concepts from the neurosciences, cognitive psychology, developmental or community psychology, and, maybe, psychoanalysis. But the relevance of each of these approaches depends on the nature of the fields perceived as psychosociological. And it just so happens that these are very different.

## Personality Psychology and Politics

Personality is usually defined as an organized, dynamic but relatively enduring set of characteristics that affects how an individual responds in various situations. In the study of politics, a focus on this concept seems to make sense above all when a limited number of key persons are involved in a process of decision making. For example, it would be important to know whether political leaders are proactive or reactive, conciliatory or aggressive, open-minded or close-minded. But personality psychology strongly matters if, and only if, it is believed that the will of a few policymakers—and particularly that of the political leadership—can overcome the hurdles imposed on the policy-making process and successfully implement their will. This rarely occurs. In most cases, leaders are compelled to search for compromises, to face internal power struggles as well as demands from pressure groups, and to come to terms with the expectations imposed on them by their elite status. So they are obliged to curb their desires, and instead of expressing their genuine motivations (or following what drives them), they adopt behaviors strictly dictated by the power games at play. Thus, it is unsurprising that many sociologists see such psychological approaches as groundless. The real explanatory factors may be elsewhere.

This is all true, but three additional points must be taken into consideration. First, as Fred Greenstein noticed, it may happen that the competing forces of power are so well balanced and under such fluid circumstances that there is space for a key decision maker to make a genuinely free choice among policy options. In this case, psychological characteristics matter. Of course, this situation is much more infrequent in democratic regimes than in dictatorships. Furthermore, in either government structure, leaders are dependent to some degree on the will of their followers and the nature of the alliances they have forged. Second, even if free choice is highly restricted, the fact remains that personal psychology affects the style of governance adopted and particularly the way in which leaders appeal to citizens, supporters, and opponents. This has a great deal of influence on the course of political life. A charismatic style versus a sober tone or a bright versus a stoic appearance can make all the difference in the electoral process—as we saw in the competition between Silvio Berlusconi and Romano Prodi in Italy (2008) or among Barack Obama and several of his challengers in the United States primaries of the same year. Third, personality factors are relevant for leaders acting in situations where strong emotions are triggered, as Betty Glad claims, citing the case of Jimmy Carter handling the Iranian hostage crisis or Ronald Reagan's inability to directly confront people he liked, which hindered his dealings with Menachem Begin at the time of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Investigating the effects of character on role performance is never pointless.

Throughout the 20th century, research in personal psychology dealt with the motivations of politicians and/or their followers. Since the 1950s, many biographical works have emphasized the idea that politicians are qualitatively different from other humans because, as Carol Barner-Barry noted, political behavior is strongly related to making choices between disputed alternatives, strongly oriented toward losing or winning, and often motivated by feelings of justice or fairness. So in these biographers' minds, political involvement derives from special incentives. James Payne (and his associates) have uncovered five main political motivations: the quest for status or prestige, the need to work on concrete issues, the need to have conviviality and friendship, the fulfillment of moral obligations, and the pleasure of competing aggressively in political games. Their research shows how skeptical citizens ought to be about the assertions of politicians, who tend to idealize their motivations. But, even if Payne's list is useful to later analysis, it is too short. Obviously, activists and politicians share other common emotional drives, such as the desire to overcome low self-esteem by public self-realization or to escape the monotony of life through stimulating social games, not just aggressive ones. In the last few decades, several authors also tried to build ideal types of personality. When applied to leaders, such classifications aim not only to make their behaviors more predictable to

observers but also to uncover the mechanisms by which they charm their followers (or threaten their opponents). Of course, the appeal of revolutionary ascetics or moral masochists differs from that of absolute narcissists or catchall seducers. Moreover, we may expect that revolutionary (and stressing) situations produce different types of leaders than do ordinary democratic times.

Other authors were interested in designing typologies of ordinary citizens. In this field, the most famous investigation was carried out by Theodor Adorno and a team of psychologists and psychoanalysts; their book *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950) later inspired much subsequent field research in political science. In their view, authoritarian personalities are characterized by traits that result from childhood experiences and become stabilized for life. Harsh and punitive parents produce adults whose personalities are defined by authoritarian submission, conventionalism, destructiveness, superstition and stereotypy, and fear of intraception (the ability to delve into one's deep feelings and attitudes). They used this syndrome to help explain right-wing ideology, prefascism, and fascism. This thesis was widely criticized for methodological flaws, particularly blindness about the characteristics of left-wing authoritarian personalities. But the main objection here is the very use of the concept of personality. Adorno's research implies that political opinions, choices, and behaviors are primarily the outcome of psychological factors since personality is perceived as the center at which such choices are made. It also tends to exaggerate the consistency of individual responses to the challenges of life. Individuals sometimes undergo sudden psychological changes in attitudes, related to changing circumstances such as fear of war, local unrest, or economic decline. For instance, in such trying circumstances, individuals may abandon cooperation strategies in favor of more competitive or defensive ones. In his classic monograph, *Personality and Assessment* (1968), Walter Mischel asserts that personal psychology searches for consistency in the wrong places (e.g., seeking stable responses in cross-situational behaviors). Because the individual's behavior is highly dependent on situational cues, his or her consistency is found in stable patterns of the "if–then" variety—doing A when X but B when Y. So, for instance, similar aggressive personalities can differ dramatically in the types of situations in which they are aggressed. So without dismissing some of the psychological insights put forward by Adorno or Milton Rokeach (author of the famous *The Open and Closed Mind*, 1960), it is better to see personality psychology as complementing rather than supplanting sociological approaches. Too much attention to personal psychology can result in too much attention being paid to personal responsibility, while in fact political life is made up of collective processes and interactions.

Today, there is a shift in political psychology toward other conceptualizations borrowed from behaviorist or cognitive psychology. Both underscore the role of external stimuli and their effects on personal behavior. Burrhus Skinner, a very influential behaviorist, has demonstrated that there is a mutual interaction of the ego with its environment. According to his three-step contingency model (stimuli/responses/consequences), everyone develops habits of thinking and acting that are reinforced by their effectiveness in earlier situations. Cognitive processes involve adaptive selectivity. In the political field, this means, for instance, that the development of Adolf Hitler's or Joseph Stalin's personality was itself a process, strongly related to the course of their political rise and sharpening instrumental tendencies with every victorious step. Moreover, it can be said that the economical, cultural, and political circumstances of their days—a humiliating defeat in World War I for Germany, and civil war and the triumph of the one-party system in Russia—played a role in the later selection of these types of personalities as omnipotent leaders. These personality types fit well with the kinds of crises that their respective countries were confronting. Many political scientists may argue that the critical question is not "Which personality?" but "Under which circumstances did particular persons establish themselves as the leader of a country?" Though this argument underlines the importance of social and political considerations, it would be wrong to entirely dismiss the role of personal psychology because it has a significant impact in other ways.

### Interactionist Psychology and Groupthink

Rather than focusing solely on factors shaping a person, political psychology must also take into

account interactions between thoughts and feelings that link individuals to each other in a given situation. Cognitive processes such as thinking and judging political events are not affected only by macrosocial influences. Of course, early socialization, economic and cultural status, and religious, ethnic, or political affiliations all shape the ways in which citizens make up their minds in a voting booth or engage in political activities. However, the inner circle—family, friends, highly respected figures—matters, too. And, in this circle, emotional relationships play a significant role. Feelings of confidence or mistrust, a tendency to judge others, the degree of empathy or ambivalence toward relatives, or a fear of annoying them—these kinds of relations can modify a specific behavior like choosing a candidate in an election. It is for this reason that when family or tribal links are strong, as is the case in rural areas or in many non-Western cultures, electoral processes are shaped by factors other than those in more individualistic cultures. Pressure from other members of the "tribe" may compel individuals to endorse particular opinions. In addition, the appearance of competitors may awaken emotional tensions resulting from relationships between parents and children, especially between fathers and sons. A great deal of research shows that these tensions in turn influence the reproduction process of inherited political attitudes.

The influence of these psychological interrelations at a microsocial level is most visible and most consequential for the course of political life when studying decision-making processes. With his theory of groupthink, Irving Janis describes how systematic errors result from psychological biases held by small groups of policymakers taking collective decisions in a very closed (and stressful) environment. The more a group is cohesive, due to its homogeneity of social background and ideology, the more its members value unanimity of thoughts, which in turn may override a realistic perception of facts and alternative interpretations of issues. The risk occurs when the situational context is highly provocative because of recent policy failures or very serious external threats, noticeably in the field of security. The debate can, in these cases, become overloaded with implicit (or sometimes explicit) emotion. Wrong decisions, Janis claims, result from self-censorship of ideas that deviate from the apparent group consensus—each of the members fearing being dubbed "disloyal" to the leader—and from channels that shield the group from disturbing information in order to prevent too much anxiety. To get rid of these biases, Janis advocates some kind of reorganization of the decision-making process, particularly by setting up several independent groups working on the same issue and by increasing the involvement of outside experts. So we can see that certain methods of political management are—or should be—responses to psychological challenges. Much subsequent research has tried to test Janis's thesis in laboratory experiments or in the field. In a broad survey of post-Janis research, Robert Baron claims that groupthink is even more ubiquitous than Janis asserted. In particular, it occurs even if there are neither external threats nor much anxiety present. So in Baron's opinion, such an approach must not be underestimated for explaining political mistakes and misunderstandings of the challenges to be resolved.

Interactionist psychology investigates phenomena such as the way in which political judgment is shaped among members of think tanks, associations, and parties. In political life, engagement means sharing values and goals with others within an organization and, above all, self-identification with those ideas. Politicians and grassroots activists claim an identity that supposedly summarizes what they think and what they are going to do. They call themselves either Republican or Democrat, right wing or left wing. Even within a party, they often claim an affiliation to one faction. This self-categorization or political identity puts big constraints on their actions: first on the kind of labels with which they can describe a situation and, second, on the set of issues they can take for consideration. The rank and file have to represent the positions traditionally taken by their organization in order to avoid accusations of disloyalty, prevent reproaches from their entourage, and avoid being marginalized—which may be painful. This pressure is stronger where organizations are well established and their members allegedly share mutual friendships, based on a past history of political struggles. Sometimes blind allegiance causes a process of real de-individuation: for example, a loss of self-awareness and personal

evaluation made about political events and leaders. In this regard, if the authoritarian management of a party mostly attracts persons who completely identify with the leader, this generates feedback reinforcing authoritarian management. A process of isolation and insulation from society may result, as many examples of extremist parties (right wing or left wing) demonstrate.

As for leaders, if they have space to undertake initiatives and formulate political judgments of their own, they can work in a more or less polarized world. If the outgroups they confront are particularly despised (which is the case when competition is high), positions issued by political leaders may be greatly—and negatively—influenced by their opponents' stances. "What differentiates your program from your competitor's?" is a common question leaders have to address. But the distinctions these individuals demonstrate from each other may not only be political. We may consider that, in democratic regimes, political action is as much affected by emotions as formal political allegiances. The degree to which one sees his or her opponents as friends or enemies or the degree to which one treats them with deep respect or equally deep disgust colors political life with a touch of psychology.

### Mass Belief Systems in Electoral Processes

How do citizens make decisions in the voting booth? This classic question in political science draws much attention. Some researchers argue that votes are generally consistent with the beliefs and political frames with which the voter grew up. In this regard, the so-called Michigan paradigm, identified with the publication of the influential *The American Voter* (1960), was seminal. This book insists on the long-standing effects of socialization by neighborhood, education, ethnic, religious, and class affiliation. It puts forward party identification as a decisive variable in voting. A second line of thinking sees citizens as relatively naive individuals, relying heavily on wrong, irrelevant, or incomplete information. This research is interested in the way volatile (or nonexistent) opinions are influenced by media coverage in electoral campaigns, above all when real political knowledge is lacking. A third stream of research, closely related to the theory of public choice, underscores the tactical ability of voters to pursue rational goals. Voters are portrayed as consumers searching for the most efficient costs/benefits choice.

All these explanations rely on implicit or, much less often, explicit psychological considerations, even if they are tightly intertwined with sociological and political ones. Contributors to *The American Voter* like Philip Converse, a social psychologist, accept this. Whether people have "sticky" preferences that discriminate according to partisan affiliations or remain independent and open-minded and whether they are prone to trust, or not to trust, political parties, governmental agencies, union leaders, and so on, are significantly related to psychological factors. What may be at stake, for instance, are the degree of self-protection involved and the ways and means of keeping oneself safe. Those who score high on attitudinal scales measuring anxiety are more likely to adopt vigilant behavior and show a strictly selected confidence in a few authorities. As soon as the political situation becomes tense, they view the public arena as divided and feel confronted by merciless foes. By contrast, a strong self-esteem makes an individual more open to opposite views without fearing destabilization, more able to understand others' points of views, and eventually, more likely to adopt conciliatory or balanced opinions and behavior.

Political scientists have always known that political choices are related to ideological values in a country's cultural environment. But they seldom investigate this subject in great depth, making it more difficult for them to understand all the various roles ideology plays in thinking and judging. Rationalizing an action through purported values rewards the Ego, helping individuals keep a sense of self-consistency and self-esteem. This idealizes a given behavior with rationalizing explanations; conceals less glorious motivations for action, such as envy, jealousy, and hate; and confirms linkages between individuals—which are of the utmost importance for individuals participating in political organizations. In this respect, ideological and psychological factors are strongly related to each other but in a complex way that needs to be explored. Voters may cast a ballot for a party candidate because they think that he or she is the best or the least distasteful among the choices; but they may also have in mind a desire to show what kind of citizen they are—a responsible democrat, an

enthusiastic patriot, a justice seeker, or even an inflexible rebel—no matter what their real personality may be. Framed early on by socialization and strengthened by the daily influence of an individual's social location, this self-affirmation, ostensibly relying on internalized values, induces a ballot choice that is relatively independent from the real stakes of the polling day (such as policy relevance or candidate competence). It is the reason why public images (of a party or a candidate) matter so much. Politicians, in turn, who make identification processes easier will more easily obtain votes. Issue positions are not enough; a candidate's whole life must testify in his or her favor.

Political psychology, used by political scientists interested in the ways in which mass opinion is created, is hardly psychological in the eyes of "genuine" psychologists because it considers external structures of psychology as well as internal factors. Cultural linkages, as well as the cognitive, ideological, and institutional structures of the political arena, are all taken into account when considering why citizens make a particular choice. In electoral studies, this kind of political psychology has been drawing more and more attention. Since the later 1970s, research based on surveys or various attitudinal scales has attempted to give a more precise picture of different types of voters by taking into account psychological factors such as whether one is pessimistic or optimistic, self-directed or other-directed, or confident or suspicious. In a survey, counting likes and dislikes about issues and candidates has become of the utmost importance in predicting electoral choices. These studies have focused less on personality factors than on psychological styles. They are the product of responses extracted from aggregated statistical data, so that certain general categorizations can be correlated with the appeal of public figures in a highly personalized competition. When Jack Doppelt and Ellen Shearer identify five types of nonvoters—doers, unplugged, irritated, don't know, and alienated—they shed some new light on the phenomenon of abstention and the reasons why such behavior can be volatile from one election to another. These analyses tend to depreciate the idea that electoral motivations are always based on pure rationality and controlled economic calculus.

The ways in which psychology matters in the voting process are well known. Electoral campaigns mostly activate psychological predispositions. Beliefs and emotions like fear or hope and anger or enthusiasm influence perceptions and evaluations of public figures (parties or candidates) that, in turn, determine the final choice. But news media attention to particular incidents or hitches in the campaign can also modify the evaluation process, depending on what problems are being stressed: for example, threats to national security, economic crises, immigration, taxes, or purchasing power. Political scandals can also have significant negative effects. So voting should be understood not only as a political outcome but also as a mediated psychological process.

People cannot be locked into precise categorizations. Many citizens change their mind as situations develop, in accordance with changes in the political arena. Even the Michigan model never claimed that party identifications remain indefinitely stable. So snapshots taken at different times of the fluid mood of an electorate enable us to better understand the way in which beliefs and fantasies cause opinions and emotions and eventually lead to a political choice. An interesting discovery in the United States, valuable to some extent for other Western democracies, is that a large range of public likes and dislikes, extracted from frequent surveys, can be aggregated in a "policy mood" (James Stimson) that has swung, over four decades, from a "liberal" high to a low, in regular increments. Politicians cannot take this finding lightly. It remains to be emphasized again that pure rationality and controlled calculus will never successfully explain any particular behavior. But people with higher levels of political information (and education) know better than novices or lower educated persons how to express through strict political rationalizations their candidate or issue preference.

## Emotional Intelligence and Related Concepts

Since the later 1980s, emotional intelligence has been given increasing attention in a wide range of academic publications that draw on observations from political scientists. Just as the neurosciences underscore the links between reason and emotion in the way the human brain works, these psychologists dismiss the idea of pure intelligence. Political

scientists may borrow some crucial assertions from Daniel Goleman's book *Emotional Intelligence* (1995)—above all, the fact that all people harness their emotions, even negative ones, to understand and decipher external information and manage these emotions to achieve their intended goals. Some cross-cultural research suggests that there are many universally recognized emotions, which means they are biological in origin even if cultures interfere in their expression. Of this list, which ranges from 6 to 15 in Paul Ekman's works (the most noteworthy being *What the Face Reveals*, 1999), some are of greater interest for political studies: anger and fear, disgust, shame and contempt, all are often described as negative emotions; hope and pride, relief, and compassion are all perceived as positive ones. But this opposition (negative/positive), most clearly expressed by the pairing of satisfaction and frustration, needs to be reappraised even if it is still employed in some field research. Why should shame or pride be always seen negatively? More important, each of these emotions is dynamic, and its intensity is strongly related to the internalized ability of each individual to maintain self-control (which develops through early socialization) as well as to the nature of the challenges faced in his or her environment.

The first lesson of this literature is that we cannot avoid taking into account the primacy of feelings in political evaluations—about issues as well as actors. Affects and emotions interfere with political value judgments and contribute to a selective memory of past events, whether they were pleasant or unpleasant. The fact is well-known to politicians but continues to be underestimated by social scientists. One must expect a complex interaction of emotion and cognition during any deliberation over political decisions. In stressful circumstances, affective states such as fear or anger may unsettle otherwise sound political judgment, resulting in a misperception of the adequate response to a given situation. Noticeably, this is the case when high-level violence occurs, targeting personalities, assets, or even public values. Islamist terrorism has led to suspicion toward Muslim populations, strong war threats have resulted in an overwhelming denouncement of foes, and ethnic disturbances reduce those affected to a single trait of their identity, whether this be origin, religion, or language. But less noticed, even in day-to-day political life, is that emotions diminish or stimulate an individual's capacity to judge actions or actors. Satisfaction prompts people to distance themselves from disturbing or unpleasant information or to adopt convenient interpretations of it, which in turn make it easier for them to remain satisfied. Frustration causes a symmetrical mechanism of increasing frustration. The more this process remains unconscious, the more it weighs in political evaluations and, particularly, voting decisions. Hope and fear, and pride and humiliation, whether well founded or imagined, are the main emotions interfering with rational evaluations of citizens. In electoral campaigns, this phenomenon is greatly reinforced either by the scarcity or, conversely, the excess of information available, which is in all cases hard to control. Uncertainty in cognition gives way to more emotional investment.

The second lesson is that emotions are the engine of behavior. Where you stand depends on what you feel. When taking any action, most people search to build their self-esteem and earn a good reputation among the individuals or groups whose opinions matter to them. This is at the root of both conformism and rebellion. What differs between people are the values or guides to which they refer. Understanding the intensity and direction of such inclinations is decisive for the interpretation of political choices. But such an investigation may be misguided if too much importance is attached to authors' statements of their own intentions. If circumstances compel people to take actions of which they are not proud, their real motives will, if at all possible, be hidden behind more noble legitimizations. In some cultures, ambition, outrage, or compassion are more or less valued, even if everywhere they are decisive factors that determine the degree of political engagement and its relationship to the quest for self-esteem. So political psychology must study the complex factors that, in any society, tend to stimulate or diminish the public acknowledgment of these motivations. Other people are mainly directed by their fears or even by paranoid hatred. In these cases, it is necessary to delve into the conditions under which these feelings arise or even affect an entire population. We know that people who express strongly held anger as a result of difficult challenges they cannot properly face want to hold

external agents responsible as scapegoats for their troubles. But what explains the trajectory that leads to mass murder or genocidal violence? A combination of sociological and psychological factors must be acknowledged here.

To take into account these dimensions of the political life, it is useful to refer to the theory of rational choice but understood in an untraditional way. The basic assertion of this economic paradigm is that people evaluate the costs and benefits of the choices they have to make and generally prefer the object that provides the greatest reward (utility, attractiveness) at the lowest price. But in political life, this kind of calculus, when restricted to material costs and rewards, is a myth. This is not only because information is restricted—individuals are unwilling to pay the high costs for complete information—but also because there are costs and rewards of another kind to be taken into consideration. Rational choice theory sets emotionality and rationality against each other. This is an error. Even if emotions easily spin out of control under certain circumstances, they are always part of the rational calculus. Individuals tend to choose the option that will diminish the emotional costs of fear or humiliation. They want to feel more secure as well and search to heal any frustrations, regardless of whether this may take them down a favorable or unfavorable path. But individuals are also attracted by intangible rewards, such as pride, self-esteem, and even surpassing their image of themselves. All these considerations are just as rational as purely material estimations of gains and losses. And as they weigh heavily in political life, researchers, therefore, should be interested in studying what is called (in contrast to ego-psychology) "situation psychology"—that is, the study of emotional costs and rewards that are predictable in a specific environment. Economic crises create particular concerns and fears; the rise of new leaders with a reputation of efficiency or integrity awakens new hopes for economic improvement, political uprightness, and so on. Politicians value emotional appeals when these further their own goals. In dictatorships or in populist discourses, they will not hesitate to mobilize hatred, suspicion, or aversion. In democracies, fear or hope, and pride or outrage remain instrumental but in a way that encourages sufficient monitoring of their effects. Nevertheless, even in these regimes, it happens that "rational calculus," including material and emotional rewards or costs, is somewhat suspended because the level of emotional intensity can spiral out of control. This is the reason why it may be said—under these circumstances but only under them—that emotion can become "irrational."

It should not be forgotten that people problematize their own levels of emotional comfort in accordance with their early socialization and expectations derived from their actual position in social life. On the one hand, some research strongly suggests that individuals acquire, in childhood or late adolescence, lasting predispositions that shape their evaluations of the situations they confront. Racial prejudices, ideological identifications, or an aversion to communism or capitalism all may persist throughout life. On the other hand, short-term considerations also influence attitudes and subsequent responses to challenges. For instance, Linda Putnam refers to the concept of "bounded emotionality" to suggest that "interrelatedness" helps shape individual expectations in organizations. In any situation, many factors that can be perceived as opportunities—bringing hopes or threats, or inducing fear—matter as well. So in these instances, attitudes and choices reveal some kind of "rationality," even if (or, more precisely, because) this rationality is based on emotions. Even if sometimes it happens that emotions get out of control, more often than not they are useful in clarifying the real interests and aspirations in a given environment.

## Symbolic Politics

The power of political symbols lies in their strong capacity for evocation—that is, to create associative meanings that enrich the way in which people react to them. This can occur first of all with knowledge more or less forgotten but open to being revived when appropriately stimulated. But above all, reactions are elicited from the emotional charges contained in the symbols—because of their historical origins and/or added content since then. Some words in political discourses are not purely referential but engage strong connotations under special circumstances. They are cognitively and affectively loaded. That is the case, for instance, when a highly respected politician is abruptly charged with corruption or treason by an authoritative agency.

Everybody can understand the destructive stigma of such a powerful allegation. When used in all seriousness, some terms that refer to positive values, such as *liberty* or *human rights*, or those that negatively describe political foes, such as *fascists*, *terrorists*, *plutocrats*, or *communists*, appear to contain heavy emotional associations. Choosing an effective label for a political competition or defining appropriately a social mobilization can give an organization or a political figure a distinct advantage in politics. Take the prochoice and prolife movements: Both attempt to associate their position with indisputable values while denouncing their opponents as being antichoice or antilife.

Strong cognitive and emotional connotations are linked not only to single words but also to elaborate arguments. Storytelling discourses, which often incorporate ethical messages, whether strongly negative or strongly positive, can spark any number of emotions, from praise to reproach or even to outrage. This is often the way history is taught at school to very young children, with the aim of having them embrace the heroism of their country's forefathers and feel connected to the accomplishments of their nation while being repulsed by the actions of their enemies. This can have a lasting effect throughout their lives. Political parties may similarly refer to historical figures or invoke long-lasting doctrines to make their assertions more authoritative. They may also recall past disasters to extract painful lessons. So some events, personalities, and accomplishments can become overloaded with affective cognition.

Within these storytelling narratives, there are codified lines of argumentation that use a common thread to make sense of the past and the present or to help decipher the future. To identify them, some academics (Ibarra, Kitsuse) have put forward the concept of "rhetorical idioms." These are common-sense constructions of moral competence. Their deployment tends to presume that the listeners are obliged to acknowledge the importance of the values expressed. Moreover, rhetorical idioms are useful in enlisting people to make sympathetic moves in a particular language game. For example, the "rhetoric of loss" or the "rhetoric of endangerment" prioritizes facts and behavior that show, in a more or less simplified way, how people should fear the extinction or devaluation of something highly valuable and cherished, whether this be national pride, ethnic or religious identity, or political ethics. Such rhetoric appeals to emotional responses: mourning, apprehension, or even dread but, above all, admiration for the potential rescuer and a desire to identify with such a wise prophet.

