as OLS or probit in Brader's study. Statistical inference about the marginal effects on Y of changes in an X require more complicated calculations than in models without interaction terms because these marginal effects change with the values of the exogenous variables.

An important variation in this structure with temporal models occurs when the coefficients vary with time. There are a number of different propositions one might make about the pattern of these variations. One can depict such models as $Y_t = X_t B(t) + U_t$, where $B(t)$ represents some function of time. The simplest variation is when there is a sharp break in the value at a critical point but the coefficients are constant on either side of that break. In this structure, $B_t = (B_1 + B_2 D_t)$, where D_t equals zero for intervals before the critical period and one for the periods following. This creates interaction variables that consist of the explanatory variable of interest multiplied by D_t . This shifts the relationship between Y_t and X_t up or down for the second period but leaves the relationship constant within these periods. More complicated variations in the relationship between Y_t and X_t can be modeled through a variety of functions, such as polynomials: for example, $B(t) = a_0 + a_1 t + a_2 t^2 + \dots + a_m t^m$. The more complex models necessitate more sophisticated estimation procedures than the linear models shown so far, but the main point is that these models, which are required for studying dynamic processes, as with studies of the federal open market committee and monetary policy, have a far more complex structure than Equation 4 or 5.

Random Coefficients. Models with randomly varying coefficients are used in a variety of contexts. Here, the relationships between Y and the X s are

not identical for all observations, as in Equation 5, nor do they vary in some systematic way with time or with other variables but are themselves random variables. The model with random coefficients can be represented by $Y_i = X_i B_i + U_i = X_i(B + \varepsilon_i) + U_i$, where ε_i denotes the variations in the relationship between Y and X among observations. If $E(\varepsilon_i) = 0$ for all observations, meaning that B_i is uncorrelated with X_i , then B denotes the mean effect of X on Y .

The random coefficients model has been used to critique the use of regression adjustments to experimental data. Some statisticians consider the outcome for individual i to be fixed or random for that individual conditional on whether the person is in the treatment or control group, respectively. These constant individual effects then vary among individuals, so that $Y_i = X_i T_i + (1 - X_i) C_i$, where X_i equals one if the subject is in the treatment group and T_i and C_i are the outcome for person i if she or he is in the treatment or control group, respectively. The average treatment effect is $\bar{T} - \bar{C} = (1/n) \sum_i T_i + (1/n) \sum_i C_i$, which corresponds to the mean of the coefficients on X_i and $(1 - X_i)$, for the treatment and control groups, respectively.

Estimation of the model with random coefficients requires one important condition and some specialized methods. The condition is that $\sum_{i=1}^n (X_{ik} - \bar{X}_k) \varepsilon_i = 0$ for all K explanatory variables, meaning that the coefficient variations are independent of each explanatory variable. If the condition is met, then OLS estimates are consistent but inefficient. More elaborate estimators are required for efficiency and to get the standard errors correct as the stochastic term created by inclusion of the coefficient variations does not meet the homoskedastic conditions for OLS estimation. If this independence condition is not met, the result is biased estimates for B . The correction if X and B_i are correlated involves modeling the systematic variations in B_i as a function of some exogenous variables, for example, $B_{ik} = Z_i A_k + \varepsilon_{ik}$, so that ε_{ik} is now uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. Including this expression for B_{ik} in Equation 5 gives the model with interaction terms between X_k and Z .

Hierarchical Models. Often the context for studying outcomes of interest consists of multiple levels. Individuals in voting studies reside

within a layer of election districts. In the United States, this hierarchy consists of municipalities, counties, congressional districts, and states. In the European Union, individuals are nested within districts, provinces, and countries. It is likely that the factors affecting individual behavior vary among these different higher level units but are constant for all individuals within a unit. Party organizations, resources, strategies, and competitiveness, which affect individuals' turnout and vote decisions, vary substantially among local areas and states. In democratic countries, there is substantial institutional variation, which affects individual decisions. Models that adequately represent these hierarchical relationships are more complex than Equation 5 and are an application of the previous models with interaction terms and random coefficients.

Models with these multiple levels, frequently referred to as hierarchical or mixed models, combine explicit interaction terms and random coefficients to represent these multilevel effects. Consider the following two-level model, where Y_{ij} refers to the outcome for person i residing in Level 2 of unit j , such as a state or a country; X_j refers to if individual-level explanatory variables; and Z_j refers to M variables describing state or country characteristics for unit j . The full model is

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{ij} &= B_{oj} + \sum_{k=1}^K X_{ijk} B_{kj} + U_{ij}, \\ B_{oj} &= A_{00} + \sum_{m=1}^M Z_{jm} A_{0m} + \varepsilon_{oj}, \\ B_{kj} &= A_{ok} + \sum_{m=1}^M Z_{jm} A_{km} + \varepsilon_{kj}. \end{aligned}$$

Combining these equations gives

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{ij} &= A_{00} + \sum_{m=1}^M Z_{jm} A_{0m} + \sum_{k=1}^K X_{ijk} A_{0k} \\ &+ \sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{m=1}^M X_{ijk} Z_{jm} A_{km} + U_{ij} \\ &+ \varepsilon_{oj} + \sum_{k=1}^K X_{ijk} \varepsilon_{kj}. \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

The A_{0m} terms estimate the Level 2 (e.g., state or country) effects on Level 1 (e.g., individual)

behavior by shifting the intercept for all individuals in the same Level 2 unit. The coefficients A_{0k} estimate the effects of individual-level variables on individual behavior. These are the terms in the conventional individual model possibly represented by Equation 5. Finally, the coefficients A_{km} indicate how the Level 2 factors, Z_j , alter the relationship between the individual variables and the individual outcome. For example, if the competitiveness of the two U.S. parties within a state affects both voter turnout in a state and the relationship between education and turnout, then the model needs to include an interaction term that is the respondent's education, X_{ijk} , times the two parties' competitiveness within state j , Z_{jm} . The ϵ_{0j} and ϵ_{kj} terms represent heterogeneity in the higher unit's intercepts and coefficients, respectively, and are terms in the random coefficients model just discussed.

Summary. There is a major distinction between the models described in this section and the one represented by Equation 4 or 5. Both structures are linear and separable in the parameters, meaning that the basic model is described by the expression $Y_i = \sum_{k=1}^K X_{ik}B_k + U_i$, but the models in this section are not linear and separable in the relations between Y and X . In Equations 4 and 5, $\partial Y/\partial X_k = B_k$ regardless of the value of X_k or of any other X . Transformations of Y and X such that $Y^* = f(Y)$ and $X^* = f(X)$ still leave the expression $\partial Y^*/\partial X_k^* = B_k$. In the models with interaction terms, the expected marginal change in Y for a marginal change in X_k is not the constant B_k . Consider the simple model with one interaction term:

$$Y_i = B_1 + B_2X_i + B_3Z_i + B_4X_iZ_i + U_i. \quad (10)$$

This produces the marginal relationship $\partial Y_i/\partial X_i = B_2 + B_4Z_i$. This changes the marginal relationship between Y and X , even to the point that for certain values of Z there may be no change in Y for a change in X , depending on the values of B_2 and B_4 . Any effort to use or mimic experimental methods to estimate $\partial Y/\partial X$ must take the context, meaning the value of Z , into account. More important, if the interest is in estimating how the relationship between Y and X varies with the value of Z , as it is in many

studies, one must have observations in which both X and Z vary. Estimation of both B_2 and B_4 may not require observational data, as Brader demonstrates, but it requires an estimation method that matches the structure of the model in Equation 10 and data with systematic variations in both X and Z .

Models With Interactions Among Observations

Some substantively important topics require models with explicit interactions among the observations, whether temporal or spatial. Such models are necessary to examine the temporal dynamics of social processes and their possible equilibrium properties. The extensive work on the interaction of macroeconomic and political conditions exemplifies such models. In these studies, the effects of conditions in one time period on conditions in later periods are an explicit part of the model, the data, and the estimation procedures. There is increasing interest in models that include explicit interactions among individuals or geographically defined units. Communication of political attitudes and information among individuals and the diffusion of policy innovations among states are examples of these substantive interests. The substantive questions focus, at least in part, on the interdependence of observational units, and this interaction is more than a statistical nuisance. Models that treat the interdependence of either temporal or cross-sectional units as an integral part of the structure are more complex than those in Equations 4 and 5 and require sophisticated statistical methods to estimate these interactions.

Interdependencies among observations imply a different model and their estimation requires different statistical methods from those derived from the experimental paradigm. A central necessary condition of the experimental method and of the techniques developed to mimic it is that each observation is observed and is behaving independently of all the other units observed. This is referred to as the SUTVA (stable unit treatment value assumption) condition. In the context of Gosnell's and other voter turnout field experiments, it means that there is no interaction between someone receiving the "treatment," for example, a mailing or a phone call, and an individual not receiving the treatment. For subjects living in the same neighborhood and

possibly attending meetings of the same local organizations, such as a church or PTA, this condition might be problematic. The basic premise for SUTVA is obviously violated for studies of how units interact, be they time periods, individuals, or political units.

Temporal Interdependence. For studies of dynamic processes, the interactions among observational units are a primary focus. Even when an examination of the temporal interactions is not the primary interest but one must use observational time-series data, the possible interdependence cannot be ignored but must be included in the model. At one point, these interactions were treated as nuisance terms that had to be diagnosed and then dealt with statistically in order to obtain efficient estimators and accurately estimated standard errors. The extensive use of the Durbin-Watson statistic and of models with first-order autocorrelated error terms exemplifies this thinking.

Increasingly, this autocorrelation is interpreted as being substantively interesting, and efforts being made to incorporate temporal interdependencies into the model. Consider the commonly used error correction model (ECM), which is an elaborated version of Equation 6:

$$\Delta Y_t = \Delta X_t B_1 + (1 - \rho)(Y_{t-1}^* - Y_{t-1}) + U_t, \quad (11)$$

where $Y_{t-1}^* = (1 - \rho)^{-1}(B_0 + X_{t-1} B_2)$ is the long-run equilibrium value of Y at time $t - 1$ given X_{t-1} and $\rho < 1$. Changes in Y from $t - 1$ to t depend on its responsiveness to exogenous shocks, defined by $\Delta X_t B_1$; and how quickly Y responds to being out of equilibrium, given by $(1 - \rho)(Y_{t-1}^* - Y_{t-1})$. With appropriate manipulation of terms, this model is estimated as

$$\begin{aligned} Y_t &= B_0 + X_t B_1 + X_{t-1}(B_2^* - B_1) + \rho Y_{t-1} + U_t \\ &= B_0 + X_t B_1 + X_{t-1} B_2 + \rho Y_{t-1} + U_t. \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

In time-series models of the macropartisanship of the U.S. electorate, for example, the interest is in whether the electorate's partisanship responds to short-term economic shocks, ΔX_t , and how quickly it returns to equilibrium after these shocks. The ECM also predicts a new equilibrium, given by $Y^* = (1 - \rho)^{-1}[B_0 + X^*(B_1 + B_2)]$, if there is a permanent shift in the exogenous variables from

X_{t-1} to X^* and estimates how long it takes to approximate that equilibrium. In this framework, macropartisanship might shift to a new equilibrium if the electorate permanently shifts its preferences on a major issue, if the parties adopt new platforms, and/or if the electorate sees a permanent shift in the parties' ability to manage economic or foreign policy issues.

Spatial and Individual Interdependence. The treatment of cross-sectional interdependence is experiencing a comparable and extensive transformation. One approach treats the stochastic terms as spatially interdependent and develops tests and methods for incorporating this interdependence. There is no causal interdependence, whereby the actions of one unit influence the actions or outcomes in the other units. An example of this stochastic interdependence would be a model of voter turnout in election districts where bad weather reduces turnout and weather patterns are not confined to individual districts but spill across boundaries, reducing turnout in the adjacent districts. More substantively interesting models incorporate interdependence whereby the actions or outcomes in one unit directly influence the actions of the other units. This type of interdependence has a long history in political science research. Propositions about how political attitudes are communicated among individuals and about the diffusion of policy innovations among states within the United States are examples.

Here is the formal distinction between the two types of interdependence:

Stochastic interdependence:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_i &= \sum_{k=1}^K X_{ik} B_k + \varepsilon_i, \\ \varepsilon_i &= \lambda \sum_{j=1}^N w_{ij} \varepsilon_j + U_i \end{aligned}$$

gives

$$Y_i = \sum_{k=1}^K X_{ik} B_k + \lambda \sum_{j=1}^N w_{ij} \varepsilon_j + U_i. \quad (13)$$

Structural interdependence:

$$Y_i = \rho \sum_{j=1}^N w_{ij} Y_j + \sum_{k=1}^K X_{ik} B_k + \varepsilon_i. \quad (14)$$

The terms w_{ij} indicate the pattern of interdependence among observations, so that $w_{ij} = 0$ if units i and j are independent and $w_{ij} \neq 0$ otherwise. There are various ways to measure w_{ij} for the non-independent case, depending on how dense one expects the interactions to be and whether one standardizes each unit's values for w based on the number of connections. The terms λ and ρ indicate the magnitude of the stochastic and structural interdependence, respectively.

In Equation 13, the expected effect on Y_i of a change in X_{ik} remains fixed and is given by B_k . Random shocks in one observation are shared among the other observations as their effects are propagated through the other stochastic terms. This indicates that the stochastic terms in the equation to be estimated are no longer independent, which means that the OLS estimates are unbiased but inefficient and the computed standard errors are incorrect. In Equation 14, by contrast, any change in X_{ik} leads to direct and indirect changes in Y_i as its effects are propagated through the other observations. The total magnitude of these direct and indirect effects depends on the structure of interdependence, the w_{ij} s, and the magnitude of the interdependence, ρ . [These effects are shown better in matrix notation as $Y = (I - \rho W)^{-1}(XB + \varepsilon)$, where W is an $N \times N$ matrix showing the full pattern of interdependencies.] This latter model is by far the more *substantively* interesting as it proposes some form of strategic or learning behavior among the units. This would be the appropriate model for discussing the diffusion of innovations among states or the communication of political information. Common programs such as Stata describe and include various tests and estimation procedures for each type of interdependence.

Summary. The substantive questions that motivate Equations 11 and 14 are different from the ones embodied in Equation 4 or 5. The parameter ρ , which measures the interdependence among units, does not have an analog in Equation 5. So it is not surprising that the structure of the models is different, even to the point that Equation 14 is not even linear in the coefficients. Estimation of ρ , and therefore of the whole model, requires different types of data

and methods. Furthermore, the observational interdependence embodied in ρ is not a nuisance parameter or a property of the data to be excised, if possible. It represents a substantive part of the model.

Nonlinear Models

The most general version of the model in Equation 3 is nonlinear in the coefficients. This form is useful for modeling a large set of complex processes. The model in Equation 14 is an example of a model that is nonlinear in its coefficients. Some models with interaction terms can become nonlinear in the parameters. For example, a model of central bank and governmental control of monetary and inflation policy posits interaction terms that are functions of unobserved variables, which are modeled as functions of observables. When the functions for the latent variables are introduced as interaction terms, it produces a model that is nonlinear in the coefficients because of the constrained multiplicative terms.

Nonlinear dynamic systems are likely to include nonlinear functions of parameters. Processes that might be path dependent, for example, have received considerable attention in some areas of political science. Path dependence in a temporal process requires a time-varying transition parameter. Incorporating this requirement in a dynamic model similar to Equation 6 requires a ρ_t that is a function of time-varying variables in the system, denoted by Z_t , giving $\rho_t = \rho(Z_t)$. This variation in and extension to the temporal models discussed above gives

$$\begin{aligned} Y_t &= \rho_t Y_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_t) X_t B + U_t \\ &= \rho(Z_t) Y_{t-1} + [1 - \rho(Z_t)] X_t B + U_t. \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

There is an important difference between this model and the ECM model in Equation 11, although Y has the same long-run equilibrium in both if $\rho_t < 1$ for all t . In the ECM model ρ is constant, while here ρ varies with time as a function of the values of Z_t . The constraints on a dynamic system are that $0 \leq \rho_t \leq 1$, which implies that it is a nonlinear function of Z_t . An example of such a function is $\rho = a_1 e^{-a_2 Z_t^2}$, which ensures that $0 \leq \rho_t \leq a_1$. The resulting model has important

dynamic properties that are vastly different from those of the linear model in Equation 5, and possibly even Equations 6 and 11. For example, if $a_1 = 1$, meaning that $\rho_t < 1$ when $Z_t^2 \neq 0$ and $\rho_t = 1$ when $Z_t^2 = 0$, if the variance of U_t goes to zero as Z_t goes to zero, it produces a path-dependent sequence for Y_t , whose equilibrium value depends both on the values for X_t , as in Equations 6 and 11, and on the sequence of values for X_t and for U_t prior to the point where $Z_t = 0$. If the variance of U_t does not go to zero when $\rho_t = 1$, the process becomes what is called a random walk after $Z_t = 0$.

If the stochastic term is separable and additive, as it is in Equation 15, a method called nonlinear least squares can be used to estimate the model's coefficients. Derivation of the nonlinear least squares estimator is straightforward. As in Equation 3 let $Y_t = F(X_t, B)$ and $\hat{Y}_t = F(X_t, b)$, and let there be K coefficients B_k to be estimated. As with OLS, the nonlinear method chooses the values for each b_k that minimize the expression $\sum_{t=1}^T e_t^2 = \sum_{t=1}^T (Y_t - \hat{Y}_t)^2 = \sum_{t=1}^T [Y_t - F(X_t, b)]^2$. The central term in this minimization is the matrix of the partial derivative of each $F(X_t, b)$ with respect to each coefficient b_k , $f(X_t, b_k) = \partial F(X_t, b) / \partial b_k$. There are K such derivatives for each observation, which when done for all T observations gives a $T \times K$ matrix. The non-linear least squares estimator is the solution to the set of K nonlinear simultaneous equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{t=1}^T f(X_t, b_k) e_t &= \sum_{t=1}^T f(X_t, b_k) (Y_t - \hat{Y}_t) \\ &= \sum_{t=1}^T f(X_t, b_k) Y_t \\ &\quad - \sum_{t=1}^T f(X_t, b_k) [F(X_t, b)] = 0. \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

With the linear model, $\hat{Y}_t = \sum_{k=1}^K X_{tk} b_k$, and the partial derivative of $\hat{Y}_t$ with respect to b_k is simply X_{tk} , so the j th equation in Equation 16 then becomes

$$\sum_{t=1}^T X_{tj} e_t = \sum_{t=1}^T X_{tj} \left(Y_t - \sum_{k=1}^K X_{tk} b_k \right) = \sum_{t=1}^T X_{tj} Y_t - \sum_{k=1}^K b_k \sum_{t=1}^T X_{tj} X_{tk} = 0,$$

which is the familiar expression for the OLS estimator. (In matrix form, this expression is $X'Y - (X'X)b = 0$, which may be more familiar.) Finding the solution to the equations in Equation 16 is much more complicated than for the OLS estimator, but with the power of current computers and numerical methods, most estimations can be accomplished relatively easily. The resulting estimates are consistent and asymptotically normally distributed.

As in many models of nonlinear dynamic systems and other applications of nonlinear least squares, the substantive process is best, or possibly only, modeled by a structure that is nonlinear in the coefficients. Also, in many of these applications, accurate parameter estimates are very important as the models may have vastly different equilibrium and dynamic properties for different coefficient values, as is the case with the model of path dependence above. The properties of these models render the linear model inappropriate, giving rise to the need for a nonlinear estimator. Fortunately, as various simulation studies illustrate, the nonlinear least squares estimator performs quite well, even for potentially difficult parameter values.

Multi-Equation Models

Some important processes can only be represented by multiple equations, as there are several interacting endogenous variables, and these interactions are the central concern. The Blau and Duncan model of occupational status attainment features two predetermined but not necessarily exogenous variables, father's occupation and education, and three outcome measures for the respondent, education, first job, and current job status. These five variables are organized in a hierarchical system in which the variables expressed earlier in the system are not functions of the variables included later. By then treating all the stochastic terms in the separate equations as uncorrelated (a strong assumption), the system is recursive and can be estimated with the same methods used to estimate Equation 5. This early multi-equation model stimulated an extensive amount of work on models with multiple outcomes. This subsequent work and earlier but related work in economics removed both the hierarchical structure and the condition

of uncorrelated stochastic terms, leaving a fully endogenous system.

A much more complex example is Brandt's and Freeman's recent model of the U.S. macropolitical economy. This model uses nine equations to model the contemporaneous interaction of nine economic and political variables, emphasizing the dynamic interactions within the political economy. Each of these variables is the left-hand-side variable in one equation and a right-hand-side variable in the others. Multi-equation systems with joint endogenous variables, whether hierarchical or not, present difficult estimation problems as the endogeneity of the variables included in each equation violates the basic principle of independence between the explanatory variables and the stochastic term, referred to earlier as the exogeneity condition.

As with some of the previous models, the early treatment of multi-equation models considered the presence of endogenous variables in an equation to be a necessary nuisance resulting from the observational nature of the data. There is an extensive literature in econometrics related to dealing with these nuisances, usually under headings such as endogenous regressor, instrumental variables, two-stage least squares, or simultaneous equations. These concerns are real, and endogeneity poses serious estimation problems, even in the best of conditions.

The thumbnail description of the IV estimator is as follows. The equation being estimated is

$$y_t = \sum_{k=1}^K X_{tk} B_k + \sum_{m=1}^M Y_{tm} C_m + U_t, \quad (17)$$

where the X_k s are exogenous variables and the Y_m s are endogenous variables. The Y_m s are considered endogenous because they are correlated with U . IV estimation requires one or more exogenous variables, denoted by Z_l , that are correlated with Y_m but uncorrelated with U . There must be at least as many instruments as there are included endogenous variables, that is, $L \geq M$. Formally, these requirements are that $E\left(\sum_{t=1}^T Z_{tl} Y_{tm}\right) = \sigma_{lm} \neq 0$ and that $E\left(\sum_{t=1}^T Z_{tl} U_t\right) = \sigma_{lu} = 0$. (These conditions are usually stated as probability limits, but the covariance form is easier to picture.) Informally, this means that y is related to each instrument variable Z_l , but only because of Z_l 's

association with Y_m ; that is, Z_l has no direct association with y .

The natural experiments discussed earlier can be a good source of instruments. If the consequences of some natural event, such as the local severity of a hurricane's winds, are a random event, then measures of this event can be good instruments. The research estimating the ability of federal aid to build support for an incumbent administration had to treat the amount of aid distributed to communities as endogenous as it was also proposed that aid distribution was influenced by votes for the incumbent in previous elections. The hurricane's intensity should be related to the amount of aid, but because of the randomness of hurricane paths, wind intensity should be uncorrelated with previous vote patterns over the larger area covered by the hurricane.

The selection of instruments is often aided by the model itself. Many applications contain equations modeling each of the endogenous variables in the system, which means that there are separate equations for each Y_m in addition to the equation for y . This set of equations is referred to as a structural model, and each equation will usually contain both exogenous and endogenous explanatory variables. In estimating the equation for y , the exogenous variables not included in this equation but that are included in the equations for the other endogenous variables become the natural instruments. Denote by X^* the K^* exogenous variables that are included in the equations for Y_m but are not included in the equation for y . The variables in X^* become the instruments, that is, the Z s. The propositions that argue for their inclusion in the other equations imply that they are correlated with Y_m . The logic for excluding them from the equation for y is that they are uncorrelated with U . Together these define the properties of an instrument.

A necessary condition for estimating the equation for y is that the number of included endogenous variables be less than or equal to the number of excluded exogenous variables, $M \leq K^*$. This, however, is only a necessary condition. The sufficient conditions, referred to as identification, require a more detailed knowledge of which variables in X^* are related to which included endogenous variables. If there is only one included endogenous variable—for example, the structural model contains only two equations—the necessary

condition is also the sufficient condition. Determining if the equation for y is identified and can be estimated if it contains more than one endogenous variable is a more exacting process, for which there are no simple, uniform rules. A more detailed discussion of identification and how to determine if an equation is identified can be found in any econometrics textbook.

IV estimation is a general estimation strategy for equations with endogenous variables. Its application to multi-equation systems is a special case. Regardless of the application, the requirements for IV estimation are the reason why one should approach IV estimation with caution, because they may be difficult to meet. The requirement that the Z_s , or the X^*_s , and Y_m be correlated can be tested as these variables are observed. The tests for this correlation require more than a simple correlation. First, what is important is the partial correlation between Y_m and the Z_s , controlling for the included exogenous variables, the X_k s. Second, if there is more than one included endogenous variable, each Y_m must be correlated with a different instrument or set of instruments. This is another statement of the identification condition, but it means that it must hold for the data at hand, not just as a theoretical statement.

The condition that the Z_s and U are uncorrelated is not testable, as U is not observed. In cases where there are more instruments than endogenous variables, that is, $K^* = L > M$, referred to as the over identified case, there are some weak tests for the adequacy of the instruments. These tests are based on the fit between the residuals from the estimated equation for y and the instruments. The better this fit is, the less likely the instruments are to be independent of U . But these are relatively low-power tests, meaning that they are not highly reliable for deciding whether to accept the null hypothesis of independence.

There are other, and very different, estimation strategies for accommodating endogeneity as illustrated by the model of the U.S. macropolitical economy mentioned earlier. But they are beyond the scope of this entry. These estimation methods rely on different constraints and assumptions from those in the IV estimator. They also nicely illustrate the development, specification, and use of multi-equation models to provide important insights into the intricate interactions among the

components of complex social phenomena. Substantive use of these models extends far beyond models of political economy. The challenge in these models is to continue to develop estimation methods that are tailored to the models and to the types of data available to estimate these models. The estimation task posed by these models is not simply the reliance on observational data due to the difficulty, maybe impossibility, of performing experiments that carefully and exogenously manipulate one variable at a time. The central feature of these models is how to represent and then to estimate the complex contemporaneous and lagged interactions among a set of variables, which are endogenous because of these interactions.

Concluding Comments

The focus of this entry is on models that represent causal statements about social processes and on some of the data and estimation methods that are consistent with these models. The models discussed here (from Equations 4 through 17, regardless of whether the data are derived from experiments or observations, share one common feature. The stochastic component is separable and additive to the systematic part. This condition simplifies the estimation process and facilitates derivation of the estimator's statistical properties. There are methods beyond the scope of this discussion that rely on other specifications, assumptions, and conditions that need to be considered in any empirical study.

There are a variety of strategies one might use to estimate and evaluate the various models. There is no single "best" method for all studies. The choice of estimation method should follow from the substantive question, from the model used to study that question, and from the available data. The limitations of OLS regression in accurately estimating Equation 5 with observational data are well documented, if not always acknowledged in practice. Lab experiments are often considered the "gold standard," and they have very desirable properties in many contexts. They also need to be considered carefully. The experimental setting, stimuli, and subjects must closely approximate the actual setting, stimuli, and individuals on which the results will be applied. Artificial experimental

settings may generate artificial findings. Field experiments will overcome the validity concerns but may raise other problems. Randomization and double-blindedness may be difficult to achieve when working with real organizations with their own agendas and procedures.

Natural experiments and regression discontinuity designs and matching methods all use observational data. This gives them the advantage of analyzing “real” data from “real” subjects in their natural setting and in ways that can overcome some of the problems associated with regression analysis of observational data. One must be sure, however, that there are no subtle selection processes that prevent true randomization. For example, in the studies based on lottery winnings, can one be sure that those with large winnings were not playing different games from those with small earnings and thus might have different personal characteristics that could be correlated with how the money was spent or with political attitudes? In the regression discontinuity study of incumbency mentioned earlier, the electoral margins were taken as $50\% \pm 2.5\%$. Is assignment to incumbency or nonincumbency still random within that range? And what about a margin of $\pm 1\%$ or $\pm 5\%$? With matching methods, one must be sure there are no unobservables omitted from the propensity score that might be correlated with the treatment. Matching procedures can also be compromised by subtle biases in the selection processes and the failure of those in the treatment group to actually receive the treatment. Subjects reachable by phone may have different characteristics from those who are not, and receiving a mailing is not the same thing as receiving and reading a mailing.

There is an important aspect to the decision about what method to employ that is not captured in the debates about the limitations of observational data, regressions, experiments, and the methods that mimic them. This is the match, or mismatch, between the proper causal model, the available data, and the empirical method. For models with additive and separable variables, such as Equations 4 and 5, experiments, when possible, and the methods that mimic them with observational data are indeed powerful tools that should be and are used regularly. But, as discussed here, there are many models of important substantive

phenomena in the social sciences and many types of data for which these methods are inadequate. As always in the social sciences, and maybe other sciences as well, this situation leads to some less than desirable choices. One can choose to study phenomena that are suited to particular methods because of their desirable properties, for example, sticking with phenomena that can be studied experimentally or with matching techniques. But this means choosing substantive topics that are well modeled by the additive and separable equations and the SUTVA condition. One can choose to use methods that are powerful in one setting to examine phenomena that are better represented by more complex models, in the hope that the power of the method trumps the cost of having an inadequate model. Or one can examine substantive questions of interest with the appropriate models and the best available methods and data, recognizing the limitations of each. Good science requires a combination of the three, with a conscious and modest admission of their limitations. It is also the case that important methodological advances have come from efforts to advance the third strategy.

Particularly in the case of the third strategy, where the substantive questions require complex models, where the available and observed data may be far from perfect, and where the “best” methods are weak, the process of building confidence in causal statements and applications will be slow and highly contested. Scientists would do well to follow the description of this process offered by Arthur Stinchcombe quite a while ago, which every empirical researcher should read. He is very emphatic that not only can empirical research not prove theories, it seldom rejects theories. What it does do is lend credibility to theories. This credibility is enhanced with a cumulation of studies in multiple settings and with multiple types of data and methods. For some questions and evidence, this credibility may quite high. But for many others, because of the complexity of the causal process that connects X to Y of the available data, or because of the limitations of even the most appropriate best methods, this credibility may remain low and contestable. In this context, proposals for another study, for a new design, or for the use of a new method are a critical part of normal science. As is some honest modesty about

what is and can be learned from each study and with each method.

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See also Methodology; Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions

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STRATEGIC (SECURITY) STUDIES

Within the discipline of political science, the study of security was, until the 1990s, dominated by strategic studies. The end of the Cold War dealt a significant blow to the legitimacy of strategic studies as the centerpiece of the study of security, resulting in the transformation of the field into what we now know as security studies. This entry traces the history of that transformation, beginning with the evolution of strategic studies, its challengers, and the emergence of security studies as the new moniker for the field. It begins with the so-called golden age of strategic studies, in which the central concepts of Cold War security and defense were elaborated, and in particular, intellectual work was performed to integrate nuclear weapons into the discussion on national defense. It then considers the other two periods of Cold War strategic studies: the first characterized by the operationalization of arms control in the period of détente and the second coincident with the period known as the Second Cold War. As the Second Cold War swiftly gave way to the rapid transformation of Europe and the Cold War's end, the criticisms of strategic studies that had been voiced throughout its history gained greater purchase within the discipline. The entry traces first the emergence of security studies in the 1990s as a reformed study of security after the Cold War's end and then the changes wrought to the field by the events of September 11, 2001. The final section in the entry considers the state of the field today.

The close connection of the periodization of strategic and security studies with the major events of the postwar world is no accident. Security studies is a policy science and was intimately connected to the creation of the national security state in the United States following World War II. The close connection of academic disciplines and the security state is by no means unique to strategic studies and has been particularly noted in the creation of area studies within political science, but the ties were particularly overt in the case of strategic studies. While strategic studies developed as a recognized academic discipline within the universities, it was always closely tied to military institutions, as in the case of the RAND Corporation, formed to

conduct research for the U.S. Air Force. As a policy science with a military focus, strategic studies was underpinned theoretically by the political realism that emerged in the 1950s as the dominant approach to the study of international relations (IR) in the English-speaking world. Even as the marginal variant of realism, liberal institutionalism, grew in importance in the 1970s and 1980s, strategic studies remained largely immune, and was, indeed, at the heart of the reassertion of a parsimonious “neorealism” in the period. With the development of security studies, theoretical pluralism has developed in the field, with the various theoretical traditions of IR reflected in security studies. This pluralism has included the development of what has become termed *critical security studies*, drawing the traditions of critical social theory into the study of security—which has, in turn, led to the suggestion that security itself be abandoned.

Strategic Studies

In the aftermath of World War II, the United States undertook one of the largest reorganizations of its state institutions in its history—a reorganization exceeded only by that following the events of September 11, 2001. The centerpiece of this reorganization was the National Security Act of 1947, but that was only the most prominent piece of legislation among a range of legislative and executive actions that collectively created the U.S. national security state. Explaining the nature and meaning of this transformation of the U.S. state depends on the theoretical position taken to look at it. The overt explanation, accepted by most in the mainstream of IR and reflected in strategic studies, is that the United States was responding to the emergence of a global threat posed by its erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union. Based on this reading, the National Security Act (1947) and its attendant reorganization of the U.S. state were strategic responses to the security threat of the former USSR, designed to achieve “national security” for the United States. One problem with this explanation is that the very idea of “national security” was a product of the same processes that gave rise to the national security state in this period. Scholars informed by critical theories have therefore argued that the national security state and the threat to

which it purports to respond were both a creation of the same practices, designed to maintain an increasingly globalized American liberal capitalism.

On either account of the creation of the national security state, the development of strategic studies paralleled the state’s transformation and supported the goals of U.S. national security. The nature of the enterprise, however, is seen rather differently in each account. The mainstream view is that strategic studies developed as a policy-relevant science in response to the same problem that gave rise to the transformation of the U.S. state: the growing animosity between the United States and the former USSR and the addition of nuclear weapons to the traditional great power conflict. The goal of strategic studies, based on this view, was to build on previous work on great power relations and the nature of warfare in order to understand the dynamics of the emergent Cold War and to develop concepts for understanding the application of force and the provision of defense in the nuclear era. Critically informed scholars reject this reactive view of the strategic studies field and see rather that the conceptual development performed by strategic studies was part of the production of a particular kind of United States, a particular kind of Soviet Union as its enemy, and of the specific form the nuclear-armed Cold War took. This entry will provide an account largely consonant with the critical view of the place of strategic studies, both because it is more compelling and because the mainstream account is easily read through the critical one.

Strategic Studies’ Golden Age

The “golden age” of strategic studies was dominated by the question of nuclear weapons. Indeed, nuclear weapons provided the *raison d’être* for strategic studies as a separate, civilian, academic enterprise in the context of the early Cold War and the production of the national security state. The problem strategic studies set out to solve was how to normalize nuclear weapons—that is, how to take a technology whose destructive power was orders of magnitude greater than any that had preceded it and make of it a usable military and political instrument. The scale of the problem was magnified soon after the field’s founding when the United States successfully tested a thermonuclear

device in 1954, making the explosive potential of nuclear arms all but unlimited. The explosives that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki were roughly the equivalent of 25,000 tons of high explosive; the thermonuclear devices that were developed after that initial test in 1954 are measured in the millions of tons of equivalent trinitrotoluene (TNT). Plotting how to make something this destructive appear meaningfully as a “weapon” was truly, in Herman Kahn’s evocative phrase, “thinking about the unthinkable.”

Deterrence

The primary solution that was developed by strategic studies to the problem of nuclear weapons and national security was the theory of deterrence. The basic concept of deterrence is quite simple, as it involves issuing a threat of some kind in an attempt to prevent another from doing something that they would otherwise do. Even as a military concept, deterrence much predates the nuclear age, as the issuing of threats is a common military tactic. Nuclear deterrence is different in two ways, however. First of all, strategic studies reformulated deterrence as a strategy rather than a tactic, and second, it developed deterrence to be mutual.

The elevation of deterrence from tactic to strategy solved the central problem of nuclear weapons for the national security state. A strategy of deterrence placed nuclear devices at the heart of the military (and political) organization but structured the system of management in such a way that the devices did not need to be detonated to be useful. Deterrence produced nuclear devices as “weapons” in name only, as they were intended only to be used as a threat; the actual use of nuclear weapons would mark the failure of deterrence. Deterrence is therefore an elegant solution to the problem of vast destructive capability being framed as “weapons,” because it produces a strategy that never actually calls on the explosive potential of the devices to be realized.

As elegant as the deterrence solution is to the nuclear problem, it raises a number of problems of its own, not the least of which is that it frees nuclear weapons from any rational constraints. A “normal” explosive weapon, the purpose of which is to be detonated in the course of a military campaign

to achieve certain ends, is limited by its tactical uses and the ends to be sought. Those uses and ends will largely dictate both the size of the explosive needed and the number of explosives in a usable arsenal. Together with some assumptions about the likely scale and duration of any conflict, military planners will have a fair sense of the necessary development of any given weapon. By contrast, deterrence produces nuclear weapons simply as the materialization of threat, rather than as explosives to be deployed, and so more and bigger are likely to be better as they are even more threatening than smaller and fewer.

Strategic studies provided one solution to the problem of constraint in developing nuclear deterrence as mutual. Without nuclear weapons, deterrence is generally a unilateral tactic: The relatively larger, stronger, more capable potential combatant can threaten the smaller and weaker to shape the latter’s actions, but the smaller, weaker combatant is unlikely to be able to threaten the stronger sufficiently to deter. Nuclear weapons were seen to change this simple equation, because if both sides in a conflict had them, they would be able to inflict tremendous damage on each other without one having first to “win” on the battlefield. This observation led to one of the most memorable products of golden age strategic studies: mutually assured destruction, or MAD. MAD was not considered a strategy but rather a condition. With enough weapons and delivery systems, both the United States and the Soviet Union would be able to inflict untold damage on each other, at the same time, regardless of anything either tried to do to defend itself.

Most of the work of golden age strategic studies was devoted to operationalizing a strategy of deterrence in conditions of MAD. Central to this effort was the concept of “strategic balance,” which provided an answer to the problem of limits. Deterrence, strategic studies argued, would be workable in conditions of MAD if the two sides were roughly equivalent. It is worth noting that this conclusion does not derive from the logic of nuclear deterrence under MAD, where all that is necessary is to retain the capacity to devastate an opponent under any conditions, and so the relative size of the arsenals is irrelevant. However, a strategic imbalance in which the former USSR held more weapons than the United States was politically

unacceptable and so was never seriously countenanced in strategic studies, an indication of the mutually constitutive relationship between the study of strategy and the production and maintenance of the national security state.

While strategic stability provided a relative solution to the problem of limits, it provided no guidance in absolute terms. As long as there was rough parity and the two arsenals were configured in such a way that MAD obtained (i.e., each retained a so-called survivable second-strike capability), the absolute numbers of arms could continue to climb. The solution to the arms race problem was the second major output of strategic studies' golden age: the theory of arms control.

Arms Control

While deterrence theory provided no upper limit on the level at which strategic stability could be achieved, it did have consequences for lower limits. The most important of these was that zero was not an option: Eliminating nuclear weapons does not allow for strategic stability in the terms developed by strategic studies. Before the emergence of strategic studies, attempts to limit arms were generally conceived in terms of disarmament—the United States had even attempted to entice the former USSR into mutual nuclear disarmament under the United Nations (UN) control with the Baruch Plan of 1946. With the elaboration of nuclear deterrence theory and the demonstrated ability of the former USSR to develop and build nuclear weapons, seemingly at the same pace as the United States, strategic studies took up the problem of devising limits to their development.

Through the latter half of the 1950s, following the test explosion of a Soviet thermonuclear device in 1955, strategic studies turned its collective attention to the question of controlling the development of nuclear weapons. This effort culminated in the special issue of the journal *Daedalus* in 1960, which was described by the issue's editor as a "handbook on the problems of arms control and national policy."

The two outputs of the golden age of strategic studies were intimately interconnected, as arms control was developed as a means of achieving the balance required of "strategic stability," which was in turn the necessary condition for the successful

functioning of deterrence. The handbook that strategic studies devised was then put into operation by the U.S. state throughout the 1960s, producing a series of bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements, culminating with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, 1968) on the multilateral side and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT, 1972) on the bilateral one.

While both the theory of deterrence and that of arms control were seen to be scholarly answers to objective problems, they were rather more political programs that required the mutual consent of those operating them to function. What this meant in particular was that the managers of Soviet military and foreign policies needed to accept the basic tenets of deterrence for both it and arms control to function, and initially they did not. Deterrence theory is more formally termed *rational-deterrence theory*, and the modifier "rational" is important. To develop its impressive edifice of theory, strategic studies assumed that decisions were taken by strategically rational men—that is, by applying a simple cost-benefit analysis to the situation in which the decision makers find themselves—and it further assumed that the costs and benefits associated with nuclear war were fairly clear. Those responsible for Soviet policy, however, had been trained in a tradition quite different from that of liberal economics, which gave rise to the parsimonious assumptions of strategic rationality and to the game theories that were derived from these assumptions, which, in turn, informed the strategy of deterrence.

For deterrence to function, therefore, the United States needed not only to build weapons and issue the appropriate threats but also to educate the Soviet Union in the intricacies of strategic rationality and the theory of deterrence that flowed from it. The arms control negotiations that followed strategic studies' development of an arms control theory in the 1950s therefore served two purposes in facilitating the functioning of deterrence. The first, overt function was to reach agreements on limits to the size and structure of the two sides' nuclear arsenals, creating the much sought strategic stability. However, at least as important, if not more so, was the educative function of the negotiations, as the U.S. delegations socialized their Soviet counterparts into the nature and functioning of deterrence theory. This was, perhaps, strategic

studies' greatest contribution to the successful functioning of the U.S. national security state—that is, the development of a body of concepts that could be successfully communicated to the Soviet Union to construct it as the particular enemy called for in the security doctrines of the United States. It was truly a singular achievement.

Détente and a New Cold War

The successful SALT negotiations ushered in a period of détente between the Soviet Union and United States and seemingly reduced the urgency of the problems that defined strategic studies as a field of inquiry. In the broader discipline of IR, this period was marked by the growth of liberal institutionalism as a challenge to political realism and a reorientation of the discipline toward issues of political economy and international cooperation rather than those of security and conflict. Interest in strategic studies waned through the 1970s, although the institutional basis in both universities and think tanks was not seriously eroded, and with the return of the Cold War following the election of Ronald Reagan to the U.S. presidency in 1980, strategic studies experienced what Stephen Walt has termed *a renaissance*.

As with the golden age, the renaissance in strategic studies was driven by the complicity of the academic field with the security policies of the United States. The Reagan administration ushered in what is generally termed the *Second Cold War*, a period of heightened rhetorical tension between the United States and the former USSR and of staggering growth in U.S. defense spending. In particular, two elements of the Reagan foreign policy required the intellectual talents of strategic studies: (1) dissatisfaction with a deterrence theory that pronounced any actual use of nuclear weapons as a failure and (2) a closely related desire to escape from nuclear vulnerability by technical means.

There are a number of terms used to denote the first of these changes in U.S. state attitude. The most official is the term *countervailing strategy*, but its opponents attempted to offset the poor public relations of MAD by terming it the *Nuclear Utilization Targeting Strategy*, or NUTS. Whatever term is used, it denotes a change in U.S. military thinking about the way in which nuclear weapons would be used in times of war. The golden age

answer to this question had been that nuclear weapons should be held as a threat and should only be used in the case of deterrence failure to punish the Soviet Union for not heeding those threats. The countervailing strategy, or NUTS, sought to develop a tactical doctrine for nuclear weapons, giving them a real military mission, with the ultimate goal not just of deterring the Soviet Union but of doing so by planning to win a nuclear war.

The shift to a countervailing strategy, which triggered the renaissance in strategic studies, is associated with the bellicose Reagan administration, but in fact, it was put into motion during the Carter administration. It represents, therefore, not a partisan shift in policy as much as a reinvigoration of the national security state, and, as with the foundation of that state in the 1940s and 1950s, strategic studies undertook much of the necessary intellectual work. Strategic studies through the 1980s was dominated by literature working through the problems posed by the countervailing strategy, testing them through the rigors of academic contestation by those still committed to deterrence strategies that were not so overtly war-fighting strategies.

The second prompt to the renaissance of strategic studies was rather more partisan in its origins, though it reflected the flip side of the move to a war-fighting strategy for nuclear deterrence: Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In the often-quoted words of the presidential speech that launched SDI in March 1983, the initiative was designed to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" by providing a defensive shield against incoming Soviet nuclear missiles. The strategic implications of a defense of this kind would have been extraordinary, though nothing compared with the technical achievements required to make it happen. The twin challenges of technology and strategy drove a second constituent of the strategic studies renaissance of the 1980s, as analysts grappled with how to realize Reagan's dream and also questioned whether or not it was a dream that should ultimately be pursued.

The renaissance of strategic studies also marks the apogee of the field as the heart of the study of security. Critics of strategic studies in the 1980s had increasing grist for their mills, as the patently absurd "winnable nuclear war" was taken up as a serious issue for scholarly debate, and similarly,

the science fiction dream of an impenetrable missile shield was actively pursued. While these two intellectual pursuits undermined the legitimacy of strategic studies, the ground on which it had been built was unceremoniously removed from underneath the field by the end of the Cold War.

The Critics of Strategic Studies

Given the close connection of strategic studies to the national security system in the United States, it is not surprising that much of the criticism of the field came from outside the United States. There were certainly criticisms of strategic studies raised within the United States in the 1980s, particularly from outside the discipline, but many of those with the deepest resonance came from scholars based in the United Kingdom (UK) and continental Europe.

One of the most extensive critiques of strategic studies was developed institutionally around peace studies. Peace studies, or peace research, as an alternative discipline to strategic studies was largely concentrated in Scandinavia (notably at the Stockholm Peace Research Institute and the Peace Research Institute of Oslo) and in the UK. Peace studies grew alongside strategic studies in the post-war period, and where strategic studies were largely the product of political science, peace studies attracted substantial involvement from natural scientists, particularly nuclear scientists, who were concerned with the destructive potential their work had produced. It stressed pacifism in its approach to foreign policy and rejected the rational and instrumental approach to nuclear weapons adopted by strategic studies. In particular, peace studies argued that the potential devastation of nuclear conflict—including the potential extinction of the human species, what Jonathan Schell in an influential text called “second death”—meant that rational cost-benefit analysis was inappropriate and, particularly, that nuclear explosives had to be conceived as something other than military weapons. The peace studies’ critique did not gain much purchase within political science until the 1980s, when the MAD versus NUTS debate made the peace studies’ position considerably more generally comprehensible.

A second important line of critical argument was advanced by Ken Booth in the UK in an important book, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*. Booth also

took aim at the instrumental rationality of strategic studies, arguing that it represented a construct of a particular Western philosophical tradition. Decision makers outside that tradition, he argued, would not necessarily accept the arguments underpinning rational deterrence theory, nor, therefore, would they act in the ways predicted by strategic studies. The need to socialize the Soviet Union into the logic of deterrence is a clear example of the sort of problem Booth’s work raised.

A third line of criticism that has informed much of what followed in security studies after the end of the Cold War took issue with the narrowly military focus of strategic studies. The most prominent exponent of this criticism was Barry Buzan in his noted work *People, States & Fear*. Buzan argued that while military defense was, of course, important to the security of states, there were a number of other “sectors” in which states faced threats from which they needed to be secured. These sectors—political, economic, societal, and environmental, in addition to the military—call for security strategies that are not necessarily (indeed, not usually) military and thus for a study of security that is potentially quite different from that found in strategic studies.

Taken together, these and related criticisms of strategic studies informed a significant transformation in the study of security within political science following the end of the Cold War. Strategic studies was a creature of the Cold War in a number of quite fundamental ways. The national security state that it serviced was built for the Cold War, and the principal research focus of strategic studies was the Cold War nuclear contest between the East and the West. Even more significant than this, however, was the evident failure of political realism to anticipate or even explain the end of the Cold War. Realism was the theoretical foundation of strategic studies, and as the end of the Cold War undermined realism’s claims, so too did it undermine the legitimacy and supremacy of strategic studies as an approach to security.

Security Studies

The end of the Cold War appeared to transform the global security environment fundamentally. The contest between the Soviet Union and the United States had defined the international security

environment since the end of World War II. Its passage seemed to herald an era in which cooperation rather than conflict might define global security, in which direct military threats to the future of the state might recede in importance, and in which security was divisible—that is, not every security issue worldwide was connected to a central great power rivalry. Furthermore, the apparent changes to a more peaceful global order led many in both the West and the East to seek a “peace dividend,” an opportunity to redirect resources away from military security and toward other social goals.

Although the end of the Cold War was clearly a tremendous opportunity, it also posed a difficult problem for the management of international security. The Cold War had guided policy practitioners in the practice of security policy—they knew what the risks were, and they knew how to “go on” in conditions of Cold War. Indeed, providing the stock body of answers to the nature of the risks and the best means of response was precisely what strategic studies provided to the national security state through the latter half of the 20th century. Without the Cold War context, neither the risks nor the strategies were accepted as understood, and what is more, the discipline that had been providing the answers was undermined by its own failure to comprehend this extraordinarily significant change in its own object of study.

In this context of global political change, policy uncertainty, and intellectual fluidity, there grew a series of movements to redefine security, to understand it in some new way, and to provide a reconfigured study of security for the new era. These movements have given rise to what is now called, in political science, security studies, which is a much broader, theoretically plural, and interdisciplinary activity compared with strategic studies, which both preceded it and continues within it. The fragmentation and flowering of security studies began with a simple question: What is security?

What Is Security?

Booth (1991) characterized the study of security during the Cold War as “looking at world politics through a missile-tube and gun-sight” and said that in such a study “weapons provided most of

the questions, and they provided most of the answers—whatever the weapon, whatever the context, and whatever the cost” (pp. 315–316). Booth’s caustic comment points to the assumptions of strategic studies in the Cold War: that security, first and foremost, meant the defense of the state against external threats, specifically those that threaten the continued existence of the state itself. Such existential threats against the state are military threats, particularly nuclear threats, and the defense against them is primarily a military matter. In Walt’s (1991) terms, security concerned the “threat, use and control of military force” (p. 212).

Once the Cold War’s end undermined the military conception of both security and the study of security that followed from it, scholars took to asking the deceptively simple question “What is security?” The debates that followed from this question rapidly identified two axes along which answers could be organized. These axes followed from challenges to the two key elements of the traditional answer to the question of security by strategic studies: that it was the protection of *states* from *military threats*. The first axis emerged from considering the question of what security is by asking, “What if there are security threats to the state other than military threats?” This refinement on the question led to a discussion of the *broadening* of security. The second axis developed from challenging the first element of the traditional answer—the focus on states. This second line of argument began by asking what happens if we are concerned with securing objects other than the state, leading to a debate on *deepening* security. Post–Cold War security studies is, therefore, born from a debate characterized by the broadening and/or deepening of security.

Broadening Security: Multiple Threats/Multiple Responses

The arguments suggesting the broadening of security followed from, or largely reproduced, Buzan’s critique of strategic studies from *People, States & Fear*. Buzan had argued that the state was threatened in a range of ways, which could be organized into five sectors, of which the military was only one. The broadening argument looked at the other sectors Buzan outlined—the political, economic, societal, and environmental—to suggest

that a post-Cold War security needed to be concerned with the threats faced in these areas, at least as much as those in the military realm.

There is an important consequence of any move to broaden the security agenda by considering non-military threats to the security of the state: The military will not necessarily be the most useful tool in responding to those threats. Consider, for example, the threat supposedly posed to Western Europe by “communism” during the early Cold War. This is an evident example of a threat in the “political” sector, according to Buzan’s schema: a threat aimed at the organizational stability of the (in this case, liberal-capitalist) state. While there may have been a connection between the European Communists and the Soviet Union, the military could not provide any meaningful protection against that external influence, and it was entirely irrelevant to the ideological threat posed by the appeal of communist parties internally. The same is true of societal, economic, and, particularly, environmental threats.

The final of Buzan’s sectors—the environmental—attracted considerable attention in the debate over the broadening of security in the early 1990s. A variety of issues that later became gathered under the label of “climate change”—global warming, rising sea levels, desertification, and environmental pollution such as “acid rain”—were gathering significant political attention. Several of these were seen to pose important risks to the state, and a literature on “environmental security” developed as part of the argument for broadening security studies. Not only was the environmental security debate important in its own right, but it also raised a number of the issues that have defined much of the rest of security studies since the early 1990s.

The first question of the environmental security debate was what sort of security issue was posed to the state by environmental change. One line of argument was that environmental change posed a direct threat to the state, in much the same way as external armies did. Under extreme conditions, climatic change could threaten the very existence of the state. However, the conditions under which this was possible seemed extremely rare in most instances: The most common example raised was that of Pacific Island nations that could be inundated by rising sea levels. For the Western states generally serviced by security studies, however, it was difficult to imagine such a direct threat to their

continued existence. A second line of argument suggested that the environmental threat was not direct but rather that climatic change could produce effects that were generally recognized to be issues of security, most commonly the mass movement of people and conflict over increasingly scarce resources.

The second line of environmental security argument, that climatic change would produce conflict, did not fundamentally challenge the traditional notion of security as a military affair but rather argued that military threats could emerge from nontraditional locations. This rather conservative consequence bred a third argument within the environmental security debate, which focused on the contradiction between military means and environmental security. Essentially, the argument was that the military, in both preparation for and prosecution of wars, was tremendously destructive to the environment. Environmental security, this argument suggested, was therefore best seen as protecting the environment from the military! By making such an argument, however, its proponents posed a fundamental challenge to traditional security studies, as it was no longer the state that was to be secured but rather, in this case, the environment itself. Such a conclusion tied the “broadening” security arguments to the second stream of the security studies debate in the early post-Cold War period, that of considering “deepening” security.

Deepening Security: Protecting Other Referents

The “deepening” security discussion began from the question of whether what should be secured (i.e., the *referent object* of security) should be something other than the state. The environmental security debate led to the suggestion that it was the environment itself that needed protection from, among other things, the very practices that are generally considered to provide security. However, a number of other answers to this question were advanced in the context of the discussion of what security meant. Some argued that the state was a representative of a community—usually termed *the nation*—and that what should be secured was not the state as such but rather the nation. Others rejected the narrowness of even thinking of states as “nations” and suggested that security studies should be concerned with the security of communities,

regardless of the terms under which they were constituted. Any of these forms of communal argument were particularly useful in drawing attention to those circumstances in which the state, rather than *providing* security to its population, was an active threat to at least some part of that population.

The most influential argument for broadening security was drawn into security studies from international development, specifically the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) 1994 annual report, *New Dimensions of Human Security*. The basic notion of human security was that individuals, rather than states, should be the referent object of security. As the UNDP formulated it, human security was a very broad notion, encompassing all threats to the lives and livelihoods of people. In many ways, the UNDP's conception of human security was an attempt to reformulate the notion of development, particularly human development, in terms of "security," driven in part by a desire to capture some of the expected peace dividends from the end of the Cold War for the global development agenda.

Coming as it did, just as states, and the security studies that serviced them, were searching for a way to think about security in a post-Cold War world, human security has had a significant impact on both policy and scholarship. It has been picked up particularly by midranked states in the international system, who have seen in it a means of forging for themselves a significant role in the global security agenda, often otherwise dominated by the larger states. As the states and security studies have turned to human security, the breadth of the original UNDP conception has been lost. Indeed, two competing conceptions of human security have emerged from this debate, with Canada championing a conception of human security as "freedom from fear" and Japan championing one of "freedom from want," both of which are contained within the UNDP's formulation. Canada's formulation has had, perhaps, the most obvious policy impact, as it led to actions to ban antipersonnel land mines, a global plan of action on small arms and light weapons, and some consideration of action on child soldiers.

Securitization

The attempt by the UNDP to recast human development in terms of human security can be

usefully described using one of the most important concepts to be developed in post-Cold War security studies: that of "securitization." In these terms, it would be said that the UNDP attempted to "securitize" the development agenda, or at least some significant part of it, though it would then be a question of whether or not that "securitizing move" was successful. The term *securitization* was introduced into security studies by Ole Wæver, who then later teamed with Buzan to marry the latter's sectoral approach to securitization in order to form what has been termed the *Copenhagen School of security studies*. There are some deep tensions between securitization and Buzan's security sectors, and so in addition to the Copenhagen School, the idea of securitization has spawned a wide range of scholarship, often simply called "securitization studies."

The idea of "securitization" is at once simple and radical. Wæver counsels that we treat security as a "speech act," by which he means an utterance that produces something in the world by virtue of its being said. Promising is one of the more common examples of a speech act: A promise only exists by virtue of someone saying, "I promise." Wæver suggests that security only exists by virtue of someone authoritatively saying "such and such is an issue of security" and (importantly) having that utterance broadly accepted by its target audience. The effect of a successful securitization, he argues, is to remove an issue from the realm of normal politics and so make it possible for extraordinary means (often, but not necessarily, military means) to be applied in response.

The radical implications of securitization are also quite easily seen. Securitization fundamentally undermines the claims of political realists, and the forms of security study that follow them, that the world *is* a dangerous place, and security involves identifying the threats "out there" and responding appropriately. By contrast, securitization argues that there are no objective security threats; rather, an issue becomes a matter of security if and only if it is successfully securitized. Security is socially produced—socially constructed to use language common in the field—and securitization provides a broad conception of the means of that construction. Securitization also, therefore, makes security intensely political. While successful securitization removes an issue from normal politics (it is

worth thinking here of the range of extraordinary measures taken in response to “terrorism” as a security threat following 9/11), the act of securitization itself is a potential site of political contestation. For strategic studies, by contrast, security is “too important” for politics. What securitization illustrates is that this assertion by the academic study of security is part of the securitizing apparatus of the state, designed to insulate the most extreme forms of violent state action from political opposition.

Critical Security Studies

The treatment of security as a social construct and, therefore as a site of politics, is a feature of a number of approaches to security that have grown up in the period following the end of the Cold War, in addition to securitization studies. These approaches are loosely termed *critical security studies*, after a 1997 volume of the same name. The volume, and the conference from which it came, drew a range of scholars dissatisfied with strategic studies as the heart of the study of security and sought theoretical pluralism among the disaffected. Theoretical pluralism, however, does not sit well with the professional practices of academics, and so the inclusive home for opponents to the mainstream has divided into rather more exclusive and exclusionary literatures, largely along theoretical lines.

The first theoretical tradition that gathered under the critical security studies name was *social constructivism*, which had emerged in the United States in the late 1980s. Constructivism was concerned with the role of ideas in international politics, particularly the ways identities and interests were constructed in social interaction. Borrowing from Anthony Giddens’s ideas of structuration, IR constructivism sought to overcome the debate between agency and structure in IR through the reflexive production of identities and social institutions in world politics. The constructivist position, however, did not accept a complete break with the epistemological realism of mainstream IR, which closely allied it to the Copenhagen School and, particularly, securitization studies. The same is not true of the other two broad streams of critical security studies, which drew on continental European critical social theory for theoretical guidance: The first laid claim to the critical security studies label by virtue of its drawing its primary theoretical inspiration from the critical theory of the Frankfurt

School and the related post-Marxist German social theory; the second is a looser gathering of scholars informed by poststructural French social theory.

Critical Theory, with capitals, is a product of the Frankfurt School, which is both an institution and an intellectual tradition, and is associated with a series of important social theorists, including Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Walter Benjamin. The most prominent contemporary social thinker associated with the Frankfurt School is Jürgen Habermas. The ideas of these thinkers have been drawn into the study of security, largely by Booth and his colleagues at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, and so have spawned what is sometimes termed the *Welsh School of critical security studies*. The Welsh approach to security sees emancipatory politics at the heart of security studies—that is, security studies that in reality works for those presently oppressed by the global capitalist security system, rather than being an academic exercise undertaken by the national security state, which is the principal institution of that oppression.

Progressive political change is also a hallmark of the French tradition of social critique. French social theory is not so clearly organized into a school as is its German counterpart, but it is generally associated with the work of a number of influential French thinkers—Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Jean Baudrillard, among the most commonly cited in security studies—as well as a number of others with similar philosophical starting points: Slavoj Žižek, Judith Butler, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and Giorgio Agamben. What marks out the poststructural contribution to security studies is an acceptance of a radical epistemological break with the modern tradition, an epistemological break that is resisted by mainstream security studies, constructivism, and even the Welsh School. This break, often termed *antifoundationalism*, leads, for example, to an acceptance of contingency and contextuality in understanding social formations, including security institutions and practices. In relation to security, the contributions of a poststructural approach can be found most prominently in the work of David Campbell, Simon Dalby, and James Der Derian, among others. Poststructural security studies has also flourished in response to the dramatic reexpansion of the national security state following the 9/11 attacks.

Feminism and Security

Most accounts of security studies, even critical security studies, exclude feminist scholarship, and yet feminist work on security has flourished in the same period, and much of it draws on a similar range of mostly critical social theory, as do other parts of the field. The range of feminist scholarship is particularly important, because there is not one single feminist approach to security but rather feminist analysis begins from the full range of social theory—including liberal, post-Marxist, poststructural, and postcolonial—and in no way seeks to distill these theoretical traditions into a single “feminist” theory. What does unite feminist scholarship is a concern with gender in social life and, for those interested in security, the relationship of gender to security. *Gender* refers to the constitution of sex-related social differences, of masculinities and femininities, and so feminists are concerned with the ways in which these social categories are (re)produced and with its effects.

Feminist security scholarship has explored the ways in which masculinities and femininities have been produced in and through security institutions and practices, as well as the ways in which those institutions differentially affect the lives of men and women. The military is perhaps the quintessential such security institution, and much feminist scholarship has explored the ways in which the military produces and relies on a particular kind of masculinity (often termed *hypermasculinity*), which is also (re)produced in wider society. Feminist scholars have also demonstrated the ways in which, unsurprisingly, the hypermasculine and necessarily violent military has particular, and highly gendered, effects when it acts. These effects are seen most obviously in rape as a tactic of war and in the persistent use of prostitution to service soldiers in the field, both of which have been shown to be long-standing features of militaries. Indeed, Sandra Whitworth has turned the feminist gaze on UN Peacekeepers, and she found that donning a blue beret does not alter these violent, hypermasculine practices.

More broadly, much feminist scholarship can be said to show the way in which the national security state as a whole is a product and producer of patriarchy. In other words, the state and the form of “national security” it produces and practices, (re)produce a broad social structure that differentially benefits men at the expense of women. For an account of security studies, this finding is

particularly important, because of the role that security studies has played in providing intellectual service to the national security state. The inescapable corollary of the feminist critique of that state is that security studies is not only an enabler of the national security state but is a product and producer of gender inequality too. Security studies, in other words, is in itself a highly gendered practice.

The End of Security?

The post–Cold War era has seen a burgeoning of security. The peace dividend anticipated from the end of the superpower confrontation was never realized as the decade following the transformation of Europe saw the national security state reassert itself in novel ways. In its search for continued relevance, the national security state and its academic support, security studies, looked to the world outside the Central European front and found it dangerously unstable. The national security state and security studies, therefore, retooled to bring security to the violent hinterland—particularly when that hinterland bordered on the core, as it did in the wars of the former Yugoslavia. Security studies provided the intellectual resources for this retooling, providing a wealth of literature exploring the dynamics of what, most notably, Mary Kaldor has termed the *New Wars*. The fact that these new wars tend to be fought in some of the least advantaged parts of the world—Afghanistan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone, for example—has led to a growing merger between security and development, although ironically not in the fashion the UNDP would have hoped in launching its notion of human security. Rather than capturing the power and resources of “security” for the hard work of human development, the merger of security and development has harnessed the global development institutions to the national security state’s violent export of its liberal-democratic self.

Having survived the 1990s, security received its largest single boost since the end of World War II with the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. Suddenly, the homeland appeared once more to be under threat, and this time, unlike during the Cold War, even the United States had been successfully attacked. Security spread like a virus throughout Western societies in response: Antiterrorism legislation was passed, amended, updated, and passed again; borders became sites of ever-greater

scrutiny and potential violence; state surveillance spread rapidly; and a wide range of legal protections in Western societies, which had been won through centuries of struggle, were summarily cast off. The prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, stood as the symbol of this renewed security, but security was far from contained in an island limbo. The United States undertook the largest reorganization of its state structure since the National Security Act of 1947 with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which in turn has served as the model for the reinvigoration of the national security state among the allies of the United States. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that security studies has likewise flourished, since the transformed national security state has just as much need for intellectual support work as it did at its postwar founding.

Much of the work in security studies as it emerged from strategic studies, however, leads to troubling questions about the future practice of security studies itself. The original securitization work, for example, argued that the best security politics was “desecuritization,” an attempt to remove as much of it as possible from the ambit of security and into the realm of normal politics. The feminist work on the gendered character of the national security state similarly suggests that there is something deeply troubling about the services provided to that state by security scholars. Mark Neocleous gave a strong and clear voice to these questions in his 2008 book, *Critique of Security*, in which he suggested that security was the central logic of the liberal state, and so speaking in terms of security, even to oppose the extravagant security practices of the state, is to reproduce the national security state and insulate it from the possibility of political transformation. Just as security studies is maturing in its new, poststrategic studies guise, therefore, we are led to ask whether we have now reached the end of security.

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See also Arms Race; Constructivism in International Relations; Critical Theory in International Relations; Disarmament; Feminist Theory in International Relations; Postmodernism in International Relations; Realism in International Relations; War and Peace

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STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING

Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a very general statistical approach for modeling and estimating data. It is seen as a combination of factor analysis and regression or path analysis. These procedures are regarded as special cases of SEM. It contains, in addition, classical multivariate

techniques such as analysis of variance, analysis of covariance, dummy regression, and canonical correlation as special cases. A structural equation model contains latent variables that should correspond to theoretical constructs from substantive theory and their reflective indicators or items that form the measurement model. The relationships between the latent variables (constructs and factors) and their indicators (observed variables) are quantified by the corresponding factor loadings. The regression coefficients between the latent variables (structural relations) take random and nonrandom measurement error into account and are, therefore, not biased. This part of the model is called “structural model” and represents the underlying theory. This entry presents some of the basic features of SEM using an example from the European Social Survey (ESS).

SEM models can be visualized by a graphical path diagram, which represents the relationships between the latent variables (structural model) and the relationships between latent and observed variables (measurement model). The latent variables are symbolized by circles, the observed variables by rectangles, and the postulated direction of influences by directed arrows (see Figure 1). The path diagram can be translated into a set of linear or matrix equations. Figure 1 displays a diagram that graphically represents a structural equation model with the measurement and the structural part. It contains one exogenous (independent) construct and one endogenous (dependent) construct. Each construct in Figure 1 is measured by three indicators to control for all forms of random and non-random measurement errors.

In Figure 1, ξ_1 is an exogenous latent construct, measured by three indicators x_1 , x_2 , and x_3 . Their

measurement errors are designated as δ_1 , δ_2 , and δ_3 . η_1 is an endogenous latent construct, measured by three indicators y_1 , y_2 , and y_3 . Their measurement errors are designated as ε_1 , ε_2 , and ε_3 . λ is the symbol for the unstandardized factor loading. The residual of the latent endogenous variable is ζ_1 . It represents the unexplained variance of the latent endogenous variable. The regression coefficient between the exogenous and the endogenous latent variable is γ_{11} . The first subscript refers to the dependent variable, the second to the independent variable.

The corresponding equation system for the model in Figure 1 is as follows:

Structural model:

$$\eta_1 = \gamma_{11} \xi_1 + \zeta_1 \quad (1.1)$$

Measurement model:

$$x_1 = \lambda_1^x \xi_1 + \delta_1 \quad (2.1)$$

$$x_2 = \lambda_2^x \xi_1 + \delta_2 \quad (2.2)$$

$$x_3 = \lambda_3^x \xi_1 + \delta_3 \quad (2.3)$$

$$y_1 = \lambda_1^y \eta_1 + \varepsilon_1 \quad (2.4)$$

$$y_2 = \lambda_2^y \eta_1 + \varepsilon_2 \quad (2.5)$$

$$y_3 = \lambda_3^y \eta_1 + \varepsilon_3 \quad (2.6)$$

The intercepts of the structural and the measurement model have been omitted.




Figure 1 The General Model for Two Latent Variables

The items are conceptualized as reflective indicators, as in confirmatory factor analysis, which means that the researcher postulates a direction of influence from the latent to the observed variable. Both the measurement model and the structural model can be generalized to take into account n indicators and m constructs. One can now differentiate between three types of parameters: (1) free parameters to be estimated from the data, such as in classical multivariate analysis; (2) fixed parameters that are set a priori to a certain value such as 0 or 1; and (3) constrained parameters that are set equal to another parameter. For estimating the coefficients, several estimation methods are available. The standard method is maximum likelihood estimation. By using this method, all the free parameters are estimated simultaneously taking into account both the fixed and the constrained parameters in the minimization of the fitting function. Other estimation methods take nonnormal distributions into account such as robustified maximum likelihood, asymptotic distribution free estimator (ADF), and weighted least squares (WLS). In addition, Bayesian estimation is possible, which allows the testing of a broader class of hypotheses and which may be more robust in smaller samples. The model testing is mostly done in at least two steps, because otherwise the necessary model modifications are too complex.

The measurement model is first tested via confirmatory factor analysis. After one has found a well-fitting measurement model, in the second step, the full structural equation model, which includes the fitted measurement model, is tested. There are three approaches for testing SEM models: (1) strictly confirmatory, (2) the use of alternative models, and (3) model generating.

1. In a strictly confirmatory situation the researcher has formulated one single model and has obtained empirical data to test it. The model should be either accepted or rejected.

2. The researcher has specified several alternative models (or competing models), and on the basis of an analysis of a single set of empirical data, one of the models should be selected.
3. In the model-generating approach, the researcher has specified a tentative initial model. If the initial model does not fit the given data, the model should be modified and tested again using the same data. The respecification of each model may be theory driven or data driven. (cf. Jöreskog, 1993)

As with classical multivariate analyses, the estimation procedure (in the standard case this is maximum likelihood estimation) provides unstandardized and standardized coefficients and standard errors and z values for the unstandardized coefficients from the estimation procedure. In addition, global- and detailed-fit measures for the specified model are provided. The global-fit measures are all some function of the chi-square, the degrees of freedom, and, in some cases, the sample size. There are descriptive measures such as the comparative fit index (CFI), probability-based ones such as the chi-square test and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and those based on information theory (e.g., Akaike's information criterion [AIC]). Cutoff values for these measures have been proposed, although there is an ongoing discussion about which ones should be used in which way.

Generally, the process of model building in SEM can be described in the steps visualized in Figure 2. It is important to understand that most specified models are in the first step falsified, and one has to modify the model according to detailed fit measures such as the modification index and the expected parameter change that together with substantive theoretical knowledge should guide the respecification of model modifications. This process corresponds to model generating (the third




Figure 2 The Process of Causal Modeling

approach) rather than model testing (the first or second approach).

The following example uses data from the British sample of the ESS, Round 1 (2002). Results of a model to explain attitude toward immigration by the two latent variables “education” and “tradition/conformity” value are reported. These relations represent the structural model. This model is specified as a partial mediation model, as education influences both values and attitude toward immigration, and the effect of education is only partially mediated by value. As a consequence, the structural model is composed of two equations for explaining the two latent endogenous variables value and immigration. “Immigration” is measured by three reflective indicators, “tradition/conformity” by four observed variables, and “education” by two. The

question wordings and the unstandardized factor loadings and their standard errors are reported in Table 1; the standardized solution is reported in Figure 3. All factor loadings are significant ($p < .001$). The fit of the model is very good according to the standard criteria ($\chi^2 = 32.82$ with 24 degrees of freedom; CFI = .999; RMSEA = .013).

Figure 3 shows that the loadings of the three items to measure attitude toward immigration are all very high, indicating a high formal validity. The same is the case for the two indicators of “education.” The standardized factor loadings of the value construct “tradition/conformity” are generally lower than those of the other constructs, and they range from 0.44 to 0.72. The regression coefficient between “education” (EDU) and “tradition/conformity” (TRCO) is significant, but weak (0.24);

Table 1 Question Wordings and Unstandardized Factor Loadings

		<i>Education (EDU)</i>	<i>Tradition/ Conformity (TR/CO)</i>	<i>Immigration (IMM)</i>
edu ₁ : Highest level of education	λ	0.47	0	0
	SE	0.02	0	0
edu ₂ : Years of full-time education	λ	1.00	0	0
	SE	^a	0	0
tr/co ₁ : Important to follow traditions and customs	λ	0	0.75	0
	SE	0	0.05	0
tr/co ₂ : Important to do what is told and follow rules	λ	0	1.05	0
	SE	0	0.06	0
tr/co ₃ : Important to behave properly	λ	0	1.00	0
	SE	0	^a	0
tr/co ₄ : Important to be humble and modest	λ	0	0.63	0
	SE	0	0.04	0
imm ₁ : Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ ethnic group from majority	λ	0	0	1.31
	SE	0	0	0.03
imm ₂ : Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ ethnic group from majority	λ	0	0	1.00
	SE	0	0	^a
imm ₃ : Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries	λ	0	0	1.18
	SE	0	0	0.03

Source: ESS Round 1: European Social Survey Round 1 Data (2002). Data file edition 6.1. Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway—data archive and distributor of ESS data. Results computed by the authors.

Notes: λ = unstandardized factor loadings; SE = standard error of λ .

a. No SE is estimated because 1.0 is a fixed parameter, which is necessary for identification of the model.




Figure 3 Results From a Structural Equation Modeling (Standardized Solution)

Source: ESS Round 1: European Social Survey Round 1 Data (2002). Data file edition 6.1. Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway—data archive and distributor of ESS data. Results computed by the authors.

more education is associated with less agreement on the TRCO scale. The effect of education on “immigration” (IMM) (-0.34) is higher than that “TRCO” on “immigration” (-0.15). The regression coefficients on “immigrants” are partialized coefficients. Substantively, more education and more disagreement on the TRCO scale are associated with less negative attitudes toward immigration. One can see in the path diagram that “education” has not only a direct effect on “immigration” but also an indirect effect mediated by “TRCO.” Direct (-0.34) and indirect effects (0.24 multiplied by -0.15) are added as total effects (-0.38) of one variable (education) on another (immigrants). The asymptotic standard errors and bootstrapped standard errors for indirect effects and total effects and their significance levels are additionally calculated in most SEM software.

In Figure 3, one can see for the latent variables that the explained variance is 0.06 for “TRCO” and 0.17 for “immigrants.” These low numbers indicate that especially for the explanation of “TRCO,” but also for the attitude toward

immigration, the relevant explanatory variables are missing.

The model can be extended as a generalized latent variable model to multiple groups or models, estimating latent means and intercepts; autoregressive, cross-lagged, latent growth curves; latent curve models; and stochastic differential equations for longitudinal/panel data, testing mediation and moderation, nonlinear models, multilevel models, and mixture models. Furthermore, it can be extended to ordinal and categorical data, where other estimation techniques are used. The latent variable approach can be embedded easily in a Bayesian framework.

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See also Factor Analysis; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian; Statistics: Overview

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SUBJECT CULTURE

Among scholars of political culture, the term *subject culture* signifies a specific subtype whose members are not actively participating in the central political system. The members of all political systems at all times exhibit significant differences in their orientations, attitudes, and beliefs about politics. Many of the differences depend on the inequalities in access to the political opportunities existing in these political systems. Especially, gender differences, with women disadvantaged vis-à-vis men, are clearly the product of solidly structured biases against women's participation in politics. Many differences are also the consequence of some aspects of the processes of socialization. Finally, some of the differences simply derive from the preferences of the individuals, from their willingness to devote more or less of their time and energy to learning about politics and to taking part in political activities. Some political cultures encourage and reward political knowledge, involvement, and participation; others do not. However, differences among individuals appear in all political systems. These have been the object of quite a number of studies, mainly carried out by political anthropologists, but in the

1960s, the study of political culture became an important component of the field of political science and, more precisely, in the work of scholars attempting to explain modernization and political development.

The first major contribution to the field of political culture was made by the survey of citizens' attitudes in five democracies performed by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. In their seminal book *The Civic Culture*, they explored the dense web of relationships between political attitudes and the survival/stability of Germany, Italy, Mexico, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States. The underlying hypothesis was, understandably, that there should exist significant differences in the political cultures of citizens to explain the differences in the various political systems, two of them (the United States and the UK) stable and effective democracies, two of them (Italy and Germany) democracies that had previously failed, and one (Mexico) a single-party hegemonic regime. To capture the nature and quality of the respective civic cultures, the authors identified three different orientations: cognitive, affective, and evaluational. *Cognitive* orientations refer to the knowledge of and the beliefs about the political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs and its outputs. *Affective* orientations are the feelings about the political system and its roles, personnel, and performance. *Evaluational* orientations concern the judgments and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings. Combining these orientations with aspects of the political system and its inputs, outputs, and the role of the individual in the system, Almond and Verba suggested the existence of three types of political cultures. More precisely, in a *parochial* political culture, individuals have no knowledge concerning the political system—that is, neither its inputs nor its outputs. By contrast, in a *participant* political culture, individuals know about the political system and its inputs and outputs and are also aware that they can play an active role. *Subjects* have come to know about the political system and its actions, the outputs, but they are not familiar with how they themselves can affect the inputs and how to play a role in the political system.

All political systems contain varying combinations of individuals with parochial, subject, or

participant orientations. It makes a great difference for any political system, of course, whether any one of these three types of political culture is or has become dominant. Almond and Verba argue that there must exist and develop some congruence between political cultures and political structures. They suggest that a parochial culture is most congruent with a traditional political structure, a subject culture with a centralized authoritarian structure, and a participant culture with a democratic political structure. One could also remark that, for instance, a centralized authoritarian structure may devote some resources to the transformation of parochials into subjects, but it will certainly also pursue the goal of preventing the subjects from becoming participants. Unfortunately, the analysis by Almond and Verba did not aim at providing sharp profiles of the types of political cultures prevailing in the five political systems they had taken into consideration. Instead, they shifted their attention to the relationship between cognition, affect, and evaluation and three additional dimensions of political culture: *allegiance*, *apathy*, and *alienation*. However, they did not even explore whether the parochials, the subjects, and the participants were more likely to become allegiant, apathetic, or alienated. Nor did they give enough attention to the presumably differentiated impact of diverse combinations of parochials, subjects, and participants in the political culture of a democracy. Moreover, as Verba has recognized in *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Almond & Verba 1980), a dynamic view and a careful interpretation of how these processes and situations were bound to be affected by time were sorely lacking. Finally, practically none of the studies that followed their path-breaking empirical research (Lucian Pye & Sidney Verba, 1965), not even the book reappraising their original contribution, has devoted specific attention to the category of *subject* political culture.

According to Almond and Verba, two variables have a significant impact on all types of political culture: the amount of information and the level of education. In slightly different ways, of course, both the parochials and the subjects have a rather low level of education and are exposed to a limited amount of political information. Therefore, they are easily manipulated by the rulers. In a way, one can say that both information and education, increasing their political knowledge, will encourage

their eventual transformation into participants. Indeed, this was the most important message conveyed by Daniel Lerner in his 1958 book, *The Passing of Traditional Society*: The revolution in communications will produce significant consequences for the political cultures of traditional societies. The most important among these consequences were thought to be the almost complete disappearance of the parochials because, inevitably, all individuals living in the same territory, under the same rulers, and affected by similar processes would become increasingly cognizant of the political system and its inputs and outputs and would probably also come to realize that they might have a role, though subordinate, to play. Even more so for the subjects, their growing knowledge of the political system and its outputs might motivate them to learn more about the way to produce inputs (demands and support) and to become personally active in politics.

Scholars studying political development have often been accused of having a teleological and ethnocentric bias in their approach—that is, of being oriented to foresee and predict for developing countries the political future already reached by Western democracies. Curiously, though, when it came to the likelihood of the transformation of political cultures, most of the same scholars were significantly more cautious. There was no explicit prediction of any possibility of a swift appearance of a widespread participant culture. On the contrary, most scholars believed that for some indefinite period of time, the majority of developing countries would suffer exactly because of the difficulty of transforming parochials and subjects into participants. In any case, in the 1960s and early 1970s, the scholarly and policy-making emphasis was placed on the need to build states and to strengthen their structures (the bureaucracy and the armed forces and, to a minor extent, representative assemblies) more than on the creation of nations, an idea not easy to export into developing countries. The analysis of the agencies and processes of socialization—families and schools—so important for the transformation of political cultures, remained of limited interest and was rarely carried out with specific commitment. That social and political movements, for instance, those active in the national liberation struggles, could exert some influence in accelerating cultural

changes, especially among those “subjects” who might become involved in their activities, was not a common theme worthy of in-depth studies.

The concept of a subject culture disappeared rather quickly from the language of scholars interested in modernization and political development. It had never made significant inroads among scholars studying political participation. The attention shifted to more precise and better manageable and researchable directions. The following three elements, interest, information, and efficacy, have been explored extensively by subsequent scholars who were specializing in the study of political participation. Nevertheless, one can still stretch the concept of subject culture to indicate the type of political culture shown by those individuals who have some interest in politics, not much information, and a very low sense of political efficacy. Their interest in the working of the political system may be stimulated only by their awareness that it affects their lives. They collect the amount of political information that seems sufficient to cope with the outputs of the political system. They are more or less painfully conscious of their inability to play a successful role in the working of the political system. With reference to the wealth of existing data on the quantity and quality of political participation in contemporary political systems, it is possible to state that, contrary to the views formulated by Almond and Verba in the 1960s, there remain significant numbers of individuals, not only in centralized authoritarian regimes but in all contemporary democratic regimes as well, whose political culture shows the features of a subject culture.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Efficacy, Political; Participation; Political Culture; Political Socialization

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SUPERPOWER

International relations as a field of study has traditionally been defined as a science whose primary purpose has been to explain the behavior of states operating in an anarchic world where power—usually measured in terms of economic resources, military strength, and moral influence—has always been unevenly spread among its various units. How to measure power, the uses to which power is put, how states acquire and lose it, and what impact its unequally distributed character has on relations between states in the wider international system have been central issues discussed by scholars of international relations ever since Thucydides wrote his classic *History of the Peloponnesian War* in the 4th century BCE.

Measuring the power of states has, of necessity, created its own taxonomy. Thus, different states may be defined as great, weak, imperial, regional, global, or even—more recently—failed, largely in terms of three attributes: (1) their own set of unique capabilities, (2) the distribution of capabilities in the wider international system, and (3) their capacity to exercise control over both their own affairs and those of others. Inevitably, most attention has been paid to the actions of great powers insofar as they have exercised most influence on the international system. Thus, when the Napoleonic wars ended with France's defeat in 1814, it was naturally assumed that the future of Europe would be shaped by at least five “great” powers: Great Britain, the Austrian Empire, Russia, Prussia, and France. A century later, it was taken for granted that the outcome of World War I

would, in the end, be determined—once again—by the policies and capabilities of the various great powers.

World Wars I and II

The term *superpower* only emerged in the period following the “Great War” (World War I) of 1914 to 1918. Hitherto, writers had hardly used the term, preferring instead to speak of certain states possessing vast powers that extended well beyond their own territory as empires. The term *superpower* was thus very much a modern creation and was first used in the early 1920s with special reference to the greatest of all modern empires—the British Empire, with one in four people around the world living under its flag. It then became more commonly employed during World War II. Indeed, the idea that the war would conclude with an enormous concentration of power in the hands of only three states—the British Empire, the United States, and the former USSR—was initially mooted by the Dutch American geostrategist Nicholas J. Spykman, first in his 1942 study *America’s Strategy in World Politics* and then 2 years later in his short, but highly influential, book *The Geography of the Peace*. Spykman was a power theorist par excellence. But he made a clear distinction between different kinds of power and concluded (against the then influential arguments advanced by the British geographer Halford Mackinder) that the dominant global actor after the war would not be the Soviet Union, which now controlled the Eurasian land mass—what Mackinder termed the *heartland*—but rather the United States, with its unmatched maritime global supremacy.

The belief that the defeat of the Axis powers would lead to the creation of a new kind of world order dominated by “super” powers was also advanced by William T. R. Fox, a Chicago-trained academic who after forming part of the international staff at the United Nations conference in San Francisco went on to influence many up-and-coming international relations scholars in the United States. In his justly famous 1944 book, *The Super-Powers: The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union—Their Responsibility for Peace*, Fox effectively helped popularize the term *superpower*. Interestingly, like Spykman, he identified three (not two) states that could lay claim to this particular

status as the war came to an end. Two of these—the United States and the Soviet Union—had acquired their position in the process of waging war against Germany and Japan; the third (the United Kingdom [UK]) had for some time been the most extensive empire in world history. Fox, however, drew different conclusions from those of Spykman. Spykman never believed that the three would easily work together to ensure the peace after the war. In his opinion, they were doomed to compete. Fox, on the other hand, was more optimistic and initially hoped that the three powers could work in concert to secure a more stable world. Indeed, as the subtitle of his book suggested, they had a responsibility to do so.

The Cold War Period

The period between 1944 and 1950 saw a significant change in the application, if not the meaning, of the term *superpower*. This led to the deletion of the British Empire from the original trio. Weakened by war and increasingly dependent on the United States in a new world order that was fast decolonizing (India declared independence in 1947), it became more and more difficult to think of the UK as a superpower. This of course left only two superpowers in play—the United States and the Soviet Union. They in turn were said to be “super” for a variety of different reasons: their sheer geographical size, their respective hard power capabilities, their global reach, their pursuit of defined missions worldwide, and their ability to shape the policies and choices of other increasingly dependent small- and medium-sized powers.

