concepts from the neurosciences, cognitive psychology, developmental or community psychology, and, maybe, psychoanalysis. But the relevance of each of these approaches depends on the nature of the fields perceived as psychosociological. And it just so happens that these are very different.

Personality Psychology and Politics

Personality is usually defined as an organized, dynamic but relatively enduring set of characteristics that affects how an individual responds in various situations. In the study of politics, a focus on this concept seems to make sense above all when a limited number of key persons are involved in a process of decision making. For example, it would be important to know whether political leaders are proactive or reactive, conciliatory or aggressive, open-minded or close-minded. But personality psychology strongly matters if, and only if, it is believed that the will of a few policymakers and particularly that of the political leadership can overcome the hurdles imposed on the policymaking process and successfully implement their will. This rarely occurs. In most cases, leaders are compelled to search for compromises, to face internal power struggles as well as demands from pressure groups, and to come to terms with the expectations imposed on them by their elite status. So they are obliged to curb their desires, and instead of expressing their genuine motivations (or following what drives them), they adopt behaviors strictly dictated by the power games at play. Thus, it is unsurprising that many sociologists see such psychological approaches as groundless. The real explanatory factors may be elsewhere.

This is all true, but three additional points must be taken into consideration. First, as Fred Greenstein noticed, it may happen that the competing forces of power are so well balanced and under such fluid circumstances that there is space for a key decision maker to make a genuinely free choice among policy options. In this case, psychological characteristics matter. Of course, this situation is much more infrequent in democratic regimes than in dictatorships. Furthermore, in either government structure, leaders are dependent to some degree on the will of their followers and the nature of the alliances they have forged. Second, even if free choice is highly restricted, the fact remains

that personal psychology affects the style of governance adopted and particularly the way in which leaders appeal to citizens, supporters, and opponents. This has a great deal of influence on the course of political life. A charismatic style versus a sober tone or a bright versus a stoic appearance can make all the difference in the electoral process as we saw in the competition between Silvio Berlusconi and Romano Prodi in Italy (2008) or among Barack Obama and several of his challengers in the United States primaries of the same year. Third, personality factors are relevant for leaders acting in situations where strong emotions are triggered, as Betty Glad claims, citing the case of Jimmy Carter handling the Iranian hostage crisis or Ronald Reagan's inability to directly confront people he liked, which hindered his dealings with Menachem Begin at the time of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Investigating the effects of character on role performance is never pointless.

Throughout the 20th century, research in personal psychology dealt with the motivations of politicians and/or their followers. Since the 1950s, many biographical works have emphasized the idea that politicians are qualitatively different from other humans because, as Carol Barner-Barry noted, political behavior is strongly related to making choices between disputed alternatives, strongly oriented toward losing or winning, and often motivated by feelings of justice or fairness. So in these biographers' minds, political involvement derives from special incentives. James Payne (and his associates) have uncovered five main political motivations: the quest for status or prestige, the need to work on concrete issues, the need to have conviviality and friendship, the fulfillment of moral obligations, and the pleasure of competing aggressively in political games. Their research shows how skeptical citizens ought to be about the assertions of politicians, who tend to idealize their motivations. But, even if Payne's list is useful to later analysis, it is too short. Obviously, activists and politicians share other common emotional drives, such as the desire to overcome low self-esteem by public selfrealization or to escape the monotony of life through stimulating social games, not just aggressive ones. In the last few decades, several authors also tried to build ideal types of personality. When applied to leaders, such classifications aim not only to make their behaviors more predictable to

observers but also to uncover the mechanisms by which they charm their followers (or threaten their opponents). Of course, the appeal of revolutionary ascetics or moral masochists differs from that of absolute narcissists or catchall seducers. Moreover, we may expect that revolutionary (and stressing) situations produce different types of leaders than do ordinary democratic times.

Other authors were interested in designing typologies of ordinary citizens. In this field, the most famous investigation was carried out by Theodor Adorno and a team of psychologists and psychoanalysts; their book The Authoritarian Personality (1950) later inspired much subsequent field research in political science. In their view, authoritarian personalities are characterized by traits that result from childhood experiences and become stabilized for life. Harsh and punitive parents produce adults whose personalities are defined by authoritarian submission, conventionalism, destructiveness, superstition and stereotypy, and fear of intraception (the ability to delve into one's deep feelings and attitudes). They used this syndrome to help explain right-wing ideology, prefascism, and fascism. This thesis was widely criticized for methodological flaws, particularly blindness about the characteristics of left-wing authoritarian personalities. But the main objection here is the very use of the concept of personality. Adorno's research implies that political opinions, choices, and behaviors are primarily the outcome of psychological factors since personality is perceived as the center at which such choices are made. It also tends to exaggerate the consistency of individual responses to the challenges of life. Individuals sometimes undergo sudden psychological changes in attitudes, related to changing circumstances such as fear of war, local unrest, or economic decline. For instance, in such trying circumstances, individuals may abandon cooperation strategies in favor of more competitive or defensive ones. In his classic monograph, Personality and Assessment (1968), Walter Mischel asserts that personal psychology searches for consistency in the wrong places (e.g., seeking stable responses in crosssituational behaviors). Because the individual's behavior is highly dependent on situational cues, his or her consistency is found in stable patterns of the "if-then" variety—doing A when X but B when Y. So, for instance, similar aggressive personalities

can differ dramatically in the types of situations in which they are aggressed. So without dismissing some of the psychological insights put forward by Adorno or Milton Rokeach (author of the famous *The Open and Closed Mind*, 1960), it is better to see personality psychology as complementing rather than supplanting sociological approaches. Too much attention to personal psychology can result in too much attention being paid to personal responsibility, while in fact political life is made up of collective processes and interactions.

Today, there is a shift in political psychology toward other conceptualizations borrowed from behaviorist or cognitive psychology. Both underscore the role of external stimuli and their effects on personal behavior. Burrhus Skinner, a very influential behaviorist, has demonstrated that there is a mutual interaction of the ego with its environment. According to his three-step contingency model (stimuli/responses/consequences), everyone develops habits of thinking and acting that are reinforced by their effectiveness in earlier situations. Cognitive processes involve adaptive selectivity. In the political field, this means, for instance, that the development of Adolf Hitler's or Joseph Stalin's personality was itself a process, strongly related to the course of their political rise and sharpening instrumental tendencies with every victorious step. Moreover, it can be said that the economical, cultural, and political circumstances of their days—a humiliating defeat in World War I for Germany, and civil war and the triumph of the one-party system in Russia—played a role in the later selection of these types of personalities as omnipotent leaders. These personality types fit well with the kinds of crises that their respective countries were confronting. Many political scientists may argue that the critical question is not "Which personality?" but "Under which circumstances did particular persons establish themselves as the leader of a country?" Though this argument underlines the importance of social and political considerations, it would be wrong to entirely dismiss the role of personal psychology because it has a significant impact in other ways.

Interactionist Psychology and Groupthink

Rather than focusing solely on factors shaping a person, political psychology must also take into

account interactions between thoughts and feelings that link individuals to each other in a given situation. Cognitive processes such as thinking and judging political events are not affected only by macrosocial influences. Of course, early socialization, economic and cultural status, and religious, ethnic, or political affiliations all shape the ways in which citizens make up their minds in a voting booth or engage in political activities. However, the inner circle—family, friends, highly respected figures—matters, too. And, in this circle, emotional relationships play a significant role. Feelings of confidence or mistrust, a tendency to judge others, the degree of empathy or ambivalence toward relatives, or a fear of annoying them—these kinds of relations can modify a specific behavior like choosing a candidate in an election. It is for this reason that when family or tribal links are strong, as is the case in rural areas or in many non-Western cultures, electoral processes are shaped by factors other than those in more individualistic cultures. Pressure from other members of the "tribe" may compel individuals to endorse particular opinions. In addition, the appearance of competitors may awaken emotional tensions resulting from relationships between parents and children, especially between fathers and sons. A great deal of research shows that these tensions in turn influence the reproduction process of inherited political attitudes.

The influence of these psychological interrelations at a microsocial level is most visible and most consequential for the course of political life when studying decision-making processes. With his theory of groupthink, Irving Janis describes how systematic errors result from psychological biases held by small groups of policymakers taking collective decisions in a very closed (and stressful) environment. The more a group is cohesive, due to its homogeneity of social background and ideology, the more its members value unanimity of thoughts, which in turn may override a realistic perception of facts and alternative interpretations of issues. The risk occurs when the situational context is highly provocative because of recent policy failures or very serious external threats, noticeably in the field of security. The debate can, in these cases, become overloaded with implicit (or sometimes explicit) emotion. Wrong decisions, Janis claims, result

from self-censorship of ideas that deviate from the apparent group consensus—each of the members fearing being dubbed "disloyal" to the leader—and from channels that shield the group from disturbing information in order to prevent too much anxiety. To get rid of these biases, Janis advocates some kind of reorganization of the decision-making process, particularly by setting up several independent groups working on the same issue and by increasing the involvement of outside experts. So we can see that certain methods of political management are—or should be—responses to psychological challenges. Much subsequent research has tried to test Janis's thesis in laboratory experiments or in the field. In a broad survey of post-Janis research, Robert Baron claims that groupthink is even more ubiquitous than Janis asserted. In particular, it occurs even if there are neither external threats nor much anxiety present. So in Baron's opinion, such an approach must not be underestimated for explaining political mistakes and misunderstandings of the challenges to be resolved.

Interactionist psychology investigates phenomena such as the way in which political judgment is shaped among members of think tanks, associations, and parties. In political life, engagement means sharing values and goals with others within an organization and, above all, self-identification with those ideas. Politicians and grassroots activists claim an identity that supposedly summarizes what they think and what they are going to do. They call themselves either Republican or Democrat, right wing or left wing. Even within a party, they often claim an affiliation to one faction. This self-categorization or political identity puts big constraints on their actions: first on the kind of labels with which they can describe a situation and, second, on the set of issues they can take for consideration. The rank and file have to represent the positions traditionally taken by their organization in order to avoid accusations of disloyalty, prevent reproaches from their entourage, and avoid being marginalized—which may be painful. This pressure is stronger where organizations are well established and their members allegedly share mutual friendships, based on a past history of political struggles. Sometimes blind allegiance causes a process of real de-individuation: for example, a loss of self-awareness and personal

evaluation made about political events and leaders. In this regard, if the authoritarian management of a party mostly attracts persons who completely identify with the leader, this generates feedback reinforcing authoritarian management. A process of isolation and insulation from society may result, as many examples of extremist parties (right wing or left wing) demonstrate.

As for leaders, if they have space to undertake initiatives and formulate political judgments of their own, they can work in a more or less polarized world. If the outgroups they confront are particularly despised (which is the case when competition is high), positions issued by political leaders may be greatly—and negatively—influenced by their opponents' stances. "What differentiates your program from your competitor's?" is a common question leaders have to address. But the distinctions these individuals demonstrate from each other may not only be political. We may consider that, in democratic regimes, political action is as much affected by emotions as formal political allegiances. The degree to which one sees his or her opponents as friends or enemies or the degree to which one treats them with deep respect or equally deep disgust colors political life with a touch of psychology.

Mass Belief Systems in Electoral Processes

How do citizens make decisions in the voting booth? This classic question in political science draws much attention. Some researchers argue that votes are generally consistent with the beliefs and political frames with which the voter grew up. In this regard, the so-called Michigan paradigm, identified with the publication of the influential The American Voter (1960), was seminal. This book insists on the long-standing effects of socialization by neighborhood, education, ethnic, religious, and class affiliation. It puts forward party identification as a decisive variable in voting. A second line of thinking sees citizens as relatively naive individuals, relying heavily on wrong, irrelevant, or incomplete information. This research is interested in the way volatile (or nonexistent) opinions are influenced by media coverage in electoral campaigns, above all when real political knowledge is lacking. A third stream of research, closely related to the theory of public choice, underscores the tactical

ability of voters to pursue rational goals. Voters are portrayed as consumers searching for the most efficient costs/benefits choice.

All these explanations rely on implicit or, much less often, explicit psychological considerations, even if they are tightly intertwined with sociological and political ones. Contributors to The American Voter like Philip Converse, a social psychologist, accept this. Whether people have "sticky" preferences that discriminate according to partisan affiliations or remain independent and open-minded and whether they are prone to trust, or not to trust, political parties, governmental agencies, union leaders, and so on, are significantly related to psychological factors. What may be at stake, for instance, are the degree of self-protection involved and the ways and means of keeping oneself safe. Those who score high on attitudinal scales measuring anxiety are more likely to adopt vigilant behavior and show a strictly selected confidence in a few authorities. As soon as the political situation becomes tense, they view the public arena as divided and feel confronted by merciless foes. By contrast, a strong self-esteem makes an individual more open to opposite views without fearing destabilization, more able to understand others' points of views, and eventually, more likely to adopt conciliatory or balanced opinions and behavior.

Political scientists have always known that political choices are related to ideological values in a country's cultural environment. But they seldom investigate this subject in great depth, making it more difficult for them to understand all the various roles ideology plays in thinking and judging. Rationalizing an action through purported values rewards the Ego, helping individuals keep a sense of self-consistency and self-esteem. This idealizes a given behavior with rationalizing explanations; conceals less glorious motivations for action, such as envy, jealousy, and hate; and confirms linkages between individuals—which are of the utmost importance for individuals participating in political organizations. In this respect, ideological and psychological factors are strongly related to each other but in a complex way that needs to be explored. Voters may cast a ballot for a party candidate because they think that he or she is the best or the least distasteful among the choices; but they may also have in mind a desire to show what kind of citizen they are—a responsible democrat, an

enthusiastic patriot, a justice seeker, or even an inflexible rebel—no matter what their real personality may be. Framed early on by socialization and strengthened by the daily influence of an individual's social location, this self-affirmation, ostensibly relying on internalized values, induces a ballot choice that is relatively independent from the real stakes of the polling day (such as policy relevance or candidate competence). It is the reason why public images (of a party or a candidate) matter so much. Politicians, in turn, who make identification processes easier will more easily obtain votes. Issue positions are not enough; a candidate's whole life must testify in his or her favor.

Political psychology, used by political scientists interested in the ways in which mass opinion is created, is hardly psychological in the eyes of "genupsychologists because it considers external structures of psychology as well as internal factors. Cultural linkages, as well as the cognitive, ideological, and institutional structures of the political arena, are all taken into account when considering why citizens make a particular choice. In electoral studies, this kind of political psychology has been drawing more and more attention. Since the later 1970s, research based on surveys or various attitudinal scales has attempted to give a more precise picture of different types of voters by taking into account psychological factors such as whether one is pessimistic or optimistic, self-directed or otherdirected, or confident or suspicious. In a survey, counting likes and dislikes about issues and candidates has become of the utmost importance in predicting electoral choices. These studies have focused less on personality factors than on psychological styles. They are the product of responses extracted from aggregated statistical data, so that certain general categorizations can be correlated with the appeal of public figures in a highly personalized competition. When Jack Doppelt and Ellen Shearer identify five types of nonvoters doers, unplugged, irritated, don't know, and alienated—they shed some new light on the phenomenon of abstention and the reasons why such behavior can be volatile from one election to another. These analyses tend to depreciate the idea that electoral motivations are always based on pure rationality and controlled economic calculus.

The ways in which psychology matters in the voting process are well known. Electoral campaigns

mostly activate psychological predispositions. Beliefs and emotions like fear or hope and anger or enthusiasm influence perceptions and evaluations of public figures (parties or candidates) that, in turn, determine the final choice. But news media attention to particular incidents or hitches in the campaign can also modify the evaluation process, depending on what problems are being stressed: for example, threats to national security, economic crises, immigration, taxes, or purchasing power. Political scandals can also have significant negative effects. So voting should be understood not only as a political outcome but also as a mediated psychological process.

People cannot be locked into precise categorizations. Many citizens change their mind as situations develop, in accordance with changes in the political arena. Even the Michigan model never claimed that party identifications remain indefinitely stable. So snapshots taken at different times of the fluid mood of an electorate enable us to better understand the way in which beliefs and fantasies cause opinions and emotions and eventually lead to a political choice. An interesting discovery in the United States, valuable to some extent for other Western democracies, is that a large range of public likes and dislikes, extracted from frequent surveys, can be aggregated in a "policy mood" (James Stimson) that has swung, over four decades, from a "liberal" high to a low, in regular increments. Politicians cannot take this finding lightly. It remains to be emphasized again that pure rationality and controlled calculus will never successfully explain any particular behavior. But people with higher levels of political information (and education) know better than novices or lower educated persons how to express through strict political rationalizations their candidate or issue preference.

Emotional Intelligence and Related Concepts

Since the later 1980s, emotional intelligence has been given increasing attention in a wide range of academic publications that draw on observations from political scientists. Just as the neurosciences underscore the links between reason and emotion in the way the human brain works, these psychologists dismiss the idea of pure intelligence. Political

scientists may borrow some crucial assertions from Daniel Goleman's book Emotional Intelligence (1995)—above all, the fact that all people harness their emotions, even negative ones, to understand and decipher external information and manage these emotions to achieve their intended goals. Some cross-cultural research suggests that there are many universally recognized emotions, which means they are biological in origin even if cultures interfere in their expression. Of this list, which ranges from 6 to 15 in Paul Ekman's works (the most noteworthy being What the Face Reveals, 1999), some are of greater interest for political studies: anger and fear, disgust, shame and contempt, all are often described as negative emotions; hope and pride, relief, and compassion are all perceived as positive ones. But this opposition (negative/positive), most clearly expressed by the pairing of satisfaction and frustration, needs to be reappraised even if it is still employed in some field research. Why should shame or pride be always seen negatively? More important, each of these emotions is dynamic, and its intensity is strongly related to the internalized ability of each individual to maintain self-control (which develops through early socialization) as well as to the nature of the challenges faced in his or her environment.

The first lesson of this literature is that we cannot avoid taking into account the primacy of feelings in political evaluations—about issues as well as actors. Affects and emotions interfere with political value judgments and contribute to a selective memory of past events, whether they were pleasant or unpleasant. The fact is wellknown to politicians but continues to be underestimated by social scientists. One must expect a complex interaction of emotion and cognition during any deliberation over political decisions. In stressful circumstances, affective states such as fear or anger may unsettle otherwise sound political judgment, resulting in a misperception of the adequate response to a given situation. Noticeably, this is the case when high-level violence occurs, targeting personalities, assets, or even public values. Islamist terrorism has led to suspicion toward Muslim populations, strong war threats have resulted in an overwhelming denouncement of foes, and ethnic disturbances reduce those affected to a single trait of their identity, whether this be origin, religion, or language. But less noticed, even

in day-to-day political life, is that emotions diminish or stimulate an individual's capacity to judge actions or actors. Satisfaction prompts people to distance themselves from disturbing or unpleasant information or to adopt convenient interpretations of it, which in turn make it easier for them to remain satisfied. Frustration causes a symmetrical mechanism of increasing frustration. The more this process remains unconscious, the more it weighs in political evaluations and, particularly, voting decisions. Hope and fear, and pride and humiliation, whether well founded or imagined, are the main emotions interfering with rational evaluations of citizens. In electoral campaigns, this phenomenon is greatly reinforced either by the scarcity or, conversely, the excess of information available, which is in all cases hard to control. Uncertainty in cognition gives way to more emotional investment.

The second lesson is that emotions are the engine of behavior. Where you stand depends on what you feel. When taking any action, most people search to build their self-esteem and earn a good reputation among the individuals or groups whose opinions matter to them. This is at the root of both conformism and rebellion. What differs between people are the values or guides to which they refer. Understanding the intensity and direction of such inclinations is decisive for the interpretation of political choices. But such an investigation may be misguided if too much importance is attached to authors' statements of their own intentions. If circumstances compel people to take actions of which they are not proud, their real motives will, if at all possible, be hidden behind more noble legitimizations. In some cultures, ambition, outrage, or compassion are more or less valued, even if everywhere they are decisive factors that determine the degree of political engagement and its relationship to the quest for self-esteem. So political psychology must study the complex factors that, in any society, tend to stimulate or diminish the public acknowledgment of these motivations. Other people are mainly directed by their fears or even by paranoid hatred. In these cases, it is necessary to delve into the conditions under which these feelings arise or even affect an entire population. We know that people who express strongly held anger as a result of difficult challenges they cannot properly face want to hold

external agents responsible as scapegoats for their troubles. But what explains the trajectory that leads to mass murder or genocidal violence? A combination of sociological and psychological factors must be acknowledged here.

To take into account these dimensions of the political life, it is useful to refer to the theory of rational choice but understood in an untraditional way. The basic assertion of this economic paradigm is that people evaluate the costs and benefits of the choices they have to make and generally prefer the object that provides the greatest reward (utility, attractiveness) at the lowest price. But in political life, this kind of calculus, when restricted to material costs and rewards, is a myth. This is not only because information is restricted individuals are unwilling to pay the high costs for complete information—but also because there are costs and rewards of another kind to be taken into consideration. Rational choice theory sets emotionality and rationality against each other. This is an error. Even if emotions easily spin out of control under certain circumstances, they are always part of the rational calculus. Individuals tend to choose the option that will diminish the emotional costs of fear or humiliation. They want to feel more secure as well and search to heal any frustrations, regardless of whether this may take them down a favorable or unfavorable path. But individuals are also attracted by intangible rewards, such as pride, self-esteem, and even surpassing their image of themselves. All these considerations are just as rational as purely material estimations of gains and losses. And as they weigh heavily in political life, researchers, therefore, should be interested in studying what is called (in contrast to ego-psychology) "situation psychology"—that is, the study of emotional costs and rewards that are predictable in a specific environment. Economic crises create particular concerns and fears; the rise of new leaders with a reputation of efficiency or integrity awakens new hopes for economic improvement, political uprightness, and so on. Politicians value emotional appeals when these further their own goals. In dictatorships or in populist discourses, they will not hesitate to mobilize hatred, suspicion, or aversion. In democracies, fear or hope, and pride or outrage remain instrumental but in a way that encourages sufficient monitoring of their effects. Nevertheless, even in

these regimes, it happens that "rational calculus," including material and emotional rewards or costs, is somewhat suspended because the level of emotional intensity can spiral out of control. This is the reason why it may be said—under these circumstances but only under them—that emotion can become "irrational."

It should not be forgotten that people problematize their own levels of emotional comfort in accordance with their early socialization and expectations derived from their actual position in social life. On the one hand, some research strongly suggests that individuals acquire, in childhood or late adolescence, lasting predispositions that shape their evaluations of the situations they confront. Racial prejudices, ideological identifications, or an aversion to communism or capitalism all may persist throughout life. On the other hand, short-term considerations also influence attitudes and subsequent responses to challenges. For instance, Linda Putnam refers to the concept of "bounded emotionality" to suggest that "interrelatedness" helps shape individual expectations in organizations. In any situation, many factors that can be perceived as opportunities—bringing hopes or threats, or inducing fear-matter as well. So in these instances, attitudes and choices reveal some kind of "rationality," even if (or, more precisely, because) this rationality is based on emotions. Even if sometimes it happens that emotions get out of control, more often than not they are useful in clarifying the real interests and aspirations in a given environment.

Symbolic Politics

The power of political symbols lies in their strong capacity for evocation—that is, to create associative meanings that enrich the way in which people react to them. This can occur first of all with knowledge more or less forgotten but open to being revived when appropriately stimulated. But above all, reactions are elicited from the emotional charges contained in the symbols—because of their historical origins and/or added content since then. Some words in political discourses are not purely referential but engage strong connotations under special circumstances. They are cognitively and affectively loaded. That is the case, for instance, when a highly respected politician is abruptly charged with corruption or treason by an authoritative agency.

Everybody can understand the destructive stigma of such a powerful allegation. When used in all seriousness, some terms that refer to positive values, such as *liberty* or *human rights*, or those that negatively describe political foes, such as *fascists*, *terrorists*, *plutocrats*, or *communists*, appear to contain heavy emotional associations. Choosing an effective label for a political competition or defining appropriately a social mobilization can give an organization or a political figure a distinct advantage in politics. Take the prochoice and prolife movements: Both attempt to associate their position with indisputable values while denouncing their opponents as being antichoice or antilife.

Strong cognitive and emotional connotations are linked not only to single words but also to elaborate arguments. Storytelling discourses, which often incorporate ethical messages, whether strongly negative or strongly positive, can spark any number of emotions, from praise to reproach or even to outrage. This is often the way history is taught at school to very young children, with the aim of having them embrace the heroism of their country's forefathers and feel connected to the accomplishments of their nation while being repulsed by the actions of their enemies. This can have a lasting effect throughout their lives. Political parties may similarly refer to historical figures or invoke longlasting doctrines to make their assertions more authoritative. They may also recall past disasters to extract painful lessons. So some events, personalities, and accomplishments can become overloaded with affective cognition.

Within these storytelling narratives, there are codified lines of argumentation that use a common thread to make sense of the past and the present or to help decipher the future. To identify them, some academics (Ibarra, Kitsuse) have put forward the concept of "rhetorical idioms." These are common-sense constructions of moral competence. Their deployment tends to presume that the listeners are obliged to acknowledge the importance of the values expressed. Moreover, rhetorical idioms are useful in enlisting people to make sympathetic moves in a particular language game. For example, the "rhetoric of loss" or the "rhetoric of endangerment" prioritizes facts and behavior that show, in a more or less simplified way, how people should fear the extinction or devaluation of something highly valuable and cherished, whether this be national pride, ethnic or religious identity, or

political ethics. Such rhetoric appeals to emotional responses: mourning, apprehension, or even dread but, above all, admiration for the potential rescuer and a desire to identify with such a wise prophet.

Symbolism is not restricted to discourses but is also found in both material objects and rituals performed in the political arena. A flag is much more than a simple piece of cloth: it symbolizes the nation, its identity, and glory. Burning a flag is the utmost form of abuse that can be inflicted on the people it represents. The architecture of governmental palaces similarly exhibits power or glory. Statues and monuments, particularly war memorials, signify that they deserve a central place in peoples' imagination and memory. Political rituals such as the opening of a parliamentary session, the appointment of a new prime minister, or diplomatic formalities and protocols—all of these highly codified ceremonies intend to arouse intimidation and deference, to exhibit the gap between ruling personalities and ruled citizens, to signify where the power is and who is to be viewed as being at the center of the social order (Clifford Geertz). But, of course, the substance of the symbolism does not lie within these material objects or ceremonies. Their ability to evoke emotional cognition is contingent on the attitudes and comments they arouse in a given cultural environment. So it may be said that symbolism results from an ongoing process of emotional construction, undertaken by authorities perceived as entitled to do so: intellectuals, social leaders, and politicians interacting with each other. If this process fails, it may be that the symbolic appeal has been exhausted. This may occur when indifference, or even disrespect toward such materials or rites, has developed over time.

What are the uses of symbols and symbolic gestures in politics? They can possibly fulfill three functions, which are all decisive in political life. First, many symbols help develop a feeling of mutual liking and appreciation—what is called "solidarity" in political language. Governments must necessarily try to stimulate solidarity because life in society compels them to impose obligations and sacrifices, which may be more easily accepted if people think they have much in common beyond strict material necessity. A sense of allegiance to a community, within which the members supposedly share the same values and history, makes exercising power much easier. Constructing collective identities, national or otherwise, relies on emotional narratives

that emphasize the great things the people have realized together and the highly prized goals they may achieve if they remain united. The reality of this "imagined community" (Benedict Anderson) is exhibited through the symbols everyone learns to love: keywords such as *republic*, *national state*, and *liberty and equality*; material objects such as flags, war memorials, and other emblems of the community and its legacy; historical figures that are endlessly praised; economic, cultural, and sports achievements as a source of communal pride; and so on.

A second function of symbols in politics is to control the need for peace and stability. In international relations, a policy of recognition—one that accepts the principle of equal dignity between states and recognizes the necessity of taking the blame for injuries and damages inflicted on another by the state—is a major factor permitting appearement between peoples. For this purpose of building better relations with other people, words and gestures matter a lot, as suggested by the respective German Chancellors' kneeling down at the Ghetto Memorial in Warsaw (1970) or a visit to Yad Vashem (2008), both highly charged with emotions. Within any particular state, symbolism appears to be much more intense when institutions become more vulnerable which predictably occurs at certain stages of institutional life. This is the case, for example, with the formation or the replacement of a government. Constitutions provide explicit rules for such transitions. It is necessary to ensure that these rules are uniformly respected in order to create a consensus about the way in which power must be exercised. When people go to the polls, it is of the utmost importance that the outcome be honored. If not, disorder and instability may quickly appear and destroy the rule of law. It is in these times of uncertainty, when current governments are challenged by opposition figures, that comments on the value of an emotional attachment to democratic principles will intensify on all sides. Any fear of death will similarly evoke symbolic displays, whether this be the deaths of soldiers on the battle front or the unforeseen death of a prominent leader. Elaborate ceremonies and rituals are used to restrain confusion and to prevent the situation from getting out of control.

A third function of symbols is to mobilize citizens to support a "good cause." Purely rational considerations are not always sufficient to get people involved in political life, even when their

own interests are at stake. Invoking the breach of equality or the infringement of human rights, both highly prized values, is an effective way to awaken their moral sensibilities and provoke some kind of outrage, which may possibly lead to a commitment to action. More broadly, social problems to be managed by those in power are coded through contextually grounded discourses and vocabularies that designate and dramatize in the same way. Noticeably, they are inhabited by the concept of victim, a putative person being subject to harmful conditions of which a victimizer is the causal agent. For example, common victims include an unemployed, impoverished populace or powerless minorities, while the victimizers may be the wealthy, capitalism, or even the "system" itself. All of these words, when related to a victimization process, become charged with emotional connotations set up by ideologies and, thus, tend to appear as signals for action. In this way, symbolic politics constructs victim-and-victimizer categories within particular universes of morality where there is good to be loved and evil to be condemned.

Short Methodological Considerations

Political science needs scientific precision. This presents a particularly strong challenge in political psychology. First, because emotions are typically volatile or subtle phenomena and, second, because psychological costs and rewards are often far from being transparently displayed. In the past, the key obstacles included a false consensus on imprecise core definitions, a diversity of underlying psychological theories, and above all, insufficient techniques for data collection. Dramatic advances have recently been achieved with the development of rich interview materials using projective questions, ingenious experiments (the first of them being Stanley Milgram's), the construction of attitudinal scales and EQ (emotional quotient) to measure preferences and subjective reactions with performance metrics (Likert, Altemeyer), and even computer simulations. But these methods must avoid traps such as an abundance of missing data points, sample bias, poor psychometric techniques, and the possible contradictions between attitudinal factors and real behavior. Certain phenomena will never be well understood without longitudinal research that still remains quite scarce. Furthermore, even

if the positivist-empirical leaning of modern political psychology indisputably favors strong breakthroughs in better understanding the emotional dimensions of political life, there are possible negative implications as well. One may be tempted to give up questions that are too difficult to translate into solid empirical inquiries or to use exaggerated simplifications. Less sophisticated observations may produce more richness, even if the findings cannot be so strongly asserted.

At this point, it is necessary to discuss what room may be left to psychoanalysis. In mainstream political psychology, this theory is widely ruled out as a method of analysis. This is right because its techniques are far from being compatible with social science requirements of intersubjectively transmissible and controllable findings. Nevertheless, if something is to be borrowed from psychoanalysis, it should be the theory of defensive attitudes in a protection of the self. The blocking of cognitive representation and affect (denial), a sudden reversal to take the opposite position, a projection leading to rationalization or identification with the other—all these processes matter greatly when dealing with psychological or sociological material. The more a researcher seriously engages with these processes, the more likely it is that he or she will be able to identify both the bias that may interfere with his or her interview or discourse material and the bias he or she may experience when setting up a research project.

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See also Beliefs; Electoral Behavior; Groupthink; Identity, Social and Political; Psychological Explanations of International Politics; Rituals; Symbols, Political

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POLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS

Political risk analysis is rooted in the intersection between politics and business. It analyses the probability that political decisions, events, or conditions will significantly affect the profitability of a business actor or the expected value of a given economic action. This definition incorporates three different approaches among early theorists about the sources of political risk—namely, a focus on foreign national governments, the recognition of the impact of actors from both government and nongovernment circles, and an emphasis on historical and cultural environments. A wide spectrum of political risks may affect business, and political risk analysts use both qualitative and quantitative frameworks to analyze and assess the risks to business.

Cross-border traders and investors are often involved in forms of political risk analysis. However, political risk analysis only became recognizable as an institutionalized business practice in the United States in the 1970s. Several factors enhanced the prevalence of international business activities at the time. Simultaneously, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil boycott in 1973 resulted in a partial institutionalization of the political risk function in more U.S. companies. This function became full-time and more firmly centered in many businesses after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Most initial academic research on political risk analysis was also done in the 1970s and 1980s.

Political risk analysts identify political risks and their variables, assess their significance and the relationships between them, and make recommendations regarding the management and mitigation of political risks. Social science research and nonacademic interpretations of current affairs influence all three phases—namely, the analysis, assessment, and management of political risk. In principle, political risk could also be useful in analyzing the general judgment and policy design of politicians under conditions of uncertainty. However, political risk analysis is undertheorized in this regard and currently remains rooted in the intersection between politics and business.

Although political risk analysis could apply to domestic business, in practice it mostly comes into play when a business is considering business activities in other countries. In the academic literature, the focus tends to be on political risk analysis related to foreign direct investment (FDI) rather than relatively passive portfolio investment. The exposure of assets or personnel in FDI reinforces the relevance of political risk analysis. However, political risk can also affect the expected profits

and market stakes of exporters, contractors, and licensors.

Sources of Political Risk

Several, sometimes overlapping, government functions can have an impact on business. In many industrialized countries, its role as a regulator is especially extensive, resulting in legislation related to the environment, health and safety, employment, trade unions, and consumers. A government can also serve as a restrictor (tariffs and trade quotas), redistributor (taxation and welfare policies), director (training, regional and sectoral development, and human resource policies), customer (procurement), or sponsor (subsidies).

Some authors contend that there is an inbuilt potential bias in political risk analysis, whereby any government intervention in the economy is seen as potentially negative, even though such an intervention may be motivated by relevant local interests and aspirations. It is in any case meaningful to locate the particular relationships between multinational business and national governments or other political actors when assessing the actual political risk. The particular cultural and historical context may also influence political risk—for example, where energy or mineral companies are associated with earlier colonial projects in Africa or the Middle East.

The most familiar relationship between business and political authorities is a cooperative arrangement, where negotiations are ongoing and a normal part of operations. While the government would not act deliberately to affect operations, the company would only use lobbying, either singly or through participation in probusiness pressure groups and associations. A second relationship would be collaborative, consisting of joint-venture relationships with public sector companies or privately owned companies with a strong governmental presence.

An authoritative relationship applies when a multinational corporation and a government are at loggerheads. Mostly, a government can impose new rules, which may result in divestment by the company. Two other relationships are far less frequent. A home government may use a multinational company to promote its political objectives. Alternatively, in the case of subversion, a multinational company may actively work to undermine a

host government, partly with the covert encouragement of the company's home government. In the latter two cases, the conduct of business can also constitute a source of political risk.

Risks to business in a country may not only ensue from a government in a foreign country but also from actions by the governments in its neighboring or other countries. Transnational or international actors, opposition groups and other domestic stakeholders, and the particular political field in a country may become linked to political risk. In some countries, due to the power or authority of informal networks linked to the government, these groups, rather than the government, may be the main source of political risk to a particular business.

Types of Political Risk

Political risk may vary at different business levels—that is, for all foreign business actors, a particular industry or company, or a particular project. It also depends on the type of investment, its methods of financing, its location, and the time frame involved. Political risk may have an impact on one or more aspects of a business actor, including personnel, assets, contracts, operations, transfers, company goals, and business continuity. The impact may be directly or indirectly in the form of opportunity costs forgone.

Risks to personnel and operations may include intimidation, kidnapping, sabotage, and terrorism, if these risks are motivated by political concerns. However, some of these risks may also ensue from nonpolitical actors and constitute a general security risk only, requiring a different set of preventive measures and incident responses. Asset risks may include general nationalization and specific expropriation, restrictions on ownership, and an insistence on locally owned shareholdings or local directorships. Contractual risks may include changes in contractual conditions due to legislative or bureaucratic action, or the frustration of contracts due to violent or political change, including a revolution, civil war, secession, interstate war, coup d'état, or peaceful succession.

Risks to operations are a wide category and include all host country regulations that affect business operations. These may include labor relations, taxation, restrictions on labor or

technology transfer, and local product content regulations. Some other examples include quotas and tariffs, environmental and consumer protection, antitrust and merger laws, discrimination in awarding contracts, and bureaucratic nepotism. Transfer risks could include exchange controls, profit repatriation, and restrictions on royalty payments. Local variations in these risks are also possible in countries where the regional authority of an area is at loggerheads with the central government of the country or where a local power broker is the actual authority on the ground.

Differentiating Political Risk Analysis From Country Risk Analysis

Political risk analysis partly grew out of the country risk analysis conducted by major banks and international economic agencies. The analysis of country risk and political risk differs but may sometimes overlap. Country risk analysis tends to include political risk but also economic and operational risk. Some of the economic factors included under country risk, for example, a bad balance of payments and low creditworthiness, may reflect an inability to pay debt but may also result in a political risk—namely, an unwillingness to pay debt. Political risk may also overlap with some of the country risk factors, where events, foreign confidence, and capital inflows meet.

Political stability as an indicator is included in comparative country risk-rating systems such as the Peren-Clement Index or the Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) Index. However, the management of political risk may differ from that of country risk. For example, many political risks are insurable, whereas many economic and financial risks included under country risk are not.

Political risk analysis may distinguish between a microlevel and a macrolevel political risk. A microlevel political risk is a risk specific to a business or some sectors only. A macrolevel political risk is a non–project-specific risk that affects all participants in a given country. However, it does not include country-level political risk alone, but it may link local, national, and regional political forces, events, and environments. Depending on the requirement of the particular business, political risk analysis can focus on both or one of the two levels.

The Methodology of Analysis

Some major business actors have in-house analysts, while others at least partially outsource the task of analysis to specialist providers. A company's need for political risk analysis may differ at different times. The perceived need for political risk analysis tends to be higher around the decision to enter or avoid a particular country's marketplace, but different forms of political risk analysis are also used as a regular form of early warning, to periodically review in-country operations, or sporadically in response to new uncertainties or setbacks.

Political risk itself is a subjective category and will vary according to the actor defining the risk and the field of action. While pure risk only entails loss or a chance of loss, speculative political risk can entail the chance of both loss and opportunity. In this regard, political risk analysis is not necessarily a linear process of unilateral communication but may become part of an ongoing dialogue between the analysts and (other) actors within the particular business, who may have a better appreciation of the particular business or project than the analyst.

Analysts use both quantitative and qualitative models for analysis, and there is no consensus on the methodology. A model is an extended representation to better understand, adapt to, manage, and control identified political risk factors. The number and nature of variables, their combinations, and the weights assigned to them by the model builders are based on the interpretative frameworks used by political risk analysts.

Quantitative assessment models include complex econometric models and simpler macropolitical risk indexing models that purport to assess various indices such as political stability, based on nominal, ordinal, or interval variables. Some models have been designed for particular sectors, for example, the financial or energy sector, and most models also include an element of qualitative judgment.

The main qualitative techniques are judgmental forecasting, for example, the so-called Delphic method or accumulation of expert opinion under controlled conditions and involving expert feedback. Informal brainstorming between experts is also used, especially where time is of the essence. A more systematic scenario model may be used to identify key assumptions and key drivers to then construct several alternative futures within different

time frames and to estimate the likelihood of different outcomes and their impact on particular business concerns. Political risk analysis aims to provide insight into where a business needs to intervene in the political process if it wants to change the environment, mitigate its potential risks, and maximize its potential opportunities.

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See also Risk and Public Policy; Stability

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POLITICAL SCIENCE

See Introduction to Political Science (Volume 1)

POLITICAL SCIENCE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Contemporary political science has its ancient roots in the legislations, teachings, and writings of Greek and Roman statesmen, travelers, historians, and philosophers. The issues that concerned them, their reflections, and their advice dominated

European thinking on politics to the Enlightenment, enriched by medieval, Renaissance, and early modern authors. They are still considered relevant by a substantial number of political scientists—not, quite clearly, by a majority. Political science began to be recognized as a legitimate academic discipline, on the same plane as history and economics, and later sociology and psychology, in the second half of the 19th century, in Europe and the United States, and with surprising speed in the latter country. This institutional recognition is considered first. The second part of this entry deals with the birth, programs, and impact of the international institutions, communication media, and exchanges that have shaped the present political science community since the end of World War II. This account draws on an extensive literature, too abundant to be quoted, and also on the author's close connection with the International Political Science Association (IPSA) since 1952.

Institutional Institutionalization Through Recognition

The first professorships and chairs dealing with politics were created in the Netherlands, at the University of Leiden (1613); in Sweden, at the University of Uppsala (1627); and at the Åbo Akademi (1640), now in Finland. Several professorships and departments, including in their title political science or government, were created in the United States in the second half of the 19th century, starting in 1857 at Columbia University. In Europe, political topics started to be taught at about the same time, as part of the training of future civil servants and members of the political elite. In France, the École libre des Sciences Politiques [Free School of Political Sciences], set up in 1872 as a private institution in reaction to France's defeat in 1871 in the war with Prussia, used in its name the plural, thus including the study of politics in the social sciences. The *École* inspired the creation of the Columbia School of Political Science (1880) and the London School of Economics and Political Science (1895), both of which used the singular; similar institutions that followed the École's model were later created in Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Germany, and Czechoslovakia.

The main impetus came, however, from the United States, where a substantial number of

chairs and departments of political science, and also of government or public administration, were established in the fourth quarter of the 19th century. The existence of an American community of political scientists led to the creation in 1903 of the American Political Science Association, the first of its kind, and of the *American Political Science Review* (1905). National political science associations were later created in Canada (1913), in conjunction with economics, and in China (1932), Finland (1933), and India (1938).

In Europe, with few exceptions, political science topics were investigated, analyzed, and taught in the 1920s and 1930s by journalists and civil servants and by academics from disciplines such as history, public and constitutional law, sociology, geography, and philosophy. Politics was meant to provide flesh to the abstract approaches; thus, the study of political parties and elections added reality to the traditional state doctrine and constitutional law. Analysis of political ideologies led to the study of political movements and revolutions, for which traditional political philosophy did not account. Political science was not recognized as a discipline and certainly not as a "science." At best, political topics were seen as belonging to an interdisciplinary field and politics as a "crossroads" discipline.

At the same time, in the United States, partly under the influence of American sociologists, social psychologists, and empirically minded economists, political scientists were increasingly attracted by theoretical rigor, quantitative analysis, and systematic comparisons. The influx of German and Central European social scientists, including refugee scholars before and during World War II, contributed to that transformation. The study of mass phenomena, such as elections, public opinion, communications, authoritarian regimes, and international relations, justified innovative approaches, enriched by the views and the experience of the refugees, who found a hospitable haven in American universities at a time when Europe was isolated and European social science stifled, when not suppressed, except in the United Kingdom (UK). Crossbreeding was important, as these European scholars discovered the unfamiliar realities of American politics and America's political traditions.

When the war ended, émigré social scientists, some of whom had, at U.S. and Canadian universities, embraced political science, were invited to

teach at universities of their home countries, together with native American colleagues, and laid the ground for the recognition of their discipline in Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and many other countries. Their courses and some of the research fields that they opened up or investigated in new ways contributed greatly to interest in political science as a discipline. European graduate students crossed the Atlantic, professors met foreign colleagues at professional conferences, and the gap was progressively closed. Their contributions to a better and richer understanding of politics and the use of more rigorous approaches and research methods were increasingly accepted, not without resistance, however, from traditional scholars. The same applied to Asian countries such as Japan and later Taiwan and South Korea.

The recognition of political science as a discipline outside of the United States was generally a slow process. It depended very much on the strength of contrary academic traditions, on the sympathy or hostility of scholars in other fields of learning, and on the institutional setting. It was understandingly more difficult in educational systems where decisions concerning the curricula and recruitment procedures were made at the ministerial level than in those where universities enjoyed substantial autonomy; this was more rapid in the United Kingdom and in countries where the knowledge of English made for easier and more intense exchanges and access to the relevant political science works. The UK itself, however, was for many years a hotbed of such resistance.

Thus, even in countries where political science topics were commonly analyzed and taught, the obstacles to recognition proved difficult to overcome. In the UK, with its long and glorious tradition of political inquiry and reflection, there was thus still no political science department at the close of the 1940s, and it is significant that the discipline's academic association, founded in 1950, is still called the Political Studies Association of the UK and its official journal, *Political Studies* (1953); the rival British Journal of Political Science was launched only in 1971. Political topics were long taught by historians, sociologists, and sometimes very eminent constitutional lawyers and political philosophers, even at the London School of Economics and Political Science, rather than by political scientists.

The situation was partly similar in France, with an additional institutional obstacle: While in the UK, the Scandinavian countries, or the Netherlands universities enjoyed great autonomy, French universities had only a nominal existence until 1968; higher education was administered by a government department and organized at the level of facultés. Of the various social sciences, history and sociology as well as philosophy and geography belonged to the Facultés des Lettres (schools of liberal arts), and law and economics to the Facultés de Droit (law schools). The proponents of modern political science were thus divided between two separate schools in the universities in which they were active. Introductory political science courses, which became mandatory in the law schools' curriculum in the 1950s, were taught mainly by professors of public law who had had no training in political science and often not much respect for it. For many years after 1945, the main institutions that developed both teaching and research in political science were the Paris Institut d'Études Politiques [Institute of Political Studies] and the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques [National Foundation of Political Science], the heirs of the École libre des Sciences Politiques, jointly known as Sciences Po, where research centers on French politics, area studies, and international relations were created in the late 1950s and the 1960s. The resistance of the law schools, finally overcome by public law professors who considered themselves political scientists, prevented, until 1971, the creation of political science doctorates and the adoption of a procedure for the recruitment of political science professors. With a distinct chronology, conditions were not very different in Germany, Italy, and Spain, unlike the UK, where academic autonomy allowed a spectacular development of disciplinary teaching and research, with ever more professorships and departments attracting an increasing number of students.

American political science has remained dominant, thanks to the number and variety of U.S. university institutions and the recognition of the relevance of the discipline for nonacademic careers. It has been supported by the major foundations concerned with the development of the social sciences and by the creation of cooperative institutions such as the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research established in 1962

at the University of Michigan, which has provided access to a huge international collection of social science data. The annual American National Election Studies, also based at the University of Michigan, and since 1997 considered a national resource by the National Science Foundation, have provided since 1948 invaluable data on the electorate and public opinion. Institutions linked to the military, such as the RAND Corporation, have contributed to the development of strategic studies. Many new theoretical approaches and methodological innovations or improvements have thus originated in the United States and spread everywhere. Some proved to be fads, but the "behavioral revolution" of the 1960s, which emphasized rigorous analysis of political processes-sophisticated treatment of quantitative data, comparative analysis, and the study of new fields—decisively supported by nongovernmental bodies such as the Social Science Research Council and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, has had a lasting influence, despite its excesses. A large number of increasingly specialized journals were created; the advent of the information technology revolution, which has transformed both research and teaching, resulted also in what many political scientists consider an unhealthy fragmentation of the discipline.

By the 1960s, it became obvious that for its acceptance and development, political science needed an environment that favored, or at the very least allowed, freedom of investigation and thought. Authoritarian regimes do not encourage or even tolerate analyses that highlight their shortcomings. The political science map coincided very clearly with that of democracy. But there were hidden exceptions: The rulers of powers such as the Soviet Union understood that for policy-making purposes, they needed reliable information and analyses. Strongly controlled centers were set up, where broad access to foreign publications was provided. The collapse of communism revealed their existence, and starting in the 1990s, there appeared in many countries of the former Soviet bloc political science journals and books of a quality close to the internationally recognized standards. A new generation of well-informed political scientists, secretly self-trained, became visible. Political science began to be taught in universities, and the map changed rapidly. The same phenomenon had earlier happened in European countries such as Spain and

Portugal and in various Latin American countries, where dictatorships had prevented the open development of political science. High-quality scholars, who had found refuge in the United States and Europe, went back when conditions changed and contributed to the academic acceptance and development of their discipline.

International Institutionalization Through Organizations and Associations

A new and important factor of institutionalization at the international level was the creation in 1949 of the IPSA, to which most of this second section will be devoted.

Before World War II, political science was highly developed, recognized, and taught in the United States in a majority of colleges and in most research universities at the graduate level. It was also taught under various names and in various forms in certain European and Asian countries. There were, however, almost no organized international contacts other than visits and exchanges of scholars and students. The Political Science Congress held in Paris in 1900 was not followed by any large international meetings except for a few regional ones, such as the Scandinavian Political Science Congress held in Stockholm in 1930.

The only organization of any importance was active in the field of international relations. Sponsored by the League of Nations' International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC), located in Paris, a Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations had been created in 1928; it changed its name in 1933 to International Studies Conference (ISC). The ISC used for its operations the Secretariat of the IIIC and held annual conferences, the last of which was held on the eve of the war, on August 30, 1939. It was unable to survive the postwar creation of the broader IPSA.

A few other bodies had existed. The International Institute of Political and Social Sciences in their Application to Countries With Different Civilizations did survive but devoted itself mostly to the study of colonized areas. The International Institute of Political and Constitutional History, renamed the International Academy of Political Science and Constitutional History, was, despite efforts by

some of its leading members, active mainly in the field of history.

The organization responsible for the conception and birth of IPSA was the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Implementing a recommendation made at its very first General Conference (Paris, 1946), the second General Conference (Mexico, 1947) instructed the Director General to promote a study of political science. The UNESCO Social Science Department had singled out that discipline because political phenomena were considered major factors of tensions and because intellectual cooperation was hopefully seen as contributing to the maintenance of peace.

The process soon gained impetus. A massive international study of political science, or its absence, was undertaken by UNESCO in 1948 under the leadership of an American scholar, William Ebenstein, of Princeton University. The huge resulting volume, including no less than 51 national reports, was published by UNESCO in 1950. At a coordination meeting held in 1948 at UNESCO's headquarters in Paris, political science was tentatively defined as comprising political theory; central, regional, and local institutions; parties, groups, and public opinion; international policy and organization; and international law. It was also decided to call a conference to examine the possibility of creating an IPSA.

At that conference, held in September 1949, at the initiative of UNESCO's Director General, 23 scholars—political scientists, political theorists, sociologists, constitutional lawyers, and historians—considered and approved a draft constitution for the future body, constructed as a federation of national associations, and elected a provisional executive committee. UNESCO was similarly active in the creation of associations in other social sciences and the International Social Science Council.

IPSA thus came into existence officially at the end of 1949, as a "foreign association," under French law and regulations, with its legal seat in Paris. Its founders were four associations, those already active in the United States, Canada, and India, plus a French association set up largely for that purpose. Its provisional executive committee elected as chairman Quincy Wright, a professor at the University of Chicago, and a Frenchman,

François Goguel, the secretary-general of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, as executive secretary. A first World Congress, attended by 80 participants, was held in Zurich in 1950 and the second one at The Hague in 1952. Subsequent congresses were organized triennially, at first in Europe only, then in more exotic places such as Montreal, Rio de Janeiro, Washington, D.C., and Buenos Aires. From 1997 (Seoul) to 2008 (Santiago de Chile), all congresses were held outside Europe. Attendance has grown to about 2,000 participants, with IPSA funding many travel grants for young scholars and scholars from developing countries.

Over its 60 years of existence, the number of IPSA's collective members (national associations) has grown from the initial 4 to more than 40. IPSA's existence has contributed to the creation of associations in almost all Western European countries; in a few cases, such as that of Italy, IPSA has had to recognize a new association to replace a previous collective member considered too traditional by the younger generation of political scientists.

Never a Cold War instrument, IPSA emphasized inclusion and dialogue, and the rulers of the Soviet bloc preferred to have delegates participate in it, as in UNESCO. A Polish association was thus created as early as 1950 and was soon admitted to IPSA. Associations were later set up in Yugoslavia (1954), the Soviet Union (1960), Czechoslovakia (1964), Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania (1968).

Against strong opposition, especially in the United States, IPSA stood by its decision to hold its 1979 Congress on strict conditions in Moscow, despite the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1978. It was later acknowledged that the Moscow Congress had helped young political scientists establish the discipline both in the Soviet Union and in several satellite countries. The "missionary" purpose of IPSA also inspired assistance to political scientists in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, especially where dictatorial regimes were hostile to political analysis.

A major problem arose when Taiwan was, in 1989, admitted as a collective member, under the compromise name of Chinese Political Science Association (Taiwan), although its association claimed to be the legitimate heir of the Chinese Association created in 1932. The compromise

accepted by the delegate of the Chinese Political Science Association (People's Republic) was soon rejected, and as of 2010, the Mainland Chinese Political Science Association had not returned to IPSA.

Starting in the mid-1960s, IPSA was strengthened and enriched in its operations by the creation of Study Groups and Research Committees, later merged under the second denomination. Numbering about 50, the committees meet at each Congress and at least once between congresses, with participation by scholars from different countries. They deal with both traditional topics and innovative issues and approaches. Several research committees have their own journals. Associate members—about 100 political science departments and research organizations—and individual members—nearly 2,500—find IPSA's activities valuable.

IPSA's first journal, International Political Science Abstracts, launched in 1951, 2 years after IPSA's creation, and prepared since then in Paris at Sciences Po, is still the standard reference tool of the discipline. From 1951 to 1962, it published annually, in four issues, about 1,400 abstracts of journal articles. It now provides each year more than 8,000 abstracts, in six issues, reflecting the explosion in the number of journals; it has since 2007 been published by SAGE Publications. Its database goes back to 1951; at the end of 2009, it contained 270,000 abstracts and is distributed by both EBSCO and Ovid. The second, started in 1980, is the International Political Science Review, also published by Sage, which has been recognized as one of the leading journals in the discipline. In recent years, the two journals have also contributed substantially to IPSA's budget. To the journals must be added the IPSA Portal, created and maintained at the University of Naples, which selects, describes, and evaluates the top 300 political science websites, and IPSA's newsletter, Participation.

Ever since its inception, IPSA has sought to participate in the diffusion of political science as a rigorous discipline and also to serve as a bridge between American political science, in many ways still central, and the rest of the world while respecting the distinct national traditions and different approaches, sometimes strongly critical of those dominant in the United States. Until relatively recently, the landscape seemed pretty clear,

with IPSA playing the leading role. It has since then become increasingly complex and somewhat more competitive. Other international bodies have appeared in some regions. American organizations also sometimes supplement IPSA or compete with it.

Regional associations, of somewhat uncertain strength, have in recent decades been organized in Africa (1973) and Asia-Pacific (1983). In Europe, the creation in 1970 of the European Consortium for Political Research, based at the University of Essex and assisted in its first years by the Ford Foundation, has proved spectacularly successful. From 8 founding institutions, it has grown to more than 300, together with associate institutions throughout the world. Its workshops, conferences, and summer schools have contributed greatly to the emergence of a European political science community, and the reputation of its journals—the European Journal of Political Research, started in 1973, to which have been added European Political Science and the European Political Review—and its three book series is enviable. It entertains warm relations with IPSA.

More recently, in 2007, 23 European national and international associations have joined in a European Confederation of Political Science Associations, whose main aim, according to its website, is to "promote the interests of the discipline" and "make it more meaningful in public debate and policy-making." The Confederation has a promising future, as it reflects the vitality of political science associations in some countries where none existed until recently as well as that of the established ones.

Challenges have also come from the United States. Thus, in the field of international relations, the U.S. International Studies Association and its journals have progressively become representative of International Relations scholars throughout the world. The same can be said of area studies organizations such as the U.S. Latin American Studies Association, which attracts and welcomes many Latin American political scientists.

Finally, the powerful American Political Science Association, which numbered more than 15,000 members in 2010, at least twice as many as there are political scientists in the rest of the world, has increasingly become a magnet for foreign political scientists. Its conventions have the dual function of

a forum for scholarly exchanges and an unrivalled job market in the discipline. They attract many participants from outside the United States, sometimes assisted by travel grants.

The international institutionalization of political science may thus be at a crossroads. IPSA has proved its ability to play a major role in it by continuously adapting to a changing landscape. Thus, it has of necessity practically forsaken French as its second language for its meetings and publications. Its secretariat, which until recent years used to move to the city of residence of its secretary-general whenever that changed, is now permanently established in Montreal, where the staff is bilingual. It also maintains IPSA's archives, now assembled in a single location.

In this increasingly complex and competitive scholarly landscape, new activities and organizational schemes will need to be experimented with. Major gaps will need to be filled in Africa, Latin America, and Asia-Pacific, concerning obviously China but also countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines. The relevance and the vitality of the discipline seem, however, to be ensured for many years to come, certainly much better than a generation ago.

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POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

Political socialization is a form of socialization. An individual's biological birth is followed by a second phase, described as a "social-cultural birth," which turns him or her into a social being. This procedure is called *socialization*. It is a multidimensional process that significantly shapes the relation of the individual toward the social environment. A great number of people (e.g., educators), institutions (e.g., schools), and factors in the social environment (e.g., mass media) are involved. In the following, the major forces shaping this process in modern societies are discussed.

Socialization can be defined as the following:

- a process of forming an individual into a sociocultural personality through the shaping of those cognitive, linguistic, motivational, emotional-affective, and similar features that enable persons to understand the social environment and to participate in its shaping (primary socialization);
- a process of imparting social values, norms, and abilities for the accomplishment of social existence, occurring outside the family, mainly in peer groups and schools (secondary socialization); and
- a lifelong process of social experience, on the basis of primary and secondary socialization (lifelong learning).

In a wider definition of politics, all processes of socialization can be seen as political. The separation of political and general socialization is unnecessary if politics is defined by all relations of social power (including the family, the workplace, etc.). If the members of a society are subjected to such relations and are thereby shaped politically, socialization always develops political effects as well.

In a narrower sense, political socialization is regarded as a part of the general process of socialization. This contains purposive and functional dimensions. The purposive part regards political socialization in the context of pedagogical institutions and methods (education, tuition). The functional side looks at political goals, values, and norms that are being socialized and form individuals into political beings.

Political socialization is not free of values. It is defined as the entirety of all learning processes that form a person into a political being (citizen). The learning processes can be measured in terms of how far they promote or impede political maturity. Maturity in this context means all abilities necessary to meaningfully participate politically—the competence of participation. Political socialization gains its specific political content from an understanding of democracy, which underlies this value orientation. The aim of socialization is maturity, in the sense of self-determination, and political decision making and responsibility. Democracy determines the political-social process in which politically mature individuals develop. The structural-organizational basis of this ability lies in the institutions and policies of political socialization, whereas the subjective-personal part is found in the competence of participation. This is perceived as a goal of political learning. The question of how this goal of learning can be founded theoretically and how it can be empirically achieved, for example, not only in political education but also in processes of participation, pervades considerable areas of work in the research on political socialization.

Political Socialization as Political Learning/Education

Political education is a historical phenomenon. "Political" thinking, learning, and acting (in a sense of politics as a struggle or competition for influence and power) was only established when a sphere of civil life developed besides the state. Civil life needed and claimed individual freedom from governmental and absolutistic-feudal power, beginning in Europe in the 18th century. The struggle for autonomy of the newly established class—the middle classes—was borne by ideas of the Enlightenment ("liberty, equality, fraternity" as the slogan of the French Revolution). The aim was to replace feudal arbitrariness of power with a constitutional framework that ensured freedom and equality before the law. The guarantee of equal rights for all citizens made political learning necessary for the first time. Political learning in its beginnings was more focused on the idea of civil freedom. Not long after the collapse of the medieval social order, political education turned into a problem from a historical perspective.

The social-historical background of political learning reveals different phases of development:

- Education of classes in the feudal society: Being politically educated meant knowing the rights and duties of one's class.
- Education toward the ideal of civil liberty in the early middle-class society: It ought to serve as an instrument for the enforcement of civil rights as provided by the constitutional state.
- Means of controlling the fourth estate of the society in the era of 19th-century capitalism: In this phase, political education was an intellectual-political weapon for the suppression of the upcoming industrial proletariat;
- *Political education in nationalistic-authoritarian systems:* Political education is focused on the subordination of all people to the state.
- Education toward a racist ethnic community under National Socialism in Germany:
 Education served as a means for the forming of the national-socialist man.
- Education toward the "new man" under communist systems: It helped people live harmoniously in a classless society.
- Education toward democratic behavior in contemporary democratic states: Political learning takes part in the challenge of enabling the development and stability of democratic conditions.

Political learning continuously tries, in its contents as well as in its methods, to consolidate or to criticize existing forms of authority. In a democracy, its objectives include different concepts of democracy. Political learning that is focused on the imparting of political decision making and responsibility is interested in more than just the imparting of knowledge. It is geared toward certain states of awareness, abilities for political action, and attitudes and motivations for a democratic political commitment.

The achievements of socialization on a microdidactic level (political education/instruction) are limited, though. They are not able to compensate the deficits of the political system and the structural basis of political socialization. However, it is possible to implement the goals of political socialization on a macrodidactic level. Political learning can then be described as functional. This is how it can be distinguished from intentional political education.

Processes of learning that shape the potential of qualification and actions of political decision making and responsibility are processes of participation. Competence in participation can be acquired through participation itself. In this way, participation serves as an educational goal as well as an educational means. Political learning takes place when political consciousness can be applied and political participation can be reflected (learning by doing)—the basis of which is political communication.

Political Socialization Through Political Communication

Political systems and their social environment are in constant communicative exchange. The basis of such communication is the aggregation and conversion of social interests into political decisions (interest intermediation) as well as the transmission of political values and norms into society (intermediation of politics). Political communication consists of the exchange of information about politically relevant topics. It can take place because constitutional regulations organize this exchange of information and groups of citizens take part in it. Political communication can also take place without the exchange of information being organized by the governmental system. Effective political communication is established if, from the side of the political system, there is a high degree of transparency of its institutions and decisions. Political communication is the basis of participation in political decision making and decision processes. Political communication acts as a socializing process if, in the system and the system environment, the efficiency of exchange of information between institutions and participants is ensured by steering processes (through norms, culture, sanctions, etc.).

Transparency, participation, and efficiency are regarded as the "magic triangle of social science." They are principles of organization that determine the success of political communication. The relevance of the principle of participation determines the extent to which political communication enables the learning of participation skills.

As far as political communication is organized by a political system, its institutions act as agents for political socialization. The accomplishments in socialization are the result of the practice of organized political communication between the system and the environment of the system. Through passing on of prevailing norms and values and thereby the culture of the system (political culture, organizational culture, etc.), it allows the possibility of evaluation of the system output (laws, party platforms, etc.) and ensures the return of information (input) into the system, whereby innovation (e.g., political reforms) is made possible. The socialization of the political system thus increases the learning capacity of the political system and its facilities. It is the basis for a successful conveyance of politics.

Conclusion

The learning capacity of the political system and thereby its survivability depend on an organized exchange of information between politics and society as well as between political and administrative facilities and citizens. In a democracy, this exchange is organized by parliament and through intermediate actors of civil society (parties, organizations, associations, etc.). Their achievements are measured in terms of how far they are able to exercise political communication. In a democracy, the medium of political communication is the political public. In the medium of the political public, socialization obtains its empirical location, and from the political public, it derives its normative power.

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See also Participation; Political Communication; Political Culture

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POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY AS A FIELD OF STUDY

Political sociology deals with the nexus between social and political life. Traditionally, the political consequences of social arrangements are stressed, but attention has also been paid to the social consequences of political arrangements. Combining these two perspectives, political sociology studies links political and social phenomena; that is, it is an interdisciplinary endeavor combining social and political factors to explain distributions of power and dominance in state and society. Almost by definition, intermediary actors and institutions such as interest groups, political parties, and voluntary associations play an important role. The main research topics of political sociologists are voting behavior, new social movements, parties, civil society, and interest groups (usually inputoriented microlevel approaches), on the one hand, and state formation, transformations of political systems, and political reform processes (usually output-oriented macrolevel approaches), on the other.

In the past decades, the distinction between state and society gradually disappeared and has been replaced by a melding and blending of political and social phenomena. The rise of multinational corporations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the spread of international interdependencies and supranational arrangements changes the position and nature of the state, whereas rising levels of

education, welfare, social security provisions, secularization, and individualization imply similar changes for society. As a consequence, political sociology as a field of study seems to have lost much of its traditional position to more specific approaches. The first question to be dealt with here concerns the distinction between the use of social factors to explain political phenomena (a "sociology of politics") and the explanation of social phenomena using political factors (a "political science of society"). Political sociologists stress the reciprocal nature of these relationships and the need for integrated approaches. Second, the main theories used in political sociology-modernization theories, variants of Marxism, rational choice theories—are presented by following the debates since World War II. For each of these approaches, the major goals and attainments are presented and illustrated with a closer look at one or two seminal works. As will become clear, these newer approaches still rely on the presumption that a distinction—or at least an analytical distinction—between political and social phenomena makes sense. Finally, the consequences of the massive shifts in the relationships between state and society for political sociology as a field of study are scrutinized.

An Interdisciplinary Hybrid

Political sociologists study topics such as interest groups, state formation processes, old and new social movements, class-based power, public opinion, elites, trade unions, civil society, the spread of governance practices, and social and political participation. What do those very diverse subject matters have in common that arouses the curiosity of political sociologists? Ordinary answers to this question usually point to power and domination as core concepts to draw a line of demarcation. In this way, typical broad definitions of political sociology presented in social science encyclopedias refer to the "operation of power in social life" and the distribution of power at the various levels (individuals, organizations, communities, countries, etc.). Other definitions stress the "social causes and consequences of given power distributions" or the "study of power and domination in social relationships" as the defining characteristics of political sociology. In this way, it could include studies of the distribution of power in families, the mass media, universities, parliaments, trade unions, and so on. These broad definitions underline the wide range of topics studied by political sociologists. Referring to power and domination is certainly helpful to characterize the field in general terms, but the use of these terms is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to define political sociology. Since virtually every topic studied by social scientists is related to the operation and distribution of power, further specifications are required. Such a more specific definition of political sociology as a field of study implies, first, a closer look at the distinction between the political and the social and, second, a specification of the presumed causal directions in our explanations and interpretations.

Any study of the relationships between political and social life—between state and society—is based on the conjecture that these two areas, indeed, can be distinguished. Yet in the history of ideas, this is a fairly recent invention. In his essay on the origins of political sociology, Walter Runciman (1963) points to the national state and the rise of the bourgeoisie in the 18th century as the main factors stimulating a distinction between the political and the social. Exactly that distinction made political sociology possible and sensible, and it initiated a wealth of studies focusing on the relationships between state and society from a wide variety of perspectives. More recently, a distinction between state and society or between the political and the social has become increasingly problematic. The developments in the last few decades show a remarkable extension of politics and political power. Besides, the distinction between political and nonpolitical activities or areas became blurred or disappeared completely. Yet characterizing political sociology on the basis of a distinction between social and political life does not presume that these two areas can be distinguished empirically unequivocally. In fact, using this distinction analytically and conceptually allows political sociologists to point out the historical roots of their discipline and to analyze actual developments in terms of a melding and blending of political and social phenomena.

Accepting an analytical and conceptual distinction between social and political life gives rise to a second complication. Traditionally, specific demarcations of political sociology are obtained by drawing attention to the relationships between

state and society. In this approach, political sociology deals with the ways in which social and societal factors have an impact on political phenomena, or vice versa, it deals with the ways in which political factors influence social phenomena. The first perspective might be labeled as a "sociology of politics" and is common among American sociologists. For instance, the major aim of the Political Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association is to promote activities of those concerned with a sociological understanding of political phenomena. The combined Committee on Political Sociology of the International Sociological Association and the International Political Science Association (IPSA) relies on a somewhat broader approach. In their view, since political sociology is about the nexus between social and political life, the focus is on organizations or individual acts that seek to take or influence political power. Both approaches share an unambiguous interest in the relationships between state and society—they differ, however, in the extent to which the focus is on social factors. Whereas a "sociology of politics" stresses the relevance of social factors for political phenomena, a "political science of society" reverses the argument. In practice, the disciplinary roots of sociologists and political scientists appear to be highly relevant for the selection of one of these perspectives.

In his seminal article on sociology, political science, and political sociology Giovanni Sartori (1969) explicitly rejects the idea that political sociology is characterized by one of these single-directional perspectives. For him, political sociology is an interdisciplinary hybrid whose main goal is to combine social and political explanatory factors as suggested by both sociologists and political scientists. It is not the direction of impacts presumed in the analyses (social factors explaining political phenomena vs. political factors explaining social phenomena) but, more generally, the nexus between social and political life that defines political sociology as a distinct subfield.

As in every major area of the social sciences, political sociologists do not agree on a straightforward definition of their activities or the objects they study. A minimum consensus, however, includes the focus on power and domination in the relationships between social and political phenomena. Political sociologists use this last distinction for analytical and conceptual purposes and presume a

reciprocal relationship between political and social life—that is, between the state and society. Claims by either sociologists or political scientists to seize political sociology as an exclusive subdiscipline are not only gratuitous but also do not teach us much about the distribution of power and domination.

The Rise and Fall of Modernization Approaches

Although its roots go back to the work of 19thand early-20th-century social scientists (Karl Marx, Alexis de Tocqueville, Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Vilfredo Pareto, to mention only a few), the heydays of political sociology started after World War II. The spread of modernization approaches especially contributed to this advance. These approaches consider the development of societies as an evolutionary progressive process that is driven by economic and technological forces. Its basic ideas were spelled out by early social scientists and philosophers (Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx). Every society evolves from simpler to more complex ones and passes through various phases or stages depending on the available resources and challenges confronted. In this way, "primitive" societies will gradually become more complex, heterogeneous, and differentiated. Political arrangements, especially state formation and nation building, develop accordingly and are attuned to the social requirements of each evolutionary stage or phase. Modern industrial society—with its capitalist ownership, market allocation, and division of labor—establishes the culmination of this progressive evolutionary process. Conceptualizing social and political developments in this way almost directly leads to the study of reciprocal relationships between social and political phenomena, that is, to the study of political sociology.

Modernization theories obtained their strongest impulses from the spread of structural-functional system theory as a universal framework for studying the evolution of societies. Mainly following the work of Max Weber, Talcott Parsons distinguished between four major social subsystems: the economic system, the political system, the community system, and the sociocultural system. These four subsystems are interdependent and each contributes to the persistence of the system as a whole by

performing, respectively, four functions: adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latentmaintenance (the AGIL scheme). Approaching the relationships between the social and the political on the basis of the Parsonian system theory has many evident advantages. First, a universal framework is presented that offers (functional) explanations for the development of entire societies as an evolutionary process. Furthermore, political phenomena are handsomely conceptualized as a distinct subsystem whose features and developments are systematically integrated in the system as a whole. Third, Parsonian system theory underlines the progressive character of the evolutionary processes studied: A structural-functional explanation is offered to show that primitive societies inevitably will become more complex, heterogeneous, and differentiated. In the end, all societies will converge to a liberal-capitalist society of the U.S. and Western European type.

Early examples of the application of modernization approaches by political sociologists can be found, for instance, in the works of Gabriel Almond, Seymour Martin Lipset, Stein Rokkan, or Robert Dahl. These authors mainly focus on the consequences of social arrangements for the distribution of power to assess the chances for democracy in capitalist society. Major variants include elite theories, pluralist theories, and class-based theories.

The idea that specific groups obtain privileged and leading positions in society directly follows from the basic presumption of modernization approaches that societies increasingly become more complex, heterogeneous, and differentiated. As such, the rise to power of specific groups (elites) is well founded in these theories. Traditional examples can be found in the works of Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and especially Robert Michels. For Mosca, the driving force behind societal developments is the continuous struggle between groups to gain dominance and power. As a result, society always consists of two groups only: the dominating and the dominated, the powerful and the powerless. As Mosca, Pareto considers elites to be unavoidable. Since human beings are very unequal, society is, by definition, not homogeneous-and elites will not be homogeneous either. Following this argument, Pareto concludes that social change is always based on elite

circulation. The replacement of elites is also an important aspect of the work of Michels. Instead of continuous battles or circulation of elites, Michels presumes that a permanent amalgamation of members of old and new elites takes place. Elite amalgamation is ascertained in organizations, and so Michels focuses his attention on developments within organizations and, in particular, within political parties. On the basis of this work, he formulated his famous Iron Law of Oligarchy already in 1911: "Who says organization, says oligarchy."

Pluralist theorists accept the idea that in modern societies elites are inevitable. For pluralists, however, this does not imply that in each area of social and economic life the very same elite group is in power. In fact, increasing complexity, heterogeneity, and differentiation of societal arrangements make it highly unlikely that a single group would be able to dominate several different areas at the same time. Pluralist approaches presume, first, that modern societies are complex and highly fragmented and, second, that different elites gain power in each area. As a result, social life is characterized by conflicts between elites from various areas, which are based on different groups. Pluralists do not simply consider these elites or conflicts between elites as a threat to democracy. On the contrary, especially because of elite competition, progress is possible, and group interests will be taken into account. To avoid the destructive consequences of severe conflicts between elites, the social groups on which they are based should overlap; that is, they should not be completely distinct. If these structural arrangements are fulfilled, successful democratization will be the outcome of modernization. An example of a pluralist approach is the seminal study of Robert Dahl on the distribution of power in an American community in the early 1960s. Conscientiously, he studied decisionmaking processes in various policy areas in a small town (New Haven, Connecticut) and was able to show the existence of distinct, competing elites in different areas. The existence of these elites does not endanger democracy; it is an essential precondition for its functioning.

Most class-based approaches accept the idea that societies increasingly become more complex, heterogeneous, and differentiated. Instead of focusing on elites, class-based theories prefer a broader conceptualization of the consequences of ongoing modernization for power struggles between social groups and for the resulting social inequalities. Broadly speaking, class as a term to depict some group of people is used in two ways: by referring, first, to functional contributions in (industrial) production processes (e.g., working class) or, second, to positions in some hierarchy (e.g., middle class or ruling class). Directly following Marx, political sociologists in the Marxist tradition use class concepts based on contributions to the production process. Other social scientists—among them Max Weber-prefer relational concepts. Since positions in a production process and in a social hierarchy are evidently related, actual research usually deals with both class concepts. In his seminal article on the "social requisites of democracy," Lipset (1959) pointed to the fact that economic development is an important precondition for democracy. Modernization does not only result in complexity, heterogeneity, and differentiation but also implies massive expansion of production capacities and wealth. Increased wealth dampens class struggles and permits broad support for distributional compromises. Besides, a rising middle class will claim political rights and promote democratic values. These combined effects of modernization, Lipset argued, strongly favor democratization in countries with high levels of economic development.

Whereas Lipset searched for the mechanism behind democratization, Stein Rokkan attempted to explain the varieties of modernization in Europe. Political developments in Europe are, according to Rokkan, mainly a consequence of the deep-rooted cleavages that arose in the aftermath of several invasive events (the Reformation, nation building, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution). Since these events occurred differently in different places and times, European societies show both similarities and differences. Accordingly, political arrangements show similarities and differences too. Together Rokkan and Lipset analyzed these similarities and differences, especially for party systems and voter alignments in Europe: Evident similarities (such as the existence of social-democratic and Christian Democratic parties) are combined with striking differences (such as the spread of liberal parties). Rokkan and Lipset underlined the strong impact of cleavages by pointing out the fact that party systems and voter alignments in Europe

remained "frozen" from the early extension of suffrage until the mid-1960s; that is, the impact of social factors survived two world wars and severe economic turmoil.

The closeness of political sociology to modernization theories in the first 2 decades after World War II provided the upcoming discipline with many advantages. Nonetheless, from the very beginning, modernization theories provoked strong criticism—criticism that applied also to political sociology as its main intellectual ally. A major concern of many critics is the idea that (American) capitalist society and liberal democracy should be seen as the end-stage of a progressive evolution of humanity. This teleological tendency in modernization approaches is rejected as being ideologically biased and epistemologically unwarranted. On a closer look, the presumed progressive evolutionary process in many societies appeared to be fragile, inconsistent, nonmonotonous, and not necessarily following a European or Western model. Furthermore, the basic idea that economic and political developments are interdependent was challenged and replaced by a much more open approach conceptualizing economic and political modernization as two distinct processes whose potential interdependencies should be studied carefully instead of simply being taken for granted. Furthermore, methodological criticisms were raised. Since modernization approaches are based on general frameworks and claims of universality, the usual methods applied were quantitative and comparative (typically, statistical analyses of cross-national data in large-N designs). Newer approaches challenged these ideas and considered in-depth historical analyses and case-oriented methods (usually hermeneutic-interpretative and cultural-historical approaches in small-N designs) as much more appropriate to the study of complicated reciprocal relationships between the social and the political.

Main Approaches

In a somewhat exaggerated way, one might regard many developments in political sociology in the last half century as attempts to present alternatives for the apparent limitedness, erroneousness, and ideological bias of the modernization approaches of the 1940s and 1950s. Alternative approaches challenge the capitalist distribution of power and its implicated social inequalities as well as the strong emphasis on structural-functional arguments. These disputes reflect a more general change in the social sciences away from socialscientific approaches (emphasizing causal explanations based on regularities and mainly applying quantitative, comparative methods) toward cultural-scientific approaches (emphasizing specific cultural meanings and constructions of meanings; mainly applying qualitative, case-oriented methods). The three major groups of alternatives presented for liberal-capitalist modernization approaches consist of Marxist theories, critical and conflict theories, and postmodern and poststructural theories. But agents of social-scientific approaches did not simply abscond from the battle field. Following mainstream microeconomic theory, deductive approaches based on the idea of human rationality resulted in the blossoming of rational choice approaches as the key to understanding social and political developments. Besides, a revival of modernization theories—based on social-scientific as well as on cultural-scientific approaches—can be observed currently.

Marxism

Liberal-capitalist modernization approaches emphasize structural-functional interdependencies between the political subsystem and other parts of the system. In this sense, American society is usually depicted as the end-stage of progressive evolutionary developments. These propositions have been challenged by political sociologists working in a Marxist tradition. According to these approaches, the capitalist state is not some "subsystem" that adjusts itself in neutral ways to the functional requirements of other subsystems. The genesis of the late-medieval idea of a "state," with its territorial-based claim on sovereignty, can only be understood by looking at the requirements enabling the accumulation of capital—that is, by looking at property rights and the protection of markets at home and abroad. In this way, social and political developments are based on developments in the production process and the accompanying arrangements to acknowledge rights and to legitimate the distribution of wealth. Like modernization theories, Marxist approaches depict liberal capitalism as a stage in the progressive evolution of societies. Contrary to many modernization theorists, however, Marxists regard capitalism and liberal democracy as a transitory phase and not as the end-stage of this evolutionary process.

The renaissance of Marxist approaches in political sociology reaffirmed the idea that politics is based on social, in particular on economic, developments. Two main areas of research benefited especially from this advance: (1) state formation and state building and (2) the distribution of power and social inequalities. In his detailed study on the Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Barrington Moore showed that various countries took different routes to come to the modern industrial world. According to his view, the power of bureaucracies in raising taxes and granting privileges was countervailed by the nobility and the upcoming bourgeoisie, which laid the basis for democracy in England and France. Since these countervailing forces were largely suppressed by a coalition of bureaucrats and aristocrats in Germany (Prussia), dictatorship was more likely than democracy in Central Europe. Although Moore did not concentrate on state formation, his book highly stimulated the revival of analyses dealing with that topic, gradually moving the emphasis from Marxist theories based on economic primacy toward more complex approaches. Charles Tilly, especially, attempted to overcome the limitations of retrospective arguments and the neglect of noneconomic factors in explanations of the formation of national states in Europe. In his view, nation-states proved to be the most effective way to mobilize and organize the resources required for the severe political conflicts and wars in medieval Europe; that is, arms and warfare strongly stimulated the rise of the state. The renewed debate also provided the opportunity to move well beyond the eurocentrism of many approaches and to strongly stimulate interest in state developments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Economic causes also are at the heart of Marxist approaches dealing with the distribution of power in capitalist society and the implied social inequalities. George Domhoff, in a controversial publication, answered the question "Who rules America?" unambiguously: The country is dominated by political and economic elites. He

stressed that the dominant pluralist approaches of the 1950s and 1960s tended to overlook class consciousness and class struggles in capitalist society and are slanted toward political decision-making processes instead of the resulting inequalities. Although he did not consider himself to be a Marxist, Domhoff's approach and terminology clearly reflect the economic primacy characteristic of Marxist approaches.

Debates about the power structure in capitalist society were strongly influenced by the publication of Nicos Poulantzas's work on classes and political power in the late 1960s. The capitalist state, he argued, is not simply an instrument in the hands of the capitalists who use it for their own interests. Instead, the capitalist state is a relatively autonomous actor ensuring the smooth operation of capitalist society. It is the structure of the system not the short-term interests and preferences of the capitalist class—that works to the benefits of that class. Therefore, major problems in capitalist society consist of the clashes between the demands of various classes, on the one hand, and the need for the system to provide social stability to reproduce itself, on the other. Authors such as Claus Offe expanded this line of reasoning by focusing on the unavoidable tensions produced by the actions of capitalist states to overcome class divisions without endangering the long-term benefits of the capitalist class.

With the theories of Tilly, Domhoff, and Offe, we have left orthodox Marxism. The relevance of economic factors is almost universally accepted; likewise economic determinism and economic reductionism are widely rejected as being one-sided and insufficient. With a few exceptions, political sociologists focus on reciprocal relationships between social and political phenomena and try to avoid one-way lines of reasoning in explanations of power and dominance.

Neo-Marxism: Conflict Theories and Critical Theories

Neo-Marxism is a rather loose term referring to approaches that amend Marxist theory, usually by incorporating elements from other traditions to overcome the deficiencies of orthodox Marxism, especially economic determinism and reductionism. Major blends of neo-Marxism consist of combinations of Marxist approaches with conflict theories and critical theories. Conflict theories stress that resources are scarce. Therefore, conflict and competition, rather than cooperation and consensus are characteristic of human relationships in all societies. Struggles to maximize benefits and to defend interests depend on the ability and resources to exercise power and dominance in a society. Powerful groups use their power to exploit groups with less power—through brute force and suppression if necessary but also by securing ideological hegemony and structural advantages. Inevitably, permanent social struggles deeply affect the political and social order and imply societal and political changes. Conflict theories are unmistakably based on the work of Marx and Weber and are easily discernable in almost each and every politicalsociological theory: pluralists, elitists, and class theorists all agree that conflicts and struggles between social or political groups are crucial to understand the reciprocal relationships between the social and the political. Conflict theorists, however, claim that these struggles are the exclusive driving force behind social and political developments.