Symbolism is not restricted to discourses but is also found in both material objects and rituals performed in the political arena. A flag is much more than a simple piece of cloth: it symbolizes the nation, its identity, and glory. Burning a flag is the utmost form of abuse that can be inflicted on the people it represents. The architecture of governmental palaces similarly exhibits power or glory. Statues and monuments, particularly war memorials, signify that they deserve a central place in peoples' imagination and memory. Political rituals such as the opening of a parliamentary session, the appointment of a new prime minister, or diplomatic formalities and protocols—all of these highly codified ceremonies intend to arouse intimidation and deference, to exhibit the gap between ruling personalities and ruled citizens, to signify where the power is and who is to be viewed as being at the center of the social order (Clifford Geertz). But, of course, the substance of the symbolism does not lie within these material objects or ceremonies. Their ability to evoke emotional cognition is contingent on the attitudes and comments they arouse in a given cultural environment. So it may be said that symbolism results from an ongoing process of emotional construction, undertaken by authorities perceived as entitled to do so: intellectuals, social leaders, and politicians interacting with each other. If this process fails, it may be that the symbolic appeal has been exhausted. This may occur when indifference, or even disrespect toward such materials or rites, has developed over time.

What are the uses of symbols and symbolic gestures in politics? They can possibly fulfill three functions, which are all decisive in political life. First, many symbols help develop a feeling of mutual liking and appreciation—what is called "solidarity" in political language. Governments must necessarily try to stimulate solidarity because life in society compels them to impose obligations and sacrifices, which may be more easily accepted if people think they have much in common beyond strict material necessity. A sense of allegiance to a community, within which the members supposedly share the same values and history, makes exercising power much easier. Constructing collective identities, national or otherwise, relies on emotional narratives

that emphasize the great things the people have realized together and the highly prized goals they may achieve if they remain united. The reality of this "imagined community" (Benedict Anderson) is exhibited through the symbols everyone learns to love: keywords such as *republic*, *national state*, and *liberty and equality*; material objects such as flags, war memorials, and other emblems of the community and its legacy; historical figures that are endlessly praised; economic, cultural, and sports achievements as a source of communal pride; and so on.

A second function of symbols in politics is to control the need for peace and stability. In international relations, a policy of recognition—one that accepts the principle of equal dignity between states and recognizes the necessity of taking the blame for injuries and damages inflicted on another by the state—is a major factor permitting appeasement between peoples. For this purpose of building better relations with other people, words and gestures matter a lot, as suggested by the respective German Chancellors' kneeling down at the Ghetto Memorial in Warsaw (1970) or a visit to Yad Vashem (2008), both highly charged with emotions. Within any particular state, symbolism appears to be much more intense when institutions become more vulnerable—which predictably occurs at certain stages of institutional life. This is the case, for example, with the formation or the replacement of a government. Constitutions provide explicit rules for such transitions. It is necessary to ensure that these rules are uniformly respected in order to create a consensus about the way in which power must be exercised. When people go to the polls, it is of the utmost importance that the outcome be honored. If not, disorder and instability may quickly appear and destroy the rule of law. It is in these times of uncertainty, when current governments are challenged by opposition figures, that comments on the value of an emotional attachment to democratic principles will intensify on all sides. Any fear of death will similarly evoke symbolic displays, whether this be the deaths of soldiers on the battle front or the unforeseen death of a prominent leader. Elaborate ceremonies and rituals are used to restrain confusion and to prevent the situation from getting out of control.

A third function of symbols is to mobilize citizens to support a "good cause." Purely rational considerations are not always sufficient to get people involved in political life, even when their own interests are at stake. Invoking the breach of equality or the infringement of human rights, both highly prized values, is an effective way to awaken their moral sensibilities and provoke some kind of outrage, which may possibly lead to a commitment to action. More broadly, social problems to be managed by those in power are coded through contextually grounded discourses and vocabularies that designate and dramatize in the same way. Noticeably, they are inhabited by the concept of *victim*, a putative person being subject to harmful conditions of which a *victimizer* is the causal agent. For example, common victims include an unemployed, impoverished populace or powerless minorities, while the victimizers may be the wealthy, capitalism, or even the "system" itself. All of these words, when related to a victimization process, become charged with emotional connotations set up by ideologies and, thus, tend to appear as signals for action. In this way, symbolic politics constructs victim-and-victimizer categories within particular universes of morality where there is good to be loved and evil to be condemned.

## Short Methodological Considerations

Political science needs scientific precision. This presents a particularly strong challenge in political psychology. First, because emotions are typically volatile or subtle phenomena and, second, because psychological costs and rewards are often far from being transparently displayed. In the past, the key obstacles included a false consensus on imprecise core definitions, a diversity of underlying psychological theories, and above all, insufficient techniques for data collection. Dramatic advances have recently been achieved with the development of rich interview materials using projective questions, ingenious experiments (the first of them being Stanley Milgram's), the construction of attitudinal scales and EQ (emotional quotient) to measure preferences and subjective reactions with performance metrics (Likert, Altemeyer), and even computer simulations. But these methods must avoid traps such as an abundance of missing data points, sample bias, poor psychometric techniques, and the possible contradictions between attitudinal factors and real behavior. Certain phenomena will never be well understood without longitudinal research that still remains quite scarce. Furthermore, even

if the positivist-empirical leaning of modern political psychology indisputably favors strong breakthroughs in better understanding the emotional dimensions of political life, there are possible negative implications as well. One may be tempted to give up questions that are too difficult to translate into solid empirical inquiries or to use exaggerated simplifications. Less sophisticated observations may produce more richness, even if the findings cannot be so strongly asserted.

At this point, it is necessary to discuss what room may be left to psychoanalysis. In mainstream political psychology, this theory is widely ruled out as a method of analysis. This is right because its techniques are far from being compatible with social science requirements of intersubjectively transmissible and controllable findings. Nevertheless, if something is to be borrowed from psychoanalysis, it should be the theory of defensive attitudes in a protection of the self. The blocking of cognitive representation and affect (denial), a sudden reversal to take the opposite position, a projection leading to rationalization or identification with the other—all these processes matter greatly when dealing with psychological or sociological material. The more a researcher seriously engages with these processes, the more likely it is that he or she will be able to identify both the bias that may interfere with his or her interview or discourse material and the bias he or she may experience when setting up a research project.

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***See also*** Beliefs; Electoral Behavior; Groupthink; Identity, Social and Political; Psychological Explanations of International Politics; Rituals; Symbols, Political

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## Political Risk Analysis

Political risk analysis is rooted in the intersection between politics and business. It analyses the probability that political decisions, events, or conditions will significantly affect the profitability of a

business actor or the expected value of a given economic action. This definition incorporates three different approaches among early theorists about the sources of political risk—namely, a focus on foreign national governments, the recognition of the impact of actors from both government and nongovernment circles, and an emphasis on historical and cultural environments. A wide spectrum of political risks may affect business, and political risk analysts use both qualitative and quantitative frameworks to analyze and assess the risks to business.

Cross-border traders and investors are often involved in forms of political risk analysis. However, political risk analysis only became recognizable as an institutionalized business practice in the United States in the 1970s. Several factors enhanced the prevalence of international business activities at the time. Simultaneously, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil boycott in 1973 resulted in a partial institutionalization of the political risk function in more U.S. companies. This function became full-time and more firmly centered in many businesses after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Most initial academic research on political risk analysis was also done in the 1970s and 1980s.

Political risk analysts identify political risks and their variables, assess their significance and the relationships between them, and make recommendations regarding the management and mitigation of political risks. Social science research and nonacademic interpretations of current affairs influence all three phases—namely, the analysis, assessment, and management of political risk. In principle, political risk could also be useful in analyzing the general judgment and policy design of politicians under conditions of uncertainty. However, political risk analysis is undertheorized in this regard and currently remains rooted in the intersection between politics and business.

Although political risk analysis could apply to domestic business, in practice it mostly comes into play when a business is considering business activities in other countries. In the academic literature, the focus tends to be on political risk analysis related to foreign direct investment (FDI) rather than relatively passive portfolio investment. The exposure of assets or personnel in FDI reinforces the relevance of political risk analysis. However, political risk can also affect the expected profits and market stakes of exporters, contractors, and licensors.

## Sources of Political Risk

Several, sometimes overlapping, government functions can have an impact on business. In many industrialized countries, its role as a regulator is especially extensive, resulting in legislation related to the environment, health and safety, employment, trade unions, and consumers. A government can also serve as a restrictor (tariffs and trade quotas), redistributor (taxation and welfare policies), director (training, regional and sectoral development, and human resource policies), customer (procurement), or sponsor (subsidies).

Some authors contend that there is an inbuilt potential bias in political risk analysis, whereby any government intervention in the economy is seen as potentially negative, even though such an intervention may be motivated by relevant local interests and aspirations. It is in any case meaningful to locate the particular relationships between multinational business and national governments or other political actors when assessing the actual political risk. The particular cultural and historical context may also influence political risk—for example, where energy or mineral companies are associated with earlier colonial projects in Africa or the Middle East.

The most familiar relationship between business and political authorities is a cooperative arrangement, where negotiations are ongoing and a normal part of operations. While the government would not act deliberately to affect operations, the company would only use lobbying, either singly or through participation in probusiness pressure groups and associations. A second relationship would be collaborative, consisting of joint-venture relationships with public sector companies or privately owned companies with a strong governmental presence.

An authoritative relationship applies when a multinational corporation and a government are at loggerheads. Mostly, a government can impose new rules, which may result in divestment by the company. Two other relationships are far less frequent. A home government may use a multinational company to promote its political objectives. Alternatively, in the case of subversion, a multinational company may actively work to undermine a

host government, partly with the covert encouragement of the company's home government. In the latter two cases, the conduct of business can also constitute a source of political risk.

Risks to business in a country may not only ensue from a government in a foreign country but also from actions by the governments in its neighboring or other countries. Transnational or international actors, opposition groups and other domestic stakeholders, and the particular political field in a country may become linked to political risk. In some countries, due to the power or authority of informal networks linked to the government, these groups, rather than the government, may be the main source of political risk to a particular business.

## Types of Political Risk

Political risk may vary at different business levels—that is, for all foreign business actors, a particular industry or company, or a particular project. It also depends on the type of investment, its methods of financing, its location, and the time frame involved. Political risk may have an impact on one or more aspects of a business actor, including personnel, assets, contracts, operations, transfers, company goals, and business continuity. The impact may be directly or indirectly in the form of opportunity costs forgone.

Risks to personnel and operations may include intimidation, kidnapping, sabotage, and terrorism, if these risks are motivated by political concerns. However, some of these risks may also ensue from nonpolitical actors and constitute a general security risk only, requiring a different set of preventive measures and incident responses. Asset risks may include general nationalization and specific expropriation, restrictions on ownership, and an insistence on locally owned shareholdings or local directorships. Contractual risks may include changes in contractual conditions due to legislative or bureaucratic action, or the frustration of contracts due to violent or political change, including a revolution, civil war, secession, interstate war, coup d'état, or peaceful succession.

Risks to operations are a wide category and include all host country regulations that affect business operations. These may include labor relations, taxation, restrictions on labor or technology transfer, and local product content regulations. Some other examples include quotas and tariffs, environmental and consumer protection, antitrust and merger laws, discrimination in awarding contracts, and bureaucratic nepotism. Transfer risks could include exchange controls, profit repatriation, and restrictions on royalty payments. Local variations in these risks are also possible in countries where the regional authority of an area is at loggerheads with the central government of the country or where a local power broker is the actual authority on the ground.

## Differentiating Political Risk Analysis From Country Risk Analysis

Political risk analysis partly grew out of the country risk analysis conducted by major banks and international economic agencies. The analysis of country risk and political risk differs but may sometimes overlap. Country risk analysis tends to include political risk but also economic and operational risk. Some of the economic factors included under country risk, for example, a bad balance of payments and low creditworthiness, may reflect an inability to pay debt but may also result in a political risk—namely, an unwillingness to pay debt. Political risk may also overlap with some of the country risk factors, where events, foreign confidence, and capital inflows meet.

Political stability as an indicator is included in comparative country risk–rating systems such as the Peren-Clement Index or the Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) Index. However, the management of political risk may differ from that of country risk. For example, many political risks are insurable, whereas many economic and financial risks included under country risk are not.

Political risk analysis may distinguish between a microlevel and a macrolevel political risk. A microlevel political risk is a risk specific to a business or some sectors only. A macrolevel political risk is a non–project-specific risk that affects all participants in a given country. However, it does not include country-level political risk alone, but it may link local, national, and regional political forces, events, and environments. Depending on the requirement of the particular business, political risk analysis can focus on both or one of the two levels.

### The Methodology of Analysis

Some major business actors have in-house analysts, while others at least partially outsource the task of analysis to specialist providers. A company's need for political risk analysis may differ at different times. The perceived need for political risk analysis tends to be higher around the decision to enter or avoid a particular country's marketplace, but different forms of political risk analysis are also used as a regular form of early warning, to periodically review in-country operations, or sporadically in response to new uncertainties or setbacks.

Political risk itself is a subjective category and will vary according to the actor defining the risk and the field of action. While pure risk only entails loss or a chance of loss, speculative political risk can entail the chance of both loss and opportunity. In this regard, political risk analysis is not necessarily a linear process of unilateral communication but may become part of an ongoing dialogue between the analysts and (other) actors within the particular business, who may have a better appreciation of the particular business or project than the analyst.

Analysts use both quantitative and qualitative models for analysis, and there is no consensus on the methodology. A model is an extended representation to better understand, adapt to, manage, and control identified political risk factors. The number and nature of variables, their combinations, and the weights assigned to them by the model builders are based on the interpretative frameworks used by political risk analysts.

Quantitative assessment models include complex econometric models and simpler macropolitical risk indexing models that purport to assess various indices such as political stability, based on nominal, ordinal, or interval variables. Some models have been designed for particular sectors, for example, the financial or energy sector, and most models also include an element of qualitative judgment.

The main qualitative techniques are judgmental forecasting, for example, the so-called Delphic method or accumulation of expert opinion under controlled conditions and involving expert feedback. Informal brainstorming between experts is also used, especially where time is of the essence. A more systematic scenario model may be used to identify key assumptions and key drivers to then construct several alternative futures within different time frames and to estimate the likelihood of different outcomes and their impact on particular business concerns. Political risk analysis aims to provide insight into where a business needs to intervene in the political process if it wants to change the environment, mitigate its potential risks, and maximize its potential opportunities.

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***See also*** Risk and Public Policy; Stability

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## Political Science

*See Introduction to Political Science* (Volume 1)

## Political Science, International Institutionalization

Contemporary political science has its ancient roots in the legislations, teachings, and writings of Greek and Roman statesmen, travelers, historians, and philosophers. The issues that concerned them, their reflections, and their advice dominated

European thinking on politics to the Enlightenment, enriched by medieval, Renaissance, and early modern authors. They are still considered relevant by a substantial number of political scientists—not, quite clearly, by a majority. Political science began to be recognized as a legitimate academic discipline, on the same plane as history and economics, and later sociology and psychology, in the second half of the 19th century, in Europe and the United States, and with surprising speed in the latter country. This institutional recognition is considered first. The second part of this entry deals with the birth, programs, and impact of the international institutions, communication media, and exchanges that have shaped the present political science community since the end of World War II. This account draws on an extensive literature, too abundant to be quoted, and also on the author's close connection with the International Political Science Association (IPSA) since 1952.

## Institutional Institutionalization Through Recognition

The first professorships and chairs dealing with politics were created in the Netherlands, at the University of Leiden (1613); in Sweden, at the University of Uppsala (1627); and at the Åbo Akademi (1640), now in Finland. Several professorships and departments, including in their title *political science* or *government,* were created in the United States in the second half of the 19th century, starting in 1857 at Columbia University. In Europe, political topics started to be taught at about the same time, as part of the training of future civil servants and members of the political elite. In France, the *École libre des Sciences Politiques* [Free School of Political Sciences], set up in 1872 as a private institution in reaction to France's defeat in 1871 in the war with Prussia, used in its name the plural, thus including the study of politics in the social sciences. The *École* inspired the creation of the Columbia School of Political Science (1880) and the London School of Economics and Political Science (1895), both of which used the singular; similar institutions that followed the *École's* model were later created in Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Germany, and Czechoslovakia.

The main impetus came, however, from the United States, where a substantial number of chairs and departments of political science, and also of government or public administration, were established in the fourth quarter of the 19th century. The existence of an American community of political scientists led to the creation in 1903 of the American Political Science Association, the first of its kind, and of the *American Political Science Review* (1905). National political science associations were later created in Canada (1913), in conjunction with economics, and in China (1932), Finland (1933), and India (1938).

In Europe, with few exceptions, political science topics were investigated, analyzed, and taught in the 1920s and 1930s by journalists and civil servants and by academics from disciplines such as history, public and constitutional law, sociology, geography, and philosophy. Politics was meant to provide flesh to the abstract approaches; thus, the study of political parties and elections added reality to the traditional state doctrine and constitutional law. Analysis of political ideologies led to the study of political movements and revolutions, for which traditional political philosophy did not account. Political science was not recognized as a discipline and certainly not as a "science." At best, political topics were seen as belonging to an interdisciplinary field and politics as a "crossroads" discipline.

At the same time, in the United States, partly under the influence of American sociologists, social psychologists, and empirically minded economists, political scientists were increasingly attracted by theoretical rigor, quantitative analysis, and systematic comparisons. The influx of German and Central European social scientists, including refugee scholars before and during World War II, contributed to that transformation. The study of mass phenomena, such as elections, public opinion, communications, authoritarian regimes, and international relations, justified innovative approaches, enriched by the views and the experience of the refugees, who found a hospitable haven in American universities at a time when Europe was isolated and European social science stifled, when not suppressed, except in the United Kingdom (UK). Crossbreeding was important, as these European scholars discovered the unfamiliar realities of American politics and America's political traditions.

When the war ended, émigré social scientists, some of whom had, at U.S. and Canadian universities, embraced political science, were invited to

teach at universities of their home countries, together with native American colleagues, and laid the ground for the recognition of their discipline in Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and many other countries. Their courses and some of the research fields that they opened up or investigated in new ways contributed greatly to interest in political science as a discipline. European graduate students crossed the Atlantic, professors met foreign colleagues at professional conferences, and the gap was progressively closed. Their contributions to a better and richer understanding of politics and the use of more rigorous approaches and research methods were increasingly accepted, not without resistance, however, from traditional scholars. The same applied to Asian countries such as Japan and later Taiwan and South Korea.

The recognition of political science as a discipline outside of the United States was generally a slow process. It depended very much on the strength of contrary academic traditions, on the sympathy or hostility of scholars in other fields of learning, and on the institutional setting. It was understandingly more difficult in educational systems where decisions concerning the curricula and recruitment procedures were made at the ministerial level than in those where universities enjoyed substantial autonomy; this was more rapid in the United Kingdom and in countries where the knowledge of English made for easier and more intense exchanges and access to the relevant political science works. The UK itself, however, was for many years a hotbed of such resistance.

Thus, even in countries where political science topics were commonly analyzed and taught, the obstacles to recognition proved difficult to overcome. In the UK, with its long and glorious tradition of political inquiry and reflection, there was thus still no political science department at the close of the 1940s, and it is significant that the discipline's academic association, founded in 1950, is still called the Political Studies Association of the UK and its official journal, *Political Studies* (1953); the rival *British Journal of Political Science* was launched only in 1971. Political topics were long taught by historians, sociologists, and sometimes very eminent constitutional lawyers and political philosophers, even at the London School of Economics and Political Science, rather than by political scientists.

The situation was partly similar in France, with an additional institutional obstacle: While in the UK, the Scandinavian countries, or the Netherlands universities enjoyed great autonomy, French universities had only a nominal existence until 1968; higher education was administered by a government department and organized at the level of *facultés*. Of the various social sciences, history and sociology as well as philosophy and geography belonged to the *Facultés des Lettres* (schools of liberal arts), and law and economics to the *Facultés de Droit* (law schools). The proponents of modern political science were thus divided between two separate schools in the universities in which they were active. Introductory political science courses, which became mandatory in the law schools' curriculum in the 1950s, were taught mainly by professors of public law who had had no training in political science and often not much respect for it. For many years after 1945, the main institutions that developed both teaching and research in political science were the Paris *Institut d'Études Politiques* [Institute of Political Studies] and the *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques* [National Foundation of Political Science], the heirs of the *École libre des Sciences Politiques*, jointly known as *Sciences Po*, where research centers on French politics, area studies, and international relations were created in the late 1950s and the 1960s. The resistance of the law schools, finally overcome by public law professors who considered themselves political scientists, prevented, until 1971, the creation of political science doctorates and the adoption of a procedure for the recruitment of political science professors. With a distinct chronology, conditions were not very different in Germany, Italy, and Spain, unlike the UK, where academic autonomy allowed a spectacular development of disciplinary teaching and research, with ever more professorships and departments attracting an increasing number of students.

American political science has remained dominant, thanks to the number and variety of U.S. university institutions and the recognition of the relevance of the discipline for nonacademic careers. It has been supported by the major foundations concerned with the development of the social sciences and by the creation of cooperative institutions such as the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research established in 1962

at the University of Michigan, which has provided access to a huge international collection of social science data. The annual American National Election Studies, also based at the University of Michigan, and since 1997 considered a national resource by the National Science Foundation, have provided since 1948 invaluable data on the electorate and public opinion. Institutions linked to the military, such as the RAND Corporation, have contributed to the development of strategic studies. Many new theoretical approaches and methodological innovations or improvements have thus originated in the United States and spread everywhere. Some proved to be fads, but the "behavioral revolution" of the 1960s, which emphasized rigorous analysis of political processes—sophisticated treatment of quantitative data, comparative analysis, and the study of new fields—decisively supported by nongovernmental bodies such as the Social Science Research Council and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, has had a lasting influence, despite its excesses. A large number of increasingly specialized journals were created; the advent of the information technology revolution, which has transformed both research and teaching, resulted also in what many political scientists consider an unhealthy fragmentation of the discipline.

By the 1960s, it became obvious that for its acceptance and development, political science needed an environment that favored, or at the very least allowed, freedom of investigation and thought. Authoritarian regimes do not encourage or even tolerate analyses that highlight their shortcomings. The political science map coincided very clearly with that of democracy. But there were hidden exceptions: The rulers of powers such as the Soviet Union understood that for policy-making purposes, they needed reliable information and analyses. Strongly controlled centers were set up, where broad access to foreign publications was provided. The collapse of communism revealed their existence, and starting in the 1990s, there appeared in many countries of the former Soviet bloc political science journals and books of a quality close to the internationally recognized standards. A new generation of well-informed political scientists, secretly self-trained, became visible. Political science began to be taught in universities, and the map changed rapidly. The same phenomenon had earlier happened in European countries such as Spain and Portugal and in various Latin American countries, where dictatorships had prevented the open development of political science. High-quality scholars, who had found refuge in the United States and Europe, went back when conditions changed and contributed to the academic acceptance and development of their discipline.

## International Institutionalization Through Organizations and Associations

A new and important factor of institutionalization at the international level was the creation in 1949 of the IPSA, to which most of this second section will be devoted.

Before World War II, political science was highly developed, recognized, and taught in the United States in a majority of colleges and in most research universities at the graduate level. It was also taught under various names and in various forms in certain European and Asian countries. There were, however, almost no organized international contacts other than visits and exchanges of scholars and students. The Political Science Congress held in Paris in 1900 was not followed by any large international meetings except for a few regional ones, such as the Scandinavian Political Science Congress held in Stockholm in 1930.

The only organization of any importance was active in the field of international relations. Sponsored by the League of Nations' International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC), located in Paris, a Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations had been created in 1928; it changed its name in 1933 to International Studies Conference (ISC). The ISC used for its operations the Secretariat of the IIIC and held annual conferences, the last of which was held on the eve of the war, on August 30, 1939. It was unable to survive the postwar creation of the broader IPSA.

A few other bodies had existed. The International Institute of Political and Social Sciences in their Application to Countries With Different Civilizations did survive but devoted itself mostly to the study of colonized areas. The International Institute of Political and Constitutional History, renamed the International Academy of Political Science and Constitutional History, was, despite efforts by

some of its leading members, active mainly in the field of history.

The organization responsible for the conception and birth of IPSA was the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Implementing a recommendation made at its very first General Conference (Paris, 1946), the second General Conference (Mexico, 1947) instructed the Director General to promote a study of political science. The UNESCO Social Science Department had singled out that discipline because political phenomena were considered major factors of tensions and because intellectual cooperation was hopefully seen as contributing to the maintenance of peace.

The process soon gained impetus. A massive international study of political science, or its absence, was undertaken by UNESCO in 1948 under the leadership of an American scholar, William Ebenstein, of Princeton University. The huge resulting volume, including no less than 51 national reports, was published by UNESCO in 1950. At a coordination meeting held in 1948 at UNESCO's headquarters in Paris, political science was tentatively defined as comprising political theory; central, regional, and local institutions; parties, groups, and public opinion; international policy and organization; and international law. It was also decided to call a conference to examine the possibility of creating an IPSA.

At that conference, held in September 1949, at the initiative of UNESCO's Director General, 23 scholars—political scientists, political theorists, sociologists, constitutional lawyers, and historians—considered and approved a draft constitution for the future body, constructed as a federation of national associations, and elected a provisional executive committee. UNESCO was similarly active in the creation of associations in other social sciences and the International Social Science Council.

IPSA thus came into existence officially at the end of 1949, as a "foreign association," under French law and regulations, with its legal seat in Paris. Its founders were four associations, those already active in the United States, Canada, and India, plus a French association set up largely for that purpose. Its provisional executive committee elected as chairman Quincy Wright, a professor at the University of Chicago, and a Frenchman, François Goguel, the secretary-general of the *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques*, as executive secretary. A first World Congress, attended by 80 participants, was held in Zurich in 1950 and the second one at The Hague in 1952. Subsequent congresses were organized triennially, at first in Europe only, then in more exotic places such as Montreal, Rio de Janeiro, Washington, D.C., and Buenos Aires. From 1997 (Seoul) to 2008 (Santiago de Chile), all congresses were held outside Europe. Attendance has grown to about 2,000 participants, with IPSA funding many travel grants for young scholars and scholars from developing countries.