The idea that there were now only two superpowers also gave rise to another connected idea: bipolarity. This notion was popularized by the most widely read international relations scholar of the immediate postwar years: the German-born American scholar Hans J. Morgenthau, who in 1948 spoke of a radically new world organized around two dominant “poles” of power and attraction. This system could quite easily conclude in war, he feared. But as time passed, Morgenthau began to wonder whether this bipolar international system might even contain within itself the basis of a more stable international order. Later, another international relations scholar, Kenneth Waltz, developed this argument even further. Like

Morgenthau, Waltz noted the apparent stability of the postwar order and the success of the superpowers in defying earlier predictions that the Cold War would sooner or later turn hot. This, he argued, happened in part because of nuclear weapons. But it was also a function of the bipolar distribution of power. This, he insisted, was less war prone than a system where there were many power sources (a multipolar order). He believed that error was more common in the latter system because of the difficulty of estimating accurately the power and cohesion of shifting and often unstable coalitions. In a bipolar world, on the other hand, where the two superpowers relied on their own vastly superior power for their security, coalitions were less important and so stability more likely.

As a simplifying device, the idea of a bipolar world composed of two superpowers to describe the international system after 1947 was useful enough. But it was not without its limits. Four at least deserve mention here.

One was that it could not really explain the Cold War itself. To do this, one required to look at more than just the uneven distribution and concentration of power in the world. This only provided one kind of measure. It did not necessarily explain the deeper reasons for, and unique character of, the conflict. To do this, it was necessary to examine the very different socioeconomic foundations of the two states, their opposing worldviews, and their quite different histories.

Second, the idea of a “superpower” implied a rough-and-ready equality between the two states. But as we know, from the outset—and for the duration of the Cold War—the United States was always in a superior position. This was partly for the geographical reasons originally suggested by Spykman. But it was also because its economy was larger and more productive and its allies richer and generally more willing to follow its lead than say Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were ever prepared to follow that provided by the former USSR.

Third, the notion of there being just two superpowers having the capacity to project power anywhere in the world does not explain significant alterations in the balance of power in the world after 1947. In 1950, for example, there were only two nuclear weapons states: the United States and

the former USSR. By the late 1960s, however, there were five, including China, the UK, and France. In 1947, the United States was “super” in nearly every conceivable way. Twenty-five years later, it faced quite a different set of circumstances brought about by the emergence of new economic players such as Europe and Japan. Nor could the United States and the former USSR control events quite so easily as the notion of a superpower might have implied. Thus, both lost significant allies in the 1960s when China broke from the former USSR and France left the military command structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Then, in the 1970s, the United States was unceremoniously ejected from two key countries—Vietnam and Iran—while the former USSR was thrown out of Egypt. And during the next decade, the Soviet Union fought a long and unsuccessful war on its southern border in Afghanistan.

Finally, the notion of superpower really had no predictive capacity. Indeed, precisely because many scholars viewed the former USSR as a superpower, it may well have misled them into assuming it was far stronger than it turned out to be. Certainly, one of the more important reasons why so many students of international relations failed to anticipate the sudden and unexpected end to the Cold War in 1989, followed 2 years later by the collapse of the former USSR itself, was because of an attachment to a concept that ultimately proved to be more an obstacle than an asset in understanding how the Soviet Union actually worked.

1991 and After

If a superpower is a state traditionally considered to be one step higher than a great power, it remains an open question as to how we should characterize the distribution of power following the collapse of the former USSR in 1991. Clearly the world was no longer bipolar. But what kind of world was it? For a while, some predicted the rise of a new multipolar world order consisting of Japan, the newly empowered European Union, and the United States. It soon became clear, however, that this was not to be. Japan failed financially. Europe proved to be weak in its efforts to end the civil war in (former) Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, the United States experienced one success after another from military victory in Iraq in 1991 through to Kosovo

just a few years later. At the same time, the U.S. economy boomed, the Russian economy declined, and the capabilities gap between the United States and the rest of the world grew and grew.

In a world without rival (or indeed without balance) in which American values seemed to be driving all before them, it was hardly surprising that scholars and policymakers alike were drawn to the distinctly radical conclusion that we were now living in an entirely, almost unique, world order whose single most obvious characteristic was that there was only one single pole in it. This in turn raised the intriguing question of how one should then characterize the United States itself: "Superpower" seemed too weak and anyway was too much associated with a period now long since passed—namely, the Cold War. Analysts thus began to look around for new ways of defining the United States. Some, like the French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, preferred the idea of a "hyperpower," suggesting that the United States now had unprecedented power and capacity. Others were attracted to the notion of hegemony, implying that the United States had not only enormous power but also a capacity to lead and inspire others. A few writers, however, began to define the United States as a new form of liberal Empire—a new Rome on the Potomac, as one observer put it—which, even if it did not seek to acquire other people's territory, did what all empires have done in the past: It shaped the choices of others and defined the rules of the game while punishing those who did not play by them.

By the beginning of the 21st century, therefore, the term *superpower* was no longer much used. Indeed, according to many thinkers, the very term had little value in trying to explain international politics in an increasingly interdependent world composed of several actors often facing challenges that did not necessarily arise from the possession of vast concentrations of power. Some even suggested that the distribution of power had changed so much in the first 10 years of the new millennium that it would be quite meaningless to think of the world in terms of any kind of superpower determination. That age, it was argued, was now past.

Yet the idea did not die away entirely. On the contrary, as America's fortunes began to fade

and those of China started to rise, many began to view the emerging international order in increasingly superpower, possibly even bipolar, terms. China may have been no Soviet Union. Still, its potential was huge and its ambitions global. Nor was it the only potential superpower on the scene seeking to compete with the United States. Europe, and perhaps India in time, could also lay some claim to being, or over time becoming, superpowers of a sort. Policymakers certainly seemed to think so and, while talking the cooperative language of globalization and global governance, continued to act in ways that would have been easily recognizable to policymakers from a bygone age. The Cold War with all its ideological baggage might have been over. The market may have also triumphed. But very powerful states, or groupings of states, with serious capabilities, international ambitions, and a desire to mould the future, still sought to determine the way the world looked. Even if one kind of superpower rivalry had concluded by the beginning of the 1990s, nearly 20 years later, it very much looked as if another was just starting to take shape.

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See also Balance of Power; Bipolarity and Multipolarity; Hegemony; Power and International Politics

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SUPPORT, POLITICAL

The concept of *political support* was initially devised by David Easton in the context of his theory of political systems. According to Easton (1965), political systems have inputs and outputs, with inputs taking the form of demands and support. Political support occurs when “A acts on behalf of B or when he orients himself favorably toward B” (p. 159). A more precise definition was provided by this author in a later work where he defines *political support* as the “way in which a person evaluative orients himself to some object through either his attitudes or his behaviour” (1975, p. 436). Easton develops a multi-dimensional conceptualization of political support in which he distinguishes both between the objects of support and the types of support. Within the first, he differentiates from each other support for three distinct objects: the political community, the regime, and the authorities. Within types, he distinguishes between two: specific and diffuse.

As important as it has been for the study of political attitudes, Easton's conceptualization of political support has been seen by some as unclear

and has led to much research that has been criticized as ambiguous, confusing, and noncumulative. Different understandings of Easton's original arguments have led to a variety of schemes, approaches, and indicators that have aimed to capture the different dimensions of political support. There is no consensus on how exactly Easton's ideas should be empirically assessed. Long-standing debates among scholars have concentrated not only on which are the best ways to measure the different dimensions empirically but also on what the evidence gathered thus far has meant.

Objects of Political Support

An initial distinction put forward by Easton deals with the classification of the different objects toward which political support might be extended. According to him, support is fed into the political system in relation to three basic objects, which he orders in a scale of abstractness. At one extreme lies the most intangible or “abstract” object: the political community, or nation. At the other extreme lies the most immediate, concrete object: the political authorities. Between the poles lies a third object of support: the regime, or the “rules of the game,” that allow a political system to be maintained. Easton warns that the fact that support for a political system can be broken down into three elements does not mean that support for each one of these objects is independent of the others. Many times the three kinds of support are closely inter-related, so that the presence of one is a function of the presence of one or both of the other kinds.

Authors such as Pippa Norris and Russell Dalton have followed Easton's line in differentiating certain objects of support that are more generalized from others that are more concrete. Both authors offer refined versions of Easton's classification of objects of political support, in which they argue about the need to differentiate between three different components of the political regime: regime principles, performance, and institutions. Along these lines, they suggest and empirically confirm a five-dimensional structure that includes as objects the political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political authorities. John Booth and Mitchell Seligson have confirmed through factor analysis that a similar structure is operating in several Latin American

democracies, with the addition of a sixth dimension that reflects attitudes toward local government.

Diffuse and Specific Political Support

Besides classifying the objects of political support, Easton (1975) distinguishes between two kinds of support, specific and diffuse, which are of different natures and have different implications for the political system. On the one hand, specific support is described as the type related to the “satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities” (p. 437). On the other hand, diffuse support refers to “evaluations of what an object is or represents—to the general meaning it has for a person—not of what it does” (p. 444). Thus, specific support is the temporary and relatively ephemeral acceptance or approval that citizens express for a political object as a result of its satisfaction of their specific demand; whereas diffuse support is conceived of as a deeper, more enduring, and more generalized political loyalty resulting from early-life political socialization and, therefore, is more immune to short-term inducements, rewards, or performance evaluations.

This distinction is an important contribution. Specific support can be object specific in two ways: In the first place, people are assumed to be capable of being aware of the political authorities working on behalf of the system; in the second place, it takes into account the perceived decisions, policies, actions, utterances, and style of the authorities. In this sense, members of a political system can perform a rational calculation of whether the authorities’ actions address their needs and demands. Under such conditions, specific support, which can only exist in societies whose institutions allow authorities to be held accountable for their actions and the resulting consequences, will fluctuate according to people’s perceived benefits and satisfactions. Diffuse support instead hinges on the general meaning given to political objects and is defined as a “reservoir of favorable attitudes” that members of a given political system possess, which allow them to overlook outputs that do not benefit their wants. It is more durable than specific support and more resistant to or even independent of sudden epiphenomena such as policy outputs and performance. This support also remains, despite

the ups and down in outputs and beneficial performances. While diffuse support may change, it is difficult to weaken when strong and to strengthen when weak. Rooted in early socialization and experience, diffuse support might be generated and fostered independent of the fulfillment of particular needs and demands by the authorities.

The Problem of the Multidimensionality of Political Support

Most research has interpreted Easton’s conceptualization as a unidimensional axis that ranges from specific to diffuse support, along which the different political objects are arrayed (Figure 1) (Norris, 1999). In this conception, support for each political object is given a level of specificity/diffuseness, implying that specific and diffuse support do not represent distinct kinds that could be extended toward every political object. This approach has been criticized by other readers of Easton such as Mariano Torcal and José R. Montero (2006) for its simplicity, which has given birth to an excessively




Figure 1 Unidimensional Conception of Political Support

broad concept of support, which “empirically works as a sort of umbrella under which different dimensions are not differentiated” (p. 10).

The latest refinements to the multidimensional understanding of political support have been developed by Dalton (2004) and by Torcal and Montero (2006). These authors have argued that the correct interpretation of Easton’s theory implies that every political object is subject to both specific and diffuse support. Thus, a multidimensional structure of political support is devised, where objects may be subject to both diffuse and specific support at the same time (Figure 2). This view does not imply that support for a political object, in every context, will be a combination of both specific and diffuse support. What it means is that each political object should be “addressed alternately or jointly by both diffuse and specific support” (Torcal & Montero, 2006, p. 9).

Measurement and Hypothesis Testing Problems

The disagreements over the multidimensional nature of *political support* have been extended to

debates regarding the appropriate ways of measuring it. No consensus has been reached among scholars on which are the best indicators for capturing the different components of political support. Furthermore, discussions regarding what the indicators aiming to measure specific and diffuse support have meant date back to the 1970s, when scholars debated whether the increasing levels of discontent shown in surveys reflected attitudes toward the incumbents or toward the regime. Almost 40 years later, the debate is still open. Indicators that have been used to measure political support have been criticized severely and recurrently for their problems of validity. For instance, it is still common to measure regime support (both specific and diffuse) with satisfaction with democratic functioning, an indicator highly contaminated by incumbent support, which in a way is reproducing the 1970s debate between Jack Citrin and Arthur Miller, reaching again the same inconclusive results.

Dalton (2004) has warned about the difficulties on drawing fine theoretical distinctions when aiming to measure the different components of political support. In fact, there are doubts about the efficiency of empirical research when trying to isolate the different types of support, as public sentiments can blend adjacent orientations and indicators of public support frequently overlap between levels. Despite the obstacles in measuring the different components of political support, Dalton argues that it is important to depart from a multidimensional framework, as “public orientations towards different objects of support carry different political implications” (p. 7). Therefore, he proposes different indicators to measure specific and diffuse support for each different political object, leaving aside the frequent assumption, discussed before, that each political object contains by definition a level of specificity/diffuseness. However, this approach, although not too critical of Easton’s theoretical proposal, does contain a problematic assumption: It assigns an a priori meaning of specificity or diffuseness to different survey indicators for each political object. Some critics or researchers argue, instead, that the level of conditional (specific) and unconditional support (diffuse) can only be estimated by assessing empirically the role of different variables in explaining political support for each political object. Support




Figure 2 Multidimensional Conception of Political Support

is specific, and therefore conditional, when it can be explained by variables such as ideological preferences, party preferences, underlying values, or satisfaction with the economic or social performance. Support becomes diffuse, and therefore unconditional, when neither of these factors influences the level of individual support in a significant way.

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See also Democracy, Theories of; Democratic Consolidation; Legitimacy; Systems Theory

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SURVEY RESEARCH

Survey research is a method of measurement based on the systematic collection of information from a sample of members of a population. This sample is only a fraction of the population of interest. It represents the whole population by the way it is selected. Conclusions about the total population are reached through a process of statistical inference.

Samples can be drawn of anything whose properties can be defined and, therefore, can be made of many types of populations, such as persons, products, institutions, organizations, or events. The most familiar surveys are those taken from persons about their opinions using a structured questionnaire. This entry is mostly about survey research of human populations. In the United States and other English-speaking countries, surveys are also called polls. There is no precise distinction between these terms and there are no significant methodological differences between polls and surveys. The term *survey* is frequently used when speaking of polls done by academic institutions, and *polls* are surveys reported in the media. The first part of this entry describes the general scientific bases of survey research and offers an overview of the principal aspects involved in the design of surveys. The second part gives an account of the key moments in the evolution of survey research. The third part describes the principal contributions of survey research to the social sciences along with some criticisms.

Scientific Bases of Survey Research

Survey research is based on sampling techniques founded on probability theory. People attribute different meanings to the concept of probability. Most often it is interpreted as the relative frequency of events, such as the number of red or black cards in a deck. Its precise meaning is centered on the concept of a “normal distribution.” The most important characteristic of the normal distribution is that even when the actual values of a variable do not have a normal distribution, the mean of that variable estimated from a large sample can be regarded as having come from a normal distribution of sample means. This is what the central limit theorem states. If researchers draw a large number of independent random samples of any variable, the mean value of the means obtained in each of the random samples will be close to the actual mean of the population. Moreover, they will be able to calculate the standard error of the mean. Hence, researchers can draw samples of populations and infer that the mean of the variables observed will be close to the mean of the population with a known margin of error.

Good, reliable surveys follow basic scientifically founded rules to select the sample of the population

to be studied. First, the researcher has to precisely define the population he or she wants to study. The sample of individuals to be interviewed is selected in such a way that every member of the total population has a not necessarily equal, but a known, chance of selection. If all members of the total population have the same chance to be selected, every individual in the sample represents the same number of persons in the population. These are self-weighted samples. If the selected individuals have different chances of being selected, weights are used to estimate the number of persons in the population they represent.

Any bias in the selection of the sample would produce distorted measurements. Errors of selection come from many sources, but selection errors are frequently produced when the researcher has some preconceived ideas about the individuals he or she wants to select—for instance, when the researcher looks for *typical or relevant individuals* of a population, when the poll depends on volunteer or easy-to-contact subjects, or when interviewers are asked to look in the field for some specific type of subjects. A random selection of a sample, such as choosing a specific number of persons from a list using random numbers or selecting every n th number of persons from the list, minimizes selection biases. The designer of a survey can improve the accessibility of the sample-selecting groups of individuals that can be found in the same location or area, in clusters of individuals, such as electoral precincts, counties, or neighborhoods. This technique is known as *area probability sampling*. The survey designer can also subdivide the population into more homogeneous subparts, known as strata, to improve the quality and accessibility of the samples. This technique is known as *stratification*. For instance, in an electoral study, the researcher can select in the first stage a sample of precincts from a total list of polling areas, a list that was previously divided according to turnout and voting behavior. In the second stage, the researcher selects households within each of the precincts selected following a systematic method, such as every other household starting where the voting site is installed. In the third stage, the interviewer selects the persons to be interviewed following some almost random method of selection, such as asking for the person with the most recent birthday.

When a sample is selected following these basic rules—that is, if it is truly probabilistic—it will be unbiased and will therefore reproduce the characteristics of the total population within a known margin of error. In the electoral example, the aggregate vote of the sampled precincts should be very close to the actual vote in previous elections, and the sociodemographic characteristics of the population interviewed would be very similar to the total population. In other words, once aggregated, the statistics obtained from the sample will reproduce the actual parameters of the population with a known margin of error.

The adequate size of a sample does not depend on the extent of the total population. The decision on the size of a survey is always a delicate balance between the value of the additional information and the cost to obtain it, but ultimately, the designer of the study has to determine the lowest number of cases on which he or she is willing to generalize from the sample to the total population and the size of the error he or she is willing to accept. In any case, as the size of the sample is increased, its quality improves, but at some point, any increase in size produces very limited gains in quality. Common sample sizes for national or regional studies usually vary between 1,200 and 2,500 cases, but if the designer of the study wants to generalize about something of very low occurrence, say some rare illness, he or she would get very few cases with these sizes. For instance, imagine that only 3% of the population has been infected by the H1N1 virus at some moment. In a well-designed survey of 1,000 cases, the researcher would generalize about the infected population based on only 30 cases, a very small number.

Surveys are interviews with the individuals of the sampled population using a structured questionnaire. The interview with the sampled individuals can be done by an interviewer or can be self-administered. Individuals can be interviewed in person or by telephone. Wherever the extent of telephone lines is not significantly biased toward the upper-level economic strata, the telephone is the preferred way to interview. The new information technologies offer new forms of interviews. Self-administered interviews are questionnaires to be filled out that were given to the sampled population directly or sent via e-mail or the Internet. In

some cases, surveys can be done using more than one mode of interview, but the sample has to be very carefully designed, and the researcher should be aware that the mode of interview can have some effects on the results that the researcher must take into account.

The design of the questionnaire is another fundamental aspect. Questions should produce good, unbiased, and objective information. The questions in a survey should answer what the designer of the study wants to know and should be equally accessible to all respondents. For some topics, the researcher knows in advance that the questions asked could produce something called *social desirability biases*, simply because they are embarrassing, or because the respondent might be afraid to reveal what he or she assumes to be "bad" behavior. Some questions might be simply deliberately biased because they include approval of means and of results, what is known as *double-barreled questions*. The order of the questions in a questionnaire should be also carefully designed, because some questions might lead to the answers of the following questions.

The biggest challenge to survey research is the problem of nonresponse. Even if the sample and the questionnaire are carefully designed, and the field execution of the actual process of data collection is done by well-trained professional interviewers and close supervision, people can refuse to participate or not answer the questions asked in the survey. In some environments, the intense use of polls by the media has resulted in an increasing number of refusals to participate. Survey research is based on the information provided by those who participated in the survey. Based on the random selection of the sample, in survey research, it is assumed that those who refused to participate or did not answer some of the questions are not substantially different from those who participated, except for their unwillingness to participate. This may be a sound assumption, but ultimately there is no way to be sure about it, since the researcher does not have actual information from the nonrespondents. Consistent trends in public opinion data or the rationality of actual changes in these trends and other indicators show that the assumption about nonresponse is sound, but surveys with very large numbers of nonresponse should be read with some degree of skepticism.

Information Obtained in Surveys

Surveys can produce factual or perceptual information. The objective information can be actual facts of different matters such as how many individuals in the sampled population are employed or unemployed, the extent of the audience of a TV program, the number of years a person attended school, or the types of goods the family owns or uses. They can also measure past or present behavioral experiences, such as cigarette consumption, crime victimization, or use of public transportation. Likely future behavior can also be measured, but there is a general consensus that polls are not a very good instrument to do this. The typical electoral forecasts are based on questions about the vote preference of the respondent at the moment of the interview, and a typical error in predicting the election results usually comes from late changes in preferences that surveys might fail to register.

Perceptual information can measure attitudes or opinions, such as the evaluation of the job performance of different authorities, the state of the economy, or opinions about some general topics or issues. Attitudes are positive or negative orientations toward objects, persons, governments, institutions, public policies, or party programs. Surveys can measure not only the prevalence of the attitudes explored but also their intensity. Preferences based on comparisons of attitudes are also measured in surveys. Comparisons of candidates, parties, specific public policies, or general orientations toward them are frequently obtained from the public in surveys of all kinds. People have opinions or perceptions about the objective state of the world. For the researcher who measures these beliefs, it is not relevant if the belief is true or not, the relevant finding is that a population thinks that the state of affairs at a given moment is as they describe it. Many times, perceptions about the state of the economy or crime are not in correspondence with actual reality. As in the case of attitudes, surveys can measure how important these beliefs are for the public.

A survey taken at some particular moment produces a cross-sectional measure of the value of variables at the moment of the interview. Many variables are constantly measured, resulting in extremely useful longitudinal studies that show changes and continuities. If these continuous measurements are obtained from differently sampled

individuals, they can show changes over time in the mean values of the variables studied, but conclusions about the behavior of the individuals would be unfounded. The researcher would have to interview the same individuals over time to come to sound conclusions about the individual's changes of behavior. These are panel studies with specific methodologies.

Development of Survey Research

Survey research evolved gradually from various social needs. A survey is any comprehensive view or appraisal of any population. In this broad sense, surveys have probably been done since the first tax collectors valued the extent and resources of their desired contributors. Actually, the first evidences of written language are records of commercial transactions and of tax or tribute payers. In the Middle Ages, poll began to mean "head" and acquired the contemporary meaning of taxing. In the 16th century, every Spanish conquistador was always accompanied by an accountant in charge of the survey of the conquered territories. These tax collectors produced hundreds of invaluable surveys of the "New World," first recovering the tax records of the Indian authorities where available and later carrying out their own appraisals. The Industrial Revolution created a complex set of new social problems and the need to understand them. There are records of some surveys that were done on different matters such as poverty, education, and health in many of the countries that are now called industrialized or developed. In the newly independent national states, the need to create new tax rolls kept tax collectors busy.

These were enterprises of data collection that attempted to survey the entire population of interest. The evolution of surveys based on fractions of the populations took longer to become the common practice of today. The desire to predict the results of upcoming elections has been a constant incentive in the development of survey research. Besides the value that the news media attribute to these forecasts, particularly in presidential systems, electoral predictions based on surveys offer the rare if not unique opportunity to evaluate *ex post* the accuracy of the polls on which they are based. The first of these surveys were the so-called straw polls that some newspapers in the United States

conducted to predict the winner of upcoming elections. It is generally agreed that the first such poll was taken in the summer of 1824 by the *Harrisburg Pennsylvanian* in the election between Andrew Jackson and John Quincy Adams. Other straw polls were done in the 19th century, and at least nine newspapers and magazines published the results of straw polls for different state and presidential elections in the first quarter of the 20th century. The newspapers obtained the information to do their prediction by various methods. In some cases, the newspaper printed a ballot for some period of time and asked its readers to cut it and mail it back to the journal. Others polled citizens attending political meetings or in selected areas.

From 1916 through 1932, the magazine *Literary Digest* predicted the outcomes of the U.S. presidential elections correctly but missed in 1936 with data obtained with its well-known straw poll. At every presidential election, the *Literary Digest* mailed millions of ballots some time before the elections to a mail list taken from the telephone directories of state car registrations. In 1936, the magazine announced that the Republican candidate Allan Landon was expected to obtain 57% of the national vote. He obtained 38.5%. This fiasco marked the demise of the straw polls. Regardless of the occasional accuracy of some of the predictions estimated with the data obtained with this form of data collection, the ballots were tabulated ignoring the implicit biases involved in the way the respondents were selected. The mail list used by the *Literary Digest* magazine was clearly biased to upper-income households, and the magazine received information only from those who were willing to respond to the poll. They assumed in aggregating the results that car owners willing to respond represented the entire population. In other words, the researcher assumed that the participants in the poll had the same chance of selection as those who did not participate in the survey, either because they were not contacted or because they refused to answer. These nonresponse biases favored the most committed Republicans, resulting in the mistaken estimate. These were typically what we call now nonprobabilistic samples.

By the 1930s, vast changes in the production and in the marketing of goods and services started to develop. New information about the markets and the demands of consumers was needed, and

market research appeared to satisfy it. A long tradition of social statistics supplied in Western Europe the needs of this new market research, while in the United States, data collection based on surveys became a common practice, and survey research received a substantial impulse that has pervaded until today. By the end of World War I, many large manufacturers and advertisement media had market research groups, and new firms began to offer market and consumer information to their clients; among them were those founded by Elmo Roper and George Gallup. They adopted the methods of market research to measure public attitudes and, in fact, created today's public opinion polls. In July 1935, *Fortune* magazine published the first Fortune poll produced by Roper, and in October, Gallup published the first Gallup poll as a syndicated service to 35 newspapers and magazines.

The methodologies used by this new industry were closer to the scientific standards of the methods in use today but insufficient to produce unbiased results. Usually, respondents were contacted and interviewed either in clusters of neighborhoods or in places of great attendance of visitors such as commercial plazas. To try to prevent biases in the data collected, researchers selected very diverse points of interview, and interviewers were asked to complete predefined sociodemographic quotas in such a way that the aggregate would resemble the strata defined in the population census.

Another big fiasco marked again the change in methodologies and the real incorporation of the probability principles to the selection of the sampled population. Polls had predicted with great accuracy the U.S. presidential elections of 1940 and 1944, but in 1948, the three major producers of electoral forecasts, George Gallup, Elmo Roper, and Archibald Crossley predicted a substantial victory for Thomas E. Dewey over Harry S. Truman who was the actual winner by a comfortable margin of more than four points. Hearings were called by the House of Representatives to discuss the big mistake, and the Social Science Research Council produced a study of the major polls. The study pinpointed various reasons for the error, but the most important in terms of the adoption of better sampling methods pointed to the persistence of selection biases associated with the quota sampling in use. Instead of following loose quota samples, the industry began to assign interviewers to specific

areas previously selected through a random process. As the installation of telephone lines dramatically expanded, interviewing respondents over the phone became the most common form of contact and interview. Respondents were selected through a process known as random digital dialing where the researchers do not need lists or directories since the lines are selected automatically following random processes. Survey research expanded all over through market research and government production of social studies and economic data. As large producers or marketing companies entered new territories, local market research began to be demanded, and local industries emerged. Gallup opened local offices in many places, and by the outbreak of World War II, public opinion polling was a common practice in most democratic societies.

Perspectives of Survey Research

Public acceptance of surveys varies constantly. Big flaws, such as those that still occur in electoral forecasts, produce widespread criticism and disappointment. During political campaigns, when polls tend to be more present in the media, criticism increases, and the idea that polls influence voters is frequently expressed. The use of polls as a source of information for politicians to craft their messages has become a constant source of criticism of survey research. The media, particularly broadcast media, play an increasingly important role in politics today. Image and constructed messages prevail in the public arena. A new breed of political consultants has emerged to polish the image of politicians and to construct their messages. These consultants struggle to tune their designs to public opinion based on polls and surveys. Critics claim that this use of survey research leads to the trivialization of democracy and that it manipulates the desires and choices of the public.

These are serious criticisms, but survey research has produced many positive things as well. The electronic and printed media routinely report public sentiments on a wide variety of issues and closely follow electoral campaigns. This common practice in established democracies set in later in younger democracies, but in the long run, the use of survey research to monitor governments and elections developed together with the consolidation of democratic practices. This intensive use of

public opinion polling to produce political data such as election forecasts or presidential approval is the most visible evidence of survey research in the daily life of citizens.

Survey research has also been widely used for a long time to produce a broad range of data about markets and various economically relevant variables. Surveys are routinely taken to estimate market opportunities for old or new products or to follow public sentiment toward brands and products. Many of the most familiar economic data, such as employment, income, and expenditure patterns among households or consumer sentiments, are obtained using surveys. Policymakers use survey research to assess social needs or to evaluate the impact on the public of the policies implemented.

But the most significant effect of survey research has been in the production of knowledge over a vast number of disciplines. The impact of survey research in pure and applied social research has been of great consequence. Studying scientifically selected samples, researchers can soundly infer conclusions of total populations without the almost impossible task of studying every individual. The repeated measurement of many and very diverse variables has allowed the understanding of change. Information obtained through direct interviews to actual persons, and scientifically based statistical inferences to the entire population, opened the door to the study of individual motivations. Before, individual motivations could be studied only through experimentation with very small samples or improperly inferred from the study of aggregate data. Survey research has produced abundant findings in many areas of economics, sociology, social and political psychology, and political science among others.

In many countries, huge collections of surveys have been collected, and various international projects are booming, opening the doors to a new comparative understanding of many aspects of societies and politics.

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See also Attitudes, Political; Beliefs; Cross-National Surveys; Interviewing; Panel Data Analysis; Public Opinion; Sampling, Random and Nonrandom; Statistical Inference, Classical and Bayesian; Survey Research Modes

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SURVEY RESEARCH MODES

Systematic surveys of the opinions, attitudes, and behavior of human populations are one of the major inventions of 20th-century social science research. Although survey research has its origins in the pre-World War II era, in the late 1940s, social scientists began to conduct high-quality survey research on a regular basis. Since that time, surveys have become a staple of social science research, and data generated by such studies are used by thousands of scholars around the world. These data are gathered in a variety of ways, which methodologists call survey *modes*. In the early 21st century, major survey modes are in-person interviews, telephone interviews, self-completion questionnaires, and Internet questionnaires. Below, these modes and their respective advantages and disadvantages are discussed in greater detail.

In-Person Interviews

The in-person or face-to-face interview occupies a preeminent position in scientific survey research. Such interviews typically are carried out in respondents' homes, although, historically, survey firms ("houses") have used other venues as well. In-person interviews have been a major data

collection device since the inception of survey research and—when used in conjunction with probability samples of populations of interest—still are considered by many scholars to be the gold standard for valid and reliable measurement. The claim is that experienced, well-trained interviewers doing in-person surveys can gather higher quality data than would be possible using any other data-gathering mode. Working in the face-to-face mode, interviewers can build rapport and trust with respondents, thereby minimizing social desirability biases that threaten data quality. Also, although in-person surveys have a long history, they are not technically primitive. Using computer-assisted personal interview techniques, sophisticated experiments can be conducted without recourse to a researcher's lab. Data can be e-mailed back immediately from the field to project headquarters, ensuring the close and continuous monitoring of a survey's progress.

Despite its virtues, the face-to-face mode has significant drawbacks that have prompted some researchers to consider alternative data collection modes. One very serious problem is the high cost. National surveys with large probability samples have become extremely expensive, and their cost is escalating rapidly. Another problem is declining response rates. Although some major in-person surveys continue to have very high response rates, others have experienced a sizable erosion in the percentage of people willing to participate.

Telephone Interviews

Starting in the 1980s, social scientists and commercial pollsters reacted to these emerging problems by employing computer-assisted telephone interview methods, with probability samples chosen by random digit dialing procedures. In addition to their relatively low cost, these surveys can be conducted quickly, with fieldwork completed in a fraction of the time needed for a face-to-face study. This is a very important consideration for researchers interested in monitoring the dynamics of public opinion. Using telephone interviewing techniques, researchers can conduct daily interviews with random subsets (replicates) of larger samples to produce fine-grained portraits of the evolving public mood during national election campaigns. Yet another

desirable feature is that telephone interviewing facilitates survey experiments.

These pluses notwithstanding, the attractiveness of the telephone mode has faded in recent years. Response rates have fallen substantially, with implications that are not yet well understood. Although some studies suggest that the impact of low response rates on data quality is not particularly pernicious, deleterious effects may vary by subject matter. Coverage problems are also increasing as people abandon landline telephones for cell phones that are not reached using traditional techniques. And there is emerging evidence of an enhanced social desirability bias relative to other modes.

Self-Completion Questionnaires

Another survey mode is the self-completion, mail back questionnaire. A cover letter, a printed questionnaire, and a self-addressed return envelope are mailed to a list of potential respondents. If the names and addresses of a population of interest are available, a researcher can draw a probability sample and deploy the standard machinery of statistical inference. The self-completion mail back questionnaire also can be used in conjunction with an in-person survey, with the questionnaire being given to respondents after they have completed a face-to-face interview. The interviewer can wait while the respondent fills out the questionnaire or request that it be returned later.

Self-completion questionnaires have enormous cost advantages relative to in-person and telephone interviews. In Australia and New Zealand, national election studies have been conducted quite effectively using mail back questionnaires. The British Election Study and the British Social Attitudes surveys cut costs and expanded their data collections by having interviewers deliver supplementary self-completion questionnaires to respondents when face-to-face surveys were conducted. The response rates for these surveys have been very good. However, the overall report card for self-completion surveys is not stellar. Researchers using this mode typically find that response rates are mediocre to dismal unless careful attention is paid to the incentives needed to secure participation by members of particular study populations.

Internet Surveys

Over the past 2 decades, a new mode, the Internet survey, has become increasingly popular. Internet surveys have several attractive features. Total cost is typically at least an order of magnitude less than that for a comparable in-person survey, and the marginal cost of increasing the sample size is extremely low. These cost advantages make it possible to do extremely large-*N* surveys and to employ multiple waves of data collection to track individual-level dynamics. Low costs also mean that multiple surveys on the same topic can be fielded simultaneously or in rapid succession, thereby making replication a realistic possibility. There is more. Speed is spectacular, and the reach is global; Internet surveys have the ability to enter and exit from the field in countries around the world in a matter of hours. In addition, with the spread of high-speed broadband connections, sophisticated experiments involving a variety of audio and visual stimuli are realistic options.

These exciting features notwithstanding, Internet surveys are controversial. A major sticking point is the failure of the vast majority of Internet surveys to employ probability samples. The reason is a lack of Internet sampling frames for populations of interest. In pioneering work in the 1980s, the Dutch social scientist Willem Saris addressed this problem by recruiting a panel of Internet respondents via initial telephone contact. The Internet coverage problem—that is, that some potential respondents lacked a computer—was handled by giving them one. Saris's methodology was subsequently adopted by the American firm Knowledge Networks. Although the Saris methodology initially seemed to be a sound method for obtaining a probability sample of Internet respondents, it was only as good as the obtained telephone sample. With telephone surveys suffering from declining response rates and increasing coverage problems, the quality of an Internet panel recruited by telephone cannot be assumed. A related problem may be long-term panel retention.

Other Internet survey researchers do not attempt to recruit a traditional probability sample. For example, the British survey house YouGov draws stratified random samples from a huge list of people that it has recruited to its master Internet panel by a variety of non-probability-based methods. Poststratification weights based on demographic

characteristics, media consumption patterns, and political partisanship are used to improve sample representativeness. YouGov's U.S. partner, Polimetrix, employs an innovative respondent selection technique in which people chosen at random from large-scale surveys using high-quality probability samples are matched with participants in its enormous PollingPoint panel on several demographic and political characteristics. The panelist with the closest match to the person from the probability sample is then sent an Internet survey. Polimetrix argues that its matched sample estimates outperform poststratification weighting procedures and have a sampling distribution similar to that used for simple random samples. Yet another innovative approach has been developed by George Terhanian of Harris International, who uses a propensity score matching technique to select respondents for Harris's Internet surveys.

Some analyses of the quality of the data produced by these non-probability-based Internet surveys indicate that they can produce results comparable with high-quality probability surveys. For example, the marginal distributions for key variables in the Internet component of the 2005 British Election Study are very similar to those produced by the traditional in-person survey. Perhaps, more important, the vast majority of parameters for models of electoral choice estimated using the two data sets are statistically indistinguishable. YouGov has experienced great success in predicting vote shares in recent British elections; there are similarly encouraging results for U.S. survey data gathered as part of the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. However, other studies conducted using U.S. data, particularly those by Jon Krosnick and his colleagues, report significant differences between results of analyses of Internet data gathered using panels of respondents recruited by non-probability means and data gathered using either in-person interviews or Internet questionnaires administered to national probability samples.

These discrepant findings are part of the larger, very lively debate concerning the advantages and disadvantages of various modes of survey research. As this debate unfolds, considerations of cost-effectiveness, representativeness, sample size, speed of data collection, and possibilities for sophisticated experimentation and replication will be key factors that analysts weigh when deciding which

survey mode is best able to accomplish their particular research goals.

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See also Cross-National Surveys; Interviewing; Public Opinion; Sampling, Random and Nonrandom; Survey Research

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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Sustainable development was famously defined in the 1987 *Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development* (The Brundtland Report) as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Long accepted as a guiding notion aimed at reconciling developmental and environmental concerns, the concept has been criticized as being based on the anthropocentric notion of nature as a resource requiring expert human management. Others point out that this is too closely linked with notions of capital-intensive economic development to be of any use in the formulation of an alternative environmental vision that can restore the balance in human interaction with the ecosphere.

Proponents and detractors of the concept agree that it is a vague notion that can be interpreted in divergent ways, depending on whether the emphasis is placed on development or on resource sustainability, on economic development only, or on broader notions of *human* development. Despite the appropriateness of these and other criticisms, there is no evidence that the concept is soon to lose its privileged position in the national and international politics of development and the environment.

Development refers to the process of increasing people’s welfare. The welfare of a group ultimately depends on the extent and quality of stock of all natural and human assets in their economy—commonly referred to as *wealth*. The notion of sustainable development reminds us that current changes in wealth must have consequences for welfare in the future of both the current generation and generations to come. Attempts to increase people’s welfare must therefore be accompanied by *genuine savings* in wealth: the offsetting of resource depletion and environmental degradation, limiting exhaustible resource exports, protecting critical natural capital, and maintaining and increasing investment in human resources.

Intergenerational and Global Inequality

Sustainable development’s biggest contribution is to broaden the scope of ethical thinking to include future generations among those to whom we owe obligations. It also holds important consequences for the practices of national accounting and for issues of global governance. Appreciation of the importance of genuine savings implies that we have to look anew at national accounts and indicators of development. Analysts have long agreed that national production and income figures provide little evidence of the fundamentals of development, as they indicate only how successfully the current generation is exploiting resources. With its measure of *human development* the United Nations (UN) Development Programme and its annual *Human Development Reports* have attempted to introduce a broader and intergenerational measure of development by combining data about education and health with national production/income figures. However, the literature on sustainable development prescribes that we also consider how countries manage their natural and human

resources with an eye to the future. Income ratios between the rich and poor have converged in recent decades (according to some measures and in some parts of the world) and infant mortality is declining across the majority of countries. There is also a perceptible narrowing of average human development index scores over time in the cross-sectional data. Some analysts take this as indicative of a narrowing of inequality between countries (which is only one but a very important dimension of the phenomenon of global inequality). However, when we measure in what shape the production processes and social policies of the industrial era have left the human and natural resource base of many parts of the world, it is clear that a devastating global divide is widening between those parts of the world where genuine savings have kept pace with population growth and those where fertility increasingly outstrips genuine savings. The evolution of this *genuine savings divide* is a tale of the misuse of power and the generation of privilege and of marginalization, and it places humankind before one of its most daunting policy and moral challenges: how to reduce global poverty and inequality *now* without exacerbating both in the *future*. Unfortunately, the international politics of sustainable development makes it unlikely that we will be able to meet that challenge anytime soon.

Sustainable Development and International Politics

From its inception, the term *sustainable development* has had a bearing on international politics. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the newly independent industrializing countries of the South started to use UN resources to frame their needs for economic modernization in terms of the structural inequities of the global economy. The emerging green political revolution in the industrialized states, precipitated by reports of imminent resource scarcity, compelled leaders of the rich North to focus on possible causal links between economic modernity and environmental degradation. In contrast, John Vogler argues, the leaders of the South coalition in global affairs saw their own rapid economic modernization, supported by generous official development assistance from the industrialized North, as the solution for the interrelated problems of poverty and environmental degradation.

These diverging conceptions of the relationship between development and protection of the environment were carried into the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm but were largely left unresolved. Nevertheless, Stockholm led to the mainstreaming of environmental concerns both internationally and nationally and precipitated, among others, the formation of the UN Environment Programme and the creation of departments of environmental affairs in many countries. It was only with the publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987 and the UN Conference on the Environment and Development (Rio "Earth Summit") of 1992 that it became possible diplomatically to strike a tenuous balance between the interests of the North and the South. The concept of "sustainable development"—first popularized in the Brundtland Report and then institutionalized at Rio with the creation of the Commission for Sustainable Development—persuaded the leaders of the South that after the end of the Cold War development issues were to be placed at the center of world attention. When the Rio Declaration and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—two of the major outcomes of Rio—formulated the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities," the long-standing resource concerns of the South also seemed to be alleviated. On the other hand, the term *sustainable development* and its operationalization at Rio also came as a bonus for the leaders of the North, as it allowed them to satisfy the demands of their increasingly environmentally conscious electorates to mainstream environmental issues; to build up domestic *modi vivendi* between agriculture, business, and environmental activists; and to attempt to add environmental standards as a new weapon in their protectionist armor.

Problems and Future Prospects

While the normative framework of sustainable development continues to be the focal point on which global environmental and developmental regimes converge, it appears as if the underlying bargain that was struck at Rio is eroding. Bitterly disappointed by the failure of the North to live up to its resource-sharing promises, and after the indecisiveness of the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, emerging

centers of power in the South are falling back on a distributive bargaining strategy in global negotiations on development, the environment, and international economic interaction. This is evident in their vocal resistance to the inclusion of environmental issues in trade negotiations and in their resistance to accept any climate change mitigation deal that will undermine their economic modernization. Having been conned before by *sustainable development*, the major countries of the South are adamant not to let their “right to develop” be compromised by a deal on the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, no matter how persuasive the case for mitigation is. With growing concerns about fuel and food shortages becoming more common in the first decade of the new millennium, the emphasis for the leaders of the South again falls on how to make *development* sustainable.

Both conceptually and politically, the notion of sustainable development thus seems less sustainable than it was in 1992. However, there is no conceptual or normative challenger in sight, and it remains embedded in numerous dimensions of global and national governance. Successive secretaries general of the UN have elevated the notion of sustainable development to an overarching norm in multilateral attempts to secure global public goods. These efforts no longer include only government leaders, but they also include transnational nongovernmental organizations and private corporations. The very definition of a global public good favored in the UN system is based on the idea that a public good can claim to be global only if it allows for nonexcludability and nonrivalry across generations.

Its institutionalization at the highest governance levels has allowed the notion to contribute a range of principles and managerial tools to the governance of the environment, both nationally and internationally. Among the lasting principles that it has contributed are the so-called precautionary principle that is now deeply ingrained in multilateral negotiation practice, the notion of common but differentiated responsibilities, the importance of taking an ecosystem approach in dealing with challenges, the “polluter pays” principle, and the principle of environment policy integration. In recent years, emphasis has also shifted to the political conditions of sustainability: subsidiarity (i.e., that decisions should be taken at the appropriate level of governance), participation by and responsiveness

to the people directly affected by decisions, and gender equity.

The concept of sustainable development has also presided over the emergence of international environmental law dealing with the protection of the ozone layer, the protection of biological diversity, biosafety, the protection of natural forests, the combating of desertification, and the stabilization of climate change. It has also had a profound effect on corporate governance, where it joins profitability and social responsibility as one of the three “bottom lines.”

Political scientists have good reasons to be interested in sustainable development. First, the concept prompts a broader, more inclusive basis for ethical deliberation by introducing intertemporal considerations (i.e., an analysis that takes into account a large span of time). Second, sustainable development has become an integral part of the contemporary state’s managerial apparatus. Third, it progressively has become the normative focus around which the global governance of the environment converges. Fourth, it adds a significant new dimension to distributive battles between the industrialized North and the industrializing South and to analytical attempts to measure inequality between states. Finally, the concept itself continues to be politically highly contested.

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See also Development, Political; Governance, Global; Inequality, Economic; Measurement; Multilateralism; United Nations

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SYMBOLS, POLITICAL

Political symbols are signs (images, flags, slogans, etc.) that represent political reality. Political symbols constitute the foundation for the cognitive, emotional, and psychomotor processes with which individuals evaluate the political sphere. Political symbols can be used strategically in a quest for political power; they may, however, also have unintended consequences. This happens because the interpretation of political symbols is not only informed by predefined notions but is the social, political, and cultural context that adds another dimension of meaning to a given set of political symbols.

Political symbols reduce the complexity of politics by making references and increasing the amount of information in the communication process. While the term *political symbol* describes the objects of political communication, the term *symbolic politics* subsumes the occurrence of a specific process of political communication. In habitual language, symbolic politics means a publicly displayed deception or surrogate action that is used to detract from actual political reality. In this sense, symbolic politics is considered to be a surrogate for politics. Symbolic politics differs from substantial policy. As a policy of signs (terms and slogans, badges, banners and pictures, gestures, ritual acts, and political staging), symbolic politics evolves in a semantic field. Substantial policy, by contrast, consists of a revisable succession of political decisions (e.g., legislation, contracts, and taxes). Symbolic politics and substantial policy can be related to each other. On the one hand, symbolic politics can have an impact on substantial policy. On the other hand, substantial policy can be communicated,

implemented, or averted by symbolic politics. In the following sections, the relationships between political symbols and symbolic politics and their various functions are discussed.

The Use of Signs and the Nature of Symbolic Politics

Political symbols/symbolic politics constitute a specific dimension of how we construct, represent, and perceive political reality. As is always the case, when we deal with the reality of social phenomena, this happens against a backdrop of questions concerning the difference between substance and appearance. The negative connotation of symbolic politics, which is often expressed in public opinion polls, does not correspond to the more sophisticated view of symbolic politics in cultural studies and the social sciences, for symbolic politics in a broader sense also means the strategic use of signs to meet society's requirements of political orientation. Attention may be attracted; willingness to engage in political action, to express loyalty, or to demonstrate protest may be shown by symbolic politics. In doing so, the symbolic value of signs is converted into political power.

This process is not a common cultural, philosophical, or epistemological phenomenon of nomination or interpretation. The use of symbols in politics is the expression of a struggle for a certain view of life. Thus, questions of dominance or subordination are involved, resulting in the tendency to unilaterally implement or achieve by mutual agreement what should be generally binding. The strategic use of symbolic instruments in politics does not simply aim at achieving interaction. Political symbols are neither mere decorative attachments nor ideological ballast, in contrast to "real" politics. Symbolic politics was, and is, still an integral part of political communications in the media society and thereby of politics in general. Thus, symbolic politics is not restricted to acts of state with ostentation, national commemoration ceremonies, or mass rallies. Precisely because there is no pure form of politics—it is more or less always a dual reality of occurrence and interpretation—there is a need for the use of symbolic means.

Symbols have a constitutive meaning for social reality in an all-embracing cultural and philosophical sense. They are neither simply an image of

reality nor an exponent of its objects but, as the philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1985) points out, are a medium for the perception of reality and thus part of the aesthetic construction of the world. They create a transcendental precondition for the construction of human reality. From a sociological point of view, social reality is not perceived by firsthand experience but by a symbolic world of meaning. This symbolic world can overlap or assimilate antithetical parts of everyday life.

An important impulse for the international debate about symbolic politics was provided by Murray Edelman in his works *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (1964) and *Politics as Symbolic Actions: Mass Arousal and Quiescence* (1971). He argues in favor of an analysis of political power based on substantiated social theory. Edelman ties in with the basic assumptions of the symbolic interactionist and the interpretative school of sociology, as exemplified in the work of George Herbert Mead (1863–1931), which propagates the extension of normative and institutional political concepts by affective and evaluative aspects of politics. He understands political action as playing a certain role, which finds its expression in dramatic or symbolized form. Edelman connects subjective and intersubjective forms of analysis—microphenomena—with the production of general binding decisions—macrophenomena. Referring to Walter Lippmann's (1922/1997) classic study of public opinion, he draws the conclusion that politics is too complex to be accessible to the public. Instead of improving real conditions, a dramatic symbolic scene of abstractions appears. A panoptic view is built by images, staging, and symbols. This surrogate world may refer to objective reality ("referential symbols"). But then there are also "condensation symbols," which deceive about reality. Permanently installed democratic rituals encourage belief in political participation and rational acts of state, even though they are instruments of political "quiescence." Publicly communicated policy is becoming ritual, a political sport for spectators. According to Edelman, political symbols and symbolic politics are becoming instruments of manipulation for political elites.

To a large extent, there has been no result in the critical debate initiated by Edelman to correlate the assumed real politics and their legitimation by symbolic politics. Furthermore, symbolic politics has to deal with collective actors and institutions

that are symbolic regimes themselves, being central elements in forming, stabilizing, and transforming social relationships. Political symbols/symbolic politics are successful when they make room for interpretations that are compatible with the way a culture endows its politics with meaning. As Pierre Bourdieu (2000) observed, symbolic politics is successful if it refreshes a specific repertoire of interpretation that can be affiliated to the culture of political interpretation or "symbolic space."

So symbolic politics, in the sense of pseudopolitics, is just a negative special case of a fundamental aspect of political acting that always has instrumental and expressive parts. Four fundamental functions of symbolic politics can be defined:

- Political symbols as well as symbolic politics have a signal function: They attract attention, breach routines for providing or placing information, organize the perception of politics, and contribute to the reliability of behavior.
- By decreasing complexity, they provide a regulator to cope with the mass of information.
- The use of political symbols not only aims to denominate political circumstances but is also a part of the political fight for the disposal of denomination.
- By perceiving symbols in a mode of suggestive immediacy, symbolic politics not only addresses rationality but also activates emotions.

Conclusion

Symbolic politics is policy and as such neither principally good nor bad. It is an essential component of political communications. Symbolic politics is not an invention of a media society. However, the permanent presence of politics in the media and a high-level display of modern media systems bring about responses concerning mediation and the impact of "symbolic power" (as portrayed by Bourdieu) to an extent that has never occurred in history before. The mere existence of symbolic politics is not itself a political problem. A striking question concerns its quality. An analytical, differentiated evaluation may result from varying stress ratios: between retrogressive or reflexive, withdrawn to privacy or active citizenship, relating to persons or relating to factual issues, entertaining or informative, causing emotions or solving problems,

concerning actors or concerning affected persons, being hermetic or proceeding from an idea to logically following an idea, and so on. By using such an analytical concept, an incorrect dualistic understanding can be avoided, one that regards symbolic politics as being a phenomenon of political acting on stage, while “real” politics are seen as taking place backstage. Politics, including symbolic politics, are played on many different stages at the same time. In this action, politicians can only succeed if they know how to play different roles and are able to use symbolic politics.

Research concerning symbolic politics shows serious gaps. In cultural studies, the dominant interpretive of symbolic politics should be reinforced with an analysis of social sciences, especially with the results of evaluation research. Researching symbolic politics should not be restricted to a view on the interior logic of systems of symbols. It should contain the structure of material and pragmatic problems, as is the case in various cultural-historical evaluations. An analysis of symbolic politics has to evaluate the relationship of symbolic and pragmatic means in structures of political interpretation and construction. By detecting coherences and antitheses between the logic of fact and the logic of presentation, such an analysis can contribute toward understanding the logic of the function of the political dimension as well as the rating of political communications according to the quality of democracy.

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See also Political Communication; Political Culture;
Public Opinion; Rituals

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SYSTEMS THEORY

Systems theory is a science that has the comparative study of systems as its object. There are different types of systems: organisms (animals, humans, and particularly cognitive mechanisms in organisms), machines (particularly computers), physico-chemical systems, psychic systems, and social systems. Such a comparative research program for heterogeneous types of systems presupposes a highly general concept of systems, for which numerous features have been proposed: the interdependency of the parts of a system, the reference of any structure and process in a system to the environments of the system, equilibrium and adaptedness and continuous readaptations to environmental demands as core elements of the understanding of a system, self-organization of a system as the principal way it responds to external intervention, and complexity as a trigger mechanism for system formation and as the form that describes the internal network structures of connectedness among system elements. After examining the historical roots of general system theory, this entry focuses on the main two theories that have been elaborated in social sciences from this perspective.

General System Theory, Information Theory, and Cybernetics

Systems theory is an understanding related to those definitions developed in the years after 1940 on the basis of suggestions from biology (the “general system theory” of Ludwig von Bertalanffy), physiology (Walter B. Cannon, Walter Pitts, and Warren McCulloch), and information theory and

cybernetics (Claude Shannon, Norbert Wiener, and William Ross Ashby). Particularly, the idea by Shannon and Wiener of defining information as a selection among alternative possibilities turned out to be a generalization transcending heterogeneous systems and pointing to systems theory as a kind of general selection theory. This was connected to the strictly binary way of operation Pitts and McCulloch postulated in a paper on nerve cells published in 1943. This idea that at any branching of nerve cells there are only two alternative states available proved to be the simplest suggestion of how to make use of a network of cells for long chains of numerical operations. From this came the computer and, at the same time, came more general ideas regarding the operational realities of any observing system whatsoever.

Since its beginnings, the social sciences were an important part of the establishment of systems theory. Jürgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson were in 1951 the first who tried to base a social science discipline on an information and communication theory coming from cybernetics (*Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry*). But the two most influential suggestions were the comprehensive sociological versions of systems theory that were proposed by Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann beginning in the 1950s and the 1970s, respectively.

Talcott Parsons

Parsons (1902–1979) had been influenced by equilibrium ideas from physiology (Cannon), the system–environment thinking of the Harvard physiologist Lawrence Henderson, and the duality of information and energy that Wiener had proposed. From these materials, he developed a sociological systems theory. Social systems are related either to the internal environment of other social systems or to external nonsocial environments (psychic, biological, and cultural environments). Furthermore, they differ in the way they refer to time: They are either oriented toward realizations in the future or to satisfactions of needs in the present (*instrumental* or *consummatory*). From these two distinctions, internal/external and instrumental/consummatory, Parsons derived four possibilities for the formation of systems: first, there are *adaptive* systems (combining external reference and future orientation, e.g., the economy); second, systems that are

specialized on *goal attainment* (internal reference and future orientation, e.g., the polity); third, systems focused on *integration* of system elements (internal reference and present orientation, e.g., the society conceived as a community); and fourth, systems that are responsible for the *maintenance* of long-term *patterns* (external reference and present orientation, e.g., cultural institutions in society).

There is one further aspect that Parsons adds to this elementary distinction of the four types of systems. Among these four system types, he distinguishes those in which a primacy of the *transfer of information* obtains all cultural institutions and systems from those that are focused on transfers of energy (e.g., the adaptive economic system). Information-rich systems *control* energetical systems. These, on the other hand, are thought of as *conditioning* factors that limit the scope of information-rich systems. This argument was taken from Wiener, and Parsons derived from it a bidirectional hierarchy of conditions and control that interrelated all types of systems.

On the basis of these elementary distinctions, Parsons worked for a further 3 decades on a social theory that identified in any concrete social system these four universal functional aspects (adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and pattern maintenance), which often constitute autonomous subsystems of the respective system. In an analogy to economics, he then added input–output analysis. Systems and subsystems are interrelated via the input and output of resources that are either the result or the precondition of ongoing system processes. Among these resources are the cognitive and motivational resources of participants and the rights and values that are attributed to them. These different types of resources are transferred in exchange processes between systems. For analyzing these exchange processes going on between systems, without which systems would never be able to procure the resources they need for their functioning, Parsons created a theory about *media of exchange*.

Parsons started again with an analogy to economics in theorizing about media of exchange. He postulated that there is first of all *money* in its economic function as a medium of exchange, well-known to economists. Then, he added *power* and argued that it is best understood when analyzed as

analogous to money, as an exchange medium that mediates the transfer of resources (decisions, support, responsibility, etc.) important in political processes. And after having written theories for power and money, Parsons added further media of exchange for input–output processes between systems, among which *influence* and *value commitments* play an especially prominent role on the level of societal exchanges.

In continuing his decades-long work on media of exchange between systems, Parsons affirmed once more the cognitive starting point of systems theory in the 1940s: Systems theory as an interdisciplinary endeavor making use of intellectual resources, from the sciences as well as from the humanities, always focused on strategies for comparing heterogeneous systems and diverse system processes.

Niklas Luhmann

Luhmann's (1927–1998) writings always presupposed what Parsons had done. But it is also true that he started systems theory anew. For him, the system–environment distinction as inspired by Ludwig von Bertalanffy's theory of open systems was a much more important starting point than it was for Parsons. Whereas for Parsons the environment of a social system always consists of other systems, for Luhmann, a phenomenological understanding of *environment* is far more prominent—one that looks at the *difference* between system and environment, environments being structured in a completely different way than is the case in systems. *Order from noise*, the formula of Henri Atlan, which Luhmann later on cited very often, gives a good idea of concepts of environment that look for contrasts and for differences and not for a simple plurality of other systems.

From the start, *complexity* was another central term in Luhmann's writings. Systems process complexity; they arise by establishing and stabilizing the difference in complexity with respect to their environments. As is the case in the work of Wiener and Bateson, systems for Luhmann are those originating in communications, and as such they are based on a way of processing information that Luhmann calls *meaning*. Meaning is formally similar to information as it is based on something being a selection among plural alternatives. But

what is characteristic of meaning and thereby constitutive for social and psychic systems, as the two types of systems making use of meaning, is that the alternatives not chosen are still remembered. One can come back to them, one can criticize selections by pointing to the alternatives that were available, and one can write history on the basis of this dual structure of meaning.

For Luhmann, too, systems have a functional orientation. They specialize in certain problem solutions characteristic and constitutive of them. But he completely refrains from making a finite catalog of the basic functions that have to be dealt with everywhere. Instead, every system is conceived to be singular in fulfilling the functional need that somehow was the catalyst around which the process of system formation came about as a historical and a contingent process. Sports, for example, is a global function system in present-day world society. But the formation of this system is contingent on the improbable synthesis of very heterogeneous traditions (the hunting and riding traditions of the European nobility, boxing and wrestling as popular amusements in early-modern Europe, ball games in English public schools, the gymnastics of Northern Europe, etc.). On the basis of such examples, one can understand that for Luhmann, modern society consists of huge and global function systems for economic relations, science, religion, law, and intimate relations—and for a number of other functional problems in communication. Functional differentiation is the guiding principle of differentiation in contemporary society.

Further elaboration of the theory then was done by work on three theories that were added to the theory of social systems. There is a theory of socio-cultural evolution, conceived as a neo-Darwinist theory, which analyzes how structure formation is possible on the basis of chance events. Second, Luhmann reformulates the Parsonian theory of media of exchange that mediate input–output processes between systems as a theory of communication media, which are conceived as being internal to functional systems. These communication media are effect mechanisms. They are based on symbols that are thought to be effective in communication—such as symbols of money, power, truth, or love—and as such effective symbols, motivate other

social actors to do something they would not otherwise have done. In this version of the theory there is no exchange implied, as communication is not understood as an exchange process. Third, Luhmann works out a differentiation theory that embeds the empirical core diagnosis of functional differentiation into a more general theory of forms of system differentiation, including segmentation and stratification. The guiding idea is once more to have an instrument for doing comparative research on social systems. Different historical formations can be compared by looking at the forms of system differentiation that are dominant in them.

A further shift in the foundations of systems theory arose in the late 1970s as the result of a new interdisciplinary import. Luhmann adopted the theory of *autopoiesis* proposed by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, which differs from the Bertalanffy tradition of open systems in looking at systems (e.g., cells) as being completely closed on the basis of their own production processes. Whatever they consist of—elements, structures, processes, or boundaries—systems are conceived to produce all their elementary constituents by their own production processes. Luhmann connected this hypothesis to communication theory. He then described social systems as autopoietic communication systems, which always produce and reproduce a specific type of communication (e.g., payments in the economy or published truth claims in the social system of science) and which do this only on the basis of processes internal to the system. At the same time, he held on to the primacy of the system–environment distinction. Regarding autopoietic systems, this means that for them, too, it is true that they only can continue their processes of production and reproduction of their components if they incessantly observe their relevant environments and generate information instructive for their production processes on the basis of these observations.

Systems Theory Today

Systems theory today continues in its two variant forms: first, as general systems theory, primarily influential among some biologists, chemists, physicists, and mathematicians and holding an important institutional place in the Santa Fe Institute

and, second, as a paradigm of sociological theorizing and research, linked to the writings of Parsons and Luhmann. As a sociological paradigm, it is attractive because of its universalism, conceiving a multifaceted approach to the analysis of social systems that, in the plurality of theoretical approaches it brought about, promises to be applicable to a whole range of problems relevant for sociology. In political science, this tradition was deepened by David Easton (1953), who opened the way to a more empirical use of the concept of “political system” that was clearly compatible with the behaviorist approach to politics and challenged the classical use of the concept of the state. Strongly present during the 1960s, this tradition faded by the end of the 1970s.

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See also Comparative Methods; Functionalism; Self-Regulation

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T

TAX POLICY

Taxes are monetary charges imposed by governments on natural or legal persons. They are compulsory and unrequited: Taxpayers are legally obliged to pay taxes and cannot expect to receive any specific benefit in return, such as a piece of public property or a particular health care treatment in a public hospital. Taxes are not fees. While taxes are ostensibly collected for the sake of the public good, the liability of the individual taxpayer is independent of the personal utility he or she derives from that good. Taxes are levied in virtually all countries of the world. They constitute the major source of revenue of the modern state.

This entry deals with tax policy generally. It considers the major types and purposes of taxation, reviews common trends and national variations in the tax policy of advanced Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, reflects on the causes and constraints of tax policy making, discusses the effects of taxation on growth and inequality, and highlights specific features of taxation in developing countries.

Types of Taxes

It is conventional to distinguish between direct and indirect taxes. A direct tax is paid directly to the government by the (natural or legal) person on whom it is imposed. Direct taxes are usually based

on the taxpayer's ability to pay. The most important direct tax is the individual income tax levied on the labor, capital, or other income of a person or household. Other important direct taxes include the corporate income tax on business profits, the property tax on real estate holdings, the wealth tax on net worth, the inheritance tax on bequests, and social security contributions. An indirect tax is paid to the government by a person different from the person on whom it is imposed. The most important examples are general consumption taxes, such as the value-added tax (VAT) or the sales tax, and specific consumption taxes, such as excises on fuel, tobacco, or alcohol. These taxes are indirect in the sense that they are imposed on the consumers of goods and services but paid to the government by the seller of the goods or services. In contrast to direct taxes, indirect taxes cannot take into account taxpayers' ability to pay. While poor people usually pay less income tax, absolutely and relatively, than rich people, they always pay the same rate of VAT or excise.

Another typology sorts taxes according to their presumed distributive effect. The individual income tax is usually considered a progressive tax because it typically combines a progressive statutory rate schedule with a personal exemption for a minimum level of income. Both features ensure that income earners pay progressively more of their income in tax the higher their earnings. Corporate income, property, and wealth taxes are also often considered to be progressive. Social security contributions, by contrast, can be considered proportional to the extent that they are charged at flat

rates and with little or no personal exemption. Often they are charged only up to a maximum level of income. This tends to make their distributive effect regressive because taxpayers with incomes above the income cap owe an ever smaller share of their income to social security contributions the more they earn above the income cap than taxpayers with income below the cap. General consumption taxes and excises are commonly considered to be regressive because the share of income spent on consumption tends to decrease as the level of personal income increases. The theoretical basis for distinguishing taxes according to their distributive impact is shaky, however. The link between corporate income taxation and tax progressivity, for example, is by no means clear and crucially depends on assumptions about incidence. There is also empirical evidence to suggest that common intuitions about the distributive effects of taxes are often inaccurate. For example, income and property taxes are not invariably progressive in end effect and may sometimes even be regressive.

Purposes of Taxation

According to the American economist Richard Musgrave (1959), taxation serves three broad purposes, which are discussed below.

Resource Allocation. Taxes allocate resources to the public sector. This is the obvious fiscal function of taxation. During the 19th and 20th centuries, alternative sources of revenue—ownership of productive resources, sales of public office or monopoly power, coercive confiscation of domestic or foreign wealth, monetary debasement—decreased in significance. For the modern state, taxation is the single most important source of government revenue. Taxes can also improve resource allocation in the private sector, for example, by forcing actors to internalize externalities, as in environmental taxation or tobacco and alcohol taxation. Hence, taxation may also serve a regulatory function for private resource allocation.

Redistribution. Taxation is one major instrument to reduce inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth either directly through tax progressivity or indirectly through funding redistributive expenditure programs.

Stabilization. Taxation, together with public expenditure, monetary policy, and public debt, can help stabilize the business cycle and ensure high levels of employment and growth.

Common Trends and National Variations

Tax policy in advanced OECD countries has followed broadly similar trends over the past 50 years in terms of tax level, tax mix, and tax design, but significant national variations remain.

The level of total taxation has risen in all advanced OECD countries. Taxation as a share of GDP grew from roughly 25% on average in 1955 to 38% on average in 2005. The level of taxation is highest in Nordic countries, such as Sweden (49% of GDP in 2005) and Denmark (51%). It tends to be below average in Anglo-Saxon countries, such as Australia (31%). IT is also below average in the United States (28%). Tax levels in continental Europe and in Mediterranean states lie between these extremes.

The tax mix has grown more uniform. All advanced OECD countries derive the bulk of their tax revenues from just three taxes: individual income tax, social security contributions, and a general consumption tax, usually a VAT. While these taxes accounted for only about 45% of total tax revenues on average in 1955 and for as little as 21% and 23% of total revenues in Ireland and Portugal, respectively, by 2005, they accounted for an average of 71% of total tax revenues. Other taxes, the most important of which are excises on specific goods and services, have lost in fiscal importance. Significant national variations still remain in the relative reliance on the three major taxes though. Anglo-Saxon countries tend to rely more heavily on the individual income tax (and also the corporate income tax) than other OECD countries but less on general consumption taxation and social security contributions. Australia and New Zealand collect no revenue from social security contributions at all. Continental European and Mediterranean countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Portugal, and Spain, tend to rely disproportionately on social security contributions, while the revenue raised through individual income taxes is often below average. Finally, Nordic countries rely heavily on income tax (but not corporate income tax) and

VAT but less on social security contributions. Denmark is the extreme case, raising almost 50% of total tax revenue through income tax and 20% through VAT but hardly anything through social security contributions in 2005.

In terms of tax design, the most prominent recent development in income taxation has been the flattening of the statutory rate schedule. The top individual income tax rate fell from an average of almost 70% in advanced OECD countries and more than 90% in the United Kingdom and Japan in 1975 to an average of slightly below 48% by 2005. In some states, rate cuts were accompanied by a move away from a global income tax, under which income from whatever source is aggregated and subjected to a single rate of tax, toward a so-called schedular income tax, under which income from different sources is taxed at different rates. Thus, interest income is increasingly subjected to a separate final withholding tax outside the individual income tax in OECD countries. The so-called dual income tax, introduced in Norway, Sweden, and Finland in the 1990s, separates the taxation of capital and labor income completely, subjecting only the latter but not the former to taxation at high progressive rates. Corporate income taxation has been characterized by a general move toward lower statutory tax rates and broad tax bases since the 1980s. The dominant trend in consumption taxation has been the spread of VAT since the 1970s. In 2010, all OECD countries except the United States had a VAT. At the same time, the number of excises has generally fallen, and some new environmental taxes have been introduced.

Determinants of Tax Policy

Various factors shape the choice of tax level, tax mix, and tax design, including public spending, administrative capacity, domestic politics, and international influences.

Public spending has increased even faster than total taxation over the past 50 years. It went up from 27% of GDP on average in 1950 to 45% on average in 2005. The main driver behind the growth in spending was social expenditure. As the welfare state expanded, the outlays for social purposes went up. Social expenditure now accounts for more than 50%, on average, of public spending in advanced OECD countries and explains virtually

all the variance in national tax levels. The major difference between high-tax and low-tax countries is simply that the former have a large welfare state while the latter do not. While the close association between public spending and taxation is obvious, the direction of causation is more contested. Some, such as Junko Kato (2003), argue that the establishment of high-performance tax systems preceded and enabled the growth of large welfare states, while others, such as Peter Lindert (2004), maintain that high taxation is a consequence of high levels of social expenditure.

According to B. Guy Peters (1991), administrative capacity has a major influence on the level and shape of taxation. Early taxes, such as tolls, tariffs, excises, and property taxes, targeted the easy-to-monitor bottlenecks of economic activity. This helped economize on scarce administrative resources but was economically distorting and fiscally ineffective. As administrative capacities grew during the 20th century, these bottlenecks were relieved, and the tax burden was spread more widely and efficiently. Tolls, customs duties, and excises were replaced by general sales taxes and, since the 1960s, by the technically superior but administratively complex VAT. In direct taxation, property and wealth taxes were supplanted by income tax. The spread of the withholding method of income tax collection since the 1940s, whereby the tax due is retained ("withheld") by the income's paying agent (the employer or bank) rather than the income earners themselves, facilitated the conversion of an income tax originally restricted to the upper class into a mass tax and increased the timeliness and buoyancy of tax collections. Problems of assessment, monitoring, and enforcement also explain why, for example, capital (net wealth, capital gains, owner-occupied housing) or fringe benefits are usually taxed more leniently than labor income or why financial services are often exempt from VAT even though they constitute an important part of economic activity.

Taxation is a major issue in domestic politics. It is commonly assumed that left parties favor high and progressive taxation because their core constituency comes primarily from the lower half of the income distribution, while right parties prefer moderate levels of proportional or regressive taxation because they represent the upper half of income earners. All else being equal, high levels of

inequality should move tax policy to the left, low levels to the right. However, various contextual factors modify or even reverse this simple logic. First, electoral competition is usually multidimensional, and this tends to moderate the parties' policy positions on any one dimension, including taxation. Second, left-party governments may be deterred from high, progressive taxation by the possibility of negative macroeconomic consequences. Actually, left governments in Sweden and elsewhere have often opted for regressive consumption taxes and social security contributions rather than progressive income taxes, to fund social spending. Finally, institutional factors shape the translation of party preferences into government policies. Consensus democracies, characterized by multiparty systems, proportional representation electoral institutions, broad coalition governments, interest group corporatism, and strong judicial review, decrease the responsiveness of tax policy making to the policy preferences of the median voter, while majoritarian systems with two-party systems, majority elections, single-party governments, and interest group pluralism tend to increase it. Some argue that this difference explains why majoritarian Anglo-Saxon democracies rely more heavily on progressive income taxes and corporate taxation than the more consensus-oriented continental and Nordic European countries: In these countries, as noted by Jude Hays (2009), the majoritarian impulse to impose heavy taxes on the rich has been kept in check by multiple veto players, while in majoritarian Anglo-Saxon democracies, it dominates tax policy making during periods of leftist government.

Various international influences shape national tax policy making. One is the diffusion of tax policy examples and ideas across national borders. It has been argued, for example, that the highly visible "market-conforming" 1986 U.S. Tax Reform Act triggered a wave of reform in other OECD countries, which emulated the U.S. example and established a new, "neoliberal" tax policy orthodoxy. This may account for the general trend toward low statutory tax rates and broad tax bases in corporate and individual income taxation. International organizations can also influence national tax policy. The European Union (EU) severely constrains the freedom of its member states in matters of tax design and administration

by detailed tax harmonization in indirect taxation and through the case law of the European Court of Justice in direct taxation. The influence of other international organizations is more selective and less obvious. The World Trade Organization stipulates international norms for the tax treatment of international trade. The so-called OECD Model Tax Convention, which serves as an almost universally accepted blueprint for bilateral double-tax-avoidance treaties, exerts some soft harmonizing pressure on national income taxation by defining basic tax concepts that have become established features of national taxation, such as the distinction between active and passive income or between subsidiaries and permanent establishments. Also, OECD revenue statistics, by defining a common classificatory frame for the comparison of national taxes, exerts subtle pressure to design national taxes such that they can be fitted into this frame. Finally, national tax policy is constrained by international tax competition. Tax competition has been a major driver behind the general fall in corporate tax rates since the 1980s. Corporate tax revenues remained largely unaffected partly because of the offsetting effects of broadening the tax base. But the corporate tax burden shifted from high-profit firms, which benefit most from low rates, to low-profit firms, which suffer most from base broadening. Arguably, individual income tax also suffered because low corporate tax rates increase the incentives for rich individuals to shift income into the corporate sector in order to protect it from taxation at the top individual income tax rate. Generally, tax competition is more constraining for small states than for large states: They suffer more in terms of tax base flight if they try to maintain high corporate tax rates. However, they also potentially benefit more from undercutting foreign tax rates. Ireland has set aggressive corporate tax rates to speed up national economic development, and many new EU member states in Eastern Europe have tried to emulate Ireland's apparent success.

Taxation and Economic Growth

Perhaps surprisingly, there is little evidence for a negative correlation of economic growth and taxation. High-tax states do not systematically grow more slowly than low-tax ones in the OECD area.

Most observers agree that a crucial key to explaining what Lindert (2004) called the “free-lunch puzzle” is that high-tax, high-spending welfare states in Scandinavia and continental Europe have a more growth-friendly tax mix than the relatively low-tax Anglo-Saxon states. Some highlight the fact that the former group of states relies more heavily on regressive taxes on labor and consumption (social security contributions, VAT, and excises on alcohol, tobacco, and fuel) and less on progressive income taxes than the latter. As Lindert notes, a more regressive tax mix is said to promote growth by reducing the disincentive effects of taxation. Progressive taxes purportedly discourage extra effort by subjecting extra income to a higher tax burden; regressive taxes encourage effort by rewarding extra income with lower effective tax rates. Others note that progressive taxes may also stimulate growth. A progressive tax system is praised for putting money into the hands of those most likely to spend it—namely, the poor. According to Achim Kemmerling (2009), a progressive tax system invigorates the labor market by facilitating the take-up of low-wage work and by discouraging wage drift, and it smoothes disposable income over the business cycle and, thus, helps stabilize the macroeconomy. From this perspective, continental European and Scandinavian tax mixes appear more growth friendly than the Anglo-Saxon tax mix, not because they are more regressive but because they burden capital less. Steffen Ganghof (2006) suggested that focusing taxation on labor and consumption stimulates savings and investment and, therefore, innovation and employment.

Taxation and Inequality

Taxation can reduce income inequality either directly, by a progressive rate schedule that imposes a higher tax burden—relatively and absolutely—on the rich than on the poor, or indirectly, by funding redistributive social expenditure. According to Lane Kenworthy (2008), while advanced OECD countries rely on both strategies, they generally achieve more inequality reduction by social expenditure than by progressive taxation. The redistributive effects of both strategies are not completely equivalent though. While poverty alleviation calls for social expenditure because the poor have little

or no taxable income to begin with, the reduction of high-end income inequality calls for progressive taxation because the rich do not depend on social transfers and public services. The combination of progressive taxation and redistributive expenditure is made difficult by economic and political trade-offs. Redistribution by progressive taxation requires a high tax burden on the rich and also a high tax burden on capital because the rich are likely to derive a large share of their income from capital. This tends to increase the efficiency costs of taxation in terms of reduced savings, investment, and work effort, and to alienate the rich and parts of the middle class from the welfare state. This may explain why countries relying strongly on redistribution by progressive taxation, such as the United States, usually allocate less funds to social expenditure. It may also explain why countries with high levels of social expenditure, such as Sweden and Germany, rely strongly on regressive consumption taxes and/or social security contributions and have a low income tax burden on capital. Harold Wilensky (2002) suggested that these features reduce the efficiency costs of taxation and keep the well-off committed to the welfare state thus allowing for higher levels of taxation and spending.

Taxation in Less Developed Countries

Developing countries rely less on taxation and more on nontax sources of revenue—debt, seigniorage (the “inflation tax”), and foreign transfers—than advanced OECD countries. This is reflected in a significantly lower level of total taxation. According to some estimates, the tax take of an average developing country has stagnated at less than 20% since the late 1960s. The tax mix of developing countries is typically geared toward indirect taxation, especially excises and taxes on international trade, while direct taxes on income, property, wealth, corporate profits, or capital gains typically contribute little to total revenues. Various potential explanatory factors have been discussed for the specific tax features of developing countries. Low levels of legitimacy and trust in state institutions are said to increase tax resistance, constraining revenue-raising potential. High levels of corruption purportedly have a similar effect. There is empirical evidence of a substitution effect as people do

not like to pay for public services twice, first via taxes and then again via bribes. The economic structure can also have a constraining effect. High levels of agricultural employment and a large informal sector tend to be negatively associated with tax revenue, whereas industrialization and a concentration of economic activity in resource extraction tend to increase tax revenue. Also, developing countries are more vulnerable to the pressures of tax competition and have purportedly suffered revenue losses because of it. Finally, administrative problems help explain the strong focus on easy-to-monitor tax handles, such as specific transactions (excises and trade taxes) or large corporations (the corporate income tax).

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See also Economic Policy; Public Budgeting;
Redistribution; Welfare State

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TERRITORY

Several dimensions of politics come together in the word *territory*: land, a functional factor such as communication infrastructure, and a symbolic factor such as national identity. Typically associated with a polity, particularly a nation-state, the term can also be applied to any portion of space referred to otherwise as a region, locality, or place. Sometimes, a territory is an area awaiting formal incorporation into an adjacent state, as in the case of Alaska before it became one of the U.S. states. In general, however, territory is particularly, if not exclusively, associated with the spatial organization of the modern state with its claim to absolute control or sovereignty over a population within carefully defined external borders. Indeed, until Robert D. Sack extended the understanding of human territoriality as a strategy to individuals and organizations in general, use of the term *territory* was largely confined to the spatial organization of states. In the social sciences, such as sociology and political science, this is still the case, such that the challenge posed to territory by networked forms of organization (typically associated with globalization) is invariably characterized in totalistic terms as “the end of geography.” This signifies the extent to which territory has become the dominant geographical term (and imagination) in the social sciences. It is then closely allied to state sovereignty. As John Agnew (1994) pointed out, because sovereignty is seen to “erode” or “unbundle,” territory is also assumed to behave likewise. From this viewpoint, territory takes on an epistemological centrality, in that it is understood as absolutely fundamental to modernity.

The territorial nation-state is a highly specific historical entity. It first arose in Europe in the 16th

and 17th centuries. Since that time, political power has often been seen as inherently territorial. Politics take place only within "the institutions and the spatial envelope of the state as the exclusive governor of a definite territory. We also identify political territory with social space, perceiving countries as 'state-societies'" (Paul Hirst, 2005, p. 27). Much interstate conflict is about competing territorial claims. The process of state formation has always had two crucial attributes. One is exclusivity. All the political entities (the Roman Catholic Church, city-states, etc.) that could not achieve a reasonable semblance of sovereignty over a contiguous territory have been steadily delegitimized as major political actors. The second is mutual recognition. The power of states has rested to a considerable extent on the recognition each state receives from the others in the form of noninterference in its "internal" affairs. Together, these attributes have created a world in which there can be no territory without a state. In this way, territory has come to underpin both nationalism and representative democracy, both of which depend critically on restricting political membership by homeland and address, respectively.

In political theory, control over a relatively modest territory has long been seen as the primary solution to the security dilemma: to offer protection to populations from the threats of anarchy (disorder), on the one hand, and hierarchy (distant rule and subordination), on the other. The problem has been to define what is meant by "modest" size. To Baron de Montesquieu (1949), the Enlightenment philosopher, different size territories inevitably have different political forms: "It is, therefore, the natural property of small states to be governed as a republic, of middling ones to be subject to a monarch, and of large empires to be swayed by a despotic prince" (p. 122). Early modern Europe offered propitious circumstances for the emergence of a fragmented political system, primarily because of its topographical divisions. Montesquieu further notes, however, that popular representation allows for the territorial extension of republican government. The founders of the United States added to this by trying to balance between centralizing certain security functions, on the one hand, and retaining local controls over many other functions, on the other. The recent history of the European Union can be thought of in similar terms.

Human activities in the world, however, have never conformed entirely to spaces defined by proximity as provided by territory. Indeed, and increasingly, as physical distance proves less of a barrier to movement, spatial interaction between separated nodes across networks is an important mechanism of geographical sorting and differentiation. Sometimes posed today in terms of a world of flows versus a world of territories, this is better thought of in terms of territories and/or networks of flows rather than as one versus the other. Territories and networks exist relationally rather than mutually exclusively. If territorial regulation is all about tying flows to places, territories have never been zero-sum entities in which the sharing of power or the existence of external linkages totally undermines their capacity to regulate. If at one time territorial states did severely limit the local powers of transterritorial and local agencies, the fact that this is no longer the case does not signify that the states have lost all of their powers:

Territory still matters. States remain the most effective governors of populations. . . . The powers to exclude, to tax, and to define political rights are those over which states acquired a monopoly in the seventeenth century. They remain the essentials of state power and explain why state sovereignty survives today and why it is indispensable to the international order. (Hirst, 2005, p. 45)

Territoriality is the strategic use of territory in either the organization and exercise of power, legitimate or otherwise, over blocs of space or the organization of people and things into discrete areas through the use of boundaries. In studies of animal behavior, spatial division into territories is seen as an evolutionary principle, a way of fostering competition so that those best matched to their territory will have more surviving offspring. With human territoriality, however, spatial division is more typically thought of as a strategy used by organizations and groups to organize social, economic, and political activities. From this viewpoint, space is partitioned into territorial cells or units that can be relatively autonomous (as with the division of global space into territorial nation-states) or arranged hierarchically from basic units in which work, administration, or surveillance is

carried out through intermediate levels at which managerial or supervisory functions are located to the topmost level at which central control is concentrated. Alternative spatial organizations of political and economic institutions, particularly hierarchical networks (as in the world-city network) or reticular networks (as with the Internet), can challenge or supplement the use of territoriality.

Theoretically, territory can be seen as having a number of different socioeconomic origins. As Sack notes, these include the following:

1. as a result of explicit territorial strategizing or territoriality to devolve administrative functions but maintain central control,
2. as a secondary result of resolving the dilemmas facing social groups in delivering public goods (as in Michael Mann's 1984 sociology of territory),
3. as an expedient facilitating coordination between capitalists who are otherwise in competition with one another (as in Marxist theories of the state),
4. as the focus of one strategy among several of governmentality (as in Michel Foucault's writings), and
5. as a result of defining boundaries between social groups to identify and maintain group cohesion (as in the writings of Georg Simmel and Fredrik Barth and in more recent sociological theories of political identity such as that of John Agnew).

Whatever its origins, territoriality is put into practice in a number of different, if often complementary, ways: by popular acceptance of classifications of space (e.g., "ours" vs. "yours"), through communication of a sense of place (where territorial markers and boundaries evoke meanings), and by enforcing control over space (by surveillance, policing, and legitimation). When combined, these practices constitute a political hegemony exercised territorially.

In a distinctive formulation, that of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, the term *detrterritorialization* has been used to refer to the breakdown of territorial organization. Epistemologically juxtaposing "state philosophy" with "nomad thought,"

Deleuze and Guattari associate territorialization with the former and deterritorialization with the latter. Ontologically, however, there could be quite different territorial systems at play over time as, for example, with pre- and postcolonial contact between colonizers and natives leading to the breakdown of one system followed by a period of deterritorialization before the imposition of a new territorial organization. Crucial to the concept of deterritorialization of Deleuze and Guattari is the claim that "processes are becomings, and aren't to be judged by some final result but by the way they proceed and their power to continue, as with animal becomings, or nonsubjective individuations" (Deleuze, 1995, p. 146).

More typically, however, two other approaches tend to dominate most thinking about the contemporary erosion of territorial organization. In the first case, territory is posed as a physical base for economic activities, and deterritorialization is viewed as either the lessening importance of local constraints or the weakening of the impact of physical distance on economic transactions. Such ideas are part and parcel of much discussion of economic globalization. In the second case, territory is perceived as a declining spatial assemblage of power relations and identity strategies. From this perspective, ideas such as the "end of territory" and the rise of network space are linked to the recent onset of a worldwide deterritorialization. This camp tends to see deterritorialization in terms of the overall weakening of territorial identities in the face of globalization and the proliferation of "nonplaces" such as airports and fast-food joints.

In summary, there have been important historical dimensions to and philosophical disputes about territory. It takes various forms, and they have waxed and waned in relative significance. Overall, churches and polities (states, empires, federations, etc.) have been the most important users of territory. Some churches (such as the Roman Catholic Church) and some states (such as the United States) have more complex and formally hierarchical territories than do others. Today, transnational and global businesses often erect territorial hierarchies that cut across existing state-based ones. So even as some uses of territory fade away, others emerge. State-based territory may undergo a renaissance in the face of recent challenges to the

sustainability of financial globalization. Therefore, though varying in precise form and complexity, territory seems still to be very much with us in one form or another.

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See also Geopolitics; Globalization; Sovereignty; State

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TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL

“International terrorism” is a contested term. In popular usage, it is typically taken to refer to groups that use “terrorist” tactics, such as targeting civilians, across national borders. A contemporary example of “international terrorism” is the transnational Al Qaeda network. But the term has been used to describe phenomena as diverse as the 19th-century anarchist movement, the Palestine Liberation Organization in the 1970s and 1980s, and the various Marxist groups operating in Europe and elsewhere during the 1970s, such as the Italian Red Brigades.