Analyses of the distribution of power and dominance are the main objects of conflict theories. From this perspective, not only the work of Domhoff but also the classic study of C. Wright Mills depicting the American ruling class as a Power Elite can be seen as an important neo-Marxist and conflicttheoretical contribution to political sociology. In his book, Mills points out the strong overlapping of interests of the military, business, and political elites in the United States. Behind the façade of pluralism and interest differentiation, the aims of elites in various areas appear to be remarkably attuned and congruent to each other. By contrast, the ordinary citizen is perceived as relatively powerless and an easy subject of manipulation by those elites. Power, conflict, and social inequality, then, appear to be robustly related in the world's largest liberalcapitalist democracy.

Class provides the major way to distinguish competing social groups in conflict-theoretical approaches. As we have seen, Marxists define classes based on the functional contributions of groups in production processes, whereas many other social scientists use the concept to refer to positions of groups in a hierarchy. Both conceptualizations usually refer to deep and persistent

social distinctions. Yet class is certainly not the only distinction offering a basis for conflicts and struggles between various groups. Race and ethnicity definitely play an important role in many societies and are a cause of virulent conflicts both within and between states. In a similar way, geographical and regional differences are used to define conflicting interests. Furthermore, the social definition of distinct roles for men and women (gender) and the resulting inequalities lead to various conflicts and struggles. For centuries, religion has proven to be an extremely vigorous basis for social and political conflicts. Religion, and not class, played the key role in the political history of many European countries, and numerous contemporary conflicts in the world are based on religion. The list of social distinctions that can be articulated in conflicts between groups for power and dominance is virtually endless. As we have seen, Rokkan's theory of long-standing social cleavages covers many diverse social distinctions and is an example of the openness of conflict-based approaches. In the early 1990s, Samuel Huntington advanced the proposition that world politics would be increasingly dominated by conflicts based on a Clash of Civilizations: People are likely to see "us" versus "them" in the relations between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion. According to Huntington, the resulting clash will take place not only between people and groups within states but also between states and between groups of states.

Conflict theories and critical theories have a lot in common. The main difference does not lie in the depiction of capitalist society as conflictual and contradictory but in the emphasis placed on the rejection of the positivist background of modernapproaches and conflict theories. Positivists—especially logical positivists—attempt to understand and explain social phenomena by searching for regularities and general statements. Besides, they strictly observe a distinction between facts and values and consider the normative consequences of their work as exogenous. Critical theorists reject that model of science and support emancipatory (usually anticapitalist) causes; that is, emancipation, freedom, and decreasing domination are explicitly stated as the normative bases for social research. According to critical approaches, the social sciences are not concerned with isolated social phenomena but with society as a whole as well as its historical specificity. Consequently, critical theories cannot rely on work in distinct disciplines alone—understanding society requires the integration of all the major social sciences.

Critical theory originated with the Frankfurt School in the 1930s. In political sociology, important representatives are, among many others, Pierre Bourdieu and Jürgen Habermas. Bourdieu's main interests are the mechanisms that reproduce social hierarchies (inequalities). The reproduction of the social order and the simultaneous dominance of specific groups over others cannot be explained with economic factors only. Instead, Bourdieu stresses the relevance of educational and cultural factors for the active engagement of people in the (re)production of culture. In each society, people are struggling to reach their goals in distinct social arenas (fields such as the economy, sports, or the family). These struggles, however, depend not only on the objective conditions in each arena but also on the persistent skills and dispositions (habitus) of the people involved. The skills and dispositions generated are compatible with the objective conditions (including the development of different tastes for art or food in different arenas) and legitimize existing social structures. Moreover, they exclude improbable practices as unthinkable or unnatural. By focusing on the close interdependencies between objective and subjective factors, Bourdieu presents explanations for both the existence of social hierarchies as well as the reproduction of these hierarchies as social and political inequalities.

Already in the 1960s, Jürgen Habermas started his attempts to liberate critical theory from its Marxist and Frankfurt School roots. Whereas Bourdieu presents a sociological analysis of social processes of power distribution and the reproduction of inequalities, one of Habermas's main interests concerns the opportunities for democracy in the modern world. In his early study on The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, he explores the historical development of public contacts, characterized by an expansion of public interactions (from families to coffee houses and parliaments) and by a contraction through the market and bureaucracies. Public interactions, Habermas stresses, should enable people to interact with each other in critical ways on the basis of equality. Through self-reflection, critical knowledge can offer an important contribution to ascertain the public character of these interactions by enabling people to emancipate themselves from dominance. Basically, Habermas approaches modern society positively since its ongoing complexity and functional differentiation provide opportunities for democratic forms of self-organization. In other words, the very fact that complexity and differentiation make total control over social life in the modern world illusory enables people to gain control over their own life on the basis of mutual recognition and democratic interactions.

It is not always easy to distinguish between neo-Marxist, conflict-theoretical, or critical-theoretical approaches, and these labels are not used consistently. Moreover, many conflict theorists rely on critical approaches, whereas virtually every critical theorist stresses the importance of conflict between various groups in society. Yet they all dismiss Western-centered structural-functionalist modernization approaches as well as orthodox Marxism. Liberal capitalism is not seen as the end-stage of a progressive evolutionary process but as a system whose inherent social and political inequalities have to be confronted and battled against.

The Cultural Turn: Postmodernism and Poststructuralism

The rise of conflict and critical theories was mainly based on attempts to overcome the shortcomings of positivism, with its epistemological proximity to the natural sciences and its claims on normative neutrality. In addition, the economic determinism and reductionism of Marxism as well as the Western-centeredness of most approaches in early political sociology were criticized. Generally speaking, conflict and critical theories do not question the close interdependencies between structural (objective) and cultural (subjective) factors. Especially among French social scientists in the 1970s, attention shifted from structure to culture, and a new wave of post-Marxist approaches developed under labels such as postmodernism and poststructuralism.

Postmodernism and poststructuralism are part of the "cultural turn" in political sociology. In these approaches, cultural factors are considered to be more important for the study of power and

dominance in a society than structural ones. The emphasis is shifted toward (the construction of) meaning, and culture is considered to be more relevant than politics or economics. The rationale for this "turn" lies in the developments in modern societies as they could be especially observed in the United States in the late 1950s and 1960s. According to postmodernists and poststructuralists, life is defined on the basis of cultural factors: The cultures of consumerism, leisure, lifestyle, fashion, arts, and so on are much more important than positions in the production process or in some hierarchy. The spread of mass media strongly stimulates these cultures, and these are, in fact, important parts of the fundamental changes in society. Exactly because modern society is characterized by complexity, heterogeneity, and differentiation, people increasingly rely on cultural factors to define their life and their position within society. As a consequence, no common or general distinctions between groups of people can be presumed or predicted—it is exactly the apparent lack of common and general distinctions that characterizes postmodern societies.

Almost by definition, it is hard to find a common understanding of postmodernism. Literally, the term refers to the passing of "modernism" only. A regular feature of many postmodernists is that they clearly criticize "modern" society as it developed in the Western world in the past 2 centuries, especially its claims of being based on universal principles of progress, equality, and freedom. Postmodernists do not challenge the meaning or importance of each one of these principles. Instead, they reject the possibility of universal, normative, and ethical judgments in general and stress the relative nature of all such statements. From this, it follows that truth and knowledge depend on the social and historical context. Depicting scholars as postmodernists is a difficult task since most of them reject such general labels as being inconsistent with their theories. Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, and Anthony Giddens are among the most prominent authors being typified as postmodernist. For political sociology, Foucault and Giddens probably are the most influential.

The nature and distribution of power and dominance in societies are the major concerns of Foucault. He studies these topics in various institutions (such as psychiatric hospitals and prisons) and introduces

a number of new concepts to deal with power and dominance. The concept discourse refers to the way in which language is used to express acceptable, institutionalized ways of thinking; it defines what can be said about a topic with the vocabulary and expressions available. Since every idea is phrased in some terms, discourses affect our views on everything. In that way, discourses construct the phenomena about which we speak. In other words, ideas, concepts, attitudes, and ideologies do not only arise within specific contexts, but they also define the way in which we consider the various aspects of those contexts. The study of power and dominance, then, is the study of discourses about power and dominance (such as texts, speeches, policies, and practices) in various historical and social settings. Therefore, to understand power and dominance, it is necessary to study both power and dominance themselves and the systems of knowledge that are used to produce power and dominance. According to Foucault, power is not possessed by individual people or groups but is an activity that all people can engage in. Exercising power will always provoke resistance and competition by challenging the dominant discourse. Starting with the discourse concept, Foucault's actual work became the study of how knowledge is produced. Since knowledge production underlies the same principles of cultural conditioning and competing meanings as any other area, it cannot be based on structural determinants only. For that reason, these approaches are summarized under the label poststructural theories.

The interdependencies of structural and cultural factors also play an important role in the work of Giddens. With his theory of structuration he attempts to take into account that, although people are not free to do what they want and their knowledge is imperfect, there are acts of individuals that reproduce the social structure and enable social change. Therefore, what we call "society" can be understood neither as a set of institutions nor as a simple aggregation of all human acts. Relying more on Weber than on Marx, Giddens approaches social and political actions from the perspective that individual thoughts and behavior are structured by social institutions, conventions, and ethical codes. Besides, the social structure is reinforced and reproduced by the continuous repetition of human acts; that is, social action creates structures

that, at the same time, make social action possible. In this way, individual acts also provide the key for understanding social change: If people start to break from repetitive acts, the social structure will be reproduced differently.

Like Foucault, Giddens rejects a distinction between structure and culture. But whereas Foucault considers the two hopelessly entangled by the very same discourse they rely on, Giddens returns to the notion of mutual dependency. The idea that actions are constrained by structures, which are, in turn, created and reproduced by those very actions, avoids the fallacies of social determinism and reductionism. In modern societies, new information constantly challenges and modifies social practices, altering their character constantly, too. Since a sound foundation for knowledge is missing and the expansion of the social sciences increasingly results in differences of opinion, people more and more "reflect" on their own situation and the social structures they live in. As a result, uncertainty gradually drives out confidence and certitude. According to Giddens, we are observing not the rise of some postmodern society but merely a "radicalized modernity."

The Economic Turn: Rational Choice

Neo- and post-Marxist theories revitalized theoretical thinking in political sociology and stimulated new directions. Postmodernist and poststructuralist scholars, especially, presented proposals for radically different approaches. Their extensive epistemological and ideological criticisms of positivist social-scientific theories and methods are accompanied by appeals for social-cultural approaches and the use of appropriate strategies. Yet research based on these approaches is usually characterized by rather narrow definitions of the actual objects studied in terms of power and dominance. Neo- and post-Marxists drew attention to the old questions about the relationships between structure and culture and did present new approaches to study these interdependencies. Not all social scientists are convinced, however, that approaches to deal with these questions necessarily have to be based on epistemological criticism, the rejection of positivism, or the application of radically new research methods.

Presumed causal links between social entities such as interest groups or states are difficult to

analyze. What do we mean when we say, for instance, that "parties try to win elections" or that "economic development leads to democracy"? Usually, these phrases are not based on ontological presumptions about actual "behavior" of parties or economic systems but are shorthand for the activities of party leaders or middle-class people only. In fact, one could argue that causal explanations are only possible for human behavior—all other statements are interpretations based on the aggregation of the behavior of individuals and its consequences. By concentrating on the behavior of individual consumers, citizens, producers, and so on, macrosocial and macropolitical phenomena can be explained as aggregations of microsocial behavior. This so-called methodological individualism rescues the idea of regularities underlying social phenomena from neo- and post-Marxist attacks and reconfirms the search for regularities as an intellectually fruitful goal for the social sciences.

At least since the 19th century, deductive reasoning starting with straightforward axioms about individual behavior is the typical field of mainstream microeconomic theory. It is clear that many sociologists and political scientists are fascinated by the way in which economics proceeds and relies on rigorous deductive ways of thinking. This allure resulted in the rapid annexation of large parts of the social sciences by so-called rational choice approaches in the past decades. Individuals are presumed to have persistent "preference functions" that guide their actions: Each person attempts to reduce "costs" and maximize "gains" under specific constraints; that is, each individual tries to maximize his or her "utility." Rational choice approaches rely on methodological individualism and the presumption that individual behavior and its consequences can be aggregated by using formal modeling and mathematical reasoning. Most rational choice theorists do not use the rationality of individuals as a necessarily correct description of human behavior. Instead, they stress the need for strict deductive reasoning starting with elementary statements and leading to the formulation of falsifiable hypotheses. Successful hypotheses are not necessarily based on intuitively plausible presumptions; successful hypotheses are those that survive rigid empirical testing. In this way, rational choice approaches provide prescriptions for both theoretical arguing (deductive and

formalized) and empirical work (falsification of hypotheses).

The application of rational choice theories in political science and sociology started in the 1950s and 1960s. Clearly working in the tradition of descriptive democratic theory presented by Joseph Schumpeter in his book An Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony Downs argued that citizens vote on the basis of a rational calculation of which party is most likely to meet their preferences. Voting decisions are similar to those of consumers in a market who calculate the costs (taxes) and benefits (public services) of choosing one political party rather than another. To win elections, parties try to locate themselves and their policies close to the median voter. In this way, both the behavior of individual voters and the strategies and policies of political parties are explained. From a sociological perspective, the advantages of using deductive reasoning started with the idea of individual rationality evident in Mancur Olson's book, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, published in the mid-1960s. Why would rational individuals contribute to the production of collective goods that, by definition, are freely available to everybody? Olson argues that rational individuals will only join groups and contribute to collective goods if separate and "selective" incentives are provided that are strictly available for group members only. In other words, the provision of collective goods by rational individuals is only possible if the free rider problem is solved. Olson's work bridges the gap between economical and sociological explanations of joint actions and group activities. As did Downs's work on democracy, Olson's work initiated a wealth of research on the consequences of individual

Rational choice approaches provide the instruments to study the microfoundations of macrosocial and macropolitical phenomena in rigorous ways. Even clearer than neo- and post-Marxism—which usually focus on power and dominance—rational choice does not provide an object specification but a specific method and research strategy principally based on positivist epistemology. Due to this openness, rational choice approaches have been applied to an enormous variety of themes and topics, many of which are in the field of political sociology: voting behavior, bureaucracies, state formation,

interest groups, new social movements, social mobility, class reproduction, participation, and social capital are only a few of the most prominent examples. The almost unrestricted opportunities to apply rational choice approaches to various questions are clearly underlined by the use of rational choice as a basis for Marxist theories of class and exploitation. Jon Elster, especially, strongly rejects the functional explanations typical of Marxism and many other social sciences. Instead, he uses the analytical tools of rational choice approaches (especially methodological individualism) to provide microfoundations for the explanation of social and political phenomena.

Rigorous deductive reasoning usually takes individuals as a starting point, but—as phrases such as rational choice institutionalism already suggest—this does not imply a restriction to psychological explanations only. However, it is clear that rational choice simply takes "preferences" for granted and runs the risks of being circular, nonfalsifiable, or even tautological. How can we tell when people are not acting in their own selfinterest, and what counts as nonrational behavior? Some people define their preferences in terms of the public good and are prepared to risk their life for others and their own beliefs, but whatever they do, this can always be depicted as a "rational" calculation of self-interest. Critics of rational choice theories, therefore, do not reject the need for rigorous deductive reasoning in the social sciences but point to the limited advantages of restricting explanations of social and political phenomena to the consequences of individual behavior only. Preferences, interests, utility, or the application of rational strategies are all embedded in historical, cultural, political, and societal contexts and cannot merely be taken for granted and reduced to axioms in deductive arguments.

The Return of the State and Modernization Approaches

The cultural turn in political sociology mainly followed the general shift in many social sciences away from social-scientific approaches toward cultural-scientific approaches. Yet not every political sociologist was convinced by the arguments of neo- and post-Marxists to abandon modernization and positivism. Moreover, the cultural turn had

taught us a lot about power and dominance in areas such as sexual relations and national identities, but it contributed relatively little to our understanding of the reciprocal relationships between the social and the political. Postmodern theorists usually simply reject the usefulness of such concepts, and many authors inspired by conflict and critical theories would consider the relationships between social and political phenomena as a relatively unimportant specimen of more general questions about power and dominance. By contrast, rational choice theories have proven their usefulness in many areas of human behavior but do not seem to offer much for the explanation of, say, the rise of the nation-state or civic engagement in revolutionary eras.

Criticism of structural-functional system theories and modernization approaches has not just led to a cultural turn of the neo- and post-Marxist type. In fact, some political sociologists continued to improve modernization theories and to apply them to social and political developments. A general feature of these approaches is that they are all highly stimulated by actual major social and political events in the past decades and not by the desire to contribute to epistemological and ideological debates or to develop a new research methodology. Faced with the wave of political unrest sweeping Western countries in the late 1960s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the success of European integration in the 1990s, and the ongoing processes of economic and political globalization, political sociologists renewed their interest in evolutionary approaches. Furthermore, the nationstate apparently did not disappear but appears to be surprisingly flexible and able to attune itself to the new challenges of a globalized world and the rise of many competitors. Within states, ongoing complexity, heterogeneity, and differentiation do not seem to result in converging social and political arrangements but in perceptibly different ones. Between states, we observe a continuous rise in the number of states and a further differentiation of their nature all over the world.

Pursuing his goals with determination and well aware of the cultural turn proposed by neo- and post-Marxists, Ronald Inglehart has been urging for a very different cultural turn ever since he published his theory of postmaterialist value change in the early 1970s. Confronted with the startling

wave of political unrest in many Western countries in the late 1960s, he points to the rise of a new generation with value orientations that are different from those of their predecessors. As a consequence of ongoing modernization, the generation born after World War II, especially, rejects authority, material advantage, and tradition. Instead, it gives priority to goals such as self-fulfillment, participation, and lifestyle issues. As newer generations replace old ones, deep-seated social and political changes will take place (a "silent revolution"). Evidently, Inglehart uses a modernizationtheoretical approach and positivist methods, but he does not presume that developments in modern society necessarily will be progressive. Nor does he take value priorities for granted. The share of postmaterialists among new generations is likely to increase only if economic growth is secured and social unrest remains absent. Originally starting with a focus on new modes of participation in Western countries, Inglehart expanded his research to almost every country in the world and to many aspects of social and political developments. Using standardized comparative surveys of representative population samples, his work also shows that epistemological criticism of positivist approaches does not necessarily mean that highly interesting information about social and political developments cannot be obtained. Moreover, methodological individualism and deductive reasoning are not exclusive privileges of rational-choice approaches.

Modernization theories experienced a strong revival with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of democratic political systems around the world in the early 1990s. At first, the question about the causes or favorable conditions for democratic changes attracted renewed attention. Was the old Lipset thesis about the social requisites of democracy still valid? On the basis of a strong correlation between democracy and economic development, many authors concluded that economic development provides sufficient (and probably also necessary) conditions for democracy. Yet deviate cases are easy to find. For instance, Nazi Germany was a dictatorship in spite of being economically advanced, and India is a vibrant democracy despite its socioeconomic problems, which casts doubts on the general validity of the argument. Economic development plays an important role, indeed, but is certainly not the only motivating force. Returning

to the work of Tocqueville, Robert Putnam (1994) showed that democracy relies on an active "civil society" and much less on economic development. His theory unequivocally underlines the need for social capital (especially trust and confidence) to produce collective goods efficiently. As Tocqueville had observed in the United States in the early 19th century, voluntary associations are extremely important for the functioning of democracy since in these clubs, groups, organizations, alliances, associations, and the like, people develop and maintain social networks. Established social networks, in turn, facilitate social trust, which enables the production of goods without coercion. The functioning of democracy is such a major collective good. Putnam's research in Italy and the United States initiated a lively debate on the "social requisites of democracy"—depicting social capital as the crucial determinant and curtailing the importance of economic factors.

Whereas Putnam's work focuses on requirements for the functioning of democracy, the establishment of democracy is a different topic. Analyses of a transition (or transformation) of a political, social, and economic system require encompassing approaches based on explicit specifications of the reciprocal relationships between social and political developments. For the transition of authoritarian systems into democratic ones, evolutionary approaches distinguishing between distinct phases or stages of democratization rely heavily on Samuel Huntington's idea of a "third wave." The first wave of democratization (from the mid-19th century to the end of World War I) coincided with the rise of the nation-state, whereas the second one, starting after World War II through the early 1960s, was mainly the result of decolonization. According to Huntington, the third wave, from about 1975 to the end of the 20th century, consists of the spread of democracy in Latin America and Asia and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Economic growth, the declining legitimacy of authoritarian rule, and the changing role of the Catholic Church as well as international structural factors such as the rise of the European Union and the agreement on human rights included in the Helsinki Treaty in 1975 all contributed to the spread of democracy. By the end of the 20th century democracy had reached all regions of the world. South America, all of Europe, and considerable

parts of Asia and Africa have been turned into democracies. At the same time, it is clear that the three waves are characterized by different processes and that no general explanation for democratization is available. As Huntington and numerous other scholars have shown, democracy can be reached through many different paths.

Modifying the modernization framework of the 1950s proved to be very helpful in studying democratic transformations. The idea of evolutionary social and political developments with distinct phases or stages appeared to be even more helpful for the study of democratic consolidation. In each phase or stage, the changing relationships between social and political factors are specified. In the initial phase, opposition toward the ruling elite and undemocratic arrangements is mobilized. The request for more liberty is broadly accepted and generally seen as the main goal. The next phase is characterized by the establishment of institutional arrangements to replace the old undemocratic ones. A new constitution is adopted, and general elections are organized for the first time. An easy return to the Old System is no longer feasible. In the advanced phase, attention shifts toward the achievements of the new democracy to satisfy group interests, and economic performance becomes crucial. Finally, the phase of democratic consolidation is reached where the new arrangements are institutionalized, and the system is able to meet the demands and expectations of large parts of the population.

The study of democratic transformation and consolidation, once again, shows the advantages and pitfalls of modernization-theoretical approaches to study links between social and political phenomena. Especially, the use of phases and stages easily runs the risk of backsliding into teleological and ideological prejudices. Just as American liberalcapitalism was the highest stage of social development in the evolutionary modernization theories of the 1940s and 1950s, various transformation and consolidation theories implicitly take democracy as the "highest" or "most sophisticated" system. All other systems are lumped together as negative deviations from this ideal, under terms such as illiberal democracy, pseudodemocracy, partial democracy, or defective democracy. More recent approaches reject teleological interpretations and treat political systems with a mixture of authoritarian and democratic features not as "deviant" cases

but as novel systems. Obviously, these approaches do not exclude the chance that the direction of democratization processes can be reversed. Only a close look at the reciprocal relationships between state and society can provide explanations for a return to authoritarian rule.

The introduction of concepts such as postmaterialism, social capital, or transformation and consolidation establishes a cultural turn in political sociology that is quite different from the cultural turn initiated by neo- and post-Marxists. The new variants of modernization approaches do not presume that increasing complexity, heterogeneity, and differentiation inevitably prepare the way for a liberal-capitalist society as the highest stage of human development; they do, however, presume that the opportunities for democratic transformation and consolidation strongly depend on the social and economic development of a society. Further, the revival of modernization approaches did not follow the shift in the social sciences from social-scientific approaches toward culturalscientific approaches and its accompanying change in research methodologies. Discussions about the character of political systems are usually based on quantitative, standardized, and comparative indicators (e.g., the Freedom House Index or large cross-national surveys among populations), and terms such as social capital and the third wave clearly underline attempts to summarize divergent phenomena under general concepts and to stress regularities. In a similar manner to rational choice approaches, recent modernization approaches are not based on a rejection of positivism or appeals for a radically different epistemology.

The End of the State?

Political sociology has come a long way since its start in the 19th century. The heydays of modernization approaches in the 1940s and 1950s seemed to mark the definite breakthrough and establishment of political sociology as an independent subdiscipline. Yet the list of criticisms and objections against conventional political sociology is long, and many modifications and alternatives have been presented. Furthermore, the main object of political sociology—power and dominance in the reciprocal relationships between state and society—changed dramatically in the last few decades. As a

consequence, political sociology has been confronted with the dual task of dealing with severe epistemological and ideological criticism and with deep-seated changes of its object at the same time. Several appeals for a paradigm shift, a new political sociology, and a political sociology for the 21st century have been presented. For instance, Kate Nash (2000) pleads for a new political sociology that should not be mainly concerned with states or class-based approaches to narrowly defined political phenomena but with cultural politics. These "politics" should be understood in the broadest possible sense, and the focus is on conflicts about social identities and structures and the opportunities to change them. Although this depiction does not exclude the state as a major object of political sociology, it is clear that power and dominance are the key features of such a new political sociology.

For discussions of actual and desirable modifications of political sociology, a reappraisal of the changing position of the state is required. Traditionally, political sociologists have a complicated relationship with the state as their pet topic. They celebrate the concept as the main subject matter of their studies of state formation, the development of the state (especially the nation-state), and the chances for democratic consolidation. They study the ongoing blending and melding of social and political phenomena within states and observe the blurring of the distinctions between the two in an era of radicalized modernity. Some of them examine the disappearance of the state in a world characterized by globalization and increasing interdependencies. Others observe the rise of new forms of the state (particularly in Europe) and study the evaporation of states confronted with powerful multinational corporations, criminal gangs, or NGOs. By the mid-1980s, the diminishing position of the state as a central topic for political sociologists was counterbalanced by attempts to "bring the state back in." Following appeals by Theda Skocpol and her collaborators, the state was rediscovered and reacknowledged as an autonomous actor. Formal political institutions, especially, attracted renewed attention as important factors for the distribution of power and dominance. Not only the behavior of politicians but also that of citizens or elites is relevant for the relationships between state and society: The constitutional framework, electoral laws, the composition of government, and many

other institutional arrangements are evidently relevant as well. In short, institutions matter.

Among the divergent depictions of the position of the state, all agree that the domain of politics lost its characteristic features and government its preeminent position in the distribution of wealth and the management of public services in society in the past decades. For many, the distribution of power and dominance changed fundamentally with the changing nature and position of the state. The observation that nowadays there is no escape from politics is correct but does not imply that the social and the political cannot be distinguished analytically and conceptually. With its traditional focus on the reciprocal relationships between the political and the social, political sociology is essentially open to all these observations and interpretations. The question remains, however, as to whether the changes in the nature and position of the state require a new political sociology—and if so, what such a renewal should look like.

The rapid and permanent changes of the relationships between state and society are highly relevant for political sociologists, and none of the processes referred to can or should be abandoned as study topics. Examining the consequences of these developments, Irving Horowitz (1999) observed that classical political sociological approaches are not very useful since we are confronted by a "larger scale," which lies very far beyond anything that could have been imagined by Montesquieu, Tocqueville, Durkheim, or Weber. Although important, the idea of differences in scale between traditional and actual states and societies does not cover the fundamental changes experienced. Studying these changes and their implications for the relationships between state and society is only possible if political sociologists stick to a broad conceptualization of the political and the social and avoid any a priori restrictions. Major developments relevant for making political sociology more amenable to study are discussed as follows.

Identity

The consequences of the ongoing process of blending and melding of social and political phenomena for citizens are hard to summarize. Many authors have pointed out changes in social identity—that is, the ways in which individuals

label themselves as members of particular groups. Social identity can be based on nation, class, ethnicity, gender, and so on and has important consequences both for the individual concerned and for the distribution of power and dominance in society. For political sociologists, the fact that societies increasingly become more complex, heterogeneous, and differentiated always implied a constant change in social groups. Especially, critical theorists emphasize that in postmodern societies, the development of social identities cannot be explained by structural factors alone. Instead, it is the process of acquiring identities itself that has changed. Although usually starting with quite different assumptions, much of the work on social capital and political culture is also based on the recognition that blending and melding of social and political developments have radically changed the ways in which people identify with groups. Social identity—and not the structural aspects of the social or the political—becomes increasingly relevant for political sociology.

Civil Society

Closely related to the rising relevance of social identity is the need for a reassessment of the role and function of groups and associations in societies, where social and political processes are hard to distinguish. Considered to be intermediaries between state and society, groups and associations have been textbook topics in political sociology for a long time. More recently, several authors point to the fact that a shift from state-centered governance toward self-governing associations in civil society can be observed. Groups and associations still perform many of their traditional functions—such as interest mediation and mobilization—but instead of being participants among many other participants, they gradually developed into more independent entities, claiming to be essential elements of the fabric of domestic society. Clearly, in the spirit of many political sociologists, starting with Tocqueville and Marx, democracy and civil society are seen as two sides of the same coin. In a world characterized by the blending and melding of the social and the political, the rise of civil society and its drive to replace conventional interest groups and associations is one of the most interesting challenges for political sociologists.

States and Other Actors

Acknowledging the end of the dominant position of the state implies the recognition of the increasing relevance of other actors and participants. This expansion can be easily accepted and discussed in terms of the erosion of sovereignty or the loss of regulatory control by the state. Important aspects include struggles between states and big companies (limits of private initiatives, antitrust legislation, etc.) and competition between multinational corporations. The most threatening danger here is that the main advantage political sociologists realized in the past few decades—the rejection of attaching a priori causal direction to either society or the state in their analyses—is given up effortlessly and replaced by a fashionable depiction of the state as the main loser in a world controlled by multinational corporations and NGOs. Unless political sociologists come up with fruitful conceptualizations of the relationships between states and other actors, we will see a revival of society-centered approaches and a relapse to a sociology of politics of the pre-Sartori era.

Democracy

Democracy is closely linked to the rise of the national state and clearly defined within its borders. States can do very well without being democratic, but so far, it has taken the organized and limited forms of political power of the conventional state to promote democracy: no state, no democracy. Furthermore, democracy continues to spread around the world. Freedom and liberty are not restricted to wealthy countries, and many poor and developing states have a record of respecting political rights and civil liberties. The problem with this development, however, is that it appears to be rather easy to create a blend of formal democracy and political corruption, civil rights abuses, and autocratic rule. While only a few countries have slid backward into military rule, many more seem to reach a standoff or cease-fire between democratic and nondemocratic forces, where elected governments fail to regulate or take control of the most powerful social and economic groups in society. For political sociologists, very interesting cases and questions develop that bring us back to the heart of the traditional discussions

about social conditions for democratic rule—and for undemocratic rule.

Globalization

Since democracy is closely linked to the nationstate, many scholars emphasize that globalization presents new challenges to the study of the reciprocal relationships between state and society. If political power is no longer concentrated in states, then democratic control should be expanded beyond the borders of the state. A global civil society is presumed to fill the gaps here. The struggles between competing groups in a globalized world, however, are a familiar topic for political sociologists, and no radical changes are required to deal with questions about democracy and globalization. Yet the old focus on reciprocal relationships between the social and political within states is no longer appropriate, and the global connections and interdependencies of social, economic, and political actors should also be considered.

New Technologies

It is not just advocates of modernization approaches who presume that technical developments in communication and transportation have a clear impact on power and dominance between individuals and groups. As the cliché goes, the world has become smaller in many respects in the past few decades. Important consequences of this development are already included above under headings such as changing identities and globalization. New technologies further reduce the traditional lines of demarcation between social and political phenomena by making information universally available and communication a routine matter. There does not seem to be much need to expand studies on the impact of technological innovations in general, but political sociologists should include the spread of new technologies as an important aspect of each of the aforementioned five topics.

Recent social-end political developments—the rise of postmodern civil society, democratization, globalization, and new technologies—have important consequences for political sociology because they fundamentally change the distribution of power and dominance. The conventional distinction between

the social and the political as the main object of interest for political sociologists, however, is absolutely indispensable for analytical purposes. Precisely because the state appears to change its nature and position rapidly, a coherent conceptual framework is required to study these developments. Appeals for a new political sociology lay too much emphasis on the ways in which the world is changing and tend to undervalue the analytical and conceptual clarity provided by the old approaches. New directions for political sociology, then, should be based on the acceptance of fundamental changes and of evident continuities in the role and position of the state as well as on the recognition of the need for theoretical and conceptual innovations and on the demonstrated usefulness of available approaches.

Political Sociology as a Field of Study?

The heydays of political sociology appear to be over at first glance. Newer approaches and variants—such as neo-institutionalism, comparative sociology, political economy, comparative politics, and postmodernism—gradually seem to seize the intellectual arenas that used to be reserved for political sociologists. The almost euphoric postwar period of widely shared structural-functional modernization approaches was followed by vivacious controversies about the object of the discipline as well as its epistemological foundations and methodological performance. Two cultural turns, one economic turn, and a renaissance of modernization theories apparently left the field dispersed and divided. Feasible accounts for this ostensible decline are, first, the disappearance of a clear-cut distinction between the social and the political and, second, a general move toward more specialized subfields in the social sciences.

Already, Runciman depicted the enormous "expansion of the political" as the most important change in the history of the modern state. This development still continues. Important as this extension is in quantitative terms, we experience not only a strengthening of the position of the state but also a change in the nature of the relationships between the social and the political. The distinction between state and society—the main premise of political sociology—has gradually disappeared with the expansion of the state and has been replaced by a much more ambiguous melding and

blending of state and society. The reluctance to deal with the changing distribution of political power within and between states probably contributed considerably to the decline of political sociology as a self-reliant field of study. Power and dominance can be studied in many spheres of life—hospitals, neighborhoods, executive boards, and so on-without referring explicitly to some reciprocal relationships between the social and the political. However, it is precisely the disappearance of a clear distinction between state and society that makes the study of power and dominance much more interesting and relevant by focusing on the connections between the two phenomena; that is, power and dominance are not the main objects of interest in themselves but as part of the processes underlying the dissolution of the conventional distinctions between state and society. Political sociology as a field of study offers excellent opportunities to deal with the melding and blending of the social and the political.

A second explanation for the apparent decline of political sociology is related to the move toward more specialized subfields in the social sciences. This change is part of the more general change away from social-scientific approaches (emphasizing causal explanations based on regularities, mainly applying quantitative, comparative methods) toward cultural-scientific approaches (emphasizing specific cultural meanings and constructions of meanings, mainly applying qualitative, caseoriented methods). With the economic turn and the renaissance of modernization approaches, this general change is counterbalanced. As a result, many subfields flourish, while the label political sociology increasingly appears to be too unspecific. The apparent decline of political sociology as a field of study, then, is at least partly due to the evident accomplishments of the initial enterprise: If many more specialized subsubfields carry on successfully, the broader idea loses much of its appeal.

Political sociologists continue to contribute to our understanding of the distribution of power and dominance in society. Many of the actual topics suggested by advocates of new approaches—identities, citizenship, new social movements, and so on—do not differ from topics studied by traditional envoys of political sociology. Instead of debating claims for new approaches or paradigm shifts, the consensus about the selection of relevant

topics should be stressed. Political sociologists have been mainly concerned with input-oriented microlevel approaches (voting behavior, new social movements, parties, interest groups, etc.), on the one hand, and with output-oriented macrolevel approaches (state formation, transformations of political systems and political reform processes, etc.), on the other. The very rapid spread of rational choice approaches in many social sciences in the past few decades reflects a need for more precise theoretical arguments than is usually provided by available approaches. Therefore, the most important theoretical enhancements in political sociology as a field of study focus on the reformulation of existing approaches in more rigorous ways—that is, in more deductive ways. Note that this does not necessarily imply a reduction of all behavior to naive utility maximizing nor does it require the use of formal modeling or quantification. Institutions, norms, and values; historical peculiarities; collective goods; and frustrations all can have a place in deductive theories attempting to provide microfoundations for macrophenomena. Forthcoming theoretical approaches in political sociology as a field of study, then, will mainly consist of attempts to provide these foundations.

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See also Class, Social; Cleavages, Social and Political; Marxism; Modernization Theory; Postmodernism in International Relations; Power; State

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POLITICAL SYSTEMS, TYPES

The term *political system* is an abstract concept and is used widely and often with different meanings. In this entry, a political system is defined as a form of governing society that is embedded in a legal (constitutional), economic, and cultural environment. The essence of a political system relies on the interdependence of its institutions (rules of the political game) and collective actors (political

parties, organized interests, governments, and bureaucracies) that operate within such a system. From this definition, it follows that political systems are seen as a whole: Authority is exercised over a territory through the body politic, including its state format, organization of public decision making, and related processes of policy formation. The study of types of political systems is—almost by definition—comparative by means of developing typologies. One can distinguish between two directions in the study of types of political systems: one, the descriptive approach and, two, the analytical approach by developing typologies.

The descriptive approach has a long-standing history in political science and focuses on typologies of political systems—often on the basis of taxonomies, that is, a (more or less) logical ordering of types that are hierarchically organized. An example of such a taxonomy is Aristotle's classification of political regimes. On the one hand, Aristotle divided the politics of his time into two types: good versus corrupt governance. Many of these typologies have been developed over time, and more often than not, they were directed by normative ideas (e.g., Montesquieu, the separation of powers). Other typologies have been driven by forms of culture, economic systems, or stages of societal development, and so on. All these classifications are not only subject to normative belief systems but are also limited, as they describe the state of affairs rather than explain how and why these differences have emerged or what they pertain to.

The analytical approach aims at developing comparative typologies that are not only (or only indirectly) normative but also evidence based. One of the earliest attempts was made by Lord Bryce, who compared the democracies of his time by means of seeking the commonalities between democratic systems that made them different from other political systems (e.g., direct vs. indirect forms of representation and decision making). Others tried to develop classifications on the basis of theory (e.g., Max Weber's trichotomy of traditional, charismatic, and rational rule and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's idea of variations in political culture) or by means of evidence-based induction (e.g., Arend Lijphart, 1999).

The use of typologies in political science is widespread and considered as useful for theory

development, descriptive analysis, and reducing. This entry first elaborates the method of typology construction and offers some examples. As will become clear, the use of a typology is more often than not an instrument for analysis in comparative political science (see also Paul Pennings, Hans Keman, & Ian Kleinnijenhuis, 2006). Second, this entry discusses a number of existing typologies of political systems that can be labeled as descriptive and have figured in comparative political science. Third, the focus is on typologies where the aim is to explain the patterned variation in politics that emerges from empirical investigation. For example, Robert Dahl and Arend Lijphart have developed typologies to highlight the intradifferences within democratic polities. Whereas the former focuses on the institutional configuration of rules and rights resulting in polyarchy, the latter developed a typology (i.e., majoritarian vs. consensus democracy) to understand the actual working of a democratic political system. Finally, the entry moves to a specific approach in political science: A Systems Analysis of Political Life (1965) as developed by David Easton. This approach is deductive and claims to explain the variations across diverse systems. In this approach, the organization of government is the core of each system. This approach is elaborated by examining patterned variations of government.

Developing a Typology

Although typologies are not exclusive to comparative politics, they are frequently used in this subdiscipline to sustain and develop arguments as regards the organization and institutional design of political systems. This is not surprising since political systems are seen as closed entities (like states, polities, governments, etc.). To reduce the real-world complexities, comparativists have always made attempts to translate their ideas on political systems into typologies. Aristotle did so, as did Polybios (comparing various Greek city-states) and, later, Montesquieu and Lord Bryce.

Typologies are seen to be useful as a prototheory. They are used not only to reduce complexity but also to inspect certain (hypothetical) relationships. For instance, one can develop a typology that combines two dimensions such as democracy (yes/no) and economic development (high/low) and inspect the hypothesis that democracy and welfare correlate. It is easy to understand that such relatively simple typologies are more often than not victim of the choices made by the researcher and, therefore, lead to biased perspectives. However, as a proto-theory, a typology can certainly help refine and develop concepts. Furthermore, a typology assists in observing to what extent concepts function empirically. In short, a properly developed typology is conducive to concept formation, theory development, and validation in view of empirical evidence (Mattei Dogan & Dominique Pelassy, 1990).

Typology development is in some ways a Scylla and Charybdis problem: On the one hand, simple typologies can enhance clarity in a systematic fashion; on the other hand, however, overelaboration lurks around the corner (by developing too many categories or subdivisions within one category). Although a refined typology can be useful and points to all logical possibilities, it also tends to produce confusion and complexity. There is no solution to this problem other than empirical verification. As a methodological principle, the researcher has to follow as a rule of thumb that a classification scheme as applied to a typology should include as many real cases as feasible, and at the same time, these cases should exclusively fit only one of the cells of the typology. This means that arbitrary cases are to be avoided as much as possible. This not only avoids confusion but also prevents the occurrence of hybrid systems.

Take for example Lijphart's typology of democracies (Lijphart, 1968). There are two dimensions: (1) elite behavior (cooperation vs. competition) and (2) whether society is divided or not (homogeneous vs. fragmented societies). This leads to a 2 × 2 typology with four types: centripetal, centrifugal, depoliticized, and consociational. In this typology, the basic argument is that under divisive societal conditions—where sociocultural cleavages are politically organized (by parties or organized interests)—the key condition for stability is elite behavior (being the first dimension of the typology) to regulate political behavior at the mass level. Lijphart argues that whether elites produce stability depends on the type of conflict in plural societies.

So far, so good: There is an explanation, and it appeared plausible (at the time). However, others

have also attempted to use this typology for other systems and found it difficult to decide for all relevant cases where to locate them in this fourfold table or to accept that the proposed mechanism did indeed explain the political process for all the cases in each separate cell. This is not the place to discuss Liphart further. The main point is that typologies often flounder in view of empirical evidence or are biased in terms of case selection and measurement problems. In addition, one problem with this is that many typologies tend to be exclusively focused on the commonalities among the cases rather than taking into account the differences that exist. Finally, sometimes cases do not fit the defined cells because of additional circumstances that defy the hypothesized relationship. In other words, typology construction is certainly a useful tool for comparing political systems, but it is also vulnerable to misplacement and biased results.

In summary, typologies are considered as a useful instrument to develop a proto-theory or a conceptual design and can serve as operational controls on how far they travel in reality. In addition, typologies help reduce the complexities of researching political systems in order to create a systematic account of how the real world can be ordered. Even taking into account the pitfalls and the caveats mentioned here, the typology has been and continues to be one of the foremost tools of comparative political science. Hence, and this is the topic of the next section, typologies are an essential analytical step to analyze and investigate types of political systems.

Descriptive Typologies of Political Systems

Throughout the development of political science, classifications have been developed, and those of Polybios, Aristotle, Montesquieu, and others have already been mentioned. A number of these are basically (unidimensional) listings according to a feature considered to be a central one, such as, for example, the "state" or "forms of government," as has been developed by Samuel Finer (1997). Other examples are developmental classifications that define historical stages of society, each producing a specific type of political authority.

A classic example is Friedrich Engels's description of the change and development from a primitive society to a communist society. This anthropological approach related the production/consumption patterns of society to political authority (from absence of rule to authoritarian rule to self-rule). This teleological model can be seen as an almost conditional set of political-economic stages predicting the type of political system to emerge in the course of history, based on Marxist ideas regarding societal development culminating in "classless communism."

Max Weber, a famous German sociologist, has earned a reputation by defining the state as well as developing a typology of ruling systems. Whereas his definition of the state essentially rested with the exercise of (legitimate) power over a territory, his typology concerned an ideal type that served as a proto-theory, arguing that the degree of state development is associated with a certain type of political rule, of which the rational-legal rule (i.e., bureaucracy) is the modern one.

Contrary to Engels's teleological approach, the Weberian approach can be considered as a proto-theory. Most approaches before the 1960s were in fact descriptive, were based on broad—if not vague—analytical distinctions, and often tended to be close to teleological reasoning (i.e., a future goal-oriented argument). In particular, developmental studies focusing on the poorer regions suffered from this bias.

More recently, classification-based typologies of wholesale political systems are becoming less popular among comparativists. The analytical focus of researchers concerned with the study of political systems has shifted to highlighting specific features of political systems. This change in focus also meant that typologies were confined to specific types of systems such as democracies. Examples are party systems, electoral systems, cleavage systems, parties, governmental features, and so on (see, e.g., Dogan & Pelassy, 1990).

Jean Blondel (1982) developed, for instance, a simple comparative typology of party systems by counting the number of parties that are represented on average (from a two-party system to a multiparty system). This would explain the differences between legislatures in terms of interactions between parties and government. His contemporary, Maurice Duverger, argued that the effect of a party system is related to government stability: The fewer the number of parties, the more stable party government would be. Hence, according to Maurice Duverger, the nexus between the electoral

system and the party system could be considered as a predictor of how a (democratic) political system would function. In fact, Duverger's law (as it is also known) is conducive to a typology of electoral laws and system stability. The so-called first-past-the-post electoral system would be superior to proportional representation because it produces a stable single-party government as opposed to an unstable coalition government. Most of the classifications made regarding electoral and party systems, however, remain simple, but as regards questions of voting and party behavior, they are merely descriptive.

Stein Rokkan is also well-known and respected for his work on modeling (the term *Rokkan* is used for developing a typology of political systems) the emergence of national states in Europe. His concern was to understand how political systems developed to take on the contemporary shape and organization of the nation-state in Europe. To this end, he developed grids of reference or, in fact, dimensions to account for the functional and territorial differentiation across the European area from a historical perspective. In his view, the only way to do so is to make macromodel comparisons that are subsequently specified by means of region-specific models and highlighted by individual cases.

Rokkan's typology (see Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle, & Derek Urwin, 1999) contains, first, a trichotomy: economy-territory-culture. From these master dimensions, specific indicators to analyze pathways to the contemporary form of the state are developed: religious diversity, linguistic variation, ethnic distinctiveness, dispersal of land ownership, urbanization, industrialization, trade, geographical location and size (including center/ periphery situations), (de)centralization of authority, and polity formation (constitutional development). This grid of reference served the purpose of accounting for the cross-system variation of state formation over time and ultimately of explaining the Europe-wide democratization within the emerging nation-state.

Rokkan's model is—in retrospect—less a model and more a typology since the classification is conducive to certain types (or paths) of democratization that are more favorable than others (earlier fully accomplished democratization). It enables the researcher to examine both the similarities and the differences in the development of political systems

(in Europe). In addition, it was the basis for understanding not only how political systems emerged but, foremost, how they shaped the democratic state in the early 20th century. Although Rokkan's work is widely acknowledged, it is nowadays more often politely referred to than actually used.

Another attempt to develop a diachronical typology of political systems stems from Finer (1997). His attempt focused on regime types that identify over time the organization of political authority (or who governs). Finer listed four "pure" types: palace, forum, nobility, and the church, representing the type of rule. In addition, the four types could well develop as hybrids. The resulting 10 cells serve as an empirical grid to be filled by real-world cases; for example, the pure church category only concerns two cases: the Vatican and Tibet, whereas forum includes all modern, secular democracies. However impressive Finer's book is, the typology is purely descriptive and fails to pass the mentioned methodological rule of thumb on typologies: In many cases, one may question whether there are overlaps in the located position of cases or whether cells remain (almost) empty.

The typologies presented so far are mixtures of description and modest explanation. Second, they represent either whole-system approaches or systemic (intrasystem) typologies (e.g., electoral systems or types of government). Third, it must be noted that many of these typologies of political systems are often forgotten or only sparsely used at present. Yet there is an exception to this: In 1996 (originally 1989), Denis and Ian Derbyshire published Political Systems of the World. In this monumental and ambitious book, the authors set out to cover *all* existing political systems (N = 192at the time), classify them according to social and economic influences, and highlight a number of particular political features common to many but not all: a constitutional design, an ideological base, executive/legislative relations, an electoral system, and political parties. In other words, Derbyshire and Derbyshire follow the traditional pattern of descriptive analysis of political systems (i.e., the unit of comparison is the independent state). Although the book contains some cross-tables that hint at more elaboration, most of the (useful) information is based on one-dimensional classifications. In fact, it concerns a kind of political map

of the (contemporary) world, and only the sections on ideology and political parties can be considered analytically novel.

The authors argue that, in addition to parties competing for office or representing the population as a whole (as under communist rule), there are pressure groups and interest groups that are functionally equivalents of parties within the political system. Therefore, Derbyshire and Derbyshire introduced the concept of corporatism as an alternative mode of interest representation vis-àvis pluralism. In fact, they introduce a new type of state: the corporatist state. Apart from the fact that this type of state (as far as it [has] existed) is limited to Western Europe with some similar practices elsewhere, it is questionable whether or not this type of polity is relevant to understanding political systems all over the world in a comparative perspective.

The ideological base of a political system is considered by Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996) as "a body of ideas which reflects the beliefs and values of a nation and its political system" (p. 23). Hence, in their view, the ideological base of a political system (i.e., national state) refers to a (often underlying) shared belief system on dominating values within a society (including religion). As the authors admit, the labeling of nation-states by ideological base is bound to be arbitrary, and hybrid forms are to be found as well. Nevertheless, it is interesting to examine how this dimension is distributed across the world.

Derbyshire and Derbyshire distinguish eight different ideological bases (see Table 1). In fact, some of these are closer to being a type of state than a belief system per se. In this table, the ideological divisions by Derbyshire and Derbyshire are reported in connection with socioeconomic factors and indicators of quality of life. The idea is obviously that there is a relation between economic development and social conditions, on the one hand, and the ideological base of a state, on the other.

As is known from the literature, the relationship between types of political systems and social and economic development is not straightforward, nor is it that statistically strong (Keman, 2002). The only solid observation is that fully fledged democratic systems are almost always among the prosperous countries and are highly developed in socioeconomic terms. The other categories may

	Gross Domestic				
	No. of Political	Product (%	GDP per	Literacy	Human Rights
Ideological Base	Systems	World Share)	Capita (\$)	Rate (%)	Index
Liberal	73 (38.0%)	86.1	8.475	88	80
democratic					
Emerging	73 (38.0%)	8.0	1.490	66	63
democratic					
Communist	5 (2.6%)	2.4	810	87	25
Nationalist	8 (4.2%)	0.6	1.500	57	45
Religious	3 (1.6%)	0.6	1.200	39	25
Authoritarian ^a	20 (10.4%)	0.7	490	60	40
Absolutist	10 (5.2%)	1.0	8.235	66	44

Table I Distribution of Ideological Base of the State and Social and Economic Development

Source: Derbyshire, J. D., & Derbyshire, I. (1996). Political systems of the world (pp. 25-26). New York: St. Martin's Press.

perhaps tell us something about the background of the form of government that has emerged around the world, but—given the broad categories—very little more. In addition, the defining categories remain vague (what distinguishes nationalist from authoritarian?). Probably, there are various cases that are hybrids or that simply overlap (e.g., Kenya appears to be authoritarian and nationalist, whereas Tanzania is labeled as socialist and nationalist by the authors).

In particular, the distinction between liberal democracies and emergent democracies is confusing and debatable. First, the definition tells us little about what the ideological differences are between the two (apart from the fact that the former have had an undisturbed history [as a state] in terms of coups d'état, whereas the latter emerged in the various postwar waves of democratization and often experienced political disruption). Second, comparing the listings of Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996) with others, it appears that a number of cases are misplaced as regards being democratic, or emerging or not. All in all, classifications as developed by Derbyshire and Derbyshire are certainly useful as reference sources but have little added value in terms of understanding the differences between types of political systems and are limited in their descriptive-analytical value (e.g., as a proto-theory or in explaining comparative differences). In some scholars' view, a typology should

add to existing knowledge rather than only recycle existing knowledge regarding the similarities of and differences between political systems. Hence, typologies are useful but only if they are systematic, two- or multidimensional, and related to a theory-driven research question (e.g., Lijphart's typology of democratic variations and Rokkan's models of state development).

This section has discussed various types of typologies as they have been developed and elaborated in comparative political science. On the one hand, pure descriptive classifications and typologies have been presented (Finer; Derbyshire & Derbyshire). On the other hand, a number of analytical typologies have been put forward. It should be noted that typologies either aspire to classify all political systems of the world (like Finer) or confine themselves to regions—such as Europe (Rokkan)—and to specific regime types—for example, democracies (Lijphart). In addition, it was argued that after the 1970s, another kind of typology emerged in the form of systemic or intrasystem classifications (e.g., party systems and type of government; see Blondel, 1982).

Hence, the present strategy for developing types of political systems involves going from descriptive to analytical approaches and from focusing on whole systems to attributes of political systems. The focus on attributes of political systems can be applied to comparative politics and enhance insight

a. Distinction military and authoritarian collapsed by this author.

for the student regarding both the cross-system and intrasystem variation around the world or within certain regions or regime types. One useful way of developing further theory-driven typologies is to derive them from Easton's *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*.

Variations of Political Systems: Types of Political Governance

Systems theory is derived from evolutionary biological models that emphasize the interdependence of the elements that are considered to be essential for the survival of the system. Systems theory applied to analyze political systems is in the form of a set of interactions between political actors whose behavior is structured by institutions and is embedded in a wider environment. It departs from the idea that these institutionalized interactions shape the dynamics of a system toward more or less an equilibrium situation. This approach was already developed in the 19th century (e.g., Herbert Spencer) and has been applied to political science since the late 1950s. Easton (1965, 1981) has been the main advocate of this approach, and others like Almond and Verba applied it to compare polities (institutionalized rule of a society).

Easton conceived of politics in terms of its relationship with society by means of the authoritative allocation of material and "immaterial" for a society (i.e., by means of public policy formation). The political system receives inputs from society in terms of demands and support, such as policy preferences of organized interests and political parties, and electoral support, for example, for parties in government or the junta in power. The political system converts these into outputs in the form of decisions and enforceable policies that feed back to society. If and when demand and support are (more or less) in balance, it would imply an equilibrium situation that is, political stability. Of course, this process is not an automatic one but is driven by the types of institutions and political actors. Gatekeepers, like parties or interest groups, cumulate various preferences from the public and direct the system of governance (i.e., the conversion process). The resulting outputs (policy) feed back into support and demand for the actors that are responsible for government.

More often than not, the Eastonian approach of systems theory has been criticized for being mechanistic, teleological, static, and not fit for empirical analysis. However, the practitioners of comparative politics have helped refute these criticisms. First, they applied systems theory to compare countries as political systems; second, by elaborating Easton's model by specifying political actors and institutions, they analyzed the "black box" of the conversion process (or governance); third, with the data available now, which allow for closer scrutiny while comparing political systems, they developed whole-system and systemic classifications of political systems.

In the remainder of this section, the differences and similarities between political systems are elaborated by means of the Eastonian approach to demonstrate the extent to which types of political systems do vary. This allows for assessing the extant typologies. Recall that a distinction was made between descriptive and analytical typologies, on the one hand, and between whole-system comparisons and systemic or intrasystem typologies, on the other. The Eastonian approach allows for an analytical systemic typology.

In what follows, the focus is first on the institutional variation of polities (in this case, the countries of the world) in terms of their types of political rule, both representative and nonrepresentative.

Institutional Variations of Political Systems

As we have observed, there have been and always will be classifications of political regimes. The term *regime* simply means a system of ruling society. Numerous indicators are used, but here we shall concentrate on the institutional configuration of government. As has already been stated, political institutions are basically the rules of the political game, and these rules shape and direct the behavior of the players involved (e.g., parties, movements, interest groups, bureaucrats, people, and also the members of government) with respect to the political process of governing. The main types of representative government are introduced in the section that follows. In addition, the nondemocratic types are also discussed. This enables us to define the relationship between government as the conversion agency (making decisions on policies) and the eventual policy performance in terms of its societal impact (or feedback process).

Representative Government

This type is related to the political-ideological basis regarding the "liberal-democratic" and "emerging democratic" types of governance (see Table 1). The connection lies with the idea of democracy. Central to democracy is that the executive is elected indirectly by the population and, thus, the population (or more precisely, the electorate), through its representation in the Assembly, directs and controls government. Hence, the way in which the relationship between the executive and legislative is institutionalized shapes the role and position of government. This relationship is constitutionally driven almost everywhere or laid down in a basic law. In addition, there are the "conventions" that shape the structure of representative government. Hence, institutions are determining the "room for manoeuvre" for government and more often than not, will be conducive to its "leadership and optimisation" (see Blondel, 1982). For instance, differences in the formal relationship between the executive and legislative, on the one hand, and the type of electoral system, on the other, influence the composition of government and its policy-making capacities. Four types of government can be distinguished within the category of representative government:

- 1. presidential government,
- 2. parliamentary government,
- 3. dual-power government, and
- 4. single-party government.

According to Derbyshire and Derbyshire, the cross-national distribution of these types is as shown in Table 2.

The parliamentary type of representative government is quite dominant in Europe. Only one out of five government types outside Europe is parliamentary. Presidential government is the dominant type within both the consolidated and the emergent democracies in the rest of the democratic world. Yet since the late 1980s, the number of dual-power governments has doubled (particularly in Central and Eastern Europe). This typology of representative government is driven by the constitutional features of the polity.

Presidential Government. The role and position of the head of state is crucial for each type. Although most states have a president as head of state, in most cases, the presidency is merely symbolic, and its main function is to represent the sovereignty of the nation and government. In this sense, presidents are comparable to constitutional monarchs. However, in other systems—for example, the United States—the president has been assigned the role of executive (as head of government), and the related power is separated from the legislative powers of the (elected) assembly. In most cases, the executive head of state cannot be removed by the legislative (he or she appoints the other members of government) and derives his or her legitimacy from popular election to office (i.e., elected leadership).

The foremost feature is that of the one-person executive who dominates the politics of government. He or she can call on the public, by whom he or she is elected, and represents national government at home and abroad. This feature of a one-person executive also reinforces the position of the bureaucracy, which, at least in many cases, is indirectly subservient to the president. Of course, this differs from system to system, but if

Table 2 Types of Representative Government

Region	п	Presidential	Parliamentary	Dual Power
Europe	49 (31%)	15 (30%)	24 (48%)	10 (22%)
Americas	43 (27%)	29 (58%)	12 (35%)	2 (7%)
Rest of the world	67 (42%)	43 (64%)	19 (28%)	5 (8%)
Totals	159 (100%)	87 (52%)	55 (36%)	17 (12%)

Source: Derbyshire, J. D., & Derbyshire, I. (1996). Political systems of the world (p. 40). New York: St. Martin's Press. Note: Percentages of types of representative government are row totals.

well organized, the president can direct the bureaucracy effectively and even strengthen the coordination of policy implementation.

Typical for presidentialism is the executive command of the head of state, who is also head of government. Conversely, parliament plays an indirect role by exerting legislative control. It is clear that the structure of presidential government is characterized by quite a few lines of command. Conversely, the lines of control are either reciprocal or indirect. This implies that the institutional configuration of presidential government can be, and often is, conducive to conflict (e.g., think of "divided government"—i.e., the political "color" of the president is different from the majority in the legislature) and considered to be prone to political instability.

Parliamentary Government. Parliamentary government is organically linked to the legislature, or parliament. The government emerges from the assembly and can be dismissed by a vote of no confidence (and often also needs a vote of investiture by the same parliament). At the same time, government can—often after consultation with the head of state—dissolve parliament and call for a new election. Whereas presidential government appears strong and relatively independent, parliamentary government is often considered to be weak because of the mutual dependence of the executive and legislature. In other words, a typical consequence of parliamentary government is that both powers are fused and bargaining eventually directs the outputs of the system. Hence, the institutional means of command and control are distributed across the executive and legislative.

Given these differences from presidentialism, it is usual to differentiate between parliamentary governments by means of their conventional shape and working. On the one hand, there is the one-party government, where the majority party in parliament forms the government (e.g., in the United Kingdom until recently). On the other hand, there is the coalition government, where a combination of parties forms a government that is supported by a majority in parliament. A subtype is the minority governments (one-party or coalition, occurring often in Scandinavia). In short, in parliamentary types of government, the political representation is mediated by means of parties.

All in all, in parliamentary systems, government is structured differently from presidential government. The formal powers of the executive and legislative are largely fused; consensus formation between parties in government and in parliament is a prerequisite to make policies, and therefore, negotiations take place in both government and parliament, where, in the final instance, parties do really matter.

What should also be clear is that the electorate only indirectly influences government. Hence, as is often argued, parliamentary systems of governance are indeed an indirect form of democracy. Whereas in presidential systems the head of government is primarily directly elected, this is not the case in parliamentary systems. To push this argument farther, in parliamentary democracies, parties are the key factor linking the electorate to parliamentary government.

Dual-Power Government. This type of government has often been considered as an anomaly or as a residual category. But, as a consequence of the criticisms raised versus both presidential and parliamentary government, dual-power government is taken much more seriously nowadays, and more attention is paid to this type of government (usually labeled semipresidentialism) as an alternative to both presidentialism and parliamentarism. The majority of the cases can be found in Europe: France, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and, to some extent, Portugal, Finland, the Czech Republic, and Poland. It should be noted that most of these states have developed this dual system only recently. This may well be an expression of a growing dissatisfaction (given the apparent disadvantages) with both the straightforward presidential and parliamentary systems of democratic and constitutional government. The third type of representative government is presented in Figure 1.

Dual-power government is strongly influenced by constitutional rules (the direct arrows in Figure 1) and the multiple relations that exist. The main disadvantage is the delicate interrelations in terms of command and control between all powers. This may well imply that imbalances and disruption lead to stalemates, gridlocks, and, thus, governmental instability. However, the fact that the electorate has a more direct influence on both the executive and the legislative than in the other




Figure I Dual-Power Government

Note: Dotted arrows represent indirect forms of command or control.

types of representative government appears to be an advantage.

Nonrepresentative Government

These types of government overlap to a large extent with the ideological bases that have been distinguished in Table 2 and that do not belong to the democratic family. Here, the distinction between one-actor government and autocratic governance is made. The first type is characterized by the fact that one political actor—be it a party, movement, or a (charismatic) leader—rules the state in the name of the whole nation. Often, these regimes are ideologically inspired by communism or variations of nationalism. Autocratic governments can also be characterized by one political actor who rules but not in the name of the collective interest. The same line of reasoning can be applied to military and religious rule. The polity is not the framework of reference, but rather, a specific interest or idea provides an ideological basis of and justification for autocratic rule. Autocratic government concerns about 15.6% of all regimes in the world, and together with the one-actor government, this covers 24% of all the regimes of the world.

One-Actor Government. The basic feature of a one-actor government is that a party or movement or, eventually, a leader represents the "will of the people" and governs for the people but by no means is the state governed by the people. Hence, insofar as there exists representation, it is limited to a "top-bottom" type of indirect representation

(see Figure 2). In most cases, these ideas are laid down in a constitution or in a set of basic laws by one party or movement. In addition, the constitution preamble serves to justify the nature of the system in terms of ideology (e.g., socialism or patriotism) and the need for a unified actor steering the state and society. In essence, this implies that both the executive and the legislature (which almost always formally exist in this type of government) are formed by the same party or movement (hence, there is no competition between parties). In fact, government is formed by an "elite" that is either confined to party membership (like in communist regimes) or to having a function in the movement. In particular, this pattern can be observed in the developing and postcolonial world.

It would appear that the charismatic style of leadership, the avoidance of personality cults, and self-interested behavior of the elite are requirements for smooth change and adequate societal performance by means of such a type of government. If these requirements are not met or external pressure mounts, a fundamental regime change is almost inevitable. Many of these changes (in particular, in the past decades) are going in two directions: either toward emergent democracy or toward an autocratic type of government.

Autocratic Government. The fundamental features that shape this category of governance are that not only is it not representative but also that there is no explicit link with society at large and hardly any formal or constitutional organization of the polity. Instead, the ideological basis is often derived from




Figure 2 One-Actor Government

absolutism or religion, on the one hand, or based on military rule (operating by suspending the basic laws), on the other.

The structure of this form of government is that it is completely self-organized, and command and control are organized by force, ruling out any form of political and civil rights for the population. The most extreme form is tyranny, more often than not by means of (personalized) dictatorship (e.g., Joseph Stalin [Iosif Vissarionovic Dzugasvili]). This means that government equals the "rule of the day" and that force and fear prevail over the well-being of the nation and its population. At the end of the day, neither the leadership nor its subservient elite is accountable to anybody but itself.

Nonrepresentative government is hardly structured by formal rules. Informal rules tend to be beneficial and shaped by the leadership and its concomitant elites and are often insufficient for stable and enduring government. The major difference between both types distinguished here is the absence of abuse and outright perversion of human rights in combination with attempts to enhance the public welfare of the nation by one-actor governments. Yet in reality, it is difficult to draw a line between the two types. Often the one develops into the other.

Toward a Typology of Contemporary Forms of Governance

The different forms of government that have been discussed are all derived from one theoretical model: Easton's systems theory of political life. The focus has been on the institutional configuration of each type: presidential, parliamentary, dual power, one-actor, and autocratic government. It has been shown how the central actors representing the systems of governance are interrelated (directly, indirectly, or not) through the institutions that are typical for each political system. In this way, one can fill in the real cases that belong to each type as well as consider how in each of these political systems, the central actors are ordered in terms of (supposed) influence and their powers to command or control (or both).

Of course, not all systems within each category are perfectly the same; there is variation in presidential systems as there is in autocratic systems. In addition, all systems are more or less in flux: Institutional arrangements are changed and sometimes completely altered (e.g., the transition of the Fourth French Republic to the Fifth in 1958 or the degradation of Kenya from a one-party state to an autocratic system in the 1980s). Finally, there are cases that tend to be hybrids—that is, some features of two of the main types appear in one system: Finland, for example, showed strong features of presidentialism until the 1980s, but at the same time, it could well be considered to have a parliamentary type of representative government. Finally, it is fair to say that in reality, it is a thin line that separates autocratic systems from oneparty systems (think of the absolutist kingdoms that exist in the Arabic world).

At the end of the day, it is up to the comparative political scientist to make a decision on the basis of

evidence, on the one hand, and depending on the research question asked, on the other. This could well mean that a specific typology is developed, for instance, to describe how democratic a political system is or how well different systems perform (Keman, 2002). Developing typologies of political systems can help answer such questions and enhance comparative analysis.

Conclusion

The different types of political systems have been discussed throughout history, and many typologies have been developed. The construction of a typology is more challenging if the researcher not only wishes to use it as a descriptive tool to systematically reduce the comparative complexities but also aims to arrive at an analytically driven typology. As a methodological rule of thumb, this entry emphasized that a proper typology of political systems should contain those cases that not only belong in one cell but are also empirically mutually exclusive across cells. In addition, this entry distinguished between typologies that are whole-system oriented or intrasystem focused. Whole-system typologies of political systems had been quite frequent up to the 1970s, whereas the intrasystem ones came more into use after World War II.

The variation in both descriptive and analytical typologies of political systems was also treated. In addition, this entry also discussed that types of political systems may well be enhanced on the basis of Easton's idea of systems analysis of political life. To this end, systems of representative and nonrepresentative government were discussed as an example of constructing a typology of political systems in terms of their institutional design. This resulted in an analytical typology that is neither static nor teleological and allows for interpreting the process of government as the crucial component of any political system together with its systemic features.

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See also Authoritarian Regimes; Democracies, Types of; Democratization; Hybrid Regimes; Parliamentary Systems; Presidentialism; Semipresidentialism; Systems Theory; Totalitarian Regimes

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POLITICAL THEORY

Theory is defined as a set of propositions that is internally consistent and based on a certain set of axioms and assumptions. Theory must be logically derivable in all cases. It must be politically persuasive, especially when it deals with norms. It must be empirically verifiable when it deals with reality. Therefore, political theory is defined as a set of propositions about "who gets what, when, how" (Harold Lasswell) and "the authoritative allocation of values in society" (David Easton). Thus defined, political theory covers a very wide range of subjects in the form of propositions.

In what follows, first the origins and types of political theory are examined. Among the types of political theory, this entry takes into account the following three: (1) classical philosophy, (2) empirical political theory, and (3) formal political theory. Next, this entry examines schools of political theory and their evaluation. Under this heading, 10 schools are evaluated: 4 schools of normative political theory (conflict, shared values, exchange, and coordination) and 6 schools of empirical political theory (systems theory, behavioralism, rational choice theory, institutionalism, neuroscience, and globalism). Third, this entry discusses the need to enhance conversations between normative political theory and empirical political theory, or between "ought" and "is." In other words, normative political theory should talk more about the plausibility, feasibility, and self-sustainability of the normative order it advances, and empirical political theory should discuss normative implications more seriously. With the aim of providing for more conversations and interactions within political theory, concise and concrete illustrations of such proposed conversations and interactions are given.

Origins and Types of Political Theory

Although political theory as a part of the modern discipline of political science emerged only in the 20th century, the origins of political theory are unquestionably in ancient thought-whether in the philosophy of Greece, Mesopotamia, Egypt, India, or China. One can cite passages from Aristotle, Kautilya, or Confucius easily to demonstrate that they are political scientists indeed and that political science, although modern, has very ancient roots. One of the major differences the discipline of political science can claim to have visà-vis other social science disciplines such as economics and sociology is that the ancient versions of political science, such as those of the three philosophers mentioned above, retain much power and relevance to the current reality in politics. Aristotle is often mentioned in contemporary writings on politics and political science. Kautilya is referred to in discussions on rulers' state craft both at home and vis-à-vis their rivals. Confucius continues to be taken up as providing possible versions of authoritarian politics. It is rare for Aristotle to be discussed in relation to economics, although his ideas on this subject are significant for the history of economics. All these disciplines are relatively young, since they have grown as

modern social science disciplines in the West, especially in the 20th century. Yet one can argue that political science has retained its ancient origins even at the dawn of the 21st century. Thus, its development is very complex.

In Western Europe, the major distinction between the sacred and the secular was made gradually but quite steadily during the Enlightenment and the Reformation, and it diffused to European settlements and later to the rest of the world as well, at least superficially; secularism is therefore closely related to Western cultures. Religion and politics are said to have been distinguished in the West since the modern age. The same can be said about the relationship between religion and science. William of Ockham gave an early epistemological foundation for what would be called modern science by making a clear distinction between realism and nominalism. Realism refers to the school of thought that believes that God does exist in reality and that reality was conceived as the basis of that knowledge; nominalism refers to the view that God exists insofar as the concept of God is imagined. With this stance, science was able to separate itself from the cosmos of the sacred. With this separation, modern science was able to make spectacular progress in the West.

Needless to say, the separation between God and science and between God and politics did not come about so neatly or once and for all; rather, the picture is complex. The separation between religion and politics has been tenuous at best. At any rate, for our purposes, the separation of politics from God was a step forward in distinguishing political theory from philosophy. Also the separation of science from God was a step forward in distinguishing political theory from political philosophy. This distinction tries to separate God's judgment from that of scientists or political leaders.

At the crux of political theory is the mixture of the normative and the empirical—that is, what ought to be versus what is. The normative has to do with the judgment by which a verdict on justice is determined. While in medieval times, such judgments came from the Catholic Church or, in some cases, duels were fought between opposing parties, in modern times, they come from the courts where secular matters are concerned. Courts have been conceived like God. The concept of the empirical refers to something that can be experienced or

tested in the daily lives of people. It was not until modern times, with the increasingly sharp distinction between the sacred and the secular—which made "reality checks" possible—that empirical testing became common.

Political theory comprises all this under one umbrella, including both classical philosophy and empirical political theory. To complicate matters further, political theory contains within its territory what is called formal political theory. Classical philosophy refers to prescientific and pre-empiricist statements about what justice is, how it should be achieved, and how it should be conceptualized. Empirical political theory refers to statements made from the scientific and empiricist viewpoints on how politics is played out. Formal political theory refers to logically and/or mathematically derivable statements that may or may not be amenable to empirical testing. Dealing with the normative and the empirical is inherently not easy. Compounding the problem is the recent tendency toward overspecialization and mutual isolation, rather than mutual engagement, among political scientists dealing with the normative and the empirical. Mutual isolation between classical normative theory and empirical theory has gone sometimes too far as their borderlines are not always very clear.

In practice, normative political theory and empirical political theory are far apart for several reasons. First, their knowledge base differs. Classical political theorists often are concerned with philosophy, theology, and intellectual history, whereas empirical political theorists are often interested in other empirical social sciences such as economics, sociology, and social psychology or in other applied empirical sciences such as neuroscience in politics. Second, their methods of training are very different. Classical political theory focuses on text critique and robust argumentation. All study is based on careful reading and argumentation. Empirical political theory focuses on hypothesis testing conducted according to positivistic practices or a systematic reality check. Yet these differences are not strong enough to undermine their disciplinary identity as political science and to split it into two or more subdisciplines. Although no solid and systematic evidence exists, it looks as if the shared fascination with how power is built and exercised seems to give many political scientists identity and solidarity to band together.

The types of political theory—classical philosophy, empirical political theory, and formal political theory—are discussed in turn in the remainder of this section.

Classical Philosophy

Classical philosophy comprises almost everything from the normative to the empirical, the prescriptive, and their mixture. In *The Great Learning (Daxue)*, one of the famous Confucian teachers instructs his disciples to do the following: "Tackling things, seeking truth, nurturing yourself (morally), sorting the family, governing the state, and pacifying the world under heaven." This sentence instructs the disciples that to stand above people they must start studying many things and knowing a lot. Then, they must discipline themselves morally. That leads them to sort out things in their family, and this process becomes the basis of governing the country. Only by going through all this can disciples envisage "pacifying the world under heaven."

This philosophical statement is described in a number of ways: (a) the authoritarian conception of governing by the sage, (b) the moralistic conception of governing, and (c) the familial conception of the state. The way in which the argument is constructed is bottom up. But the argument itself is replete with authoritarian, paternalistic, and personalistic overtones.

The no less famous classical philosophy of Niccolò Machiavelli, author of *The Prince*, is also prescriptive and empirical. He warns his readers that politics is determined by virtue and fortune. By virtue is meant a range of strengths including moral strength. Such an exercise of strength is needed to deal with the effects of fortune. This classical philosophy was meant to teach the monarch to act properly and prudently. Thus, it is largely prescriptive. At the same time, it is sometimes speculated that since Machiavelli was republican, his preaching was meant to subvert monarchism by deliberately encouraging the monarch to act most "monarchically" that is, always assuming one's superiority, not trusting anyone but oneself, and acting mostly on the basis of strength—thus undermining the basis of popular support, which was becoming increasingly significant.

Classical philosophy includes the Federalist Papers, in which precursors of empirical political

theory are often found. The view that federalism is a viable alternative to a unitary state is an example. This proposition has generative affinity with the work of William Riker (1964) and his Rochester School on formal political theory. Riker's brand of formal political theory on democracy and democratic choice has some affinity with both classical philosophy and empirical political theory.

Immanuel Kant's famous essay Perpetual Peace has been empirically tested lately, with quite stimulating debates arising from such efforts. In 1795, Kant argued that three conditions should be nurtured to bring about eternal peace. First, commerce should be invigorated, with free passage and free trade ensured among nations. Second, one should encourage the republican form of politics rather than the monarchical form, to make war more difficult. Third, international institutions should be created to allow for the expression of voices of varying assertions, to facilitate discussion, and to come up with formulas for conflict resolution. Kant's formulation has been reformulated in the tradition of empirical political theory by Michael Doyle, Bruce Russett, and others. The first is called *liberal peace*. The second is called democratic peace. The third is sometimes called peace by consortium. The second is the most popular, and U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush used this doctrine to justify U.S. military interventions. Kant's affinity with empirical political theory is abundantly clear, even if it is not universally accepted as such.

Thomas Hobbes is arguably the most frequently mentioned author in relation to the state in the social sciences, along with Max Weber and Karl Marx. Facing what he saw as anarchy both at home and abroad in 16th-century England, Hobbes argued that absolutism and an absolutist state should be the answer to these anarchies—what people wish to achieve cannot be accomplished unless anarchical situations are overcome. In discussions of failed states and rogue states, therefore, Hobbes is one of the philosophers most frequently referred to. Describing and analyzing what is seen as anarchy in places and time points such as Cambodia in the 1980s and 1990s, Somalia since the early 1990s, Sudan in the 1990s and 2000s, Afghanistan for the past 40 years, the Democratic Republic of Congo for most of the 1990s and 2000s, Rwanda in the 1990s and 2000s, and the

West Balkans in the 1990s and 2000s, many authors point to the need to establish a monopoly of violence and the legitimate use of power in the initial and yet critical phase of state building, along with the concord forged with the international community. A similar diagnosis and prescription are offered to show the process of state building that may evolve from a democratic spirit and under globalizing circumstances and the process of absolutism arising from claims of state sovereignty. Needless to say, the yearning for state sovereignty cannot be suppressed fully—one form of which is expressed by the concept of "sovereign democracy" coined by Vladislav Surkov, chief of staff to former Russian President Vladimir Putin and now President Medvedev. Sovereign democracy implies a sovereign state whose representative heads are chosen democratically but that disallows foreign interference from abroad, even if by democratic means—for example, the attempts at "colored revolutions" in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. Chinese leaders view "peaceful change" (heping yanbian) as anathema because it means foreign interference to force a regime change on the basis of human rights and democracy as universally shared values. Thus, on the anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre (June 4, 1989), China was placed under high-level alert. In short, Hobbes is just as relevant now, at the dawn of the 21st century, as in 16th-century England.

Empirical Political Theory

Empirical political theory aims at generating hypotheses that can be empirically tested and that are also capable of generating a higher level set of generalizations. In other words, empirical political theory places utmost importance on two aspects of research: (1) empirical validation (or falsification) and (2) empirical generalization (or theorization). Thus, empirical political theory first proposes an empirically verifiable hypothesis and then tests it. If it is confirmed, it can then be generalized. A good example of this type of theory is voting in U.S. presidential elections. To link with political theory, the characteristically American utilitarian model of electoral victory based on the death toll of American troops in combat situations and on per capita net income level change over the preceding year(s) serves as an example. As pointed out by

Douglas Hibbs (1989), the question of whether the candidate of the party that occupies the executive office is elected in the presidential elections is likely to be determined by the combination of the death toll of U.S. troops in combat situations and per capita net income level change over the preceding year(s). This model hypothesizes that voters yearn for peace (i.e., having no Americans killed in combat) and for prosperity (i.e., increasing income). If one considers the 2008 U.S. presidential race, two Ss were important: Operation Surge in Iraq and subprime housing loans. Operation Surge reduced the death toll of American troops from the summer of 2007 through Election Day. How this affected the voter equation is one of the key points. The other S is the economic setback triggered by the subprime housing loans crisis. Not only were stock prices going down, but the U.S. dollar also lost value. Whether the government could prevent a recession by stimulating the economy through pumping a massive amount of money into it was also a key issue in the voter equation. Expecting the economy to recover seemed premature. This worked against the Republican presidential candidate, John McCain, who did not support such an economic stimulus.

A number of studies suggest that trust and health are quite significantly related. Those who hold concerns about social institutions such as social insurance are more likely to report bad health. Similarly, those who do not trust others very much tend to report their own bad health. The reasoning is as follows: Those with lower vertical trust, that is, those who do not place much confidence in social institutions, cannot enjoy the benefit of making the best use of them, one of the consequences of which is the loss of health. In a similar vein, those with lower horizontal trust, that is, those who do not place much confidence in other persons, cannot enjoy the benefits of working together, one of the consequences of which is the loss of health. Loss of health is measured by self-reported health using the World Health Organization's Quality of Life questionnaire. This proposition is interesting from a public policy perspective in that keeping public confidence in social institutions is important in itself. Otherwise, the service that can be supplied by social institutions cannot be fully provided. Thus, from a more conventional public policy perspective, public policy

performance is a dependent variable and is to be explained by a number of factors. However, from the version of public policy perspective, the dependent variable is something individuals can experience physically, such as health, or emotionally, such as happiness and honor.

The electoral system can be either divisive or cohesive. In the political theory of representative democracy, how to choose electorates is of key importance. Representative democracy takes into account at least two forms of justice. "Representative democracy requires two conditions to be successful": (1) fair representation, reflecting electors' preferences, and (2) government stability, enabling government to execute policy pledges to the electorate. Two major systems exist: (1) proportional representation, whereby parliamentary or legislative seats are awarded according to the percentage of votes polled by a party, and (2) first pass the post, in which the person from a district who receives the highest number of votes is awarded the seat; this method awards a disproportionate number of seats to parties that get a larger number of votes and reduces the number of seats awarded to parties with a smaller share of votes. The proportional representation system is said to give fair representation but not regime stability, whereas the first-past-the-post method is said to give moderately unfair representation but regime stability. The latter is widely adopted in many English-speaking countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and, until recently, New Zealand. The former is widely adopted by Continental European countries. Lately, the mixed system combining both methods has become more popular, especially in non-European regions such as the Asia-Pacific region, and seems to provide fair representation and regime stability to a reasonably satisfactory degree.

Proportional representation can be very divisive, as, for example, in Israel or in Iraq. The state of Israel is sometimes said to have committed two institutional mistakes in its founding days: First, it was unable to promulgate a constitution, largely because of the fundamental cleavages manifested on the issue of religion and the state, and, second, it adopted proportional representation as the mode of election. Parenthetically, there are only three states in the world that do not have a constitution: Israel, the United Kingdom, and New

Zealand. The United Kingdom does not have a written constitution, except for the Magna Carta, and it seems that New Zealand has inherited that tradition. Interestingly, the Iraqi constitution adopted a proportional representation electoral system, whereby ethno-religious cleavages have been amplified and invigorated. The one-person-from-one-district, or first-pass-the-post, system, common in the United States and the United Kingdom, tends to exaggerate the number of votes the winning party gets to obtain parliamentary seats. In other words, more proportional strength is given to the winning party so that government can enjoy at least a minimally stable majority.

Formal Political Theory

Formal political theory is a set of propositions that are logically derived from a set of assumptions about politics. A formal political theory of electoral democracy was first formalized by Anthony Downs (1957). This theory relates the statistical distribution of electorates' ideological and policy positions on a number of dimensions to the policies parties make to capture more votes. In other words, political parties shape their positions according to the number of voters who are likely to vote for them. Anthony Downs propounded an economic theory of democracy that has become very influential for those political scientists who believe that political science should be able to generate theories from which empirical claims about political phenomena can be deduced (after the theories themselves have been tested as described above). Downs's key insight into spatial economics is illustrated by his example of gas stations, which he explains are located close to each other because the spatial distribution of consumers of gasoline is that of a statistically normal curve. In other words, rather than opening a gas station miles away from another gas station, one might as well open it close to the other one, with the chance of getting many more customers for both. Downs applied this insight to the dynamics of electoral democracy. Suppose there are two major parties, one rightwing and the other left-wing. Further suppose that voters who support extreme views are fewer than voters who support moderate views, statistically speaking. To gain more votes, candidates will moderate their views, whether about war and

peace, bread and butter, or honor and humiliation. The consequence is that the two major parties move closer to each other. As a result, such parties start to look alike. Many empirical efforts have been made to validate or invalidate empirically this Downsian theory of party competition. Thus, formal political theory has been quite well linked in many ways to empirical political theory. By using the statistical distribution patterns of electorates in a multidimensional space, this formal political theory shows that under representative democracy, electorates are sovereign whereas candidates or political parties are the subjects. This analysis is one example of how formal political theory has been applied to explain empirical phenomena.