Over its 60 years of existence, the number of IPSA's collective members (national associations) has grown from the initial 4 to more than 40. IPSA's existence has contributed to the creation of associations in almost all Western European countries; in a few cases, such as that of Italy, IPSA has had to recognize a new association to replace a previous collective member considered too traditional by the younger generation of political scientists.

Never a Cold War instrument, IPSA emphasized inclusion and dialogue, and the rulers of the Soviet bloc preferred to have delegates participate in it, as in UNESCO. A Polish association was thus created as early as 1950 and was soon admitted to IPSA. Associations were later set up in Yugoslavia (1954), the Soviet Union (1960), Czechoslovakia (1964), Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania (1968).

Against strong opposition, especially in the United States, IPSA stood by its decision to hold its 1979 Congress on strict conditions in Moscow, despite the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1978. It was later acknowledged that the Moscow Congress had helped young political scientists establish the discipline both in the Soviet Union and in several satellite countries. The "missionary" purpose of IPSA also inspired assistance to political scientists in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, especially where dictatorial regimes were hostile to political analysis.

A major problem arose when Taiwan was, in 1989, admitted as a collective member, under the compromise name of Chinese Political Science Association (Taiwan), although its association claimed to be the legitimate heir of the Chinese Association created in 1932. The compromise

accepted by the delegate of the Chinese Political Science Association (People's Republic) was soon rejected, and as of 2010, the Mainland Chinese Political Science Association had not returned to IPSA.

Starting in the mid-1960s, IPSA was strengthened and enriched in its operations by the creation of Study Groups and Research Committees, later merged under the second denomination. Numbering about 50, the committees meet at each Congress and at least once between congresses, with participation by scholars from different countries. They deal with both traditional topics and innovative issues and approaches. Several research committees have their own journals. Associate members—about 100 political science departments and research organizations—and individual members—nearly 2,500—find IPSA's activities valuable.

IPSA's first journal, *International Political Science Abstracts*, launched in 1951, 2 years after IPSA's creation, and prepared since then in Paris at Sciences Po, is still the standard reference tool of the discipline. From 1951 to 1962, it published annually, in four issues, about 1,400 abstracts of journal articles. It now provides each year more than 8,000 abstracts, in six issues, reflecting the explosion in the number of journals; it has since 2007 been published by SAGE Publications. Its database goes back to 1951; at the end of 2009, it contained 270,000 abstracts and is distributed by both EBSCO and Ovid. The second, started in 1980, is the *International Political Science Review*, also published by Sage, which has been recognized as one of the leading journals in the discipline. In recent years, the two journals have also contributed substantially to IPSA's budget. To the journals must be added the *IPSA Portal*, created and maintained at the University of Naples, which selects, describes, and evaluates the top 300 political science websites, and IPSA's newsletter, *Participation*.

Ever since its inception, IPSA has sought to participate in the diffusion of political science as a rigorous discipline and also to serve as a bridge between American political science, in many ways still central, and the rest of the world while respecting the distinct national traditions and different approaches, sometimes strongly critical of those dominant in the United States. Until relatively recently, the landscape seemed pretty clear, with IPSA playing the leading role. It has since then become increasingly complex and somewhat more competitive. Other international bodies have appeared in some regions. American organizations also sometimes supplement IPSA or compete with it.

Regional associations, of somewhat uncertain strength, have in recent decades been organized in Africa (1973) and Asia-Pacific (1983). In Europe, the creation in 1970 of the European Consortium for Political Research, based at the University of Essex and assisted in its first years by the Ford Foundation, has proved spectacularly successful. From 8 founding institutions, it has grown to more than 300, together with associate institutions throughout the world. Its workshops, conferences, and summer schools have contributed greatly to the emergence of a European political science community, and the reputation of its journals—the *European Journal of Political Research*, started in 1973, to which have been added *European Political Science* and the *European Political Review*—and its three book series is enviable. It entertains warm relations with IPSA.

More recently, in 2007, 23 European national and international associations have joined in a European Confederation of Political Science Associations, whose main aim, according to its website, is to "promote the interests of the discipline" and "make it more meaningful in public debate and policy-making." The Confederation has a promising future, as it reflects the vitality of political science associations in some countries where none existed until recently as well as that of the established ones.

Challenges have also come from the United States. Thus, in the field of international relations, the U.S. International Studies Association and its journals have progressively become representative of International Relations scholars throughout the world. The same can be said of area studies organizations such as the U.S. Latin American Studies Association, which attracts and welcomes many Latin American political scientists.

Finally, the powerful American Political Science Association, which numbered more than 15,000 members in 2010, at least twice as many as there are political scientists in the rest of the world, has increasingly become a magnet for foreign political scientists. Its conventions have the dual function of

a forum for scholarly exchanges and an unrivalled job market in the discipline. They attract many participants from outside the United States, sometimes assisted by travel grants.

The international institutionalization of political science may thus be at a crossroads. IPSA has proved its ability to play a major role in it by continuously adapting to a changing landscape. Thus, it has of necessity practically forsaken French as its second language for its meetings and publications. Its secretariat, which until recent years used to move to the city of residence of its secretary-general whenever that changed, is now permanently established in Montreal, where the staff is bilingual. It also maintains IPSA's archives, now assembled in a single location.

In this increasingly complex and competitive scholarly landscape, new activities and organizational schemes will need to be experimented with. Major gaps will need to be filled in Africa, Latin America, and Asia-Pacific, concerning obviously China but also countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines. The relevance and the vitality of the discipline seem, however, to be ensured for many years to come, certainly much better than a generation ago.

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## Political Socialization

Political socialization is a form of socialization. An individual's biological birth is followed by a second phase, described as a "social-cultural birth," which turns him or her into a social being. This procedure is called *socialization*. It is a multidimensional process that significantly shapes the relation of the individual toward the social environment. A great number of people (e.g., educators), institutions (e.g., schools), and factors in the social environment (e.g., mass media) are involved. In the following, the major forces shaping this process in modern societies are discussed.

Socialization can be defined as the following:

- a process of forming an individual into a sociocultural personality through the shaping of those cognitive, linguistic, motivational, emotional-affective, and similar features that enable persons to understand the social environment and to participate in its shaping (primary socialization);
- a process of imparting social values, norms, and abilities for the accomplishment of social existence, occurring outside the family, mainly in peer groups and schools (secondary socialization); and
- a lifelong process of social experience, on the basis of primary and secondary socialization (lifelong learning).

In a wider definition of politics, all processes of socialization can be seen as political. The separation of political and general socialization is unnecessary if politics is defined by all relations of social power (including the family, the workplace, etc.). If the members of a society are subjected to such relations and are thereby shaped politically, socialization always develops political effects as well.

In a narrower sense, political socialization is regarded as a part of the general process of socialization. This contains purposive and functional dimensions. The purposive part regards political socialization in the context of pedagogical institutions and methods (education, tuition). The functional side looks at political goals, values, and norms that are being socialized and form individuals into political beings.

Political socialization is not free of values. It is defined as the entirety of all learning processes that form a person into a political being (citizen). The learning processes can be measured in terms of how far they promote or impede political maturity. Maturity in this context means all abilities necessary to meaningfully participate politically—the competence of participation. Political socialization gains its specific political content from an understanding of democracy, which underlies this value orientation. The aim of socialization is maturity, in the sense of self-determination, and political decision making and responsibility. Democracy determines the political-social process in which politically mature individuals develop. The structural-organizational basis of this ability lies in the institutions and policies of political socialization, whereas the subjective-personal part is found in the competence of participation. This is perceived as a goal of political learning. The question of how this goal of learning can be founded theoretically and how it can be empirically achieved, for example, not only in political education but also in processes of participation, pervades considerable areas of work in the research on political socialization.

## Political Socialization as Political Learning/Education

Political education is a historical phenomenon. "Political" thinking, learning, and acting (in a sense of politics as a struggle or competition for influence and power) was only established when a sphere of civil life developed besides the state. Civil life needed and claimed individual freedom from governmental and absolutistic-feudal power, beginning in Europe in the 18th century. The struggle for autonomy of the newly established class—the middle classes—was borne by ideas of the Enlightenment ("liberty, equality, fraternity" as the slogan of the French Revolution). The aim was to replace feudal arbitrariness of power with a constitutional framework that ensured freedom and equality before the law. The guarantee of equal rights for all citizens made political learning necessary for the first time. Political learning in its beginnings was more focused on the idea of civil freedom. Not long after the collapse of the medieval social order, political education turned into a problem from a historical perspective.

The social-historical background of political learning reveals different phases of development:

- *Education of classes in the feudal society:* Being politically educated meant knowing the rights and duties of one's class.
- *Education toward the ideal of civil liberty in the early middle-class society:* It ought to serve as an instrument for the enforcement of civil rights as provided by the constitutional state.
- *Means of controlling the fourth estate of the society in the era of 19th-century capitalism:* In this phase, political education was an intellectual-political weapon for the suppression of the upcoming industrial proletariat;
- *Political education in nationalistic-authoritarian systems:* Political education is focused on the subordination of all people to the state.
- *Education toward a racist ethnic community under National Socialism in Germany:* Education served as a means for the forming of the national-socialist man.
- *Education toward the "new man" under communist systems:* It helped people live harmoniously in a classless society.
- *Education toward democratic behavior in contemporary democratic states:* Political learning takes part in the challenge of enabling the development and stability of democratic conditions.

Political learning continuously tries, in its contents as well as in its methods, to consolidate or to criticize existing forms of authority. In a democracy, its objectives include different concepts of democracy. Political learning that is focused on the imparting of political decision making and responsibility is interested in more than just the imparting of knowledge. It is geared toward certain states of awareness, abilities for political action, and attitudes and motivations for a democratic political commitment.

The achievements of socialization on a microdidactic level (political education/instruction) are limited, though. They are not able to compensate the deficits of the political system and the structural basis of political socialization. However, it is possible to implement the goals of political socialization on a macrodidactic level. Political learning can then be described as functional. This is how it can be distinguished from intentional political education.

Processes of learning that shape the potential of qualification and actions of political decision making and responsibility are processes of participation. Competence in participation can be acquired through participation itself. In this way, participation serves as an educational goal as well as an educational means. Political learning takes place when political consciousness can be applied and political participation can be reflected (learning by doing)—the basis of which is political communication.

## Political Socialization Through Political Communication

Political systems and their social environment are in constant communicative exchange. The basis of such communication is the aggregation and conversion of social interests into political decisions (interest intermediation) as well as the transmission of political values and norms into society (intermediation of politics). Political communication consists of the exchange of information about politically relevant topics. It can take place because constitutional regulations organize this exchange of information and groups of citizens take part in it. Political communication can also take place without the exchange of information being organized by the governmental system. Effective political communication is established if, from the side of the political system, there is a high degree of transparency of its institutions and decisions. Political communication is the basis of participation in political decision making and decision processes. Political communication acts as a socializing process if, in the system and the system environment, the efficiency of exchange of information between institutions and participants is ensured by steering processes (through norms, culture, sanctions, etc.).

Transparency, participation, and efficiency are regarded as the "magic triangle of social science." They are principles of organization that determine the success of political communication. The relevance of the principle of participation determines the extent to which political communication enables the learning of participation skills.

As far as political communication is organized by a political system, its institutions act as agents for political socialization. The accomplishments in socialization are the result of the practice of organized political communication between the system and the environment of the system. Through passing on of prevailing norms and values and thereby the culture of the system (political culture, organizational culture, etc.), it allows the possibility of evaluation of the system output (laws, party platforms, etc.) and ensures the return of information (input) into the system, whereby innovation (e.g., political reforms) is made possible. The socialization of the political system thus increases the learning capacity of the political system and its facilities. It is the basis for a successful conveyance of politics.

## Conclusion

The learning capacity of the political system and thereby its survivability depend on an organized exchange of information between politics and society as well as between political and administrative facilities and citizens. In a democracy, this exchange is organized by parliament and through intermediate actors of civil society (parties, organizations, associations, etc.). Their achievements are measured in terms of how far they are able to exercise political communication. In a democracy, the medium of political communication is the political public. In the medium of the political public, socialization obtains its empirical location, and from the political public, it derives its normative power.

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***See also*** Participation; Political Communication; Political Culture

### Further Readings

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# Political Sociology as a Field of Study

Political sociology deals with the nexus between social and political life. Traditionally, the political consequences of social arrangements are stressed, but attention has also been paid to the social consequences of political arrangements. Combining these two perspectives, political sociology studies links political and social phenomena; that is, it is an interdisciplinary endeavor combining social and political factors to explain distributions of power and dominance in state and society. Almost by definition, intermediary actors and institutions such as interest groups, political parties, and voluntary associations play an important role. The main research topics of political sociologists are voting behavior, new social movements, parties, civil society, and interest groups (usually input-oriented microlevel approaches), on the one hand, and state formation, transformations of political systems, and political reform processes (usually output-oriented macrolevel approaches), on the other.

In the past decades, the distinction between state and society gradually disappeared and has been replaced by a melding and blending of political and social phenomena. The rise of multinational corporations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the spread of international interdependencies and supranational arrangements changes the position and nature of the state, whereas rising levels of education, welfare, social security provisions, secularization, and individualization imply similar changes for society. As a consequence, political sociology as a field of study seems to have lost much of its traditional position to more specific approaches. The first question to be dealt with here concerns the distinction between the use of social factors to explain political phenomena (a "sociology of politics") and the explanation of social phenomena using political factors (a "political science of society"). Political sociologists stress the reciprocal nature of these relationships and the need for integrated approaches. Second, the main theories used in political sociology—modernization theories, variants of Marxism, rational choice theories—are presented by following the debates since World War II. For each of these approaches, the major goals and attainments are presented and illustrated with a closer look at one or two seminal works. As will become clear, these newer approaches still rely on the presumption that a distinction—or at least an analytical distinction—between political and social phenomena makes sense. Finally, the consequences of the massive shifts in the relationships between state and society for political sociology as a field of study are scrutinized.

## An Interdisciplinary Hybrid

Political sociologists study topics such as interest groups, state formation processes, old and new social movements, class-based power, public opinion, elites, trade unions, civil society, the spread of governance practices, and social and political participation. What do those very diverse subject matters have in common that arouses the curiosity of political sociologists? Ordinary answers to this question usually point to *power* and *domination* as core concepts to draw a line of demarcation. In this way, typical broad definitions of political sociology presented in social science encyclopedias refer to the "operation of power in social life" and the distribution of power at the various levels (individuals, organizations, communities, countries, etc.). Other definitions stress the "social causes and consequences of given power distributions" or the "study of power and domination in social relationships" as the defining characteristics of political sociology. In this way, it could include studies of the distribution of power in families, the

mass media, universities, parliaments, trade unions, and so on. These broad definitions underline the wide range of topics studied by political sociologists. Referring to power and domination is certainly helpful to characterize the field in general terms, but the use of these terms is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to define political sociology. Since virtually every topic studied by social scientists is related to the operation and distribution of power, further specifications are required. Such a more specific definition of political sociology as a field of study implies, first, a closer look at the distinction between the political and the social and, second, a specification of the presumed causal directions in our explanations and interpretations.

Any study of the relationships between political and social life—between state and society—is based on the conjecture that these two areas, indeed, can be distinguished. Yet in the history of ideas, this is a fairly recent invention. In his essay on the origins of political sociology, Walter Runciman (1963) points to the national state and the rise of the bourgeoisie in the 18th century as the main factors stimulating a distinction between the political and the social. Exactly that distinction made political sociology possible and sensible, and it initiated a wealth of studies focusing on the relationships between state and society from a wide variety of perspectives. More recently, a distinction between state and society or between the political and the social has become increasingly problematic. The developments in the last few decades show a remarkable extension of politics and political power. Besides, the distinction between political and nonpolitical activities or areas became blurred or disappeared completely. Yet characterizing political sociology on the basis of a distinction between social and political life does not presume that these two areas can be distinguished empirically unequivocally. In fact, using this distinction analytically and conceptually allows political sociologists to point out the historical roots of their discipline and to analyze actual developments in terms of a melding and blending of political and social phenomena.

Accepting an analytical and conceptual distinction between social and political life gives rise to a second complication. Traditionally, specific demarcations of political sociology are obtained by drawing attention to the relationships between state and society. In this approach, political sociology deals with the ways in which social and societal factors have an impact on political phenomena, or vice versa, it deals with the ways in which political factors influence social phenomena. The first perspective might be labeled as a "sociology of politics" and is common among American sociologists. For instance, the major aim of the Political Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association is to promote activities of those concerned with a sociological understanding of political phenomena. The combined Committee on Political Sociology of the International Sociological Association and the International Political Science Association (IPSA) relies on a somewhat broader approach. In their view, since political sociology is about the nexus between social and political life, the focus is on organizations or individual acts that seek to take or influence political power. Both approaches share an unambiguous interest in the relationships between state and society—they differ, however, in the extent to which the focus is on social factors. Whereas a "sociology of politics" stresses the relevance of social factors for political phenomena, a "political science of society" reverses the argument. In practice, the disciplinary roots of sociologists and political scientists appear to be highly relevant for the selection of one of these perspectives.

In his seminal article on sociology, political science, and political sociology Giovanni Sartori (1969) explicitly rejects the idea that political sociology is characterized by one of these single-directional perspectives. For him, political sociology is an interdisciplinary hybrid whose main goal is to combine social and political explanatory factors as suggested by both sociologists and political scientists. It is not the direction of impacts presumed in the analyses (social factors explaining political phenomena vs. political factors explaining social phenomena) but, more generally, the nexus between social and political life that defines political sociology as a distinct subfield.

As in every major area of the social sciences, political sociologists do not agree on a straightforward definition of their activities or the objects they study. A minimum consensus, however, includes the focus on power and domination in the relationships between social and political phenomena. Political sociologists use this last distinction for analytical and conceptual purposes and presume a

reciprocal relationship between political and social life—that is, between the state and society. Claims by either sociologists or political scientists to seize political sociology as an exclusive subdiscipline are not only gratuitous but also do not teach us much about the distribution of power and domination.

## The Rise and Fall of Modernization Approaches

Although its roots go back to the work of 19th- and early-20th-century social scientists (Karl Marx, Alexis de Tocqueville, Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Vilfredo Pareto, to mention only a few), the heydays of political sociology started after World War II. The spread of modernization approaches especially contributed to this advance. These approaches consider the development of societies as an evolutionary progressive process that is driven by economic and technological forces. Its basic ideas were spelled out by early social scientists and philosophers (Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx). Every society evolves from simpler to more complex ones and passes through various phases or stages depending on the available resources and challenges confronted. In this way, "primitive" societies will gradually become more complex, heterogeneous, and differentiated. Political arrangements, especially state formation and nation building, develop accordingly and are attuned to the social requirements of each evolutionary stage or phase. Modern industrial society—with its capitalist ownership, market allocation, and division of labor—establishes the culmination of this progressive evolutionary process. Conceptualizing social and political developments in this way almost directly leads to the study of reciprocal relationships between social and political phenomena, that is, to the study of political sociology.

Modernization theories obtained their strongest impulses from the spread of structural-functional system theory as a universal framework for studying the evolution of societies. Mainly following the work of Max Weber, Talcott Parsons distinguished between four major social subsystems: the economic system, the political system, the community system, and the sociocultural system. These four subsystems are interdependent and each contributes to the persistence of the system as a whole by performing, respectively, four functions: adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latent-pattern maintenance (the AGIL scheme). Approaching the relationships between the social and the political on the basis of the Parsonian system theory has many evident advantages. First, a universal framework is presented that offers (functional) explanations for the development of entire societies as an evolutionary process. Furthermore, political phenomena are handsomely conceptualized as a distinct subsystem whose features and developments are systematically integrated in the system as a whole. Third, Parsonian system theory underlines the progressive character of the evolutionary processes studied: A structural-functional explanation is offered to show that primitive societies inevitably will become more complex, heterogeneous, and differentiated. In the end, all societies will converge to a liberal-capitalist society of the U.S. and Western European type.

Early examples of the application of modernization approaches by political sociologists can be found, for instance, in the works of Gabriel Almond, Seymour Martin Lipset, Stein Rokkan, or Robert Dahl. These authors mainly focus on the consequences of social arrangements for the distribution of power to assess the chances for democracy in capitalist society. Major variants include elite theories, pluralist theories, and class-based theories.

The idea that specific groups obtain privileged and leading positions in society directly follows from the basic presumption of modernization approaches that societies increasingly become more complex, heterogeneous, and differentiated. As such, the rise to power of specific groups (elites) is well founded in these theories. Traditional examples can be found in the works of Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and especially Robert Michels. For Mosca, the driving force behind societal developments is the continuous struggle between groups to gain dominance and power. As a result, society always consists of two groups only: the dominating and the dominated, the powerful and the powerless. As Mosca, Pareto considers elites to be unavoidable. Since human beings are very unequal, society is, by definition, not homogeneous—and elites will not be homogeneous either. Following this argument, Pareto concludes that social change is always based on elite

circulation. The replacement of elites is also an important aspect of the work of Michels. Instead of continuous battles or circulation of elites, Michels presumes that a permanent amalgamation of members of old and new elites takes place. Elite amalgamation is ascertained in organizations, and so Michels focuses his attention on developments within organizations and, in particular, within political parties. On the basis of this work, he formulated his famous Iron Law of Oligarchy already in 1911: "Who says organization, says oligarchy."

Pluralist theorists accept the idea that in modern societies elites are inevitable. For pluralists, however, this does not imply that in each area of social and economic life the very same elite group is in power. In fact, increasing complexity, heterogeneity, and differentiation of societal arrangements make it highly unlikely that a single group would be able to dominate several different areas at the same time. Pluralist approaches presume, first, that modern societies are complex and highly fragmented and, second, that different elites gain power in each area. As a result, social life is characterized by conflicts between elites from various areas, which are based on different groups. Pluralists do not simply consider these elites or conflicts between elites as a threat to democracy. On the contrary, especially because of elite competition, progress is possible, and group interests will be taken into account. To avoid the destructive consequences of severe conflicts between elites, the social groups on which they are based should overlap; that is, they should not be completely distinct. If these structural arrangements are fulfilled, successful democratization will be the outcome of modernization. An example of a pluralist approach is the seminal study of Robert Dahl on the distribution of power in an American community in the early 1960s. Conscientiously, he studied decision-making processes in various policy areas in a small town (New Haven, Connecticut) and was able to show the existence of distinct, competing elites in different areas. The existence of these elites does not endanger democracy; it is an essential precondition for its functioning.

Most class-based approaches accept the idea that societies increasingly become more complex, heterogeneous, and differentiated. Instead of focusing on elites, class-based theories prefer a broader conceptualization of the consequences of ongoing modernization for power struggles between social groups and for the resulting social inequalities. Broadly speaking, *class* as a term to depict some group of people is used in two ways: by referring, first, to functional contributions in (industrial) production processes (e.g., *working class*) or, second, to positions in some hierarchy (e.g., *middle class* or *ruling class*). Directly following Marx, political sociologists in the Marxist tradition use class concepts based on contributions to the production process. Other social scientists—among them Max Weber—prefer relational concepts. Since positions in a production process and in a social hierarchy are evidently related, actual research usually deals with both class concepts. In his seminal article on the "social requisites of democracy," Lipset (1959) pointed to the fact that economic development is an important precondition for democracy. Modernization does not only result in complexity, heterogeneity, and differentiation but also implies massive expansion of production capacities and wealth. Increased wealth dampens class struggles and permits broad support for distributional compromises. Besides, a rising middle class will claim political rights and promote democratic values. These combined effects of modernization, Lipset argued, strongly favor democratization in countries with high levels of economic development.

Whereas Lipset searched for the mechanism behind democratization, Stein Rokkan attempted to explain the varieties of modernization in Europe. Political developments in Europe are, according to Rokkan, mainly a consequence of the deep-rooted cleavages that arose in the aftermath of several invasive events (the Reformation, nation building, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution). Since these events occurred differently in different places and times, European societies show both similarities and differences. Accordingly, political arrangements show similarities and differences too. Together Rokkan and Lipset analyzed these similarities and differences, especially for party systems and voter alignments in Europe: Evident similarities (such as the existence of social-democratic and Christian Democratic parties) are combined with striking differences (such as the spread of liberal parties). Rokkan and Lipset underlined the strong impact of cleavages by pointing out the fact that party systems and voter alignments in Europe

remained "frozen" from the early extension of suffrage until the mid-1960s; that is, the impact of social factors survived two world wars and severe economic turmoil.

The closeness of political sociology to modernization theories in the first 2 decades after World War II provided the upcoming discipline with many advantages. Nonetheless, from the very beginning, modernization theories provoked strong criticism—criticism that applied also to political sociology as its main intellectual ally. A major concern of many critics is the idea that (American) capitalist society and liberal democracy should be seen as the end-stage of a progressive evolution of humanity. This teleological tendency in modernization approaches is rejected as being ideologically biased and epistemologically unwarranted. On a closer look, the presumed progressive evolutionary process in many societies appeared to be fragile, inconsistent, nonmonotonous, and not necessarily following a European or Western model. Furthermore, the basic idea that economic and political developments are interdependent was challenged and replaced by a much more open approach conceptualizing economic and political modernization as two distinct processes whose potential interdependencies should be studied carefully instead of simply being taken for granted. Furthermore, methodological criticisms were raised. Since modernization approaches are based on general frameworks and claims of universality, the usual methods applied were quantitative and comparative (typically, statistical analyses of cross-national data in large-*N* designs). Newer approaches challenged these ideas and considered in-depth historical analyses and case-oriented methods (usually hermeneutic-interpretative and cultural-historical approaches in small-*N* designs) as much more appropriate to the study of complicated reciprocal relationships between the social and the political.