Both parts of the term are contested. The term “terrorism” continues to elicit passionate debate, both in terms of how it should be defined (and whether it constitutes a separate category of violence) and how it is used. Definitions range from those encompassing most forms of political violence (rendering it indistinguishable from other forms of warfare) to those encompassing most oppositional activism (rendering it indistinguishable from nonviolent activism). A more precise set of definitions defines it with reference to the type of target selected (usually noncombatants) and to the way in which violence is used to inculcate fear in a wider audience than those actually targeted, to achieve political change. Disagreements persist, though, over who can be considered a “noncombatant” and whether one can generalize such a definition, given that the very notion of “noncombatant” is intertwined with the development of the modern state and warfare in Europe, while boundaries between combatants and civilians are blurred by practices such as conscription and aerial and asymmetric warfare.

Similarly, controversy continues to rage over how the term is applied. Acts of violence against military personnel, for instance, are regularly labeled “terrorist,” while state actors engaging in “terrorist” tactics (as defined above) are typically not labeled thus—unless they are considered “rogue” states. Definitions are routinely used beyond their analytical reach to describe any acts by actors who have been labeled “terrorist” by state elites. What or who is considered “terrorist” is thus profoundly shaped by political context. Before terrorism became a widely accepted term, acts of violence in 1970s Italy, for instance, were described as bombings or kidnappings. Only in retrospect, when the term had gained international credence in the context of the Cold War, were these acts labeled “terrorist.” The term is, moreover, used by governments and nonstate actors alike to delegitimize opponents and justify extraordinary measures against them. This has led some, particularly critical terrorism scholars, to argue that the term is a political–normative tool, rather than a useful analytical concept.

The “international” part of the term is also contested. Some reserve the term “international terrorism” for the acts of those whose goals, membership, and operations cross national boundaries. Others

apply it to the acts of any group operating in more than one state, even if goals and membership are limited to one state. Yet others use the term interchangeably with “terrorism,” particularly in the context of the global war on terror where “terrorism” has become synonymous with opposition to the international order, regardless of one’s aims. The U.S. State Department, for instance, refers to all organizations it has labeled “terrorist” as indulging in “global terrorism.” Intriguingly, few use “international terrorism” to describe acts of state terrorism across borders, even though within the discipline of international politics, the term “international” is usually reserved for relationships between states (as opposed to “transnational,” which refers to nonstate actors across borders). Those who recognize this distinction tend to use the term “transnational terrorism” to refer to nonstate terrorism across boundaries.

The “new terrorism” debate has added further fuel to these definitional controversies. According to a number of scholars, a “new terrorism” has emerged since the 1990s, which is transnational, religiously inspired, organizationally decentralized, and more lethal, radical, and uncompromising. Al Qaeda is the primary example, but other groups, mostly Islamist, are also cited. Critics of this trend have pointed out that many aspects of this so-called new terrorism can be found in examples of “old terrorism” and that by calling this type of violence “new,” insights from the “old terrorism” literature and from past conflicts are ignored. Moreover, by linking the “new” to the ostensibly “religious” motivations of these groups, the “new terrorism” literature overemphasizes the religious aspect of these groups while downplaying political and socioeconomic dynamics. It also downplays the vast differences between groups that draw their inspiration from religion. Hamas, for instance, draws its inspiration from Palestinian nationalism as well as religion and has shown more willingness to compromise and practice restraint than Al Qaeda.

Because there is little agreement over what constitutes “terrorism,” let alone “international terrorism,” debates over what drives this type of violence are problematic. Most “terrorism databases,” for instance, exclude nonstate violence in sub-Saharan Africa because this is usually classified as “civil war”—with significant implications for analyses of

the relationship between “terrorism” and “poverty” or the availability of mineral resources. Similarly, few databases include acts of state terror, and most do not distinguish between violence against noncombatants and violence against combatants, if the perpetrators are classified as “terrorist.”

Contributing Factors

With this caveat, numerous factors have been cited as facilitating “terrorism.” Political exclusion and repression have been found to play a role in many instances (e.g., Algeria, Egypt, Colombia), but so has (rapid) political liberalization and an increase in political opportunities (e.g., Indonesia, Colombia, Spain). Ethnic and religious cleavages can contribute to violence, especially when overlapping with socioeconomic cleavages or with interethnic occupation or repression. Modernization—and in particular urbanization, the expansion of education, the weakening of traditional power structures, and unequal development—has been a factor, but so has lack of development and recession (especially following economic growth). Recession played a part in the slide of Algeria into civil war in the 1990s and in the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada in the late 1980s (both of which conflicts included “terrorist” acts as defined above). The weakening of traditional power structures and expansion of the university sector, coupled to unequal development, facilitated the development of, among others, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, Hizbollah (also known as Hezbollah) in Lebanon, and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. But without state violence and discriminatory policies these socioeconomic factors would not have been sufficient to trigger a violent response.

Transnational safe havens and support from third-party states have played a part in a number of conflicts, as have—facilitated by the processes of globalization—the presence of transnational diasporas or criminal networks (such as those linked to the blood diamond trade). The Tamil Tigers, for instance, were strengthened by support from elements in the Tamil diaspora. The Basque nationalist ETA benefited from safe havens across the Spanish border in France, while Lebanon’s Hizbollah has been profoundly shaped by Iran’s support. Al Qaeda’s transnational character is

similarly in part a product of the transnational networks of volunteers arriving in Afghanistan during the 1980s, just as it is a product of globalization and its effect on resources, a sense of self, culture, and territory. But it is important not to overstate the significance of transnational factors because this can obscure the, often, very local reasons for political violence. The Tamil Tigers' struggle was rooted in deeply felt grievances over the marginalization of Tamils by the Sri Lankan government, just as Hizbollah's emergence was a response to Israel's 1982 Lebanon invasion and local Shi'i grievances against the Lebanese state. Even Al Qaeda has roots in local struggles across the Middle East and Asia between secular state elites, reformist Islamists, and militant Islamists.

Macrofactors alone cannot explain "terrorism." Modernization, political exclusion, and inequality have not everywhere given rise to political violence. Political liberalization in Morocco did not usher in the level of violence seen in neighboring Algeria. This underlines the importance of complementing macro with micro- and mesolevel explanations. What type of organization emerges, how many competing groups materialize within a particular social movement sector, what resources are available, how macro and micro events are interpreted—all these factors influence whether or not violence ensues.

Research on what factors facilitate "international state terrorism" or state sponsorship of nonstate "terrorism" (beyond that carried out by so-called rogue states) is still in its infancy even though the scale of violence emanating from states far outstrips that of its nonstate equivalent. There is a nascent literature on the role of Western states in supporting state repression or nonstate "terrorism in the Global South." But there is nothing (yet) resembling the amount of research that has been done on nonstate "transnational terrorism."

International Coordination of Responses

Until the attacks on New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, most responses to "transnational terrorism" remained within the national sphere, limited cooperation notwithstanding. Since 2001 and the declaration of a Global War on Terror, responses have become more coordinated internationally,

facilitated by the broader processes of globalization. The establishment of the international Financial Action Task Force, which has coordinated the freezing of financial assets of internationally designated "terrorist" groups and individuals, is a case in point, as is the involvement of an international alliance in the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Cooperation between states has increased on practices such as extradition, the sharing of intelligence data, rendition (transporting suspects to states that allow torture), and replicating deradicalization models, such as the rehabilitation programs for prisoners accused of "terrorism."

The notion of "international terrorism" and the term's malleability has arguably helped state elites to forge a united response to a plethora of different threats, both local and international. Critics have argued that such an approach risks downplaying local differences, encouraging a homogeneous counterterrorism model that advances a hegemonic globalization (seen as part of the problem) against all dissenters, and privileging military over non-military measures, such as the controversial invasion of Iraq. The notion of an all-threatening "international terrorism" has, according to its critics, served to increase state power while weakening mechanisms of accountability, facilitating the birth of a surveillance society, particularly affecting those believed to be "at risk" from radicalization (so-called suspect communities). Against this, protagonists point to the success in foiling "terrorist" plots through increased international cooperation, including cooperation with previously uncooperative states, and to the development of nonmilitary responses, such as rehabilitation programs, economic development, and the strengthening of "at risk" communities.

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See also Globalization; Social Movements; Terrorist Groups; Violence

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TERRORIST GROUPS

Defining a terrorist group is as difficult as defining terrorism, which is a highly contested concept politically. There is no universally accepted, legally binding definition of the term, and national legislations or international organizations attach different meanings to the concept. As a consequence, the United Nations, for example—in 13 conventions and protocols adopted since 1963—confined itself to defining and proscribing specific acts of terrorism (such as skyjacking, hostage taking, and nuclear terrorism). A review of the literature by Alex Schmid produced more than 100 different definitions some of which diverge strongly. However, there are commonly cited criteria, such as the use of violent means, the political motivation of the perpetrators, and the intention to create panic and fear among segments of the population or the population as a whole. In the following, the major characteristics, forms of action, and types of such groups are discussed in light of a number of current explanatory approaches.

Against this background, terrorist groups or organizations can be described as actors who use primarily terrorist tactics and means to pursue their political goals. This does not exclude the use of other violent or nonviolent means. Most groups labeled terrorists are, therefore, multifaceted: For example, they may also conduct guerrilla-style operations; they may act as political movements or parties by instigating a political wing; they may work as business actors through the establishment of companies and fund-raising organizations; and they may serve as social welfare organizations by delivering services to particular segments of the population. Thus, terrorist groups are usually not

only interested in pursuing terrorist activities but in a whole range of different issues. Nevertheless, the frequent or occasional use of terrorism remains a key characteristic of these groups, which has severe implications for the recruitment and training of activists; internal organization; operational planning and logistics; methods of internal and external communication; transfer and channeling of money, weapons, and people; and leadership and their opportunities to act and maneuver. Most of this is simply because terrorism is a tactic that attacks people and institutions from underground. “Going underground” and acting from the hidden, however, has material and political costs, which affect the entire organization, their followers, and supporters.

Distinguishing Terrorist Groups From Other Phenomena of Violence

Terrorist groups—or more precisely terrorist cells, squads, and commands—should analytically be distinguished from other phenomena of violence. First, terrorist groups are *groups* in the sense that they comprise a number of members who are bound together by some kind of organizational structure, which exists over a certain period of time. According to some national legislations (e.g., that in Germany), a minimum of three persons is required in an organization to speak about it as a “terrorist organization.” This implies that violent acts by single individuals (gunmen, killers, snipers, homicide, etc.) do not fall into that category. Second, because of their political ambitions, however defined, terrorist groups differ from primarily criminally or economically motivated organizations—such as criminal gangs, mafia structures, syndicates, warlords, or mercenaries. This distinction does not exclude the fact that individual members of terrorist organizations may be economically motivated; indeed, sometimes, terrorist groups may exploit the socioeconomic needs of particular persons or segments of the society for their own ends. Moreover, terrorist groups often undertake criminal activities (e.g., drug trafficking)—or cooperate with criminals (e.g., to get weapons and explosives)—to finance and launch terrorist operations. Therefore, a terrorist–criminal nexus usually exists. But the key question still remains as to whether the economic and criminal activities are

ends in themselves or whether they are instruments to further a political and ideological agenda. Third, terrorist groups should be distinguished from other politically motivated actors, in particular from rebel or guerrilla groups, militias, and paramilitary organizations. Rebel movements in general aim at the conquest of and—if possible—permanent control over territory. Terrorist groups, on the other hand, might have territorial ambitions; however, they simply lack the capabilities to conquer and control larger territories. In addition, while rebels usually employ physical violence in the context of unconventional warfare (insurgencies) to diminish their opponent's military clout, to defeat the enemy, or force it to surrender, terrorist groups are mainly interested in the psychological effects of violent acts. In the real world, it may still be difficult to uphold these ideal-type distinctions as some groups may transform from one type of actor to another in the course of a conflict, while others have to be seen as hybrid organizations, which incorporate features of both rebel or militia and terrorist groups (e.g., the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and Hizbollah [also known as Hezbollah] in Lebanon).

Fourth, terrorist groups are nonstate actors and should not be equated with state institutions responsible for acts of state terror. Phenomena of state terror have variously been subsumed under the specific terms of *war crimes*, *crimes against humanity*, *torture*, *extralegal killings*, *human rights abuses*, and *genocide*—labels that are much more adequate than the concept of terrorism. State terror (tyranny, at worst) and terrorist groups differ fundamentally in that the former is oriented toward keeping and consolidating the political status quo, while nonstate actors use terrorist tactics to change the situation and, finally, to overthrow a political regime. Moreover, state actors or those acting on behalf of a government do not typically operate covertly but seek visibility to intimidate either the population at large or particular groups (such as opposition groups or minorities). Furthermore, terrorist attacks can be the work of a few armed individuals, while state terror requires a relatively powerful security and intelligence apparatus. There is, however, a gray area of state-sponsored terrorism, which implies state toleration of, support for, or direction of terrorist groups. Thereby, state actors strategically sponsor

terrorist groups in pursuit of their own agenda. In a few cases, they may even actively promote the founding of terrorist organizations or may be directly involved in terrorist operations, thus blurring the line between state and nonstate actors.

Rationale and Characteristics of Terrorist Groups

Despite the fact that terrorist groups differ largely in size, organizational structure, ideology, political goals, and support, their rationale has remained basically unaltered since the beginning of modern terrorism during the 19th century, even though terrorist methods have changed over time. First of all, terrorist groups—even the largest ones—are relatively “weak” actors compared with regular armies or security forces. Terrorist tactics, such as car or truck bombs, suicide bombings, targeted assassinations, kidnapping, and hostage taking, are therefore used because of lack of alternatives. Terrorist groups use this kind of violence—frequently against targets of high symbolic value—not only to shock and intimidate particular segments or the society at large but also to mobilize sympathizers and supporters as well as to contribute to the radicalization of political movements. They see themselves as the vanguard acting on behalf of “oppressed,” “humiliated,” and “marginalized” groups, thus, adopting a sense of moral superiority, which serves to justify their immoral and illegal acts in their eyes and that of others. In this sense, terrorism is a “communication strategy” conveying political messages to friends and foes alike.

In addition to the operational level, terrorist groups also rely on the spread of propaganda in the form of claims of responsibility after attacks, the launch of warnings, and political declarations, which nowadays are usually disseminated on the Internet or on videotapes. For this purpose, some larger groups even have their own media departments and ways of transmitting their messages. Propaganda aims not only at conveying signals but also at purposeful deception and disinformation; it provides terrorist groups with a platform that makes them appear “bigger” and “more powerful”—an effect that an isolated terrorist attack can hardly produce. Terrorism would simply not work without publicity. Yet terrorist attacks and terrorist

propaganda in and of themselves do not necessarily produce the desired mobilization of supporters. Rather, mobilization is achieved through the reaction that an attack provokes among those against whom it is directed. Attacks are aimed at prompting the opponent to adopt brutal and disproportionate measures, which will—as terrorist groups frame it—“delegitimize” and “unmask” him. For terrorist groups, the objective is to convey the impression that the target of their attacks (e.g., a government) is the actual aggressor, while the attack itself is justified as a means of legitimate self-defense and self-assertion.

Terrorist groups employ an action–reaction spiral, which allows them to swap roles and portray themselves as the actual victims. As many observers note, there is an asymmetrical relation between terrorist groups and the state’s security apparatus: On the one hand, terrorists are typically inferior to the state’s police and military potential—logistically but also in terms of manpower. On the other hand, they operate underground and, thus, have the element of surprise on their side. It is enough for them to succeed every now and then to demonstrate that even comprehensive and cost-intensive security measures by the state cannot offer complete security for the population. Moreover, many terrorist groups have a time horizon that is different from that of their counterparts; they see themselves as being on a historical mission and, therefore, think long term; they do not aim at quick victories but believe that “history” or “destiny” will be on their side and that in the long run, they will prevail.

These strategic advantages do not come without costs, however. Terrorist groups are forced to be innovative—on the one hand, because they are usually constantly on the run and, on the other hand, because they have to do the unexpected to remain successful. They have to be unpredictable; they must avoid adopting behavioral patterns and must therefore change their methods from time to time. By the same token, this increases the risk of failure. Not every terrorist organization is able to be innovative in the long run due to the lack of resources, adequate leadership, or a favorable environment. Terrorist groups face a structural dilemma: On the one hand, they have to implement considerable precautionary measures to avoid being discovered—measures that, however,

limit their freedom of movement and their operational capacity. On the other hand, their political visibility and influence crucially depend on their ability to launch successful and surprising attacks. But each plot, in turn, inevitably provides investigators with information about the group, their logistics, and their operational patterns. A further difficulty for terrorist groups lies in securing their financial and logistical base for a longer period of time. To some extent, actors are preoccupied with sustaining themselves and organizing their survival. Doing this from the underground and with discreet support from outside does have a number of implications for the internal organization and the cooperation with others. In many instances, for example, terrorists need to cooperate with organized crime groups in acquiring weapons, laundering money, or trafficking illegal goods. In other cases, terrorist groups undertake legal or shadowy business activities; they are involved in fund-raising or in collecting a “revolution tax.” A critical juncture is when the means become an end in themselves, and the self-sustaining aspect of a group becomes more important than the actual political ambitions. Then, terrorist groups or, at least, certain segments of that group, simply degenerate into criminal or money-making organizations—such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) and the IRA—which no longer care about mobilizing larger parts of the population for political ends.

Over time, the conspiratorial character of terrorist groups often leads to psychological defects—mainly due to group-think as well as to strict black-and-white thinking. The groups tend to create their own reality, perceiving and interpreting every event and all information according to their own world-views. From their perspective, each setback or “failure” is merely an “insignificant episode” on the long-term path to “victory.” Terrorist leaders generally disregard contradictory developments and the possibility of pursuing alternative strategies. This development culminates in terrorists feeling reassured in their behavior, irrespective of what is happening around them. Progressive loss of reality frequently goes hand in hand with increasing radicalization and brutalization in the use of violence. The latter may also be directed against group members or supporters. Doubts, dissent, or even compromise

with the opponents is usually not tolerated because they jeopardize the group's internal coherence.

Numbers and Types

Since the labeling of militant groups as *terrorists* is loaded with political considerations and terminological problems, there can be no authoritative list of terrorist groups. The most comprehensive set of data is provided by the Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START] at the University of Maryland). The database contains information about more than 80,000 terrorist attacks beginning in 1970 and conducted by more than 2,000 squads, commands, or groups with distinct names, ranging from very small fringe groups to large, full-fledged insurgencies. These data, however, just indicate how many groups may use *inter alia* terrorist tactics, but it does not say anything about a consistent pattern of behavior, which would justify the term *terrorist group* and which would enable analysts to distinguish them from other armed nonstate actors. The same problem applies to the comprehensive list of groups in a 2008 study by Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, which refers to 648 "terrorist organizations" that existed between 1968 and 2006—244 are still active and 241 have been active for 10 or more years, which underscores how persistent militant groups can be once they have been established. This set of data also points to the fact that most terrorist groups are very small and count in the 10s rather than the 100s. But the list also includes a number of larger groups, which are better understood as rebel or guerrilla movements (such as FRELIMO in Mozambique, the Maoists in Nepal, or the Sandinistas of Nicaragua) or simply as organized crime groups. Not least because of these difficulties, governments' official lists of terrorist groups are much smaller. For example, the U.S. State Department has listed 45 groups as "foreign terrorist organizations" (July 2009); the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 40 (November 2008); and the Council of the European Union, 47 (January 2009); a large number of them are characterized by an Islamist ideology.

Beyond the issue of numbers, the literature on terrorism mainly deals with the question of typologies since terrorist groups differ greatly

according to various aspects. The most common typology focuses on the ideological orientation and worldviews of terrorist groups. Depending on the author, they are categorized as follows:

- social revolutionary, Marxist, or left-wing groups (e.g., the German Red Army Faction);
- ethnonational, separatist groups (e.g., the IRA or the Basque Homeland and Liberty [Euskadi ta Askatasuna, ETA]);
- right-wing, neo-fascist, or racist groups (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan in the United States);
- religious groups (e.g., Al Qaeda and other Jihadist groups); and
- apocalyptic groups (the Aum Shinrikyō sect in Japan may be a case in point).

The assumption is that the form of ideology does explain other aspects of terrorist groups, such as the political agendas, the links with particular communities and milieus, the level of public support, the duration of the group, or their destructive potential.

An alternative typology distinguishes terrorist groups on the basis of their geographical reach, that is, based on whether their actions and goals are limited to a local area or whether they pursue an overarching, global agenda.

First, *national* or *domestic terrorist group* refers to a terrorist group that operates mainly in its home country to challenge the domestic political status quo, either by regime change or by territorial separation; perpetrators and victims are both residents of the same state. Despite their contacts with like-minded groups elsewhere, the Basque ETA, the IRA, the Kurdish Workers' Party (Partiya Karker Kurdistan, PKK), the Sri Lankan Tamil Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the European left-wing groups of the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Brigade Rosse in Italy, Action Directe in France, and Red Army Faction in Germany) do by and large fit into that category.

Second, the label *international terrorism*—or internationally operating terrorists—applies to groups that aim at internationalizing a local conflict to attract the attention of a wider public and to put their issues on the international agenda. They deliberately choose and attack targets abroad; typically, assassins and victims are not residents of the same state. Examples for this kind of terrorism

have been Palestinian groups, such as the Palestine Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC), and the Abu Nidal Group, which in the late 1960s consciously decided to undertake spectacular operations abroad to make the world aware of the Palestinian cause.

Third, *transnational terrorism*—sometimes also called *new terrorism*—involves groups and networks of groups that aim at changing the global or, at least, the regional political order. Their acts are directed against the actual or assumed dominance or hegemony of certain states, ideologies, and ways of life (e.g., the Western culture). These groups may be engaged in local conflicts also, but they see these struggles in a broader context of a global or regional fight. Transnational terrorist groups share a number of features, including a transnational ideology, multinational membership, and transnational network structures designed to bypass states and regions. The paradigm case is the Al Qaeda network of Osama bin Laden. Since 1996 at the latest, bin Laden's Islamist movement has been directly targeting U.S. and Western influence, or "imperialism," in the Islamic world, which in its view has to be defeated first in order to "liberate" Muslim populations from their "corrupt" rulers and install a "true" Islamic order under the rule of the Caliphate. In its ideology, Al Qaeda has linked local conflicts with Muslim involvement (e.g., Bosnia, Chechnya, Mindanao, and Indonesia), with the mission of a global jihad against the "Jewish-Christian crusaders." Moreover, in contrast to most conventional terrorist groups, Al Qaeda works as a multinational enterprise, which—despite its Arab origin—comprises persons of different ethnic, national, and linguistic backgrounds bound together by a common transnational Islamist ideology. Other groups—associated with Al Qaeda to a greater or lesser extent—such as Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia, the Al Qaeda of the Maghreb region, and some Central Asian as well as some Pakistani jihadi groups—have adopted a similar worldview.

Understanding and Explaining Terrorist Groups

There is no single theory that could explain the emergence, persistence, transformation, and decline of terrorist groups in general—the universe

of groups is simply too diverse for that. However, it has been widely established that most terrorist groups are the radical outgrowth of domestic or international conflicts. Thus, terrorist groups typically emerge in three different situations: The first is a latent conflict that terrorists aim at escalating by their acts to mobilize parts of the population in order to trigger a mass movement (e.g., left-wing terrorism in Western Europe in the 1970s). Here, terrorist groups view themselves as "catalysts" of a subversive or separatist movement. The second case of terrorist groups emerges in the context of an armed struggle, which has already escalated to a greater extent. The militarily weaker actor—feeling backed into a corner—then frequently resorts to terrorist methods. Depending on the circumstances, terrorist acts may replace previous strategies altogether, which leads to the actor's transformation and the consolidation of terrorist structures. In the third scenario, a ceasefire or peace agreement would have been concluded between the warring factions, which will then be undermined and sabotaged by radical fringe groups that may have frequently split from existing militant factions. These groups continue the "fight" by launching terrorist attacks to reignite the conflict (e.g., Real IRA in Northern Ireland after the 1998 agreement).

Despite this common terrorism-conflict nexus, there are a number of factors that determine the circumstances under which terrorist groups emerge and exist. These factors can be analyzed on three levels and using various social science theories. First, the microlevel refers to individual motivations and circumstances to establish or join a terrorist group. Here, biographical analysis, theories about deviant behavior, identity theories, psychological and sociopsychological theories, and rational choice theories are often used for isolating explanatory variables, such as, *inter alia*, traumatic events, past or current experience with violence, personal revenge, altruism, narcissistic personality, paranoia, peer pressure, frustration and aggression because of "relative deprivation," and cost-benefit calculations, which may influence the behavior of individuals. Second, the mesolevel considers the group as a collective actor together with its decisions and activities. In this regard, theories on collective action (e.g., resource mobilization theory); social learning and group behavior (e.g., ingroup-outgroup thinking); organizational and network

studies; perceptions, belief systems, and mind sets; political economy; concepts and theoretical assumptions about the role of ideology; and myths and symbols as well as theories about the role of leadership (e.g., charismatic leadership) are usually applied in order to analyze the establishment, the internal coherence and structure, and the prospects for persistence of a group. Third, the macrolevel addresses the general political, cultural, and socioeconomic environment in which a terrorist group operates. This level refers to modernization theories; center-periphery models and theories about structural imbalances; issues of historical injustice; approaches of conflict and peace studies; theories on globalization, transnationalization, and space; sociological questions about the political system; and the behavior of ruling elites as well as concepts of statehood. Based on these, a number of explanatory factors are mentioned in the literature, such as poverty, relative deprivation, political frustration and marginalization, fragile or failed statehood, lack of democratic governance, geographical aspects, and the effects of shadow economies and global markets. In any case, the three levels have to be studied in combination because they are deeply intertwined: For example, factors at the meso- or macrolevels may influence individual motivations and the demands, needs, and identity of individuals, which, in turn, have to be reflected at the mesolevel to keep a group together.

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See also Anarchism; Conflicts; Islamist Movements; State Failure; Terrorism, International; Violence

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THEOCRACY

The term *theocracy* was coined by Flavius Josephus in the 1st century CE to label a political system in which political rule is exercised by the clergy or other religious officials deemed as representatives of God on earth. This entry discusses the meaning of the term *theocracy* and its presence in various religions, historically and in the present. Theocracies have existed throughout the world at various points in history, not only in the Catholic and Islamic worlds but also in contexts as varied as that of the early Mormons in the United States, under Joseph Smith and Brigham Young, and in Tibet from the 13th until the mid-20th centuries. After describing the concept of theocracy in various religions, this entry further explores the meaning of theocracy through the example of the role of the Russian Orthodox Church. It concludes with questions about whether political society in general presupposes some broadly theocratic foundation.

The Concept of Theocracy in Various Religious Contexts

In the strict sense of the term, theocracy is not parallel to the categories of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy. One would indeed be at a loss if one wanted to situate God, who certainly is not of this world, in a concrete political function of any kind.

The word *theocracy* has, however, a real history, related to the justifications given by both ecclesiastical and secular authorities for the imposition of

their views in the political sphere or in some aspects of it. There is a theocratic aspect to a given viewpoint if it is presented as indisputable because it is derived from a scripture deemed religious, or sacred, such as the Bible or the Koran, or from an assertion coming from a religious authority not recognized as competent in the political sphere. The latter is the case with fatwas, the decrees proclaimed by one form or other of Islamic authority, an ulema or a college of ulemas, even if it is on the other hand affirmed that in Islam there is no authority of any kind above the individual believer's reading of the Koran.

During the Middle Ages, the removal of a king or an emperor by a pope could also be termed an act with a theocratical basis, since papal sovereignty gave the pope indirect power over the political sphere. Another example is the pope's authority to intervene in the case of sin (*ratione peccati*) when there is a question of morality.

On the other hand, some princes and some kings, especially those who were the objects of quasi-sacramental coronations, seemed to be invested with a divine right proper; there was something theocratic about them, their power, and their commands. One may wonder whether this form of pretension still exists today anywhere. It may have been the case, probably, with the Japanese emperor until after World War II. The present Iranian regime, in which the final authority lies with an ayatollah (presently Seyed Ali Khamenei), can in some real sense be termed theocratic, and the same applies, with the differences specific to the Sunni world, to the Wahhabi monarchy of Saudi Arabia. Today's jihadist movement advocates the restoration of the caliphate system, abolished almost a century ago by Atatürk at the fall of the Ottoman Empire.

John Calvin is known, for his part, to have ruled Geneva, the city of his reformation, in a theocratic way and with a theocratic justification. Luther, contrarily, reinforced the profane power of the temporal sovereigns, freeing them from any pretense of jurisdiction of the Catholic authority. Thus, in his theory of two kingdoms, he made them dependent on God alone (*Zwei Reiche*).

In the Catholic world of the 17th century, Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1627–1704) was convinced of the divine character of the absolutist power of his king. More generally, he thought that

there is something divine in the proper sense of the term invested by God himself in the princes as such. One had consequently to show “religion” proper toward them, though it was to be the religion of “second majesty,” or second degree, in comparison with the religion of first majesty, which we owe to God (*La politique tirée des propres paroles de l'Écriture sainte*, III 2, 3). All this again sounded theocratical, at least in the broad sense of the term. Perhaps one can ask whether there is any branch of religion that has not known something of this in the past. But even today, in Tibetan Buddhism, the power of the Dalai Lama, at the same time temporal and spiritual, is invested with a similar dual character.

The Russian Orthodox Church

On the other hand, the close association of a state with a religion—even if it is short of a state religion—produces, similarly, some kind of a theocratical effect. In contemporary Russia, where, in spite of the constitutional separation of church and state, there exists a special recognition of the Orthodox Church (Moscow patriarchate) in some documents of the state, one can sense a special religious aura of favor to the advantage of the Church in many actions of the government. In the perception of many citizens, the government is not quite purely profane. Conversely, this has to do with the special relationship to the “nation” that appears in the statements of the Orthodox Church. In the *Sotsialnaia kontseptsia (Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church)*, approved by the Holy Synod in the year 2000, one reads,

The Church does not distribute men according to nationality or social origin. . . . The universal character of the Church does however not mean that the Christians do not enjoy a national specificity, a national expression. [There exists] a Christian national culture. . . . Among the saints whom the Russian Orthodox Church venerates many have made themselves famous by their love and fidelity to their fatherland.

While it is true that no mention is made here of the 1941 case when the Patriarch was called by Joseph Stalin to the rescue of the nation, the

insistence is, however, significant. Following Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, Stalin relaxed his formerly vigorous antireligious and anticlerical policy and adopted a more tolerant stance toward the Russian Orthodox Church. According to some historians, this shift occurred in part to satisfy U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt's conditions for increased American support in the war against Adolf Hitler and also because, particularly with clerical approval, many who might resist an appeal to go to battle for communism could be relied on to do so for the Holy Russia of Orthodox Christianity. The Russian Church has many times given its blessing to the people for their participation in the Liberation wars.

Today other Christian denominations in Russia complain about the special treatment of the Orthodox Church. Some Muslims too are critical of this situation of privilege enjoyed by the Russian Orthodox Church.

Of course, the Russian Orthodox Church, however, is far from theocratic in Ayatollah Khomeini's sense of running a state as of a few years ago in Iran, or even in Khomeini's sense of running a state today. It is Islam that most frequently looms on the horizon whenever one speaks of theocracy today, even if it be in a vague sense in countries that do not kowtow to politicoreligious authorities as such.

The Possibility of Political Authority Without Theocracy

The word *theocracy* may also come up in discussions on the question of whether any political authority can exist without an aura of religious transcendence, such an aura signifying conversely that the political authority bows to conscience and stops from acting whenever conscience or conscientious objection is at stake—the latter being, of course, of utmost importance. There is indeed such a majesty in political power that some authors do not hesitate to see an element of theocracy in the democratic governments themselves. In March 2007, the Paris *Revue d'éthique et de théologie* (*Journal of Ethics and Moral Theology*) published an article of strongly paradoxical intent by the prominent French scholar Rémi Brague under the title "Un régime autre que la théocratie est-il possible?" ("Is a Regime Other Than Theocracy Possible?"). Brague, an expert on medieval Arabic,

Jewish, and Latin philosophy and cultural history, notes that democracy particularly is some kind of theocracy:

Whether the fundamental idea in democracy is the law or conscience does not make much of a difference: the two of these ideas have theological foundations. This is why our democratical ideals of the supreme power of the law (Law state) or of an interior tribunal of ethics as the last authority in the each person's soul, are theologically grounded. (p. 110)

In Western political regimes, Brague says, law is considered to be "anchored in the people's will," but

the people consists of free human beings, apt to recognize what they should do through listening to the voice of their conscience. In this case too, law is grounded in the last instance in the idea of the human conscience. *Vox populi, vox Dei* is the origin of "one man, one vote." (p. 111)

Brague then discusses in the same vein the nature of divine law and Islam and notes also that with respect to Western democracy, "we Westerners live, or have lived, in a certain sense, in a theocracy of conscience" (p. 117). Although today Westerners want to conceive of their regime as a democracy, Brague asks whether, in fact, that is the kind of society we really want. He argues that, instead, we want a regime of free citizens. That freedom means "that we have to obey no other instance but our conscience, the presence of which in us expresses God's care for his creature" (p. 118). With Rousseau, Fichte, and Kant, there has been a secularization of conscience. But, says Brague,

The secularized state of our democracies is [itself] a problem. One can indeed ask whether a human community can live in the long run otherwise than a "laos" (people under a conscience) or without some kind of a theological basis. . . . Is a non theocratical regime possible in the long run? (p. 120)

If we take *theocratical* in a broad sense of the term, the answer is indeed clearly no. No one is self-engendered. The social contract, so praised as the

foundation of political society, does not produce *those* who themselves make the contract. So, at the least, it seems that political life presupposes some sense of moral authority as a condition for the social contract, though this may not be considered a theocratic concept in the strict sense, especially today, when the term is used primarily in reference to Islam.

Authorities in the Religious Sphere Itself

Can the religious authority exercised *in the religious sphere proper*—that is, the authority of the Christian bishops, and of the Catholic pope in particular—be termed *theocratic*? It is not so, at least in the official documents of the Catholic Church. Any such reference is normally avoided because, among other things, it is obvious that such authorities are under the authority of the Scriptures themselves. The Vatican II Council has of late repeatedly stressed that there is a term of reference beyond any episcopal or pontifical authority itself.

Such authority is religious when it is derived from the faith of the believers, but this does not mean the same as theocratic, because here there can be no pretension to enjoying God's very authority, or some part of it. There is the pretension only of some participation in the authority of Jesus Christ as the founder of this body, the Church, in which he is in some sense continued. Vatican II in its document *Lumen gentium* (1964) says, "The social whole which constitutes the Church is at the service of the Spirit of Christ who gives it life, for the growth of that body" (No. 8).

Aftermath of "Political Theology"

In the realm of political philosophy, one should finally also mention here the Christian legal scholar and philosopher Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), whose views on the national socialism of Nazi Germany probably were drawn from his adherence, in his early writing *Politische Theologie* (1922), to the idea of some form of perpetuation of the Holy Empire. In a context of "neutralization" and "depolitization," dominated by a technicist way of thinking—the Weimar Republic—he defended a view of politics as not innocent but instead characterized by the dialectics of friend and foe and the

presence of power (*Macht*), as well as a certain transcendence. This colored in some way the very positive attitude he showed, at least for a time, toward national socialism. (For this reason, it would of course be dangerous to associate all ideas of transcendence in political philosophy with such an extreme vision of the political realm).

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See also Buddhism; International Regimes; Islam; Religion

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THICK DESCRIPTION

Thick description is a research method enabling us to discern meanings within the contexts in which social actions take place. It originated as a tool for ethnographers engaged in participant observation and was later adopted by a wider range of qualitative researchers, including some sociologists and political scientists. In his famous 1973 essay titled "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," the anthropologist Clifford

Geertz explained the contrast between “thick” and “thin” description. Drawing from the Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle’s reflections on thinking as entailing an account of the settings, circumstances, and intentions that give actions their meanings, he showed how important it is to go beyond mere facts and appearances when it comes to interpreting behavior. The most well-known illustration provided is that of the contraction of one eyelid, which may be taken as either an involuntary twitch or as a wink (imparting a particular message, related to a socially established code), as a parody of wink, or even the rehearsal of this parody. Geertz goes on with other examples taken from his own field experiences. The core of the argument is that performing empirical research involves accurately describing social actions and exploring underlying meanings. In other words, thick description leads to thick interpretation. This entry discusses the basic assumptions underlying this method and its relevance for political science.

Methodological Critique and Epistemological Debate

From a methodological point of view, such an approach marks an important departure from traditional assumptions. What is explicitly criticized is the empirical “thinness” of some research traditions—such as behavioralism—which largely overlook what makes sense to the social actors studied. A typical reproach from the advocates of thick description is that in many sectors of the social sciences, there is too much abstract theorization and not enough serious field research. Interpretivists are notably skeptical about “armchair scholars” who delegate the collection of data to polling organizations or junior assistants and concentrate on the more noble tasks of calculation and theory building. To some extent, this opposition coincides with the endless debates between researchers who use quantitative indicators that are deemed reliable insofar as they are replicable and those who resort instead to direct observation or long interviews because they believe that only intense immersion into particular settings will yield the information required. Within the first (positivist) tradition, the norm is to handle “objective” data or at least evidence that is not excessively dependent on what

might be seen as the researcher’s subjective reading; moreover, all sorts of highly sophisticated analytical instruments (correlation coefficients, causal modeling based on econometric techniques, etc.) are seen to guarantee “true science.” On the other (interpretivist) side, serious doubts are harbored about the reliability of the procedures and the outcomes these procedures, which are often influenced by the questions asked.

At the epistemological level, it is claimed that thick description leads, for better or worse, to contextualism. Rich information is a leading hallmark of thick descriptive qualitative research—not in the sense of pooling superficial comparable data from many places but in amassing many contextually relevant details. This richness may be seen as commendable in the context of monographs; however, it is somewhat problematic when theoretical ambitions or even comparisons are involved. Once again, here, we are at the core of hotly debated axiomatic beliefs. Many social scientists share the view that it is incumbent on them to emulate the natural sciences and provide universal laws. Any “excessive empiricism” is consequently viewed as a posture making it difficult to develop necessary generalizations. On the contrary, in the other camp, it is held that the chief merit of in-depth field studies lies precisely in making us understand that efforts to explain the social world with grand theories held to be ubiquitously valid amount to denying important sources of difference and complexity. In political science, contextual analysis—referring to historical, cultural, psychological, and demographic dimensions and others—is sometimes taken quite seriously (see Robert Goodin & Charles Tilly, 2008). However, the question arises as to what extent context matters and whether the main goal of the discipline should, or should not, remain the defense of abstract and homogenizing models, even at the price of glossing over important contextual dimensions.

We are touching here on several key themes, such as context dependency possibly leading to relativism, the sensitive question of causality and, more generally, that of whether or not the social sciences should seek to ape the methods used in the “hard” sciences. To return to Geertz, who clearly defined himself as an “anti anti-relativist,” the world is incorrigibly diverse because human development has led to infinite sociocultural arborescence, with

ever multiplying branches. This enabled the existence of myriad cultural expressions and an unlimited number of potentialities and motivations, each of which should be understood in its particular context. This clearly draws attention to the importance of culture and, more specifically, to what concerns us here—its place within the analysis of political life. In what is probably his most often quoted phrase, Geertz (1973) explains,

Believing with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning. (p. 5)

It is important to note that he adds that culture must be understood as a “deep” context and not merely as “reflecting,” “expressing,” “corresponding to,” “emerging from,” or “conditioned by” interest-based social cleavages. This perspective obviously defies the assumptions of several classical schools of thought (e.g., Marxist visions in terms of ideology or constructivist theories of social reality), and it was to have a considerable influence on several disciplines, leading notably to what is now known as the new cultural history or cultural sociology.

Universalism Versus Relativism in Political Science

As far as political science is concerned, and more specifically if we look at the subfield of comparative politics, it might be argued that two rival metatheoretical frameworks for research are used: the universalist and the relativist. Within each one of them, obviously, there are distinct standpoints. For example, both structuralist and rational choice perspectives are universalist. Similarly, there is a variety of cultural approaches. In the following, an attempt will be made to clarify the positioning of interpretive perspectives based on thick description vis-à-vis other established traditions in this discipline. Within the universalist paradigm, there is, first of all, the political philosophy tradition. Geertz insists that cultural categories emerging from the past hold us in thrall. Therefore, one should wonder whether ways of thinking formulated in

one particular context—say that of Athens during the 4th century BCE—are relevant when it comes to interpreting politics in settings far removed from those from which those views derive. Likewise, having systematic recourse to the concepts of political economy, a discipline elaborated to account for the dynamics of the rise of capitalism in Europe, might not always be relevant to non-Western polities. There, it may be more appropriate to reason in terms of “moral economy” or “economy of affection,” concepts that have been applied, respectively, to Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa as a result of the empirical observation of actual political practices. In a Geertzian perspective, one should think twice before using any apparatus with universalistic ambitions because they are usually ethnocentric and normative. This inevitably raises the tricky issue of the dominance of a terminology drawn from the experience of Europe and North America, which is assumed to apply to the entire world. However, if each “terrain” generates its own operational notions, how can political scientists communicate with each other, and how can we make comparisons possible? We shall return to this crucial point and suggest how the conundrum can be resolved at the end of this entry.

As was already mentioned, the Geertzian approach holds that culture is not merely to be defined as a by-product of more fundamental factors. This does not necessarily mean that we should argue in terms of primacy of culture but only that we should beware of approaches that systematically resort to the same structural determinants (economic ones, for instance). Structuralists frequently accuse those they classify as “culturalists” of having an overly impressionistic and “essentialist” viewpoint. Seeking to identify universal features transcending cultural diversity, they are eager to reduce the range of observable cases to a limited number of given types, looking for functional equivalents if need be. Pivotal to the dispute between the two schools of thought is the question of meaning. In sharp disagreement with the idea that local meanings would merely be a negligible surface phenomenon, interpretivists hold that it is imperative to unravel what makes sense (or not) to the actors concerned. Hence, there is a dialogue of the deaf between adherents of structuralist approaches, who argue that it is necessary to avoid

being blinded by the apparent diversity of concrete situations, and advocates of thick descriptions, who are constantly wary of reductionist approaches prone to fitting realities into preconceived molds.

Another influential perspective, within the universalist paradigm, is rational choice. We can all agree that human beings are possessed of reason. However, the motivations and interests that motivate groups or individuals in one milieu are often incomprehensible to those in another. For interpretivists, the aim is not to deny the possible use of the concepts of interest and rationality. It is merely to place them in context. Even if we take it for granted that human beings always carefully weigh the consequences of their actions, we need to accept that the realm of possible choices is constrained by the prevalent universe of meaning within which they live. This is where thick description is viewed as fundamental. We would all like to believe that it is easy to transcend the limitations of our own culture and to understand those of others. In reality, this is an exercise that requires lengthy training and is never fully completed. To take just one example, Scandinavian diplomats may deplore the fact that in international summits “the poorer the country, the more ostentatious its representatives,” but reciprocally, the conspicuously modest behavior of the members of some Nordic nongovernmental organizations appears to be incomprehensible in the eyes of some sub-Saharan elites. The role of the interpretivist is to go beyond such ethnocentric views and to make sense of the respective attitudes and cross-perceptions.

The developmentalist schools of thought may be placed at the intersection of the universalist and the relativist paradigms. The singularity of these approaches is that their adherents are usually rather conscious of important disparities between societies or polities, but they also share the assumption that it is quite possible to move toward a desirable direction. Their frameworks are affected by the fact that they take their own model of reference as the end point toward which all others should be converging. The teleological goals might be different, and indeed radically divergent (suffice it to think of the Cold War era and the two systems in competition), and largely biased by ideological convictions. However, evolution toward the supposedly best system would only be a matter of time, willpower, and application of the right recipes. Even if some

macromodels of deep sociopolitical mutations deserve to be admired for their sophistication, the question is whether they are generally applicable. Adherents of cultural approaches are often accused of promoting a fairly static and immutable vision of societies. It is true that they are particularly attuned to the *longue durée* and thus to the resilience of cultural traits or some logics of adoption/adaptation. However, they think it useful to reason not only in an evolutionist way (when appropriate) but also in terms of involutions—that is, to pay full attention to the possible specific dynamics of some societies. This heuristic concept, widely used by Geertz in his studies of Indonesia, makes it possible to account for cultural patterns that are no longer traditional but not evolving into a recognizable modernity either.

Relativism, Postmodernism, Interpretivism

Let us now consider the relativist paradigm. As is well-known, some confusion is engendered by the fact that there are so many conceptions of what is exactly meant by culture. Space limitations preclude the full enumeration and discussion of all the schools of thought that take cultural dimensions seriously, but it is important to explain, at least, in which ways an interpretivist approach diverges from perspectives in terms of values and from postmodernist views. In political science, a large number of scholars equate culture with systems of beliefs and customs. At the heart of all these definitions lies the notion of *values*, which refers to that “conception of the desirable” commonly shared within a given social grouping. If it is arguable that such an approach is useful as concerns small, traditional communities, it is less likely that it can offer insights regarding modern polities, characterized by a high degree of social differentiation, and even less regarding postmodern societies in which normative conventions have been shattered. As Bertrand Badie has noted, the great advantage of an approach in terms of meaning is that once we accept that culture is not a concatenation of normative standpoints but the language that makes understanding possible, it becomes easier to explain why individuals who live within the same cultural setting can hold antagonistic convictions based on different values and still belong to the same culture. For similar reasons, interpretivists distance

themselves from conceptions in terms of political culture. If they accept that the notion of culture refers to a wide semiotic framework, the idea of a political culture autonomous from the rest of a society's cultural codes presupposes the existence of a political sphere strongly differentiated from other spheres (religious, economic, etc.)—which is far from being generally the case, even in the contemporary world. Beyond the antagonistic visions of the ideal society held by political parties, what is of interest to an interpretivist approach is that they all operate within shared systems of meaning.

It is sometimes assumed that Geertzian anti-positivist writings have paved the way for post-modernist skepticism (see, e.g., Goodin & Tilly, 2008, p. 8). Admittedly, some postmodernists praise interpretivists for having recontextualized “Western knowledge” and also for having emphasized the need to study other systems of meaning in their own terms. Nevertheless, they typically criticize interpretivists for not following them all the way when it comes to challenging dominant cultures and glorifying those of the so-called oppressed minorities. There is obviously a huge gap between militant postures eager to propagate multiculturalism and a scientific one merely aiming to underline the magnitude of cultural cleavages. An interpretivist approach does not exalt differences; it just seeks to analyze them seriously. Likewise, if interpretivists are fairly critical of much of the apparatus of the natural sciences, including hypothesis testing or the formulation of dependent and independent variables, it does not mean that they readily adhere to deconstructivist perspectives considering that reality is pure illusion and that everything is intertextual. The intention certainly is to challenge the premises on which earlier approaches have been constructed but with the aim of providing a new form of science generating rigorous theorizing driven by data collected through serious fieldwork.

This has several important consequences. First, thick description implies thinking semiotically. It should be underlined that the semiotic approach espoused here does not refer to semiology and assorted structuralist theories of signs derived from linguistics but entails being particularly attentive to the worlds of meaning of others. A key aspect that should be noted is that, whereas thin descriptions

use experience-distant concepts, thick descriptions resort more willingly to experience-near concepts. In other words, this tradition of studies is not very comfortable with ubiquitous abstract concepts that confer an illusion of analytical familiarity to all places and situations. As already alluded to, a major problem is our need to operate at a certain level of generalization and to find ways of translating the unfamiliar logics of other cultures into an idiom that all political scientists can understand without falling prey to excessive universalism. This is not necessarily an impossible mission. Following Bertrand Badie and Guy Hermet (1990), one possible approach to resolving this dilemma is to make a distinction between concepts that are transcultural and those that are monocultural. For instance, according to these two authors, the concept of *norm* falls into the first category but that of *state* would fall into the second—insofar as, thanks to the insight provided by historical sociology, we understand that the state is not the natural framework of political activity but merely one specific mode of political organization, which unpremeditatedly emerged in some European countries at the end of the Middle Ages. Moreover, we know that its transplantation to other contexts has often proved problematic, largely because of cultural factors. What is required is not the evaluation of states according to an ideal-type model or according to a gradualist approach that would put Scandinavian countries at one extreme of a continuum and Somalia at the other. It is rather to study all sorts of polities without necessarily placing the concept of the state at the heart of our research and, instead, to pay full attention to the thick description of the nature and working of social and political relations. Consequently, comparative studies should question the explanatory value of concepts and analytical models across cases.

Second, a thick description perspective involves thinking inductively rather than deductively. This means beginning with an examination of empirically observed realities and only at a later stage mobilizing the most appropriate instruments. The chief merit of in-depth field studies is precisely in avoiding the temptation of a priori generalization on the basis of grand theories held to be universally valid. Although many apparatuses are worthy of note, it is often relatively simple to supply empirical

findings that do not readily fit with their respective predictions. The existence of such discrepancies necessitates not a further elaboration of alternative theories with global explanatory ambitions but limited ones succeeding in making sense of nonnegligible variations across time or space. The scientific reasoning suggested here is not one that attains the highest level of abstract generalization but one that takes into account various logics of meaning. Placing the issue of meaning center stage leads us to rethink the merits and demerits of the classical approaches and challenges the supposed universality of some mechanisms (see the many illustrations in Patrick Chabal & Jean-Pascal Daloz, 2006). Such an interpretivist standpoint leads to theoretical eclecticism. Needless to say, its intention is not to juxtapose largely incompatible theories but rather to move toward an awareness of the limited validity of exclusivist conceptual frameworks. The result is certainly not sterile empiricism or subjectivism but a nondogmatic perspective seeking to illuminate a great diversity of scenarios. At the paradigmatic level, in contrast, ecumenism (see, e.g., Mark Lichbach & Alan Zuckerman, 1997, which attempts to marry rationalist, cultural, and structuralist approaches in the field of comparative politics) can only be considered with skepticism. There is obviously little possibility of analytical dialogue or theoretical convergence between the proponents of universalist and relativist paradigms.

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See also Comparative Methods; Culturalism;
Epistemological and Methodological Foundations;
Participant Observation; Quantitative Versus
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THINK TANKS

The term *think tank* has been used to describe both private and public organizations that provide advice to governments. A generally accepted definition would describe think tanks as organizations that are distinct from government and whose objective is to provide advice on a diverse range of policy issues through the use of specialized knowledge and the activation of networks. What follows in this entry is, first, a discussion of the historical and geographical development of the concept; second, a typology of think tanks; third, a discussion of characteristics and myths related to think tanks; and finally, some thoughts about the impact of globalization on think tanks.

Origins

The term *think tank* was first used in military jargon during World War II to describe a safe place where plans and strategies could be discussed, but its meaning started changing during the 1960s when it was used in the United States to describe private, nonprofit policy research organizations. It has been proposed that in reality the first example of a think tank was the Fabian Society, which was aiming to influence public policy in Britain at the end of the 19th century. For many years, the majority of scholars studying think tanks considered them as a uniquely American phenomenon that boomed in the United States because of the exceptionality of its political system and its rich tradition of private funding available for think tanks. From a global perspective, however, the argument that think tanks are a uniquely American phenomenon is not convincing. Think tanks have also flourished in other industrial Anglo-American countries, such as Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), and Australia, where normally, they are more modest than in the United States. European think tanks vary

considerably. In Germany, for example, large, influential think tanks are encountered, but they are often state funded and associated with political parties or universities. In France, what could be described as think tanks are organizations gathered around the government in Paris that operate in a conflictual but subordinate relationship with political parties. In southern Europe, think tanks are a more recent phenomenon as they began to appear in the 1970s after the establishment of democratic governments. Research on think tanks outside the Western world shows that it is likely that an even greater variety of organizations exists globally.

Typology

The diversity of organizations that fall under the term *think tank* has led to the creation of typologies. At least four types of think tanks can be observed. The first is the ideological tank, which refers to organizations that have a clearly specified political or, more broadly, ideological philosophy and are clearly related to the category of advocacy tanks. Examples include the New Right think tanks in the UK and the think tanks that are affiliated to political parties in Germany. This type is the closest to the stereotypical idea of what a think tank is. The next type is the specialist tank, which includes institutes that have a thematic focus. The most common subjects are foreign and public policy, but think tanks also specialize in other issues, such as the environment. The third category includes institutes that do not work at the national level. They could either work at the regional level, such as the American state tanks, or at the supranational level, such as the think tanks that are based in Brussels and are aiming at the European Union (EU). The final category is the think-and-do tanks that relate to organizations that apart from their traditional research activities, are starting to be active at a more practical level, such as in the funding of charity projects. This type of think tank is closer to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Following the above typology, it can be observed that think tanks are similar, but they can be distinguished from other organizations that are involved in the political arena. A think tank is different from a university unit that offers courses but also conducts research. It is different from philanthropic organizations that have as one of their lower priorities the funding of research and prefer

the funding of actions directed to society in a more straightforward way. They are different from government advisory organizations because they play a distinctive and unique role by providing more independent intellectual support to, or new alternatives for, public policy. Nevertheless, there have been government research institutes, for example, in France, that are often described as think tanks. Finally, think tanks are also different from pressure groups and interest groups. This division has become less obvious because pressure groups increasingly develop in-house, well-researched critiques of existing policy. One of the most important differences is that pressure groups have a membership of individuals as one of their central characteristics. When they do get involved in research, they do it to support their campaigns, and it does not constitute their preliminary interest.

Common Characteristics of Think Tanks

If these are the types of think tanks, what are the common characteristics of these organizations? First, it is their policy focus, which means that their objective is to bring knowledge and policy making together by informing and, if possible, influencing the policy process. Think tanks conduct and recycle research that aims to solve policy problems and not solely to advance the theoretical debate. The second characteristic is public purpose, which refers to the reason for the existence of think tanks. Most of the think tanks claim that they conduct research to inform the public and the government on how to improve public policy. Their rhetoric often claims that their work is for the common good and to educate the public. Third, the expertise and professionalism of their research staff is the key intellectual resource of think tanks and a way of legitimizing their findings. Finally, the key activities of think tanks are usually research analysis and advice, which come in the form of publications, conferences, seminars, and workshops.

Myths Concerning Think Tanks

It has been argued that think tanks do not always possess the characteristics described above and that some of these features are better described as myths. The first myth concerns the policy focus of think tanks and their role as bridges between knowledge and government policies. As has already

been discussed, no one type of think tanks exists. Furthermore, the borders between think tanks and organizations such as interest groups, professional associations, consultants, and university institutes are blurred. The result is that it is not always easy to identify an organization as a think tank and that bridging knowledge and policies can happen in a variety of ways, if indeed it is a priority of the organization. Another obstacle for think tanks that wish to play the role of a bridge between knowledge and government is that in many countries, the directors and experts of think tanks are closely related to politicians and bureaucrats. In reality, they belong to the same elite; they have similar worldviews, and they often move between governmental organizations and NGOs. Thus, think tanks cannot fulfill their role as bridges.

The second myth is that think tanks serve the public purpose. Although the public purpose is always in their rhetoric, think tanks are themselves organizations that have private interests, and they are dependent on their sources of funding. Often, their concern about their image and reputation limits the spectrum of their policy proposals. It is even doubtful to what extent think tanks can determine their own research agendas because this is often dependent on contracts and funding opportunities. This myth is closely related to the alleged independence of think tanks, which as has been shown is only partial given their needs for funding and publicity. The third myth concerns the knowledge resources of think tanks. Although think tanks do normally recruit experts and provide policy analysis, they often recycle rather than produce academic knowledge. Their aim is to make academic findings more palatable for busy politicians and policymakers. This means that think tanks play an important role in setting the research and policy agenda and in prioritizing some subjects over others.

International Think Tanks

Globalization has affected think tanks, especially by increasing their appetite and capacity for international networking. International think tanks and global networks have emerged since the 1990s. International think tanks, although they are based in one country, claim not to have any specific national links. An example is the European Policy Centre in Belgium, which claims that it is interested

in the EU and not in a particular member state. Additionally, there is a tendency for transnational communication between think tanks to occur through the creation of regional and international fora, such as the Global Development Network. International organizations, such as the World Bank, are encouraging this kind of activity through the organization of a number of regional and international conferences for the promotion of think tanks and their work. On the other hand, think tanks are increasingly offering their services to international organizations, such as the World Bank and the EU. All this international activity has translated into a proliferation of the number of such organizations globally.

Future Challenges

The challenges, but also the opportunities, that think tanks are facing are many. First, the nature of funding has changed, and at times of economic recession, obtaining it has become difficult. Second, the proliferation of think tanks and other NGOs has meant increased competition but also increased possibilities for synergies, better productivity, and broader audiences. Third, the rise of the Internet has multiplied their communication possibilities, but it has also signified the spread of information that is not always accurate. Fourth, the emergence of specialist think tanks in new areas, such as biotechnology and genetics has facilitated the provision of more focused analysis. Finally, globalization has meant an increased demand for policy advice and a new role for think tanks that are forced to study policy alternatives from around the globe and then adapt them to their local context.

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See also Advocacy Coalition Framework; Epistemic Communities

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TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS

Time-series analysis is a type of statistical analysis of observational data that vary over regular units of time. In political science, the data used are typically aggregate descriptors, such as unemployment rates, levels of presidential approval, the incidence of terrorist attacks, or the percentages of Democratic and Republican Party identifiers in the electorate. The time intervals over which these data are gathered are usually years, quarters, or months, but data gathered over much shorter periods also may be employed. For example, political economists studying variations in currency exchange rates or volatility in stock markets may use data gathered every day, every minute, or even every second. Although there are exceptions, time-series analysts normally do not generate their data *de novo* but rather rely on data gathered by government statistical agencies or private entities, such as public opinion polling agencies. In the following, the basic features and recent advances in this field are presented.

Historically, time-series analysis was closely integrated with other aspects of econometrics. Researchers typically began by specifying a model where the dependent (Y_t) and independent (X_{kt}) variables as well as the stochastic error term (ε_t), were subscripted with t to denote variation over time. Equation 1 is an example with a single predictor variable (X_t). The coefficients β_0 and β_1 in this equation were assumed to be time invariant and were estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression:

$$Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_t + \varepsilon_t. \quad (1)$$

A standard set of postestimation diagnostics was performed, with a Durbin-Watson test used to

detect the presence of first-order autocorrelation in the residuals. Autocorrelated residuals prompted analysts to infer the existence of autocorrelation in the error process, that is, $\varepsilon_t = \rho\varepsilon_{t-1} + v_t$, where v_t is a well-behaved Gaussian error term that is $\sim N(0, \sigma^2)$ by assumption. In turn, autocorrelated errors were treated as a nuisance, rather than as an indicator of model misspecification. This nuisance could be eliminated by a variant of generalized least squares (the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation), with the parameter ρ being estimated from the data.

The resulting model (Equation 2) involves first-order partial differences of all left- and right-hand-side variables, including the error process:

$$Y_t - \rho Y_{t-1} = \beta_0 - \rho\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_t - \beta_1 \rho X_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t - \rho\varepsilon_{t-1}. \quad (2)$$

The model thus contains a common factor restriction $(1 - \rho L)$, where L is a backshift operator. Political scientists using this technique often appeared to be unaware that the model had dynamic properties with effects of all predictor variables being distributed over time by the presence of a lagged endogenous variable Y_{t-1} , with the rate of decay of these effects being governed by the parameter ρ .

Starting in the 1970s, analysts became increasingly aware of the restrictive nature of the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation, and many began to address the “nuisance” of autocorrelated errors by inserting a lagged endogenous variable on the right-hand side of their model (Equation 3).

$$Y_t = \beta_0 + \lambda Y_{t-1} + \beta_1 X_t + \varepsilon_t. \quad (3)$$

This specification avoided the common factor restriction associated with the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation, but it still imposed a possibly theoretically unattractive uniform dynamic on the effects of all predictor variables, with the rate of decay of those effects being governed by the parameter λ associated with the lagged endogenous variable. In addition, the lagged endogenous variable heightened the possibility that parameter estimates would be biased and inconsistent. Analysts recognizing this possibility typically tested model residuals for first-order correlation using statistics such as Durbin’s H (the Durbin-Watson test being inapplicable for models with lagged endogenous variables).

Another important development in the 1970s involved threats to inference posed by trending (nonstationary) data. The stationarity condition requires that variables have constant means, constant variances, and constant autocovariances for any lag k regardless of the value of t . Well before World War II, prominent statisticians and economists (e.g., George Udny Yule and John Maynard Keynes) worried about the fact that relationships between variables as suggested by statistically significant coefficients estimated in time-series regressions might be artifacts of nonstationarity. The reality of this spurious regression threat was documented by Clive Granger and Paul Newbold in 1974. Using simulated nonstationary variables that were independent by construction, Granger and Newbold found that they falsely rejected the null hypothesis for regression coefficients at alarmingly high rates. Type I errors (rejecting a true hypothesis) were a serious problem when data were nonstationary.

Traditionally, researchers concerned about this threat had “detrended” their data by regressing them on a time counter corresponding to the units of temporal aggregation of their data. However, many analysts believe that such deterministic trends are rare in the data-generating processes for variables of interest to social scientists. In this regard, Granger and Newbold had assumed that nonstationarity was a product of a local-level process, such as a random walk (see Equation 4).

$$Y_t = 1.0 * Y_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t. \quad (4)$$

As Equation 4 shows, a random walk “remembers everything”: that is, its value at time t equals its value at $t - 1$ plus a contemporaneous random shock, ε_t . Since shocks are not discounted over time, the value of a random walk at any time t is the sum of all shocks to that point in time, plus the initial value of the series. The variance of such a process increases without bound as t goes to infinity. If the random walk model also includes a constant on the right-hand side, the resulting model—a random walk with drift—generates a deterministic trend. Random walks, with and without drift, are clearly nonstationary.

Given the seriousness of the spurious regressions threat, it is important to diagnose the presence of nonstationarity in time-series variables. Historically, the simplest of these diagnostics has been an ocular

inspection of the graph of successive values of a time-series variable. If the variable appears to move predominantly upward or downward over the period for which data are available, the analyst concludes that the process “trends,” that is, it is nonstationary. A second diagnostic was suggested by George Box and Gwilym Jenkins, who demonstrated that “stochastic trending” variables, such as random walks, have characteristic autocorrelation functions. An autocorrelation function is the correlation of a time-series variable with itself at successively longer lags. The autocorrelation function for a random walk will have very large values at low lags, and the value of those correlations will decay only very slowly as the lag length increases. The autocorrelation functions of stationary variables are very different, either decaying at geometric rates in the case of an autoregressive process or having one or more significant “spikes” (correlations) in the case of a moving average process.

Inspection of graphs and autocorrelation functions involves judgment calls rather than formal statistical tests. However, over the past three decades, econometricians have developed a large battery of formal tests for nonstationarity. The most widely used of these unit-root tests was proposed by David Dickey and Richard Fuller (DF):

$$(1 - L)Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T + \lambda Y_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t, \quad (5)$$

where T represents time.

The DF test involves regressing the first difference of a variable on its lag in levels plus possibly a constant and a deterministic trend (as in Equation 5), depending on hypotheses about the data-generating process. The key parameter is λ , with a significance test (t test) for λ determining whether the variable is nonstationary. For the DF and many other (but not all) of these tests, the null hypothesis is nonstationarity. The t distribution for the DF test is nonstandard, and special tables of critical values must be used for significance tests. If one is concerned that test results may be biased because the error process of the DF regression is not “white noise,” lags of the dependent variable may be added to the right-hand side. The result is an augmented Dickey-Fuller test, and again, special t distributions must be used. Like other unit-root tests, the DF has been criticized for having low power, thus, raising the possibility of incorrectly

failing to reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity (a Type II error).

Since the 1980s, it has become standard practice for analysts who conclude that variables of interest are nonstationary to first-difference these variables prior to doing regression analyses, that is, to compute $Z_t = Y_t - Y_{t-1}$. If subsequent diagnostics suggest that the differenced series remains nonstationary, a second difference is taken, that is, $W_t = Z_t - Z_{t-1}$. If we assume that the data-generating process is characterized by a stochastic trend, such differencing will engender stationarity.

Analyses of models using differenced variables will not be subject to the spurious regressions threat. However, by virtue of being specified with differenced variables, these models address only the short-term effects of various predictor variables. Any long-run relationships will be ignored. Since such relationships can be of considerable theoretical interest, a methodology for incorporating them in the analysis of nonstationary data is very useful. Such a methodology was provided in 1987 by Robert Engle and Clive Granger, who developed the concept of co-integration and demonstrated its relationship with error correction models in the context of applied time-series analysis. (Engle and Granger were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for this work in 2003.) They showed that it is possible for a linear combination of two nonstationary variables to be stationary. If this is the case, then, the variables are said to be co-integrated. Engle and Granger's proposed test for co-integration is simple—regress Y_t on X_t in their original-level form, and then, test the residuals for nonstationarity. (Again the requisite t distribution for a DF test on these residuals is nonstandard.) If the residuals are stationary, one concludes that the two series are co-integrated. If Y and X are co-integrated, Engle and Granger show that it is possible to model both the short- and long-run effects of X on Y via an error correction specification. This error correction model (an autoregressive distributed lag model with restrictions) is

$$(1 - L)Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1(1 - L)X_t + \alpha(Y - C_1X)_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t, \quad (6)$$

where C_1 is the correction term.

In Equation 6, the short-run effect of X operating at time t on Y_t is captured by the β_1 coefficient.

The long-run effect is captured by α , with $(Y - C_1X)$ operating with a one-period lag constituting the error correction mechanism. If such a mechanism is operating, the expectation is that α will have an absolute value less than 1.0 and carry a negative sign. For example, an estimated α of $-.5$ implies that, *ceteris paribus*, any shock to the system that disturbs the long-run dynamic equilibrium between Y and X will be eroded at a rate of 50% in all subsequent time periods. Engle and Granger suggested that $(Y - C_1X)$ could be measured as the residuals from the co-integrating regression of Y on X . Then, Equation 6 could be estimated using OLS. However, this two-step approach to estimation is not necessary, and equations such as Equation 6 can be estimated in one step using nonlinear least squares or maximum likelihood procedures. If one is not interested in a standard error for C_1 , OLS can be used.

In contrast to the methods described above, Box and Jenkins in 1976 offered a class of ARIMA (autoregressive, integrated, moving average) models designed to simplify and improve forecasting. Reacting to the perceived theoretical inadequacies and empirical failures of the traditional Cowles Commission approach to forecasting, which involved the specification and estimation of large multi-equation models, Box and Jenkins proposed that the future values of a time series could be forecast using only its own history. As illustrated in Equation 7, the resulting ARIMA models had autoregressive and moving-average components, with the variable of interest (Y_t) being differenced one or more times if necessary to achieve stationarity. A variable that becomes stationary with one difference is said to be integrated of order 1 (i.e., $I(1)$). Using Box and Jenkins's (p, d, q) notation, the model in Equation 7 is a (1, 1, 1) model; it has one difference to produce stationarity, one autoregressive term $[(1 - \varphi L)Y_{t-1}]$, and one moving-average term $(\theta\varepsilon_{t-1})$. The parameters φ and θ are estimated from the data:

$$(1 - L)Y_t = \varphi(1 - L)Y_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t + \theta\varepsilon_{t-1}. \quad (7)$$

Since univariate ARIMA models are theoretical forecasting tools, the data are used as a guide to model identification (specification). In this regard, Box and Jenkins showed analytically that

autoregressive and moving-average models have characteristic patterns in their autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions that could be used as specification guides. In addition, they suggested diagnostic procedures for assessing the quality of ARIMA models. These include significance tests for model parameters, parameter values consistent with the assumption that the (differenced) series is stationary, and the presence of white-noise residuals from a series filtered with an estimated ARIMA model; the latter condition was typically assessed via Ljung-Box or Box-Pierce portmanteau tests. *Ex post* forecasting performance using a portion of currently available data is another important diagnostic.

ARIMA models may be extended to include explanatory variables. These may be a mixture of continuous variables (X s; e.g., inflation and unemployment rates) and interventions (I s; e.g., a national election, a terrorist attack), with the latter typically being measured using dummy variables 0 and 1 (see Equation 8). Depending on how these dummy variables are coded, interventions may be specified as having permanent or temporary effects. The impact of any explanatory variable may begin contemporaneously or with a delay of 1 through k periods. Also, unlike garden-variety time-series regression models with lagged endogenous variables, multivariate ARIMA models may specify different dynamics for the effects of different predictors. For example, in Equation 8, the immediate (time t) impact of I is captured by ω_1 , and the lagged effects (growth or decay) are captured by δ_1 . Lagged effects of X are estimated with δ_2 , which need not have the same value as δ_1 . Depending on the available degrees of freedom, several δ s may be specified in a single multivariate ARIMA model:

$$(1 - L)Y_t = \phi(1 - L)Y_{t-1} + \omega_1/(1 - \delta_1 L)(1 - L)I_{t-k} + \omega_2/(1 - \delta_2 L)(1 - L)X_{t-k} + \varepsilon_t + \theta\varepsilon_{t-1} \quad (8)$$

Recent research on long-memory processes has produced a class of autoregressive, fractionally integrated, moving average (ARFIMA) models that generalize the integration concept in traditional ARIMA models. As Janet Box-Steffensmeier and Renée Smith argue, time-series variables are not simply stationary or nonstationary in a knife-edged

sense; rather, they can be thought of as having degrees of integration. Thus, the d term in the Box-Jenkins p, d, q models is no longer an integer with values 0 if a variable is stationary or 1 if it needs to be differenced once to make it stationary. In ARFIMA models, the values of d lie along a continuum from -0.5 to 1.0 , with values equal to or greater than 0.5 and less than 1.0 , indicating that the variable is nonstationary but ultimately mean reverting.

The d parameter and its associated standard error, together with any specified autoregressive and moving-average parameters, can be estimated from the data using maximum likelihood or other procedures. An example of such an ARFIMA model is Equation 9. Lacking any autoregressive or moving-average terms, this model is called “pure fractional noise.” As with conventional ARIMA models, explanatory variables can be included in ARFIMA specifications. A recent extension of these models involves the development of the concepts of fractional co-integration and fractional error correction:

$$(1 - L)^d Y_t = \varepsilon_t \quad (9)$$

The desire for simple, easily estimated, accurate forecasting models did not abate with the development of ARIMA models. In 1980, the econometrician Christopher Sims offered a penetrating critique of conventional multi-equation forecasting models and suggested a radical alternative. Sims argued that many of the parameter restrictions required to achieve identification in multi-equation models (with endogenous regressors) were simply “incredible.” Researchers imposed these restrictions not because they were justified by theory or evidence but rather because they were necessary to avoid simultaneity biases. Given this ad hoc nature, the poor forecasting performance of such models was hardly surprising.

Sims did not claim that econometricians were radically ignorant of their subject matter. Rather, he asserted that researchers could use theory and experience to assemble sets of variables that were dynamically interrelated in possibly highly complex ways. Researchers wishing to forecast could “round up the usual suspects,” even if that complexity kept them from developing credible identifying restrictions needed for the estimation of

structural parameters. But all was not lost. Sims proposed that forecasters use these sets of variables to develop simple multi-equation autoregressive models comprising unrestricted reduced forms. Each variable of interest was a function of one or more lagged values of itself and one or more lagged values of all other variables in the system. Additional variables capturing important exogenous shocks could be added if desired. The resulting set of equations is called a vector autoregression or VAR. In Sims's original formulation, parameters in VARs could be estimated simply—via OLS or SUR techniques. Equations 10a and 10b are an example of a simple two-variable VAR with a single lag on both variables in the system:

$$Y_t = A_0 + A_1 Y_{t-1} + B_1 X_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t, \quad (10a)$$

$$X_t = C_0 + C_1 X_{t-1} + D_1 Y_{t-1} + u_t. \quad (10b)$$

Although the simplicity of these VARs was attractive, researchers soon attempted to improve their forecasting performance by imposing restrictions on various parameters in a system. Later, analysts attracted by the ideas of co-integration and error correction developed vector error correction models that incorporated hypothesized long-run relationships explicitly into a VAR setup. Others, wishing to extract explanatory power from VARs, respecified them as moving-average representations of a system of interest. By so doing, they could trace the dynamic effects of shocks to a variable on other variables in that system. These analyses are not entirely theory-free; rather, general hypotheses about the flow of causality are required to order the variables in a system and, hence, how shocks are transmitted through it. Still others have leveraged recent developments in applied Bayesian statistics to specify and estimate VARs.

Another important methodological advance enables researchers to study the evolution of the variance of a time-series variable. These autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models were pioneered by Engle in 1982, with a subsequent generalization by producing the generalized ARCH (GARCH) model that closely resembles traditional ARIMA models. Equations 11a and 11b are an example. Here, the error process (ε_t) for Y_t in Equation 11a has a heteroskedastic variance that evolves according to Equation 11b.

The scaling parameter for this conditional variance, h_t , is driven by its own past value as well as the size of the variance at $t - 1$, that is, ε_{t-1}^2 :

$$Y_t = \beta_0 + \lambda Y_{t-1} + \beta_1 X_t + \varepsilon_t, \quad (11a)$$

$$h_t = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 h_{t-1} + \lambda_2 \varepsilon_{t-1}^2. \quad (11b)$$

Econometricians have extended GARCH models to incorporate ideas such as asymmetry, nonlinearity, integration, and fractional integration. GARCH models also may be specified such that the conditional variance influences the evolution of the mean of a process, and explanatory variables may be included in the equation for h_t to help account for how it evolves.

To date, the vast majority of applications of GARCH models have been in the field of finance, where investigators are keenly interested in measuring risks associated with holding an asset at any time t . Conditional heteroskedasticity, tapping overtime variation in the size of shocks to a system and, hence, volatility, is a natural way of calibrating such risks in empirical analysis. Other applications are possible. For example, in 2009, Harold Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne Stewart, and Paul Whiteley used GARCH models to study the development of consensus in public opinion regarding the performance of British Prime Minister Tony Blair. A key explanatory variable in the model of the GARCH process for the conditional variance of Blair's performance evaluations is a measure of civilian casualties in the Iraq War. This application of GARCH modeling illustrates how advanced time-series methods can be used in empirical analyses of phenomena of long-standing interest to political scientists.

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See also Event History Analysis; Path Dependence; Process Tracing; Time-Series Cross-Section Data and Methods

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since asymptotic properties of estimators for pooled data are either derived for $N \rightarrow \infty$ or $T \rightarrow \infty$. In addition, violations of full ideal conditions and specification issues have more or less severe effects for bias and efficiency depending on whether the number of units exceeds the number of observations over time or vice versa. In what follows, we discuss the respective strengths and weaknesses of this method and various ways by which we can cope with some of the inherent problems.

Some have argued that TSCS and CSTS data consist of observations at different points in time for fixed units of theoretical interest, such as countries or dyads, whereas in panel data, the units, mostly individuals in surveys, are of no specific interest and are randomly sampled from an underlying population with all inferences dedicated to uncovering the relationships in the population. Textbooks and articles, however, use these terms quite loosely. This entry follows this trend and discusses general estimation procedures and specification issues with respect to different kinds of data pooling cross-sectional and time-series information.

TIME-SERIES CROSS-SECTION DATA AND METHODS

The use of pooled time-series cross-section (PTSCS) data in quantitative political analysis has increased immensely over the last two decades. Pooled data analysis has become the standard especially in subdisciplines such as international relations, comparative politics, and comparative political economy. However, fields that use microdata, such as political behavior or American politics, also increasingly use PTSCS data due to the greater availability of survey data over time. Panel data pool cross-sectional information (number of units N) with information over time (number of time points T), for example, data on individuals or firms at different points in time, information on countries and regions over time, and so on. Thus, panel data consist of repeated observations on a number of units. We can distinguish between cross-sectional dominant data (cross-section time-series, CSTS), time-series dominant data (time-series cross section, TSCS), and pooled data with a fixed number of units and time points. The data structure has implications for the model choice

Advantages and Disadvantages of PTSCS Data Analysis

Panel data pool observations for units (i) and time periods (t). The typical data-generating process can be characterized as

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k x_{kit} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad i = 1, \dots, N; \\ t = 1, \dots, T, \quad (1)$$

with k independent variables x , which have observations for N units (i) and T periods (t). The dependent variable y is continuous (though in principle, it can be limited dependent, which requires nonlinear estimation procedures) and also observed for i and t . ε_{it} describes the error term for observations i and t and we can assume an $NT \times NT$ variance-covariance matrix Ω of the error term with the typical element $E(\varepsilon_{it}, \varepsilon_{js})$. In case all Gauss-Markov assumptions are met (the error term is *iid*), this model can be straightforwardly estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). Because PTSCS data combine time-series and cross-section

information, this is rarely the case. However, the analysis of PTSCS data offers significant advantages over the analysis of pure time-series or pure cross-sectional data. First, using pooled data increases the number of observations and, therefore, the degrees of freedom, which allow us to test more complex arguments by employing more complex estimation procedures. More important, most theories in the social sciences generate predictions over space and time, and it seems, therefore, indispensable to test these hypotheses by using data providing repeated information for theoretically interesting units. PTSCS data analysis allows the modeling of dynamics, which is impossible when pure cross sections are examined, which may lead to spurious regression results. Finally, analyzing pooled data allows controlling for unit heterogeneity beyond the inclusion of additional right-hand-side (RHS) variables. Accordingly, pooled data can be used to get rid of some kinds of omitted-variable bias, make the best of the available information, test theories that predict changes, and test theories that predict parameter heterogeneity.

The most prominent disadvantage of panel data analysis lies in the fact that an econometrically sound model specification is typically hard to find since the data structure not only combines all the problems of cross-sectional and time-series data, but also these problems typically arise simultaneously. Specification problems in pooled data analysis can be summarized as follows:

- The residuals are typically serially correlated and not independent of each other.
- The residuals have different variances for different units (panel heteroskedasticity).
- The residuals of different units are contemporaneously correlated.
- The residual of unit i covaries with residuals of unit j for different points in time.
- The expected mean of the error term deviates from zero for different units.

While each single violation of the underlying model assumptions is often straightforwardly accounted for by existing econometric measures, combinations of problems might not be solved simultaneously in a satisfying manner. Econometric solutions are often incompatible with theories. Sometimes, it is hard to find models that at the

very same time are econometrically sound (unbiased, efficient) and provide an appropriate test of the theory. Weighing the advantages and disadvantages of pooled data analysis, the positive aspects certainly prevail, especially because the analysis of pooled data allows the testing of complex arguments over space and time, which are characteristic for the social sciences. From this perspective, the steep increase in the popularity of panel data analysis does not seem to be surprising.

Heteroskedasticity and Contemporaneous Error Correlation in Panel Data

Heteroskedasticity in pooled data presents a more complex problem than in pure cross sections since (a) the error term can have unit-specific variances (panel heteroskedasticity), (b) the error term can be contemporaneously correlated, that is, the error term of unit i is correlated to that of unit j in the same year, and (c) the error term of one unit i can be correlated with the error term of unit j at different points in time. In addition, the error term can have time-dependent error variances (autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity). Panel heteroskedasticity mainly occurs if the model specification fits different units differently well. Correlations of the errors across units are determined by unobserved features of one unit that are linked to another unit. Both features violate Gauss-Markov assumptions: While they leave the simple estimators consistent, such estimators are now inefficient, and standard errors may be incorrect. More important, both heteroskedasticity and error correlation often signal omitted-variable bias since in both cases something that should have been included into the structural part of the equation was left out.

This problem can be solved in a substantive way by identifying the causes of the omitted-variable bias and including these variables into the RHS of the models. Often, this approach is not feasible since the sources for heteroskedasticity are unknown, or excluded factors cannot be measured. In this case, several econometric solutions have been proposed.

A first approach brought forward by R. W. Parks and Jan Kmenta is a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimation, which is characterized by an $NT \times NT$ block diagonal matrix with an $N \times N$ matrix Σ that contains contemporaneous

covariances along the block diagonal. Parks and Kmenta also suggest an Ω matrix with a panel-specific first-order autoregressive, AR(1), error structure and contemporaneously correlated errors, but in principle, FGLS can handle different correlation structures.

Because the true structure of Σ and Ω are unknown, this procedure requires the estimation of a very large number of parameters to obtain the error covariances, which in turn leads to very inefficient and therefore unreliable results. Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz show that the Parks method highly underestimates standard errors and therefore induces overconfidence in estimation results. As a result, this estimation procedure is very rarely used in recent work using pooled data. Beck and Katz suggest a different way of dealing with panel heteroskedasticity. They argue that coefficient estimates of OLS are consistent but inefficient in pooled data and that the degree of inefficiency depends on the data and the exact error process. They suggest using OLS and correcting the estimated standard errors by taking the specific panel structure of the data into account:

$$\text{Var}[\beta] = (X'X)^{-1}X'\Omega X(X'X)^{-1}, \quad (2)$$

with

$$\Omega = (E'E/T) \otimes I_T. \quad (3)$$

This is called the panel-corrected standard errors method. Other violations of Gauss-Markov assumptions, such as serial correlation of the error term, have to be treated beforehand. Since this approach manipulates only the standard errors of an OLS model, the coefficients are biased whenever OLS is biased.

Dynamics and Serial Correlation

As pooled data combine information across units and over time, another problem arises if the error term is serially correlated. The error term in t is dependent on the error term in $t - 1$:

$$\varepsilon_{it} = \rho_i \varepsilon_{it-1} + \xi_{it}. \quad (4)$$

Again, violating the independence assumption econometrically only influences the efficiency of

the estimation. Yet since the residual of a regression model picks up the influences of those variables that have not been included, persistence in excluded variables is the most frequent cause of serial correlation. Several remedies for serial correlation are available, all of which have different consequences for the model specification and interpretation of the estimation results.

A substantive solution to the problem of serial correlation is the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable (LDV) y_{it-1} to the RHS of the regression equation. In many cases, this is enough to eliminate serially correlated error terms. However, there are also many perils of adding an LDV to the list of regressors. One of the main problems arises because the inclusion of an LDV makes it difficult to interpret effects of the substantial RHS variables directly and correctly since the conditional effect of x on y is dynamic and aggregated over all periods. It can be described by the following polynomial:

$$y(x)_{t_1 \rightarrow t_p} = \beta_1 x_{it} + \sum_{p=1}^{t_p} (\beta_0^{t-p} \beta_1 x_{it}). \quad (5)$$

Unfortunately, the standard errors of the function in Equation 5 cannot be easily calculated.

Since including an LDV resembles a shortened distributed lag model, we implicitly assume that all variables exert an equally strong one-period lagged impact on the dependent variable. Therefore, finding a nonsignificant coefficient of a theoretically interesting explanatory variable in an LDV model does not necessarily mean that this variable has no effect; it only tells us that this variable does not affect the dependent variable contemporaneously—it might still have a lagged effect. From this, it follows that the coefficient of the LDV estimates at best the average dynamic effect of all substantive RHS variables rather than the actual dynamic effect of each explanatory variable.

Another (lesser) problem occurs when combining an LDV with the estimation of unit-specific effects by a fixed-effects (FE) specification or a least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model (see the next section for a more detailed description). This leads to biased estimates since the LDV covaries with the time-invariant part of the error term. This problem is called Nickell bias. The best known suggestions tackling the problem of Nickell

bias are the instrumental variable approach by Theodore Anderson and Cheng Hsiao (AH), the differenced GMM (generalized methods of moments) model by Manuel Arellano and Stephen Bond (AB), and the Kiviet correction (by Jan Kiviet), which proposes a corrected within estimator that subtracts a consistent estimate of the bias from the original FE estimator. The first two approaches solve the bias problem by first differencing both sides of the regression equation and instrumentation of the LDV with higher order lags of the LDV. Thereby, AH only uses the two-period lagged LDV as an instrument while AB allows the use of all possible lags of the LDV and all exogenous variables in the model. Both approaches generate asymptotically consistent estimation results, whereby AB produces more efficient estimates due to the exploitation of all moment conditions. In finite samples, however, both estimators are problematic with regard to efficiency as Monte Carlo experiments examining the finite sample properties reveal. Higher lags of the LDV provide good instruments only in the case when y is highly persistent over time. Unfortunately, in such a case, the probability that the instruments also covary with the error term remains high. From this perspective, both estimators cannot solve the problem of Nickell bias if y is highly persistent, or they solve the problem very inefficiently in the case of low persistence.

A Prais-Winsten (PW) transformation of the model offers another solution to serial correlation. The advantage of the PW approach consists in the transformation of both the LHS and the RHS of the equation, which allows a direct interpretation of the regression coefficients. PW is estimated by GLS and is derived from the AR(1) model for the error term. First, a standard linear regression is estimated:

$$y_{it} = x_{it}\beta + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (6)$$

An estimate of the correlation in the residuals is then obtained by the following auxiliary regression:

$$\varepsilon_{it} = \rho\varepsilon_{it-1} + \xi_{it}. \quad (7)$$

A Cochrane-Orcutt transformation is applied for observations $t = 2, \dots, n$:

$$y_{it} - \rho y_{it-1} = \beta(x_{it} - \rho x_{it-1}) + s_{it}. \quad (8)$$

And the transformation for $t = 1$ is as follows:

$$\sqrt{1 - \rho^2}y_1 = \beta\left(\sqrt{1 - \rho^2}x_1\right) + \sqrt{1 - \rho^2}s_1. \quad (9)$$

Equation 9 shows that another advantage of the PW transformation is the preservation of the first period. The differences between a PW and an LDV model might be substantial depending on ρ and the serial correlation in both y and x .