Politics is played out most commonly in and among organizations. How people react to the decline of organizational life is one of the key questions in politics. Albert Hirschman (1970) formulated the model of exit, voice, and loyalty. The binary choice is between loyalty and exit. These binary choices are most commonly observed in the market: One's choice is between purchase and nonpurchase. In organizational life, if one is loyal, one will remain with the organization in spite of decreasing rewards. The exit option is to get out without procrastination. Between the two options is a third, more common one: raising one's voice to ask others to join forces in improving organizational life. This is more common in politics. But when one starts thinking about the major consequences of each option, it is much more complex. Consider an exit-prone country whose income has not increased dramatically in a long time, such as the Philippines. Filipinos earn a substantial amount of income through emigration—by sending doctors to the United States and maids to the Gulf countries, as they bring back a substantial amount of their earnings to their country. One can speculate that a consequence of a large migrant population is the lack of momentum for endogenous development. In contrast, in a loyalty-prone nation such as Japan, not leaving the country is a common response to the decline of organizational life, so migration rates are low. At the height of organizational decline, as conditions become intolerable and such loyalty fails to attract attention or admiration, loyalty may take on the character of voice. This is a formal political theory, but it could be an empirical political theory as well. The theory

of exit, voice, and loyalty touches on complex manifestations of organizational life and varied options of human endeavor to improve it. In other words, the exit option is based on conflict, the voice option is based on coordination, and the loyalty option is based on loyalty.

Other than classical philosophy, empirical political theory, and formal political theory, there are two major genres that can be sometimes treated under the umbrella of political theory: epistemology and methodology. Epistemology refers to the study of how human beings recognize what they see and hear as knowledge. René Descartes, a French philosopher, most famously in *Le Discours de la Méthode*, laid down what might be called the modern positivistic method. It is a set of advice and instructions that would be helpful to obtain a clearer understanding of what one observes. Methodology refers to the study of various instruments through which reality can be observed and analyzed effectively.

Schools of Political Theory

Schools of political theory are sometimes messy in part because empirical political theory has grown, at least initially, out of other disciplines such as psychology, psychiatry, sociology, economics, and anthropology. One of the direct origins of empirical political theory is to be found in the deep transformations and the new needs following World War II. The application of methodologies and concepts from these disciplines to political science was first done by Samuel Stouffer and Harold Lasswell. For empirical political theorists, historical and institutional descriptions were the only methods used in their research. With the new methodologies and concepts, empirical political theory expanded its scope dramatically. Observing, measuring, and assessing in a generalizable fashion became conventions in political science, which allowed schools of empirical political theory to proliferate. Prior to World War II, the discipline of political science was concerned mostly with constitutions and institutions, on the one hand, and political philosophy, on the other. World War II was also a catalyst for empirical political theory, because governments were interested in measuring and assessing the morale of their troops and the effectiveness of propaganda and of military actions.

Stouffer and colleagues conducted a morale study that contributed immensely to the development of survey research. Similarly, Harold Lasswell, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and colleagues advanced a propaganda study that contributed immensely to the development of intelligence analysis. Robert MacNamara and colleagues developed a bombing effects study that contributed immensely to the development of strategic analysis of costs and benefits associated with strategic options. Another example is the military occupation study by Ruth Benedict, which was instituted through a psychocultural analysis of the Japanese people. It took more than two decades after World War II for political science to come into its own with empirical political theory.

With regard to normative political theory, schools are commonly linked to great philosophers like Aristotle, Machiavelli, John Locke, Karl Marx, Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas. But the increased interactions with other disciplines and related methodologies and concepts have also helped advance schools of normative political theory. One of the schemes adopted here is that of Russell Hardin, which distinguishes four schools of normative political theory.

Four Schools of Normative Political Theory

Hardin classified normative political theory in terms of theory based on conflict, on shared values, on exchange, and on coordination.

Conflict

Normative political theory focusing on conflict of interest includes the work of Carl Schmitt (1922/1985). Schmitt defines politics as a friend-foe relationship within and across nations. His theory is commonly categorized as ultra-conservative and sometimes fascist. Its explanatory capacity is high under conflictual situations such as wartime but not in more peaceful contexts. Although it is not necessarily categorized as work in the area of normative political theory, Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* has a strong normative affinity with the notion of the friend-foe relationship. Clausewitz defines war as no more than the continuation of politics by other means. In a similar vein, Field Marshall Boris Shaposhnikov defines

peace as no more than the continuation of war by other means. The fact that both Clausewitz and Shaposhnikov were military officers may mean that their theories may be regarded not as normative political theory but as a technical guide for action, but the simplicity and clarity of their works may appeal to those studying war and conflict. Turning to a Marxist work that tends to focus on class conflict, Barrington Moore's (1966/1993) book, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, can be regarded as normative political theory focusing on class conflict. His argument is that agriculture is pivotal. The rise of democracy, fascism, and communism in the 20th century may be explained by studying the evolution of agriculture: Commercialization of agriculture led to its advancement, as in England and France; agriculture stagnated due to the indifference of the land-owning class, as in Germany, Japan, and Italy; and agriculture was overexploited by state-led capitalism, as in Russia and China—which corresponded to the advent of democracy, fascism, and communism in these countries, respectively.

Shared Values

Normative political theory focusing on shared values was dominant in the 20th century, especially after the Cold War. The ascendancy of shared values as a normative political theory has much to do with the rise and spread of liberal democracy since the past century. Liberalism is based often on the utilitarian calculation of free individuals, as John Rawls argued (1971). Democracy is based on the aggregation of the preferences of citizens, as described by Downs (1957). In a sense, liberal democracy demands a regime in which shared values are key. As long as liberal democracy is premised, the type of normative political theory focusing on shared values flourishes. Even the latest definition of politics by Robert Goodin (2009), as the constrained use of social power, reflects this. It is important to note that liberalism does not require either the knowledge or the sharing of values of other individuals. Downs's An Economic Theory of Democracy is a formal political theory with normative implications. Values are often illustrated by the left-right ideology. In a two-party system, the two parties tend to move toward the center from both directions, that is, from left to center and

from right to center. Moderate or "centrist" citizens share values, whereas extreme or fringe citizens have few fellows. To win votes, the two parties target the numerically large central point. This leads the parties to adjust their ideological and policy positions and to compete to attract the large number of citizens located at the center. The explanatory capacity of normative political theory on the basis of shared values is high, especially when the tide of globalization weakens the intermediate and high-level organizations within the national body politic, so that individual citizens become more important than ever before.

Exchange

Normative political theory based on exchange is represented by Adam Smith. It is well known that of Smith's two major works, The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations, the former explains the sources of the human ability to make moral judgments. His key concept is sympathy, whereby the act of observing others makes people aware of others' behavior and the morality of their own behavior. Without sympathy in interpersonal relations, exchange loses its solid base. Even when it is writ large in national and global markets, exchange functions well only if it is grounded in sympathy in social relations. Sympathy is sometimes called social capital by authors such as James Coleman and Robert Putnam, among others. It is not necessary to note that human life cannot function sufficiently well if it is equipped only with exchange instruments and mechanisms. As long as the system of numerous exchange relationships called markets functions well, those normative political theories can be evaluated highly. More frequently, political life calls for schemes and instruments that go beyond exchange. To the extent that exchange helps resolve conflict, normative political theory based on exchange does have good explanatory capacity.

Coordination

It may be surprising to find that the notion of coordination has not played a major role in the development of normative political theory. It is natural that normative political theory based on conflict abounds, given that all politics is regarded as dealing with conflict-of-interest situations and

friend-foe relations. It is also natural that normative political theory based on exchange abounds because conflict resolution can be achieved often by making use of exchange on a small to large scale. Hardin (2009) points out that normative political theory on the basis of coordination has been insufficiently advanced, perhaps because of a lack of awareness of coordination as a scheme and instrument of politics in a normative political theory framework. Even Hobbes's argument on absolutist rule by a sovereign king can be rendered as normative political theory articulated by the notion of coordination if Hobbesian theory is reformulated within a multilevel, multistage framework. In such a framework, a powerful concept is strategy. Determining how to coordinate when you take Strategy A and your adversary takes Strategy B is complex. Implementing a two-party coordination based on multilevel and multistage strategies makes normative political theory more complex. Yet this line of theorization has been conducted since the mid-20th century in other disciplines, such as military science, business management, and different branches of engineering, often in the form of game theory. Normative political theory with coordination as a key concept is bound to grow, since politics relies heavily on coordination.

Six Schools of Empirical Political Theory

As noted before, schools of empirical political theory are difficult to classify (see Robert Goodin, 2009; Robert Goodin & Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 1996; Fred Greenstein & Nelson Polsby, 1975). Two yardsticks are the behavioral revolution (the 1950s through the 1960s) and the postbehavioral revolution (the 1970s through the 1980s), followed by the "perestroika" movement in the American Political Science Association (the 1990s through the 2000s). With the behavioral revolution, systems theory and behavioralism became prominent. With the postbehavioral revolution, new attempts were made beyond the behavioral revolution in political science. The postbehavioral revolution and the perestroika movement tried to make political science more interpretative, reflective, context sensitive, and path dependence attentive, on the one hand, and more focused on institutions as contrasted to individuals, on rigorous utilitarian calculus versus culturally derived motivations, on neurophysical movement as opposed to manifested human behavior, and on a global outlook as against the perspective of the national organic whole, on the other.

Systems Theory

Dissatisfied with the state of political science in the 1940s, which was very different from what it is today, Easton attempted, during the 1960s, to make political science a scientific discipline whose theories are derived from empirical testing of theoretically formulated hypotheses on the basis of systematically generated data. By so doing, Easton aimed at creating a "general theory" of politics with a systems theory framework. Easton's famous definition of politics as the "authoritative allocation of values for a society" was born of this systems theory thinking. It was refreshing to those political scientists who were dissatisfied with the political science of that period, with its focus on constitutions and institutions on the one hand and ideas and ideologies on the other. Easton, with Jack Dennis, embarked on the study of a political system in terms of the political socialization of children, whereby children learn about politics from parents, peers, teachers, and preachers. Norms, values, and rules are those components that are channeled from one generation to another in a political system. What was probably felt by those self-claimed systems theory-influenced political scientists was that the political system is a vastly complex set of interactions of actors under a vast array of rules and norms and that theorizing it at a systems level on the basis of empirically derived evidence is definitely a daunting task. The behavioral revolution was raging in the United States concurrently with the acceptance of systems theory thinking. Then came a mild disillusionment with both systems theory and behavioralism in political science, concurrent with the turmoil in the world during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In other words, the limitations of systems theory thinking were deeply felt. Easton himself confessed later that his systems analysis and behavioralism had clear limits.

Behavioralism

Calls for behavioral persuasion were hailed as revolutionary by enthusiasts, who proclaimed that

it would transform political science from an old, rusty discipline to one of the newest, acclaimed disciplines, with its focus on action rather than intention and motivation and on analysis rather than interpretation. Despite the short-lived enthusiasm for behavioralism, the spirit and style of behavioralism were consolidated in highly reputed journals. Returning to the explanatory capacity of empirical political theory, we can take up Bruce Russett's (1993) democratic peace theory. The hypothesis tested is one of the arguments made first by Kant: A republican regime (as contrasted to a monarchical regime) is less prone to waging war against another republic than against a nonrepublican regime. In contemporary parlance, the hypothesis states that democracies rarely fight each other. Russett made use of pooled time-series data composed of pairs of all the sovereign states each year from 1815 through 1989.

Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory was born of formal political theory. Yet it is normally attached to the testing of propositions that are logically derived from a certain set of assumptions and axioms. Its rise was due in part to the steady influence of economics in political science. Also, among the subdisciplines of political science, political economy, in which economics-trained academics like Anthony Downs (1957), Mancur Olson, and Gerald Kramer exerted considerable influence, was widely studied in the 1970s and 1980s. It was also due in part to the reaction against the kind of behavioralism that was criticized as blind and barefooted empiricism. Daran Acemoglu and James Robinson's (2005) Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy is an example. It starts with the presence of different social groups. They prefer different political institutions with different ways of allocating power and resources. The highly resourceful groups want to monopolize power. The rest want democracy. In due course, democracy prevails because the majority wants it. In Thailand, the old elites and the newly growing masses fight each other intermittently, using violence. The old elites have not acquiesced in the capture of power by the masses and have recaptured power by resorting to a military coup d'état. But their reasoning is lucid and general, unlike the largely descriptive political science

accounts of such struggles between democracy and dictatorship.

Institutionalism

As distinguished from the institutionalism of the past, institutionalism today is called neo-institutionalism. Its key features are (1) a strong empiricism using detailed institutional mechanisms and (2) an ardent comparativism of institutions, which is used to highlight the strength of the argument being made. The following contrast is intended to make the general orientation and product of institutionalism much clearer. If Acemoglu and Robinson are the representative authors of rational choice theory, John Ferejohn is the representative author of institutionalism. Acemoglu and Robinson formulate and test in a more general way. Ferejohn formulates and tests in a more comparative fashion, making the best use of a comparative exercise in hypothesis formulation and testing. These features are forcefully presented in his work on federalism and on war and state building. The limit of institutionalism can be said to depend on the scope and angle of comparative institutional screening and investigation, whether it examines the electoral consequences of electoral rules such as proportional representation and oneperson-from-one-district or the social policy consequences of the taxation system.

Neuroscience During the revolutionary period of behavioralism, Easton's A Framework for Political Analysis and A Systems Analysis of Political Life may be called the bible of behavioralism. Another work that might be considered seminal is Karl Deutsch's (1963) The Nerves of Government. It highlights the importance of the nerves of the body politic, which enable flows and feedbacks of information. The work can be regarded as a forerunner of the neuroscience school of politics in a sense, although his framework did not delve into neurons and other neurophysical components and functions. Since Deutsch's interest moved from social communication and nationalism in a divided country to regional integration across the Atlantic, he is often categorized as a behavioralist. The steady advances in neurophysical science since the 1990s may make Deutsch a true forerunner of neuroanalysis. If Tip O'Neill is right when he says, "All politics is local," a neurophysician is right when he or she

says, "All politics is neural." Neuroanalysis is sharply contrasted to behavioral analysis in that the former focuses on intention and motivation as revealed by changes in the neurons in the brain whereas the latter focuses on concrete, visible action. The former does not probe into real intentions and motivations. Scientific advances such as magnetic resonance imaging and other devices have made it possible to interpret and understand human intentions and motivations. In detecting suspected criminals, both assembling material evidence and deciphering the motivations of crime suspects are indispensable. Neuroanalytical data are increasingly used to fathom politics. Giacomo Rizzolatti and Corrado Sinigaglia's (2008) Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions, Emotions, and Experience reveals how political science can benefit from neuroanalysis. Although neuroanalysis is not limited to political science, its use is bound increase because, after all, the complexity of politics lies in the fathomability of the movement of brain neurons.

Globalism

Political science at the dawn of the 21st century is moving in two opposite directions simultaneously: One is a neuronal direction, while the other is a global direction. Advances in science and technology have enabled human beings to connect with each other far and fast in order to "macrograsp" politics and dig deep into the brain in order to "micrograsp" politics. The tide of globalization was energized by the technological advances in the 20th century. One of them is the electronic revolution in communications, which enabled the movement of money to go "mad," in the words of Susan Strange. It now moves incredibly fast, and along with money, many other things (e.g., commodities, education, medicine, migrants, viruses, crimes, drugs, weapons, and information) move fast on a global scale. Politics is not an exception to this irresistible and irreversible tide of globalization. David Held (1995) is the representative globalist. His Democracy and the Global Order builds the normative stand of cosmopolitan democracy founded on various democratic theories. The extent to which normative political theory is really universal and global at the same time was questioned until recently because a large bulk of normative political theory originated from modern Europe, where state building and political theory construction were both carried out mostly on a national scale.

Conversations Between Normative and Empirical Theories

So far, this entry has summarized three kinds of political theory: classical, empirical, and formal. It has also shown that they are intimately related to each other. In this section, a few illustrations are used to show that normative and empirical political theories can conduct fruitfully their conversations in ways that would help articulate them more sharply and precisely and identify their blind spots, thus enriching each other. Examples drawn from to make this point include warlike democracies and bottom-up regime typology. Both of these draw their propositions from classical political theories, such as those of Kant, Machiavelli, Aristotle, and Charles de Montesquieu, and conduct empirical testing of such propositions to see how much revision is desirable in both classical and empirical theories.

Normative political theory is meant to transcend the particular time and space in which it is generated in its argument about how justice is to be achieved. That is its raison d'être in a sense. At the same time, it is recognized that in normative political theory, issues based on conflict, shared values, and exchange tend to dominate. Those based on shared values have been especially numerous. This is in part because in the latter half of the 20th century, political science publications and their readership have been dominated by academics in the United States who have shown an enduring affinity with liberalism. Empirical political theory is also meant to go beyond the particular temporal and spatial settings so as to be valid under universal circumstances. At the same time, it is recognized that the bulk of empirical political theory has tended to be focused on the latter half of the 20th century and on the United States and the European Union. These two facts together represent a serious problem: Empirical political theory is heavily biased to present the West as a fountain of universal truth and justice.

It is remarkable that Kant, living in Koenigsberg his entire life and witnessing the vicissitudes of life in European environments, grasped the wave of the future in a most succinct way. Although democracies are peace loving among themselves, they are war prone toward nondemocracies, which they fear are a threat to their existence. The rightwing Kantians were born in the 2000s, in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and the Afghan and Iraq wars. They argued that if Kant had been alive and had observed these events, he would have supported the Iraq war to prevent the weapons-of-massdestruction (WMD) state of Iraq from exploding externally. They argued that democracies cannot be just passive, sitting idly by while innocent civilians are being killed and when democracies are challenged by the threat of force. Instead, democracies should fight against antidemocratic forces. In stark contrast to the democratic interventions of right-wing Kantians, the left-wing Kantians called for democracy that rejects interference from outside in the internal democratic affairs of a country, termed sovereign democracy by Vladislav Surkov. This refers to the incidents that took place in relation to the democratization and secessionist movements in those societies that used to be united in the former Soviet Union, such as Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.

In the late 18th century, Europe saw the French Revolution and the Napoleonic War. Kant believed that the advent of a republican regime, free trade, and multilateral treaties and international organizations would herald eternal peace in a fledgling form. It is clear that Kant's ideas are surely bound by time and space. In the dawn of the 21st century, we saw the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Afghan and Iraq wars, leading the right-wing Kantians and the left-wing Kantians to argue as to whether humanitarian interventions are justified (the right-wing Kantians) or not (the left-wing Kantians) to propagate democratic regimes from the outside. Thus, we can conclude that normative political theory has, not surprisingly, a context boundedness.

Along a different line of argument, Kant's republics have two types of checks-and-balances mechanisms, according to John Ferejohn and Frances Rosenbluth (2008). *Horizontal checks* are those mechanisms working at the higher level of the legislature and the executive. Lawmakers and law executors are different and separate. Neither can dictate to the other, and thus, a regime's

restraining mechanisms work better than otherwise would be the case. Vertical checks are those mechanisms working between the elite and citizen levels. Kant's republican democracies distinguish between the decision-making elites and the decision-shaping citizens but only on the condition that they interact with each other. In other words, elites take into account citizen preferences in their decision making, while citizens express their preferences verbally and demonstrably to elites in their decision shaping. Ferejohn and Rosenbluth argue that Kant must be differentiated from Machiavelli in that the republican democracies equipped with checks-andbalances mechanisms in Kant's argument prescribe tangentially against Machiavelli's democratic mobilization theory and, thus, his war-prone democracy theory. Machiavelli's argument is based on the comparison between republican Rome and monarchical Florence. Republican Rome was endowed with soldiers whose war-fighting motivation and capacity were high because it was a politically inclusive regime. Monarchical Florence was plagued by mercenaries whose war-fighting motivation and capacity were not high. Ferejohn and Rosenbluth use Machiavelli to make sense of war-prone democracies as witnessed in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Therefore, according to them, peaceloving and war-prone democracies are not separate but different sides of the same coin.

In 1835, focusing on the armed forces in democracies, Alexis de Tocqueville observed and pointed to the inherent danger of the military conducting activities that might give a bad reputation to democracies. Tocqueville observed that the army in America defended the invaders, who plundered the land originally possessed by natives and broke armistice and peace treaties with the natives. The army was hugely supported by the Americans, who advanced to the west from the initial patches of land on the Atlantic coast as if it were their "manifest destiny," before this phrase was coined later. Tocqueville was apprehensive of the danger of the military having its conduct legitimated by democracies whose ideas he emphatically approves and expressly admires. In the wake of 9/11 and the acts of revenge the United States engineered, Reiji Matsumoto sensitizes this aspect of American democracy fully, citing Tocqueville. In other words, democratic peace and war proneness are different sides of the same coin.

American authors like Max Boot and Robert Kagan make the same set of observations of American being prone to the use of force in settling conflicts of interest abroad even before its independence from England. Both authors are called neoconservative in the United States; in Russia, they are called the Bolsheviks of the 21st century. The American neoconservatives and the Russian Bolsheviks led by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin during the previous century have two things in common: They are idealists, pursuing their ideals with commitment and compassion, and they are realists, legitimating the use of force if their casus belli is deemed justifiable in light of their ideals, such as democracy and human rights. Perhaps Tocqueville was right in his instinctive apprehension since he had experienced democratic imperialism in Europe in the form of the revolutionary war waged by Napoleon Bonaparte.

Classical political theorists often talk about regime types. Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, argues that ethics is the basis of politics. Thus, depending on the prevailing ethics in society, three regime types are identified: monarchy, aristocracy, and politeia. Monarchy is shaped by the kind of ethics that prevail between a father and a son; aristocracy is shaped by the kind of ethics that prevail between a husband and a wife; and politeia is shaped by the kind of ethics that prevail between an elder brother and a younger brother. Aristotle's theory is monadic in the sense that once the prevailing ethics is identified, the regime type is automatically determined. Montesquieu's (1748) Spirit of Law is also monadic. Three regime types republicanism, monarchy, and autocracy—are determined by the driving spirit of a regime. Republicanism is driven by virtue, aristocracy is driven by honor, and autocracy is driven by fear. It is clear that the relationship between citizens and the state is monadic and that once the regime type is specified, the prevailing ethics of citizens is also specified. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Weber talked about regime types via means of regulation—that is, charisma, force, and legal rationality. Again, the monadic determination is assumed. Once the means are specified, regime types are determined, and vice versa. The state of affairs has not changed much even in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. For instance, Stein Rokkan, during the 1960s, articulated the formation of democratic states in European history. Yet Rokkan talks about only regime types, not citizens. One may wonder why there has been little interest in citizens and their relationship with the state when opinion polls are conducted all over the world, including in many authoritarian societies. Until recently, one could explain the paucity of discussion on citizens in theories about the state as the main theories deal with the institutions rather than with the social actors.

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics makes ethics shared and practiced by a certain set of people the determinant of regime types—thus his regime types of monarchy, aristocracy, and politeia. Within politeia, he has three regime subtypes: autocracy, oligarchy, and democracy. How are the three regime subtypes of politeia determined? Some scholars conjecture that those regimes subtypes are not well "disciplined" by a certain set of ethics the way monarchy and aristocracy are determined by what is called the societal regime prevailing at the bottom. Ethics here is broadly understood as the prevailing political culture, whose key components are defined as identity, confidence, and satisfaction. These few societal regime types are not quite formulated at an abstract level that may be comfortable to some political theorists. But it is important to stress the need to initiate conversations. The classical theorists may start from anywhere they wish. The empirical theorists may start from the point where they are most comfortable. What is important is that they must move in new directions, which could bring them to carry out conversations tête-à-tête, instead of digging holes on both sides of what might be called the Maginot line of both schools of theorists.

With survey and nonsurvey data being continuously collected, empirical political theorists must grapple with the bottom-up determination of a regime type. So must normative political theorists. Neither normative nor empirical political theorists should discuss a regime type without examining the bottom level, that is, the citizens. The theoretical problem does not end here. Even in the general discussion of a regime type, say democracy, fuzziness abounds in the usage of this term.

Takashi Inoguchi University of Niigata Prefecture Tokyo, Japan See also Concept Formation; Epistemological and Methodological Foundations; History of Political Science; Normative Political Theory; Political Philosophy; Political Science

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POLITICIZATION OF BUREAUCRACY

Politicization of the bureaucracy is best understood in reference to two phenomena that are sometimes related. The first is the attempt of political principals to exercise control over the bureaucracy. Because politicization thus understood is in the first place an aspect of particular institutional structures, it may be called *institu*tional politicization. The second form of politicization occurs when this control is exploited—that is, when the bureaucracy behaves in a manner responsive to politicians. Because the entailed notion of politicization refers primarily to patterns of behavior rather than features of institutions, it is significantly distinct from institutional politicization. This second notion is called behavioral politicization. Although both types of politicization are often criticized, their social consequences vary. Thus, while a given instance of politicization can be evaluated, a broad a priori claim about politicization of the bureaucracy is difficult.

Institutional Politicization

Politicians have many means at their disposal for influencing and controlling the bureaucracy. These include administrative procedures, budget controls, oversight, and prior review of agency action. The mechanism most commonly associated with politicization is staffing an agency with appointees chosen by politicians, usually in the executive branch; the higher the proportion of political appointees within the agency and the greater the extent of their penetration of the agency hierarchy, the more politicized the agency is. Thus, the United States Office of Management and Budget, with more than 7% of its staff appointed by the executive, is more politicized than the United Kingdom's Treasury Ministry, with only seven political appointees, or 0.5% of its staff. This entry focuses on political appointees rather than the other mechanisms of institutional politicization.

A politicized bureaucracy can be contrasted with one that is neutral, autonomous, or insulated—that is, one free from influence by the political branches and able to pursue its own agenda. Agencies may be free to do so by virtue of stalemates between political actors, each actor seeking to influence agency decisions, having cultivated a sufficiently influential constituency of its own, or monopolizing the information necessary for effective oversight. Political appointees within the bureaucracy can also be contrasted with careerists who enter the civil service and work their way through its ranks. This distinction is particularly important because careerists typically enjoy tenure, promotion, and salary protections. Careerists are thus not chosen by politicians. Rather, they are typically selected on the basis of objective measures, such as a competitive exam or special education (e.g., the *Ecoles* Nationale d'Administration and Polytechnique in France), and are insulated from politicians. This insulation should not, however, be overstated: Politicians can still influence careerists within many systems by offering transfers to prestigious posts and manipulating budgets.

There are two general motivations for institutional politicization. The first is patronage, where political appointments are created and filled as rewards to political allies or in exchange for favors. Patronage appointments are often "spoils" distributed by winners to those who aided in the campaign. The second is policy oriented. Politicians, usually executives, can politicize an agency to acquire greater control over it, staffing it with personnel of their choosing and whom they can dismiss. In this manner, politicization is a

means by which executives steer policy. Similar reasoning informs the extent of institutional politicization when programs are enacted or implemented. If they anticipate losing political control, supporters of a new bureaucratically administered program may try to place it in an insulated agency dominated by careerists, whereas opponents may do the opposite, favoring increased politicization of the agency as a means of managing the program when they come to power. Similarly, a legislature faced with a hostile executive may prefer careerist administration of policy rather than politicization as a means of cabining the executive's influence.

Behavioral Politicization

Institutional politicization is frequently a determinant of behavioral politicization; structures that grant politicians influence over the bureaucracy will make it more responsive to them. Institutional politicization is not, however, a necessary precondition of behavioral politicization. The bureaucracy can adjust its behavior out of an internal norm, for example, or in anticipation of a threat of institutional politicization. Likewise, as indicated by the patronage motivation for political appointments, institutional politicization does not always lead to or seek to implement behavioral politicization. Institutional and behavioral politicization, as defined here, have a close relationship, but one does not necessarily imply the other.

Analytically, behavioral politicization can be further divided into two types. Behavioral politicization can indicate a shift in policy mediated through the bureaucracy. A new administration can usher in a new set of priorities and programs, and agencies may alter their behavior to better realize these goals. It can also indicate using agency discretion for purely political ends, such as directing government funds toward political allies or targeting opponents for investigation and scrutiny by enforcement agencies. The first, more general type of behavioral politicization is not normatively suspect, while extreme or egregious examples of the second are often made unlawful, such as under the Hatch Act in the United States, which forbids many government employees from using their official authority to influence or interfere with elections. An a priori normative evaluation of behavioral politicization in general is therefore difficult.

Effects of Institutional Politicization on Agency Performance

Some research indicates that increased institutional politicization in the form of political appointees decreases agency performance. However, this finding hinges on the presence of several key conditions. First, it requires that bureaucratic management expertise is site specific, so that it is not enough that the manager understands the policy area, the political environment the agency operates within, and so on. Instead or in addition, it assumes that an effective agency requires staff with particular knowledge about agency structure, budget, internal culture, and so on. A variation on this assumption is that public management is idiosyncratic, so that other management experience—which political appointees tend to have—does not transfer well. The contention is that appointees are generally less familiar with navigating the bureaucratic environment or marshaling coalitions to support their agenda. The second condition is that appointees with the relevant expertise and experience cannot be found or that the costs of doing so are unreasonably high. The third is that political appointees do not offer their own countervailing advantages. The alternative being assumed away is, for instance, that a political appointee, who is far more likely to have served in the White House or Congress, could not use those connections to facilitate achieving the agency's goals within its political environment.

If all these conditions hold, then ceteris paribus, the greater the extent of institutional politicization through political appointees, the less effective the agency will be at its allotted tasks. But these conditions are demanding. While there exists some empirical support for the first and second conditions, they may not hold universally even in the archetypal case of a patronage appointment where a neophyte is given a position as a reward or political favor. Furthermore, the alternative—careerist bureaucrats—can have its own drawbacks. Careerists, especially if they are insulated from political principals, can shirk their duties, become captured by the interests they are charged to regulate, or cultivate their own influence over policy.

Civil service career protections may help encourage bureaucrats to develop expertise, which alone would support concerns about institutional politicization. However, the most systematic arguments for this view demonstrate that bureaucrats only

develop expertise if they have policy preferences and are given some control over such issues. This implies that perhaps the ideal system is a hybrid of institutional politicization and the civil service protections typically enjoyed by careerists: Politicians can staff agencies with those who care about the relevant policies, rather than using an objective staffing mechanism such as an exam, and then provide agency employees with job protection. So long as the bureaucrats are given some influence over policy, they will invest in developing expertise.

Politicization and Democracy

In addition to its possible impact on agency performance, institutional politicization can strengthen democratic control over policy by making the bureaucracy more responsive to (elected) politicians. There is thus the potential for trade-offs between efficiency or expertise and democratic accountability.

As previously noted, institutional politicization can lead to behavioral politicization. If voters exercise effective control over their representatives, then behavioral politicization does not threaten democratic control. The politicized bureaucracy is responsive to politicians and acts accordingly, and in this case, the politicians are in turn responsive to the voters. The result is essentially the same as if the bureaucrats were elected directly. Put another way, if the principal-agent problems between the voters and elected officials are resolved, then politicization need not undermine democratic control of policy. Institutional politicization is a possible means of resolving the principal-agent problems between politicians and bureaucrats, so that the politicized bureaucracy's behavior (i.e., behavioral politicization) is ultimately responsive to the voters.

This analysis assumes, however, that bureaucratic policy is a salient issue for voters, that is, that they are willing and able to condition their vote for the political controller of the agency on the bureaucracy's actions. If out of ignorance or other reasons they cannot, then behavioral politicization can be used to deliver targeted benefits (penalties) to allies (enemies) in order to gain political advantage.

Nicholas Almendares New York University New York City, New York, United States See also Accountability, Electoral; Agencies; Bureaucracy; Bureaucracy, Rational Choice Models; Effectiveness, Bureaucratic; Politicization of Civil Service; Principal–Agent Theory

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POLITICIZATION OF CIVIL SERVICE

The term *politicization* of civil service refers to the introduction of political considerations into actions traditionally carried out by the civil service, thus changing political-administrative relations. There are three established ways of studying this process, reflecting somewhat different understandings of the basic concept. The first tradition concerns how civil servants are appointed and promoted. In politicized appointment and promotion processes, merit-based criteria are replaced by political criteria. Scholars in the second tradition study the political preferences of civil servants, often using attitudinal data, with the aim of answering questions such as whether the civil service is dominated by the political left or the political right. In the third tradition, the actions of civil servants are analyzed to assess to what extent civil servants are directly involved in political decision making. If they are involved, it is seen as an indication of politicization. In this entry, political-administrative

relations are first described generally, followed by a discussion of the three traditions just mentioned.

Underlying the concept of politicization is the normative ideal of the separation of politics and administration. The argument is that to prevent corruption and patronage and to shield the expertise of the civil service, the two spheres should not be merged. The scholarly interest in political-administrative relations dates back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when influential authors such as Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber advocated a clear distinction between policy making and administration. The dominant view at the turn of the 20th century was that politicians should be responsible for policy making, while civil servants should execute the decisions taken.

The sharp distinction between the activities of politicians and civil servants has been questioned by many scholars. It has been pointed out, for example, that elected politicians have a legitimate interest in controlling what government organizations do. From a politician's point of view, having party loyalists implementing policies ensures that policies are not changed, or in any other way obstructed, on the way from decision to implementation. The basic idea of this line of argument is that neutral competence is not the only important virtue of the civil service in a democratic society. The neutrality should be complemented by responsiveness to democratically elected leaders. From this point of view, some degree of control, even if it is imposed by politicization of the civil service, could therefore very well be advocated.

However, although it has been claimed that the distinction between politics and administration has been overstated, the ideal of a separation of activities for politicians and civil servants is still very important. Most students of political-administrative relations would today agree that a collapse of political and administrative activities would have severe consequences for both democracy and the efficiency of the civil service.

Political Appointments

The common view is that political appointments and promotions have increased dramatically during the past decades. There have been numerous reports from countries belonging to different Western administrative traditions, for instance, the United States, Sweden, Belgium, and the United Kingdom (UK), of an increasing politicization of the civil service. There is also evidence pointing to widespread politicization of the civil service in the developing world. These studies have created a growing and often critical debate regarding the move toward a more politicized civil service, which has engaged also international organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank.

Nevertheless, even if scholars have suggested that there is a common trend of politicization of the civil service, one should be aware of the large differences among countries in terms of the methods, levels, and trends of politicization.

Generally, there are two methods of imposing political control over the civil service using political appointees. The most common method in the Western world is not to directly replace civil servants with political appointees but rather to add a layer of political appointees to the civil service. Political appointees within this new layer take on advisory, public relation, or managerial functions. These functions could otherwise have been carried out by the civil service. In some cases, for example, during the Blair administration in the UK, political appointees mix these roles and serve as spin doctors involved in policy-making processes, the implementation of policies, and public relations. The system with a layer of political appointees has a long tradition in the United States, historically rooted in the so-called spoils system, where party loyalists fill important functions in the executive branch and in federal agencies. Another example of a similar strategy is found in Belgium, where ministers in the government have large private offices, so-called ministerial cabinets, that duplicate civil service functions and give ministers a political apparatus to turn to for advice. There are, however, also examples where political appointments are used directly within the civil service. Germany has, for example, the institution of political civil servants, which refers to the top two ranks of the civil service in Germany. Other examples with a more widespread and direct substitution of civil servants can be found in Southern European countries such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain and on the African continent.

Not only do the methods differ among countries but also the levels of politicization of the civil

service. Generally, the levels of politicization of the civil service are higher in developing societies, the two main reasons being a political demand for a committed civil service and the fact that the civil service not only functions as a provider of public goods but is also a valuable asset for the employee. Scholars studying administrative reforms in India have, for example, observed that the neutral civil service was seen as "a hindrance rather then a help" and noted the politicians' demand for a more committed civil service. Another example can be found in sub-Saharan Africa, where the state often is the main employer. Some scholars argue that the primary objective of the civil service in sub-Saharan Africa is not to provide service to the general public but to give rewards to the supporters of the political leader. Turning to the Western democracies, they can be divided into several administrative traditions with different levels of politicization. Countries such as Italy and Belgium, which are influenced by the French administrative tradition, have the highest levels of politicization. This group is followed by countries in continental Europe that are influenced by the German administrative tradition. Then, there are the Scandinavian countries, together with countries belonging to the Anglo-Saxon administrative tradition, such as Ireland, New Zealand, and the UK, with relatively low levels of politicization. There are, of course, several exceptions to this very general observation, but it should especially be noted that the United States, belonging to the Anglo-Saxon administrative tradition, is fairly politicized in comparative terms.

Political Attitudes

Studies of the political attitudes of civil servants have been used as an indication of the politicization of the civil service. There are at least two different ways in which the attitudes of civil servants are important in the political process. First, the civil service can make up a substantial part of the electorate and therefore be an important actor if it is politically mobilized. Second, and maybe more important in this context, the attitudes of civil servants might sometimes conflict with the attitudes of the political party in government, and this can create obstacles for policy implementation even if the civil servants are not mobilized. Sweden can

serve as an example. In 1976, for the first time since 1936, a government not led by the Social Democratic Party was elected. It is often claimed that the new center-right Swedish government had problems implementing new policies because of the socialdemocratic attitudes of senior civil servants (even if they were not politically appointed). To avoid similar situations, most countries have subsequently created some kind of legal or normative framework stating the political neutrality of the civil service and/or limiting the political involvement of civil servants. Another example, from the Thatcher years in the UK, can, however, illustrate that conflicts between the political leadership and the civil service are not always about party politics. The Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher tried to implement a radical reform program in the public sector. Studies have shown that the civil service was not trusted to carry out these reforms, and therefore, civil servants in key positions were replaced by persons committed to the reform program. Politicization was based on attitudes to that reform program rather than to the Conservative Party.

Political Actions

It is inevitable that civil servants take part in the political processes to some extent, since they are parts of politically led machineries. In most countries, top civil servants are also, to some extent, involved in giving policy advice to ministers. However, there are large variations in how the civil service is involved in political actions.

Participation in the policy-making process is regarded as a critical indication of politicization. Generally, the civil service can participate in three different ways: (1) directly, (2) indirectly as actors in the political decisions, or (3) as advisors to the elected politicians.

One example of direct involvement is the Japanese tradition, where the civil service does not limit its role to policy implementation or technical advice but is considered to be a powerful actor in the policy-making process. Until the end of the 1990s, top civil servants even took part in discussions in the Japanese legislature, the Diet, something that would be unthinkable in most other countries. In Spain, civil servants are indirectly involved in the policy-making process. Spain traditionally has a close connection between the political and administrative

elites. The political elite is largely recruited from the Spanish administrative corps. It could, therefore, be argued that the civil service is involved in the policy-making process, although not in the same direct way as it is in Japan.

A third example, illustrating the advisory functions of the civil service, can be found in Denmark. It is one of the countries in the world with the fewest political appointments in the civil service. This puts the politically elected leaders in a situation where the civil service is the only body outside the party organization where they can turn for advice. Civil servants in Denmark, therefore, play a significant role in the policy-making process as advisors, and this is paradoxically due to Denmark's low-level, rather than high-level, political appointments.

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See also Bureaucracy; Civil Service; Legitimacy; Politicization of Bureaucracy; Responsiveness of Bureaucracy; Weber, Max

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POLITICS AND POLITY

See Introduction to Political Science (Volume 1)

Index

Entry titles and their page numbers are in **bold**.

```
typologies, 1:4-5
Abelson, Robert, 7:2363
ABM Treaty. See Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
                                                                   See also Transitional justice
ABMs. See Agent-based models
                                                                 Accountability, electoral, 1:13-16
Abortion rights, 6:1790
                                                                   democratic quality, 2:567
Absolutism, 4:1100, 6:2053, 6:2058, 8:2510, 8:2600
                                                                   distinction from interinstitutional accountability,
  See also Dictatorships; Monarchy
                                                                        1:16-17
Abu-Lughold, Janet, 8:2760
                                                                   effectiveness, 1:5
Accountability, 1:1-13
                                                                   in electoral campaigns, 1:13-14
  auditors and monitoring agencies,
                                                                   influence, 1:5
       1:7-8, 1:20-21, 1:106
                                                                   interest groups and, 4:1229
  of coalitions, 6:1824
                                                                   in majoritarian systems, 1:14, 1:15-16, 7:2126
  defining, 1:1-4
                                                                   in policy implementation, 1:14
  delegation and, 2:550
                                                                   in presidential systems, 7:2126
  democratic, 4:1229-1230, 7:2284
                                                                   in proportional systems, 1:14, 1:15
  democratic quality, 2:566-567
                                                                   reelection and, 1:14-15
  hierarchical, 4:1007, 4:1008
                                                                   responsiveness and, 7:2301-2302
  of intelligence agencies, 4:1213
                                                                   subversion, 2:569-570
  internalized, 1:2-3
                                                                 Accountability, interinstitutional, 1:16-22
  in international sphere, 1:10
                                                                   challenges, 1:21-22
  intra-organizational, 1:8-9
                                                                   definitions, 1:16-17
  judicial, 1:5, 1:6-7, 4:1008, 5:1372
                                                                   democratic quality, 2:567
  legal, 1:5, 1:6-7
                                                                   distinction from electoral accountability,
  legislative scrutiny, 1:6, 2:456, 4:1007, 5:1624, 6:1772,
                                                                        1:16-17
       6:1773, 7:2128
                                                                   evolution, 1:17-18
  mechanisms, 1:2, 1:5-10, 2:456,
                                                                   in France, 1:19-20
       4:1007-1008
                                                                   in Germany, 1:20
  of media, 1:21
                                                                   in Great Britain, 1:18
                                                                   perils, 1:21
  media role in, 1:3-4, 1:8
  monitoring and, 5:1624, 5:1626
                                                                   roles of other agencies, 1:20-21
  multiple, 5:1626
                                                                   in United States, 1:17-19
  of neo-Weberian state, 4:1004
                                                                 Accounting, 2:485-486
  in networks, 1:11
                                                                   See also Budgeting; Cost-benefit analysis
  new public management and, 1:11-12
                                                                 Acemoglu, Daron, 1:222, 6:2059
  in parliamentary systems, 1:4-5, 1:18, 6:1769
                                                                 ACF. See Advocacy coalition framework
  political, 1:5
                                                                 Achen, Christopher H., 7:2392
  professional, 1:5
                                                                 ACP. See Age-Cohort-Period framework.
  in representative democracies, 2:566-567
                                                                 Activism. See Advocacy; Protests; Social movements
                                                                 Adenauer, Konrad, 4:1038, 6:1800
  of representatives, 7:2284
  reputational, 1:3-4
                                                                 Adjudication, 5:1383
  responsibility and, 1:2, 7:2299, 7:2300
                                                                   See also Judiciary
  responsiveness and, 1:3, 7:2301-2302
                                                                 Administration, 1:22-25
  single versus multiple, 1:10-11
                                                                   civil services and, 1:258-259
  specialism, 2:454-455
                                                                   coordination, 2:449-457
```

deconcentration, 5:1464	definitions, 1:37, 1:38, 4:1271
development administration, 3:648-650	human rights issues, 4:1106, 4:1111, 4:1112
incrementalism, 6:1910-1911	impact, 1:38–39, 4:1270
local, 5:1468–1469	literature on, 1:37–39, 4:1106
neo-Weberian state, 5:1681–1684	parties, 1:226, 5:1428, 6:1714
reorganization, 7:2268–2273	Afghanistan
separation from politics, 1:26, 2:482, 4:985, 4:1004,	constitution, 2:413
4:1006, 6:2066	government, 5:1423
traditional methods, 1:22–23	militias, 5:1580
transaction costs, 8:2650	Soviet invasion, 3:638
See also Administrative reform; Agencies; Civil services;	Taliban rule, 3:656, 4:1213, 5:1423, 7:2352–2353, 8:2593
	U.S. invasion, 4:1285
Implementation; New public management;	
Performance management	warlords, 8:2734, 8:2735, 8:2736
Administration theory, 1:25–28	Africa 1110 1111 51649
contemporary challenges, 1:27–28	authoritarian regimes, 1:110, 1:114, 5:1648
development, 1:25–27	collapsed states, 8:2500, 8:2501, 8:2502
in development administration, 3:648–650	colonialism, 1:41, 2:303–304, 2:305, 2:306, 4:1155,
Administrative autonomy. See Autonomy, administrative	5:1648, 8:2500
Administrative corruption. See Corruption, administrative	constitutional reforms, 2:353
Administrative elites, 3:768	decolonization, 2:304, 4:1282, 5:1648
Administrative law, 5:1412–1413, 5:1683	democratization, 2:351–352, 2:354, 5:1648
Administrative reform	diaspora, 1:40, 3:651
anticorruption efforts, 2:482	dictatorships, 3:654
challenges, 7:2232	dominant parties, 6:1742, 6:1743
local governments, 5:1468–1469	economic development, 3:630
new public management, 1:12, 1:43-44, 1:171-172,	education, 3:829
2: 452, 5:1699, 5:1702, 5:1703, 7:2272	ethnic conflicts, 3:830, 3:831
performance management, 6:1855	governance challenges, 2:352–353
public employment and, 4:1006, 7:2157	green parties, 4:1052
reorganization, 7:2272	indigenous peoples' rights, 4:1172
in United Kingdom, 1:23, 1:100, 2:452, 5:1701	nation building, 5:1645, 5:1647, 5:1648
Adorno, Theodor	peasant movements, 6:1848
on authoritarian personality, 1:84, 6:2002, 7:2199, 8:2427	populist movements, 7:2076
Frankfurt School and, 2:497, 2:498, 4:1292, 5:1499,	presidentialism, 1:39–40, 5:1648, 7:2124
8:2550	separatist movements, 5:1648–1649
Lazarsfeld and, 5:1535	socialism, 8:2453, 8:2459
life, 4:1094, 4:1208	state formation, 8:2510
Advertising, 6:1805–1806, 6:1964	traditional rule, 5:1647, 8:2639–2643
See also Political communication	warlords, 8:2734, 8:2735, 8:2736
Advice. See Policy advice	wars, 8:2723, 8:2724, 8:2728
·	
Advocacy, 1:28–33	See also North Africa; and individual countries African Americans
actors, 1:28–29, 1:33–37	political thinkers, 1:40
definition, 1:28	public employment, 7:2286, 7:2287–2288
impact, 1:32–33	
levels and targets, 1:29–30	racism and, 7:2197–2198
organizations, 1:28–29	African National Congress (ANC), 1:40, 1:42, 6:1742,
strategies and tactics, 1:30–31	6:1743, 7:2236
structures, 1:31–32	African political thought, 1:39–42
See also Interest groups; Social movements	"againstism," 1:41–42
Advocacy coalition framework (ACF), 1:33–37	dialectics, 1:40–41
applications, 1:34	modern, 1:41
flow diagram, 1:35	pluralism, 1:39–40
foundation, 1:34–35	renaissance concept, 1:42
future research, 1:36–37	traditional, 1:40–41
hypotheses, 1:36	African Union, 2:352, 2:353
policy change and, 1:36, 4:999, 6:1882, 6:1922, 6:1935	Agamben, Giorgio, 7:2096, 8:2550
policy learning, 6:1935	Age-Cohort-Period (ACP) framework., 1:294-296
Advocacy networks, transnational, 1:37-39	Agencies, 1:42–48
actors, 1:38	accountability, 1:8-9, 1:12, 1:47

budgets, 1:165-166	Aldrich, John, 3:710, 7:2356
characteristics, 1:43	Alesina, Alberto, 6:1980
control, 1:46–47	Alexander, Herbert, 6:1804
coordination, 2:449–457	Alexander, Jeffrey, 3:932–933
creation, 1:44	Alexander the Great, 4:1050
definition, 1:42–43	Alford, Robert, 4:1063
diversity, 1:44–45	Algeria
managerial reforms, 1:12, 1:43-44	elections, 3:604
missions, 3:713–714	Islamist movements, 3:604, 3:605, 5:1354, 5:1355
organizational structures, 7:2156	language policies, 7:2070
performance, 1:47, 3:713–716, 6:2065	parties, 3:605
resources, 3:714	Alienation, 1:57–60
roles and functions, 1:45	dimensions, 1:57–58, 1:59
See also Administration; Autonomy, administrative;	empirical research, 1:58-59
Bureaucracy; Civil services; Executive; Intelligence	of labor, 1:58
agencies; Public employment; Regulatory agencies	meanings, 1:57
Agenda-setting, 1:48–53	Allende, Salvador, 7:2125
analytical models, 1:49–52	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in Europe, 5:1428
bargaining models, 1:51–52	Alliances, 1:60–62
budgeting and, 1:164–165	asymmetric, 7:2385
definition, 1:48	balance of power and, 1:133
dynamics, 4:1001	challenges, 1:133, 7:2385
epistemic communities, 3: 790	containment policies and, 2:432
in legislatures, 1:50–51	definition, 1:60
media role, 5:1537, 5:1539, 5:1542, 5:1544	of democracies, 5:1435, 5:1436
in policy process, 4:999, 4:1001, 6:1921, 8:2480–2481	between developed and developing countries, 3:641, 3:643
politics of, 1:48–49	formation, 1:60, 7:2385
research, 4:1001	impact, 1:61–62
See also Policy process, models of	implementation, 1:61
Agent-based models (ABMs), 5:1605–1606	institutionalization, 7:2385
Aggregate data analysis, 1:53–57	international trade and, 5:1330
data sources, 1:54–55	neutrality and, 5:1696-1699
kinds of data, 1:53	postwar, 4: 1012
problems, 1:53–54	provisions, 1:60–61
use of, 1:54, 1:55–56, 5:1563	purposes, 1:61
See also Multilevel analysis	security cooperation, 7:2384–2385
Aggression, 4:1236	solidarity expressed in, 5:1320-1321
See also Interventions; Violence; Wars	Warsaw Pact, 1:61, 4:1012, 8:2458
Aging	See also Collective security; NATO
cohort analysis, 1:290, 1:292-294	Allison, Graham T., 1:23-24, 3:924, 6:1943
of population, 8:2750	Allport, Gordon W., 7:2197
See also Pensions; Welfare policies	Almond, Gabriel A.
Agnew, John A., 8:2588	on civic culture, 1:84, 1:244–245, 1:248,
Agriculture	3: 718–719, 8: 2557
exports, 6:1846	on civic participation, 1:249, 1:252
irrigation, 8:2508	on democratic stability, 1:159
modernization, 6: 1846, 6: 1847	on one-party systems, 6:1792
political systems and, 6:2057	on political culture, 1:245, 1:246, 6:1968–1969, 6:1970,
productivity, 8:2508	8:2557–2558
sustainability, 6:1847–1848	on political performance, 6:1849–1850, 6:1851
trade liberalization, 8:2762, 8:2763	on political science, 1:lviii
Aguilar, Paloma, 4:1079	on representative democracy, 3:627
Aitken, Alexander, 8:2739	on trust, 8:2672
Ajzen, Icek, 1:93, 1:94–95, 1:144	Alt, James E., 1:165
Akerlof, George A., 5:1488	Althusius, Johannes, 2:459, 2:573, 3:897–898
Al Qaeda, 4:1212, 4:1213, 5:1594, 7:2352–2353,	Althusser, Louis, 4:1144
8:2592–2593, 8:2598	Amendola, Giovanni, 8:2628, 8:2633
Albanian communist party, 2:319, 8:2458	American National Election Studies (ANES), 1:58, 3:717,
Albert, Hans, 7:2211	5:1338, 6:1760, 6:1779, 6:1807, 6:2016

American Political Science Association (APSA) behavioralism, 1:138, 1:139	civil society, 1:260 diplomacy, 3:662
biology and politics movement, 1:151	origins of political theory, 6: 2051
conventions, 6:2018–2019	political system breakdowns, 1:158
evolution, 4:1096 formation, 4:1091, 6:2014	republics, 7:2288
	See also Greece; Rome
human rights section, 4:1105	Anderson, Benedict, 4:1270, 5:1645, 5:1654, 5:1659,
membership, 4:1093, 6:2018	8:2394
methodology groups, 5:1566	Anderson, Perry, 4:1084, 8:2510
perestroika movement, 6:2058	Anderson, Theodore, 8:2618
American Political Science Review, 1:139, 4:1091,	ANES. See American National Election Studies
4:1305, 6:2014	Annales school, 7:2074, 8:2758
American Revolution, 2:407, 7:2289, 8:2395	Annan, Kofi, 8:2681, 8:2683
American Sociological Association, 6:2023	Anomia, 1:81–84
Americanization of politics, 6:1962, 6:1965, 6:1966	alienation and, 1:58
Amin, Samir, 3:630, 3:631, 3:642	in contemporary political economy, 1:83
Amnesties, 8:2666	Durkheim on, 1:81–82
Amnesty International, 4:1110, 4:1112	institutional, 1:83
Analogical reasoning, 7:2118, 7:2367	Merton on, 1:82–83
Analysis of variance (ANOVA), 1:62-66	migration and, 5:1568
model selection, 1:64-66	social change and, 1:82
tables, 1:63-64	ANOVA. See Analysis of variance
use of, 1:62–63, 1:66	Antagonistic pluralism, 2:403
Analytic narratives: applications, 1:66-70, 3:798, 5:1560	Anthropology
Analytic narratives: method, 1:70-72	historical, 7:2074
Anarchism, 1:72-78	history of, 3: 833
classical age, 1:74	political science and, 1:lxiv
collectivist, 1:76	politics and, 1:lv
definition, 1:72	study of rituals, 7:2326, 7:2327
economic views, 1:75–76	thick description, 8:2602-2603
feminism and, 1:74, 1:77	See also Ethnographic methods; Functionalism
history, 1:73–75, 3:610	Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 3:637
individualist, 1:75–76	Antifoundationalism, 8:2550
libertarian municipalism, 1:76–77	Anti-Semitism, 3:889, 3:890, 3:895, 8:2765
new, 1:75	Apathy, 1:84–86
organizations, 1:74, 1:75	APEC. See Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
political ideology, 1:73	APPAM. See Association for Public Policy and Management
principles, 1:72–73	Appropriateness. See Logic of appropriateness
revival, 1:74–75	Approval voting, 3:750, 8:2418
terrorism, 1:74, 1:78	APSA. See American Political Science Association
in twenty-first century, 1:73, 1:75, 1:77–78	Aquinas, Thomas, 5:1664, 7:2321, 8:2625
violence, 1:74	Arab states
Anarcho-capitalism, 1:75–76, 5:1445	authoritarian regimes, 1:115–117
Anarcho-communism, 1:76	dictatorships, 3:655
Anarcho-syndicalism, 1:76, 2:315, 6:1796, 6:1869	obstacles to democracy, 3:602–603
Anarchy, 1:78–81	patriarchal cultures, 3:602–603
consequences, 1:79	reforms, 3:603–604
constructivist view, 2:424	See also Middle East and North Africa
critiques, 1:79–81	Arabs
definition, 1:78	nationalism, 5:1662
international system, 1:lvi, 5:1324, 7:2220	Pan-Arabism, 1:40, 5:1662
organizational, 6:1920	views of Zionism, 8:2767
	See also Islam
power structure, 1:132–133	
Anaximander, 4:1047	Archival data. See Data, archival
Anaximenes, 4:1047	Area studies, 1:86–89
ANC. See African National Congress	comparative, 1:89
Ancient world	criticism of, 1:88
auditing, 1:103	geographic areas, 1:86, 1:88
balance of power, 7:2222	Orientalism debate, 1:88

origins, 1:87	modeling, 1:90–92, 7:2131–2132
political science in, 1:86, 1:87-88, 3:647	as security threat, 7:2378–2379
Arellano, Manuel, 8:2618	Arms sales
Arendt, Hannah	corruption, 2:477
on banal nationalism, 5:1647	embargoes, 7:2352, 7:2353
on breakdown of democracy, 1:159	profits, 3:671–672
life, 4:1094, 4:1208	Aron, Raymond, 2:311, 3:767, 6:1793, 7:2110-2111,
on participatory citizenship, 1:250	8:2629, 8:2634
on Soviet Union, 2:311	Arrow, Kenneth Joseph, 1:49, 3:709, 3:754
on totalitarianism, 8:2630–2631, 8:2634, 8:2635	Arrow's impossibility theorem, 3:709–710, 4:1206,
Argentina	8:2415–2416
caudillismo, 1:201–202	Arthasastra, 1:liii, 1:liii, 1:103
Falkland Islands claim, 3:622, 5:1346–1347, 7:2301	Articles of Confederation, 5:1372–1373, 5:1579
	ASEAN. See Association of South East Asian Nations
judicial review, 5:1373	
land reform, 3:876–877	Ashby, Ross, 6:1930
military dictatorship, 3:619, 3:658, 3:659, 8:2666	Ashforth, Adam, 3:834
Aristocracy, 5:1480, 5:1613, 6:1739, 6:1952, 8:2622	Ashley, Richard, 4:1283
See also Elites	Ashoka, 8:2625
Aristotle	Asia
on citizenship, 1:239, 7:2296	capitalism, 1:192
on civic culture, 1:243–244	communitarianism, 2:327, 2:328
on civil society, 1:260	corporativism, 2:462–463
criticism of Plato, 4:1050	decolonization, 5:1648
on democracy, 1:17, 2:572, 3:719, 6:2062	democratization, 2:351–352, 2:354
on equality, 3:803	dictatorships, 3:654–655
ethics, 3: 824, 6: 2062	economic development, 3:631, 3:633, 3:646
on justice, 3: 803, 5: 1389	financial crisis, 4:980, 4:1246, 5:1621,
on language, 7:2069	7:2240, 8:2498
lectures, 4:1050–1051	green parties, 4:1052
life, 4:1 050	nation building, 5:1648
on mixed regimes, 1:17, 8:2403	nationalist movements, 5:1661, 5:1662
on natural law, 5:1663	peasant movements, 6:1847
on nature of world, 3:792	populist movements, 7:2076
Nicomachean Ethics, 6: 2062	regional governments, 7:2243
on oligarchy, 6:1739	regional organizations, 7:2238, 7:2240
Peri Hermeneias, 4: 1073	socialist systems, 8:2459
on political system change, 1:158	state formation, 8:2510
Politics, 3:793, 7:2335, 8:2403, 8:2478	See also Buddhism; Confucianism; Orientalism; and
on politics, 1:lii, 1:liii, 1:lvi, 4:1050–1051,	individual countries
5:1399, 6:2051	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 7:2238,
regime types, 6: 2062	7:2239, 7:2240, 7:2243
rule of law, 7:2335	Assassinations, 1:74, 2:398 Association for Politics and the Life Sciences, 1:151
on society, 2:439	
Armajani, Barbak, 7:2272	Association for Public Policy and Management
Armenian genocide, 4:968	(APPAM), 6:1894
Arms control	Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN),
distinction from disarmament, 3:670	3:842, 7:2238, 7:2240, 7:2243, 7:2244
international regimes, 5:1634, 7:2387–2388	Asylum, political, 4:1147–1148, 4:1150, 5:1569
nuclear, 8:2544–2545	Asymmetric threats, 6:1840
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 3:637, 7:2388, 8:2544	See also Terrorism
treaties, 3:637, 3:670–671, 4:1242, 8:2544	Atatürk, Kemal, 5:1350, 8:2514
U.S. policies, 3:636, 3:637, 7:2388	Atheism, 7:2372
See also Disarmament	Athens
Arms races, 1:89–92	constitution, 4:1051
in Cold War, 1:90, 2:448, 3:636, 3:670-671	direct democracy, 2:584
consequences, 1:90	elections by lot, 3:719, 3:720
definition, 1:89–90	equality in, 3:815
deterrence policies, 2:448, 2:486–487	Sophists, 4: 1047–1048
examples, 1:90, 2:448	See also Greece, ancient
· / /	<i>,</i>

At-large elections, 3:751	Australia
Atrocities. See Genocide; Human rights; Interventions,	Aboriginal rights, 4:1170, 4:1171
humanitarian; War crimes	monarchy, 5:1616
Attitude consistency, 1:92–95	public budgeting, 7:2153, 7:2154
with behavior, 1:94–95, 1:98	referenda, 2:561
explanations, 1:93–94	whole of government approach, 2:452
interattitudinal, 1:93	Austria
intra-attitudinal, 1:92–93	consociational democracy, 2:554–555
Attitudes	judicial review, 5:1374
of civil servants, 7:2285, 7:2287	militias, 5:1579
compared to beliefs and values, 1:143, 1:144–145,	neo-corporatism, 5:1669
8:2691–2692	neutrality policy, 5:1697
definitions, 1:93, 1:96–97	parties, 1:229, 1:230–231, 6:1799
discriminatory, 3:681	pillarization, 6:1860, 6:1861
social dominance orientation and, 8:2426	referenda, 2:561–562
survey research, 8:2568	Austrian school of economics, 5:1488, 5:1677, 5:1678
value orientations and, 7:2093	See also Hayek, Friedrich A.
Attitudes, political, 1:95–100	Austro-Marxists, 5:1660–1661
changes, 1:98–99	Ausubel, David P., 7:2363
cohort analysis, 1:289	Autarky, 6:1719
definition, 1:96–97	Authoritarian communitarianism, 2:327
distinction from beliefs, 1:144	Authoritarian corporativism, 2:462–463
formation, 1:97–98	Authoritarian democracies, 3:646
measurement, 1:96, 1:97	Authoritarian personality, 1:84–85, 6:2002, 7:2199, 8:2427 Authoritarian regimes, 1:107–118
media influences, 5:1537 party identification and, 6:1809	9 .
± •	in Africa, 1:110, 1:114, 5:1648 in Arab world, 1:115–117
political officery, 1.59, 3.716, 719	
political efficacy, 1:59, 3:716–719 radical, 5:1580, 7:2199–2202, 7:2265	borderline, 1:109 breakdowns, 1:159–160, 3:618, 3:623
spatial models, 8:2472–2476	cabinets, 1:183
survey research, 8:2568	censorship, 1:214–215
values and, 8:2695–2696	characteristics, 1:108
See also Dissatisfaction, political;	civil society, 1:261
Political culture	closed, 1:114, 1:115
Audience democracy, 2:570	competitive, 7:2236–2237
Audit society, 1:100–102, 1:106	conceptual abuses, 2:374
Auditing, 1:102–107	definition, 4:1114
as accountability mechanism, 1:7	democratic transitions, 3:623–624
administrative system, 1:105	dictatorships, 3:655, 3:656
cameral system, 1:105	distinction from totalitarian regimes, 1:108, 1:109
compared to evaluation, 6:1 909	electoral authoritarianism, 1:108, 1:112–114, 7:2234,
compliance, 1:104	7:2235–2236
definition, 1:102	explanations, 1:159
of democratic quality, 2:565	judiciaries, 5:1384
evaluation and, 1:100, 1:104	in Latin America, 1:111, 1:114, 2:462
external, 1:103, 1:104	legitimacy, 5:1422
financial, 1:100–101, 1:103, 1:104	legitimacy crises, 3:623, 3:624
growth, 1:7–8, 1:102, 1:106	liberalization, 8:2662
history, 1:103–104	media roles, 5:1542
institutional arrangements, 1:104–105	in Middle East and North Africa, 1:114, 1:115-117,
internal, 1:103, 1:104	3:602-603, 3:604
as neurosis, 1:106	military-bureaucratic, 1:110–111, 5:1574
performance, 1:7	opposition, 3:623–624, 5:1592, 5:1593–1594,
politics of, 1:106–107	6: 1788–1789, 7:2235–2236
principles, 1:104	personalistic rule, 3:623–624
public, 1:102, 5:1413–1414	political cultures, 8:2558
Augustine, 1:liii, 6:1729, 6:1758, 6:1837–1838	political spaces, 6:1789
Austin, John, 7:2069, 7:2321	power in, 7:2107
Austin-Smith, David, 6:1982	referenda, 7:2226, 7:2228
· , · · · · · · · ·	···, · · · · · · ·

reform factions, 3:623	Autonomy, subnational, 1:123-128
repression, 5:1594, 6:1788–1789, 8:2711	decentralization, 1:124, 1:125–126, 1:128, 5:1464
right-wing, 7:2199, 8:2427	empowerment, 3:775
social movements, 6: 1788–1789	local government, 4:986–987, 5:1464
Stalinist, 8:2482	minority nationalism and, 1:128, 2:547
subtypes, 1:109–114, 1:159–160	multilevel governance, 1:126–127, 4:1022
theocratic, 7:2234	national interests and, 4:986–987
traditional, 7:2234	regionalization, 1:125–126, 2:547, 7:2246–2249
See also Dictatorships; Liberalization; Military rule;	resources, 1:124–125
Totalitarian regimes; Transitions	state structure and, 1:124
Authoritarianism	Axelrod, Robert, 7:2131, 7:2367
right-wing, 7:2199, 8:2427	Aylwin, Patricio, 8:2666
social dominance orientation and, 8:2427	Aztecs, 6:1837
Authority	
formal-legal (rational-legal), 1:80, 1:167, 1:225,	Babangida, Ibrahim, 5:1576, 5:1577
4: 1004, 6: 2042, 7: 2102, 8: 2738	Babst, Dean V., 5:1435
power as, 1:liv	Bacchi, Carol, 3:686, 3:687
spheres, 4: 1014	Bache, Ian, 4: 997
Weber on forms of, 1:80, 5:1420, 5:1679, 5:1680,	Bachelet, Michelle, 8:2668
6:1859, 6:1969, 6:2042, 7:2102, 8:2738	Bachrach, Peter, 7:2104
See also Charisma; Legitimacy; Traditional rule	Backes, Uwe, 7:2201
Autocorrelation	Bacon, Francis, 3:799-801
assumption, 7:2178, 7:2180, 7:2186	Badie, Bertrand, 4:1084, 8:2605, 8:2606
causes, 7:2186	Bagehot, Walter, 1:18, 5:1614, 5:1615-1616, 5:1617,
spatial, 7:2186	6: 1767, 8: 2404
tests for, 5:1583–1584	Bahrain, Islamist movements, 5:1354, 5:1355
Autocratic regimes	Bakhtin, Mikhail, 7:2074
ideological basis, 6:2048–2049	Bakunin, Mikhail, 1: 73, 3: 610
internal conflicts, 1:267	Balance of power, 1:129–134
moderate, 7:2236	alliances and, 1:133
Russian perspective, 3:607–608, 3:610	in ancient world, 7:2222
structure, 6:2049	during Cold War, 3:637, 7:2219, 8:2654
wars, 7:2390	contemporary study, 1:131–133, 1:153–154
See also Authoritarian regimes; Dictatorships;	debates on, 1:129, 1:131
Totalitarian regimes	in Europe, 7:2106
	historical development of idea, 1:130–131, 4:1276
Autonomy of elites, 3:761	metaphor, 1:129–130
institutional, 4:1201 of international organizations, 4:1256	in multipolar systems, 1:132–133, 1:153–154
ě ,	realist view, 1:129–133, 1:152, 1:153, 7:2110,
of markets, 4:987	7:2218, 8:2654
See also Sovereignty	theoretical approaches, 1:152–153
Autonomy, administrative, 1:118–123	triangular, 3:637
advantages, 1:258	See also Bipolarity and multipolarity
contrast with politicization, 6:2064	Balandier, Georges, 2:304
de facto and de jure, 1:119–120	Baldwin, David, 7:2111
degrees, 1:123	Ballots. See Electoral systems
dimensions, 1:120, 1:121	Bandung conference, 3:641
discretion, 3:677–679	Banfield, Edward, 6:1975
formal (legal), 1:46	Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 1:219,
individualism and, 4:1175–1176	4:1012, 5:1621
managerial autonomy, 1:45, 1:46	Bank of Korea (BOK), 5:1413
maximizing, 3:714–715	Banks
policy autonomy, 1:45–46	globalized markets, 1:219
in public administration, 1:118–119	legitimacy, 5:1419–1420
real (empirical), 1:46	regulation, 1:216, 5:1491
of street-level bureaucrats, 1:179	See also Central banks
theories, 1:120–122	Banks, Jeffrey, 6:1982
vs. popular representation, 4:985	Banna, Hassan al-, 7:2266-2267
See also Discretion	Baratz, Morton, 7:2104

Bardach, Eugene, 4:1160, 4:1161	political culture, 6:1973
Bargaining, 1:134–136	political science and, 1:136, 1:138, 4:1093–1095,
asymmetric information, 1:136	6:2058–2059
Baron-Ferejohn model, 1:52, 1:135–136	politics and, 1:liii, 1:lvii
definition, 1:134	post-, 6: 2058
in governance networks, 4:1031	research methodologies, 1:140–142, 5:1337–1338
legislative, 1:135–136	theoretical, 1:139, 1:140
noncooperative models, 1:135	value relativism, 1:141–142
paradox of weakness, 1:135	Belgium
process, 1:134	fascist movement, 3:888 , 3:890 , 6:1797
social science study of, 1:134	multiculturalism, 5:1630
Ståhl-Rubinstein model, 1:135	parties, 2:317, 4:1053, 6:1798, 6:1799, 6:1823
strategic theory, 1:134–135	pillarization, 6: 1860, 6: 1861
Barnes, Harry Elmer, 7:2310	Belief systems, 1:145
Barnett, Michael, 4:1015	Beliefs, 1:143-146
Barni, Jules, 7:2297	in advocacy coalition framework, 1:34
Baron, David P., 1:52, 6:1982	collective, 7:2151
Baron, Hans, 7:2293	compared to attitudes and values, 1:143, 1:144-145,
Baron, Robert, 6:2003	8:2691
Baron-Ferejohn model of legislative bargaining,	conceptual problems, 1:143-145
1:52, 1:135–136	core and secondary, 1:34
Barry, Brian, 1:246, 2:557, 6:1721	evaluative, 1:144
Bartle, John, 6:1809	ideology and, 1:145
Bartlett, Frederic, 7:2362	media and, 5:1544
Barzelay, Michael, 7:2272	See also Attitudes; Policy learning; Racism; Values
Bashir, Omar al-, 8:2665	Bell, Daniel, 1:192
Basinger, Scott, 8:2707	Bellah, Robert, 2:327, 6:1978, 8:2624
Basque Nationalist Party, 6:1798	Bellegarrigue, Anselme, 1:73
Basso, Lelio, 8:2628	Bellucci, Paolo, 6:1809
Bates, Robert H., 1:66, 1:67-69, 1:70, 1:160	Ben Gurion, David, 8:2766
Bateson, Gregory, 6:1924	Bendix, Reinhard, 1:lxii, 1:240, 2:346
Bauer, Otto, 5:1660-1661	Benedict, Ruth, 6:2056
Bauman, Zygmunt, 4:1175–1176	Benefit-cost analysis. See Cost-benefit analysis
Baumgartner, Frank, 1:164, 6:1903-1904	Benford, Robert, 6:1925
Bayes, Thomas, 8:2521	Benjamin, Walter, 2:497, 4:1208, 8:2550
Bayes rule, 8:2516, 8:2521	Benninghaus, Hans, 1:94
Bayesian analysis, 8:2516-2519	Bentham, Jeremy
confidence intervals, 8:2520	cardinal utilities, 8:2418
development, 8:2521	on French Revolution, 5:1615
Monte Carlo methods, 5:1627, 5:1628, 8:2520-2521	on international relations, 6:1727
in political science, 5:1563, 8:2520	legal positivism, 7:2321
See also Statistical inference	liberalism and, 5:1431-1432, 5:1433
Beck, Nathaniel, 7:2136, 8:2617	on public office rewards, 7:2162
Beck, Ulrich, 1:274, 7:2324	on rights, 7:2319, 7:2321
Becker, Gary, 3:682, 6:1974, 8:2659-2660	utilitarianism, 3:811, 3:824, 5:1440, 8:2684
Beckford, James A., 7:2259	Bentley, Arthur F., 5:1691, 6:1869
Beetham, David, 2:565	Berelson, Bernard, 5:1535
Behavior, consistency with attitudes, 1:94–95, 1:98	Berkman, Alexander, 1:76
Behavioralism, 1:136-143	Berlin, Isaiah, 2:403, 4:1086, 4:1102, 6:1990, 7:2297
core concepts, 1:139	Berlinguer, Enrico, 6:1797
definition, 1:136	Berlusconi, Silvio, 3:734, 5:1538, 6:1795, 6:1802-1803.
empirical research, 1:139, 1:140-141	6: 1858–1859, 6: 2001, 7: 2077
goals, 1:136, 1:139–140	Bernanke, Ben, 6:1934
influence, 1:138–139, 1:142	Bernstein, Eduard, 7:2311, 8:2424, 8:2452
institutionalism and, 4:1205-1206	Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 7:2236
judicial decision making, 5:1367	Bhabha, Homi, 7:2089
leadership, 5:1408–1409	Bhagwati, Jagdish, 8:2676
as movement, 1:138, 6:2058–2059	Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 3:935, 4:1077, 7:2263,
origins, 1:137–138	7:2264–2265