## Main Approaches

In a somewhat exaggerated way, one might regard many developments in political sociology in the last half century as attempts to present alternatives for the apparent limitedness, erroneousness, and ideological bias of the modernization approaches of the 1940s and 1950s. Alternative approaches challenge the capitalist distribution of power and its implicated social inequalities as well as the strong emphasis on structural-functional arguments. These disputes reflect a more general change in the social sciences away from social-scientific approaches (emphasizing causal explanations based on regularities and mainly applying quantitative, comparative methods) toward cultural-scientific approaches (emphasizing specific cultural meanings and constructions of meanings; mainly applying qualitative, case-oriented methods). The three major groups of alternatives presented for liberal-capitalist modernization approaches consist of Marxist theories, critical and conflict theories, and postmodern and poststructural theories. But agents of social-scientific approaches did not simply abscond from the battle field. Following mainstream microeconomic theory, deductive approaches based on the idea of human rationality resulted in the blossoming of rational choice approaches as the key to understanding social and political developments. Besides, a revival of modernization theories—based on social-scientific as well as on cultural-scientific approaches—can be observed currently.

### *Marxism*

Liberal-capitalist modernization approaches emphasize structural-functional interdependencies between the political subsystem and other parts of the system. In this sense, American society is usually depicted as the end-stage of progressive evolutionary developments. These propositions have been challenged by political sociologists working in a Marxist tradition. According to these approaches, the capitalist state is not some "subsystem" that adjusts itself in neutral ways to the functional requirements of other subsystems. The genesis of the late-medieval idea of a "state," with its territorial-based claim on sovereignty, can only be understood by looking at the requirements enabling the accumulation of capital—that is, by looking at property rights and the protection of markets at home and abroad. In this way, social and political developments are based on developments in the production process and the accompanying arrangements to acknowledge rights and to legitimate the distribution of wealth. Like modernization theories, Marxist approaches depict liberal

capitalism as a stage in the progressive evolution of societies. Contrary to many modernization theorists, however, Marxists regard capitalism and liberal democracy as a transitory phase and not as the end-stage of this evolutionary process.

The renaissance of Marxist approaches in political sociology reaffirmed the idea that politics is based on social, in particular on economic, developments. Two main areas of research benefited especially from this advance: (1) state formation and state building and (2) the distribution of power and social inequalities. In his detailed study on the *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Barrington Moore showed that various countries took different routes to come to the modern industrial world. According to his view, the power of bureaucracies in raising taxes and granting privileges was countervailed by the nobility and the upcoming bourgeoisie, which laid the basis for democracy in England and France. Since these countervailing forces were largely suppressed by a coalition of bureaucrats and aristocrats in Germany (Prussia), dictatorship was more likely than democracy in Central Europe. Although Moore did not concentrate on state formation, his book highly stimulated the revival of analyses dealing with that topic, gradually moving the emphasis from Marxist theories based on economic primacy toward more complex approaches. Charles Tilly, especially, attempted to overcome the limitations of retrospective arguments and the neglect of noneconomic factors in explanations of the formation of national states in Europe. In his view, nation-states proved to be the most effective way to mobilize and organize the resources required for the severe political conflicts and wars in medieval Europe; that is, arms and warfare strongly stimulated the rise of the state. The renewed debate also provided the opportunity to move well beyond the eurocentrism of many approaches and to strongly stimulate interest in state developments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Economic causes also are at the heart of Marxist approaches dealing with the distribution of power in capitalist society and the implied social inequalities. George Domhoff, in a controversial publication, answered the question "Who rules America?" unambiguously: The country is dominated by political and economic elites. He stressed that the dominant pluralist approaches of the 1950s and 1960s tended to overlook class consciousness and class struggles in capitalist society and are slanted toward political decision-making processes instead of the resulting inequalities. Although he did not consider himself to be a Marxist, Domhoff's approach and terminology clearly reflect the economic primacy characteristic of Marxist approaches.

Debates about the power structure in capitalist society were strongly influenced by the publication of Nicos Poulantzas's work on classes and political power in the late 1960s. The capitalist state, he argued, is not simply an instrument in the hands of the capitalists who use it for their own interests. Instead, the capitalist state is a relatively autonomous actor ensuring the smooth operation of capitalist society. It is the structure of the system—not the short-term interests and preferences of the capitalist class—that works to the benefits of that class. Therefore, major problems in capitalist society consist of the clashes between the demands of various classes, on the one hand, and the need for the system to provide social stability to reproduce itself, on the other. Authors such as Claus Offe expanded this line of reasoning by focusing on the unavoidable tensions produced by the actions of capitalist states to overcome class divisions without endangering the long-term benefits of the capitalist class.

With the theories of Tilly, Domhoff, and Offe, we have left orthodox Marxism. The relevance of economic factors is almost universally accepted; likewise economic determinism and economic reductionism are widely rejected as being one-sided and insufficient. With a few exceptions, political sociologists focus on reciprocal relationships between social and political phenomena and try to avoid one-way lines of reasoning in explanations of power and dominance.

### *Neo-Marxism: Conflict Theories and Critical Theories*

Neo-Marxism is a rather loose term referring to approaches that amend Marxist theory, usually by incorporating elements from other traditions to overcome the deficiencies of orthodox Marxism, especially economic determinism and reductionism. Major blends of neo-Marxism consist of

combinations of Marxist approaches with conflict theories and critical theories. Conflict theories stress that resources are scarce. Therefore, conflict and competition, rather than cooperation and consensus are characteristic of human relationships in all societies. Struggles to maximize benefits and to defend interests depend on the ability and resources to exercise power and dominance in a society. Powerful groups use their power to exploit groups with less power—through brute force and suppression if necessary but also by securing ideological hegemony and structural advantages. Inevitably, permanent social struggles deeply affect the political and social order and imply societal and political changes. Conflict theories are unmistakably based on the work of Marx and Weber and are easily discernable in almost each and every political-sociological theory: pluralists, elitists, and class theorists all agree that conflicts and struggles between social or political groups are crucial to understand the reciprocal relationships between the social and the political. Conflict theorists, however, claim that these struggles are the exclusive driving force behind social and political developments.

Analyses of the distribution of power and dominance are the main objects of conflict theories. From this perspective, not only the work of Domhoff but also the classic study of C. Wright Mills depicting the American ruling class as a *Power Elite* can be seen as an important neo-Marxist and conflict-theoretical contribution to political sociology. In his book, Mills points out the strong overlapping of interests of the military, business, and political elites in the United States. Behind the façade of pluralism and interest differentiation, the aims of elites in various areas appear to be remarkably attuned and congruent to each other. By contrast, the ordinary citizen is perceived as relatively powerless and an easy subject of manipulation by those elites. Power, conflict, and social inequality, then, appear to be robustly related in the world's largest liberal-capitalist democracy.

Class provides the major way to distinguish competing social groups in conflict-theoretical approaches. As we have seen, Marxists define classes based on the functional contributions of groups in production processes, whereas many other social scientists use the concept to refer to positions of groups in a hierarchy. Both conceptualizations usually refer to deep and persistent social distinctions. Yet class is certainly not the only distinction offering a basis for conflicts and struggles between various groups. Race and ethnicity definitely play an important role in many societies and are a cause of virulent conflicts both within and between states. In a similar way, geographical and regional differences are used to define conflicting interests. Furthermore, the social definition of distinct roles for men and women (*gender*) and the resulting inequalities lead to various conflicts and struggles. For centuries, religion has proven to be an extremely vigorous basis for social and political conflicts. Religion, and not class, played the key role in the political history of many European countries, and numerous contemporary conflicts in the world are based on religion. The list of social distinctions that can be articulated in conflicts between groups for power and dominance is virtually endless. As we have seen, Rokkan's theory of long-standing social cleavages covers many diverse social distinctions and is an example of the openness of conflict-based approaches. In the early 1990s, Samuel Huntington advanced the proposition that world politics would be increasingly dominated by conflicts based on a *Clash of Civilizations*: People are likely to see "us" versus "them" in the relations between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion. According to Huntington, the resulting clash will take place not only between people and groups within states but also between states and between groups of states.

Conflict theories and critical theories have a lot in common. The main difference does not lie in the depiction of capitalist society as conflictual and contradictory but in the emphasis placed on the rejection of the positivist background of modernization approaches and conflict theories. Positivists—especially logical positivists—attempt to understand and explain social phenomena by searching for regularities and general statements. Besides, they strictly observe a distinction between facts and values and consider the normative consequences of their work as exogenous. Critical theorists reject that model of science and support emancipatory (usually anticapitalist) causes; that is, emancipation, freedom, and decreasing domination are explicitly stated as the normative bases for social research. According to critical approaches, the social sciences are not concerned with isolated

social phenomena but with society as a whole as well as its historical specificity. Consequently, critical theories cannot rely on work in distinct disciplines alone—understanding society requires the integration of all the major social sciences.

Critical theory originated with the Frankfurt School in the 1930s. In political sociology, important representatives are, among many others, Pierre Bourdieu and Jürgen Habermas. Bourdieu's main interests are the mechanisms that reproduce social hierarchies (inequalities). The reproduction of the social order and the simultaneous dominance of specific groups over others cannot be explained with economic factors only. Instead, Bourdieu stresses the relevance of educational and cultural factors for the active engagement of people in the (re)production of culture. In each society, people are struggling to reach their goals in distinct social arenas (fields such as the economy, sports, or the family). These struggles, however, depend not only on the objective conditions in each arena but also on the persistent skills and dispositions (habitus) of the people involved. The skills and dispositions generated are compatible with the objective conditions (including the development of different tastes for art or food in different arenas) and legitimize existing social structures. Moreover, they exclude improbable practices as unthinkable or unnatural. By focusing on the close interdependencies between objective and subjective factors, Bourdieu presents explanations for both the existence of social hierarchies as well as the reproduction of these hierarchies as social and political inequalities.

Already in the 1960s, Jürgen Habermas started his attempts to liberate critical theory from its Marxist and Frankfurt School roots. Whereas Bourdieu presents a sociological analysis of social processes of power distribution and the reproduction of inequalities, one of Habermas's main interests concerns the opportunities for democracy in the modern world. In his early study on *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, he explores the historical development of public contacts, characterized by an expansion of public interactions (from families to coffee houses and parliaments) and by a contraction through the market and bureaucracies. Public interactions, Habermas stresses, should enable people to interact with each other in critical ways on the basis of equality. Through self-reflection, critical knowledge can offer an important contribution to ascertain the public character of these interactions by enabling people to emancipate themselves from dominance. Basically, Habermas approaches modern society positively since its ongoing complexity and functional differentiation provide opportunities for democratic forms of self-organization. In other words, the very fact that complexity and differentiation make total control over social life in the modern world illusory enables people to gain control over their own life on the basis of mutual recognition and democratic interactions.

It is not always easy to distinguish between neo-Marxist, conflict-theoretical, or critical-theoretical approaches, and these labels are not used consistently. Moreover, many conflict theorists rely on critical approaches, whereas virtually every critical theorist stresses the importance of conflict between various groups in society. Yet they all dismiss Western-centered structural-functionalist modernization approaches as well as orthodox Marxism. Liberal capitalism is not seen as the end-stage of a progressive evolutionary process but as a system whose inherent social and political inequalities have to be confronted and battled against.

### *The Cultural Turn: Postmodernism and Poststructuralism*

The rise of conflict and critical theories was mainly based on attempts to overcome the shortcomings of positivism, with its epistemological proximity to the natural sciences and its claims on normative neutrality. In addition, the economic determinism and reductionism of Marxism as well as the Western-centeredness of most approaches in early political sociology were criticized. Generally speaking, conflict and critical theories do not question the close interdependencies between structural (objective) and cultural (subjective) factors. Especially among French social scientists in the 1970s, attention shifted from structure to culture, and a new wave of post-Marxist approaches developed under labels such as postmodernism and poststructuralism.

Postmodernism and poststructuralism are part of the "cultural turn" in political sociology. In these approaches, cultural factors are considered to be more important for the study of power and

dominance in a society than structural ones. The emphasis is shifted toward (the construction of) meaning, and culture is considered to be more relevant than politics or economics. The rationale for this "turn" lies in the developments in modern societies as they could be especially observed in the United States in the late 1950s and 1960s. According to postmodernists and poststructuralists, life is defined on the basis of cultural factors: The cultures of consumerism, leisure, lifestyle, fashion, arts, and so on are much more important than positions in the production process or in some hierarchy. The spread of mass media strongly stimulates these cultures, and these are, in fact, important parts of the fundamental changes in society. Exactly because modern society is characterized by complexity, heterogeneity, and differentiation, people increasingly rely on cultural factors to define their life and their position within society. As a consequence, no common or general distinctions between groups of people can be presumed or predicted—it is exactly the apparent lack of common and general distinctions that characterizes postmodern societies.

Almost by definition, it is hard to find a common understanding of postmodernism. Literally, the term refers to the passing of "modernism" only. A regular feature of many postmodernists is that they clearly criticize "modern" society as it developed in the Western world in the past 2 centuries, especially its claims of being based on universal principles of progress, equality, and freedom. Postmodernists do not challenge the meaning or importance of each one of these principles. Instead, they reject the possibility of universal, normative, and ethical judgments in general and stress the relative nature of all such statements. From this, it follows that truth and knowledge depend on the social and historical context. Depicting scholars as postmodernists is a difficult task since most of them reject such general labels as being inconsistent with their theories. Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, and Anthony Giddens are among the most prominent authors being typified as postmodernist. For political sociology, Foucault and Giddens probably are the most influential.

The nature and distribution of power and dominance in societies are the major concerns of Foucault. He studies these topics in various institutions (such as psychiatric hospitals and prisons) and introduces a number of new concepts to deal with power and dominance. The concept *discourse* refers to the way in which language is used to express acceptable, institutionalized ways of thinking; it defines what can be said about a topic with the vocabulary and expressions available. Since every idea is phrased in some terms, discourses affect our views on everything. In that way, discourses construct the phenomena about which we speak. In other words, ideas, concepts, attitudes, and ideologies do not only arise within specific contexts, but they also define the way in which we consider the various aspects of those contexts. The study of power and dominance, then, is the study of discourses about power and dominance (such as texts, speeches, policies, and practices) in various historical and social settings. Therefore, to understand power and dominance, it is necessary to study both power and dominance themselves and the systems of knowledge that are used to produce power and dominance. According to Foucault, power is not possessed by individual people or groups but is an activity that all people can engage in. Exercising power will always provoke resistance and competition by challenging the dominant discourse. Starting with the discourse concept, Foucault's actual work became the study of how knowledge is produced. Since knowledge production underlies the same principles of cultural conditioning and competing meanings as any other area, it cannot be based on structural determinants only. For that reason, these approaches are summarized under the label poststructural theories.

The interdependencies of structural and cultural factors also play an important role in the work of Giddens. With his theory of structuration he attempts to take into account that, although people are not free to do what they want and their knowledge is imperfect, there are acts of individuals that reproduce the social structure and enable social change. Therefore, what we call "society" can be understood neither as a set of institutions nor as a simple aggregation of all human acts. Relying more on Weber than on Marx, Giddens approaches social and political actions from the perspective that individual thoughts and behavior are structured by social institutions, conventions, and ethical codes. Besides, the social structure is reinforced and reproduced by the continuous repetition of human acts; that is, social action creates structures

that, at the same time, make social action possible. In this way, individual acts also provide the key for understanding social change: If people start to break from repetitive acts, the social structure will be reproduced differently.

Like Foucault, Giddens rejects a distinction between structure and culture. But whereas Foucault considers the two hopelessly entangled by the very same discourse they rely on, Giddens returns to the notion of mutual dependency. The idea that actions are constrained by structures, which are, in turn, created and reproduced by those very actions, avoids the fallacies of social determinism and reductionism. In modern societies, new information constantly challenges and modifies social practices, altering their character constantly, too. Since a sound foundation for knowledge is missing and the expansion of the social sciences increasingly results in differences of opinion, people more and more "reflect" on their own situation and the social structures they live in. As a result, uncertainty gradually drives out confidence and certitude. According to Giddens, we are observing not the rise of some postmodern society but merely a "radicalized modernity."

### *The Economic Turn: Rational Choice*

Neo- and post-Marxist theories revitalized theoretical thinking in political sociology and stimulated new directions. Postmodernist and poststructuralist scholars, especially, presented proposals for radically different approaches. Their extensive epistemological and ideological criticisms of positivist social-scientific theories and methods are accompanied by appeals for social-cultural approaches and the use of appropriate strategies. Yet research based on these approaches is usually characterized by rather narrow definitions of the actual objects studied in terms of power and dominance. Neo- and post-Marxists drew attention to the old questions about the relationships between structure and culture and did present new approaches to study these interdependencies. Not all social scientists are convinced, however, that approaches to deal with these questions necessarily have to be based on epistemological criticism, the rejection of positivism, or the application of radically new research methods.

Presumed causal links between social entities such as interest groups or states are difficult to analyze. What do we mean when we say, for instance, that "parties try to win elections" or that "economic development leads to democracy"? Usually, these phrases are not based on ontological presumptions about actual "behavior" of parties or economic systems but are shorthand for the activities of party leaders or middle-class people only. In fact, one could argue that causal explanations are only possible for human behavior—all other statements are interpretations based on the aggregation of the behavior of individuals and its consequences. By concentrating on the behavior of individual consumers, citizens, producers, and so on, macrosocial and macropolitical phenomena can be explained as aggregations of microsocial behavior. This so-called methodological individualism rescues the idea of regularities underlying social phenomena from neo- and post-Marxist attacks and reconfirms the search for regularities as an intellectually fruitful goal for the social sciences.

At least since the 19th century, deductive reasoning starting with straightforward axioms about individual behavior is the typical field of mainstream microeconomic theory. It is clear that many sociologists and political scientists are fascinated by the way in which economics proceeds and relies on rigorous deductive ways of thinking. This allure resulted in the rapid annexation of large parts of the social sciences by so-called rational choice approaches in the past decades. Individuals are presumed to have persistent "preference functions" that guide their actions: Each person attempts to reduce "costs" and maximize "gains" under specific constraints; that is, each individual tries to maximize his or her "utility." Rational choice approaches rely on methodological individualism and the presumption that individual behavior and its consequences can be aggregated by using formal modeling and mathematical reasoning. Most rational choice theorists do not use the rationality of individuals as a necessarily correct description of human behavior. Instead, they stress the need for strict deductive reasoning starting with elementary statements and leading to the formulation of falsifiable hypotheses. Successful hypotheses are not necessarily based on intuitively plausible presumptions; successful hypotheses are those that survive rigid empirical testing. In this way, rational choice approaches provide prescriptions for both theoretical arguing (deductive and

formalized) and empirical work (falsification of hypotheses).

The application of rational choice theories in political science and sociology started in the 1950s and 1960s. Clearly working in the tradition of descriptive democratic theory presented by Joseph Schumpeter in his book *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Anthony Downs argued that citizens vote on the basis of a rational calculation of which party is most likely to meet their preferences. Voting decisions are similar to those of consumers in a market who calculate the costs (taxes) and benefits (public services) of choosing one political party rather than another. To win elections, parties try to locate themselves and their policies close to the median voter. In this way, both the behavior of individual voters and the strategies and policies of political parties are explained. From a sociological perspective, the advantages of using deductive reasoning started with the idea of individual rationality evident in Mancur Olson's book, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, published in the mid-1960s. Why would rational individuals contribute to the production of collective goods that, by definition, are freely available to everybody? Olson argues that rational individuals will only join groups and contribute to collective goods if separate and "selective" incentives are provided that are strictly available for group members only. In other words, the provision of collective goods by rational individuals is only possible if the free rider problem is solved. Olson's work bridges the gap between economical and sociological explanations of joint actions and group activities. As did Downs's work on democracy, Olson's work initiated a wealth of research on the consequences of individual behavior.

Rational choice approaches provide the instruments to study the microfoundations of macrosocial and macropolitical phenomena in rigorous ways. Even clearer than neo- and post-Marxism—which usually focus on power and dominance—rational choice does not provide an object specification but a specific method and research strategy principally based on positivist epistemology. Due to this openness, rational choice approaches have been applied to an enormous variety of themes and topics, many of which are in the field of political sociology: voting behavior, bureaucracies, state formation, interest groups, new social movements, social mobility, class reproduction, participation, and social capital are only a few of the most prominent examples. The almost unrestricted opportunities to apply rational choice approaches to various questions are clearly underlined by the use of rational choice as a basis for Marxist theories of class and exploitation. Jon Elster, especially, strongly rejects the functional explanations typical of Marxism and many other social sciences. Instead, he uses the analytical tools of rational choice approaches (especially methodological individualism) to provide microfoundations for the explanation of social and political phenomena.

Rigorous deductive reasoning usually takes individuals as a starting point, but—as phrases such as *rational choice institutionalism* already suggest—this does not imply a restriction to psychological explanations only. However, it is clear that rational choice simply takes "preferences" for granted and runs the risks of being circular, nonfalsifiable, or even tautological. How can we tell when people are not acting in their own self-interest, and what counts as nonrational behavior? Some people define their preferences in terms of the public good and are prepared to risk their life for others and their own beliefs, but whatever they do, this can always be depicted as a "rational" calculation of self-interest. Critics of rational choice theories, therefore, do not reject the need for rigorous deductive reasoning in the social sciences but point to the limited advantages of restricting explanations of social and political phenomena to the consequences of individual behavior only. Preferences, interests, utility, or the application of rational strategies are all embedded in historical, cultural, political, and societal contexts and cannot merely be taken for granted and reduced to axioms in deductive arguments.

### *The Return of the State and Modernization Approaches*

The cultural turn in political sociology mainly followed the general shift in many social sciences away from social-scientific approaches toward cultural-scientific approaches. Yet not every political sociologist was convinced by the arguments of neo- and post-Marxists to abandon modernization and positivism. Moreover, the cultural turn had

taught us a lot about power and dominance in areas such as sexual relations and national identities, but it contributed relatively little to our understanding of the reciprocal relationships between the social and the political. Postmodern theorists usually simply reject the usefulness of such concepts, and many authors inspired by conflict and critical theories would consider the relationships between social and political phenomena as a relatively unimportant specimen of more general questions about power and dominance. By contrast, rational choice theories have proven their usefulness in many areas of human behavior but do not seem to offer much for the explanation of, say, the rise of the nation-state or civic engagement in revolutionary eras.

Criticism of structural-functional system theories and modernization approaches has not just led to a cultural turn of the neo- and post-Marxist type. In fact, some political sociologists continued to improve modernization theories and to apply them to social and political developments. A general feature of these approaches is that they are all highly stimulated by actual major social and political events in the past decades and not by the desire to contribute to epistemological and ideological debates or to develop a new research methodology. Faced with the wave of political unrest sweeping Western countries in the late 1960s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the success of European integration in the 1990s, and the ongoing processes of economic and political globalization, political sociologists renewed their interest in evolutionary approaches. Furthermore, the nation-state apparently did not disappear but appears to be surprisingly flexible and able to attune itself to the new challenges of a globalized world and the rise of many competitors. Within states, ongoing complexity, heterogeneity, and differentiation do not seem to result in converging social and political arrangements but in perceptibly different ones. Between states, we observe a continuous rise in the number of states and a further differentiation of their nature all over the world.

Pursuing his goals with determination and well aware of the cultural turn proposed by neo- and post-Marxists, Ronald Inglehart has been urging for a very different cultural turn ever since he published his theory of postmaterialist value change in the early 1970s. Confronted with the startling wave of political unrest in many Western countries in the late 1960s, he points to the rise of a new generation with value orientations that are different from those of their predecessors. As a consequence of ongoing modernization, the generation born after World War II, especially, rejects authority, material advantage, and tradition. Instead, it gives priority to goals such as self-fulfillment, participation, and lifestyle issues. As newer generations replace old ones, deep-seated social and political changes will take place (a "silent revolution"). Evidently, Inglehart uses a modernization-theoretical approach and positivist methods, but he does not presume that developments in modern society necessarily will be progressive. Nor does he take value priorities for granted. The share of post-materialists among new generations is likely to increase only if economic growth is secured and social unrest remains absent. Originally starting with a focus on new modes of participation in Western countries, Inglehart expanded his research to almost every country in the world and to many aspects of social and political developments. Using standardized comparative surveys of representative population samples, his work also shows that epistemological criticism of positivist approaches does not necessarily mean that highly interesting information about social and political developments cannot be obtained. Moreover, methodological individualism and deductive reasoning are not exclusive privileges of rational-choice approaches.

Modernization theories experienced a strong revival with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of democratic political systems around the world in the early 1990s. At first, the question about the causes or favorable conditions for democratic changes attracted renewed attention. Was the old Lipset thesis about the social requisites of democracy still valid? On the basis of a strong correlation between democracy and economic development, many authors concluded that economic development provides sufficient (and probably also necessary) conditions for democracy. Yet deviate cases are easy to find. For instance, Nazi Germany was a dictatorship in spite of being economically advanced, and India is a vibrant democracy despite its socioeconomic problems, which casts doubts on the general validity of the argument. Economic development plays an important role, indeed, but is certainly not the only motivating force. Returning

to the work of Tocqueville, Robert Putnam (1994) showed that democracy relies on an active "civil society" and much less on economic development. His theory unequivocally underlines the need for *social capital* (especially trust and confidence) to produce collective goods efficiently. As Tocqueville had observed in the United States in the early 19th century, voluntary associations are extremely important for the functioning of democracy since in these clubs, groups, organizations, alliances, associations, and the like, people develop and maintain social networks. Established social networks, in turn, facilitate social trust, which enables the production of goods without coercion. The functioning of democracy is such a major collective good. Putnam's research in Italy and the United States initiated a lively debate on the "social requisites of democracy"—depicting social capital as the crucial determinant and curtailing the importance of economic factors.