Heterogeneity

One of the advantages of analyzing pooled data is the possibility of controlling for heterogeneity across units. When examining cross-sectional data, it is impossible to tell whether the estimated effects are contingent on unobserved effects that are specific to each unit and, therefore, biased. PTSCS data analysis rests on the assumption that units are similar enough to be pooled together. If that were not the case, we could still find appropriate specifications that allow accounting for differences across units that might influence the estimation results. Textbooks discuss this problem usually under the header “unit-heterogeneity” and offer remedies such as FE or random-effects (RE) models. However, these models only deal with time-invariant unit-specific effects, but units can also be heterogeneous with respect to slope parameters, dynamics, or lag structures. The next sections discuss different versions of unit heterogeneity.

Unit Heterogeneity

When units have specific characteristics that cannot be measured and are time invariant, they offer different initial conditions that might influence the regression model. Especially, if these time-invariant unit-specific effects are correlated with any of the RHS variables, coefficient estimates are distorted by omitted-variable bias. If that is the case and we do not control for unit-specific effects, the Gauss-Markov assumption of x being deterministic is violated:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k x_{kit} + \sum_{m=1}^M \gamma_m z_{mi} + u_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (10)$$

where u_i denotes the unit-specific effects and z the other explanatory variables that are time invariant but can be measured and are of theoretical interest. If u_i is excluded from the estimation, it becomes part of the overall error term and will make the model less efficient in the case when it does not covary with any of the x or z but will induce bias if it is correlated with any of the regressors. Econometrically, we can solve for correlated unit-specific effects by including a dummy variable for each unit into the RHS of the model, which generates unit-specific intercepts. This estimation procedure is called the LSDV model:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_k \sum_{k=1}^K x_{kit} + \gamma_{n-1} D_i + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (11)$$

The unit-specific dummy variables (D_i) are multicollinear to any time-invariant variable z ; the coefficients for z are therefore not identified. We can also employ a so-called FE specification, which is econometrically equivalent to an LSDV model. The FE model first de-means all variables in the model and then estimates the transformed equation by OLS:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{it} - \bar{y}_i &= \beta_k \sum_{k=1}^K (x_{kit} - \bar{x}_{ki}) + \varepsilon_{it} - \bar{\varepsilon}_i + u_i - \bar{u}_i \\ &\equiv \ddot{y}_{it} = \beta_k \sum_{k=1}^K \ddot{x}_{kit} + \ddot{\varepsilon}_{it}. \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

The FE transformation eliminates not only the unit-specific effects but also the time-invariant variables that might be of theoretical interest. FE can become highly inefficient because it only uses the within information of all variables. Yet not controlling for unit-specific effects leads to biased estimates if unit effects exist and are correlated with any of the regressors.

If unit-specific effects do exist but do not covary with any of the RHS variables, not controlling for unit effects does not bias the estimates but increases the sampling variation of the OLS estimator and therefore generates less efficient results. A straightforward remedy is an RE specification, which treats the u_i as a random unit specific part of the error term. The RE model only quasi-de-means the variables: Rather than removing the time average from the explanatory and dependent variables at each t , RE

removes a fraction of the time average. The RE estimator generates more efficient results than the FE estimator, but the RE model produces biased estimates if the RHS variables covary with the unobserved unit-specific effects. RE resembles a feasible GLS estimator where the Ω matrix (VC [variance-covariance of the errors]) matrix of the error term) has a specific RE structure that only depends on two parameters: σ_u^2 and σ_ε^2 . RE and FE estimates tend to be close if T gets large or the variance of the estimated unit effects increases as compared to the error variance.

Since the RE estimator is more efficient than its FE counterpart in the case when the unit effects are uncorrelated with the regressors, it is useful to determine which of the two specifications should be used. Textbooks typically suggest employing the Hausman test. The Hausman test is based on the following logic: Since the RE estimator is biased if unit-specific effects are correlated, differences between FE and RE estimates are interpreted as evidence against the RE assumption of zero covariance between x and u_i . Econometricians confirm that the Hausman test has good asymptotic properties. Nevertheless, in finite samples, the test results are influenced by the trade-off between bias and efficiency. The Hausman test is only powerful in the limit: Since FE is consistent, the difference between RE and FE estimates can only be caused by biased RE estimates. In finite samples, however, the differences can result from two sources: biased RE estimates and unreliable FE point estimates due to inefficient estimation of variables with low within variation. The Hausman test actually mirrors this trade-off since it divides the difference of RE and FE estimates by the difference in the asymptotic variances of the RE and FE estimates. From this, it follows that the test results are especially unreliable if the estimation equation contains regressors that are both correlated with the unit-specific effects and rarely change over time.

Highly problematic in a FE specification is the estimation of time-invariant or nearly time-invariant variables. While the problem of including completely time-invariant variables is apparent, the estimation of rarely changing variables does not seem as problematic since FE specifications generate an estimate. However, this estimate might be very inefficient since FE specifications eliminate all cross-sectional variation, and only

the variance over time is used to compute the coefficient. If this within-unit variation is very small, the sampling variation of FE estimates increases drastically, which leads not only to large standard errors but also to very unreliable point estimates. In the case of time-invariant variables, applied researchers often resort to a simple pooled OLS or an RE model, which allow the estimation of coefficients for time-invariant variables that are biased in case the unit-specific effects covary with the regressors. Hausman and Taylor suggest an estimator that uses the uncorrelated RHS variables as instruments for the correlated regressors. If the instruments are poor, the Hausman-Taylor estimator produces highly inefficient parameter estimates. Plümper and Troeger developed an estimation procedure combining the favorable characteristics of FE with the possibility of efficiently estimating time-invariant and nearly time-invariant variables. This procedure is called a fixed-effects vector decomposition (FEVD). FEVD is a three-stage estimation procedure that decomposes the unit fixed effects into a part that can be explained by the time-invariant and rarely changing variables and an unexplained part. FEVD generates estimates with smaller root-mean-squared errors than competing estimators (Hausman-Taylor, FE, RE, pooled OLS) under a wide range of conditions.

Parameter Heterogeneity

As compared with unobserved time-invariant unit heterogeneity, we observe parameter heterogeneity if the coefficient of an explanatory variable differs significantly across units or over time. If parameters change across time or units, we are likely to deal with unobserved and therefore excluded interaction effects, or it could be that we have assumed the wrong functional form for the statistical relationship. If the source of parameter heterogeneity is known or our theoretical model even predicts differences in parameters across units or time periods, we can straightforwardly specify the correct model by including interaction terms between time periods or groups of units and the specific RHS variables.

In cases where the source of parameter heterogeneity is unknown, seemingly unrelated regressions

(SURs) or random-coefficients models (RCMs) offer an econometric solution to the problem. SUR models estimate a single regression for every unit but exploiting the panel structure of the data by assuming a joint error process for all units. This increases the efficiency of estimation by “borrowing strength.” SUR models only generate acceptable parameter estimates for long time series, that is, when T is much larger than N . SUR models employ a GLS-type estimator for the VC matrix, which weights the standard errors by the cross section-specific mean-squared errors.

The random-coefficients estimator (e.g., Beck and Katz) provides a compromise between estimating the fully pooled model and a fully unpooled estimate (separate OLS for each unit). Pooled OLS depends on the stark assumption of unit homogeneity, whereas separate OLS estimation for each unit produces inefficient results. The RCM borrows strength by shrinking each of the individual unit OLS estimates back to the overall (pooled) estimate. It is, therefore, also a good test for “poolability” of the data. The RCM generalizes the RE estimator from the intercept to all parameters of interest

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_{ki} \sum_{k=1}^K x_{kit} + \delta_m \sum_{m=1}^M w_{mit} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (13)$$

$$\beta_i \sim N(\beta, \sigma_\beta^2).$$

The RCM can be made more useful by allowing the β_i to be functions of other unit-specific variables.

Heterogeneity of Dynamics and Lag Structures

In pooled data, not only do coefficient estimates vary across units but also dynamic effects. In addition, different RHS variables might exert a differently lagged impact on the dependent variable, and the lag length can differ across units. Different dynamics can be straightforwardly incorporated into an RCM or SUR models by including an LDV with unit-specific coefficients. PW specifications also allow for unit-specific autoregressive processes in the error term.

Since statistical tests for heterogeneous dynamics or lag structures are not readily available, defining specific dynamics should be based on theoretical grounds. Unit-specific dynamics can then be more

directly modeled by making the relevant regressors or the LDV interact with dummies for specific groups of units. Since different explanatory variables can have differently lagged effects across units as well, it is not plausible to just vary the estimates of the LDV because the marginal effect of an RHS variable at time $t > 1$ partially depends on the estimate for the LDV.

In summary, different kinds of unit heterogeneity do not prevent pooling of information over time and across units. Theoretically, unit heterogeneity leads to interesting research questions that can be empirically analyzed with the appropriate model specification. The possibility of controlling for unit heterogeneity renders pooled data analysis more attractive than pure cross-section or time-series analysis.

Conclusion

This entry provides a short overview of basic estimation procedures and specification issues in PTSCS data. Due to space constraints, other important topics, such as spatial effects in pooled data, nonstationarity, and the usefulness of error correction models as well as estimation procedures and specification issues in limited dependent-variable models for pooled data, could not be discussed. While estimators and statistical tests are discussed in most econometric textbooks, a thorough discussion of specification problems in pooled and panel data remains important. This also holds true for the question of how asymptotic properties of estimators translate to finite-sample analysis.

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See also Quantitative Methods, Basic Assumptions; Regression; Robust Statistics; Statistical Inference; Statistical Significance; Time-Series Analysis; Variables, Instrumental

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TOCQUEVILLE, ALEXIS DE (1805–1859)

French political thinker, author, historian, and political philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville, known primarily for his *Democracy in America* (two volumes, 1835–1840), has constantly gained readership after a hiatus from 1880 to 1945. The development of liberal democracies, demands for pluralism, and the demise of the communist model seem to explain this worldwide renewal of interest. It is important not to succumb to the allure of a visionary who saw it all coming, however. Instead, let us gauge the work's originality with respect to its era and the tradition of political philosophy. Three points in particular come to the fore: the relationship between freedom and equality, the concept of democracy, and the vision of despotism.

Freedom and Equality

Compared with a predecessor, such as Benjamin Constant, or a contemporary, such as François Guizot, Tocqueville pondered the consequences of

the principle of equality promoted by the French Revolution in 1789 in far greater depth. He believed that the aspiration to equality is the driving force in history that would inevitably transform not only class relations, law, customs, and language but also all of modern humanity's self-representations. The "gradual and progressive development of equality," as the introduction to *Democracy in America* states, upsets hierarchies and shapes minds in such a way that Tocqueville wondered if they are compatible with freedom—the other great modern value. It was because he was of the liberal school but also of aristocratic stock (old nobility by his father, *noblesse de robe* by his mother) that Tocqueville pursued this inquiry. He viewed the aristocracy, due to intermediate bodies and the decentralization of power under the feudal system, as the very source of the spirit of liberty in Europe, together with the Christian idea of human freedom.

For Tocqueville, the conflict between freedom and equality largely corresponds to the opposition between aristocratic society and democratic society. This gives rise to the second originality, less with respect to his era than our own: modern democracy does not necessarily promote a society of freedom, contrary to what today has become a widespread idea. Guizot shared this opinion. He preferred the representative system, in which payment of the poll tax determined eligibility to vote, over democracy, which he believed, like Sieyès, was a primitive and oppressive form of societies in their infancy. Guizot considered that the model for free societies was found in the English parliamentary system and not in the young republic of the United States of America. For Tocqueville, France had certainly experienced a period of despotic democracy in the form of the Napoleonic Empire and even a bloody democracy during the Terror practiced by the revolutionary government of 1793. But America offered food for thought as it had found the means to curb the dangers of popular sovereignty by dispersing the locus of power and allowing civil society to organize, thereby, diminishing the threats that the spirit of equality posed to freedom via associations, freedom of the press, systematic recourse to justice, religious freedom, the separation of church and state, local community life, and more generally speaking, federalism.

Traveling to investigate President Jackson's America at the age of 26 (1831), Tocqueville thus reproduced Baron de Montesquieu's accomplishment as regards the English Constitution: to draw overarching principles from a particular case. The liberal tradition had taken the British monarchy as a model. Tocqueville took this same comparative stance, in line with Montesquieu's aspiration, that is, aristocratic liberalism, but this time, he aimed to draw lessons from the American republic. This young writer, with his aristocratic background, did not seek to salvage the values of his milieu by taking the supposedly right model or right version of society: England, with its aristocracy, a service class, and open to merit, which was a stark contrast to the social sterility of the French nobility steeped in its privileges of birth. He instead aimed to reform, elevate, and spiritualize a lifestyle that he had little sympathy for: a society of commerce and jealous competition among equals, calculated self-interest, utilitarianism, and the lack of any official hierarchy. The typical example is America, but it was bound to gain favor in Europe. He hoped nevertheless to breathe certain aristocratic values, such as the spirit of freedom, public service, and protection of the weak, into this social form that was making advances in history with the expansion of the bourgeoisie.

Democracy

Actually, Tocqueville's new concept of democracy consisted of two very different components: the political system on one hand (elections, constitution, political debate as a public scene) and the social state (*état social*) on the other—that is, civil society, but including in it customs, beliefs and public opinion, forms of self-representation, and relations between individuals.

What is there in common between these two constitutive spheres of democracy? Majority rule triumphs in both civil society and government, but—it is remarkable to note—political despotism in government can very well gain acceptance by democracy as a social state. Tocqueville himself witnessed with sorrow and helplessness the rise to power and the coup d'état of Napoleon III and then his lasting triumph. The Second Empire regime illustrated, unfortunately, what he had described in *Democracy in America* some 20 years

earlier. In the foreword to the *Ancien Régime and the Revolution* (1856), he alluded to a few pages of the introduction to *Democracy in America* (1835) pertaining to the immoderate thirst for wealth, lack of interest in politics, cynicism in social relations, respect for brute force as being the very passions aroused by democracy that can lead to despotism. “Democratic societies that are not free can be wealthy, refined, even splendid.” It is in that sense that a democratic society can be not free, despite the opinions we hold today.

Despotism

From this derives the treatment of despotism as a theoretical problem to which Tocqueville, building on the analyses of Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, takes an entirely new approach. The originality is to consider that despotism can arise out of the very logics of democracy (considered as civil society), as we have already seen. But actually, two possibilities exist, which are sometimes combined and sometimes separate.

Apathetic, depoliticized citizens devoted to the constant search for “material gratifications” (to use Tocqueville’s expression) will in the long run unburden themselves of the task of governing themselves if a power (and a leader) offers its services, promising to satisfy their thirst for wealth and take charge of all aspects of their everyday life. In this sense, despotism, “soft and tutelary” (as Tocqueville calls it), occurs when a centralized and bureaucratic state extends its intervention, replacing citizen freedom with egalitarian paternalism, even if it means harshly repressing unruliness. The picture of this new brand of despotism is found in the now famous pages at the end of Volume 2 of *Democracy in America*.

Further, given both the numerical and moral weaknesses of an individual faced with the mass of his equals and fellow men, despotism is realized in the form of this *conformism* that always plagues democracies. The “tyranny of the majority” that is given free rein in a parliamentary regime if minority rights are not preserved by appropriate institutions finds its counterpart in civil society as well. The democratic paradox is thus as follows: Proud of his individual freedom of judgment, the individual feels intimidated before the majority judgment every time he is told that public opinion has

spoken. Can one be right alone against thousands of people when one makes the equality of minds the cornerstone of the regime and life in society? In a democracy, it may seem that enlightenment, wisdom, and truth lie in numbers, which make up the public or public opinion: Tocqueville believed that he had observed in America the paradoxical union of freedom of thought, proclaimed as a founding axiom, with the stifling of this selfsame freedom—in certain periods—under the Empire of the Public: “In the United States, the majority takes it upon itself to provide individuals with a range of ready-made opinions and thus relieves them of the obligation to form their own.” (p. 491).

Modern democracy would thus be a confirmation of the fact that democracy embodies just as much the potential for freedom as it does a new brand of despotism and that it is in general profoundly ambivalent as is its chief principle, the principle of equality. Equality even embodies a new religion that democracy eagerly builds on:

Regardless of what political laws men are subject to in ages of equality, we may anticipate that faith in common opinion will become a sort of religion, with the majority as its prophet. (p. 492)

The Public is democracy’s new god; it worships itself through the practice of consulting public opinion. No one more than Tocqueville has arrived at such a richness of expression on this question, however much it was debated during the 18th century: What is the new power of public opinion? What is government by opinion?

We will note that Montesquieu, after Plato, had described the disadvantages of total equality (*The Spirit of the Laws*, VIII 3, “Of the Spirit of Extreme Equality”). Tocqueville makes use of this analysis but enriches it as well with his readings of the French moralists and especially the Jansenists, such as François de la Rochefoucauld, Blaise Pascal, and Pierre Nicole: He analyzes the endless pursuit of material gratifications as an equivalent to what Pascal had called “distractions” (in which man hides his own mortality from himself by the pursuit of satisfactions that occupy him entirely); he even says explicitly that perfect and definitive equality flees on an “eternal flight,” according to an expression Pascal had used and that Tocqueville cites. As regards the situation of the French after the 1789

revolution, he adopts a tone that is both patrician and one of a Jansenist-influenced author, so to speak: “Having destroyed the obstructing privileges enjoyed by some of their fellow men, they run up against universal competition” (p. 627). Such is “democracy” according to Tocqueville—at once a set of political institutions, mentalities, and social behaviors. It is a system that can be improved on, with which one must learn to live, he explains to his family and his friends in the legitimist party: local freedoms, the power of public opinion, the search for material well-being are all fields of action offered to democracy and that should draw the attention of reformers, theoreticians, and political professionals alike.

Influence on U.S. Political Science

Tocqueville has inspired many works of political science, especially in America. We might mention Louis Hartz, for whom liberalism in America developed in the absence of a feudal past to be fought against (*The Liberal Tradition in America*, 1955); Robert Bellah expounds on a typically Tocquevillian theme in *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (1985), as does Robert D. Putnam in his theory of “social capital” more recently (*Bowling Alone*, 2000): the communitarian stream takes Tocqueville as one of its reference points.

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See also Democracy, Theories of; Liberalism; Political Philosophy; Political Theory

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TOLERANCE

Tolerance is derived from the word *tolerate*, which is broadly defined as permitting or enduring what is objectionable. This entry discusses the historical and philosophical background of tolerance with an emphasis on liberal doctrines and examines its connection to human rights as well as the limits of tolerance.

Social tolerance involves a permissive attitude toward those whose race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, sexual orientation, opinion, or habits differ from one's own. In politics, tolerance can be a quality of an individual, group, corporate entity, or state. Although the meaning of the concept has changed over time, tolerance for different opinions and, thus, allowing for freedom of expression and association is considered the hallmark of a liberal democratic state. Although it started as an exclusive political system, some commitment to religious pluralism and the gradual expansion of political rights have contributed to its identification with social tolerance as well.

Historical and Philosophical Background

Eurocentric historiographies of tolerance attribute its origin to the Protestant movement or the age of Enlightenment, which respectively, invited religious pluralism and humanism. Arguments raised by natural law and social contract theorists, such as John Locke (1632–1704) and Jean-Jacques

Rousseau (1712–1778), against the “divine rights of kings” or aristocratic privileges of the ancien régime and in favor of religious freedom or secularism constitute the core of liberal theories of tolerance. John Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873) emphasis on liberty and utilitarian endorsement of non-conformity, deemed necessary for the creative mind to flourish and help advance the society, have been very influential as well.

However, the philosophy and practice of tolerance existed in both European and non-European societies since ancient times, and the latter ones were usually more advanced and informed the former. The Edicts of Ashoka, issued by the 3rd century BCE ruler of the Maurya Empire with the purpose of spreading his recently adopted religion of Buddhism, also included provisions of ethnic and religious tolerance. Islamic empires, in general, were known for respecting other major religions and protecting their followers. These protected people (the *dhimmi*) originally included “the people of the book” (the Abrahamic texts: the Old and New Testaments and the Koran), but the definition was expanded to include Hindus and Buddhists when the Mughal Empire expanded Islamic rule into the territories of some older Asian civilizations.

Andalusian Spain, ruled by the Moorish Muslims between the early eighth and late fifteenth centuries, was a hotbed of multiculturalism and collaboration of intellectuals of all creeds and cultures. Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126–1198) and Rabbi Moses Maimonides (1135–1204) argued not only for tolerance but also promoted the Stoic notions that there was an eternal and universal natural law that governed the entire universe, that all human beings were born with the ability to reason, and that human conduct therefore needed to be harmonized with this universal law. For Christian Europeans, Andalusia served as a door to new ideas; in addition to the Moorish philosophers’ writings, their ancient Greek sources entered the European worldview, especially after the completion of the Christian conquest of Spain in 1492. However, this exposure had no immediate impact on discriminatory practices. In fact, the Inquisition and other mechanisms were employed more vehemently than before, and the persecuted “heretic” Christians and Jews sought refuge in the multicultural Islamic Empire of the Ottomans.

The recognition of the legitimacy of diversity and allowing different cultural groups to maintain their customs and identity, however, did not make these empires immune to discrimination. In fact, the noninterference form of tolerance, advanced or practiced in highly authoritarian or hierarchal empires, involved considerable discrimination. For example, the Ottoman state, often praised for allowing all nationalities to freely practice their customs, language, and religion, also imposed heavier taxes on its non-Muslim subjects.

In the West, the natural rights philosophers usually fell short of upholding the universalism of the Stoic teachings and denied equality to certain segments of humanity. John Locke, for example, claiming that the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and estate were held by land-owning men, trusted only that small group of people with governance and political rights, disenfranchised other men and all women, and justified slavery. Though more egalitarian, John Stuart Mill denied equal treatment and rights to “those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage” (Chapter 1, *On Liberty*). The blatant sexism of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), who wondered why God would even create woman, a “misbegotten male,” in the first production of things, has been expanded on by others who questioned if women had souls (if they were fully human). In the early modern era, Western imperialist expansion instigated similar queries about whether aboriginals had souls. Colonialism, often justified as an enlightening and civilizing mission, involved repression, assimilation, and the ultimate devaluation of the colonized and their cultures.

Liberal Doctrines

The democratization of liberal philosophies and states drew them closer to universalism. However, while the contemporary liberal democratic stance against discrimination constitutes an improvement over the discriminatory tolerance displayed in ancient and medieval empires, it maintains a similar negative conceptualization of tolerance. Both the liberal democratic and imperial models of tolerance allow different people or peoples “to exist” by employing a “let them be” approach, which is considered a major flaw by their contemporary critics.

Feminists, postcolonial theorists, and postmodernist detractors have scrutinized the egalitarian claims of the liberal tradition and democratic systems. They find that the liberal model's demand of and reliance on noninterference translates to a lack of full recognition, thus, permitting the continuation of inequalities and discriminatory practices. In fact, they consider the act of toleration as hierarchical and patronizing, because by tolerating the "objectionable," the person (or the dominant group in a society) passes a judgment and creates an "other" that is considered less valuable, yet harmless enough to be allowed existence. Thus, instead of promoting tolerance, which would involve a vertical recognition, they call for horizontal recognition, which would mean recognizing that other individuals and cultures are equal in value.

In Western societies, these debates on the accommodation of differences have included questions about the limitation of legal equality and freedoms. Arguments about the repressive impact of nonrecognition of the achievements and contributions of minority cultures and the notion that indifference to one's identity or culture can in fact harm the person ushered in the advocacy of multiculturalism, which is also referred to as identity politics or politics of recognition. (The main and overt battleground of multiculturalism has been educational systems, where the debates ranged from the means and merits of preserving minority languages, e.g., French in Québec, to revising the curricula to include the historical, literary, and other contributions of non-White, non-Western populations, e.g., Africans and African Americans in the United States.) While the movement has promoted equality in dignity and recognition, the means of evaluation of cultures and parameters of recognition continue to be contentious issues.

Connection to Human Rights

Arguments in favor of tolerance have been always closely related to arguments on human rights, which are rights claimed against the state and society for the sole reason of being a human. While human rights can be traced back to ancient times, a leap toward a common definition of human rights and their universal recognition was made with the establishment of the United Nations

(UN), the Charter (1945) of which included the promotion of human rights as one among the goals of the organization. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, provided a list of human rights, and the subsequent conventions and treaties issued by the organization created a body of international human rights law.

The principles of antidiscrimination and equality in dignity lie at the core of the normative framework of the international human rights law. First, the UDHR spells out that human rights are put under protection because "human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights" (Article 1). In addition to the UN Charter, which specifies that human rights apply to all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, Article 2 of the UDHR expands the list to include "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status" and objects to discrimination based on "political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs." The same extensive nondiscrimination list is repeated in various articles of the subsequent human rights treaties but without taking a position on the value of the specified categories of differences—they do not call for their elimination or protection. The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, which was adopted in 1966 and came into force in 1976), however, brings ethnicity, religion, and language under protection as minority rights (Article 27).

In addition to nondiscrimination, the international human rights law promotes respect for differences. For example, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted and entered into force in 1966 and 1976, respectively) not only recognizes everyone's right to education but also stipulates that "education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and sense of dignity" and "enable all persons to participate in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups" (Article 13).

The emphasis placed on equality in dignity and respect for differences provide for a "nonnegative" conceptualization of tolerance in the international human rights law. It promotes positive and

horizontal tolerance by requiring the acceptance and full recognition of differences, and the unique identity of individuals or groups without discrimination. This approach has been displayed in other UN documents and activities on tolerance, including the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981), the designation of 1995 as the “Year for Tolerance,” and holding a World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance (2001).

The Limits of Tolerance

A question that applies both to the liberal notion of “negative” tolerance and to the broader conceptualization of it as recognition is whether tolerance warrants tolerating the intolerant. In other words, what are the limits of tolerance? While the liberal philosopher Karl Raimund Popper (1902–1994) considered the intolerant (especially the advocates of totalitarian ideologies) as the enemies of open society and thus objected to the idea of tolerating them, another liberal philosopher, John Rawls, argued that tolerance for all was necessary to maintain a just (tolerant) society, but that could be allowed only if the intolerant ones do not endanger the tolerant essence of the society. In a similar vein, stating that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law,” the ICCPR sets boundaries of tolerance in the international human rights law (Article 20). Although paradoxical, these propositions address some concerns about hate speech, violence stemming from bigotry, or authoritarian takeover of democratic systems. However, calls for cultural preservation and recognition, prevalent in the discourse of politics of recognition and multiculturalism, make women and others, whose subordination is dictated or enforced by cultural norms and values, uneasy. It is not only gender equality and other emancipatory aspects of the international human rights law that can be jeopardized in the name of religious freedom or celebration of multiculturalism, cultural relativism, but also the right to self-determination in primarily undemocratic contexts, where members are not allowed to interpret the cultural sources and determine their

own lives, may help sustain discrimination and serve the privileged.

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See also Colonialism; Democracy, Theories of; Discrimination; Feminism; Human Rights, Comparative Perspectives; Liberalism; Locke, John; Multiculturalism; Postcolonialism; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; United Nations

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TOTALITARIAN REGIMES

The most common definition of totalitarian regimes, categorized generally under the concept of “totalitarianism,” refers to modern antiliberal and antidemocratic regimes based on the monopolization of power by a revolutionary single party led by a charismatic leader and dominating over the state and society by means of terror and propaganda. Totalitarian regimes carry out their policy using a variety of institutions controlled by the single party: a highly centralized bureaucracy, an official and secret police, a party militia, the manipulation of culture and public opinion through the monopoly of mass media, and a network of organizations set up all over the country under the control of the single party, whose tasks are to regiment, indoctrinate, and mobilize permanently the individual and the masses.

More specifically, some scholars consider mass extermination as a necessary feature whose presence makes a regime truly totalitarian; other scholars argue that there can be totalitarianism without

terror, or they emphasize the role of the charismatic leader or the mobilization of the masses as an essential characteristic of totalitarian regimes. However, all scholars, whatever their definitions of totalitarian regimes, agree that these are new types of anti-democratic political systems that differ substantially from traditional dictatorships and civil or military modern authoritarian states, whose concentration of power is based mainly on repression but does not require a revolutionary single party, an all-encompassing ideology, or a network of collective organizations for the mobilization of the masses.

The definition of totalitarian regimes has been a matter of endless debate, with highly ideological and political implications. Hence, any definition of totalitarian regimes necessarily implies a survey of the origins and development of the concept of totalitarianism. This will be done in the following sections of the entry, complemented by an analysis of this type of regime in the Cold War. Next, the entry examines the eclipse of the concept of totalitarianism in political science from the middle of the 20th century through the 1970s. The entry concludes by examining the renewed interest in this concept that began in the 1980s and has led to new interpretations of it.

The Name and the Thing

Contrary to widespread opinion, the terms *totalitarian* and *totalitarianism* were not invented by Mussolini, even if the Fascist regime was the only one to label itself as totalitarian. Both words were originally coined by Italian antifascists a few months after Mussolini was appointed by the King as Prime Minister in October 29, 1922. In November 1923, the liberal antifascist Giovanni Amendola, probably the inventor of the word *totalitarian*, described fascism as imbued with a *totalitarian spirit*, using violence to impose its ideology as a form of faith obligatory for all Italians. In the same period, Catholic antifascists used this new adjective to define fascism as a *political religion* sacralizing the nation and the state, thus being anti-Christian in essence. Since June 1924, when the socialist deputy Giacomo Matteotti was assassinated by a Fascist gang, the word *totalitarian* was also applied to the Fascist extremists pushing Mussolini hard to establish a dictatorship. In December 1924, the Marxist antifascist Lelio

Basso used the substantive *totalitarianism* for the first time to describe the new Fascist state in the making by transforming traditional institutions such as the monarchy, the parliament, and the magistracy, as well as the armed forces, into the instruments of a single party.

We must bear in mind that *totalitarian* and *totalitarianism* were coined by anti-Fascists before the establishment of the single-party regime in Italy. Therefore, they did not refer to Fascist ideology or to Fascist rhetoric but to the reality of the Fascist party's practice of ruling over the country using an armed militia to terrorize, persecute, and kill political opponents. It was the first time that an armed militia party, identifying itself with the nation and attacking all political opponents as internal enemies of the state, took power in a Western parliamentary democracy to destroy it. The novelty of the phenomenon required a new concept to define it.

The concept of totalitarianism was first developed by the Italian priest Luigi Sturzo, the founder of the Popular Party, who was forced into exile by the Fascists in 1924. In his book *Italy and Fascism*, published in English in 1926, Sturzo compared the reality of the two regimes fascism and bolshevism and defined both as totalitarian because of their points of resemblance, in spite of their differences in historical background, social support, ideologies, and method of achieving power. The points of resemblance were the rejection of the principles and method of democracy, the monopoly of power and politics by a single party, the violent suppression of all opponents, and the regimentation of society under party control. Sturzo's book was soon translated into German, French, and Spanish, thus spreading the concept of totalitarianism in Europe and America from the late 1920s.

The Totalitarian State

After Adolf Hitler's seizure of power in 1933 and the establishment of a single-party regime in Germany, the expression *totalitarian state* was being commonly used by intellectuals and politicians to define the new antidemocratic regimes in Russia, Italy, and Germany in order to distinguish them from ancient despotism and the modern dictatorships mushrooming all over Europe during the interwar period. Most of these antidemocratic

regimes believed in the concentration of power in the hands of a king, an army official, or a “strong man” representing the old establishment. During the 1930s, an increasing number of scholars in Europe and the United States, such as Raymond Aron, Franz Borkenau, Alfred Cobban, Michael Florinsky, Hans Kohn, Fritz Morestein Marx, Elie Halevy, Carlton J. H. Heyes, Emil Lederer, and José Ortega y Gasset, put forward various interpretations of the totalitarian regimes, emphasizing their novelty.

According to these scholars, the basic feature of totalitarianism was a single-party regime created by an antidemocratic mass movement that used paramilitary violence and terror combined with electoral consensus, as in the case of fascism and Nazism, to conquer and maintain power, rendering permanent its own dictatorship as a police state based on the supremacy of a charismatic leader and the oligarchy of the single party, which comprised an elite group of “new men” emerging from anonymity. Other peculiar features of a totalitarian state were the cult of the supreme leader of the party, who was exalted and revered like a demigod by the followers and by the masses; absolute state centralization in the administrative and political fields; state control of the economy; the militarization of society through the permanent and capillary rule of the single party, whose main goal was to remold and transform the individual and the masses in the image of its ideology; the fanaticism and missionary spirit of the single-party regime; a rigorous monopoly of education militarizing the youth; the use of methods of technological and organizational modernization for the mobilization of the masses; and the development of an intense and constant activity of collective indoctrination through mass organizations, festivals, parades, pageants, plebiscites, and sports.

Here again, we have to bear in mind that it was the reality of these regimes, their structure and functioning, and their concrete policy toward the masses, and not their ideologies, intentions, or goals, that were at the origins of the definition of totalitarianism.

Interpretations of Totalitarianism

Theories of the totalitarian regime were also developed by the intellectuals mentioned above to

explain its origins, workings, and foreseeable evolution. The theories focused mainly on modern phenomena and events that contributed to the emergence of totalitarian regimes in different countries such as Russia, Italy, and Germany. Since all these regimes were established after World War I and were strictly connected to the war, although in different ways, the war was considered as the seedbed for totalitarianism. Conditions for the emergence of totalitarian regimes were the radicalization of politics and class struggles; the incapacity of the parliamentary system to provide an effective solution to social and economic conflicts; the impoverishment and disorientation of social classes hit by fierce economic crises, moving toward a revolution or a counterrevolution to survive; and the rebellion of the masses, looking for simple and reassuring solutions by subordinating themselves to the command of a “strong man,” who promised to resolve the crisis with brutal yet efficient methods. From the war experience, the revolutionary movements that built up a totalitarian regime derived the militarization of politics, the use of violence, total state control over society, and brainwashing propaganda as basic methods to maintain the monopoly of power. A feeble or short-lived democratic tradition, widespread political fragmentation, and a sequence of weak governments were also reckoned as conditions for the emergence of totalitarian regimes.

In a broader historical perspective, the roots of the totalitarian state were linked to the mounting tendency toward centralization of the modern state, expanding its control over public and private life. Some scholars pointed to the advent of the mass society, the atomization of individuals, the political mobilization of amorphous masses, and the use of modern techniques of propaganda by ruthless and cynical demagogues as the main factors for the making of a totalitarian regime. The totalitarian state was also seen as a perverted experience of mass democracy in the age of industrialization. The Jacobin dictatorship during the French Revolution as well as the regimes of Napoleon I and Napoleon III were numbered among the harbingers of totalitarianism.

More specifically, scholars of religious orientation, such as Adolf Keller, Waldemar Gurian, Jacques Maritain, and Eric Voegelin, attributed the

origins of the totalitarian state to the process of secularization: They defined totalitarianism as a political religion deifying the state, race, or class and enforcing state control over the body and mind of the people to mold them into obedient believers and servants. Hence, totalitarianism was anti-Christian in essence, even if fascism and Nazism did not preach atheism as bolshevism did but pretended to be respectful of the churches.

Theories of totalitarianism had their heyday in 1939, when many writings on totalitarian regimes were published. The nonaggression treaty between Nazi Germany and Soviet Union in August 1939 was regarded as a confirmation of the affinity between the two totalitarian regimes. In his book *The Totalitarian Enemy*, published in 1940, discussing the conflict between the democratic and totalitarian types of regime, its origins, and its results, Franz Borkenau called Nazism "Brown bolshevism" and affirmed that Russian communism was inherently the most expanding and aggressive form of totalitarianism.

After 1941, however, when the Soviet Union was attacked by Nazi Germany and hence joined the Allied forces in World War II, the tendency prevailed among anti-Fascists not to talk about Joseph Stalin's regime as totalitarian, one exception being Sigmund Neumann's book *Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the Ages of International Civil War*, published in 1942. Neumann put forward the most systematic and in-depth comparative analysis of the totalitarian regimes of the time. Taking into account earlier interpretations of the roots, features, and structure of totalitarianism—the legacy of the Great War, mass democracy, single-party rule, the new elite, the cult of the leader, state control of the economy, the militarization of society, the mobilization of the masses, political religion—Neumann systematized them into a new comprehensive theoretical framework, adding new concepts to define totalitarianism: the revolutionary dictatorial party, the permanent revolution, and the international civil war. The revolutionary dictatorial party was antidemocratic in essence, imbued with a quasi-religious missionary spirit and claiming an exclusive identification with a collectivity, the nation, the proletariat, or the race. It was driven by its own ideological dynamism to acquire monopoly of power, to build a one-party state, and to organize,

regiment, and mobilize the masses in order to regenerate them and create "a new man," aiming also at extending its revolution through territorial and ideological expansionism, therefore promoting an international civil war to achieve its goals. While emphasizing significant structural similarities, Neumann also stressed that communism, fascism, and Nazism must be differentiated through their historical background, ideological orientation, social mobilization, and ultimate goals. Hence, he concluded, a full definition of the totalitarian regime must include this diversity, avoiding therefore any sweeping formula.

Totalitarianism in the Cold War

Following the fall of fascism and Nazism in 1945, the only surviving totalitarian regime was the Soviet Union, which never accepted being labeled as such. After the breakdown of the international antifascist alliance and the start of the Cold War, there was a new wave of interest in totalitarianism, this time with a strong anticommunist orientation. This time, because of the Holocaust and the mass killings under Stalin's regime, terror and mass extermination were added as necessary features in the development of the concept of totalitarianism. At the beginning of the Cold War, the concept was widely used in anticommunist propaganda to identify Stalin's regime as a political "evil" similar to Hitler's regime. Two major works in the 1950s triggered off new debates on totalitarianism: Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, published in 1951, and Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski's *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, published in 1956, after a conference on totalitarianism held in March 1953 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, whose proceedings were published 1 year later.

In her interpretation of totalitarianism, Arendt echoed many concepts developed by earlier scholars—the atomization of society, the amorphous masses, the ruthless elite, and the permanent revolution—while stressing the role of an all-encompassing ideology and the subordination of the state to the single party as key features of the totalitarian regime. Arendt also theorized that the totalitarian regime was the result of a totalitarian movement, but she argued that actually

only the Nazi party was a totalitarian movement, while denying this characterization to the Bolshevik party. She considered only Germany under the Nazis and the Soviet Union under Stalin's rule as examples of "true totalitarianism," asserting that Lenin's Bolshevik party and the Soviet Union were not totalitarian until Stalin's rule. Even Mussolini's regime, according to Arendt, was not totalitarian until 1938. Nevertheless, she also asserted that only if Nazi Germany had won World War II would Hitler have been able to establish a fully developed totalitarian regime. Arendt considered that the essence of totalitarianism was mass terror and mass extermination, as the Holocaust under the Nazis and the purges under Stalin's regime. Therefore, she defined totalitarianism in its final stages as an absolute evil. Arendt's approach to the question of totalitarianism was more philosophical than theoretical. Notwithstanding serious criticism of her interpretation of totalitarianism based on what were claimed to be its many shortcomings and contradictions, Arendt's work had a major impact on the debate on totalitarianism in the following decades.

More theoretically oriented, Friedrich and Brzezinski analyzed the structure of the totalitarian regimes in Russia, Italy, and Germany, classifying their similarities in a syndrome of six basic features:

1. an official ideology that covers all vital aspects of man's existence and is projected toward a perfect final state of mankind;
2. a single party led by one man, unquestionably dedicated to its ideology, hierarchically and oligarchically organized, and either superior to or completely intertwined with the bureaucratic government organization;
3. a system of terroristic police control;
4. technologically conditioned, near-complete monopoly control by the party of all means of mass communication;
5. similar technologically conditioned, near-complete monopoly and control of all means of effective armed combat; and
6. central control and direction of the entire economy through bureaucratic coordination of its formerly independent entities.

Modernization and industrialization were also emphasized by Friedrich and Brzezinski as necessary conditions for the establishment of the totalitarian regime.

Friedrich and Brzezinski were criticized because their *totalitarian syndrome* was considered a descriptive concept instead of an explanatory theory, while historians who were skeptical about the validity of the concept of totalitarianism put into question the applicability of their static model of similarities to the complex reality of the so-called totalitarian regimes, obscuring their substantial differences and their contradictory reality.

The Eclipse of the Concept of Totalitarianism

Debates on totalitarianism flourished during the Cold War. Among the totalitarian regimes then included were the communist states established in Eastern Europe, China, and North Korea after the end of World War II, as well as Castro's regime in Cuba after 1959. However, after Stalin's death and the condemnation of Stalin's cult of personality and his crimes by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1956, there was mounting criticism of the concept of totalitarianism. It was rejected by communist and left-wing scholars as a mere propaganda slogan to denigrate the Soviet Union and the communist regimes by comparing them to the Nazi regime.

The use of the concept of totalitarianism came under fierce attacks through the 1960s. It is significant to note that in the 1967 edition of her book on totalitarianism, Arendt mentioned the spread of totalitarian governments in Eastern Europe after World War II because of the imposition of bolshevism by Stalin, but she also asserted that Stalin's death was followed by a process of *detotalitarianization*. She recognized also that the Chinese Communist Party's totalitarian traits have been manifest from the beginning and that Mao Zedong's regime was characterized by mass terror and extermination, but she denied that Communist China was totalitarian because she felt that Mao's was not a criminal mind like Stalin and Hitler.

Attacks on the concept of totalitarianism went so far as to propose that the name itself should be banned from encyclopedia entries and political science itself, because there has never been such a thing as a totalitarian regime. In the wake of

Arendt's interpretation, some historians asserted that fascism was not totalitarian; other historians made similar claims about the Nazi regime and the Soviet Union, denying any validity to the concept of totalitarianism. The more traditional and generic term *authoritarianism* was preferred to describe all types of modern dictatorships and one-party states.

In the following decade, there was actually a sort of "eclipse of totalitarianism." One scholar proposed seriously in 1976 that we should cease to speak of totalitarianism. Ten years later, another scholar asked ironically if there has ever been such a thing as totalitarianism. The rejection of the concept meant actually the rejection of the thing, thus producing a sort of conceptual void in the analysis of the variety of single-party regimes in the 20th century, though new experiences of domination, such as the Khmer Rouge regime established in Cambodia in 1976 to 1979, did replicate the fundamental traits of the totalitarian regime in its most extreme form—mass extermination—to transform human beings and create a "new man." Many features of totalitarianism were also present in many secular nationalist one-party states in the Islamic world and the Third World: the cult of the leader, an armed militia, mass mobilization, a political religion, and the myth of regeneration.

Going Back to Reality: New Interpretations

However, since the late 1980s, mainly due to the fall of the Soviet Union, there has been a revival of interest in totalitarianism, resulting in new approaches to the question of totalitarianism and new interpretations of it. Pioneers in the revival of the concept, even during its eclipse, were scholars such as Hans Buchheim, Karl D. Bracher, and above all Juan J. Linz. They dealt with the definition of totalitarianism going back to the historical reality and revising previous theories according to the result of new research. They argued that the nature of the totalitarian regime is not static but dynamic and that such regimes are monistic but not monolithic. Hence, a more nuanced interpretation of the relationship between the leader and the party and between the party and the state arose from their revision of the concept of totalitarianism. While stressing the prominence of police control and repression, they denied that terror was the essence of totalitarianism and argued that it was

not sufficient to define it. Finally, they did not underestimate the role of ideology, mass mobilization, and even popular enthusiasm in totalitarian politics but recognized also that the totalitarian claim to total control over society had never been achieved.

Linz's definition of what characterizes a regime as totalitarian has been fundamental in the revision of the concept of totalitarian regimes and its revival. In an essay published first in 1974 and then in 2000 with an up-to-date introduction, Linz defines a regime as totalitarian when the following characteristics apply and only when they occur together: an exclusive ideology, a single mass party and other mobilization organizations, and power concentrated in an individual and his or her collaborators that is not accountable to any large constituency and cannot be removed by legal, peaceful means. When one or more of these characteristics are missing, the regime could be defined as pretotalitarian or posttotalitarian.

Since the early 1990s, there has been worldwide a flourishing of new discussion about totalitarianism. New historical works, mainly those on Italian fascism, have also contributed to renewing substantially the interpretation of totalitarianism. The result of this new research and interpretation can be summarized as follows.

The totalitarian regime is a modern experiment in political domination undertaken by a revolutionary movement, with an integralist conception of politics, that first secures total power monopoly, whether by legal or illegal means, and then destroys or transforms the previous regime and constructs a new state. This new state is based on a single-party regime under the rule of a charismatic leader and has as its chief objective the conquest of society—that is, the subordination, integration, and homogenization of the ruled by means of the integral politicization of existence, whether collective or individual. The new reality is interpreted according to the categories, myths, and values of an exclusive and all-encompassing ideology, institutionalized in the form of a political religion, that aims to shape the individual and the masses through an anthropological revolution, thus regenerating the human being and creating the new man, dedicated in body and soul to the realization of the revolutionary and imperialistic policies of the totalitarian party. The ultimate goal

of this regime is to create a new civilization along expansionist and supranational lines.

Defining the totalitarian regime as an *experiment* is intended to emphasize that totalitarianism is a *continual process* or a *permanent revolution*; it is a *method of rule* to achieve a goal, not a goal in itself.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Democracy, Theories of; Fascism; Fascist Movements

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TOTALITARIANISM

All political concepts are essentially contested, but some are more contested than others. This is certainly the case for totalitarianism. It is almost impossible to reach a consensus based on an operational definition of this term. Many of its users apply it to any dictatorship, autocracy, or fanatical belief or behavior. Many of its critics see it as an invention of Cold War propaganda, aiming to identify Nazism and communism in order to delegitimize the latter or excuse the former. While the scientific character and the present relevance of the concept of totalitarianism can be

challenged legitimately, the discussion must first get rid of the two temptations mentioned above. If the use of the term *totalitarianism* is to be justified, it makes sense only if it is applied to a regime, a movement, a mentality, and an aspiration that goes beyond the limits of politics to encompass the whole of society, culture, and human life by negating the autonomy of domains such as science, religion, or art. Also, whatever the propagandistic instrumentalization during the Cold War, it is simply historically wrong to see in it the origins of the concept. In this entry, its origins, different uses, and contemporary relevance are discussed.

Origins and Definitions

The first known use of the term *totalitarianism* occurred in 1922 in Italy. It is due to liberal opponents of Mussolini, like Piero Gobetti and Giovanni Amendola, who were accusing him of wanting to dominate not only government but the whole of social and institutional life—an accusation that Mussolini proudly accepted by proclaiming his “ferocious totalitarian will.” While Italian fascism was in fact less totalitarian than German Nazism, it made abundant use of the term *the total state*, while the German Marshal Ludendorff was promoting the idea of *total war*. As for totalitarianism as such, it was mainly used by left-wing German émigrés like Emil Lederer in his “State of the Masses” or Sigmund Neumann, trying to pinpoint the novelty of Nazism. They converged with Catholic authors like Waldemar Gurian and Eric Voegelin who were putting forth the notion of “political religion” to indicate the ambition of both fascism and communism to bring salvation on earth and their appeal to total faith and total commitment, similar to that demanded from the members of a sect.

The “totalitarian syndrome” continued to take shape in the 1930s, centered on fascism but, more and more, involving an implicit or explicit comparison with communism. It included the three elements of an ideology, a movement or a party, and a regime. The ideology characteristically combined an interpretation of the world and of history, claiming to be based on science (a racist biology in one case, scientific materialism in the other) and a quasi-religious appeal. The movement or party

was a totally devoted elite. The regime was based on a complete monopoly of power and a claim of total unity, typically incarnated in one leader, and total war against the enemies of the faith and against the groups (racial in one case, social in the other) who were supposed to be the sources of all evil and who had to be eliminated in order to bring about the triumph of justice.

For some authors, like the French philosopher Claude Lefort, the essence of totalitarianism is the effort to bring back societies based on modern individualism and differentiation to a premodern unit with a total primacy of the community, albeit through modern means. Others emphasize the other side of the coin: the attempt at totally eliminating an enemy—the inversion of the Clausewitzian formula, “War is the continuation of politics by other means” into “Politics is the continuation of war by other means.” The perfect formulation would be that of Carl Schmitt, which he, ironically, applied to the enemies of Nazism rather than to Nazism itself: “Total enemy, total war, total state,” the total enemy being the key.

Two works provide the central formulation of this classical notion of totalitarianism: that of George Orwell (*Animal Farm* and 1984) and Hannah Arendt (*The Origins of Totalitarianism*). Orwell’s lasting contribution is above all the notion of total surveillance (“Big Brother is watching you”), the manipulation of feelings (with the conclusion of 1984: “He loved Big Brother”), and even more, the “newspeak,” the creation of a new language where *love* can mean *hatred* and *peace* means *war*. Hannah Arendt’s emphasis is on the dynamics of ideology and terror (the latter literally eliminating the groups condemned to historical extinction by the former), which become an irrepressible process and a force by themselves, beyond their original content and target. Here, too, a “supersense” is created, a kind of “mad logic” through which Hitler diverts precious vehicles from the war effort to the extermination of the Jews and Stalin purges the Soviet elite, including the Red Army leadership, on the eve of the German invasion.

A third, less illustrious but more academic work has nevertheless become a classic of totalitarianism studies. It is Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski’s *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. It provides a number of criteria that distinguish a

totalitarian regime from an ordinary tyranny. These refer to the existence of a single party; a monopoly on ideological, political, cultural, and economic affairs; and the use of modern technology for a degree and pervasiveness of control and indoctrination that were not at the disposal of earlier autocracies. Raymond Aron provides an analogous list of criteria, but he also makes a point that is more important—that the totalitarian dynamic, powerful and fearsome as it is, is not the only one at work even in societies in which it rules. Other dynamics, like that of economic development, the arms race, or of external contacts, which cannot be entirely suppressed, may compete with it or deviate from it.

Earlier, the great social historian Barrington Moore had distinguished three forces in Soviet evolution: power (leading to totalitarianism), rationality (leading to bureaucracy or to democracy, or to both), and tradition (leading to the reassertion of old Russian cultural and imperial patterns). Similarly, Alex Inkeles proposed in 1966 that the logic of totalitarianism be combined with that of development and that of industrial society. This more complex and, in a way, more modest approach, is in any case more able to respond to the barrage of criticism aimed at the key notion of totalitarianism, particularly toward the end of the Cold War, by a number of historians and social scientists.

The attacks revolve mostly around two themes. First, the notion of totalitarianism is supposed to gloss over the fundamental difference between Nazism (or fascism) and Stalinism (or communism). It seems to rely on an essentialist and fixed view of politics, negating the changes that have affected, in particular, Soviet communism over the years. Clearly, communism and fascism come from two different traditions. As the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski put it, one is the monstrous child of the enlightenment, the other the monstrous child of romanticism. While both react against bourgeois democracy, the one does it in the name of a radical equality, the other in the name of the superiority of an esthetic, aristocratic, or heroic elite. Both were propelled by World War I, but one by a pacifist reaction and the other by a cult or nostalgia for war. Above all, one was bound to alienate the entire world since it proclaimed the national and racial supremacy of one

people, while the other stood for universalism as well as for equality. But this can be seen as one more argument in favor of the problem raised by totalitarianism: How can a universalistic, egalitarian, and libertarian doctrine, whose official song proclaimed the refusal of any supreme savior, be it God or Caesar, end by adopting the divinization of one man, the absolute power of the rulers, and a permanent war against supposed enemies, all practices that seem to go much more naturally with Nazism?

It is precisely this strange convergence that is the strong point of Hannah Arendt, whose analysis is essentially based on a parallel between the two extreme periods of the two regimes—1936 to 1939 for one and 1941 to 1945 for the other. Even there, however, there are enormous differences. Nazi totalitarianism was more directly murderous and targeted a number of categories (Jews, Roma, homosexuals, communists), which had to be destroyed, whereas normal apolitical Germans were left in peace. In Russia, totalitarianism was extended to every sphere of life and literally any citizen could be its victim.

Of course, the end was very dissimilar: violent overthrow from outside through lost war in one case and the decay of ideology and terror and the considerable reduction of its role over time in the other. This leads us to the other group of objections: about the possibility of change. Of course, nobody knows whether de-Hitlerization or de-Polpotization would have occurred in Germany or in Cambodia after the death of their respective leaders. The loss of self-confidence in their power and legitimacy, which obviously occurred in the European communist elite, or the attempt to combine their power with an adoption of the most extreme form of capitalism, as in the Chinese case, are not a unique evolution, yet who can say that they were inevitable in each case? Two pure cases of totalitarianism, the Maoist and the Cambodian ones, appeared or were flourishing at a time when a process of de-Stalinization was already well under way in the Soviet Union. And an almost pure totalitarian fossil-like North Korea survives to this day.

At any rate, the end of the Soviet Union surprised the critics of the totalitarian model as much as its advocates. Most of the former believed that the Soviet Union would reform and evolve toward

a kind of social democracy. Most of the latter thought that totalitarianism could never change. In fact, it did. But due precisely to the nature of totalitarianism, the attempt to reform it led to its collapse.

Contemporary Relevance

Where, then, are we now? Is totalitarianism dead, or alive and well? The most likely answer is that it has taken a postmodern turn; in other words, its various components are dispersed and carry on independently or in various new combinations. It does not seem likely that the combination of a general doctrine and a revolutionary practice claiming to be scientific but appealing to religious feelings and commitment can rule a country or an empire in the 21st century as in the 20th. Theocratic fundamentalism seems to be on the rise rather than “secular religions,” and while less exposed to verification and disappointment than the latter, it seems even less able to adapt to modern society. Totalitarian regimes in their pure form—like North Korea—do survive for the time being but ever more precariously. Genocidal regimes like that of the Khmer Rouge, collective genocides like in Rwanda, mad dictators, or oppressive military regimes are likely to appear and disappear with catastrophic results, but they are more likely to be based on nationalism, ethnicity, religion, or old-fashioned personal tyranny than to be or remain specifically totalitarian, unless the progress of biology enables a government to fulfill one old totalitarian dream: that of changing human nature and creating a posthuman society that would be totally controlled. But for the time being, this possibility still belongs to science fiction rather than political analysis.

The same cannot be said, with the same probability, of totalitarian movements. The combination of fanaticism and technology, to use George W. Bush’s formulation, in movements that attempt to use science and technology to destroy the existing order, or even the planet itself in a grand apocalypse, is certainly a possibility. The Aum Shinrikyō sect in Japan, with a membership that includes scientists and engineers, trying to destroy Tokyo in order to hasten or forestall the end of the world, may be a harbinger of things to come. But should one call it totalitarian?

More broadly, should one call global terrorism or a movement like Al Qaeda totalitarian? Or should we reserve the term for the historical phenomenon born in the 20th century and assuming a specifically modern character? Both choices are legitimate, and depend on whether one adopts a narrow and precise or a broad and approximate definition of totalitarianism. What seems certain, however, is the permanence or the periodic resurgence of a third element—totalitarian aspirations and passions. The wish to be God; the wish to eliminate one's enemies; the wish for absolute security or for "escaping from freedom"; passions such as compassion or indignation, which can lead to hatred and revenge; and, above all, the search for sacrifice and for identifying with a great cause or conversely the search for stability and for definitive answers in an ever-changing and complex world—all these are permanent possibilities of human nature. But they are particularly likely reactions to a regime like liberal democracy and an era like that of globalization, both of which generate anxiety because they deprive us of the old certainties about the fate of the individual and of the world.

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See also Communism; Fascism; Fundamentalism; Ideology; Totalitarian Regimes

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TRADE LIBERALIZATION

Trade liberalization refers to the opening up of markets to foreign imports and entails the abolishment or reduction by governments of tariff and nontariff barriers (quotas, standards, etc.) that limit trade in goods or services across countries. Governments can liberalize trade unilaterally or on a reciprocal basis in negotiations with other countries and can apply any cuts in a preferential or a nonpreferential manner. Preferential liberalization removes barriers to imports only from selected countries and can lead to the establishment of free trade areas and customs unions, whereas nonpreferential liberalization applies to all countries that are covered by a most favored nation clause. The modern international trading system built around the World Trade Organization is based on the nonpreferential liberalization of trade and thus limits member countries' discretion to liberalize trade preferentially. A country that abolishes all its trade barriers engages in free trade. This entry first presents a brief history of major moves toward international free trade and then discusses the possible causes and consequences of trade liberalization.

Most major European countries engaged in trade liberalization from the mid-19th century until the start of World War I, producing the rapid growth in international trade that was a key feature of the first phase of globalization. By contrast, nearly all countries increased barriers to trade in the interwar years, leading to a collapse of international trade. The process of trade liberalization was restarted by the United States in 1934, when Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act that conferred authority on the president to agree on reciprocal tariff cuts with other countries, which entered into force without requiring further congressional approval. After the end of World

War II, other developed countries joined the process of trade liberalization and agreed to repeated negotiations in the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947–1994).

While initially these trade rounds yielded only minor tariff cuts, the Kennedy Round (1964–1967), which was launched as a response to the creation of the European Economic Community (1958), led to a reduction of average tariffs by about one third. Overall, the multilateral negotiations caused a drop in the average tariffs on industrial goods applied by developed countries from more than 40% at the end of World War II to less than 4% after the implementation of the cuts agreed on in the Uruguay Round (1986–1994). For some time, these tariff reductions were partly offset by the imposition of nontariff barriers to trade and the use of administrative trade instruments, such as antidumping duties. Since the 1960s, however, a series of international agreements have also imposed limits on the use of these instruments for protectionist purposes.

Throughout most of the postwar period, developing countries hardly participated in the process of trade liberalization, not least because they received one-sided preferences from developed countries, which gave them little incentive to reduce their own barriers. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, many of them undertook partly substantial unilateral tariff cuts when moving away from import-substituting industrialization policies. Developing countries have also become eager participants in the proliferation of preferential trade agreements that characterize the current international trading system. There has been little progress in multilateral trade liberalization since the mid-1990s, and therefore, it seems safe to conclude that international trade is currently as free as it has ever been, which also explains the rapid growth in international trade over the last few decades. Variation in trade barriers across countries and sectors obviously still persists: on average, developed countries have lower trade barriers than developing countries, and industrial goods and services face lower trade barriers than agricultural goods.

Causes of Trade Liberalization

While the economic case for free trade is very strong, trade liberalization is puzzling from a

political science perspective given that politicians have short-term incentives to impose barriers to trade. These incentives derive from the fact that although overall a country is expected to gain from freer trade, trade liberalization imposes costs on some sectors of the society—generally, the scarce factor of production and producers of goods and providers of services that face competition from imports. A political economy model of trade policy making expects these losers to defend their interests—namely, averting trade liberalization—in the policy-making process, for example, by lobbying and voting for parties or politicians that promise protectionist policies. By contrast, consumers, who benefit from the lower prices on imported goods and services resulting from trade liberalization, are unlikely to become politically active to defend their interests because of the diffuse nature of these benefits.

The puzzle of trade liberalization in the face of short-term political incentives to provide protection has motivated a large political science literature that stresses factors such as hegemony and geopolitics, societal demands, political institutions, and ideas and learning. One of the earliest explanations provided for trade liberalization emphasized the existence of a hegemonic power in the international system that may either have an interest in an open trading system or provide openness as a public good. A hegemonic power's interest in free trade may stem from its ability to reap the traditional gains resulting from trade while at the same time avoiding the associated costs because the large internal market cushions the distributional effects of trade. A hegemonic power, moreover, may open its market in pursuit of geopolitical objectives, such as strengthening allies, creating relations of asymmetric dependence, and fostering security alliances. A prominent explanation for the liberalization of trade after World War II, consequently, highlights the hegemonic position of the United States at that time and its geopolitical rivalry with the Soviet Union.

Another school of thought looks for a change in the balance of societal demands when trying to explain trade liberalization. Following this reasoning, the rise of multinational companies, which benefit from low trade barriers when shipping inputs across borders and selling finished goods abroad, may have given impetus to the

liberalization of trade after World War II. Moreover, an increase in the number of firms that can take advantage of economies of scale should foster trade liberalization since these firms are likely to be competitive on world markets. As the United States is the home country to both many multinational companies and firms that benefit from economies of scale, these arguments may explain why that country was at the forefront of trade liberalization after World War II. At the same time, these arguments have relatively little to say about trade liberalization in the second half of the 19th century, when neither multinationals nor economies of scale played a major role. Equally based on societal demands is the argument that trade liberalization may be a reaction to the trade policies chosen by other countries. If the trade policies of a country reduce foreign exporters' market access, these exporters are likely to react and lobby their government to engage in negotiations with the foreign country with the aim of eliminating the obstacles they face. These negotiations, in turn, may lead to a liberalization of trade. Finally, an initial step toward trade liberalization may have feedback effects that strengthen free trade forces. By bolstering exporters and weakening import competitors, it should change the balance of societal demands in a way that favors further liberalization.

Trade liberalization may also be a result of changes in political institutions. At the domestic level, an increase in the size of electoral districts, for example, should undermine the influence of protectionist forces by exacerbating their collective action problems and thus pave the way for freer trade policies. Moreover, democratization may lead to more liberal trade policies in countries in which labor is abundant. The reasoning behind this argument is that in labor-abundant countries, workers are expected to benefit from more trade; therefore, inclusion of their preferences in the political process should make that country's trade policy more liberal. At the international level, the existence of an international regime that facilitates trade cooperation among countries by reducing the transaction costs associated with trade negotiations and providing a commitment device may also lead to trade liberalization. The international trading regime after World War II may not only have resolved intergovernmental bargaining problems but also reduced domestic opposition to trade liberalization

by enabling the coexistence of relatively free trade and domestic compensation—a system that has become known as *embedded liberalism*.

Ideas and learning provide for final potential causes of trade liberalization. In the second half of the 19th century, the spread of the idea that free trade is beneficial for all countries may have motivated the abolition of trade barriers, first in the United Kingdom and later in the rest of Europe. In the second half of the 20th century, decision makers may have been influenced by their perception that the protectionist policies in the interwar years had contributed to, and had made worse the consequences of, the Great Depression. Most recently, developing countries may have reacted to the perceived failure of import substitution industrialization policies when enacting relatively liberal trade policies from the 1980s onward. In this last case, economic ideas may also have become causally relevant because they were carried by international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, which applied them when arranging for conditionality agreements with debtor countries.

Consequences of Trade Liberalization

Whatever the causes of trade liberalization, a step toward free trade is likely to have consequences for the distribution of wealth in a country and the political organization of that country. With respect to the distribution of wealth, trade liberalization produces winners and losers in a society. Unless a government redistributes income, this will lead to greater inequality—an effect that is confirmed by a series of empirical studies. What is more, some authors have suggested that free trade will undermine a country's capacity to redistribute income, since an open trading system makes it easier for companies to relocate to countries with lower taxes and less welfare spending. The evidence concerning this expectation, however, is at best mixed.

Trade liberalization may also have an impact on the political organization of countries, especially if an initial move toward freer trade makes them dependent on continued openness. A country that becomes dependent on relatively free trade may require changes in the political structure that lock in liberal policies. This may be achieved, for example, by adopting corporatist practices, with strong domestic compensation mechanisms. Alternatively,

countries may insulate decision makers from protectionist pressures by increasing the size of electoral districts and moving toward proportional representation. Trade liberalization may even foster political disintegration. By allowing small countries to benefit from a large market, an increasingly open international trading system removes one of the incentives for their continued stay within a larger federation. This reasoning may provide a rationale for the recent increase in the number of sovereign countries in the world.

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See also International Political Economy; International Trade; Political Economy; Protectionism; Regionalism; World Trade Organization (WTO)

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TRADITIONAL RULE

As indicated by F. Nyamnjoh (2003) in the 1950s and 1960s, modernization theorists predicted that traditional rule would soon become outdated and would be replaced by “modern” bureaucratic

offices and institutions. Nyamnjoh further contends that even underdevelopment and dependency theorists did not seem to give chiefs and chieftaincy much of a chance; they saw chieftaincy as lacking in mobilizational ability for social and political change. However, political scientists, sociologists, historians, and educated traditional leaders in Africa acknowledge the resilience of chieftaincy institutions (cf. Nyamnjoh, 2003, pp. 233–250; Chief Linchwe II, 1989, pp. 99–102). Today, new scholarship in Southern Africa such as that by Lungisile Ntsebeza (2005) is paying attention to chieftaincy, intrigued by the manner in which the institution remains part of the cultural and political landscape constantly negotiating and renegotiating its position within the modern institutions of countries such as Botswana. This entry examines the place of traditional rule in Africa, using Botswana as an example.

Botswana enjoys a good reputation for its record of good government and democracy. Over decades, Botswana has demonstrated to the world an immense socioeconomic strength driven by a combination of modern and conservative traditional leadership despite diversification of socioeconomic bases. The country’s leadership has been able to face and overcome challenges of great magnitude, such as the scourge of HIV/AIDS. Several scholars have attributed the country’s pillars of modern democracy and ability to withstand 21st-century socioeconomic challenges to its traditional government system (cf. G. Somolekae & M. H. Lekorwe, 1998). In Botswana, there are intangible but identifiable group sensibilities toward democratic discourse, a discourse that is situated within culture, leadership, and development. In this entry, traditional rule in Botswana and its contemporary methods for avoiding and resolving conflicts in the past and the present are examined. The role of chieftaincy (*bogosi*) and the *kgotla* system is emphasized. *Bogosi* and the *kgotla* institution are deeply ingrained in Botswana society, and the chiefs (*dikgosi*) are a critical component of chieftaincy. In fact, one cannot conceive of chieftaincy without a chief who is placed at society’s helm. A few relevant examples will be cited as illustration for Botswana’s historic and contemporary tools for dialogue, consultation, and mediation. However, the entry does recognize limitations that still exist within the *bogosi* institution.

On several occasions, the *kgotla* institution has been cited in contemporary studies as an institution that encourages mutual knowledge, appreciation, respect, and tolerance (cf. Somolekae & Lekorwe, 1998).

***Bogosi* and the *Kgotla*: Agents of Sustainable Democracy and Development**

One important feature of the precolonial Tswana traditional rule was the use of tribal assemblies or *kgotlas* and the conduct of public affairs, including the tradition of peacemaking, that took place through the *kgotla*. Tswana institutions of governance, such as *bogosi* (chieftainship) and the *kgotla* system, have continued to be relevant to the lives of Batswana.

Earlier studies suggested that the *kgotla* had been a central element in the traditional machinery of Tswana government. Kofi Darkwah (1996) argues that before 1966, the *kgotla* may be said to have been not just a public meeting place but also the seat of the government or administration of the community. As Isaac Schapera (1994) notes, the central *kgotla* of the *kgosi* was the public assembly where he not only delivered judgments and laws but also listened to the people when matters of public interest were discussed. Chiefs (*dikgosi*) presided in large *kgotla* meetings (*pitso* or *phuthego*), where after lengthy discussion in which “all” could participate, the *Kgosi* had the right to make final decisions on all matters. The chief exercised authority over a large area (a district today) through a hierarchy of relatives and officials, including close advisers and ward headmen (P. M. Mgadla & A. Campbell, 1989, p. 49). During the 19th century, BaNgwato in what is today the central district and BaTawana of Ngamiland (north-west district) extended their political control over other groups considered of lower status than the Tswana dominant groups. The so-called minority groups included San/Basarwa, BaYei, Bambukushu, BaKalanga, BaBirwa, and BaTswapong. BaNgwato and BaTawana were among those who considered themselves superior to others because of their strong political and administrative system, which included monarchy, as well as courts of laws and an economy based on large-scale animal husbandry. In both the Ngwato and Tawana hierarchical system of government, the whole area under

their thralldom was divided into “counties” with senior Tswana each in charge as chief’s representatives (*baemedi ba kgosi*). The chief’s representatives would supervise their areas and ensure that the paramount chief’s (*kgosi e kgolo*’s) property, such as cattle, ivory, and furs, was properly guarded. Representatives of the constituent wards expressed their opinions at the main *kgotla* on behalf of their charges. The constituent ward far from the administrative center of the traditional rule also had its own small *kgotla*, which gave certain semiautonomy from the paramount chief and invested the group with the authority to regulate some of its affairs and to address the chief.

Although the subordinate *kgotla* did not have the power to legislate, they formed part of the traditional government machinery in the sense that they were part of the administrative and judicial system of the community. Early accounts of the Tswana chief portray him as relying a great deal on consultation with leading men, both agnates and commoners, hence the Tswana aphorism “*Kgosi ke Kgosi ka batho*” [The chief is the chief by the grace of the people]. Omulf Gulbrandsen (1995, pp. 415–444) points out that on the one hand, the Tswana strongly felt the need for an effective ruler, while on the other hand, they were strongly aware of the need for a check on the powers entrusted to him as expressed in the above proverb. Pauline Peters (1994, p. 34) argues that the *kgotla* embodied the consultative aspect of ruling authority; thus, it played the role of counterweight to central power. The great *kgotla* was the arena where the chief promulgated laws, which had been discussed in detail at prior meetings, and where the many not included in the select circle around the chief were able to express their opinions on the proposal. In theory, all men who attended the *kgotla* had the right to air their views without fear of reprimand. The dictum, “*mmualebe o bua la gagwe*” or “*mahoko a kgotla a mantle otlhe*” meant that no one could be debarred from voicing his or her opinion, no matter how unpopular.

In defining the contemporary *kgotla*, during an interview, Isaac Tudor (August 23, 2001) of Kgosing ward in Maun (Ngamiland district) describes it as a

democratic institution, you are free to say anything from your mind, it’s your freedom of

speech, and nobody will send you to court for talking nonsense. Everyone deserves to be heard. You are bound to have endless *Kgotla* meetings, depending on the seriousness of the subject discussed.

It is common that each male speaker randomly stands up to speak. In what is considered Tswana custom and tradition, respectable adult men wore hats (which they had to remove at the *kgotla*); by contrast, female adults had to cover their heads with scarves when attending the *kgotla*.

The result was a government with a certain openness, and the whole idea of debate was recognized as an important part of policy making. While all major decisions and pronouncements appear to have been subjected to public appraisal, it also seems clear that once a decision was made, it was expected to be observed by all. Peters (1994, p. 35) has described the *kgotla*, therefore, as an open forum where consensus politics decided the outcomes of debate. Although the powers of the *kgotla* were advisory only, the chief and his officials could use that forum to generate a consensus before taking action and to sense opposition to particular proposals.

There were exceptions to this openness. L. D. Ngcongco (1989, pp. 46, 58–74) has cited the example of exclusions in Kweneng where BaKgalagadi were not as a rule expected to speak at a *kgotla*, even though they were free to attend. In the case of Ngamiland, likewise, subordinate groups such as the BaSarwa (San) felt intimidated and thus found it difficult to stand up and speak at the Maun *Kgotla*. Tswana societies, like other African societies, did not consider public affairs a domain for women (Somolekae & Lekorwe, 1998, p. 187). Like other subordinates, women were treated as children. Thus, as a rule, they did not participate in *kgotla* debates unless they were invited to give evidence during the settlement of disputes. The aggregate functions of the *kgotla* rendered it a space that was historically a male domain. Only during the colonial period were Western-educated women, such as Pulane Moremi of BaTawana (1947–1964) and Gaogangwe Gaseitsiwe Ntebogang Ratshosa of BaNgwaketse (1924–1928), made regents. Gradually, after World War II, nonroyal women found their place in the *kgotla* and could speak in meetings.

Chieftaincy has presented the strongest challenge to women's struggles against their minor status than any other factor. Arguments have been advanced against chieftaincy in Africa with the assumption that this is a predominantly male institution. Gender and human rights activists have called for reform within the traditional rule structure, which is often viewed as an institution of an undemocratic nature. Although chieftaincy has been dominated by men in the past, the approval of the appointment of female paramount chiefs by the Botswana Minister of Local Government in the past few years is an indication that traditional rule has reformed and that the institution accommodates women as capable leaders. The ascension of Kgosi Mosadi Seboko to head a *kgotla* in 2002 is a good example of the few women who have broken new ground. Her official installation as a chief, draped in a leopard skin like other male traditional leaders, marked her authority among her tribal group, the Balete, 30 km south of the capital, Gaborone. Seboko became the first woman to serve in the Ntlo Ya Dikgosi mandated to advise both the government and parliament on issues relating to custom and tradition, including tribal property. The transformation of *bogosi* was noted by several speakers during this historic moment in Botswana. During Kgosi Mosadi Seboko's inauguration, Athaliah Molokomme, the first Botswana female Attorney General remarked,

The institution of chieftainship and the installation of Botswana's first woman paramount chief cannot be seen in isolation from the tremendous socioeconomic changes that have taken place in our country and the world. (*Mmegi*, 2003)

On her side, Seboko thanked her people for support. "You were able to transcend the gender imbalance that many are still grappling with, and installed me not because I am a woman, but rather on the basis of birthright equity" (*Mmegi*, 2003). Since her installation as paramount chief, her major concern has been the increase in the number of disintegrating families, crime, domestic abuse and violence, unemployment, and HIV/AIDS. Nyamnjoh (2003) observes that these new developments in Botswana point to an institution that is adaptable and negotiating with changing political and social realities in the country. Since

Seboko's installation, several women, such as Keleatile Moremi of Batawana, are now claiming full citizenry as provided for in Botswana's constitution. The Bill of Rights in the Constitution suggests that actually women have equal rights as men. On August 26, 2009, Mosadi Seboko was recognized at Riverwalk cinema in Gaborone, with a few other women, through a Botswana home-produced film documentary not only contributing to the socioeconomic and political development of Botswana but also for serving as a mentor to the younger generation.

Another visible transformation within traditional rule in the country is the installation of young and educated chiefs to strengthen the voice in the *Ntlo ya Dikgosi*, negotiating their way into the democratic discourse. In the past, educated chiefs, such as Kgosi Seepapitso IV of BaNgwaketse and Kgosi Linchwe of BaKgatla II, not only served as traditional authorities within the confines of the then House of Chiefs (an advisory body to Parliament and government on matters pertaining to Botswana tradition and culture) but were at some point assigned by the government to serve as diplomats in countries such as the United States and China. The number of young, educated, and elite paramount chiefs has been increasing since the installation of a number of Tawana II of BaTawana in the late 1990s. Among these young cadre of chiefs are Lotlamoreng II of BaRolong (2002); Kgari Sechele II of BaKwena (2002), who was enthroned chief of Puso Gaborone of BaTlokwa (2006); the new chairman of *Ntlo ya Dikgosi*; and more recently Kgafela II of BaKgatla (2008).

In 2009, Kgosi Tawana II, who had resigned from chieftainship to stand for public office, was elected to Parliament. As men such as Tawana move from traditional authority into modern politics, they remain royalty and carry the prestige of being *Kgosi* into Botswana's modern politics. Like the first president of Botswana, Seretse Khama, and his son and current president, Seretse Ian Khama, their relative Tawana is likely to enjoy a legitimacy drawn from his position as former chief of the dominant BaTawana tribe. Ian Taylor has observed that the electorate of Botswana is still inclined toward a traditionalist culture of respect for authority, and this may explain why Kgosi Bathoen II of BaNgwaketse in 1969 played a dominant role in local politics and won support

for the opposition Botswana National Front Kanye South constituency. The well-educated but non-royal Quett Ketumile Masire, a Botswana Democratic Party candidate, lost the constituency to Bathoen II. The Kanye South constituency was in the hands of the opposition for a very long time. In his recent biography, Masire (2006, p. 103) contends that in the mid-1950s, tradition or authority was often used to undermine the emerging non-royal elites. However, it is worth noting that when the Chieftainship Act was introduced in 1965, it meant that power was granted to the president to recognize or not recognize a traditional ruler, making all chiefs subordinate to central government. *Ntlo ya Dikgosi* has no legislative powers, and the positions of chiefs are dependent on recognition by the state.

Transformation in chieftaincy in Botswana should also be understood in the context of ethnic minority representation in the *Ntlo ya Dikgosi*. In 2006, the President of Botswana Festus Mogae toured the country to address and consult Batswana on issues of *bogosi* and the reconstitution of the House of Chiefs to become *Ntlo ya Dikgosi*. The president's tour was a follow-up to the Balopi Commission, which had been assigned earlier to undertake a national consultation exercise to come up with proposals for change that would have a profound impact on national unity (Republic of Botswana, 2000, pp. 93–110). After independence (1966), some sections of Botswana society repeatedly voiced concern at the inadequacy of the constitution in addressing the aspirations of some sections of the nation. According to President Mogae, "The House of Chiefs, as it was then known, was singled out as a classic symbol of inequality as it was perceived to be an exclusive club of some tribes" (Piet, 2007). He observed that this did not go well with some citizens of Botswana and viewed this as a threat to national unity and lack of political will for democratization and political development. The inequality that existed then had to be addressed by amending sections 77, 78, and 79 of the Constitution of Botswana in order to render them tribally neutral. On February 1, 2007, Botswana's historic opening of the first meeting of the *Ntlo ya Dikgosi* was held at which 20 new members, including a few women, were welcomed to the house. The forum of communication for these presidential deliberations was the *kgotla*.

Conclusion

Bogosi and the *kgotla* have gradually evolved as institutional agents of democratization and development. Since independence, chiefs have become active agents of government. However, traditional rule has displayed remarkable dynamism and adaptiveness to new socioeconomic and political developments in the country. Traditional institutional functionaries have over time learned to adapt themselves in accessing and using resources such as political power and education in building sustainable change in governance. It is worth emphasizing that to promote interaction leadership and a culture of peace and to support actions that foster understanding, tolerance, and solidarity in Botswana, traditional rule still requires further transformation to address gender equality and minority representation in the Ntlo ya Dikgosi. Leadership skills, such as strategic planning, communication and presentation, team building, creative problem solving, consultation, and conflict resolution, are very relevant to *bogosi* and the *kgotla* for fostering democratic participation.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Democracy, Theories of; Dictatorship; Transition

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TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

The tragedy of the commons is a concept that denotes a specific type of social dilemma in which interdependent individuals face incentives to choose independent actions that maximize their individual benefit but generate a suboptimal aggregate outcome. Garrett Hardin is credited with first introducing the concept to describe the potential conflict between individual rationality and collective efficiency inherent in the management of a common-pool resource (CPR). A CPR is a natural or man-made resource characterized by a low

degree of excludability and a high degree of subtractability. Excludability refers to the feasibility and hence costliness of excluding potential users from using a resource; subtractability, on the other hand, concerns whether a user's appropriation of units from the resource would reduce the amount of the units available to others. The two physical attributes generate what are known as *provision problems* facing individuals managing a CPR. Once a CPR is provided, it is difficult to exclude potential users from using the resource, regardless of whether or not they have contributed to the resource's provision. A rational individual who considers the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action would find no incentive to contribute and instead would wait for others to provide the resource. Collective inaction is often the outcome.

In his famous 1968 article in *Science*, Hardin depicted a hypothetical world of a pasture open to all. Every herder faced the incentive that by bringing in an additional animal to graze in the pasture, he would reap all the benefit generated by the additional animal but bear only a small fraction of the cost of overgrazing. A rational herder facing such a cost-benefit calculus would likely choose to bring in as many animals to the pasture as possible to maximize his short-term personal gain. When every herder adopted the same calculus and acted on it, however, the collective outcome would be a complete depletion of the pasture—an outcome that would harm every herder. As Hardin pointed out, what makes the situation a tragedy is not the unhappy ending per se but the remorselessness involved. Although every herder would see the predicament coming, they would find themselves trapped in a dilemma from which they could not escape.

The tragedy of the commons is in fact one type of social dilemma in which interdependent individuals face the incentive to make independent choices that, while maximizing short-term individual benefit, collectively generate an inefficient aggregate outcome. The outcome is inefficient because there is at least one alternative that can generate a higher level of collective gain benefiting all the individuals involved. While the individuals are fully cognizant of their contributing to the sub-optimal situation by failing to exercise temperance and restraint, they find themselves left with no

choice but to continue to pursue short-term interest so as to avoid falling prey to others. In a social dilemma, aggregate inefficiency is not necessarily a result of evil acts by some malicious culprits who means to harm others. Even for a group of benign and innocent individuals, as long as they have to choose independent actions in an interdependent situation and are unable to read others' minds, the possibility of a social dilemma always exists.

The "tragedy of the commons" provides policy analysts with a powerful metaphor for describing and deciphering public problems that are rooted in human interdependence. Moving from the more traditional forms of CPRs, such as irrigation, fishery, forestry, groundwater, transport systems, and budgets, studies of the commons have extended to cover nontraditional sectors, including the intellectual domain and the Internet. Recent studies of the new commons—forms of shared resources formerly not recognized as CPRs—have been a result of changing understanding of resource management and organization in new policy areas or sometimes an improved appreciation for the formerly unrealized extent and complexity of long-existing problems. Starting with high-seas fisheries and other more traditional forms of cross-border commons, the field of "global commons" now includes abstract common properties—biodiversity, genetic commons, atmosphere, social diversity and interconnectedness, equality, and knowledge.

Governing the Commons as a Search for Policy Panaceas

Hardin's grim prediction about the tragedy of the commons prompted generations of social scientists and policy analysts to engage in a search for effective ways to govern the commons. Hardin himself sees a change in human values and ideas of morality as the only way to escape from the tragedy; the crux of the problem lies with the question of how the morality of temperance can be put in place. Hardin is pessimistic about the possibility that a morality of temperance could emerge out of conscience; the perverse incentives embedded in a commons are simply too strong for the development of credible mutual commitment, which is the very foundation for conscience. To Hardin, the second best alternative is to create mutual coercion that is mutually agreed on. Although Hardin is

well aware that coercion can be generated by various mechanisms, such as shame, he argues that for the commons, which are on a large scale and involve a large number of individuals, restrictive laws passed by a government are the more feasible way to generate mutual coercion.

A caveat is warranted here. Hardin did not naively argue that coercion by government is a foolproof and straightforward solution. In particular, he cautioned that the morality of temperance is highly context sensitive, and hence, it is almost impossible to stipulate a law that could take all conditions into account. Hardin also recognized that a major challenge of legislating temperance is to make sure that those who make and monitor the rules are themselves properly monitored and controlled.

For many policy analysts who favor simple and clear-cut policy advice, however, the tragedy of the commons metaphor provides not only a diagnosis of the problem of the commons but, more important, also a neat policy panacea. Given that the users of a commons are trapped in a social dilemma and are presumably unable to get out of it by themselves, direct government intervention seems to be the logical solution to help them out. In irrigation management in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, many international donors and governments in much of the developing world considered direct government intervention a policy panacea. When put into practice, the panacea took the form of outright nationalization of the existing irrigation systems, large-scale infrastructure investment, and the establishment of a strong, centralized irrigation bureaucracy. As policy analysts embraced the policy panacea, Hardin's caution about the context specificity of the morality of temperance and the need to monitor the monitors fell largely on deaf ears and was often considered a trivial matter involving implementation details.

At the time when direct government intervention was hailed as a policy panacea for coping with the problems of the commons, policy analysts trained in economics, in particular property rights economics, advocated the imposition of private property rights as an alternative policy panacea. The logic of their argument is straightforward: By putting in place private property rights and hence some sort of (pseudo)market exchange, individual owners of a CPR would be able and willing to internalize all

the costs and benefits of their actions in relation to the provision and use of the resource. Without externalities, the maximizing behavior of the individuals will aggregate into collective efficiency.

Although the privatization panacea seems to offer a neat analytic solution to the problems of the commons, attempts to apply the panacea in the real world have been subject to the thorny questions of whether it is practically possible and, if so, how to divide up a commons and how to keep the transaction costs involved in the exchange at a reasonably low level. In irrigation management, for example, ample evidence has shown that an effective water market is possible only if there exists both a strong physical infrastructure that allows for efficient transfers of resource units and a solid social infrastructure that enables the users to engage in exchange activities in an orderly manner. Unfortunately, in the real world, both types of infrastructure are often in short supply; this is particularly the case in many developing countries where the livelihood of the poor often directly hinges on the effective management of various CPRs, such as irrigation systems and other rural infrastructure.

Empirical Research on the Commons

In the early 1980s, as direct government intervention in CPR management, particularly in the developing world, had produced rather mixed outcomes, scholars and policy analysts began to question the viability of the panacea of centralized control and regulation. Instead of taking Hardin's pessimistic prediction for granted, researchers started to seriously take stock of existing ethnographic evidence of the governance of the commons and conduct systematic empirical research. If there were major lessons that the decades of empirical research on the commons had to offer, three would stand out.

First, a commons is not destined to be a tragedy. While there are instances of failure, there are many cases of success in various policy domains ranging from irrigation, fishery, groundwater, and forestry, to grazing lands. In most of these successful cases, resource users and managers are able to develop an appropriate governance structure to manage and regulate the use of the resources so as to maintain a certain level of sustainability.

Second, the users of a CPR are not doomed to be helpless individuals awaiting help from an external authority. Empirical evidence has shown that around the world many communities of resource users are able to organize effective collective action to govern the commons. In fact, self-governance is not only a possibility but a commonplace. Moreover, contrary to what conventional theories have suggested, successful self-governance is not confined to CPRs of a small scale. In irrigation management, for example, there are cases in which local communities have successfully governed and managed irrigation systems that serve a service area of thousands of hectares over long periods of time. What is intriguing is that self-organized community-based irrigation systems have often significantly outperformed government-managed irrigation systems, which are often characterized by sophisticated physical infrastructure and management by professional engineers.