Biases, 3:798–801	fuzzy algebra and, 3:945
See also Selection bias	origins, 1:155
Bible, 1:232, 4:1073, 5:1363, 6:1758, 8:2600	sets, 1:155–156
Bicameralism, 6:1773, 8:2720	truth tables, 1:156-157
Biehl, Janet, 1:76	Boot, Max, 6:2062
Bilateralism, 1:146-149	Booth, John A., 8:2479, 8:2563-2564
definition, 1:146	Booth, Ken, 4:1296, 8:2546, 8:2547, 8:2550
multilateralism and, 5:1635	Bootstrap, 6: 1709
trade agreements, 1:146–147, 1:148, 5:1328, 5:1329	1,
	Borchardt, Gustaaf, 8:2462
treaties, 1:146–147	Borda counts, 3:750, 8:2417–2418
Bill of Rights, 2:419, 5:1430, 6:1720, 6:1721, 7:2319,	Border control, 5:1568–1569
7:2337	See also Immigration policy
Bin Laden, Osama, 4:1212, 8:2505, 8:2598	Bosanquet, Bernard, 4:1126–1127
Biological weapons, 3:670	Bosnia, 4:968, 5:1347, 5:1646, 8:2653
Biology and politics, 1:149–152	See also Yugoslavia
influences on political behavior, 1:149, 1:150	Bossuet, Jacques-Bénigne, 8:2600
movement, 1:149, 1:151	Botswana
public policy and, 1:150–151	democracy in, 5:1441, 6:1743, 8:2639, 8:2642
research, 1:149-150	elections, 7:2236
Biopolitics. See Biology and politics	ethnic minorities, 8:2642
Bipolarity and multipolarity, 1:152–155	indigenous peoples' rights, 4:1172
during Cold War, 8:2560-2561	traditional rule, 8:2639–2643
debates on, 1:154	Boucher, David, 6:1728
definitions, 1:152	Bouckaert, Geert, 4:1004, 5:1682, 5:1701
in post-Cold War period, 7:2221, 8:2561-2562	Boudon, Raymond, 4:1176
theoretical approaches, 1:152–154, 7:2219,	Boulding, Kenneth, 7:2079
7:2220, 7:2221	Bounded rationality. See Rationality, bounded
•	·
See also Balance of power; Superpowers	Bourdieu, Pierre
Birmingham School of Cultural Studies, 7:2074–2075	on discrimination, 3:682
Birnbaum, Pierre, 3:766, 4:1084, 4:1173, 4:1176	on elites, 3: 767
BIS. See Bank for International Settlements	on ethics, 3:826
Bismarck, Otto von, 8:2513–2514	on <i>habitus</i> , 4: 1194
Bivariate Granger causality, 4:1043	on ideology, 4: 1143–1144, 4: 1145
BJP. See Bharatiya Janata Party	on inequality, 6:2029
Black, Duncan, 1:49, 2:360	on language, 7:2069
Blair, Tony, 1:78, 6:1858, 6:1899, 7:2155, 8:2429	on public opinion, 7:2169
Blanchard, Olivier, 5:1489	on social capital, 8:2410
Blau, Peter, 8:2526, 8:2537	on symbolic politics, 8:2578
Blondel, Jean, 4:1037, 5:1410, 5:1411, 6:1792,	Bourgeois, Léon, 5:1321
6: 1801, 6: 2042	Bouthoul, Gaston, 8:2726
Blumer, Herbert, 7:2194	Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 2:394, 6:1841,
Blumler, Jay G., 5:1532–1533, 5:1535, 6:1964, 6:1966	8:2681, 8:2730
Blyth, Mark, 4:1191	Bowley, Arthur, 1:134
Boas, Franz, 7:2198	Bowman, Isaiah, 4: 969, 4: 972
Bobbio, Norberto, 1:lxiii	Bowornwatana, Bidhya, 7:2272
Bodin, Jean, 2:459, 3:654, 4:1275, 8:2470, 8:2509	Bracher, Karl D., 8:2632
Boix, Carlos, 1:160, 6:1983	
	Brader, Ted, 8:2532, 8:2534
BOK. See Bank of Korea	Brady, Henry, 7:2356
Bolingbroke, Henry St. John, Viscount,	Brague, Rémi, 8:2601
6:1744–1745, 6:1793	Brandt, Patrick, 8:2526, 8:2538
Bolsheviks, 2:310, 2:314, 2:316	Brazil
See also Russian Revolution	democratization, 3:658
Bond, Stephen, 8:2618	fascist movement, 3:888
Bookchin, Murray, 1:76–77	foreign investment, 3:632
Boole, George, 1:155, 2:335	green party, 4:1053
Boolean algebra, 1:155-158	military rule, 5:1576
axioms, 1:156	peasant movements, 6:1847, 6:1848
comparative methods using, 2:335, 7:2173	Breakdown of political systems, 1:158-161
functions, 1:156–158	authoritarian regimes, 1:159-160, 3:618, 3:623
	=

communist systems, 2:313, 2:319–320, 2:325, 7:2091,	serial judgment theory, 1:164
8:2396, 8:2460–2461, 8:2635, 8:2660	use of, 1:164
definition, 1:158	Bukharin, Nikolai, 8:2483
democracies, 1:158–159, 1:244, 2:493, 3:616	Bull, Hedley, 1:153, 4:1241, 4:1281, 4:1291, 4:1315,
dictatorships, 3:655, 3:657–659	4:1316, 4:1317, 5:1320
explanations, 1:158–160	Bunce, Valerie, 1:160
hidden factors, 2:493	Bureaucracy, 1:166–172
origins of concept, 1:158	accountability, 1:4–5, 1:8–9, 1:12, 1:24, 1:169, 1:171,
See also State collapse	4:1007, 5:1624
Brecher, Michael, 3:919	advantages, 1:172
Brehm, John, 4: 1162–1163	budgets, 1:165–166
Bretton Woods system	cabinets and, 1:185
establishment, 4: 1245, 4: 1280, 5: 1619	capitalism and, 1:167–168
exchange rates, 3:701, 4:973, 5:1619	characteristics, 1:166–167
failures, 1:217–218	coordination, 2:449–457
global governance and, 4:1012	corruption, 2: 480–483
monetary system, 3:701–702, 4:973	criticism of, 1:22–23, 8:2495–2496
U.S. hegemony and, 4:1070	decision making, 3:923, 3:925
See also International Monetary Fund; World Bank	definition, 1:166
Brewer, Gary, 8:2480	delegation to, 2:548-550, 7:2203
Brewer, William F., 7:2363	demographic characteristics, 7:2285-2287
Brezhnev, Leonid, 3:636, 3:637	diplomatic services, 3:663, 3:664
Brezhnev Doctrine, 2:318	discretion, 3:677-679, 5:1381
Bribery. See Corruption	distinction from public administration, 4:1004
Britain. See United Kingdom	effectiveness, 1:258, 3:713-716
British Commonwealth, 5:1616	expertise, 2:549, 7:2307
British East India Company, 5:1641-1642	explanations, 1:167
British Empire	hierarchical authority structures, 1:166, 1:169,
administrators, 2:303-304, 6:1754, 7:2158	6: 1748–1749
hegemonic power, 4:975	incentives, 1:171, 1:175
in India, 2:303, 2:305, 4:1077, 6:1754	in international organizations, 1:10, 4:1250, 4:1251
opposition, 7:2087	markets and, 1:167-168, 1:171
Pax Britannica, 4:1154–1155	monitoring of, 5:1624
strengths, 3:771	officials, 1:167
as superpower, 8:2560	organizational structures, 7:2129
British school of international political economy, 4:1259,	pathologies, 1:167, 1:169-172
4:1262–1265, 4:1266, 4:1267	politicization, 6:2063–2066
Broadcast media. See Media, electronic; Radio; Television	red tape, 1:170–171
Brokers	relations with politicians, 4:1007–1008, 7:2127–2128
parties as, 6:1 812	representative, 4:1005, 7:2285–2288
policy, 6:1922	responsiveness, 1:171, 4:985, 7:2306–2309
Brundtland Report, 8:2574, 8:2575	rules and procedures, 1:166–167
Bryce, James, 6:1952, 8:2404	in socialist systems, 8:2459
Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., 8:2630, 8:2631, 8:2634	specialization, 6:1748–1749
Buchanan, Allen, 4:1015	state formation and, 8:2488–2490
Buchheim, Hans, 8:2632	Weber on, 1:25, 1:166, 1:167, 1:255, 4:1004, 5:1625,
Buddhism, 1:161–163	6:1747, 6:1856, 7:2271–2272, 8:2738
characteristics, 1:161–162	in welfare state, 1:178–179, 8:2747
evolution, 1:162–163	See also Administration; Agencies; Civil services;
pacifism and, 6: 1757	Executive; New public management
Tibetan, 8:2600	Bureaucracy, rational choice models, 1:172–178
view of politics, 1:liii	appointments, 1:175
Budgeting	assumptions, 1:172–174
definition, 1:163	delegation, 1:173, 1:174–177
incremental model, 4:1000, 6:1910, 6:1911	information, 1:174
See also Public budgeting	preferences, 1:174
Budgeting, rational models, 1:163–165	special-interest influence, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178
bounded rationality, 1:164–165, 4:1000–1001	Bureaucracy, street-level, 1:178–181
development, 1:164	abandonment, 7:2323
actorophicing 11101	acandonnicity / .2020

accountability, 1:169, 1:179	constitutional setting, 1:184, 3:865
autonomy, 1:179	decision making, 1:183–184, 1:185, 3:865, 3:867
client relationships, 1:179–180	definition, 1:183
clients, 4:1163, 4:1166, 4:1167	duration, 1:288, 3:865
control and monitoring, 1:179, 3:679, 5:1624	external actors and, 1:185
coping mechanisms, 4:1162	falls, 1:184
coproduction, 1:180	functions, 1:183–184
definition, 1:178	future research, 1:184–186
discretion, 1:178, 3:677, 3:678, 3:679, 4:1158, 4:1162	historical origins, 1:183
growth, 1:178–179, 1:180	internal operation, 1:184–185
implementation roles, 4:1162–1164, 4:1168	ministerial responsibility, 7:2300–2301
influence, 3:769, 8:2745	in monarchies, 1:183, 6:1766-1767
management of, 4:1162, 4:1164-1165	in parliamentary systems, 1:183, 1:185, 3:865, 3:867,
outsourcing, 1:179	4: 1037–1038, 6: 1768–1769
representativeness, 7:2157	in presidential systems, 1:183, 7:2123
See also Police	single-party, 1:185, 1:287, 1:288
Bureaucratic drift, 1:176–177	stability, 8:2706
Bureaucratic politics, 3:923, 3:924	veto players, 8:2706, 8:2707
Bureaucratic slack, 1:175–176	See also Executive; Parliamentary systems
Bureaucratic state, 1:168	Cadre parties, 6:1800, 6:1801–1802, 6:1820
Burgess, John W., 4: 1089–1090	CAL. See Capital account liberalization
Burke, Edmund	Calhoun, John, 6:1722, 6:1952
on aristocracies, 6:1952	Calvez, Jean-Yves, 8:2486
on French Revolution, 2:406, 2:407, 5:1615, 7:2319	Calvin, John, 8:2600
on limited monarchy, 5:1614	Cambodia, Khmer Rouge rule, 2:311, 4:1112
on masses, 5:1501	Cameron, Charles, 7:2203
on parties, 6: 1791	Campaigns. See Electoral campaigns
on representation, 7:2277	Campbell, Angus, 3:716, 3:726, 6:1807
on responsibility, 7:2300	Campbell, Donald T., 5:1561
Burke, Peter J., 4: 1133–1134	Canada
Burma, 1:162	indigenous peoples' rights, 4:1171
See also Myanmar	language policies, 7:2070
Burnham, James, 3:765, 6:1955	militias, 5:1579
Burns, James McGregor, 5:1409	monarchy, 5:1616
Burt, Ron, 5:1686	multiculturalism, 5:1630, 5:1631
Bush, George H. W., 7:2149, 7:2366	parties, 3:732, 3:733, 6:1742
Bush, George W.	provincial governments, 1:127
axis of evil speech, 2:432	trade agreements, 1:148
Christian Right and, 7:2265	Candidates. See Electoral campaigns
Group of 20 summit, 5:1622	Canovan, Margaret, 6:1834
interventions, 6:2053	Capital account liberalization (CAL), 5:1622
transatlantic relations, 8:2653–2654	Capitalism, 1:186–193
unilateralism, 4:1242, 5:1635, 8:2675, 8:2676	anarchist views, 1:75–76
war on terror, 4:1285	bureaucracy and, 1:167-168
Bush Doctrine, 7:2122	contradictions, 3:630
Business interest groups, 4:1228–1229, 6:1871	critiques, 1:192, 1:193
Businesses. See Firms; Multinational corporations; Nonstate	culture, 1:191–192
actors; Political risk analysis	defining features, 1:186
Butler, Judith, 4:963	dependency theory view, 3:629, 3:630
Butler, Stuart, 7:2132	firms, 1:188–189, 1:190–191
Butterfield, Herbert, 7:2389	globalization and, 4:972, 4:973-974
Buzan, Barry, 4:1291, 4:1316–1317, 8:2546,	institutions, 1:189–191
8: 2547–2548, 8: 2549	labor markets, 6:1885, 6:1888–1889
	labor movements and, 5:1403–1404, 5:1405, 5:1406
CA. See Correspondence analysis	liberal democracy and, 5:1422
Cabinets, 1:183–186	markets, 1:186–188
accountability, 1:18	Marxist view, 2:315, 5:1493, 5:1494–1495, 5:1496,
coalitions, 1:185, 1:286–289	5:1497–1498, 6:2026–2027, 8:2451, 8:2657–2658
committees, 1:184	neo-corporatism, 5:1668–1673

oligarchic, 6:1741	origins, 1:201–202
papal encyclicals on, 2:461	populist movements and, 7:2076
production regimes, 1:191	Causal heterogeneity, 4:1104, 8:2520
property rights, 1:188	Causality, 1:203-210
Protestant ethic, 1:191, 3:825, 7:2262, 8:2737	in comparative methods, 2:332, 2:339, 3:796
regional integration, 7:2241	complexity, 2:387, 2:388–389
social classes, 1:271, 1:273–274	contractual models, 1:205
socialist view of, 8:2449, 8:2454, 8:2456	correlation and, 2:385, 2:464, 2:465, 7:2116
spread, 8:2660–2661	counterfactual models, 1:204-205, 2:387
state formation and, 8:2509	definition, 1:203
varieties, 5:1486	endogeneity and, 5:1565-1566
Weber on, 1:191, 3:825, 8:2736–2737	Granger, 4:1041–1043, 7:2120
in world systems theory, 3:631, 4:1292, 8:2759, 8:2760	inference, 1:203, 1:204, 1:209
See also Market economies; Property	mechanisms, 1:208–209
Caporaso, James A., 7:2243	model specification and, 5:1595
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 3:629, 3:630, 3:631, 3:632	natural experiments, 3:875–878
Carey, John M., 8:2402	necessary and sufficient conditions, 2:384–388, 7:2175
Carnap, Rudolf, 7:2082	Neyman-Rubin model, 1:203, 1:206–208
Caro, Robert, 7:2160	nonparametric models, 6:1711
Carr, Edward Hallett, 1:153, 4:1274, 4:1279, 4:1288,	observational data, 1:207, 1:209, 8:2527, 8:2530–2531
4:1290, 4:1295, 7:2218	observational data and, 8:2530–2531
Carrington doctrine, 7:2300–2301	
9	process tracing, 4:1106, 7:2134–2138
Carson, Rachel, 3:776, 3:782	qualitative evidence, 1:209–210
Cartel parties, 6:1802, 6:1806, 6:1821, 7:2281, 7:2282	regularity models, 1:203–204
Carter, Jimmy, 7:2265	research designs, 5:1558, 5:1560, 5:1563–1566
Case studies, 1:193–196	selection bias, 7:2391–2393
analytic narratives, 1:66–72	statistical models, 1:205–208, 5:1563–1566, 8:2524–2527
choice of cases, 1:194	structural equation modeling, 1:208
comparative methods, 2:332, 2:334–335, 2:339,	See also Hypothesis testing
2: 343–344, 5: 1560	CBA. See Cost-benefit analysis
cross-case studies and, 1:194, 1:195, 1:196	CCMs. See Configurational comparative methods
definition, 1:194	CCP. See Chinese Communist Party
elite interviews, 5:1340–1341	CD. See Conference on Disarmament
groups, 7:2194	CDA. See Critical discourse analysis
meta-analysis, 5:1551–1554	CDPs. See Christian Democratic parties
methodologies, 1:193-194, 1:195	CE. See Counterespionage
process tracing, 4:1106, 7:2134–2137	Censored and truncated data, 1:210-213
representativeness, 1:194	concerns about, 1:210-211
selection, 5:1560	definitions, 1:210, 5:1599
strengths and weaknesses, 1:195-196	event data, 3:856-857
use of, 3:794–795	random variables, 1:211
See also Comparative methods	in regression analysis, 1:211–212
Cassese, Antonio, 6:1731	sample selection and, 1:212, 5:1599
Castro, Fidel, 2:319, 8:2460, 8:2477	Censorship, 1:213–215
Categorical principal component analysis (CATPCA),	in authoritarian regimes, 1:214–215
7:2357, 7:2359–2360, 7:2361–2362	definition, 1:213
Categorical response data, 1:196-200	in democracies, 1:213–214
analysis of, 1:197–200	history, 1: 213
associations, 1:198–199	informal, 1:213
distributions, 1:197–198	self-, 1:214
typology, 1:197	Center for Public Integrity, 2:478
Catholic Church. See Roman Catholic Church	Central banks, 1:215–221
CATPCA. See Categorical principal	banking system role, 1:216–217
component analysis	in consociational democracies, 2:555
Caudillismo, 1:201–203	credibility, 1:217
definition, 1:201	debt crises and, 1:219
evolution, 1:202–203	definition, 1:215
examples, 1:201, 1:202, 5:1616	in developing countries, 1:219
military leaders, 1:202, 3:654	European, 1:218, 1:219

functions, 1:215–217	caudillismo, 1:203
government debt held by, 1:216	parties, 1:227, 3:734
independence, 1:20, 1:219–220, 2:487, 5:1413	Pinochet regime, 1:214–215, 2:374, 3:656, 5:1576–1577,
international political economy and, 1:217-220	8:2666
lending, 1:216	transition to civilian rule, 5:1576-1577
monetary policy, 1:215, 1:216, 1:218-220, 3:705-706	Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 4:1081, 8:2666,
powers, 1:218	8:2668
relationship with government, 1:215–216, 1:217–219	China
as substate actors, 1:215–217	administrative law, 5:1412-1413
U.S. Federal Reserve, 1:20, 1:218-219, 6:1934	Buddhism, 1:162–163
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 4:1059, 4:1211, 4:1212,	civil war and revolution, 5:1482
4:1213, 8:2504	Confucianism, 1:liii, 1:163, 1:192, 2:399–402, 6:2052
Centralization	constitution, 3:595, 3:596
in consociational democracies, 2:555	corporativism, 2:463
of foreign policy, 1:127	Cultural Revolution, 4:1144–1145, 5:1483, 5:1484,
of government functions, 2:545	5:1500, 8:2477
party organizations, 6: 1818, 6: 1819–1820	democracy perspectives, 3:595–601
See also Decentralization	economic reforms, 5:1440, 5:1484, 5:1500–1501, 8:2660
Centrifugal democracy, 2:587–588	famines, 8:2478
Centripetal democracy, 2:588	Great Leap Forward, 5:1482–1483
Centrist parties, 5:1426	Han empire, 3:771
CFA. See Confirmatory factor analysis	human rights issues, 4:1111
CFP. See Comparative foreign policy	international law and, 4:1243
Chamberlain, Neville, 7:2365	international relations field in, 4:1302
Change, institutional, 1:221–224	Internet use, 3:597–598
explanations, 1:221	manufacturing, 8:2497
logics, 1:222–224	media, 5:1543–1544
study of, 1:221–222	militias, 5:1579
in welfare states, 1:222	minor parties, 3: 596–597
See also Reform; Reorganization	netizens, 5:1661
Chaos theory, 7:2119	political systems, 3:596–597
Charisma, 1:224-226	relations with Soviet Union, 8:2458
during crises, 2:493	relations with United States, 2:432, 3:638, 4:979,
definition, 1:224	8: 2497–2498
of office, 1:225	religions, 1:163
of party leaders, 6:1817-1818	socialist system, 5:1500–1501, 8:2457
of populist leaders, 7:2077	as superpower, 8:2562
routinization, 8:2738	Taiwan claim, 5:1347, 5:1662
as source of authority, 1:80, 1:224–226, 8:2738	U.S. government debt held by, 3:703
Weber on, 1:80, 1:224–225, 2:493, 4:1083, 5:1409,	warlords, 8:2734
5:1420, 6:1859, 7:2077, 8:2738	WTO accession, 8:2763
See also Leadership	See also Maoism
Chartists, 8:2451	Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 2:312, 2:319, 2:320,
Charts. See Data visualization	3:595, 3:598–599, 5:1422, 5:1482, 8:2631, 8:2660
Chase-Dunne, Christopher, 8:2760	Chinese Political Science Association, 6:2017–2018
Chavez, Hugo, 5:1681, 6:1859	Chirac, Jacques, 8:2401
Checkel, Jeffrey, 7:2136	Chomsky, Noam, 1:77, 7:2071
Checks and balances, 1:2, 1:21, 2:574, 3:596, 8:2407	Christian Demonstration (CDPs) 1,226, 222
See also Separation of powers	Christian Democratic parties (CDPs), 1:226–232
Chemical weapons, 3:670, 3:671, 5:1634	Catholic, 1:226–232, 6:1795, 6:1799, 6:1800
Chiang Kai-shek, 5:1482	conservative parties and, 2:412
Chicago School, 1:137, 6:1774, 7:2255	economic policies, 1:230
Chieftaincy, 8:2639–2641	electoral strength, 1:230–231
See also Traditional rule	in Europe, 1:226–230, 2:412, 6:1794, 6:1795,
Child soldiers, 8:2735	6: 1798–1799, 6: 1800
Childs, Harwood, 7:2166–2167	evolution, 1:228–231, 6:1798
Chile	formation, 1:228
Allende government, 7:2125	ideology, 1:230, 6:1795, 6:1800
anarchism, 1:74	international networks, 1:231

in democracies, 1:239
dual, 3:652, 4:1149, 5:1571
equality, 4:1182
historical sociology approach, 4:1084–1085
ideal, 1:239
impact on identity, 1:239–241
juridical status, 1:238–239
laws, 5:1656
meanings, 1:237–238, 5:1570–1571
9.
migration and, 5:1570–1572, 5:1631
multicultural, 1:238, 5:1572, 5:1629, 5:1631
nationality and, 5:1571
naturalization, 4:1149, 4:1184, 5:1571
pluralism and, 3:653
political knowledge and, 5:1537
political participation, 1:239
promotion, 8:2493
rights, 1:238, 1:240, 5:1571
transformations, 1:241-243
transnational, 5:1572
U.S., 1:238
Citrin, Jack, 3:690
City-states
in ancient Greece, 2:559, 2:572, 2:583, 2:584,
4: 1047–1048, 4: 1069, 7: 2288
Italian, 1:130–131, 6:1832–1833, 7:2289
Civic capacity, 4:1028
Civic culture, 1:243–248
criticism of concept, 1:245–247
definition, 1:243
democratic stability and, 1:159
education, 1:252
orientations, 8:2557–2558
as political culture, 1:244–245, 6:1970
political efficacy and, 3:718–719
renaissance, 1:247–248
rule of law and, 7:2342
social capital and, 6:1974, 6:2034
Tocqueville on, 1:244, 6:1974, 6:2034, 8:2622
See also Social capital
Civic education, 1:252
Civic engagement, 1:250–251, 1:252, 8:2412
See also Civic participation; Social capital
Civic nationalism, 5:1656, 5:1657, 5:1661
Civic participation, 1:248-254
apathy and, 1:84-86
civic education and, 1:252
conceptualization, 1:249-252
definition, 1:248–249
democratic consolidation and, 3:627-628
empirical measurements, 1:252-253
incentives, 1:253, 3:874
institutional model, 1:249–250
liberty and, 5:1453
promoting, 1:253–254
social capital and, 1:247
social trust and, 8:2671
theoretical tensions, 1:253–254
See also Social movements

Civic voluntarism model (CVM), 6:1784–1785	economic impact, 1:265
Civil liberties, 6:1720–1721, 7:2235	forms, 1:264
See also Liberty; Religious freedom	historical, 1:264–265
Civil rights, 7:2319	international dimension, 1:268
See also Rights	number of, 1:265, 1:266, 8:2723, 8:2727-2728
Civil services, 1:254–259	opportunity structures, 1:268
career employees, 6:2064, 6:2065, 7:2157, 7:2308	research, 1:268, 1:269-270
characteristics, 1:255-256	state collapse and, 8:2499-2500
definition, 1:254	termination, 1:268–269, 6:1841
education and training, 1:257, 7:2157	See also Conflicts; Revolutions
evaluations, 1:257	Civilizations
laws regulating, 1:255	clash of, 1:114, 1:237, 4:1150, 4:1209, 4:1284, 4:1285,
merit selection, 4:1006, 6:2064, 7:2156, 7:2162	6:2028, 7:2262, 7:2327
models, 1:256	convergence, 5:1352
officials, 1:167	Hindu, 4:1075
operational subsystems, 1:256–258	Clark, William R., 8:2532
politicization, 6: 2066–2068, 7: 2156	Clarke, Adele, 4:1057
promotions and mobility, 1:256, 1:257–258	Class, political. See Political class
public administration and, 1:258–259	Classes, social, 1:270–275
recruitment and selection, 1:256–257	
	in capitalism, 1:271, 1:273–274
reforms, 1:23, 7:2162	caste system, 2:397
relations with politicians, 4:1007–1008	changes, 1:273–274
removals, 1:258	conflict theory, 6: 2028
representative of population, 4:1005	definitions, 1:270–271, 8:2443, 8:2446
rules, 7:2157, 7:2165	division of labor, 8:2508
See also Agencies; Bureaucracy; Executive;	Durkheim on, 1:272
Public employment	electoral behavior and, 3:738–739
Civil society, 1:259–264	formation, 8:2508
in authoritarian regimes, 1:261	Machiavelli on, 2:417, 5:1480
definition, 1:259	Maoist view, 5:1483
in democracies, 3:617	Marxist view, 1:271–272, 5:1497, 5:1498, 6:1951,
democratic consolidation and, 3:617, 3:618	6:2027, 8:2447
failure, 8:2506	mobility, 1:271, 1:273
functions, 8:2506	neighborhoods, 3:747
global, 4:1013, 6:1713	parties and, 1:274, 6:1794–1796, 6:1819
globalization and, 1:263–264	political behaviors, 1:274–275
institutional framework, 1:259–260	political inequality and, 3:821, 3:822–823
international, 4:1258	political sociological study, 6:2025
in Middle East and North Africa, 3:602	popular culture and, 7:2072, 7:2073
modern developments, 1:260–262	in postindustrial societies, 1:273–274
normative claims, 6:1719–1720	power relations, 8:2446
political sociology, 6:2036	relational attributes, 1:272
pressures for disarmament, 3:671-672	revolutions and, 7:2313
public opinion and, 7:2167	ruling class, 6: 1951–1952
reasons for establishment, 2:443	stratification schemes, 8:2446–2447
relationships to state, 1:262-263, 3:617, 8:2506	value orientations and, 8:2693, 8:2695-2696
roots, 1:260	voting and, 1:84
social participation, 6:1786–1787	Weber on, 1:271–272
transnational advocacy networks, 1:37-39	See also Elites; Middle classes; Social stratification;
use of concept, 1:263	Working classes
See also Nongovernmental organizations; Religious	Classical realism. See Realism in international relations
movements; Social movements	Clausewitz, Carl von, 2:493, 6:2056, 6:2057, 7:2222,
Civil society organizations (CSOs), 6:1713, 6:2036	8:2725-2726
See also Nongovernmental organizations	Cleavages, social and political, 1:275-281
Civil wars, 1:264–270	behavioral system, 1:278–279
causes, 1:265–268, 8:2709	definition, 1:275–277
deaths, 1:265	electoral behavior and, 3:738-739
definition, 1:264	historical, 6:1795
duration, 1:269	in international relations, 3:639, 3:641

within nations, 5:1646, 5:1647	Coase, Ronald H., 8:2648, 8:2649
normative system, 1:277–278	Coase theorem, 5:1489, 8:2649
parties and, 6: 1794–1799, 6: 1827	Cobb, Roger, 4: 1001
religious, 8:2693	Cochrane, Archibald L., 3:861
sources of division, 1:276–278	Coercion
types, 1:279–281	economic, 5:1445-1446
value orientations and, 8:2693–2694	exercise of power and, 5:1415-1416
See also Classes, social; Pillarization; Social exclusion;	power, 1:liv, 3:821
Social stratification	See also Interventions; Violence
Cleveland, William S., 4:1045	Cognition, in decision making, 7:2148-2151
Cleyre, Voltairine de, 1:73, 1:77	Cognitive models. See Prospect theory
Clientelism, 1:281-286	Cohabitation, 1:19, 2:591, 8:2401
caudillismo and, 1:202	Cohen, Michael, 6:1920, 7:2217
corrupt, 1:283	Cohesion. See Social cohesion
definition, 1:281	Cohort analysis, 1:289-296
in democracies, 1:284-286	Age-Cohort-Period framework., 1:294-296
exchange of resources, 1:281-283	cohort effects, 1:289-290, 1:292-293
identifying, 1:282–284	example, 1:291–294
in international relations, 3:640	life cycle effects, 1:290, 1:293
party linkage and, 6:1812, 6:1813	period effects, 1:289, 1:290, 1:291, 1:293-294
patrons, 1:281–282	use of, 1:289, 1:296
persistence, 1:285	Cold War
traditional practices, 1:282, 1:284	alliances, 1:61, 8:2458
See also Neo-patrimonialism; Patronage	American political science in, 4:1259–1260
Climate change	area studies and, 1:87
definition, 3:778	arms race, 1:90, 2:448, 3:636, 3:670–671
framing in debates, 6:1925	balance of power, 3:637, 7:2219, 8:2654
international meetings, 8:2575–2576	Christian Democratic parties, 1:229
Kyoto Protocol, 2:448, 4:1238, 8:2651	conflicts, 8:2681
policy network, 6: 1937	containment policy, 2: 431–433, 4: 1280
policy responses, 3:778, 3:780, 8:2763	Cuban Missile Crisis, 5:1652, 7:2366
public awareness campaigns, 6:1899	deterrence, 2:448
as security threat, 8:2548	domino theory, 7:2365–2366
Clinton, Bill, 5:1682, 6:2053, 7:2133, 7:2366	end of, 4:1209, 7:2221
Clore, Gerald L., 7:2150	geopolitics, 4:969–970
Club goods, 2:307, 7:2160	neutral states, 5:1697
Clubs, international, 7:2385–2386	peacekeeping missions, 6:1842, 8:2731–2732
CNES. See Cross-National Study of Electoral Systems	political science during, 1:137–138
Coalitions, 1:286–289	Second, 8:2545–2546
accountability, 6:1824	strategic studies, 6:1840, 8:2542–2545
advocacy coalition framework, 1:33–37, 4:999, 6:1882,	tensions, 3:638
6:1922, 6:1935	United Nations and, 8:2680, 8:2681–2683
in cabinets, 1:185, 1:286–289	See also Détente; post-Cold War period; Superpowers
in consociational democracies, 2:555	Cole, George D. H., 6:1869
definition, 1:286	Colebatch, Hal, 6:1897
electoral, 8:2455	Coleman, James S., 1:lx, 6:1786, 6:1891, 6:1974, 8:2410
formation, 1:287–288, 2:363, 4:1189–1190	Coleman's bathtub, 1:lx
fragmented party systems, 6:1823–1824	Collaboration, 2:297–299
game theory, 4:948, 4:960–961	definition, 2:297
international, 7:2384	democratic implications, 2:298–299 distinction from cooperation, 2:297
local growth, 4:1027	distinction from coordination, 2:297
in parliamentary systems, 1:286–289, 4:1038–1039,	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
6:1767–1768, 6:1770, 6:1982–1983, 6:2047	governance and, 2:297–298
parties included, 2:362 party manifestos and, 6:1815	importance, 2:298
rational choice perspective, 4:1189–1190	partnerships, 2:298 Collapsed states. <i>See</i> State collapse
revolutionary, 7:2314–2315, 7:2317	Collective action
trade liberalization positions, 3:712	complex system modeling, 2:365
trade interalization positions, 5:712 types, 1:286	epistemic communities, 3:790
types, 1:200	episteinie communices, 3:/70

identity and, 8:2435	definition, 2:307
by interest groups, 4:1223–1224	empirical research, 8:2645-2646
organizations, 3:822	global, 7:2160–2161
public goods, 2:307–308, 7:2160, 7:2387	institutions, 8:2646–2648
repertoire, 5:1593, 8:2433, 8:2441	managing, 2:308-309, 7:2205, 8:2644-2646
social capital and, 4: 1104, 6: 1974	prisoners' dilemma, 7:2132
theories, 4:1018, 4:1223-1224	types, 2:307
See also Common goods; Cooperation; Mobilization,	See also Natural resources; Public goods; Tragedy of the
political; Parties; Social movements	commons
Collective action problems, 7:2205	Common pool resources (CPRs), 2:307, 2:308, 2:309,
Collective goods. See Public goods	5:1666, 7:2159, 7:2204, 8:2643–2646
Collective identity, 1:277, 1:278, 8:2434-2435	See also Tragedy of the commons
Collective memory. See Historical memory	Communal rolls, 3:751
Collective security, 2:299–302	Communication
definition, 2:299	during crises, 2:496
enforcement, 2:301	logics, 4:1188, 4:1196
harmony of interests, 2:392–393	See also Political communication
history of concept, 2:299	Communication media, 5:1530
nature of, 2 :299–301, 7 :2386–2387	See also Media, electronic; Media, print
neutrality and, 5:1697-1698	Communication studies, 6:1961–1962
participants, 2:300	Communication technology, 5:1684, 6:1939, 6:2060
United Nations and, 8:2677, 8:2679–2680	Communicative action, 2:499, 3:685, 4:1196, 7:2327–2328
See also League of Nations; Security cooperation	Communicative discourse. See Discourse analysis
Collider variables, 8:2700	Communism, 2:310–314
Collier, David, 2:370, 2:372	anarcho-, 1:76
Colonialism, 2:302–307	distinction from socialism, 2:310, 8:2450–2451
administration, 2:303–304, 6:1754	equality, 8:2450
in Africa, 1:41, 2:303–304, 2:305, 2:306, 4:1155,	evolution of theory, 2:310–311, 2:314–315
5:1648, 8:2500	as ideal, 2:313–314
area studies and, 1:87	ideology, 2:311, 2:314–315, 2:320, 4:1145
civilizing mission, 2:303	intellectuals and, 4:1208
commercial involvement, 5:1641–1642	legacy, 2:313
conflicts, 1:264, 1:267	Marx on, 2:310, 2:311–312, 2:314–315, 5:1499
contested paradigm, 2:304–306	nationalism and, 2:313
decolonization, 3:644	pacifism and, 6:1759
definition, 2:302	as political organization, 2:311–312
European, 2:302, 2:303, 5:1641–1642, 5:1648,	redistribution, 7:2225
7:2086–2087	utopianism and, 8:2687
international law and, 4:1242	See also Maoism; Marxism; Socialism
justifications, 2:303	Communist International (Comintern), 2:310, 2:312,
language policies, 7:2070–2071	2:317–319, 6:1796, 8:2452
legacies, 2:306, 7:2085	Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels), 2:310,
mercantilism and, 8:2656	2:314–315, 5:1493–1494, 5:1497–1498, 8:2451,
modernity and, 7:2088	8:2657, 8:2687
neo-, 1:40, 1:41, 2:304, 3:641, 3:642, 6:1731	Communist parties, 2:314–320
political doctrine, 2:302–304	after fall of communist regimes, 7:2092
resistance, 1:267, 2:304, 7:2086–2087, 8:2394, 8:2396	Chinese, 2:312, 2:319, 2:320, 3:595, 3:598–599, 5:1422,
state formation, 8:2500	
	5:1482, 8:2631, 8:2660
Zionism as, 8:2767	contemporary, 2:319–320
See also Decolonization; Empires; Imperialism; Indigenous	Cuban, 2:319
peoples' rights; Orientalism; Postcolonialism	in democracies, 2:313
Columbia University, 1:139, 5:1534, 5:1535,	democratic centralism, 2:312, 2:316
6:1778–1779, 6:2014	development stages, 2:319
Comecon, 8:2458	East European, 2:312, 2:318, 2:320, 2:325
Comintern. See Communist International	French, 2:312, 2:317, 2:318, 6:1797
Commission on Global Governance, 4:1011	goals, 2:314
Common goods, 2:307–310	hegemony, 2:311, 2:316, 8:2457
common pool resources, 2:307, 2:308, 2:309, 5:1666,	history, 6:1796–1797, 8:2452
7:2159, 7:2204, 8:2643–2646	ideology, 2:314

Italian 2.212 2.217 2.219 2.724 6.1742	over original to 0.2440 0.2600
Italian, 2:312, 2:317, 2:318, 3:734, 6:1743,	experiments, 8:2449, 8:2688
6:1795, 6:1797	homeland security and, 2:328–329
Marx on, 2:311–312, 5:1494	influence, 2:326
media control, 5:1543	international relations theory and, 2:328
organization, 2:316–317	moral dialogues, 2:329–331
origins, 2:315–316	responsive, 2: 327–331
Stalinist, 8:2483	social capital, 8:2410-2411
structures, 8:2458	Tocqueville's influence, 8:2624
vanguard, 2: 312	view of state, 1:262
West European, 2:312, 2:313, 2:317, 2:318, 6:1796–1797	Communities
See also Socialist parties	expatriate, 3:651, 3:652–653
	±
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)	imagined, 4:1270, 5:1645, 5:1654, 5:1659, 7:2088–2089,
democratic centralism, 2:312, 2:316, 3:611–612, 8:2483	8:2394
dictatorship, 3:654	network analysis, 5:1690
dissolution, 2:316, 2:320	security, 7:2388–2389
founding, 2 :310, 2 :316	transnational, 5:1569
Lenin and, 2: 312	utopian, 2:310, 8:2449, 8:2688
membership, 2:317, 2:320	See also Epistemic communities; Policy communities
nomenklatura, 2:316-317, 2:322, 8:2458, 8:2459, 8:2484	Comparative area studies, 1:89
Politburo, 2:317	Comparative foreign policy (CFP), 3:917, 3:926, 3:927
popular sovereignty and, 3:612	Comparative methods, 2:331–341
relations with other communist parties, 2:318–319	assumptions, 3:795
See also Marxism-Leninism; Stalinism	case studies, 2:332, 2:334–335, 2:339, 2:343–344, 5:1560
Communist systems, 2:320–326	causality, 2:332, 2:339, 3:796
collapses, 2:313, 2:319–320, 2:325, 7:2091, 8:2396,	configurational, 2:388–391
8:2460–2461, 8:2635, 8:2660	current developments, 2:340–341
common features, 2:311	deductive approach, 2:333–334
contradictions, 2:321–322, 2:323–324	definition, 2:331
definition, 2:320	formal, 2: 335–338, 2: 340–341
dictatorships, 3:654, 3:655, 3:656, 3:657	goals, 2: 333–334
dissidents, 4:1208-1209	human rights research, 4:1104-1105
economic declines, 8:2660	inductive approach, 2:333–334
economic organization, 2:311, 2:322–323, 7:2090–2091	informal, 2:335, 2:340
elites, 2:316–317, 2:322, 3:762, 3:763, 8:2458, 8:2459	logic, 2: 334–335
history, 2: 310–311	small-N researchers, 2:331, 2:332, 3:794
ideologies, 7:2090–2091	statistical, 2: 342–343
informal economy, 2:323	survey research, 6: 1970–1974, 6: 1977
legacies, 7:2092	time-series cross-section, 8:2531, 8:2615–2621
legitimacy, 5:1421, 5:1422	use of, 3:794, 6:1970–1974
Marxism applied in, 7:2090–2091	variable-oriented methods and, 2:338–340
parliamentary governments, 2:321	See also Case studies; Cross-national surveys
politics, 2:321–322	Comparative policy analysis, 2:354–355
print media, 5:1543–1544	Comparative politics, 2:342–359
revisionism, 7:2311–2312	definition, 2:342
social organization, 2:323–324	distinction from international relations, 2:342, 2:357
as totalitarian, 2:311, 2:321	future of, 2: 355–357
variations, 2: 324–325	historical institutionalism, 2:346-347, 2:349, 4:1037
violent repression, 2:311, 2:320, 2:324-325, 8:2460	human rights, 4:1104–8
See also China; Cold War; Eastern Europe; Postcommunist	issues, 2:350–355
regimes; Socialist systems; Soviet Union	legal constitutionalism, 2:416, 2:418-420, 4:1037
Communitarianism, 2:326–331	methods, 2:342–344
academic, 2:326–327	political development field, 3:644-648
authoritarian, 2:327	public office rewards, 7:2163, 7:2166
branches, 2:326–328	rational choice institutionalism, 2:345–346, 4:1037
citizenship, 1:239, 1:240–241	social movements, 8:2435–2436
civil society, 1:262	sociological institutionalism, 2:347–349
	structural functionalism, 4:996
contrast to liberalism, 1:240–241, 2:326, 2:330	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
definition, 2:326	success, 2:355
East Asian, 2:327, 2:328	theories, 2: 344–349

typologies, 6:2040-2041, 6:2042-2050	opacity, 2:372-373
See also Regimes	reification, 2: 371–372
Competition, political, 2:359–364	semantic constraints, 2:381
alternation in government, 6:1828–1829	semantic fields, 2:381
among parties, 2:360, 2:361, 2:363, 3:728, 6:1792,	structures, 2: 377–378
6:1828–1829	vagueness, 2:373–374
definition, 2:359	Conceptual abuse, 2:374–375
in democracies, 2:359–361, 2:363, 2:589	Conceptual confusion, 2:373–374
democratic quality, 2:568	Conceptual disorders, 2:372–375
electoral, 2:359–361, 2:363	Conceptual lumping, 2:375
governmental, 2:359	Concert of Europe, 4:1011, 5:1632, 7:2386, 8:2677
measures, 2:361	Conditionality, 2:382–384
median voter theorem, 2:360, 6:1981–1982, 6:2032,	aims, 2:382–383
8:2417, 8:2716	definition, 2:382
political economy models, 6:1981–1983	effectiveness, 2:383–384
subversion, 2:570	evolution, 2:383
theory, 2:361–363	foreign aid, 2:383, 4:1040
veto players, 8:2706	legitimacy, 2:384
Competitive democracy, 6:1956	structural adjustment packages and loans, 2:382–383,
Complex system modeling, 2:364–367	2:384, 4:1016, 8:2756–2757
compared to game theory, 2:366	utility calculations and, 2:382–383
foundations, 2:364–365	welfare policies, 8:2745, 8:2751
political science applications, 2:365–367	Conditions, necessary and sufficient, 2:384–388, 7:2175
Complexity, 2:364–367, 8:2581	Condorcet, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de,
Compliance, 2:367–370	3:809, 7:2203, 8:2417
definition, 2:367	Condorcet cycle, 8:2416
enforcement, 2:368–369	Condorcet efficiency, 3:754
management approach, 2:368, 2:369	Condorcet's paradox, 3:709
by states, 2:367–369	Conference on Disarmament (CD), 3:671
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 3:671, 4:1242	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
Compromises, in consociational democracies, 2:556, 2:557	8:2461
Computational models. See Models, computational/	Configurational comparative methods (CCMs), 2:388–391
agent-based	applications, 2:389, 2:390
Computer simulations. See Information technology; Monte	assumptions, 2:388–389
Carlo methods	causality, 2:388–389
Comte, Auguste, 6:1951–1952, 7:2080–2081	debates on, 2:390
Concept formation, 2:370–382	definition, 2:388
abstraction levels, 2:375	further developments, 2:390–391
analytic frames, 2:376–377	goals, 2:388–389
definition, 2:375	techniques, 2:389–390
disorders, 2:372–375	See also Qualitative comparative analysis
empirical boundaries, 2: 376 innovation, 2: 380–381	Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), 3:881, 3:882–884, 5:1524, 8:2554
•	
language acts, 2:370–371 Ogden-Richards triangle, 2:372	Conflict resolution, 2:391–394 civil wars, 1:268–269
in political science, 2:370, 2:380–381	definition, 2:391
reconstruction, 2:375	between democracies, 3:621
semantic fields, 2:376	mediation, 5:1545–1548
structures, 2:377–378	participants, 2:393
Concepts	peaceful means, 5:1545, 6:1759
abstraction levels, 2:375	superpower interventions, 2:396
ambiguity, 2:373	theoretical approaches, 2:392–393
contested, 2:379–380	third-party roles, 6:1841
cores, 2:377	Conflict theory, 2: 396, 6: 2027–2028, 6: 2029
definitional defects, 2: 374	Conflicts, 2:394–399
diminished subtypes, 2:378–379	armed, 8:2723–2725, 8:2726–2729
family resemblances, 2:377–378	classifications, 2: 394–395
instability, 2:374	definition, 2:394, 8:2727
meanings, 2:371, 2:375, 2:380	dimensions, 2:395–396
1110a1111150, 2007 1, 2007 0, 2000	Giricitotorio, 2.070 070

nonstate, 8:2724, 8:2727	main currents of thought, 2:407-410
origins, 2: 394	as philosophy, 2:405
possible outcomes, 2:391–392	See also Christian Right; Fundamentalisms;
religious, 5:1351, 6:1720, 7:2262	Neo-conservative idealism
research, 2: 397–398	Conservative dictatorships, 3:656
in state of nature, 2:447	Conservative parties, 2:410–413
strategies, 2:396, 2:397	British, 2:406, 2:411–412, 6:1801, 6:1802
territorial, 8:2589, 8:2727, 8:2728	definition, 2:410
theoretical approaches, 2:396–397	electoral performance, 2:412
violent, 2:397–398	in Europe, 2:4 12–413
See also Civil wars; Ethnic conflicts; Revolutions;	evolution, 2:411
Violence; Wars	organization, 2:411–412, 6:1801
Confounding variables, 5:1581–1582, 5:1597,	political principles, 2:410–411
7: 2181–2182, 8: 2699, 8: 2701	privatization policies, 7:2133
Confucianism, 2:399–402	role in party systems, 2:412–413, 5:1427
capitalism and, 1:192	social bases, 2:412, 6:1794
in China, 1:163	See also Christian Democratic parties
compatibility with democracy, 2:401	Considerant, Victor, 8:2450
good government principles, 2:399–401	Consistency. See Attitude consistency
moral education, 2:400	Consociational democracy. See Democracy, consociational
political statements, 6:2052	Consolidation, democratic. See Democratic consolidation
view of politics, 1:liii	Constitution, U.S.
Confucius, 2:399, 2:400, 2:401, 6:2051	Bill of Rights, 2:419, 5:1430, 6:1720, 6:1721, 7:2319,
Congo crisis, 8:2681	7:2337
Congress, U.S.	Establishment Clause, 1:236
agenda-setting, 1:50	executive branch, 3:864
apportionment, 3:751, 3:754	federalism, 3:896
delegation to bureaucracy, 2:548–550, 7:2128, 7:2203	Fifth Amendment, 7:2138
impeachment process, 8:2405	First Amendment, 1:236, 3:825, 6:1720, 6:1721
powers, 1:18–19, 8:2405	goals, 6:1723
Senate Intelligence Committee, 4:1057 war powers, 8:2406, 8:2407	judicial review, 5:1373 liberalism, 5:1440
Congress of Vienna, 8:2450, 8:2677	presidential system, 7:2123
Conner, Mark, 1:95	representation, 7:2278–2279
Conscientious objectors, 6:1721, 6:1758	republic, 7:2289–2290
Consensus, 2:402–404	separation of powers, 1:4, 1:6, 1:10, 1:17–19, 8:2403,
definition, 2:402	8:2404, 8:2405–2407
deliberative policy making, 2:551	Twenty-Second Amendment, 3:864
domain, 2:402, 2:404	Constitutional engineering, 2:413–416
on foreign policy, 3:695	amendments, 7:2231
in international organizations, 4:1253	constraints, 2:413, 2:414, 2:415
overlapping, 2:4 02–403	definition, 2:413
political applications, 2:404	duration, 2:415
public opinion and, 7:2168	participants, 2:414–415
See also Deliberative democracy; Election by lot;	stages, 2:413
Groupthink	See also Separation of powers
Consensus democracy, 2:402, 2:403, 2:555-556,	Constitutional monarchy, 5:1613, 5:1614, 7:2290
2: 564 , 2: 587	Constitutional patriotism, 5:1649, 5:1657, 6:1833-1834
See also Democracy, consociational	Constitutionalism, 2:416–421
Consequentialism, 3:824	constraints on government, 6:1722–1723
Consequentialist libertarianism, 5:1442, 5:1444–1445	definition, 2:416
Consequentiality, logic of, 5:1475	democratic, 2:353
Conservatism, 2:405–410	goals, 2: 416, 6: 1722–1723
British sources, 2:405–407	identity building, 5:1649
classical, 2:407–408	international, 4:1243
critique of liberalism, 2:405, 2:410	judiciary, 5:1383–1384
definition, 2:405	legal, 2:416, 2:418–420, 4:1037
as ideology, 2:405	legislative voting rules, 8:2718, 8:2719–2720
individualism 4.1176-1177	liberalism and 5:1429 5:1430 5:1431 5:1442

liberty and, 6:1720	norms, 2:424–425
in multiethnic states, 5:1649	ontological innovations, 2:427
normative claims, 6:1722–1723	peace, 6:1837
party systems, 2:418	power, 7:2110, 7:2112–2113
political, 2:416–418, 2:419–420	premises, 2:425–426
processes, 5:1649, 7:2340	rise of, 2:426
republican, 2:417	security studies, 8:2550
rights, 2:419, 7:2337	subdivisions, 4:1292
rule of law and, 7:2336–2337, 7:2338, 7:2340	transatlantic relations, 8:2655
statism and, 8:2513	Containment, 2:431–433
See also Separation of powers	alliances, 2:432
Constitutions	alternatives, 2:433
cabinets, 1:184	during Cold War, 2:431–432, 2:433, 4:1280
Chinese, 3:595, 3:596	engagement and, 2:433
church-state relationships, 1:235-236	objectives, 2:431
in consociational democracies, 2:555	origins of concept, 2:431–432
English, 1:10, 1:18, 5:1614, 8:2404	in post-Cold War period, 2:432-433
French, 7:2227, 7:2337, 8:2403	of rogue states, 2:432
as institutions, 4:1203	Content validity, 5:1514–1515
Construct validity, 5:1515–1517	Contentious participation. See Participation, contentious
Constructionism, 2:421	Contested concepts, 2:379–380
Constructivism, 2:421–425	Continental Congress, 8:2404–2405
contextual, 2:422	Contingency theory, 2:433–436
definition, 2:421	definition, 2:434
discursive institutionalism and, 3:684	explanations of organizational performance, 2:434
on ethics, 3: 826–827	fits and misfits, 2: 434–436
frames, 2: 422–423, 6: 1924	task uncertainty, 2:434
globalization, 4:976	variables, 2:434
identity, 4:1136, 7:2113	Continuous variables, 8:2698–2699
influence, 2:425	Contract theory, 2:436–447
international law, 4:1241	consent and, 6:1723, 6:1724
intersubjectivity, 2:428	contemporary, 2:442
methodologies, 3:798	critiques of, 2:445–446, 6:1723, 7:2334
mutual constitution of structures and agents, 2:428-429	definition, 2:436
perspective on crime, 2:423–424	gender, 2:443–444
policy analysis, 6: 1898–1899	history, 2:438–442
policy models, 6: 1879–1881	individualism and, 2:443-444
religion, 7:2259	modernity and, 2:437, 2:438, 2:445, 2:446
in social sciences, 2:421–424, 6:1879	moral dimension, 6: 1723–1724
sovereignty, 8:2471	necessity of contract, 2:442–443
strict, 2:4 22	on society, 2: 437–438
strong and weak, 6:1879	state of nature, 2:440-442, 2:444
terminology, 2:421	two pacts, 2:445
view of reality, 3:796-798, 6:1879	See also Social contract
See also Discourse analysis	Converse, Philip, 1:145, 3:726, 5:1502, 6:1807, 6:2004
Constructivism in international relations, 2:425-431	Cooley, Charles Horton, 4:1132
anarchic world, 1:79, 4:1292	Coombs, Clyde, 7:2355
building blocks, 2:428–430	Cooperation, 2:447–449
contrast to realism, 2:424	areas, 2:447–448
development, 2:426-428, 2:430	in communities, 2:447, 2:449
domestic politics and, 3:694-695	complex system modeling, 2:365
double hermeneutics, 2:425, 2:429–430	definition, 2:447
epistemic communities, 3:787–791	developing and sustaining, 2:448-449
interests, 2:426	distinction from collaboration, 2:297
international political economy, 4:1262	game theory models, 2:448–449, 4:1251, 7:2130–2132
international regimes, 4:1273, 4:1274	international, 4:979, 4:981, 4:1012–1013, 7:2382–2383
irredentism, 5:1348	transaction costs, 8:2648
methodological issues, 2:427–428	See also Democracy, consociational; Intergovernmentalism;
national interests, 5:1651–1652	Multilateralism; Security cooperation

Coordination, 2:449–458	nonparametric, 2:467
during crises, 2:495	partial, 2:4 65
definition, 2:449–450	Pearson's r, 2:464–465, 2:466
distinction from collaboration, 2:297	scatterplots, 2:464, 2:465
of economic policy, 3:703–704	sensitivity analysis, 5:1596
effectiveness, 2:457	serial, 6:1761–1762, 8:2617–2618
by executive, 2:449–457, 3:866, 4:1161, 7:2215	spatial, 2:522–525
goals, 2:450–451	spurious relationships, 2:465
history, 2: 451–452	See also Model specification
of implementation, 4:1161–1162	Correspondence analysis (CA), 2:468-474
informal governance, 4:1020	definition, 2:468
instruments, 2:451, 2:456, 2:457, 7:2205-2206	maps, 2:470–471, 2:473
means, 2:451	multiple, 2:471–474
normative theory, 6:2057–2058	profiles, 2:469–471
opposing principles, 2:454–456	simple, 2: 468–471
organization theory, 2:449–457	Corruption, 2:474–480
political importance, 2:452	categories, 2: 475–477
rational choice perspective, 7:2205–2206	causes, 2:478–479, 4:1017–1018
strategic approaches, 2:456–457	clientelism, 1:283
theories, 2:452–454	control of, 6: 1972–1973
types and levels, 2:456–457	country rankings, 2:478
See also Cooperation; Multilateralism	cures, 2:479–480
Copenhagen School, 4:1302, 4:1303, 7:2376, 8:2549	definition, 2:474–475
Coproduction, 1:180, 4:1020	effects, 2:479
Copyright, 7:2141–2142	electoral, 2:475, 2:478, 6:1804
Corbin, Juliet, 4:1057	embezzlement, 2:476
Core executive models of government, 4:1039	measures, 2:478, 7:2235
Cornell Series in Political Economy, 4: 1262	in natural resources management, 5:1667
Cornes, Richard, 7:2159	in party finance, 6:1804
Corporate oligarchy, 3: 766	patronage, 1:283, 1:286
Corporate social responsibility, 5:1643, 8:2463, 8:2576	patterns, 2:477–478
Corporations. See Business interest groups; Firms;	political, 1:283, 1:286, 2:474–479
Multinational corporations	rule of law and, 7:2340-2341
Corporatism. See Corporativism	tax evasion and, 8:2586-2587
Corporativism, 2:458–463	See also Governance, good
advocacy activities, 1:31–32	Corruption, administrative, 2:480–483
authoritarian, 2:462-463	causes, 2:481
Catholic concepts, 2:461	consequences, 2:481
contemporary, 2:459, 5:1670–1673	definition, 2:480–481
criticism of, 2:458–459, 5:1668	distinction from political corruption, 2:480-481
definition, 2:458	measurement, 2:481
Durkheim on, 3:698-699	reduction efforts, 2:481–483
functional democracy, 2:589-590	theories, 2:482
history, 2:459–461, 5:1668	Cortright, David, 7:2353
interest intermediation, 6:1875	Cosmopolitan democracy, 2:580, 2:593, 5:1424,
medieval, 2:459-460	6: 1734–1736, 6: 2060
model, 2: 459	Cosmopolitan interventionists, 5:1438
modern ideologies, 2:459, 2:461, 5:1485	Cosmopolitanism, 4:1276, 5:1436, 6:1733, 6:1834, 6:1994
policy formulation, 6:1920–1921	8: 2466
regimes, 1:110, 4:1222, 6:2043	Cost-benefit analysis (CBA), 2:483-486
secular, 2:461–462	definition, 2:483
social insurance, 8:2743	discounting, 2:484–485
See also Governance networks; Neo-corporatism	of foreign aid, 3:912
Correlation, 2:463–468	framework, 2:483
causation and, 2:385, 2:464, 2:465, 7:2116	government use, 2:483–484
coefficients, 2:467–468	nonmarket values, 2:485–486
contemporaneous, 6:1762	partial and general equilibrium analysis., 2:484
definition, 2:463–464	process, 2:484–486
history of concept, 2:464	public goods and, 7:2160

risk and uncertainty, 2:485, 7:2324 standing, 2:484	political, 2:489–493 reform and, 7:2233
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or	structural transformations, 2: 490–492
Comecon), 8:2458	study of, 2:489–490, 2:492–493
Council of Europe, 5:1374	termination, 2:496
Council of Financial Stability, 4:1247	uncertainty, 2:492
Counterespionage (CE), 4:1212	vulnerability of modern societies, 2:494
Counterfactual models, 1:204–205, 2:387	See also Breakdown of political systems; Financial crises;
Counterintelligence (CI), 4:1212, 4:1213	State collapse
Counterrevolutionary dictatorships, 3:656	Crisis management, 2:494–497
Counterterrorism	challenges, 2:494–496
international conventions, 4:124 0	cooperation, 7:2386
international coordination, 8:2593	decision making, 2:495
network analysis, 5:1690	diplomatic roles, 3:668
policies, 8:2593	EU role, 3: 840–841
See also Security apparatus; Terrorism, international; War	learning, 2:496
on terror	meaning making, 2:496
Country risk, 6:2012	political dimension, 2:495
Coups, 3:657, 3:658, 3:763, 5:1574, 5:1576, 5:1577	sense making, 2:495
Courts. See International courts; Judicial systems; Judiciary;	technical-administrative dimension, 2:495
Supreme Court, U.S.	Critias, 4:1048
Cox, Gary W., 8:2713, 8:2715–2716, 8:2717	Critical discourse analysis (CDA), 3:674–675, 6:1883
Cox, Gray, 7:2080	Critical junctures, 7:2233
Cox, Robert, 4:1072, 4:1263, 4:1264, 4:1292	Critical rationalism. See Rationalism, critical
CPC. See Chinese Communist Party	Critical theory, 2:497–501
CPRs. See Common pool resources	communicative action, 2:499, 4:1196
CPSU. See Communist Party of the Soviet Union	definition, 2:497
CR. See Christian Right	deliberative democracy, 2:500
Credible commitment, 2:486–489	on ethics, 3:826–827
definition, 2:486	Habermas's contributions, 2:498-501
delegation, 2:487-488	mass communications, 5:1535-1536
deterrence, 2:486–487	origins, 2:497–498
of negotiated settlements, 6:1841	political sociology, 6:2027-2029, 6:2036
nonmajoritarian institutions, 2:487–488	power, 7:2099
principal-agent theory and, 7:2129	public sphere, 2: 499–500
programming behavior, 2:487	Critical theory in international relations, 2:501–504
Crime	critique of ideology, 2:502–503
constructivist view, 2:423–424	Habermas on, 2:500
corruption and, 2: 477, 2: 479	influence, 2:503
election fraud, 3:722, 3:723	international political economy, 4:1264
organized, 7:2379, 7:2380, 8:2596	opposition to positivism, 2:502, 4:1289
political issues, 6:1878	origins, 2:503, 4:1292
by terrorist groups, 8:2594, 8:2596	peace, 7:2079
war crimes, 4:1110, 4:1111, 4:1112, 8:2665	power, 1:152, 1:154
See also Genocide; Police	strategic studies and, 8:2542, 8:2550
Crimes against humanity, 4:968–969, 5:1336	supporters, 4:1287, 4:1292
Criminal law, 4:1239–1240	tensions in, 2:503
See also Judicial systems; Law	war, 8:2726
Crises, 2:489–494	Croatia, 2:463
in capitalism, 1:192	See also Yugoslavia
constitutional reforms, 2:415	Croce, Benedetto, 4:1127
coordination during, 2:495	Cross-case studies, 1:194, 1:195, 1:196 Cross-level inference. <i>See</i> Inference, ecological
definition, 2:489, 2:494	
legitimacy, 3:623, 3:624 lessons, 2:496	Cross-National Study of Electoral Systems (CNES), 6:1778
market failures and, 5:1491–1492	Cross-national surveys, 2:504–508
natural disasters, 3:668	archives, 6:1971–1972
opportunities for conflict, 1:268	Eurobarometer, 2 :504–505, 6 :1778, 6 :1971, 7:2094
outcomes, 2:489–490	European Social Survey, 2:504, 2:506, 6:1778
0.000, 20, 107, 170	24.500, 0.1770

European Values Studies, 2:505–506, 6:17/8, 6:19/1, 8:2672–2673	Czech Republic, parties, 1:22/, 4:1053, 4:1054 Czechoslovakia, Charter 77, 4:1209
evolution, 2:504–505	Czechoslovakia, Charter 77, 1.1207
history, 2: 504, 6: 1977	Dahl, Robert A.
International Social Survey Programme, 2:506, 6:1778,	on administrative science, 1:27
7:2357	on democracy, 4:1097
methodological issues, 2:506, 2:507	democratic theory, 4:1095–1096
social trust questions, 8:2672–2673	democratic typology, 6: 2040
See also Survey research	on elites, 3:766, 3:768, 6:1956, 6:2025, 7:2104
•	
Cross-sectional data. See Panel data analysis; Time-series	on interest groups, 4:1222
cross-section data and methods	on opposition, 6: 1745–1746
Cross-tabular analysis, 2:508–510	on parties, 6:1955
correspondence analysis, 2:468–474	pluralism, 6:1869, 6:1870, 6:1871, 7:2225
definition, 2:508	on political competition, 2:589
use of, 2:510	on political dissatisfaction, 3:689
Crouch, Colin, 2:581–582	on polyarchy, 2:359, 2:565, 2:574, 6:1745, 7:2339
Crowds, psychology of, 5:1503, 6:2000	on power, 3:675, 7:2100, 7:2104
CSCE. See Conference on Security and Cooperation in	on rule of law, 7:2339
Europe	Dalai Lama, 8:2600
CSOs. See Civil society organizations	Dalton, Russell J., 6:1979, 8:2433, 8:2563, 8:2565
Cuba	Damasio, Antonio, 7:2150
Bay of Pigs invasion, 4:1059, 4:1212, 4:1213	Daoism, 1:162, 1:163, 6:1758
communist party, 2:319	Darkwah, Kofi, 8:2640
socialist system, 2:311, 8:2457, 8:2460	Data
stability, 8:2477	aggregate, 1:53–56, 5:1563
Cuban Missile Crisis, 5:1652, 7:2366	bivariate, 4: 1045
Cultural hegemony, 3:820, 3:821, 3:822, 7:2074	categorical variables, 1:196-200
Cultural nationalism, 7:2072–2074	clustered, 5:1637
Cultural pluralism, 6:1869–1870, 6:1871–1872	coding, 5:1558–1559
See also Multiculturalism	dependence, 5:1597-1598
Cultural rights, 7:2319–2320	event counts, 3:853–855
Cultural studies, 5:1536	imperfections, 1:212, 5:1598-1599
Cultural violence, 7:2079	influential, 7:2329-2330
Culturalism, 2:510-513	multivariate, 4:1045
definition, 2:510-511	nominal, 1:197, 1:198
neo-, 2: 512–513	ordinal, 1:197
origins, 2:511	outliers, 2:533, 2:534, 7:2329
in political science, 2:511–512, 2:513, 7:2163	sharing, 5:1559–1560
"thin" and "thick," 2:511	univariate, 4:1045
Culture	See also Measurement; Observational data; Variables
collective identity, 1:278	Data, archival, 2:515-518
definitions, 2:510, 2:511	access to, 2:515-516
effects of globalization, 4:980	cooperative institutions, 6:2015–2016
homogeneity, 1:240	declassified, 2:517
organizational, 6: 1749, 6: 1750, 7:2216	definition, 2:515
political sociology, 6:2029–2031	digitization, 2:517, 2:527–528
values, 8:2692	management, 2:516
See also Civic culture; Political culture; Popular culture	methodologies, 2:516–517
Cumulative voting, 3:750–751, 3:753	online, 2:517
Curle, Adam, 7:2080	research using, 2:515, 2:516–517, 6:1778
Currencies	Data, missing, 2:518–520
Euro, 3:844, 3:846, 5:1620	adjustments for, 2:518, 6:1762–1763
exchange rates, 5:1619, 5:1621, 5:1622	causes, 2:518, 2:519, 6:1762
national, 5:1620	
	listwise deletion, 2:518–519 multiple imputation, 2:519–520
See also Monetary relations	
Currency crises. See Financial crises	panel data, 6:1762–1763
Cusack, Thomas, 6:1984	selection bias and, 1:212, 2:519
CVM. See Civic voluntarism model	types, 1:211
Cybernetics, 1:lxiii–lxiv, 8:2579–2580	See also Censored and truncated data

Data, spatial, 2:520-525	minority nationalism and, 1:128
regression analysis, 2:522-525	natural resources management, 5:1667
spatial relations, 2:520-522	in organizations, 2:434
use in political science, 2:520	subnational autonomy and, 1:124, 1:125-126, 1:128,
Data, textual, 2:525-530	5:1464
advantages, 2:526-527	trends, 2:545-546, 2:547, 7:2247
analysis, 2:525, 2:527, 2:529-530, 5:1558-1559	See also Centralization; Metagovernance; Regionalization
challenges, 2:526	Decision making approaches
definition, 2:525	bounded rationality, 7:2212–7
electronic forms, 2:527–528	cognition and emotional factors, 7:2148-2151
practical issues, 2:527–529	consensus, 2: 402–404
preprocessing, 2:528–529	during crises, 2:495
quasi-sentences, 2:529	in democracies, 2:577–578
sampling, 2:527	Foreign Policy Analysis research, 3:922-923, 3:925
Data analysis	of groups, 5:1503
analysis of variance (ANOVA), 1:62–66	in international organizations, 4:1253
of categorical data, 1:197–200	neurological research, 3:923
See also Aggregate data analysis; Qualitative comparative	organization theory, 6: 1749–1750
analysis; Statistics	preference-guided, 6:1864–1865
Data analysis, exploratory (EDA), 2:530–537	prospect theory, 7:2143–2145
bag plots, 2:533–535	scripts, 7:2364–2367
characteristics, 2:530–531	See also Discretion; Game theory; Judicial decision
five-number summary, 2:531	making; Planning; Policy formulation; Policy process
median polish, 2:536	models of
outliers, 2:533, 2:534	Declaration of Independence, 8:2395
	Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 2:418,
reexpression, 2:536	5:1431, 7:2318, 7:2319
residual plots, 2:533, 2:534	
robust curves, 2:536	Decolonization
scatterplots, 2:532, 2:533	of Africa, 2:304, 4:1282, 5:1648
smoothers, 2:535–536	of Asia, 5:1648
stem-and-leaf displays, 2:531–532	of developing countries, 3:641, 3:643, 3:644,
tables, 2:531	3:654–655, 3:666
techniques, 2:531–536	movements, 2:304, 7:2087
Data collection, 5:1558	nation building, 5:1647
See also Interviewing; Survey research	nationalism, 4:1086
Data visualization, 2:537–545	political integration, 6:1987
connection (or distance) tables, 2:538–539	republic formation, 7:2290
functions, 2: 539	self-determination, 8:2396
geographic information systems, 2:541–542	state collapse and, 8:2500
graph visualization, 2:542–543	state formation and, 8:2510, 8:2511–2512
multidimensional, 2:543, 2:544	See also Nation building; Postcolonialism
object-feature tables, 2:537–538	Deconcentration, 5:1464
objectives, 2:537	De-democratization, 6:1813–1814
problems and risks, 2:544	Defense policy. See Security and defense policy
statistical graphics and infographics, 2:539–541	Degenerate policy making, 6:1881
use in political science, 2:537	Delegation, 2:548–551
See also Graphics, statistical	accountability shifted, 2:550
Davis, S. Rufus, 3: 897	to bureaucracies, 2:548–550, 7:2203
Dayan, Daniel, 5:1536	causes and effects, 2:548–550
De Gaulle, Charles, 1:19–20, 2:493, 4:1038, 4:1231,	credible commitment, 2:487–488
6:1793, 8:2652	definition, 2:548
Debt	in parliamentary systems, 6:1769
crises, 1:219, 4:1246, 4:1247	principal-agent theory and, 2:549, 7:2203, 7:2302
public, 1:216, 7:2153, 7:2154	responsiveness and, 7:2302, 7:2307-2308
Decentralization, 2:545-548	risk and, 7:2323
arguments for, 2:546	trade policy, 5:1328
definition, 2:545	Delegative democracy, 2:565, 2:570, 2:588, 2:590
effects, 2:547	Deleuze, Gilles, 6:1996-1997, 7:2096,
measurement, 2: 546–547	8:2550, 8:2590

Deliberative democracy	neo-corporatism and, 5:1672-1673
as alternative to majoritarian democracy, 2:551	normative claims, 6:2034-2035
challenges, 6:1722, 6:1779-1780	oligarchic, 6:1740
Chinese perspectives, 3:598, 3:599	paradox of, 4: 1088
collaboration, 2:298	performance, 6: 1850–1851
communitarian view, 2:330	political class in, 6: 1955, 6: 1956, 6: 1958
consensus decision making, 2:404, 2:592-593	political cultures, 1:244–245, 6:1969, 8:2558
discursive institutionalism and, 4:1197–1198,	political socialization, 6:2020
6: 1779–1780	power in, 7:2107
Habermas on, 2:500, 2:578, 2:593, 6:1779	promotion, 5:1422–1423
participation, 6:1779–1780	pseudo-, 1:109, 1:112, 1:113, 2:351, 6:2034
practical implications, 2:578	public opinion and, 7:2167, 7:2169–2170, 7:2172
processes, 2:577–578	purpose, 2: 571
Deliberative policy making, 2:551–553	quasi, 4: 1116
aims, 2:551	radicalism and, 7:2200-2202
collaboration, 2:298	rationality, 2: 577–578
critiques of, 2:552–553	religions and, 1:229, 1:230, 7:2261
discourse and, 4:1003, 6:1881	Rousseau on, 2:444, 2:560, 2:573, 5:1439, 7:2332
efficiency, 2:553	rule of law, 2:566, 2:567, 7:2337, 7:2339-2340, 7:2341,
global, 2:581	7:2343–2344
interests and, 2:553	secularism in, 1:236
legitimacy, 2:551, 2:552–553	sovereign, 6: 2053, 6: 2061
techniques, 2:552	stability, 8:2477
Deliberative polling, 7:2171	supranationalism and, 2:350–351
Della Porta, Donatella, 1:78	Tocqueville on, 2:313, 2:573, 4:1083, 8:2622–2624
Democracy	tutelary, 1:110
accountability, 4:1229–1230, 7:2284	in United States, 4:1088
advantages over autocracy, 3:625–626	war and, 6: 2061
apathy in, 1:85–86	without law or state, 4:1116
authoritarian features, 3:646	See also Accountability, electoral; Civic culture; Equality,
breakdowns, 1:158–159, 1:244, 2:493, 3:616	political; Liberal democracy; Majoritarian democracy;
bureaucracy in, 1:168	Representative democracy; Social democracy
censorship in, 1:213–214	Democracy, consociational, 2:553–559
characteristics, 2:586	causes and determinants, 2:556
citizenship, 1:239	consensus democracy and, 2:403
civic participation, 1:249–250, 3:627–628	consequences, 2:556–557
civil wars, 1:267–268	criticism of, 2:557–558, 6:1861
classifications, 2:350	definition, 2:553–554
comparative politics study of, 2:350–355	disappearance, 6:1862
competitive, 2:350, 6:1956	distinction from centrifugal democracy, 2:587–588
consensus, 2:402, 2:403, 2:555–556, 2:564, 2:587	distinction from consensus democracy, 2:555–556
constitutions, 2:353	examples, 2:553–555, 6:1976–1977
cosmopolitan, 2:580, 2:593, 5:1424,	majoritarian democracy and, 2:554
6: 1734–1736, 6: 2060	majorities in, 2:587
credible commitment problems, 2:488	operational criteria, 2:554
criticism of, 2:500, 2:591–594	parties, 2:555, 6:1861
defective, 1:213–214	pillarization, 6: 1860–1863
definitions, 2:583, 3:614, 3:818	stability, 2: 588
economic development and, 2:352–353, 3:626	Democracy, direct, 2:559–565
electoral, 7:2234–2235	in ancient Greece, 2:559, 2:572, 2:583, 2:584
legitimacy, 2:552–553, 3:617, 5:1397	Chinese perspective, 3:595–596, 3:597–598
limited, 4:1116	citizens, 2:584
local, 6: 1787	
mass, 5:1501–1502	citizens' initiatives, 2:560, 2:561, 2:562, 2:563,
	2:564, 2:584 consequences, 2:564
meaning shifts, 2:572–574	1 ,
minimal requirements, 4:1114	contrast to representative democracy, 2:560, 2:562–563
Muslim attitudes, 1:114–115, 1:237, 3:603,	decision making, 2:583–584
3:626–627, 7:2261	definition, 2:559
natural resources management in, 5:1667	forms, 2:559, 2:560–561

future of, 2:584–585, 7:2284–2285	deliberative democracy, 3:598, 3:599
history, 2:559–560, 2:583–584	direct democracy, 3:595-596, 3:597-598
issues, 2:562–564	grassroots level, 3:597
local level, 2:584, 5:1466	inner-party democracy, 3:598-599
national level, 2:561-562	official view, 3:595–597
paths to, 2:562	socialist democracy, 3:595-598, 3:600
policy impacts, 2:564	Democracy: Middle East perspectives, 3:601–607
regional level, 2:562	absence of, 3:601–602
regulation, 2:561	Islamist competitors, 3:604-606, 3:943
supporters, 8:2442	obstacles, 3:602-603, 5:1423
theories, 2:560	prospects for, 3:626–627, 3:942–943
See also Referenda	recent trends, 3:603–604, 3:606
Democracy, quality, 2:565–571	Democracy: Russian perspectives, 3:607-614
auditing, 2:565	authority versus people, 3:608–610
characteristics, 2:566	autocracy and, 3:607-608, 3:610
consolidation, 3:615	contemporary, 3:613
corruption control, 6:1972–1973	future of, 3:613–614
dimensions, 2:566–568, 7:2343	historical development, 3:607-611
interest groups and, 4:1228-1230	peasant communities, 3:607
meanings, 2:566	perestroika, 3:611, 3:612–613, 8:2460
measurement, 2:565, 2:574–575, 3:620–621, 7:2235,	popular sovereignty, 3:610–611
7:2343	soviets, 3:611–612
participation, 2:567–568, 6:1785–1786	Democratic consolidation, 3:614-620
political culture and, 6:1972–1973	anchors, 3: 617–618
political equality, 3:818–823, 4:1183–1184	challenges, 3:627
political performance, 6:1850–1851	criticism of concept, 3:616
referenda, 7:2229	definition, 3:614
rule of law and, 2:566, 2:567, 7:2343-2344	dominant parties, 6:1742–1743
scholarship on, 2:565, 6:1850	elections, 3:722–724, 8:2663
subversion, 2:568–571	empirical indications, 3:616-617
Democracy, theories of, 2:571–582	external actors and, 3:619
ancient, 2:571–573	institutionalization, 6:2034
economic, 6:1983–1984, 6:2055, 6:2059	international organizations and, 4:1257
empirical, 2:574–575, 2:583, 2:586	legitimacy, 3:617
feminist, 2:576–577	meanings, 3:615, 3:619
formal, 6: 2053, 6: 2055	measures, 7:2237
future of, 2: 579–582	mechanisms, 3:617-618
global, 2:579-581	missions, 3:615
modern, 2: 572–574	normative, 3:617
normative, 2:576–579, 2:583–586	social movements and, 8:2438-2439
positive, 2:575–576	success factors, 2:351-352, 3:615-616, 3:618-619, 3:625
postdemocracy, 2:581–582	See also Democratization; Transitions
purposes, 2:571	Democratic deficit
rationalization, 2:579	in consociational democracies, 2:557
research, 2:578–579	in European Union, 1:85, 2:579-580, 3:845,
See also Economic theories of politics	4: 978, 5: 1424
Democracy, types of, 2:582–594	in global governance, 2:580-581, 4:1014-1015
classifications, 2:586-591, 3:614-616	Democratic leadership, 5:1410–1411
critical approaches, 2:591-594	Democratic Party (U.S.), 6:1807
empirical models, 2:583, 2:586	Democratic peace, 3:620-622
normative models, 2:583–586	alliances, 5:1435, 5:1436
See also Democracy, consociational; Democracy, direct;	criticism of concept, 3:620, 3:622
Liberal democracy; Majoritarian democracy;	definition, 3:620
Parliamentary systems; Representative democracy	domestic politics and, 3:621, 5:1435
Democracy: Chinese perspectives, 3:595–601	empirical support, 6:2059
academic work, 3:597–599	exceptions, 3:620, 3:622
autonomous democracy, 3:597	foreign policy influenced by, 3:622
consultative democracy, 3:598	impact of democracy, 3:620–621, 3:626, 3:711–712,
debates, 3:599-601	5:1435, 6:1839, 7:2390

irredentism and, 5:1347-1348	Dependency theory, 3:628–633
supporters, 4:1130, 4:1285, 4:1291, 5:1435, 6:1759	blocked development, 3:630-631
theoretical basis, 3:621-622, 5:1435-1436	claims, 3:628, 3:642, 3:646, 4:1265-1266, 5:1330,
Democratic socialism. See Social democracy	5:1642, 7:2084
Democratic transitions. See Transitions	debates, 3:630-631
Democratization, 3:622-628	decline of, 3:646
agency factors, 3:623-624	emergence, 3: 628, 3: 629–630
clientelism, 1:285	Marxist roots, 3:645
cooperation, 2:447–448	new approaches, 3:632-633
deep, 3:623, 3:624–625, 3:627–628	traditional rule, 8:2639
definition, 3:622–623	See also World systems theory
in developing countries, 2:363, 3:655	Dependent variables, 7:2249, 8:2699
economic factors, 3:624–625, 6:2025	See also Variables
economic liberalization and, 5:1440-1441	Depillarization, 6:1862
empirical research, 8:2661-2662	See also Pillarization
evolutionary forces, 3:625-626, 6:2034	Depoliticized democracies, 2:588
external threats and, 3:625	Derbyshire, I., 6:2043-2044, 6:2046
failures, 8:2500	Derbyshire, J. D., 6:2043-2044, 6:2046
in former dictatorships, 3:658-659	Deregulation, 3:633-636
future of, 3: 626–627	administrative, 3:633
of global governance, 2:579–581	aims, 3:633, 3:635
globalization and, 4:978	definition, 3:633
international organizations and, 4:1257	economic, 3:633
liberal party roles, 5:1428	empirical research, 3:634–635
by military regimes, 5:1576	financial, 5:1489
modernization theory of, 2:575, 3:625, 3:645	historical perspective, 3:634
monarchs and, 5:1616–1617	motives, 7:2257
nation building, 5:1647	social, 3: 633
obstacles, 3:602–603, 3:625	theories, 3:634
party roles, 2: 353–354	See also Regulation
party system development, 6:1828	Derrida, Jacques, 6:1879, 6:1996–1997, 6:2030, 7:2096,
political culture and, 6: 1976	7:2097, 8:2550
political sociology, 6:2034, 6:2037	Descartes, René, 6:2056
in post-Cold War period, 2:351	Détente, 3:636–639
of postcommunist regimes, 7:2092	agreements, 3:637
power relations, 8:2662	commercial ties, 3:638
preconditions, 3:602, 8:2662	definition, 3:636
rule of law, 7:2 337	domestic politics and, 3:638
social movements and, 8:2438–2439	end of, 3:638
spread to new regions, 3:626–627, 5:1441	in Europe, 3: 637
theories, 3:602	realist view, 7:2219
trade liberalization and, 8:2638	strategic studies and, 8:2545
waves, 5:1441, 6:1771–1772, 6:2034	summits, 3:637
See also Democratic consolidation; Transitions	U.S. policies, 2:431, 3:636–638
Demographics	See also Cold War
election research, 3:725	Deterrence
of electoral turnout, 3:757, 6:1782	credible commitment, 2:486–487
of public employees, 7:2285–2288	nuclear, 2:448, 7:2221, 8:2543, 8:2544
See also Aging; Migration	realist view, 7:2221
Demonstrations. See Participation, contentious	See also Arms races
Deng Xiaoping, 5:1483, 5:1500–1501	Deterritorialization, 8:2590
Denmark	Deutsch, Karl W., 5:1646, 6:1960–1961, 6:1976, 6:2059
church–state relationship, 1:235	8:2711
civil service, 6: 2068	Developing world
constitution, 1:235	civil services, 3:648
militia, 5:1579	concept, 3:639, 3:640–641
neo-corporatism, 5:1669, 5:1671	corruption, 8:2586–2587
parties, 6: 1797, 6: 1798	democratic consolidation, 3:618–619
See also Scandinavia	dictatorships, 3:654–655
Dec 4150 Scattuinavia	dictatorships, 3.037-033

diversity, 3:639, 3:641	definition, 3:650
economic growth, 3:629, 3:632	evolution of concept, 3:651
economic inequality, 4:977–978, 7:2224	examples, 3:651
environmental security, 3:786	future perspectives, 3:652–653
ethnic conflicts, 3:830–831	Jewish, 3:651, 5:1364, 8:2766
IMF lending, 4:1246	networks, 3:651–652
import substitution industrialization, 7:2147, 8:2637	political significance, 3:651–652
military rule, 3:645, 5:1573–1574, 5:1575,	relations with original location, 3:652–653
5:1576, 5:1577	typologies, 3:651
neo-patrimonialism, 5:1681	See also Migration
new democracies, 2:363, 3:655	Dickinson, G. Lowes, 4:1278
poverty, 3:640, 4:977–978, 6:1846	Dictatorships, 3:653–659
print media, 5:1544	appeasement, 7:2365, 7:2366
public administration, 3:648–650	authoritarian, 3:655, 3:656
quality of life indicators, 4: 977	breakdowns, 1:159-160, 3:655, 3:657-659
revolutions, 7:2314–2315, 7:2316	causes, 3: 656–657, 6: 2059
social exclusion, 8:2430-2431	communist, 3:654, 3:655, 3:656, 3:657
socialism, 8:2453, 8:2457	conservative, 3:656
sweatshops, 5:1643	counterrevolutionary, 3:656
tax policies, 8:2587–2588	current, 3:655, 3:657
trade, 3:629, 8:2637	definition, 3:653
wars, 8:2728	establishing, 3:657
See also Dependency theory; Foreign aid and development	fascist, 3:654, 3:888, 3:889
Developing world and international relations, 3:639-644	history, 3:653–655
as actors, 3:640–641	ideological, 3:656
alliances, 3:641, 3:643	legitimacy, 3:657, 5:1421
Bandung conference, 3:641	military, 1:160, 3:654, 3:655, 3:656, 5:1421
decolonization, 3:641, 3:643, 3:644, 3:654–655, 3:666	modernizing, 3:656
diplomatic services, 3:666–667	party, 3: 655, 5: 1573
international law, 4:1241–1242	party linkage, 6: 1813–1814
Non-Aligned Movement, 3:641, 3:667	personalistic, 3:655
North-South cleavage and, 3:639, 3:641	pragmatic, 3:656
powerlessness, 3:640	repression of enemies, 3:657
science of international relations, 3:641–642	stability, 8:2477–2478
theories, 3:642–644	totalitarian, 3:655–656
United Nations and, 8:2681–2683	typologies, 3:655–656
Development, political, 3:644–648	weaknesses, 3:658
political economy of, 6:1983–1984	See also Authoritarian regimes; Totalitarian regimes
political integration and, 6:1987	Diderot, Denis, 7:2333
themes, 3:646–647	Difference-in-difference research designs, 5:1562
See also Dependency theory; Modernization theory	Dilthey, Wilhelm, 4:1073–1074, 7:2081
Development, sustainable. See Sustainable development	Diminished subtypes, 2:378–379
Development administration, 3:648–650	Diop, Cheik Anta, 1:40
definition, 3:648	Diplomacy, 3:659–669
demise, 3:650	adaptation and change, 3:668–669
history, 3:648	ambassadors, 3:663, 3:665, 3:666
theoretical approaches, 3:648–650	contemporary trends, 3:667–668
Development assistance, 3:911 See also Foreign aid and development; Official	critiques of, 3:665
development assistance	definition, 3:659
Developmental state, 4:1265	emergence and development, 3:661–666 mediation, 5:1545–1548
Dewey, John, 3:828, 4:1055, 4:1092, 4:1093, 5:1691,	modern, 3:663–665
6:1867, 6:1941, 6:1950	multilateral, 3:664, 3:665–667, 4:1011, 5:1632–1633
DI. See Discursive institutionalism	principles, 3:663
Di Palma, Guiseppe, 3:690	processes, 3:659, 3:660, 3:661–662
Diamond, Larry, 1:112, 1:113, 2:351, 3:625, 6:1851	public, 3:667–668, 4:1269
Diasporas, 3:650–653	realist view, 7:2218–2219
African, 1:40, 3:651	recruitment and training, 3:664
contemporary, 3:652–653	theoretical approaches, 3:660–661
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	

in twentieth century, 3:665–667	against minority groups, 3:680–682, 5:1662, 6:1871–1872
See also Foreign policy	multiple, 4: 963
Diplomatic history, 3:660, 3:662–667	persistence, 8:2626
Direct democracy. See Democracy, direct	religious, 5:1572, 5:1630, 8:2625
Disarmament, 3:669–672	social dominance orientation, 8:2426
agreements, 3:670–671	structural, 3:682
definition, 3:669	types, 3:681–682
distinction from arms control, 3:670	unequal opportunities, 3:813–814
general and complete, 3:670	See also Human rights; Racism; Social exclusion;
nuclear, 3:670, 8:2544	Tolerance
public involvement, 3:671–672	Discursive institutionalism (DI), 3:683–686
unilateral and multilateral, 3:671	approaches, 3:683
Discipline of political science. See Political science	areas of investigation, 3:683–684
Discontent. See Dissatisfaction, political	background abilities, 4:1194
Discourse analysis, 3:672–677	definition, 3:683
aims, 3:672, 6:1881	deliberative democracy, 4:1197–1198, 6:1779–1780
critical, 3:674–675, 6:1883	endogenizing change, 4:1195–1198
definition, 3:672	historical institutionalism and, 3:684–685, 4:1193–1194,
foreign policy, 5:1652	4:1196
narratives, 3:676, 3:686	institutional context, 3:683, 3:684, 4:1188
in political science, 3:673, 3:675–676, 4:1195, 6:1880	interactive discourse, 4:1195–1196
power as topic, 6:2030	logics of communication, 4:1188, 4:1196
varieties, 3:673–675	methods, 3:685
See also Discursive institutionalism; Discursive policy	rational choice and, 4:1190–1192, 4:1196–1197
analysis	sociological institutionalism and, 3:684, 4:1194, 4:1195,
Discourse theory, 3:674, 4:1072, 4:1136, 6:1884	4:1196
Discourses	See also Discourse analysis; Neo-institutionalism
definition, 6:1881	Discursive policy analysis, 3:686–688, 6:1880,
meanings, 3:686, 3:687	6:1881–1884, 6:1898
nationalist, 7:2089	Dissatisfaction, political, 3:688-691
Discrete random variables, 8:2698–2699	consequences, 3:690
Discretion, 3:677–679	definition, 3:688–689
applications, 3:678–679	under dictatorships, 3:658
debates on, 3:677–678	evolution of concept, 3:689–690
definition, 3:677	measurement, 3:690–691
judicial, 5:1376, 5:1387	system support model, 3:689
justice and, 3:677	Distributive justice, 3:810–812, 6:1721–1722, 6:1732
limiting, 3:677, 3:678, 3:679	Distrust. See Trust
limits, 5:1381–1382	Divided government, 2:360, 7:2123, 7:2125, 7:2146
nature of, 3: 678	Division of labor
politicization and, 6:2064	classes, 8:2508
of regulatory agencies, 3:678–679, 5:1413	Durkheim on, 1:272, 2:460–461, 3:697, 3:930
sharing, 3:679	industrialization and, 5:1501
of street-level bureaucrats, 1:178, 3:677, 3:678, 3:679,	international, 3:632
4:1158, 4:1162	social, 1:liv
zone of, 2:549	social consequences, 5:1501
Discriminant analysis/classification. See Categorical	Dobrynin, Anatoly, 3:636, 3:637
response data	Doelen, Frans van der, 6:1929
Discrimination, 3:680–683	Domain consensus, 2:402, 2:404
anti-Semitism, 3:889, 3:890, 3:895, 8:2765	Domestic politics and international relations, 3:691-696
contingency of, 3:681	as black box, 3:692
definitions, 3:680–681	constructivism, 3:694–695
in developing countries, 4: 1110	current trends, 3: 691, 3: 696
explanations, 3:682	definition, 3:691–692
formal charges, 7:2287	history of study of, 3:692–693
forms, 3: 680	neoclassical realism, 3:695-696
institutional, 3:681	rationalism, 3:693-694
international convention on, 4:1110, 8:2627	Domhoff, G. William, 3:766, 3:767, 6:1956,
migration and, 5:1572	6: 2027, 6: 2028