Whereas Putnam's work focuses on requirements for the functioning of democracy, the establishment of democracy is a different topic. Analyses of a transition (or transformation) of a political, social, and economic system require encompassing approaches based on explicit specifications of the reciprocal relationships between social and political developments. For the transition of authoritarian systems into democratic ones, evolutionary approaches distinguishing between distinct phases or stages of democratization rely heavily on Samuel Huntington's idea of a "third wave." The first wave of democratization (from the mid-19th century to the end of World War I) coincided with the rise of the nation-state, whereas the second one, starting after World War II through the early 1960s, was mainly the result of decolonization. According to Huntington, the third wave, from about 1975 to the end of the 20th century, consists of the spread of democracy in Latin America and Asia and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Economic growth, the declining legitimacy of authoritarian rule, and the changing role of the Catholic Church as well as international structural factors such as the rise of the European Union and the agreement on human rights included in the Helsinki Treaty in 1975 all contributed to the spread of democracy. By the end of the 20th century democracy had reached all regions of the world. South America, all of Europe, and considerable parts of Asia and Africa have been turned into democracies. At the same time, it is clear that the three waves are characterized by different processes and that no general explanation for democratization is available. As Huntington and numerous other scholars have shown, democracy can be reached through many different paths.

Modifying the modernization framework of the 1950s proved to be very helpful in studying democratic transformations. The idea of evolutionary social and political developments with distinct phases or stages appeared to be even more helpful for the study of democratic consolidation. In each phase or stage, the changing relationships between social and political factors are specified. In the initial phase, opposition toward the ruling elite and undemocratic arrangements is mobilized. The request for more liberty is broadly accepted and generally seen as the main goal. The next phase is characterized by the establishment of institutional arrangements to replace the old undemocratic ones. A new constitution is adopted, and general elections are organized for the first time. An easy return to the Old System is no longer feasible. In the advanced phase, attention shifts toward the achievements of the new democracy to satisfy group interests, and economic performance becomes crucial. Finally, the phase of democratic consolidation is reached where the new arrangements are institutionalized, and the system is able to meet the demands and expectations of large parts of the population.

The study of democratic transformation and consolidation, once again, shows the advantages and pitfalls of modernization-theoretical approaches to study links between social and political phenomena. Especially, the use of phases and stages easily runs the risk of backsliding into teleological and ideological prejudices. Just as American liberal-capitalism was the highest stage of social development in the evolutionary modernization theories of the 1940s and 1950s, various transformation and consolidation theories implicitly take democracy as the "highest" or "most sophisticated" system. All other systems are lumped together as negative deviations from this ideal, under terms such as *illiberal democracy*, *pseudodemocracy*, *partial democracy*, or *defective democracy*. More recent approaches reject teleological interpretations and treat political systems with a mixture of authoritarian and democratic features not as "deviant" cases

but as novel systems. Obviously, these approaches do not exclude the chance that the direction of democratization processes can be reversed. Only a close look at the reciprocal relationships between state and society can provide explanations for a return to authoritarian rule.

The introduction of concepts such as postmaterialism, social capital, or transformation and consolidation establishes a cultural turn in political sociology that is quite different from the cultural turn initiated by neo- and post-Marxists. The new variants of modernization approaches do not presume that increasing complexity, heterogeneity, and differentiation inevitably prepare the way for a liberal-capitalist society as the highest stage of human development; they do, however, presume that the opportunities for democratic transformation and consolidation strongly depend on the social and economic development of a society. Further, the revival of modernization approaches did not follow the shift in the social sciences from social-scientific approaches toward cultural-scientific approaches and its accompanying change in research methodologies. Discussions about the character of political systems are usually based on quantitative, standardized, and comparative indicators (e.g., the Freedom House Index or large cross-national surveys among populations), and terms such as *social capital* and the *third wave* clearly underline attempts to summarize divergent phenomena under general concepts and to stress regularities. In a similar manner to rational choice approaches, recent modernization approaches are not based on a rejection of positivism or appeals for a radically different epistemology.

## The End of the State?

Political sociology has come a long way since its start in the 19th century. The heydays of modernization approaches in the 1940s and 1950s seemed to mark the definite breakthrough and establishment of political sociology as an independent subdiscipline. Yet the list of criticisms and objections against conventional political sociology is long, and many modifications and alternatives have been presented. Furthermore, the main object of political sociology—power and dominance in the reciprocal relationships between state and society—changed dramatically in the last few decades. As a consequence, political sociology has been confronted with the dual task of dealing with severe epistemological and ideological criticism and with deep-seated changes of its object at the same time. Several appeals for a paradigm shift, a new political sociology, and a political sociology for the 21st century have been presented. For instance, Kate Nash (2000) pleads for a new political sociology that should not be mainly concerned with states or class-based approaches to narrowly defined political phenomena but with cultural politics. These "politics" should be understood in the broadest possible sense, and the focus is on conflicts about social identities and structures and the opportunities to change them. Although this depiction does not exclude the state as a major object of political sociology, it is clear that power and dominance are the key features of such a new political sociology.

For discussions of actual and desirable modifications of political sociology, a reappraisal of the changing position of the state is required. Traditionally, political sociologists have a complicated relationship with the state as their pet topic. They celebrate the concept as the main subject matter of their studies of state formation, the development of the state (especially the nation-state), and the chances for democratic consolidation. They study the ongoing blending and melding of social and political phenomena within states and observe the blurring of the distinctions between the two in an era of radicalized modernity. Some of them examine the disappearance of the state in a world characterized by globalization and increasing interdependencies. Others observe the rise of new forms of the state (particularly in Europe) and study the evaporation of states confronted with powerful multinational corporations, criminal gangs, or NGOs. By the mid-1980s, the diminishing position of the state as a central topic for political sociologists was counterbalanced by attempts to "bring the state back in." Following appeals by Theda Skocpol and her collaborators, the state was rediscovered and reacknowledged as an autonomous actor. Formal political institutions, especially, attracted renewed attention as important factors for the distribution of power and dominance. Not only the behavior of politicians but also that of citizens or elites is relevant for the relationships between state and society: The constitutional framework, electoral laws, the composition of government, and many

other institutional arrangements are evidently relevant as well. In short, institutions matter.

Among the divergent depictions of the position of the state, all agree that the domain of politics lost its characteristic features and government its preeminent position in the distribution of wealth and the management of public services in society in the past decades. For many, the distribution of power and dominance changed fundamentally with the changing nature and position of the state. The observation that nowadays there is no escape from politics is correct but does not imply that the social and the political cannot be distinguished analytically and conceptually. With its traditional focus on the reciprocal relationships between the political and the social, political sociology is essentially open to all these observations and interpretations. The question remains, however, as to whether the changes in the nature and position of the state require a new political sociology—and if so, what such a renewal should look like.

The rapid and permanent changes of the relationships between state and society are highly relevant for political sociologists, and none of the processes referred to can or should be abandoned as study topics. Examining the consequences of these developments, Irving Horowitz (1999) observed that classical political sociological approaches are not very useful since we are confronted by a "larger scale," which lies very far beyond anything that could have been imagined by Montesquieu, Tocqueville, Durkheim, or Weber. Although important, the idea of differences in scale between traditional and actual states and societies does not cover the fundamental changes experienced. Studying these changes and their implications for the relationships between state and society is only possible if political sociologists stick to a broad conceptualization of the political and the social and avoid any a priori restrictions. Major developments relevant for making political sociology more amenable to study are discussed as follows.

### *Identity*

The consequences of the ongoing process of blending and melding of social and political phenomena for citizens are hard to summarize. Many authors have pointed out changes in social identity—that is, the ways in which individuals label themselves as members of particular groups. Social identity can be based on nation, class, ethnicity, gender, and so on and has important consequences both for the individual concerned and for the distribution of power and dominance in society. For political sociologists, the fact that societies increasingly become more complex, heterogeneous, and differentiated always implied a constant change in social groups. Especially, critical theorists emphasize that in postmodern societies, the development of social identities cannot be explained by structural factors alone. Instead, it is the process of acquiring identities itself that has changed. Although usually starting with quite different assumptions, much of the work on social capital and political culture is also based on the recognition that blending and melding of social and political developments have radically changed the ways in which people identify with groups. Social identity—and not the structural aspects of the social or the political—becomes increasingly relevant for political sociology.

### *Civil Society*

Closely related to the rising relevance of social identity is the need for a reassessment of the role and function of groups and associations in societies, where social and political processes are hard to distinguish. Considered to be intermediaries between state and society, groups and associations have been textbook topics in political sociology for a long time. More recently, several authors point to the fact that a shift from state-centered governance toward self-governing associations in civil society can be observed. Groups and associations still perform many of their traditional functions—such as interest mediation and mobilization—but instead of being participants among many other participants, they gradually developed into more independent entities, claiming to be essential elements of the fabric of domestic society. Clearly, in the spirit of many political sociologists, starting with Tocqueville and Marx, democracy and civil society are seen as two sides of the same coin. In a world characterized by the blending and melding of the social and the political, the rise of civil society and its drive to replace conventional interest groups and associations is one of the most interesting challenges for political sociologists.

### *States and Other Actors*

Acknowledging the end of the dominant position of the state implies the recognition of the increasing relevance of other actors and participants. This expansion can be easily accepted and discussed in terms of the erosion of sovereignty or the loss of regulatory control by the state. Important aspects include struggles between states and big companies (limits of private initiatives, antitrust legislation, etc.) and competition between multinational corporations. The most threatening danger here is that the main advantage political sociologists realized in the past few decades—the rejection of attaching a priori causal direction to either society or the state in their analyses—is given up effortlessly and replaced by a fashionable depiction of the state as the main loser in a world controlled by multinational corporations and NGOs. Unless political sociologists come up with fruitful conceptualizations of the relationships between states and other actors, we will see a revival of society-centered approaches and a relapse to a sociology of politics of the pre-Sartori era.

### *Democracy*

Democracy is closely linked to the rise of the national state and clearly defined within its borders. States can do very well without being democratic, but so far, it has taken the organized and limited forms of political power of the conventional state to promote democracy: no state, no democracy. Furthermore, democracy continues to spread around the world. Freedom and liberty are not restricted to wealthy countries, and many poor and developing states have a record of respecting political rights and civil liberties. The problem with this development, however, is that it appears to be rather easy to create a blend of formal democracy and political corruption, civil rights abuses, and autocratic rule. While only a few countries have slid backward into military rule, many more seem to reach a standoff or cease-fire between democratic and nondemocratic forces, where elected governments fail to regulate or take control of the most powerful social and economic groups in society. For political sociologists, very interesting cases and questions develop that bring us back to the heart of the traditional discussions about social conditions for democratic rule—and for undemocratic rule.

### *Globalization*

Since democracy is closely linked to the nation-state, many scholars emphasize that globalization presents new challenges to the study of the reciprocal relationships between state and society. If political power is no longer concentrated in states, then democratic control should be expanded beyond the borders of the state. A global civil society is presumed to fill the gaps here. The struggles between competing groups in a globalized world, however, are a familiar topic for political sociologists, and no radical changes are required to deal with questions about democracy and globalization. Yet the old focus on reciprocal relationships between the social and political within states is no longer appropriate, and the global connections and interdependencies of social, economic, and political actors should also be considered.

### *New Technologies*

It is not just advocates of modernization approaches who presume that technical developments in communication and transportation have a clear impact on power and dominance between individuals and groups. As the cliché goes, the world has become smaller in many respects in the past few decades. Important consequences of this development are already included above under headings such as changing identities and globalization. New technologies further reduce the traditional lines of demarcation between social and political phenomena by making information universally available and communication a routine matter. There does not seem to be much need to expand studies on the impact of technological innovations in general, but political sociologists should include the spread of new technologies as an important aspect of each of the aforementioned five topics.

Recent social-end political developments—the rise of postmodern civil society, democratization, globalization, and new technologies—have important consequences for political sociology because they fundamentally change the distribution of power and dominance. The conventional distinction between

the social and the political as the main object of interest for political sociologists, however, is absolutely indispensable for analytical purposes. Precisely because the state appears to change its nature and position rapidly, a coherent conceptual framework is required to study these developments. Appeals for a new political sociology lay too much emphasis on the ways in which the world is changing and tend to undervalue the analytical and conceptual clarity provided by the old approaches. New directions for political sociology, then, should be based on the acceptance of fundamental changes and of evident continuities in the role and position of the state as well as on the recognition of the need for theoretical and conceptual innovations and on the demonstrated usefulness of available approaches.

## Political Sociology as a Field of Study?

The heydays of political sociology appear to be over at first glance. Newer approaches and variants—such as neo-institutionalism, comparative sociology, political economy, comparative politics, and postmodernism—gradually seem to seize the intellectual arenas that used to be reserved for political sociologists. The almost euphoric postwar period of widely shared structural-functional modernization approaches was followed by vivacious controversies about the object of the discipline as well as its epistemological foundations and methodological performance. Two cultural turns, one economic turn, and a renaissance of modernization theories apparently left the field dispersed and divided. Feasible accounts for this ostensible decline are, first, the disappearance of a clear-cut distinction between the social and the political and, second, a general move toward more specialized subfields in the social sciences.

Already, Runciman depicted the enormous "expansion of the political" as the most important change in the history of the modern state. This development still continues. Important as this extension is in quantitative terms, we experience not only a strengthening of the position of the state but also a change in the nature of the relationships between the social and the political. The distinction between state and society—the main premise of political sociology—has gradually disappeared with the expansion of the state and has been replaced by a much more ambiguous melding and blending of state and society. The reluctance to deal with the changing distribution of political power within and between states probably contributed considerably to the decline of political sociology as a self-reliant field of study. Power and dominance can be studied in many spheres of life—hospitals, neighborhoods, executive boards, and so on—without referring explicitly to some reciprocal relationships between the social and the political. However, it is precisely the disappearance of a clear distinction between state and society that makes the study of power and dominance much more interesting and relevant by focusing on the connections between the two phenomena; that is, power and dominance are not the main objects of interest in themselves but as part of the processes underlying the dissolution of the conventional distinctions between state and society. Political sociology as a field of study offers excellent opportunities to deal with the melding and blending of the social and the political.

A second explanation for the apparent decline of political sociology is related to the move toward more specialized subfields in the social sciences. This change is part of the more general change away from social-scientific approaches (emphasizing causal explanations based on regularities, mainly applying quantitative, comparative methods) toward cultural-scientific approaches (emphasizing specific cultural meanings and constructions of meanings, mainly applying qualitative, case-oriented methods). With the economic turn and the renaissance of modernization approaches, this general change is counterbalanced. As a result, many subfields flourish, while the label *political sociology* increasingly appears to be too unspecific. The apparent decline of political sociology as a field of study, then, is at least partly due to the evident accomplishments of the initial enterprise: If many more specialized subsubfields carry on successfully, the broader idea loses much of its appeal.

Political sociologists continue to contribute to our understanding of the distribution of power and dominance in society. Many of the actual topics suggested by advocates of new approaches—identities, citizenship, new social movements, and so on—do not differ from topics studied by traditional envoys of political sociology. Instead of debating claims for new approaches or paradigm shifts, the consensus about the selection of relevant

topics should be stressed. Political sociologists have been mainly concerned with input-oriented microlevel approaches (voting behavior, new social movements, parties, interest groups, etc.), on the one hand, and with output-oriented macrolevel approaches (state formation, transformations of political systems and political reform processes, etc.), on the other. The very rapid spread of rational choice approaches in many social sciences in the past few decades reflects a need for more precise theoretical arguments than is usually provided by available approaches. Therefore, the most important theoretical enhancements in political sociology as a field of study focus on the reformulation of existing approaches in more rigorous ways—that is, in more deductive ways. Note that this does not necessarily imply a reduction of all behavior to naive utility maximizing nor does it require the use of formal modeling or quantification. Institutions, norms, and values; historical peculiarities; collective goods; and frustrations all can have a place in deductive theories attempting to provide microfoundations for macrophenomena. Forthcoming theoretical approaches in political sociology as a field of study, then, will mainly consist of attempts to provide these foundations.

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***See also*** Class, Social; Cleavages, Social and Political; Marxism; Modernization Theory; Postmodernism in International Relations; Power; State

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# Political Systems, Types

The term *political system* is an abstract concept and is used widely and often with different meanings. In this entry, a political system is defined as a form of governing society that is embedded in a legal (constitutional), economic, and cultural environment. The essence of a political system relies on the interdependence of its institutions (rules of the political game) and collective actors (political

parties, organized interests, governments, and bureaucracies) that operate within such a system. From this definition, it follows that political systems are seen as a whole: Authority is exercised over a territory through the body politic, including its state format, organization of public decision making, and related processes of policy formation. The study of types of political systems is—almost by definition—comparative by means of developing typologies. One can distinguish between two directions in the study of types of political systems: one, the descriptive approach and, two, the analytical approach by developing typologies.

The descriptive approach has a long-standing history in political science and focuses on typologies of political systems—often on the basis of taxonomies, that is, a (more or less) logical ordering of types that are hierarchically organized. An example of such a taxonomy is Aristotle's classification of political regimes. On the one hand, Aristotle divided the politics of his time into two types: good versus corrupt governance. Many of these typologies have been developed over time, and more often than not, they were directed by normative ideas (e.g., Montesquieu, the separation of powers). Other typologies have been driven by forms of culture, economic systems, or stages of societal development, and so on. All these classifications are not only subject to normative belief systems but are also limited, as they describe the state of affairs rather than explain how and why these differences have emerged or what they pertain to.

The analytical approach aims at developing comparative typologies that are not only (or only indirectly) normative but also evidence based. One of the earliest attempts was made by Lord Bryce, who compared the democracies of his time by means of seeking the commonalities between democratic systems that made them different from other political systems (e.g., direct vs. indirect forms of representation and decision making). Others tried to develop classifications on the basis of theory (e.g., Max Weber's trichotomy of traditional, charismatic, and rational rule and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's idea of variations in political culture) or by means of evidence-based induction (e.g., Arend Lijphart, 1999).

The use of typologies in political science is widespread and considered as useful for theory development, descriptive analysis, and reducing. This entry first elaborates the method of typology construction and offers some examples. As will become clear, the use of a typology is more often than not an instrument for analysis in comparative political science (see also Paul Pennings, Hans Keman, & Jan Kleinnijenhuis, 2006). Second, this entry discusses a number of existing typologies of political systems that can be labeled as *descriptive* and have figured in comparative political science. Third, the focus is on typologies where the aim is to explain the patterned variation in politics that emerges from empirical investigation. For example, Robert Dahl and Arend Lijphart have developed typologies to highlight the intradifferences within democratic polities. Whereas the former focuses on the institutional configuration of rules and rights resulting in polyarchy, the latter developed a typology (i.e., majoritarian vs. consensus democracy) to understand the actual working of a democratic political system. Finally, the entry moves to a specific approach in political science: *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (1965) as developed by David Easton. This approach is deductive and claims to explain the variations across diverse systems. In this approach, the organization of government is the core of each system. This approach is elaborated by examining patterned variations of government.

## Developing a Typology

Although typologies are not exclusive to comparative politics, they are frequently used in this subdiscipline to sustain and develop arguments as regards the organization and institutional design of political systems. This is not surprising since political systems are seen as closed entities (like states, polities, governments, etc.). To reduce the real-world complexities, comparativists have always made attempts to translate their ideas on political systems into typologies. Aristotle did so, as did Polybios (comparing various Greek city-states) and, later, Montesquieu and Lord Bryce.

Typologies are seen to be useful as a prototheory. They are used not only to reduce complexity but also to inspect certain (hypothetical) relationships. For instance, one can develop a typology that combines two dimensions such as democracy (yes/no) and economic development

(high/low) and inspect the hypothesis that democracy and welfare correlate. It is easy to understand that such relatively simple typologies are more often than not victim of the choices made by the researcher and, therefore, lead to biased perspectives. However, as a proto-theory, a typology can certainly help refine and develop concepts. Furthermore, a typology assists in observing to what extent concepts function empirically. In short, a properly developed typology is conducive to concept formation, theory development, and validation in view of empirical evidence (Mattei Dogan & Dominique Pelassy, 1990).

Typology development is in some ways a Scylla and Charybdis problem: On the one hand, simple typologies can enhance clarity in a systematic fashion; on the other hand, however, overelaboration lurks around the corner (by developing too many categories or subdivisions within one category). Although a refined typology can be useful and points to all logical possibilities, it also tends to produce confusion and complexity. There is no solution to this problem other than empirical verification. As a methodological principle, the researcher has to follow as a rule of thumb that a classification scheme as applied to a typology should include as many real cases as feasible, and at the same time, these cases should exclusively fit only one of the cells of the typology. This means that arbitrary cases are to be avoided as much as possible. This not only avoids confusion but also prevents the occurrence of hybrid systems.

Take for example Lijphart's typology of democracies (Lijphart, 1968). There are two dimensions: (1) elite behavior (cooperation vs. competition) and (2) whether society is divided or not (homogeneous vs. fragmented societies). This leads to a $2 \times 2$ typology with four types: centripetal, centrifugal, depoliticized, and consociational. In this typology, the basic argument is that under divisive societal conditions—where sociocultural cleavages are politically organized (by parties or organized interests)—the key condition for stability is elite behavior (being the first dimension of the typology) to regulate political behavior at the mass level. Lijphart argues that whether elites produce stability depends on the type of conflict in plural societies.

So far, so good: There is an explanation, and it appeared plausible (at the time). However, others have also attempted to use this typology for other systems and found it difficult to decide for *all* relevant cases where to locate them in this fourfold table or to accept that the proposed mechanism did indeed explain the political process for all the cases in each separate cell. This is not the place to discuss Lijphart further. The main point is that typologies often flounder in view of empirical evidence or are biased in terms of case selection and measurement problems. In addition, one problem with this is that many typologies tend to be exclusively focused on the commonalities among the cases rather than taking into account the differences that exist. Finally, sometimes cases do not fit the defined cells because of additional circumstances that defy the hypothesized relationship. In other words, typology construction is certainly a useful tool for comparing political systems, but it is also vulnerable to misplacement and biased results.

In summary, typologies are considered as a useful instrument to develop a proto-theory or a conceptual design and can serve as operational controls on how far they travel in reality. In addition, typologies help reduce the complexities of researching political systems in order to create a systematic account of how the real world can be ordered. Even taking into account the pitfalls and the caveats mentioned here, the typology has been and continues to be one of the foremost tools of comparative political science. Hence, and this is the topic of the next section, typologies are an essential analytical step to analyze and investigate types of political systems.

## Descriptive Typologies of Political Systems

Throughout the development of political science, classifications have been developed, and those of Polybios, Aristotle, Montesquieu, and others have already been mentioned. A number of these are basically (unidimensional) listings according to a feature considered to be a central one, such as, for example, the "state" or "forms of government," as has been developed by Samuel Finer (1997). Other examples are developmental classifications that define historical stages of society, each producing a specific type of political authority.

A classic example is Friedrich Engels's description of the change and development from a primitive society to a communist society. This anthropological

approach related the production/consumption patterns of society to political authority (from absence of rule to authoritarian rule to self-rule). This teleological model can be seen as an almost conditional set of political-economic stages predicting the type of political system to emerge in the course of history, based on Marxist ideas regarding societal development culminating in "classless communism."

Max Weber, a famous German sociologist, has earned a reputation by defining the state as well as developing a typology of ruling systems. Whereas his definition of the state essentially rested with the exercise of (legitimate) power over a territory, his typology concerned an ideal type that served as a proto-theory, arguing that the degree of state development is associated with a certain type of political rule, of which the rational-legal rule (i.e., bureaucracy) is the modern one.

Contrary to Engels's teleological approach, the Weberian approach can be considered as a proto-theory. Most approaches before the 1960s were in fact descriptive, were based on broad—if not vague—analytical distinctions, and often tended to be close to teleological reasoning (i.e., a future goal-oriented argument). In particular, developmental studies focusing on the poorer regions suffered from this bias.

More recently, classification-based typologies of wholesale political systems are becoming less popular among comparativists. The analytical focus of researchers concerned with the study of political systems has shifted to highlighting specific features of political systems. This change in focus also meant that typologies were confined to specific types of systems such as democracies. Examples are party systems, electoral systems, cleavage systems, parties, governmental features, and so on (see, e.g., Dogan & Pelassy, 1990).

Jean Blondel (1982) developed, for instance, a simple comparative typology of party systems by counting the number of parties that are represented on average (from a two-party system to a multiparty system). This would explain the differences between legislatures in terms of interactions between parties and government. His contemporary, Maurice Duverger, argued that the effect of a party system is related to government stability: The fewer the number of parties, the more stable party government would be. Hence, according to Maurice Duverger, the nexus between the electoral system and the party system could be considered as a predictor of how a (democratic) political system would function. In fact, Duverger's law (as it is also known) is conducive to a typology of electoral laws and system stability. The so-called first-past-the-post electoral system would be superior to proportional representation because it produces a stable single-party government as opposed to an unstable coalition government. Most of the classifications made regarding electoral and party systems, however, remain simple, but as regards questions of voting and party behavior, they are merely descriptive.

Stein Rokkan is also well-known and respected for his work on modeling (the term *Rokkan* is used for developing a typology of political systems) the emergence of national states in Europe. His concern was to understand how political systems developed to take on the contemporary shape and organization of the nation-state in Europe. To this end, he developed grids of reference or, in fact, dimensions to account for the functional and territorial differentiation across the European area from a historical perspective. In his view, the only way to do so is to make macromodel comparisons that are subsequently specified by means of region-specific models and highlighted by individual cases.

Rokkan's typology (see Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle, & Derek Urwin, 1999) contains, first, a trichotomy: economy–territory–culture. From these master dimensions, specific indicators to analyze pathways to the contemporary form of the state are developed: religious diversity, linguistic variation, ethnic distinctiveness, dispersal of land ownership, urbanization, industrialization, trade, geographical location and size (including center/periphery situations), (de)centralization of authority, and polity formation (constitutional development). This grid of reference served the purpose of accounting for the cross-system variation of state formation over time and ultimately of explaining the Europe-wide democratization within the emerging nation-state.