Third, contrary to what Hardin presumed, a CPR is not necessarily an open-access resource that is available to all at any time. In a majority of the successful cases, the users of the commons are able to define membership in relation to their resource through a diversity of institutional arrangements. The existence of considerable diversity in the design of CPR institutions raises a fundamental question as to whether the tripartite choice of the state, markets, and open access can fully capture the empirical diversity and provide an adequate analytical framework for the study of the commons.

Governing the Commons as a Search for Effective Design of Institutions

Hardin's analysis of the commons and the conventional CPR theories are anchored on two assumptions. The first assumption is that those involved in the commons dilemma resemble the neoclassical rational man, who is portrayed as having clear and definite preferences and excellent information-processing capabilities. While the neoclassical rational man may not make the right choice every time, he commands good knowledge of the probability distribution of what might happen for alternative courses of action. Theoretical and policy analyses, then, focus on examining the logic of action of the neoclassical rational man in a social dilemma and explicating possible ways to

circumvent the perverse incentives embedded in the dilemma.

The problem of the neoclassical assumption of rationality is not so much that it oversimplifies but that it has been overgeneralized, as if it were the only viable assumption of rationality. Recent research has shown that the neoclassical model works relatively well only in stable situations where the information required for decision making is more or less complete, such as in a perfectly competitive market. For the analysis of individual choice making in a commons where a high level of uncertainty is involved, and hence learning is essential, the more complex model of bounded rationality, which takes into account human beings' cognitive limitations as well as their ability to learn and engage with one another, would be more appropriate. An implication of the model is that fallible individuals, while capable of making mistakes, can learn from the mistakes, improve their understanding of action situations, and design new institutional arrangements and strategies to cope with the social dilemma. The model points to the need to understand problem solving as a process of trial and error in a search for both means and ends (common understanding) and to the relevance of choices at multiple levels.

The second assumption underlying the conventional analysis of the commons is that individuals make choices in an institutional vacuum. The conventional theories not only fail to acknowledge the process of socialization as central to the creation of the individual but also decontextualize the analysis of actors' behavior. As argued by many researchers, individuals in a commons are in fact making situated choices; their decisions are shaped and conditioned by the greater contexts of culture and social rules.

As a result of a better appreciation of human fallibility and the importance of institutions, beginning in the 1980s, the focus of CPR research has shifted toward examining how the boundedly rational individuals struggle to cope with social dilemmas by crafting institutions and identifying design principles for institutions that can bring about effective outcome. Among the contending definitions of institutions in CPR research, the one developed by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues in a tradition of institutional analysis and development (IAD) is a particularly useful analytical construct. In the IAD framework, institutions are defined as

“rules-in-use” adopted by a community of individuals to regulate their repetitive interactions pertaining to the physical–biological world. The rules-in-use are linguistic prescriptions that require, prohibit, or permit a range of action for individuals under particular situations. When individuals ponder their actions and strategies in relation to one another, they take the rules into their calculus.

Based on careful theoretical analysis and meta-analysis of a large number of empirical case studies, Ostrom and her colleagues have identified eight principles of institutional design for robust governance of CPRs. These now well-known principles are

1. clearly defined boundaries,
2. congruence between rules and physical conditions,
3. collective-choice arrangements,
4. monitoring,
5. graduated sanctions,
6. conflict resolution mechanisms,
7. minimal recognition of rights to organize, and
8. nested enterprises.

Unlike conventional theories that focus on how users choose strategies of action in response to a given incentive structure, the IAD framework looks at the governance of the commons as an ongoing process that requires continual contribution from the users and recognizes the possibility of the users developing and modifying institutions to govern the resource. Empirical evidence has shown that institutions that are characterized by some or all of these design principles are better able to provide incentives for users of a commons to engage in collective action and, more important, to craft and continuously recraft institutions (rules-in-use) to govern the commons.

First, individuals in a CPR situation would be more likely to participate in the provision and management of the resource if they perceived a possibility that they would enjoy the benefits generated by their collective effort. Rules that stipulate clearly how consequences of collective endeavors would impact on whom are of major significance in providing incentive for individuals to engage in collective

action. The existence of well-defined boundary rules and user rights is a particularly important factor accounting for system performance.

Second, individuals in an interdependent situation are not always able to see their interdependence and its implications for aggregate efficiency. Only when the users of a CPR are aware of and understand how their interests relate to those of one another, how much potential benefits could be generated by working with one another, and how fragile one could be when acting alone in an interdependent situation can they begin to see the potential of and need for arriving at a broader conception of preference in which self-interest is conditioned by recognizing the need to take the interests of others into consideration. When institutions provide opportunities and incentives for the users to communicate, reason, and share information with one another about not only the physical conditions of the commons but also their concerns, the users are more ready to work with others in managing the resource.

Third, research has found that the users of a CPR are better able and willing to cooperate with one another if they have a better understanding of the physical conditions of the resource and are able to monitor and keep track of the change in the physical environment. Institutions can serve an information-inducing function if they embody useful information, encourage the gathering and use of local information at various settings, and allow the users to use time-specific and place-specific information in their daily exigencies. Moreover, by ruling in certain actions and ruling out some others, institutions also provide information not only about the structure of the action situation faced by individuals but also about the choices of others. Such information allows them to form expectations, which in turn enable the individuals to make choices by taking the possible choices of others into consideration.

Fourth, strategies available to resource users that are ruled in by institutions are usually the ones that maximize collective outcomes but not individual payoffs. Hence, a collectively optimal outcome usually hinges on quasi-voluntary compliance, where the compliance of a user is contingent on the compliance of others. Quasi compliance can be sustained only if the users expect long-term gains from complying with the rules and perceive some prospect of being sanctioned if any one user

among them breaks the rules. For monitoring and sanctioning to be effective, they have to be designed in such a way that the activities of monitoring and sanctioning involve only low costs, are diffused in scope, and are perceived by users in the community as fair and reasonable.

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See also Governance, Multilevel; Institutional Theory; Natural Resources; Rationality, Bounded

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TRANSACTION COSTS

Transaction costs figure prominently in formal political decision making as well as in informal

processes of political negotiation. Transaction cost considerations are highly relevant in a number of domains, such as social choice theory, public sector reforms aiming at contracting in or out, and the design of global governance.

Costs linked with transacting among humans arise when there is cooperation in one form or another. Cooperation resulting in agreements requires a number of measures for it to be effective, such as negotiation of the terms of agreement, specifying a contract or writing down the agreement, and implementation of the agreement, possibly through court action.

As these costs before and after an agreement tend to be measured chiefly in time, effort, and frustration rather than in money, they are distinguished from ordinary production costs in economics. Although transaction costs were first theorized about in economic theory, they have figured prominently in politics, less often as the costs of contracting and more often as so-called decision costs. One may here recall the much debated institutions of *liberum veto* and the filibuster, both of which tend to maximize transactions costs. Today transaction costs are a major consideration in public sector reform, especially in new public management, where government seeks to replace long-term contracting (bureaucracy) with short-term contracting (tendering/bidding).

Foundations of Transaction Cost Economics

Transaction cost economics started with the 1937 article by Ronald Coase on the firm and continued with his 1960 article on social costs. Economic life is replete with different forms of contracts, whose shape transaction cost theory helps explain. Thus, in the Coasean tradition, internal firm organization with long-term contracts presents a mechanism to reduce transaction costs when relying on massive short-term contracting in the market. This 1937 insight received a much needed elaboration by Oliver E. Williamson, underlining the implications of transaction costs for both hierarchies and markets. In the Williamson tradition, minimizing transaction costs is of paramount importance in economic life where strong forces like opportunism and asymmetric information with economic agents, especially when possessing asset-specific knowledge, are conducive to economic inefficiency, such

as monopoly. The 1960 Coase article broadened transaction cost economics to the domain of public policy and externalities, arguing that with zero transaction costs, external effects and market failures could be handled by means of bargaining and compensation. This claim about the ability of market forces to allocate responsibility for external costs is known as the Coase theorem. It anticipated recent debates about extending the “polluter pays” idea to a global ecology policy to reduce carbon emissions. In general, institutional economics (new or neo-institutional) combine the insights from both Coase and Williamson, emphasizing that economic evolution aims at minimizing transaction costs (Oliver Williamson & Scott Masten, 1997). No similar teleology concerning a fundamental drive to develop institutions that minimize transactions is to be found in politics, however.

Transaction Costs in the Political Sphere

In politics, transaction cost arguments are primarily found in the theory of voting and the public choice school. Transaction costs arise in any political group taking decisions by some mechanism of voting, whether the group be a domestic one like the national assembly or an international organization like the World Bank, the United Nations, or the International Monetary Fund. In a group of choice participants—political parties, legislators, state representatives, faculty members, and club members—any decision or collective action will result from the summation of the preferences of the participants according to some mechanism of aggregation. Alternative social choice mechanisms—majoritarian techniques, proportional methods, utilitarian scoring, positional techniques—result in varying transaction costs for the group as a whole.

Given the assumption that no participant in the choice group should be given a separate status, the decision method that appears to be the just one is the Wicksell unanimity principle. It epitomizes the idea of deliberative democracy—namely, that a group decision must take into account the views of all participants. By deliberating the relevant issues, the “correct” group decision will emerge. In 1896, Swedish economist Knut Wicksell had already identified this kind of efficiency justice with the veto principle, meaning that all choice participants

have not only a *say* but in effect a *no* capacity. By favoring the consensus method, Wicksell wanted to avoid the situation of a minority getting pushed over, having to bear alone the heavy costs from a collective decision. Thus, unanimity would secure Pareto optimality in politics. However, Wicksell did not recognize the full scale of the transaction costs that attend the unanimity principle when employed in practice. Consensus is the most transaction cost–burdensome decision rule for a choice group. Thus, alternatives must be employed, at least in domestic politics, to avoid decision inertia. As noted by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), Wicksell’s insights into decision costs—for the loser (external costs) and for the group as a whole (transaction costs)—form the backbone of the public choice school.

It is interesting to note that in politics, minimizing transaction costs is not an overall manifest objective or latent function, as it were. One may distinguish between domestic politics and international relations. Only for the first domain can one speak of a search for institutions that minimize transaction costs, such as the simple majority decision procedure and majoritarian election techniques. In contrast, choice participants in international institutions—the governments of member states—are reluctant to give up the Wicksell unanimity principle. The principle of state sovereignty entails that governments can protect their vital interests in international organizations with a firm veto. Similarly, in regional organizations, with the exception of the EU, the veto rule is upheld, although it maximizes transaction costs.

Transaction costs surface in decision making in political groups whether domestic, regional, or international. They are inversely related to the decisiveness of the group, which is the ratio of the number of winning coalitions to the total number of coalitions among the choice participants. When decisiveness is low, then, a stalemate is probable because of the ensuing strategies of delaying and holding out. Voting under a simple majority or qualified majority increases decisiveness and reduces transaction costs. The existence of a dictator in the group minimizes transaction costs but also increases the majority’s risk of losing out on its preferred positions. A simple majority minimizes transactions costs in social choice while at the same time letting the majority prevail.

The fact that regional and international organizations seldom employ simple majority entails that minimizing transaction costs is not the sole preoccupation of these choice participants. They may favor unanimity or qualified majority because these regimes increase the choice participants' power to block, which may be a more important concern than the decisiveness of the group. Thus, transaction costs in politics may be supported because they follow necessarily from the highly valued blocking power of each participant.

These insights into the inverse relationship between blocking power and group decisiveness stemming from the logic of transaction costs in political decision making have been elaborated on in constitutional economics and *N*-person game theory. Recognizing the positive effect of increasing transaction costs, many constitutions provide for a qualified majority on sensitive matters, increasing the individual power to block and decreasing group decisiveness. Constitutional decision making is especially surrounded by inertia that leads to more substantial transaction costs. Realizing that transaction costs may become staggering as a result of delays and holding out, international organizations have deviated from unanimity and introduced qualified majorities of one or another kind. Yet procedural matters, being less sensitive, are often decided by simple majority.

Measuring and Managing Transaction Costs

In economics, several attempts have been made to measure transactions, but they are far less identifiable than standard production costs like labor and capital. More specifically, the costs of establishing a patent in various countries have been measured in the form of the length of time it takes from the launching of an application. Some scholars estimate that transaction costs may amount to a staggering one third of the GDP, including both financial operations and enforcement costs. Yet it must be pointed out that these measures of transaction costs in the economic literature are somewhat imprecise. It has even been argued by Eirik Furu-both and Rudolf Richter that transaction costs include the costs of maintaining or changing the political institutions that legislate about or administer contracts. More convincing are the

attempts, such as that by Yoram Barzel, to estimate the reduction in transaction costs involved in introducing more efficient institutions like the *Aktiengesellschaft*, private property to land and partnership schemes.

In political science, transaction costs can be identified as being related to the inverse of the decisiveness of an assembly or a decision-making board. In domestic affairs, one tends to opt for a transaction costs minimizing mechanism like simple majority, whereas in regional and international coordination, unanimity or a qualified majority is favored, resulting in sometimes heavy transaction costs. Transaction costs in political assemblies are minimized when the individual blocking power is not substantial. *N*-person game theory, especially the power index approach, offers a convenient method for estimating the decisiveness of a choice group under alternative institutional arrangement, as, for instance, in the European parliament, the European Council, and various international bodies.

In public administration or public management, the seminal move toward contracting out or externalization has raised a concern over rising transaction costs. Relying on a multitude of delivery agents—public, private, and third sector—governments have become more anxious about getting the contracts correct as disputes under the new public management will be settled in court. It is an open question as to whether the reduction in production costs that come with short-term contracting is enough to compensate for the sharp rise in transaction costs with tendering/bidding schemes, especially litigation costs. When giving up long-term contracting in standard employment relations, the government also loses its general authority to direct the work effort and to train its employees continuously—sometimes described as the hollowing out of the state.

Transaction Costs in Global Governance

Today, transaction costs surface strongly in global governance as the governments of the countries of the world confront a number of issues arising from growing interdependences. Groups like the G8 or G20 are basically unanimity groups and are, therefore, associated with decision inertia and delays. Since the decisions of international coordination

bodies are not only time-consuming in the making but can also be reneged on *ex post*, transaction costs loom large in several domains of global governance. To reduce these transaction costs, international organizations need to reconsider their structure, avoiding unanimity but allowing for quantitative voting in order to recognize the immense differences in scale between various countries. They also need to examine the enforcement problem in global governance as few of them have explicit dispute settlement mechanisms, at least not those that operate speedily.

Transaction costs have also been taken into account in global policy making in the form of the carbon emissions scheme—the Kyoto agreement. If a price on carbon abatement could be set and emission rights be allocated to all countries globally, then, a global emissions policy imitating the market would be conducive to an efficient reduction in carbon emissions, following the Coase theorem. However, arriving at such a comprehensive global emissions policy has not yet been successful due to transaction costs both in negotiating the emission rights (*ex ante*) and in enforcing the agreement against reneging (*ex post*).

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See also Governance, Global; Governance, Multilevel;
New Public Management; Social Choice Theory

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TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

Like many of the most widely used concepts in the political science subfield of international relations, the term *transatlantic relations* defies precise definition and has been used to refer to a variety of historical, political, cultural, social, and economic interactions between polities, societies, institutions, groups, and individuals in Europe and North America. As such, the phenomenon, if not the term itself, stretches from the period of European exploration and colonization of the Americas, especially in the 16th and 17th centuries, through the ensuing political upheavals of the late 18th century—in particular those associated with the United States War of Independence—the consolidation and extension of U.S. power and influence across the New World in the 19th century—primarily at the expense of Spain and France—to the projection of U.S. power and influence into Europe itself. The latter process was most clearly reflected in the United States' crucial contribution to the outcomes of the two world wars of the last century and the establishment of a permanent military presence in Europe, which, although it outlived its origins in the Cold War, continues today. Because of their origins in the efforts of European powers to colonize the New World, however, transatlantic relations have never been limited to merely political or security affairs. They have always been influenced by economic and cultural interactions, with trade and immigration constituting the most important components of transatlantic relations in the 18th and 19th centuries.

The rich history of transatlantic relations and the membership of Canada in important transatlantic institutions, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe notwithstanding, the term today is most often used with reference to post-World War II relations between the United States and Europe. In security affairs, it primarily comprises relations between the United States and its European NATO partners. In economic affairs, the frame of reference is the United States and the members of the European Union (EU), although relations between the EU and the North American Free Trade Area are sometimes covered by the term. Generally excluded from the

concept are relations between Europe and Latin America as well as relations between the United States and European states that are not members of either the EU or NATO.

Following a brief summary of the major contours of transatlantic relations in the post-World War II period, this entry addresses the development of transatlantic relations after the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The discussion then turns to a survey of the major theoretical approaches to the analysis and explanation of the history and future development of transatlantic relations.

Transatlantic Relations in the Postwar Period

Although there were some efforts to systematically analyze transatlantic relations in the interwar period, they first emerged as a central topic of concern in international relations theory and practice in the period following World War II. In particular, the breakdown of the wartime alliance between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, the extension and consolidation of Soviet control over the states of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union to the war-ravaged states of Western Europe implied the need for close economic and military cooperation between the states of Western Europe and the United States and led to the Marshall Plan, the development of NATO, and the strategy of containment. For the first three decades of the Cold War, transatlantic relations were characterized by a high degree of asymmetry. In economic and military affairs, the United States was the provider and Europe the consumer. In both fields, the United States was a global superpower. Europe, by contrast, was at most a regional junior partner.

Both sides of the Atlantic drew large benefits from this asymmetrical relationship; however, transatlantic relations experienced frequent and serious controversies. Whereas the states of Europe were quite happy to accept American economic assistance and security guarantees on the continent, the former colonial powers found it difficult to cede to the United States those prerogatives that had accompanied their previous status as great powers. A general American aversion to Europe's

continued colonial pretensions resulted in strained relations throughout the 1950s and erupted into a serious crisis when the United States demanded the withdrawal of British and French forces from Egypt, which together with Israel they had attacked in October 1956 in response to President Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. For their part, Europeans often resented the fact and exercise of American power. In the wake of Suez, French president Charles de Gaulle set out to enhance France's military and political independence by developing nuclear weapons, successfully testing an atomic bomb in 1960. In early 1966, he announced that France would alter the terms of her participation in the Atlantic Alliance. As a result, France withdrew its ground and air forces as well as headquarters personnel from NATO commands, demanded the removal of U.S. and Canadian forces from French territory, and forced the relocation of NATO headquarters and installations to neighboring countries.

The 1970s and 1980s were similarly marked by periodic strains in transatlantic relations, in particular over nuclear strategy and arms control, as well as relations with the Soviet Union and its East European satellites, but the debates were generally conducted within a larger consensus over basic interests, goals, and values. It is perhaps a paradox of transatlantic relations that their very success has tended to engender subsequent tensions between Europe and North America. Hence, the American decision to condition receipt of Marshall Plan assistance on the development of a common European economic policy contributed to the development of the European Communities and eventually the EU. Premised on transatlantic cooperation, Europe's economic recovery nonetheless led to conflict with the United States over questions of economic policy especially in the fields of trade and investment.

By the beginning of the 21st century, the economic asymmetry between the United States and its European trading partners was all but eliminated. Ongoing efforts to widen and deepen European integration in the fields of foreign and security policy by means of a European Constitution hold the prospect of eliminating the political asymmetries between the United States and Europe, although Europe's capacity for power projection lags far behind that of its American ally.

Transatlantic Relations After the Cold War

The rapid and unexpected end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union and communist governments across Eastern Europe in 1989 to 1990 dramatically changed the context within which transatlantic relations had developed for almost a half century, leading many to question their future course. If transatlantic relations had been premised on meeting the threat posed by the Soviet Union in a global anticommunist struggle and the reinforcing imperative of economic recovery and if the early asymmetry in capabilities between the two sides of the Atlantic was disappearing, could a basic consensus on both sides of the Atlantic over fundamental interests, goals, and values in international and domestic affairs suffice to sustain the history of close cooperation? Since 1990, the question has preoccupied policymakers and scholars alike.

Scholars of international security and defense policymakers wondered whether NATO could survive without an identifiable enemy. Prominent political scientists maintained that NATO was indeed disappearing, while influential politicians argued that NATO would have to go out of area if it were to retain relevance. Meanwhile, many observers of transatlantic economic relations argued that with the opening of the economies of Eastern Europe augmenting ongoing economic liberalization in China, the end of the Cold War would accelerate the ongoing processes of globalization. As a result, Europe and the United States were expected to engage in fierce competition for mobile capital and a declining number of high-paying jobs. Moreover, as the relative importance of other regions of the world for both Europe and the United States increased, some reduction in the level of importance that was accorded to transatlantic relations seemed unavoidable.

After an American-led coalition defeated Iraq and restored the Kuwaiti Emir to power in 1991, the transatlantic agenda of the 1990s was largely dominated by two broad strategic issues. The first involved the expansion of NATO and the EU to the newly independent states of Eastern Europe; the second issue was how to respond to the campaign of mass murder and ethnic cleansing that emerged after the breakup of Yugoslavia and resulted in the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia. With respect to the latter issue, NATO proved unwilling

or unable to develop and execute a coherent strategy for the first three and a half years of the conflict. In light of that failure, the logic of NATO expansion was less than entirely persuasive. Meanwhile, the EU pursued a strategy of sanctions, United Nations resolutions, and threats of diplomatic isolation in an effort to coerce Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs to stop the ethnic cleansing but to no avail. Following a series of transatlantic recriminations and a change of government in both the United States and France, NATO eventually intervened militarily and forced the parties to negotiate a resolution to the crisis. The lessons of the Bosnian War still fresh in their minds, United States and European leaders responded in a swift and effective manner to the 1999 crisis over Kosovo.

The question of the future course of transatlantic relations again became acute in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., and the ensuing transatlantic debate over the course and scope of the global war on terror and how to deal with the perceived threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of so-called rogue states. The debate was focused primarily on Iraq, which the U.S. and European intelligence agencies believed possessed WMD and which was invaded by U.S. and British forces in March 2003. The ensuing dispute pointed to divergent perceptions of core interests between the United States and important European allies—France and Germany in particular—and led to a breakdown of allied cooperation in the United Nations and a wave of anti-American sentiment across Europe. Many regard the crisis over Iraq to have been the most serious of the post–World War II era.

Transatlantic relations appeared to reach a nadir during the two administrations of U.S. President George W. Bush (2001–2009). For example, in Germany, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder not only opposed the United States on a fundamental question of security but premised his 2002 reelection campaign on opposition to American foreign policy. But the transatlantic divide was not limited to debates over single issues or the rhetoric of individual politicians. A series of differences over issues as diverse as the role of religion in politics, the establishment of an International Criminal Court, climate change, and the death

penalty, many of which predated the Bush presidency, led substantial numbers of citizens on both sides of the Atlantic to conclude that the postwar consensus over fundamental interests, goals, and values had dissipated.

Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Transatlantic Relations

Given that the field of international relations is characterized by a number of competing paradigms, theoretical traditions, or schools of thought, the absence of a scholarly consensus over the basic causes and consequences of transatlantic relations should come as no surprise. Owing to the interdependence of facts and theory, disputes begin at the level of description—that is, over the question of what precisely needs to be explained. Thus, many state-centric approaches find it difficult to describe, let alone explain, what constructivist or culturally oriented approaches regard to be a major development in transatlantic relations over the course of the second half of the 20th century: the emergence of a pluralistic security community in the North Atlantic area. Although the relevant literature is vast and includes Marxist and other critical perspectives, mainstream scholarship has come to cluster around three broad approaches.

Realism

Although no longer as dominant as it was during the Cold War, realism as an approach to the study of international relations remains influential, particularly in the subfield of international security. Realism does not offer a single theory of international relations, but realist theories tend to share a set of common assumptions about the fundamental causes of international outcomes. These include the following: that international relations are characterized by the absence of legitimate authority above the sovereign state, which is to say that the ordering principle is anarchy; that sovereign states are the primary actors in the international system; and that states at a minimum seek to survive but may strive to dominate the system by maximizing their power relative to other states. Because of anarchy and the possibility that some states may try to dominate others, the use of force is always possible and hence states are fundamentally insecure. Realism assumes

that the insecurity produced by anarchy leads states to jealously guard their relative position in the international system. When considering opportunities for economic cooperation, states will worry that the eventual distribution of benefits might leave others better off. Moreover, they will fear that economic gains might be converted to military capability. Hence, realist theory expects relatively little cooperation in international politics.

Among realist theories, the balance-of-power theory is the most developed and relevant for the analysis of transatlantic relations. Because realism in general is skeptical regarding the prospects for durable cooperation in international politics, the long history of cooperative transatlantic relations appears puzzling. At first glance, balance-of-power theory appears to offer an explanation. When confronting a potential threat to their security, states are expected to try to balance it through the acquisition of arms or allies. Hence, the history of postwar transatlantic cooperation is explained as a response to the commonly perceived Soviet threat. Although rivalry between the United States and its European allies was never completely absent, the need to maintain a united front against the Soviet bloc kept conflict within manageable bounds.

From the perspective of balance-of-power theory, however, because the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact eliminated the overriding common interest that sustained close transatlantic relations, it should have led to a significant weakening of transatlantic cooperation and the collapse of common institutions, including NATO. Indeed, balance-of-power theory would appear unable to explain not only NATO's persistence but also its expansion to Eastern Europe in the 1990s and the early years of the 21st century as well as the decision of French President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2009 to reverse President de Gaulle's decision of 1966 and to reenter the alliance's integrated military command. With regard to economic relations, even the largest economic crisis since the Great Depression during 2008–2009 did not lead to a repeat of the “beggar thy neighbor” policies that plagued transatlantic economic relations during the 1930s. Rather, transatlantic relations were characterized by intense efforts to coordinate American and European macroeconomic policies in an effort to stimulate the global economy, an outcome clearly

at odds with the predictions of realist-inspired analyses.

Liberalism

Like realism, liberal theories tend to assume that states are the most important actors in international politics and generally regard their identities and interests as fixed and given. Nonetheless, liberal theories of international relations are more sanguine with regard to the future of transatlantic cooperation after the Cold War. In particular, institutional theories maintain that by reducing structural impediments to cooperation—high transaction costs, informational asymmetries, and insufficient communication principal among these—international institutions can produce durable patterns of cooperation even in the absence of world government by creating a common set of rules and norms to govern the interactions of states. Because the long-term benefits of cooperation are held to outweigh the short-term gains that states might achieve from unilateral defection, they are expected to place a high value on maintaining institutions even if the conditions under which they were established no longer obtain.

Hence, in the wake of the Cold War, liberal theorists would expect Europe and the United States to maintain a high degree of cooperation even in the absence of a common enemy. From this perspective, NATO's persistence is explained in terms of its ability to adapt to the challenges of a new era and its potential for managing security relations among its members. Moreover, although there is a surprising lack of formal institutions specifically directed at governing transatlantic economic relations, some have argued that a dense transnational network of like-minded bureaucrats, regulators, and lawyers constitutes an informal institution that has helped Europe and the United States avoid a rupture in their economic relationship.

Constructivist and Cultural Approaches

Whereas both realist and liberal theories of transatlantic relations begin from the standpoint of states with fixed preferences or interests, constructivist theories stress the embeddedness of states in social structures of shared norms and beliefs—that is, culture—which evolve over time.

Not only are these social structures shaped by state behavior, but they serve to shape and reshape the conceptions of the identity and interests of states. Constructivists stress the transformational potential in international politics. When states come to share the values, norms, and symbols that provide their social identity, their relations may come to resemble those of individuals in a society or even a community in which the use of force by one member of the community against another is considered unthinkable.

Although security communities are not unprecedented in the history of international relations, the postwar international system appears unique. In modern times, there has never been a period in which war among the European great powers or between a European power and the United States was considered unthinkable. Yet with the end of the Cold War, this appears to be the case. Given the scale and frequency of great power wars in the past, Robert Jervis has argued that the emergence of a security community among the great powers constitutes the single most striking discontinuity in the modern history of international relations.

If true, the claim suggests serious limitations to many realist and liberal theories and their application to the subject of transatlantic relations, which might be better understood from the perspective of actors enjoying shared identities and values. But although they point to the possibility of transformational change, constructivist theories have not done a good job of establishing the conditions under which such changes are likely to take place. Understanding the role of agency in path-dependent processes, thus, poses key challenges for the further development of constructivist theory.

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See also Alliances; Balance of Power; Institutional Theory; Realism in International Relations; Security Cooperation

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TRANSFORMATION, ECONOMIC

The term *economic transformation* is often used in economics vocabulary, though it is not defined in the discipline's textbooks and dictionaries. In general, the term refers to structural changes in the economic, monetary, and financial systems of states, which are generated by passing from one mode of production to another or by the transition of one model of development to another.

Since the beginning of the modern era, several economic theories have contributed to these structural changes by advocating for the replacement

of one mode of production by another, or of one model of development by another, that is more able to ensure the prosperity of nations and individuals. Over time, those that have had the largest influence are mercantilism, classical liberalism, Marxism–Leninism, the heterodox liberal theory, and neoliberal theory.

This entry retraces the history of economic transformations since the 17th century by showing the major impacts of the evolution of economic ideas with regard to such changes. It also examines several approaches in political science that have analyzed the impacts of economic transformations on the political regimes of states and in international relations. It is indeed difficult to devote more attention to the work of political scientists as most have ignored economic transformations and those who have noted them have not carried out any additional analyses of such changes. They have instead focused on the legal, social, cultural, and political impacts of economic changes. Although enormously interesting, the aforementioned literature is not pertinent to this entry.

Mercantilism

Mercantilism appeared in the context of the formation of the first European nation-states during the 16th and 17th centuries. The central idea of this theory, as it was applied in France and England, was that the state had to support the development of trade and industry in order to expand its economic power, which was the principal support of its military and political strength. To this end, the state had to promote the growth of production by subsidies, privileges, monopoly concessions, and maintaining the lowest wages possible. The state also had to encourage the conquest of colonies, which provided a source of primary goods and an opportunity for manufacturing; this involved the construction of a powerful navy to protect trade between colonies and the homeland and to block out rival nations. While this economic model enabled all the European colonial empires to expand, only in countries such as the Netherlands and England, which practiced a form of commercial and financial mercantilism, was the development of a capitalist economy dominated by a rich bourgeoisie in the manufacturing, trading, and banking sectors favored. Over time, this bourgeoisie became more and more hostile toward the

constraints of mercantilism, such as laws that forbade the concentration of businesses, limitations on the importation of primary goods, and the iron law of wages, which hindered consumption, provoked overproduction crises, and lowered investments and profits. This conflict was the root cause of the revolution of 1688, which allowed the English bourgeoisie to implement a new economic model inspired by classical liberal economics.

Liberalism

According to classical liberalism, conceptualized notably by John Locke, Adam Smith, and David Ricardo, all individuals are rational and naturally seek to improve their economic well-being at the least possible cost. It is from this common desire that the market is created, a place where producers attempt to sell the largest number of goods at the most advantageous price and where consumers seek to purchase the goods that they need at the lowest possible price. The free market naturally tends toward equilibrium between supply and demand and between the growth of production and income. It is the state's interference in the market that causes the misallocation of resources (unemployment or a lack of manpower), imbalances between supply and demand (overproduction or a shortage of goods), and excessive rises and falls in prices (inflation or deflation). According to this theory, free trade—not only within but between nations—is the source of wealth. Since nations do not possess all the three main requisites of capitalism (raw materials, capital, and manpower), they must specialize their economies according to their comparative advantages to reap the maximum benefits of free trade. Liberal theory became the dominant economic model between 1750 and 1920 because of the British Empire's supremacy and the adoption of the theory by other European colonial powers following the overthrow of absolutist regimes by revolutionary movements led by national bourgeoisies.

Neo-Mercantilism

However, in the 19th century, liberalism was rejected by Germany and the United States, both of which adopted a model based on British mercantilism in order to strengthen their industries behind

protectionist barriers. According to the founders of neo-mercantilism (Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List, Wilhelm Roscher, and Gustav Schmoller), it is to the state's advantage to be protectionist when they are weak or in economic decline and to favor free trade when they are strong or in a period of economic growth. The application of this doctrine permitted both countries to become great economic, political, and military powers in less than a century. However, if the United States practiced a peaceful and isolationist neo-mercantilism because of their vast domestic market, Germany, deprived of both such a market and colonies, opted for an imperialist neo-mercantilism that was one of the causes of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and World War I.

Marxism

In the 19th century, the most radical critics of liberal English political economy were Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Their theory argued that within the framework of capitalism, value was not found in labor, as Adam Smith and David Ricardo claimed, but rather in surplus value or in unpaid wages to workers. To outlast the competition, businesses would have to constantly raise their growth or profit rates by replacing workers by machines and by creating monopolies, which would bring about overproduction crises, a rise in unemployment, bankruptcy of small businesses, and the impoverishment of the middle class. These barriers to growth in supply and demand would inevitably bring about a relocation of businesses to periphery markets. Such actions, far from countering the falling rate of profit, would generate consequences of the contradictions and evils of capitalism, which would create conditions favorable for a global socialist revolution. Thus was born the famous slogan of the Communist Manifesto: "Workers of the world, unite!" Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov Lenin, founder of the Russian Bolshevik party, took the theory of Marx and Engels further. According to Lenin, over the course of the last third of the 19th century, capitalism had reached the "highest stage of imperialism." Capital was now more concentrated in the hands of financial oligopolies, which stemmed from the merger of monopolistic commercial, industrial, and banking

firms. These oligopolies ferociously struggled among each other for the possession of resources and already conquered or available territories, which led to imperialist wars that victimized the oppressed lower classes. Over the course of World War I, the Bolshevik party called on Russian workers and farmers to mobilize and take up arms against the Tsar, which led to the revolution of 1917 and the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Confronted with the construction of socialism, a subject largely ignored by Marx and Engels, Lenin developed a theory that would largely serve as a model for those communist regimes that came into being after 1945. According to this theory, the first step in the construction of socialism is the dictatorship of the proletariat, in which the state assumes control of all means of production and moves toward a progressive collectivization of agriculture in order to finance the development of heavy industry, both civil and military—a key sector of the economy and national defense. The development of consumer goods industries is thus pushed back to a later stage.

From 1920 to the Present: Heterodox Liberalism

The troubled interwar period, characterized by several failed attempts at a socialist revolution, the establishment of fascist regimes in a number of countries, the economic depression of the 1930s, and the abandonment of liberalism in favor of protectionism, led several liberal economists, such as John Maynard Keynes, James Meade, Joan Robinson, and Gunnar Myrdal, to develop a new economic theory—heterodox liberalism. This theory argues that neither liberalism, which led to the worst economic depression in history; nor nationalism, which was the source of several wars; nor Marxism, which attempts to mitigate socioeconomic inequalities at the expense of political liberties; is capable of guaranteeing sustained economic growth, greater social justice, democracy, and peace. Following World War II, most advanced capitalist countries adopted this theory. It would serve as the basis for the developmentalist theory of Raul Prebisch, Oswaldo Sunkel, José Serra, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, which was used by a large number of developing nations. It was at the origin of the Bretton Woods compromise, the

foundation of the new world economic order of the postwar period. Due to the economic and social progress that it brought about, it contributed to limiting the expansion of communism. Nevertheless, this theory was adopted, under the influence of the USSR, by roughly 40 countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa in the years following 1945.

According to Keynesian heterodoxy, it is not the rise in supply but the increase in household and business demand that serves as the lifeblood of economic growth. Governments thus sought to promote full employment by investing in infrastructure, protecting labor-intensive industries that produce consumer goods, and encouraging unionization. They also had to support the income of those excluded from the labor market (e.g., unemployed, dependents, pensioners) by social programs and liberalize consumer credit, all while requiring central banks to maintain low interest rates. To counter the imbalances of an unregulated international market, governments were left to establish multilateral institutions that provide the necessary capital to rebuild the European and Japanese economies and to aid the industrialization of developing countries, ensure the stability of currencies and the balance of payments, and promote a gradual and sectorized liberalization of trade adapted to the unequal development of nations. These precepts served as the basis for the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). They would eventually inspire the creation of the European Economic Community and several other regional integration agreements. They also allowed for the adoption of agreements facilitating the exportation of manufactured goods from newly industrialized countries (NICs) to industrialized countries (ICs), such as the Multi Fibre Arrangement and the Preferential Trade System.

Theories Inspired by Heterodox Liberalism

For 30 years, the heterodox liberal model generated the longest growth cycle in history; a decrease in socioeconomic inequalities, especially in ICs; a reinforcement of state interdependence and cooperation; and mitigation of North–South disparities from the emergence of South European, East Asian, and Latin American NICs. These transformations were the origin of several new theories in political science.

The most notable of these is the modernization theory developed by Seymour Martin Lipset, which argued that the progress of economic and social development is the main determinant in the emergence and stability of democracies. During the 1960s and 1970s, the validity of this theory was challenged by the domination of authoritarian regimes in most NICs. However, the democratization of most NICs between 1974 and 1995 and the instability of democracies established in developing nations after the Cold War would confirm the legitimacy of the modernization theory. David Mitrany's functionalist theory argued that the modernization of societies generates myriad nonpolitical problems whose solutions require the collaboration of experts from several countries. One of the benefits of such collaboration is that it encourages states to strengthen cooperation by concluding economic integration agreements that contribute to the development of their political integration. This analysis, confirmed by the early stages of European construction, was completed by Ernst Haas's neo-functionalist theory. According to this theory, the creation of supranational institutions is not uniquely determined by the benefits of economic integration. It follows when national leaders are convinced that it is in their interest to transfer their loyalty and their ability to respond to institutions that have supranational jurisdiction. The neo-institutionalist theory advanced by Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner attempted to demonstrate that the economic interdependence of states reinforces their common interest to cooperate within international regimes; as such, regimes allow them to reduce uncertainty and their transaction costs. Unlike neo-realists, neo-institutionalists argue that international cooperation does not necessarily stem from the leadership of a hegemonic power. The results and actions of international organizations affirm both theories. International cooperation without a hegemon is possible in areas of low politics (economic, environmental, social, and cultural issues) but not in areas of high politics (political and military issues).

Transition to Neoliberalism

At the start of the 1970s, several problems brought about the decline of the heterodox liberal model and the ensuing crisis. The transnationalization of firms and capital gave rise to an increase

in the volume of Eurodollars in circulation and a depletion of American gold reserves, in such a way that in 1971, the United States had to abandon the gold exchange standard, which was fundamental to the system of fixed exchange rates administered by the IMF. The latter was replaced by a floating-exchange-rate system entirely at the mercy of the monetary market's supply and demand. For 30 years, the rise in public spending and in consumption was largely financed by public and private debt, which took advantage of surplus capital and low interest rates. However, this dynamic led to a general rise in prices and wages. This inflationist context prompted firms in developed countries to lower their investments and accelerate the relocation of their production to NICs. This movement created a situation of stagflation in ICs, which was aggravated by the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 and the subsequent recessions of 1974–1975 and 1980–1983. Pressure from financial institutions, worried over the solvency of governments and firms, convinced central banks to sharply raise interest rates in 1983. This decision brought about a severe crisis in the public finances of states, which was the determining factor in the transition toward a new economic model based on neoliberalism.

Neoliberal theory is the synthesis of new American economic theories derived from classical and neoclassical liberal economics, which were developed in opposition to Keynesianism during the 1960s and 1970s. Milton Friedman's monetarist theory argues that inflation is caused by maintaining low interest rates through government control of central banks. Governments should allow monetary authorities to adjust interest rates as a function of the market, which would raise the level of money and combat inflation, the principal cause of slowdowns in growth. The supply-side theory, advanced by Arthur Laffer and Jan P. Seymour, maintains that excessively high taxes on incomes and profits discourage initiative, savings, investment, and productive effort, all while encouraging tax evasion and leading to reductions in government revenues. The theory calls for lower taxes for the rich, who spend more than the poor, and for a transfer of social spending to the private sector. Gary Becker and Jacob Mincer's human capital theory maintains that all human activities are determined by cost-benefit calculations. This

logic must prevail in public and para-public institutions to raise their productivity and efficiency and to lower deficits and government debt.

The precepts of neoliberalism were upheld by the IMF and the World Bank during the 1980s and 1990s. They eventually led to the creation of structural adjustment programs, which would become conditions for aid to ICs, NICs, and developing countries. Progressively, governments of capitalist countries the world over began to embrace this philosophy. However, very few countries fully applied the recommendations of neoliberal theories. Most adopted mixed economic policies, which combined the ideas of heterodox liberalism and neoliberalism. Contrary to the fears of the Left, the transition toward neoliberalism did not lead to a dismantling of the state or to the destruction of the economic and social achievements of Keynesianism. Nevertheless, the neoliberal model was at the origin of an unprecedented liberalization of international trade. The Uruguay Round of the GATT (1986–1993), the adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994, the transformation of the European Economic Community into a common market (following the Single European Act of 1986) and then into an economic and monetary union (following the Maastricht Treaty of 1993), and the creation of the Mercosur customs union in 1994 have all not only abolished trade barriers for manufactured goods but also liberalized the flow of services and capital. The opening of markets has reinforced the power of multinational firms and banks and weakened the control of states over their economies. In 2008, Peter Willets counted 77,200 nonfinancial multinational firms in 138 countries. The few hundred with the most important assets are Western European, Japanese, or American, but a large number are also found in other ICs (Canada, Sweden, and Australia) or in emerging countries (China, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, India, Brazil, and Russia). Nonfinancial multinational firms have enormous power over governments as they can relocate their production to other countries that offer better advantages. Financial multinational firms not only largely determine the value of currencies and the interest rates for states but also make investment decisions that determine the profitability of their banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and other financial institutions.

The Crisis of Communism

The crisis of the heterodox liberal model coincided with the crisis of the communist model. In the USSR, it was caused by the concentration of government spending in the military industry and the decline of productivity in other sectors of the economy caused by a disillusionment with the communist ideology, unable to fulfill its promises “of a better tomorrow.” In China, it was brought about by the disastrous cumulative economic effects of “The Great Leap Forward” and by the “Great Cultural Revolution” envisioned and led by Mao Zedong. Though the outcome of these crises was a transition toward capitalism, they ran very different courses in each country. In the USSR, the combination of economic liberalization (*perestroika*) and the liberalization of the political system (*glasnost*) led to the disappearance of the Communist Party, the breakup of the USSR, and the collapse of communist regimes in central and eastern Europe in less than 5 years (1987–1991). Russia subsequently adopted an orthodox neoliberal model that had some disastrous effects while mortgaging the democratization of the political regime. Conversely, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe succeeded, between 1991 and 2004–2007, in establishing functional market economies and stable democracies, largely due to the European Union’s accession process, closely supervised by Brussels. In China, the transition toward a market economy has been very gradual and controlled by the Communist Party. It has been accompanied by a progressive yet limited liberalization of the political system, with the authorities seeking to preserve the country’s unity and stability. This stability has encouraged the inflow of capital and investment by foreign firms, and has been the principal cause of the very strong economic growth that China has seen in the years since 1980.

Conclusion

History demonstrates that over the past four centuries, the capitalist mode of production has been the source of economic transformation in a majority of nations. The communist mode of production appeared in about 40 countries during a brief period of less than 50 years. Today capitalism

spans the globe, with the exception of certain regions in central Asia, Africa, and Oceania, where precapitalist modes of production exist. The industrialization and modernization of developing countries are the lifeblood of growth and of the globalization of capitalism. Given that over time these transformations are more and more rapid—the industrialization of European countries happened in 200 years, while the process in NICs in the 20th century lasted 4 or 5 decades—it is highly probable that the possibilities of an expansion of capitalism will dry up before the end of the 21st century. What will happen then? Will we witness the onset of imperial wars, as Lenin predicted; or the establishment of a world order founded on specialization and the economic cooperation of states, as liberals claim; or rather, the institution of a postcapitalist model, characterized by the protection of natural resources, a decrease in population and consumption, and orientation of economic activity toward human needs rather than material ones, as ecologists desire? No one knows for sure. One thing is certain: No mode of production or model of development lasts forever.

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See also Capitalism; Communism; Communist Systems; Democratization; Developing World and International Relations; Development, Political; Liberalism; Neoliberalism

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TRANSITION

The term *transition* is one of several used in research on the transformation of political regimes. Other competing terms include *transformation*, *regime change*, *system change*, and *democratization*. These terms not only are closely related to each other but also overlap in meaning; however, they are not identical in their meaning. Moreover, they all have specific connotations and are often linked to particular theoretical concepts or even reflect ideological biases.

The term *transition* was first used in political science by Dankwart Rustow in his 1970 article “Transitions to Democracy.” However, it was not until 1986 that the term was transformed into a more coherent theoretical concept by the seminal 1986 work of Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. They defined *transition* as “the interval between one political regime and another” (p. 6). Transitions are limited in time: on the one hand by the dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, “by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative” (p. 6). The two authors deliberately introduced contingency as an important variable with respect to the regime outcome. They do not deterministically speak about “transition to democracy,” but “transition from authoritarian rule” to an “uncertain something else” (italics added; p. 3). However, the study triggered and inspired an avalanche of empirical research in democratization, first on Southern Europe and Latin America and later on in the 1990s on Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe.

Transitologists conceive the (not necessarily) successful transition from authoritarian to democratic rule typically in three subsequent phases: first liberalization, then democratization, and finally consolidation. Liberalization marks the beginning of transition. It is the process of granting some of those "liberal" rights to the citizen that are traditionally associated with habeas corpus, (partial) freedom of movement, free speech, freedom of association, the sanctity of the home, and so forth. Authoritarian rulers grant these rights typically in situations when the regime suffers from a crisis of legitimacy and the so-called softliners among the ruling elites prevail over the hardliners by arguing that a limited liberalization and controlled broadening of the ruling base can ultimately save the political power of the authoritarian regime. However, Adam Przeworski has shown that this often turns out to be a misperception. The changing power relations and the dynamics of regime change are barely controllable and often trigger a chain of events and decisions that finally lead to democratization by default. Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika*, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the beginning of democratization constitute only one of many examples.

Democratization by default occurs when the newly conditioned and nonguaranteed civil and political rights open a new space for an emerging civil society. The more civil society grows beyond the control and repression of the authoritarian regime, the more the risk of punishment decreases for protest movements and prodemocratic demonstrations. The increasing number of protesters lowers the costs for individual and collective actions against the authoritarian regime. The granting of some liberal rights by authoritarian rulers is often motivated by their calculation of avoiding protests and broadening the base of legitimacy of the old regime. However, the contrary has often been the case: Liberalization has triggered more protests, leading to the emergence of a stronger civil society, which then led to the beginning of democratization.

The phase of democratization is the proper core of each transition. It is the time when the old institutions and the repressive apparatus of the authoritarian regime have lost their power, and the new rules of democracy are not yet fully established. The lack of effective institutions opens a large space for new political actors. In these situations,

where the precise power relations are not transparent, the relevant actors of the remaining old regime and the new opposition decide to negotiate form and content of the next steps of democratization. The core of these negotiations involves crucial democratic institutions, such as electoral laws, the form of government, its relation to the parliament, the debate surrounding the decision to have a presidential or parliamentary system, majoritarian or consensus forms of democracy, and a centralized or federalist state. Although the social and historical context of a country and society matters, the final configuration of the new institutions is above all a logical outcome of the power relations and the power struggle between the relevant actors of the old authoritarian regime and the democratic opposition and their strategic decisions.

The role of actors is decisive in transition research. Philippe C. Schmitter and colleagues and Adam Przeworski ascribe to them the crucial role within any transition from authoritarian rule. Structural and socioeconomic constraints or opportunities that are at the core of modernization theory are neglected or deliberately excluded from the analysis by an implicit *ceteris paribus* clause. It depends above all on the constellation of actors whether a transition leads to democracy or falls back to dictatorial rule. Inspired by the *transición pactada* in post-Franco Spain (1975-1977) and confirmed by the negotiated transitions in Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile in the 1980s or the roundtables in Eastern Europe after 1989, pacted transitions became the paradigmatic key of successful transitions. Particularly when the reformers (softliners) of the old regime and the moderates of the democratic opposition dominate their respective camps and agree in negotiations or even formalized pacts on the next steps of political reforms, democracy is the most probable outcome of the transition. Elite settlements, where the relevant actors agree on the fundamental rules of the democratic game, are considered to be a solid base for further democratization. Elites play the decisive role in the movements, whereas the actions of the masses are mostly understood as a transient phenomenon at the beginning of the political transformation.

Since it is basically an analytical distinction, it is not precisely clear in reality when the phase of liberalization ends and the transition begins. The same is true for the borderline between transition

to, and consolidation of, democracy. Both lines are blurred, and the different phases can best be understood and researched as overlapping processes. However, the mainstream of transitology argues that transition has finished when the first democratic elections, the founding elections of the new democratic regime, have taken place. Others, such as Wolfgang Merkel, believe that the passing of a revised or new democratic constitution is the proper end of the transition. Only when the transfer of political power from one person or a group of persons to a set of institutionalized rules has taken place, which are equally valid for both the ruling and the ruled, can the formal rules of democracy be said to be established.

What is the theoretical contribution of transition to democracy literature to our understanding of regime changes or democratization of political regimes? Theoretically, the transition paradigm can be considered, according to Barrington Moore, as an answer to historical structuralism and, according to Talcott Parsons, Seymour Martin Lipset, and others, to modernization theory. While structuralists focus particularly on class relations and the link of social classes to the state, modernization theory could never get rid of a certain deterministic bias. It is above all socioeconomic development and the emergence of the middle classes that lead sooner or later to democracy; actors are not taken seriously into account. One of the strengths of the transition paradigm is that it can shed light into the black box of political actors, actor constellations, and finally political action. Transition theory brought political actors back into the limelight. However, the transitologists constructed their own black box: They did not sufficiently integrate in their analyses the socioeconomic opportunity structure for political action. For some, such as Giuseppe Di Palma, democracy can be crafted only if the actors agree regardless of the socioeconomic and structural constraints. Despite all its merits, the transition paradigm could never overcome the theoretical burden of a considerable degree of voluntarism. The disregard of structural and historical factors was not the least of the issues that contributed to the exhaustion of the transition paradigm in the late 1990s. Since then, historical institutionalism has taken over the paradigmatic lead in regime research and democratization studies linking actors and actions to the structural and historical context. However, the

theoretical merit of the transition paradigm lasts: Political actors and agency are back in research on the transformation of political regimes.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Change, Institutional; Democracy, Types of; Democratic Consolidation; Democratization; Liberalization

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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

One of the effects of the third wave of democratization that took place in the last quarter of the 20th century has been to confront newly democratizing countries with the need to come to terms with their "evil past"—the human rights violations committed under authoritarian rule. Transitional justice, one of the fastest growing areas within the study of democratization, deals with the manner in which the claims arising from such wrongdoings, often undertaken by the state and its agents, should be handled fairly and equitably.

The study of transitional justice is by no means confined to lawyers or to the discipline of the law. It is an eminently interdisciplinary field in which law, political science, history, sociology, anthropology, theology, and other disciplines converge. A number of institutes in several continents have been established in the first decade of the 21st century to study the many dimensions of transitional justice, to analyze the different policy tools used to achieve its objectives, and to disseminate best practices in the field. The handling of transitional justice issues and their consequences affects the dynamics of the political transition and the subsequent democratic consolidation.

Much like the latter two processes, transitional justice itself is also marked by contingency and paradox. Much depends on the historical context and the legacies of any given political trajectory. Transitions are, by definition, highly fluid, and both political action and the uses of the law find themselves under a different set of rules from those obtaining in periods of stability and calm. To identify the transformative opportunities presented by the conjuncture, which will allow change to proceed toward the new order, becomes an essential task both for political leaders and for those responsible for the transitional justice tools.

Historical Context

Transitional justice falls squarely within the broader issue of human rights. The latter emerged as an international issue in the aftermath of the Holocaust, and was formalized as such in the 1948 United Nations (UN) Human Rights Declaration. However, it was not until the early 1970s, in the light of human rights violations committed in the Southern Cone of Latin America, that the issue of transitional justice came to the forefront of international relations and foreign policy agendas.

In its original incarnation, transitional justice was seen as mainly concerned with transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule. It first drew heavily on the experiences of Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s as well as on those in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 and in Southern Africa in the mid-1990s. It shared some of the same value orientation of democratization studies more generally—what Abraham F. Lowenthal has referred to as the “thoughtful wishing” school

of scholarship. Over time, however, transitional justice has expanded to other instances, encompassing a much broader scope, to include postconflict societies more generally, arising both from international and civil wars. The field has thus become somewhat less normative and more neutral, with a stronger emphasis on empirical work. After the many internal conflicts that erupted in the post-Cold War world—mainly in Southeastern Europe, Africa, and Asia—transitional justice has emerged as an important tool within the wider panoply of nation- and peace-building instruments to be deployed after wars come to an end.

In all these cases, however, the critical question is the same: What to do “the morning after”—be it after the fall of the dictator or the signing of the peace. And here come to the fore the many dilemmas and paradoxes that are such a hallmark of transitional justice. On the one hand, there is so much to do on so many fronts that the last thing the new leaders may want is to “frontload” their own political agenda—a problem often compounded by the possibility of authoritarian regression. On the other hand, the very legitimacy of the incoming coalition will often be based on their alleged moral superiority over the outgoing elites. It was the new order’s denunciation of those human rights violations that contributed to depleting the political capital of the ancien régime. To do nothing now, safely ensconced in office, would seem the height of cynicism. There will thus be strong domestic and international pressures against a policy of “do nothing.”

What to do, then, about this evil past and about the evildoers? Though some countries (Brazil and Spain come to mind) effectively decided to do nothing—although this does not mean that the issue itself disappeared—many new governments have felt it necessary to take some sort of action. The reasons for this go beyond the routine pressures the rulers experience “to do something” about a given matter. After dictatorship or after war, there is a deep-felt need to draw a clear line between the old regime and the new dispensation, between yesterday’s order and that of today. In many cases—that of apartheid in South Africa is one of them—the suffering inflicted on significant portions of the population has been such that the very notion of pretending that nothing happened or that it is best to simply forgive and forget is abhorrent to many.

Elements of Transitional Justice

Transitional justice, then, as Mark Freeman has pointed out, encompasses four distinct sets of activities:

1. trials in their various manifestations, be they criminal or civil, national or international;
2. fact-finding bodies, of which the most prominent are truth commissions (TCs);
3. reparations to the victims of human rights violations and/or their relatives; and
4. criminal justice reforms designed to avoid the repetition of mass abuses.

Trials and Amnesties

The question is how to go about this highly sensitive task. The classic response to this after wars has been the successor trials—to put the high command of the outgoing regime in the dock. The best known example in the contemporary period is the trial of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, ending in his conviction and execution. And although there are many precedents, the most relevant one for these purposes is that of the Nuremberg and the Tokyo trials after World War II, which in many ways set the template for the form. Nuremberg was largely a response to the Holocaust, which caused such a shock to humanity that it triggered a large number of legal responses and innovations.

Something similar could be said about the post-Cold War era. The large number of internal conflicts that have erupted in the absence of the constraints imposed by the bipolar international dynamic have led to the growth of international criminal justice institutions. The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and hybrid (i.e., courts that combine national and international elements) criminal tribunals in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste are among them. The most significant addition to this roster of tribunals is, of course, the International Criminal Court (ICC), established in the Rome Treaty signed in 1998, and which came into being in 2002 in The Hague. Despite the unwillingness of some large powers to ratify the Rome Treaty and become

party to it (most prominently the United States, which went so far as to formally unsign the treaty), as of 2009, 108 UN member states had ratified it.

The ICC has come to fill a long-standing void in international law, making it possible to bring individuals to justice, something for which the International Court of Justice, also based in The Hague, has no jurisdiction (only states have standing).

Hand in hand with this development has been the expansion of universal jurisdiction. By this is meant the ability of judges to investigate, indict, and ultimately, arrest individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and massive human rights abuses committed anywhere in the world. Although, under normal circumstances, the jurisdiction of criminal courts is fixed territorially (i.e., by the boundaries of the state in which the crime was committed), globalization and a higher awareness of the need to stand up for human rights have started to change this, and a more expansive notion of jurisdiction has taken hold. Spain, where a law allows for universal jurisdiction in cases of human rights violations involving Spanish citizens or Spanish residents, has been a country whose judges have been especially active in this regard.

In 1998, General Augusto Pinochet became the first former head of state arrested abroad (in London) for human rights violations committed at home. Shortly thereafter, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic became the first sitting head of state to be indicted for such crimes by the ICTY, being eventually arrested and taken to stand trial in The Hague, where he died in prison. Former Liberian strongman Charles Taylor suffered a similar fate, awaiting trial in The Hague. In 2008, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir became the first head of state to be indicted by the ICC special prosecutor for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in Darfur. In 2009, the ICC issued arrest warrants against Bashir on the last two charges but not the first.

Domestically, however, as Ruti Teitel has observed, much as successor trials are seen as crucial for the reestablishment of the rule of law, considered to have been compromised by the ancien regime, they also, paradoxically, may endanger the legal foundations of the new order. A basic principle of criminal law is that of nonretroactivity of the penal code: *Nulla poena sine lege*. Yet the crimes for

which the authorities and functionaries of the old regime are to be held accountable for are often not typified as such in the statutes of the preexisting order. The risk, thus, is to give the appearance of highly politicized, quasi “show trials” that make a mockery of the moral and juridical superiority claims of the new leaders. Some have argued that that is exactly what happened with the trial of Saddam Hussein. After the return of democracy, both Greece (in the 1970s) and Argentina (in the 1980s) prosecuted the members of the military junta and had them stand trial in special tribunals set up for that purpose.

At the other end of the spectrum of responses are amnesties. The enactment of amnesty takes cognizance of the fact that evil deeds were committed and that they need to be addressed. However, it is estimated that the needs of national peace and reconciliation take precedence and that, for their sake, it is best to let sleeping dogs lie. After its own transition to democracy in 1985, Uruguay enacted such a law. A variant of this is self-amnesty. In 1978, Chile’s military regime, led by General Augusto Pinochet, approved such an amnesty law, covering human rights violations committed during the 1973 to 1978 period.

According to some legal scholars, self-amnesties are null and void as they violate a basic legal principle: No one should be entitled to enact legislation for his or her own benefit. Yet when President Patricio Aylwin (1990–1994) gave consideration to derogating Pinochet’s amnesty law, one counterargument he faced was that once the penal responsibility for a given crime has been extinguished by an amnesty law, it cannot be recreated simply by derogating the amnesty law.

The limitations and, in some cases, the unsatisfactory results of both successor trials and blanket amnesties have contributed to the rise of a third option in the tool kit of transitional justice—that of TCs.

Truth Commissions

TCs are officially appointed (although usually independent) bodies tasked with investigating human rights violations during a specific period (often that of the previous authoritarian regime or the one on the losing end of a war). Their powers vary, but they are generally made up of respected

personalities who are supposed to produce within a specified time period (ideally not more than 6 months to 2 years) a report that documents those violations for the record and establishes a factual truth about them. They serve as group exercises in collective expiation and memorialization. They are not tribunals, and they may be formed by nationals (the general rule), foreign citizens (in cases where nationals dare not tread, as happened in the one in El Salvador), or both.

TCs are not necessarily incompatible with pre-existing amnesty provisions, nor do they preclude subsequent prosecutions by the courts. They have increasingly become the policy tool of choice of new democracies as they come to terms with their evil past. Several dozen of them have been established in the course of the past decades. Two particularly significant ones, associated with two emblematic transitions of the 1990s, were the Chilean (1990–1991) and the South African (1995–1998) Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs). If the quality of the report of the former was considered to have set a standard of sorts, it was the latter, led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, that most enhanced the profile of TCs, particularly because of its innovative use of public hearings. Since then, countries such as Peru, Panama, Timor-Leste, Ghana, Burundi, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone have relied on them, with varying results. As a rule, TCs have largely not been used in Eastern and Central Europe, where the preferred system of dealing with the past has been that of lustration, whereby former party officials and high-ranking functionaries are disqualified from government service in the new dispensation.

The reasons for this veritable explosion of truth commissioning are many. On the one hand, they provide a reasonable compromise between the extremes of outright prosecution through special courts and full amnesty. On the other, through their fact finding, they can lay the foundations for much of the work that needs to be done to heal the body politic of the blows inflicted on it by dictatorship and/or war. The truth must be established: Violations need to be put on the public record. A measure of justice must be meted out: The culprits deserve some punishment, even if only symbolic. With the facts on the open, reparations can proceed. Not bound by the exacting evidentiary standards of judicial procedures, they have more flexibility to call on

witnesses and to gather relevant data. The established judiciary, compromised by its acquiescence to dictatorship, is often not in a position to undertake anything comparable to this. Still, it may well be able to follow up on the work of the TC, using the initial evidence thus gathered to prosecute the culprits of human rights violations.

TCs are most appropriate after a significant regime change, in which major human rights violations were committed primarily by one side, and when there is still a certain balance between the democratizing forces and those of the outgoing coalition. Under such circumstances and when there is often some dispute about what actually happened under the previous regime, the need to have a common national narrative about those facts is especially acute to overcome past divisions and forge a common future.

The parallel has been made with the needs of patients suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder. People who have undergone major traumas in their lives often find themselves disoriented and in acute need of telling their story to someone who will take it seriously. It should not be surprising to realize that individuals who lost their loved ones and/or were themselves submitted to torture and were then publicly denounced as subversives should often suffer from all sorts of psychological difficulties and should need help.

Beyond individual grief and the imperative to overcome it, looms a larger issue, what José Zalaquett has referred to as the cathartic function of TCs. After the collective trauma of repressive dictatorship or war and all it entails, nations need a moment of rebirth or regeneration of their sense of identity and being, one that provides a clean break with that oppressive past and thus gives them the necessary impetus to forge ahead and build a better future. If conducted properly, TCs can perform this function. The experience of the South African TRC, which in its 2.5 years of existence engaged in one of the most extraordinary exercises in national soul-searching ever undertaken, remains a prime example of that. The public hearings held during those years, often in churches, with strong religious undertones and amply covered by the media, made the country come to terms with the legacy of apartheid in a way that perhaps no other mechanism could have.

Until the South African TRC, no TC had ever held public hearings. Since then, many countries, including Nigeria, Grenada, Timor-Leste, Ghana, Peru, Morocco, and Paraguay have done so. Public hearings have distinct advantages over those held in camera. In our media-driven societies, they generate enormous public attention, increase the awareness of past abuses, and are more likely to trigger public debate than the mere publication of a report. However, they are time-consuming, expensive to set up, and demand enormous amounts of staff time. They are also a high-risk endeavor. The need for procedural fairness in the proceedings of TCs is especially apparent in the case of public hearings, given the lack of ordinary judicial rules like witness cross-examination.

Another critical issue is that of “naming names.” A key feature of TCs is their victim-oriented approach, so different from the regular adversarial penal proceedings prevailing in the West, mainly directed toward establishing guilt rather than toward highlighting the victim’s plight. In that context, the issue of whether the report of TCs should actually name the likely culprits of human rights violations is highly contested. For some, given the lack of exacting evidentiary standards in the TC’s hearings and procedures, this would be an inherently unfair and even dangerous exercise. For others, it would be the equivalent of the journalistic mention of the suspects of a crime, no more and no less. Yet given the official weight that the TC reports carry, the latter is a complex, if not downright dubious, proposition. Passing on the relevant information to the courts for further action rather than making such names public would seem to be the more prudent course of action.

Reparations

Inextricably intertwined with TCs, though analytically separate from them, is the issue of reparations for human rights violations. Lost lives cannot be resurrected, and cutting off limbs inflicts permanent damage to its victims. Yet some degree of reparation is both of material and symbolic significance. Through reparations, the state effectively acknowledges its responsibility for past human rights violations. Who qualifies? For how much? How fair is it to impose what may be a

heavy budgetary burden for reparations on the governments of developing societies that have great difficulty in balancing competing social and economic priorities? What about intergenerational justice? Why should present and future generations pay for the sins of past ones? These are some of the questions raised by the vexed issue of reparations.

The report of TCs provides an important initial data set that makes it possible to identify, at least on a preliminary basis, the likely beneficiaries of such reparations. There is consensus in the literature, however, that the formal handling of reparations claims should be done by a separate body, established after the TC has discharged its mandate. This is likely to be a long and cumbersome process, which may take several years to be completed.

Reparations are by no means limited to cash payments. Lump sum payments (especially involving high sums to large numbers of people) can be particularly onerous on the public purse, which is why pensions and scholarships are often preferred. As Pablo de Greiff has pointed out, reparations include apologies, educational and health services, pensions, property and job restitutions, business loans, and other types of assistance. A particularly sensitive issue is how to determine the reparations due to torture victims, as evidentiary questions often arise.

Some TCs, though by no means all, have added *reconciliation* to their name. This has also become a contested term. *Prima facie*, there is nothing wrong with it. Presumably, the very purpose of any TC is to bring the country together, to reconcile it with itself, and to avoid the repetition of another cycle of human rights abuses. Yet some, including Chilean president Michelle Bachelet, herself the victim of human rights violations, have argued that reconciliation is a very personal process that cannot be expected to occur in a collective, such as a nation. Others have stated that it is a concept with religious overtones, which has no place in contexts of separation of church and state.

Setting the record straight in terms of the victims and what happened to them (the "Truth"); aiming for a measure of limited, even if only symbolic, sanction of the culprits ("some Justice"); and setting up follow-up mechanisms that through

reparations to the victims or their relatives and some institutional changes (human rights education and reform of the judiciary and of the military) prevent such future wrongdoings may, in the end, be the best that TCs can aim for.

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See also Democratic Consolidation; Democratization;
Nation Building

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TRIANGULATION

Triangulation is a research strategy in which one brings multiple forms of evidence to bear on a single research question. The term *triangulation* is often modified by an adjective (e.g., within-method triangulation) to reflect how the evidentiary variation is introduced. In the years since the term was introduced into the research methods lexicon, two primary accounts of the value of triangulation have emerged. One account views triangulation as valuable for what it reveals about the validity of a descriptive or causal inference. The second views triangulation as valuable for how it enriches the perspective one gains on the question under investigation. The endorsement of triangulation for one or both of these reasons is widespread within the social sciences, but skeptical and cautious voices are heard as well. This entry discusses varying perspectives of triangulation and points to new developments.

Early references to triangulation focused on measuring concepts with data gathered from multiple methods. The classic reference is to the 1966 volume *Unobtrusive Measures* by Eugene J. Webb and colleagues. The advice was threefold: (1) supplement measures of social and political behavior drawn from interviews and questionnaires with (unobtrusive) measures drawn from physical trace evidence, documents, and observation; (2) test any given hypothesis repeatedly using the different measures of key concepts; and (3) treat the hypothesis as more credible if all the tests converge in support. The reasoning is that measures built from different data sources will each be flawed in ways that the researcher should be able to anticipate, if not correct, in advance. But the particular flaws will vary across the measures. A survey-based measure of alcohol consumption, for example, would likely suffer from social desirability bias, which would not threaten the validity of a measure based on (covert) observation of how many liquor bottles were found in a person's trash, even though the latter will have its own limitations. If, therefore, one finds similar results when testing a hypothesis with each measure, one can draw conclusions with greater confidence. It becomes implausible to view the findings as an artifact driven by biases unique to each measure.

Note that the major concern here is systematic error in the measures (a question of measurement validity) not random error (a question of measurement reliability). Hence the advice is to repeat one's analysis using each measure, not to form indices from the set as if they were simply parallel measures. This strategy loses value, however, if it is plausible to view the bias in each measure as having concordant effects; even if the hypothesis were false, flaws in the measures could produce converging results. Hence, it is important to select measures where the biases are expected to produce discordant effects on the results.

Influenced by Norman Denzin's more expansive treatment of the topic in 1970, social science understanding of triangulation quickly extended beyond the measurement context. To represent the varying ways in which different forms of evidence can be combined, triangulation is now routinely differentiated into types. Between-method triangulation involves multiple methods of data collection (focus groups, sample surveys, participant observation in field settings, content analysis of documents, laboratory experiments, and so on). In within-method triangulation, the data collection method is held constant but the design (e.g., analyze a panel and a cross-sectional survey) or measurement technique (e.g., work with different survey questions or question types) may vary. Data triangulation refers to the use of data on multiple samples, obtained at different times and/or in different contexts. With investigator triangulation, multiple investigators work at least semi-independently on a joint venture. In analysis triangulation, the same data are analyzed using multiple techniques (e.g., apply narrative and conversational analysis to in-depth interview texts or analyze quantitative data with both Bayesian and non-Bayesian statistical techniques).

Two accounts of triangulation's purpose and value emerged alongside this expansion of its forms. One follows the same logic of corroboration laid out in the earlier work on measurement: Because each piece of evidence—generated from research that varies in method, design, measurement technique, sample, investigator, and/or mode of analysis—has weaknesses not shared with the other(s), working with multiple forms of evidence should help the researcher reach conclusions that are more valid than if any one evidentiary source had been used alone. Whether the goal is descriptive

or causal inference, triangulation should enhance the researcher's ability to rule out rival explanations for the findings and/or establish their generality.

Of course, just what is gained in any study depends on the research question and form(s) of triangulation employed. Working with multiple samples, as with data triangulation, will speak most directly to questions of generalization. Combining lab and field experiments will offer evidence both on the validity of a causal hypothesis and on whether a result found in the lab setting generalizes to the natural setting. Corroboration of a result when using two or more analysis techniques demonstrates that the finding is not an artifact of the specific assumptions that underlie each one. As these examples suggest, for triangulation to be effective, the researcher must deliberately select forms of evidentiary variation to achieve specific objectives.

The second account of triangulation's purpose and value follows a logic of complementarity rather than corroboration. It boils down to three propositions:

1. Any one form of empirical evidence will inevitably yield a partial or incomplete understanding of the phenomena under study.
2. Different forms of evidence will provide different perspectives on and insights into the phenomena.
3. Thus, by combining forms of evidence, a research project will generate a richer and more complete body of knowledge about the phenomena.

Examples abound. Observational data may make evident what interview data do not because of people's tendencies to focus on what is salient, novel, or positive. Analysis of quantitative data sets might establish an empirical regularity while in-depth case studies provide insights into causal mechanisms. Interviews with multiple actors who work within or interact with an organization will provide multiple, situated perspectives on the dynamics of interest. Documents may be used to gain insight into the historical and institutional context of a problem while interviews are used to acquire perspectives on current debates.

Some social scientists embrace both purposes of triangulation. One version of this position simply

conceives of triangulation as a multipurpose research strategy—one that may at times be used to see if a descriptive or causal hypothesis can be corroborated with multiple forms of evidence and that may at other times be used to generate a more complete (deeper, broader, multifaceted, contextualized, complex, and/or holistic) understanding of a topic. Another version sees both purposes as potentially relevant to any hypothesis-testing study, depending on the results: If the triangulated results converge, the hypothesis will be validated by the logic of corroboration, but if the findings are inconsistent or contradictory, the researcher can develop a more complete (nuanced, contextualized, deeper, etc.) explanation that reconciles the divergent results.

Other social scientists adopt one version of the virtues of triangulation but not the other. In some of the literature, triangulation is simply associated with one objective (corroboration via convergence vs. enrichment via multiplicity) while the other is ignored or underplayed. Scholars who work primarily with qualitative methods frequently go further, however, and reject the corroboration point of view entirely, arguing that it presupposes an (positivist) epistemology that is inconsistent with their own. The issues here are complex and the viewpoints many, but they often revolve around the interpretation of convergence versus divergence in results. Consider, for example, a project on the topic of "bureaucratic conflict" that finds widely varying accounts of how much conflict there is between political appointees and civil servants depending on who is being queried about the matter and that uncovers discrepancies between interview reports and evidence gleaned from public records. A simple (perhaps simplistic) application of the convergence logic would treat that variability as due to bias in each indicator of the true or objective level of conflict. To scholars working within constructivist or interpretivist traditions, this would make no sense at all. Differences in perspective across individuals are to be expected, public records have their own generative processes, and all this variation is constitutive of the phenomenon of bureaucratic conflict and central to the inquiry, not getting in the way of a clear understanding of it.

Ideas about triangulation are still evolving. New issues are arising in the burgeoning literature on research strategies that mix quantitative and

qualitative evidence (often called mixed-method or multimethod research strategies). Although one still finds the between-methods triangulation label applied to any research project that has a qualitative and a quantitative component, scholars are beginning to depict triangulation as just one form of mixing the methods. For example, since in triangulation the various methods are chosen a priori for how they together provide more insight into a central research question than any one taken alone, it would be a stretch to treat a project in which quantitative and qualitative methods are used *in seriatim*, with the results of the first used to determine what is done (sampled, measured, focused on) in the second, as a case of triangulation. Systematic attention is also being given to the varying purposes served by qualitative and quantitative evidence in mixed-method designs and to the ways in which such evidence can be effectively integrated.

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See also Measurement; Mixed Methods; Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods

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TRUST, SOCIAL

Social trust is the expectation of reliance that individuals in a community have toward each other on the basis of shared norms, mutual reciprocity, and cooperative behavior. Trusting others is based on the belief that their behavior will not be harmful or deceitful. Although trust in family and close friends may be common in most societies, the concept of generalized social trust involves trusting people in a much wider scope of social, political, and economic relations. Also referred to as interpersonal trust, social trust is regarded as a cultural trait that develops with the formation and maintenance of social networks and secondary associations. Rationalist approaches also see social trust as a learned reciprocal and cooperative behavior. Whether it is cultural or rational, social trust varies significantly from one society to another, and this variation is thought to have an impact on politics and economics. This entry reviews the origins of the concept of social trust, the ways in which it has been more commonly measured, the limitations attributed to its measurement, the more general theoretical and empirical relationships between social trust and economic growth and democracy, and the role of social trust as a key component of a broader concept of social capital.

Origins of the Concept of Social Trust

The idea of trust can be found in various political thinkers from different ages, but its current understanding as trust in others within a community or a set of social networks can most prominently be traced back to Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*. He wrote that in 19th-century America vast numbers of associations "are formed and maintained by the agency of private individuals" on the basis of trust and shared interests. From this perspective, trust is strongly related to associational life, which in turn facilitates the pursuit of common goals that would be harder to achieve through purely individual efforts. The link between trust, secondary associations, and democracy has been emphasized by many authors throughout the second half of the 20th century and still attracts a lot of attention, particularly because indicators have shown a significant decrease in social trust, a point that we will return to later.

In the late 1950s, an influential culturalist approach to politics put the concept and measurement of social trust at the center of the academic debate. *The Civic Culture* study, published in 1963, established a theoretical and empirical relationship between trust and democracy. The authors, Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, conceived of trust as a component of a democratic political culture. In their view, stable democracy requires a set of democratic values and beliefs that supports it, and trust in others is one of those values. Their book, based on survey data from five nations, reinforced the idea that social trust is a condition for the formation of secondary associations and, as a consequence, a feature that fosters the development of a participatory society, a pillar of democracy.

The relationship between social trust and democracy was very persuasive, and it had a great impact on subsequent empirical political research. As trust was part of a more general democratic political culture, higher levels of interpersonal trust were consequently linked to higher levels of democratization. Subsequent research has shown that social trust is related to effective democratic governance, not only because secondary associations are a vital part of democracy but also because trust enhances the development of a loyal opposition respecting the “rules of the game,” facilitates self-compliance of political agreements, and fosters tolerance. Democratic politics is based on rules and procedures that require the acceptance and compliance of the parts, and trust is a positive intervening factor. It is important to note that the close relationship between social trust and democracy as a form of government does not mean that trusting other people is the same as trusting political institutions. Social trust and political trust, generally understood as confidence in political institutions, may be related, but they are two different concepts, and each one is subject to different explanations.

Measures of Social Trust

Social trust has been measured in various ways but mainly through survey research. The most common indicator was used in *The Civic Culture* study, but it was only one of five original survey items designed to measure “faith in people” that its authors borrowed from previous research. The measure of social trust derives from the following

question: “Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can’t be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?” The percentage of survey respondents who chose the option “most people can be trusted” became an empirical representation of social or interpersonal trust as well as an initial basis for cross-national comparisons. Today, many comparative public opinion surveys include this item in their questionnaires, and some of them have kept record of it for several years, providing a relatively standard measure for a wide array of societies with different levels of economic development, political institutions, and cultural traditions.

Although many surveys use this indicator as a standard measure of social trust, the question from which it is derived has been subject to criticism and continual revision. One of the main complaints is that the question is posed as a simple dichotomy in which people in general can only be trusted or distrusted. This implies that trust is not a matter of degree. However, this is questionable because, as some argue, some groups in society can be trusted at a higher rate than others, or the same group of people can be trusted under some circumstances but not so much under different ones. This leads us to a second criticism, which is that the standard question fails to provide any social context or group reference that could help evaluate who can be trusted and who cannot. If a person says that “most people can be trusted,” who is included in that response and who is not? Moreover, can the same person be trusted under different circumstances or situations? This leads to a third criticism—that the question is ambivalent and, therefore, an unreliable indicator of social trust.

Despite these problems and the development of alternative, context-specific questions in cross-national survey research, the standard question of generalized social trust continues to be widely used. And this is so mainly for two reasons: First, many believe that, despite its limitations, the standard question does tap generalized social trust, and second, the percentage of respondents who say “most people can be trusted” has a high level of cross-national variation. This is shown by the most recent European Values and World Values Studies, conducted in 2005 to 2007. The data from those surveys display a range that goes from a high of 74% of respondents in Norway who think that

“most people can be trusted” to a low of 4% in Trinidad and Tobago (see Table 1). This significant variation in trust also correlates with other variables, such as the level of economic development and democracy. Richer and more democratic societies tend to express higher levels of generalized social trust.

Trust and Economic Development

Cross-national comparative studies as well as more particular case studies on social trust have shown that some societies are highly trusting while others are driven by a culture of suspicion and distrust. The economic and political implications of this variation have been documented in various works. On the economic side, some authors argue that high-trusting societies where social networks exist are far more efficient and much more able to take advantage of information technology, for

example, than low-trusting societies. The latter face several organizational and competitive disadvantages when compared with the former. Others argue that norms of trust and reciprocity facilitate good economic performance and create economic prosperity. Part of the explanation is that trust diminishes the costs of transaction and makes economic relations more efficient. Also, data gathered in different environments have shown that the rates of financial investment are related to trust, thereby, influencing economic growth. Organizational perspectives have linked trust to teamwork and higher levels of productivity. From any of these perspectives, trust is clearly an economic asset.

Trust, Democracy, and Social Capital

On the political side, the relationship between trust and democracy has been extensively discussed.

Table 1 Social Trust by Country: Percentage of Respondents Who Say “Most People Can Be Trusted”

Norway	74	Italy	29	Mexico	16
Sweden	68	Uruguay	28	Serbia	15
Finland	59	Ukraine	28	Burkina Faso	15
China	52	Russia	27	Colombia	14
Vietnam	52	Ethiopia	24	Morocco	13
New Zealand	51	Taiwan	24	Cyprus	13
Switzerland	51	India	23	Chile	12
Australia	48	Bulgaria	22	Zambia	12
Netherlands	44	Andorra	21	Iran	11
Indonesia	43	Romania	20	Brazil	9
Canada	42	Spain	20	Malaysia	9
Thailand	42	Poland	19	Ghana	9
Hong Kong	41	France	19	Peru	6
Iraq	41	Egypt	18	Rwanda	5
USA	40	Slovenia	18	Turkey	5
Japan	39	Moldova	18	Trinidad & Tobago	4
Germany	34	Mali	17		
Jordan	31	South Africa	17		
Britain	30	Argentina	17		
South Korea	30	Guatemala	16		

Source: World Values Surveys, 2005–2007 (www.worldvaluessurvey.org).

Interpersonal trust is viewed as part of a set of values that are related to the development of democratic institutions, although the causal direction in this relationship has been the subject of an ongoing debate. The role of trust and its accompanying associational life influence the functioning of democracy, and civic engagement is thought to have a positive effect on democratic governance. But this is where a more general concept of social capital unfolds, and social trust is only a part of it. Social capital, generally understood in terms of social networks and norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness, is a more comprehensive construct. However, social trust can be seen as an important but autonomous component. Recent research has found, for example, that the link between social capital and socioeconomic development is mainly mediated by trust and not by an organized civil society. Thus, social trust is a component of social capital, but it should not be equated to it.

Social capital studies have recorded a steady decline in trust and associational life during the last decades, mainly in the United States. This decline has several theoretical and empirical implications, and scholars have asked whether a decline in trust is also a decline in democracy or a decline in socioeconomic development. Following social capital studies, as trust and social networks are strongly associated to giving and volunteering, to participatory communities, to higher levels of tolerance, and as Robert Putnam has called them, to “many other forms of civic virtue,” the decline of trust has been an alarming trend. Some argue that this decline is the result of an increase in economic inequality, which means that the once achieved horizontal social relations are returning to vertical and hierarchical ones. Others argue that the decline in associational life is only observed in traditional organizations but that, increasingly, autonomous individuals driven by self-expression and emancipative values are creating different ways of organizing, even through the use of new

technologies. Trust, for example, is seen as part of a more postmodern cultural syndrome of well-being than a part of civic traditions.

We can confidently say that the literature on social trust takes on a vibrant topic that is not limited to the macrophenomena of democracy and socioeconomic development but that contributes to important issues in organizational research, where social trust is viewed as a process, even a strategy, for successful joint work between individuals, groups, institutions, and nations.

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See also Civic Culture; Civic Participation; Political Culture; Social Capital; Tolerance

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U

UNILATERALISM

The most precise and parsimonious definition of unilateralism is numerical: a state acting alone. However, unilateralism has a wide range of definitions, none of which has emerged as predominant within the literature. A further complication is that some definitions of unilateralism are general and can be applied to either security affairs or the global economy, whereas other definitions are specific to only one of these realms. This entry first reviews four general definitions of unilateralism, followed by two definitions that pertain specifically to the global economy, and then two definitions concerning security affairs.

Although the term *unilateralism* has long existed, it rose dramatically in prominence during the George W. Bush administration. The Bush administration was widely regarded by scholars and pundits as promoting a strong turn in U.S. foreign policy away from multilateralism and toward unilateralism. The widespread debate over the Bush administration's foreign policy led to greatly renewed interest among scholars about the practice and consequences of unilateralism.

Of the four general definitions of unilateralism, the easiest one to operationalize focuses on the number of countries that coordinate: An action with a single participating state is regarded as unilateral, whereas one that has three or more coordinating states is multilateral. The clarity of this definition notwithstanding, many analysts question whether the mere fact that three or more

states coordinate is sufficient to constitute multilateralism. Critics of this quantitative definition argue that the real question is not how many countries coordinate but the way in which they do. Some critics argue that for an action to be considered multilateral, the burden of coordination must be widely shared. These analysts argue, for example, that if a powerful country contributes the vast majority of its troops for a military operation, then it is still best seen as unilateral even if three or more countries do participate in the action. In his critique of the quantitative definition, John Ruggie argues that what distinguishes multilateralism is that it involves the coordination of policies by three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct. In this view, ad hoc coordination by even a large group of states should not be considered multilateralism. The fact that more than 20 countries contributed troops to the 2003 Iraq War, for example, does not constitute multilateralism since this coordination did not occur on the basis of generalized principles but instead reflected particular interests.

The second general definition of unilateralism is a state acting on the basis of narrow self-interest without regard for the interests of other countries. Using this rubric, unilateralism is easy to identify in those situations when a state acts by itself against the wishes of all other countries. Conversely, an action is clearly not unilateral if all countries agree that it should be undertaken. Yet it is rare in international politics that either all or no states agree with a given action, and the literature is unclear regarding how many countries must agree

with an action before it is no longer considered unilateral. In this regard, analysts sometimes apply the term *unilateralism* to actions that many states see as beneficial and participate in.

A related general definition of unilateralism is when a state acts without consulting other states beforehand. The literature does not specify, however, how much consultation must occur for a state or leader to avoid being regarded as undertaking a unilateral foreign policy. In this regard, the Bush administration was generally viewed as acting unilaterally during its first term, in significant part because it was seen as not consulting very much with its allies. Yet American consultation with its allies on some matters—such as intelligence sharing regarding terrorists—remained extremely high under the Bush administration. Moreover, in areas where U.S. consultation with allies did drop off, the decline was not to zero; for example, the United States continued to have a very close working relationship on military operations with states such as Britain and Australia.

A final general definition of unilateralism is a state not complying with international institutions and/or withdrawing from them. Actions such as the Bush administration's withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, its failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and its efforts to undermine the International Criminal Court were roundly criticized by the international community as unilateral. As with the previous two general definitions, the literature lacks a threshold regarding this third definition: It is unclear exactly how much noncompliance with institutions and/or treaty withdrawals must occur before a state is regarded as pursuing a unilateral foreign policy in an overall sense. It is notable in this regard is that the Bush administration followed its predecessors in continuing to comply with many international institutions, particularly in the economic realm.

Unilateralism has two principal definitions with respect to the global economy, the first of which is a departure from the principle of nondiscrimination. The significance of nondiscrimination is typically outlined with respect to trade, in which a defining feature of the Bretton Woods order was the extension of most-favored-nation treatment to all members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Unilateralism can also be applied to the monetary sphere; in this regard,

unilateralism is typically equated with the creation of exclusive currency blocks, as occurred during the interwar period.