Dominant authoritarian parties, 6:1742, 6:1743	on semipresidentialism, 3:864, 8:2400-2401
Dominant-party systems. See One-party dominance	on single-party regimes, 1:110
Domino theory, 7:2365–2366	on voting behavior, 3:710
Doppelt, Jack, 6:2005	Dworkin, Ronald, 3:678, 7:2321, 7:2322, 7:2337
Dorn, Harold, 1:208	Dye, T. R., 7:2104-2105
Dos Santos, Theotonio, 3:629	• • •
Douglas, James, 1:119–120	East Timor, 5:1662
Douglas, Mary, 7:2163, 7:2324	Eastern Europe
Downs, Anthony	Christian Democratic parties, 1:227
on bureaucracy, 7:2270	communist parties, 2:312, 2:318, 2:320, 2:325
economic theory of democracy, 6:2055, 6:2057	constitutional reforms, 2:353
influence, 3:727	democratic regimes, 1:114
issue attention cycle, 3:781	democratization, 3:659, 8:2660
median voter theorem, 6:1981-1982, 8:2716	EU members, 3:843–844, 7:2092, 8:2660
political competition model, 2:360, 3:710, 3:727,	liberal parties, 5:1428
6:1981–1982	market economies, 8:2660
rational choice theory, 2:345, 4:1096, 6:2032, 6:2059	media, 5:1543
spatial models, 8:2716	multiculturalism, 5:1630
voting behavior model, 3:710, 3:874, 6:1722, 6:2032,	national identities, 4:1138, 4:1139, 8:2396
8:2475	nationalism, 5:1662
Doyle, Michael, 5:1435, 5:1436, 7:2122	nation-states, 5:1659
Dresher, Melvin, 7:2131	NATO members, 7:2092
Dreyfus Affair, 4:1208, 7:2311	Soviet relations with, 2:325, 3:624, 3:637
Drezner, Daniel, 7:2353	state formation, 8:2510
Drost, Pieter, 4:967	Warsaw Pact, 8:2458
Dryzek, John, 1:49, 6:1880	See also Communist systems; Postcommunist regimes; and
Du Bois, W. E. B., 1:40, 7:2197	individual countries
Dual-power government, 6:2047–2048, 7:2123	Easton, David
See also Semipresidentialism	on attitude consistency, 1:93-94
Dummy variables, 5:1527	on behavioralism, 1:138, 6:2059
Duncan, Otis Dudley, 8:2526, 8:2537	interest intermediation model, 6:1873
Dunn, John, 6:1726, 6:1732	on political science, 4:1094
Duration analysis. See Event history analysis	on political support, 8:2563, 8:2564
Durkheim, Émile, 3:696–699	on political systems, 8:2582
on anomia, 1:81–82	politics definition, 6:2058
on attitude formation, 1:97	on power, 7:2101
on classes, 1:272	on regimes, 7:2233
on democracy, 3:699	on stability, 8:2478
on division of labor, 1:272, 2:460-461, 3:697, 3:930	system support model, 3:689
functional analysis, 3:929-930	systems theory, 6:2045, 6:2049, 6:2058
on history, 4: 1082	Ebenstein, William, 6:2017
on institutions, 3:698–699	EBP. See Evidence-based policy
on morality, 3:824	ECJ. See European Court of Justice
on politics, 1:liv, 3:697–698, 3:699	Eckstein, Harry, 1:159, 6:1849
on rituals, 7:2326	Ecological fallacy, 5:1563
on sanctions, 3:698	Ecological inference. See Inference, ecological
on social cohesion, 8:2420	Ecology. See Environmental issues
on social order, 3: 696–697	Economic development levels
on solidarity, 1:liv, 3:697, 5:1320, 6:1986, 8:2421, 8:2465	of democracies, 2:352–353, 3:626
on suicide, 1:54, 1:82	democratic consolidation and, 3:618-619
works of, 1:81–82, 3:696, 3:698	democratization and, 3:624-625, 3:645, 6:2025
Dutch East India Company, 5:1641–1642	governance and, 2:352–353
Duverger, Maurice	industrialization, 3:702
on electoral system effects (Duverger's law), 3:710,	information technology contributions, 3:702-703
6: 1983, 6: 2042, 8: 2712, 8: 2713, 8: 2715	measurement, 3:639
legal constitutionalism, 4:1037	political system types, 6:2043–2044
on oligarchy, 6: 1740	regulatory quality and, 3:635
on parties, 6:1791, 6:1794, 6:1800, 6:1801, 6:1820-1821	resource degradation, 5:1667
on political families, 1:226	social capital and, 6:1974-1975

social trust and, 8:2673	Economic transformation. See Transformation, economic
violence levels and, 8:2710	ECOSOC. See United Nations Economic and Social Council
See also Developing world; Foreign aid and development;	ECPR. See European Consortium for Political Research
Modernization theory; Sustainable development	ECSC. See European Coal and Steel Community
Economic grievances, civil wars caused by, 1:265–267	EDA. See Data analysis, exploratory
Economic growth	Edelman, Murray, 6:1930, 6:1961, 8:2578
in developing world, 3:629 , 3:632	Edgeworth, Francis, 1:134
environmental policy and, 3:778, 3:781	Edkins, Jenny, 4:1079
globalization and, 4:977	Education
regulation and, 3:635	civic, 1:252
tax policy and, 8:2586–2587	in civil services, 1:257
trade and, 4: 977	economic opportunities, 3:829
Economic history, 4:1266	of elites, 3:767–768
Economic inequality. See Inequality, economic	evaluation research, 3:852
Economic integration, 4: 972, 4: 973–974, 4: 977,	government levels involved, 5:1467
6:1986, 8:2496	ideology in, 4:1144
Economic policy, 3:701–706	Islamic, 5:1432
autarky, 6: 1719	migration and, 3:829
central planning, 2:311, 2:322–323	political, 6:2020–2021, 6:2058
convergence among states, 4:979–980	Edwards, Allen, 5:1523
coordination mechanisms, 3:703–704	EFA. See Exploratory factor analysis
definition, 3:701	Effectiveness, bureaucratic, 3:713–716
information technology revolution, 3:702–703	of career civil services, 1:258
internationalization, 3:701–702, 3:703–704	definition, 3:713–714
Keynesian, 3:704–705, 6:1887, 7:2133, 8:2453,	innovation, 3:715
8:2455, 8:2658	metrics, 3:715–716
monetarist, 3:705, 8:2659	varieties, 3:713–715
national control, 4:979	Efficacy, political, 3:716–719
policy networks, 6:1938	civic culture and, 3:718–719
of socialist parties, 8:2455–2456	definition, 3:716
state role, 8:2509–2510	development of concept, 3:716–718
statism, 8:2514	importance, 1:59
trends, 3:703–706	internal and external, 3:717
unilateralism, 8:2676	measurement, 3:717–718
Washington Consensus, 2:382, 2:403–404, 3:634,	participation and, 3:718
4:1246, 5:1440, 5:1678	research on, 3:718–719
See also Monetary policy; Neoliberalism; Policy,	Efficient institutions, 1:223–224
employment; Policy instruments; Tax policy;	Egalitarianism
Welfare policies	comparative, 3:815
Economic sanctions. See Sanctions	social cohesion and, 8:2422
Economic statecraft, 3:706–708	utilitarian, 3:811
definition, 3:706	See also Distributive justice; Equality
foreign policy goals, 3:706–707	Egypt
forms, 3:706	history, 6: 1753
history, 3: 706, 3: 707	Islamist movements, 5:1354–1356
See also Monetary relations; Sanctions	Mubarak's downfall, 3:604, 3:657, 3:941, 5:1662
Economic theories of politics, 3:708–713	Six-Day War, 7:2121, 7:2149
democracy, 6:1983–1984, 6:2055, 6:2059	Suez Crisis, 5:1620, 8:2652
in international relations, 3:711–712	See also Muslim Brotherhood
public goods provision, 7:2158–2160	Ehrlich, Carol, 1:77
public office rewards, 7:2163	Eichengreen, Barry, 1:216, 1:217, 5:1619
voting behavior, 3:710, 3:727, 8:2475	Eisenhower, Dwight D., 2:431, 4:1059, 7:2104
See also Game theory; Political economy;	Ekman, Paul, 6: 2006
Rational choice	Elazar, Daniel, 3:897
Economic theory	Elder, Charles, 4:1001
neoclassical, 2:345, 5:1618, 7:2225	Eldersveld, Sam, 6:1803
neoliberal, 3:632–633, 3:634, 5:1676, 5:1678,	Election by lot, 3:719–722
8:2659–2660	advantages, 3:720
See also Liberal economic theory	current uses, 3:721

definition, 3:719	information of voters, 3:711
historical examples, 3:719, 3:720-721	laboratory experiments, 3:873-874
Election observation, 3:722–725	media influences, 5:1538, 7:2167
definition, 3:722	Ostrogorski paradox, 2:575
functions, 3:722, 3:723	political economy of, 6:1980-1981
historical origins, 3:722–723	psychology of, 6: 2004–2005
limitations, 3:724	psychosociological approach, 3:738, 3:740–741
purposes, 3:722	rational choice perspective, 3:727, 3:738, 3:741–743,
reports of violence, 3:746	3: 756–757, 6: 2032, 7: 2206
types, 3:723–724	research on, 3:738, 6:1778–1779, 6:1781–1782, 6:2005
Election research, 3:725–730	7:2167–2168
aggregate level, 3:727-728, 3:735-736	social group theory, 3:725–726
data sources, 3:729	sociological approach, 3:738-739
definition, 3:725	spatial models, 8:2475-2476
demographics, 3:725	See also Voting
economic voting, 3:727	Electoral campaigns, 3:743-747
history, 3:725–727	accountability, 1:13–14
issue voting, 3:727, 3:742–743	advertising, 6:1805–1806, 6:1964
Michigan School, 3:726, 3:740	in authoritarian regimes, 1:112–113
multimotivated voting, 3:728-729	candidate-centered, 6:1857–1858, 6:1962, 6:1965
in new democracies, 2:354	codes of conduct, 3:744, 3:746
party identification, 3:726–727	corruption, 2:475, 2:478, 6:1804
statistical techniques, 3:725–726	debates, 6:1858
surveys, 3:725–726, 3:738, 8:2569, 8:2570, 8:2573	definition, 3:743–744
turnout, 3:727, 3:759	effects on voters, 1:99
volatility, 3:735–738	finances, 2:478, 3:745, 3:819, 6:1803, 6:1805–1806
Elections	geographic concerns, 3:748
conflicts over results, 6:1 790	incumbency advantages, 3:745
consequences, 3:729	intimidation and violence, 3:746
fraud prevention, 3:722 , 3:723	lengths, 3:744
free and fair, 7:2235	level playing field, 3:744, 3:745
prediction and forecasting, 7:2116, 7:2117	manifestos, 3:744–745, 6:1814–1816
stakes, 3:758, 3:759	media role, 3:745–746, 6:1964–1965
See also Referenda	methods, 3:744
Elections, primary, 3:730–735	nature of, 3:744
classifying, 3:730–731	negative, 6:1967
consequences, 3:734–735	professionalization, 6:1964–1965
definition, 3:730	security measures, 3:746
in Europe, 6: 1802	Electoral competition, 2: 359–361, 2: 363
expenditures, 6:1804	See also Competition, political
importance, 3:730	Electoral democracy, 3:614, 7:2234–2235
open, 3:731, 3:750	Electoral geography, 3:747–749
voters, 3:731–732	campaigning, 3:748
Elections, volatility, 3:735–738	constituencies, 3:751–752
bloc and intrabloc, 3:736–737	district boundaries, 3:747–748, 3:751–752
definition, 3:737	effects on electoral behavior, 3:747-748
index of, 3: 736, 3: 737–738	electoral systems and, 3:748
turnout variations, 3:757–759	future research, 3:748–749
variations, 3:736, 6:1862	hypothesis, 3:747–749
Electoral accountability. See Accountability, electoral	Electoral systems, 3:749–756
Electoral authoritarianism, 1:108, 1:112–114, 7:2234,	ballot aggregation rules, 3:752–754, 8:2713
7:2235–2236	ballot types, 3:750–751, 8:2417–2418
Electoral behavior, 3:738–743	candidate eligibility, 3:750
attitudes and, 1:96, 1:97–98, 1:99	compulsory voting, 3:759
class differences, 1:84	constituencies, 3:751–752
determinants, 5:1503, 6:1980–1981	effects, 3:749–750, 3:754–756, 6:1983, 8:2417,
economic influences, 6:1980–1981	8:2712–2718
electoral geography and, 3:747–748	geographic influences and, 3:748
experiments, 3:874	majoritarian, 8:2712, 8:2713, 8:2716, 8:2717
	,0:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

multiple rounds, 3:751	transformation, 3:763
for parliaments, 6: 1773	See also Classes, social; Democracy, consociational;
plurality, 3:710, 3:750, 8:2417, 8:2712, 8:2713	Interviews, elite; Oligarchy; Political class; Social
political economy of, 6:1983–1984	stratification
proportional, 6:1983, 6:1984, 8:2417, 8:2712,	Elitism, 3:764–770
8:2713–2714, 8:2716–2717	definition, 3:764–765
rank order count, 8:2417–2418	in democracies, 3:768–769
rules, 3:749	democratic, 2:592
simple, 3:754	theories, 3:765–767
timing, 3: 752	Elliott, William Yandell, 4:1092
typologies, 3:749–754, 6:2042	Elshtain, Jean, 3:909
Electoral turnout, 3:756–759	Elster, Jon, 2:413, 4:1176, 5:1560, 6:1992, 6:2032, 7:2091
definition, 3:756	Embedded systems, 3:755
demographic factors, 3:757, 6:1782	Emergency management. See Crisis management
effects of political communication, 3:870	Emerging markets, 5:1620, 5:1622
European Parliament elections, 3:845	See also Developing world
field experiments, 3:870	Emirbayer, Mustafa, 5:1691
individual-level explanations, 3:757	Emotional intelligence, 6:2005-2007
motivations, 3:757, 6:1782	Emotions, in decision making, 7:2148-2151
rational choice explanations, 3:727, 3:756-757, 7:2206	Empires, 3:770–773
referenda, 2:563–564, 7:2229	administration, 4:1155
research, 3:727, 3:759	contemporary, 3:771–772, 4:1156
stakes of election and, 3:758, 3:759	definition, 3:770
variations, 3:757–759, 6:1782	end of, 7:2290, 8:2508
Electronic media. See Media, electronic	evolution, 3:771–772, 4:1154–1157
Elgie, Robert, 3:864, 4:1039, 8:2400	international relations and, 3:772
Elias, Norbert, 3:825, 3:826, 4:1218, 7:2073	language policies, 7:2070–2071
Elites, 3:759–764	nature of, 3: 770–771
administrative, 3:768	relations among, 4:969
aristocracy, 5:1480, 5:1613, 6:1739, 6:1952, 8:2622	sovereignty, 8:2470
in authoritarian regimes, 3:624	wars, 6: 1759
autonomy, 3:761	wars, 6.1739 world, 8:2758–2759
characteristics, 3:760–761	See also Colonialism; Hegemony; Imperialism
circulation, 3:763, 3:766, 4:1085–1086, 6:2024–2025	Empirical research
in communist systems, 2:316–317, 2:322, 3:762, 3:763,	misspecification problems, 5:1581–1585
8:2458, 8:2459 cultural, 3:759–760	model specification, 5:1595–1602
	theory and, 5:1557, 6:2053–2055 value, 3:793–794
cultural hegemony, 3:820, 3:821, 3:822, 7:2074	
definitions, 3:759, 3:764, 5:1340, 5:1341–1342	See also Hypothesis testing; Methodology;
in democracies, 3:768–769, 6:1870, 6:1956	Research designs
distinction from nonelites, 3:760–761	Employment, public. See Public employment
education, 3:767	Employment policies. See Policy, employment
gender, 3:760–761	Empowerment, 3:773–776
historical sociology approach, 4:1085–1086	of citizens, 3:774, 3:775
irredentism, 5:1347	of clients of government services, 1:179–180
Marxist view, 6:2027	definition, 3:773
masses and, 3:768, 5:1501	media role, 5:1540
party, 3:733–734, 6:1804, 6:1818–1819	in organizations, 3:773
pluralism and, 3:766–767, 3:768, 6:2025	people empowerment framework, 4:1102–1103
political, 3:759, 3:760, 3:764–765, 5:1540, 6:1953–1954,	in public sector, 3:774–775
6:1956	targets, 3:773, 3:774–775
political involvement, 5:1503	of women, 3:904
power, 6:2028, 7:2100, 7:2103–2105	See also Power
scholarship on, 3:760, 3:764, 3:765-767, 3:769	EMU. See European Monetary Union
sizes, 3:759	Endogeneity
socialization and, 3:767	causality and, 5:1565-1566
spatial models of voting, 8:2476	of change, 4:1187-1199
state formation roles, 5:1654	classical, 5:1600
structures and values, 3:761-763	definition, 5:1600

Engagement, political, 6:1780, 6:1784	regulation, 3:780, 3:790, 8:2398
See also Civic engagement	responsibility principle, 6:1733
Engels, Friedrich	risk analysis, 7:2322-2323
Communist Manifesto, 2:310, 2:314-315, 5:1493-1494,	See also Sustainable development
5:1497–1498, 8:2451, 8:2657, 8:2687	Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 7:2129
Marx and, 5:1493, 5:1494, 5:1495	Environmental security
nationalist movements supported, 5:1660	debates, 8:2548
political system typology, 6:2041–2042	definition, 3:782
socialism, 8:2450, 8:2451–2452	evolution of concept, 3:782–783
England. See United Kingdom	foreign policy and, 3:783–785
English school in international relations	security cooperation and, 3:785–787
anarchical society, 1:lvi, 4:1318	Environmental security studies, 3:782–787
criticism of, 4:1319	EPA. See Environmental Protection Agency
establishment, 4:1301	Epistemic communities, 3:787–791
influence, 4:1318–1319	characteristics, 3:788
pluralists, 4:1291	criticism of concept, 3:789
power, 1:152, 1:153	definition, 3:787–788
principles, 4:1291	identifying members, 3:789
scholars included, 4:1315	influence, 3:790
solidarists, 4:1291	international, 4:1013, 4:1273
traditions, 4:1317–1319	research on, 3:788, 3:789–791
See also International society	roles, 3:788–789, 3:790
Enlightenment	Epistemological and methodological foundations
international relations thinking, 4: 1276	3:791–802
political philosophy, 6:1991, 6:1997	bias issues, 3:798–801
racism and, 7:2197	controversies, 7:2083–2084
republics, 7:2290	empiricism, 3: 793–794
Rousseau and, 7:2334	international relations, 4:1295-1296
rule of law, 7:2336	multi-dimensionality, 1:lvi-lvii
socialism and, 8:2448-2449	multilevel analysis, 1:lx-lxi
Enloe, Cynthia, 3:909, 4:1293	ontology and, 3:792-798
Environmental issues, 3:776–779	philosophical underpinnings, 3:792, 6:2056
debates, 3:776-778, 3:781	plastic matter, 1:lvii–lviii
definition, 3:776	positivism, 6:2056, 7:2083–2084
history, 3:776, 3:782–783	rationalism, 3:793, 3:794
internationalization, 3:777	reflective pluralism, 1:lxi
interventions, 3:776	relativism, 8:2605–2606
ozone depletion, 3:777	self-referential aspects, 1:lviii-lix
public interest, 2:330, 3:776, 3:781	systems perspective, 1:lix-lx
sustainable development, 3:780–781, 8:2574–2576	universalism, 8:2604–2605
See also Climate change; Natural resources	views of political world, 3:792–798
Environmental justice, 6:1733	See also Methodology; Political philosophy
Environmental movements, 3:776, 3:781, 4:1052, 8:2438	EPP. See European People's Party (EPP)
See also Green parties; Social movements	Epp, Charles, 5:1367
Environmental policy, 3:779–782	Eppler, Martin, 2:539
	Equality, 3:802–818
agriculture and, 6:1 847–1848	• •
challenges, 3:780–781	in communism, 8:2450
characteristics, 3:780–781	comparative, 3:805
cooperation, 2:448	democratic quality, 2:568
deliberative policy making, 2:551	gender, 3:902, 3:903, 4:963, 8:2641–2642
drivers, 3:781	in "good" democracies, 2:566
economic growth and, 3:778, 3:781	ideal of, 3:802, 3:803, 3:818
European, 3:777, 3:778	impartiality and, 3:816–817
evolution, 2:330, 3:776–777, 3:779–780, 3:781	income, 3:803, 3:805–806, 3:811–812, 8:2478
fragmentation, 3:777	justice and, 3:803, 3:810-812
international regimes, 2:369, 2:448, 3:777, 3:790, 4:1238,	legal, 7:2297
4:1241, 5:1667–1668, 8:2651	liberty and, 3:803, 3:806, 3:812-815
natural resources management, 5:1665-1668	from logic, 3:805, 3:806–810
precautionary principle, 3:777–778, 7:2324, 8:2576	modernity and, 3:804

ontological, 3:803-804	Ethnic cleansing, 4:968, 4:1110
of opportunity, 3:813–814	Ethnic conflicts
rationality, 3:807–808	causes, 8:2725
reasons for, 3:804–806, 3:809–810	civil wars, 1:264, 1:267
responsibility and, 3:814	cross-border, 1:268
in rights, 3:803, 3:812-813	in developing countries, 3:830-831
rule-, 3:804, 3:807	factors in, 3:831
social, 3:817	mobilization, 5:1594
social democratic policies, 8:2424	number of, 8:2724–2725
subversion, 2:570	potential for, 8:2711, 8:2724
Tocqueville on, 8:2621–2622, 8:2623	security dilemma, 7:2391
types, 3:803	state collapse and, 8:2500
universal, 3:805	violent, 2:395, 8:2711
See also Inequality	Ethnic groups
Equality, political, 3:818–823	discrimination against, 6:1871–1872
competing concerns, 3:819–821	exploiting divisions, 3:625
cultural hegemony and, 3:820, 3:821, 3:822	irredentism, 5:1347
definition, 3:818	migrants, 4:1148, 5:1572
in democracies, 3:815-816, 3:818, 3:823, 4:1182	mobilization, 5:1593-1594
formal, 4: 1183	as nations, 4:970, 5:1653, 5:1655, 5:1656, 8:2394
gap between ideal and reality, 3:818-819, 6:1722	parties associated with, 6:1798
ideal of, 3:818	profiling, 3:681
increasing, 4: 1182, 4: 1184	rights, 5:1631
normative political theory, 6: 1715–1716, 6: 1718–1719	self-determination, 8:2394
opposition to increasing, 3:819	in weak states, 8:2500
power resources and, 3:821–823	See also Minorities; Multiculturalism; Pluralism
See also Inequality, political	Ethnic homogeneity, democratic consolidation and,
Equilibria	3:618, 3:625
Nash, 1:91, 4:949–951, 4:954	Ethnic nationalism, 5:1656, 5:1657, 5:1661
subgame-perfect, 4:954–955	Ethnic nations, 4:970, 5:1653, 5:1655, 5:1656, 8:2394
See also Game theory	Ethnicity, 3:828–832
Equivalence functionalism, 3:932	constructivist view, 2:421
Erikson, Erik, 4:1133	economic prosperity and, 3:828–829
ESF. See European Science Foundation	investments in education, 3:829
Esman, Milton, 3:649–650	multiethnic societies, 4:1139, 4:1150, 5:1647, 5:1649
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, 1:273, 2:335, 4:1003, 7:2225,	national identities, 4:1142
8:2743, 8:2748	public goods provision and, 3:829–830
ESS. See European Social Survey	See also Racism
Essentialism, 2:421	Ethno-cultural pluralism, 6:1871–1872
Esser, Hartmut, 1:lx	Ethnographic methods, 3:832–837
Ethics, 3:824–828	added value, 3:834–835
Aristotelian, 3:824, 6:2062	cases, 3:836
consequentialism, 3:824	criticism of, 3:835–836
constructivist view, 3:826–827	definition, 3:832–833
definition, 3:824	future of, 3: 836–837
foreign policy issues, 3:926	history, 3:833
Kantian, 3:824, 3:825	interviewing, 5:1338
perfectionist, 4:1126	nonparticipant observation, 3:832–833
in political science, 3:824	in political science, 3:833–834, 5:1338
in politics, 6:2062 pragmatist views, 3:828	thick description, 7:2193–2194, 8:2602–2607
regime types, 6:2062	See also Case studies; Participant observation Ethnorealism, 3:643
relativism, 3:827, 3:828	Ethnosymbolism, 5:1655
rule of law and, 7:2340–2341 social history, 3:824–826	Etzioni, Amitai, 2:327, 6:1920 Euro (currency), 3:844, 3:846, 5:1620
tension with politics, 3:826	Eurobarometer, 2:504–505, 6:1778, 6:1971, 7:2094
universalism, 3:824, 3:827	Eurocommunism, 2:312, 2:318
utilitarianism, 3:824, 3:825	Europe Europe
See also Normative political theory	halance of power 1.130–131

church-state relationships, 1:235-236	political integration, 6: 1987
collective diplomacy, 4:1011, 5:1632	public opinion, 2:505
communist parties, 2:312, 2:313, 2:317, 2:318,	soft law, 8:2463
6: 1796–1797	sovereignty issues, 2:356–357
debt crises, 4:1247	study of, 2:350-351, 4:1021-1022, 7:2245
dictatorships, 3:654, 3:658	subsidiarity principle, 7:2107–2108
human rights organizations, 8:2461	tax policies, 8:2586
immigration policies, 5:1571–1572	theories, 7:2240–2241
imperialism, 2:302, 2:303–304, 3:771, 4:1154–1156	transatlantic relations and, 8:2652
international law and, 4:1242–1243	welfare states and, 8:2749–2750
multiculturalism, 5:1630–1631	See also Regional integration
nationalism, 5:1654–1655, 5:1656, 5:1661–1662	European Monetary System, 1:218, 3:702
nation-states, 3:843, 5:1647–1648, 5:1654–1655	European Monetary Union (EMU), 1:218, 4:1019, 5:1620, 8:2749
populist movements, 7:2076–2077	
public administration tradition, 1:25	European Parliament, 1:21, 1:30, 1:50, 3:845
regionalization, 1:125	European People's Party (EPP), 1:230, 2:413
state formation, 8:2508–2510	European Police Office (EUROPOL), 7:2382–2383
See also Eastern Europe; Transatlantic relations; and	European Policy Centre, 8:2609
individual countries	European Science Foundation (ESF), 2:504, 2:506
Europe as an international actor, 3:837–842	European Social Survey (ESS), 2:504, 2:506, 6:1778, 6:1780
advantages, 3:839	European Union (EU)
common values and interests, 3:837-839, 3:846-847	blame shifting, 2:569–570
crisis management, 3:840–841	common foreign and security policy, 3:838, 3:839, 3:846,
influence, 3:845–846	3: 847, 7: 2376
meaning of phrase, 3:837	common security and defense policy, 3:838, 3:839,
military actions, 3:840, 3:846	3: 840–841, 7: 2376
multilateralism, 3:840-841, 3:846	conditionality in foreign aid, 2:383-384
in practice, 3:839-842, 3:846-847	cross-national surveys, 2:504–505
security policy, 3:838, 3:839, 3:840	decision making processes, 2:404, 3:844-845, 4:1022,
strategies, 3:839-840	4:1253, 5:1362, 5:1424
supporters, 3:837	democratic deficit, 1:85, 2:579-580, 3:845, 4:978, 5:1424
United Nations and, 3:840–841	development assistance, 3:912
European Central Bank, 1:218, 1:219	economic policies, 3:701, 3:704, 3:841
European Citizens' Initiative, Lisbon Treaty, 2:562	employment policy, 8:2430
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 3:842	enlargement, 2:353, 2:383, 3:843–844, 4:1025, 5:1697,
European Commission, 1:21, 1:50, 2:504–505, 3:843,	7:2092, 8:2660
3:844–845, 8:2430	environmental policies, 3:777, 3:778
European Confederation of Political Science Associations,	federalism, 3:899
6:2018	foreign policy, 5:1635, 5:1636
European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR),	Human Rights Commission, 4:1111
4:1105, 6:2018	informal governance, 4:1019, 4:1020
European Court of Human Rights, 4:1109, 5:1374, 7:2342	interest groups, 1:28, 1:29, 1:30, 4:1228
European Court of Justice (ECJ), 5:1368, 5:1374,	interinstitutional accountability, 1:20–21
7:2107–2108, 7:2241, 7:2342	as international actor, 3:837–842, 3:846–847
European integration, 3:842–848	Lisbon Treaty, 2:562, 3:838, 3:841, 3:842, 3:847
challenges, 3:844–845	lobbying, 4:1226
deepening and widening, 3:843-844, 8:2660	Maastricht Treaty, 1:125, 1:218, 2:350, 2:383, 4:1231,
definition, 3:842	5:1329, 7:2238, 8:2749
domestic adaptations, 3:848–850, 8:2749–2750	member states, 3:843
economic, 3:841, 8:2749	multilevel governance, 1:126, 4:1021, 4:1022, 4:1023
future of, 3: 847, 7: 2243	national identities, 4:1141, 4:1142
goals, 3:843	Neighborhood Policy, 2:383
history, 3:842, 3:843, 7:2241, 7:2245	Nice treaty, 3:838
intergovernmentalism, 4:1230-1231, 4:1232, 7:2242	ombudsperson, 1:20–21
judicial institutions, 5:1368, 5:1374, 7:2107–2108,	peacekeeping missions, 8:2729
7:2241, 7:2342	as political system, 2:350–351
legal norms, 7:2342	presidency, 3:841
monetary, 1:218, 3:844, 3:846, 5:1620, 8:2749	research funding, 1:lxv
neutral states and, 5:1697	Schengen area, 4:1146, 4:1150

Single European Act, 5:1329, 8:2749	legislative scrutiny, 1:6, 6:1772, 6:1773
social cohesion policies, 8:2421	national, 3:863–867
social exclusion discourse, 8:2429–2430, 8:2746 soft law, 8:2463	in parliamentary systems, 3:865 , 3:867 , 6:1766 , 6:1767 6:1772–1773
trade agreements, 3:841, 5:1330	political appointees, 6:2064, 6:2065, 6:2066-2067
trade policies, 3:841-842, 3:846	powers, 3:865–868, 6:1858
See also European integration European Values Studies (EVS), 2:505–506, 6:1778, 6:1971	in presidential systems, 1:18–19, 3:864–865, 3:866–867 6:2046–2047
Europeanization of policy, 3:848–850	in semipresidential systems, 3:864, 3:865
horizontal and vertical mechanisms, 3:848–849	structure and composition, 3:864–865
meanings, 2:356–357, 3:848	See also Agencies; Bureaucracy; Cabinets; Civil services;
as outcome, 3:848–849	Presidents; Prime ministers; Separation of powers
as process, 3:849–850	Expatriate communities, 3:651, 3:652–653
study of, 7:2242–2243	Experimental psychology, 5:1534–1535
EUROPOL. See European Police Office	Experiments
Evaluation	average treatment effect, 1:207
monitoring and, 5:1624	causation, 1:207
of public budgeting, 7:2154	designs, 8:2527
See also Normative political theory; Performance	instrumental-variables analysis, 8:2701-2703
management	methodologies, 3:794
Evaluation research, 3:850-853	in political science, 2:342, 5:1560-1562, 8:2527-2528
approaches, 3:850–852	program evaluations, 6:1914–1915
definition, 3:850	quasi-, 5:1561–1562, 6:1915
on social programs, 4:1157–1158	random assignment, 8:2698, 8:2701
use of results, 3:852	in social sciences, 3:868, 5:1601–1602
See also Policy evaluation	Experiments, field, 3:868–872
Event counts, 3:853–855	compared to lab experiments, 3:868-869, 3:871
definition, 3:853	definition, 3:868–869
models, 3:853–855	in political science, 3:869–871, 5:1561
Event history analysis, 3:855–860	program evaluations, 6: 1915
advantages, 3:856–857	realism, 3:869
concepts, 3:857	survey research, 5:1559
data, 3:853, 3:856–857, 3:858	types, 3:869
definition, 3:855	validity, 5:1561
diagnostics, 3:859 discrete and continuous time approaches, 3:858	weaknesses, 3:871–872 Experiments, laboratory, 3:872–875
extensions, 3:859–860	advantages, 3:872–873, 3:874–875
nonparametric models, 3:858	compared to field experiments, 3:868–869, 3:871
parametric models, 3:857–858	definition, 3:872
repeated events, 3:859	designs, 3:873
spatial dependence, 3:860	monetary incentives, 3:873
unobserved heterogeneity, 3:859–860	in political science, 3:872–874, 5:1561
use in political science, 3:856	validity, 1:150, 3:874, 5:1561
Evidence-based policy (EBP), 3:860-863	Experiments, natural, 3:875–879
challenges, 3:861-862	advantages, 8:2540
definition, 3:860	compared to other methods, 3:875, 3:876
development of concept, 3:860, 3:861	data analysis, 3:877-878
Evolutionary theory, 1:149, 1:150, 1:151, 7:2197	definition, 3:875
EVS. See European Values Studies	on electoral rules, 3:755
Exchange rates, 3:701, 4:973, 5:1619, 5:1621, 5:1622	evaluating, 3:877–878
See also Currencies; Monetary relations	random assignment, 3:875, 3:876, 3:877,
Executive, 3:863–868	3: 878, 5: 1562
in consociational democracies, 2:555	statistical analysis, 8:2527-2528
coordination, 2:449-457, 3:866, 4:1161, 7:2215	uses, 3:875-877, 5:1561-1562, 8:2529, 8:2538
definition, 3:863	Experts
dual-power government, 6:2047-2048, 7:2123	definition, 5:1343
evolution, 3:863–864	policy making roles, 6:1881
functions, 3:866	professionals, 8:2397-2398
legislative process and, 6:1772	See also Interviews, expert

Exploratory data analysis (EDA). See Data analysis, exploratory	differences among, 3: 888 European, 3: 887–888, 3: 890–895, 6: 1797–1798
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA), 3:881-882, 3:884,	evolution, 3:893
5:1524	examples, 3:887–888
Exports. See International trade Exports Side 2,482 5,1487 5,1489 1491 5,1492 7,2159	leaders, 3 :889, 3 :890, 3 :893 marginal, 3 :893–894
Externalities, 2:483, 5:1487, 5:1489–1491, 5:1492, 7:2159, 7:2160	membership, 3:889, 3:892-893, 3:894-895
Extreme center, 6: 1794–1795, 6: 1797, 6: 1799, 7: 2200	paths to power, 3:889
Extremists, 6:1744, 7:2200–2201	Post-World War II, 3:892, 6:1797-1798
See also Radical attitudes	Fauconnet, Paul, 3:824
Eysenck, Hans Jürgen, 7:2201	Fayol. Henri, 1:26 , 6: 1747
	FCC. See Federal Communications Commission
FA. See Factor analysis	Fearon, James D., 3:711
Fabbrini, Sergio, 2:350, 2:351	Feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), 5:1584-1585
Fabian Society, 6:1868–1869, 8:2607	Feasible weighted least squares (FWLS), 8:2740
Factor analysis (FA), 3:881–885	Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 2:549
confirmatory, 3:881, 3:882–884, 5:1524, 8:2554	Federal Reserve, U.S., 1:20, 1:218–219, 6:1934
definition, 3:881	Federalism, 3:895–900
exploratory, 3:881–882, 3:884, 5:1524	accountability and, 1:2, 1:4, 1:20
goals, 5:1524	contemporary applications, 3:895, 3:900
scaling methods, 7:2357, 7:2358	decentralization, 2:546–547
See also Structural equation modeling	defining principles and characteristics, 3:896
Failed states. See State collapse; State failure	definition, 3:895
Failing states, 8:2503–2504	in Europe, 3:897–899
Fair division, 3:885–887	evolution of concept, 3:895–896, 3:900
applications, 3:887	German, 1:20, 5:1361
criteria, 3:885–886	integral, 3:899–900
definition, 3:885	international relations, 1:127
procedures, 3:885, 3:886–887	joint-decision trap, 5:1361–1363
Fairclough, Norman, 3:674, 3:676, 3:687, 6:1883	legislatures, 8:2720
Fairness, 3:827, 6:1724, 7:2223, 7:2224, 7:2322	minority nationalism and, 1:128
Faletto, Enzo, 3:630	peace preserved, 6:1759
Falkland Islands, 3:622, 5:1346–1347, 7:2301	public employment and, 7:2156
Families	quasi-, 5:1464
trust in, 8:2414	subnational autonomy and, 1:124, 1:127
welfare policies, 8:2744	theories, 3:896–898, 3:900
Family resemblances, 2:377–378	in U.S. Constitution, 3:896
Fanon, Frantz, 1:40, 1:41	Federalist Papers, 3:711, 3:896, 4:1088, 5:1430,
Farmers, 6:1848	6:2052–2053, 7:2123, 7:2278, 7:2289, 7:2336–2337
See also Agriculture; Peasants	8:2404, 8:2405, 8:2406
Fascism, 3:887–890	Femia, Joseph, 5:1501
Catholic Church and, 1:228, 3:893, 3:894	Feminism, 3:900–906
corporativism and, 2:462	anarchism and, 1:74, 1:77
definition, 3:887	citizenship, 1:241
dictatorships, 3:654, 3:888, 3:889	critique of liberalism, 1:241, 8:2626
factors in rise, 3:888, 3:891–892	critique of science, 4:962
ideology, 3:888–889, 7:2200	democracy theories, 2:576–577
influence on political scientists, 1:137	liberal, 3:903
legacy, 3:891	in political science, 3:903–905, 4:964
legitimacy of regimes, 5:1421, 5:1422	popular culture, 7:2075
mass mobilization, 3:889–890	postcolonial, 7:2087–2088
militias, 3:888, 8:2628	poststructuralism, 3:904
nature of, 3:890	radical, 3:903–904
statism, 8:2514	research agenda, 3:905
totalitarianism, 3:890, 8:2628, 8:2631	in twentieth century, 3:900–903 , 3:906 , 3:907–908
World War I and, 3:888, 3:891	welfare policies, 8:2743
See also Italian fascism	See also Gender
Fascist movements, 3:890–895	Feminist movements, 3:906–908
changes, 3: 893	definition, 3:906

demands, 8:2436, 8:2437	Firms, capitalist, 1:188–189, 1:190–191
successes, 3:908	See also Multinational corporations
transnational, 3:906	First Amendment, U.S. Constitution, 1:236, 3:825,
waves, 1:77, 3:907	6:1720, 6:1721
See also Social movements	First International, 2:315, 5:1321, 8:2450, 8:2451, 8:2454
Feminist theory in international relations, 3:908–911	FISA. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
critiques by, 3:909–910	Fiscal policy, 1:165, 1:216, 7:2223
formalization, 3:909	See also Public budgeting; Tax policy
gendered social relations, 4:1293	Fischer, F., 6:1881
international political economy, 4:1264	Fishbein, Martin, 1:93, 1:94–95, 1:144
methodologies, 3:910–911	Fisher, R. A., 4:1117, 5:1509–1510, 8:2521, 8:2522
positive peace, 7:2079	Fisher test of significance, 4:1116, 4:1117–1118,
postcolonial perspective, 3:904–905	4:1120, 8:2522
postmodernism and, 7:2097	Fishkin, James, 7:2171
security studies, 3:909, 3:910, 8:2551	Flinders, Matthew, 4:997
Fenno, Richard, 6:1774	Flood, Merrill, 7:2131
Ferejohn, John, 1:52, 6:2059, 6:2061, 7:2153, 7:2203	Florence
Festinger, Leo, 1:85, 1:94	monarchy, 6: 2061
Feudalism, 7:2132–2133, 8:2753	parties, 6: 1793, 6: 1794
FGLS. See Feasible generalized least squares	republic, 7:2289
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 4:1126, 5:1401	FOIA. See Freedom of Information Act
Field experiments. See Experiments, field	Follett, Mary Parker, 4:1092
Fieldwork, 3:832, 3:834–835	Food security, 6:1846
See also Ethnographic methods; Participant observation	Food sovereignty, 6:1846 , 6:1847
Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution, 7:2138	Ford, Gerald, 3:638, 4:1212
Filmer, Robert, 5:1614	Ford Foundation, 3:648
Finance, political, 3:745, 3:819, 6:1803, 6:1805–1806	Forecasting. See Prediction and forecasting
See also Party finance	Foreign aid and development, 3:911-916
Finances, public. See Public budgeting; Tax policy	allocation, 3:914, 3:915–916
Financial crises	donor motives, 3:914
Asian, 4:980, 4:1246, 5:1621, 7:2240, 8:2498	evaluations, 3:913–915
contagion, 4:980	goals, 3:913
debt crises, 1:219, 4:1246, 4:1247	history, 3: 912–913
factors in, 5:1491–1492	impact, 3:914-915, 3:916
global (2008), 3:703, 3:705, 4:1244, 4:1246–1247,	mechanisms, 3:913
5:1621, 5:1673, 6 :1934	multilateral channels, 3:912, 3:913
increase in, 5:1620	sanctions for human rights violations, 4:1111-1112
management of, 5:1621	structural adjustment programs, 8:2660
prevention efforts, 4:1247	theoretical context, 3:912, 3:913-914
as security threat, 7:2379	UN targets, 3:914, 5:1636
Financial markets	war prevention, 6:1839
deregulation, 5:1489	See also Official development assistance
global architecture, 5:1619-1621, 5:1622-1623	Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 2:329
globalization, 1:219, 4:1246, 5:1619-1621, 8:2749	Foreign investment
liberalization, 1:219	attracting, 6:1713
regulation, 3:706, 5:1491	political risk analysis, 6:2010-2013, 7:2323
Finer, Herman, 1:3	regulations, 5:1642
Finer, Samuel E., 4:1083, 4:1114, 5:1458,	trade and, 5:1331
6: 2041, 6: 2043	See also Multinational corporations
Finland	Foreign policy
neo-corporatism, 5:1669, 5:1671	analogies, 7:2367
neutrality policy, 5:1697	analysis of, 3: 916–917
parties, 2:318, 6:1797, 6:1798	centralized, 1:127
performance management, 6:1856, 6:1857	conditionality, 2:382–384
semipresidentialism, 8:2401	definition, 3:921
See also Scandinavia	domestic politics and, 3:923-924
Finnemore, Martha, 4:1015	economic instruments, 3:706–708
Finnis, John, 7:2321	effectiveness, 3:925–926
Fiorina, Morris, 1:251, 6:1808	environmental security, 3:783-785

environments, 3:926–927	colonialism, 2:303, 2:304
ethics, 3:926	communist party, 2:312, 2:317, 2:318, 6:1797
goals, 3:925, 5:1650	constitutions, 7:2227, 7:2337, 8:2403
identity and, 3:921-922	Dreyfus Affair, 4:1208, 7:2311
international law and, 4:1240	economic nationalism, 5:1549
multilateral strategies, 5:1634-1635	education system, 3:767-768
national interest and, 5:1650-3	elites, 3:767–768
neutrality, 5:1696–1699	European integration and, 4:1231
scripts, 7:2365–2366	Fifth Republic, 1:19-20, 8:2400
strategic interactions, 7:2150-2151	foreign ministry, 3:663
unilateralism, 5:1635, 8:2675-2676	green party, 4:1053, 4:1054
See also Diplomacy; Security and defense policy	historical memory, 4: 1079
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), 3:916-928	immigration policies, 5:1570
as academic field, 3:916-918, 3:927-928	Indochinese War, 4:1282
comparative politics and, 3:917	interinstitutional accountability, 1:19-20
domestic sources of foreign policy, 3:923-924	international political economy scholarship, 4:1265
environments and structures, 3:926-927	international relations field, 1:lvi, 4:1279
importance, 3:927–928	language policies, 7:2070
leadership and decision making, 3:922-923	local governments, 5:1465, 5:1466, 5:1468
methodologies, 3:922	monarchy, 5:1549, 5:1614
organizational logics, 3:924–925	multiculturalism, 5:1630
origins of field, 3:917–918	Muslim voters, 3:739
subfields, 3:922–927	Napoleon's rule, 3:654, 3:657
theoretical concepts, 3:918–922	nationalism, 5:1654, 5:1655, 5:1658, 5:1660, 5:1661
Formal political theory, 6: 2052, 6: 2055–2056	nation-state, 3:825
See also Game theory; Political theory;	NATO and, 8:2652
Social choice theory	nuclear weapons, 8:2652
Fortune magazine, 8:2570	parliament, 1:19–20
Forza Italia, 6:1802–1803, 6:1858–1859	parties, 2:412–413, 3:733–734, 3:888, 6:1795,
Foucault, Michel	6: 1799, 6: 1802
on bio-politics, 3:676, 7:2072	police organization, 6:1878
discourse analysis, 3:673–674, 4:1195, 6:1880,	political participation, 1:86
6:1882, 6:2030	political science field, 6: 2015
governmentality theory, 4: 1034, 4: 1037, 6: 1883	public budgeting, 7:2155
influence, 8:2550	radicals, 7:2200
on morality, 3:825–826	referenda, 2: 562, 7: 2227
political philosophy, 6: 1996	regional governments, 5:1464
postmodernism, 7:2096, 7:2097	relations with African states, 3:641
on power, 3: 675, 6: 2030	republics, 7:2290, 7:2295
on sexuality, 3:825	Roman Catholic Church, 4:1085
Fourier, Charles, 8:2450, 8:2687, 8:2688	secularism, 1:236, 4:1085
Fox, Charles James, 7:2200	security studies, 8:2550
Fox, William T. R., 7:2218, 7:2219, 8:2560	semipresidential system, 1:19, 2:591, 4:1038,
FPA. See Foreign Policy Analysis	8:2400, 8:2401
Fragile states, 8:2504	separation of powers, 8:2403
See also Weak states	social exclusion concept, 8:2429
Fragmentation. See Party system fragmentation	socialism, 5:1493, 5:1495–1496, 8:2450–2451
	statism, 8:2513
Framing, 2:422–423, 4:1197–1198, 6:1866, 6:1880,	Suez Crisis, 5:1620, 8:2652
6:1924–1925 Sociales Policy framing	
See also Policy framing France	think tanks, 8:2608
	See also French Revolution
anarchism, 1:73, 1:74, 1:76	France, Anatole, 3:812
Annales school, 7:2074, 8:2758	Franco, Francisco, 1:214, 1:228, 3:654, 3:894, 5:1616
Boulangism, 7:2076	Frank, Andre Gunder, 3:629–630, 3:631, 3:642, 4:1282
Christian Democratic party, 1:228–229, 1:230	Frankfurt School, 1:84, 2:497, 4:1094, 4:1292, 5:1499,
church–state relationship, 1:236	5:1535–1536, 8:2550
citizenship, 4:1085, 5:1571	See also Critical theory
civil service, 7:2157	Franklin, Benjamin, 8:2737
cohabitation, 1:19, 8:2401	Franklin, Grace, 6:1903

Fraser, Nancy, 4:965	Fundamentalisms, 3:934–939
Free market economies. See Market economies	characteristics, 3:935–937
Free riding, 2:308, 5:1675, 6:2032, 7:2112, 7:2159	definition, 3:934
Free speech, lobbying and, 5:1463	historical background, 3:934–935, 3:939
Free trade agreements (FTAs)	politics, 3: 937–938
bilateral, 1:146-147, 1:148, 5:1328, 5:1329	Fundamentalist movements
of European Union, 3:841–842	Hindu, 3:935, 7:2263, 7:2264-2265
regional, 5:1328, 5:1329–1330, 7:2238–2239, 8:2660	Jewish, 3:936, 3:937, 3:938, 7:2263, 7:2264,
See also Trade liberalization	7:2265–2266
Freeden, Michael, 7:2318-2319, 7:2320	politics and, 7:2263, 7:2264-2267
Freedom. See Liberty	Protestant, 3:934–935, 3:936, 3:937–938, 3:939
Freedom House, 1:115, 7:2235	study of, 7:2260
Freedom of information, 1:8, 2:515	terrorism, 7:2266
See also Secrecy	See also Religious movements
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 7:2371	Fundamentalist movements, Islamic, 3:939-944
Freeman, Gary, 4:1149	goals, 3:938
Freeman, John, 8:2526, 8:2538	history, 3:940–941
French Regulation School, 7:2255	identity, 3:939–940
French Revolution	in Iran, 3: 938
conservative reaction, 2:406–407, 5:1615	legalism, 3:936
Declaration of Rights, 2:418, 5:1431, 7:2318, 7:2319	modernization and, 3:941-942
English views, 2:406–407, 5:1615	motives, 3:939–942
Hegel on, 4: 1067	politics and, 3:937, 3:938, 3:940-941, 3:942-944
Jacobins, 8:2449-2450, 8:2451	salafi movement, 3:943
popular sovereignty, 5:1654	suppression, 3: 940–941
principles, 8:2449	terrorism, 3: 938, 3: 941
republicanism, 7:2290	See also Islamist movements; Muslim Brotherhood
Terror, 7:2295, 8:2622	Fuzzy-set analysis (FSA), 2:389, 3:944-946, 7:2175-2176
wars following, 8:2449-2450, 8:2622	FWLS. See Feasible weighted least squares
Freud, Sigmund, 2:441, 4:1205, 5:1409	
Fried, Morton, 8:2508	Gaebler, Ted, 7:2272
Friedman, Milton, 3:705, 5:1678, 6:1729, 8:2398, 8:2659	Gallie, Walter Bryce, 2:379
Friedrich, Carl, 1:3, 6:1890, 7:2100-2101, 8:2630,	Gallup, George, 7:2168, 8:2570
8:2631, 8:2634	Galton, Francis, 2:521, 3:795
Fröbel, Folker, 3:632	Galtung, Johan, 7:2078, 7:2079
Fromm, Erich, 1:57, 2:497, 4:1205	Gama'at al-Islamiyya, 7:2267
Frontline bureaucrats. See Bureaucracy, street-level	Game theory, 4:947–961
FsQCA. See Fuzzy-set analysis	analytic narratives, 1:70, 1:71-72
FTAs. See Free trade agreements	bureaucracy models, 1:173
Fukuyama, Francis, 4:1209, 4:1284-1285,	coalition formation, 1:287
5:1649, 8:2724	compared to complex system modeling, 2:366
Functional democracy, 2:589–590	conflicts strategies, 2:396–397
Functionalism, 3:928–934	cooperative, 2:448–449, 4:948, 4:960–961
criticism of, 3:931-932, 3:933-934, 4:1231	definition, 4:947
definition, 3:928–929	development, 4: 947
equivalence, 3:932	evolutionary, 4:951
international organizations, 4:1255	Hobbes's work and, 4: 1099–1100
media theory, 5:1536	in international relations, 3:711, 4:947
neo-, 3:932–933, 4:1021–1022, 5:1368, 7:2241–2242,	Nash equilibria, 1:91, 4:949-951, 4:954
7:2245, 8:2659	noncooperative, 4:947–960, 6:1983
origins, 3:929–930	payoffs, 4:948–949
political culture, 6:1973	power, 7:2107, 7:2108
in political science, 1:lxiv, 3:933	public office rewards, 7:2163
regional integration, 7:2240–2241	rational choice and, 1:173, 7:2202
religion, 7:2259	sequential games, 4:952–960
social movements, 8:2433	signaling games, 1:136, 4:958–960
structural, 3:930–932, 4:996, 4:1205, 6:2024	strategic games, 4:948–952
system types, 6:2024, 8:2580	strategic theory of bargaining, 1:134–135
systems theory, 8:2580–2581	use in political science, 1:lxiv, 3:709, 4:947, 4:948, 4:952

veto players, 8:2706	definitions, 4:966–968
See also Prisoners' dilemma	interventions, 7:2366
Gamson, William, 2:362, 3:689, 5:1590, 8:2436	issues with concept, 4:967-969
Gandhi, Indira, 2:398	related concepts, 4:968
Gandhi, Mahatma, 1:225, 1:251, 6:1838, 7:2087, 7:2264	trials, 8:2665
Gant, George F., 3:649	UN Convention on, 4:966-969, 4:1239-1240
Garbage can model, 6:1920, 6:1922, 7:2217	See also Holocaust
Garzon, Baltasar, 4:1111	Gentile, Giovanni, 3:890, 4:1127
Gasper, Karen, 7:2150	Geographic information systems (GIS), 2:541-542
Gates, Scott, 4:1162–1163	Geography. See Data, spatial; Electoral geography; Territory
GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade	Geopolitics, 4:969–972
Gay theory, 4:963	George, Alexander, 7:2135
Geddes, Barbara, 1:159-160, 2:346	Georgia, Rose Revolution, 1:251
Geertz, Clifford, 1:lv, 3:827, 7:2328, 8:2602-2604	German Workers' Association, 8:2452
Geiger, Theodore, 1:108	Germany
Gellner, Ernest, 1:240, 4:1086, 5:1654, 5:1659, 5:1660,	advocacy groups, 1:29
6: 1832, 7: 2077, 8: 2394	arms race with Britain, 1:90
Genco, Stephen, 1:lviii	chancellors, 4: 1038, 6: 1768
Gender, 4:961–966	Christian Democrats, 1:229, 1:230, 1:231, 1:287, 6:1795,
citizenship and, 1:241	6: 1800, 6: 1858
constructivist view, 2:421, 3:908–909, 4:962	civil service, 6 :2067, 7 :2157
contractarian view, 2:443	coalition governments, 1:287, 6:1811
differences, 4:963	colonies, 4:1155
discrimination, 3:682	communist party, 2:317
elites, 3:760–761	electoral behavior, 7:2167
equality, 3:902, 3:903, 4:963, 8:2641–2642	employment policies, 6: 1886, 6: 1888, 6: 1889
in expert interviews, 5:1345	federalism, 1:20, 5:1361
inequality, 4:961–962, 4:963–964, 8:2551, 8:2557,	geopolitics, 4:969–971, 4:972
8:2625, 8:2641	green party, 4:1053, 6:1799
meanings, 4:961, 4:963	interinstitutional accountability, 1:20
policy issues, 2:355	judiciary, 5:1386
in political science, 4:964–966	Länder (states), 1:127, 2:562, 5:1464, 5:1467
power and, 7:2099	local governments, 5:1465
as process, 4:962	multiculturalism, 5:1630
public and private spheres, 4:962, 4:964–965	nationalism, 5:1654, 5:1656, 5:1660, 5:1661
social dominance orientation and, 8:2427–2428	neo-mercantilism, 8:2657
social relations, 4:1293	parliamentary system, 1:20, 6:1768
See also Feminism; Women	parties, 3:733, 6:1797, 6:1800, 6:1805
Gender studies, 4:962–964	pillarization, 6: 1860–1861
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)	radicals, 7:2200
establishment, 3:701, 4:1280, 5:1328, 5:1633,	relations with Soviet Union, 3: 637
8:2637, 8:2760	reunification, 7:2091
Kennedy Round, 8:2637	revisionism, 7:2310
most-favored-nation treatment, 5:1329, 8:2676, 8:2761	secularization, 8:2513
negotiating rounds, 8:2762	security apparatus, 7:2381–2382
principles, 8:2761	social democratic party, 8:2425, 8:2452
rules, 1:147, 1:148, 8:2761–2762	socialism, 8:2452
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
trade liberalization, 3:702, 5:1328–1329	statism, 8:2513–2514
Uruguay Round, 5:1329, 5:1330, 7:2239, 8:2637, 8:2660, 8:2762–2763	think tanks, 8:2608
	welfare state, 8:2513–2514, 8:2747–2748
See also World Trade Organization	See also Nazism
Generalized least squares. See Weighted least squares	Gerring, John, 2:372
Generalized linear model (GLM), 7:2187–2188	Gerth, Hans, 1:137
Genetics, 1:149, 7:2198	Gerwith, Alan, 7:2320, 7:2322
Geneva Conventions, 3:670, 4:1109, 4:1110, 5:1697	Ghana, public budgeting, 7:2155
Gennep, Arnold van, 7:2326	Gibbon, Edward, 4:1276
Genocide, 4:966–969	Giddens, Anthony, 1:274, 2:424, 2:429, 4:1176, 5:1678,
associated factors, 4:1110	6:2030-2031
as crime, 4: 967	Gierke, Otto von, 2: 460–462

Gill, Stephen, 5:16/9	Goebbels, Joseph, 5:1531
Gills, Barry, 8:2760	Goertz, Gary, 2:386–387
Gilpin, Robert, 4:1282–1283	Goffman, Erving, 4:1133, 6:1924, 6:2000
Gini index, 4:1180	Goguel, François, 6:2017
GIS. See Geographic information systems	Gold standard, 5:1619
Glaeser, Edward, 6:1980	Golden, Daniel, 7:2134
Glaser, Barney, 4:1054, 4:1055, 4:1056, 4:1057	Goldman, Emma, 1:73, 1:77
Glass, Gene V., 5:1551, 5:1552, 5:1553	Goldstein, Baruch, 7:2266
GLM. See Generalized linear model	Goldthorpe, John H., 1:273, 1:274
Global financial architecture, 5:1619–1621, 5:1622–1623	Goleman, Daniel, 6:2006
Global governance. See Governance, global	Gomułka, Władislaw, 7:2311–2312
Global Terrorism Database, 8:2597	Good governance. See Governance, good
Global warming. See Climate change	Good government. See Performance
Globalism, 5:1636, 6:2060	Goodnow, Frank, 4:1091
Globalization, 4:972–983	Goods
capital flows, 5:1486	characteristics, 2: 307, 5: 1490–1491
causes, 4: 973, 4: 974–976	demerit, 5:1491
civil society and, 1:263-264	mixed, 5:1490–1491
communications technology, 4:1270, 6:2060	private, 5:1490, 7:2160
consequences, 2:356, 4:976–981, 8:2749	taxonomy, 2:307
constructivist view, 4:976	See also Common goods; Public goods
convergence among states, 4:979–980	Goodwin, Jeff, 7:2314–2315
critical view, 4: 975–976	Gorbachev, Mikhail, 2:325, 3:612, 3:624, 3:659, 8:2460,
cyclical, 4:973, 4:982	8:2662, 8:2683
debates on, 4:1014	Gore, Albert, Jr., 3:785–786, 6:1899, 6:1937
	Gosnell, Harold, 8:2525
definition, 4:972	
diplomacy and, 3:666	Gouvernementalité. See Governmentality theory
economic integration, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 8:2496	Governability theory, 4:1033, 4:1034
financial, 1:219, 4:1246, 5:1619–1621, 8:2749	Governance, 4:983–994
future of, 4:982	activities, 4:1019, 4:1027
gender and, 3:905	change in, 4: 992–993, 4: 996–997
interdependence and, 4:1217	collaboration and, 2:297–298
international relations theory and, 4:1283-1284	definitions, 1:27, 4:996, 4:1026
managing, 4: 981–982	devolution, 4:998
market economies and, 5:1486	dimensions, 4:984–988, 4:990–993
modernity and, 5:1611-1612	distinction from government, 4:996, 4:1040
multinational corporations and, 5:1641, 5:1642-1643	economic development and, 2:352-353
neoliberal, 4:972, 4:976, 4:980, 5:1676, 5:1678	formal, 4:1019
neutrality and, 5:1698	hierarchical, 5:1554
normative, 4:976, 4:980	inequality and, 1:222
perspectives, 4:972–973	institutional capacity, 4:986, 4:996–997
policy issues, 2:355	liberal-democratic, 4:988–989, 4:991–992
political economy of, 6: 1984	
· ·	logic of, 6:1947–1948, 6:1949
political effects, 4:978	market, 5:1554
political sociology, 6:2037	meta-, 4:998, 4:1041, 5:1412, 5:1554–1557
political theory and, 6:2060	models, 4:983–984, 4:988–993, 4:996
politics of, 1:lv-lvi	monitoring and, 5:1626
power and, 1:154	multiple, 6:1948, 6:1949
protests, 1:75, 4:1014, 5:1580, 6:1714, 8:2763	network, 4:989–990, 4:992, 4:997, 4:1020, 5:1554–1555
social classes and, 1:274	nonrepresentative, 6:2048–2049
technological change and, 3:666, 3:668, 4:973, 4:974,	one-actor, 6: 2048
4: 980, 6: 2060	outcomes, 4:996
territory and, 8:2589, 8:2590-2591	paradigms, 6:1945-1946
transnational advocacy networks and, 1:37-38	policy choices and, 4:983–984, 4:990–992, 4:995,
transnational identities, 4:1140–1141	4: 1002–1003
virtual states, 8:2496–2499	in political science, 4:995–999, 4:1040
See also Migration	reorganization and, 7:2272
Gobineau, Arthur de, 7:2197	representation and, 7:2284
Godwin, William, 1:73	state-centric, 4:988, 4:990–991
Gouwin, william, 1./J	state-centric, 7.700, 7.770-771

study of, 6:1945–1947, 6:1949	theories, 4:1022–1023
traditions, 4:983	use of concept, 4:1025–1026
See also Policy instruments	Governance, urban, 4:1026-1029
Governance, administration policies, 4:994–1010	challenges, 4:997
functions, 4: 994–995	comparative research, 4:1028-1029
policy process, 4:995, 4:999–1001, 4:1009	definition, 4:1026
politics and, 4: 1001–1004	models, 4:1027–1029
public administration and, 1:27, 4:1004–1007	need for, 4:997, 4:1026–1027
Governance, global, 4:1010–1016	regimes, 4:1027–1028
anarchy and, 1:80-81	social movements and, 8:2437–2438
consequences, 4:1017	types, 4:1027
definition, 4:1010–1011	See also Local governments
democracies cooperating in, 5:1437	Governance networks, 4:1029–1035
democracy and, 2:579–581	consequences, 4:989–990, 4:1032
democratic deficit, 2:580–581, 4:1014–1015	defining features, 4:1030–1031
domestic politics and, 5:1437	functions, 4:1031
history of concept, 4:1011–1012	relationships in, 4:1020, 4:1027, 4:1030–1031
international governmental organizations, 4:1011–1012,	strengths and weaknesses, 4: 1032–1033
4:1013, 5:1633, 8:2439–2440	study of, 4:1030, 4:1033, 4:1034–1035,
legitimacy, 4:1014–1015	5:1554-1555
nongovernmental actors, 4:997, 4:1013	theories, 4:989, 4:992, 4:997, 4:1031–1032,
nonstate actors, 6:1714, 8:2463–2464	4:1033–1034, 6:1938
policy outcomes and, 4:1017	See also Corporativism; Networks; Policy networks
postinternational perspectives, 4:1013–1014	Government, 4:1035–1041
procedures, 4:1017	comparative research, 4:1037
transaction costs, 8:2650–2651	distinction from governance, 4:996, 4:1040
transnational actors, 5:1634	functions, 4: 1036–1037
See also International regimes	institutional settings, 4:1038–1039
Governance, good, 4:1016–1018	limited, 2:416
collective action theory, 4:1018	meanings, 4:1035–1036
future research, 4:1018	models, 4:1037–1038, 4:1039–1041
meanings, 4:997, 4:1016–1017	See also Administration; Cabinets; Executive
measurement, 4: 1040, 6: 1853	Governmentality theory, 4 :1034, 4 :1037, 6 :1883
state building and, 8:2506	Gramsci, Antonio, 1:261, 4:1071–1072, 5:1499, 6:1797
use of concept, 4: 1016, 4: 1040	7:2074, 7:2087, 7:2168
See also Performance	Gramscian approach to regional integration, 7:2243
Governance, informal, 4:1018–1021	Granger, Clive, 4: 1041–1042
characteristics, 4:1019	Granger causality, 4:1041-1043, 7:2120, 8:2611
definition, 4:1019	Granovetter, Mark, 5:1686
in democracies, 4: 1020–1021	Grant, Wyn, 6: 1903
evaluating, 4: 1020–1021	Graph visualization, 2:542–543
forms, 4:1019–1020	See also Data visualization
increase in, 4: 1018–1019	Graphics, statistical, 4:1043-1046
See also Soft law	historical evolution, 4:1044–1045
Governance, multilevel, 4:1021–1026	human perception of, 4:1045
collaboration and, 2:297-298	path diagrams, 8:2553
complexity, 4: 997–998	regression, 7:2249–2250
criticism of concept, 3:899, 4:1023, 4:1025	types, 4: 1045–1046
democratic participation, 2:579-580	use of, 2:539–541, 4:1044
in Europe, 3:849, 3:899, 4:1021–1022, 4:1023, 5:1361	Great Britain. See United Kingdom
evolution of concept, 3:899, 4:1021–1022	Great Society programs, 4:1157–1158
federalism and, 3:899-900, 4:1023-1024	Greece
future research, 4: 1025–1026	church-state relationship, 1:235
informal, 4:1020	communist party, 2:318
joint-decision trap, 5:1361–1363	conflicts with Turkey, 5:1662
models, 4:1023–1024	constitution, 1:235
strengths and weaknesses, 4:1024–1025	debt crisis, 4:1247
structures, 3:899	military dictatorship, 3:654, 3:659, 8:2666
subnational autonomy and, 1:126–127, 4:1022	monarchy, 5:1613

Greece, ancient	Group liberalism, 5:1432–1433
agora, 1:260	Group of 7 (G-7), 3:702, 3:703–704, 4:1014,
city-states, 2:559, 2:572, 2:583, 2:584, 4:1047–1048,	5:1621, 5:1622
4:1069, 7:2288	Group of 8 (G-8), 1:78, 3:701, 3:702, 3:703, 3:704, 5:1621
direct democracy, 2:559, 2:572, 2:583, 2:584	Group of 20 (G-20), 3:703, 3:704, 4:1247, 5:1622
elections by lot, 3:719, 3:720	Group of 77, 3:786, 5:1637
Jewish diaspora, 3:651	Groups. See Interest groups
natural law, 5:1663	Groupthink, 4:1057-1060
political systems, 4:1048	antecedent conditions, 4:1058, 4:1059, 6:2003
republics, 7:2288	criticism of concept, 4:1058-1059
Greek philosophy, 4:1046–1051	definition, 4:1058
classical period, 4:1046–1047	effects, 6: 2003
on democracy, 1:17, 2:571–573, 2:584,	empirical research, 4:1059, 6:2003
3: 719, 6: 2062	identifying, 4:1058
early, 4: 1046, 4: 1047	types, 4: 1059
Hellenistic, 4:1046	use of term, 4: 1057–1058
influence, 4:1046, 4:1047, 4:1051	GT. See Grounded theory
late antiquity, 4:1046–1047	Guatemala, truth commission, 4:1081
political theory and, 6:2051	Guattari, Felix, 8:2550, 8:2590
Sophists, 4:1047–1048	Guba, Egon, 6:1880, 6:1896
stages, 4:1046	Guicciardini, Francesco, 1:130-131
texts, 4:1046-1047, 4:1050	Guild socialism, 2:461-462, 6:1869
time period, 4:1046	Guizot, François, 6:1724, 8:2621, 8:2622
views of political world, 3:792	Gujarati, Damodar, 5:1581, 5:1583
See also Aristotle; Plato	Gulf War (1991), 7:2366, 8:2676, 8:2683
Green, Thomas Hill, 4:1126, 4:1127	Gulick, Luther, 1:26, 1:27, 7:2214, 7:2215
Green parties, 4:1051–1054	Gullion, Edmund, 4:1269
development, 4:1051, 4:1052	Gunder Frank, Andre, 8:2758, 8:2760
electorate, 4:1053, 4:1054, 5:1427	Gurin, Gerald, 3:716
in Europe, 4: 1051, 4: 1052–1054, 6: 1799	Gurr, Ted Robert, 6:1849, 8:2709
government coalition partners, 4:1053-1054	Gush Emunim, 7:2266
ideology, 6:1795, 6:1799	Guttman, Louis, 5:1522–1523, 5:1529, 7:2355
impact, 4: 1054	Guttman scale, 5:1522–1523, 5:1529–1530, 7:2355–2356
left-wing, 4: 1052–1053	
number of, 4 :1051–1052	Haas, Ernst, 8:2659
organizations, 4:1053	Habermas, Jürgen
performance, 4:1053	on civil society, 2:581
platforms, 4:1051, 4:1052–1053, 6:1799	on communicative action, 2:499, 4:1196
postmodernism, 6: 1799, 8: 2696	on consensus, 2:402
roles, 3:777, 4:1051	on constitutional patriotism, 5:1649, 5:1657,
transnational networks, 6:1714	6: 1833–1834
Green theory, 4:1294	on cosmopolitan democracy, 6:1734–1735
Greenfeld, Liah, 5:1661	critical theory, 2:498–501
Greif, Avner, 1:66, 1:70, 4:1190	on deliberative democracy, 2:500, 2:578, 2:593, 6:1779
Grid groups, 7:2163, 7:2324	on democracy, 4:1097
Grimes, Ronald L., 7:2327	discourse models, 6:1881
Gross, Leo, 8:2753, 8:2754	Frankfurt School and, 2:497, 4:1292, 8:2550
Grotius, Hugo, 4:1275, 4:1288, 5:1335, 7:2078,	on ideal speech situation, 2:552
7:2120, 8:2470	on international relations, 2:500, 6:1734–1735
Grounded theory (GT), 4:1054–1057	on public opinion, 7:2168
coding, 4:1056	on public sphere, 1:252, 2:499–500, 6:1967, 6:2029,
constant comparative method, 4:1054	7:2167
definition, 4:1054	Haddock, Geoffrey, 1:93
heuristics, 4:1055	Hague Conventions, 5:1697
origins, 4:1055	Halbwachs, Maurice, 4:1078–1079
procedures, 4:1055–1056	Hall, Peter A., 3:796, 4:1192, 4:1194
sampling, 4:1056	Hallerberg, Mark, 8:2707
use in political science, 4:1056–1057	Hallin, Daniel C., 5:1543
variants and add-ons, 4:1057	Hamas, 8:2592

Hamilton, Alexander, 1:17-18, 3:754, 3:896, 4:1088,	on corporativism, 2:460
5:1369, 8:2405	on democracy, 2:573
See also Federalist Papers	on history, 4 :1067, 4 :1069
Hammarskjöld, Dag, 8:2680, 8:2681	on ideal state, 4:1067, 4:1068, 4:1069
Hardin, Garrett, 2:308, 2:309, 5:1665-1666, 7:2132,	idealism, 4: 1126
8:2643, 8:2644–2645, 8:2646	Marx and, 2:460, 5:1493, 5:1495, 8:2451
Hardin, Russell, 6:2056, 6:2058, 7:2337-2338, 7:2342	philosophy, 4: 1067–1069
Hare, Richard M., 3:811	political writings, 4:1066–1067
Harm principle, 5:1431, 6:1733	on politics, 1:lvii
Harris, Chester, 6:1911	on public office rewards, 7:2162
Harris International, 8:2573	on state, 8:2 513
Harsanyi, John C., 3:816	Hegemonic stability, 4:1070
Hart, Herbert L., 7:2320, 7:2321, 7:2336	Hegemonic stability theory (HST), 4:975, 4:1252,
Hartz, Louis, 4:1094, 8:2624	4:1260–1261, 4:1272
Hate groups, 5:1580	See also International regimes
Hate speech, 1:213	Hegemonic state system, 1:133, 1:218
Haushofer, Karl, 4:969, 4:971, 4:972	Hegemony, 4:1069–1072
Hayek, Friedrich A., 5:1429, 5:1444, 5:1488,	coercive, 4: 975–976
5:1677, 5:1678	of communist parties, 2:311, 2:316, 8:2457
HD. See Human development	cultural, 3:820, 3:821, 3:822, 7:2074
HDI. See Human Development Index	in international relations theory, 4:1070–1071, 4:1261.
Heads of government	4: 1282–1283, 5: 1676
diplomatic roles, 3:667	Marxist theory, 4:1070, 4:1071-1072
dual-power governments, 6: 2047–2048, 7: 2123	masculine, 3:909, 3:910, 4:962
in parliamentary systems, 6:1770	meanings, 3:772, 4:1069–1070
in presidential systems, 7:2123, 7:2125–2126	neo-Gramscian view, 4: 1292
in semipresidential systems, 8:2401	post-hegemonic system, 7:2239
summits, 3:776	trade liberalization and, 8:2637
See also Executive; Prime ministers	transnational, 4:1072
Heads of state	of United States, 4:975–976, 4:1261, 5:1676, 7:2239,
in parliamentary systems, 2: 590–591, 6: 1767–1768	8:2562
powers, 1:184	in world systems theory, 4:1070–1071
in presidential systems, 6: 2046, 6: 2047, 7: 2123,	See also Empires; Imperialism
7:2125–2126	Heidenheimer, Arnold J., 6: 1804
in semipresidential systems, 8:2400	Heinrich, Carolyn J., 4:1160, 6:1947–1948
summits, 5:1333, 5:1621, 5:1622	Heinrichs, Jürgen, 3:632
See also Monarchy; Presidentialism	Held, David, 6:1735, 6:2060
Health care systems, 4:1064	Hellenistic philosophy, 4:1046
Health policy, 4:1061–1066	Helsinki Accords, 4:1208–1209, 8:2461
actors, 4:1063–1064	Hempel, Carl Gustav, 1:lviii, 7:2082
contexts, 4:1062–1063	Herder, Johann Gottfried, 5:1655, 6:1833, 7:2197
debates on, 4:1062	Hermeneutics, 4:1072–1075
definition, 4:1061	definition, 4:1072–1073
economic importance, 4:1063	double, 2:425, 2:429–430
interest groups, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228	history of concept, 4:1073–1074
networks, 5:1693	meta-analysis and, 5:1553
options, 4:1064–1065	political science and, 4:1074–1075
processes, 4:1062, 4:1063–1064	Hermet, Guy, 8:2606
public opinion, 4:1062	Herodotus, 4:1047, 4:1048
reforms, 4:1065–1066, 4:1227–1228, 8:2751	Herring, Pendelton, 4: 1092, 4: 1093
risk analysis, 7:2322–2323	Herz, John H., 4:1129, 4:1279, 4:1288, 7:2218, 7:2220,
values and, 4: 1062	7:2389
See also Welfare policies	Herzl, Theodor, 8:2765
Heckman, James J., 1:212, 5:1565, 7:2391–2392, 7:2393	Heteroskedasticity
Heckman model, 1:212	causes, 7:2185–2186
Hecksher-Ohlin model, 5:1326, 5:1327, 5:1330, 7:2146	in multilevel analysis, 5:1638
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 4:1066–1069	panel, 5:1597, 6:1762
on alienation, 1:57	tests for, 5:1583–1584
on civil society, 1:261	weighted least squares, 8:2739-2741
**	. ,

Hettne, Björn, 7:2245	Historical sociology, 4:1082-1087
Heuristics, 7:2214	citizenship, 4 :1084–1085
Hezbollah. See Hizbollah	comparative, 4:1083
HI. See Historical institutionalism	contemporary, 4:1083–1087
Hierarchical accountability, 4:1007, 4:1008	definition, 4:1082
Hierarchical/multilevel models. See Multilevel analysis	elites, 4:1085–1086
Hierarchies	future of, 4:1086–1087
in bureaucracies, 1: 166, 1: 169, 6: 1748–1749	history of field, 4: 1082–1083
governance, 5:1554	nationalism, 4:1086, 5:1654
political systems, 1:132, 6:1986, 6:2040	political science and, 1:lxii
schemata, 7:2363	state theory, 4: 1083–1084
social dominance orientation and, 8:2426, 8:2427	See also Sociology
in states, 8:2489	History
statistical models, 8:2520, 8:2533–2534	analogies, 7:2118, 7:2367
See also Classes, social; Social stratification	Annales school, 7:2074, 8:2758
Hill, Carolyn J., 6: 1947–1948	economic, 4:1266
Hill, Michael J., 6:1941, 6:1943, 6:1945, 6:1948	end of, 4:1209, 4:1279, 4:1285,
Hindu nationalism, 3: 935, 4: 1077, 7: 2264–2265	6: 1733–1734, 8: 2724
Hinduism, 4:1075–1078	political science and, 1:lxii, 1:lxv, 3:647
beliefs, 4 :1075–1076	See also Path dependence
caste system, 2:397, 4:1075, 4:1076	History of political science, 4:1087–1098
as civilization, 4:1075	ancient origins, 6:2051
conflicts with Muslims, 2:397-398, 4:1077	behavioral era, 4: 1093–1095
diversity, 4: 1075–1076, 4: 1077	democratic values, 4:1087, 4:1088
epics, 1:lii, 1:liii	international institutionalization, 6:2013-2019
fundamentalist movements, 3:935, 7:2263,	in nineteenth century, 4:1088-1091, 6:1952, 6:2014
7:2264–2265	origins, 1:li
history, 4: 1076–1077	pluralism, 4: 1091–1093
sects, 4 :1076	practical politics and, 4:1087
views of politics, 1:lii	recent developments, 1:lxiv–lxv, 4:1096–1097
war justifications, 6: 1757–1758	in twentieth century, 1:lxii–lxiii, 1:87–88, 1:137–138,
Hirohito, Emperor, 5:1616	4 :1091–1097, 6 :2014–2019
Hirschman, Albert O., 2:408, 6:2055, 7:2308, 8:2710	See also Greek philosophy
Historical institutionalism (HI)	Hitler, Adolf, 3:654, 3:707, 3:888, 3:890, 3:893, 7:2365,
comparative politics, 2:346–347, 2:349, 4:1037	8:2628
critical junctures, 4:1192, 4:1194, 4:1200	See also Nazism
discursive institutionalism and, 3:684–685,	Hizbollah, 8:2592, 8:2593
4:1193–1194, 4:1196	Hobbes, Thomas, 4:1098–1101
endogenizing change, 4:1188, 4:1192–1194 governance networks, 4:1033–1034	absolutism and, 4:1100, 6:2053, 6:2058
,	on civil society, 6:1990, 6:1991
institutional development, 4:1200	game theory and, 4:1099–1100
interest groups, 4:1227–1228	individualism, 5:1429–1430, 6:1716
party organization, 6:1817–1818	on laws of nature, 6:1717
path dependence, 4:1188, 4:1192, 4:1200, 4:1207	Leviathan, 2:440, 2:442–443, 3:826, 4:1099–1100,
policy models, 6:1882	4:1275, 8:2512-2513
reform, 7:2231	liberalism and, 5:1429–1430, 5:1439
revisionism, 4:1192	life, 4:1098
transition to democracy, 8:2663	normative political theory and, 6:1716, 6:1718
See also Neo-institutionalism	on peace, 7:2078
Historical materialism, 1:lvii, 1:191, 2:315, 4:1072, 4:1082,	on prisoners' dilemma, 7:2204
4: 1264, 4: 1292, 5: 1496–1497	on public goods, 7:2159
Historical memory, 4:1078–1082	relevance, 6:2053
definition, 4:1078	on religion, 5:1430
desire to forget, 4:1080	on religious tolerance, 6:1720
history of concept, 4:1078–1079	on social contract, 2:442-443, 2:459, 3:696-697, 4:1099
political importance, 4:1078	6: 1717, 6: 1723
sites, 4: 1079	on society, 2:438
study of, 4:1078, 4:1079–1080	on sovereignty, 7:2276, 8:2470
in transition periods, 4: 1078, 4: 1079–1081	on state, 8:2512–2513

on state of nature, 1:lii, 2:440-441, 2:442, 2:443, 2:447, 3:909, 4:1099-1100, 4:1275, 6:2053	international regimes, 4:1104, 4:1106, 4:1109–1112, 4:1239, 5:1374, 5:1569, 5:1631
writings, 4: 1098–1099	of migrants, 5:1569
Hobsbawm, Eric, 5:1646, 8:2395	of minorities, 5:1631
Hobson, John, 4:1155	nongovernmental organizations, 5:1705
Hoffmann, Stanley, 4:1230, 6:1726–1727	norms, 4:1104, 4:1108, 4:1109–1110
Hofstadter, Richard, 6:1793	positive peace, 7:2079
Hofstede, Geert, 8:2692	protection, 4:1105-1106, 4:1110, 5:1381
Hohfeld, Wesley, 7:2320	reforms, 4:1112-1113
Holland, Paul, 1:206	tolerance and, 8:2626-2627
Holocaust	Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 4:1109, 4:1239,
Arendt on, 8:2631	7:2319, 8:2626, 8:2679
denial, 7:2310-2311	See also Discrimination; Indigenous peoples' rights;
as genocide, 4:967	Interventions, humanitarian; Rights; Transitional
interpretations, 4:1208	justice
Nuremberg trials, 8:2665	Human rights, comparative perspectives, 4:1104–1108
reactions, 4:966, 4:1109, 8:2766	challenges, 4: 1107–1108
See also Genocide	measures, 4: 1105
Homans, George, 3:930	methodologies, 4:1104–1105, 4:1106–1108
Homeland security, 7:2376, 8:2551–2552	research, 4:1105–1108
See also Security and defense policy; War on terror	Human rights in international relations, 4:1108–1113
Homoskedasticity, 7:2178–2179, 7:2180, 7:2185	bilateral diplomacy, 4:1111
See also Heteroskedasticity	consensus, 4:1109
Hong Kong, 8:2497, 8:2498	Helsinki Accords, 4:1208–1209, 8:2461
Honneth, Axel, 2:497	international regimes, 4:1104, 4:1106, 4:1109–1112,
Hood, Christopher, 5:1699, 6:1929, 7:2162–2163, 7:2272	9
	4:1239, 5:1374, 5:1569, 5:1631
Horizontal accountability. See Accountability,	regional organizations, 4:1111, 8:2461
interinstitutional	sanctions, 4:1111–1112, 7:2352
Horkheimer, Max, 2:497, 2:498, 4:1094, 4:1292, 5:1499,	Human Rights Watch, 4:1112
5:1535, 8:2550	Human security, 6:1838
Hotelling, Harold, 8:2716	Humanitarian interventions. See Interventions,
Howland, Carl, 6:1963	humanitarian
Hsiao, Cheng, 8:2618	Humboldt, Alexander von, 1:87
HST. See Hegemonic stability theory	Hume, David
Hu Jintao, 3:595	on causation, 1:203–204, 2:384–385, 3:797
Hufbauer, Gary C., 7:2353	on conventions, 6:1724
Hughes, Richard, 7:2155	on English politics, 2:406
Hugo, Victor, 8:2688	on human nature, 6: 1716
Hull, Cordell, 8:2678, 8:2761	on laws of nature, 6: 1717
Human capital, 3:829-830, 8:2659-2660	on monarchy, 5:1614–1615
See also Education	normative political theory and, 6:1716–1717
Human development (HD), 4:1101-1104	on religious tolerance, 6: 1720
capabilities approach, 4: 1101	on social contract, 6:1723
definition, 4:1101	specie-flow theory, 5:1549
emancipation, 4: 1101–1102	value theory, 8:2684, 8:2685
measurement, 3:639, 4:1101	Hunter, Floyd, 3:766, 7:2103
people empowerment, 4:1102–1103	Huntington, Samuel P.
postmaterialism and, 7:2095	on breakdown of regimes, 1:159, 1:160
strengths of theory, 4: 1103–1104	on citizen participation, 3:627
Human Development Index (HDI), 3:639, 4:1101, 4:1179,	on citizenship, 1:239
6:1853, 7:2092, 8:2574	on clash of civilizations, 1:114, 1:237, 4:1150, 4:1209,
Human rights	4:1284, 4:1285, 6:2028, 7:2262, 7:2327
abuses, 4:1110, 4:1113, 5:1332, 5:1336, 5:1438, 5:1660	on democratization waves, 1:54, 5:1441, 6:2034
advocacy groups, 4:1106, 4:1111, 4:1112	on institutionalization, 4:1201
collective, 4:1109	on single-party regimes, 1:111
critiques of concept, 4:1113	Hupe, Peter L., 6:1941, 6:1943, 6:1945, 6:1948
definition, 4:1109–1110, 7:2318–2319	Hussein, Saddam, 1:114, 4:1212, 5:1690, 7:2149, 7:2366,
environmental security and, 3:786	8:2665
history of concept, 4:1108–1109	Huxley, Julian, 7:2327
/	·· -/, J ·······, · · ·