Rokkan's model is—in retrospect—less a model and more a typology since the classification is conducive to certain types (or paths) of democratization that are more favorable than others (earlier fully accomplished democratization). It enables the researcher to examine both the similarities and the differences in the development of political systems

(in Europe). In addition, it was the basis for understanding not only how political systems emerged but, foremost, how they shaped the democratic state in the early 20th century. Although Rokkan's work is widely acknowledged, it is nowadays more often politely referred to than actually used.

Another attempt to develop a diachronical typology of political systems stems from Finer (1997). His attempt focused on regime types that identify over time the organization of political authority (or who governs). Finer listed four "pure" types: palace, forum, nobility, and the church, representing the type of rule. In addition, the four types could well develop as hybrids. The resulting 10 cells serve as an empirical grid to be filled by real-world cases; for example, the pure church category only concerns two cases: the Vatican and Tibet, whereas forum includes all modern, secular democracies. However impressive Finer's book is, the typology is purely descriptive and fails to pass the mentioned methodological rule of thumb on typologies: In many cases, one may question whether there are overlaps in the located position of cases or whether cells remain (almost) empty.

The typologies presented so far are mixtures of description and modest explanation. Second, they represent either whole-system approaches or systemic (intrasystem) typologies (e.g., electoral systems or types of government). Third, it must be noted that many of these typologies of political systems are often forgotten or only sparsely used at present. Yet there is an exception to this: In 1996 (originally 1989), Denis and Ian Derbyshire published *Political Systems of the World*. In this monumental and ambitious book, the authors set out to cover *all* existing political systems ($N = 192$ at the time), classify them according to social and economic influences, and highlight a number of particular political features common to many but not all: a constitutional design, an ideological base, executive/legislative relations, an electoral system, and political parties. In other words, Derbyshire and Derbyshire follow the traditional pattern of descriptive analysis of political systems (i.e., the unit of comparison is the independent state). Although the book contains some cross-tables that hint at more elaboration, most of the (useful) information is based on one-dimensional classifications. In fact, it concerns a kind of political map of the (contemporary) world, and only the sections on ideology and political parties can be considered analytically novel.

The authors argue that, in addition to parties competing for office or representing the population as a whole (as under communist rule), there are pressure groups and interest groups that are functionally equivalents of parties within the political system. Therefore, Derbyshire and Derbyshire introduced the concept of corporatism as an alternative mode of interest representation vis-à-vis pluralism. In fact, they introduce a new type of state: the corporatist state. Apart from the fact that this type of state (as far as it [has] existed) is limited to Western Europe with some similar practices elsewhere, it is questionable whether or not this type of polity is relevant to understanding political systems all over the world in a comparative perspective.

The ideological base of a political system is considered by Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996) as "a body of ideas which reflects the beliefs and values of a nation and its political system" (p. 23). Hence, in their view, the ideological base of a political system (i.e., national state) refers to a (often underlying) shared belief system on dominating values within a society (including religion). As the authors admit, the labeling of nation-states by ideological base is bound to be arbitrary, and hybrid forms are to be found as well. Nevertheless, it is interesting to examine how this dimension is distributed across the world.

Derbyshire and Derbyshire distinguish eight different ideological bases (see Table 1). In fact, some of these are closer to being a type of state than a belief system per se. In this table, the ideological divisions by Derbyshire and Derbyshire are reported in connection with socioeconomic factors and indicators of quality of life. The idea is obviously that there is a relation between economic development and social conditions, on the one hand, and the ideological base of a state, on the other.

As is known from the literature, the relationship between types of political systems and social and economic development is not straightforward, nor is it that statistically strong (Keman, 2002). The only solid observation is that fully fledged democratic systems are almost always among the prosperous countries and are highly developed in socioeconomic terms. The other categories may

**Table 1** Distribution of Ideological Base of the State and Social and Economic Development

| *Ideological Base* | *No. of Political Systems* | *Gross Domestic Product (% World Share)* | *GDP per Capita ($)* | *Literacy Rate (%)* | *Human Rights Index* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Liberal democratic | 73 (38.0%) | 86.1 | 8.475 | 88 | 80 |
| Emerging democratic | 73 (38.0%) | 8.0 | 1.490 | 66 | 63 |
| Communist | 5 (2.6%) | 2.4 | 810 | 87 | 25 |
| Nationalist | 8 (4.2%) | 0.6 | 1.500 | 57 | 45 |
| Religious | 3 (1.6%) | 0.6 | 1.200 | 39 | 25 |
| Authoritarian[a] | 20 (10.4%) | 0.7 | 490 | 60 | 40 |
| Absolutist | 10 (5.2%) | 1.0 | 8.235 | 66 | 44 |

*Source:* Derbyshire, J. D., & Derbyshire, I. (1996). *Political systems of the world* (pp. 25–26). New York: St. Martin's Press.

a. Distinction military and authoritarian collapsed by this author.

perhaps tell us something about the background of the form of government that has emerged around the world, but—given the broad categories—very little more. In addition, the defining categories remain vague (what distinguishes *nationalist* from *authoritarian*?). Probably, there are various cases that are hybrids or that simply overlap (e.g., Kenya appears to be authoritarian and nationalist, whereas Tanzania is labeled as socialist and nationalist by the authors).

In particular, the distinction between liberal democracies and emergent democracies is confusing and debatable. First, the definition tells us little about what the ideological differences are between the two (apart from the fact that the former have had an undisturbed history [as a state] in terms of coups d'état, whereas the latter emerged in the various postwar waves of democratization and often experienced political disruption). Second, comparing the listings of Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996) with others, it appears that a number of cases are misplaced as regards being democratic, or emerging or not. All in all, classifications as developed by Derbyshire and Derbyshire are certainly useful as reference sources but have little added value in terms of understanding the differences between types of political systems and are limited in their descriptive-analytical value (e.g., as a proto-theory or in explaining comparative differences). In some scholars' view, a typology should add to existing knowledge rather than only recycle existing knowledge regarding the similarities of and differences between political systems. Hence, typologies are useful but only if they are systematic, two- or multidimensional, and related to a theory-driven research question (e.g., Lijphart's typology of democratic variations and Rokkan's models of state development).

This section has discussed various types of typologies as they have been developed and elaborated in comparative political science. On the one hand, pure descriptive classifications and typologies have been presented (Finer; Derbyshire & Derbyshire). On the other hand, a number of analytical typologies have been put forward. It should be noted that typologies either aspire to classify *all* political systems of the world (like Finer) or confine themselves to regions—such as Europe (Rokkan)—and to specific regime types—for example, democracies (Lijphart). In addition, it was argued that after the 1970s, another kind of typology emerged in the form of systemic or intrasystem classifications (e.g., party systems and type of government; see Blondel, 1982).

Hence, the present strategy for developing types of political systems involves going from descriptive to analytical approaches and from focusing on whole systems to attributes of political systems. The focus on attributes of political systems can be applied to comparative politics and enhance insight

for the student regarding both the cross-system and intrasystem variation around the world or within certain regions or regime types. One useful way of developing further theory-driven typologies is to derive them from Easton's *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*.

## Variations of Political Systems: Types of Political Governance

Systems theory is derived from evolutionary biological models that emphasize the interdependence of the elements that are considered to be essential for the survival of the system. Systems theory applied to analyze political systems is in the form of a set of interactions between political actors whose behavior is structured by institutions and is embedded in a wider environment. It departs from the idea that these institutionalized interactions shape the dynamics of a system toward more or less an equilibrium situation. This approach was already developed in the 19th century (e.g., Herbert Spencer) and has been applied to political science since the late 1950s. Easton (1965, 1981) has been the main advocate of this approach, and others like Almond and Verba applied it to compare polities (institutionalized rule of a society).

Easton conceived of politics in terms of its relationship with society by means of the authoritative allocation of material and "immaterial" for a society (i.e., by means of public policy formation). The political system receives inputs from society in terms of demands and support, such as policy preferences of organized interests and political parties, and electoral support, for example, for parties in government or the junta in power. The political system converts these into outputs in the form of decisions and enforceable policies that feed back to society. If and when demand and support are (more or less) in balance, it would imply an equilibrium situation—that is, political stability. Of course, this process is not an automatic one but is driven by the types of institutions and political actors. Gatekeepers, like parties or interest groups, cumulate various preferences from the public and direct the system of governance (i.e., the conversion process). The resulting outputs (policy) feed back into support and demand for the actors that are responsible for government.

More often than not, the Eastonian approach of systems theory has been criticized for being mechanistic, teleological, static, and not fit for empirical analysis. However, the practitioners of comparative politics have helped refute these criticisms. First, they applied systems theory to compare countries as political systems; second, by elaborating Easton's model by specifying political actors and institutions, they analyzed the "black box" of the conversion process (or governance); third, with the data available now, which allow for closer scrutiny while comparing political systems, they developed whole-system and systemic classifications of political systems.

In the remainder of this section, the differences and similarities between political systems are elaborated by means of the Eastonian approach to demonstrate the extent to which types of political systems do vary. This allows for assessing the extant typologies. Recall that a distinction was made between descriptive and analytical typologies, on the one hand, and between whole-system comparisons and systemic or intrasystem typologies, on the other. The Eastonian approach allows for an analytical systemic typology.

In what follows, the focus is first on the institutional variation of polities (in this case, the countries of the world) in terms of their types of political rule, both representative and nonrepresentative.

### *Institutional Variations of Political Systems*

As we have observed, there have been and always will be classifications of political regimes. The term *regime* simply means a system of ruling society. Numerous indicators are used, but here we shall concentrate on the institutional configuration of government. As has already been stated, political institutions are basically the rules of the political game, and these rules shape and direct the behavior of the players involved (e.g., parties, movements, interest groups, bureaucrats, people, and also the members of government) with respect to the political process of governing. The main types of representative government are introduced in the section that follows. In addition, the nondemocratic types are also discussed. This enables us to define the relationship between government as the conversion agency (making decisions on policies) and the eventual policy performance in terms of its societal impact (or feedback process).

**Representative Government**

This type is related to the political-ideological basis regarding the "liberal-democratic" and "emerging democratic" types of governance (see Table 1). The connection lies with the idea of democracy. Central to democracy is that the executive is elected indirectly by the population and, thus, the population (or more precisely, the electorate), through its representation in the Assembly, directs and controls government. Hence, the way in which the relationship between the executive and legislative is institutionalized shapes the role and position of government. This relationship is constitutionally driven almost everywhere or laid down in a basic law. In addition, there are the "conventions" that shape the structure of representative government. Hence, institutions are determining the "room for manoeuvre" for government and more often than not, will be conducive to its "leadership and optimisation" (see Blondel, 1982). For instance, differences in the formal relationship between the executive and legislative, on the one hand, and the type of electoral system, on the other, influence the composition of government and its policy-making capacities. Four types of government can be distinguished within the category of representative government:

1. presidential government,
2. parliamentary government,
3. dual-power government, and
4. single-party government.

According to Derbyshire and Derbyshire, the cross-national distribution of these types is as shown in Table 2.

The parliamentary type of representative government is quite dominant in Europe. Only one out of five government types outside Europe is parliamentary. Presidential government is the dominant type within both the consolidated and the emergent democracies in the rest of the democratic world. Yet since the late 1980s, the number of dual-power governments has doubled (particularly in Central and Eastern Europe). This typology of representative government is driven by the constitutional features of the polity.

***Presidential Government.*** The role and position of the head of state is crucial for each type. Although most states have a president as head of state, in most cases, the presidency is merely symbolic, and its main function is to represent the sovereignty of the nation and government. In this sense, presidents are comparable to constitutional monarchs. However, in other systems—for example, the United States—the president has been assigned the role of executive (as head of government), and the related power is separated from the legislative powers of the (elected) assembly. In most cases, the executive head of state cannot be removed by the legislative (he or she appoints the other members of government) and derives his or her legitimacy from popular election to office (i.e., elected leadership).

The foremost feature is that of the one-person executive who dominates the politics of government. He or she can call on the public, by whom he or she is elected, and represents national government at home and abroad. This feature of a one-person executive also reinforces the position of the bureaucracy, which, at least in many cases, is indirectly subservient to the president. Of course, this differs from system to system, but if

**Table 2** Types of Representative Government

| *Region* | *n* | *Presidential* | *Parliamentary* | *Dual Power* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Europe | 49 (31%) | 15 (30%) | 24 (48%) | 10 (22%) |
| Americas | 43 (27%) | 29 (58%) | 12 (35%) | 2 (7%) |
| Rest of the world | 67 (42%) | 43 (64%) | 19 (28%) | 5 (8%) |
| Totals | 159 (100%) | 87 (52%) | 55 (36%) | 17 (12%) |

*Source:* Derbyshire, J. D., & Derbyshire, I. (1996). *Political systems of the world* (p. 40). New York: St. Martin's Press.

*Note:* Percentages of types of representative government are row totals.

well organized, the president can direct the bureaucracy effectively and even strengthen the coordination of policy implementation.

Typical for presidentialism is the executive command of the head of state, who is also head of government. Conversely, parliament plays an indirect role by exerting legislative control. It is clear that the structure of presidential government is characterized by quite a few lines of command. Conversely, the lines of control are either reciprocal or indirect. This implies that the institutional configuration of presidential government can be, and often is, conducive to conflict (e.g., think of "divided government"—i.e., the political "color" of the president is different from the majority in the legislature) and considered to be prone to political instability.

***Parliamentary Government.*** Parliamentary government is organically linked to the legislature, or parliament. The government emerges from the assembly and can be dismissed by a vote of no confidence (and often also needs a vote of investiture by the same parliament). At the same time, government can—often after consultation with the head of state—dissolve parliament and call for a new election. Whereas presidential government appears strong and relatively independent, parliamentary government is often considered to be weak because of the mutual dependence of the executive and legislature. In other words, a typical consequence of parliamentary government is that both powers are fused and bargaining eventually directs the outputs of the system. Hence, the institutional means of command and control are distributed across the executive and legislative.

Given these differences from presidentialism, it is usual to differentiate between parliamentary governments by means of their conventional shape and working. On the one hand, there is the one-party government, where the majority party in parliament forms the government (e.g., in the United Kingdom until recently). On the other hand, there is the coalition government, where a combination of parties forms a government that is supported by a majority in parliament. A subtype is the minority governments (one-party or coalition, occurring often in Scandinavia). In short, in parliamentary types of government, the political representation is mediated by means of parties.

All in all, in parliamentary systems, government is structured differently from presidential government. The formal powers of the executive and legislative are largely fused; consensus formation between parties in government and in parliament is a prerequisite to make policies, and therefore, negotiations take place in both government and parliament, where, in the final instance, parties do really matter.

What should also be clear is that the electorate only indirectly influences government. Hence, as is often argued, parliamentary systems of governance are indeed an indirect form of democracy. Whereas in presidential systems the head of government is primarily directly elected, this is not the case in parliamentary systems. To push this argument farther, in parliamentary democracies, parties are the key factor linking the electorate to parliamentary government.

***Dual-Power Government.*** This type of government has often been considered as an anomaly or as a residual category. But, as a consequence of the criticisms raised versus both presidential and parliamentary government, dual-power government is taken much more seriously nowadays, and more attention is paid to this type of government (usually labeled *semipresidentialism*) as an alternative to both presidentialism and parliamentarism. The majority of the cases can be found in Europe: France, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and, to some extent, Portugal, Finland, the Czech Republic, and Poland. It should be noted that most of these states have developed this dual system only recently. This may well be an expression of a growing dissatisfaction (given the apparent disadvantages) with both the straightforward presidential and parliamentary systems of democratic and constitutional government. The third type of representative government is presented in Figure 1.

Dual-power government is strongly influenced by constitutional rules (the direct arrows in Figure 1) and the multiple relations that exist. The main disadvantage is the delicate interrelations in terms of command and control between all powers. This may well imply that imbalances and disruption lead to stalemates, gridlocks, and, thus, governmental instability. However, the fact that the electorate has a more direct influence on both the executive and the legislative than in the other




**Figure 1** Dual-Power Government

*Note:* Dotted arrows represent indirect forms of command or control.

types of representative government appears to be an advantage.

### Nonrepresentative Government

These types of government overlap to a large extent with the ideological bases that have been distinguished in Table 2 and that do not belong to the democratic family. Here, the distinction between one-actor government and autocratic governance is made. The first type is characterized by the fact that one political actor—be it a party, movement, or a (charismatic) leader—rules the state in the name of the whole nation. Often, these regimes are ideologically inspired by communism or variations of nationalism. Autocratic governments can also be characterized by one political actor who rules but not in the name of the collective interest. The same line of reasoning can be applied to military and religious rule. The polity is not the framework of reference, but rather, a specific interest or idea provides an ideological basis of and justification for autocratic rule. Autocratic government concerns about 15.6% of all regimes in the world, and together with the one-actor government, this covers 24% of all the regimes of the world.

*One-Actor Government.* The basic feature of a one-actor government is that a party or movement or, eventually, a leader represents the "will of the people" and governs for the people but by no means is the state governed by the people. Hence, insofar as there exists representation, it is limited to a "top–bottom" type of indirect representation (see Figure 2). In most cases, these ideas are laid down in a constitution or in a set of basic laws by one party or movement. In addition, the constitution preamble serves to justify the nature of the system in terms of ideology (e.g., socialism or patriotism) and the need for a unified actor steering the state and society. In essence, this implies that both the executive and the legislature (which almost always formally exist in this type of government) are formed by the same party or movement (hence, there is no competition between parties). In fact, government is formed by an "elite" that is either confined to party membership (like in communist regimes) or to having a function in the movement. In particular, this pattern can be observed in the developing and postcolonial world.

It would appear that the charismatic style of leadership, the avoidance of personality cults, and self-interested behavior of the elite are requirements for smooth change and adequate societal performance by means of such a type of government. If these requirements are not met or external pressure mounts, a fundamental regime change is almost inevitable. Many of these changes (in particular, in the past decades) are going in two directions: either toward emergent democracy or toward an autocratic type of government.

*Autocratic Government.* The fundamental features that shape this category of governance are that not only is it not representative but also that there is no explicit link with society at large and hardly any formal or constitutional organization of the polity. Instead, the ideological basis is often derived from




**Figure 2** One-Actor Government

absolutism or religion, on the one hand, or based on military rule (operating by suspending the basic laws), on the other.

The structure of this form of government is that it is completely self-organized, and command and control are organized by force, ruling out any form of political and civil rights for the population. The most extreme form is tyranny, more often than not by means of (personalized) dictatorship (e.g., Joseph Stalin [Iosif Vissarionovic Dzugasvili]). This means that government equals the "rule of the day" and that force and fear prevail over the well-being of the nation and its population. At the end of the day, neither the leadership nor its subservient elite is accountable to anybody but itself.

Nonrepresentative government is hardly structured by formal rules. Informal rules tend to be beneficial and shaped by the leadership and its concomitant elites and are often insufficient for stable and enduring government. The major difference between both types distinguished here is the absence of abuse and outright perversion of human rights in combination with attempts to enhance the public welfare of the nation by one-actor governments. Yet in reality, it is difficult to draw a line between the two types. Often the one develops into the other.

### *Toward a Typology of Contemporary Forms of Governance*

The different forms of government that have been discussed are all derived from one theoretical model: Easton's systems theory of political life. The focus has been on the institutional configuration of each type: presidential, parliamentary, dual power, one-actor, and autocratic government. It has been shown how the central actors representing the systems of governance are interrelated (directly, indirectly, or not) through the institutions that are typical for each political system. In this way, one can fill in the real cases that belong to each type as well as consider how in each of these political systems, the central actors are ordered in terms of (supposed) influence and their powers to command or control (or both).

Of course, not all systems within each category are perfectly the same; there is variation in presidential systems as there is in autocratic systems. In addition, all systems are more or less in flux: Institutional arrangements are changed and sometimes completely altered (e.g., the transition of the Fourth French Republic to the Fifth in 1958 or the degradation of Kenya from a one-party state to an autocratic system in the 1980s). Finally, there are cases that tend to be hybrids—that is, some features of two of the main types appear in one system: Finland, for example, showed strong features of presidentialism until the 1980s, but at the same time, it could well be considered to have a parliamentary type of representative government. Finally, it is fair to say that in reality, it is a thin line that separates autocratic systems from one-party systems (think of the absolutist kingdoms that exist in the Arabic world).

At the end of the day, it is up to the comparative political scientist to make a decision on the basis of

evidence, on the one hand, and depending on the research question asked, on the other. This could well mean that a specific typology is developed, for instance, to describe how democratic a political system is or how well different systems perform (Keman, 2002). Developing typologies of political systems can help answer such questions and enhance comparative analysis.

## Conclusion

The different types of political systems have been discussed throughout history, and many typologies have been developed. The construction of a typology is more challenging if the researcher not only wishes to use it as a descriptive tool to systematically reduce the comparative complexities but also aims to arrive at an analytically driven typology. As a methodological rule of thumb, this entry emphasized that a proper typology of political systems should contain those cases that not only belong in one cell but are also empirically mutually exclusive across cells. In addition, this entry distinguished between typologies that are whole-system oriented or intrasystem focused. Whole-system typologies of political systems had been quite frequent up to the 1970s, whereas the intrasystem ones came more into use after World War II.

The variation in both descriptive and analytical typologies of political systems was also treated. In addition, this entry also discussed that types of political systems may well be enhanced on the basis of Easton's idea of systems analysis of political life. To this end, systems of representative and nonrepresentative government were discussed as an example of constructing a typology of political systems in terms of their institutional design. This resulted in an analytical typology that is neither static nor teleological and allows for interpreting the process of government as the crucial component of any political system together with its systemic features.

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***See also*** Authoritarian Regimes; Democracies, Types of; Democratization; Hybrid Regimes; Parliamentary Systems; Presidentialism; Semipresidentialism; Systems Theory; Totalitarian Regimes

**Further Readings**

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# Political Theory

Theory is defined as a set of propositions that is internally consistent and based on a certain set of axioms and assumptions. Theory must be logically derivable in all cases. It must be politically persuasive, especially when it deals with norms. It must be empirically verifiable when it deals with reality. Therefore, *political* theory is defined as a set of propositions about "who gets what, when, how" (Harold Lasswell) and "the authoritative allocation of values in society" (David Easton). Thus defined, political theory covers a very wide range of subjects in the form of propositions.

In what follows, first the origins and types of political theory are examined. Among the types of political theory, this entry takes into account the

following three: (1) classical philosophy, (2) empirical political theory, and (3) formal political theory. Next, this entry examines schools of political theory and their evaluation. Under this heading, 10 schools are evaluated: 4 schools of normative political theory (conflict, shared values, exchange, and coordination) and 6 schools of empirical political theory (systems theory, behavioralism, rational choice theory, institutionalism, neuroscience, and globalism). Third, this entry discusses the need to enhance conversations between normative political theory and empirical political theory, or between "ought" and "is." In other words, normative political theory should talk more about the plausibility, feasibility, and self-sustainability of the normative order it advances, and empirical political theory should discuss normative implications more seriously. With the aim of providing for more conversations and interactions within political theory, concise and concrete illustrations of such proposed conversations and interactions are given.

## Origins and Types of Political Theory

Although political theory as a part of the modern discipline of political science emerged only in the 20th century, the origins of political theory are unquestionably in ancient thought—whether in the philosophy of Greece, Mesopotamia, Egypt, India, or China. One can cite passages from Aristotle, Kautilya, or Confucius easily to demonstrate that they are political scientists indeed and that political science, although modern, has very ancient roots. One of the major differences the discipline of political science can claim to have vis-à-vis other social science disciplines such as economics and sociology is that the ancient versions of political science, such as those of the three philosophers mentioned above, retain much power and relevance to the current reality in politics. Aristotle is often mentioned in contemporary writings on politics and political science. Kautilya is referred to in discussions on rulers' state craft both at home and vis-à-vis their rivals. Confucius continues to be taken up as providing possible versions of authoritarian politics. It is rare for Aristotle to be discussed in relation to economics, although his ideas on this subject are significant for the history of economics. All these disciplines are relatively young, since they have grown as modern social science disciplines in the West, especially in the 20th century. Yet one can argue that political science has retained its ancient origins even at the dawn of the 21st century. Thus, its development is very complex.

In Western Europe, the major distinction between the sacred and the secular was made gradually but quite steadily during the Enlightenment and the Reformation, and it diffused to European settlements and later to the rest of the world as well, at least superficially; secularism is therefore closely related to Western cultures. Religion and politics are said to have been distinguished in the West since the modern age. The same can be said about the relationship between religion and science. William of Ockham gave an early epistemological foundation for what would be called modern science by making a clear distinction between realism and nominalism. Realism refers to the school of thought that believes that God does exist in reality and that reality was conceived as the basis of that knowledge; nominalism refers to the view that God exists insofar as the concept of God is imagined. With this stance, science was able to separate itself from the cosmos of the sacred. With this separation, modern science was able to make spectacular progress in the West.

Needless to say, the separation between God and science and between God and politics did not come about so neatly or once and for all; rather, the picture is complex. The separation between religion and politics has been tenuous at best. At any rate, for our purposes, the separation of politics from God was a step forward in distinguishing political theory from philosophy. Also the separation of science from God was a step forward in distinguishing political theory from political philosophy. This distinction tries to separate God's judgment from that of scientists or political leaders.

At the crux of political theory is the mixture of the normative and the empirical—that is, what ought to be versus what is. The normative has to do with the judgment by which a verdict on justice is determined. While in medieval times, such judgments came from the Catholic Church or, in some cases, duels were fought between opposing parties, in modern times, they come from the courts where secular matters are concerned. Courts have been conceived like God. The concept of the empirical refers to something that can be experienced or

tested in the daily lives of people. It was not until modern times, with the increasingly sharp distinction between the sacred and the secular—which made "reality checks" possible—that empirical testing became common.