A second definition of unilateralism pertaining to the global economy is the aggressive use of power by a dominant state to force a weaker state to accept concessions in economic negotiations. Analysts who advance this definition, such as Jagdish Bhagwati, stress that a powerful state such as the United States is at inherent advantage over other states in bilateral negotiations. In this view, a departure from negotiations within the context of global international institutions such as the World Trade Organization constitutes unilateralism.

With respect to security affairs, there are two key definitions of unilateralism. The first focuses on operational conduct. According to this perspective, a military action is obviously unilateral if only one state participates. Yet it is rare for a state to act in the military realm without any help whatsoever from other states. In light of this, Sarah Kreps argues that an action by a coalition of states should still be considered unilateral if one state contributes the vast majority of the troops and financial resources and also if the lead state is able to effectively control the decisions made by the coalition. Kreps argues that from an operational standpoint, the 2003 Iraq War was clearly unilateral in nature since the United States contributed around 90% of the troops, bore the vast preponderance of the financial costs of the war, and was dominant in terms of the planning process for the timing and conduct of the military operation. She argues that, in comparison, the 1991 Gulf War was multilateral since it was much more balanced on all three of these dimensions: The United States provided less than 75% of the troops, was responsible for only 11.5% of the coalition expenditures for the war, and had relatively less authority regarding the planning of the war since most of the other major powers in the world also participated.

Second, many scholars define unilateralism in the security realm on the basis of whether an international institution authorizes or endorses a military action. Scholars who make this argument typically argue that a military action is unilateral if it does not receive the backing of the United Nations (UN). A key reason for this focus on the UN is international law. According to customary international law, the use of military force is

unlawful without the authorization of the UN (the sole exception is self-defense in response to an armed attack). Other scholars argue that it sets too high a standard to say that any action should be considered unilateral if it fails to receive UN authorization; they stress that if this standard were adopted, then the 1999 Kosovo War would be considered unilateral even though this military action was approved by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and was prosecuted collectively by its members. For these analysts, the Kosovo case suggests the need for a more narrow definition of unilateralism: A military action should be considered multilateral if it is approved by any international institution and is unilateral only if it completely fails to receive institutional backing.

Although the concept of unilateralism is used very prominently by scholars and pundits, analysts typically employ the term without specifying it. Given the plethora of different meanings of the term, it is incumbent to be precise about the particular definition that is being used. It is only recently that scholars have moved to establish detailed coding procedures for clearly distinguishing unilateralism from multilateralism, and more work along these lines would be beneficial.

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See also Foreign Policy Analysis; International Law;
International Organizations; Multilateralism

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UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations (UN) is an intergovernmental organization dedicated to the maintenance of international peace and security. It achieved nearly universal state membership in 2002. With 192 members at the beginning of the 21st century, the organization rests on the principle of collective security, by which its members commit themselves to reject the use of force in the settlement of their disputes and promise to act jointly against any aggressor. Founded at the close of the modern world's most destructive war, the final provisions of the UN Charter were negotiated at the San Francisco Conference, which met from April through June 1945. The organization came into being on October 24 of that year with the issuance of sufficient ratifications by member governments.

History and Philosophy

At the time of its creation, the UN was the latest manifestation of a 130-year-old search for mechanisms of international cooperation and law to supplant the traditional methods of national self-defense and war that had been common to international relations. Following the defeat of the French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte in 1815, the victorious allies gathered at the Congress of Vienna and crafted an arrangement dubbed the Concert of Europe to maintain a hoped-for peaceful continent. Under the arrangement, the major powers of Europe agreed to meet regularly and to act collectively against any threat to the post-Napoleonic settlement. Often considered a conservative settlement, the Vienna meeting nonetheless ushered in a reasonably tranquil 19th century, which experienced a creative expansion of international organizations. Early river commissions such as the Central Rhine Commission (1815) and the European Danube Commission (1856) reflected a new interest in “functional” international organizations that built trust among peoples by providing venues of cooperation to resolve common problems. The International Telegraphic Union (1865) and the Universal Postal Union (1874) paved the way for numerous future international agencies dealing with issues as diverse as narcotic drugs, agriculture, health, weights and measures,

UNION

See Labor Movement

railroads, time zones, and tariffs. "Political" international organizations meant to ease tensions and resolve formal disputes between governments also proliferated. In 1899 and 1907, the Hague Conferences established the Permanent Court of Arbitration for the resolution of legal controversies between states.

The Congress System collapsed in the carnage of World War I. However, the war itself convinced many leaders of the need for a world organization with the authority and political will to avert another major conflict. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson led the effort at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference to create the League of Nations, committed to maintaining peace and security, fostering international cooperation, and developing comprehensive international law as enforceable substitutes for the use of force by any member of the league.

The League came into being on January 10, 1920, with its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. The organization consisted of an Assembly composed of all members, a Council that included permanent members from the great powers, and a Secretariat. Both the Assembly and the Council required unanimity on any decision. The Covenant also established a Permanent Court of International Justice to hear disputes between states and a mandate system (whereby major colonizing powers would prepare colonial areas for independence) that foreshadowed the end of colonialism. The most controversial provision of the Covenant, Article 10, called for collective security to assure nations of the League's protection against aggression.

Wilson's League proved ineffective in resolving the most important conflicts of the interwar period. In no small measure, the U.S. rejection of the Versailles Treaty, and, therefore, its nonparticipation in the League, undercut the will and authority of the organization. Also, the Covenant requirement that decisions in the League's Assembly and Council secure unanimous approval—acknowledging each member's sovereignty—made action to stop an aggressor nearly impossible. The League collapsed as fascist governments ignored the terms of the 1919 peace settlement and carried out aggression in both Europe and Asia.

Just as the League of Nations was the brainchild of Woodrow Wilson, so too the UN had its origins in the deliberations of an American president and his administration.

When President Franklin Delano Roosevelt entered World War II as an advocate of great-power realism, he argued that the League had been too dependent on world public opinion and not adequately sensitive to the realities of power. By 1943 he had come to believe that only a world organization that had none of the League's weaknesses was needed to secure the postwar peace. Roosevelt himself would name the organization the "United Nations," taking the name from the "Declaration by United Nations," signed by the allies in January 1942.

Roosevelt's views shifted in part because of the strong advocacy by the U.S. State Department for some postwar agency that could enforce the rule of law and the pacific settlement of international disputes. U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull was the primary promoter of the idea. He established a departmental committee to draft plans for an international organization. This committee, largely under Leo Pasvolsky's leadership, worked until the end of the war to develop the proposals that would ultimately be the basis for the UN Charter itself. The projected Charter, like the League's Covenant before it, created a plenary conference, a secretariat, agencies for technical services, and most important an executive committee, in this case consisting of the four allied powers—the United States, Great Britain, China, and the former USSR—plus other nonpermanent member states. In a series of meetings during the spring and summer of 1943, Roosevelt informally gave his blessing to the effort to obtain British and Soviet assent to a new international organization. Following the Tehran Conference of wartime leaders in November 1943, Roosevelt approved a "Plan for the Establishment of an International Organization for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security."

The most serious Charter issue that Roosevelt had to solve in the final months of the war was the question of voting; from his perspective, the issue was how to protect the traditional sovereignty of the nation-states that would be members of the world organization and yet not allow the UN to fall victim to the requirement of unanimity among the members. The topic was addressed at the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference and at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. Josef Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, while acceding to

majority voting in both the General Assembly and the contemplated Security Council, insisted on an absolute veto in the latter even over the discussion of any issue that threatened international peace or security. The United States opposed the Soviet position, and in the end, a compromise emerged under which any issue could be brought to the Council but substantive action on the matter required an enlarged majority and the concurrence of the five permanent members—the four allied great powers plus France—in effect, giving each a veto.

As many as 50 governments sent representatives to the UN Conference on International Organization in San Francisco. While the Big Three—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain—already had agreed on important aspects of the new organization, the participation of many other nations, with their own interests, made the conference a complex exercise in multilateral diplomacy.

The great powers often were required to make meaningful alterations in the proposed Charter in order to achieve the necessary votes for passage. In response to small-state concerns, the competence of the General Assembly was expanded. It was given control of the UN budget. The conference agreed that the Assembly could discuss any issue, including security concerns and threats to the peace, at least until the Security Council was “seized” with the issue. Further, the secretary-general, elected by the General Assembly, would be able to bring any matter that he believed threatened international peace and security to the attention of the Council (UN Charter, Article 99).

States from Latin America, Africa, and Asia envisioned an institution of universal membership with extensive activities in the economic, cultural, and human rights domains. In particular, they pressed for a UN role in the achievement of “independence” for existing colonial possessions. Their demands led to a declaration on self-government being incorporated in the final Charter. Under the leadership of Latin American governments, there was also an effort to promote human rights. The final UN Charter draft reflected this new concern, becoming the first international treaty to use the term *human rights*, in this case citing those rights six times in the text and calling for their protection. To support this effort, the founding delegates called for the creation of a Commission on Human

Rights. Once established in 1946, the Commission proceeded under the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt to draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Structure and Purposes of the United Nations

The UN Charter serves as the constitutional basis for the organization’s structures and procedures, the rights and responsibilities of UN members, and the UN’s authority to act in the international community. The Charter envisions an institution with revolutionary powers and authority in international affairs. The organization is granted not only the traditional instruments of diplomatic practice but also the authority to impose crushing sanctions and to use military force (Article 41), with nation-states required to put their troops at the disposal of the institution. Chapters VI and VII of the Charter provide the legal legitimacy for these sweeping powers. Chapter VII contains the primary mechanisms for collective security, allowing the organization to undertake enforcement measures, while Chapter VI provides for the traditional means of diplomacy to achieve the “peaceful settlement” of disputes.

Chapter VII, Article 39, gives the Security Council the authority under international law to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” and to “decide what measures shall be taken” to halt the threat or punish the aggressor. Article 40 empowers the Council to take provisional measures to prevent an escalation or aggravation of a dispute. In July 1987, the Soviet Union and the United States for the first time joined in a resolution (598) on the Middle East and demanded that Iran and Iraq “observe an immediate cease-fire” in their ongoing war. Citing Article 40, the Council decided “to consider further steps to ensure compliance” if either of the parties refused to accept the UN’s demands.

According to the original conception of the UN as the guarantor of international peace, the organization was expected to command military forces under the authority and direction of the Security Council and with the help of a Military Staff Committee. All member states, as charged by Articles 43 and 44, were obliged to contribute troops and equipment to these UN-led operations.

Despite the intentions of the founders, the Military Staff Committee quickly fell into disuse, largely ignored after 1946 as the Cold War intensified. In place of direct UN military action, the more common practice emerged of the Council empowering individual states to take such action, usually in the form of ad hoc coalitions. In this context, the Council's role of legitimation is critical. Using Article 48, which requires member states "or some of them," to "carry out the decisions of the Security Council," the body has regularly authorized coalitions "to use all necessary means" to restore peace and stability. Thus, the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq and interventions in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, Albania, Liberia, Afghanistan, and the Central African Republic were authorized UN-enforcement operations.

On paper, Chapter VII worked a revolution in international politics. The Cold War, however, made that revolution more theory than practice. With the Security Council locked in a superpower stalemate, Chapter VII provisions generally could not be implemented when conflicts arose. Council members and the General Assembly were forced to fall back on the more traditional methods outlined in Chapter VI in the hope of resolving a dispute or ending hostilities.

Chapter VI describes mechanisms for noncoercive measures to settle disputes peacefully between nations.

On its own, Chapter VI gives the Council little beyond the means of international public persuasion to end disputes. Yet without the far-reaching remedies of Chapter VII at their disposal, the Security Council and the General Assembly often have turned to broad interpretations of Chapter VI to end a particular conflict. It is through this process of reinterpretation that the devices of "peace-keeping" and "observer" missions have come about. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld coined the term *Chapter VI½* to designate the Charter-based authority for these operations. A new "gray area" of UN action emerged, keeping UN involvement relevant to the resolution of disputes in ways that neither the Charter formally established nor earlier practice by the League of Nations contemplated.

The Charter establishes six principal organs to guide the organization: (1) the General Assembly,

which serves as the plenary body of the full membership; (2) the Security Council, made up of five permanent members and, as of 2009, 10 nonpermanent members who are elected on a rotating basis to 2-year terms; (3) the Economic and Social Council, which oversees the myriad functional agencies reporting to the world body; (4) the Trusteeship Council, which is now defunct, having presided over the end of the colonial system; (5) the Secretariat headed by the secretary-general, which provides the international civil servants for all the administrative tasks of the UN; and (6) the International Court of Justice (ICJ), successor to the League of Nations Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). All but the ICJ are headquartered in New York City. The Court sits in the former chambers of the PCIJ in The Hague, the Netherlands.

These six organs are at the center of a much larger umbrella organization. The "United Nations System" includes a full array of UN entities, programs, funds, specialized agencies, and international bodies related to the UN and scattered around the world. Much of the work of the UN is done far from New York City, in other headquarters cities, most particularly in Geneva, Switzerland, where more diplomatic meetings are convened each year than in New York and where the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the International Labour Organization have their offices; in Nairobi, Kenya, the home of the UN Environment Programme; and in Vienna, Austria, the seat of the International Atomic Energy Commission.

Some entities in the UN system act independently, but as a rule, intrasystem communication is directed from the various wings to the six principal organs of the UN. The secretary-general manages this sprawling system by way of the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB). The CEB is made up of the heads of UN bodies and agencies. The specialized agencies on the CEB are autonomous, self-governing entities that, nonetheless, fall under the rubric of the UN. In 2009, 17 specialized agencies were affiliated with the UN, including well-known entities such as the World Health Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, World Bank Group, Food and Agriculture Organization, and Universal Postal Union. Among the UN "Programmes and Funds,"

the most important are the UN Development Programme, World Food Programme, UN Children's Fund, UN Population Fund, UN Environment Programme, and International Fund for Agricultural Development.

The public "face" of this worldwide system is the secretary-general, who is nominated by the Security Council and elected by the General Assembly to a 5-year renewable term. By tradition, the post is never held by an individual from a major power. As of 2011, there have been eight secretaries-general: Trygve Lie (Norway, 1946–1952), Dag Hammarskjöld (Sweden, 1953–1961), U Thant (Burma, 1961–1971), Kurt Waldheim (Austria, 1972–1981), Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (Peru, 1982–1991), Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt, 1992–1996), Kofi Annan (Ghana, 1997–2006), and Ban Ki-moon (South Korea, 2007–). Secretaries-general must be both adroit managers and world-class diplomats. Often during their tenure, their attempts to fulfill both of these roles have led them into conflict with one or the other of the great powers. In the 1960s, for example, the Soviet Union attempted to replace Dag Hammarskjöld, calling him a puppet of U.S. policy. In the 1990s, the United States vetoed a second term for Boutros Boutros-Ghali, largely for being ineffective in carrying out administrative and budgetary reform in the UN.

The United Nations and the Cold War

In the late 1940s, the expected cooperation among the world's great powers essential to UN success dissolved into a Cold War contest between the United States and the Soviet Union, each with their respective allies. Superpower competition affected the working of the UN Security Council most intensely because the veto could deadlock any contemplated UN action. Early confrontations in Iran, Greece, and Turkey highlighted the ineffectiveness of the Council when the national security interests of the United States and the former USSR conflicted. They also foreshadowed Council inaction in later conflicts in Vietnam (1947–1974), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968). Only in Korea in 1951 was the Security Council able to invoke its powers under the Charter's collective security provisions to declare the North Korean government the aggressor in the conflict and to order member nations to take all necessary military measures to

repulse the attack. This was only possible, however, because the Soviet Union was boycotting Council meetings at the time to protest Western unwillingness to seat the new government of Mao Zedong as the legitimate representative of China in the body.

When the Soviet delegate returned to the Security Council, the United States circumvented the Council by pushing through the General Assembly the "Uniting for Peace Resolution," which allowed the Assembly to make recommendations on the restoration of peace and security when the Council was deadlocked by the veto. The Soviet government protested the maneuver as an unconstitutional revision of the Charter. Korea was a prime early indication of the Cold War's impact on the UN. Fighting ended with an armistice in 1953, but the country remained into the 21st century, long after the end of the Cold War, the last divided country dating from the end of World War II.

The Congo crisis of the early 1960s further underscored the Cold War challenge to the UN. When the Congo became independent from Belgium in 1960, a complicated civil war broke out, with one side being supported by the Soviet Union, one side by Washington, and a third side trying to secede. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld tried to insert a UN presence to bring the disorder to an end. Believing Hammarskjöld to be carrying out the wishes of the United States, the Soviet Union demanded a reorganization of the office of secretary-general, replacing the single secretary with a "Troika," whereby there would be a three-person executive with equal representation from the Western bloc, the Eastern bloc, and the neutral countries in the UN. The Soviets, along with the French, also refused to donate their assessment for the Congo operation, claiming it to be illegal since it had not been approved by the Security Council. Their refusal to pay contributed to a serious financial crisis for the UN that would plague the organization for the rest of the century.

Because of the deadlock in the Security Council, the locus of UN activity shifted to the General Assembly, where, after 1960, states from the developing world gained a working majority. As a result, UN attention shifted to the problems of the so-called Third World. Economic development and the amelioration of social dislocation in postcolonial




Figure 1 The United Nations System

Source: UN Department of Public Information (2009). Used by permission.

regions became primary concerns of the membership. In 1965, the Assembly established the UN Development Programme to address the extraordinary challenges of poverty, underdevelopment, and the humanitarian crisis in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Of course, General Assembly decisions imposed no mandatory requirements on the member states. Consequently, the Assembly depended on moving world public opinion and putting in place new programs that could command near-universal support for their success. In the context of the Cold War, where the Soviet/Third World bloc, after 1970, had a working majority in the Assembly, finding such a consensus proved nearly impossible. UN debate became increasingly acrimonious, and UN decisions proved to be less and less commanding of world attention.

Post-Cold War Cooperation and Reform at the UN

The 1980s witnessed the first glimmer of a new and expanded role for a world body such as the UN. The rise of Mikhail Gorbachev to power in the Soviet Union in 1985 and the Kremlin's rapid fashioning of a new, less antagonistic foreign policy opened the door to possible U.S.–USSR cooperation under UN auspices to address global conflicts. By the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Gulf War in 1991, Gorbachev's anticipation of an effective UN seemed prescient, as Moscow and Washington cooperated within the Security Council to declare Iraq the aggressor and to authorize military action under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Success in the Gulf War translated to a new optimism that the UN might be an effective instrument for resolving global problems. After 1985, UN peacekeeping operations evolved into nation-building experiments, with some success in Namibia, Cambodia, and East Timor. More problematic were UN efforts in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The UN, reinforced by a newly engaged Security Council, took on a plethora of global challenges: terrorism in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States; HIV/AIDS, particularly in Africa; pandemic disease in Asia; climate change; human rights violations, which it met not only with sanctions against governments

complicit in human rights abuses but also by its creation of the International Criminal Court; and the endemic economic and social problems of the developing world, which it attempted to meet by the implementation of a set of Millennium Development Goals, established in 2000.

Under strong pressure from the United States, the UN also carried out a significant reform program. Particularly under the leadership of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the UN apparatus streamlined its budgetary and administrative processes, cutting the staff by a quarter and operating with a zero-growth budget for nearly 5 years. After 2005, UN members also took up structural reform. They replaced the much maligned Commission on Human Rights with a new Human Rights Council and established a Peacebuilding Commission to manage assistance to postconflict states and regions. Eased regulations opened many of the UN decision-making bodies to influence from nongovernmental organizations and private actors such as corporations, social groups, and individuals. There were also lengthy discussions and several proposals to expand the Security Council to include states representative of new centers of power in world politics. While several permanent members of the Council blocked these efforts for the time being, there was a general recognition that structural change at the UN would need to come sooner or later to reflect the changed realities in the international system. As the millennium began, there appeared to be an emergent “new” UN, still reflective of the basic Charter provisions established in 1945 but prepared to respond to the changed conditions of the 21st century.

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See also Collective Security; Intergovernmentalism;
International Law; International Organizations;
International System; Multilateralism; Sanctions;
Sustainable Development

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UTILITARIANISM

Throughout the history of moral and political philosophy, the idea of welfare as a moral good has repeatedly appeared. Utilitarians distinctively take welfare consequences to be the central good and the principle by which to judge the morality of individuals' actions. It would be odd, even perverse, to suppose that political theory should not attend to the consequences of actions or policies, because consequences are the very point of important policies. Hence, moral and political philosophy is a joint program in the view of utilitarians. Indeed, Jeremy Bentham's most cited statement on utilitarianism is in his 1789 book *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Thereafter, utilitarianism was more or less a dominant

moral theory into the beginning of the 20th century with Henry Sidgwick's *The Methods of Ethics* (1907) in philosophy and down to this day in the work of many economists. Herbert Hart (1958/1983) states that it dominated legal theory from Bentham through roughly the 1960s, when somewhat disorganized and often contradictory theories of rights rose to a brief heyday. Since then, a hundred flowers and not a few weeds have grown. This entry examines both act utilitarianism, which focuses on the consequences of *individual actions*, and rule utilitarianism, which states that we should act in accordance with the *rules* that achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number. It also considers the role that institutional rules play in utilitarian assessment of public policy and examines the utilitarian perspective on distributive justice.

During all of this development, utilitarianism was often taken in new directions. For much of its first century, it was grounded in the value theory of interpersonally comparable and additive utility theory. This was cardinal rather than ordinal utility, roughly in keeping with views in economics, most especially in the utilitarian discussion of Francis Edgeworth. If utility is interpersonally comparable, 10 utiles for you is equal to 10 utiles for me in our overall evaluation of our society. If it is additive, your utiles added to mine sum to 20 utiles.

Paul Samuelson notes that many issues in economics can be well understood only if we treat utility as not simply additive but as ordinal. You can prefer A to B, but you cannot say by how much you prefer it. It follows that your utility from a policy cannot simply be added to mine to yield an overall value of the policy. Although this view has been criticized because it is not part of Bentham's statement of utilitarianism, such critics incorrectly assume that utilitarianism is all and only what Bentham states. In fact, utilitarian theory develops in tandem with the value theory of utility in other fields, particularly, of course, in economics but also in psychology and in recent experimental games. More typically, John Rawls (1999) compares his own theory of justice with utilitarianism. But after smartly canvassing David Hume's value theory and implicit utilitarianism, which he seems to think are more credible than Bentham's, Rawls then argues for the superiority

of his own theory over utilitarianism as though the only definitive utilitarian vision is that of Bentham (1789/1970).

An obvious problem with ordinal utilitarianism is that it is much harder to do aggregations. We cannot simply add everything up to determine how great a particular community's welfare is. It is important to note that this difficulty is not an artifact of the theory; it is inherent in the world to which the theory is applied. On our best current understandings of economic value theory, the ordinal, noninterpersonally comparable value theory is descriptively correct. It is the underlying reality that is difficult. The developments in utility theory and therefore in utilitarianism are clearly driven by the wish to achieve realism.

Rawls gives himself the trivially easy task of basically attacking act utilitarianism, which should be distinguished from rule utilitarianism and which focuses our concern narrowly on individuals' actions, many of which cannot be motivated by interest but only, if it is available, by beneficence. Indeed, no standard classical moral theory for individuals can be the basis for a distributive theory. No serious utilitarians would disagree with this point, nor would they think it relevant to start from an account of individual action to reach distributive judgments. To dismiss utilitarianism in its most primitive Benthamite version in order to reach conclusions about distributive justice is irrelevant both for any theory of distributive justice and for aptly sophisticated utilitarianism.

Hume's general concern is the naturalist analysis of our motivations and actions. He virtually dismisses act utilitarianism—before the term existed—because it requires too much beneficence, which Hume thinks is in too short supply to have much impact at the societal level. He thinks that the supposition that we can all be motivated by beneficence violates human nature. Our concern with ourselves largely trumps our beneficence.

Any moral theory that cannot address institutional issues may be reduced to a sideline game with trumped-up examples. A useful theory must be a joint moral and political theory and must address real issues in the world in which we live. Combining moral and political theory is an easy challenge for utilitarianism, which from Bentham forward, and arguably even from Hume forward, is inherently a joint theory. We can label the

broader concern as institutional utilitarianism. Such utilitarianism addresses many of the problematic issues that have arisen since Bentham. Beginning arguably with John Stuart Mill, theorists have tried to accommodate the theory to institutions and norms with a theory of rule utilitarianism. This idea solves the seeming problems of calculating which of the available actions would contribute the most to overall welfare. Unfortunately, the difficulties in determining what rules we should follow might commonly be as great as those in directly calculating what action to take. This difficulty has generally been resolved in practice—typically without any reference to utilitarianism—by creating institutions that guide us or even control us in following institutional rules. Daily life is full of such institutional rules. Many of these merely coordinate us on some good action, as argued by Hume for a remarkable array of social contexts. It could be true that many people see the usefulness—one of Hume's favorite terms—of various institutional arrangements, but if they follow the rules of the institutions, that will be because the institutions can give them incentives to do so, not because they see and are motivated by the good of having people comply in general.

Finally, we take note of the intellectual reception of utilitarianism. Far more than any other moral theory, utilitarianism is invoked explicitly or implicitly by social scientists. This fact does not make the theory morally correct. Most social scientists are essentially naturalists. With Hume, they seek to explain people's moral views, their morally motivated actions, and their moral failings, as when their interests trump their moral visions. Utilitarians and social scientists share a central concern with institutions and their workings. Institutions have a minor secondary role in most of moral theory and no role at all in some of it.

Competing moral visions, such as Kantianism and virtue theory, are taken far less seriously by nonphilosophers. Strangely, its critics arguably have spent more time on utilitarianism than its advocates have. Many of the criticisms wrongly claim that utilitarianism is self-contradictory. For example, critics argue that utilitarians must spend so much time calculating that they have no time left for living, so that utilitarianism is crippling in practice. This criticism was demolished with ridicule by Mill nearly 2 centuries ago, and yet it lives

on. We have institutions to handle many complicated issues. Often, we can rely on the past experiences of millions of others who have gone this way before. Individuals are therefore not left in the lurch when they face an important decision for action. They can act and then get on with living.

It is interesting that Rawls (1955) has given utilitarian theory one of the best defenses against a pervasive but misguided attack. Not surprisingly, it is in the realm of justice under the law. To the commonplace objection that a utilitarian sheriff must violate the law and allow the lynching of an innocent prisoner to quell the impending violence of a mob, Rawls argues that this is a specifically institutional problem for which utilitarianism has adequate resources. Implicitly, he argues for institutional utilitarianism. Unfortunately, he forgets that vision in his later theory of justice.

The main criticism is that the focus on utility or welfare and therefore on consequentialism is misguided—that is, a moral theory should focus instead on evaluating actions and not their outcomes, as pointed out by Gertrude Anscombe. This is to say that utilitarianism is thoroughly misguided. There is no credibly insightful way to respond to such an attack. What theory of distributive justice, for example, could possibly make compelling sense without attention to the consequences? The disagreement here has come to have an almost ideological tone. It is pointless to adjudicate this difference. It is far more compelling to focus on the structures of utilitarianism and competing theories rather than on their whole-cloth justification or rejection.

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See also Constructivism; Economic Theories of Politics; Game Theory; Individualism; Liberalism; Normative Political Theory

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UTOPIANISM

Utopianism is the systematic use of utopias—that is, forms of thinking that depict a desirable but impractical state of things. As with all other isms, the concept may also have a pejorative connotation but not necessarily so.

The term *utopia* derives from the eponymous book (1516) by Thomas More, who coined it to designate the imaginary ideal society that he described in the second part of his book. More intentionally, it played with the ambivalence of the term, since *u-topia*, from ancient Greek, can be a contraction of both *eu-topos* (the “good-place”) and *ou-topos* (the “no-place”). This, as we shall see, would have enduring consequences. With time, the term came generally to mean all ideas or proposals that are good but unrealistic or even impossible. As Karl Mannheim famously put it, a state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous with the reality within which it occurs: Utopias break the bonds of existing social order. This entry discusses the concept of utopianism by reconstructing its forms, its functions, and, finally, its prospects in the contemporary world.

Forms of Utopianism: “Good-Place” or “No-Place”?

Generally speaking, we can distinguish between two forms of utopianism. The first is the literary genre that followed the example of More's *Utopia*. Tommaso Campanella's *City of the Sun* (1602), Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis* (1627), and William Morris's *News From Nowhere* (1891) are all examples of such a genre. The description of the good-place often takes the form of a narrative by a traveler who discovers the land of utopia, typically an island or at least a territory separated from the others. Soem works in this genre are negative utopias, such as Orwell's *1984* (1949), which describes the dreadful dream of a disciplinary and totalitarian society ruled by Big Brother. These works are also at times called “dystopias”—from the Greek *dys*, which means abnormal, faulty, or bad.

The second form of utopianism is that of works that are not part of the literary utopian genre but nevertheless enclose significant utopian elements. Political treatises such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *The Social Contract* (1762) or Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace* (1795) contain important utopian moments in that they depict societies that are good-places but also no-places. The degree to which they are realizable is still a matter of controversy: Rousseau portrayed a direct democracy where human beings stand as free and equal, whereas Kant's *Perpetual Peace* defined the articles of the hypothetical international treaty that would put an end to the international condition of anarchy and war. In synthesis, a work contains utopian elements when it expresses the belief that some (or all) social evils can be eliminated and a better society created.

While in the case of the literary genre it is relatively easy to determine whether a work is part of it or not, the degree of utopianism of works that contain utopian moments is highly controversial. Things are further complicated by the fact that the concept of utopianism has at times a pejorative connotation. A significant example is Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels's *Communist Manifesto* (1848). On the one hand, perhaps, no other authors have been as influential in spreading the belief that social evils can be eradicated and a good-place developed. On the other hand, Marx and Engels's prospect of a communist society does

not derive from imagination alone but is grounded on a scientific analysis of the historical conditions of the proletariat. In their *Manifesto*, they strongly criticized former socialists such as Comte de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, and Robert Owen for their utopianism—used here in the pejorative sense. Having theorized about the emancipation of the proletariat in an epoch when the material conditions for emancipation were not yet ripe, utopian socialists necessarily failed in identifying the economic presuppositions for such a transformation, so that their social criticism remained a merely fantastic picture of an impossible future society. To such utopian socialism, in which personal inventiveness takes the place of historical action, Marx and Engels opposed their scientific communism.

Some authors have criticized utopianism by arguing that by depicting inexistent perfect societies, it can generate authoritarian and totalitarian attempts to endorse them. According to Karl Popper, for instance, utopias such as Plato's idealized republic endorse visions of a “closed” society that anticipate those of modern thinkers such as Hegel and Marx and must therefore be repudiated. Utopias can, however, be defended in many ways from their critics. First, one can argue that utopias are by definition no-places. Indeed, most utopian thinkers did not even think of trying to enforce their schemes of perfect society. Even those who actually tried to transform their no-places into something real most often favored means such as education and small-scale experiments. Those who endorsed the possibility of a violent revolution remain a minority.

Second, the accusation of totalitarianism holds at best only for major utopias. The distinction between major and minor utopias is another helpful distinction to group the different forms that utopianism can take. As Jay Winter observed, major utopians are those, such as Hitler and Stalin, who radically aimed at extirpating all social evils from the world and resorted to unconditional violence to realize their projects. Their totalitarian visions and their commitment to ruthless removal from the world of those malevolent elements blocking the path to a beneficent future, even at the price of extermination, render them *major* utopians. Minor utopianism is generated by imaginings of liberation on a usually smaller scale, which also sketch out a world very different from the one

we live in but from which not all social conflicts and evils are eradicated. Examples of such minor utopians are the authors of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) or the ideologists of ecological movements.

The Functions of Utopianism

Against the critics of utopianism, it can also be observed that the latter performs very important functions within society. In the first place, utopias are the means to exercising a *critique* of the present. By depicting “good-places,” they tell us where we are and therefore also how far away we are from that ideal. It comes therefore as no surprise to find out that the first part of More’s *Utopia* was devoted to the analysis of the evils affecting the society More lived in. Even when utopians do not explicitly go through the detailed description of the evils of society, a criticism is implicit in the radical alternative to the existing order that they disclose. To put it in a nutshell, utopias transcend reality but do not depart from it.

Utopianism has therefore an important regulative function. By “regulative,” we mean the capacity of an idea to serve as a guiding ideal for human conduct independent of its content of reality. Utopias in this sense are not necessarily blueprints for the creation of a radically new society. They are the means to measure the good and the bad contained in each society. The presupposition of such a critique is the conviction that the current state of affairs is modifiable. This can be the result of a belief in the perfectibility of human nature or of the social world.

Finally, we should observe that utopias also help develop new ideals. Utopias not only tell us where we stand, they also uncover the new directions that we may take. They are the result of the work of the imagination that discloses alternative scenarios and, therefore, enrich the sense of human possibility. As Victor Hugo once said, today’s utopia is tomorrow’s reality. The aphorism is usually understood in the sense that utopias can be realized, at least to a certain extent. But we could also reverse it by saying that tomorrow’s realities are today’s utopias. Indeed, modern conquests such as the abolition of slavery or universal suffrage have all been utopias once. In a way, all ideas that contribute to social progress have to contain a certain

degree of utopianism insofar as what they portray is a no-place.

The Prospects of Utopianism Today

We have seen that utopianism unfolds itself in the disclosure of “good-places” that are also “no-places.” This also means that utopianism breaks away from the present but only to criticize it. One could even argue that utopianism is realistic in the sense that it tells us where we do not stand. Of course, utopias can be more or less realistic in this sense. If the literary utopias of the Golden Age or the *Paradise Lost* after the original sin have very little grasp on contemporary reality, the most significant utopias of modernity have all contributed to the critique of existing societies and the disclosing of new directions for their development. Utopias are often reality whose time is not yet ripe. This clearly emerges if we think of major social conquests such as universal suffrage or the abolition of apartheid, which used to appear as impossible, utopian goals. The societies that have been created after their achievement are not perfect but certainly better ones.

Although historically less significant, we should also mention the attempts to realize integral utopias. Even if this remains a small phenomenon, there is a type of utopianism that has inspired the design of integrally utopian experimental communities. These living utopias range from religious communities such as the Oneida community in the United States, first formally established in 1848, to the socialist phalanxes inspired by Charles Fourier that were created in France and the United States in the 19th century, to the kibbutz, a form of Jewish settlement that began early in the 20th century.

Despite the fact that utopianism is far from vanishing, many authors have claimed that we live in an epoch of the death of utopia. For instance, they observe that the utopian genre is increasingly limited to literature and fiction. This is partly because the high degree of specialization in the social sciences has rendered global utopias unacceptable to the academic community. But according to some interpreters, behind the alleged death of utopias, there are more structural reasons. Herbert Marcuse, for instance, observed that the concept of utopia becomes obsolescent in the contemporary world

because today any transformation of the technical and natural environment is a real possibility. On the opposite front are those who consider utopia dead because they see no possibility of envisaging an alternative to the status quo. In an epoch when many celebrate the end of history, there seems to be no space in terms of time, and also no need, to embark on a journey to the land of utopia. Yet the societies we live in are far from perfect, and this ultimately guarantees the possibility of and also the persisting need for utopias.

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See also Communism; Democracy, Direct; Idealism;
Ideology; Justice; Kant, Immanuel; Marx, Karl;
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V

VALIDITY, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL

See Measurement

VALUES

Several definitions of *values* have been influential in the social sciences. For the anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn, a value is a conception of the desirable that influences the selection of available modes, means, and ends of action. Central to this definition is the notion of “a conception of the desirable.” A desire is a wish or a preference, while the term *desirable* goes beyond a wish or a want by bringing in considerations of moral content.

For the psychologist Milton Rokeach, a value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is preferable to opposite or converse modes of conduct or end states of existence. Rokeach’s definition includes several elements that can be used as a point of departure for discussing several dimensions of the value concept. Rokeach indicated that there are two types of values: (1) consummatory (end state of existence) and (2) instrumental (mode of conduct) values. Rokeach also differentiated between personal and social values. People have values that they want to emphasize in their own lives (self-centered) and also those that they would emphasize in their

social environment (society centered). This differentiation can be expanded to different domains, and one can talk about, for example, family values, work values, bureaucratic values, and political values.

For Rokeach, a value is a basic and relatively stable element in a person’s belief system. A value is a prescriptive belief wherein some means or end of action is judged to be desirable or undesirable. Values are sometimes contrasted with *attitudes*, which are often defined as a set of beliefs organized around a specific object or situation. A value is considered to be a basic (prescriptive) belief that often influences a specific attitude together with other beliefs. Beliefs, attitudes, and values can be conceived to lie on a center–periphery dimension where values are the most central, intensive, and enduring and beliefs are the most peripheral.

Building on Rokeach and others, Shalom Schwartz identifies six formal characteristics that are the defining features of basic human values: (1) Values are beliefs (2) about desirable end-states or behaviors (modes of conduct) that (3) transcend specific situations or actions, (4) guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and (5) are ordered by relative importance to form a value system. (6) The relative importance of values guides attitudes and behavior.

Other researchers such as Jan van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough consider the relationship between values and attitudes as a reciprocal one that, at the individual level, provides opportunities for the modification and adaptation of values. These scholars use the notion “value orientation”

for constellations of attitudes that can be patterned empirically and interpreted theoretically in a meaningful way. This implies that value orientations can be studied with data that include indicators of attitudes.

Culture can be considered as the rich complex of meanings, beliefs, symbols, norms, and values prevalent among people in a society. Cultural differences can be studied along many dimensions. Given that values are the central elements in individuals' belief systems, the values that are emphasized in a society are a very central feature of culture. A major conceptual advantage of an approach in which values are central is that values can be considered as important intermediate variables between several independent background variables and various variables that can be considered to be consequences of values.

Sociostructural, personal (including personality traits), and various institutional variables can be considered independent variables that can explain variations in value priorities. Values are considered determinants of virtually all kinds of social behavior: evaluations and attitudes, moral judgments, and justifications of self and others. Values are also determinants of political behavior, for example, various types of political participation and voting behavior.

Given the central intermediate role values have in the causal chain, from background variables to behavior, values often play a central role in *explaining* the impact of background variables on behavior. Some general value dimensions have received considerable attention. First, these are presented. Then, the focus is on political value dimensions, political value change and comparative patterns of value priorities, and political values' antecedents and consequences.

General Value Dimensions

The Dutch social scientist Geert Hofstede's studies of national cultural differences have received worldwide attention. Culture consists of values, rituals, heroes, and symbols, according to Hofstede, but values are seen as most fundamental. His famous five dimensions of national cultures are power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus collectivism, masculinity versus femininity, and long- versus short-term orientations.

Hofstede studied in detail national differences in culture in more than 50 nations along these dimensions and examined the consequences of the cultural dimensions along a series of domains, for example, family patterns, school and work organizations, and politics.

Another influential theory of human values was formulated by Schwartz, who describes 10 types of basic human values that are distinguished by their motivational goals. These values are power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security. This theory formulates a structure of dynamic relations among the values. This is indicated by a classification of the 10 value types in a circular continuum. Adjacent value types share some motivational emphases and are therefore compatible, while other values are more distant from each other and are considered to be conflicting or even diametrically opposed.

The oppositions can also be summarized by organizing the values into two bipolar higher order dimensions. One dimension contrasts openness to change and conservation values. This dimension puts self-direction and stimulation values—which emphasize independent action, thought, and feeling and readiness for new experiences—in opposition to conservation values, security, conformity, and tradition—which emphasize self-restriction, order, and resistance to change. The second higher order dimension contrasts self-enhancement and self-transcendence value types. This dimension puts power and achievement values—which emphasize one's pursuit of success and dominance of others—in opposition to universalism and benevolence values—which involve concern for the welfare and interests of others. There has also been considerable research on the causes and consequences of each of these value types.

Political Values and Political Value Dimensions

Consummatory political values can be considered as end states that individuals would like to see characterize the society as a whole and see implemented through the political system. Instrumental political values are modes of conduct that are considered legitimate (or illegitimate) to influence political decisions, for example, various types of political participation and ways of influencing

political decisions. In political science, the concept of values is at the core of David Eastons's famous definition of politics—as interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society.

The most well-known political value dimension is that of the materialist/postmaterialist value orientations. These value orientations were originally formulated by Ronald Inglehart, who argues that “new” postmaterialist values are deeply rooted and stand in opposition to more traditional materialist values. Materialist values emphasize economic and physical security, such as economic stability and growth, law and order, and strong defense. Postmaterialist values emphasize self-expression, subjective well-being, and quality of life. The new postmaterialist political values are central to the “New Politics” because these values are associated with new political issues such as environmental concerns, lifestyle issues, social and political participation, minority rights and social equality and social issues, and a change in the social base for radical, change-oriented politics. Another way of conceptualizing the New Politics is represented by *environmental versus economic growth values*. Today, this conflict is firmly rooted in the public consciousness, and in many West European countries, conflicts over environmental values seem to be the most manifest expression of the New Politics conflict. A clear manifestation of this is the emergence of Green parties, which have gained considerable electoral support in many Western democracies.

Scott Flanagan has emphasized that Inglehart's conceptualization of value change combines two dimensions: (1) a *materialist/nonmaterialist dimension* and (2) a *libertarian/authoritarian dimension*. Flanagan considers value change along the latter dimension as most important. The overarching concept that integrates libertarian values is self-actualization, and the central value orientations within the notion of libertarian values are autonomy, openness, and self-improvement. The authoritarian value orientations designate a broader cluster of values, which, along with concerns about security and order, includes respect for authority, discipline and dutifulness, patriotism, intolerance toward minorities, conformity to customs, and support for traditional religious and moral values. The libertarian/authoritarian value orientations are also the central components in

Herbert Kitschelt's important work on changes in the party systems of Western democracies.

Though dominant, research on materialist/postmaterialist political values has gradually been supplemented by work on other political value dimensions. Political value conflicts can be considered to originate in the most crucial sociopolitical cleavages. For example, according to the seminal work of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, the most important political cleavages in industrial society are the religious cleavage and the class cleavage. Both of these cleavages are associated with important value orientations. Christian values focus on the importance of Christian morals and principles in society and politics and on traditional moral guidelines in school and society in general. Secularization is often understood as a process whereby mundane reality is less and less interpreted from a supernatural perspective, and secular values are based on more modern norms of morality that people want to decide for themselves without the guidelines of the church. Religious/secular values tap these contrasting orientations. Religious orientations are often considered to comprise two different aspects. One aspect is the religious beliefs that people hold. This can be tapped by concrete questions about which religious conceptions and dogmas the respondents believe in, how important God is in their life, or what kind of God—if any—they believe in. The other aspect is church-oriented religion or church religiosity. The essence of this dimension is “church integration”: The more people participate in the relevant church's rites and services, the more church integrated they are.

The Industrial Revolution gave rise to economic interest conflicts that were anchored in hierarchical sociostructural variables. The most important political value orientations that emerged from the Industrial Revolution were the economic (materialist) left–right values. These value orientations are economic in nature, and they refer in particular to the role of government in creating more economic equality in society versus the need for economic incentives and efficiency. These value orientations incorporate value conflicts related to control, power, and the degree of distribution of resources in the production sphere. They include workers' control and state regulation of the economy versus private enterprise, private property, and the market economy, and the size of the welfare state and

economic and social equality versus the need for differentiated rewards for stimulating effort. The moral value dimension and economic left-right values are often referred to as "Old Politics" because they capture the essence of the traditional lines of conflict in industrial society. In contrast, the New Politics refers to value conflicts emerging from postindustrial society.

Inglehart has broadened his study of value dimensions by emphasizing that his materialist/postmaterialist dimension is only one component of a much larger value syndrome. In an alternative way of conceptualizing and analyzing value orientations in a long-term perspective, he focuses on a two-dimensional value structure: one dimension based on traditional versus secular-rational values and the other based on survival versus self-expression/well-being values. These two dimensions are associated with the structural changes from preindustrial to industrial and from industrial to postindustrial society, respectively. The most essential values in the first dimension are religious versus more secular values, but the traditional pole also includes family values, social conformity rather than individualistic striving, deference to authority, high levels of national pride, and a nationalistic outlook, while the secular-rational pole has the opposite preferences.

The self-expression values on the second dimension are values and attitudes such as tolerance, trust, emphasis on subjective well-being, and civic activism that emerge in postindustrial societies with high levels of existential security and individual autonomy. At the opposite pole, survival values emphasize economic and physical security, and they include orientations such as intolerance of outgroups, an authoritarian outlook, insistence on traditional gender roles, and resistance to cultural change. Materialist/postmaterialist values are central in the second dimension. Economic left-right values do not appear to be central in their characterization of either of the two dimensions, but they could, nevertheless, be primarily located along the first dimension.

Value Change and Cross-National Differences in Political Value Priorities

Inglehart incorporates most explicitly the issue of cultural change in his work. He identifies a "silent

revolution" in which a gradual value change takes place along the materialist/postmaterialist dimension. As older and more materialist generations die, they are continuously replaced by younger, less materialist generations. Inglehart's theory is based on two hypotheses: (1) The *scarcity hypothesis* implies that short-term effects may induce all cohorts to emphasize postmaterialist values when economic conditions are good and materialist values when economic conditions decline. The cohort differences are explained by differences in economic and physical security during the formative years of the various cohorts. (2) The *socialization hypothesis* predicts a watershed between the post-World War II and the prewar cohorts in value priorities because they have such different experiences in the formative years regarding economic security (economic scarcity vs. economic prosperity) and physical security (war vs. absence of war).

The theory of value change is based on a strong and consistent relationship between age and materialist/postmaterialist values and presupposes that life cycle effects are not dominant for explaining age differences. These expectations are supported by comparative survey data. Inglehart finds also that support for postmaterialist values is strongest in wealthy countries and that generation differences are largest in countries with high economic growth. This is explained by differences in economic security during childhood and youth (formative years): In wealthy countries, a large portion of the population has grown up in an economically secure environment. In countries with a high level of economic growth, the various cohorts have experienced dramatic changes in levels of economic security. Similar patterns and explanations have been put forward for comparative differences and generational differences on the broader survival/self-expression value dimension.

Empirical research has shown a fairly consistent decline in religiosity in rich, advanced industrial countries along the different dimensions discussed above. In the discussion of secularization in Europe, some have argued that this applies only to the church-oriented dimension, not the belief dimension. Comparative longitudinal empirical research, however, has found that these two sides of religious involvement are highly correlated and even that the distinction between them is difficult to uphold in empirical analysis. Church-oriented and

belief-oriented religious involvements tend to “go together” and are difficult to separate in empirical research. There is even evidence that the changes in the two measures take place simultaneously, with changes in church integration being paralleled by similar changes in religious beliefs. The most important aspect of secularization at the individual level is the decline in both religious beliefs and church attendance. In other parts of the world, religiosity has been much more stable. Overall, the world is apparently becoming more religious even though the advanced industrial countries in the West have become considerably more secular.

The late 1970s and the 1980s saw a revival of conservative and neoliberal ideas and movements and increased support for nonsocialist political parties that challenged the postwar Keynesian consensus on the welfare state, state intervention, and citizenship rights in the social domain—economic leftist values that had been implemented in most West European polities. This right-wing ideology underscored the superiority of market mechanisms in promoting both economic prosperity and the maximization of individual freedom. It was also adamant that state intervention did not work and accorded a minimal role to the state in the operation of the economy and the social order. In many countries, nonsocialist governments with a neoliberal agenda came to power. The value change that underpinned these rightist trends was a move toward economic rightist values that could be documented in many countries. However, the 1980s saw a trend toward leftist values, and in many countries, the mass public's values were as leftist as they had been before the shift toward the right around 1980. In the 1990s, many social democratic governments came to power but with more centrist programs than before, and trends in economic left-right values from the 1990s show stability or inconclusive patterns.

Two different perspectives on comparative differences in priorities of economic left-right orientations are found in the literature. The first one is that values will vary according to the welfare regime that exists in the given country. The point of departure is the well-known distinction between the universal or social democratic, the conservative or Christian democratic, and the liberal or residual welfare state. Welfare state attitudes are—according to this perspective—formed by the character of the

institutional regimes of social policy. Universal welfare states are underpinned by strong popular support because most social groups are included as recipients. This is not the case with the liberal welfare state, where the recipients are the lower social classes. Support for these hypotheses is rather mixed.

The second perspective predicts that leftist orientations will receive greatest support in the least advanced Western societies, where welfare programs and the regulation of the economy have been low and where social inequalities are fairly large. People in these countries want change in a more egalitarian direction, while those in more advanced welfare states live in a different economic environment where the need for further development of leftist policies is not appreciated. In Inglehart's conceptualization, there is a diminishing marginal utility or return of classical economic leftist policies such as economic regulation and income equality in advanced welfare states. This view is supported by different comparative studies of attitudes toward income equality and state intervention, as well as general economic left-right orientations.

Antecedents of Political Value Orientations

Most of the research has been done on materialist/postmaterialist values. According to the theory of the New Politics, the social basis of these values turns the old order upside down: The spread of postmaterialist values is explained by economic growth and wealth, generational replacement, the growth of the new middle class, and the spread of higher education. Change-oriented postmaterialist values should be most frequently found among the higher educated strata, the new middle class, and the younger cohorts. Studies have found that support for environmental and libertarian values in advanced industrial societies is strongest among the younger age-groups, those with higher education, and those who belong to the new middle class.

Regarding religious/secular values, age and gender are the most important predictors, while education has a smaller impact and other sociostructural variables such as social class are of less importance. Men and the younger cohorts have more secular values. Economic left-right values are coupled with the class cleavage. Leftist values are strongest

among the working class, those with lower income, and the lower educated strata. The correlations between these class variables and economic left-right values have, however, declined considerably over time. Age and gender are seldom consistently correlated with economic left-right values in comparative research.

Consequences of Value

Personal and social values can have important consequences, as research on Hofstede's and Schwartz's value dimensions has shown. Most of the research on political consequences of values, however, has focused on political values. According to the theory of the New Politics, materialist/postmaterialist values will have important consequences for political attitudes and behavior in advanced industrial democracies. This is framed within a developmental perspective: There is a transformation of cleavage structure from ascriptive variables (e.g., gender and religious denomination) and achieved or hierarchical (social status) variables to postindustrial (political value) variables. New value conflicts are gradually replacing traditional social structural variables for explaining political behavior, or—in Inglehart's words—there is a change from a “class-based to a value-based pattern of political polarization.”

In accordance with New Politics theory, materialist/postmaterialist values have several aspects:

1. They have shown themselves to be important predictors for attitudes toward social change. Individuals with postmaterialist values express stronger support for radical social change.
2. They are increasingly the basis for identification with the ideological labels “Left” and “Right.” This implies that the ideological meaning of *Left* and *Right* changes from meanings related to the social structure and values in industrial society to postmaterialist values.
3. They are an important cause of the “participatory revolution”—that is, the increase in protest activities or unconventional participation.
4. They will increasingly become an important determinant for party choice. They will constitute a new political axis that will cut

across the established social cleavages and polarities between the New Left and Green parties and the New Right parties.

5. They are determinants of a series of political attitudes that are closely related to the New Politics, environmental concerns, lifestyle issues, social and political participation, minority rights, and social equality and social issues.

However, when economic left-right values and religious/secular values are included in the analyses, these values sometimes have an even larger impact on attitudes and behavior than materialist/postmaterialist values.

There are also different views on the impact of values on political attitudes and behavior. When Van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough (1995) explicitly examined the impact of the three sets of political value orientations, the main finding was that the behavioral consequences of value orientations are rather modest: They are not uniform across countries, and the impact of values on different phenomena did not change much from the 1960s to the 1990s. A major exception to the modest impact of political values is party choice, where all three sets of value orientations have considerable impact and tend to cut across each other in the way they differentiate between various political parties.

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See also Electoral Behavior; Political Culture; Postmaterialism; Public Opinion; Religiosity; Secularism; Social Cleavages

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VARIABLES

The term *variable* is used in a variety of senses in social science methodology, with the various usages unified by reference to a score on an indicator that in some sense could have been different. Variables, in the broadest sense, are indicators that are not constants; contrasting usages of both terms are briefly considered below. Social scientists and other methodologists often make more fine-grained distinctions among variables in terms of their statistical or causal characteristics. In this entry, these distinctions and their applications are discussed.

Variables and Constants

Some indicators capture traits that are ontologically variable: If a study were to be in some sense

repeated, the score on this indicator for a given case could have been other than what it was. An intuitive example of a variable in this sense is the result of rolling a die. If the die were to be rolled again, there is no particular reason to believe that it would show the same number of dots as on an earlier roll. Hence, the number of dots shown on the die after a roll is a variable in the ontological sense. An equivalent example in social science research involves random experimental assignment of a subject to one of a number of treatments: If the process of assignment were to be repeated, one may reasonably expect that many subjects would get a different assignment than they did in the initial iteration of the study. For this reason, one may conclude that experimental assignment is a variable, not a constant.

A second common usage of the distinction between variables and constants involves describing the data actually produced by a particular study, rather than the ontological characteristics of the data-generating process. In this usage, an indicator is said to be a variable if the cases included in the study have more than one score on the indicator. Thus, a research design in which only political activists are selected for analysis may be described as one in which political participation is a constant; in contrast, if some apolitical individuals are added to the research design, participation would then be said to be a variable. This is the usage employed in the common aphorism that it is impossible to explain a variable with a constant.

These two usages are nonequivalent. An indicator may be ontologically variable while still producing the same score for every case in a given study. As a simple example, consider an extremely unfair coin that shows heads in 99.9% of flips and tails in 0.1%. The study involves flipping the coin 100 times, recording 1 for each instance of heads and 0 for tails. With this setup, the probability of observing a score of one for each of the 100 cases of flipping the coin is about 90.5%, so it is quite probable that the resulting indicator will be a constant in the second sense. However, each coin flip obviously involves a variable in the ontological sense: It is not impossible (although obviously unlikely) that a given flip will show tails rather than heads.

Likewise, an indicator may take on different scores across the cases in a given study without

being ontologically variable. Consider a hypothetical, badly designed experiment in which the students in a large lecture course are assigned to one of two treatments by the decision rule that students whose last names start with the letters A to M receive one treatment (recorded as 0), while those falling between N and Z receive the other (recorded as 1). Clearly, the indicator recording the resulting treatment status does not have the same score across all cases and is thus a variable in the second sense. Nevertheless, consider the research design. The set of experimental subjects is fixed; if the study were to be repeated, the same students in the same lecture course would be the participants. Likewise, the decision rule for assignment to treatment is deterministic—that is, a person would always get the same treatment assignment (unless he or she were to change last names during the course of the term). Therefore, in the ontological sense, treatment assignment in this study is a constant, even though it takes on different scores for different cases. The key idea is that, for a given individual in this research design, treatment assignment could not have been other than what it was.

Types of Variables

Probability theory distinguishes variables in terms of the mathematical characteristics of the set of values that the variable may take on, as well as the probability that each specific value (or sometimes a value within a narrow window of the specified point) will actually turn up in a specific realization of the variable. The first of these criteria produces the distinction between discrete and continuous variables, while the second generates the various families of named random variables discussed in probability theory. *Discrete random variables* are those that take on values that can be associated with (some subset of) the integers. Discrete variables in political science may include the number of times a survey respondent was contacted by representatives of a political party during the past year, the number of battle deaths during an armed conflict, or the number of seats per voting district in a legislative election. These variables may or may not have an upper limit; the number of battle deaths in a conflict is essentially unlimited, whereas the number of legislative seats in a district probably

cannot exceed several hundred. What all discrete variables, whether bounded or not, share is that some numerical values between the lowest and highest observed scores are in principle nonsensical. For example, it makes little sense to speak of a conflict that produces 134.52 battle deaths or of a survey respondent who was visited three and a half times by representatives of a party.

Continuous variables, in contrast, are those that take on values that are too numerous to be mapped onto the integers. A simple example of a continuous variable is the angle between the minute and the hour hand on a clock. Because the angle can, in principle, be measured with virtually unlimited precision, the set of possible results of this variable is essentially infinite. In political science practice, few variables are measured with such high precision. However, variables that are measured with sufficient detail to take on a very large number of possible scores are essentially treated as continuous, even though in principle they are discrete. By this reasoning, variables such as an individual's age or years of education, a country's per capita gross domestic product, or the proportion of the population of a country belonging to the country's largest ethnic group are effectively continuous.

The distinction between discrete and continuous variables has sometimes played a major role in recommendations for data analysis, with researchers being advised to choose techniques that are close fits for the characteristics of the variable that they seek to explain. Hence, unbounded continuous variables may be explained using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, while discrete variables should be explained using techniques such as logistic regression, Poisson regression, negative binomial regression, and so on. A different perspective, which places less emphasis on the distinction between continuous and discrete variables, has recently received increased attention. In this perspective, OLS regression always predicts the mean of the variable to be explained, conditional on the values of the other variables included in the model. Further, the mean is an important quantity regardless of whether the variable of interest is discrete or continuous. Therefore, OLS regression may be a useful analytic tool regardless of whether the variable to be explained is itself discrete or continuous.

Probability theorists and statisticians have described a large number of more specific families

of discrete or continuous variables. These families of variables are characterized in terms of the probability that specific outcomes will occur. For example, consider two different kinds of continuous variables. One can take on any value between 0 and 10, and each of those values is equally likely to occur. This is one example of the family of *uniformly distributed* variables; other members of the family are generated by moving the lower and higher bounds of the variable's range of possible values. The second variable is unbounded, although most of the scores fall between 0 and 10. Whereas with the uniformly distributed variable all values within the range are equally likely, with this second variable, the probability associated with a given value increases as the value gets closer to 5. If the distribution of probability across values follows what is informally described as the bell curve, then this is a normally distributed variable; otherwise, it may follow one of many similar distributions, such as the *t* distribution.

These formally characterized families of variables have highly specific mathematical forms and generally tolerate no deviations from the ideal. Thus, for example, if the second variable described above is slightly more likely to take on values below its mean than above its mean, then the variable does not follow the normal distribution or any of the other bell-like distributions. Indeed, statisticians routinely argue that most real-world variables do not exactly conform to any of the mathematically described families of variables. Instead, they may typically have their own idiosyncratic probability structures. Named and well-studied families of variables may nonetheless be useful as approximations to the probability distributions of real-world variables, although specific arguments about why a given approximation is useful in a particular context are needed.

Social scientists routinely distinguish among types of variables in terms of their causal, rather than statistical, structure. A hypothesis to be tested, or the report of a finding, may be specified in terms of a series of variables that are said to play certain roles with respect to each other. The most common distinction in this vein is between dependent and independent variables, but scholars also discuss confounding or omitted variables; collider variables; intervening, mediator, or mechanism variables; moderator variables; exogenous variables;

endogenous variables; and instrumental variables. These categories of variables largely crosscut the various meanings of *variable* vis-à-vis *constant* discussed earlier.

A *dependent variable* is the variable to be causally explained; it is the outcome of interest. Such a variable is said to be dependent because, if the hypothesis is correct, its value depends causally on the values of several other variables specified by the analyst. The variables that are hypothesized to cause the dependent variable are routinely described as independent variables. This usage seems to draw on experimental research contexts, in which one or more key hypothesized causes of the outcome in question are randomly assigned to subjects. With a large enough sample, random assignment will make these hypothesized causes have no statistical relationship with each other or with any other variable that they do not cause; hence, they are independent of each other and of all other causes of the dependent variable. In nonexperimental research, the independent variables are rarely statistically independent in this sense. Thus, for nonexperimental research, it is best to regard the term *independent variable* as a synonym for hypothesized cause.

Confounding or *omitted variables* are usually variables that cause one or more of the independent variables in a hypothesis *and also* the dependent variable. (Confounding variables may also have more complex positions in a causal chain.) Omitted or confounding variables are important because, if they are not dealt with in some appropriate way, they can distort the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable—making a causal relationship appear to exist when it does not or changing the apparent direction or magnitude of a really existing relationship. Strategies for dealing with confounding variables include randomly assigning cases to different categories on the key independent variable or variables to ensure (with large enough samples) that no confounding variables exist; choosing a set of cases in which a suspected confounding variable does not vary, such that its effects are constant across the cases; identifying some component of the key independent variable that is known to be unrelated with the confounding variable and using that component to test the hypothesis; or incorporating the confounding variable into a statistical model to remove its interference.

Collider variables, first discussed by Judea Pearl, are variables that meet the following criteria. First, they are caused by a key independent variable or by a cause of that independent variable. Second, they are also caused by an unmeasured variable that is statistically and causally unrelated to the key independent variable. Third, that unmeasured variable is a cause of the dependent variable. Collider variables typically pose no problems to causal inference when they are left out of a research design; however, if the research design mistakenly identifies a collider variable as a confounder and either selects cases so as to hold the collider constant or incorporates the collider into the statistical model, the result will be to induce a statistical relationship between the key independent variable and the unmeasured variable, thereby distorting any causal inference.

Variables that are said to be *intervening*, *mediator*, or *mechanism* variables are those that constitute a step in the causal process, linking an independent variable to the dependent variable. These variables thus help answer the question, “How does the independent variable cause the dependent variable?” Researchers often attend to intervening variables because they regard accounting for the causal process connecting the independent and dependent variables as central to their analytic task. Moderator variables are variables that act to change the causal effect of an independent variable. For example, watching a campaign advertisement might increase Democrats’ evaluation of the candidate in question while decreasing the evaluation of Republicans and leaving political independents unaffected. In this case, if watching the advertisement is regarded as the independent variable, then a subject’s party identification is a moderator variable.

Exogenous variables are independent variables that have no causal or statistical relationship with any confounding variable. Typically, this is either because of random assignment or because the causes of the exogenous variable or variables are not themselves causes of the dependent variable. If an independent variable is exogenous, then its apparent relationship with the dependent variable will generally provide information about the true causal relationship between the variables. *Endogenous variables* are independent variables that are not exogenous (sometimes, the dependent variable is also said to be endogenous). In other words, an

endogenous variable is causally or statistically related with one or more confounding variables. As a result, the apparent relationship between an endogenous variable and the dependent variable provides little direct information about causal relationships.

Finally, *instrumental variables* are exogenous variables that cause an endogenous independent variable but have no direct causal relationship with the dependent variable. That is to say, instrumental variables are variables that cause one of the hypothesized causes of the outcome and that are unaffected by confounders. Sometimes, an experimental assignment can serve as an instrumental variable if the outcome caused by that experimental assignment is itself a hypothesized cause of another variable of interest and if the experimental assignment has no direct effect on that other variable. Alternatively, researchers seek instrumental variables by looking for causes of their key independent variable that seem to be in some sense like an experiment. For instance, the amount of rainfall in a given year may be usefully like an experiment as a cause of agricultural productivity, which in turn may have effects on various political outcomes that are not themselves directly affected by rainfall. Instrumental variables are useful because they can identify a component of an independent variable that is not affected by confounders.

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See also Measurement; Measurement, Levels; Variables, Instrumental; Variables, Latent

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VARIABLES, INSTRUMENTAL

Confounding is a pervasive problem for drawing inferences about political causes and effects. In brief, some individuals, countries, or other units are exposed to a “treatment” or “intervention,” while others are not. Differences in outcomes may reflect the effect of treatment, or they may be due to confounders—that is, variables associated with exposure to treatment and with the outcome. For example, does civil war inhibit economic growth? Do political institutions shape development? How does service in the military affect wages after war? Such questions are difficult to settle, because a range of unobserved variables are associated with the presence of civil war, types of political institutions, or service in the military, and these may shape growth, development, or individual wages. Reverse causality can also be a problem.

Instrumental variables can be used to address the problem of confounding, in both experiments and observational studies. In randomized controlled experiments, a coin flip determines which subjects are assigned to treatment, so subjects assigned to receive the treatment are, on average, just like subjects assigned to control. However, even in experiments there can be confounding, if subjects who accept the treatment are compared with those who refuse it. Analysts should, therefore, compare subjects randomly assigned to treatment with those randomly assigned to control. Instrumental-variables analysis may be used to estimate the effect of treatment on Compliers (subjects who follow the treatment regime to which they are assigned). In experiments, treatment assignment usually satisfies two key requirements for an instrumental variable: It is statistically independent of unobserved causes of the dependent

variable, and it plausibly affects the outcome only through its effect on treatment receipt.

In observational studies (those in which assignment to treatment is not under the control of the researcher), the problem of confounding is typically more severe because units self-select into the treatment and control groups. Instrumental-variables analysis can be used to recover the effect of an endogenous treatment—that is, a treatment variable that is correlated with confounders. However, strong assumptions are often required, and these can be only partially validated from data. The use of instrumental variables in observational studies is discussed below, after a benchmark application to experimental data is first described.

Instrumental-Variables Analysis of Experiments

In experiments, subjects often fail to follow the treatment regime to which they are assigned. In A. Gerber and D. Green’s (2000) study of the effect of door-to-door canvassing on turnout, for example, some voters who were assigned to receive a get-out-the-vote message did not answer the door. It is misleading to compare subjects who answer the door with subjects who do not because there may be confounding. However, treatment assignment can serve as an instrumental variable for treatment receipt, which allows an estimation of the effect of treatment on Compliers.

An example from the health sciences helps make the logic clear. In the 1960s, the Health Insurance Plan (HIP) clinical trial studied the effects of screening for breast cancer. About 31,000 women between the ages of 40 and 64 years were invited for annual clinical visits and mammographies, which are X-rays designed to detect breast cancer. The group of women invited for screening was called the assigned-to-treatment group, or just the treatment group. In the control group, 31,000 women received the status quo health care. The invitation for screening was issued at random, so that the women in the assigned-to-treatment group were just like the women who were not, up to random error.

Table 1, adapted from D. Freedman (2009), shows death rates from breast cancer 5 years after the start of the trial. In the assigned-to-treatment

group, 20,200 women or about two thirds of women accepted the invitation to be screened, while one third refused. It might seem natural to compare the women who received screening with those who refused. Yet women self-select into screening, and those who accept screening are different from those who refuse. There is an important confounder: Richer and better-educated women tend to come in for screening, and while such women are less vulnerable to other diseases (see the final column of Table 1), they are more prone to breast cancer (probably because they tend to have fewer children and childbearing is protective against breast cancer).

The correct, experimental comparison is between women randomly invited to come in for screening—whether or not they were actually screened—and the whole control group. This intention-to-treat analysis shows a strong effect in relative terms. In the assigned-to-treatment group, there were 1.26 deaths per 1,000 women, while there were 2.03 deaths per 1,000 women in the

control group. So the effect of assignment to screening is -0.77 deaths per 1,000. However, the intention-to-treat analysis likely understates the effect of screening—after all, one third of the women in the assigned-to-treatment group were not actually screened.

What, then, was the effect of screening on women in the treatment group who accepted screening? Instrumental-variables analysis answers this question. To begin, it is useful to think about the experimental population as comprising two kinds of subjects: Compliers and Never Takers. Here, Compliers are women who accept screening if they are assigned to treatment but are not screened if assigned to control, while Never Takers are women who are not screened, whether they are assigned to treatment or control. By looking at the control group alone, we cannot tell which is which: Never Takers look just like Compliers, since neither type of subject receives the treatment when assigned to the control group. In the treatment group, however, 20,200 or about two thirds

Table 1 Deaths From Breast Cancer and Other Causes (Health Insurance Plan Study)

	<i>Group Size</i>	<i>Deaths From Breast Cancer</i>	<i>Death Rate per 1,000 Women</i>	<i>Deaths From Other Causes</i>	<i>Death Rate From Other Causes per 1,000 Women</i>
Assigned to treatment					
Accepted screening	20,200	23	1.14	428	21.19
Refused screening	10,800	16	1.48	409	37.87
Total	31,000	39	1.26	837	27.00
Assigned to control					
Would have accepted screening	20,200	47	2.33	—	—
Would have refused screening	10,800	16	1.48	—	—
Total	31,000	63	2.03	879	28.35

Source: Adapted from Freedman, D. (2009). *Statistical models: Theory and practice* (2nd ed., p. 4, Table 1). New York: Cambridge University Press.

of the women accepted screening. Because subjects are randomly assigned to treatment and control, the mix of Compliers and Never Takers should be about the same in both groups. We can thus estimate that two thirds of women in the control group are Compliers, just as in the treatment group.

Instrumental-variables analysis compares death rates of Compliers in the treatment group with death rates of Compliers in the control group. It is easy to measure the former quantity because we observe which subjects are screened in the treatment group and can track their death rates. But what about the latter? First, note that Never Takers in the treatment group and Never Takers in the control group should have a similar incidence of death from breast cancer—after all, neither group was screened. In the treatment group, 16 women who refused screening—these were Never Takers—died from breast cancer. Thus, about 16 of the women who died from breast cancer in the control group are also Never Takers. (Here, the treatment and control groups are the same size; if they differed, we would use rates instead of numbers.) Because 63 women died from breast cancer in the control group, it implies that about 47 (i.e., $63 - 16$) of the women who died from breast cancer in the control group were Compliers.

We can then fill in the third column of Table 1 for the subjects assigned to control, dividing deaths from breast cancer by group size. The analysis implies a death rate of 1.14 deaths per 1,000 women among Compliers in the treatment group and 2.33 deaths per 1,000 among Compliers in the control group. Thus, the effect of screening on Compliers is -1.19 (i.e., $1.14 - 2.33$) deaths per 1,000 women—a substantially larger effect than suggested by the intention-to-treat analysis. One may arrive at this same estimate by dividing the estimated intention-to-treat parameter by the fraction of the treatment group that was screened—that is,

$$-\frac{0.77}{0.65} = -1.19. \quad (1)$$

In the instrumental-variables estimator in Equation 1, we are implicitly assuming that no

women in the control group were screened. (In the 1960s, few women sought out mammography on their own.) In other contexts, subjects who are assigned to the control group may seek out the treatment. With a double crossover, the model for compliance would be extended to include Always Takers—that is, subjects who receive treatment whether assigned to treatment or control—as well as Compliers and Never Takers. In the denominator of the instrumental-variables estimator analogous to Equation 1, we would then need to subtract the fraction of the control group that was screened from the fraction of the treatment group that was screened. Note that random assignment is crucial here, because it allows us to estimate the counterfactual outcomes for women in the control group who would have accepted screening had they been assigned to control.

Some assumptions are required. For one, we must assume that there are no Defiers: These are subjects who do the opposite of what they are told. In the HIP breast cancer study, Defiers are subjects who would take an exam if assigned to control but would refuse an exam if assigned to treatment. Notice also that Equation 1 estimates the causal effect of treatment for a specific subset of experimental subjects—namely, Compliers. When the effects of treatment are heterogeneous for different subjects, this “local average treatment effect” may not in general be the same as the average causal effect of treatment for all subjects in the experimental population.

Instrumental-Variables Analysis of Observational Data

In observational studies, researchers do not apply the treatment or intervention; instead, the subjects select themselves into treatment or control groups. Selection is usually highly nonrandom, and there is typically confounding. However, under some conditions, researchers may exploit instrumental variables to recover the effect of an endogenous treatment variable. Just as in experiments, a valid instrumental variable must be independent of other causes of the dependent variable, and it must influence exposure to treatment but not influence the outcome, other than through its effect on exposure

to treatment. The latter condition is sometimes called an *exclusion restriction*, with reference to the exclusion of the instrumental variable from a causal equation governing the outcome.

Joshua D. Angrist (1990), for example, uses draft lottery numbers as an instrumental variable for military service during the Vietnam War. Understanding the effects of past military service on labor market earnings is difficult, because people who choose to serve in the military may be different from those who do not, in ways that matter for future earnings. A key assertion in Angrist's study is that the draft number is as good as being randomly assigned: Whether one's draft number is high or low is, therefore, independent of factors that influence future earnings. With a dichotomous treatment (military service/no military service), the instrumental-variables estimator is analogous to Equation 1, though the denominator should be adjusted for a double crossover: Some people dodge the draft, while others serve in the military even if they are not drafted. An important but reasonable assumption is that there are no Defiers—that is, people who sign up for the military if not drafted but emigrate to Canada when their number comes up. Note that, here, instrumental variables estimate the effect of treatment for a particular subset of subjects—those who serve in the military if drafted, but not otherwise. Whether this effect is informative about the effect of military service for other subjects may be a matter of opinion.

A second example comes from an influential study by E. Miguel, S. Satyanath, and E. Sergenti (2004) of the effect of growth on the probability of civil war in Africa. Confounding poses a big problem in this research area, since many difficult-to-measure variables may affect both growth and the likelihood of civil war. However, year-to-year variation in rainfall is plausibly as-if random, and it may influence economic growth—that is, treatment receipt—without independently affecting the probability of civil war through other channels. If so, an instrumental-variables analysis may allow estimation of the effect of economic growth on conflict for those countries whose growth performance is shaped by variation in rainfall. This application illuminates another, distinct concern about the interpretation of instrumental-variables

estimates: Variation in rainfall may influence growth only in particular sectors, such as agriculture, and growth in distinct economic sectors may have different effects on the probability of conflict. Using rainfall as an instrument for studying growth may capture such idiosyncratic rather than general effects, so caution may be advised when extrapolating results or making policy recommendations.

Finally, D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson (2001), in a pathbreaking study of the effects of institutional arrangements on countries' economic performance, use colonial settler mortality rates as an instrumental variable for current institutions. These authors argue that settler mortality rates during colonial years do not affect current economic performance in former colonies, except through their effect on current institutions; they also argue that settler mortality is as good as randomly assigned, at least conditional on covariates. Since neither assumption is verifiable from the data, a combination of historical evidence and a priori reasoning must be used to try to validate, at least partially, these core assumptions. The portion of current institutions that is "explained" (in a statistical sense) by past settler mortality rates may also have idiosyncratic effects on economic growth, which could limit the generalizability of the findings.

Strengths and Limitations of Instrumental-Variables Analysis

As these examples suggest, instrumental variables provide an important tool, because they help confront the problem of confounding—a first-order issue in the social sciences. Instrumental-variables regression may also be used to correct for error in the measurement of independent variables, which can pose important inferential obstacles in social scientific research. In recent years, instrumental variables have been used to estimate causal effects in many substantive domains.

Nonetheless, the use of instrumental variables often requires strong assumptions, which can be only partially validated from data. Some empirical tests can be performed to assess the central assumption that the instrumental variable is as good as randomly assigned; for instance, the

instrument may be shown to be uncorrelated with pretreatment covariates (those that are determined before the intervention). A priori reasoning and detailed knowledge of the empirical context may also play an important role. In observational studies, however, because there is often no actual randomization, the validity of an as-if random assignment is often a matter of opinion; this assertion may be classified along a spectrum from “less plausible” to “more plausible,” but it is difficult to validate the placement of any given study on such a spectrum.

Additional issues arise in many applications, often in connection with the use of multiple regression models. For instance, concerns about the endogeneity of a single treatment variable will typically lead researchers to use instrumental-variables regression. Yet analysts typically do not discuss the possible endogeneity of other covariates in their multiple regression models. (One reason may be that the number of instruments must equal or surpass the number of endogenous variables, and good instruments are difficult to find.) Furthermore, instruments that are truly random may not be strongly related to an endogenous treatment; in this case, a substantial small-sample bias can arise. One recommendation for practice may be to report “reduced-form” results. (Reduced form is a synonym for intention to treat; here, the outcome is regressed directly on the instrumental variable.)

Another recommendation may be to report instrumental-variables regressions without covariates; with one endogenous treatment variable and one valid instrument, including covariates can be unnecessary and even be harmful. The estimand should be carefully defined, and difficulties that may arise when extrapolating results to other contexts and types of subjects should be considered. In multiple-regression models, the statistical model itself must be validated, to the extent possible; with regression, the identification of causal effects depends not just on the exogeneity of instrumental variables in relation to a posited regression model but also on the validity of the underlying model itself.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that neither of the core criteria for a valid instrumental variable—that it is statistically independent of unobserved causes of the dependent variable and

that it affects the dependent variable only through its effect on the endogenous treatment—are directly testable from data. Analysts using instrumental variables should defend these assertions using evidence and reasoning, to the extent possible. Yet instrumental-variables estimates should be interpreted with an appropriate degree of caution, especially outside the experimental context.

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See also Experiments, Field; Hypothesis Testing; Matching; Measurement; Statistics: Overview

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VARIABLES, LATENT

See Factor Analysis; Logit and Probit Analyses

VETO PLAYER

A veto player is an individual or collective actor who possesses veto power in a political process and behaves strategically. Particular conceptions of the basic concept have to specify, among other things, what the relevant process is, who the veto players are, and what motivates them. The most influential conception of veto players has been developed by George Tsebelis (2002) in his veto player theory. That model has been elaborated in a number of different ways by subsequent scholars.

Tsebelis relies on the concept of the veto player to unify the comparative analysis of political systems. One part of this unification is *conceptual*. Tsebelis argues that traditional institutional dichotomies such as between unicameral and bicameral parliaments or between presidential and parliamentary systems of government can to a significant extent be replaced by analyzing political systems and situations as particular veto player configurations.

But veto player theory also aims at unifying our *causal* understanding of politics. The basis of this causal unification is the concept of *policy stability*—that is, the difficulty of changing the existing policies (the status quo) in a political system. Policy stability is the causal mechanism that links veto player configurations to particular outcomes of substantive importance. Tsebelis argues that in parliamentary systems, in which the cabinet depends on the confidence of the assembly, policy stability leads to *cabinet instability*. If the cabinet cannot agree on policy change, it will be replaced. For presidential systems, in contrast, veto player theory predicts that policy stability is likely to encourage a coup or some other form of *regime instability*. Neither of these two arguments is completely new, and they can be criticized, but veto player theory embeds both of them, and many others, in one relatively parsimonious and coherent framework.

Tsebelis distinguishes two types of veto players: (1) *Institutional* players are those established by a country's constitution. For example, the U.S. Constitution identifies the president as a veto player. (2) *Partisan* players are established by the way political competition plays out in a given country at a given time. One important analytical strategy of veto player theory is to focus on partisan

veto players whenever possible. For example, instead of treating the Finnish parliament as one institutional veto player, the theory treats cabinet parties forming a majority coalition within the parliament as partisan veto players. One advantage of “replacing” institutional with partisan veto players for analytical purposes is that we may be able to ascribe particular policy preferences to the latter. Estimating actors' preferences is crucial for the application of veto player theory.

Tsebelis relies on game theory and a spatial representation of preferences. Actors' preferences are represented by a point—their so-called ideal point—in some one-dimensional or multidimensional policy space, and the actors' main goal is to move the collective decision as close as possible to this point. Based on these formal tools, Tsebelis derives specific hypotheses about the relationship between veto players and policy stability.

A superficial reading of veto player theory often misunderstands it as proving a seemingly trivial point—that a higher number of veto players increases policy stability. Yet one crucial insight of the formal analysis is that the *number* of veto players alone tells us little about the potential for policy change. What matters is how this number interacts with the *distances* between the ideal points of veto players' preferences. Moreover, the location of the status quo, the allocation of agenda-setting power, and the internal cohesion of collective veto players may also be of great importance for the outcome of collective decisions. Veto player theory analyses the *interplay* of these explanatory factors.

One important formal result of veto player theory is the “absorption rule.” This rule states that if a (potential) veto player has an ideal point that is geometrically embedded within the ideal points of other veto players—that is, if its ideal point is in the so-called unanimity core—then this player does not matter in the analysis; it is absorbed. For example, Tsebelis argues that even courts with the authority to review and veto legislation can often be ignored in veto player analyses because they are selected in ways that virtually guarantee their absorption.

Discussion and Critique

Distinguishing between “pure” and “interpreted” veto player theory is helpful in discussing the limits and criticism of Tsebelis's theory. The *pure*

theory consists of the formal models in which the conclusions follow logically from the assumptions. Yet we know that the assumptions are idealizations or useful fictions. The combination of these two facts—"false" assumptions and valid conclusions—implies that testing the "truth" or "falsity" of the veto player theory is not a meaningful enterprise. The more important question is whether the theory is *useful* for particular purposes.

In contrast to pure theory, *interpreted* veto player theory includes assumptions about how the formal models relate to reality. It is mainly these assumptions that give empirical content to the theory and hence make it testable. Moreover, while no theorist doubts the validity of Tsebelis's deductions, many theorists make conflicting assumptions about how these deductions are to be applied to the real world.

Consider an example. In a five-party, multidimensional legislature, parties A, B, and C form a majority coalition whereas parties D and E are in opposition. Tsebelis's interpreted veto player theory assumes that A, B, and C are veto players on all policies. A competing assumption, proposed by Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle (1996), is that each minister is a sort of policy dictator for his or her portfolio so that one of the three parties *alone* determines policy on a particular issue. A third assumption, highlighted by Anthony McGann (2006), is that legislation may reflect the preferences of all five parties. The reason is that one of the opposition parties may undermine the existing coalition by forming an alternative coalition that makes some of the members better off. Taking opposition parties' preferences into account may thus be a way of reducing their incentive to challenge the existing coalition. Formally speaking, while Tsebelis expects the collective decision to be within the unanimity core of the putative veto players A, B, and C, McGann expects it to be within the so-called uncovered set for the entire five-party parliament. For Tsebelis, it is sufficient to be a member of the *actual* winning coalition in order to be a veto player. For McGann, a true veto player must be a member of *every* possible winning coalition, as would be the case if one party had a majority in parliament.

Just as Tsebelis's pure veto player theory may be interpreted differently, theorists may also use the label of "veto players" to refer, at least in part, to other pure theories. For instance, Scott Basinger and Mark Hallerberg (2004) question the

importance of Tsebelis's absorption rule. They highlight the relevance of the mere *number* of veto players, regardless of the distances between their preferences, based on the view that many veto players increase *transaction costs*.

Interpreted veto player theory is often tested in isolation rather than along with competing theories. Or it is simply applied to some phenomenon. Even these noncomparative tests or applications are not without problems, however, for two related reasons: It is difficult to adequately *measure* actors' policy preferences, and it is difficult to unambiguously *identify* the actual veto players.

The *problem of identification* is most obvious in the case of minority cabinets. By definition, the parties forming a minority cabinet do not have sufficient seats in parliament to change the status quo, but it is not known in advance which party or parties will support the cabinet on a particular piece of legislation. Tsebelis argues that minority cabinets tend to have a privileged position in the policy space as well as strong agenda-setting powers, so that they typically do not have to make significant concessions to support parties. Hence, he treats only cabinet parties as veto players. Other authors, such as Steffen Ganghof and Thomas Bräuninger (2006), doubt Tsebelis's assumptions and believe that support parties can be quite powerful. Assumptions about how to identify veto players are part of the interpretation of pure veto player theory: They increase the theory's empirical content and hence testability, but they may be contested.

The *problem of measuring preferences* is as follows: Veto player theory refers to actors' final (all things considered) preferences over legislative proposals. Yet these preferences are often difficult to measure, especially in broad comparative studies. Empirical estimates of preferences based on party manifestos or expert surveys often measure parties' general ideological orientations or *outcome* preferences (e.g., more growth vs. more equality) rather than their final *policy* preferences (e.g., a high or a low business tax rate). If this is the case, there is a significant gap between theory and measurement. If this gap is ignored, the predictions of veto player theory may be misunderstood. For example, if an empirical analysis measures veto players' outcome preferences, it is far from clear whether large distances between *these* preferences lead to policy stability. It is also possible that policy preferences are much more proximate, possibly

due to strong economic or technological constraints faced by the players, thus allowing for significant policy change.

The problems of identification and preference measurement also imply that veto player theory is strongest when applied to *cohesive and/or disciplined parties*. While veto player theory has all the formal tools to deal with situations of noncohesive parties, comparative analyses typically lack the detailed information on individual preferences that would be needed to apply these tools empirically. The difficulty of dealing with noncohesive parties is quite significant because the likelihood of such parties is much greater in presidential systems. At the same time, presidential systems are also more likely to have significant institutional veto points in addition to (the first chamber of) parliament. Applications of veto player theory, therefore, often focus on parliamentary systems and boil down to the assumption that *cabinet parties* are veto players.

Despite these limitations, veto player theory is a significant achievement. It helps unify our understanding of political systems and political processes. And such unification of knowledge is central to scientific progress.

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See also Coalitions; Game Theory; Parliamentary Systems; Presidentialism

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Violence

In addition to finding food and shelter, the containment of violence has always been a vital issue for humankind. Violence denotes the use of physical force to inflict injury on persons or cause damage to property and manifests itself in forms as different as *homicide* or *state violence* (e.g., repression, coercion). This definition is independent of agents, objects, or circumstances of violence. *Political* violence can be distinguished from *collective* or *civil* violence (such as social banditry) by (a) the *number* of persons involved, (b) the *intentions of the actors*, and (c) the *reactions of the public*.

The more discontent is blamed on the political system, the greater the potential for political violence. Often, there is no clear boundary between a *bargaining*, a *coercion*, and a *terror* model in the use of violence. Also, *domestic* (political) violence is to be distinguished from *interstate* violence in that at least one participant is not a government.

Typologies of violence flourish (violence against persons/nonhumans, direct/indirect, physical/psychological, individual/collective, organized/spontaneous, criminal/political, and noninstitutionalized/institutionalized [e.g., the Mafia or the period in Colombian history known as La Violencia, or noninstitutionalized]). Our definition precludes the dichotomy between personal and structural violence, the latter implying no direct actor but rather “structural or indirect” (Galtung, 1969, p. 170) causes. Such a definition excludes very little and thus inflates the concept of violence.

The most important differentiation is between *legal/illegal* and *legitimate/illegitimate* violence. Max Weber defines the modern state by its specific *means*, that of physical violence. Where the authority of the state is considered legitimate, stable rule will result. In the opposite case of illegal and illegitimate violence, social disorder prevails, with the violence and instability envisioned by Thomas Hobbes. To a lesser extent, social order also breaks down where legal state violence is not

accepted by the population and in the reverse scenario where violence is illegal but considered highly legitimate by the people. These are instances of classical, often revolutionary protest.