Hybrid regimes, 4:1114–1116	neo-conservatism, 4:1128–1129, 4:1130
censorship, 1:213–214	neutrality, 5:1696, 5:1698
characteristics, 4:1114-1115, 7:2237	peace, 6: 1837
classification, 4:1115-1116, 6:2043	realism and, 4:1129-1130
collapses, 1:160	Wilsonian approach, 4:1128, 4:1129, 4:1278
examples, 6:2049	Ideational neo-institutionalism, 6:1883
military influence, 5:1578	Identity
rule of law, 7:2338	foreign policy and, 3:921–922
veto players, 4:1115	personal, 4:1131, 4:1132, 4:1133
See also Semipresidentialism	religious, 3:942, 4:1085
Hybridity, 7:2089	salience and commitment, 4:1134
Hydraulic society, 6: 2027	Identity, social and political, 4:1131–1143
Hyperpower, 8:2562	collective identity, 1:277, 1:278, 8:2434–2435
Hypothesis testing, 4:1116–1123	constructivist view, 4: 1136, 7: 2113
Fisher test of significance, 4:1116, 4:1117–1118,	content and meanings, 4:1141–1142
4:1120, 8:2522	e .
	definitions, 4:1131
interview questions, 5:1338	history of concepts, 4:1132
misinterpretations, 4:1121–1123	political identity theories, 4:1136–1142
Neyman-Pearson, 4:1116, 4:1117, 4:1118–1121,	political sociology, 6:2036
8:2522, 8:2523	psychology of, 4:1134–1136, 4:1138, 6:2003–2004
null hypothesis significance test, 4:1116–1117,	social identity theories, 4:1133–1136, 6:1809, 6:2036
4:1120–1123, 8:2522	supranational, 4:1141, 4:1142, 6:1735
in political science, 5:1563, 6:2053–2054, 8:2522	transnational, 4:1140–1141
rank-sum test, 6: 1709–1710	See also National identities; Party identification
in social sciences, 1:209–210	Identity politics, 4:1140, 7:2199, 8:2438, 8:2626
statistical significance, 8:2521–2524	Ideology, 4:1143–1146
See also Statistical inference	in Arab states, 1:117
	beliefs and, 1:145
IAD. See Institutional analysis and development	Christian Democratic, 1:230, 6:1795, 6:1800
IBRD. See International Bank for Reconstruction and	colonialism, 2:303
Development	communist, 2:311, 2:314–315, 2:320, 4:1145
ICAS. See International Council of Arbitration for Sport	conservatism, 2:405
ICC. See International Criminal Court	critical discourse analysis, 6: 1883
ICCPR. See International Covenant on Civil and Political	critical theory, 2:502–503
Rights	definition, 4:1143
ICESCR. See International Covenant on Economic, Social,	in education, 4:1144
and Cultural Rights	end of, 4: 1145
ICISS. See International Commission on Intervention and	evolution of concept, 4:1143–1145
State Sovereignty	fascist, 3:888–889, 7:2200
ICJ. See International Court of Justice	Islamist, 5:1349, 5:1351
ICPSR. See Interuniversity Consortium for Political and	left-right scale, 7:2200, 7:2201
Social Research	of liberal parties, 5:1426-1427
ICs. See International courts	Marxist view, 4:1143, 4:1144, 4:1145
ICTY. See International Criminal Tribunal for Former	mentalities compared to, 1:108
Yugoslavia	Nazi, 3:889, 7:2200
IDA. See International Development Association	party identification and, 6:1811
Ideal state. See Westphalian ideal state	political system types, 6:2043–2044
Idealism, 4:1125–1128	revolutionary role, 7:2315
British, 4:1126–1127	social democratic, 2:594, 8:2455
definition, 4:1125	totalitarian, 8:2633, 8:2634
Hegel on, 4:1126	voting behavior and, 3:741
Kant on, 4:1126	IEL. See International economic law
Plato on, 4:1125–1126, 8:2687	IFDO. See International Federation of
view of reality, 4:1125	Data Archives
See also Utopianism	IGOs. See International governmental organizations
Idealism in international relations, 4:1128–1131	IHL. See International humanitarian law
criticism of, 4:1130, 4:1240, 4:1279, 4:1288, 4:1290	IHRL. See International human rights law
international law, 4:1240	IISS. See International Institute for Strategic Studies
liberalism 4.1128 4.1130	II O See International Labour Organization

Imagined communities, 4:1270, 5:1645, 5:1654, 5:1659,	success factors, 4:1158, 4:1169
7:2088–2089, 8:2394	target groups and, 4: 1165–1167
Immergut, Ellen M., 4: 1227–1228	theories, 4:1169
Immigration policy, 4:1146–1151	See also Discretion; Evaluation research; Impacts, policy;
challenges, 4:1146–1147, 4:1149	Policy evaluation; Policy instruments
definition, 4:1146	Import substitution industrialization (ISI),
dependents, 4:1148	1: 111, 7: 2147, 8: 2637
dimensions, 4: 1147–1149	Imports. See International trade
ethnic immigration, 4: 1148	Incentives
European, 5:1570, 5:1571–1572	bureaucratic, 1:171, 1:175
integration of immigrants, 4:1148–1149, 4:1150	policy instruments, 6:1929
international relations and, 5:1570	for political participation, 1:253, 3:874
Japanese, 5:1571	Income equality, 3:803, 3:805–806, 3:811–812, 8:2478
labor migration, 4:1147	Income inequality, 1:84, 3:821, 4:1178, 6:1980, 8:2586
of liberal democracies, 5:1568–1569	See also Inequality, economic
naturalized citizens, 4: 1149, 4: 1184, 5: 1571	Incrementalism, 1:164, 4:1000, 6:1909–1911, 6:1919
political asylum, 4: 1147–1148, 4: 1150, 5: 1569	Incumbency advantages, 3:745
political pressures, 5:1568	Independence. See Decolonization; Sovereignty
political science and, 4:1149–1150	Independence, judicial. See Judicial independence
restrictions, 5:1568–1569	Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), 1:119
rights of immigrants, 4:1184	See also Regulatory agencies
See also Migration	Index of Political Predisposition (IPP), 3:725-726
Impacts, policy, 4:1151–1154	India
measurement, 6: 1913–1915	British rule, 2:303, 2:305, 4:1077, 6:1754
monitoring, 6: 1915–1916	Buddhism, 1:161–162
policy design and, 4:1153–1154	caste system, 2:397, 4:1075, 4:1076, 8:2427
social justice, 4:1153	Hindu nationalism, 3:935, 4:1077, 7:2264–2265
target populations, 4:1152–1153	partition, 2:395
theories, 4:1151–1154	peasant movements, 6:1847
See also Implementation; Policy evaluation	religious conflicts, 2:397–398
Imperialism, 4:1154–1157	religious pluralism, 7:2264, 7:2374
debates on, 4:1155, 4:1156	subaltern studies, 2:305
definition, 4:1154	See also Hinduism
European, 2:302, 2:303–304, 4:1154–1156	Indigenous peoples' rights, 4:1170–1173
Marxist view, 4:1156	contested, 4:1171
Marxist-Leninist view, 3:642, 4:1156, 8:2758	future challenges, 4: 1172
New, 4: 1155	international regimes, 4: 1110, 4: 1170–1171
See also Colonialism; Empires	land rights, 4: 1171–1172
Implementation, 4:1157–1170	legal, 4: 1171–1172
actors, 4: 1157	meanings, 4: 1170
bureaucratic role, 4:995	multiculturalism and, 5:1631
commitment and coordination, 4:1161-1162	UN Declaration, 4:1170, 4:1171, 4:1172
definition, 4:1157	See also Human rights
democratic effectiveness standard, 4:1157	Individualism, 4:1173–1178
failures, 4: 1158	autonomy and, 4:1175-1176
instruments, 4:1002, 4:1159–1160	citizenship and, 1:240
integrated model, 4:1158, 4:1159	conservative, 4:1176–1177
interorganizational relations, 4:1161-1162	contract theory and, 2:443-444
joint action, 4:1161	democracy and, 4:1174
management of, 4: 1164–1165	epistemological, 4:1173
networks in, 6: 1939	ethical, 4: 1173
organizational arrangements, 4:1160	gender and, 2:443-444
policy design and, 4:1153, 4:1158-1160, 6:1922-1923	history of concept, 5:1429, 6:1716
policy instruments, 6:1931	interpretations, 4:1173–1176
processes, 4:999–1000	juridical, 4: 1173
quantitative research, 4:1000, 4:1168	liberalism and, 4:1176-1177, 5:1429-1430,
research methodologies, 4:1167-1168	5:1433, 5:1434
socioeconomic environment and, 4:1167	methodological, 4:1176, 4:1205
street-level bureaucrats' role, 4:1162-1164, 4:1168	modernity and, 4:1173

normative political theory, 6: 1716 republicanism and, 7: 2296	Inequality, social. See Classes, social; Social stratification Inference. See Causality; Statistical Inference
romantic, 4:1173	Inference, ecological, 4:1185–1187
of Rousseau, 2:443	approaches, 4:1187
sociological, 4:1173	in political science, 4:1185, 4:1186, 5:1563
solidarity and, 8:2467	problems, 4:1185–1187
in United States, 4: 1174, 4: 1175, 6: 1978–1979	Inflation
utilitarian, 4:1173	monetarist policies, 3:705
Indonesia	monetary policy goals, 1:215, 1:216, 1:217–218, 2:487
Constitutional Court, 5:1412	tax policy and, 1:216, 8:2586
democratization, 5:1662	Informal governance. See Governance, informal
Islam in, 5:1351	Information, political. See Political communication
oligarchic system, 6: 1740	Information asymmetries, 5:1487, 5:1488–1489
proportional representation, 3:748	Information technology
Industrial Revolution, 6:1795	change, 5:1684, 6:1939, 6:2060
Industrial Revolution, 6.1773	economic development and, 3:702–703
in Asia, 3:702	simulations, 7:2118–2119, 7:2131
in developing countries, 3:632, 3:646	statistical software, 2:340–341, 5:1553, 7:2193
employment policies, 6:1886	See also Internet
import substitution, 1:111, 7:2147, 8:2637	Inglehart, Ronald
socialist view of, 8:2449	on participation, 1:253, 6:1784
Inequality	on postmaterialism, 1:247, 1:274, 6:1799, 6:1970–1971
fairness and, 6:1721	6:2033, 7:2093–2094, 8:2693
gender, 4:961–962, 4:963–964, 8:2551, 8:2557,	socialization hypothesis, 7:2093–2094, 7:2095
8:2625, 8:2641	value structure, 8:2694, 8:2695, 8:2696
historical examples, 3:803	values research, 1:237, 4:1102, 4:1103, 6:1972, 6:1978
power in international relations, 3:640	Inglehart Index, 7:2094, 7:2095
social dominance orientation, 8:2426–2428	INGOs. See International nongovernmental organizations
study of, 3:817	Ingram, Helen, 4:1152–1153, 6:1881
See also Discrimination; Equality; Social stratification	Initiatives, 7:2226, 7:2228
Inequality, economic, 4:1178–1182	See also Citizens' initiatives
civil wars caused by, 1:265–267	Inkeles, Alex, 8:2634
consequences for political equality, 3:819–820, 3:821	Institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework,
consequences of globalization, 4:977–978	6:1948, 6:1949, 8:2646–2648
between countries, 1:222	Institutional capacity, 4:986, 4:996–997
in developed countries, 4:978, 7:2224	Institutional change. See Change, institutional
in developing countries, 4:977–978, 7:2224	Institutional interest groups, 4:1219, 4:1221
explanations, 1:222, 3:682, 4:1180–1182, 7:2225	Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), Mexico, 5:1441,
income differences, 1:84, 3:821, 4:1178, 6:1980, 8:2586	6: 1742, 6: 1793
interpretations, 4:1178	Institutional theory, 4:1187–1199
measurement, 3:817, 4:1178–1179, 4:1180, 7:2225	behavioralism and, 4:1205–1206
political effects, 6: 1980, 8: 2478	criticism of, 4:1231
populations, 4: 1179–1180	debates in, 4:1207
reducing, 3:820	definition, 4:1204
trade policies and, 8:2638	deregulation, 3:634
trade-offs, 6: 1718–1719	economic, 4 :1205
violence levels and, 8:2710	endogenizing change, 4:1187–1199
See also Classes, social; Redistribution; Social exclusion	evolution, 2:344–345
Inequality, political, 4:1182–1185	governance networks, 4:1033–1034
citizenship and, 4:1184	international organizations, 4:1255
definition, 4:1182	normative integration, 4:1034
formal, 4: 1183	normative political theory and, 6:1718
implications for quality of democracy,	policy process model, 6:1920, 6:1940, 6:1948, 6:1949,
4:1183–1184	8:2646–2648
interest groups and, 4:1228	public office rewards, 7:2163
reducing, 3:818, 4:1184	reactions against, 1:137
subject culture, 8:2557–2559	redistribution, 7:2225
substantive, 4: 1183, 4: 1184	scope, 4: 1207
See also Equality, political	self-regulation, 8:2399

in social sciences, 4:1204–1205 strategic studies and, 8:2452, 8:2545 transatlantic relations, 8:2655 transatlantic relations, 8:2685 See also Historical institutionalism; Neo-institutionalism; Neoliberal institutionalism; Rational choice definition, 4:1210, 4:1211–1212 definition, 4:1210 definition, 4:1201 definition, 4:1201 definition, 4:1202 mechanisms, 4:1200–1202 failures, 4:1202 mechanisms, 4:1200–1201 processes, 4:1199–1200 of states, 8:2486–2487, 8:2489, 8:2506 thick, 4:1200 Institutions as constraints, 4:1188 creation, 4:1203, 4:1204–1205 definitions, 4:1203, 4:1204–1205 definitions, 4:1203, 4:1204–1205 definitions, 4:1200, 4:1202–1204 democratic consolidation and, 3:618 Durkheim on, 3:698–699 efficient, 1:223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223, 5:1646 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutionalism, 4:1202–1207 See also Enstitutional ministrutionalism; A:1208-1207 See also Enstitutional ministrutional ministrutions and institutionalism, 4:1208-1207 See also European integration political integration; Regional integration; Political, 4:1211 number of, 4:1211 counter, 4:1210, 4:1211 counter, 4:1210, 4:1211 counter, 4:1210, 4:1211 counter, 4:1210, 4:1213 analysis, 4:1211 counter, 4:1210, 4:1213 covert action, 4:1210 failures, 6:1934–1935 nature of, 6:1934–1935 nature of, 6:1934–1935 nature of, 6:1934–1935 nature of, 6:1234–1935 nature of, 6:1210 results of nciton, 4:1210 failures of, 6:1934–1935 nature of, 6:1211 results of action, 4:1210 study of, 4:1210–1211 surveillance, 6:1934–1935 nature of, 6:1211 results of action, 4:1210 failures of, 6:1934–1935 nature of, 6:1934–1935 nature of, 6:1211 results of action, 4:1210, 4:1214 fellore-1218 study of, 6:1210–	social capital, 8:2411	Intelligence, 4:1210–1213
rransalantic relations, 8:2655	in social sciences, 4:1204–1205	accountability, 4:1213
utilitarianism and, 8:2685 See also Historical institutionalism; Neo-institutionalism; Neoliberal institutionalism; Sociological institutionalism Institutional stitutionalism; Sociological institutionalism Institutional stitutionalism; Sociological institutionalism Institutionalism; Sociological institutionalism Institutional, 4:1208—1200 See also Evidentia, 4:1208—1200 Social Social Social Social Institutionalism, 4:1205—1204 definition, 4:1210—1213 sharing information, 7:2380 study of, 4:1210—1211 Institutional, 4:1203—1214 Interaction effects, 4:1214—1216 failure to include, 5:1582 models, 8:2531—2532, 8:2334—2536 Interaction effects, 4:1214—1216 definition, 4:1216 dimensions, 4:1216—1217 functional, 4:	strategic studies and, 8:2542, 8:2545	analysis, 4:1211
See also Historical institutionalism; Neo-institutionalism; Neoliberal institutionalism; Rational choice institutionalism; Sociological institutionalism (alithure, 4:1120) of alliances, 7:2385 constraints, 4:1201-1202 criteria, 4:1201 definition, 4:1129, 4:1202-1203, 4:1204 failures, 4:1200 mechanisms, 4:1200-1201 processes, 4:1199-1200 of states, 8:2486-2487, 8:2489, 8:2506 thick, 4:1200 lostitutions as constraints, 4:1204-1205 definitions, 4:1205, 5:1466-1467, 6:2045-2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social movements and, 8:2435-2436 trade policy and, 5:1327-1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Enstitutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Insurance. See Health policy Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593-1594 See also European integration woold, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration comomic, 4:972, 4:973-974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Political integration; Regional integration Intellectuals, 4:1208-1210	transatlantic relations, 8:2655	collection, 4:1210, 4:1211
Neoliberal institutionalism; Sociological institutionalism Institutionalism, Sociological institutionalism Institutionalism, Sociological institutionalism Institutionalism, 4:1199-1202 of alliances, 7:2385 constraints, 4:1201 cefinition, 4:1199, 4:1202 criteria, 4:1201 definition, 4:1199, 4:1202-1203, 4:1204 failures, 4:1202 mechanisms, 4:1200-1201 mocesses, 4:1199-1200 of states, 8:2486-2487, 8:2489, 8:2506 thick, 4:1200 lost study of, 4:1210-1211 surveillance, 2:329 See also Secret services; Security apparatus Intelligence agencies, 3:924-925, 4:1211, 4:1213, 7:2369-2372 Interaction effects, 4:1214-1216 failure to include, 5:1582 models, 8:2531-2532, 8:2534-2536 Interdependence, 4:1216-1218 complex, 4:1220-1204 democratic consolidation and, 3:618 Durkheim on, 3:698-699 efficient, 1:223, 2:164 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466-1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466-1467, 6:2045-2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435-2436 trade policy and, 5:1327-1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions; Regimes Institutions and institutionalism, 4:1202-1207 See also Institutional theory Instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Plealth policy, Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593-1594 See also Eutropean integration with the see also Eutropean integration; Regional integration; Regional integration; Regional integration; Regional integration; Regional integration; Regional integration; Political integration; Regional integration; Political integr		
institutionalism; Sociological institutionalism Institutionalization, 4:1199–1202 of alliances, 7:2385 constraints, 4:1201–1202 criteria, 4:1201 definition, 4:1219, 4:1202–1203, 4:1204 failures, 4:1202 mechanisms, 4:1200–1201 processes, 4:1199–1200 of states, 8:2486–2487, 8:2489, 8:2506 thick, 4:1200 Institutions as constraints, 4:1188 creation, 4:1203, 4:1204–1205 definitions, 4:1204, 4:1205–1207 democratic consolidation and, 3:618 Durkheim on, 3:698–699 efficient, 1:223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223, 5:1364 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy, Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Evil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integrated Implementation Political integration; Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210	See also Historical institutionalism; Neo-institutionalism;	covert action, 4 :1211–1212
Institutionalization, 4:1199–1202 of alliances, 7:2385 constraints, 4:1201–1202 criteria, 4:1201 definition, 4:1199, 4:1202–1203, 4:1204 failures, 4:1202 mechanisms, 4:1200–1201 processes, 4:1199–1200 of states, 8:2486–2487, 8:2489, 8:2506 thick, 4:1200 Institutions as constraints, 4:1188 creation, 4:1203, 4:1204–1205 definition, 4:1203, 4:1204–1205 defmoratic consolidation and, 3:618 Durkheim on, 3:698–699 efficient, 1:223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223, 5:1634 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 3:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy, and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:334 See also Constitutions; Regimes Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrative, 4:1219 integration even the sand, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration even the sand, 4:1227–1228 integration, 4:1229 oroganizational structures, 4:1221 intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 integrative, 4:1219 integration even the sand and the policy of social integration; Regional integration results of actions, 4:1217 integrative, 4:223–1223, 5:1621, 1211, 4:1213, 3sharing information, 7:2380 secret conics, 4:1211–1212 intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 integrative, 4:1210 integrative of include, 5:1582 models, 8:2531–2532, 8:2534–2536 Interdependence, 4:1216 interdependence, 4	Neoliberal institutionalism; Rational choice	definition, 4:1210
of alliances, 7:2385 constraints, 4:1201-1202 criteria, 4:1201 definition, 4:1199, 4:1202-1203, 4:1204 failures, 4:1200-1201 mechanisms, 4:1200-1201 processes, 4:1199-1200 of states, 8:2486-2487, 8:2489, 8:2506 thick, 4:1200 Institutions as constraints, 4:1188 creation, 4:1203, 4:1204-1205 definitions, 4:1200, 4:1205 definitions, 4:1200, 4:1202-1204 democratic consolidation and, 3:618 Durkheim on, 3:698-699 efficient, 1:223-224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223, 5:1634 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466-1467, political, 4:1205, 1:1264 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2224, 7:2224, 7:2224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435-2436 trade policy and, 5:1327-1328 trade policy instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593-1594 See also Constitutionalism, 4:1202-1207 See also Institutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593-1594 See also Constitutionalism, 4:1207-1218 systemic, 4:1219-1220 democracy and, 4:1219, 4:1228-1223, 6:1873 distinction from parties, 4:1220 democracy and, 4:1219, 4:1221-1222, 8influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177-178 instruicional, 4:1219, 4:1221 leaders, 6:1870 lobbying, 4:1225-1226, 4:1229 organizational structures, 4:1221 purpliatis view, 4:12221-1229, 4:1228-1229 organizational structures, 4:1221 party linkage, 6:1811-1812 purpliatis view, 4:12221-1222, 4:1228-1229	institutionalism; Sociological institutionalism	failures, 6: 1934–1935
constraints, 4:1201–1202 criteria, 4:1201 definition, 4:1199, 4:1202–1203, 4:1204 failures, 4:1200 mechanisms, 4:1200–1201 processes, 4:1199–1200 of states, 8:2486–2487, 8:2489, 8:2506 thick, 4:1200 Instructions as constraints, 4:1188 creation, 4:1203, 4:1204–1205 definitions, 4:1203, 4:1204–1205 definitions, 4:1200, 4:1202–1204 democratic consolidation and, 3:618 Durkheim on, 3:698–699 efficient, 1:223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223, 5:1634 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions; Regimes Instruments variables, See Variables, instrumental Instruments variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments, Regiones Institutions and institutionalism, 4:1207–1227 See also Institutional theory Unemployment insurance Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Constitutions, Regiones Institutional, 4:1219, 4:1228–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1228–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1228–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1228–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1228–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1229 organizational structures, 4:1221 party linkage, 6:1811–1812	Institutionalization, 4:1199–1202	nature of, 4: 1211
criteria, 4:1201 definition, 4:1199, 4:1202–1203, 4:1204 failures, 4:1200 mechanisms, 4:1200–1201 of states, 8:2486–2487, 8:2489, 8:2506 thick, 4:1200 Institutions as constraints, 4:1188 creation, 4:1203, 4:1204–1205 definitions, 4:1200, 4:1202–1204 democratic consolidation and, 3:618 Durkheim on, 3:698–699 efficient, 1:223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223, 5:1634 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:16634 legitimacy, 4:1204, 4:1205 local government, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:13327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions; Regimes Institutions and institutionalism, 4:120–1207 See also Institutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental linstruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Felath policy Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integration conomic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Political integration; Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210		
definition, 4:1199, 4:1202–1203, 4:1204 failures, 4:1202 mechanisms, 4:1200–1201 processes, 4:1199–1200 of states, 8:2486–2487, 8:2489, 8:2506 thick, 4:1200 Institutions as constraints, 4:1188 creation, 4:1203, 4:1204–1205 definitions, 4:1200, 4:1202–1204 democratic consolidation and, 3:618 Durkheim on, 3:698–699 efficient, 1:223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223–5:1634 legitimacy, 4:1206, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 see also Constitutions Regimes Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments, variables, variables		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
failures, 4:1202 mechanisms, 4:1200–1201 processes, 4:1199–1200 of states, 8:2486–2487, 8:2489, 8:2506 thick, 4:1200 Institutions as constraints, 4:1188 creation, 4:1203, 4:1204–1205 definitions, 4:1200, 4:1202–1204 democratic consolidation and, 3:618 Durkheim on, 3:698–699 efficient, 1:223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223, 5:1634 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions and institutionalism, 4:1202–1207 See also Institutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurrance. See Pleatht policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2112 Intellectuals, 4:1208 surveillance, 2:329 Sec also Secert services; Security apparatus Intelligence agencies, 3:924–925, 4:1211, 4:1213, 7:2369–2372 Interaction effects, 4:1214–1216 failure to include, 5:1582 models, 8:2331–2532, 8:2534–2536 Interdependence, 4:1216–1218 complex, 4:1260, 4:1291 definition, 4:1216 dimensions, 4:1216 dimensions, 4:1216 globalization and, 4:1217 integration and, 4:1217 functional, 4:1216 memanaging, 4:1249–1250, 4:1255 in political science, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1230, 4:1255 in political interestion and, 4:1219 definition, 4:1219 members, 4:1216 members, 4:1217 functional, 4:1219 political science, 4:1216 members, 4:1216 members, 4:1216		
mechanisms, 4:1200–1201 processes, 4:1199–1200 of states, 8:2486–2487, 8:2489, 8:2506 thick, 4:1200 Institutions as constraints, 4:1188 creation, 4:1203, 4:1204–1205 definitions, 4:1200, 4:1202–1204 democratic consolidation and, 3:618 Durkheim on, 3:698–699 efficient, 1:223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223, 5:1634 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Instructions See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Instrugencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions netgracies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Regional integration conomic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Regional integration; Political integration; Politica		
processes, 4:1199–1200 of states, 8:2486–2487, 8:2489, 8:2506 thick, 4:1200 Institutions as constraints, 4:1188 creation, 4:1203, 4:1204–1205 definitions, 4:1200, 4:1202–1204 democratic consolidation and, 3:618 Durkheim on, 3:698–699 efficient, 1:223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223, 5:1634 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 see also Constitutions; Regimes Instruments. See Policy instruments Instruments. See Policy instruments Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars, Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Regional integration Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208 Interaction effects, 4:1214–1216 failure to include, 5:1582 models, 8:2331–2532, 8:2534–2536 Interacten effects, 4:1214–1216 failure to include, 5:1582 models, 8:2331–2532, 8:2534–2536 Interdependence, 4:1216 definition, 4:1291 definition, 4:1216 definition, 4:1216 definition, 4:1216 definition, 4:1216 definition, 4:1216 memplex, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1255 in political science, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1255 in political science, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1255 in political science, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1255 in political, 4:1219 definition, 4:1219 political, 4:1216 definition, 4:1219 definition, 4:1219 political, 4:126 places, 6:1870 lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 members, 4:1216 memployment insurance local political integration; proving number of, 4:1219 mobilization, 4:1219, 4:1221 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 party linkage, 6:1811–1812		
of states, 8:2486–2487, 8:2489, 8:2506 thick, 4:1200 Institutions as constraints, 4:188 creation, 4:1203, 4:1204–1205 definitions, 4:1200, 4:1202–1204 democratic consolidation and, 3:618 Durkheim on, 3:698–699 efficient, 1:223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223, 5:1634 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Unemployment insurance Unemployment insurance Unemployment insurance Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Regional integration Regional integration Institutions, 4:1208 Interaction effects, 4:1214–1216 failure to include, 5:1582 models, 8:2531–2532, 8:2534–2536 Interdependence, 4:1216–1218 complex, 4:1206 definition, 4:1216 dimensions, 4:1216 dimensions, 4:1216 globalization and, 4:1217 integration elefticition, 4:1216 dimensions, 4:1216 globalization and, 4:1217 integration, 4:1216 systemic, 4:1216 definition, 4:1217 integration, 4:1216 definition, 4:1216 definition, 4:1216 imensions, 4:1216 imensions, 4:1216 imensions, 4:1216 social, 4:1208 situation, 4:1216 imensions, 4:1216 social, 4:1208 systemic, 4:1216 systemic, 4:1216 systemic, 4:1216 systemic, 4:1216 systemic, 4:1216 systemic, 4:1216 systemic, 4:1219 systemic, 4:1216 systemic, 4:1219 systemic, 4:1219 systemic, 4:1219 systemic, 4:1219 systemic, 4:1216 systemic, 4:1216 sy		
thick, 4:1200 Instructions Instructions as constraints, 4:1188 creation, 4:1203, 4:1204–1205 definitions, 4:1200, 4:1202–1204 democratic consolidation and, 3:618 Durkheim on, 3:698–699 efficient, 1:223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223, 5:1634 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions; Regimes Instruments. See Policy instruments Instruments. See Policy instruments Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 Social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Interaction effects, 4:1216 failure to include, 5:1582 models, 8:2531–2533, 8:2534–2536 Interdependence, 4:1216–1218 complex, 4:1260, 4:1216 dimensions, 4:1216 dimensions, 4:1216 dimensions, 4:1216 dimensions, 4:1216 dimensions, 4:1216 minersions, 4:1216 managing, 4:1226, 4:1225 in political science, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 managing, 4:1235, 4:1255 in political science, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1255 in political science, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1255 in political science, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1255 in political science, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1255 in political science, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1255 in political science, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1255 in political science, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1255 in political science, 4:1227–1228 in consociation and, 4:1219–1220 democracy and, 4:1219, 4:1220 goal	•	
Institutions as constraints, 4:1188 models, 8:2531–2532, 8:2534–2536 Interdependence, 4:1216–1218 definitions, 4:1200, 4:1202–1204 democratic consolidation and, 3:618 Durkheim on, 3:698–699 efficient, 1:223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223, 5:1634 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 Institutions and institutionalism, 4:1202–1207 See also Constitutions; Regimes Institutions and institutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 Social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 failure to include, 5:1328, 8:2534–2536 Interdependence, 4:1216–1218 complex, 4:1260, 4:1291 definition, 4:1216 dimensions, 4:1216–1217 functional, 4:1216 mensaging, 4:1249–1250, 4:1255 in political science, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 theories, 4:1221 goals, 4:1219 placelery, 4:1241 placelery, 4:124 placelery, 4:125		
as constraints, 4:1128 models, 8:2531–2532, 8:2534–2536 Interdependence, 4:1216–1218 complex, 4:1260, 4:1291 democratic consolidation and, 3:618 Durkheim on, 3:698–699 directiont, 1:223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223, 5:1634 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 rradic policy and, 5:1327–1328 tradicional, 2:354 See also Constitutions; Regimes Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also European integration; Political integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 Social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Political integration, Regional integration metal latelectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 models, 4:1208–1220 democracy and, 4:1223–1224, 4:1221 leaders, 6:1870 lobbying, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1229 organizational structures, 4:1221 party linkage, 6:1811–812 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		
creation, 4:1203, 4:1204–1205 definitions, 4:1200, 4:1202–1204 democratic consolidation and, 3:618 Durkheim on, 3:698–699 efficient, 1:223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223, 5:1634 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions, Regimes Institutions and institutionalism, 4:1202–1207 See also Institutional theory Instrumenta Variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1758, 4:1759 Integrated Implementation Mode		
definitions, 4:1200, 4:1202–1204 democratic consolidation and, 3:618 Durkheim on, 3:698–699 efficient, 1:223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223, 5:1634 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 Institutions and institutional ism, 4:1202–1207 See also Constitutions; Regimes Institutions and institutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 Social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Regional integration Regional integration Intellectual, 4:1208–1210 complex, 4:1216 definition, 4:1216 globalization and, 4:1217 integratioe, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1225 in political science, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 theories, 4:1033–1034 Interest groups, 4:1219–1230 access to policymakers, 4:1224–1225 in consociational democracies, 2:555 corporatism and, 4:1219–1220 democracy and, 4:1219, 4:1228–1230, 6:1873 distinction from parties, 4:1220 goals, 4:1219 growing number of, 4:1219 prowing number of, 4:1219 institutional sit view, 4:1227–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1223–1226, 4:1229 members, 4:1266 managing, 4:126 managing, 4:1207 integrative, 4:1216 globalization and, 4:1227–1228 in political science, 4:1217 integration goals, 4:1219 prowing number of, 4:1219 members, 4:1220 promission and, 4:1219, 4:1221 party linkage, 6:1817 lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 organizational structures, 4:1221 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 party linkage, 6:1811–1812		
democratic consolidation and, 3:618		
Durkheim on, 3:698–699 efficient, 1:223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223, 5:1634 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions; Regimes Instruments variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Instruments See Policy instruments Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrative enconomic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 Social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Political integration; Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 dimensions, 4:1216–1217 functional, 4:1217 functional, 4:1217 functional, 4:1217 functional, 4:1217 functional, 4:1217 functional, 4:1216 managing, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1255 in political science, 4:12158 in political science, 4:1216 theories, 4:1216 theories, 4:1216 theories, 4:1216 theories, 4:1219 access to policymakers, 4:1224–1225 in consociational democracies, 2:555 corporatism and, 4:1229–1220, 5:1670, 5:1671, 5:167 definition, 4:1219–1220 democracy and, 4:1219, 4:1228–1230, 6:1873 distinction from parties, 4:1220 goals, 4:1219 growing number of, 4:1219 health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 historical institutionalist view, 4:1227–1228 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1221 leaders, 6:1870 lobbying, 4:1223–1226, 4:1229 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1229 organizational structures, 4:1221 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1222, 4:1228–1229		
efficient, 1;223–224 evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1;223, 5;1634 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1;223, 1;224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions; Regimes Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Regional integration Regional integration Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 functional, 4:1216 integrative, 4:1216 integrative, 4:1216 integrative, 4:1216 integrative, 4:1216 integrative, 4:12216 integratio, 4:1219 integration, 4:1219 integration, 4:1219 integration and, 4:1217 integrative, 4:1216 integrative, 4:1216 integrative, 4:1216 integrative, 4:1216 integrative, 4:1216 integrative, 4:1216 integration, 4:1219 interest groups,	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
evolution, 8:2399 informal, 1:223, 5:1634 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions; Regimes Institutions and institutional theory Instruments. See Policy instruments Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Political integration; Regional integration Regional integration Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 globalization and, 4:1217 integrative, 4:1246 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1255 in political science, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 theories, 4:1033–1034 Interest groups, 4:1219–1230 access to policymakers, 4:1224–1225 in consociational democracies, 2:555 corporatism and, 4:1222–1223, 5:1670, 5:1671, 5:16 definition, 4:1219–1220 democracy and, 4:1219, 4:1228–1230, 6:1873 distinction from parties, 4:1220 goals, 4:1219 growing number of, 4:1219 health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1221 leaders, 6:1870 lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1229 organizational structures, 4:1221 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
informal, 1:223, 5:1634 legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions; Regimes Institutions and institutionalism, 4:1202–1207 See also Institutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrative, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1255 in political science, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 theories, 4:1216 theories, 4:1216 theories, 4:1216 theories, 4:1216 theories, 4:1216 theories, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1255 in political science, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 theories, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:125 in political science, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 theories, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1216 theories, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1216 theories, 4:1216 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1221 systemic, 4:1216 theories, 4:1216 menoracy and, 4:1219–1230 access to policymakers, 4:1224–1225 in consociational democracies, 2:555 corporatism and, 4:1222–1223, 5:1670, 5:1671, 5:166 definition, 4:1219, 4:1228–1230, 6:1873 distinction from parties, 4:1220 goals, 4:1219 growing number of, 4:1219 health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 members, 4:1216 memoracy and, 4:1219, 4:1228–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 members, 4:1216 memoracy and, 4:1219 memoracy and, 4:1219 memoracy and, 4:1219, 4:1228–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 members, 4:1219 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function		
legitimacy, 4:1204 local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions; Regimes Institutions and institutionalism, 4:1202–1207 See also Institutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Regional integration Regional integration Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 managing, 4:1249–1250, 4:1217–1218 systemic, 4:1216 theories, 4:1033–1034 Interest groups, 4:1219–1230 access to policymakers, 4:1224–1225 in consociational democracies, 2:555 corporatism and, 4:1221–2123, 5:1670, 5:1671, 5:16 definition, 4:1219–1220 democracy and, 4:1219, 4:1228–1230, 6:1873 distinction from parties, 4:1220 goals, 4:1219 playlib policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1221 leaders, 6:1870 lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 members, 4:1219 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1229 organizational structures, 4:1221 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		· ·
local government, 5:1466–1467 political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions; Regimes Institutions and institutionalism, 4:1202–1207 See also Institutions and institutionalism, 4:1202–1207 See also Institutions see Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Regional integration Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Interest groups, 4:1216 theories, 4:1224–1225 tin consociational democracies, 2:555 corporatism and, 4:1224–1223, 5:1670, 5:1671, 5:16 definition, 4:1219–1220 democracy and, 4:1219, 4:1228–1230, 6:1873 distinction from parties, 4:1220 goals, 4:1219 growing number of, 4:1219 health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 historical institutionalist view, 4:1227–1228 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1227 leaders, 6:1870 lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 members, 4:1219 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1229 organizational structures, 4:1221 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		9 .
political, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048 redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions; Regimes Institutions and institutionalism, 4:1202–1207 See also Institutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 See also European integration; Regional integration Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 systemic, 4:1216 theories, 4:1033–1034 Interest groups, 4:1219–1220 access to policymakers, 4:1224–1225 in consociational democracies, 2:555 corporatism and, 4:1222–1223, 5:1670, 5:1671, 5:16 definition, 4:1219–1220 democracy and, 4:1219, 4:1228–1230, 6:1873 distinction from parties, 4:1220 goals, 4:1219 growing number of, 4:1219 health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 historical institutionalist view, 4:1227–1228 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1221 leaders, 6:1870 lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 members, 4:1219 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1229 organizational structures, 4:1221 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229	• •	
redistributive, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2225 social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions; Regimes Institutions and institutionalism, 4:1202–1207 See also Institutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Regional integration Intellectuals property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 The lectuals and integration integration integration integration organizational structures, 4:1221 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		±
social, 4:1203 social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions; Regimes Institutions and institutionalism, 4:1202–1207 See also Institutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration Integration Integration Regional integration; Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectuals variables, 2:555 corporatism and, 4:1222–1223, 5:1670, 5:1671, 5:16 definition, 4:1229–1220, 4:1228–1230, 6:1873 definition, 4:1219, 4:1228–1230, 6:1873 distinction from parties, 4:1220 goals, 4:1219 growing number of, 4:1219 growing number of, 4:1219 health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1221 leaders, 6:1870 lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 members, 4:1219 monitoring function, 4:1229 organizational structures, 4:1221 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229	•	·
social movements and, 8:2435–2436 trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions; Regimes Institutions and institutionalism, 4:1202–1207 See also Institutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration Integration Integration Regional integration; Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 access to policymakers, 4:1224–1225 in consociational democracies, 2:555 corporatism and, 4:1222–1223, 5:1670, 5:1671, 5:166 definition, 4:1221–1220 democracy and, 4:1219, 4:1228–1230, 6:1873 distinction from parties, 4:1220 goals, 4:1219 growing number of, 4:1219 health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1221 leaders, 6:1870 lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 members, 4:1219 monitoring function, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1229 organizational structures, 4:1221 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		
trade policy and, 5:1327–1328 traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions; Regimes Institutions and institutionalism, 4:1202–1207 See also Institutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 See also European integration; Regional integration Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectuals in consociational democracies, 2:555 corporatism and, 4:1222–1223, 5:1670, 5:1671, 5:16 definition, 4:1219–1220 democracy and, 4:1219, 4:1220 goals, 4:1219 goals, 4:1219 growing number of, 4:1219 health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1221 leaders, 6:1870 lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 members, 4:1219 monitoring function, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1229 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
traditional, 2:354 See also Constitutions; Regimes Institutions and institutionalism, 4:1202–1207 See also Institutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 See also European integration Regional integration Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 corporatism and, 4:1222–1223, 5:1670, 5:1671, 5:167 definition, 4:1219–1220 democracy and, 4:1219, 4:1228–1230, 6:1873 distinction from parties, 4:1220 goals, 4:1219 growing number of, 4:1219 health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutionalist view, 4:1221 leaders, 6:1870 lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 members, 4:1219 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1229 organizational structures, 4:1221 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 puralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		
See also Constitutions; Regimes Institutions and institutionalism, 4:1202–1207 See also Institutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 See also European integration; Regional integration Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 definition, 4:1219–1220 democracy and, 4:1219, 4:1220 goals, 4:1219 growing number of, 4:1219 health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 historical institutionalist view, 4:1227–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1221 leaders, 6:1870 lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 members, 4:1219 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1229 organizational structures, 4:1221 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229	± , .	
Institutions and institutionalism, 4:1202–1207 See also Institutional theory Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 See also European integration; Regional integration Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectual row institutional institution from parties, 4:1220 distinction from parties, 4:1229 goals, 4:1219 goals, 4:1219 health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 historical institutionalist view, 4:1227–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 leaders, 6:1870 lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 members, 4:1219 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1223–1224 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		
See also Institutional theorydistinction from parties, 4:1220Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumentalgoals, 4:1219Instruments. See Policy instrumentsgrowing number of, 4:1219Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance;health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227-1228Unemployment insurancehistorical institutionalist view, 4:1227-1228Insurgencies, 5:1593-1594influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177-178See also Civil wars; Revolutionsinstitutional, 4:1219, 4:1221Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159leaders, 6:1870Integrationlobbying, 4:1225-1226, 4:1229economic, 4:972, 4:973-974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496members, 4:1219social, 6:1986mobilization, 4:1223-1224See also European integration; Political integration;monitoring function, 4:1229Regional integrationorganizational structures, 4:1221Intellectual property, 7:2141-2142party linkage, 6:1811-1812Intellectuals, 4:1208-1210pluralist view, 4:1221-1222, 4:1228-1229		
Instrumental variables. See Variables, instrumental Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectual property, 4:1228–1229, 4:1228–1229 Intellectual property, 4:1228–1229 Intellectual property, 4:1228–1229 Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectual property, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		
Instruments. See Policy instruments Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Insurance. See Policy instruments growing number of, 4:1219 health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 historical institutionalist view, 4:1221, 1:177–178 instruments. See Policy instruments health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 historical institutionalist view, 4:1221, 1:177–178 instruments. See Health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 historical institutionalist view, 4:1221, 1:177–178 instructional, 4:1227–1228 historical institutionalist view, 4:1221, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1221 headers, 6:1870 lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 members, 4:1219 members, 4:1219 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		
Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 Insurance. See Health policy; Social insurance; health policy field, 4:1063, 4:1227–1228 historical institutionalist view, 4:1227–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1221 leaders, 6:1870 lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 members, 4:1219 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1223–1224 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		
Unemployment insurance Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 See also Civil wars; Revolutions Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 Integration economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 historical institutionalist view, 4:1227–1228 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 institutional, 4:1219, 4:1221 leaders, 6:1870 lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 members, 4:1219 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1223–1224 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229	•	
Insurgencies, 5:1593–1594 influence on bureaucracy, 1:173, 1:174, 1:177–178 See also Civil wars; Revolutions institutional, 4:1219, 4:1221 Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 leaders, 6:1870 Integration lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 members, 4:1219 social, 6:1986 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 See also European integration; Political integration; monitoring function, 4:1229 Regional integration organizational structures, 4:1221 Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		
See also Civil wars; Revolutions institutional, 4:1219, 4:1221 Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 leaders, 6:1870 Integration lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 members, 4:1219 social, 6:1986 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 See also European integration; Political integration; monitoring function, 4:1229 Regional integration organizational structures, 4:1221 Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		
Integrated Implementation Model, 4:1158, 4:1159 leaders, 6:1870 Integration lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 members, 4:1219 social, 6:1986 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 See also European integration; Political integration; monitoring function, 4:1229 Regional integration organizational structures, 4:1221 Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		
Integration lobbying, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229 economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 members, 4:1219 social, 6:1986 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 See also European integration; Political integration; monitoring function, 4:1229 Regional integration organizational structures, 4:1221 Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		
economic, 4:972, 4:973–974, 4:977, 6:1986, 8:2496 social, 6:1986 See also European integration; Political integration; Regional integration Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 members, 4:1219 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 monitoring function, 4:1229 organizational structures, 4:1221 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		
social, 6:1986 mobilization, 4:1223–1224 See also European integration; Political integration; monitoring function, 4:1229 Regional integration organizational structures, 4:1221 Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		
See also European integration; Political integration; monitoring function, 4:1229 Regional integration organizational structures, 4:1221 Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		
Regional integrationorganizational structures, 4:1221Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142party linkage, 6:1811–1812Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		
Intellectual property, 7:2141–2142 party linkage, 6:1811–1812 Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		
Intellectuals, 4:1208–1210 pluralist view, 4:1221–1222, 4:1228–1229		
contemporary issues, 4:1209 policy networks approach, 4:1226–1227	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
engagement, 4:1208–1209 trade policy and, 5:1326, 5:1327, 7:2146, 8:2761		1 , 11 .
history of concept, 4 :1208 types, 4 :1220–1221		
neo-conservative, 4:1209 See also Advocacy; Labor movements;		
political roles, 4:1208–1210 Lobbying; Pluralist interest intermediation;		
in post-Cold War period, 4:1209 Social movements		

Interest intermediation. See Pluralist interest intermediation Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 4:1248	International human rights law (IHRL), 4:1239, 5:1381, 8:2626–2627
See also International organizations	International humanitarian law (IHL),
Intergovernmentalism, 4:1230–1233	4:1239, 5:1697
definition, 4:1230	International Institute for Strategic Studies
European integration and, 4:1230–1231, 4:1232, 7:2242	(IISS), 8:2726
judicial decision making, 5:1368	International institutions. See International organizations;
liberal, 4:1231–1232, 7:2242	Neoliberal institutionalism
local governments, 5:1464–1465	International justice. See International Criminal Court;
Interinstitutional accountability. See Accountability,	International law
interinstitutional	International Labour Organization (ILO), 3:840, 4:1170,
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	4:1171, 5:1633, 6:1714, 8:2680
(IBRD), 8:2755	International law, 4:1233–1244
See also World Bank	administrative, 5:1412
International Commission on Intervention and State	attitudes toward, 4:971, 4:972, 4:1241–1243
Sovereignty (ICISS), 5:1333	changes, 4:1234–1235
International comparative politics, 2:357	compliance and enforcement, 4:1234–1237, 4:1238
See also Comparative politics	criminal, 4: 1239–1240
International cooperation, 4:979, 4:981, 4:1012–1013,	customary, 4:1234
7:2382–2383	definition, 4:1233
See also Cooperation; Multilateralism; Security	economic, 4:1238
cooperation	environmental, 4: 1238, 4: 1241
International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS),	future of, 4: 1243
5:1412	history, 4 :1233, 4 :1276–1277, 5 :1377–1378
International Court of Justice (ICJ), 4:1012, 4:1234,	human rights, 4:1239, 5:1381, 8:2626–2627
4:1235–1236, 5:1632, 7:2122, 8:2680	humanitarian, 4: 1239, 5: 1697
International courts (ICs)	impact on states' behavior, 4:1240–1241
ad hoc, 4:1237	influence in international relations field, 1:lxiv
definition, 5:1379	international system and, 5:1324
global governance and, 4:1012	judicialization, 5:1377–1382
growth, 4:1235, 5:1378–1379	Law of the Sea, 4:1238–1239, 4:1243
rulings, 5:1379, 5:1380	legalization, 4:1241
supranational, 5:1368	private, 4: 1233
war crimes trials, 4:1111, 4:1112, 8:2665	sources, 4:1233–1234
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	Third World approaches, 4:1242
(ICCPR), 4:1109, 4:1111, 8:2626, 8:2627	UN Conventions, 4:967, 4:1234
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural	use of force, 4:1236, 4:1237–1238
Rights (ICESCR), 4:1109, 7:2319	war justifications, 6:1759
International Criminal Court (ICC)	See also International courts
complementarity, 4:1236	International Monetary Fund (IMF),
establishment, 4:968, 4:1236, 6:1731, 8:2665, 8:2683	4:1244–1248
global governance and, 4:1012	conditionality, 2:383, 2:384
jurisdiction, 4: 1111, 4: 1236	criticism of, 4:1244, 4:1247–1248
war crimes trials, 4: 1111, 4: 1112	development assistance, 3:912
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL),	establishment, 4:1245, 4:1280, 5:1619
7:2382	evolution of role, 3:703, 4:1245–1247
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia	functions, 4: 1244, 4: 1245–1246
(ICTY), 4:967, 4:1237, 6:1731, 8:2665	goals, 3:701, 3:703, 4:1244
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 4:967, 4:968,	governance of, 4 :1245, 4 :1247–1248, 5 :1423
4: 1237, 8: 2665	lending, 5:1621, 8:2498
International Development Association (IDA), 8:2755,	managing directors, 4:1247
8:2756, 8:2757	membership, 4:1245
International economic law (IEL), 4:1238	protests at meetings, 8:2440
International Federation of Data Archives	structural adjustment programs, 8:2660
(IFDO), 6: 1778	structure, 4:1245
International financial institutions. See International Monetary Fund; World Bank	Washington Consensus, 2:382, 2:403–404, 3:634, 4:1246 5:1440, 5:1678
International governmental organizations (IGOs),	International monetary orders. See Bretton Woods system;
4:1011–1012, 4:1013, 5:1633, 8:2439–2440	Monetary relations

International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs),	measurement, 4:1269-1270
2:581, 4:1248, 4:1249, 4:1257–1258, 4:1270–1271,	public diplomacy and, 4:1269
5:1706, 8:2440	statistical research methods used, 4:1268
See also Nongovernmental organizations	technological change and, 4:1270
International organizations (IOs), 4:1248–1259	See also Cross-national surveys; Public opinion
accountability, 1:10	International regimes, 4:1271–1274
autonomy, 4:1256	arms control, 5:1634, 7:2387–2388
bureaucracies, 1:10, 4:1250, 4:1251	benefits, 5:1437
decision making, 2:404, 4:1253	compliance, 2:369
defining features, 4:1248	constructivist view, 4:1273, 4:1274
functions, 4:1252–1254	definition, 4:1271
governance, 4:1238, 5:1423–1424, 5:1621	empirical study, 4: 1273–1274
growth, 3:665–666	environmental, 2:369, 2:448, 3:777, 3:790, 4:1238,
	4:1241, 5:1667–1668, 8:2651
historical development, 4:1249–1250, 5:1632–1633, 8:2677–2678	
	hegemonic stability theory, 4:975, 4:1252, 4:1260–1261, 4:1272
influence, 4:1254–1257, 5:1378	
intergovernmentalism and, 4:1231, 4:1232	human rights, 4:1104, 4:1106, 4:1109–1112, 4:1239,
legitimacy, 5:1423–1424	5:1374, 5:1569, 5:1631
managing globalization, 4:981–982	impact, 7:2107
number of, 4:1249	issue-specific, 4:1261, 5:1633
purposes, 4:1251–1252, 5:1321	levels, 7:2387
security apparatus, 7:2382–2383	liberal view, 5:1436–1437
social cohesion policies, 8:2421–2422, 8:2423	natural resources management, 5:1667–1668
soft law, 8:2462–2463	neoliberal view, 4:1272–1273, 5:1437, 5:1674
study of, 4:1250–1251, 4:1254–1257, 4:1261–1262	neorealist view, 5:1437
theories, 5:1636–1637	realist view, 4:1272
types, 4:1248	security, 7:2387–2388
See also Multilateralism	theories, 4:1012–1013
International political economy (IPE), 4:1259–1268	International Regimes Database, 4:1273
American school, 4:1259–1262, 4:1264, 4:1266,	International relations (IR)
4:1267, 6:1984	cognition and emotional factors, 7:2148–2151
Asian scholarship, 4:1265, 4:1266	developing world and, 3:641–642
British school, 4:1259, 4:1262–1265, 4:1266, 4:1267	distinction from comparative politics, 2:342, 2:357
definitions, 4:1259	states as actors, 8:2752
feminist view, 3:909–910	subject matter, 4:1274, 4:1284, 4:1289, 4:1297–1298,
French view, 4:1265	4:1310-1312
future of, 4:1266–1267	International relations, history, 4:1274–1286
journals, 4:1264	debates, 4:1279, 4:1280, 4:1281, 4:1283, 4:1284, 4:1289
Latin American, 4:1265–1266	interwar period, 4:1277–1279, 4:1288
monetary relations, 5:1618–1619	methodologies, 4:1281, 4:1312–1314
other social sciences disciplines and, 4:1266	philosophical forebears, 4:1274–1277, 4:1288
trade liberalization, 8:2637	post-Cold War period, 4:1283-1285
See also Political economy	postwar period and Cold War, 4:1279–1283,
International Political Science Abstracts, 6:2018	4:1288–1289
International Political Science Association (IPSA)	World War I and, 4:1274, 4:1278–1279
biology and politics movement, 1:151	International relations, theory, 4:1286–1297
Committee on Political Sociology, 6:2023	communitarianism, 2:328
establishment, 1:lxiv, 4:1093, 6:2016, 6:2017	conflict resolution, 2:392
human rights section, 4:1105	debates, 2:426–427, 4:1289, 4:1296, 4:1303, 4:1308
languages used, 6:2019	green, 4: 1294
members, 6:2017–2018	historical perspective, 4:1287–1290, 6:1727
publications, 6:2018	international law and, 1:lxiv
Research Committees, 4:1096, 6:1804, 6:2018	issues, 4:1294–1296
secretariat, 6:2019	Marxism, 3:642-643, 4:1291-1292, 6:1839
World Congresses, 6:2017	meanings, 4:1287
International Political Science Review, 6:2018	parsimony, 7:2209–2210
International public opinion, 4:1268–1271	plurality, 4:1289-1290, 4:1307-1308
comparative surveys, 4: 1268–1269, 4: 1270	politics and, 1:lv-lvi
future of, 4: 1270–1271	postcolonialism, 4:1293–1294

postpositivism, 4:1287, 4:1289	historical evolution, 5:1323–1324
poststructuralism, 4:1283, 4:1293	structure, 5:1323
revolutionary approach, 4:1282	units, 5:1323
scope, 4:1286, 4:1287, 4:1289, 4:1294–1295	See also Westphalian state system
trends, 4: 1296–1297	International trade, 5:1325–1331
See also Constructivism in international relations; Critical	agricultural, 6:1846
theory in international relations; English school;	conflict deterrence, 5:1330
Feminist theory in international relations; Liberalism	definition, 5:1325
in international relations; Normative theory in	economic growth and, 4:977
international relations; Realism in international	foreign investment and, 5:1331
relations; World systems theory	free trade, 5:1326-1327
International relations as field of study, 4:1297–1315	future of, 5: 1330–1331
academic departments, 4:1278, 4:1288	politics of, 5:1328–1330
alternative terms, 4:1298	sanctions, 3:706
associations, 4:1105, 4:1300-1301, 4:1311-1312,	See also Trade liberalization; Trade policy; Trade theory
6: 2016, 6: 2018	International Trade Commission (ITC), 2:550
debates, 4:1307-1309	Internet
in Europe, 4:1299, 4:1300, 4:1301, 4:1302, 4:1303	citizens' communication with government,
expansion, 4:1309–1314	3: 597–598, 5: 1534
intellectual structure, 4:1299, 4:1306	cyber democracy, 3:597-598, 5:1540
journals, 4:1299, 4:1300, 4:1302, 4:1303, 4:1305-1306	direct democracy, 2:585
marginalized communities, 4:1303-1304	global communication, 6:1939
methodologies, 4:1281, 4:1312-1314	history, 5:1533–1534
national schools, 4:1301-1302	news sites, 5:1542, 6:1713
non-Western, 4:1302, 4:1303-1304, 4:1306, 4:1310	personalization of politics and, 6:1859
paradigms, 4:1282, 4:1289, 4:1307-1309	political activity, 5:1534, 5:1538
research agenda, 4:1310-1312	political communication, 5:1533–1534, 5:1538, 5:1542,
scope, 4:1309–1314	6: 1859, 6: 1966
size, 4:1299, 4:1310	political mobilization, 5:1538, 5:1593, 6:1859
social structure, 4:1295, 4:1299, 4:1304-1306	public diplomacy using, 3:668
in Switzerland, 4: 1278	role of nongovernmental organizations, 5:1705
in United Kingdom, 4:1278	social media, 3:668
in United States, 4:1278, 4:1299, 4:1300-1301, 4:1302	survey research, 5:1559, 7:2170, 8:2567, 8:2573
See also Foreign Policy Analysis	See also Media, electronic
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP),	INTERPOL (International Criminal Police Organization),
2: 506, 6: 1778, 7: 2357	7:2382
International society, 4:1315–1319	Interpretivism, 8:2605–2606
definition, 4:1315	Intersectionality, 4:963–964
English school view, 4:1289, 4:1291, 4:1315–1316,	Interstate system, 8:2752
5:1320	See also International system; Westphalian ideal state
institutions, 4: 1316–1317	Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research
international system and, 5:1324	(ICPSR), 1:55, 2:507, 6:2015–2016
of states, 4:1301	Interventions, 5:1331–1334
thinkers, 4: 1317–1318	conflict with self-determination, 8:2394
International Sociological Association, 6:2023	conflict with state sovereignty, 5:1332, 5:1335, 5:1336
International solidarity, 5:1320–1322	debates, 5:1332, 5:1437-1438
existence of, 5:1320	definition, 5:1331
international order, 5:1321–1322	goals, 5:1331–1332, 5:1437–1438
mutual empowerment, 5:1320–1321	liberal views, 5:1437–1438
nonstate actors, 5:1321, 5:1322	military, 5:1331, 6:1729, 6:2061, 8:2676–2677
See also Alliances; Solidarity	self-defense justifications, 5:1332–1333
International Studies Association (ISA), 4:1105,	by superpowers, 2:396
4:1300–1301, 4:1311–1312, 6:2018	unilateral, 8:2676–2677
International Studies Conference (ISC), 6:2016	See also Wars
International system, 5:1322–1325	Interventions, humanitarian, 5:1334–1337
changes in, 5:1324–1325	definition, 5:1334
critiques of concept, 5:1325	genocide cases, 7:2366
definition, 5:1322–1323	increase in, 5:1332, 5:1333, 5:1335
future of, 5:1324–1325	justifications, 5:1332, 5:1438, 6:1729, 6:1730

legal basis, 4:1237, 5:1333, 5:1335 norms, 5:1332, 5:1333	Islamic revolution, 3:938, 7:2290, 7:2316–2317 totalitarianism, 1:109, 3:656
opposition to, 5:1335–1336	
origins, 5:1335	Iraq containment policy, 2:432
responsibility to protect, 5:1333, 5:1334,	Gulf War (1991), 7:2366, 8:2676
5:1336–1337, 6:1838	invasion of Kuwait, 7:2366
strategic use, 5:1333–1334	Islamist movements, 5:1354
tensions, 5:1334, 5:1438	militias, 5:1579–1580
See also Peacekeeping	nuclear facilities, 7:2121, 7:2122
Interviewing, 5:1337–1340	sanctions on, 3:708
advantages, 8:2571–2572	U.S. invasion, 3:708, 3:711, 3:784, 4:1057, 4:1237–1238,
analysis, 5:1345	4:1285, 6:1730, 7:2121–2122, 8:2653, 8:2676
definition, 5:1337	IRAs. See Independent regulatory agencies
ethnographic methods, 5:1338	Ireland
fieldwork, 3:834, 5:1338	church–state relationship, 1:235
methodological issues, 5:1339	constitution, 1:235
in-person, 8:2567, 8:2571–2572	neutrality policy, 5:1697
in political science, 5:1337–1340	parties, 3:733, 4:1053, 6:1792
public opinion polls, 7:2170–2171	referenda, 2:561
questions, 5:1338, 5:1342	Irish Republican Army (IRA), 6:1798, 8:2596
semistructured, 5:1339, 5:1342	Iron law of oligarchy, 3:768, 5:1502, 6:1740, 6:1741,
techniques, 5:1338, 7:2170–2171	6:2025, 7:2225
by telephone, 8:2567, 8:2572	Iron triangles, 1:31, 6:1922, 6:1937
See also Survey research	Irredentism, 5:1346–1348
Interviews, elite, 5:1340–1343	conflicts caused, 5:1346, 8:2711
access, 5:1342	definition, 5:1346
conducting, 5:1342–1343	examples, 5:1346–1347
definition, 5:1340	explanations, 5:1347
distinction from expert interviews, 5:1344	in former Soviet states, 2:395, 2:398
objectives, 5:1340–1341	justifications, 8:2394
samples, 5:1341	Irrigation hypothesis, 8:2508
semistructured, 5:1339, 5:1342	ISA. See International Studies Association
structures, 5:1342	ISC. See International Studies Conference
Interviews, expert, 5:1343–1346	ISI. See Import substitution industrialization
access, 5:1344–1345	Islam, 5:1348-1353
analysis, 5:1345	citizenship and, 5:1572, 5:1631
conducting, 5:1344–1345	conflicts within, 5:1351, 5:1352
definition, 5:1343	culture, 3:939–940, 3:942
ethical issues, 5:1345–1346	democracy and, 1:114-115, 1:237, 3:603,
gender in, 5:1345	3:626–627, 7:2261
history, 5:1344	education, 5:1432
interviewers, 5:1345	in Europe, 5:1630, 5:1631, 7:2373–2374
purposes, 5:1344	expansion, 5:1350
samples, 5:1344	fatwas, 8:2600
Investment	fundamentalist movements, 3:935, 3:936, 3:937, 3:938
educational, 3:829	global community, 5:1348, 8:2505
social, 8:2743	history, 5:1349–1350
See also Foreign investment	holy wars, 5:1350, 6:1758, 6:1838
Ionescu, Ghita, 7:2077	identity, 3:942
Os. See International organizations	in India, 7:2264
IPE. See International political economy	jihad, 5:1352, 6:1838
IPP. See Index of Political Predisposition	Koran, 5:1349, 6:1758, 8:2600
IPSA. See International Political	lack of religious freedom, 5:1433
Science Association	pacifism and, 6:1758
IR. See International relations	peace, 7:2078
IRA. See Irish Republican Army	philosophy, 6: 1989, 6: 1990, 6: 1991, 6: 1998
Iran	politics and, 1:lii, 1:lv, 5:1348–1353
Basij Militia, 5:1579	relations with Judaism, 5:1364
Islamic republic, 1:109, 3:944, 7:2290, 7:2315, 8:2600	relationship with states, 1:236–237, 5:1350–1352

secularism and, 5:1350, 5:1351, 5:1352 sharia law, 1:lii, 1:236, 1:237, 5:1349, 5:1351, 5:1352, 5:1423, 5:1631 Shi'a, 5:1349–1350, 7:2315 Sunni, 5:1349–1350	ISSP. See International Social Survey Programme Issue networks, 4:1227, 6:1922, 6:1937, 6:1938 Issue voting, 3:727, 3:742–743 Italian fascism Blackshirts, 3:891
See also Muslims	communist party outlawed by, 2:318
Islamic states	corporativism, 2:462
caliphates, 5:1349–1350	development, 3:887, 3:890, 3:893
dictatorships, 3:656	dictatorship, 3:654
Iran as, 1:109, 3:656, 3:944	ideology, 3:889
legitimacy, 5:1423	opposition, 8:2628, 8:2633
organizations, 5:1349	organization and methods, 3:888, 3:890
prospects for democracy, 3:626–627, 5:1423, 7:2261	sanctions on regime, 3:707
republics, 7:2290	statism, 8:2514
role in world politics, 5:1352	totalitarianism, 8:2628, 8:2631
sharia law, 5:1349	World War I and, 3:891
tolerance of other religions, 8:2625	Italy
See also individual countries	alliance with Germany, 1:6 0
Islamism	Christian Democratic party, 1:228–229, 1:230, 1:231,
definition, 3:603	2:412, 6:1742, 6:1743, 6:1795, 6:1799
ideology, 5:1349, 5:1351	city-states, 1:130–131, 6:1832–1833, 7:2289
moderate, 3:605, 3:606, 5:1353–1354	coalition governments, 6: 1742, 6: 1799
modern, 3:606, 5:1352	communist party, 2:312, 2:317, 2:318, 3:734, 6:1743,
radical, 3:605	6: 1795, 6: 1797
Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP),	corruption scandals, 2:477
Turkey, 3:605	judiciary, 5:1386
Islamist movements, 5:1353–1356	media, 5:1538
challenges, 5:1356	nation building, 6:1 977
characteristics, 5:1353	nationalism, 5:1654
democracy and, 3:604-606, 3:943	parliamentary system, 6: 1768
in Egypt, 7:2266–2268	parties, 4: 1053, 6: 1795, 6: 1797, 6: 1798, 6: 1802–1803,
fear of, 1:116	6:1858–1859
goals, 8:2600	political cultures, 6:1 975, 6:1 977
holy wars, 6: 1838	regional governments, 5:1464, 6:1974
in Middle East and North Africa, 3:604–606, 5:1351,	security apparatus, 7:2380–2381
5:1354–1356, 7:2264	social capital, 1:247
political participation, 3:604-606, 5:1354-1356	trade unions, 6:1795
political parties, 3:941, 3:942	ITC. See International Trade Commission
repression, 1:116	Item-response (Rasch) models, 5:1356-1359
social welfare activities, 3:605, 7:2266–2267	definition, 5:1356
terrorism, 3:938, 3:941, 5:1352, 5:1594, 7:2262, 8:2598	estimation, 5:1358
variations, 3:942, 5:1353–1354	probability models, 5:1356-1357, 5:1358-1359
See also Al Qaeda; Fundamentalist movements, Islamic;	use in political science, 5:1357–1358
Muslim Brotherhood	Iversen, Torben, 6:1981, 6:1984
Isocrates, 4:1050	
Isolationism, 4:1218	Jackson, Paul, 8:2736
Israel	Jackson, Robert, 4:1291, 8:2511
Arab population, 8:2767	Jahn, Detlef, 3:795-796
conflict with Palestinians, 2:395-396, 7:2265-2266,	Jainism, 6:1757
8:2767	James, William, 4:1132, 6:1867
democracy, 3:602	Janis, Irving, 4:1057, 4:1058–1059, 6:2003
founding, 2:395, 8:2765, 8:2767	Japan
Jewish fundamentalists, 7:2263, 7:2264,	anarchism, 1:74
7:2265–2266	Buddhism, 1:163
parties, 3:732, 3:733	civil service, 6:2068
preemptive strikes, 7:2121	corporativism, 2:462–463
religious parties, 7:2265-2266	corruption scandals, 2:477
wars, 3:638, 5:1350, 5:1351, 7:2149	exports, 3:702
See also Zionism	immigration policies, 5:1571

imperialism, 5:1661	pacifism and, 6:1758
industrialization, 3:702	peace, 7:2078
Liberal Democratic Party, 6:1742, 6:1743	rabbis, 5:1364, 5:1365
monarchy, 5:1616	Reform, 5:1364–1365
nationalism, 5:1661	relations with Christianity and Islam, 5:1364
revisionism, 7:2310	socialism and, 5:1365
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Jay, John, 8:2406	Talmud, 5:1363–1364
See also Federalist Papers	See also Jews; Zionism
JDM. See Judicial decision making	Judges 4.10, 5.1254, 5.1204, 5.1205, 1204
Jefferson, Thomas, 3:754, 3:825, 6:1720, 6:1721,	appointments, 1:19, 5:1376, 5:1384, 5:1385–1386
7:2295, 8:2395	roles, 5:1375
Jehovah's Witnesses, 6:1721	See also Judiciary
Jellinek, George, 8:2753	Judicial accountability, 1:5, 1:6-7, 4:1008
Jenkins-Smith, Hank, 1:33–34, 1:36, 4:999	Judicial councils, 5:1385
Jervis, Robert, 7:2149, 8:2655	Judicial decision making (JDM), 5:1366–1369
Jesse, Eckhard, 7:2201	behavioral model, 5:1367
Jessop, Bob, 5:1554	case-by-case, 5: 1376–1377
Jews	comparative analysis, 5:1367–1368
anti-Semitism, 3:889, 3:890, 3:895, 8:2765	legal model, 5:1366-1367
Ashkenazic, 5:1364	neo-institutionalism, 5:1367
assimilation, 4:1085	normative approach, 5:1366–1367
Bund, 8:2766	political influences, 5:1371, 5:1377
diaspora, 3:651, 5:1364, 8:2766	rational choice analysis, 5:1367
identity, 4:1085	supranational courts, 5:1368
in Muslim states, 8:2625	Judicial discretion, 5:1376, 5:1387
nationalism, 8:2766	
	Judicial independence, 5:1369–1372
Sephardic, 5:1364	as accountability mechanism, 1:6–7
See also Holocaust; Judaism; Zionism	appointments of judges, 1:19, 5:1376
Jiang Zemin, 3:595, 3:598	comparative analysis, 5:1368
Jidah, al-, 7:2267	credible commitment, 2:488
Job, Brian, 7:2391	criticism of, 5:1387
John, Peter, 6:1942	definition, 5:1369–1370
Johnson, Lyndon B., 4:1059, 4:1157, 7:2160, 7:2366	external, 5:1384
Johnson, Mark, 3:686–687	formal guarantees, 5:1369, 5:1383, 5:1385
Johnston, Richard, 6:1810	lack of, 5:1384
Joint-decision traps, 5:1361–1363	protecting, 5:1370–1371
avoiding, 5:1362	purposes, 5:1371–1372, 5:1383
consequences, 5:1361–1362, 7:2108	rule of law and, 7:2340
definition, 5:1361	threats to, 5:1370-1371
Jonas, Hans, 6: 1733	in United Kingdom, 8:2404
Jones, Bryan, 1:164, 6:1903–1904	in United States, 1:19, 5:1371
Jones, Seth G., 8:2597	See also Separation of powers
Joppke, Christian, 4:1149–1150	Judicial review, 5:1372–1375
Jordan, 3:605, 5:1354–1356	administrative, 5:1372
Jordan, Andrew, 4:1023	controversies, 5:1372
Jordan, Grant, 6:1902, 6:1903, 6:1904, 6:1922	definition, 5:1372
Journalism. See Media	forms, 5:1374, 5:1383
Juan Carlos I, King, 5:1616	historical evolution, 5:1372–1373, 8:2406
Judaism, 5:1363–1366	
· ·	legislatures and, 8:2720
beliefs, 5:1363	scope, 1:6-7
challenges, 5:1365	spread, 5:1373–1374
exilic, 5:1363–1364	transnational, 5:1374
festivals, 5:1365	Judicial systems, 5:1375–1377
fundamentalists, 3:936, 3:937, 3:938, 7:2263, 7:2264,	appellate courts, 5:1375, 5:1376, 5:1412
7:2265–2266	court jurisdictions, 5:1375–1376
history, 5:1363–1364	effectiveness, 5:1377
law, 5:1364	functions, 5:1376
modernity and, 5:1364-1366	judges, 5:1375
Orthodox, 5:1365	law making, 5:1376, 5:1377

organizational structures, 5:1375–1376, 5:1384–1386	Kaase, Max, 1:93 Kach, 7:2266
politics and, 5:1376	•
pretrial practices, 5:1375	Kagan, Robert, 6:2062
rules, 5:1375	Kahane, Meir, 7:2266
trials, 5:1375	Kahane Chai, 7:2266
Judicialization of international relations,	Kahn, Herman, 8:2543
5:1377-1382	Kahneman, Daniel, 7:2143, 7:2145, 7:2149
definition, 5:1377	Kaldor, Mary, 8:2551
effects, 5:1379–1380, 5:1381–1382	Kallen, Horace, 6:1867, 6:1869, 6:1871
historical evolution, 5:1377–1379	Kalyvas, Stathis N., 1:227, 8:2711
issue areas, 5:1380–1381	Kant, Immanuel, 5:1399–1401
Judicialization of politics, 5:1377, 5:1379,	categorical imperative, 5:1392–1393, 5:1435–1436
5:1386-1387	cosmopolitan law, 5:1436
Judiciary, 5:1382–1388	Critique of Pure Reason, 1:lvii, 5:1399
accountability, 1:5, 1:6–7, 4:1008, 5:1372	democratic peace theory and, 5:1435–1436
in authoritarian regimes, 5:1384	on ending wars, 6:1 730
bureaucratic and professional, 5:1384–1385	on equality, 3:803–804, 3:811
changes, 5:1385–1386	ethics, 3:824, 3:825
in constitutional states, 5:1383–1384	idealism, 4:1126
definition, 5:1382	on law, 5:1400
discretionary powers, 3:678, 5:1387	liberalism, 5:1434, 5:1435, 5:1436
legalization of policy, 5:1411–1414	moral theory, 5:1433, 5:1438, 6:1724, 6:1732
legitimacy, 5:1368, 5:1387	on perception of world, 3:796–797
in political systems, 5:1386–1387	political philosophy, 5:1399–1401, 5:1435
power, 5:1384, 5:1386–1387	on social contract, 2:442, 2:443
in totalitarian regimes, 5:1384	utopianism, 8:2687
See also International courts	on war, 6: 2060–2061
Juergensmeyer, Mark, 7:2262	See also Perpetual Peace
Jung, Carl, 6: 2000	Kaplan, Abraham, 7:2101
Just war theory, 6:1729, 6:1730, 6:1731, 6:1758,	Kaplan, Robert, 4:1284, 4:1285
6:1837–1838, 7:2120	Karl, Terry L., 4:1114–1115
Justice, 5:1388–1398	Kateb, George, 4:1177
concept, 5:1388	Katz, Elihu, 5:1535, 5:1536
corrective, 6: 1731–1732	Katz, Jonathan, 8:2617
criteria, 5:1388–1389	Katzenstein, Peter, 4:1262, 6:1983, 7:2246
distributive, 3:810–812, 6:1721–1722, 6:1732	Kautilya, 6:2051
environmental, 6:1733	Kautsky, Karl, 5:1499
equality and, 3:803, 3:810-812	Kavanagh, Dennis, 5:1532–1533, 6:1964
as fairness, 3:827, 6:1724	Kavelin, Konstantin, 3:611
global, 6: 1731–1733	Keck, Margaret, 1:39
importance, 5:1388	Kellogg-Briand Pact, 6:1838
inductive approach, 5:1389–1390	Kelsen, Hans, 6:1734, 7:2274, 7:2280-2281
legitimacy and, 5:1395–1397	Kennan, George F., 2:431, 2:432, 2:433, 3:784, 4:1280
meanings, 5:1388–1389	Kennedy, John F., 4:1059, 4:1212, 4:1213, 6:1858,
negative approach, 5:1390–1391	7:2154, 7:2366
normative theory, 6:1731–1733	Kent, Sherman, 7:2369
public reasons, 5:1394–1395	Kenyatta, Jomo, 1:39, 1:41
Rawls on, 2:437, 2:444, 2:445, 2:446, 3:816,	Keohane, Robert O.
3:827, 4:1175, 6:1718, 6:1721–1722, 6:1724,	critique of realist theory, 3:692-693
6:1727, 6:1732	on hegemony, 4:1070, 4:1283
retributive, 5:1389	on historical institutionalism, 2:347
reversibility, 5:1394, 5:1395	on interdependence, 4:1216–1218, 4:1260
social, 3:810–811	on international institutions, 4:1015, 4:1289
solidarity and, 8:2466	on multilateralism, 5:1437
theories, 3:810, 5:1388–1391	neo-institutionalism, 4:1291, 8:2659
universal jurisdiction, 8:2665	on power, 7:2111
universalism, 3:827, 5:1390–1394	on September 11 attacks, 6:1728
utilitarian, 5:1389	Key, V. O., Jr., 1:138, 3:725, 6:1800
See also Transitional justice	Keynes, John Maynard, 3:704, 3:705, 8:2658, 8:2761

Khmer Rouge, 2:311, 4:1112	migrants, 4:1147, 5:1569
Khrushchev, Nikita, 2:311, 2:319, 4:1282, 7:2312, 8:2484,	sweatshop conditions, 5:1643
8:2485, 8:2631	training, 6:1981
Kim Il Sung, 2:311, 8:2477	See also Division of labor; Policy, employment; Public
Kindleberger, Charles, 4:1070, 4:1260–1261, 5:1619	employment
King, Gary, 2:347	Labor markets, 1:187–188, 1:189, 6:1885, 6:1888–1889
Kingdon, John, 6:1906, 6:1921, 6:1922	Labor movements, 5:1403–1408
Kirchheimer, Otto, 4:1094, 6:1800, 6:1821, 7:2281	anarcho-syndicalism, 1:76, 2:315, 6:1796, 6:1869
Kirk, Russell, 2:407–408	associations of unions, 4:1221
Kiser, Larry, 6:1948	collective mobilization, 5:1403, 5:1405–1406, 8:2434
Kissinger, Henry, 2:431, 3:636–637, 3:638, 3:847	communism and, 2:310
Kiviet, Jan, 8:2618	definition, 5:1403
Kjellén, Johann Rudolf, 4:969, 4:970–971, 4:1276,	future of, 5:1407–1408
8:2514, 8:2515	goals, 5:1403, 5:1405, 5:1406
Klanfer, Jean, 8:2429	historical evolution, 5:1405–1406
Kleptocracy, 2:477	Marxist, 5:1403–1404
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, 4:1102, 4:1103	pacifism and, 6:1759
Kluckhohn, Clyde, 8:2691	parties associated with, 4:1223, 5:1405, 6:1794,
Kmenta, Jan, 8:2616–2617	6:1795, 6:1796
Knight, Frank, 7:2322	radical, 7:2200
Knoke, David, 5:1693	representation, 5:1406–1407
Kołakowski, Leszek, 7:2312	revolutionary syndicalism, 5:1404
Kohl, Helmut, 6:1858	socialism and, 2:315, 5:1405, 8:2451, 8:2452, 8:2454
Kohn, Hans, 5:1654, 5:1656, 5:1661, 8:2629	theories, 5:1403–1405
Kojève, Alexandre, 4:1279, 6:1733–1734	See also Trade unions
Kolakowski, Leszek, 8:2634	Laboratory experiments. See Experiments, laboratory
Kolm, Serge, 3:805, 3:811, 3:815	Labour Party (U.K.), 3:732, 3:748, 6:1743, 6:1796, 6:1858
Komintern. See Communist International	6:1868, 7:2155, 8:2424–2425, 8:2429
Kondratieff, Nikolai, 8:2759	Laclau, Ernesto, 3:674, 4:1071–1072, 4:1195,
Koran, 5:1349, 6:1758, 8:2600	6:1880, 6:1884
Korea. See North Korea; South Korea	Laffer, Arthur, 8:2659
Korean religions, 1:163	Laitin, David, 4:1190
Korean War, 8:2406, 8:2407, 8:2681	Lakin, James, 6:1979
Kornhauser, William, 5:1503–1504	Lakoff, George, 3:686–687
Kosovo, 2:395, 3:840, 4:1112, 4:1237, 5:1333, 5:1346,	Lambert, Johann Heinrich, 2:539
8:2653, 8:2677	Land. See Territory
See also Serbia; Yugoslavia	Land mines, 3:671
Krasner, Stephen, 4:1271, 8:2659	Landis, James M., 2:548
Krause, George, 1:119–120	Lane, Jan-Eric, 1:55
Krehbiel, Keith, 7:2153	Lane, Robert E., 3:717
Kreps, Sarah, 8:2676	Language
Kreye, Otto, 3:632	constructivist view, 6:1879
Kropotkin, Peter, 1:73, 1:76, 3:610	culturalist view, 2:512–513
Krueger, Anne, 5:1327	diversity, 7:2069, 7:2071
Kruskal, Joseph, 7:2355	essentialism, 7:2208–2209
Kuhn, Thomas, 6:1763	explicitness, 7:2192
Kuran, Timor, 8:2710	official, 5:1656, 7:2070, 7:2071
Kuwait, Islamist movements, 5:1354, 5:1355	Oriental, 6:1752–1754
Kyoto Protocol, 2:448, 4:1238, 8:2651	postcolonialism and, 7:2087
I P (c) fc: 1 7 2202	societal context, 3:687
La Boétie, Étienne de, 7:2293	spatial, 8:2472
Laakso, Markku, 2:361	written, 7:2069–2070
Laakso-Taagepera Index of the Effective Number of Parties,	See also Concept formation; Discourse analysis; Political
2:361, 6:1822 Labond Paul 7:2279	communication; Politics of language
Labard, Paul, 7:2279	Language acts, 2:370–371
Labor alienation, 1:58	Language policies, 5:1656, 7:2069, 7:2070–2071
	Laplace, Simon, 8:2521
in capitalist economies, 1:187–188, 1:189 globalization effects, 4:977–978, 4:980–981, 5:1671	Lasch, Christopher, 4: 1174 Laski, Harold, 4: 1091, 4: 1092, 6: 1867, 6: 1868–1869
giobalization effects, 4:2//-2/0, 4:200-201, 3:10/1	Laski, Hatulu, 7:1071, 7:1072, 0:1007, 0:1000-1009

Lassalle, Ferdinand, 8:2452	Islamic, 1:lii, 1:236, 1:237, 5:1349, 5:1351, 5:1352,
Lassen, David D., 1:165	5:1423, 5:1631
Lasswell, Harold D.	Jewish, 5:1364
as APSA president, 1:138	legislative process, 6:1772–1773
on elites, 3: 768	political science and, 1:lxii, 1:lxiv, 1:lxv
on leadership, 5:1409	positive, 8:2487–2488
policy analysis, 3:861	rule and, 8:2487
on policy making steps, 6:1905	See also International law; Judicial review; Natural law;
on policy science, 6:1894, 6:1941, 6:1950	Rule of law
on political class, 6:1955	Law enforcement. See Crime; Police; Security apparatus
on political communication, 6:1961, 6:1963	Law of the Sea, 4:1238–1239, 4:1243
politics definition, 4:994	Lawler, Peter, 7:2079
on power, 7:2101	Lazarsfeld, Paul, 1:84, 3:725, 5:1534, 5:1535, 5:1537,
propaganda study, 5:1531, 6:2056	6:1774, 6:1778–1779, 6:1961–1962, 6:1963
on psychopathology, 6:2000	Le Bon, Gustave, 5:1503, 6:2000
redistribution, 7:2224	Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 3:734, 6:1797
research, 4:1093	Leadership, 5:1408–1411
stages model, 6:1940, 8:2479–2480	caudillismo, 1:201–203, 3:654, 5:1616, 7:2076
Latin America	definition, 5:1408
anarchism, 1:74	democratic, 5:1410–1411
authoritarian corporativism, 2:462	Foreign Policy Analysis research, 3:922
authoritarian regimes, 1:111, 1:114	"Great Man" theory, 1:225
caudillismo, 1:201–203, 3:654, 7:2076	legal-rational, 5:1409
Christian Democratic parties, 1:227, 1:231	personalistic rule, 3:623–624, 3:655
civil services, 1:255	personality and, 5:1411, 6:2001–2002
civil wars, 1:265	personality cults, 8:2457, 8:2460, 8:2484
communist parties, 2:319	personalization, 5:1411, 5:1540
debt crises, 1:219	political, 5:1408–1411
democracies, 2:590	research on, 5:1408–1410
democratization, 2:351–352, 2:354, 3:655,	theories, 5:1409
3:658, 5:1441	traditional, 5:1409
dependency theory, 3:628–633	warlords, 8:2734–2736
dictatorships, 3:656	See also Charisma; Crisis management; Presidents; Prime
fascist movements, 3:888	ministers
foreign investment regulations, 5:1642	League of Nations
green parties, 4:1052	collective security elements, 2:299
historical memory, 4:1080	criticism of, 4:971, 4:1279
independence from Spanish rule, 1:201–202, 5:1648,	establishment, 8:2678
7:2290	failures, 4:1278–1279, 5:1633, 8:2678
international political economy, 4:1265–1266	goals, 4:1237, 5:1633
MERCOSUR, 3:841–842, 5:1633, 6:1985, 7:2238,	idealism and, 4:1129
7:2239, 7:2244, 8:2660 military regimes, 3:645, 3:654, 3:655	International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, 6: 2016 membership, 5: 1633, 8: 2511, 8: 2678
, 8	** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
nation building, 5:1648 peasant movements, 6:1847, 6:1848	neutral states as members, 5:1698 in operation, 4:1278
populist movements, 7:2076	proposal, 4:1278
populist regimes, 1:110	sanctions, 3:707, 7:2351
presidential systems, 7:2124, 7:2125, 7:2126–2127 republics, 7:2290	structure, 4:1012, 8:2678
socialist systems, 8:2459	Learning from crises, 2:496
Spanish colonial rule, 3:721, 5:1549	definition, 6: 1933
state formation, 8:2510	political, 6: 2020–2021
See also individual countries	schemata, 7:2362–2364
Laumann, Edward O., 5:1693	See also Education; Policy learning
Laver, M., 6:1982–1983, 8:2707	Lebanon, Islamist movements, 5:1354, 8:2592, 8:2593
Lavine, Howard, 1:94	Lebow, Richard Ned, 7:2221–2222
Law administrative 5:1412 1413 5:1693	Leca, Jean, 4:1173, 4:1176
administrative, 5:1412–1413, 5:1683	Lederer, Emil, 8:2633
criminal, 4: 1239–1240	Leech, Beth, 6:1904