Political theory comprises all this under one umbrella, including both classical philosophy and empirical political theory. To complicate matters further, political theory contains within its territory what is called formal political theory. Classical philosophy refers to prescientific and pre-empiricist statements about what justice is, how it should be achieved, and how it should be conceptualized. Empirical political theory refers to statements made from the scientific and empiricist viewpoints on how politics is played out. Formal political theory refers to logically and/or mathematically derivable statements that may or may not be amenable to empirical testing. Dealing with the normative and the empirical is inherently not easy. Compounding the problem is the recent tendency toward overspecialization and mutual isolation, rather than mutual engagement, among political scientists dealing with the normative and the empirical. Mutual isolation between classical normative theory and empirical theory has gone sometimes too far as their borderlines are not always very clear.

In practice, normative political theory and empirical political theory are far apart for several reasons. First, their knowledge base differs. Classical political theorists often are concerned with philosophy, theology, and intellectual history, whereas empirical political theorists are often interested in other empirical social sciences such as economics, sociology, and social psychology or in other applied empirical sciences such as neuroscience in politics. Second, their methods of training are very different. Classical political theory focuses on text critique and robust argumentation. All study is based on careful reading and argumentation. Empirical political theory focuses on hypothesis testing conducted according to positivistic practices or a systematic reality check. Yet these differences are not strong enough to undermine their disciplinary identity as political science and to split it into two or more subdisciplines. Although no solid and systematic evidence exists, it looks as if the shared fascination with how power is built and exercised seems to give many political scientists identity and solidarity to band together.

The types of political theory—classical philosophy, empirical political theory, and formal political theory—are discussed in turn in the remainder of this section.

### *Classical Philosophy*

Classical philosophy comprises almost everything from the normative to the empirical, the prescriptive, and their mixture. In *The Great Learning (Daxue)*, one of the famous Confucian teachers instructs his disciples to do the following: "Tackling things, seeking truth, nurturing yourself (morally), sorting the family, governing the state, and pacifying the world under heaven." This sentence instructs the disciples that to stand above people they must start studying many things and knowing a lot. Then, they must discipline themselves morally. That leads them to sort out things in their family, and this process becomes the basis of governing the country. Only by going through all this can disciples envisage "pacifying the world under heaven."

This philosophical statement is described in a number of ways: (a) the authoritarian conception of governing by the sage, (b) the moralistic conception of governing, and (c) the familial conception of the state. The way in which the argument is constructed is bottom up. But the argument itself is replete with authoritarian, paternalistic, and personalistic overtones.

The no less famous classical philosophy of Niccolò Machiavelli, author of *The Prince*, is also prescriptive and empirical. He warns his readers that politics is determined by virtue and fortune. By virtue is meant a range of strengths including moral strength. Such an exercise of strength is needed to deal with the effects of fortune. This classical philosophy was meant to teach the monarch to act properly and prudently. Thus, it is largely prescriptive. At the same time, it is sometimes speculated that since Machiavelli was republican, his preaching was meant to subvert monarchism by deliberately encouraging the monarch to act most "monarchically"—that is, always assuming one's superiority, not trusting anyone but oneself, and acting mostly on the basis of strength—thus undermining the basis of popular support, which was becoming increasingly significant.

Classical philosophy includes the *Federalist Papers*, in which precursors of empirical political

theory are often found. The view that federalism is a viable alternative to a unitary state is an example. This proposition has generative affinity with the work of William Riker (1964) and his Rochester School on formal political theory. Riker's brand of formal political theory on democracy and democratic choice has some affinity with both classical philosophy and empirical political theory.

Immanuel Kant's famous essay *Perpetual Peace* has been empirically tested lately, with quite stimulating debates arising from such efforts. In 1795, Kant argued that three conditions should be nurtured to bring about eternal peace. First, commerce should be invigorated, with free passage and free trade ensured among nations. Second, one should encourage the republican form of politics rather than the monarchical form, to make war more difficult. Third, international institutions should be created to allow for the expression of voices of varying assertions, to facilitate discussion, and to come up with formulas for conflict resolution. Kant's formulation has been reformulated in the tradition of empirical political theory by Michael Doyle, Bruce Russett, and others. The first is called *liberal peace*. The second is called *democratic peace*. The third is sometimes called *peace by consortium*. The second is the most popular, and U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush used this doctrine to justify U.S. military interventions. Kant's affinity with empirical political theory is abundantly clear, even if it is not universally accepted as such.

Thomas Hobbes is arguably the most frequently mentioned author in relation to the state in the social sciences, along with Max Weber and Karl Marx. Facing what he saw as anarchy both at home and abroad in 16th-century England, Hobbes argued that absolutism and an absolutist state should be the answer to these anarchies—what people wish to achieve cannot be accomplished unless anarchical situations are overcome. In discussions of failed states and rogue states, therefore, Hobbes is one of the philosophers most frequently referred to. Describing and analyzing what is seen as anarchy in places and time points such as Cambodia in the 1980s and 1990s, Somalia since the early 1990s, Sudan in the 1990s and 2000s, Afghanistan for the past 40 years, the Democratic Republic of Congo for most of the 1990s and 2000s, Rwanda in the 1990s and 2000s, and the West Balkans in the 1990s and 2000s, many authors point to the need to establish a monopoly of violence and the legitimate use of power in the initial and yet critical phase of state building, along with the concord forged with the international community. A similar diagnosis and prescription are offered to show the process of state building that may evolve from a democratic spirit and under globalizing circumstances and the process of absolutism arising from claims of state sovereignty. Needless to say, the yearning for state sovereignty cannot be suppressed fully—one form of which is expressed by the concept of "sovereign democracy" coined by Vladislav Surkov, chief of staff to former Russian President Vladimir Putin and now President Medvedev. Sovereign democracy implies a sovereign state whose representative heads are chosen democratically but that disallows foreign interference from abroad, even if by democratic means—for example, the attempts at "colored revolutions" in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. Chinese leaders view "peaceful change" (*heping yanbian*) as anathema because it means foreign interference to force a regime change on the basis of human rights and democracy as universally shared values. Thus, on the anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre (June 4, 1989), China was placed under high-level alert. In short, Hobbes is just as relevant now, at the dawn of the 21st century, as in 16th-century England.

### *Empirical Political Theory*

Empirical political theory aims at generating hypotheses that can be empirically tested and that are also capable of generating a higher level set of generalizations. In other words, empirical political theory places utmost importance on two aspects of research: (1) empirical validation (or falsification) and (2) empirical generalization (or theorization). Thus, empirical political theory first proposes an empirically verifiable hypothesis and then tests it. If it is confirmed, it can then be generalized. A good example of this type of theory is voting in U.S. presidential elections. To link with political theory, the characteristically American utilitarian model of electoral victory based on the death toll of American troops in combat situations and on per capita net income level change over the preceding year(s) serves as an example. As pointed out by

Douglas Hibbs (1989), the question of whether the candidate of the party that occupies the executive office is elected in the presidential elections is likely to be determined by the combination of the death toll of U.S. troops in combat situations and per capita net income level change over the preceding year(s). This model hypothesizes that voters yearn for peace (i.e., having no Americans killed in combat) and for prosperity (i.e., increasing income). If one considers the 2008 U.S. presidential race, two *S*s were important: Operation *S*urge in Iraq and subprime housing loans. Operation Surge reduced the death toll of American troops from the summer of 2007 through Election Day. How this affected the voter equation is one of the key points. The other *S* is the economic setback triggered by the subprime housing loans crisis. Not only were stock prices going down, but the U.S. dollar also lost value. Whether the government could prevent a recession by stimulating the economy through pumping a massive amount of money into it was also a key issue in the voter equation. Expecting the economy to recover seemed premature. This worked against the Republican presidential candidate, John McCain, who did not support such an economic stimulus.

A number of studies suggest that trust and health are quite significantly related. Those who hold concerns about social institutions such as social insurance are more likely to report bad health. Similarly, those who do not trust others very much tend to report their own bad health. The reasoning is as follows: Those with lower vertical trust, that is, those who do not place much confidence in social institutions, cannot enjoy the benefit of making the best use of them, one of the consequences of which is the loss of health. In a similar vein, those with lower horizontal trust, that is, those who do not place much confidence in other persons, cannot enjoy the benefits of working together, one of the consequences of which is the loss of health. Loss of health is measured by self-reported health using the World Health Organization's Quality of Life questionnaire. This proposition is interesting from a public policy perspective in that keeping public confidence in social institutions is important in itself. Otherwise, the service that can be supplied by social institutions cannot be fully provided. Thus, from a more conventional public policy perspective, public policy performance is a dependent variable and is to be explained by a number of factors. However, from the version of public policy perspective, the dependent variable is something individuals can experience physically, such as health, or emotionally, such as happiness and honor.

The electoral system can be either divisive or cohesive. In the political theory of representative democracy, how to choose electorates is of key importance. Representative democracy takes into account at least two forms of justice. "Representative democracy requires two conditions to be successful": (1) fair representation, reflecting electors' preferences, and (2) government stability, enabling government to execute policy pledges to the electorate. Two major systems exist: (1) *proportional representation*, whereby parliamentary or legislative seats are awarded according to the percentage of votes polled by a party, and (2) *first pass the post*, in which the person from a district who receives the highest number of votes is awarded the seat; this method awards a disproportionate number of seats to parties that get a larger number of votes and reduces the number of seats awarded to parties with a smaller share of votes. The proportional representation system is said to give fair representation but not regime stability, whereas the first-past-the-post method is said to give moderately unfair representation but regime stability. The latter is widely adopted in many English-speaking countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and, until recently, New Zealand. The former is widely adopted by Continental European countries. Lately, the mixed system combining both methods has become more popular, especially in non-European regions such as the Asia-Pacific region, and seems to provide fair representation and regime stability to a reasonably satisfactory degree.

Proportional representation can be very divisive, as, for example, in Israel or in Iraq. The state of Israel is sometimes said to have committed two institutional mistakes in its founding days: First, it was unable to promulgate a constitution, largely because of the fundamental cleavages manifested on the issue of religion and the state, and, second, it adopted proportional representation as the mode of election. Parenthetically, there are only three states in the world that do not have a constitution: Israel, the United Kingdom, and New

Zealand. The United Kingdom does not have a written constitution, except for the Magna Carta, and it seems that New Zealand has inherited that tradition. Interestingly, the Iraqi constitution adopted a proportional representation electoral system, whereby ethno-religious cleavages have been amplified and invigorated. The one-person-from-one-district, or first-pass-the-post, system, common in the United States and the United Kingdom, tends to exaggerate the number of votes the winning party gets to obtain parliamentary seats. In other words, more proportional strength is given to the winning party so that government can enjoy at least a minimally stable majority.

### *Formal Political Theory*

Formal political theory is a set of propositions that are logically derived from a set of assumptions about politics. A formal political theory of electoral democracy was first formalized by Anthony Downs (1957). This theory relates the statistical distribution of electorates' ideological and policy positions on a number of dimensions to the policies parties make to capture more votes. In other words, political parties shape their positions according to the number of voters who are likely to vote for them. Anthony Downs propounded an economic theory of democracy that has become very influential for those political scientists who believe that political science should be able to generate theories from which empirical claims about political phenomena can be deduced (after the theories themselves have been tested as described above). Downs's key insight into spatial economics is illustrated by his example of gas stations, which he explains are located close to each other because the spatial distribution of consumers of gasoline is that of a statistically normal curve. In other words, rather than opening a gas station miles away from another gas station, one might as well open it close to the other one, with the chance of getting many more customers for both. Downs applied this insight to the dynamics of electoral democracy. Suppose there are two major parties, one right-wing and the other left-wing. Further suppose that voters who support extreme views are fewer than voters who support moderate views, statistically speaking. To gain more votes, candidates will moderate their views, whether about war and peace, bread and butter, or honor and humiliation. The consequence is that the two major parties move closer to each other. As a result, such parties start to look alike. Many empirical efforts have been made to validate or invalidate empirically this Downsian theory of party competition. Thus, formal political theory has been quite well linked in many ways to empirical political theory. By using the statistical distribution patterns of electorates in a multidimensional space, this formal political theory shows that under representative democracy, electorates are sovereign whereas candidates or political parties are the subjects. This analysis is one example of how formal political theory has been applied to explain empirical phenomena.

Politics is played out most commonly in and among organizations. How people react to the decline of organizational life is one of the key questions in politics. Albert Hirschman (1970) formulated the model of exit, voice, and loyalty. The binary choice is between loyalty and exit. These binary choices are most commonly observed in the market: One's choice is between purchase and nonpurchase. In organizational life, if one is loyal, one will remain with the organization in spite of decreasing rewards. The exit option is to get out without procrastination. Between the two options is a third, more common one: raising one's voice to ask others to join forces in improving organizational life. This is more common in politics. But when one starts thinking about the major consequences of each option, it is much more complex. Consider an exit-prone country whose income has not increased dramatically in a long time, such as the Philippines. Filipinos earn a substantial amount of income through emigration—by sending doctors to the United States and maids to the Gulf countries, as they bring back a substantial amount of their earnings to their country. One can speculate that a consequence of a large migrant population is the lack of momentum for endogenous development. In contrast, in a loyalty-prone nation such as Japan, not leaving the country is a common response to the decline of organizational life, so migration rates are low. At the height of organizational decline, as conditions become intolerable and such loyalty fails to attract attention or admiration, loyalty may take on the character of voice. This is a formal political theory, but it could be an empirical political theory as well. The theory

of exit, voice, and loyalty touches on complex manifestations of organizational life and varied options of human endeavor to improve it. In other words, the exit option is based on conflict, the voice option is based on coordination, and the loyalty option is based on loyalty.

Other than classical philosophy, empirical political theory, and formal political theory, there are two major genres that can be sometimes treated under the umbrella of political theory: epistemology and methodology. Epistemology refers to the study of how human beings recognize what they see and hear as knowledge. René Descartes, a French philosopher, most famously in *Le Discours de la Méthode*, laid down what might be called the modern positivistic method. It is a set of advice and instructions that would be helpful to obtain a clearer understanding of what one observes. Methodology refers to the study of various instruments through which reality can be observed and analyzed effectively.

## Schools of Political Theory

Schools of political theory are sometimes messy in part because empirical political theory has grown, at least initially, out of other disciplines such as psychology, psychiatry, sociology, economics, and anthropology. One of the direct origins of empirical political theory is to be found in the deep transformations and the new needs following World War II. The application of methodologies and concepts from these disciplines to political science was first done by Samuel Stouffer and Harold Lasswell. For empirical political theorists, historical and institutional descriptions were the only methods used in their research. With the new methodologies and concepts, empirical political theory expanded its scope dramatically. Observing, measuring, and assessing in a generalizable fashion became conventions in political science, which allowed schools of empirical political theory to proliferate. Prior to World War II, the discipline of political science was concerned mostly with constitutions and institutions, on the one hand, and political philosophy, on the other. World War II was also a catalyst for empirical political theory, because governments were interested in measuring and assessing the morale of their troops and the effectiveness of propaganda and of military actions. Stouffer and colleagues conducted a morale study that contributed immensely to the development of survey research. Similarly, Harold Lasswell, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and colleagues advanced a propaganda study that contributed immensely to the development of intelligence analysis. Robert MacNamara and colleagues developed a bombing effects study that contributed immensely to the development of strategic analysis of costs and benefits associated with strategic options. Another example is the military occupation study by Ruth Benedict, which was instituted through a psychocultural analysis of the Japanese people. It took more than two decades after World War II for political science to come into its own with empirical political theory.

With regard to normative political theory, schools are commonly linked to great philosophers like Aristotle, Machiavelli, John Locke, Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas. But the increased interactions with other disciplines and related methodologies and concepts have also helped advance schools of normative political theory. One of the schemes adopted here is that of Russell Hardin, which distinguishes four schools of normative political theory.

### *Four Schools of Normative Political Theory*

Hardin classified normative political theory in terms of theory based on conflict, on shared values, on exchange, and on coordination.

#### Conflict

Normative political theory focusing on conflict of interest includes the work of Carl Schmitt (1922/1985). Schmitt defines politics as a friend–foe relationship within and across nations. His theory is commonly categorized as ultra-conservative and sometimes fascist. Its explanatory capacity is high under conflictual situations such as wartime but not in more peaceful contexts. Although it is not necessarily categorized as work in the area of normative political theory, Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* has a strong normative affinity with the notion of the friend–foe relationship. Clausewitz defines war as no more than the continuation of politics by other means. In a similar vein, Field Marshall Boris Shaposhnikov defines

peace as no more than the continuation of war by other means. The fact that both Clausewitz and Shaposhnikov were military officers may mean that their theories may be regarded not as normative political theory but as a technical guide for action, but the simplicity and clarity of their works may appeal to those studying war and conflict. Turning to a Marxist work that tends to focus on class conflict, Barrington Moore's (1966/1993) book, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, can be regarded as normative political theory focusing on class conflict. His argument is that agriculture is pivotal. The rise of democracy, fascism, and communism in the 20th century may be explained by studying the evolution of agriculture: Commercialization of agriculture led to its advancement, as in England and France; agriculture stagnated due to the indifference of the land-owning class, as in Germany, Japan, and Italy; and agriculture was overexploited by state-led capitalism, as in Russia and China—which corresponded to the advent of democracy, fascism, and communism in these countries, respectively.

### Shared Values

Normative political theory focusing on shared values was dominant in the 20th century, especially after the Cold War. The ascendancy of shared values as a normative political theory has much to do with the rise and spread of liberal democracy since the past century. Liberalism is based often on the utilitarian calculation of free individuals, as John Rawls argued (1971). Democracy is based on the aggregation of the preferences of citizens, as described by Downs (1957). In a sense, liberal democracy demands a regime in which shared values are key. As long as liberal democracy is premised, the type of normative political theory focusing on shared values flourishes. Even the latest definition of politics by Robert Goodin (2009), as the constrained use of social power, reflects this. It is important to note that liberalism does not require either the knowledge or the sharing of values of other individuals. Downs's *An Economic Theory of Democracy* is a formal political theory with normative implications. Values are often illustrated by the left–right ideology. In a two-party system, the two parties tend to move toward the center from both directions, that is, from left to center and from right to center. Moderate or "centrist" citizens share values, whereas extreme or fringe citizens have few fellows. To win votes, the two parties target the numerically large central point. This leads the parties to adjust their ideological and policy positions and to compete to attract the large number of citizens located at the center. The explanatory capacity of normative political theory on the basis of shared values is high, especially when the tide of globalization weakens the intermediate and high-level organizations within the national body politic, so that individual citizens become more important than ever before.

### Exchange

Normative political theory based on exchange is represented by Adam Smith. It is well known that of Smith's two major works, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* and *The Wealth of Nations*, the former explains the sources of the human ability to make moral judgments. His key concept is sympathy, whereby the act of observing others makes people aware of others' behavior and the morality of their own behavior. Without sympathy in interpersonal relations, exchange loses its solid base. Even when it is writ large in national and global markets, exchange functions well only if it is grounded in sympathy in social relations. Sympathy is sometimes called social capital by authors such as James Coleman and Robert Putnam, among others. It is not necessary to note that human life cannot function sufficiently well if it is equipped only with exchange instruments and mechanisms. As long as the system of numerous exchange relationships called markets functions well, those normative political theories can be evaluated highly. More frequently, political life calls for schemes and instruments that go beyond exchange. To the extent that exchange helps resolve conflict, normative political theory based on exchange does have good explanatory capacity.

### Coordination

It may be surprising to find that the notion of coordination has not played a major role in the development of normative political theory. It is natural that normative political theory based on conflict abounds, given that all politics is regarded as dealing with conflict-of-interest situations and

friend–foe relations. It is also natural that normative political theory based on exchange abounds because conflict resolution can be achieved often by making use of exchange on a small to large scale. Hardin (2009) points out that normative political theory on the basis of coordination has been insufficiently advanced, perhaps because of a lack of awareness of coordination as a scheme and instrument of politics in a normative political theory framework. Even Hobbes's argument on absolutist rule by a sovereign king can be rendered as normative political theory articulated by the notion of coordination if Hobbesian theory is reformulated within a multilevel, multistage framework. In such a framework, a powerful concept is strategy. Determining how to coordinate when you take Strategy A and your adversary takes Strategy B is complex. Implementing a two-party coordination based on multilevel and multistage strategies makes normative political theory more complex. Yet this line of theorization has been conducted since the mid-20th century in other disciplines, such as military science, business management, and different branches of engineering, often in the form of game theory. Normative political theory with coordination as a key concept is bound to grow, since politics relies heavily on coordination.

## *Six Schools of Empirical Political Theory*

As noted before, schools of empirical political theory are difficult to classify (see Robert Goodin, 2009; Robert Goodin & Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 1996; Fred Greenstein & Nelson Polsby, 1975). Two yardsticks are the behavioral revolution (the 1950s through the 1960s) and the postbehavioral revolution (the 1970s through the 1980s), followed by the "perestroika" movement in the American Political Science Association (the 1990s through the 2000s). With the behavioral revolution, systems theory and behavioralism became prominent. With the postbehavioral revolution, new attempts were made beyond the behavioral revolution in political science. The postbehavioral revolution and the perestroika movement tried to make political science more interpretative, reflective, context sensitive, and path dependence attentive, on the one hand, and more focused on institutions as contrasted to individuals, on rigorous utilitarian calculus versus culturally derived motivations, on neurophysical movement as opposed to manifested human behavior, and on a global outlook as against the perspective of the national organic whole, on the other.

### Systems Theory

Dissatisfied with the state of political science in the 1940s, which was very different from what it is today, Easton attempted, during the 1960s, to make political science a scientific discipline whose theories are derived from empirical testing of theoretically formulated hypotheses on the basis of systematically generated data. By so doing, Easton aimed at creating a "general theory" of politics with a systems theory framework. Easton's famous definition of politics as the "authoritative allocation of values for a society" was born of this systems theory thinking. It was refreshing to those political scientists who were dissatisfied with the political science of that period, with its focus on constitutions and institutions on the one hand and ideas and ideologies on the other. Easton, with Jack Dennis, embarked on the study of a political system in terms of the political socialization of children, whereby children learn about politics from parents, peers, teachers, and preachers. Norms, values, and rules are those components that are channeled from one generation to another in a political system. What was probably felt by those self-claimed systems theory–influenced political scientists was that the political system is a vastly complex set of interactions of actors under a vast array of rules and norms and that theorizing it at a systems level on the basis of empirically derived evidence is definitely a daunting task. The behavioral revolution was raging in the United States concurrently with the acceptance of systems theory thinking. Then came a mild disillusionment with both systems theory and behavioralism in political science, concurrent with the turmoil in the world during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In other words, the limitations of systems theory thinking were deeply felt. Easton himself confessed later that his systems analysis and behavioralism had clear limits.

### Behavioralism

Calls for behavioral persuasion were hailed as revolutionary by enthusiasts, who proclaimed that

it would transform political science from an old, rusty discipline to one of the newest, acclaimed disciplines, with its focus on action rather than intention and motivation and on analysis rather than interpretation. Despite the short-lived enthusiasm for behavioralism, the spirit and style of behavioralism were consolidated in highly reputed journals. Returning to the explanatory capacity of empirical political theory, we can take up Bruce Russett's (1993) democratic peace theory. The hypothesis tested is one of the arguments made first by Kant: A republican regime (as contrasted to a monarchical regime) is less prone to waging war against another republic than against a nonrepublican regime. In contemporary parlance, the hypothesis states that democracies rarely fight each other. Russett made use of pooled time-series data composed of pairs of all the sovereign states each year from 1815 through 1989.

#### Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory was born of formal political theory. Yet it is normally attached to the testing of propositions that are logically derived from a certain set of assumptions and axioms. Its rise was due in part to the steady influence of economics in political science. Also, among the subdisciplines of political science, political economy, in which economics-trained academics like Anthony Downs (1957), Mancur Olson, and Gerald Kramer exerted considerable influence, was widely studied in the 1970s and 1980s. It was also due in part to the reaction against the kind of behavioralism that was criticized as blind and barefooted empiricism. Daran Acemoglu and James Robinson's (2005) *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* is an example. It starts with the presence of different social groups. They prefer different political institutions with different ways of allocating power and resources. The highly resourceful groups want to monopolize power. The rest want democracy. In due course, democracy prevails because the majority wants it. In Thailand, the old elites and the newly growing masses fight each other intermittently, using violence. The old elites have not acquiesced in the capture of power by the masses and have recaptured power by resorting to a military coup d'état. But their reasoning is lucid and general, unlike the largely descriptive political science accounts of such struggles between democracy and dictatorship.

#### Institutionalism

As distinguished from the institutionalism of the past, institutionalism today is called neo-institutionalism. Its key features are (1) a strong empiricism using detailed institutional mechanisms and (2) an ardent comparativism of institutions, which is used to highlight the strength of the argument being made. The following contrast is intended to make the general orientation and product of institutionalism much clearer. If Acemoglu and Robinson are the representative authors of rational choice theory, John Ferejohn is the representative author of institutionalism. Acemoglu and Robinson formulate and test in a more general way. Ferejohn formulates and tests in a more comparative fashion, making the best use of a comparative exercise in hypothesis formulation and testing. These features are forcefully presented in his work on federalism and on war and state building. The limit of institutionalism can be said to depend on the scope and angle of comparative institutional screening and investigation,whether it examines the electoral consequences of electoral rules such as proportional representation and one-person-from-one-district or the social policy consequences of the taxation system.