The challenge to the state monopoly of violence can be combined with challenges to the national borders, by separatist groups or foreign powers, and to the societal consensus, for example, by revolutionary groups. This leads to a three-dimensional table classifying at least eight different forms of violent political conflict.

Note that with violent protest and demonstrations, usually, neither the state monopoly of violence nor the societal order is challenged. As noted by Douglas Hibbs (1973), the response of the state authorities, to a large extent, determines whether protests escalate into internal war (civil war)—the organized, initially often clandestine form of challenging the state monopoly of violence. Robustly, these two dimensions have reoccurred in analyses of diverse forms of violent political conflict. Apart from genocide and massive external warfare, internal wars claim the largest numbers of victims.

There are many overlaps between these different forms of conflict, especially from a dynamic

perspective. International terrorism, for example, would have to be located between the first and second box in the first row of Figure 1. Together with the challenge of international order, a fourth fundamental dimension arises here. Yet there are analytical and empirical limitations for all 16 types to emerge.

Political violence can be analyzed at four different levels: (1) international (wars, militarized interstate disputes, and external military interventions), (2) national (macrolevel), (3) subnational groups (mesolevel), and (4) participating individuals. According to Ted Robert Gurr (1970), both variants of deprivation (i.e., the discrepancy between expected value positions and the capabilities to achieve them), *absolute* deprivation and *relative* deprivation, fall short in explaining violent political conflicts. There are many more such situations of deprived masses but few manifest conflict events. The lack of a unifying ideology and charismatic leadership that can overcome the collective-action problem (viz., incurring relatively high costs and little rewards at the beginning of a protest action) is one factor. Without these factors making for mass mobilization, it is simply too costly for an

		State monopoly of violence <i>Challenged Not challenged</i>			
		State boundaries <i>Challenged Not challenged</i>		State boundaries <i>Challenged Not challenged</i>	
		<i>Challenged</i>	<i>Not challenged</i>	<i>Challenged</i>	<i>Not challenged</i>
Societal order	<i>Challenged</i>	International revolutionary movement	Internal war antistate terrorism revolutionary situation	"Universalist" liberation ideologies	Ideological extremism
	<i>Not challenged</i>	Irredenta	Military coup	Movements for a supranational union	Protest demonstrations

Figure 1 Politics and Violence: Central Dimensions and Forms of Conflict

individual to undergo the burden of violent conflict in view of its limited success.

A broader and theoretically more pertinent approach, *resource* mobilization, stresses the resources available to potential conflict agents (number of participants, money, weapons, organizational skills and networks of mobilization, availability, leadership, and unifying ideology). Yet even such a rational-choice view of resources, contrary to the approaches of need deprivation, cannot explain the point in time when conflict potentials materialize. This usually occurs in situations of a widening political opportunity structure marked by elite dissent, fiscal crises, external military defeats, electoral realignments, inconsistent repression, and unforeseen events. All these factors add up to making predictions at the macrolevel difficult if not impossible. As Timur Kuran (1995) points out, only the occurrence of informational and emotional “cascades” among the protesters made the dramatic changes of system collapse and transformation understandable in the demise of communism in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. Individual and group behavior is codetermined by macrofactors at the national and international level, and only through group-mobilized (violent or nonviolent) actions and particular elite responses can the changes at the macrolevel be explained. There can be no *plausible* explanation by relying on macroprocesses alone.

At least five major explanatory variables have been found at the macrolevel, distinguishing more violent nations/states from others. (External wars are excluded here.)

Economic Development and Growth

Developed states with at least some social security provisions display lower amounts of violent conflicts (measured in terms of dead and injured victims). It is unclear whether this is a consistent linear trend or whether a curvilinear relationship predominates, with mid-level states reaching the maximum values. Here, incentives for protest would be strongest, combined with higher demands and still limited means to satisfy them. Highly developed democracies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and many Mediterranean states frequently exhibit strong patterns of protest and demonstrations but usually avoid their escalation into violent internal war. There is also a group

of rather quiet democracies consisting of Scandinavia, Switzerland, and the democratic outposts of former British rule overseas (New Zealand, Australia, and the Caribbean islands). In particular, semiauthoritarian states in the Third World and successor states to the Soviet Union in the Caucasus and Central Asia, in sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere often exhibit high values on both dimensions simultaneously—protest and internal war. Only totalitarian states with high and consistent repression succeed in avoiding both forms of conflict. North Korea is the remaining prime example. Once state repression is lowered, however, events parallel to the disorders in Zimbabwe and parts of the former Soviet Union often occur.

Surprisingly, rapid economic growth may spur protests due to the uneven distribution of benefits from such dramatic changes (e.g., Iran in the 1970s). Corruption and rigged elections often are further contributing factors. In situations of manifest economic crisis, one often finds less conflict due to obstacles in overcoming the free riding problem—that is, incurring particularly high costs when being among the first protestors and with little hope of achieving goals. Fears of becoming unemployed dominate and lead to individualistic solutions to such mischief. Yet where the system capacity to deal with these problems is *massively* reduced, conditions furthering mobilization are more likely to be expected.

Socioeconomic Inequality

Contrary to much speculation, inequality in land-ownership, wealth, or income is not often associated with more violent conflicts. Ideological and religious beliefs (e.g., caste systems) may justify the persistence of such patterns. Only where these inequalities become the focus of mobilized social groups does more violent conflict have to be reckoned with. Thus, for example, massive oil revenues are passed on to the lower classes in some Latin American countries, buying off (temporary) protest and conflict. Albert Hirschman, with his “tunnel effect” (i.e., waiting in a traffic queue further back in a tunnel but still moving ahead and thus having hope for progress), predicts tolerance for inequality as long as growth trickles down. Again, deprivation must be articulated and mobilized before such structural factors may contribute directly to violent conflicts.

State Repression

The conflict-instigating effect of political repression (political censorship, bans on opposition parties and basic political rights, large internal security forces, manifest acts of repression, etc.) is countered by a deterrent effect once the level of repression has passed a vital threshold where protestors become concerned with their own physical safety. This double reasoning makes it understandable why state repression in liberal democracies often contributes to more protest, while more repression in highly authoritarian states can reduce both forms of violent conflict. Also, the turning point of driving protest underground becomes understandable—namely, where a protestor starts fearing for his or her own life. Semirepressive regimes are thus most unstable and often the place of the most persistent forms of violent conflicts, due to injustices from the past, fears for the future, and inconsistent repressive measures.

Ethnocultural Fractionalization

Ethnocultural fractionalization is the most likely and most persistent causal factor in predicting the incidence of violent conflict, even though almost any hypothesis about the size composition of the underlying populations and violent conflict has been tested and partially rejected due to other factors and contrary logic. Thus, an equal division of two distinct populations could lead not only to continual fighting (e.g., Israel and Palestine) but also to the insight that neither population will win permanently. A majority of four to one by one group may deter any challenges from a minor group, which, in effect, often may be economically more successful as, for example, the Basques in Spain, Tamils in Sri Lanka, or the Chinese in Southeast Asia show. In contrast, it may vigorously instigate such challenges due to feelings of long-term discrimination. At least four structural factors turn those multicultural relations between dominant and dominated groups into persistent ones:

1. Distinct cultural groups produce lower transaction costs for respective group members in everyday-life behavior. Also, the public good of security in the end rests only with one's own kin.
2. Such groups in the past often have been victims of violent conflict.

3. This memory effect produces a lasting legacy for the future.
4. Moreover, state institutions may possess *private information* withheld from subordinate groups. Such information may be used at the next opportunity, to the detriment of subordinate groups. Perhaps only supranational supervision, as supplied in part by the European Union or the United Nations, may serve as a "permanent" control here.

There is also Karl Deutsch's (1966) prediction at the macrolevel that, with an underlying *heterogeneous* population, the means of modernization and social mobilization will be used for within-group strengthening, thus causing larger between-group differences. *Homogeneous* populations, in contrast, do not face these challenges. At least one major study (Hibbs, 1973) corroborates this general effect of ethnocultural differentiation combined with social mobilization. Irredenta populations created by colonial border drawing or other historical effects exacerbate this conflict scenario.

Finally, there are many linkages between internal and external conflicts, such as attempts at diverting internal tensions, intervention by external agents, or the spillover of defeat in war.

Territorial characteristics, shortages of natural resources, and disputed boundaries have been identified as causes of internal wars and guerilla warfare; often combined with terrorism, they have become a renewed and intensified focus of a group of researchers, largely at the Institute of Peace Research (Oslo) and the University of Zurich. Also, there are specific accounts, such as that by Stathis Kalyvas (2006), of why and how some peaceful multicultural settings break down, while others persist. Dynamic analyses at the communal level thus strengthen insights in the understanding of violence.

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See also Civil War; Conflicts; Terrorism, International

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VIRTUAL STATE

See State, Virtual

VIRTUE

See Ethics

VOTE, TYPES

See Electoral Systems

VOTING RULES, ELECTORAL, EFFECTS OF

Voting rules determine how voters cast their ballots and how vote shares are converted to seats or mandates in the elected assembly or office. Voting rules are thus among the principal building blocks of representative democracy. They establish the most fundamental theoretical and empirical links between public preferences, political representation, and, ideally, government formation and policy making. Thus, the political consequences of alternative voting rules have always concerned political scientists. Both majoritarian and proportional voting rules exert profound effects on alleged political efficiency (i.e., the format and the fragmentation

and polarization of political party systems and their propensity for sustaining single-party or coalition governments) and for different modes of formal and substantive political representation (i.e., the distortion of vote shares and seat shares and the representation of the median voter in parliament, in government, or actually in enacted policies).

The study of voting rules and their respective consequences belongs to the very core of comparative political research. As illustrated by William H. Riker, research on voting rules and electoral behavior has been organized as a cumulative science. In theoretical and conceptual terms, the arguments have advanced from the early, inductive reasoning by John Stuart Mill, Henry Droop, or Thomas Hare toward the codification of Duverger's law and hypothesis, thereafter toward their refinement by scholars such as Giovanni Sartori or Rein Taagepera, and, more recently, toward the sophisticated, game-theoretical treatment by Gary W. Cox. Further research extended the scope of the analyses so as to also consider the additive effect of social structure or direct presidential elections and, most important, the *interactive* effects of institutional structure and political cleavages.

Voting Rules and Electoral Fragmentation

Inductive Generalizations at the National Level

Supporters of majoritarian democracy focus on the efficiency dimension and thus on the effects of voting rules on the number of viable electoral and/or parliamentary parties. The fragmentation of national party systems is their most important and politically most consequential feature, which is directly related to the impact of the respective voting rules. Riker took what is now canonized as Duverger's sociological laws as a yardstick to assess the truly scientific character of the discipline—the cumulative process of generating knowledge by a series of constant revisions and improvements. Riker's theoretical point of departure was Maurice Duverger's analysis and lawlike codification of the effects of alternative voting rules, which he discriminated into Duverger's law and Duverger's hypothesis: (a) the law states that plurality rules tend to systematically favor two-party systems and (b) the hypothesis suggests that majority systems and proportional representation (PR) tend to systematically produce multipartyisms.

These processes are fueled by two interrelated causal mechanisms: (1) The mechanical effects of voting rules operate in a deterministic way and refer to the formal conversion of exogenous given vote shares to seat shares. (2) The psychological effects, in contrast, work in a probabilistic fashion and evolve from the anticipation of these mechanical effects by (a) voters who want to avoid wasting their vote (*strategic voting*) and (b) party elites who want to avoid fielding and investing scarce resources for candidates or lists that are in fact out of the running (*strategic entry*).

Majoritarian Voting Rules

Majoritarian voting rules require successful candidates or lists to win a—however defined—majority of the votes. This broad category comprises a number of heterogeneous subtypes that are associated with different political consequences.

Plurality or “first-past-the-post” systems apply the relative majority rule. In an electoral district that consists of n seats, the n strongest competitors are awarded a mandate. In empirical terms, plurality rules are most frequently implemented in single-member districts. However, this combination does not necessarily belong to the core concept of plurality but merely flags an empirical regularity.

In contrast, *majority* rules build on an alternative concept and definition of majority. These voting systems regularly require an absolute majority for the assignment of a seat in the assembly or office—that is, candidates or electoral lists need to obtain at least 50% plus one vote of the overall votes cast. In multiparty systems, this threshold often cannot be cleared by any competitor so that vacant seats need to be assigned by either a runoff of the (two) strongest parties (runoff systems) or by a second ballot that builds on some kind of plurality rule (majority plurality systems). As before, majority rules also tend to be implemented in single-member districts, but this is not included in the definition of majority voting rules.

Although every voter still casts an exclusive, individual vote, the *single nontransferable vote* (SNTV) implies the application of plurality voting rules in multimember districts. The available seats are filled by the n strongest candidates or electoral lists.

Empirical assessments of voting rules did not sustain Duverger’s law as a deterministic national-level generalization. Systematic analyses, for instance by Douglas W. Rae, Arend Lijphart, or Gary W. Cox, have illustrated that majoritarian voting rules *grosso modo* (roughly) tend to allow for lower levels of electoral and parliamentary fragmentation than proportional voting rules. However, plurality in single-member districts does not unambiguously sustain two-party systems anywhere outside the United States. Instead, the empirical effects of classical “first-past-the-post” systems happen to depend on a variety of specific technical and contextual features, for instance, district boundaries that may be subject to the practice of gerrymandering, the structure of political competition, and alternative degrees of party system nationalization.

Proportional Voting Rules

Proportional voting rules require successful candidates or lists to win the support of a certain share of the votes that is either defined by the electoral quota or determined by the application of some highest-averages method. While majoritarian rules can in principle be combined with any possible district magnitude, PR logically only works in multimember electoral districts.

Quota systems define an electoral quota, which is calculated by the numbers of votes and available seats in an electoral district, as the price of a seat. Each party is awarded as many seats as it has full quotas, and eventually, the remaining seats are often distributed by some largest-remainder criterion. Common quota variants are, for example, the Hare quota, which is based on the number of votes divided by the number of seats; the Droop (or Hagenbach-Bischoff) quota, which divides the number of votes by the number of seats plus one; or the Imperiali quota, which divides the number of votes by the number of seats plus two.

Highest-average rules divide the votes cast for a respective party list by a series of divisors. The d’Hondt system applies the divisor sequence $\{1, 2, 3, \dots, n\}$, the Sainte-Laguë method implies division by the series of odd numbers $\{1, 3, 5, \dots, n\}$, and the Imperiali quota builds on the divisor sequence $\{1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, \dots, n\}$. In the second

step, the n seats at stake are awarded sequentially by the size of the respective averages.

The single transferable vote (STV) system realizes candidate-based PR and aims at limiting the potential for wasted votes by a system of preferential voting. STV initially assigns seats according to the stated first preferences. After candidates have been either elected or eliminated, surplus votes or wasted votes are transferred to the remaining candidates based on lower-ranking preferences of the voter.

Empirical analyses revealed ambiguous evidence for Duverger's hypothesis. *Grosso modo*, proportional voting rules do allow for higher numbers of viable parties or electoral lists than majoritarian ones. However, depending on societal polarization and political cleavage structures, proportional voting rules are also compatible with highly concentrated two-party systems.

Within the scope of proportional voting rules, there have often been intense debates about the mechanical consequences of alternative proportional formulae. However, their empirical consequences regularly do not differ much and have often been profoundly overestimated. Generally, the highest-average formulae, especially d'Hondt, are expected to benefit larger parties, while quota systems are supposed to be fairer for small parties. Simulation studies have illustrated that the effects of either group of voting rules overlap and, unless they are reinforced by a multitude of parallel electoral districts, do not have significant electoral consequences. When the mechanical consequences of alternative proportional allocation methods tend to be limited, alternative proportional voting rules do not bring about the need for strategic behavior by voters or by party elites. Note that in empirical electoral systems, pure proportionality is normally restricted by additional regulations—for example, low district magnitudes as mathematical and predefined legal thresholds as formal entry barriers. Typically, the mechanical and psychological effects of average district magnitudes and legal thresholds clearly exceed the consequences of alternative PR rules.

Further Refinements

Giovanni Sartori has contributed additional refinements and reformulations to Duverger's sociological laws. Instead of the conceptually

dubious and problematic established dichotomy of proportional and majoritarian technical rules and conceptual ideal types (and some combinations of different systems in between), Sartori arranged voting rules along a unipolar continuum from feeble to strong. Voting rules that are a priori supposed to exert a significant modifying impact on actual electoral behavior (i.e., majoritarian voting rules) are considered "strong," while those that are not expected to induce these substantial psychological effects (i.e., proportional voting rules) are labeled "feeble."

The second dimension of Sartori's typology brings in contextual features. Parallel to the voting rule dimension, Sartori contrasts strong (i.e., structured and nationalized) and feeble (i.e., unstructured and heterogeneous) party systems. In the resulting 2×2 matrix, Sartori expects a reduction in the number of viable political parties and a drive toward a two-party format where strong (i.e., plurality) voting rules meet strong (i.e., highly structured) party systems. However, when strong voting rules are combined with feeble, unstructured party systems, the reductive effect is actually less developed or limited to local bipartism within isolated districts. Any combination of feeble voting rules with structured party systems still implies restrained political competition, but then, political competition is structured by political incentives that originate not from the institutional rules of the game but solely through party channelment. Eventually, feeble party systems might be combined with feeble, unstructured party system contexts, indicating a "no effect" situation.

Subsequent empirical analyses revealed that Sartori's observance of contextual features, above all the party system context that fosters or prevents the effectiveness of voting rules, adds significant insight when the scope of an actual analysis is extended beyond the long-standing democracies of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) world. Transition countries typically lack structured modes of party competition and thus regularly fail to meet the necessary conditions for the effectiveness of constraining effects that originate from strong electoral systems. Problems with "strong" rules in these contexts can be clearly illustrated by the recent electoral history of postcommunist polities.

Searching for a general expression that ties together Duverger's law and hypothesis, Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart proposed an inductive inspection of actual electoral returns that replaces the analysis of qualitative voting rules by an exclusive focus on quantitative district magnitudes. They reason that their measure of electoral fragmentation—the Effective Number of Electoral Parties—is on average linked to district magnitude by a logarithmic association:

$$E[N|M] = 1.25 \log M + 2.5,$$

with N denoting the Effective Number of Electoral Parties and M denoting the district magnitude at the national level. The equation allows for the prediction of fragmentation levels that will, as the authors argue, usually fall within an interval of ± 1 unit from this quantitative generalization of Duverger's law.

At the national level, any link of the *national* number of parties and *average* features of the respective electoral system at the national level cannot be more than a rough, inductive generalization that lacks the necessary causal argument or mechanism. While the substantive quantity of interest, the number of electoral or parliamentary parties, is observed at the national level, the conversion of votes into seats and thus the causal mechanisms that lie at the bottom of the wasted vote argument and Duverger's psychological effect all operate at the district level. From a conceptual point of view, there are additional problems with Duverger's law and subsequent generalizations. A number of recent empirical studies sweep under the carpet an important distinction incorporated in the original law and hypothesis. Duverger linked plurality systems to bipartism, while both majority and proportional voting rules were supposed to allow for different degrees of multipartyism. As a consequence, any exclusive focus on the key variable district magnitude, therefore, no longer applies to the original argument, obviously disregards its core causal mechanisms, and potentially introduces an omitted variable bias to the empirical analysis.

Moreover, national-level analyses often follow Duverger's flawed idea of a multiplying effect of proportional voting rules: The more permissive an electoral system (i.e., the higher the district magnitude), the more parties will be viable in the

electorate. This notion is established as a quasi-deterministic argument that does not take into account intervening factors such as social heterogeneity or collective action problems partisans face when setting up their platforms. However, even the most effective PR system just reflects social heterogeneity and political polarization, which are the products of social structure and political cleavages; political institutions like voting rules do not artificially produce these phenomena. As a consequence, electoral systems need to be conceptualized as constituting an upper bound to the number of viable candidates and/or political parties and not as artificially producing an institutionally defined quantity of party system fragmentation or multiplying the number of viable competitors.

Causal Mechanisms at the District Level

In a series of contributions, Cox has explicitly focused on the district level of electoral systems, strengthened the causal stringency of Duverger's original argument by an elaborate game-theoretical reformulation, and attached conditions to its functionality. His argument concentrates on the role of expectations in electoral competition and subsequent strategic coordination attempts by voters and by party elites—that is, it concentrates on Duverger's psychological effect. Building on both classic statements of formal theory and the inductive tradition of data analysis in comparative political science, he was able to strengthen the causal argument, to broaden its applicability, and attach conditions to its functionality. In essence, Cox's contribution deals with problems of strategic cooperation in electoral politics. Formal modeling suggests, quite in accordance with the original propositions by Maurice Duverger, that in each single-member plurality district ($M = 1$) there will be only two vote-getting candidates in a game-theoretical equilibrium. Next, Cox extends his arguments to multimember districts ($M > 1$) with majoritarian SNTVs and, eventually, with proportional voting rules (d'Hondt). As a direct generalization of Duverger's law, he suggests that there may be no more than $M + 1$ viable candidates in each district of the magnitude M . This proposition, labeled the $M + 1$ rule, is the central building block of Cox's contribution to the analysis of electoral systems: $E[N|M] \leq M + 1$, with N denoting the

raw number of electoral parties and M denoting the magnitude of a local electoral district.

The formal argument spelled out in detail by Cox overcomes some of the central flaws of inductive macro–macro generalizations. In the first place, it explicitly focuses on the district level, the wasted vote argument, and the causal incentives that drive strategic voting and strategic entry. Second, Cox also develops an explicit generalization to double-ballot majority systems when he argues that the limit of $M + 1$ viable candidates does not actually relate to the actual district magnitude ($M = 1$) but to the number of first-round candidates that can qualify for the usually decisive second round (either $M = 2$ for the classical runoff system or even $M > 2$ for two-round majority plurality systems like the French one). Third, the $M + 1$ rule does not suggest a specific number of viable contenders that would be deterministically produced by the electoral structure, but in contrast, it conceptualizes institutional constraints as erecting an upper limit to or a carrying capacity for the number of viable candidates or lists in a game-theoretical equilibrium.

Next, Cox spells out a set of conditions that need to be fulfilled so as to induce a restriction to a maximum of $M + 1$ viable candidates or lists in a game-theoretical equilibrium. In particular, these contextual factors involve the presence of strictly hierarchically ordered, transitive voter preferences (as opposed to voters who do not distinguish between two or more electoral options); the absence of a Condorcet winner, short-term instrumentally rational calculations on the voters' side; and full, common information about the state of the electoral contest with the clear identifiability of competitive and trailing candidates or lists.

However, causal stringency and clarity do not come without substantive costs. The argument provided by Cox is presented in two successive stages of strategic coordination: first *within* the electoral districts and second *across* these districts. Therefore, the $M + 1$ rule does not directly address the politically meaningful number of parties at the national level but the quite politically, somewhat inconsequential fragmentation of local electorates within the respective electoral districts. The subsequent step evolves into another, second-stage coordination game when the locally viable competitors decide to link up or to abstain from cross-district linkages, to coordinate (or not to coordinate)

across the various districts of an electoral system so as to form a nationalized political party, or to remain a regionalized political force. Cox specifies national policy goals, the presidency, the premiership, and the existence of upper-tier seats in the electoral system as potential factors pressing toward cross-district linkages.

Voting Rules, Formal and Substantive Representation

The theoretical visions of democracy in which alternative majoritarian and proportional voting rules are rooted also incorporate different standards for the assessment and evaluation of political representation. Supporters of consensus or consociational democracy emphasize the alleged legitimacy dimension and focus on the inclusiveness of electoral rules and descriptive representation. Their assessment of the formal quality of representation builds on the relation of vote shares and seat shares—that is, on disproportionality indicators that have been, for instance, suggested by John Loosemore, Victor J. Hanby, and Michael Gallagher. Theoretical models and empirical analyses have illustrated that proportional, “feeble” voting rules tend to foster descriptive representation, while majoritarian, “stronger” voting rules tend to trade descriptive representation for more effective party system concentration, probably easier government formation, and supposedly higher government stability.

Supporters of the majoritarian vision of democracy would generally not accept formal, descriptive representation as a conceptually adequate and substantively meaningful criterion for evaluating alternative voting rules but rather adopt a principal–agent perspective on political representation. Thus, representation means having one's voice represented either in the decision-making process or in its outcome—actual enacted policies and their correspondence to the preferences of the electorate. In the classical spatial model of politics as devised by Harold Hotelling and Anthony Downs, two parties or candidates that compete under plurality rule and on a single policy dimension are expected to converge toward the median voter's position so as to maximize their vote shares and their probabilities of victory (the famous “median voter theorem”). When more than one mandate is at stake and some proportional voting rule is

adopted—that is, when a majority of the votes is no longer necessary but some share of the vote suffices—these centripetal incentives cease to apply, and parties or candidates are expected to spread evenly along the policy space.

The theoretical argument spelled out by Cox and others posits that majoritarian voting rules have a higher potential to ensure the correspondence of public preferences and government policies. Strong centripetal incentives generated by “strong” voting rules foster enacted policy representation; the absence of these centripetal incentives under proportional voting rules in contrast potentially allows for the fabrication of (coalition) governments and enacted policies that are more distant from the median voter’s position. Vice versa, as its proponents are ready to concede, the political consequences of majoritarian voting rules depend on effective strategic coordination by voters and by party elites, and thus effective representation of the median voter position depends on a variety of contextual parameters. Subsequent empirical analyses by G. Bingham Powell and others have, however, cast serious doubt on the capability of “strong” voting rules to produce more adequate policy representation than weak ones.

Voting, Causal Complexity, and Intervening Factors

Ultimately, voting rules—as any social or political institutions—do not originate from nowhere and, quite contrary to the notion of a sociological law, institutional pressures and the virtues of “constitutional engineering” tend to be only one impact factor in the formulation of voting rules, alongside and in interaction with others.

Empirical findings that indicate an association of voting rules and electoral fragmentation, voting rules and inner-party democracy, or voting rules and the quality of political representation do not “prove” anything about causality and the direction of potential causal effects. While the institutional perspective suggests that voting rules profoundly affect these features of party systems and political representation, scholars such as Harry Eckstein or John G. Grumm have first concluded that voting rules are either inconsequential or themselves a product (rather than the reason) of political competition and party systems, but they are

designed and negotiated by party politics to cater to partisan interest.

Theoretical and empirical insights reveal that voting rules have political consequences, for instance, on the number of viable political competitors or parties and on the quality of political representation. In turn, the very idea that voting rules might have (redistributive) effects implies that politicians will be interested in manipulating these effects in their favor. Politicians would thus not bother about electoral rules when these were of no or little significance for party competition and their respective interests.

Voting rules (or other institutional features) are only one factor among many others that affect party system fragmentation and the quality of political representation. Empirical analyses, for example, by Peter Ordeshook, Octavio Amorim Neto, and Gary W. Cox, have demonstrated additional institutional effects such as direct presidential elections and the electoral cycle. Moreover, political cleavage structures and the number of societal groups are consequential for party system fragmentation. In-depth analyses have shown that these macrosociological variables often do not directly affect the fragmentation and political representation but interact with electoral structure. Taking on the above notion of the carrying capacity of electoral systems, this means that electoral fragmentation does not originate when there are either many polarized sociological groups or a permissive electoral system (additive causation) but occur only when social and institutional factors operate conjointly (interactive effects).

These findings correspond exactly to the theoretical insights incorporated in the $M + 1$ rule: Voting rules do not artificially “produce” a specific number of viable candidates or political parties, but they only, in combination with additional features of the electoral system, establish and define the certain carrying capacity and thus an upper bound to the number of (locally) viable candidates or electoral lists. However, whether the empirical number of parties approaches these respective upper bounds is determined by sociological and organizational aspects.

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See also Electoral Geography; Electoral Systems; Party Linkage; Party System Fragmentation; Party Systems

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VOTING RULES, LEGISLATIVE

Legislative voting rules are the rules that govern the lawmaking process, as opposed to the voting rules that govern the election of representatives to lawmaking bodies. There are two kinds of rules that govern the lawmaking process. First, there are rules that define and regulate the lawmaking bodies and the relationships between them (“constitutional rules”). These rules determine the number of legislative chambers, their relative powers, and their relationship to the executive, among other things. Second, there are rules that govern the internal working of the legislative bodies (“parliamentary rules”). These rules cover matters such as control of the legislative agenda and the committee system and are usually made

within the legislature. In this entry, we will discuss the theory of voting, constitutional rules and their effects, and finally parliamentary rules.

The study of the rules of lawmaking can be traced back at least as far as Aristotle. Although there are exceptions, traditional approaches to legislative rules have tended to be descriptive and formal, drawing heavily on constitutional law. As political science took a more behavioral turn from the 1950s, many scholars put less emphasis on formal rules, as these rules did not seem to have much effect on how political agents actually behaved. However, approaches based on social choice and rational choice theory (the “new institutionalism”) did give a central place to formal rules and provided a link between these rules and behavior. Social choice theorists characterized the mechanical properties of voting rules and found these often produced counterintuitive results. Rational choice theorists considered how maximizing agents would act within a framework of formal rules. The key insight was that small changes in seemingly unimportant rules could have very large effects on predicted behavior in equilibrium.

There has also been a growth in comparative empirical work on political institutions. Recent work has considered the effect of differences in constitutional rules (and to a lesser extent, parliamentary rules) on policy outcomes such as redistribution, state size, and growth. These various approaches to legislative voting rules are likely to be complementary. For example, rational choice approaches emphasize the importance of small, seemingly insignificant rules; identifying these rules in specific legislatures requires that someone do “thick” descriptive work.

The Theory of Voting

Before considering actual voting rules, we will briefly consider the theoretical analysis of voting rules. This gives a powerful illustration of the effect that voting rules can have. The voting rules in virtually every legislature in the world use some variant of a binary amendment procedure. Here, a proposal is made, and amendments to this proposal are considered one at a time. The final bill, with amendments, is then voted on. This procedure is binary because only two alternatives are voted on at any one time. The most common procedure

for deciding between two alternatives is majority rule, although supermajority rules (a proposal fails unless it receives, say, 60% of the votes) are used in some instances. Majority rule has a special place in democratic theory in that it is the only binary rule that treats all voters and proposals equally. The pervasiveness of binary amendment procedures may be due to their simplicity; it may also be due to the fact that procedures that consider more than two alternatives at a time can be manipulated by adding extra (possibly irrelevant) proposals.

While binary amendment procedures eliminate one kind of manipulation, they are vulnerable to another. Simplifying greatly, Arrow's theorem shows that majority rule or any other nondictatorial binary procedure is vulnerable to cycling (or, strictly speaking, intransitivity). That is, it is possible for the voters to choose A over B in a head-to-head contest, to choose B over C, and to choose C over A. Cycling creates opportunities for agenda manipulation. Suppose we first have a vote between A and B and then put the winner up against C. A beats B in the first round but is then beaten by C, so C is chosen. However, suppose we put B against C first, B beats C but loses to A in the final, so A is chosen. If we put A against C in the first round, B is the eventual choice. The outcome thus depends completely on the order in which we consider the alternatives. It should not surprise us that those who get to decide the order in which alternatives are considered, such as the Rules Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives, have considerable power.

How much influence the agenda has over outcomes will depend on how often voter preferences produce cycles. Later work in social choice suggested that if more than one issue is considered at a time, cycles are almost inevitable and an agenda can be found to produce absolutely any outcome. This led some to the conclusion that political institutions and elite agenda manipulation, not voter preferences, controlled outcomes. William Riker's *Liberalism Against Populism* was perhaps the strongest statement of this position. More recent social choice results lead to more moderate conclusions. If legislators are just as smart as the agenda setter, they can resist agenda manipulation by voting strategically. Nicholas Miller showed that strategic voting with a fixed agenda, an open agenda, or a competitive agenda would produce outcomes

in the "uncovered set," which is typically a relatively small, centrally located set of alternatives. Thus, agenda setting would influence the outcome, but this would be quite tightly constrained by the preferences of the voters. Under this scenario, voting rules matter, but we are not driven to the extreme conclusion that they are the only things that matter.

Constitutional Rules

We have made a distinction between *constitutional rules* (which define the lawmaking bodies and their relations with each other) and *parliamentary rules* (which govern the internal workings of legislatures). Constitutional rules are often codified in a written constitution, which requires either the agreement of multiple institutions or a referendum to amend. Parliamentary rules can usually be changed by the legislature itself. There are some exceptions where this distinction is less clear-cut. For example, there are countries where the constitution can be changed by statute law (e.g., the United Kingdom, Israel).

One important constitutional feature that is not dealt with here is the choice of electoral system. Clearly, the effect of the legislative voting rules may vary depending on how the legislature is constituted. In particular, whether the electoral system produces a single-party government (as is often the case with plurality elections) or multiparty coalition governments (usually the case with proportional representation) is important. In some cases, electoral laws are defined or restricted by the constitution, but in others, they are simply defined by ordinary legislation. They may even be made (as in the United States) by subnational legislatures.

Constitutional rules differ over a variety of dimensions. However, they can be considered in terms of whether they concentrate legislative authority in one body or disperse it among several bodies. Rules that require the concurrence of several bodies to pass legislation have an effect similar to having a supermajoritarian rule in a single legislative body. Having more veto points means that more than a simple majority is required. For example, it is harder to pass legislation through two legislative chambers than through one, even if both chambers use simple majority rule voting. This is particularly the case when the two chambers are

elected in different ways. Constitutional features that may have an effect similar to a supermajoritarian voting rule include the following.

Bicameralism. Having two legislative chambers instead of one creates an extra hurdle for proposed legislation to clear. How significant this hurdle is will depend on whether the two chambers have equal powers or whether the second chamber has limited powers to amend/propose legislation or can be bypassed by the first chamber. It will also depend on whether the two chambers are elected the same way and, thus, have very similar policy preferences. The term *strong bicameralism* is sometimes applied to systems with equally powerful chambers that are elected in different ways, while *weak bicameralism* is applied to bicameral legislatures without these characteristics.

Presidentialism. If there is a presidential veto, then the president is essentially an extra chamber of the legislature. Thus, a system like that of the United States is essentially *tricameral*, although the presidential veto can be overridden by a supermajoritarian vote of the other chambers. Even without a legislative veto, presidents can effectively change or block legislation by the way they implement it, while in a parliamentary system, the executive is directly answerable to the legislature.

Federalism. Under a federal system, implementing a policy may require the cooperation of both central and subnational governments. Federal systems also often have strong bicameralism in the national legislature, with the second chamber representing subnational units.

Judicial Review. Constitutional courts may provide another veto point. The legislature may overcome this by changing the constitution, but this often requires a supermajoritarian procedure.

Referenda. These allow the entire population to be treated as a chamber of the legislature. Constitutions vary as to whether referenda can be demanded by the voters or whether they can only be called by the government; and they also vary as to whether they can propose new legislation or only invalidate legislation passed by the legislature. Referenda can be used to break a legislative

gridlock, but they can also be used obstructively to dismantle a multi-issue legislative program one issue at a time.

The normative justification given for constitutional rules that disperse legislative power (and thus work in a supermajoritarian manner) is that this prevents the abuse of power by the government and protects minorities from majority tyranny. Critics of this position argue that by making government action difficult, such rules effectively entrench existing injustices and prevent the remedy of new ones, thereby harming vulnerable minorities. Regardless of one's normative evaluation, we should expect constitutional rules that are effectively supermajoritarian to lead to slower change in government policy. Empirically, countries with such rules seem to have less redistributive government policy and have built welfare states more slowly. This should not be surprising, as the constitutional rules provide more opportunities for groups that lose from redistribution to block the process.

Parliamentary Rules

There are a variety of parliamentary rules (rules that regulate the internal workings of legislatures) that will significantly affect outcomes. As was argued in the first section, the theory of voting suggests that the order in which proposals are considered can change the eventual choice. The way proposals are bundled together can have a similar effect. Suppose, for example, that one proposal has the enthusiastic support of 40% of the legislature, while another proposal has the support of a different 40%. If the two proposals are bundled into a single bill, it may well pass with a majority, even though each proposal would have failed if considered separately. This process is known as logrolling. In some legislatures, it is carried out through decentralized deals between legislators, while in others, there is centralized negotiation between party leaders (the coalition agreements that follow elections in some European countries can be regarded as large, centrally negotiated logrolls). In either case, we would expect whoever has control over the order of business and what bills get to be proposed to have considerable influence. The following are among the institutional features that affect this:

Control Over Proposing Legislation. The legislative leadership (usually the government in parliamentary systems) will be in a more powerful position if it has a monopoly (or near monopoly) of the right to introduce new legislation. It is notable that some legislatures delegate the developing of some legislation to legislative committees or independent commissions (such as the Royal Commission in some Scandinavian countries) in which both government and nongovernment parties are represented.

Control Over Amendments. Once legislation is introduced, the legislative leadership may exercise different levels of control over how it may be amended. If there is a *closed rule*, the legislature is not allowed to amend the legislation and must either accept or reject what has been proposed. This increases the influence of whoever gets to propose legislation. However, under an *open rule*, where anyone can propose new amendments, the power of the agenda setter is far weaker. An intermediate position is a rule that allows only certain kinds of amendments. An important feature of some European legislatures is that the government has the right to propose the last amendment. This restores a considerable degree of agenda-setting power to the government because counteramendments to this last amendment are not possible.

Control Over Legislative Timetable. Control over what is debated, when, and for how long is also important. The legislative leadership obviously cannot get its program passed if it cannot get it debated. An extreme example of a lack of leadership control in some legislatures is the right to unlimited debate. This allows a minority to filibuster or essentially veto legislation by refusing to stop debating it (although there may be a procedure allowing a supermajority vote to end debate, as in the U.S. Senate).

Committee System. Detailed consideration of legislation is usually delegated to legislative committees before being presented to the full legislature. The legislators on these committees may develop policy expertise and be deferred to by other legislators. In some legislatures, committees may act as veto points in that all legislation on a particular topic has to pass through them. The number and importance of committees varies considerably between

legislatures. In some legislatures, the governing party or coalition controls all committee chairmanships, while in others, they are shared between all parties.

Degree of Party Discipline. In some legislatures, representatives are more or less free agents, who may represent the interests of their constituents as much as their parties. In other legislatures, parties are tightly disciplined, and important decisions are made by negotiation among the party leaders. If party discipline is tight, parliamentary rules may serve to facilitate agreements between parties (in particular the coalition agreement) rather than agreements between legislators.

There are, however, two reasons to be cautious about trying to explain policy outcomes in terms of parliamentary rules. The first is the problem of *heritability*. Parliamentary rules are usually chosen by the legislature itself. Further, the legislative leadership that implements the rules is also chosen by the legislature. If the legislature does not like the outcomes the rules produce, they could presumably change either the legislative leadership or the rules themselves. If this is the case, rules do not so much produce outcomes but are rather the means by which the ruling coalition in the legislature gets what it wants. This would suggest that the effect of constitutional rules may be more profound than those of parliamentary rules.

The second problem is that of *functional equivalence*. It may be possible for the governing coalition to get its way by a variety of different means. For example, in some countries, the government keeps very tight control over the legislative agenda. In other countries, nongovernment parties have far more ability to amend legislation, but the government has the right of last amendment. However, in both sets of countries, the government seems to be able to get most of the legislation that was laid out in its coalition agreement passed. Similarly, in some countries, there are very detailed committee hearings on legislation, while in other countries, these appear to be little more than a formality. However, if the legislation in those countries was developed by a Royal Commission on which the legislative committee members served, this compliance is not surprising. This in no way diminishes the importance of parliamentary rules in understanding the

working of legislatures, but it does make it harder to find statistical relationships between parliamentary rules and outcomes.

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See also Agenda Setting; Constitutionalism; Electoral Systems; Parliaments; Social Choice Theory; Veto Player; Voting Rules, Electoral, Effects of

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WAR AND PEACE

The 21st century has begun much as the 20th century ended: in war and armed conflict. Conflicts of many types, old and new, are under way in war zones such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Lebanon, Chechnya, and Sudan. The threat of war remains, but the nature of warfare is changing in tandem with often unforeseen geopolitical, technological, economic, and ethnic changes. According to the studies performed since 2005 by the Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia, violence is in *decline*: In the past dozen years, there has been a significant decrease in violence as measured by the number of wars, genocides, and human rights violations.

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of armed conflicts has fallen by about 40% from about 50 in 1991 to about 30 in 2004. High-intensity conflicts (those that cause more than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year) are down 80%, also down are civil wars (80%), genocides (80%), major and minor terrorist attacks (50%), the number of refugees (45%), coups and attempted coups (60%), and international crises (70%). More than 100 conflicts have ended, including 70% of secessionist conflicts, and the average number of battle deaths per armed conflict decreased by 98%, from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. (Iraq since 2003 is an exception to the trend.) There were 20,000 battle deaths in all wars combined in 2003, compared with 700,000 in

1950. In the 1990s, the ratio of battle deaths to population was a third of what it had been in the 1970s. However, these positive developments were mitigated by continued strife in some regions, particularly in Africa, where war is claiming more victims than on all other continents combined. But even in Africa, there are fewer armed conflicts today (about 10 compared with 15 per year 5 years ago). The number of African countries torn by armed conflict has therefore dropped by a third. During the same period, direct battle deaths have decreased in Africa by 24%.

At the dawn of the third millennium, inhabitants of the planet had an average risk of becoming a casualty of war of approximately 0.4%, compared with an average of about 1% between 1945 and 1990. People are much more likely to die of disease and pandemics (91%) or in car accidents (2%) than in a war. However, there is little cause for celebration, for armed conflicts that could, theoretically, have been prevented or controlled continue to claim hundreds of thousands of direct and indirect victims year after year. Of the 22 million people who have perished in armed conflicts since World War II, 5.5 million died between 1990 and 1995. The causes of conflict are far from being resolved, and the dangers attendant on conflict have by no means been eliminated, although they are perhaps being anticipated and managed more successfully. In short, it is too early to say that war is being eradicated or even curbed. Human insecurity remains a challenge and a serious danger. Many armed conflicts continue to rage with deadly consequences and wars that seemed to be coming

to an end have flared up again. In the wake of the genocides in Rwanda and Sudan, the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the new outbreaks of violence in Ivory Coast, Somalia, and Angola, there is no guarantee that we will not witness other unexpected and tragic events in Africa. Interstate conflict also remains a possibility: For example, hostilities could break out between North and South Korea should the North Korean regime decide, despite the armistice, to attack the South; between China and Taiwan over the latter's desire to secede; between India and Pakistan over their long-standing dispute over Kashmir and recently because of terrorism; between Ethiopia and Eritrea over unresolved border disputes that caused 70,000 deaths between 1997 and 2000; in central and Western Africa, where internal chaos and quarrels between neighboring countries make for a dangerous mix; in the Persian Gulf, where the Kurdish question has yet to be settled in Iraq and between the countries in the region; and in Lebanon, as the Israeli intervention in the summer of 2006 demonstrated.

These disputes are only a few examples of the continuing impact of interstate rivalries and domestic insecurity. There can be no doubt that the end of the Cold War has led to greater peace between states than at any previous time in history (hence Francis Fukuyama's well-known "end of history" thesis of 1992). However, the real challenge now is preventing or resolving intrastate wars. In other words, present-day conflicts are of a new type: In the past, states fought each other, but now clans, ethnic groups, and factions are challenging the state itself. Interstate warfare is therefore being replaced by ethnopolitical warfare. State actors are losing their monopoly on violence as intrastate players get in on the act. Supranational bodies are intervening in matters that were previously the exclusive preserve of states, in a bid to manage and control crises. It can be argued that the words *war* and *conflict* have taken on new meaning.

The Transformation of Armed Conflict

War between great powers in the industrialized world has lost its *raison d'être* in view of technological developments (nuclear weapons), demographic changes (low birth rate), economic factors (trade), and political factors (liberal democracy).

However, wars continue to ravage underdeveloped and developing regions of the world. The creation of a relatively unipolar system dominated by the United States has not prevented armed conflicts from breaking out. The world is no longer divided into strategic "protectorates" as it was during the Cold War, and the emerging multipolar system is aggravating geopolitical rivalries in some regions.

War is becoming "deinstitutionalized" and reverting to what it was before 1648—hence the suggestion that we are returning to "premodern" warfare. Classic warfare is disappearing as war becomes "privatized," in the sense that it is being waged increasingly by private armies rather than conscripts or professional soldiers. Since the beginning of the decade, there have been growing numbers of nonstate armed conflicts—that is, fighting between different factions within a state as opposed to fighting between the state and one or more factions. For example, in 2003, there were 29 armed conflicts involving states and 30 nonstate conflicts. However, both types of conflicts are in decline.

Forty percent of the casualties of war are direct victims (killed in battle), and 60% are indirect victims (those who die as a result of the consequences of armed conflict—displacement, disease, pandemics, malnutrition, and famine). Civilians, who make up a large percentage of the casualties, are 10 times more likely to be indirect victims than direct victims. It is estimated that approximately one third of the civilians who die in armed conflicts are killed by government forces and two thirds by intrastate groups.

The indirect victims of armed conflict are largely women and children. Many are sexually assaulted. Of the male casualties, 90% are direct victims of combat, but there are also large numbers of men among the indirect victims. Men are more likely than women to perish in mass killings or to die of pandemics or malnutrition.

More wars are ending than there are new wars breaking out. For example, between 1991 and 2004, 28 armed struggles for secession began or resumed, while 43 were curbed or ended. In 2004, there were 25 such armed conflicts under way, the smallest number since 1976.

Every year, "ethnic wars" account for the majority of "major" armed conflicts (12 out of 19 in 2005). However, the number of such wars has plunged since the end of the 1990s, as has the

number of civil wars. Typically, ethnic conflicts are caused by the collapse of states, not the reverse. They grow out of severe crises of governance that cause states to disintegrate. (Half a dozen states have crumbled over the past 20 years, including Afghanistan, the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Somalia.)

Armed conflicts are also spurred by the profit motive: fierce competition for control of resources, particularly minerals, diamonds, oil, and water. Elites, guerrillas, mafia, and mercenaries engage in warfare to exact tribute or to lay their hands on a nation's wealth. The geography of a conflict—its fault lines—is shaped more by the distribution of resources than by ideological or political differences (as is clearly seen in Central and Western Africa).

Democratization is a growing source of violence. Approximately one third of states are in transition. There are more democracies today than ever before in the history of the world, but the recent wave of democratization has left scars in its wake because of the failure of many transitional states to protect human rights or establish a state of law and because the democratization process has given rise to instability and bouts of political violence (examples include the former Yugoslavia, Colombia, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, Sudan, the Palestinian territories, and Iraq).

The Phenomenon of War

Interstate war is a recurring phenomenon that appears to be part and parcel of the Westphalian system; there were 278 such wars between 1648 and 1940, or one every 2 years. In 2003, J. David Singer calculated that there had been 412 interstate and intrastate wars between 1816 (when there were 23 states) and 1997 (when there were 181); 135 of these wars occurred after 1950. In all, there were 179 wars in the 19th century and 233 in the 20th century. Of the 2,340 weeks between 1945 and 1990, only 3 were entirely free of war. According to Singer, the record is not encouraging: The two decades with the largest number of wars since 1816 have been the 1970s (36 wars) and the 1990s (31 wars). In recent years, between 10% and 15% of states have been at war. The good news is that as a proportion of the number of states in the world and the world's population

(both of which are growing), the number of wars is decreasing. The ratio of wars to states has fallen steadily over the decades, from 0.74 in the 1890s (the highest in history) to 0.26 during the 1940s and 0.17 during the 1990s (one of the lowest in history). However, the number of battle deaths has been stable since 1950, at an average of approximately 2.6 million per decade, or one per 1,000, for a total of approximately 13 million dead. (These figures do not include indirect victims of war.) Wars caused an estimated 38 million battle deaths (including 11 million soldiers) between the years 1 CE and 1899 and more than 46 million deaths (including 22 million soldiers) between 1900 and 2000. From 1816 to 1939, interstate wars caused 28.4 million battle deaths and civil wars 6.8 million. Between 1940 and 2000, the proportions were reversed: 3.3 million battle deaths in interstate wars and 11.5 million in civil wars. World War I claimed a total of 20 million direct casualties, counting both soldiers and civilians, and World War II killed 40 million. Five wars accounted for more than half of all combat deaths during the 1946 to 2002 period: the civil war in China, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Iran–Iraq war, and the Afghan wars. These numbers do not include government-backed massacres of their own people (genocide, politicide, and femicide), which are estimated to have caused more than 175 million deaths between 1900 and 2000, of which approximately 125 million were caused by genocides and famines (70 million in China alone), 24 million by light arms, 17 million by artillery, and 2 million by aerial or naval bombardments.

Definition of War

We will return later to the statistics and trends, but first, we must attempt to define what war is. There is no consensus in the abundant literature. One of the classics, *A Study of War*, written by Quincy Wright (1942) of the University of Chicago, defines war as “violent contact of distinct but similar entities” (chap. 1). States may enter into violent contact, but so too may lions or tigers: This definition is inadequate since it ignores the importance of the political dimension of war. In Chapter I of his classic *On War*, the traditional strategist Carl von Clausewitz described war as “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill

our will” and then famously commented, “War is a continuation of politics by other means.”

War may be considered, then, to be an armed confrontation between enemies with irreconcilable or incompatible political goals, which *always* has the potential to escalate into an unlimited engagement aimed at achieving total victory and the destruction of the opponent. It is the ultimate instrument of policy where political differences cannot be resolved except by the use of force. War is also an organized process, a dimension stressed by the expert on war, Gaston Bouthoul: “War is armed and bloody struggle between organized groups.”

From a realist point of view, therefore, war implies acts of violence conducted and organized by political and military actors with antagonistic motives, which may be governments or infranational or supranational entities. Similarly, in the negative, we can say, with the realists, that peace is the *absence* of organized violence between groups or states. We shall see that, in the case of intrastate and ethno-political wars, there is disagreement between those who believe that war is inherent in the security dilemma (*realist theorists*) and those who argue, on the contrary, that war is constructed through the manipulation of identity by political entrepreneurs and decision makers (*critical theorists*).

War can take different forms in different eras:

International war is war between states, such as the Gulf War of 1991, North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) war against Serbia in 1999, the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It may be a regional war, such as the wars in the Middle East or between Pakistan and India, or a world war if the conflict spreads, as in World Wars I and II.

Intrastate war has been the most common type of warfare since the end of the Cold War. The examples of the former USSR, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka illustrate the wide scope of violence between governments, factions, ethnic groups, and other groups trying to win or maintain control over territory and political power. Intrastate war may also be associated with civil strife or traditional ideological warfare (revolutionary wars, national liberation wars, guerrilla wars).

War may be conducted by *conventional means* (invasion, bombing, coercion) or *unconventional means* (terrorism, insurrection, using chemical, biological, or nuclear arms). The means used determine the nature of the war.

Wars may be *short, long, or indeterminate*. They range in duration from the Six-Day War in 1967 to decades-long conflicts, such as the Vietnam War, which continued from 1945 to 1975. Civil wars, such as the ones in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and Kurdistan, which long appeared interminable (or still do), may come to seem like a permanent condition.

War may be *total or limited*. In the first case, it knows no bounds: The annihilation of the enemy, the extermination of its population, and the end of its regime are the objectives. In the second case, the war is conducted within a restricted framework and is aimed primarily at preventing an escalation to unbridled violence. The restrictions limit the geographic scope of the conflict, the number of opponents, the use of specific means or specific weapons, and the intensity of the fighting. Examples of “limited war” include the U.S. military engagement in Korea and Vietnam, and the Soviet engagement in Afghanistan.

Unconventional wars include psychological warfare, proxy or indirect wars, “nonwar operations,” and cold war (the potential for violence is ever present in all these types of warfare); *new wars* include information wars, “star wars,” the war against international terrorism, the war on drugs, and wars for control over resources (cases in which the potential for the use of force and for armed conflict is high).

Definition of Armed Conflict

Some research centers that compile statistics, such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), use the term *armed conflict* rather than war. An armed conflict may flare up sporadically, without necessarily constituting a war as defined above, but is more than a mere conflict in that it is not limited to a political dispute. There are generally some 20 “major armed conflicts” in any given year, as defined by SIPRI (“the use of armed force between the military

forces of two or more governments, or of one government and at least one organized armed group, resulting in the battle-related deaths of at least 1,000 people in any single calendar year"). The international environment is shaped to a large degree by these armed conflicts. Most are intrastate, and the majority occurs in Asia or Africa. A significant proportion, but less than half, began before 1989. Civilians make up the bulk of the victims. As a result, the number of refugees and displaced persons remains high. Recently, the Human Security Centre has begun compiling deaths resulting from armed violence between nonstate actors as well as from government-led violence against its own people.

More broadly, the term *conflict* can be used to refer to a situation of opposed interests that does not necessarily lead to armed confrontation (e.g., the 40-year East–West conflict). If it does develop into armed conflict, it can be the same thing as a war. Conflict generally implies a situation of strong opposition between a state, ethnic group, clan, or other group and another of these entities due to incompatible goals, which may be of a territorial, political, diplomatic, economic, military, ethnoreligious, internal, or external nature. The range of distinctions that can be applied to conflicts, armed or otherwise, indicates their diversity:

A conflict may be over *control of the government and the state* and therefore involve deep nationalist, ideological, or ethnic divisions (Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are good examples). Conflicts of this type can escalate into violent confrontation between groups or factions seeking at least partial control of the state (e.g., the rival guerrilla groups in Colombia).

Territory is a key issue in many conflicts. The motives may be ethnic (as in the former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Nagorno-Karabach, Georgia), economic (Iraq and Kuwait, the Spratly Islands), or strategic (Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights, India and Pakistan in Kashmir, Morocco, Western Sahara).

Ideology can be an important factor when it is enmeshed in a long-festering dispute (as in the China–Taiwan and Israel–Palestine conflicts).

Many conflicts fall into more than one of these categories. In some, all the above factors come into

play, intensifying the conflict. Collapsed states often present political, territorial, and ideological challenges that can be difficult to manage or contain. Numerous examples can be seen in Africa (Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia), the Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan), and Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador). Some major conflicts are regularly in the news; other conflicts are minor in scope and limited in time (such as the fishing disputes between Canada and Spain or between Iceland and Great Britain). Finally, in a minority of cases, we see local or regional conflicts that are confined to one country or neighboring countries, but a growing proportion of these have consequences with international ramifications (e.g., refugees, fears of escalation, collapsed states, displaced persons, humanitarian crises).

Trends and Developments in Armed Conflict

Violence, a prominent characteristic of the international system, is changing with time. What then are the main features of such violence, and how have they changed? What are the major trends in war, conflict, and violence around the world?

First, “major” wars (between major powers) have declined substantially, from 27 in the 16th century to 17 in the 17th century, 10 in the 18th century, 5 in the 19th century, and 5 in the 20th century. There have been no wars between major powers since 1945. If the trend holds, there should be no—or at the most very few—major wars in the 21st century. On the other hand, the destruction wrought by major wars has increased exponentially due to more advanced weaponry and the defense dilemma. The European wars of the 16th century caused slightly more than a million casualties, while 60 million soldiers and civilians died in the two world wars of the 20th century, more than the casualties of all previous wars combined. Since 1945, wars have caused an additional 40 million civilian and military casualties. (Civil wars and wars of independence in the Third World account for a large proportion of these.)

Second, 95% of armed conflicts and wars are intrastate. One of the goals of warfare today is the creation of smaller states, not larger ones as was the case in the past. As Kalevi Holsti observes, the great majority of wars since 1945 have been waged within states: “Almost 77% of the 164 wars were

internal, where armed combat was not against another state but against the authorities within the state or between armed communities.” Notwithstanding the oft-heard thesis that this is a phenomenon of the post-Cold War period, it has in fact been a well-established trend for 50 years. In other words, states have been under threat of fragmentation for some time.

On the one hand, interstate wars are becoming less frequent; on the other, intrastate wars are becoming more so. While there were a dozen civil wars per decade in the first half of the 20th century, the average has increased to 20 in the last 50 years. During the 1990s, the majority of *civil wars* lasted more than 5 years, two fifths lasted more than 10 years, and a quarter more than 20 years. Between 1989 and 1996, more than one third of United Nations (UN) member states—countries with a combined total of 20 million soldiers and a civilian population of 3.3 billion—were torn by civil war. Civil wars in the Third World left some 40 million dead.

Third, territorial factors are becoming considerably less important as a cause of war. Between 1648 and 1945, about one half of wars were territorial in nature, compared with 30% since 1945. As noted above, between 1945 and 1989, close to 77% of wars were internal, of which half were ideological and the other half ethnic conflicts or wars of secession.

Whereas during the Cold War armed conflicts were fairly evenly divided between conflicts of a territorial, ideological, and ethnopolitical nature, since 1989, the greatest proportion of conflicts has fallen into the last category; most commonly, these have been ethnic and identity-based conflicts in states at risk of collapse. On the other hand, serious territorial conflicts have a *greater* chance of escalating into war than do other types of conflict. While there are fewer and fewer disputes between states over territorial sovereignty, 17% of the world's 309 land borders are disputed, and 39 countries are still involved in jurisdictional disputes over archipelagos or islands. Some observers argue that territory remains an important issue, particularly in the age of globalization, as some states fight fiercely to maintain their integrity while they see their economic independence slipping away.

Fourth, the majority of wars and armed conflicts are being waged in the Global South, primarily in

Africa and Asia but also in the Middle East and the Caucasus. In Latin America, the number of armed conflicts has declined considerably. Three regions have seen no interstate wars since 1945: North America, South America, and Western Europe (except for the intervention against Serbia in 1999).

Fifth, fewer soldiers and more civilians are involved in wars. Civilians have become the leading victims of armed conflict by far: In the 1990s, 90% of the victims of war were civilians, compared with 65% during World War II and 40% during World War I. There were nearly 5 million military and civilian battle deaths in intrastate wars (counting both colonial and civil wars) between 1900 and 1949, and more than 10 million between 1950 and 2000. Interstate wars claimed 27 million military and civilian battle lives during the 1900 to 1949 period and 3 million between 1950 and 2000. These figures do not include state genocide perpetrated against domestic populations in the former USSR, China, Cambodia, and elsewhere, which have claimed more than 100 million victims.

Civil strife has had devastating effects. For example, there have been close to 4 million battle deaths in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 1998. With 1,250 people dying daily, the war in the Congo has been the deadliest since World War II. The use of rape as a weapon of war and the spread of pandemics such as AIDS, which are rampant in many countries and in the armed forces in particular, should also be noted (60% of soldiers are infected with the human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] in Zambia, 55% in Zimbabwe, 40% in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and 10% to 30% in Tanzania, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria). A growing proportion of civilian victims are children, and the majority of armed conflicts involve child soldiers under the age of 15. In the Third World, industrialization and the expansion of the service economy are creating an influx of young people into the urban centers where more jobs are available. As a result, the population of the cities is swelling, leading to the “urbanization” of conflicts. Jean-Louis Dufour has predicted that cities will be the battlefields of the next century.

In light of this survey, there is reason for both optimism and pessimism about the prospects for violence in the future.

On the one hand, while there are many more states today than there were 200 years ago, there has been no increase in armed conflicts between states. In proportionate terms, there are fewer armed conflicts today than there were at the beginning of the 20th century. On the other hand, it is clear that the human tendency toward violence has not subsided; in fact, it has become more intense and less state driven.

The Future of Peace Missions

Since the early 1990s, the UN has played a central role in the implementation of conflict prevention and resolution strategies. As a rule, the UN is automatically involved in peace missions. The existence of an international organization that is able to deploy soldiers supplied by member countries in order to maintain or restore an often fragile peace is a new development of historic significance. Over the past 50 years, the UN has sent hundreds of thousands of Blue Helmets (i.e., peace forces) to carry out a variety of observations and to monitor missions designed to help prevent a resumption of hostilities. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has adopted two additional goals: (1) creating conditions for a lasting peace settlement and (2) supporting efforts toward reconciliation and reconstruction in societies that have experienced violent conflicts. This expanded agenda explains the significant increase in peacekeeping missions during the past decade.

Seventeen UN peace missions were launched in the 4 years following the end of the Cold War, from 1989 to 1993—as many as during the preceding four decades. There had been a total of 15 missions up to 1989, all but 5 in connection with interstate conflicts. Between 1989 and 2000, there were a total of 38 new missions, all but 5 for intrastate conflicts. In 1991, there were about 11,000 peacekeepers on the ground; 2 years later there were more than 78,000, an all-time high. In the late 1990s, a certain amount of fatigue, coupled with cost concerns, set in, and the number of Blue Helmets dropped to 30,000 in 1999; however, by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, there were again almost 80,000 UN soldiers involved in more than 20 missions (approximately 100,000, if one includes military observers and civilian police). In addition, 65,000 NATO and

European Union (EU) soldiers were on duty in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia as part of robust operations aimed at maintaining a fragile peace. The UN is therefore more active than ever. The number of peace missions has increased, even though the number of conflicts has decreased. Three quarters of the total number of peace missions in the history of the UN have been launched since the end of the Cold War at an annual cost of around \$5 billion (equal to 1/100 of the U.S. security budget). According to Peter Wallensteen, the UN helped work out 25 of the 39 peace agreements that were signed between 1989 and 2000 for the purpose of ending armed conflicts. The UN is involved in peacemaking and peacebuilding in no less than half of the civil wars taking place today. Between 1990 and 2002, peacemaking initiatives increased fourfold; the imposition of sanctions, fivefold; preventive diplomacy missions, sixfold; and mediation mechanisms and truth and reconciliation commissions, sevenfold. The total number of peace operations more than tripled from 7 in 1988 to 23 in 2008 (see the reports from the Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia and the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* from the Center on International Cooperation at New York University). Between 1948 and 2008, some 2,200 Blue Helmets were killed during peace missions; more than half of those have died since 1993. Since intrastate wars have largely replaced interstate wars, to which UN mechanisms appear better suited, peace missions have become more demanding and more dangerous. In the new international security environment, the UN has been redesigning the mandates and methods of peace operations launched to end civil wars and ethnic conflicts. The results, however, have been mixed. The UN's own self-assessment reports on the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the massacre in the Bosnian village of Srebrenica in 1995 uncovered serious weaknesses in peacekeeping mechanisms and decision making. Since these events, there have been many analyses of the shortcomings of the UN's peace operations and international security efforts. Those deficiencies have been made evident again by the UN's inaction in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The impartial Blue Helmets, standing between the combatants with the consent of both parties, seem to be a thing of the past. In today's peace missions, UN soldiers (and, ironically enough,

NATO soldiers) are called on to maintain and strengthen the standards that underpin peace. In a country that has become ungovernable, the mere presence of UN forces can be enough to provide a level of security, which will enable the country to get past the roots and the effects of war, at least for a time. In addition, there is hope that as they move toward a liberal conception of democratic standards and a market economy, these countries will recover the peace that they lost or never knew. Together with other actors, particularly humanitarian organizations and financial institutions, the Blue Helmets are taking initiatives and applying principles that go beyond the limited, traditional concept of peacekeeping. Their new role pursues the far more ambitious objectives of peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding. Realists consider this to be a praiseworthy but naive approach that is based on false hopes and doomed to failure. In their view, the UN cannot abandon the Westphalian conception of security on which it was founded in 1945. According to the realists, if the UN claims a right of interference, which entails an increased practical commitment to human security, it will flounder on the severe limitations and enormous obstacles faced by intrastate peace missions. For one thing, the possibility of artificially reshaping a society in the image of a Western democracy appears to the realists to be doubtful at best. A basic contradiction immediately presents itself: The UN and other organizations such as NATO are increasingly expressing a desire to keep the peace not only *between* states but also *within* states. Whereas during the Cold War, most states wanted the UN to be no more than an arbiter of interstate relations, and a weak one at that, some now expect the UN to rescue and, if necessary, revive collapsed states that are unable to govern themselves or maintain security. Can the UN fulfill this role? Are UN peace forces able to resolve intrastate conflicts? This question can be expected to arise with every new peace mission and to fuel bitter debate for years to come.

Definitions of Peace

In general, a peacekeeping mission refers to the deployment by the UN (or another intergovernmental organization [IGO]) of civilian personnel,

police, and Blue Helmets for the purpose of conflict prevention, management, and resolution. The UN's military operations include a full range of activities aimed at curbing and resolving conflicts, from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement.

Peace has often been defined as the absence of violence. In the post-Cold War period, this classic, primarily "negative," definition has come to be seen as inadequate, and the international community is working toward a more progressive and "positive" definition of peace. The negative conception of peace implies that peace is only temporary. Peace exists when we succeed in preventing the outbreak of conflict. It is a fragile interval produced by the balance of forces. It may be based on the hegemony of one state, the balance between major powers in the international system (e.g., where several countries possess weapons of mass destruction), or the play of alliances. These are all shaky foundations for peace and, in the view of the realists, have not prevented the persistence and regular resurgence of war, the natural order of things, throughout history.

The positive conception of peace is based on the establishment of values, networks, and multilateral mechanisms that can ensure the long-term survival of a stable international system. The threat is no longer military in nature and cannot be addressed by states acting on their own. The principle "every man for himself" is replaced by "all for one" and the idea of power by the concept of sharing. Individual attitudes must change, the machinery of war must be abandoned, and peace and justice education must be promoted.

Approaches to Peace Missions

Approaches to peace and peace missions sometimes adopt a positive and sometimes a negative conception of peace.

During the Cold War, the (negative) concept of peacekeeping was the only one in common use. With the proliferation of peace missions and mandates since 1989, new (more positive) concepts have gained currency. Most notably, the Agenda for Peace proposed in 1992 by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and revised in 1995 set out principles and terms that gave new impetus to research efforts and introduced a more precise classification of peace missions. From the

voluminous literature on peace missions, we will discuss four terms that are now widely in use.

Peacekeeping means deploying UN personnel—primarily, military personnel—with the consent of the parties to the conflict to maintain a cease-fire and prevent a resumption of hostilities. By positioning multinational forces between the parties, the UN tries to preserve or increase the chances of peace. The forces are deployed only when a peace agreement has been reached and has taken hold. The forces remain impartial and neutral. They can fire only in self-defense. If hostilities break out again, they are immediately withdrawn. The UN Charter made no provision for such forces; they are often said to be mandated under a fictional Chapter VI and a half, halfway between the cooperative means of Chapter VI and the coercive means of Chapter VII.

Peacemaking includes all forms of mediation and negotiation intended to bring the parties closer together, essentially by peaceful means. The cooperative means referred to in Chapter VI of the UN Charter are used to help achieve a settlement of the conflict. Preventive diplomacy, particularly the preventive deployment of peacekeepers, can also be useful for containing the outbreak and escalation of violence between the parties. The deployment of forces with the consent of the parties can help establish a climate of trust and security conducive to the resumption of negotiations and mediation.

Peace enforcement refers to coercive action authorized by the UN Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter in response to “threats to peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.” Multinational military forces under UN command must then enforce the agreements that they are supposed to guarantee and, if necessary, engage in armed action. Peace enforcement can also be undertaken by a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter and in accordance with rules stipulated by the Security Council.

Peacebuilding means a concerted effort by the UN and the international community as a whole to develop political, economic, and security infrastructures to achieve long-term suppression or resolution of a conflict. Peacebuilding attempts to

lay the foundations for reconciliation and reconstruction. It seeks to avert any resumption of violence in a bid to redraw the settlement. While it is intended primarily for the postconflict phase, it can also be applied as a preventive measure before violence breaks out or even during the conflict to firm up an unstable or precarious peace. It is based on the economic and social measures described in Chapters IX and X of the Charter, among others.

These approaches are used in succession as part of an overall strategy for peace.

Development of Peace Missions

The development of peace missions can be thought of as spanning two periods: (1) the Cold War, from 1948 to 1988, during which traditional peacekeeping operations were conducted by the Blue Helmets, and then (2) the 1989 to 1993 period, during which the deployment of peacekeepers and their assignments expanded exponentially. A third emerging phase, the post-1994 period, is less distinct: It is a continuation of the preceding period with some accentuated features.

The first period opened with the UN Observer Missions monitoring in Palestine in 1948 and Kashmir in 1949 (the dates of the beginning of the operations). The goal of the “Blue Beret” missions was to monitor cease-fires and armistice agreements that had been agreed to by states. The deployment of the “Blue Helmets” (a Canadian invention) along the Suez Canal in 1956 was the beginning of a new, more engaged phase. Similar operations were subsequently carried out to enforce, as far as possible, other demarcation lines and cease-fires between opposed countries or communities, such as Cyprus in 1964, the Sinai in 1973, and the Golan Heights in 1974.

The Blue Helmets were positioned between the combatants to police a buffer zone and reduce the risk of a resumption of hostilities. The principle was clear, and the success criterion was the absence of war—that is, the realization of the negative conception of peace. Other missions were mandated to verify the suspension of hostilities between Iran and Iraq in 1988, to supervise the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan in 1988 and Angola in 1989, and in the first intra-state conflicts that the UN has dealt with, to

restore order in Congo in 1960 to 1964 and in southern Lebanon in 1978. This period also saw multilateral operations outside the UN framework, such as the one in Lebanon in 1982, in which several countries joined forces to deploy an implementation force.

During the second period, which extended from 1989 to 1993, 17 new missions were conducted. As the Agenda for Peace noted in 1992, the UN deployed tens of thousands of Blue Helmets to carry out expanded missions. They supervised elections (Namibia and Nicaragua in 1989), helped settle disputes (El Salvador in 1991, Cambodia and Mozambique in 1992), and served as a prevention force (on the Kuwaiti border in 1991 and Macedonia's border in 1992). They also monitored disarmament (Iraq in 1991), ensured the security of humanitarian operations, protected refugees and displaced persons (in northern Iraq in 1991, in Somalia and Bosnia in 1992), and observed and monitored the (often futile) implementation of peace agreements (in Angola in 1991, in Rwanda in 1993).

These examples confirm three notable changes in Blue Helmet missions.

1. They affirm (reinforce) the new right of intervention to provide humanitarian assistance, proclaimed by the Security Council after the Gulf War in 1991.
2. Most of these Blue Helmet missions addressed intrastate conflicts, without necessarily obtaining prior consent from the government or the rival factions.
3. The missions were multidimensional; that is, they simultaneously comprised peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding components.

Since 1994, a third generation of missions has emerged: The focus is on peace enforcement to stabilize collapsed states through reconstruction, democratization, and development. In these missions, peace enforcement and peacebuilding interpenetrate.

In one new feature, many of these missions were originally conducted by an actor other than the UN but with the UN's approval. This occurred for the first time with the deployment of U.S. troops in

Somalia in 1992, initially for strictly humanitarian reasons. The subsequent use of force by the United States in Haiti in 1994, by NATO in Bosnia in 1995 and in Kosovo in 1999, by Nigeria and Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone in 1997, by Australia in East Timor in 1999, by Great Britain in Sierra Leone in 2000, by NATO again in Afghanistan in 2001, and by France in Ivory Coast in 2002 revealed the UN's significant shortcomings when it came to deploying an *armed* force without the full consent of the host country's political authorities. Over the past 6 years, UN peace forces, acting in some cases with the support of small contingents from the African Union (AU), Organization of American States (OAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or the EU, have taken over such missions in Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, and East Timor but only once the situation was relatively stable. In Somalia, Haiti, and East Timor, the UN Blue Helmets took over the missions only once security had been reestablished. Elsewhere, the Blue Helmets continued to conduct traditional monitoring and peacekeeping operations lasting for years in Cyprus, the Middle East, Western Sahara, Kashmir, and the Ethiopia-Eritrea border. There has been lively discussion about the role of the peace forces and heated polemics about their operations against the background of UN reform and the redefinition of its mechanisms.

Clearly, there are huge obstacles to giving the UN real peace enforcement capabilities. These include the lack of a real military mechanism at the UN, archaic command structures and doctrines, lack of equipment and financial resources, poor coordination, overly decentralized training and supervision of peace forces, inability to react swiftly, and, most important, the UN's dependence on the countries that supply the Blue Helmet troops.

Hence, it is not surprising to see devolution of military operations to defense organizations, including NATO, and to major powers, such as the United States, which have greater experience and more resources in this area. Another promising approach might be to "regionalize" peace enforcement and provide regional organizations such as the AU with the logistical means, funding,

and training in command and coordination that they need to conduct enforcement and combat missions more independently, although still under the aegis of the UN. Hybrid missions of this type would also better reflect the contribution of southern hemisphere countries to UN peace missions: Five nations—India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Ghana—are now supplying three quarters of the Blue Helmet troops. At the end of the day, the UN serves the cause of peace more effectively in its role as impartial mediator than in a military capacity. However, it appears that armed force is needed to establish and shore up the peace. This is a battle that the founders of the UN clearly did not foresee and that the Blue Helmets are not equipped to wage.

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See also Arms Race; Cold War; Conflict Resolution; Democratic Peace; Disarmament; Intervention; Mediation in International Relations; Peace; Peacekeeping; Positive Peace; Security Cooperation; United Nations

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WARLORDS

The term *warlord* reemerged on the political scene due to a number of bloody intrastate conflicts since the beginning of the 1990s. In particular, the long-standing wars in West Africa, in Somalia, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in Afghanistan led to the frequent use of the term in politics, media, and academia to describe powerful men and their armed organizations, which profit economically from war and violence. Modern archetypes, such as Charles Taylor (Liberia), Johnny Paul Koroma (Sierra Leone), Mohammed Farah Aideed (Somalia), Jean-Pierre Bemba (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Mahmud Khudoberdyev (Tajikistan), and Gul Agha Shirzai, Ismail Khan, and Abdul Rashid Dostum (all Afghanistan) are regarded as both a result and a key characteristic of the so-called new wars. This entry analyzes the phenomenon, in general, and points to the main characteristics of organization, leadership, and other key aspects.

The Phenomenon of the Warlord

The warlord phenomenon is not a new challenge for governments and the international community. On the contrary, warlords have been constant companions of wars since the ancient times and the medieval period. In particular, the situation in Britain in the early Middle Ages with a number of rival armed local commanders, dukes,

and lords is seen as a historical precedent. But also during the Thirty Years' War of the 17th century, feudal warlords—Max Weber used the terms *Kriegsfürst* and *Kriegsfürstentum*—dominated European battlefields. They recruited and paid their own soldiers, and they were known for plundering the local population; perhaps the most prominent figures being Duke Albrecht von Wallenstein and Duke Mansfield. Another historical point of reference is the Chinese warlord era after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Due to the fragmentation of the Empire as well as the competition of local rulers and army commanders, about 1,300 warlords (in Chinese called *junfa*), subdivided in different cliques, were involved in more than 140 greater and smaller wars in the 1920s and 1930s. From a historical point of view, the figure of the warlord can thus be seen as the classical antagonist to the modern state's monopoly on the use of force, which was successively established in Europe and later elsewhere against various forms of warlordism.

In general, warlords are portrayed as profit-driven, economically motivated actors who have an interest in ongoing conflicts and, therefore, undermine peace and stability. As Max Weber (1978) pointed out, “The warlord becomes a permanent figure when there is a chronic state of war” (p. 1142). Moreover, warlords may also be present in a fragile postconflict setting or in situations of state failure. Under such circumstances, as demonstrated, for example, in Afghanistan after 2001 or in Bosnia after 1995, warlords and their private militias aim at consolidating the territorial, financial, or economic gains that they have made during a violent conflict. In other words, warlords may also exist outside of war times and may influence postwar economies and politics, in particular, as long as state structures are weak or failing and the state's monopoly of the use of force does not exist.

In press reports as well as in the academic literature, the label *warlord* has been used for very different persons and groups. In some cases, presidents, heads of government, leaders of political parties, or former army generals also have been described as warlords. But mostly the term refers to an armed nonstate actor who is able to control a particular territory and its inhabitants, during or after the end of a violent conflict. Or as James

Sheridan (1966) put it, a warlord is a man who exercised effective governmental control over a fairly well-defined region by means of a military organization that obeyed no higher authority than himself. The regions or territories dominated by warlords are often remote, far away from the capital, and beyond effective control of the national government. In some cases, territorial control exceeds even international borders. For example, in 1992–1993, Charles Taylor controlled not only most of Liberia but also parts of Sierra Leone and the border region with Ivory Coast (known as “Taylorland”).

Generally, warlords aim at controlling areas rich in resources such as timber, oil, minerals, diamonds, gold, or other precious metals, which are easy extractable. These resources are exploited directly or indirectly, such as by selling concessions to national or international companies. The population under the control of a warlord organization also serves as an important resource. Warlords and their fighters may regularly plunder and loot villages and farms, they may raise special “taxes” for granting physical security, and they may also benefit from local businesses and trade relationships as well as from criminal activities (e.g., drug cultivation and trade, human trafficking, smuggling of goods), which they either control or at least allow as long as they can enjoy their share of the profits. In addition, warlords—like other armed groups—may use humanitarian or developmental aid, provided by international donors, for their own purposes. Or, alternatively, they demand money or goods for allowing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or aid agencies to supply the local population with basic services or to start infrastructure projects. As emphasized by Mark Duffield (1998) and William Reno (1998), warlord organizations need to operate across borders and try to get access to regional and global networks as well as to gray and illicit markets in order to persist. Therefore, successful warlords establish transnational links with businesspeople, companies, governments, or organized crime.

The Organization and Other Key Aspects

These economic activities, however, are not only driven by selfish profit interests, but they are a

necessary requirement to finance a warlord’s activities, including acquiring weapons and paying their fighters and supporters. Warlords have to be able to recruit, maintain, train, and equip their own private paramilitary forces. Sometimes they also use child soldiers, but mostly they will rely on experienced comrades and fighters. The relationship between them and the warlord is often based on personal loyalty and to a lesser extent on ethnic ties or political ideology. Therefore, a warlord should be distinguished from a clan chief or a rebel leader. It may, however, be the case that key members of a warlord organization come from the same ethnic group, tribe, clan, or family to enhance the coherence of the group and to ensure trust among its leadership. This pattern can be found in particular in Somalia and Afghanistan where clan and tribe organizations are still very strong. In some instances, the charisma of the warlord and the myths about his (“glorious”) life play an important role in attracting supporters, in particular young men. The kind of organization differs from case to case and ranges from rather hierarchical structures to a loose band of commanders and subcommanders who pursue their own interests and have a certain degree of autonomy.

Nevertheless, to stay in power, warlords have to rely on their leadership and organizational skills as well as on their ability to sustain coalitions and networks. In this respect, many warlords can make good use of their capabilities and contacts they have made in their former lives. As several biographies show, they have often been part of the political or military establishment of a country; sometimes they come from wealthy, influential families (e.g., Bemba), a number of them have made a professional career in the army or the security sector (e.g., Khan, Dostum, Koroma, Aideed, and Khudoberdiev). Others had experience as businessmen and a few even studied abroad such as Taylor in the United States or Bemba in Belgium (both earned degrees in economics). Most of them first supported the existing regime but later joined the opposition and set up armed groups (e.g., Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia [NPFL]) or used the opportunities offered by state failure and civil wars. For example, during the 1980s and 1990s, the Afghan warlords managed to establish themselves as key field commanders and build territorial strongholds. Warlords, however, cannot always be

seen as antagonistic to state actors. Sometimes, they collaborate with the government and may even join forces with the state's military if this fits their interests and as long as the government does not challenge the warlord's autonomy.

To sustain their rule, warlords cannot only rely on the (potential) use of violence to deter enemies or intimidate the population; they often perform a political role and try to achieve some form of governance. As Paul Jackson (2003) pointed out, established warlord organizations can be understood as "quasi governance" or "embryonic states" that aim at enhancing support and legitimacy of the population by providing basic services and maintaining infrastructure. "Taylorland" serves again as an illustration since it had its own currency and banks, media, transport, and communication infrastructure as well as "external" trade relationships. Many warlords, therefore, made attempts to act as "politicians" in order to secure their power base as well as their resources and profits. They establish political movements and take part in elections; others become incorporated in official state structures. In Afghanistan, for example, a number of warlords became—at least for a certain period of time—provincial governors, ministers in the central government, or members of parliament. Similar careers can be studied in Tajikistan, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in Somalia, or in West Africa. The most prominent figure has certainly been Charles Taylor who was elected president of Liberia (1997–2003). However, it can be stated that warlordism is not a long-term phenomenon. Only in very few cases were these figures able to keep their position for more than 10 years; more often they vanished from the scene, they became ordinary criminals, or they were defeated or killed by their enemies or by internal rivals. Even in the case of Charles Taylor, the story did not end gloriously; first he had to live in exile in Nigeria before he was arrested and transferred to Sierra Leone in 2006, where he faces the Special Court on war crimes.

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See also Militias; Terrorism, International; Terrorist Groups; Violence

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WEBER, MAX (1864–1920)

At the beginning of the 21st century, the International Sociological Association asked its members to list five books published in the 20th century that were most influential in their work as sociologists. The book that was listed most often overall was Max Weber's *Economy and Society*, and *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* ranked fourth. The latter was also listed among the New York Public Library's *Books of the Century* (1895–1995). The regard for Weber's thought thus extends beyond sociology, and it continues to inform a variety of disciplines, including political science, today.

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is arguably Weber's best known study, but its purpose and main results have often been misrepresented or misunderstood. Both terms in the title represent what Weber called "ideal types," that is, they are not directly observable entities but rather constitute one-sided conceptual abstractions that provide the social scientist with a tool to better understand and interpret aspects of reality. In this

work, the particular aspect of reality that Weber was most interested in was a core constitutive element of the specifically modern type of capitalism: its underlying motivation or “spirit.” For Weber, modern capitalism’s constitutive features were not only the systematic pursuit of profit and a rational organization of the production factors of labor and capital in the economy but also a distinctive modern ethos that guided work and acquisition.

Weber illustrated this ethos by using Benjamin Franklin’s admonitions of how to act in order to succeed in business. Franklin stressed methodical, industrious, and frugal conduct, viewing it as an ethical responsibility to increase one’s material well-being through honest hard labor and focusing thereby on long-term results. Such ethical responsibility, or duty, to pursue one’s vocation or (secular) “calling” in a diligent and competent—thus, in the modern sense, professional—manner sets the “spirit” of modern capitalism and also sets apart modern capitalism itself from other economic motivations and forms of the economy. At the most general level, Weber distinguishes capitalism and its profit motive from (a) socialism/communism, which does not aim for profit making but for the satisfaction of the needs of a collective; (b) the “hand-to-mouth” existence in a subsistence economy, with no surplus to trade on markets; and (c) traditionalism, an economic motive according to which a person works only as much as is necessary to achieve or sustain a certain standard of living—an economic motive antithetical to dynamic and expanding markets. Capitalism itself can be differentiated into *market capitalism* and what Weber termed *political capitalism*. In political capitalism, a state uses its political power and resources to extract a surplus from its own citizens or even from other countries. This use of force contradicts the formally peaceful means employed in modern capitalism. The “spirit” of modern capitalism à la Franklin undergirds modern *rational* capitalism and sets it apart from robber and booty capitalism, by which a corporation or an individual employs force and illegal activities to gain an economic advantage, and from adventure capitalism, which, though not necessarily illegal, involves irrational speculation and a daredevil attitude. The motives of adventure and robber capitalists are incompatible with the spirit of capitalism and its emphasis on the engagement in a vocational

calling with the aim to make renewed, long-term profit.

Weber considered the “spirit” of modern capitalism the heir of the “Protestant ethic.” The “Protestant ethic,” according to Weber, was a form of inner-worldly asceticism practiced among ascetic Protestant groups that ultimately derived from Calvinist theology and its concept of a “calling.” These groups shared the view that individuals had to prove themselves in their entire life conduct, for it was through ascetic conduct, particularly in one’s profession and vocation, that members could gain assurance of their salvation status. Such ascetic moral conduct, Weber wrote in a companion essay, “The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism,” also allowed ascetic Protestants to gain and retain membership in groups that provided certification of moral qualification and thus business and social creditworthiness. In this context, Weber acknowledged not only the sectarian discipline in these groups but also their flat hierarchies and self-governance, which contributed to the emergence of public citizenship in civil society, dynamism in governance, and the social responsibilities of the rights-bearing individual. Ultimately, however, while Calvinist doctrine had led to the disenchantment of the world, as the use of magical means was no longer considered legitimate, paradoxically, it also laid the foundation for secularization (the decline of religion’s influence on other social spheres) and the embrace of materialism (the pursuit of material gain instead of religious goals), which led Weber to his oft-quoted characterization of the modern world as an “iron cage” devoid of meaning.

In spite of Weber’s claim that his study was merely an illumination of how ideas can become effective in history and focused on the emergence of the modern professional (*Berufsmenschen*) in its significance as a component of the capitalist spirit, *The Protestant Ethic* has sometimes been seen as an anti-Marxist idealist construction of history, and many historians have raised doubts about the imputed influence of religious notions on economic activities in the early modern age. Weber himself sought to broaden the scope of his inquiry by addressing the mutual influence of religious and economic factors in his writings on the “Economic Ethics of the World Religions,” in which he also widened his thematic focus beyond

religion and the economy to religion and the rationalization of all spheres of life.

Economy and Society

Many social scientists consider *Economy and Society* as Weber's major work and one of the most important contributions to the discipline. Due to the fragmented nature of the compilation, it is often used as a compendium from which scholars draw selectively on Weber's ideas, frequently from the first four chapters, which contain Weber's "Conceptual Composition" and are the only parts that Weber actually had sent off to the printer before his death. In contrast to this newer part, the older parts of the compilation include Weber's writings on communities, in general; religious communities; law; domination; and the city.