Leff, Carol Skalnik, 1:160	LeMay, Curtis, 2:487
Legal constitutionalism, 2:416, 2:418–420, 4:1037	Lemkin, Raphael, 4:967
Legal positivism, 4:1233-1234, 7:2082, 7:2321	Lengler, Ralph, 2:539
Legal systems. See Judicial systems; Law; Rule of law	Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich
Legalization of policy, 5:1411-1414	on capitalism, 8:2657–2658
actors, 5:1412–1413	on communist parties, 2:312, 2:315, 2:316
definition, 5:1411	on democracy, 3:769
drivers, 5:1411–1412	democratic centralism, 2:312, 3:611-612, 8:2483
instruments, 5:1413–1414	dependency theory and, 3:645-646
Legislatures	on imperialism, 3:642, 4:1156, 8:2758
accountability role, 1:6, 2:456, 4:1007, 5:1624, 6:1772,	on Marxism, 2:310
6:1773, 7:2128	on power, 8:2482
agenda-setting, 1:50-51	on revisionism, 7:2310, 7:2311
amendment processes, 1:50–51	revolutionary theory, 8:2459
bargaining, 1:135–136	socialist theory, 5:1500, 8:2483
cabinets and, 1:185	Soviet system, 3:596, 3:611
committees, 8:2721	violent repression, 2:311
in consociational democracies, 2:555	on World War I, 8:2452-2453
constituencies, 3:751–752	Leninism, 5:1499–1500
decision making, 4:1206	See also Marxism-Leninism
delegation to bureaucracy, 2:548–550, 5:1328	Lenoir, René, 8:2429
lawmaking process, 6: 1772–1773	Leonard, David K., 3:649
party discipline, 8:2721	Lepsius, M. Rainer, 7:2101-2102, 7:2107
relations with executive, 1:6, 6:1772, 6:1773	Lerner, Daniel, 8:2558
See also Congress, U.S.; Parliaments; Separation of	Leroy-Beaulieu, Paul, 2:303
powers; Voting rules, legislative	Letwin, Oliver, 7:2132
Legitimacy, 5:1414–1425	Levi, Margaret, 1:66, 1:70, 4:1196
of authoritarian regimes, 3:623, 3:624, 5:1422	Levinas, Emmanuel, 6: 1996–1997, 7:2097, 8:2466
benefits, 5:1417	Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 5:1691
charismatic, 8:2738	Lewis, David K., 1:205
conditions, 5:1417–1419	Li & Fung, 8:2498
deficits, 5:1418	Liberal constitutionalism, 2:455
definition, 5:1414	Liberal democracy
democratic, 2:552–553, 3:617, 5:1397, 5:1421–1422	capitalism and, 5:1422
democratic deficit, 1:85, 2:557, 2:579–581, 3:845, 4:978,	characteristics, 3:615, 7:2234–2235
4:1014–1015, 5:1424	civil society, 6: 1719–1720
of dictatorships, 3:657, 5:1421	debates in China, 3: 598–599
exercise of power and, 5:1415–1417, 5:1418–1420	group representation, 4:1219, 4:1228–1230
of institutions, 4:1204	immigration policies, 5:1568–1569
of international organizations, 5:1423–1424	international cooperation, 5:1437
of judiciary, 5:1368, 5:1387	legitimacy, 5:1421–1422
justice and, 5:1395–1397	nationalism and, 5:1657
libertarian view, 5:1442	rule of law, 7:2339–2340
of military rule, 5:1576	shared values, 6:2057
of monarchy, 5:1614–1615	shortcomings, 5:1422
political culture and, 6: 1976	values, 7:2201–2202
of regime types, 5:1420–1423	See also Democratic peace; Executive; Parliamentary
rule of law and, 7:2335–2336, 7:2338	systems; Representative democracy
of socialist systems, 8:2457	Liberal economic theory
sources, 1:80	economic transformations, 8:2657
stability and, 8:2478, 8:2479	free trade, 3:629, 8:2638
theories, 5:1415	heterodox, 8:2658
traditional, 8:2738	laissez-faire, 5:1677–1678
Weber on, 5:1415, 5:1417, 5:1420, 8:2478, 8:2486,	markets, 3:632–633, 5:1427, 5:1439, 5:1440, 5:1442, 5:1444, 8:2657
8:2509, 8:2738	5:1444, 8:2657
See also Sovereignty Lehrabertal Corporal 2:554 5:1670 6:1860 1861 6:1870	monetary relations, 5:1620
Lehmbruch, Gerhard, 2:554, 5:1670, 6:1860–1861, 6:1870	property rights, 5:1434, 5:1442
Leibholz, Gerhard, 7:2281	See also Market economies; Modernization theory;
Leibniz, Gottfried W., 1:155	Neoliberal economic theory; Privatization

Liberal intergovernmentalism (LIG), 4:1231–1232, 7:2242	international institutions, 5:1436–1437
Liberal International, 5:1428	international law, 4:1240
Liberal nationalism, 5:1656, 5:1657, 5:1660	national interests, 5:1651
Liberal parties (LPs), 5:1426–1428	nonstate actors, 6:1712
characteristics, 5:1426	principles, 4:1291, 5:1434
contemporary developments, 5:1428	transatlantic relations, 8:2655
democratization and, 5:1428	See also Democratic peace; Neoliberal institutionalism
electoral bases, 5:1427, 6:1794	Liberalization, 5:1439–1442
European, 5:1426, 5:1427, 5:1428	definition, 5:1439, 5:1440
government participation, 5:1427–1428	democratization and, 5:1440–1441
history, 5:1426	economic, 5:1439, 5:1440, 5:1485, 8:2749
ideology, 5:1426–1427	factors in, 5:1441, 5:1486
North American, 5:1426	by military regimes, 5:1576
organization, 5:1427	political, 5:1439, 5:1440–1441, 5:1576
transnational networks, 5:1428, 6:1714	regulatory reform, 5:1411, 5:1485, 8:2398
Whigs, 2:405–406, 5:1426, 5:1549	tensions, 5:1440
Liberal peace theory. See Democratic peace	See also Democratization; Market economies;
Liberal republicanism, 5:1434–1435	Privatization; Trade liberalization
Liberal-democratic governance, 4:988–989, 4:991–992	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 5:1580, 5:1661
Liberalism, 5:1428–1433	5:1662, 8:2503, 8:2592, 8:2593, 8:2597
church–state relationship, 6:1720–1721	Liberia. See Taylor, Charles
citizenship, 1:239	Libertarian municipalism, 1:76–77
civil society, 1:261–262	Libertarian social democracy, 1:77
classical, 5:1442, 8:2657	Libertarianism, 5:1442–1447
conservative critique, 2:405, 2:410	anarchism and, 1:75–76, 5:1445
constitutionalism, 5:1429, 5:1430, 5:1431, 5:1442	competing values, 5:1446
contrast to communitarianism, 1:240–241, 2:326, 2:330	consequentialist, 5:1442, 5:1444–1445
critiques of, 1:241, 8:2626	criticism of, 5:1443, 5:1445–1446
economic, 3:632–633, 5:1427, 5:1434	definition, 5:1442
egalitarian, 5:1442	history, 5:1442
group rights, 5:1432–1433	individualism and, 4:1177
harm principle, 5:1431	left-, 5:1444
historical development, 5:1429–1430,	media roles, 5:1542
5:1439–1440, 6:1724	principles, 5:1442
individualism, 4:1176–1177, 5:1429–1430,	rights, 5:1442, 5:1443–1444, 7:2321–2322
5:1433, 5:1434	self-ownership, 5:1442, 5:1443–1444
institutions, 5:1434	social, 6: 1716
moral theories, 5:1433	state role, 5:1442, 5:1445
patriotism and, 6: 1833–1834	Liberty, 5:1447–1458
political, 4:1093, 5:1426-1427, 5:1428-1433, 5:1434,	censorship and, 1:213
5:1440	civic, 3: 812
in political science, 4:1093, 4:1094	civil liberties, 6: 1720–1721, 7: 2235
principles, 5:1434, 8:2448–2449	conservative views, 2:4 07
religious freedom, 5:1428, 5:1430, 5:1432	constitutional protections, 5:1430
rights, 1:261, 5:1434	constitutionalism and, 6:1720
rule of law, 5:1431–1432	contract theory and, 2:446
social, 5:1427	in democracies, 2:573–574
state role, 5:1428-1429, 5:1431, 5:1434, 8:2509	democratic quality, 2:568, 7:2235
statism and, 8:2513, 8:2515	deontic, 5:1456–1457
tolerance, 8:2625-2626	equality and, 3:803, 3:806, 3:812-815
utilitarianism and, 5:1433, 5:1440	in "good" democracies, 2:566
See also Neoliberalism	governance and, 4: 985–986
Liberalism in international relations, 5:1434-1439	monarchy and, 5:1615
classical, 4:1291, 5:1434-1435, 5:1436	moralized, 5:1452-1453
cooperation among democracies, 5:1436-1437, 8:2655	negative, 4:1102, 5:1445-1446, 5:1447-1449,
debates on military interventions, 5:1437-1438	5:1450–1451, 5:1453, 5:1454
domestic politics and, 3:692, 5:1437	normative claims, 6:1720-1721
history, 4:1279, 4:1280, 4:1289-1290, 5:1434-1435	physical, 5:1456-1457
idealism, 4:1128, 4:1130	positive, 4:1102, 5:1445–1446, 5:1449–1451

postulates, 5:1447–1449 religious, 5:1428, 5:1430, 5:1432, 5:1433, 6:1720–1721	Lippmann, Walter, 5:1677, 8:2578 Lipset, Seymour Martin
republican, 5:1453–1456, 7:2297–2298	on authoritarianism, 1:159
rights and, 7:2141	on cleavages, 3: 738–739
rule of law and, 7:2339	on democracy, 2:575, 3:645, 6:1955, 6:2025–2026
subversion, 2:570	on extreme center, 6: 1794–1795, 7: 2200–2201
Tocqueville on, 8:2622	historical institutionalism, 2:346
Libicki, Martin C., 8:2597	modernization theory, 3:625, 3:646, 6:2025,
Lieber, Francis, 4:1088–1089	8:2659, 8:2663
LIG. See Liberal intergovernmentalism	on monarchy, 5:1617
Lijphart, Arend	on participation, 6:1979
on consensus democracy, 2:402, 2:403,	on parties, 6:1792, 6:1793, 6:1794–1795, 6:1799
2:557–558, 6:1853	on political science, 1:lxii
on consociational democracy, 2:554, 2:555,	on stability, 8:2478
2:556, 6:1860, 6:1861	Lipsky, Michael, 4:1162
democratic typology, 2:350, 6:2040, 6:2041	Lipson, Charles, 7:2390 Lisbon Treaty, 2:562, 3:838, 3:841, 3:842, 3:847
on electoral rules, 8:2713 on multiparty governments, 6:1983	List, Christian, 1:49
on pillarization, 6: 1860	List, Christian, 1:47 Literary Digest, 8:2569
on political performance, 6:1850, 6:1853	Livingston, William S., 3:897
Likert, Rensis, 5:1528	Lloyd, William Foster, 7:2204
Likert, Kensis, 5:1528 Likert scale, 5:1522, 5:1528–1529	Llull, Ramon, 8:2417
Limited democracy, 4: 1116	Lidit, Ramon, 8:2417 Lobbying, 5:1458–1463
Limited government, 2:416	definition, 4:1225, 5:1458
Limited government, 2.410 Limited rationality. See Rationality, bounded	distinction from advocacy, 1:28
Limited voting, 3:750	in Europe, 5:1459, 5:1460, 5:1462
Limongi, Fernando, 1:160	at European Parliament, 1:30
Lincoln, Yvonna, 6: 1880, 6: 1896	free speech and, 5:1463
Lincoln–Douglas debates, 5:1539	by interest groups, 4:1225–1226, 4:1229
Lindahl, Erik, 6:1981	nature of, 5:1459–1460
Lindblom, Charles, 6: 1864–1865, 6: 1866, 6: 1871,	processes, 5:1459–1460
6:1891–1892, 6:1909, 6:1910–1911, 6:1919	regulation of, 5:1462–1463
Linear regression	strategies, 4:1226
applications, 7:2253	study of, 4:1225–1226, 5:1458–1459, 6:1904
assumptions, 7:2177–2187, 7:2188	theories, 5:1460–1461
categorical variables, 1:199	trends, 5:1463
differences from nonlinear, 5:1707-1708	in United States, 5:1459, 5:1460,
functions, 7:2250	5:1461-1462
generalized linear model, 7:2187–2188	See also Interest groups
least squares estimator, 2:466, 7:2177, 7:2250	Lobbyists, 1:31, 5:1461–1462
variables, 5:1707	Local governments, 5:1463–1470
See also Regression	administrative reforms, 5:1468–1469
Linguistics, 6:1963, 7:2069, 7:2071, 7:2194	anarchist involvement, 1:76-77
See also Language	autonomy, 4:986-987, 5:1464
Linkage theory. See Party linkage	cooperation, 5:1466
Linz, Juan J.	corruption scandals, 2:477
authoritarian regime theory, 1:108, 1:109, 1:112,	democracy, 5:1466
1:114, 7: 2107	direct democracy, 2:584, 5:1466
on breakdown of regimes, 1:159, 1:160	in Europe, 5:1463–1470
on citizenship, 1:240	finances, 5:1468
on corporativism, 2:462	functions, 5:1467–1468
on crises, 2:4 90, 2:4 93	governance and, 4:997
on military rule, 5:1576	intergovernmental setting, 5:1464–1465
on organic statism, 1:110	levels, 5:1465
on parties, 6:1955	personnel, 5:1467–1468, 5:1469
on presidentialism, 7:2125	police forces, 6:1878
on rule of law, 7:2337	political institutions, 5:1466–1467
on state-nations, 5:1658	structures, 5:1468–1470
on totalitarianism, 8:2632	territorial organization, 5:1465–1466

urban policy, 8:2437-2438	Lukes, Steven, 4:1173, 7:2106
See also Governance, urban	Lustick, Ian, 2:557
Locke, John, 5:1470–1473	Luther, Martin, 8:2600
on equality, 8:2625	Luxembourg
individualism, 5:1471	neo-corporatism, 5:1669
labor-mixing argument, 5:1443-1444	parties, 6: 1799
liberalism, 5:1434, 5:1439, 5:1442, 5:1472, 8:2657	Lynn, Laurence E., Jr., 5:1684, 6:1947-1948
on natural law, 2:440	
political philosophy, 5:1470–1472	Maastricht Treaty, 1:125, 1:218, 2:350, 2:383, 4:1231,
on property rights, 6: 1717	5:1329, 7:2238, 8:2749
on religious tolerance, 5:1472–1473, 6:1720,	See also European integration
8:2624–2625	Macdonald, Elaine, 2:360
on rights, 7:2321	Machiavelli, Niccolò, 5:1479-1481
on self-ownership, 5:1443–1444	on civil society, 1:260
on separation of powers, 8:2403–2404	on class conflicts, 2:417, 5:1480
on social contract, 2:440, 2:441, 2:443, 6:1723	on democratic mobilization, 6:2061
on state of nature, 2:444, 4:1275, 5:1439, 5:1471, 5:1472	on dictatorship, 3:654, 5:1480
works of, 5:1470–1471, 5:1472	gendered concepts, 3:909
Locke, Robert, 5:1443	influence, 5:1480
Lockheed scandal, 2:477	on interstate relations, 4:1275, 4:1288
Logic	life, 5:1480–1481, 7:2289
classical, 1:156	on mixed government, 8:2403
equality from, 3:805, 3:806–810	on parties, 6:1794
experimental methods, 3:794	on patriotism, 6:1 833
See also Boolean algebra; Political philosophy	political philosophy, 6: 1990, 6: 2052, 7: 2289
Logic of appropriateness, 5:1473–1476	on power, 5:1479–1480
bounded rationality and, 7:2217	The Prince, 5:1400, 5:1479, 5:1480, 5:1481
consequentiality and, 5:1475	realism, 5:1479–1480
definition, 5:1473	works of, 5:1479, 5:1481
identities, 5:1474–1475	Machiavellism, 5:1479
key concepts, 5:1473–1475	MacIntyre, Alastair, 6:1996
matching situations, 5:1473	Mackinder, Halford, 4: 970, 4: 972
rules, 5:1474, 5:1475	Macroeconomic policy, 3:701, 3:704–705
situations, 5:1474	See also Economic policy
Logit and probit analyses, 5:1476–1478	Macroregions, 7:2244
derivation, 5:1476–1477	MAD. See Mutually assured destruction
estimation, 5:1477	Madison, James
interpretation, 5:1477–1478	drafting of Constitution, 1:17–18, 6:1720, 8:2405, 8:2406
multinomial models, 5:1478	Federalist Papers, 3:711, 3:896, 4:1088, 7:2278,
ordered models, 5:1478	7:2289–2290, 7:2293, 8:2404, 8:2405
use of, 5:1476	on parties, 6: 1793
Longitudinal data. See Panel data analysis; Time-series	Magazines. See Media, print
cross-section data and methods	Maggetti, Martino, 1:120
Lopez, George A., 7:2353	Mahan, Alfred T., 4:970
1	
Lorimer, James, 4:1277	Mahoney, James, 1:222
Lot, as selection method. See Election by lot	Mainwaring, Scott, 7:2126
Lotteries. See Election by lot	Mair, Peter, 6:1802
Louis XVI, King, 7:2290	Maistre, Joseph de, 4:1173
Lowerthal, Abraham F., 8:2664	Maitland, Frederick, 8:2404
Lowi, Theodore J., 4:1001, 4:1151–1152	Majoritarian democracy
Loyalty	consociational democracy and, 2:554
of civil servants, 7:2308–2309	criticism of, 7:2125
opposition, 6:1744–1745 See also Nationalism; Party identification; Patriotism	deliberative democracy as alternative, 2:551
the state of the s	democratic consolidation, 3:618 description, 2:587
LPs. See Liberal parties LTTE. See Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam	electoral accountability, 1:14, 1:15–16, 7:2126
Luebbert, Gregory, 1:159	electoral accountability, 1:14, 1:13–16, 7:2126 electoral system effects, 8:2712, 8:2713, 8:2716, 8:2717
Luhmann, Niklas, 2:575–576, 3:932, 6:1865, 7:2168,	Malatesta, Errico, 1:73
8:2581–2582	Malawi, parties, 3:748
3.2001 2002	1.14.14.17.5 parties, 5.7 10

Malaysia, monarchy, 5:1613	state formation and, 8:2509
Malberg, Raymond Carré de, 7:2279	state roles, 5:1485
Malenkov, Georgy, 8:2484-2485	statist, 5:1486
Malinowski, Bronislaw K., 3:833, 3:930, 5:1691	trends, 5:1486
Malle, Bertram, 8:2427	See also Capitalism; Liberalization; Political economy;
Maloney, William, 6:1904	Privatization
Management	Market failures, 5:1487-1492
of police, 6: 1878	causal model, 5:1487, 5:1488
principal-agent theory and, 4:1164	definition, 5:1487
private sector practices, 1:22–23	economic crises and, 5:1491–1492
scientific, 1:26	externalities, 2:483, 5:1487, 5:1489-1491, 5:1492,
See also Administration; New public management	7:2159, 7:2160
Mancini, Paolo, 5:1543	free riding, 5:1487, 5:1490, 5:1492
Mandela, Nelson, 1:40, 1:225, 7:2234	government interventions to correct, 5:1444, 5:1488,
Mandeville, Bernard de, 5:1389, 5:1400	5:1489
Manifesto Research Group (MRG), 6:1815, 6:1816	information asymmetries, 5:1487, 5:1488-1489
Manifestos. See Party manifestos	in international relations, 4:1272
Manin, Bernard, 5:1410, 7:2169	libertarian view, 5:1444–1445
Manning, Charles, 4:1315, 4:1317, 4:1319	market power and, 5:1487, 5:1489
Manzoni, Alessandro, 7:2168	monopolies, 5:1489
Mao Zedong, 2:312, 2:319, 3:595, 5:1481-1484, 5:1500,	trends, 5:1492
7:2312, 8:2477, 8:2631	See also Public goods
Maoism, 5:1481-1484	Market linkage, 6:1812
constant revolutions, 8:2477	Markets
definition, 5:1481–1482	autonomy, 4:9 87
economic policies, 5:1482–1483	governance, 5:1554
ideology, 4:1144-1145, 5:1482, 8:2460	imperfections, 5:1487–1488, 7:2225
mass line, 5:1483–1484	institutional environments, 1:189-191
nationalism and, 5:1660	labor, 1:187-188, 1:189, 6:1885, 6:1888-1889
outside China, 5:1484	liberal economic theory, 8:2657
power of peasants, 5:1483, 5:1500	monetary, 1:216–217
socialist model, 3:595–598, 5:1482–1483	regulation, 4:987, 5:1411, 7:2256, 8:2398
See also China	See also Capitalism; Financial markets
Maori, 4:1170, 4:1171	Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods,
Maps	5:1628–1629, 7:2356, 8:2520–2521
geographic information systems, 2:541–542	Marks, G., 4:1021, 4:1022
network, 2: 542–543	Marshall, John, 5:1373
Marbury v. Madison, 8:2406	Marshall, Thomas, 1:238, 1:241, 4:1084-1085, 7:2319
March, James G., 2:347, 4:1205, 5:1473–1474, 5:1475,	Marshall Plan, 2:431, 3:912, 8:2652
5:1617, 6:1920, 7:2213, 7:2217	Marx, Karl, 5:1492-1495
Marcuse, Herbert, 1:57, 2:497, 2:498, 4:1094, 4:1205,	on alienation, 1:57
5:1499, 5:1535, 8:2550, 8:2688–2689	Capital, 5:1494–1495, 5:1498, 8:2451
Marginality. See Social exclusion	on capitalism, 5:1493, 5:1494–1495, 5:1496,
Market economies, 5:1484–1487	5:1497–1498
bureaucracy and, 1:167-168, 1:171	on civil society, 1:261
commodification of goods, 1:186–187	on communism, 2:310, 2:311–312, 2:314–315, 5:1499
contrast to centrally planned economies, 5:1484	Communist Manifesto, 2:310, 2:314-315, 5:1493-1494
coordinated, 4: 987, 5: 1486	5: 1497–1498, 8: 2451, 8: 2657, 8: 2687
debates, 5:1484-1485, 5:1486	on dictatorship, 3:654
free markets, 3:632-633, 5:1427, 5:1439, 5:1440, 5:1442,	on Hegel, 2: 460, 5: 1493, 5: 1495
5:1444, 5:1485	historical materialism, 1:191, 5:1496-1497
globalization and, 5:1486	influence, 5:1492–1494, 5:1495
institutions, 5:1486	life, 5:1493–1495, 8:2451
international monetary relations, 5:1618–1624	nationalist movements supported, 5:1660
labor in, 1:187–188, 1:189	positivism, 4:1082
laissez-faire policies, 5:1677–1678	on rights, 7:2319
liberal, 4:987, 5:1486, 8:2657	socialism, 8:2450–2452
neoliberalism, 5:1676	Marxism, 5:1495–1501
resource degradation, 5:1667	abolition of private property, 5:1494

in Africa, 1:41	Maslow, Abraham, 6:1970, 7:2093
on capitalism, 2:315, 5:1493, 5:1494-1495, 5:1496,	Mass communication, 5:1530, 5:1531, 5:1532,
5:1497–1498, 6:2026–2027, 8:2451, 8:2657–2658	5:1534–1537
class analysis, 1:271-272, 5:1497, 5:1498, 6:1951,	See also Media, electronic; Media, print; Political
6:2027, 8:2447	communication
class consciousness, 8:2434, 8:2451	Mass parties
class struggle, 2:315, 5:1494, 5:1497, 5:1498,	decline, 6:1801–1802, 7:2282
7:2313, 8:2451	development, 1:284, 6:1820-1821, 6:1954
conflict theory, 2:396	discipline, 7:2280
critical theory and, 2:497–498	distinction from cadre parties, 6:1800, 6:1820
definition, 5:1495	rigid and flexible, 6:1801
on democracy, 3:768–769	socialist, 8:2454
on developing world, 3:642–643, 3:645	Mass society, 5:1503–1504
economic roots of war, 6:1839	See also Popular culture
economic transformations, 8:2657–2658	Masses, 5:1501–1505
on elites, 3:767, 3:768–769	definition, 5:1501
hegemony, 4:1070, 4:1071–1072	democracy, 5:1501–1502
historical materialism, 1:lvii, 1:191, 2:315, 4:1082,	elite control of, 3:768
5:1496–1497	historical development of concept, 5:1501
on ideology, 4:1143, 4:1144, 4:1145	political involvement, 5:1502–1503, 5:1504–1505
on imperialism, 4:1156	psychological characteristics, 5:1503
influence, 5:1495	See also Popular culture; Working classes
international relations theory, 3:642–643,	Matching, 5:1505-1509
4: 1291–1292, 6: 1839	assumptions, 5:1505, 5:1508–1509
labor movements and, 5:1403-1404	definition, 5:1505
nationalist movements and, 5:1660–1661	examples, 5:1505–1508
neo-, 6: 1921, 8: 2447	issues, 5:1564
neo-Gramscian view, 4:1292	process, 5:1505, 5:1565, 8:2530
nonstate actors, 6:1712	use of, 5:1601
opposition to statism, 8:2513	Materialism, 6:1970-1971, 7:2093, 8:2693
pacifism and, 6:1759	See also Historical materialism; Postmaterialism
pauperization thesis, 1:84	Matsyanyanya, 1:lii
policy formulation, 6:1921	Maximum likelihood, 5:1509-1512
political sociology, 6:2026–2027	definition, 5:1509
on popular culture, 7:2074	origins, 5:1509–1510
proletarian revolution, 5:1494, 5:1498–1499	properties of estimators, 5:1510–1511
redistribution, 7:2225	robust estimation, 7:2329, 7:2332
revisionist, 5:1499, 7:2310, 7:2311–2312, 8:2424, 8:2452	in structural equation modeling, 8:2554
revolutions, 7:2313	use of, 5:1511–1512, 5:1563, 8:2529
socialist systems and, 8:2457	May, Peter, 4:1163–1164, 4:1165, 4:1167
sovereignty, 8:2471	Mayflower Compact, 2:439
on state, 1:liv	Mazzini, Giuseppe, 4:1317, 5:1434, 5:1436, 5:1438, 5:1655
state formation, 6: 2027, 8: 2507	MB. See Muslim Brotherhood
theoretical sources, 5:1495–1496	MCA. See Multiple correspondence analysis
Western, 2:497, 5:1499	McAdam, Doug, 8:2432
See also Communism; Maoism; Socialism; World systems	McClelland, Muriel, 6:1849
theory	McClosky, Herbert, 7:2201
Marxism-Leninism	McDermott, Walsh, 4:1061
on capitalism, 8:2657–2658	McGann, Anthony J., 8:2707
checks and balances, 3:596	McKelvey, Richard, 7:2356
of communist parties, 2:315–316, 7:2090	MCMC. See Markov chain Monte Carlo methods
development, 5:1499–1500	McNamara, Robert, 6:1894, 6:2056, 7:2154
dictatorship of proletariat, 3:654, 3:769, 8:2658	McQuail, Denis, 5:1535
on imperialism, 3:642, 4:1156, 8:2758	MDGs. See Millennium Development Goals
personality cult, 8:2457	MDS. See Multidimensional scaling
Soviet Union as model, 2:310	Mead, George Herbert, 4:1132, 8:2578
Stalinism and, 8:2481–2483	Meade, James, 8:2658
Masculinity, 3:909, 3:910, 4:962	Mearsheimer, John, 1:153-154, 4:1291, 7:2220-2221
See also Gender	Measurement, 5:1512-1525

challenges, 7:2195	survey research, 8:2570
definition, 5:1512	theories, 5:1534–1537
errors, 5:1598–1599, 5:1602, 7:2180–2181	See also Internet; Popular culture; Television
importance, 5:1512	Media, print, 5:1541-1545
indices, 5:1521, 5:1523	audiences, 5:1541, 5:1542
multidimensional, 5:1559	auditors and monitoring agencies, 5:1544
multiple-indicator, 5:1521	in communist systems, 5:1543–1544
in political science, 5:1512-1513, 7:2180-2181	definition, 5:1541
precision, 7:2191–2192	in democracies, 5:1542-1543
reliability, 5:1513, 5:1517–1520	in developing countries, 5:1544
validity, 5:1513–1517	election coverage, 3:746
Measurement, levels, 5:1525–1527	global influence, 6:1713
interval, 5:1521, 5:1526	history, 5:1542
nominal, 5:1520–1521, 5:1525	online editions, 5:1542
ordinal, 5:1521, 5:1525-1526	political information, 5:1541
ratio, 5:1521, 5:1526–1527	political roles, 5:1541–1545
statistical techniques used, 5:1525–1526	relations with governments, 5:1542
use of, 5:1527	survey research, 8:2569, 8:2570
Measurement, scales, 5:1527–1530	Media events, 5:1536, 5:1538
definition, 5:1521–1522, 5:1528	Median voter theorem, 2 :360, 6 :1981–1982, 6 :2032,
Guttman, 5:1522–1523, 5:1529–1530, 7:2355–2356	8:2417, 8:2716
Likert, 5:1522, 5:1528–1529	Mediation in international relations, 5:1545–1548
multidimensional, 5:1523–1524	behaviors, 5:1546–1547, 5:1548
in natural sciences, 5:1527–1528	characteristics, 5:1546
in political science, 5:1528–1530, 5:1559, 7:2354, 7:2356	definition, 5:1545–1546
Thurstone, 5:1522, 7:2354–2355	objectives, 5:1547
See also Scaling	success factors, 5:1547–1548
· ·	
Measures of association. See Cross-tabular analysis Media	See also Conflict resolution
	Mediatization of politics, 5:1538–1540, 6:1962
accountability of, 1:21	Medicine, 3:861
accountability role, 1:3–4, 1:8	See also Health policy
candidate access, 3:744, 3:745–746	Medieval period. See Middle Ages
censorship, 1:213–215	Medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs),
codes of conduct, 3:744, 3:745–746	7:2153–2154
electoral campaign role, 3:745–746, 6:1964–1965	Medvedev, Dmitry, 3:613, 6:1741, 6:2053
influence on public opinion, 7:2168–2169	Meier, Kenneth, 6:1946
political coverage, 1:253, 3:744, 3:745–746	Meltzer-Richard model, 6:1982
populism, 6:1859	Memory. See Historical memory
public opinion polls, 7:2171	MENA. See Middle East and North Africa
role in reduced participation, 2:570	Mencius, 2:399, 2:400
See also Political communication	Mercantilism, 5:1548–1551
Media, electronic, 5:1530–1541	economic transformations, 8:2656–2657
candidate access, 3:745–746	history of concept, 5:1548–1551, 5:1642, 7:2145
candidate debates, 6:1858	modern, 3:632–633
censorship, 1:214	neo-, 7:2146–2147, 8:2657
definition, 5:1530	Mercer, Jonathan, 7:2150
diplomacy and, 3:668	MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market; Mercado Común
election coverage, 3:745, 5:1538, 5:1539	del Sur), 3:841–842, 5:1633, 6:1985, 7:2238, 7:2239,
global, 6: 1713	7:2244, 8:2660
history, 5:1531–1534	Merit pay. See Pay for performance
impact on political system, 5:1538-1540	Merriam, Charles E., 1:137, 4:1090, 4:1092, 4:1093
influence on attitudes, 5:1537	Merton, Robert K., 1:lviii, 1:82-83, 3:931-932, 4:1055,
influence on political behavior, 5:1537–1538	5: 1535, 5: 1537
personalization of politics and, 5:1539, 6:1857-1858,	Meta-analysis, 5:1551–1554
6: 1859	advantages and disadvantages, 5:1551-1552
political communication, 5:1532-1533, 5:1534, 5:1537,	definition, 5:1551
5:1538, 5:1539, 5:1542, 6:1805–1806	future of, 5:1553
propaganda use, 5:1531, 5:1537	program evaluations, 6:1914
rituals, 7:2328	steps, 5:1552–1553

Metagovernance, 5:1554–1557	sovereignty, 8:2470
definition, 5:1554, 5:1555	view of democracy, 2:572
feasibility, 5:1555–1556	Middle classes
legalization of policy and, 5:1412	growth, 1:272, 1:273
politics and, 4:998	Marxist view, 8:2447
rationale, 4:1041, 5:1555–1556	parties associated with, 6:1794
strategies, 5:1555	See also Classes, social
variations, 5:1554–1555	Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
Methodological individualism, 4:1176, 4:1205	Arab-Israeli conflict, 5:1350, 5:1351
Methodology, 5:1557–1567	authoritarian regimes, 1:114, 1:115–117,
behavioralist, 1:140–142	3:602–603, 3:604
choice of, 3:791, 3:794–795, 3:801–802, 8:2540	civil society, 3:602
data and measurement, 5:1558–1560	colonialism, 3:939–940
*	countries, 3:601
definition, 3:791, 5:1557	,
factor analysis, 3:881–884	culture, 6:1753
inductive, 1:141	dictatorships, 3:655
political science, 5:1557–1566	electoral competition, 1:117
recent developments, 5:1566	exceptionalism, 3:602
selecting, 5:1557–1558	Islamist movements, 3:604–606, 5:1351,
triangulation, 8:2669–2671	5:1354–1356, 7:2264
typology development and use, 6:2040-2041	Islamist parties, 3:604–606
See also Case studies; Comparative methods;	liberalization, 1:116
Epistemological and methodological foundations;	monarchies, 7:2290
Ethnographic methods; Experiments; Interviewing;	oil exporters, 3:603, 3:639, 4:1253
Measurement; Quantitative versus qualitative	popular revolutions, 3:604, 3:657, 5:1423, 5:1662
methods; Research designs; Statistics; Survey research	reforms, 3:603-604
Mexico	republics, 7:2290
anarchism, 1:74, 1:75	socialist systems, 8:2459
caudillismo, 1:201, 1:202, 1:203	See also Arabs; Democracy: Middle East perspectives;
debt crises, 4:1246	Islam; Orientalism; individual countries
democratization, 3:658	Migdal, Joel S., 4:988, 4:991
Institutional Revolutionary Party, 5:1441,	Migration, 5:1567–1573
6: 1742, 6: 1793	border control, 5:1568-1569
political conflicts, 1:202	citizenship and, 5:1570-1572, 5:1631
MGCFA. See Multiple group confirmatory factor analysis	definition, 5:1567
Michel, Louise, 1:73	economic motives, 3:829
Michels, Robert (Roberto)	expatriate communities, 3:651, 3:652–653
on elites, 3:760, 3:765, 3:768, 5:1501, 6:1804	history, 4:1146
on German social democratic party, 6:1740, 6:1804,	illegal, 5:1568, 5:1569
6:1954–1955	individual actors, 5:1572
on leadership, 5:1409	
life, 3:765	interdisciplinary nature, 5:1567, 5:1572 labor, 4:1147, 5:1569
on masses, 5:1501, 5:1502	mobility rights, 5:1568–1569
on oligarchy, 3:768, 6:1740, 6:1741, 6:2025, 7:2225	multiculturalism, 4:1140, 4:1150, 5:1572, 5:1630,
on political class, 6:1954–1955	5:1631, 6:1869
on substitution of goals, 6:1818	national identities and, 4:1140, 5:1568
Micro-mobilization model, 5:1590–1591, 5:1592–1593,	networks, 5:1569–1570
5:1594	pluralism, 6:1869, 6:1871
Microregions, 7:2244	political science research, 5:1567–1568, 5:1572–1573
Middle Ages	remittances, 3:652
contract theory, 2:439–440	secondary, 4:1148
corporativism, 2:459–460	sovereignty and, 5:1568–1570
diplomacy, 3:662–663	waves, 5:1567, 5:1568
elections by lot, 3:720	See also Diasporas; Immigration policy
feudalism, 7:2132-2133, 8:2753	Milbrath, Lester, 1:144, 6:1782-1783
guilds, 2:459–460	Milgram, Stanley, 5:1686
law, 7:2335–2336	Miliband, Ralph, 3:767
papal sovereignty, 8:2600	Military
republics, 7:2289	caudillos, 1:202, 3:654

civilian control, 5:1577, 7:2341	Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 3:639, 3:640,
environmental impact, 8:2548	5:1636, 8:2683, 8:2756
expenditures, 1:90, 1:91-92	Miller, Arthur, 3:690, 3:691, 8:2479
historical development, 8:2509	Miller, Nicholas, 8:2719
masculinity, 8:2551	Miller, S. M., 8:2429
navies, 1:90 , 4:970	Miller, Warren, 3:716, 3:726, 6:1807
organizational structures, 5:1574	Mills, C. Wright, 1:137, 3:766, 3:767, 3:768, 4:1095,
privatized functions, 7:2134	6:1947, 6:1956, 6:2028, 7:2103–2104
See also Arms races; Interventions; Security and defense	Miloševic, Slobodan, 5:1348, 7:2151, 8:2665
policy; Strategic (security) studies; Wars	Milton, John, 2:441
Military rule, 5:1573–1578	Minard, Charles Joseph, 4:1044
advantages, 3:623, 5:1575	Mincer, Jacob, 8:2659–2660
g	Minilateralism, 5:1635
characteristics, 5:1574–1575	
coups, 5:1574	Ministries. See Cabinets; Executive; Parliamentary systems
decline, 5:1575, 5:1577	Minnowbrook Conferences, 7:2270–2271
definition, 5:1573	Minorities
dependency theory view, 3:646	defense against majority rule, 2:564
in developing countries, 3:645, 5:1573–1574, 5:1575,	direct democracy and, 2:564
5: 1576, 5: 1577	discrimination against, 3:680–682, 5:1662, 6:1871–1872
dictatorships, 1:160, 3:654, 3:655, 3:656, 5:1421	nation building and, 5:1659
economic results, 5:1575	nationalism, 1:128, 2:547
explanations, 5:1573–1574, 5:1575	parties representing, 6:1798
future of, 5:1578	permanent, 2:588–589
hybrid regimes, 5:1578	profiling, 3:681
impacts, 5:1575–1576, 5:1577	public employment, 7:2286, 7:2287-2288
legitimacy, 5:1576	rights, 2:564, 5:1630, 5:1631-1632, 5:1660
missions, 5:1421	subcultures, 6:1869
opposition groups, 3:623, 5:1576	See also Ethnic groups; Pillarization; Pluralism
origins, 5:1574	Mischel, Walter, 6:2002
repression, 5:1575–1576	Mises, Ludwig von, 5:1677, 5:1678
transitions from, 5:1576–1577, 8:2666	Missing data. See Data, missing
weaknesses, 3:623	Misspecification, 5:1581–1585
Militia parties, 3:888	correcting for, 5:1584–1585, 5:1597–1598, 5:1600–1602.
Militias, 5:1578–1580	7:2186–2187
of caudillos, 1:202	definition, 5:1581
contemporary, 5:1579–1580	detecting, 5:1582–1584
definition, 5:1578–1579	sources, 5:1581–1582, 5:1595–1600, 6:1710,
fascist, 3:888, 8:2628	7:2181–2183, 7:2185–2186
	·
Florentine, 5:1480–1481	See also Model specification
functions, 5:1578, 5:1579	Mitrany, David, 8:2659
history, 5:1579	Mitterrand, François, 7:2133, 8:2401
in Latin America, 1:202	Mixed goods, 5:1490–1491
private, 5:1579, 5:1580	Mixed government
warlords and, 8:2734–2736	evolution, 2:418
Mill, John Stuart	semipresidentialism, 8:2400–2401
on causation, 1:204	theory of, 1:17, 2:416–418, 8:2403
on civic participation, 1:252	Mixed methods, 5:1585-1589
comparative methods, 2:335-336, 2:389	advantages, 5:1585
on equality, 6: 1715–1716, 8: 2625	concurrent, 5:1587–1588
ethics, 3:824	definition, 5:1585–1586
experimental method, 3:794, 3:798	evolution, 5:1585
harm principle, 5:1431	forms, 5:1587–1588
individualism, 4:1175	further developments, 5:1589
on interventions, 5:1438	justifications, 5:1586–1587
liberalism and, 5:1431, 5:1440	limitations, 5:1588–1589
on nations, 5:1657, 8:2395	nested, 5:1588
on secession, 7:2368	sequential, 5:1587
on tolerance, 8:2625	triangulation, 8:2669–2671
utilitarianism and, 3:811, 8:2685	use of, 5:1588, 7:2190

Mixed regimes. See Hybrid regimes	intellectual roots, 3:645, 5:1608-1609
MLE. See Maximum likelihood	military regimes, 5:1574–1575
MLG. See Governance, multilevel	multiple modernities, 5:1609–1611
MMDs. See Multimember districts	political sociology, 6:2024-2026, 6:2033
MNCs. See Multinational corporations	revolutions, 7:2313
Mobility rights, 5:1568–1569	state socialism, 8:2459
See also Migration	terrorism, 8:2599
Mobilization, political, 5:1589–1595	traditional rule, 8:2639
actors, 5:1590	transition to democracy and, 8:2663
definition, 5:1589–1590	views of modernity, 5:1609, 5:1612
diffusion, 5:1592–1593	Modernizing dictatorships, 3:656
effectiveness, 5:1592	Moe, Terry, 4: 1160
explanations, 5:1590–1591	Mohamed VI, King, 5:1613
goals, 5:1590	Mohammed, 1:lv, 5:1349
micro-, 5:1590–1591, 5:1592–1593, 5:1594	Mohanty, Chandra, 7:2088
motivations, 5:1594	Mohr, Lawrence, 6:1913
online, 5:1538, 5:1593	Monarchy, 5:1613–1618
partisan, 6: 1792	bureaucracies, 1:168
political culture and, 6:1976	cabinets, 1:183, 6:1766–1767
resource mobilization, 8:2433–2434, 8:2710	constitutional, 5:1613, 5:1614, 7:2290
resources, 5:1590, 5:1593–1594	current number, 5:1613
structures, 5:1591–1594	debates, 5:1613–1615
violent, 5:1593–1594	definition, 5:1613
See also Collective action; Protests; Social movements	divine right, 8:2600
Mobutu Sese Seko, 1:40, 5:1681, 6:1793	divine right of kings, 8:2625
Model specification, 5:1595–1602	elective, 5:1613
<u>.</u>	
conditionality, 5:1596–1597	English, 2:406, 2:418, 2:439, 5:1613, 5:1614–1616, 5:1617
data imperfections, 5:1598–1599	
definition, 5:1595	French, 5:1549, 5:1614
endogeneity, 5:1596, 5:1599–1600, 5:1601	hereditary, 5:1613
functional form, 5:1595, 5:1596	legitimacy, 5:1614–1615
misspecification, 5:1581–1585, 5:1595, 5:1600–1602,	limited, 5:1614, 5:1615–1616, 6:1766
7:2181–2183	ministers, 3:863
robustness tests, 5:1602	parliamentary governments, 2:590–591, 6:1766–1767
sampling, 5:1598	powers, 1:17, 5:1617, 8:2509
sensitivity analysis, 5:1596	representation, 7:2276
uncertainty, 5:1595–1598	republican opponents, 7:2292
See also Data; Sampling; Statistical models; Variables	study of, 5:1617–1618
Models	in twentieth century, 5:1616–1617, 7:2290
definition, 6:1939–1940, 6:1943	Monetarism, 3:705, 8:2659
distinction from theories and frameworks, 6:1944, 6:1945	Monetary authorities, 1:217, 1:219–220
See also Policy process, models of; Statistical models	See also Central banks
Models, computational/agent-based, 5:1603–1608	Monetary policy
agent-based, 5:1605–1606	expansion, 1:216
computational, 5:1603–1604, 5:1607	goals, 1:215, 1:216, 1:217–218
decision heuristics, 5:1604	instruments, 3: 705–706
definition, 5:1603	moral hazard and, 2:487
in political science, 5:1604–1605, 5:1606–1607	quantitative easing, 3:705
trade-offs, 5:1606–1608	quantity theory, 5:1549
Modelski, George, 4:1071	See also Central banks
Modernization theory, 5:1608–1612	Monetary relations, 5:1618–1624
claims, 3:644–645	Bretton Woods system, 3:701–702, 4:973
classical, 5:1608–1609	definition, 5:1618
critiques of, 3:630, 6:2026	emerging markets, 5:1620, 5:1622
democratization, 2:575, 3:625, 3:645	exchange rates, 3:701, 4:973, 5:1619, 5:1621, 5:1622
development process, 3:628-629	global financial architecture, 5:1619-1621, 5:1622-1623
economic transformations, 8:2659	gold standard, 3:701, 5:1619
globalization, 5:1611-1612	history, 5:1619–1620
institutions, 5:1609, 5:1610–1611	state power and, 5:1620, 5:1622

study of, 5:1623	career, 4 :1094, 4 :1279
theories, 5:1618–1619, 5:1620, 5:1622	idealism and, 4:1129
See also Financial crises	international relations approach, 4:1295
Monitorial citizens, 5:1537	on morality, 6:1727
Monitoring, 5:1624–1626	on nuclear weapons, 7:2221, 7:2222
accountability and, 5:1624, 5:1626	on Peace of Westphalia, 8:2753
of bureaucracy, 7:2128	on power in international politics, 1:lvi, 1:79, 1:153
definition, 5:1624	realism, 1:131–132, 4:1280, 4:1288,
evaluation and, 5:1624, 6:1915–1916	7:2218–2220, 7:2222
organizational models, 5:1624–1625	Morlino, Leonardo, 2:351, 3:689, 6:1851, 7:2338, 7:2341,
performance management, 5:1625–1626	7:2342, 7:2344
process and outcome, 6:1916	Mormons, 5:1432, 6:1721, 7:2262–2263
theories, 5:1624	Morocco
in totalitarian regimes, 8:2634	Islamist movements, 5:1354, 5:1355
See also Impacts, policy; Policy evaluation	
	monarchy, 5:1613
Monopolies 5.1480	parties, 3:605
economic, 5:1489	Mörth, Ulrika, 8:2462
political, 6:1793	Mosca, Gaetano
Monroe Doctrine, 4:972	on citizenship, 1:239
Monte Carlo methods, 5:1626–1629	on elites, 3:760, 3:763, 3:765, 3:766, 5:1501, 6:1740
definition, 5:1626	on group struggles for power, 6:2024
integration, 5:1627	on political class, 6:1951, 6:1952–1953, 6:1954, 7:2279
limitations, 5:1629	on representation, 7:2279
Markov chain, 5:1628–1629, 7:2356, 8:2520–2521	Mosley, Oswald, 3:888, 6:1797
random number generation and sampling, 5:1627–1628	Motivation
use of, 5:1626–1627	expectancy theory, 7:2164
Montero, José R., 8:2564, 8:2565	Maslow's hierarchy, 6: 1970, 7: 2093
Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La	reinforcement theory, 7:2164–2165
Brède et de	sources, 6: 2007
on civic culture, 1:244	types, 4: 1166–1167
on democracy, 2:573	Mouffe, Chantal, 3:674, 4:1071-1072, 4:1195,
on elections by lot, 3:719	6: 1880, 6: 1884
on equality, 8:2623	MRG. See Manifesto Research Group
influence on U.S. Constitution, 8:2404, 8:2405	MTEFs. See Medium-term expenditure frameworks
liberalism, 5:1434	Mubarak, Hosni, 3:604, 3:657, 3:941, 7:2267
on mixed government, 2:418	Mugabe, Robert, 6:1743
on monarchy, 5:1614	Multicollinearity. See Regression
on natural law, 5:1664	Multiculturalism, 5:1629-1632
on political science, 6:1991	citizenship and, 1:238, 5:1572, 5:1629, 5:1631
on republics, 7:2290	criticism of, 5:1631
on separation of powers, 1:18, 8:2404, 8:2405	cultural rights, 7:2319-2320
Spirit of Laws, 1:17, 1:18, 2:418, 3:929, 6:1991, 8:2404	debates, 5:1629-1630
on territory, 8:2589	definition, 5:1629
Moore, Barrington, Jr., 1:159, 2:335, 2:346, 6:2027,	democracy theories, 2:577
6: 2057, 7: 2313, 8: 2634, 8: 2663	examples, 5:1630–1631
Moral hazard, 1:174, 2:487, 5:1490	identity politics, 4:1140, 7:2199, 8:2438, 8:2626
Morality	language policies, 7:2070–2071
Consequentialism, 3:824	liberal, 5:1432–1433, 5:1629
Durkheim on, 3:824	migrants and, 4:1140, 4:1150, 5:1572, 5:1630,
Foucault on, 3:825-826	5:1631, 6:1869
Kantian, 5:1433, 5:1438, 6:1724, 6:1732	minority rights, 5:1630, 5:1631–1632
See also Ethics; Pacifism; Utilitarianism	national identity and, 5:1647
Moravcsik, Andrew, 4:1231–1232, 7:2242	nationalism and, 5:1657, 5:1658–1659
More, Thomas, 8:2686, 8:2687, 8:2688	political cultures, 6: 1976–1977
Moreno, Jacob, 5:1685–1686, 5:1691	recognition policies, 5:1629, 5:1631
Morgenstern, Oskar, 4:947, 4:960	republican view, 5:1629–1630
Morgenthau, Hans J.	See also Pluralism; Tolerance
on balance of power, 7:2218, 7:2219	Multidimensional scaling (MDS), 5:1523–1524,
on bipolarity, 7:2219, 8:2560	7:2355, 7:2357
on orpolatity, 1.2217, 0.2300	1.4333, 1.4331

Multiethnic societies, 4:1139, 4:1150, 5:1647, 5:1649	Musharraf, Pervez, 5:1577
See also Ethnicity; Multiculturalism	Muslim Brotherhood (MB)
Multilateralism, 5:1632-1637	founding, 3:935, 3:940, 5:1350, 7:2264
crises, 5:1637	goals, 3:935, 3:940, 7:2264, 7:2268
criticism of, 5:1636	history, 7:2266–2268
definition, 8:2675	influence, 3:943
diplomacy, 3:664, 3:665–667, 4:1011	mobilization, 3:940
disarmament, 3:671	relations with regime, 5:1662, 7:2267
EU roles, 3:840–841, 3:846	repression, 3:941, 7:2267
foreign policy, 5:1634–1635	supporters, 3:604, 3:941
informal institutions, 5:1634	See also Islamist movements
institutional system, 5:1632–1634, 5:1636–1637	Muslims
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
meanings, 5:1632	conflicts with Hindus, 2:397–398, 4:1077
as political ideology, 5:1635–1636	in democracies, 1:114–115, 1:116, 1:117, 5:1630, 5:1631
sanctions, 7:2351–2354	voting behavior, 3:739
state-centrism, 5:1634	See also Islam
theories, 5:1636–1637	Mussolini, Benito, 3:887, 3:890, 3:891, 3:893, 5:1661,
trade agreements, 1:147, 1:148, 3:712, 5:1328-1329,	6:1797, 8:2514
7:2146, 7:2239, 8:2637, 8:2761–2762	See also Italian fascism
See also Bilateralism; International regimes; Unilateralism	Mutually assured destruction (MAD), 8:2543
Multilevel analysis, 5:1637–1641	Myanmar
assumptions, 5:1638	constitution, 2:415
definition, 5:1637	military regime, 5:1577, 5:1662
heteroskedasticity, 5:1638	See also Burma
regression model, 5:1638–1640	Myrdal, Gunnar, 8:2658
Multilevel governance (MLG). See Governance, multilevel	
Multimember districts (MMDs), 3:751, 3:752,	NAFTA. See North American Free Trade Agreement
8:2713, 8:2715	Nagel, Thomas, 3:816
Multinational corporations (MNCs), 5:1641-1643	Namibia, 7:2236
controversies, 5:1642–1643	Napoleon Bonaparte, 3:654, 3:657, 3:658, 4:1044,
definition, 5:1641	4:1066–1067, 7:2290, 8:2450, 8:2622
dependency theory view, 3:632, 3:646, 5:1642	Narratives, 3:676, 7:2118
foreign investments, 3:632, 3:633, 3:646, 6:1713	See also Analytic narratives; Case studies
history, 5:1641–1642	Nash, John F., 1:134
home-country control, 5:1641	Nash, Kate, 6: 2035
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
host governments and, 6:2011–2012	Nash bargaining solution (NBS), 1:134–135
motivations, 5:1641	Nash equilibria, 1:91, 4:949–951, 4:954
number of, 6:1713, 8:2660	See also Game theory; Prisoners' dilemma
political risk analysis, 6:2010–2013	Nasr, Vali, 1:114, 1:116, 1:117, 3:605
power, 3:786, 5:1641, 5:1642, 8:2660	Nasser, Gamel Abdul, 1:31, 3:941, 7:2267
social responsibility, 5:1643	Nassmacher, Karl-Heinz, 6:1804
support of trade liberalization, 8:2637–2638	Nation building, 5:1645–1650
trade within, 3:703	assimilation, 5:1658
Multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), 2:471–474,	constitutional processes, 5:1649
7:2357, 7:2361	cultural aspects, 5:1646, 5:1648, 5:1659
Multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA),	definition, 5:1645–1646
3:884	ethnic minorities as obstacle, 5:1659
Multiple imputation, 2:519–520	external actors and, 5:1649
Multiple regression, 5:1562, 7:2249, 7:2251–2252, 8:2705	history, 5:1647–1648, 5:1658–1659
Multipolarity	instruments, 5:1649–1650
balance of power, 1:132-133, 1:152	military rule and, 5:1576
balanced and unbalanced, 1:154	nationalism and, 5:1646-1647, 5:1649-1650
definition, 1:152	political culture and, 6:1975–1978
neorealist view, 1:153	regional characteristics, 5:1647–1649
See also Bipolarity and multipolarity	risks, 5:1650
Multivariate regression, 2:466, 8:2528	state building and, 5:1645, 5:1646, 5:1654, 8:2506
Municipal governments. See Local governments	See also Transitions
Muravchik, Joshua, 4:1129	National identities
Musgrave, Richard, 8:2584	bases, 4:1136–1137
1.140914.09 1110114149 002001	20000, 111100 1107

constitutional, 5:1649	political, 5:1647, 5:1654, 5:1656
construction of, 5:1646	political integration and, 6:1986-1987
definition, 4:1131, 5:1646	political philosophy and, 6:1997
ethnicity and, 4:1142	popular sovereignty and, 5:1654, 8:2394-2395
in Europe, 4:1138, 4:1139, 4:1141, 4:1142, 8:2396	postcolonialism and, 7:2088–2089
imposition, 8:2505–2506	racism and, 7:2197
intensity, 4: 1137–1138	as secular religion, 5:1660
irredentism and, 5:1348	social dominance orientation and,
migration and, 4:1140, 5:1568	8:2426, 8:2427
multiculturalism and, 5:1647	socialization processes, 4:1086
multiple, 4:1140–1141	sportive, 5:1646–1647
negative aspects, 5:1645, 5:1646	territorial, 5:1656, 5:1659
postcolonialism and, 7:2088–2089	See also Patriotism
in postcommunist states, 4:1138, 4:1139–1140, 8:2396	Nationalist movements, 5:1658–1663
pride and, 5:1646	contemporary, 5:1661–1662
relationship to other identities, 4:1138–1141	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	definition, 5:1658
secession and, 7:2368	doctrines, 5:1655, 5:1657, 5:1660
supranational, 4:1141, 4:1142, 6:1735	goals, 5:1653
symbols, 5:1645, 5:1646–1647, 5:1649, 6:2008–2009	Marxist view, 5:1660–1661
See also Identity, social and political; Nation building	modernity and, 5:1659–1661, 5:1662
National interest, 5:1650–1653	parties, 6: 1798
content, 5:1650, 5:1651	self-determination, 8:2395
definition, 5:1650	separatist, 5:1648–1649, 5:1655, 6:1798
nationalist groups and, 5:1661	See also Zionism
party goals and, 6:1792	Nationalities, citizenship and, 5:1571
subnational autonomy and, 4:986–987	Nations
theories, 5:1651–1652	cultural homogeneity, 1:240
use of concept, 5:1650–1651, 8:2493	currencies, 5:1620
National Science Foundation, 6:2016	definition, 4:970, 5:1645, 5:1653, 5:1659
National security, as foreign policy goal, 5:1650	ethnic, 4:970, 5:1653, 5:1655, 5:1656, 8:2394
See also Security and defense policy	failures, 5:1646
National security state, 8:2541–2545	as imagined communities, 4:1270, 5:1645, 5:1654,
Nationalism, 5:1653–1658	5:1659, 7:2088–2089, 8:2394
banal, 5:1646-1647	language policies, 7:2070–2071
civic, 5:1656, 5:1657, 5:1661	origins, 5:1653–1654, 5:1659
classifications, 5:1656–1657	self-determination, 5:1655, 5:1657, 7:2368, 8:2395
communism and, 2:313	social construction, 7:2088-2089, 8:2394
comparative, 5:1661	territorial definition, 5:1645
conflicts related to, 2:398	See also Citizenship; Irredentism; Self-determination
construction of, 5:1646	Nation-states
cultural, 7:2072-2074	identities, 8:2505-2506
decolonization and, 4:1086	impact of migration, 3:652
definition, 5:1646, 5:1653, 5:1658	modernity and, 5:1611
democracy and, 5:1659	security functions, 5:1646
discourses, 7:2089	territories, 8:2494, 8:2588-2589
distinction from patriotism, 5:1656	See also Governance; States; Westphalian ideal state
doctrines, 5:1655	NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
emotional aspects, 7:2151	collective defense role, 5:1633
ethics, 5:1657–1658	as defensive alliance, 1:60
ethnic, 5:1656, 5:1657, 5:1661	expansion, 7:2092, 8:2653, 8:2654
Hindu, 3:935, 4:1077, 7:2264–2265	forces in Afghanistan, 5:1580
historical factors, 4:1138	France and, 8:2652
historical sociology approach, 4:1086, 5:1654	institutionalization, 7:2385
liberal, 5:1656, 5:1657, 5:1660	interventions in human rights cases, 4:1112
minority, 1:128, 2:547	Kosovo intervention, 4:1112, 4:1237, 5:1333,
nation building and, 5:1646–1647, 5:1649–1650	8:2653, 8:2677
negative aspects, 5:1647	as model, 7:2384
9 1	
origins, 5:1653–1655, 5:1659	nuclear forces in Europe, 4:1052
patriotism and, 6: 1832, 6: 1833	peacekeeping missions, 8:2729, 8:2732

in post-Cold War period, 7:2221, 8:2653, 8:2654 See also Transatlantic relations	Nehru, Jawaharlal, 7:2264 Neighborhoods, effects on electoral behavior, 3:747
Natural experiments. See Experiments, natural Natural field experiments. See Experiments, field	Neoclassical economic theory, 2:345, 5:1618, 7:2225 Neoclassical realism, 3:695–696
Natural law, 5:1663-1665	See also Realism
ancient views, 5:1663–1664	Neocleous, Mark, 8:2552
Christian views, 5:1664, 6:1716, 6:1990	Neocolonialism, 1:40, 1:41, 2:304, 3:641, 3:642, 6:1731
contemporary views, 5:1664–1665	See also Postcolonialism
debates, 5:1663	Neo-conservative idealism, 4:1128–1129, 4:1130
definition, 5:1663	Neo-conservative intellectuals, 4:1209, 6:2062
Natural resources, 5:1665–1668	Neo-corporatism, 5:1668–1673
comparative research, 5:1667	conditions favoring, 5:1669, 5:1670
conflicts, 3:783, 3:785	decline, 5:1670
contemporary research, 5:1666–1668	definitions, 5:1669–1670
definition, 5:1665	future of, 5:1673
degradation, 5:1667	interest groups, 4:1222–1223, 6:1870
international regimes, 5:1667–1668	participants, 5:1669, 5:1671
oil, 3 :603, 3 :639, 3 :785, 4 :1253	performance, 5:1671–1673
society and, 5:1666–1667	resurgence, 5:1670–1671
theories, 5:1665–1666, 5:1668	sites, 5:1668–1669
See also Common goods; Environmental policy; Tragedy	trade unions, 4:1222–1223, 5:1669, 5:1671, 6:1870
of the commons	See also Corporativism
Natural rights, 5:1664, 7:2318, 7:2319,	Neo-culturalism, 2:512–513
7:2320–2321, 8:2625	Neo-Darwinism, 1:149–150
See also Rights	Neo-fascist groups, 3:892
Natural rights libertarianism, 5:1442, 5:1443–1444	Neo-functionalism, 3:932–933, 4:1021–1022, 5:1368,
Naturalist ontology, 3:792, 3:794, 3:795,	7;2241–2242, 7;2245, 8;2659
3:797, 3:798	Neo-Gramscian view of international relations, 4:1292
Naturalization policies, 4:1149, 4:1184, 5:1571	Neo-institutionalism
Nazism	characteristics, 6:2059
alliances, 1:60	comparisons, 4:1189, 4:1198
communist party and, 2:317	economic transformations, 8:2659
dictatorship, 3:654	in economics, 4:1206
ideology, 3:889, 7:2200	endogenizing change, 4:1187–1199
intellectuals and, 4:1208 interest groups, 7:2107	governance, 4:1040 ideational, 6:1883
national culture, 7:2073–2074	judicial decision making, 5:1367
nationalism, 5:1661	organizational models, 5:1625
propaganda, 5:1531	policy models, 6:1882–1883
racial purity, 7:2198	political performance, 6: 1850
refugees from, 4:1279	power, 7:2110, 7:2111
statism, 8:2514	redistribution, 7:2225
supporters, 3:888	rule of law, 7:2341–2342
totalitarianism, 8:2628–2629, 8:2630–2631,	variations, 2:344–345
8:2634, 8:2635	See also Discursive institutionalism; Historical
use of language, 7:2069	institutionalism; Institutional theory; Neoliberal
World War I and, 3:891	institutionalism; Rational choice institutionalism;
youth support, 3:894–895	Sociological institutionalism
See also Holocaust	Neoliberal economic theory, 3:632–633, 3:634, 5:1676,
NBS. See Nash bargaining solution	5:1678, 8:2659–2660
Necessary and sufficient conditions. See Conditions,	Neoliberal globalization, 4:972, 4:976, 4:980
necessary and sufficient	Neoliberal institutionalism (NLI), 5:1673–1676
Necessity, 2:384–388	anarchic world, 1:79, 4:1291, 5:1674
Negotiation democracy, 2:555–556	definition, 5:1673–1674
Negotiations	emergence, 5:1674
conflict resolution through, 2:392	formal institutions, 5:1674, 5:1675–1676
unilateralism, 8:2676	international regimes, 5:1437, 5:1674
See also Bargaining; Democracy, consociational;	international relations, 4:1291, 5:1674–1675
Diplomacy; Multilateralism	principal-agent theory, 5:1676

parties, 3:732, 3:733, 6:1797, 6:1798, 6:1799
pillarization, 6: 1860, 6: 1861
republic, 7:2289
social movements, 5:1592
Network analysis, 5:1684-1690
assumptions, 5:1686
data collection, 5:1687-1688, 5:1693
definition, 5:1685
descriptive, 5:1689
goals, 5:1685
history, 5:1685–1686
research designs, 5:1686, 5:1692
sociograms, 5:1685–1686, 5:1689
use of, 1:11, 5:1684–1685, 5:1686–1687, 5:1690,
5:1692–1695, 6:1938
Network maps, 2:542-543
Networks, 5:1690–1696
accountability, 1:11
centrality, 5:1689
collaboration in, 2:298
complex system modeling, 2:365–366
definition, 5:1685
density, 5:1689
development of concept, 5:1690–1692, 6:1937–1938
diasporas, 3:651–652
egocentric, 5:1687–1688
governance, 4:1029–1035
implementation and, 4:1161–1162
of migrants, 5:1569–1570
neo-patrimonial, 5:1680–1681
nodes, 5:1685, 5:1689
political, 5:1693–1694
sizes, 8:2412
social, 6:1786, 8:2410, 8:2412–2413
social capital and, 8:2411
social movements as, 8:2431–2432, 8:2442
of terrorist groups, 8:2592–2593
ties, 5:1686
See also Advocacy networks, transnational; Governance
networks; Policy networks
Neumann, John von, 4:947, 4:960
Neumann, Sigmund, 8:2630, 8:2633
Neuroscience, 7:2149–2150, 7:2151
Neuroscience school, 6:2059–2060
Neustadt, Richard E., 1:18
Neutrality, 5:1696–1699
active, 5:1697
collective security and, 5:1697–1698
credibility, 5:1697
• *
definition, 5:1696
differential, 5:1698
globalization and, 5:1698
historical origins, 5:1696
law, 5:1697
neo-, 5:1696
policy, 5:1697, 5:1698
rationales, 5:1696
New Deal, 7:2224, 8:2515
New International Economic Order (NIEO), 4:1242

New media. See Media, electronic	NLI. See Neoliberal institutionalism
New Politics, 4:1052–1053, 4:1054, 8:2696	NLS. See Nonlinear least squares
New public management (NPM), 5:1699–1704	Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth, 7:2167–2168
accountability, 1:11–12	Nomenklatura, 2:316-317, 2:322, 8:2458,
advantages, 1:23, 1:24	8:2459, 8:2484
auditing growth, 1:106	Non-Aligned Movement, 3:641, 3:667
collaboration, 2:298	Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
components, 5:1699	5:1704–1707
concepts, 4:1004–1005, 7:2272	advocacy activities, 1:28, 1:29-30
contrast with traditional culture, 1:22–23, 1:24	domestic, 5:1706
debates on, 1:24, 1:100	functions, 4:1258
definition, 5:1699	human rights, 5:1705
diffusion, 5:1701–1702	influence, 4: 1270–1271
driving forces, 5:1700–1701	interest intermediation, 6:1874
effects, 5:1702	international, 2:581, 4:1013, 4:1248, 4:1249,
failures, 1:23–24	4 :1257–1258, 4 :1270–1271, 5 :1706, 8 :2440
future of, 5:1703–1704	international solidarity, 5:1322
goals, 1:22, 5:1699	Internet development and, 5:1705
neo-Weberian state and, 5:1682, 5:1684	organizational structures, 5:1706
performance management, 4:1005, 5:1702	origins of concept, 5:1704
performance measurement, 1:24, 4:1005	outsourcing to, 4:1160
police forces, 6:1878	peasant organizations, 6:1847, 6:1848
privatization policies, 7:2133	proliferation, 4: 1013
public employment, 4:1006, 7:2157	study of, 4: 1258
reforms, 1:12, 1:43-44, 1:171-172, 2:452, 5:1699,	in transnational advocacy networks, 1:38
5: 1702, 5: 1703	types, 5:1705–1706
separation from politics, 1:27-28	at United Nations, 5:1704-1705, 5:1706
strategies, 1:23	See also Civil society; Nonstate actors
theoretical context, 5:1699–1700	Nonlinear least squares (NLS) regression, 5:1708
New Science of Politics movement, 1:137	Nonlinear models, 5:1707-1708
New social movements (NSM), 5:1592, 5:1611-1612,	definition, 5:1707
8:2432	differences from linear, 5:1707-1708
New Zealand	estimation, 8:2537
Maori, 4:1170, 4:1171	in political science, 8:2526, 8:2536-2537
parties, 3: 733	See also Statistical models
Newspapers. See Media, print	Nonparametric methods, 6:1709-1712
Newton, Isaac, 1:lvii-lviii	advantages, 6:1709
Newton, Kenneth, 1:93	bootstrap, 6:1709
Neyman-Holland-Rubin (NHR) model, 8:2524	definition, 6:1709
Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test, 4:1116, 4:1117,	development, 6:1709
4: 1118–1121, 8: 2522, 8: 2523	rank-sum test, 6: 1709–1710
Neyman-Rubin model, 1:203, 1:206-208	regression, 6:1710
Ngcongco, L. D., 8:2641	Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), 3:670
NGOs. See Nongovernmental organizations	5:1634, 8:2544
NHM model. See Neyman-Holland-Rubin model	Nonrandom sampling, 1:212, 5:1598, 7:2348-2349,
NHST. See Null hypothesis significance test	7: 2391–2393, 8: 2519
Nicaragua	See also Sampling, random and nonrandom
indigenous peoples' rights, 4:1171-1172	Nonstate actors, 6:1712–1715
Sandinistas, 7:2315, 7:2316	armed conflicts, 8:2724, 8:2727
Somoza family, 1:114, 5:1681, 8:2477	definition, 6:1712
Niebuhr, Reinhold, 1:153, 4:1279	foreign policy of, 3:920–921
NIEO. See New International Economic Order	future of, 6: 1714–1715
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 4:1049	governance role, 6:1714
Nigeria, military rule, 5:1576, 5:1577	international solidarity, 5:1321, 5:1322
NIMBYs (not in my backyard), 4:1220, 8:2437, 8:2438	realist view, 6:1712
Niskanen, William, 1:173	roles, 6:1712–1713, 6:1714
Nixon, Richard M., 1:218, 2:431, 3:636-638,	soft law and, 8:2463-2464
5:1619, 6:1858	transnational advocacy networks, 1:37-39
Nkrumah, Kwame, 1:40, 1:41, 1:225, 2:304, 3:642	types, 6: 1713–1714

warlords, 8:2734–2736	North American Free Trade Agreement
See also Fundamentalist movements; Social movements;	(NAFTA), 5:1329, 5:1330, 7:2238, 7:2239,
Terrorist groups	7:2244, 8:2660
Nontariff barriers, 3:702, 7:2147–2148 See also Protectionism	North Atlantic Treaty Organization. See NATO
	North Korea, 1:109, 1:114, 2:311, 8:2477, 8:2635 Northern Ireland
Nonviolence, 6:1758, 6:1838	conflict in, 2:395, 2:396
See also Pacifism; Protests; Violence Nora, Pierre, 4:1079	parties, 6: 1798
Normative political theory, 6:1715–1726	•
civil liberties, 6:1720–1721	Norton, Philip, 6:1745 Norway
civil society, 6: 1719–1720	church–state relationship, 1:235
conflict of interests, 6:2056–2057	constitution, 1:235
constitutionalism, 6:1722–1724	International Peace Research Institute, 6:1838
coordination, 6:2057–2058	judicial review, 5:1373
democracy, 6:1779 , 6:1780 , 6:2034–2035	neo-corporatism, 5:1669
distributive justice, 6:1721–1722	See also Scandinavia
empirical theory and, 6: 2051, 6: 2052, 6: 2060–2062	Nozick, Robert, 5:1445, 6:1717, 7:2321-2322
equality and inequality, 6: 1715–1716, 6: 1718–1719	NPM. See New public management
exchange, 6:2 057	NPT. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
explanatory, 6: 1717–1718	Weapons
fairness, 6:1724	NSM. See New social movements
historical background, 6:1716	Nuclear power, 4:1052
individualism, 6:1716	Nuclear weapons
issues, 6: 1715–1716	arms control, 8:2544-2545
judicial decision making, 5:1366-1367	arms race, 1:90, 2:448, 3:670-671
modern origins, 6: 1716–1717	Cuban Missile Crisis, 5:1652, 7:2366
policy instrument selection, 6:1931	deterrence, 2:448, 2:486-487, 8:2543, 8:2544
political performance, 6:1850–1851	development, 8:2542-2543
public office rewards, 7:2161, 7:2162, 7:2165	disarmament, 3:670, 8:2544
representative democracy, 6:1722	intermediate-range missiles, 4:1052
rule of law, 7:2341	mutually assured destruction, 8:2543
shared values, 6:2057	nonproliferation regimes, 3:670, 5:1634, 8:2544
social movements, 8:2441–2442	realist view, 7:2221
Normative theory in international relations,	Strategic Defense Initiative, 2:431, 8:2545
6:1726–1737	strategic studies and, 8:2542–2546
global justice, 6: 1731–1733	test ban treaty, 3:671, 4:1242
global political order, 6:1733–1736	U.S. policies, 8:2545
historical evolution, 6:1726–1728	Null hypothesis significance test (NHST), 4:1116–1117
issues, 4:1294	4:1120–1123, 8:2522
supporters, 4:1287	Nussbaum, Martha, 6:1994
war dilemmas, 6: 1728–1731	Nwabueze, Ben O., 2:351
Norms behavioral, 7:2256	NWS. See Neo-Weberian state
human rights, 4:1104, 4:1108, 4:1109–1110	Nyamnjoh, F., 8:2639, 8:2641 Nye, Joseph S., 3:692, 4:1216–1218, 4:1260, 4:1284,
humanitarian interventions, 5:1332, 5:1333	4:1291, 7:2106, 7:2244, 8:2659
in international relations, 2:424–425,	Nyerere, Julius, 6: 1719
6:1727–1728	rycicic, Junus, 6.1717
legal, 7:2344–2345	Oakeshott, Michael, 6:1988
organizational, 7:2287	Obama, Barack, 2:326, 3:739, 4:1242, 6:1859,
Norris, Pippa, 1:85, 1:237, 1:247–248, 1:253,	6:2001, 7:2366
6: 1783–1784, 6: 1785, 8: 2433, 8: 2563	Oberreuter, Heinrich, 6: 1746
North, Douglass C., 1:70, 1:222, 2:345, 6:1882	Observational data
North Africa	advantages, 8:2540
authoritarian regimes, 1:115–117	causation, 1:207, 1:209, 8:2527, 8:2530–2531
economic and political reforms, 3:604	comparability, 7:2191
Islamist parties, 3:605	discontinuity, 8:2530, 8:2540
Pan-Arabism and, 1:40	independence, 3:795
See also Middle East and North Africa; and individual	influential, 7:2329-2330
countries	interactions, 8:2534–2536

outliers, 7:2329	measurement, 6:1743
See also Time-series analysis	monopolistic parties, 6:1793
Observational studies	populist parties, 7:2076
instrumental-variables analysis, 8:2703-2704	problems, 6:1742–1743
nonrandomization, 8:2528-2529	socialist systems, 8:2457
in political science, 5:1560	See also Dictatorships; Totalitarian regimes
program evaluations, 6:1913–1914	Online media. See Internet; Media, electronic
See also Experiments, natural; Participant observation	Ontological equality, 3:803-804
Occupational stratification scales, 8:2445–2446	Ontology, 2:427, 3:792–798
ODA. See Official development assistance	OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
O'Donnell, Guillermo	Operation Iraqi Freedom, 7:2121–2122
on authoritarian regimes, 1:111	Oppenheim, Lassa, 8:2753
on delegative democracy, 2:565, 2:570, 2:590	Opposition, 6:1744–1747
democratization theory, 3:602, 3:623	alternation in government, 6:1828–1829
on political system breakdowns, 1:159	to authoritarian regimes, 3:623-624, 5:1592,
on rule of law, 7:2341	5: 1593–1594, 6: 1788–1789, 7: 2235–2236
on transitions, 8:2661	contexts, 6: 1744–1745
OECD. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and	definition, 6:1744
Development	functions, 6: 1746
Offe, Claus, 6:2027, 7:2091	goals, 6: 1744
Office of Management and the Budget (OMB), U.S.,	insurgencies, 5:1593–1594
2: 483–484	loyal, 6: 1744–1745
Official development assistance (ODA)	to military rule, 3:623, 5:1576
amounts, 3:911, 3:912, 3:913	mobilization, 5:1418, 5:1592
components, 3:911	pro-democracy, 3:623-624
conditionality, 4:1040	repression, 5:1593, 6:1788–1789
sources, 3:912	research on, 6:1746
UN targets, 3:911	theories, 6: 1745–1746
See also Foreign aid and development	types, 6:1744, 6:1745, 6:1746
Ogden, Charles Kay, 2:372	See also Participation, contentious; Protests; Revolutions;
Ogden-Richards triangle, 2:372	Social movements
OIC. See Organization of the Islamic Conference	Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models, 1:295,
Oil, 3: 603, 3: 639, 3: 784, 4: 1253	5:1581–1585, 6:1760, 7:2183, 7:2250–2251, 8:2407,
Oligarchy, 6:1739–1742	8:2698, 8:2739–2741
corporate, 3:766	See also Regression
definition, 6:1739	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
historical examples, 6: 1740	Development (OECD), 1:54, 3:911, 5:1700, 6:1839,
iron law of, 3:768, 5:1502, 6:1740, 6:1741,	6: 1888, 6: 1936, 8: 2462
6:2025, 7:2225	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
legitimacy, 6:1739	(OSCE), 5:1633, 8:2461
in party organizations, 6:1819	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
theories, 6:1740–1741	4:1253
use of term, 6: 1739–1740	Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 5:1349
See also Elites	Organization theory, 6:1747–1752
OLS. See Ordinary least squares	bounded rationality, 7:2214–2216
Olsen, Johan P., 2:347, 4:1205, 5:1473–1474, 5:1475,	bureaucratic politics, 3:923, 3:924
6:1920, 7:2217	change, 6: 1750–1751, 7: 2232
Olson, Mancur, 2:307, 2:308–309, 2:345, 4:1223–1224,	classical, 6:1747
5:1590, 5:1591, 6:2032, 7:2205	contingency theory, 2:433–436
OMB. See Office of Management and the Budget	coordination, 2:449–457
Ombudsmen, 1:7, 1:9, 1:16, 1:20–21	decision making, 6: 1749–1750
One-party dominance, 6:1742–1744	definition, 6:1747
authoritarian regimes, 1:110–111	discretion, 3:679
characteristics, 6:1742	environments, 6:1749
debates, 6:1792–1793, 6:1825	formal organizations, 6:1817, 7:2214, 7:2216
democratic consolidation and, 6:1742–1743	future development, 6:1751–1752
discrimination against other parties, 6:1826	historical development, 6:1747–1748
examples, 1:110–111, 5:1441, 6:1742, 6:1792–1793	human relations approach, 6:1748
explanations, 6:1743	monitoring, 5:1624–1625

networks, 5:1692, 5:1694, 6:1752	of street-level bureaucrats, 1:179
organizational cultures, 6:1749, 6:1750, 7:2216	See also Privatization
organizational structures, 6:1748–1749	Owen, Robert, 2:310, 8:2449, 8:2450, 8:2687
political science and, 6:1751, 6:1752	
social movements, 8:2433–2434	Pacifism, 6:1757-1760
strategic planning, 6:1866-1867	conscientious objectors, 6:1721, 6:1758
topics, 6:1748–1751	definition, 6:1757
See also Party organization	individual conceptions, 6:1757–1758
Organizational policy learning, 6:1934–1935	origins, 6: 1757
Organizational slack, 7:2216	philosophical perspectives, 6:1758–1759
Organizational structures	religious beliefs and, 6:1721, 6:1757–1758, 6:1838
of agencies, 7:2156	systemic level, 6: 1759
of bureaucracies, 7:2129	varieties, 6:1757, 6:1759
of interest groups, 4:1221	Padgett, John, 1:164
of judicial systems, 5:1375–1376,	Paige, Glenn, 5:1409
5:1384–1386	Paine, Thomas, 5:1615, 7:2319, 8:2449
military, 5:1574	Pakistan
of nongovernmental organizations, 5:1706	military rule, 5:1577
organization theory, 6: 1748–1749	partition, 2:395
of police, 6:1878, 7:2381	Palestine, 8:2766–2767
of security apparatus, 7:2379–2382	Palestinians
See also Reorganization	conflict with Israel, 2:395–396, 7:2265–2266, 8:2767
Organized crime, 7:2379, 7:2380, 8:2596	Islamist movements, 5:1354
Orientalism, 6:1752–1756	refugees, 8:2767
area studies debate, 1:88	Pan-Africanism, 1:40
classical, 6:1753–1754, 6:1755	Pan-American Union, 4:1011
critique of colonialism, 2:305	Pan-Arabism, 1:40, 5:1662
issues, 6: 1755–1756	Panebianco, Angelo, 6:1796, 6:1801–1802, 6:1962
meanings, 6:1752–1753, 6:1755	Panel data analysis, 6:1760–1763
modern, 6:1754, 6:1755	advantages, 6:1760, 8:2531
origins, 6: 1753	contemporaneous correlation, 6:1762
postcolonialism and, 7:2087	fixed and random effects, 6:1760–1761
practical, 6: 1753, 6: 1754–1755	heteroskedasticity, 5:1597, 6:1762
view of Islamic regimes, 1:114	missing data, 6: 1762–1763
Orwell, George, 7:2069, 8:2634, 8:2687	model misspecification, 5:1597
Osborne, David, 7:2272	multiple-wave panels, 8:2531
OSCE. See Organization for Security and Co-operation in	in political science, 6: 1760
Europe	serial correlation, 6:1761–1762
Oskamp, Stuart, 1:144	unit effects, 6: 1760–1761
Ostrogorski, Moisei, 6:1954	See also Time-series cross-section data and methods
Ostrogorski paradox, 2:575	Paradigms in political science, 6:1763-1766
Ostrom, Elinor	competitive democracy, 6:1956
on common pool resources, 2:309, 5:1666,	definition, 6:1763
7:2132, 7:2161	governance, 6: 1945–1946
institutional analysis and development framework,	in institutional theory, 4:1194-1195
6:1948, 6:1949, 8:2646–2648	in international relations, 4:1282, 4:1289, 4:1307-1309
on models, 6: 1944, 6: 1945	use of term, 6: 1763–1765
on socially efficient institutions, 1:223-224	Paraguay, 1:203, 8:2477
O'Toole, Laurence, 6:1946, 6:1949	Paramilitary forces, 5:1594, 8:2735
Ottoman Empire, 4:968, 5:1350, 8:2510, 8:2625	See also Militias
Oucome monitoring, 6:1916	Parekh, Bhikhu, 6:1989, 6:1998-1999
See also Impacts, policy	Pareto, Vilfredo
Outsourcing	on elites, 2:408-409, 3:760, 3:763, 3:765, 3:766, 5:1501,
of implementation, 4: 1160, 4: 1161–1162	6:1740, 6:2024–2025
by local governments, 5:1469	on political class, 6: 1953–1954
of manufacturing, 8:2496–2497	Parkinson, C. Northcote, 7:2270
by military, 7:2134	Parks, R. W., 8:2616–2617
network relationships, 1:11	Parliamentary systems, 6:1766–1771
performance contracts, 6: 1836	accountability, 1:4–5, 1:18, 6:1769
performance contracts, 0.1000	4000 antability, 1.1 3, 1.10, 0.1/0/

advantages and disadvantages, 6: 1770–1771 British, 1: 18, 2: 587, 2: 590, 7: 2276	systems theory, 3:930–931, 6:2024, 8:2580–2581 on Weber, 1:137
cabinets, 1:183, 1:185, 3:865, 3:867, 4:1037–1038,	Participant observation, 6:1774–1777
6: 1768–1769	advantages and disadvantages, 6:1775–1776
coalition governments, 1:286–289, 4:1038–1039, 6:1766,	characteristics, 3:833
6: 1767–1768, 6: 1770, 6: 1982–1983, 6: 2047	definition, 6:1774
delegation, 6:1769	historical development, 6:1774
democratic consolidation, 3:618	interviewing and, 5:1338
distinction from presidential systems, 2:590–591,	in political science, 6: 1774, 6: 1775–1777
6: 2046–2047, 7: 2123, 7: 2303	process, 6: 1775
European, 6:2046	program evaluations, 6: 1914
evolution, 2: 590–591	recommendations, 6:1776–1777
executive, 3:865, 3:867, 6:1766, 6:1767, 6:1772–1773	theories, 6: 1774–1775
features, 6: 1767–1768	See also Ethnographic methods; Observational studies
forms, 6: 1768–1769	Participation, 6:1777–1788
global, 2: 580	citizenship and, 1:239
government formation, 2:591, 6:1767–1768, 6:1982–1983	definition, 6: 1777–1778
governments, 4:1036, 4:1037–1039, 6:1766	in democracies, 1:250, 2:577
judicial review, 5:1383	democracy theories and, 6:1778–1780
ministerial responsibility, 7:2300–2301	in direct democracy, 2:563, 7:2229
minority governments, 6:1770, 6:2047	of masses, 5:1502–1503, 5:1504–1505
monarchies, 2:590-591, 6:1766-1767	political efficacy and, 3:718
new public management reforms, 5:1701	research methodologies, 6:1778, 6:1783
no confidence votes, 6: 1766, 6: 1767, 6: 1768	social, 6: 1786–1787
one-party dominance, 6: 1742, 6: 2047	unequal, 4: 1183
operations, 6: 1769–1770	See also Civic participation; Electoral turnout; Political
opposition, 6: 1744–1745	participation
origins, 6: 1766–1767	Participation, contentious, 6:1788-1791
party roles, 2:354, 6:1769, 6:2047	contexts, 6:1788–1790
party system fragmentation, 6:1822-1824	definition, 6:1788
powers, 6: 2047	in democracies, 6: 1789–1790
prime ministers, 1:18, 1:288-289, 6:1768-1769	forms, 6:1788, 8:2432
representation, 7:2276–2277	nature of, 6: 1790
variations, 4: 1038–1039	See also Civic participation; Opposition; Protests; Social
Westminster model, 2:587, 4:1039, 7:2300-2301	movements
Parliaments, 6:1771–1774	Participatory democracy, 6:1779
bicameral, 6: 1773, 8: 2720	Parties, 6:1791-1803
in communist systems, 2:321	behaviors, 2:363, 2:366
definition, 6:1771	broker role, 6:1812
dissolution, 6:1767	cadre, 6:1800, 6:1801-1802, 6:1820
electoral systems, 6:1773	candidate selection, 3: 730–734, 3: 750
executive and, 6: 1766, 6: 1767, 6: 1772–1773	cartel, 6:1802, 6:1806, 6:1821, 7:2281, 7:2282
history, 6: 1771–1772	center, 6: 1794, 6: 1797, 6: 2057
legislative process, 6:1772–1773	charismatic leaders, 6: 1817–1818
organization, 6:1773	classes associated with, 1:274, 6:1794-1796, 6:1819
representation function, 6:1773	cleavages represented, 6:1794-1799
roles, 6: 1772–1773	cohesiveness, 8:2708
unicameral, 6:1773	competition, 2:360, 2:361, 2:363, 3:728, 6:1792,
See also Legislatures; Voting rules, legislative	6: 1828–1829
Parsa, Misagh, 7:2314	conflicts, 6:1792
Parsons, D. W., 6:1943, 6:1944, 6:1947, 6:1949	in consociational democracies, 2:555, 6:1861
Parsons, Talcott	decline, 7:2282
on anomia, 1:82	definition, 6: 1791–1792
on health, 4: 1061	democratization role, 2:353-354
neo-functionalism and, 3:932-933	dictatorships, 3:655, 5:1573
pattern variables, 6:1969	discipline, 8:2721
on power, 7:2102	distinction from interest groups, 4:1220
on social stratification, 1:272	dominant authoritarian, 6:1742, 6:1743
structural functionalism 4:1205	electoral mobilization 6:1792