Neuroscience During the revolutionary period of behavioralism, Easton's *A Framework for Political Analysis* and *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* may be called the bible of behavioralism. Another work that might be considered seminal is Karl Deutsch's (1963) *The Nerves of Government*. It highlights the importance of the nerves of the body politic, which enable flows and feedbacks of information. The work can be regarded as a forerunner of the neuroscience school of politics in a sense, although his framework did not delve into neurons and other neurophysical components and functions. Since Deutsch's interest moved from social communication and nationalism in a divided country to regional integration across the Atlantic, he is often categorized as a behavioralist. The steady advances in neurophysical science since the 1990s may make Deutsch a true forerunner of neuroanalysis. If Tip O'Neill is right when he says, "All politics is local," a neurophysician is right when he or she

says, "All politics is neural." Neuroanalysis is sharply contrasted to behavioral analysis in that the former focuses on intention and motivation as revealed by changes in the neurons in the brain whereas the latter focuses on concrete, visible action. The former does not probe into real intentions and motivations. Scientific advances such as magnetic resonance imaging and other devices have made it possible to interpret and understand human intentions and motivations. In detecting suspected criminals, both assembling material evidence and deciphering the motivations of crime suspects are indispensable. Neuroanalytical data are increasingly used to fathom politics. Giacomo Rizzolatti and Corrado Sinigaglia's (2008) *Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions, Emotions, and Experience* reveals how political science can benefit from neuroanalysis. Although neuroanalysis is not limited to political science, its use is bound increase because, after all, the complexity of politics lies in the fathomability of the movement of brain neurons.

#### Globalism

Political science at the dawn of the 21st century is moving in two opposite directions simultaneously: One is a neuronal direction, while the other is a global direction. Advances in science and technology have enabled human beings to connect with each other far and fast in order to "macrograsp" politics and dig deep into the brain in order to "micrograsp" politics. The tide of globalization was energized by the technological advances in the 20th century. One of them is the electronic revolution in communications, which enabled the movement of money to go "mad," in the words of Susan Strange. It now moves incredibly fast, and along with money, many other things (e.g., commodities, education, medicine, migrants, viruses, crimes, drugs, weapons, and information) move fast on a global scale. Politics is not an exception to this irresistible and irreversible tide of globalization. David Held (1995) is the representative globalist. His *Democracy and the Global Order* builds the normative stand of cosmopolitan democracy founded on various democratic theories. The extent to which normative political theory is really universal and global at the same time was questioned until recently because a large bulk of normative political theory originated from modern Europe, where state building and political theory construction were both carried out mostly on a national scale.

### Conversations Between Normative and Empirical Theories

So far, this entry has summarized three kinds of political theory: classical, empirical, and formal. It has also shown that they are intimately related to each other. In this section, a few illustrations are used to show that normative and empirical political theories can conduct fruitfully their conversations in ways that would help articulate them more sharply and precisely and identify their blind spots, thus enriching each other. Examples drawn from to make this point include warlike democracies and bottom-up regime typology. Both of these draw their propositions from classical political theories, such as those of Kant, Machiavelli, Aristotle, and Charles de Montesquieu, and conduct empirical testing of such propositions to see how much revision is desirable in both classical and empirical theories.

Normative political theory is meant to transcend the particular time and space in which it is generated in its argument about how justice is to be achieved. That is its raison d'être in a sense. At the same time, it is recognized that in normative political theory, issues based on conflict, shared values, and exchange tend to dominate. Those based on shared values have been especially numerous. This is in part because in the latter half of the 20th century, political science publications and their readership have been dominated by academics in the United States who have shown an enduring affinity with liberalism. Empirical political theory is also meant to go beyond the particular temporal and spatial settings so as to be valid under universal circumstances. At the same time, it is recognized that the bulk of empirical political theory has tended to be focused on the latter half of the 20th century and on the United States and the European Union. These two facts together represent a serious problem: Empirical political theory is heavily biased to present the West as a fountain of universal truth and justice.

It is remarkable that Kant, living in Koenigsberg his entire life and witnessing the vicissitudes of life

in European environments, grasped the wave of the future in a most succinct way. Although democracies are peace loving among themselves, they are war prone toward nondemocracies, which they fear are a threat to their existence. The right-wing Kantians were born in the 2000s, in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and the Afghan and Iraq wars. They argued that if Kant had been alive and had observed these events, he would have supported the Iraq war to prevent the weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) state of Iraq from exploding externally. They argued that democracies cannot be just passive, sitting idly by while innocent civilians are being killed and when democracies are challenged by the threat of force. Instead, democracies should fight against antidemocratic forces. In stark contrast to the democratic interventions of right-wing Kantians, the left-wing Kantians called for democracy that rejects interference from outside in the internal democratic affairs of a country, termed *sovereign democracy* by Vladislav Surkov. This refers to the incidents that took place in relation to the democratization and secessionist movements in those societies that used to be united in the former Soviet Union, such as Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.

In the late 18th century, Europe saw the French Revolution and the Napoleonic War. Kant believed that the advent of a republican regime, free trade, and multilateral treaties and international organizations would herald eternal peace in a fledgling form. It is clear that Kant's ideas are surely bound by time and space. In the dawn of the 21st century, we saw the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Afghan and Iraq wars, leading the right-wing Kantians and the left-wing Kantians to argue as to whether humanitarian interventions are justified (the right-wing Kantians) or not (the left-wing Kantians) to propagate democratic regimes from the outside. Thus, we can conclude that normative political theory has, not surprisingly, a context boundedness.

Along a different line of argument, Kant's republics have two types of checks-and-balances mechanisms, according to John Ferejohn and Frances Rosenbluth (2008). *Horizontal checks* are those mechanisms working at the higher level of the legislature and the executive. Lawmakers and law executors are different and separate. Neither can dictate to the other, and thus, a regime's restraining mechanisms work better than otherwise would be the case. *Vertical checks* are those mechanisms working between the elite and citizen levels. Kant's republican democracies distinguish between the decision-making elites and the decision-shaping citizens but only on the condition that they interact with each other. In other words, elites take into account citizen preferences in their decision making, while citizens express their preferences verbally and demonstrably to elites in their decision shaping. Ferejohn and Rosenbluth argue that Kant must be differentiated from Machiavelli in that the republican democracies equipped with checks-and-balances mechanisms in Kant's argument prescribe tangentially against Machiavelli's democratic mobilization theory and, thus, his war-prone democracy theory. Machiavelli's argument is based on the comparison between republican Rome and monarchical Florence. Republican Rome was endowed with soldiers whose war-fighting motivation and capacity were high because it was a politically inclusive regime. Monarchical Florence was plagued by mercenaries whose war-fighting motivation and capacity were not high. Ferejohn and Rosenbluth use Machiavelli to make sense of war-prone democracies as witnessed in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Therefore, according to them, peace-loving and war-prone democracies are not separate but different sides of the same coin.

In 1835, focusing on the armed forces in democracies, Alexis de Tocqueville observed and pointed to the inherent danger of the military conducting activities that might give a bad reputation to democracies. Tocqueville observed that the army in America defended the invaders, who plundered the land originally possessed by natives and broke armistice and peace treaties with the natives. The army was hugely supported by the Americans, who advanced to the west from the initial patches of land on the Atlantic coast as if it were their "manifest destiny," before this phrase was coined later. Tocqueville was apprehensive of the danger of the military having its conduct legitimated by democracies whose ideas he emphatically approves and expressly admires. In the wake of 9/11 and the acts of revenge the United States engineered, Reiji Matsumoto sensitizes this aspect of American democracy fully, citing Tocqueville. In other words, democratic peace and war proneness are different sides of the same coin.

American authors like Max Boot and Robert Kagan make the same set of observations of American being prone to the use of force in settling conflicts of interest abroad even before its independence from England. Both authors are called neoconservative in the United States; in Russia, they are called the Bolsheviks of the 21st century. The American neoconservatives and the Russian Bolsheviks led by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin during the previous century have two things in common: They are idealists, pursuing their ideals with commitment and compassion, and they are realists, legitimating the use of force if their casus belli is deemed justifiable in light of their ideals, such as democracy and human rights. Perhaps Tocqueville was right in his instinctive apprehension since he had experienced democratic imperialism in Europe in the form of the revolutionary war waged by Napoleon Bonaparte.

Classical political theorists often talk about regime types. Aristotle, in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, argues that ethics is the basis of politics. Thus, depending on the prevailing ethics in society, three regime types are identified: monarchy, aristocracy, and *politeia*. Monarchy is shaped by the kind of ethics that prevail between a father and a son; aristocracy is shaped by the kind of ethics that prevail between a husband and a wife; and *politeia* is shaped by the kind of ethics that prevail between an elder brother and a younger brother. Aristotle's theory is monadic in the sense that once the prevailing ethics is identified, the regime type is automatically determined. Montesquieu's (1748) *Spirit of Law* is also monadic. Three regime types—republicanism, monarchy, and autocracy—are determined by the driving spirit of a regime. Republicanism is driven by virtue, aristocracy is driven by honor, and autocracy is driven by fear. It is clear that the relationship between citizens and the state is monadic and that once the regime type is specified, the prevailing ethics of citizens is also specified. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Weber talked about regime types via means of regulation—that is, charisma, force, and legal rationality. Again, the monadic determination is assumed. Once the means are specified, regime types are determined, and vice versa. The state of affairs has not changed much even in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. For instance, Stein Rokkan, during the 1960s, articulated the formation of democratic states in European history. Yet Rokkan talks about only regime types, not citizens. One may wonder why there has been little interest in citizens and their relationship with the state when opinion polls are conducted all over the world, including in many authoritarian societies. Until recently, one could explain the paucity of discussion on citizens in theories about the state as the main theories deal with the institutions rather than with the social actors.

Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* makes ethics shared and practiced by a certain set of people the determinant of regime types—thus his regime types of monarchy, aristocracy, and *politeia*. Within *politeia*, he has three regime subtypes: autocracy, oligarchy, and democracy. How are the three regime subtypes of politeia determined? Some scholars conjecture that those regimes subtypes are not well "disciplined" by a certain set of ethics the way monarchy and aristocracy are determined by what is called the societal regime prevailing at the bottom. Ethics here is broadly understood as the prevailing political culture, whose key components are defined as identity, confidence, and satisfaction. These few societal regime types are not quite formulated at an abstract level that may be comfortable to some political theorists. But it is important to stress the need to initiate conversations. The classical theorists may start from anywhere they wish. The empirical theorists may start from the point where they are most comfortable. What is important is that they must move in new directions, which could bring them to carry out conversations tête-à-tête, instead of digging holes on both sides of what might be called the Maginot line of both schools of theorists.

With survey and nonsurvey data being continuously collected, empirical political theorists must grapple with the bottom-up determination of a regime type. So must normative political theorists. Neither normative nor empirical political theorists should discuss a regime type without examining the bottom level, that is, the citizens. The theoretical problem does not end here. Even in the general discussion of a regime type, say democracy, fuzziness abounds in the usage of this term.

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*See also* Concept Formation; Epistemological and Methodological Foundations; History of Political Science; Normative Political Theory; Political Philosophy; Political Science

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## Politicization of Bureaucracy

Politicization of the bureaucracy is best understood in reference to two phenomena that are sometimes related. The first is the attempt of political principals to exercise control over the bureaucracy. Because politicization thus understood is in the first place an aspect of particular institutional structures, it may be called *institutional politicization*. The second form of politicization occurs when this control is exploited—that is, when the bureaucracy behaves in a manner responsive to politicians. Because the entailed notion of politicization refers primarily to patterns of behavior rather than features of institutions, it is significantly distinct from institutional politicization. This second notion is called behavioral politicization. Although both types of politicization are often criticized, their social consequences vary. Thus, while a given instance of politicization can be evaluated, a broad a priori claim about politicization of the bureaucracy is difficult.

### Institutional Politicization

Politicians have many means at their disposal for influencing and controlling the bureaucracy. These include administrative procedures, budget controls,

oversight, and prior review of agency action. The mechanism most commonly associated with politicization is staffing an agency with appointees chosen by politicians, usually in the executive branch; the higher the proportion of political appointees within the agency and the greater the extent of their penetration of the agency hierarchy, the more politicized the agency is. Thus, the United States Office of Management and Budget, with more than 7% of its staff appointed by the executive, is more politicized than the United Kingdom's Treasury Ministry, with only seven political appointees, or 0.5% of its staff. This entry focuses on political appointees rather than the other mechanisms of institutional politicization.

A politicized bureaucracy can be contrasted with one that is neutral, autonomous, or insulated—that is, one free from influence by the political branches and able to pursue its own agenda. Agencies may be free to do so by virtue of stalemates between political actors, each actor seeking to influence agency decisions, having cultivated a sufficiently influential constituency of its own, or monopolizing the information necessary for effective oversight. Political appointees within the bureaucracy can also be contrasted with careerists who enter the civil service and work their way through its ranks. This distinction is particularly important because careerists typically enjoy tenure, promotion, and salary protections. Careerists are thus not chosen by politicians. Rather, they are typically selected on the basis of objective measures, such as a competitive exam or special education (e.g., the *Ecoles Nationale d'Administration* and *Polytechnique* in France), and are insulated from politicians. This insulation should not, however, be overstated: Politicians can still influence careerists within many systems by offering transfers to prestigious posts and manipulating budgets.

There are two general motivations for institutional politicization. The first is patronage, where political appointments are created and filled as rewards to political allies or in exchange for favors. Patronage appointments are often "spoils" distributed by winners to those who aided in the campaign. The second is policy oriented. Politicians, usually executives, can politicize an agency to acquire greater control over it, staffing it with personnel of their choosing and whom they can dismiss. In this manner, politicization is a means by which executives steer policy. Similar reasoning informs the extent of institutional politicization when programs are enacted or implemented. If they anticipate losing political control, supporters of a new bureaucratically administered program may try to place it in an insulated agency dominated by careerists, whereas opponents may do the opposite, favoring increased politicization of the agency as a means of managing the program when they come to power. Similarly, a legislature faced with a hostile executive may prefer careerist administration of policy rather than politicization as a means of cabining the executive's influence.

## Behavioral Politicization

Institutional politicization is frequently a determinant of behavioral politicization; structures that grant politicians influence over the bureaucracy will make it more responsive to them. Institutional politicization is not, however, a necessary precondition of behavioral politicization. The bureaucracy can adjust its behavior out of an internal norm, for example, or in anticipation of a threat of institutional politicization. Likewise, as indicated by the patronage motivation for political appointments, institutional politicization does not always lead to or seek to implement behavioral politicization. Institutional and behavioral politicization, as defined here, have a close relationship, but one does not necessarily imply the other.

Analytically, behavioral politicization can be further divided into two types. Behavioral politicization can indicate a shift in policy mediated through the bureaucracy. A new administration can usher in a new set of priorities and programs, and agencies may alter their behavior to better realize these goals. It can also indicate using agency discretion for purely political ends, such as directing government funds toward political allies or targeting opponents for investigation and scrutiny by enforcement agencies. The first, more general type of behavioral politicization is not normatively suspect, while extreme or egregious examples of the second are often made unlawful, such as under the Hatch Act in the United States, which forbids many government employees from using their official authority to influence or interfere with elections. An a priori normative evaluation of behavioral politicization in general is therefore difficult.

## Effects of Institutional Politicization on Agency Performance

Some research indicates that increased institutional politicization in the form of political appointees decreases agency performance. However, this finding hinges on the presence of several key conditions. First, it requires that bureaucratic management expertise is site specific, so that it is not enough that the manager understands the policy area, the political environment the agency operates within, and so on. Instead or in addition, it assumes that an effective agency requires staff with particular knowledge about agency structure, budget, internal culture, and so on. A variation on this assumption is that public management is idiosyncratic, so that other management experience—which political appointees tend to have—does not transfer well. The contention is that appointees are generally less familiar with navigating the bureaucratic environment or marshaling coalitions to support their agenda. The second condition is that appointees with the relevant expertise and experience cannot be found or that the costs of doing so are unreasonably high. The third is that political appointees do not offer their own countervailing advantages. The alternative being assumed away is, for instance, that a political appointee, who is far more likely to have served in the White House or Congress, could not use those connections to facilitate achieving the agency's goals within its political environment.

If all these conditions hold, then ceteris paribus, the greater the extent of institutional politicization through political appointees, the less effective the agency will be at its allotted tasks. But these conditions are demanding. While there exists some empirical support for the first and second conditions, they may not hold universally even in the archetypal case of a patronage appointment where a neophyte is given a position as a reward or political favor. Furthermore, the alternative—careerist bureaucrats—can have its own drawbacks. Careerists, especially if they are insulated from political principals, can shirk their duties, become captured by the interests they are charged to regulate, or cultivate their own influence over policy.

Civil service career protections may help encourage bureaucrats to develop expertise, which alone would support concerns about institutional politicization. However, the most systematic arguments for this view demonstrate that bureaucrats only develop expertise if they have policy preferences and are given some control over such issues. This implies that perhaps the ideal system is a hybrid of institutional politicization and the civil service protections typically enjoyed by careerists: Politicians can staff agencies with those who care about the relevant policies, rather than using an objective staffing mechanism such as an exam, and then provide agency employees with job protection. So long as the bureaucrats are given some influence over policy, they will invest in developing expertise.

## Politicization and Democracy

In addition to its possible impact on agency performance, institutional politicization can strengthen democratic control over policy by making the bureaucracy more responsive to (elected) politicians. There is thus the potential for trade-offs between efficiency or expertise and democratic accountability.

As previously noted, institutional politicization can lead to behavioral politicization. If voters exercise effective control over their representatives, then behavioral politicization does not threaten democratic control. The politicized bureaucracy is responsive to politicians and acts accordingly, and in this case, the politicians are in turn responsive to the voters. The result is essentially the same as if the bureaucrats were elected directly. Put another way, if the principal–agent problems between the voters and elected officials are resolved, then politicization need not undermine democratic control of policy. Institutional politicization is a possible means of resolving the principal–agent problems between politicians and bureaucrats, so that the politicized bureaucracy's behavior (i.e., behavioral politicization) is ultimately responsive to the voters.

This analysis assumes, however, that bureaucratic policy is a salient issue for voters, that is, that they are willing and able to condition their vote for the political controller of the agency on the bureaucracy's actions. If out of ignorance or other reasons they cannot, then behavioral politicization can be used to deliver targeted benefits (penalties) to allies (enemies) in order to gain political advantage.

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*See also* Accountability, Electoral; Agencies; Bureaucracy; Bureaucracy, Rational Choice Models; Effectiveness, Bureaucratic; Politicization of Civil Service; Principal–Agent Theory

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## Politicization of Civil Service

The term *politicization of civil service* refers to the introduction of political considerations into actions traditionally carried out by the civil service, thus changing political-administrative relations. There are three established ways of studying this process, reflecting somewhat different understandings of the basic concept. The first tradition concerns how civil servants are appointed and promoted. In politicized appointment and promotion processes, merit-based criteria are replaced by political criteria. Scholars in the second tradition study the political preferences of civil servants, often using attitudinal data, with the aim of answering questions such as whether the civil service is dominated by the political left or the political right. In the third tradition, the actions of civil servants are analyzed to assess to what extent civil servants are directly involved in political decision making. If they are involved, it is seen as an indication of politicization. In this entry, political-administrative relations are first described generally, followed by a discussion of the three traditions just mentioned.

Underlying the concept of politicization is the normative ideal of the separation of politics and administration. The argument is that to prevent corruption and patronage and to shield the expertise of the civil service, the two spheres should not be merged. The scholarly interest in political-administrative relations dates back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when influential authors such as Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber advocated a clear distinction between policy making and administration. The dominant view at the turn of the 20th century was that politicians should be responsible for policy making, while civil servants should execute the decisions taken.

The sharp distinction between the activities of politicians and civil servants has been questioned by many scholars. It has been pointed out, for example, that elected politicians have a legitimate interest in controlling what government organizations do. From a politician's point of view, having party loyalists implementing policies ensures that policies are not changed, or in any other way obstructed, on the way from decision to implementation. The basic idea of this line of argument is that neutral competence is not the only important virtue of the civil service in a democratic society. The neutrality should be complemented by responsiveness to democratically elected leaders. From this point of view, some degree of control, even if it is imposed by politicization of the civil service, could therefore very well be advocated.

However, although it has been claimed that the distinction between politics and administration has been overstated, the ideal of a separation of activities for politicians and civil servants is still very important. Most students of political-administrative relations would today agree that a collapse of political and administrative activities would have severe consequences for both democracy and the efficiency of the civil service.

### Political Appointments

The common view is that political appointments and promotions have increased dramatically during the past decades. There have been numerous reports from countries belonging to different Western administrative traditions, for instance, the

United States, Sweden, Belgium, and the United Kingdom (UK), of an increasing politicization of the civil service. There is also evidence pointing to widespread politicization of the civil service in the developing world. These studies have created a growing and often critical debate regarding the move toward a more politicized civil service, which has engaged also international organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank.

Nevertheless, even if scholars have suggested that there is a common trend of politicization of the civil service, one should be aware of the large differences among countries in terms of the methods, levels, and trends of politicization.

Generally, there are two methods of imposing political control over the civil service using political appointees. The most common method in the Western world is not to directly replace civil servants with political appointees but rather to add a layer of political appointees to the civil service. Political appointees within this new layer take on advisory, public relation, or managerial functions. These functions could otherwise have been carried out by the civil service. In some cases, for example, during the Blair administration in the UK, political appointees mix these roles and serve as spin doctors involved in policy-making processes, the implementation of policies, and public relations. The system with a layer of political appointees has a long tradition in the United States, historically rooted in the so-called spoils system, where party loyalists fill important functions in the executive branch and in federal agencies. Another example of a similar strategy is found in Belgium, where ministers in the government have large private offices, so-called ministerial cabinets, that duplicate civil service functions and give ministers a political apparatus to turn to for advice. There are, however, also examples where political appointments are used directly within the civil service. Germany has, for example, the institution of political civil servants, which refers to the top two ranks of the civil service in Germany. Other examples with a more widespread and direct substitution of civil servants can be found in Southern European countries such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain and on the African continent.

Not only do the methods differ among countries but also the levels of politicization of the civil service. Generally, the levels of politicization of the civil service are higher in developing societies, the two main reasons being a political demand for a committed civil service and the fact that the civil service not only functions as a provider of public goods but is also a valuable asset for the employee. Scholars studying administrative reforms in India have, for example, observed that the neutral civil service was seen as "a hindrance rather then a help" and noted the politicians' demand for a more committed civil service. Another example can be found in sub-Saharan Africa, where the state often is the main employer. Some scholars argue that the primary objective of the civil service in sub-Saharan Africa is not to provide service to the general public but to give rewards to the supporters of the political leader. Turning to the Western democracies, they can be divided into several administrative traditions with different levels of politicization. Countries such as Italy and Belgium, which are influenced by the French administrative tradition, have the highest levels of politicization. This group is followed by countries in continental Europe that are influenced by the German administrative tradition. Then, there are the Scandinavian countries, together with countries belonging to the Anglo-Saxon administrative tradition, such as Ireland, New Zealand, and the UK, with relatively low levels of politicization. There are, of course, several exceptions to this very general observation, but it should especially be noted that the United States, belonging to the Anglo-Saxon administrative tradition, is fairly politicized in comparative terms.

## Political Attitudes

Studies of the political attitudes of civil servants have been used as an indication of the politicization of the civil service. There are at least two different ways in which the attitudes of civil servants are important in the political process. First, the civil service can make up a substantial part of the electorate and therefore be an important actor if it is politically mobilized. Second, and maybe more important in this context, the attitudes of civil servants might sometimes conflict with the attitudes of the political party in government, and this can create obstacles for policy implementation even if the civil servants are not mobilized. Sweden can

serve as an example. In 1976, for the first time since 1936, a government not led by the Social Democratic Party was elected. It is often claimed that the new center-right Swedish government had problems implementing new policies because of the social-democratic attitudes of senior civil servants (even if they were not politically appointed). To avoid similar situations, most countries have subsequently created some kind of legal or normative framework stating the political neutrality of the civil service and/or limiting the political involvement of civil servants. Another example, from the Thatcher years in the UK, can, however, illustrate that conflicts between the political leadership and the civil service are not always about party politics. The Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher tried to implement a radical reform program in the public sector. Studies have shown that the civil service was not trusted to carry out these reforms, and therefore, civil servants in key positions were replaced by persons committed to the reform program. Politicization was based on attitudes to that reform program rather than to the Conservative Party.

### Political Actions

It is inevitable that civil servants take part in the political processes to some extent, since they are parts of politically led machineries. In most countries, top civil servants are also, to some extent, involved in giving policy advice to ministers. However, there are large variations in how the civil service is involved in political actions.

Participation in the policy-making process is regarded as a critical indication of politicization. Generally, the civil service can participate in three different ways: (1) directly, (2) indirectly as actors in the political decisions, or (3) as advisors to the elected politicians.

One example of direct involvement is the Japanese tradition, where the civil service does not limit its role to policy implementation or technical advice but is considered to be a powerful actor in the policy-making process. Until the end of the 1990s, top civil servants even took part in discussions in the Japanese legislature, the Diet, something that would be unthinkable in most other countries. In Spain, civil servants are indirectly involved in the policy-making process. Spain traditionally has a close connection between the political and administrative elites. The political elite is largely recruited from the Spanish administrative corps. It could, therefore, be argued that the civil service is involved in the policy-making process, although not in the same direct way as it is in Japan.

A third example, illustrating the advisory functions of the civil service, can be found in Denmark. It is one of the countries in the world with the fewest political appointments in the civil service. This puts the politically elected leaders in a situation where the civil service is the only body outside the party organization where they can turn for advice. Civil servants in Denmark, therefore, play a significant role in the policy-making process as advisors, and this is paradoxically due to Denmark's low-level, rather than high-level, political appointments.

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***See also*** Bureaucracy; Civil Service; Legitimacy; Politicization of Bureaucracy; Responsiveness of Bureaucracy; Weber, Max

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## Politics and Polity

*See Introduction to Political Science* (Volume 1)

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