Among the most influential perspectives is Weber's sociology of domination. Weber distinguished between power and authority. Power is the chance to realize intentions even against the resistance of others, whereas authority is the probability that specific commands are obeyed by a group of people. Weber believed that people typically obeyed commands so long as they considered them legitimate. He further specified three different claims to such legitimacy. *Traditional legitimacy* is based on the belief in the validity of long-standing traditions and customs. The ruled owe a personal loyalty to the ruler, who may rule over a household as a patriarch or use staff or other administrative apparatus, as in the case of patrimonialism. The social and political order under traditional rule is static. *Charismatic authority* is based on the extraordinary and exceptional qualities, or charisma (literally, a "gift of grace"), of a person, who in declaiming a "mission" motivates others to become followers and even disciples. Charismatic authority is apt to break through the static order of traditional rule. It tends to be unstable, however, as it is tied to a person; thus, Weber addressed the ways by which the inherently unstable nature of charismatic authority is depersonalized and transformed into a more stable system of authority, a process he called the *routinization* of charisma. One outcome of the routinization of charisma is "office charisma," in which an office is vested with authority from customs (traditional authority) or legal-rational rules (bureaucracy). Finally,

rational-legal authority rests on the formal legality of enacted rules and the right of those in authority to enforce rules. The purest manifestation of such authority was modern bureaucracy, which in Weber's view was the most formally efficient and rational way to administer complex modern societies. A bureaucracy relies on the knowledge of trained professional officials, whose duties and obligations are expressly defined in written regulations and whose employment and promotion are based on administrative training and experience.

Weber's views on domination had implications for his views on politics. In modern society, the bureaucratization of society could lead to its ossification into an "iron cage," governed by bureaucrats, who, unlike politicians, were typically not elected nor subject to direct public oversight. He foresaw the bureaucratization of modern capitalism through the proliferation of bureaucratically run corporations and the bureaucratization of politics through the emergence of party machines run by political functionaries. He believed that what he called a plebiscitary leader democracy, in which a charismatic leader injects politics with dynamism yet remains tied to approbation by the ruled masses, could be a solution to this problem of the bureaucratization of politics. In one of his most famous lectures, "The Profession and Vocation of Politics," he elaborated on this thought.

"The Profession and Vocation of Politics"

Weber noted that the modern state is characterized as a community that successfully claims a monopoly on legitimate physical force on a certain territory, using a bureaucratic apparatus and holding ownership over administrative means (including those that involve force). Weber not only related his notions about the state to his views on authority and power but also more precisely outlined the characteristics of a modern politician, whom he viewed as the product of larger societal trends of democratization, bureaucratization, and professionalization. The modern politician was a full-time professional who lived both for and off politics. The action of politicians, in contrast to that of bureaucrats, is not about administering rules and regulations impartially

but governed by the principle of taking responsibility in leadership. In doing so, the politician can adopt either an “ethic of conviction,” which is motivated by good intentions but does not take into account the outcomes of action, or an “ethic of responsibility,” which takes them into account and which Weber personally preferred over the former and considered more appropriate for modern politics. Leadership by professional politicians is part of the struggle among parties, which Weber saw headed toward governance by an impersonal apparatus, unless a politician who saw politics as both profession and vocation established a plebiscitary form of leadership democracy. This notion has proved controversial, for some scholars have viewed Weber’s concept as an endorsement of nationalist power politics that paved the way to fascist rule in Europe after Weber’s death, while others have pointed to Weber’s cosmopolitan, Anglophile political liberalism to reject this view.

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See also Bureaucracy; Capitalism; Charisma; Historical Sociology; Legitimacy

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(heteroscedasticity), which is common in political science data. By assigning individual weights to the observations the heteroscedasticity can be removed by design. The square root of the inverse of the error variance of the observation is typically used as a weight. The key idea is that less weight is given to those observations with a large error variance. This forces the variance of the residuals to be constant. WLS is an example of the broader class of generalized least squares estimators. The idea was first presented by Alexander Aitken (1935). The foundations of this procedure and a concrete example are presented below.

Motivation

Standard regression modeling assumes that the variance of the residuals is constant across the levels of the explanatory variables. Often in political science this is violated, causing potential problems of fit and interpretation. George Downs and David Rocke (1979) give the well-known examples of increasing spread around consumption as income increases, increasing spread in the proportion of felons incarcerated in states as legislative interest increases, and decreasing spread in that proportion as the average education level in the state decreases. All of these are examples where one aspect of the relationship between the explanatory variable and the outcome variable, outcome uncertainty, changes as the levels of the right-hand side are altered. WLS addresses this problem by *modeling* this heteroscedasticity rather than ignoring it. Thus, there is a trade-off between increased model complexity and increased interpretational complexity.

Theory

The ordinary linear model has the form $y = X\beta + \varepsilon$, where y is an $n \times 1$ outcome vector with continuous measure, X is an $n \times k$ nonsingular matrix with explanatory variables down the columns and a leading column of ones, β is a $k \times 1$ parameter vector to be estimated, and ε is an $n \times 1$ error vector with assumed mean zero. The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator of β is arrived at by minimizing the squared error terms and is formed by $(X'X)^{-1}X'y$. In the presence of heteroscedasticity, the OLS estimator of β is not the best linear

WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES

Weighted least squares (WLS) is a standard compensation technique for nonconstant error variance

unbiased estimator (BLUE). The term *best* here means that the estimator achieves the minimum possible variance.

WLS allows one to reformulate the model and generate estimates that are in principle the BLUE. The introduction of a weight matrix Ω into the calculation of $\hat{\beta}$ removes the heteroscedasticity from the model. The Ω matrix is created by taking the error variance of the i th case (estimated or known), v_i , and assigning it to the i th diagonal, $\Omega_{ii} = 1/v_i = \omega_i$, leaving the off-the-diagonal elements as zero. In this way, large error variances are reduced by premultiplying the model terms by this reciprocal. We can premultiply each term in the standard linear model setup by the square root of the Ω matrix (i.e., by the standard deviation). This “square root” is actually produced from a Cholesky factorization: If A is a positive definite symmetric ($A' = A$) matrix, then there must exist a matrix G such that $A = GG'$. A matrix A is positive definite if for any nonzero $p \times 1$ vector x , $x'Ax > 0$. In our case, this decomposition is greatly simplified because the Ω matrix has only diagonal values (all off-the-diagonal values equal zero). Therefore, the Cholesky factorization is produced simply from the square root of these diagonal values. Premultiplying gives

$$\Omega^{1/2}y = \Omega^{1/2}X\beta + \Omega^{1/2}\epsilon.$$

Instead of minimizing the squared errors in the usual manner, we now minimize $(y - X\beta)' \Omega (y - X\beta)$, and the subsequent WLS estimator is calculated as $\hat{\beta} = (X' \Omega X)^{-1} X' \Omega y$. The WLS estimator gives theoretically the BLUE of the coefficient estimator in the presence of heteroscedasticity.

Weighted Least Squares and Feasible Weighted Least Squares

In this setup, it is required that the variance of the error, v_i , be known. In principle, there are two possibilities: (1) v_i is derived from the underlying data-generating process or (2) v_i is estimated. An example of the first is the linear probability model in which the structure of heteroscedasticity is known. In a binary model, the variance is $\text{Var}(\epsilon_i) = X_i\beta(1 - X_i\beta)$. This gives an expression of the form of heteroscedasticity and allows the analyst to estimate a linear model with WLS. The

weights are directly computed by using the OLS estimates of β to compute $\text{Var}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$. Because $\hat{\beta}_{OLS}$ is an unbiased estimator, $\text{Var}(\hat{\epsilon}_i)$ is also unbiased. A possible obstacle here is that the linear probability model may produce a $\hat{y}_i$ that lies outside the $[0, 1]$ interval and therefore produces negative weights.

Often the form of heteroscedasticity is not known, and $\hat{v}_i$ rather than v_i is used. By relying on an estimate of v_i , the WLS estimator is no longer unbiased. But it is still a consistent estimate and asymptotically more efficient than the OLS estimator. This is often referred to as *feasible weighted least squares* (FWLS). This implies a two-step procedure. In the first step, a linear model is estimated using OLS, and based on $\hat{\epsilon}_{OLS}$, one can derive $\hat{v}$ and therefore $\hat{\Omega}$. The FWLS estimate is obtained by minimizing $(y - X\beta)' \hat{\Omega} (y - X\beta)$. The next section illustrates an FWLS estimation.

Example

This illustration is based on political data from Swiss cantons in 1990 (Adrian Vatter, Markus Freitag, Christoph Müller, & Marc Bühlmann, 2004). The outcome variable is the number of cantonal employees per 1,000 inhabitants. The two predictor variables are the degree of proportionality (PR) in the electoral system and cantonal gross domestic product (GDP, in 1,000s). The results from a standard OLS estimation of the linear model do not allow rejection of the null hypothesis for either of the explanatory variables at standard thresholds.

Based on the results presented in Table 1, the conclusion is that the degree of PR has no effect on the number of public employees. It is possible to test for heteroscedasticity by using, for example, the Breusch-Pagan test (Trevor Breusch & Adrian Pagan, 1979; Dennis Cook & Sanford Weisberg, 1983). In this example, the squared residuals ($\hat{\epsilon}_i^2$) are regressed on the predicted values of the outcome ($\hat{y}_i$). If the residuals have a common variance, the explanatory power of the regression is low. The null hypothesis of the test states a constant error variance. In the example here, the test value is 5.68 (χ^2 with 1 degree of freedom), which corresponds to a p value of .017. Based on this, the null hypothesis can be rejected.

In Figure 1, the residuals from the OLS estimation are plotted against the outcome variable.

Table 1 Comparison of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Weighted Least Squares (WLS)

Variable	OLS	WLS
GDP	0.14 (0.74)	0.07 (1.13)
PR	-1.95 (0.46)	-1.47 (2.15)
Intercept	26.14 (2.40)	24.46 (12.74)
N	26	26
Breusch-Pagan (<i>p</i> value)	5.68 (.017)	


Source: Based on data from Vatter, A., Freitag, M., Müller, C., & Bühlmann, M. (2004). *Political, social, and economic data of the Swiss cantons 1983–2002*. Bern, Switzerland: University of Bern.

Notes: The outcome variable is the number of public employees per 1,000 habitants. Absolute *t* values are in parentheses. GDP = gross domestic product, in 1,000s; PR = proportionality.

There is a strong positive trend, which visually confirms the Breusch-Pagan test result. The WLS approach is an effective way to address the heteroscedasticity in such cases. Based on the estimation results of the OLS procedure, it is possible to derive $\hat{\Omega}$, where $\hat{\Omega}_{ii} = 1/\hat{\varepsilon}_i^2$ and $\hat{\varepsilon}$ is the estimated error of the OLS procedure. The second column in Table 1 reports the results from the WLS procedure, $\hat{\Omega}^{-1/2} \mathbf{y} = \hat{\Omega}^{-1/2} \mathbf{X}\beta + \hat{\Omega}^{-1/2} \varepsilon$. The GDP of a canton still does not have a reliable effect on the outcome variable. But in the WLS procedure, the effect of the degree of PR on the number of cantonal employees is negative and significant at conventional levels.

Conclusion

WLS allows analysts to estimate linear models in the presence of heteroscedasticity. Premultiplying the observations by a weight matrix, Ω , makes the error variance constant. There are also other possible remedies for heteroscedasticity. First, heteroscedasticity may be the result of a misspecified model and may require the researcher to change the model. Second, the OLS estimates may still be unbiased, and robust standard errors such as the

**Figure 1** Outcome Variable Versus Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Errors

Source: Based on data from Vatter, A., Freitag, M., Müller, C., & Bühlmann, M. (2004). *Political, social, and economic data of the Swiss cantons 1983–2002*. Bern, Switzerland: University of Bern.

Huber-White sandwich estimator can be used to correct for heteroscedasticity. WLS estimation is a standard regression tool for social scientists and others, and is used in iteratively WLS to estimate generalized linear models (Jeff Gill, 2007).

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See also Regression; Robust Statistics; Structural Equation Modeling

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WELFARE POLICIES

This entry examines the role of the state and the political dimension surrounding the recognition of social needs to improve the well-being of citizens. It then discusses the multiple meanings of the term *welfare policies* across jurisdictions and analyzes welfare policies defined as actions to provide a basic level of subsistence for individuals. The type of policy instruments used to address basic needs has also generated a rich literature on the causes of poverty and on the consequences of welfare policies, which is summarized in the third section. The conclusion of the entry presents two new recognized needs: (1) low wages obtained by the working poor and (2) social exclusion.

Generally, welfare policies represent various programs, transfers, and assistance provided by the state or other organizations aimed at improving the well-being of individuals. It is impossible to develop policies to fulfill every citizen's well-being, as there are unlimited wants but limited resources. As a result, governmental authorities must decide on welfare priorities, which generate political debates usually involving a discussion of social needs and risk. First, most welfare policies seek to address *recognized* social needs. As stressed by the sociologist Richard Titmuss, defining what constitutes a need is very trivial and it is constantly changing. For example, Titmuss mentioned that Britain's needs in 1900 were very different from those in the 1950s. The process of need recognition and, subsequently, the development of a policy to address a need can be long and arduous. Providing income relief to the elderly and facilitating alternatives to

the poorhouse took decades, and it took nearly a century to raise substantially the living standards of retirees. Major events, such as wars, can accelerate both the identification of needs and the implementation of solutions to address them. For example, a major extension of welfare policy in Japan is attributed to World War II with one key issue being the ill health of its citizens, resulting in high rates of failed physicals to join the army.

There are other elements that affect the recognition of needs. For example, citizens tend to consider the needs of seniors more favorably than the needs of young adults because the former are considered to be more worthy and vulnerable. Thus, there will be stronger support to provide social assistance for an elderly citizen who failed to reintegrate the labor market near retirement age than a young citizen who cannot find employment on graduation even though both conditions can be caused by a weak labor market. The recognition of need can also be based on other factors such as the meaning of citizenship. Historically, in the United States, access to welfare policies often excluded African Americans, and race continues to permeate discussions surrounding welfare policies. In a similar optic, the gender critique stresses that recognized needs often fail to consider women. Also, immigrants often face multiple obstacles to obtaining the same treatment as citizens who were born in the country of residence. In Canada, for example, immigrant retirees must have resided in the country for at least 10 years prior to receiving the Guaranteed Income Supplement, which is given to low-income retirees.

The role of the state with regard to social needs is also politically salient. In multiple jurisdictions, social assistance is still not fully endorsed by all elected officials as a need that must be covered by governmental authorities. Worse, a need can be recognized and the state can opt to address it, but policies may still fail to resolve it. The lack of universal coverage granted by the American health system has been acknowledged, but reform efforts have failed to resolve this issue. Some needs also consist of policy problems that cannot be fully resolved. It can be possible to reduce poverty, but eradicating poverty may be impossible.

An alternative way to conceive welfare policies is by considering the ways in which they protect individuals against social risk. This form of welfare

policies is often termed *social insurance* because the policies fulfill primarily insurance functions. This includes, for example, sickness, unemployment, disability, and retirement insurance. Other programs such as active labor market policies also fall into this category since they seek to alleviate the risk of an individual to leave the labor market and fall into poverty.

Within this perspective, an interesting debate spearheaded by the Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen has sought to classify industrialized nations within welfare regimes. In a liberal regime, exemplified by the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States, the private sector plays a dominant role in providing social insurance and the state is involved primarily as a last resort. In a corporatist regime, the state has sought to preserve status along occupational lines, which explains the complexity and multiplicity of social insurance schemes in countries such as France and Germany. The state plays an integral role in providing generous universal coverage in Scandinavian countries, which typifies the Social Democrat regime. While Esping-Andersen argues that there are three welfare regimes, critics have pointed out that Australasia and Southern Europe are distinct and could represent welfare regimes in their own right. The feminist critique has been the most salient, however, by demonstrating that women are not attached to the labor market in ways similar to men, resulting in a very different experience of social insurance.

In the past 10 years, a strand of the welfare literature has focused on the emergence of new social risks caused by the socioeconomic changes that have transpired with the transition to a postindustrial society. This shift has led to an increasing number of single-parent families and elderly, to employment precariousness, and to the rising importance of education and training in the labor market. This literature on social investment assumes that the role of the state is not to satisfy a basic need but rather to invest in individuals in order to empower them to assume more responsibilities. As such, it seeks to make individuals more competitive in the new economy.

The literature on both social needs and risks has stressed the impact of preexisting programs on the capacity of the state to adapt its welfare policies to new realities. Once a welfare program is

adopted to fulfill specific needs and/or cover a social risk, it fosters a clientele and support groups, which can facilitate its expansion. This clientele will likely oppose the creation of new programs or a redefinition of welfare objectives. Further, there is a substantial literature stressing that organizations have a bias toward improving existing programs, which occurs at the expense of developing new ones.

These conclusions are, however, being increasingly challenged. In light of increasing budgetary pressures that are accentuated by an aging population and a recent financial crisis, multiple reform initiatives have been introduced. Contrary to previous expectations, political leaders have not shied away from substantial reforms even if it leads to a noticeable impact on opinion polls. The literature has been quite eclectic in providing explanations for this reversal of fortune for the welfare state. While some contributions have reverted to traditional cleavages such as class and party politics or a reconsideration of arguments related to globalization, others have targeted the role of political leadership in altering successfully the discourse surrounding the goals and objectives of the welfare state. The latter stresses that the basic understanding of social rights has been altered. In many instances, such as in health and pensions, the state has been assuming less responsibility by facilitating the creation and/or expansion of private alternatives while reducing the generosity of public benefits. The roles of international financial associations have been considered to be particularly important in prompting privatization in developing countries. Nonprofit organizations have also seen their role expand in many countries by providing a growing range of welfare services to an increasing number of citizens.

Multiple Meanings of the Term *Welfare Policies*

It is important to note that there are many national differences with regard to what welfare policies entail. For example, the term *welfare* has traditionally been used in the United States as a synonym for transfer payments to the poor (e.g., “being on welfare”). As such, it is a synonym for social assistance. In contrast, *welfare* has a more general use in Sweden, focusing mostly on social services, but it

can also include policies such as taxation, pensions, employment, health care, and social assistance. In the latter case, the term is closely related to *welfare state*. What welfare policies include and do not include has been the source of multiple debates in the social sciences. The remainder of this entry focuses primarily on welfare policies in the context of providing a basic level of subsistence for individuals. Beyond the enactment of programs and services, this also includes goals such as alleviating poverty and social exclusion.

The role of the state in combating poverty varies noticeably across industrialized countries. The use of means-tested benefit, where the state plays the role of last resort, is predominant in the UK and its former colonies (i.e., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) but not confined exclusively to this group of countries. In these cases, the influence of the English Poor Laws remains. Although previous acts and practices dealt with the poor and the working poor, the first set of formalized poor laws was adopted in the early 17th century (Old Poor Law), followed by the New Poor Law in 1834. Immediately on its creation, a sharp distinction was made to distinguish between those considered too ill or too old to work and those capable of working. This distinction is often stated as a difference between the deserving and undeserving poor. Individuals in the latter group had to enter workhouses (in the United States, these were referred to as poorhouses), whose conditions were pitiful and where individuals were often referred to as inmates. This was done deliberately to ensure that this would be a solution of last resort in order to receive poor relief.

The creation and expansion of friendly societies, the emergence of social programs (such as unemployment insurance and old-age pensions), and changes in attitude toward the poor resulted in the abolition of the workhouses in the early 20th century. The causes behind these welfare improvements have been the object of multiple debates in political science. They have been attributed to protest actions by the poor, industrialization, the rise of socialist parties and unions, the leadership role of the civil service, state capacity, and even war. While the private sector continues to perform a role in providing welfare provisions, whose importance varies across jurisdictions, the state is

now the primary welfare giver in industrialized countries. However, in many developing countries, the importance of employers and other private parties remains noticeable. When employers provide social benefits, which can include child allowance, death benefits, and health and pension insurance, to name a few, it is usually termed *occupational welfare* since the type and scope of benefits offered varies across occupations. Although not provided by the state and granted exclusively to some members of the labor force, these benefits often receive a subsidy by the state to provide an incentive to both employers and employees to establish this kind of social benefit.

Types of Welfare Policies

There are currently multiple types of welfare policies based on needs and instruments. The most common form of welfare policies involves the transfer of financial resources where recipients receive a sum of money or a tax credit. First, there are policies put in place to provide a source of income for individuals living with disabilities. This can include physical and psychological disability, and eligibility is usually based on medical recommendations and the extent to which an individual can thrive in the labor market. Second, financial assistance is granted to poor retirees based on the value of their retirement income and assets. Third, social assistance is granted to individuals who, for various reasons, exit or fail to enter the labor market. Fourth, payments can be made for families to help raise children. Rather than giving financial assistance directly to the recipient, the state can also subsidize basic needs or limit the goods and services an individual can obtain with the financial support offered. This is achieved by tying benefits to specific needs such as housing (subsidy) and food (food stamps). Financial help cannot assist with issues such as sickness, substance abuse, or being homeless. As a result, welfare policies also involve a wide range of services such as health care, shelters, and job training.

In spite of strong variance in the level of support across industrialized countries, survey research demonstrates that benefits targeting the old and the disabled receive substantially more support than policies assisting other groups. The schism between deserving and undeserving poor remains

strongly embedded in most debates surrounding welfare.

Still, today, welfare remains stringent on fulfilling social, economic, and financial conditions. The demonstration of needs plays a key role in accessing benefits. Means-tested benefits are often the norm, which implies that individuals must demonstrate a lack of resources and/or a specific condition to be eligible. The means test can actually take multiple forms. When related to a medical condition, individuals must often substantiate the claims that they are unable to participate in the labor force. Authorities can also develop criteria on the basis of various sources of income (including wages, dividends, and interest earned) and/or assets such as an automobile, a dwelling, or even artwork. Moreover, the income and assets of a third party can also be considered for assessing eligibility. It is quite common to consider the revenues and/or assets of a spouse or partner, but this is sometimes extended to others such as parents (which can occur in the case of students seeking public financial aid) or roommates in the case of shared living space.

The means test can also apply to socioeconomic conditions that are not related to health and financial resources such as age, citizenship, location, and marital status. Younger adults face the most difficulty in receiving social assistance with the requirement of prior work experience being the most important. They also tend to receive less generous benefits irrespective of employment opportunities. Citizenship also matters quite often when it comes to means-tested benefits. Recent immigrants are often excluded from receiving state aid. In some instances, authorities consider the region where a claimant resides to increase or restrict the generosity of social assistance. In regions where unemployment is widespread, eligibility criteria might be more relaxed than in regions where labor shortages are present. Marital status continues to play a role in the treatment of need. The way in which an individual becomes a single parent is sometime considered in the application of the means test, with a widower receiving preferential treatment to someone who failed to declare a parent.

As a result, street-level bureaucrats, or third parties such as medical doctors, often play a key role in assessing who can and cannot receive assistance.

The stigma attached to welfare often results in admissible individuals not seeking their benefits. For example, the British Treasury still assumes in its budget that 25% of elderly, considered to be deserving poor, will not collect their means-tested pension. Another issue involves the process on which individuals receive the benefits. It is often onerous, intrusive, and complicated. The application for the British Pensions Credit has 18 pages, which can make reading cumbersome for many seniors and make the benefit less accessible. This is in stark contrast to the Canadian case where federal authorities consider only taxable income. Individuals can access the benefit easily by adding a one-page attachment when they file their income tax.

At the heart of welfare policies are two important debates on the causes of poverty and, ultimately, reliance on welfare benefits. First, to what extent does welfare cause dependency? This has been a hallmark of recent American debates surrounding welfare. Conservative critics have stressed that welfare policies create disincentive to work and create a culture of poverty that makes a return (or entry into) to the labor market less likely. These concerns are hardly new. The Royal Commission of 1832 in England, established to study the Poor Law, was particularly concerned with the impact of granting cash benefits to non-working individuals. Thus, it stressed that individuals in poorhouses should face conditions worse than those of the poorest working poor. An underlying assumption by these critics is that individuals on welfare are primarily responsible for this outcome and eventually feel entitled to their allowance. With the expansion of welfare benefits to a higher number of individuals, they became one of the neoconservatives' favorite targets for retrenchment. In the past 25 years, multiple jurisdictions have tightened qualifying conditions to receive welfare benefits with countries such as Canada (particularly the states of Alberta and Ontario), the United States, and the UK even introducing some forms of workfare, whereby individuals must perform compulsory labor or service to obtain their benefit.

Critics have emphasized that individuals on welfare are not themselves mostly responsible for their inability to find work, as indicated by the rise of welfare cases during a recession. Moreover, the use

of the word *dependency* in the context of welfare policies evokes powerful negative images of specific groups, such as single African American mothers in the case of the former Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, and it fails to acknowledge that non-welfare recipients also receive substantial state support. For example, the “hidden” welfare state in the United States, consisting of multiple tax credits, costs far more than the totality of welfare programs targeting the poor.

Second, another important debate within the literature focuses on the consequences of having welfare policies targeted at specific groups of individuals, as opposed to being universal. The more universal a benefit is, the more likely that it will receive strong political support, which is in stark contrast to targeted benefits such as social assistance, where beneficiaries lack numbers and resources to bolster their support. Survey research demonstrates that citizens are more likely to support universal programs such as education than targeted programs such as subsidized housing and social assistance. The retrenchment literature has actually stressed that politicians have been far more successful with the latter.

Targeting the poor (or any other group) may actually result in a growing gap between the policy outcomes generated by public programs and the original need behind their creation. Ironically, there is strong evidence suggesting that means-tested programs fail to combat poverty and may even accentuate it. The type of program or mixes of programs needed to alleviate poverty has been the source of multiple debates in the literature.

New Focus: The Working Poor and Social Exclusion

In recent years, welfare policies have been developed to tackle two newly recognized needs: (1) poverty among full-time workers and (2) social exclusion. The first is a direct consequence of stagnant wages for low-income individuals. In many industrialized countries, minimum wage has not been indexed properly, resulting in an actual decrease in real income. Various measures, such as granting tax credits and readjusting the minimum wage, have been introduced.

The term *social exclusion* originated in France and it has since been adopted by the European

Union (EU), which has made social inclusion a vital component of its fight against poverty. The EU defines social exclusion as “a process whereby certain individuals are pushed to the edge of society and prevented from participating fully by virtue of their poverty, or lack of basic competencies and lifelong learning opportunities, or as a result of discrimination” (European Commission, 2004). EU countries have been elaborating and implementing national action plans to tackle social exclusion and the World Bank has recently included social exclusion within its own analyses of poverty.

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See also Citizenship; Policy, Employment; Policy Analysis; Policy Process, Models of; Welfare State

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WELFARE STATE

The expression *welfare state* denotes a number of policies through which the government provides protection against a predetermined set of social risks and needs. The term made its appearance in the political vocabulary of English-speaking countries during the 1930s and early 1940s. State activism in the social sphere dates back, however, to the second half of the 19th century and was essentially prompted by the modernization process and its accelerating pace throughout Western Europe.

From an institutional viewpoint, the essence of the welfare state is the rights-based character of protection. Through social policies, the government defines rules and standards regarding resources and opportunities, which are considered to be highly relevant for individual life conditions and thus worthy of being “guaranteed” by state authority. In contemporary democracies, such rules and standards are typically incorporated in the notion of social citizenship. Being a citizen means to enjoy not only certain civil and political rights but also specific social rights—that is, entitlements to obtain resources such as a pension or opportunities (e.g., access to medical or employment services) that uphold life chances. Social citizenship thus contributes to the concrete realization of the great normative ideals of Western modernity: freedom, equality, solidarity, and security.

A welfare state does not only limit itself to defining citizens’ entitlements (and, of course, the corresponding financial obligations) but also typically organizes the production and distribution of social protection, for example, through public insurance schemes or health services. Welfare administrations occupy the center stage of contemporary bureaucratic systems (e.g., in terms of staff employed), while social spending makes up around 50% of the public budget in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) area. In the European Union (EU), social-protection expenditures amount to about 27% of GDP (gross

domestic product; 27 average, mid-2000s). State programs funded by tax money are not the only providers of welfare: markets, families, and intermediary associations are other important spheres and channels of provision. Each society has its own composite welfare “mix” or “regime.” In the course of the 20th century, however, the state has extended and strengthened its regulatory power over all forms of welfare provision (e.g., through family or labor law) and has affirmed itself not only as the most salient but also as the ultimate “social sovereign.” By expanding its sovereignty in the social sphere, the state has fundamentally transformed its own structure, function, and legitimation basis, prompting the appearance of novel political actors and dynamics. The following sections of this entry will illustrate the main stages of development of the welfare state, from its early origins to the present phase of crisis and reform.

Early Origins

The historical background of the modern welfare state is constituted by the various “poor relief” measures introduced in European states since the 17th century and codified in some of them (e.g., England) in organic sets of provisions (the Poor Laws). The institutional watershed was, however, the establishment of compulsory insurance, resting on the new principle of a rights-based protection backed by state authority. The pioneer country was Wilhelmine Germany (1890–1914), which introduced sickness insurance in 1883, work accident insurance in 1884, and pension insurance in 1889. By the end of the Great War, virtually all West European countries had legislated at least one compulsory insurance scheme. The United States and Canada followed suit with federal insurance schemes between the 1920s and 1930s.

The relatively close temporal proximity of the introduction of compulsory social insurance reflects the similar problematic pressure that all countries were suffering in the wake of capitalist industrialization and, more generally, modernization. The specific timing reflects, in contrast, specific national political constellations. Authoritarian regimes (e.g., Germany and Austria) moved as front-runners, in the hope of taming an increasingly active workers’ movement that threatened to

jeopardize conservative hegemony. Despite their more advanced level of socioeconomic development, the early democratizers, such as Britain, lagged somewhat behind: In these countries, political elites were less worried about legitimation and consensus, and the introduction of social insurance had to wait for the strengthening of socialist representation within national parliaments.

The early phase of “instauration” witnessed the emergence of two distinct basic approaches to social insurance. The occupational approach (prevailing in continental Europe) was based on labor market status and proceeded through the establishment of several occupational schemes (the first typically covering blue-collar industrial workers), often with different regulations. The universalist approach (typical of English-speaking countries and Nordic Europe), in contrast, was based on need and later citizenship. In 1913, Sweden introduced, for example, the first universal pension scheme for all elderly citizens, including a modest flat-rate benefit topped by means-tested supplements. Rooted in different institutional traditions and reflecting historical variations in class structures and systems of corporate and political representation, the early choice of the occupational versus universalist path had significant implications for subsequent institutional developments and distributive outcomes.

The Golden Age of Postwar Expansion

In many countries, World War II spurred ambitious reform projects (e.g., the Beveridge Plan in Britain) for strengthening social protection, also with a view to underpin national cohesion. The 3 decades from 1945 to 1975 witnessed an impressive growth of the welfare state in both quantitative and qualitative terms. At the beginning of the 1950s, social expenditure was still below 10% of GDP in most European countries. By the early 1970s, many countries (e.g., Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden) had come to pass the 20% mark and most of the remaining ones had already surpassed 15%. The vast majority, if not the totality, of the population had come to be included in social protection schemes for all the “standard risks”: old age, disability, and bereavement; sickness, maternity, and work injuries; and unemployment and

family dependents. At least in terms of eligibility, the European welfare states had “grown to limits”: They had reached or were about to reach their widest possible domestic boundaries, coinciding with the whole citizenry. During this “golden age” of welfare state expansion, the more localized systems of protection were progressively marginalized in their financial size and functional scope. Sophisticated techniques were invented and deployed to improve and rationalize the extraction of taxes and contributions, govern redistributive flows from the center, and deliver benefits and services to the various clientele. Finally, alongside the various insurance schemes for the standard risks, new noncontributory programs of general social assistance were created, as well as increasingly complex health care systems providing a wide array of medical services.

A vast literature has explored cross-national variations during the long expansion phase. According to the Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s influential analysis, three distinct welfare “regimes” (i.e., systems of relationships between state policies, labor markets, and the family) consolidated themselves between the 1950s and the late 1970s: a social democratic regime, prevailing in the Nordic countries and centered on encompassing and generous schemes; a conservative-corporative regime, prevailing in the continental countries and centered on fragmented schemes linked to labor market status; and a liberal regime, prevailing in the English-speaking countries, centered on universal but means-tested schemes offering only meager benefits. The three regimes were the product of specific class coalitions and their capacity to mobilize “power resources” in their own interest. Each regime had also specific distributional implications, especially in terms of *decommodification*; that is, the extent to which workers are freed from market dependence for the satisfaction of basic needs. Esping-Andersen’s pathbreaking work led to a vast debate. By looking in more depth at the experience of specific areas or countries (e.g., southern Europe, Australia and New Zealand, the United States, and, more recently, the postcommunist countries or East Asia) various authors have articulated the original regime tripartition, adding new types and models, and have highlighted additional analytical dimensions (e.g., the

capacity of regimes to “defamilize” care and promote gender equality) and theoretical insights.

The Crisis and Permanent Austerity

In the wake of the oil shocks of the 1970s, the developmental trajectory of the welfare state started to invert its direction: The “golden age of expansion” gradually faded away and was replaced by a new phase of “permanent austerity.” This shift was mainly the result of exogenous pressures coming from the environment of the welfare state: the environment external to the nation-state and the internal environment (i.e., changes in domestic economies and social structures). The following section briefly reviews the nature and impact of all these pressures, starting with the external ones.

Globalization

Since the 1980s, the growing international integration of markets has started to impose new constraints on the welfare state, by restricting the margins of maneuver that national governments enjoyed during the golden age in designing, managing, and funding their social-protection systems. The globalization of finance has seriously weakened governments’ control over national tax bases. Policy liberalizations have widened the “exit options” for capital, investors, and firms, thus making it much more difficult for the state to steer the economy and the labor market and to reconcile the twin goals of economic competitiveness and social consensus.

In the political debates of the 1980s and early 1990s, globalization was often portrayed as a subversive force, inevitably conducive to a “race to the bottom” through regulatory competition. During the past decade, a number of serious systematic comparative analyses have, however, challenged these negative and pessimistic views. Far from being an irresistible destroyer of social protection institutions and a “flattener” of country-specific preferences and diversities, globalization is now seen as a challenge that (a) is filtered through various elements of domestic political economy configurations and (b) can be more or less effectively contravened through politico-economic responses and institutional adaptations. The debate has noted that, if appropriately (re)configured, social

policies can play a precious role in upholding the performance of domestic political economies in the new globalized environment.

European Integration

When it was launched in the 1950s, the project of European integration did not intend to challenge the institutional foundations of the nation-based welfare state. Quite to the contrary, the founders conceived of European integration as a project capable of creating and sustaining a virtuous circle between *open* economies and outward-looking economic policies on the one hand and *closed* welfare states and inward-looking social policy on the other.

The international economic crisis of the 1970s prompted, however, an ambitious project to enhance economic integration, based on two steps: (1) completing the internal market and then (2) moving toward a fully fledged economic and monetary union (EMU). The Single European Act of 1986 unleashed a dynamic of “market making,” primarily through measures of negative integration (i.e., the removal of national barriers to economic transactions). By setting fixed macroeconomic requirements and deadlines for admission into the “euro,” the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 imposed further constraints on the autonomy of national governments in the welfare state sphere.

Like globalization, the EMU project was largely considered in the early debate of the 1990s as a subversive factor for national social contracts, in the wake of increasingly stringent market compatibility requirements, the new power of business, the hardening of budgetary constraints, and the impossibility of creating some sort of Social Europe due to the institutional obstacles to “positive” integration. Recent discussions have adopted a much more nuanced view. European integration has indeed forced several domestic adjustments but not necessarily for the worse: the economic, fiscal, and monetary discipline enforced by supranational authorities has prompted or accelerated a dynamic of welfare state recalibration, which was anyway appropriate and desirable for coping with a host of endogenous problems. Liberalizations have made several goods and services more affordable to consumers, enhancing the range of options available to them; in certain areas, such as health

and safety, market integration has also brought about more consumer protection and higher labor standards. Some regulatory competition has indeed taken place but not necessarily with the worst results. As in the case of globalization, the literature has moreover highlighted a multitude of factors that mediate the impact of European integration on domestic redistributive arrangements, as well as the scope and intensity of their “Europeanization.”

Internal Challenges: The Transformation of Domestic Economies and Social Structures

In addition to external pressures and constraints, welfare state programs have also been facing growing challenges posed by the transformations of their domestic economic and social environments. The foundation and the expansion of such programs in states had taken place in the context of “industrialism”—understood as a general mode of organizing the spheres of economic production and social reproduction. The past 3 decades have witnessed a rapid transition toward a new “postindustrial” order, in the wake of the rising importance of services, changes in household patterns, and behaviors and population ageing.

The shift from an industrial to a postindustrial economy, mainly centered on the service sector, has originated serious upheavals in the occupational structures of advanced countries. “Fordist” employment (stable and guaranteed jobs with permanent contracts) has been witnessing a steady decline since the 1970s, not fully compensated by the rise of nonstandard “atypical” forms of employment (such as temporary or part-time jobs). Low wages and poor-quality jobs have increased the numbers of “working poor,” systematically exposed to the risk of the labor market and social exclusion.

The second important change has involved family and gender relations. While in postwar industrial societies, traditional families with a male breadwinner and a housewife predominated, the postindustrial age is characterized by a greater plurality of household forms: dual-earner families, single-parent households, *de facto* unions, and so on. Average household size has declined, not only partly due to a fall in fertility rates but also due to the greater number of single-person households and to a drastic drop in multigenerational households. In parallel with the increase of separations and

divorces, these changes point toward a general “precarization” of social relations in advanced societies. Another important trend since the 1970s has been the increased participation of women in the labor market—a phenomenon that is closely connected to the rise of the service sector.

The third significant transformation has been demographic aging, due to lower birth rates and higher life expectancy. The proportion of elderly people in the advanced societies has been constantly increasing in the past 3 decades. All projections point toward a dramatic intensification of this process, especially in Europe and Japan. The OECD estimates that the over-60 age-group, mainly retired people, will rise by almost 50% by 2020: For each elderly person, there will be fewer than two workers. Largely due to the full maturation of the generous benefit formulas introduced in the past, these elderly will retire on average with higher pensions than current retirees: Thus, the real intergenerational transfer of resources will grow by much more than 50%. A similar syndrome will affect the real expenditure on health care.

These internal transformations have reinforced the pressures and constraints (especially in financial terms) linked to external changes and have originated delicate policy dilemmas. They have also generated a host of new social risks and needs: from new forms of poverty and social exclusion to personal dependency and from skills obsolescence (and thus unemployability) to situations of work-life imbalances. The rebalancing of social expenditure toward the new risks and the more vulnerable social groups has clashed with the high “stickiness” of the institutional status quo—a defining feature of that “new politics of the welfare state,” which has been the object of a lively debate in the literature of the past decade or so.

Welfare State Recalibration at a Glance

Despite the gloomy prospects outlined by the early “crisis” debate, the welfare state has not crumbled under the weight of the contextual changes described so far and has actually given signs of at least some adaptive capacity. Institutional adaptation has been a complex incremental process, which has proceeded with different speed and success across the various countries and which has involved different policy areas: from macroeconomic management

and industrial relations to tax policy and labor market regulation. Limiting ourselves to the core elements of social protection, at least four key general trends of reform can be identified.

The first—and the most significant—of these trends is constituted by structural adjustments in response to socioeconomic developments. In the field of pensions, the 1990s witnessed a substantial wave of reforms, based on the following ingredients: increasing the age of retirement, tightening qualifying conditions, restricting indexation rules, or strengthening the link between contributions and benefits. In the field of health care, reforms have been introduced with a view to enhancing efficacy and efficiency in the allocation of resources and in the provision of services through better incentives at both the macro- and the microlevels. Social services and family policies have also witnessed some innovation in both substantive and organizational terms, with a view to responding to the rising needs of the elderly population, the changing gender division of labor, and new forms of poverty and exclusion.

A second general trend has been a move to an *active* approach in the management of work incapacity (e.g., disability) and especially unemployment, with a view to preventing long-term dependency on income support. In the course of the 1990s, the “job first” principle has gradually made its way throughout OECD (un)employment protection systems. Access to benefits has been generally made more restrictive and conditional, but at the same time, new networks of public and private employment services have been set up to promote and facilitate the labor market reintegration of workers without jobs. Activation strategies have proceeded hand in hand with wider exercises of labor market reconfiguration, pioneered by the Netherlands in the 1980s under the banner of “flexicurity.” Reforms in this field have received explicit spurs by the EU and in particular by the European Employment Strategy (EES), launched in 1997.

A third general trend—which cuts across various social protection programs—has been greater “targeting” or selectivity of resources toward those most in need, also in the wake of the policy recommendation of influential international bodies such as the OECD or the World Bank. Different strategies have been experimented with, depending on

national preferences, constraints, and opportunities: greater use of traditional means testing, linking the amount of benefits received to income or means testing from the top, clawing back transfer payments from those less in need via the tax system, and so on. Alongside these strategies of “vertical” targeting based on economic resources, a trend is also observable toward “horizontal” targeting based on social risk: reducing the generosity of some core transfer programs (e.g., old age, disability, and survivor pensions) while increasing family benefits, introducing new subsidies for caregivers or categories with special needs, or expanding programs against social exclusion.

A fourth general trend has involved the financial side of social protection. Pension systems have witnessed a strengthening of “funding” (i.e., the accumulation of real financial reserves) to make income security at retirement less vulnerable to demographic imbalances and to shift some of the responsibility for its provision from the state to individual workers or the social partners. Another important development on the financing front has been the attempt at reducing charges on business and labor, particularly those in the form of nonwage labor. This development has been primarily motivated not only by competitiveness preoccupations but also by the wish to neutralize the vicious circles generated by “contribution-heavy” social insurance systems. More generally, most countries have reviewed the incentives of their tax-benefit systems to make them more “employment friendly.”

Conclusion

The welfare state can be considered as one of the most salient achievements and legacies of the 20th century: Its programs have greatly contributed to consolidating democratic institutions and to harmonizing economic growth with changing social needs. A child of Western-style (and in particular European-style) modernization, the welfare state has been rapidly growing throughout the developing world as well during the past decades. A number of socioeconomic transformations are posing today serious challenges to the sustainability and effectiveness of this institution. Although many of its traditional objectives and instruments will have to be reconsidered and redesigned (a process that is already under way in many countries), it seems,

however, plausible to predict that the 21st century will witness a further strengthening and articulation of rights-based social protection, anchored not only to state-national but also possibly to supranational and international institutions.

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See also European Integration; Globalization

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WESTPHALIAN IDEAL STATE

Westphalian ideal state is the conceptualization of the modern state widely assumed to have derived from the Peace of Westphalia treaties of 1648.

The Münster and Osnabrück treaties ended the Thirty Years' War and made sovereignty and territorial principles the cornerstones of the new international arena: They paved the way to the state as the main actor in international relations (IR) and are accepted by the scientific community as the symbol of the "interstate system," which is still preeminent now, even if it is more and more contested. The modern state has been central to political science and IR since their consolidation as academic disciplines around the turn of the 20th century; in fact, both disciplines have long regarded it as axiomatic that the state is of primary importance, indeed indispensable to society. Even when, in the 20th century, it became fashionable to predict the obsolescence of the state as we know it, this in itself paid tribute to the state's significance and tended to cement it. This entry first defines the ideal state, including its historical context and key aspects such as sovereignty, internationally recognized territory, and nonintervention of other states. It then critically examines the theory that this state originated with the Westphalian peace treaties.

Defining the Ideal State

What is the state? Prevailing opinion considers it to be coeval with civilization; thus, as far as "Western" civilization is concerned, the Sumerians are usually credited with its invention and with passing it on to peoples further west. Both the "city-state" and imperial structures that transcended it have, since the 19th century, been held to be instantiations of "statehood," in the case of the Sumerians as well as in the case of the pre-Christian Greeks and Romans or of the kingdoms of ancien régime Europe.

Semantically, this attribution of statehood to the political structures of bygone eras was necessarily retrospective, since the process by which words such as *state* in English and its homologues in other European languages came to designate the state as we know it did not get under way until the 15th century at the earliest and was not complete until the 19th century; the Latin *status*, from which those words are derived, has never had this meaning. Retrospective attribution of statehood also necessarily presupposes that statehood is in fact independent of the words used to designate it, that the state exists independently of political

discourse—a premise that constructivists, in particular, must question.

Moreover, this notion of the timelessness and ubiquity of the state has always sat somewhat uneasily with the realization that political structures have varied greatly in history. That realization has virtually never, as yet, led modern writers to challenge the belief in the inescapable historic necessity of the state for civilization in principle. It has, however, encouraged attempts to track the evolution of concrete historical forms that the state is thought to have taken—more particularly, the evolution of the modern state over the past few centuries.

Such attempts were helped—indeed made possible—by the efforts of social scientists around the turn of the 20th century to define what could be called the ideal state. Most important, Georg Jellinek in 1900 posited that the state needs a territory, a people, and a government. Max Weber, in his lecture *Politics as a Vocation* (1918), identified the state as an “entity which claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force.” In practice, this monopoly, which the wording chosen by Weber vests in the state as such, can of course only be wielded by the government or those empowered by it.

Sovereignty is another concept commonly regarded as an indispensable ingredient of statehood—indeed, semantically, the two are commonly yoked together in the expression “sovereign statehood.” Although in modern democracies sovereignty is said to emanate from the people, it is, in practice, essentially wielded by the government and closely related to the monopoly on legitimate violence singled out by Weber, giving the government the last word in most domestic matters. Domestic sovereignty is complemented by external sovereignty, which, conversely, denies the right of any agency outside the state to dictate to it or any of its parts or members. The “rule of nonintervention,” proscribing interference in the internal affairs of another sovereign state, is a corollary of this. International law in what may be called its “classic” modern form—likewise elaborated around the turn of the 20th century by scholars such as Lassa Oppenheim—also laid great stress on sovereign statehood, considered the precondition for being able to create order norms as a subject (rather than merely an object) of international law.

It is quite clear that many of the preindustrial political structures to which 19th- and 20th-century

historiography habitually applies the term *state* fell short of the ideal state as defined by scholars such as Jellinek, Weber, or Oppenheim, which their own time came at least close to making a reality. Rightly or wrongly, the general conformity of more ancient structures—such as the “city-state” of the Greeks or the Roman Empire—to the ideal state is not normally called into question. Concerning Christian Europe, however, the “feudal system” is widely perceived to have been at odds with the ideal state, that system being characterized by diffusion rather than centralization of power, by competing and entangled, rather than territorially exclusive, jurisdictions (borrowing from Friedrich Meinecke, John Ruggie has, influentially in IR, called them “heteronomous”) and by a corresponding lack of any monopoly on legitimate violence.

Moreover, the collective memory of Western civilization correctly holds that civilization was informed by a lingering sense of the oneness of the Christian community (at least to the extent that it was traditionally focused on Rome) even in the late pre-Reformation phase and indeed, if probably to an ever-decreasing degree, for a century or two after the Reformation. The continuing influence of a political paradigm that emphasized oneness over diversity is, less correctly, thought to have provided a platform for the Western emperor (the ruler of the Holy Roman Empire) to claim suzerainty over Western Christendom, this of course being at odds with the concept of sovereignty.

Critical Issues

A well-known article by the international lawyer Leo Gross, published in 1948 to mark the tercentenary of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, helped shape the widespread view of that settlement as marking a watershed in the consolidation of the ideal state as conceived today. Gross was not offering a wholly new interpretation—thus, the archetypal IR textbook, Hans J. Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations*, contains brief allusions to the 1648 peace that are consistent with the article by Gross, and since Morgenthau’s book first appeared in the same year as that article, it is unlikely that it was influenced by it. Rather than create a new orthodoxy, Gross articulated authoritatively an orthodoxy that already existed.

Echoing (unwittingly and indirectly, while also adding a further “spin” of its own) the 17th-century anti-Habsburg propaganda, this view presents the Thirty Years’ War as a struggle between Habsburg aspirations for universal monarchy and attempts by other actors to emancipate themselves from such aspirations in the name of sovereignty. It takes many liberties with the historical evidence—beginning with the text of the peace settlement itself, which Gross suggested need not be taken too literally, which later exponents of the same view have most often ignored entirely, and which, it should be stressed, provides no corroboration at all of the interpretation in question. But this Grossian view nevertheless commended itself by offering, or at a minimum cementing, what has become the founding myth of the modern state. In this view, that state was freed by the Peace of Westphalia from the shackles of feudal “heteronomy,” and the concept of sovereignty and the attendant rule of nonintervention were considered (wrongly) to have been enshrined by the text of the settlement for the entire European system.

It is true that writers and diplomats started a custom of declaring the 1648 peace as being of special significance within a few decades of its signing. The grounds for doing so have not been uniform, to the extent that they are actually spelled out—once established, the habit probably became self-perpetuating, eliminating the need to give a reason for it while at the same time opening up the possibility of identifying new grounds for this special significance. The view expounded by Gross thus put the established significance of the Peace of Westphalia on a new foundation in line with the political agenda of its own period.

This gave rise to the still solid consensus among IR scholars that the “international system” as we know it began with the Peace of Westphalia—hence its designation as the “Westphalian” system in much IR literature. Once that expression had become established usage within the discipline of IR, the epithet *Westphalian* came to be applied also to the type of state that is the modular unit of this system and that is the ideal type described earlier. More recently, usage of the epithet has started spreading beyond the confines of IR.

At the same time, criticism of the epithet has been growing as well. As pointed out, there is nothing about the state as such in the text of the

Westphalian settlement, nor is that settlement concerned in any way with issues such as sovereignty, territorially exclusive jurisdictions, or the rule of nonintervention, which are key aspects of the modern state. It has also been asked whether the modern state did not in fact begin to emerge only at the very end of the *ancien régime* and was consolidated only in the course of the 19th century. Thus, whereas external sovereignty is today considered to be vested in the state as a corporate entity, in 18th-century Europe sovereignty was still vested, not only in fact but also in law, in rulers as persons rather than what they ruled over or represented. Moreover, while those rulers did, for the most part, have effective external sovereignty, their domestic sovereignty was still severely limited—for example, no central power in *ancien régime* Europe was capable of policing its own territory effectively, or of passing, let alone enforcing, general legislation on a regular basis, which, in contrast, became normal in the 19th century.

Such criticism, on historical grounds, of the epithet *Westphalian* seems so far to have had little impact. It may of course be argued that the appellation does not matter unless, beyond the reference to a current political phenomenon, it is intended to make a statement about history as well. This, however, is usually the case, implicitly or indeed explicitly, with much of the textbook literature, for example, expressly recalling the presumed historical origins of the modern state and the modern international system and thereby perpetuating the “Westphalian myth.” Political scientists were probably more in search of a name for this interstate system that was progressively shaped; historians generally do not point to a sharp break and designate a specific year for the emergence of this system, as political scientists did with 1648. Political scientists, focusing on the tension that opposed old empires to new states, considered the Westphalian Peace as the symbol of passing from one to the other. Nowadays, the state monopoly is more and more challenged by the growing influence of nonstate actors—as a result, the concept of “post-Westphalian” system is more and more frequently used.

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See also Constructivism in International Relations; Hegemony; Historical Sociology; International Law; International Society; International System; Political Systems, Types; Sovereignty; State

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WORLD BANK

The genesis of the World Bank lies in the creation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), following a conference at Bretton Woods in 1944 (which also led to the creation of the International Monetary Fund). Today the World Bank Group comprises in addition to

the IBRD, the International Development Association (IDA), International Finance Corporation (IFC), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Since their inception through 2009, the institutions comprising the World Bank group have been involved in lending nearly three fourths of a trillion dollars (Table 1).

There are two key questions about the World Bank: (1) how is power and influence brought to bear on the institution and (2) how does the institution itself exercise power and influence on others, especially its borrowers?

International organizations in general are plagued by severe agency problems, and the World Bank is no exception. Long chains of delegation and multiple stakeholders make this inevitable. Larger shareholders obviously have greater influence, with the United States being the most dominant. Nonetheless, even the United States is a distinct minority shareholder, which places considerable limits on how much it can directly influence the institution. The key mechanisms that have shaped the World Bank's governance have been senior personnel appointments (especially the President, who has been a U.S. national since inception) and importantly, the nature of the institution's finances. The financial design of the Bank, relying as it did on Wall Street initially and global financial markets in later years, was critical in establishing a degree of political autonomy for the

Table 1 The World Bank Group Institutions

	<i>Established</i>	<i>Number of Member Countries</i>	<i>Operations</i>
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)	1944	186	Cumulative lending: \$479 billion
International Development Association (IDA)	1960	169	Cumulative commitments: \$207 billion
International Finance Corporation (IFC)	1956	182	Committed portfolio: \$34.4 billion
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)	1988	174	Cumulative guarantees: \$20.9 billion
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)	1966	143	Total cases registered: 292

Source: Based on data from *The World Bank Annual Report 2009*.

institution, although this came at the expense of greater reliance on the preferences of financial markets.

This began to change with the advent of IDA as the market-based autonomy (from governments) that the IBRD built for itself was slowly eroded by the public resources that funded IDA. The replenishment procedures of IDA—its periodicity and burden-sharing procedures—made it susceptible to the goodwill of major shareholders. In any burden-sharing scheme, the largest contributor sets the tone. From the late 1960s onward, as the United States began a long process of reducing its financial share, other donors began to link their contributions to that of the United States—which paradoxically increased the bargaining power of the United States even as its contributions declined. The periodicity meant that every 3 to 4 years, new demands could be made on the institution. The peculiarities of the U.S. budgetary process with annual authorizations ensured that the exercise became perennial and further enhanced U.S. influence. Thus, over time, the Bank's overall strategic direction was set not by its own board but by the IDA deputies—the personnel representing donor countries who were charged with completing the IDA replenishment process.

The reliance on governmental monies also resulted in a shift in power (most acutely in the United States) from the executive branch to the legislative branch and nongovernment actors, a trend that accelerated with the end of the Cold War. A different tack was taken by some donors (particularly the Nordic countries and Japan) after the 1980s, who supplemented the institution's budgetary resources through "trust funds," thereby seeking to shape institutional priorities and governance and bypassing the Bank's budgetary process.

For most observers, the World Bank's exercise of power and influence has been through its lending—who it lends to, for what purpose, and with what conditions. Although the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank specifically proscribe political considerations in its lending, as a creature of nation-states, whose governance has long been dominated by the industrialized countries (and especially the United States), political factors inevitably affected its lending priorities. During the Cold War, foreign aid was an instrument of the West, and the World Bank was firmly embedded in this architecture.

Radical and left governments such as Chile in the Allende era, Vietnam in the 1970s and 1980s, and Nicaragua and Panama in the 1980s were denied Bank lending. With the end of the Cold War, countries engaged in actions deemed hostile to Western interests were similarly penalized—Iran in the 1980s and 1990s, the reduction of lending to India and Pakistan after their nuclear tests in 1998, and the hiatus in lending to China in 1989 (after Tiananmen). In contrast, the continuation of lending to countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, and Russia, despite staff concerns about their policies in different years, are all examples of lending being swayed by political pressures. Nonlending in the 1950s and 1960s and later during the 1980s debt crisis and the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis was at least in part shaped by pressure from major shareholders to press debtor countries to settle with private (mainly Western) creditors. In most cases, however, there has been a veneer of plausible justification since judgment as opposed to a strict rule-based approach is integral to the Bank's work. If the political biases of the major shareholders had leaned differently, then the decisions could easily have gone the other way.

The purposes of World Bank lending are another key mechanism by which it seeks to influence a borrower. Lending focused on physical infrastructure until the 1960s, agriculture and rural development in the 1970s, policy-based loans (so-called structural adjustment lending) in the 1980s, and human capital and public sector governance-related loans in the 1990s. More recently, lending has focused on the financial sector and global public goods, and is done in support of the Millennium Development Goals. As with country allocation decisions, lending priorities have been affected by a specific view of what constitutes development and how best to achieve these goals as well as by political and ideological considerations. Indeed, lending by the Bank invariably came packaged with certain messages and conditions on what to do and how to do it. Through its loan conditions, the World Bank has acted as an external institution of restraint as it has sought to restrain developing country governments from engaging in poor economic policies, especially microeconomic policies (the IMF plays the same role with regard to macroeconomic policies). The wider the perceived gap

between norms of “sound” economic policies and actual policies, the more important this role.

In early decades, this role of the Bank was tacit and less visible. Later on, especially in the 1980s, with the advent of policy-based structural adjustment lending, with specific loan conditions, this role became more overt and visible (and also encountered much greater resistance). However, the demise of the Soviet Union and the concomitant shift in global ideological currents made it easier for the Bank’s lending to press for neoliberal economic policy changes and equally, to tread into sectors that were politically sensitive and previously off-limits. Significantly, the Bank began to stress the relationship between political variables in borrowing countries and their impact on the poor. “Governance,” or the quality of government and corruption-related issues, began to be debated openly. Rather than dealing exclusively with governments, the Bank began to work with civil society and NGOs in implementing its antipoverty programs. And acknowledging that the fungibility of public resources meant that money channeled to a government may or may not go to the official objective, the Bank began to use public expenditure reviews to influence the overall budgetary priorities of borrowing governments. Lending programs began focusing on institutional change and core government institutions such as the civil service and judiciary.

In addition to lending, the Bank has always sought to set the development agenda. Its didactic role, through its research and information intermediary roles, has arguably been, if not more important than its lending role, at least a mechanism that has influenced it. The Bank has always sought to portray development research as a global public good and used that to obtain greater resources for itself for this purpose. As a result, it emerged as the principal producer of data and research, giving it a legitimization and imprimatur role that greatly leveraged its influence.

Perhaps, most important, the Bank has exercised influence through socializing developing country policy elites. Many developing country policy elites have at some time or the other worked in or with the Bank. By educating, convincing, and exposing LDC (least developed country) elites to a set of ideas and practices, the Bank has acted to diffuse global neoliberal economic norms and ideas. Thus, in many cases, especially in countries

with a reasonable set of economic institutions and a bureaucracy, the Bank has often gone into countries whose policy doors have already been unlocked from within instead of being forced open through loan conditions.

The World Bank’s influence has been a function of several factors: the structural power of its major shareholders in the world system, the degree of competition, and the demand for its money and advice. Until the 1980s, major shareholders had strong influence, but the imperatives of the Cold War also limited the degree to which the Bank could be hegemonic. With the end of the Cold War, while the influence of major shareholders grew even more, the phenomenal growth of international financial markets began to chip away the Bank’s role in the larger, emerging developing countries. But with failures inherent in financial markets, the boom–bust cycle in private financial flows has meant that to the extent that international capital flows have a cyclical component, the importance of the World Bank will be much greater in the down cycle. Indeed, in times of crisis—whether financial or in the aftermath of natural disasters—the insurance role of the Bank inevitably gives it greater influence.

In the large set of poor developing countries, where private financial flows have been limited—not as a cyclical but as a trend phenomenon—the Bank’s soft loan facilities (namely IDA) are still important. For nearly three decades (since the early 1980s), the economic travails of these countries (especially in sub-Saharan Africa) made them much more dependent on the World Bank. More recently, however, a revival of their own economic fortunes and growing investments from China and other emerging markets, with fewer strings attached and with much lower transaction costs, has given these countries more bargaining power. Indeed, major shifts in global economic power are bound to affect the governance of major international institutions such as the World Bank whose power structures still reflect the world as it was when the institution was established. How these shifts influence the Bank’s own governance, and in turn, its roles and functions, is an open question.

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See also Cold War; Conditionality; International Monetary Fund (IMF); International Organizations

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1. It is ontologically and epistemologically systemic.
2. It provides a historical explanation of the development of social structures.
3. It provides an account of the spatial division of the world.

World systems theory is arguably the most systemic approach to understanding international relations. As such, it offers a radically different perspective on world politics. Rather than a world of states, diplomats, and international organizations, the focus is on a global economic system. Wallerstein's earliest research was on the characteristics of poverty in Africa. He came to the conclusion that it was not possible to understand the persistence of poverty by studying individual countries. Instead, the poverty of specific countries could be understood only by considering their position within a wider economic system and international division of labor. That a higher level of analysis was necessary led to the development of the idea of a world system. The "world" in world systems does not necessarily refer to a global reach. Instead, a world system is the smallest unit of analysis that can be described as a stand-alone entity, or, in other words, can be investigated without reference to elements outside of the system. Within a world system, all developments can be analyzed with reference to forces within the system. Further, Wallerstein argues that the character of a world system determines all features of the social world at any particular time. So, for example, in the current world system, key features such as states, markets, and even the family are produced through the workings of the system. Additionally, except for periods of crisis, when a system is about to collapse, there is very little potential for agency—in other words, there are few possibilities for escaping the constraints of the system.

A second key feature of a world systems approach is that it provides an account of social change. The current world system, which Wallerstein labels the "modern world system," is one of a succession of world systems. There have been two main types of world systems: (1) world economies and (2) world empires. The modern world system is an example of a world economy, and, according to Wallerstein, there have been examples of world

WORLD SYSTEMS THEORY

World systems theory is one of the most influential of the Marxist-inspired theories of international relations. Its impact has been felt across the social sciences and humanities, influencing not only students of politics but also historians, geographers, and sociologists. The focus of analysis is on a global economic system, which is the source of processes of historical change and many features of the social world. The key influences on world systems theory include Lenin's analysis of imperialism, the work of dependency school theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank, and the French Annales school, in particular Fernand Braudel. World systems theory is most closely associated with the work of Immanuel Wallerstein, and his work provides the focus for this entry, although the general approach has been adapted, developed, and critiqued by a number of other writers.

Key Features of the Theory: An Analysis

Three main characteristics distinguish world systems theory:

systems of both types. What differentiates world systems from world economies is the system of political control. In world empires, there is one political center that has dominated the whole system (e.g., Rome in the Roman Empire), whereas in world economies, there are multiple, competing centers of political control. In the modern world system, these competing systems have been states. Historically, world empires have tended to be more enduring compared with world economies. The modern world system, however, has been remarkably stable. A number of factors have contributed to this stability, one being the efficiency and expansive character of capitalism. A second feature has been the emergence of a "geoculture," a set of ideas and norms that has acted to provide legitimation for the key features of the modern world system.

In addition to a sequence of world systems through history, each world system has its own unique history. The modern world system is no different in that it had a beginning, a middle, and will at some point come to an end. The origins of the modern world system can be found in Europe in the 16th century, where a combination of factors led to the emergence of capitalism. This system expanded rapidly and ultimately led to the incorporation, for the first time, of the entire globe within a world system. In the three volumes of *The Modern-World System*, Wallerstein outlines in great detail the early expansion of this system. The developmental path of the modern world system has been influenced by rhythms and tendencies within capitalism itself. Wallerstein draws on the work of the Russian economist Nikolai Kondratieff, who argued that capitalism goes through successive waves of expansion and contraction on a regular basis (known as Kondratieff waves). Although these waves are regular, the start and end point of each wave are not exactly the same, meaning that secular trends in the capitalist system can be detected (expansion or contraction). Capitalism is also affected by contradictions, and Wallerstein argues that there is a tendency for underconsumption—the capitalist system produces more than can be consumed, leading to a decline in profitability. For a while, the world system can absorb contradictions; however, ultimately they lead to a crisis, resulting in collapse and replacement by another world system. Much of Wallerstein's most recent work has focused on the end of the world system,

as his analysis indicates that the modern world system is now in a state of terminal decline and will be replaced by some other form of system.

The final defining characteristic of Wallerstein's world systems theory is the division of space. In the modern world system, there are three main areas: a core, a periphery, and a semiperiphery. The core constitutes the most powerful countries of the system. These have the highest living standards, the most effective systems of social provision, highest education levels, most profitable industries, and the largest coercive forces. The periphery includes the most exploited countries in the system. The periphery is the main source of raw materials for use in manufacturing in the core and provides a market for the core's manufactured goods. In the periphery, states are typically weak and are unable to provide high standards of welfare for their citizens or to protect their populations from the depredations of core states. The countries of the core and periphery are linked by a process of "unequal exchange," the implications of which are that wealth is systematically extracted from the periphery for the benefit of the core. This marks an important distinguishing feature from more traditional Marxist approaches. Wallerstein sees exploitation as deriving from exchange rather than being a result of the production process. In between the core and periphery lies a semiperipheral zone. The countries of the semiperiphery are involved in some manufacturing but primarily in those industries that are no longer profitable in the core. These countries are also involved in supplying raw materials to the core. The semiperiphery is a transitional zone, including some states that were once in the core, but that have lost their competitive edge, and some countries that have managed to escape from the periphery. The semiperiphery, according to Wallerstein, plays an important part in stabilizing the modern world system. It is an intermediate zone that is both exploiter and exploited. In its intermediary role, it plays important functions in maintaining the stability of the system. First, by dividing the opposition to the core (and sharing some of the core's interests), it deflects some of the pressure from the periphery for changes to the exploitative system. Second, it also acts as a reserve pool of labor, which can be used to undermine wage militancy in the core.

Much of Wallerstein's recent work focuses on the more immediate developments in the modern world system. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War did not mean the "end of history" in the sense that there was now no competitor to liberal capitalism. On the contrary, he argues, the system is now in a final crisis. While it cannot be predicted what form the world system (or potential world systems) will take that replaces the current system, ominously, Wallerstein warns that it may be replaced by an even less just set of arrangements. However, in this point of crisis and transition, much rests on personal choices and decisions. The determinism of the world system lessens, and there is much more potential for individual agency. Wallerstein advocates the study of "utopistics," a consideration of alternative world orders that could be more equitably organized, as a means of pushing the world toward a more just future system.

Recent Developments

Wallerstein's work has been taken and developed by a number of writers within a world systems school. Some approaches have been more sympathetic to Wallerstein's general approach. For example, Christopher Chase-Dunne has retained Wallerstein's basic framework and historical analysis but has focused more attention on the development and roles of the system of states within the modern world system. Other writers have been more critical. Janet Abu-Lughod argues that rather than emerging in Europe, the European world economy was a peripheral offshoot of an economic system that had its core in the Middle East. Extending the analysis even further, Andre Gunder Frank and Barry Gills have argued that the existence of a world system can be traced back 5,000 years, with its core in Asia. As such, their work offers a direct challenge to the notion that capitalism emerged exceptionally in Europe—a view held by most analysts of capitalism of all perspectives.

Conclusion

The world systems theory provides a radically different approach to the understanding of international relations. Rather than being a set of relations

primarily between states, the key determinant of social relations is the global capitalist system; this system is the source of the main features of the social world, and the fate of the world system will have impacts for all social relations. While being a systemic approach to international relations, it also provides the basis for an historical and geographical account of global developments, particularly the division of the world into differing zones, where the life chances of the individual will be radically different. Finally, if Wallerstein is correct that the demise of the world system is imminent and that this is a period where the impacts of social structures on individual agency slacken, then it is also a political call for action and analysis to bring about a more just and equitable social order.

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See also Capitalism; Crisis; Dependency Theory; Globalization; International Political Economy; Marxism

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WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO)

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the heir of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). The GATT treaty was hastily—almost by default—adopted in 1948, and GATT as an institution was barely known until the mid-1980s. For

many years, it had little in common with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, the World Bank) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), both founded in 1944 with great unanimity and pomp. However, half a century later, the WTO is widely seen as an institution that is as important as the two others.

Economics and Politics of Trade Policy

Such success is due largely to GATT's capacity to fit well the basic economics and politics of trade policy, a crucial heritage for the WTO. GATT was largely shaped by the views of Cordell Hull, Roosevelt's Secretary of State (and in 1945, he won the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in creating the United Nations). Hull believed in an open world trade regime based on no discrimination among countries as a key instrument of world prosperity and peace. But as Hull was deeply involved in the opening of U.S. markets to foreign goods after 1934, he was well aware that trade policy required both economic soundness and political realism—a difficult blend.

Economic soundness values trade liberalization as the best policy (exceptions are very limited in practice). It is in the best interest of the consumers, and consumers' interest is the widest possible form of "general" interest (it can even include future generations, as in the case of environmental issues).

But consumers are too numerous to build strong coalitions and make their voices heard. This creates a deep political problem because it leaves governments under the pressure of producers alone. Fortunately, producers have opposite interests. On the one hand, domestic producers facing increased competition at home are eager to maintain or increase the level of domestic protection. They are powerful (they are often close to the political establishment in their own countries), few enough to build coalitions easily, and induced to lobby hard (they gain a lot from keeping things unchanged). On the other hand, domestic producers who are able to export to foreign markets support the opening of domestic markets, if this is the price to be paid for opening the foreign markets to which they could export. They are less powerful than protectionist interests: They are often embryonic (they need foreign markets to expand), more diverse,

and more focused on foreign markets to conquer than on domestic governments to lobby. Their interests are close to those of the consumers, but their influence stops as soon as they get the market access they want.

In short, liberalizing is not easy and requires political will from governments. Joining efforts in a multilateral (world) forum makes such an endeavor politically easier while amplifying its expected economic benefits. This then is GATT's, and WTO's, role.

GATT's Growing Success (1947–1986)

In 1947, the Havana Conference tried to solve this complex blend of economics and politics by drafting a long charter, reflecting the diverging views between the United States and the rest of the world, led by the United Kingdom. The British view, shaped by John Maynard Keynes, did not see trade as a key instrument to achieving world growth and stability; hence, it was favorable to preferential trade agreements and moderately opposed to protection. The charter ended up as a stack of contradictory provisions. The U.S. Senate evidently recognized this and rejected the charter.

This decision left trade negotiators in a difficult situation. They had already agreed on tariff cuts that needed to be consolidated rapidly. They then took the charter's chapter on Commercial Policy and converted it into the GATT text, with some limited additions.

The GATT text suits political realism by stating three—only three—key rules:

1. The "most favored nation" (MFN) rule states that a member lowering a tariff (opening up a market) has to do so for the same goods from all the other GATT members—rich or poor, weak or strong.
2. The "national treatment" rule states that imported and locally produced goods should be treated equally after the foreign goods have entered the market.
3. The "binding" rule states that, once declared bound, commitments cannot be reneged upon by a member without paying compensation to the other members or risking retaliatory measures from them.

These three rules have little to do with liberalization. A protectionist-minded country can abide by them as easily as a “free trade” country. Their value flows from the trust they create. GATT members are assured that they will not be discriminated against and will have collective ways of dealing with breaches of commitments. This is GATT as a “rule maker.”

GATT “Rounds” promote economic soundness. A Round consists in GATT members negotiating concessions in terms of tariff cuts or other means to open markets. A Round is launched when enough members feel ready to open their economy more (the United States was mostly in charge of testing the waters) and is concluded when members feel that they have got an acceptable deal. The agreements are achieved by consensus, with all the members having the same weight (there is no vote). This is GATT as a “negotiating machinery.”

Such a “collective” liberalization occurred in seven Rounds scattered between 1947 and 1986. It generated a progressive—hence politically manageable—liberalization of the industrial sector in an increasingly large number of countries. As Hull had hoped, trade became a powerful engine of growth: It has grown almost two times faster than domestic production since the 1970s.

Of course, growth is not enough. Issues such as distribution of the benefits from growth are key. But economics and politics converge to suggest that such issues are domestic matters heavily loaded by national values. Hence, they should be handled by domestic policies (taxes, subsidies, regulations) that GATT rules allow in the vast majority of cases, contrary to what is often said.

From GATT to WTO: The Uruguay Round (1986–1995)

This remarkable success—nothing comparable happened during the 19th century—had some serious limits. First, in 1986, GATT was a *de facto* club of rich (or rapidly becoming rich, like Japan or Korea) members. Most developing countries remained opposed to trade liberalization. Second, GATT Rounds covered only the industrial sector (which ranges from 20% to 30% of GDP for most countries) but not key sectors for developing countries

(textiles). Last but not least, agriculture and services were totally untouched.

The key objective of the last GATT Round—the Uruguay Round, 1986 to 1995—was precisely to bring these untouched sectors under GATT rules, by the same token becoming more attractive to developing countries. Agriculture was key to changing the mind-set in countries such as Brazil and Argentina. Services played the same role for India and Pakistan. This new mind-set was boosted by China’s rapid growth since its late 1970s reforms (though not yet a GATT member, China was rapidly becoming a more open country than most developing country GATT members).

The Uruguay Round results have been mixed. New market openings were substantial in manufacturing, in particular, with the elimination of nontariff barriers on trade in goods of key interest for developing countries (textiles). But in agriculture, the liberalization process was so badly designed that, despite the rhetoric, market openings were very limited.

Turning to a broader picture, the Round succeeded in expanding the GATT negotiating machinery to services and intellectual property rights. It also established a “litigation machinery,” with a dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) that was much more credible than the one that had existed until 1995. To evaluate some of these results requires caution. Although there is no doubt that the potential gains from liberalization in services are huge, the case of intellectual property rights is more debatable (these rights consist in granting monopoly rights, possibly endangering future competition). A stronger DSM makes it more probable that WTO members will litigate rather than negotiate. Such an evolution (not yet observed) would be worrisome since it assumes a drastic change of mind in the way international relations at large are conceived.

And there were outright failures. The Round was unable to discipline the use of the “escape clauses” (safeguard, antidumping, and antisubsidy), which allow members to reestablish protection too easily. Even more important, the Round adopted the “Single Undertaking” approach—all members shall agree on all the results of a Round (GATT allowed members not to sign some agreements at the end of a Round). Such a condition

deeply rigidifies, hence weakens, the WTO negotiating process since it gives an implicit veto to any member.

The WTO: Challenges and Ambitions

While the Uruguay Round was shaping the WTO, an old world was vanishing: Centrally planned economies disappeared, and developing countries opposed to freer trade had begun to open their domestic markets. These changes were epitomized by China's accession to the WTO in 2001 (today, one third of the Chinese provinces are close to becoming as rich as the Central European countries that are members of the European Community).

These sweeping changes induced the WTO to abandon GATT's low-key approach. The cautious preparations of GATT Rounds were replaced by a rush to launch a new Round (the European Community proposed to launch the Millennium Round 5 years before the end of the enforcement of the Uruguay Round). The price was high: The TV cameras that the WTO ministerial meetings attracted made it the favorite target of antiglobalizers of all kinds, disturbing WTO's first years of operation and making cumbersome the launch of the Doha Round in 2001 (technically, the Round has not yet been officially launched).

However, the key challenges facing the WTO are not from the increasingly scattered antiglobalization ranks. Indeed, most Americans, Europeans, Chinese, and Indians realize that even though globalization has its drawbacks, closing their doors to foreign products would be a much more costly solution. Also, the current economic crisis has not so far witnessed any notable move toward reProtection.

The WTO's key challenges will come from the new world that is emerging. First, there is an ongoing tectonic shift among key players. GATT greatly benefited from the benevolent role of the United States. The United States was always very careful to keep in mind the interests of the world economy and not exploit its full power (if the United States had wanted to exploit its leverage fully, it would have concluded bilateral agreements, not pushed for a nondiscriminatory world trade regime). The rise of China and India is slowly making the

United States one key player among a few others. Multipolarity is a laudable concept, but it is hard to practice. To what extent the four to six largest economies will be eager to play collectively the benevolent role that the United States played alone for the past 50 years is a crucial open question for the years to come.

The second challenge concerns the WTO negotiating machinery. In trade in goods, the WTO will be doing "GATT business as usual": eliminate the remaining high industrial tariffs (all the members), bind more firmly and systematically the other industrial tariffs (emerging and developing members), and cut the high protection (tariffs and subsidies) in agriculture (industrial members).

Trade liberalization in agriculture will be particularly crucial. Today, the issue of climate change or water availability is widely seen as antagonistic to the world trade regime relying on GATT-WTO rules. As some critics have pointed out, this is a major mistake. Climate change will require more—not less—trade in agriculture. The half dozen models assessing the impact of climate change have only one common result: The key way to soften the adjustments required by climate change is to facilitate trade among countries. In short, cuts in barriers to trade get a new *raison d'être*—to be a key tool for fighting climate-driven hunger and water-driven conflicts.

Another big challenge to the WTO negotiating machinery is services. Because they amount to 50% to 70% of GDP, opening these markets will offer huge gains to consumers for many decades to come. But negotiating concessions in services is notoriously difficult. On what basis can opening a domestic audiovisual sector be considered equivalent to the opening of a foreign distribution sector? More crucially, such negotiations require trust in trading partners because services liberalization consists in a dynamic and long process of domestic regulatory reforms, which are often hard to anticipate when negotiating the initial agreements.

Such a trust cannot be delivered by the WTO because the regulatory reform capacities of its members are too heterogeneous. This makes it attractive to negotiate agreements in services among a narrower group of countries ("plurilateral")

agreements). Such agreements could be negotiated during (probably more frequent) WTO Rounds, but they could also be initiated outside the WTO and then repatriated under the WTO rules of non-discriminatory binding.

In short, the systemic shift of focus from goods to services suggests that the role of the WTO as a negotiating body may become less prominent. But the role of the WTO as a rule maker is as crucial as ever, buttressed by its capacity for litigation.

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See also International Monetary Fund (IMF); International Organizations; Liberalization; Multilateralism

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ZIONISM

The word *Zionism* was created in the late 19th century to describe an ideology and a political movement whose objective was the rebuilding of a Jewish nation within a political framework. The goal was defined as a Jewish national home until 1942, when the establishment of a state was officially endorsed by the Zionists. Although nourished by the 2,000-year-old Jewish commitment to the land of Israel (Zion), and by religious practice, Zionism is not merely a simple extension of this longing. It basically embodies a nationalism, deeply marked by the European nationality movement of the second half of the 19th century, whose project is highly political. However, from the start, this project was contested both within the Jewish world and, more forcefully on the ground, by the Arab majority in Palestine, which saw Zionism as a settler movement.

Zionism and Its Jewish Critics

The Zionist project came up at a time of crisis for the Jewish world, which faced a double challenge during the 19th century. The first challenge was internal, linked with the weakening of traditional community structures, speeded up by the growing interaction between Jews and their surrounding societies. The second challenge was external and stemmed from the hostility that Jews continued to face in European societies, be it the “old

anti-Judaism” based on religious grounds or the “new, racial anti-Semitism,” which was aimed primarily at newly assimilated Jews. Zionism presented itself as a way to overcome this double challenge by inventing a new form of togetherness, a national one. As Theodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, wrote in his manifesto *The Jewish State* (1896), the “Jewish question” was first and last a national issue that had to be resolved by the building of a state for the Jewish people.

Half a century later, this objective was reached with the founding of the state of Israel in May 1948. The eventual success of Zionism should not obscure the fact, however, that among the Jews the issue was passionately debated and met with strong, sometimes fierce, opposition from some quarters of the Jewish world.

The critique of Zionism took three main forms. Those who chose to assimilate had implicitly rejected the basic premise of Zionism concerning the historical continuity of the Jewish people. For the followers of Marxism or supporters of political liberalism, the Jews were no longer a people; they were just human beings following a particular faith who had to take part either in the general revolutionary struggle against capitalism or in the political debates within the states of which they had become citizens during the emancipation process. The second criticism came from the followers of Jewish ultra-orthodoxy (who were numerous in Eastern Europe): They fully accepted the idea that the Jews were a people—but a people apart from

the others, with a strictly religious calling. The longing for political normalization, which was the aim of Zionism, was condemned because it broke with this unique destiny. The third form of opposition was driven by other Jewish nationalisms, particularly the one advocated by the Bund (General Jewish Labor Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia), which campaigned for the recognition of the cultural autonomy of Jewish communities and their political rights in the diaspora.

If Zionism at the beginning was clearly a minority movement, how did it manage to become an almost undisputed fact within the Jewish world?

Reasons for the Historical Success of Zionism

Efforts to explain why Zionism was historically successful have focused on three reasons: (1) its strong ideological coherence, (2) its capacity for mobilization of support, and (3) its political record. Among the various Jewish nationalisms that came to life in the late 19th century, Zionism was the most inclusive. Unlike its main rival, the Bund, which wanted to be the representative of the Jewish proletariat and thus excluded large segments of the Jewish people, Zionism had as a goal the creation of a "home secured by public law," which was able to attract a wide range of Jews regardless of their cultural, political, and social differences. Its ideology was comprehensive enough to attract both middle-class people and workers, religious and laypeople, Ashkenazim (European Jews) and Sephardim (Jews from Islamic countries), supporters of the left and followers of the right. Of course, ideological cleavages, sometimes marked, persisted, and in the 1930s, the struggle was fierce between socialist Zionism, the dominant force in Palestine as well as within the World Zionist Organization, led by David Ben Gurion, and its rival, right-wing revisionist Zionism, led by Vladimir Jabotinsky. Nevertheless, the differences (e.g., on the nature of the future society or the pace of state building) were always subordinated to the primary objective: the achievement of political independence within a national framework.

Second, Zionism was the sole Jewish nationalism that reached the ultimate stage of development—namely, mass mobilization. Zionism was defended by an intelligentsia—composed chiefly of journalists,

teachers, and students—that strove to revive the Hebrew culture and provide it with a "political roof." Although in Western Europe, Zionism remained a minority phenomenon in Jewish communities, where the goal for many was integration into the mainstream culture, it became a genuine mass movement in Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania, where historically the most violent anti-Jewish pogroms had occurred. (In Russia, the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks quickly led to a ban on Zionist activity.) It also had considerable success in South Africa, where most of the Jewish immigrants were of Lithuanian origin. Zionism had more difficulty in winning over the Jews in the United States because its nationalist creed clashed with the dominant ideology of Americanization of the Jews, but it nonetheless gained influence in the 1940s with the gradual discovery of the genocide of European Jews. Although the Holocaust did not "produce" Zionism, it appeared like a tragic confirmation of its central thesis—namely, the vulnerability of Jews in the diaspora. From then on, Zionism—often manifested as unconditional support for Israel—had no difficulty in rallying around its cause the vast majority of the Jewish world.

Finally, the historical rise of Zionism was greatly advanced by its positive political record, while its Jewish political rivals could not show any tangible results. On the one hand, Zionism was recognized as an international political force in 1917 with the Balfour Declaration, in which Britain declared itself in favor of the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. On the other hand, in the interwar period, Zionism also asserted itself as a socio-political reality in Palestine. Gradually, an independent Jewish society, regularly strengthened by the arrival of new immigrants, took shape—with its own economy, Hebrew culture, political parties, and institutions. This quasi-Jewish state lacked only full sovereignty, which it finally gained, first through endorsement by the international community (the United Nations resolution of November 29, 1947), then by the force of arms in 1948, during the war against the Palestinians and the neighboring Arab countries, which had rejected from the start the political rationale of Zionism. Indeed, like Janus, Zionism always had two faces: (1) a legitimate national self-determination

movement for the Jews and (2) an enterprise of gradual dispossession for the Arabs.

Zionism Seen From the Arab Side: A Colonial Process

The political equation Zionism had to solve seemed intractable. Indeed, in 1897, when the Zionist Organization was created, its leaders claimed for the Jewish people, 99% of whom were living in the diaspora, the land of Palestine, which culturally and demographically was Arab, the Jews being only a small minority of 5%. Zionism could only hope to reverse this unfavorable trend by building a strong territorial foothold, despite the opposition of the native population, and with the help of an imperial outside power, namely, Great Britain. In practice, the fulfillment of Zionism had to come through colonial settlement, which seemed perfectly legitimate in the age of imperialism. Apart from a small minority of left-wing Jewish intellectuals who defended the idea of binationalism, the majority of Zionists shared the then common, dominant Orientalist vision, which viewed non-Europeans as irrelevant. The latter rejected outright this ideological depreciation and fought forcefully against Zionism in the interwar period. To become reality, the Zionist dream had to be imposed on the natives, who refused to relinquish or compromise their own right to self-determination. Of course, unlike other colonial settlers overseas (e.g., the United States, Australia), the Jewish immigrants were symbolically connected with the land in which they had settled, but for the Palestinian population, this did not make any difference: "For the Palestinian, Zionism has appeared to be an uncompromisingly exclusionary, discriminatory colonialist praxis" (Edward W. Said, 1980, p. 69). The return of the Jews was, for the Arabs, akin to a conquest.

The year 1948 was a turning point: Both the local Arabs and the Arab states refused the partition plan because they saw it as basically unfair. War was inevitable and led to a massive Arab depopulation of what became Israel. The authorities of the new state chose to make this demographic upheaval irreversible: Palestinian refugees were immediately barred from returning, while at the same time the small Arab minority remaining

in the state of Israel was controlled and marginalized. These policies could not but strengthen the Arab conviction that Zionism was structurally linked with the subjection of Palestinians, a conviction that was restated after 1967, when in the newly occupied territories (Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai) the state itself encouraged the building of new settlements.

Reconciling the Jewish and Arab narratives on Zionism seems, to many, utterly unrealistic. Perhaps the best hope is that the former acknowledge that their national movement has had tremendous negative consequences for the native society, which has retained the inalienable right to build a state of its own, while the latter recognize that, despite its initial colonial component, the Israeli polity has become a legitimate reality in the Middle East. In other words, a two-state solution may be the only credible way out of a situation of permanent conflict. Many observers believe that such a solution should be the objective of the peace process launched in the 1990s between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, but its realization remains uncertain as it is caught in the complexity of vexing issues such as the status of Jerusalem, the question of Jewish settlements, and the plight of Palestinian refugees.

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See also Judaism; Nationalism; State

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