-1:t 2.722 724 C.1004 C.1010 1010	:
elites, 3:733–734, 6:1804, 6:1818–1819	ideology and, 6:1811
extreme-center, 6:1794–1795, 6:1797, 6:1799, 7:2200	issue preferences and, 6:1809–1810
families, 1:226, 6:1795–1796, 6:1827	Michigan social psychological concept, 6:1807–1808,
fascist, 3:888, 3:890–895, 6:1797–1798	6:1810, 6:2004
global roles, 6:1714	outside United States, 6:1810–1811
history, 2:418, 6:1791, 6:1793–1794	psychology of, 6:2003–2004
incumbent, 7:2236	research, 3:726–727
labor movements and, 4:1223, 5:1405, 6:1794,	revisionist concept, 6:1808
6: 1795, 6: 1796	social identity theory, 6:1809
leadership elections, 6:1802	stability, 6:1807–1808, 6:1809, 6:1810, 6:1828
left-right divide, 6:1794, 6:1815, 6:1827, 6:2057	in United States, 6: 1807–1810
local government and, 5:1466	voting behavior and, 3:740, 6:1807-1808, 6:2004
mass, 1:284, 6:1800, 6:1801-1802, 6:1820-1821, 6:1954,	Party linkage, 6:1811–1814
7:2280, 7:2282, 8:2454	definition, 6:1811
middle-class, 6:1794	democracy and, 6:1812, 6:1813-1814
missions, 6: 1818, 6: 1820	forms, 6: 1812–1813
negative views, 6:1793	market linkage, 6:1812
objectives, 6:1792	revolutionary, 6:1812–1813
opposition, 6:1745	Party loyalty. See Party identification
in parliamentary systems, 2: 354, 6: 1769, 6: 2047	Party manifestos, 6:1814–1816
patronage, 1:282, 1:283–284, 1:285–286	coalition governments and, 6:1815
pluralist interest intermediation, 6:1873	definition, 6:1814
policy spaces, 2:362	distribution, 6:1814
political class in, 6: 1954–1955, 6: 1956–1957	implementation, 6:1815
political functions, 3:617, 3:710, 6:1825	roles, 6:1814–1815
in presidential systems, 2:362, 2:363	study of, 6: 1815–1816
radical, 7:2200	See also Electoral campaigns
relevance, 6:1826	Party organization, 6:1817–1822
representation, 2:353–354, 7:2280–2283	centralization and decentralization, 6:1818, 6:1819–1820
separatist, 6:1798	changes, 6:1820, 6:1821
socioeconomic bases, 6: 1794–1795, 6: 1827	characteristics, 6: 1791–1792
state-nationalist, 6: 1797–1798	definition, 6: 1817
transnational networks, 1:226, 5:1428, 6:1714	external environments, 6:1818, 6:1819–1820, 6:1821
as veto players, 8:2706, 8:2708	history, 6: 1817–1818
See also Cabinets; Christian Democratic parties;	mass vs. cadre parties, 6: 1800–1802
Coalitions; Communist parties; Conservative parties;	path dependence, 6:1817
Elections, primary; Green parties; Liberal parties;	personalization, 6: 1802–1803
One-party dominance; Social democratic parties;	physiognomy, 6:1818–1819
Socialist parties	power structure, 6: 1818–1819 related organizations, 6: 1805
Partisanship. See Party identification	e ,
Party attachment. See Party identification	study of, 6:1794
Party closeness. See Party identification Party finance, 6:1803–1806	typologies, 6:1820–1821
•	in United States, 6:1803
comparative research, 6:1804–1805	See also Party finance
contributions, 6:1801, 6:1802, 6:1804–1805,	Party system fragmentation, 6:1822–1824
6:1806, 6:1812	definition, 6:1822
control of, 6:1804	effects, 6:1823–1824, 8:2712–2716
corruption scandals, 6:1804	explanations, 6:1823
definition, 6:1803	measures, 2:361, 6:1822
expenditures, 6:1804, 6:1805	Party systems, 6:1824–1830
international standards, 6:1806	changes, 6:1829–1830
party linkage and, 6:1812	definition, 6:1824–1825
problems, 6:1803–1804	development, 6:1793
public subsidies, 6:1802 , 6:1805 –1806	institutionalization, 6:1828–1829
regulations, 6:1805, 6:1806	multiparty, 6:1826, 6:1982–1983
study of, 6:1804–1805	number of parties, 6:1825, 6:1826–1827
Party identification, 6:1806–1811	in parliamentary systems, 6:1769
attitudinal approach, 6:1809	policy differences, 6:1827–1828
definition, 6: 1806–1807	sizes of parties, 6:1826

two-party, 6:1826, 6:1981–1982, 6:2057, 7:2124	study of, 6: 1838–1839
typologies, 6:2042	See also Democratic peace; Pacifism; Perpetual Peace; War
See also One-party dominance; Parties	and peace
Pascal, Blaise, 8:2623	Peace building, 6:1839, 6:1841, 7:2080, 8:2730, 8:2731
Passeron, Jean-Claude, 4:1143–1144	Peace research, 6:1838–1839, 7:2079, 8:2546, 8:2711
PAT. See Principal-agent theory	Peacekeeping, 6:1840–1846
Pateman, Carol, 1:250, 2:441, 2:443, 4:965	during Cold War, 6: 1842, 8: 2731–2732
Path dependence, 6:1830–1832	components, 6: 1841–1842
change and, 6: 1830–1831, 6: 1832	costs, 6: 1842
critiques of, 6: 1831–1832	definition, 6: 1841, 8: 2731
definition, 6:1830	doctrines, 6:1841
efficiency, 6:1831	EU forces, 8:2729
of governmental institutions, 4:1041	in future, 8: 2732–2733
of institutions, 4:1188, 4:1192, 4:1200, 4:1207	goals, 6:1841, 8:2729, 8:2730, 8:2731, 8:2732
of party organization, 6:1817	NATO forces, 8:2729, 8:2732
policy instrument selection, 6: 1931	neutral state participation, 5:1697
processes, 6:1830	number of missions, 6:1842, 8:2729
theory, 2: 346–347	in post–Cold War period, 6:1841–1845, 8:2731–2732
Patrick, Stewart, 8:2504	size of forces, 6:1842, 8:2729
Patrimonialism. See Neo-patrimonialism	successes, 6:1845, 8:2683
Patriotism, 6:1832–1834	UN missions, 4:1112, 6:1839, 6:1841–1845, 8:2683,
constitutional, 5:1649, 5:1657, 6:1833–1834	8:2729–2733
contemporary views, 6: 1833–1834	See also Interventions, humanitarian
definition, 6:1832	Peacemaking, 8:2731
	Peak associations, 4:1221
distinction from nationalism, 5:1656	Pearl, Judea, 1:208, 8:2700
historical evolution of concept, 6:1832–1833 negative aspects, 6:1833	
0 1 ,	Pearson, Egon S., 8:2522
political, 5:1647, 6:1833	Pearson, Karl, 2:464, 2:543, 7:2354, 7:2356
universal values and, 6:1833–1834	Peasants
See also Nationalism	communities, 3:607
Patronage	power, 5:1483, 5:1500, 6:1846
corrupt, 1:283, 1:286	Peasants' movements, 6:1846–1849
distinction from clientelism, 1:282, 1:283–284	aims, 6:1846, 6:1847
persistence, 1:285–286	definition, 6:1846
political appointments, 6:2064, 6:2065, 6:2066–2067	food sovereignty issue, 6:1846, 6:1847
reform efforts, 2:482	protests, 8:2433
in Soviet Union, 2:316	revolutions, 7:2313–2314
spoils system, 6:2067	transnational, 6:1846–1848
Patron-client relationships. See Clientelism	Pedigree View, 4:1015
Patterson, Tom, 6:1967	PEF. See People empowerment framework
Pauperization thesis, 1:84	Pensions
Pay for performance (PFP), 6:1835–1837	public, 7:2153, 7:2164
costs, 6:1835–1836	reforms, 8:2751
definition, 6:1835	See also Welfare policies
reasons for adoption, 6:1836-1837, 7:2164-2165	People empowerment framework (PEF),
results, 6:1835, 6:1836, 7:2165	4: 1102–1103
PCA. See Principal component analysis	People's Republic of China. See China
PD. See Prisoners' dilemma	Perelman, Chaim, 5:1389
Peace, 6:1837–1840	Perestroika, 3:611, 3:612-613, 8:2460
conditions for, 6: 1839–1840	Performance, 6:1849–1854
definition, 6:1837, 8:2726, 8:2730	criteria, 6:1849, 6:1850-1851, 6:1854
education for, 4: 1277–1278	definition, 6:1849
enforcement, 8:2730, 8:2731, 8:2732	of democracies, 6:1850–1851
just, 6: 1731	explanations, 6:1853
negative, 7:2078-2079, 7:2080, 8:2730-2731	measurement, 6: 1852–1853
normative and religious context, 6:1837–1838, 7:2078	political, 6:1849–1854
perpetual, 4: 1276, 4: 1278	research, 6:1849–1850, 6:1853–1854
positive, 7:2078–2080	theories, 6:1849–1850, 6:1854
as process, 7:2080	See also Governance, good

Performance budgeting, 7:2154–2155	reorganization models, 7:2271, 7:2272
Performance management, 6:1854–1857	on rewards of public office, 7:2162-2163
administrative reforms and, 6:1855	Peterson, Theodore, 5:1542
budgeting and, 7:2154-2155	Pettit, Philip, 5:1453-1454, 7:2298
of bureaucracy, 1:24, 3:716, 5:1625-1626	Pevehouse, Jon, 1:160
challenges, 6:1855, 6:1856	Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, 2:504,
criteria, 6:1857	4: 1268–1269
debates, 5:1625	PFP. See Pay for performance
definition, 6:1854	Philippines
development, 6: 1856–1857	anarchism, 1:74
measurement, 1:24, 3:851, 5:1625, 6:1855, 6:1911–1912	Marcos regime, 1:114, 5:1681
monitoring and, 5:1625–1626	overthrow of Marcos regime, 7:2317
in new public management, 4:1005, 5:1702	peasant movements, 6:1847
processes, 6:1855–1857	Philosophy
purposes, 6:1854–1855, 6:1856	classical, 6: 2052–2053
theories, 6:1 856	counterfactual models of causation, 1:205
See also Effectiveness, bureaucratic; Evidence-based policy	political science and, 1:lxiv, 1:lxv
Performance measurement, 1:24, 4:1005	positivism, 7:2080–2081
Performance-related pay. See Pay for performance	science and, 6: 1991–1992
Periodicals. See Media, print	See also Greek philosophy; Political philosophy;
Perlman, Selig, 5:1404	Utilitarianism
Perpetual Peace (Kant), 5:1399	Piaget, Jean, 4:1205, 7:2363
conditions for peace, 6:1839, 6:2053, 7:2078	Pierre, Jon, 4:988, 4:995, 4:1027, 6:1945
cosmopolitanism, 4:1276, 5:1436, 6:1734	Pierson, Paul, 2:346
influence, 4:1278	Pigou, Arthur, 3:805–806
interpretations, 5:1435, 6:2061	Pillarization, 6:1860–1863
levels of action, 6:1759	characteristics, 6:1860
liberalism, 4:1278, 5:1435, 5:1436	decline, 6:1862
on Machiavellism, 5:1400	definition, 6:1860
utopianism, 8:2687	examples, 6:1860–1861
Personal psychology, 6:2001–2002	measurement, 6:1860
Personalistic rule, 3:623–624, 3:655	Pinochet, Augusto, 1:214–215, 2:374, 3:656, 4:1109,
Personality traits, 8:2426	8:2665, 8:2666
Personalization of politics, 6:1857–1860	Pitkin, Hannah, 7:2282–2283, 7:2305
candidate selection, 3:740–741	Planenatz, John, 2:316, 5:1656
candidate-centered campaigns, 6:1857–1858,	Planning, 6:1863–1867
6:1962, 6:1965	activity, 6: 1863–1864
causes, 5:1539–1540, 6:1859–1860, 6:1965–1966	definition, 6:1863
definition, 6: 1857 effects, 5: 1410–1411	economic, 6:1863
media role, 5:1539, 6:1857–1858, 6:1859, 6:1965–1966	future of, 6:1867 preferences-guided decision making, 6:1864–1865
neo-patrimonialism, 5:1679–1681, 6:1859	procedural approach, 6:1865–1866
party leaders, 6: 1802–1803, 6: 1820, 6: 1858	rational-comprehensive model, 6: 1864, 6: 1920
representation and, 7:2283	strategic, 6: 1866–1867
research, 6:1859	systems theory, 6:1865
voting behavior and, 3:740–741, 6:1858	value of, 6: 1863–1864, 6: 1866
Personalized leadership, 5:1411, 5:1540	See also Budgeting; Policy process, models of; Public
Peru	budgeting
caudillismo, 1:202	Platforms. See Party manifestos
historical memory, 4:1080	Plato
presidential system, 7:2126	criticism of, 4:1050
truth commission, 4:1081	on democracy, 2: 571–572
Perugini, Marco, 1:95	dialogues, 4:1049–1050
Peters, B. Guy	on ideal state, 4: 1049–1050
on administrative capacity, 8:2585	idealism, 4:1125–1126, 8:2687
on autonomy, 1:120	life, 4: 1048–1049
on governance, 4:988, 4:995, 4:1020, 6:1945	on mixed government, 8:2403
on policy design, 6:1930	on natural law, 5:1663
on public administration, 1:27, 5:1683	on nature of world, 3:792

political philosophy, 2:572	Poland
on political system change, 1:158	church-state relationship, 1:235-236
on politics, 1:lii, 4:1049	communist party, 2:325
rationalism, 3:793	constitution, 1:235–236
Republic, 2:438, 4:1049–1050	democratization, 3:659
on rule of law, 7:2335	Solidarity trade union, 1:251, 2:324
on society, 2:438–439	Polanyi, Karl, 1:187, 4:1205, 5:1677
Socrates and, 4:1048–1049	Polarity. See Bipolarity and multipolarity; Superpowers
Plattner, Marc, 2:351	Police, 6:1876–1879
Platvoet, Jan, 7:2327	abuses, 6:1 877
Playfair, William, 2:539, 4:1044	definition, 6:1876
Plebiscitary leadership democracy, 2:592	efficiency, 6:1877
Plebiscites, 2:561, 3:657, 7:2226	historical evolution, 6: 1876
See also Referenda	INTERPOL, 7:2382
Pluralism, 6:1867–1872	legitimacy, 5:1416–1417, 6:1877
antagonistic, 2:403	management systems, 6:1878
as antitheory, 1:31	networks, 6: 1877–1878
conflict resolution, 2:392–393	organizational norms, 7:2287
criticism of, 4:1095, 4:1096	organizational structures, 6:1878, 7:2381
cultural, 6: 1869–1870, 6: 1871	recent developments, 6:1877-1878
definition, 6: 1868, 6: 1874	reforms, 6: 1878
elitism, 3:766-767, 3:768, 6:2025	specialization, 6: 1876, 6: 1877
ethno-cultural, 6: 1871–1872	use of force, 6: 1876–1877
future of, 6: 1872	See also Security apparatus
history of concept, 4:1091–1093,	Policies
6: 1867–1870	globalization issues, 2:355
interest groups, 4:1221-1222, 4:1228-1229	political science and, 4:1151
liberal, 6:1 870	politics and, 4:1001–1002
limited in authoritarian regimes, 1:108	See also Health policy; Impacts, policy; Policy,
lobbying, 5:1459–1460	employment; Welfare policies
migration and, 6: 1869, 6: 1871	Policy, constructivist models, 6:1879–1881
moderate, 6: 1826–1827	Policy, discourse models, 6:1881-1884
polarized, 6: 1826–1827	See also Discourse analysis; Discursive policy analysis
policy formulation, 6:1920	Policy, employment, 6:1884–1890
political, 6: 1868–1869, 6: 1872	aims, 6: 1884
in political science, 1:lii, 1:lxi, 1:lxiii, 4:1091–1093,	definition, 6:1884
4:1095–1096, 4:1097	disability, 8:2751
power, 7:2104–2105	European, 8:2430
redistribution, 7:2225	functional needs, 6:1885
reflective, 1:lxi	history, 6: 1885–1889
religious, 7:2264, 7:2374	social exclusion and, 8:2430
representation, 7:2275, 7:2278, 7:2280–2281	unemployment insurance, 6:1886, 6:1889, 6:1981, 8:2751
sovereignty, 8:2471	See also Welfare policies
state formation, 8:2507	Policy advice, 6:1890–1893
See also Interest groups; Party systems	advisers, 6: 1890–1891
Pluralist interest intermediation, 6:1872–1876	definition, 6:1890
actors, 6:1873–1874	formal or informal, 6: 1891
definition, 6: 1872–1873	good, 6: 1891–1892
in democracies, 6: 1872–1875	need for, 6: 1891
party roles, 6:1873	policy analysis and, 6:1895
social movements, 6:1873–1874	recipients, 6:1890, 6:1892
structures, 6: 1874–1875	Policy analysis, 6:1893–1902
study of, 6: 1874	applied knowledge, 6: 1896–1897
Pluralist societies, 5:1503–1504	discursive, 3:686–688, 6:1880, 6:1881–1884, 6:1898
Plurality bloc voting, 3:752	evidence-based, 6: 1901
Plurality voting, 3:710, 3:750, 3:752	as field of practice, 6:1894–1895, 6:1900–1901,
Pocock, John G. A., 1:239, 7:2293	6:1917–1918
Poguntke, Thomas, 6: 1799	as field of study, 6: 1894, 6: 1895–1896
Poisson regression model, 3:853	fields, 6: 1893–1894
1 0105011 1 CG1 C001011 1110 UCI, J. UJJ	11C1U3, U.10/J-10/T

framing, 6: 1923–1927	goals, 4:1159, 4:1160
history, 3:861, 6:1894	groupthink, 4: 1057–1060
interpretive, 6: 1900–1901	implementation and, 4: 1160
meanings, 6: 1893, 6: 1897	models, 6: 1918–1919
methods, 6:1895–1896, 6:1901	political systems and, 6:1920-1921
oversight, 6:1896–1897	politics of, 6:1922
policy advising and, 6:1895	processes, 4:999–1001, 4:1009
specialization, 6:1900	role of ideas, 6:1882, 6:1921, 6:1935
tensions, 6: 1901	scope, 6: 1918
theories, 6:1897–1899	social movement influence, 8:2436–2437,
Policy communities, 6:1902–1904	8:2441–2442
critiques of, 6:1902–1904	values and, 6: 1918
definition, 4:1227, 6:1902	welfare state development, 4:1003-1004
development of concept, 6:1902, 6:1903	See also Advocacy coalition framework; Agenda-setting;
formal or informal, 6:1922	Evidence-based policy; Governance networks; Policy
formation, 6:1898	process, models of
importance, 6:1939	Policy framing, 6:1923–1927
policy formulation, 6:1938	evolution of concept, 6:1924-1926
study of, 6: 1938	methods, 6:1926–1927
See also Policy networks	process, 6:1923, 7:2214
Policy cycle, 6:1904–1907	use of concept, 6: 1924, 6: 1927
criticism of concept, 6:1905–1906	See also Framing
definition, 6:1904	Policy impacts. See Impacts, policy
development of concept, 6:1905	Policy implementation. See Implementation
reform and, 7:2232	Policy instruments, 6:1928–1933
stages, 6:1890–1893, 6:1904–1905, 6:1940	approaches to, 6:1928
use of concept, 6: 1906–1907	definition, 6:1928
See also Policy process, models of; Stages model of	evaluation, 6: 1932–1933
policy making	families, 6: 1929–1930
Policy design, 4:1153-1154, 4:1158-1160, 6:1922-1923	implementation, 6:1931
See also Policy formulation; Policy instruments	packaging, 6:1932
Policy entrepreneurs, 1:48–49	risk and, 7:2324–2325
Policy evaluation, 6:1907–1917	second generation, 6:1931–1932
approaches, 6:1896, 6:1907–1908	selecting, 4 :1002, 6 :1930–1931
criticism of, 6:1909	theories, 6:1928–1929
definition, 6:1907	Policy learning, 6:1933–1937
of development assistance, 3:913–915	challenges, 6:1933–1934, 6:1936
development of field, 6:1896	definition, 6:1933
effectiveness of instruments, 6:1932–1933	effects, 1:36
feasibility studies, 6:1914	enhancing, 6:1936
governance and, 6:1909	organizational, 6:1934–1935
issues, 6:1896, 6:1908, 6:1911–1912	study of, 6:1933
meta-analysis, 6:1914	theories, 6:1935–1936
methods, 6:1896, 6:1908, 6:1913–1915	transfer and diffusion, 6:1936
monitoring, 5:1624, 6:1915–1916	Policy networks, 6:1937–1939
performance measurement, 3:851, 6:1911–1912	advocacy activities, 1:31
role, 6:1908	analysis, 5:1690, 5:1693–1695
science, 6:1907, 6:1909–1915	definition, 6:1937
social change and, 6:1908	diplomacy and, 3: 667, 6: 1937
See also Evaluation research; Impacts, policy;	examples, 6:1937
Implementation	governance role, 4:989–990
Policy formulation, 6:1917–1923	implementation and, 4:1161–1162, 6:1939
actors, 6:1922–1923	interest groups and, 4:1226–1227, 6:1938
as art or science, 6:1917–1918	issue networks, 4:1227, 6:1922, 6:1937, 6:1938
collaborative, 2:297–299	local, 4:1028–1029
deliberative, 2:551–553	origins of concept, 6:1937–1938
elite influences, 3:769, 6:1920	policy formulation role, 6:1922
external environments, 6:1918 Foreign Policy Analysis research, 3:922–923	theories, 1:31, 6:1938 transnational, 6:1938–1939
roreign roney Analysis research, 3:744-743	u anshanonai, 0 :1230–1232

urban governance, 4:1027	challenges, 6: 1966–1967
See also Policy communities	definition, 6:1960–1961
Policy planning. See Planning	development of field, 6:1963-1964
Policy process, models of, 6:1939–1950	election advertising, 6: 1805–1806, 6: 1964
advocacy coalition framework, 1:33–37, 4:999, 6:1882,	goals, 6: 1966
6:1922, 6:1935	online, 5:1533–1534, 6:1859, 6:1966
garbage can, 6:1920, 6:1922, 7:2217	personalization of politics and, 6:1859
governance paradigms and, 6: 1945–1947	phases, 5:1532–1534, 6:1964–1966
incrementalism, 6: 1909–1911, 6: 1919	power distribution, 6: 1961
institutionalist, 6:1920, 6:1940, 6:1948, 6:1949,	production aspects, 6:1962
8:2646–2648	professionalization, 6: 1964–1965
learning in, 6: 1933	propaganda, 4:1211, 5:1531, 5:1537, 5:1543–1544,
0 ,	
logic of governance, 6:1947–1948, 6:1949	6:1963, 7:2069, 8:2595–2596
mixed scanning, 6:1920	public diplomacy, 3:667–668, 4:1269
multiple governance, 6:1948, 6:1949	research, 1:253, 5:1532, 6:1961–1963
neo-institutionalist, 6:1882–1883	socialization role, 6:2021
nested games, 6:1947	symbolic politics, 8:2577, 8:2578–2579
rational, 6:1918–1919, 6:1940	trends, 6:1962, 6:1964–1967
realist, 6: 1918–1919	voter turnout effects, 3:870
responsiveness and, 7:2302	See also Media, electronic; Media, print
stages model, 6:1940–1943, 6:1947, 6:1950, 8:2479–2481	Political competition. See Competition, political
theoretical approaches, 6:1944–1945	Political constitutionalism, 2:416–418, 2:419–420
use of, 6: 1943, 6: 1949–1950	Political culture, 6:1967–1979
See also Agenda-setting; Policy formulation; Rationality,	change and, 6: 1968, 6: 1970–1971
bounded	civic culture as, 1:244–245, 6:1970
Policy research. See Think tanks	cognitive and evaluative models, 6:1967, 6:1968
Policy responsiveness, 7:2303	comparative research, 6: 1970–1974, 6: 1977
See also Responsiveness	definition, 1:245, 6:1967
Policy spaces, 2:362, 8:2473–2474	in democracies, 1:244-245, 6:1969, 8:2558, 8:2672
See also Spatial models of politics	democratization and, 6:1977-1978
Policy stability, 8:2706, 8:2707–2708	development of concept, 6:1968–1971
Policy styles, 4:1002, 4:1225	features, 6: 1967, 6: 1970
Policy theories, 6:1928–1929	heterogeneity, 2:554, 6:1975, 6:1976-1977
Polimetrix, 8:2573	international, 4:1317
Political asylum, 4:1147–1148, 4:1150, 5:1569	lobbying and, 5:1460
Political attitudes. See Attitudes, political	nation building and, 6:1975–1978
Political behavior	political systems and, 8:2557–2558
cohort analysis, 1:289	research, 6:1971–1974, 8:2557–2558
media influences, 5:1537–1538	sociological institutionalism, 2:347–348
Political beliefs. See Beliefs	state formation and, 6: 1976–1978
Political class, 6:1950–1960	subject, 8:2557–2559
criticism of concept, 6:1953, 6:1954	trust in, 8:2672
definition, 6: 1950–1951	types, 6:1970, 6:1975, 8:2557–2558
evolution of concept, 6:1951–1957	values, 6: 1978–1979
members, 6: 1957–1958	See also Civic culture; Political socialization;
Mosca's theory, 6:1951, 6:1952–1953, 6:1954, 7:2279	Social capital
Pareto on, 6: 1953–1954	Political development. See Development, political
in parties, 6: 1954–1955, 6: 1956–1957	Political economy, 6:1979–1985
rational choice approach and, 6: 1959	definition, 6: 1979–1980
representation by, 7:2279	economic influences on political systems, 6:1983–1984
research on, 6: 1955–1956, 6: 1957–1958	6:2055, 6:2059
resources, 6:1953	electoral systems, 6: 1983–1984
	·
variations, 6: 1952–1953	formal models, 6:1980–1983
See also Elites	future research, 6:1984
Political cleavages. See Cleavages, social and political	of media, 5:1536–1537
Political communication, 6:1960–1967	party competition models, 6:1981–1983
actors, 6:1964	preference formation, 6:1980–1981
Americanization, 6:1962, 6:1965, 6:1966	public office rewards, 7:2163
audience fragmentation, 6:1966	See also International political economy

Political efficacy. See Efficacy, political	Political preferences. See Preferences
Political equality. See Equality, political	Political prisoners. See Human rights
Political ethnography. See Ethnographic methods	Political psychology, 6:2000-2010
Political geography, 4:969, 4:970	behaviorism, 6:2002
See also Geopolitics	cognition and emotional factors in decision making,
Political identity. See Identity, social and political	7:2148–2151
Political inequality. See Inequality, political	criticism of, 6:2000
Political institutions, 4:1205, 5:1466–1467, 6:2045–2048	crowd psychology, 5:1503, 6:2000
See also Institutions	definition, 6: 2000
Political integration, 6:1985–1988	emotional intelligence, 6: 2005–2007
characteristics, 6:1985	identities, 4:1138, 6:2003–2004
decolonization and, 6:1987	interactionism, 6: 2002–2004
decreases, 6:1987	international politics, 7:2148–2151
definition, 6:1985	mass belief systems, 6:2004–2005
evolution of concept, 6:1985–1987	methods, 6:2009–2010
instruments, 6:1987	personality, 6:2001–2002
nationalism and, 6:1986–1987	prospect theory, 7:2143–2145
theories, 6: 1987	racism, 7:2197
See also European integration	symbols, 6:2007–2009
Political involvement, 6:1780–1781	Political representation. See Representation
See also Political participation	Political risk analysis, 6:2010–2013
Political mobilization. See Mobilization, political	country risk and, 6:2012
Political participation	definition, 6:2010–2011
antecedents, 6:1784-1786	methods, 6: 2013
apathy, 1:84–86	phases, 6: 2011
conventional and unconventional, 6:1779, 6:1783,	sources of risk, 6: 2011–2012
6: 1788, 6: 1789–1790	types of risk, 6: 2012, 7: 2323
in decentralized states, 1:126	Political science
definition, 6:1781	academic departments, 1:lxiv, 1:lxv
democracy theories and, 6: 1778–1780	applied research, 5:1534
democratic quality, 2:567–568, 6:1785–1786	in area studies, 1:86, 1:87–88, 3:647
empirical research, 6:1780–1783	associations, 1:lxiv, 1:lxv, 4:1090–1091
forms, 6: 1782–1784	North American influences, 1:lxiv–lxv
future research, 6:1785	pluralism, 1:lii, 1:lxii, 1:lxiii, 4:1091–1093,
incentives, 1:253, 3:874	4:1095–1096, 4:1097
increasing, 4:1184	relations with other social sciences, 1:lxi–lxiv, 1:137–138.
<u>.</u>	6:1765
levels, 6: 1784	
measurement, 6:1780–1781	relationship to politics, 4: 1087
preference changes, 6:1786	scope, 6:1992–1993
public interest in, 6:1780–1781	See also Epistemological and methodological foundations
by social class, 1:274–275	History of political science
subversion, 2:570	Political science, international institutionalization,
voting, 6:1778–1779, 6:1781–1782	6:2013–2019
See also Participation	academic recognition, 6:2014–2016
Political parties. See Parties	American dominance, 6:2015–2016
Political performance. See Performance	associations, 1:lxiv, 1:151, 4:1093, 6:2016–2019
Political philosophy, 6:1988-2000	in Europe, 4: 1093, 6: 2014–2015, 6: 2018
contemporary, 6: 1994–1999	future of, 6: 2019
critical rationalism, 7:2082-2084, 7:2207-2211	journals, 4:1090, 6:2014, 6:2015, 6:2018
definition, 6:1988	Political Science Quarterly, 4:1090
domains, 1:lxiii, 6:1988-1990, 6:1993	Political socialization, 6:2019–2022
history, 6: 1990–1995	attitude consistency and, 1:93-94
normative epistemology, 6:1995–1996	definition, 6:2019–2020
political science and, 1:lxiii, 1:lxv	education, 6:2020-2021, 6:2058
professionalization, 6:1994	functional, 6: 2019
research, 1:lxv	political communication, 6:2021
universalism, 3:824, 3:827, 6:1996–1999	purposive, 6: 2019
view of politics, 6:1993–1994	values in, 6: 2020
See also Idealism; Political theory	See also Political culture

Deliained annied and	Delicione Conflored annual annual design Delicion
Political sociology	Politicians. See Electoral campaigns; Leadership; Political
apathy, 1:84	class; Public office Politicization of bureaucracy, 6:2063–2066
cultural factors, 6:2029–2031	• •
definition, 6: 2022 identity, 6: 2036	behavioral, 6:2063, 6:2064
power, 6: 2022–2023	democracy and, 6: 2065, 6: 2066 effects, 6: 2065
scope, 1:lxii	institutional, 6: 2063–2064, 6: 2065
* *	
state-society relationships, 6:2022–2024, 6:2035–2036	motives, 6:2064
See also Elites; Sociology	Politicization of civil service, 6:2066–2068
Political sociology as field of study, 6:2022–2039	increase in, 6:2066–2067
associations, 6:2023	involvement in political decisions, 6:2066, 6:2068
criticism of, 6:2035	political appointments, 6:2064, 6:2065,
evolutionary approaches, 6:2033, 6:2034	6: 2066–2067, 7: 2156 preferences of employees, 6: 2066, 6: 2067–2068
future of, 6:2038–2039	
interdisciplinary nature, 6:2022–2024 Marxism, 6:2026–2027	variations, 6:2067 Politics
	advocacy, 1:28–33
modernization approaches, 6:2024–2026, 6:2032–2035	
neo-Marxism, 6:2027–2029, 6:2036	definitions, 1:li-liv, 3:708, 4:994
origins, 6:2023, 6:2024	as function, 1:lii-liii
political science and, 1:liv, 6:2022	high and low, 8:2493
postmaterialism, 6:2033	instrumental view, 1:li, 1:liii–liv
postmodernism, 6:2029–2031, 6:2036	relationship to political science, 4: 1087
poststructuralism, 6:2029–2031	scope, 3:708–709
rational choice, 6:2031–2032	separation from administration, 1:26, 2:482, 4:985,
research topics, 6:2022–2023, 6:2035–2039	4:1004, 4:1006, 6:2066
Political support. See Support, political	Politics of language, 7:2069–2072
Political symbols. See Symbols, political	definition, 7:2069
Political systems	language policies, 7:2069, 7:2070–2071
characteristics, 6:1987	normative claims, 7:2071
components, 6: 2039–2040	research, 7:2069–2070
definition, 6:2039–2040	rhetoric, 4:1048, 6:2008
evolution of concept, 6:1986	symbolic, 6:2008
political culture, 8:2557–2558	Politics of memory. See Historical memory
stability, 8:2477–2479	Politics. See Political systems, types
See also Breakdown of political systems; Political integration	Pollitt, Christopher, 4:998, 4:1004, 4:1040, 5:1682, 5:1701
Political systems, types, 6:2039–2050	Polls. See Survey research
analytical approach, 6:2040, 6:2044–2045	Polyarchy, 2:359, 2:565, 2:574, 2:588–589, 3:614,
descriptive approach, 6:2040, 6:2041–2044	6:1745, 7:2339
governance types, 6:2045–2050	Polybius, 2:417, 8:2403
hierarchies, 1:132, 6:1986, 6:2040	Poole, Keith T., 7:2354, 7:2356
local, 5:1466–1467	Pooled time-series cross-section (PTSCS) data, 8:2615
power and, 7:2107	Popitz, Heinrich, 7:2100, 8:2486, 8:2488
systems theory, 6:2045	Popper, Karl
typologies, 6:2040–2041	clouds and clocks metaphor, 1:lviii
See also Regimes	on hypothesis testing, 1:209
Political theory, 6:2050–2063	life, 7:2207
classical philosophy, 6:2052–2053	methodological individualism, 4:1176
definition, 6:2050	naturalism, 3:794
empirical, 6:2051–2052, 6:2053–2055, 6:2056,	neo-positivism, 7:2082–2084, 7:2211
6:2058–2062	on Plato, 4:1050
formal, 6:2052, 6:2055–2056	on tolerance, 8:2627
origins, 6: 2051	on utopias, 8:2687
parsimony, 7:2209–2210	See also Rationalism, critical
purposes, 6:1726	Popular culture, 7:2072–2075
schools, 6:2056–2060	definition, 7:2072
See also Behavioralism; Democracy, theories of;	development of concept, 7:2072–2073
Epistemological and methodological foundations;	high culture and, 7:2072–2073
Institutional theory; Liberalism; Normative political	historical research, 7:2074
theory; Rational choice; Systems theory	Marxist view, 7:2074

modern research, 7:2074 power images, 7:2099	containment policy, 2:432–433 democratization, 2:351
See also Media	globalization, 4:974
Popular sovereignty	intellectuals, 4:1209
direct democracy and, 2:560, 2:562	multilateralism, 5:1637
global governance and, 2:581	multipolarity, 7:2221, 8:2561–2562
	peace dividend, 8:2547, 8:2551
historical development, 8:2471	•
majority rule, 8:2394, 8:2396	peacekeeping missions, 6:1841–1845, 8:2731–2732
nationalism and, 5:1654, 8:2394–2395	regional integration, 7:2239
rule of law and, 7:2336	security studies, 8:2546–2552
Russian views, 3:610–611	single superpower, 8:2561–2562
See also Sovereignty	sovereignty issues, 2:356
Population. See Demographics	transatlantic relations, 8:2653–2655
Population ecology theory, 6:1751	United States as sole superpower, 1:154, 4:1284,
Population movements. See Diasporas; Migration	8:2561–2562
Populism	wars, 2:300, 4:1285, 6:1728, 6:1729, 8:2551
characteristics, 7:2077	See also Postcommunist regimes
government organization and, 2:455	Postcolonialism, 7:2085–2090
history, 7:2075–2077	academic studies, 1:88, 2:305-306, 3:644, 7:2086, 7:2087
media, 6: 1859	assumptions, 7:2085-2086, 7:2088
negative views, 7:2077	biomedical analysis, 2:305
Populist movements, 7:2075–2078	characteristics, 7:2087–2088
in democracies, 7:2076-2077	controversies, 7:2086
leaders, 7:2076, 7:2077	critique of liberalism, 8:2626
methods used by other politicians, 7:2077	feminism, 3:904–905
phases, 7:2075–2077	international relations, 4:1293-1294
Pork barrel politics, 1:283	Marxism and, 7:2086
Portugal	meanings, 7:2086
colonies, 2:304	modernity and, 7:2088
communist party, 2:318	Orientalism and, 7:2087
dictatorship, 3:654	origins, 7:2086–2087
Posen, Barry, 7:2391	politics and, 7:2000
Positive peace, 7:2078–2080	postmodernism and, 7:2097
critiques of concept, 7:2079	scope, 7:2086
definition, 7:2078	See also Colonialism; Decolonization
development of concept, 7:2079	Postcommunist regimes, 7:2090–2093
influence, 7:2080	commonalities, 7:2091–2092
See also Peace	definition, 7:2090
Positivism, 7:2080–2085	democratization, 1:109, 7:2092
criticism of, 2:502, 4:1074, 4:1289, 7:2083–2084	local governments, 5:1465–1466
decline, 7:2084	nation building, 5:1645, 5:1648
democracy, 2:575–576	national identities, 4:1138, 4:1139–1140, 8:2396
Descartes and, 6:2056	nationalist movements and, 5:1662
in international relations, 2:426–427, 4:1295	oligarchic systems, 6:1741, 7:2091
legal, 4:1233–1234, 7:2082, 7:2321	parties, 2:320, 5:1428, 7:2092
logical, 7:2082	political science in, 6:2016
neo-, 7:2082–2084	political systems, 7:2092, 8:2400
in philosophy, 7:2080–2081	state formation, 8:2511
post-, 2:427, 4:1074, 4:1287, 4:1289, 4:1295, 7:2083	study of, 7:2092
quantitative methods, 7:2190	tensions, 7:2092
in social sciences, 2:422, 7:2080, 7:2081,	transitions, 7:2091–2092
7:2084–2085, 7:2209	use of term, 7:2091, 7:2092–2093
in sociology, 4:1082	See also Communist systems; Eastern Europe; Russia;
Vienna Circle, 7:2082	Soviet Union, former republics of
Posner, Richard, 7:2140	Postconflict situations. See Nation building;
Post-behavioralism, 6:2058	Transitional justice
Post-Cold War period	Postdemocracy, 2:581–582
conditionality in foreign aid, 2:383	Postinternational theory, 4:1013-1014
conflicts, 2:300, 4:1285, 8:2723-2725	Postman, Neil, 6:1966

Postmaterialism, 7:2093–2095	Powell, G. Bingham, 6:1849-1850, 6:1851, 6:1983
anarchism and, 1:74–75	Power, 7:2099–2109
apathy and, 1:85	as authority, 1:liv
civic culture and, 1:247	in bargaining, 1:135
criticism of concept, 7:2094–2095	coercive, 1:liv, 3:821
cultural change and, 8:2694–2695	conflict theory, 6:2028
definition, 7:2093	contexts, 7:2102–2103, 7:2111
explanations, 8:2695	cultural images, 7:2099–2100
generational changes, 7:2094	debates, 7:2103-2106
goals, 6: 1971	definitions, 4:1282, 7:2100-2103
of green parties, 6: 1799, 8: 2696	Foucault on, 3: 675, 6: 2030
measurement, 7:2094, 7:2095	fungibility, 7:2110–2111
political motives, 1:274	institutionalization, 8:2486
radicalism and, 7:2201	intentionality, 7:2100-2101
spread, 7:2093–2094	Machiavellism, 5:1479-1480
values, 1:247, 6:1970–1971, 6:1972–1973, 6:1979,	neorealist view, 7:2221
6:2033, 7:2093–2095, 8:2438, 8:2693, 8:2694	nonmaterial forms, 1:154
Postmodernism	as political instrument, 1:liii
aims, 7:2095	realist view, 7:2108
critique of liberalism, 8:2626	regime types and, 7:2107
definition, 6:2030, 7:2095	relational, 3:773, 7:2100, 7:2111
development, 6:1880	resources, 7:2101-2102, 7:2110, 7:2111
fragmented identities, 3:653	soft, 1:154, 4:1218, 4:1284, 7:2106-2107, 7:2114
interpretivism, 8:2605–2606	study of, 6:2022-2023, 7:2099-2100, 7:2103,
in political sociology, 6:2029-2031, 6:2036	7: 2107–2108, 7: 2109
Postmodernism in international relations, 7:2095–2099	theories, 3: 675
claims, 7:2096, 7:2097	See also Elites; Empowerment; Legitimacy
diplomacy, 3:661	Power, Michael, 1:106
ethical concerns, 7:2098	Power and international politics, 7:2109-2115
future of, 7:2098	changes, 7:2107
origins, 7:2096	constructivist view, 7:2110, 7:2112-2113
research topics, 7:2096–2098	distribution, 1:130, 7:2107, 7:2112
Post-positivism, 2:427, 4:1074, 4:1287, 4:1289,	hard and soft power, 1:154, 4:1218, 4:1284,
4: 1295, 7: 2083	7:2106–2107, 7:2114
Poststructuralism	measurement, 8:2559
discourse theory, 3:674, 6:1884	neo-institutionalist view, 7:2110, 7:2111
feminism, 3:904	poststructuralist view, 7:2110
in international relations, 4:1283, 4:1293, 5:1651–1652	realist view, 1:lvi, 7:2108, 7:2109–2111, 7:2218
national interests, 5:1651–1652	structuralist view, 7:2111–2112
peace, 7:2079	study of, 7:2106, 7:2113–2114
in political sociology, 6:2029–2031	See also Balance of power; Bipolarity and multipolarity;
power, 7:2110	Hegemony; Superpowers
security studies, 8:2550	Power resources theory, 7:2225
sovereignty, 8:2471	Powerlessness, 1:57–58
See also Structuralism	PPBS. See Programming, Planning, and Budgeting System
Post-totalitarianism, 1:109, 1:110, 2:311, 7:2234, 8:2632	Pragmatists, 3:828, 4:1055, 4:1092, 6:1867
Poulantzas, Nicos, 2:490, 3:767, 6:2027	Prague School, 7:2074
Poverty	Pratto, Felicia, 8:2426, 8:2427
causes, 8:2745	PRC (People's Republic of China). See China
consequences of globalization, 4:977–978	Prebisch, Raul, 3:629
in developing countries, 3: 640, 4: 977–978, 6: 1846 explanations, 1: 222	Precautionary principle, 3:777–778, 7:2324, 8:2576 Prediction and forecasting, 7:2115–2120
Millennium Development Goals, 3:639, 3:640, 5:1636,	accuracy, 7:2116–2117, 7:2118
8:2683, 8:2756	characteristics, 7:2117
state role in reducing, 8:2744, 8:2746	conditional and unconditional forecasts, 7:2116–2117
urban, 6: 1846	decision making and, 7:2115–2116
See also Foreign aid and development; Inequality,	definition, 7:2115
economic; Peasants' movements; Redistribution;	elections, 7:2116, 7:2117
Social exclusion; Welfare policies	factors in, 7:2116
, <u></u>	,

mathada 7.2115 7.2117 2120	Duossuus auguma Cas Interest auguma Labbrina
methods, 7:2115, 7:2117–2120 nontechnical, 7:2117–2118	Pressure groups. See Interest groups; Lobbying
	Preuss, Ulrich, 7:2091
regression analysis, 7:2249, 7:2253	PRI. See Institutional Revolutionary Party
self-fulfilling, 7:2116–2117	Price, Richard, 5:1615
simulations, 7:2118–2119	PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2:478
statistical models, 7:2115, 7:2119–2120	Primary elections. See Elections, primary
uncertainty, 7:2116–2117	Prime ministers
Predispositions. See Attitudes	cabinets, 1:183, 1:184, 3:865
Preemptive war, 7:2120–2122	coalition governments, 1:288–289
definition, 7:2120	in parliamentary systems, 1:18, 1:288–289, 6:1768–1769
distinction from preventive war, 6:1730, 7:2121	powers, 1:18, 1:184, 6:1858
Preferences	roles, 1:185, 3:865
of bureaucracy, 1:173–174	in semipresidential systems, 2:591, 8:2400
changes, 6: 1786	See also Cabinets; Executive; Semipresidentialism
collective, 3:709-710, 7:2203-2204, 8:2415-2416	Principal component analysis (PCA), 2:543, 7:2357–2360
decision making guided by, 6:1864-1865	Principal-agent theory (PAT), 7:2127-2130
formation, 6: 1980–1981	accountability, 1:1, 1:2, 1:9, 1:16-17
spatial models, 8:2472–2476	assumptions, 7:2127
survey research, 8:2568	bureaucracy models, 1:44, 5:1625
veto player theory, 8:2706, 8:2707–2708	complex models, 7:2128–2129
See also Attitudes, political	control issues, 6:1836
Preferential trade agreements. See Free trade agreements	corruption explanations, 4:1017–1018
Presidentialism, 7:2123–2127	definition, 7:2127
advantages, 7:2126	delegation to bureaucracy, 2:549, 7:2203, 7:2302
0 ,	
in Africa, 1:39–40, 5:1648, 7:2124	design of bureaucratic organizations, 7:2129
cabinets, 1:183, 7:2123	institutions, 4:1206
characteristics, 3:864, 7:2123	in international relations, 5:1676
criticism of, 7:2125–2126	managers and bureaucrats, 4:1164
definition, 7:2123	political control of administration, 1:119, 1:121, 6:2065,
delegative democracy, 2:590	7:2127–2129
democratic consolidation, 3:618, 7:2125	in political science, 7:2127–2130
distinction from parliamentary systems, 2:590–591,	state failure, 8:2508
6 :2046–2047, 7 :2123, 7 :2303	Print media. See Media, print
divided government, 7:2123, 7:2125, 7:2146	Prisoners' dilemma (PD), 7:2130–2132
electoral accountability, 7:2126	arms race modeling, 1:91, 7:2131-2132
executive, 1:18-19, 3:864-865, 3:866-867, 6:2046-2047	computer simulations, 7:2131
governments, 4:1038, 7:2123	cooperation, 4: 1251, 7: 2130
historical development, 2:590, 7:2123-2124	defections, 7:2130-2131, 7:2132, 7:2204
in Latin America, 7:2124, 7:2125, 7:2126-2127	definition, 7:2130
one-party dominance, 6:1742	equilibria, 7:2130, 7:2131
party roles, 2:362, 2:363	experiments, 7:2131
party systems and, 7:2124–2125	Hobbes on, 7:2204
powers, 6:1858, 6:1962, 7:2124	lessons, 2:448
succession, 2:353	payoff matrix, 4: 949, 7: 2130
trends, 6: 1962, 7: 2283	repeated, 7:2130, 7:2131
types, 7:2124	security dilemma, 3:711
veto power, 7:2203, 8:2720	tragedy of the commons, 7:2132
See also Executive; Semipresidentialism	Private goods, 5:1490, 7:2160
Presidents, U.S.	
elections, 7:2236	Private sector. See Business interest groups; Corporate social responsibility; Firms; Multinational corporations;
	Public-private partnerships
inherent authority, 8:2407	1 1 1
personalities, 6:2001	Privatization, 7:2132–2134
powers, 1:18–19, 6:1858, 7:2124, 8:2406	accountability issues, 2:482
relations with other branches, 1:18–19, 7:2124	of common goods, 8:2645
veto power, 7:2203	debates, 7:2133–2134
war powers, 8:2406	definition, 7:2132
See also individual presidents	financing public projects, 7:2155
Press freedom. See Censorship; Media	history, 7:2132–2133
Pressman, Jeffrey, 4:1000, 4:1158, 4:1160, 4:1161, 6:1931	by local governments, 5:1469

popularity, 5:1485, 7:2133	Prospect theory, 7:2143–2145
results, 7:2134	criticism of, 7:2145
types, 7:2133–2134	definition, 7:2143
Probability. See Statistics	development, 7:2143
Process monitoring, 6:1916	phases, 7:2143–2144
Process tracing, 7:2134–2138	use in political science, 7:2143, 7:2144–2145
criticism of, 7:2136	Protagoras of Abdera, 4:1048
definition, 7:2134–2135	Protectionism, 7:2145–2148
limits, 7:2137	controversies, 7:2148
methods, 7:2135–2137	definition, 7:2145
use of, 4:1106, 7:2135	exchange rate controls, 7:2147
Prodi, Romano, 6:2001	history, 7:2145–2146
Professionals	import substitution industrialization, 1:111,
accountability, 1:5	7:2147, 8:2637
self-regulation, 8:2397–2398	interest groups and, 5:1326, 5:1327, 7:2146, 8:2761
social stratification, 8:2443–2444, 8:2446	nontariff barriers, 3:702, 7:2147–2148
Program evaluation. See Evaluation research; Policy	political support, 3:712
evaluation	quotas, 7:2147
Programming, Planning, and Budgeting System (PPBS),	regulations, 7:2147–2148
6:1863, 6:1909, 7:2154	subsidies, 7:2147
Progressive reformers, 2:451, 2:482, 4:1090	tariffs, 7:2147
Propaganda	theories, 7:2146–2147
Chinese, 5:1543–1544	types, 7:2147–2148
covert, 4: 1211	See also Mercantilism; Trade liberalization
in electronic media, 5:1531, 5:1537	Protestant ethic, 1:191, 3:825, 7:2262, 8:2737
language and, 7:2069	Protestants
Nazi, 5:1531	Biblical interpretations, 4: 1073
techniques, 6:1963	Calvinism, 8:2737
by terrorist groups, 8:2595–2596	Christian Democratic parties, 6:1800
See also Political communication	cultural influence, 4:1145
Property, 7:2138–2143	denominations, 1:234
definition, 7:2138, 7:2139	fundamentalists, 3:934-935, 3:936,
historical evolution of concept,	3: 937–938, 3: 939
7:2138–2139	individualism, 5:1429
intellectual, 7:2141–2142	Reformation, 1:234, 8:2600
issues, 7:2142	See also Christianity
theories, 7:2139-2141	Protests
Property rights	anti-globalization, 1:75, 4:1014, 5:1580,
in capitalist economies, 1:188, 7:2138	6: 1714, 8: 2763
copyright, 7:2141–2142	definition, 8:2432
legal theories, 7:2139–2141	economic roots, 1:84
Locke on, 6: 1717	policy effects, 8:2436
relevance, 7:2138	study of, 6: 1782, 6: 1783
Proportional representation (PR)	against sweatshops, 5:1643
advantages and disadvantages, 6:2054–2055	tactics, 8:2433
ballot aggregation rules, 3:752–754, 8:2713	violent, 8:2709
democratic consolidation and, 3:618	youth, 6: 1783, 6: 1970
effects, 6:1983, 6:1984, 8:2712, 8:2713–2714,	See also Mobilization, political; Opposition; Participation
8:2716–2717	contentious; Social movements
electoral accountability, 1:14, 1:15	Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph, 1:73, 1:74, 1:76, 3:898, 4:1175,
in Indonesia, 3:748	5:1493, 7:2139, 8:2451
methods, 3:753–754	Provincial governments
mixed systems, 3:751	international offices, 1:127
multiparty governments, 6:1 983	subnational autonomy, 1:123–128
open list, 3:751	Przeworski, Adam, 1:160, 2:360, 7:2339,
pillarization and, 6: 1860, 6: 1861	8:2454, 8:2662
procedures, 8:2417	Pseudodemocracies, 1:109, 1:112, 1:113, 2:351, 6:2034
threshold of exclusion, 3:752	Pseudo-Xenophon, 2:571
Proprietarization, 7:2138	Psychoanalysis, 6:2010

Psychological explanations of international politics,	economic role, 7:2156
7:2148–2151	empowerment, 3:774–775
cognition and emotional factors in decision making,	management of, 4:1005–1007
7:2148–2151	patronage jobs, 1:282, 1:283–284, 1:285–286
prospect theory, 7:2143–2145	pay for performance, 6:1835–1837
See also Political psychology	political role, 7:2156–2157
Psychological warfare, 4:1211	quality of personnel, 4:1005
Psychology	representativeness, 7:2157
cognitive, 1:lxiv, 7:2148–2149, 7:2364–2365	rewards, 4: 1006–1007
experimental, 5:1534–1535	rules, 7:2157
political communication field and, 6:1963	security, 7:2157
prospect theory, 7:2143–2145	trade unions, 7:2157
rational choice theory and, 7:2207	See also Administration; Agencies; Bureaucracy; Civil
scaling, 7:2354	services
schemata, 7:2362-2363	Public goods, 7:2158–2161
trust, 7:2151	allocation, 7:2158–2160, 7:2161, 7:2303
See also Political psychology; Social psychology	characteristics, 2:307, 5:1487, 5:1490,
PTSCS. See Pooled time-series cross-section data	7:2158, 7:2159
Public administration	collective action, 2:307–308, 7:2160, 7:2387
administrative autonomy, 1:118-119	definition, 7:2158
American tradition, 1:25–26	environmental quality, 3:780
centrality, 4:1008	ethnic differences and, 3:829-830
development administration, 3:648-650	free riding, 7:2159
distinction from bureaucracy, 4:1004	global, 7:2160–2161
European tradition, 1:25	market failures, 5:1487, 7:2159, 7:2160
rational choice approach, 4:1010	mixed, 7:2159
theories, 1:25–28	political relevance, 7:2161
traditional, 1:22-23, 1:24	provision, 5:1490
See also Administration; Agencies; Bureaucracy; Executive;	pure, 7:2158, 7:2159
New public management	supply, 7:2159, 7:2160
Public budgeting, 7:2151–2156	Public interest groups, 4:1220, 4:1221, 4:1224
allocative function, 7:2151	See also Interest groups
bureaucratic lobbying, 1:165–166	Public office, rewards, 7:2161–2166
decision making, 7:2152–2153	financial, 4:1006, 7:2163-2166
distinction from private budgeting, 7:2151–2152	intangible, 7:2164
evaluation, 7:2154	in-kind benefits, 7:2164, 7:2165
increment approach, 1:164, 4:1000, 6:1910, 6:1911	legitimacy and, 4:1006–1007
medium-term expenditure frameworks, 7:2153–2154	levels, 7:2161
military spending, 1:90, 1:91-92	management reforms and, 7:2164-2165
performance budgeting, 7:2154–2155	pay for performance, 6:1835–1837, 7:2164–2165
planning and, 7:2153	structures, 7:2161–2162, 7:2163–2164
politics of, 1:165, 4:1000	theories, 7:2161, 7:2162–2163, 7:2164–2165
processes, 1:164–165	transparency, 7:2161, 7:2165–2166
Programming, Planning, and Budgeting System, 6:1863,	trends, 7:2166
6:1909, 7:2154	See also Corruption
reorganization, 7:2269	Public opinion, 7:2166–2172
roles, 7:2152–2153	definitions, 7:2166–2168
spending growth, 8:2585	democracy and, 7:2167, 7:2169–2170, 7:2172
top-down approach, 7:2153	on foreign policy issues, 3:923–924
trends, 7:2153–2155	influence, 7:2167–2168, 7:2169
See also Budgeting; Tax policy	international, 4:1268–1271
Public choice, 5:1489, 8:2649	media influences, 7:2168–2169
Public diplomacy, 3:667–668, 4:1269	normative orientations, 7:2168–2169
See also Diplomacy	polls, 2:504–508, 7:2168, 7:2169, 7:2170–2171
Public employment, 7:2156–2158	social construction, 7:2172
administrative reforms and, 4:1006, 7:2157	support for democracy, 3:617
administrative traditions, 7:2158	symbolic politics and, 8:2578
compensation, 7:2162, 7:2163–2166	See also Attitudes, political; Beliefs;
demographic characteristics, 7:2285–2288	Survey research

Public policy. See Policies	Quality, 2:566
Public sphere	See also Democracy, quality; Performance
definition, 1:252	Quantitative methods
global, 2:580	data, 1:197
Habermas on, 2:499–500, 6:1967,	textual analysis, 2:530
6:2029, 7:2167	trend toward use of, 1:141
informal, 2:552	See also Data visualization; Statistics
liberal, 8:2492–2493	Quantitative methods, basic assumptions, 7:2176–2189
public opinion and, 7:2167, 7:2168	generalized linear model, 7:2187–2188
Public-private partnerships, 2:297, 4:1020, 4:1029	inference and, 7:2188–2189, 7:2252
Publics, strong and weak, 2:552	linear regression, 7:2177–2187, 7:2188
Pufendorf, Samuel von, 2:440, 2:441–442, 2:445, 3:607,	See also Hypothesis testing
5:1323, 6:1720	Quantitative versus qualitative methods,
Putin, Vladimir, 3:613, 6:1741, 6:1859, 6:2053	7:2189–2196
Putnam, Linda, 6:2007	comparability, 7:2190, 7:2191, 7:2193–2194
Putnam, Robert D.	complementarity, 5:1586–1587
on civic engagement, 1:250	convergence, 5:1560, 5:1561, 5:1586
on civic virtue, 8:2674	debates, 7:2189–2196, 8:2603
Index of Institutional Performance, 6:1852	mixed methods, 5:1585, 7:2190
on political performance, 6:1850, 6:1852	precision and explicitness, 7:2191–2193
on social capital, 1:247, 2:348, 4:1097, 6:1786,	representation of meaning, 7:2194–2195
6: 1974–1975, 6: 2034, 8: 2410	similarities, 5:1557–1558
social capital index, 1:253	See also Qualitative methods
on television, 5:1538	Quasi democracies, 4:1116
Tocqueville's influence, 6:2034, 8:2624	Quasi states, 8:2511
two-level games, 1:135	Quasi-experiments, 5:1561–1562, 6:1915
	See also Experiments, natural
Qadhafi, Muammar al, 8:2505	Quebec, 5:1630, 7:2070
Qaeda, al, 4:1212, 4:1213, 5:1594, 7:2352-2353,	Quine, Willard van Orman, 1:205
8:2592–2593, 8:2598	Quiroga, Facundo, 1:201
QCA. See Qualitative comparative analysis	Qutb, Sayyid, 3:605, 3:941, 7:2267
Quakers, 6: 1721	
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), 7:2173–2176	Rabinowitz, George, 2:360
causal explanations, 7:2173	Race, constructivist view, 2:421, 7:2198
crisp-set, 2:340, 2:388, 2:389, 3:944-945, 7:2173-2175	Racism, 7:2197-2199
definition, 7:2173	benevolent, 7:2198
extensions, 2:340, 2:390–391	contemporary approaches, 7:2198-2199
further developments, 7:2175–2176	definition, 7:2197
fuzzy-set, 2:340, 2:389, 3:944–946, 7:2175–2176	of fascist movements, 3:889
goals, 2:388	in modern world, 7:2197
multivalue, 7:2175–2176	nationalism and, 7:2197
necessary and sufficient conditions, 7:2175	party ideologies, 6:1798
software, 2:340–341, 2:389, 2:390	postcolonial analysis, 3:904–905
steps, 2:336–338, 2:389–390, 7:2174–2175	scientific, 7:2197–2198
use of, 1:56, 2:333, 2:338, 2:340, 2:389, 2:390,	social dominance orientation and, 8:2426, 8:2427
7:2173–2174	See also Discrimination
See also Configurational comparative methods	Radcliffe-Brown, Alfred R., 3:833, 3:930, 5:1691
Qualitative methods	Radek, Karl, 8:2481-2482
analytic narratives, 1:66–72	Radical attitudes, 7:2199-2202
case selection, 5:1560	extremism, 6:1744, 7:2200-2201
causality, 1:209-210	feminist, 3:903–904
data, 1:197	history, 7:2199–2200
grounded theory, 4:1054–7	Islamist, 3:605
interview analysis, 5:1345	meanings, 7:2199
meanings, 7:2190	measurement, 7:2201–2202
textual analysis, 2:529	militia groups, 5:1580
See also Case studies; Comparative methods;	right-wing, 7:2200, 7:2265
Configurational comparative methods; Quantitative	See also Anarchism
versus qualitative methods	Radical democracy, 2:592

Radio, 5:1531-1532	governance networks, 4:1034
See also Media, electronic	government model, 4:1039–1040
Rae, Douglas W., 8:2713	institutional development, 4:1200, 4:1201, 4:1206
Ragin, Charles C., 2:332, 2:334, 2:338, 2:340-341, 2:388,	natural resources management, 5:1666
3:945, 3:946, 7:2173	See also Neo-institutionalism
RAND Corporation, 6:1894, 6:2016, 7:2131, 8:2541–2542	Rational expectations, monetary policy and, 1:220
Random number generation, 5:1627–1628	Rationalism, 3:711, 3:793, 3:794
Random samples. See Sampling, random and nonrandom	Rationalism, critical, 7:2207-2212
Random selection by lot. See Election by lot	anti-essentialism, 7:2208-2209
Random variables, 8:2698-2699	debates, 7:2211
See also Variables	definition, 7:2207
Rasch, Björn, 1:50	methods, 7:2207
Rasch models, 5:1357, 5:1358, 7:2355, 7:2357	in political science, 7:2207–2208
Rashtriya Svayamesevak Sangh (RSS), 3:935	positivism and, 7:2082-2084, 7:2209
Rational choice, 7:2202-2207	Rationality, 7:2202, 8:2448-2449
analytic narratives, 1:70	See also Rational choice
arms race models, 1:92	Rationality, bounded, 7:2212-2217
assumptions, 3:709, 7:2206	administrative theory, 1:26–27
bureaucracy models, 1:172–178	in budgeting, 1:164–165, 4:1000–1001
collective action problems, 7:2205	commons governance, 8:2646–2648
collective choices, 3:709–710, 7:2203–2204	definition, 7:2212
commons governance, 8:2646	dynamics of decision making, 7:2213-2214
conflict resolution, 2:393	formal structures, 7:2214
coordination, 7:2205-2206	limitations on decision making, 7:2212–2213
credible commitment problems, 2:488	organization levels, 7:2214–2216
criticism of, 7:2206	organizational cultures, 7:2216
definition, 7:2202	organizational slack, 7:2216
democracy, 2:575, 2:578, 6:2059	in organizations, 6: 1749–1750, 7: 2214–2216
discursive institutionalism and, 3:684	policy formulation, 6:1919
domestic politics and international relations, 3:693-694	satisficing, 1:164, 1:165, 4:1001, 5:1605–1606, 7:2212
economic model, 2:345, 4:1096	simplification models, 7:2213–2214
electoral rules, 3:755	use of, 7:2216–2217
emotions and, 6:2007	Ratzel, Friedrich, 4: 970, 4: 971
future research, 7:2206–2207	Rawls, John
human behavior theory, 7:2202–2206	on citizenship, 1:239
influence in political science, 1:lxiv, 2:345, 6:2059	on cosmopolitan democracy, 6:1735
irredentism, 5:1347	critiques of, 2:326
issue voting, 3:727	on democracy, 4:1097
judicial decision making, 5:1367	on equality, 3:803, 3:809, 3:812, 3:816
mental models, 6:1882, 7:2206	on humanitarian interventions, 5:1438
methods, 6: 2031–2032	on individualism, 4: 1175, 6: 1716, 6: 1721
policy formulation, 6: 1919	justice theory, 2:437, 2:444, 2:445, 2:446, 3:816,
political class, 6:1959	3:827, 4:1175, 6:1718, 6:1721–1722, 6:1724,
in political sociology, 6:2031–2032	6: 1727, 6: 1732
public administration, 4: 1010	normative political theory and, 6:1718
social approach, 7:2202–2203	on overlapping consensus, 2:402
strategic interactions, 3:709–712, 7:2204	on rights, 7:2320
supporters, 3:712–713	on social contract, 2:442
theses, 7:2208–2209	on social justice, 3:810
utilities, 1:173, 3:741–742	on tolerance, 8:2627
voting behavior, 3:727, 3:738, 3:741–743, 3:756–757,	on utilitarianism, 8:2684-2685, 8:2686
6:2032, 7:2206	on veil of ignorance, 3:816, 3:827,
voting rules, 8:2718	5:1393–1394, 6:1994
See also Principal-agent theory	Raz, Joseph, 7:2338
Rational choice institutionalism (RI)	Reagan, Ronald, 3:634, 3:635, 5:1676, 5:1678, 6:2001,
coalition formation, 4:1189–1190	7:2265, 8:2545
comparative politics, 2: 345–346, 4: 1037	Reagan administration
discursive institutionalism and, 4:1196–1197	EPA and, 7:2129
endogenizing change, 4:1188–1192	foreign policy, 2:431, 8:2545

Iran-Contra affair, 4:1059, 4:1213	institutions, 1:223, 1:224, 7:2224, 7:2225
Strategic Defense Initiative, 2:431, 8:2545	mechanisms, 7:2223, 7:2255
Realism	normative values, 7:2223, 7:2224
of Machiavelli, 5:1479-1480	social democratic policies, 8:2424
philosophical, 7:2208	study of, 6: 1980, 7: 2224–2226
in political science, 1:137	tax policies, 3:820, 6:1980, 7:2223, 8:2583–2584,
science and, 6:2051, 7:2135	8:2586, 8:2587
See also Neorealism	theories, 7:2225
Realism in international relations, 7:2217–2223	voters' preferences, 6:1981
alliances, 7:2384–2385	Redistricting, 3:751–752
anarchic world, 1:79, 7:2220	Referenda, 7:2226–2230
assumptions, 4:1290	abrogative, 2: 561–562
balance of power, 1:129–133, 1:152, 1:153, 7:2110,	constitutional provisions, 7:2227–2228
7:2218, 8:2654	debates before voting, 2:563
classical, 1:153, 4:1290, 4:1291, 7:2109–2110,	definition, 7:2226
7;2221–2222	democratic quality, 7:2229
collective security, 7:2387	effects, 2:563, 7:2229–2230
conflict resolution, 2:393	history, 7:2227
contrast to constructivism, 2:424	initiatives, 7:2226, 7:2228
criticism of, 4:1289	initiators, 2:560–562, 2:564
defensive, 4:1291, 7:2221	legislatures and, 8:2720
developing world, 3:643	local, 5:1466
development, 7:2217–2218	mandatory, 2:560, 2:561, 7:2226
diplomacy, 3:660, 7:2218–2219	on secession, 8:2394
±	typologies, 7:2226–2227
domestic politics and, 3:695–696	use of, 2:584, 7:2228–2229
globalization as challenge to, 1:lv	voter participation, 2:563–564, 7:2229
history, 4:1280, 4:1288, 4:1289	1 1 ,
humanitarian interventions, 5:1336	See also Democracy, direct
idealism and, 4:1129–1130	Reform, 7:2230–2233
influence, 4:1290	constitutional, 7:2231
intergovernmentalism, 4:1232	cycles, 7:2232
international law, 4:1240	definition, 7:2231
international order, 5:1320	distinction from reorganization, 7:2268–2269
international organizations, 4:1251–1252, 4:1254	institutional change, 1:221–224
international political economy, 4:1262	resistance, 7:2231, 7:2232
international regimes, 4:1272	strategies, 7:2232–2233
irredentism, 5:1347	See also Administrative reform
multinational corporations, 5:1641, 5:1642	Regime theory, 4:1012–1013, 4:1027–1028, 4:1241,
national interests, 5:1651	4:1261, 4:1271
neoclassical, 3:695–696	See also International regimes
offensive, 4:1291, 7:2221	Regimes (comparative politics), 7:2233–2238
peace, 6:1837, 8:2726	ambiguous, 7:2237
peacekeeping missions, 8:2730	breakdowns, 1:158–160
philosophical realism and, 7:2208	changes, 7:2234
power, 1:lvi, 7:2108, 7:2109–2111, 7:2218	definition, 1:158, 7:2233, 7:2234
states, 4:1281, 6:1712	democratic, 7:2234–2237
strategic studies and, 8:2542	as institutions, 4:1203
systemic approaches, 4:1282–1283	legitimacy, 5:1420–1423
transatlantic relations, 8:2654-2655	meanings, 4:1035-1036
wars, 6: 1994, 8: 2726	types, 6: 2043, 6: 2045
waves, 7:2218–2222	urban, 4: 1027–1028
See also Neorealism	See also Authoritarian regimes; Hybrid regimes; Political
Rebels, 6:1744	systems, types; Totalitarian regimes
See also Civil wars; Revolutions	Regional integration (supranational), 7:2238-2243
Reciprocity, 6:1786, 8:2410	definition, 7:2238
Reclus, Élisée, 1:73	depth and scope, 7:2239
Redistribution, 7:2223-2226	explanations, 7:2239
definition, 7:2223	future of, 7:2243
historical evolution, 7:2224	intergovernmentalism, 4: 1230–1233, 7: 2242

obstacles, 7:2239-2240	environmental, 3:780, 3:790, 8:2398
theories, 7:2240–2243, 7:2245	financial services, 3:706, 5:1491
trade agreements, 5:1328, 5:1329–1330, 7:2238–2239,	of foreign investment, 5:1642
8:2660	governance of, 7:2256–2257
trends, 7:2238, 7:2239	ideological views, 7:2254
variations, 7:2239–2240	institutional evolution, 8:2399
See also European integration	liberalization, 5:1411, 5:1485, 8:2398
Regional organizations, 7:2238–2239	of lobbying, 5:1462–1463
Regionalism, 7:2243–2246	market, 4:987, 7:2256
debates, 7:2245–2246	market reforms, 5:1411, 8:2398
definition, 7:2243–2246	of party finance, 6:1805, 6:1806
parties, 6:1798	policy instruments, 6:1929
security cooperation, 7:2388	protectionist, 7:2147–2148
world order and, 7:2246	quality, 3:635
Regionalization, 7:2246–2249	risk analysis, 7:2322–2323
autonomy, 1:125–126, 2:547, 7:2246–2249	self-, 7:2256, 8:2397–2399
within countries, 5:1464–1465, 7:2244, 7:2246–2247	strategies, 3:635
decentralization, 2:547, 7:2247	working conditions, 5:1643
definition, 7:2244–2245, 7:2246–2247	See also Deregulation; Liberalization
of Europe, 1:125	Regulatory agencies
soft, 7:2245–2246	as accountability mechanism, 1:7-8
trends, 7:2247	autonomy, 5:1413
variations, 7:2248-2249	capture of, 1:177, 7:2323, 8:2399
Regions, definition of, 7:2244	costs, 1: 171
Regression, 7:2249–2254	delegation to, 2:488, 2:548-550
analysis of variance (ANOVA), 1:62-66	discretionary powers, 3:678-679, 5:1413
applications, 7:2249, 7:2252, 7:2253–2254	functions, 1:45, 7:2255, 7:2258
bivariate, 7:2249–2251	growth, 7:2257–2258
censored and truncated data, 1:211–212	independent, 1:119, 2:488, 5:1485
definition, 7:2249	international, 4:1012, 5:1412
diagnostics, 7:2254	legalization of policy, 5:1411–1414
linear, 1:199, 7:2177–2188, 7:2250, 7:2253	public consultation, 2:551
missing data, 2:520	See also Agencies
9 .	Regulatory capture, 1:177, 4:1165, 7:2323, 8:2399
misspecification problems, 5:1581–1585, 7:2181–2183	
multilevel analysis, 5:1637–1641	Regulatory state, 1:100, 4:989, 7:2257–2258
multiple, 5:1562, 7:2249, 7:2251–2252, 8:2705	Rein, Martin, 1:49, 6:1925, 6:1926
multivariate, 2:466, 8:2528	Reiner, Robert, 6:1876
negative binomial, 3:854	Reinventing government movement, 5:1682, 7:2269
nonlinear, 5:1707–1708, 8:2527, 8:2536–2537	7:2272, 8:2496
nonparametric methods, 6:1710	See also Administrative reform
ordinary least squares, 1:295, 5:1581–1585, 6:1760,	Relational perspective, 5:1691, 5:1695
7:2183, 7:2250–2251, 8:2407, 8:2698, 8:2739–2741	See also Networks
Poisson, 3:853	Relative deprivation hypothesis, 1:85
robust estimation, 7:2328–2332	Relativism, 1:141–142, 3:827, 3:828, 8:2605–2606
spatial correlation, 2:522-525	Reliability
weighted least squares, 8:2739-2741	alternative-form method, 5:1518-1519
See also Statistical inference; Statistical models; Structural	assessing, 5:1518–1520
equation modeling	classical test theory, 5:1517
Regulation, 7:2254–2259	definition, 5:1513
administration, 7:2255–2256	internal consistency, 5:1519–1520
behavioral norms, 7:2256	measurement, 5:1513, 5:1517–1520
civil, 7:2256	parallel measurements, 5:1517–1518
costs, 7:2255, 7:2257	retest method, 5:1518
de-centered, 7:2256	split-halves method, 5:1519
definitions, 7:2254–2256	Religion, 7:2259–2261
democratic control, 7:2257	cleavages, 8:2693
	0 ,
economic growth and, 3:635	community-oriented, 7:2374
effectiveness, 7:2256–2257, 8:2399	conflicts, 5:1351, 6:1720
election campaigns, 3:744, 3:745	definition, 7:2259

1 4 222 4 222 7 224	1 1 % 0.254 0.545
democracy and, 1:229, 1:230, 7:2261	electoral system effects, 8:2716–2717
distinction from religiosity, 7:2262	fiction of, 7:2274
economic influences, 8:2737–2738	governance and, 7:2284
established, 7:2372	impure, 7:2278–2280
Jainism, 6:1757	meanings, 7:2273–2274
monotheistic, 5:1363, 5:1364, 7:2262	parties and, 2:353–354, 7:2280–2283
Mormons, 5:1432, 6:1721, 7:2262–2263	performance, 7:2282–2283, 7:2284
nongovernmental organizations, 5:1706	pluralism and, 7:2275, 7:2278, 7:2280–2281
pacifism and, 6:1721, 6:1757–1758, 6:1838	political leadership and, 5:1410
politics and, 7:2259–2261, 7:2263, 7:2264–2267	popular, 4:985
Quakers, 6:1721	pure, 7:2275, 7:2276–2278
revitalization, 7:2260, 7:2263	responsiveness and, 7:2302–2303, 7:2304, 7:2305–2306
rituals, 7:2325–2326	theories, 7:2275–2280
science and, 6:2051	Representative bureaucracy, 7:2285–2288
Sikhism, 2:398, 6:1757	active representation, 7:2285, 7:2287–2288
terrorism and, 5:1593–1594, 7:2260, 7:2266,	passive representation, 7:2285–2286, 7:2287
8:2592, 8:2597	study of, 4:1005, 7:2286–2288
values, 8:2693, 8:2694	theory, 4:1005, 7:2285–2286
See also Buddhism; Christianity; Church-state	Representative democracy
relationships; Fundamentalisms; Hinduism; Islam;	accountability, 2:566–567
Judaism; Theocracies Religiosity, 7:2262–2263	arguments for, 3:819 balanced representation, 4:1228–1229
conflicts, 7:2262, 7:2264, 7:2265	contrast to direct democracy, 2:560, 2:562–563
decline, 8:2694–2695	criticism of, 2:592–593
definition, 7:2262	direct elections, 2:560
electoral behavior and, 3:739	evolution, 2:573, 2:585–586
measurement, 7:2262–2263	future of, 7:2283
Protestant ethic, 1:191, 3:825, 7:2262, 8:2737	governance, 6: 2046–2048
See also Secularism	normative claims, 6:1722
Religious freedom	parties, 2: 353–354
liberalism and, 5:1428, 5:1430, 5:1432	party roles, 7:2280–2281
normative claims, 6:1720–1721	public opinion and, 7:2169
violations, 5:1433	quality, 2:566–567
Religious movements, 7:2263–2268	in republics, 7:2289
definition, 7:2263	See also Accountability, electoral; Democracy; Liberal
new, 7:2260	democracy; Parliamentary systems
politics and, 7:2263, 7:2264–2267	Representative government, 6: 2046–2048
See also Fundamentalist movements; Islamist movements	Repression
Religious tolerance, 1:237, 5:1472–1473, 6:1720,	by authoritarian regimes, 5:1594,
8:2624–2625	6:1788–1789, 8:2711
Remittances, 5:1572	in communist systems, 2:311, 2:320, 2:324–325, 8:2460
Renaissance, 4:1275, 6:1727, 7:2293–2294	by dictatorships, 3:657
Rentier states, 1:116	of Islamist movements, 1:116
Rent-seeking, 2:482, 5:1326, 5:1327, 7:2160	by military regimes, 5:1575–1576
Reorganization, 7:2268-2273	of opposition, 5:1593, 6:1788–1789
consequences, 7:2273	in socialist systems, 8:2460
definition, 7:2268	state violence, 5:1594, 8:2711
distinction from reform, 7:2268–2269	Republican Party (U.S.), 2:412, 6:1807, 7:2265
government, 7:2268–2273	Republicanism, 7:2291–2298
models, 7:2271–2273	citizens, 7:2295–2297
processes, 7:2232	definition, 7:2291, 7:2292
reasons for, 7:2269–2271	Florentine, 5:1549
targets, 7:2269	future of, 6: 1736
See also Change, institutional	goals, 6: 1736
Reparations, 8:2667–2668	history, 7:2292–2293
Representation, 7:2273–2285	Kant on, 5:1435
advantages, 7:2274–2275	liberal, 5:1434–1435
decline in, 7:2275–2276	liberty, 5:1453-1456, 7:2297-2298
electoral accountability, 1:13-16	modern, 7:2294

patriotism and, 6: 1834 people, 7: 2293–2295	Marxism and, 5:1499, 7:2310, 7:2311–2312, 8:2424, 8:2452
Republics, 7:2288–2291	orthodoxy and, 7:2309–2310, 7:2311–2312
decolonization and, 7:2290	Revolutionary approach to international relations, 4:1282
definition, 7:2288, 7:2291–2292	Revolutionary linkage, 6:1812–1813
	Revolutionary syndicalism, 5:1404
distinction from democracy, 7:2294–2295	
examples, 7:2288–2289	Revolutions, 7:2312–2317
foreign policy, 5: 1435, 6: 1736	causes, 7:2313–2315
history, 7:2289–2291	class conflict and, 7:2313
liberal, 5:1435–1436	coalitions, 7:2314–2315, 7:2317
use of term, 7:2291	constant, 8:2477
Research designs	definition, 7:2312
difference-in-difference, 5:1562	dictators removed by, 3:658, 7:2314–2315, 7:2316
meta-analysis, 5:1551–1553, 6:1914	by elites, 3: 763
mixed methods, 5:1585–1589, 7:2190, 8:2669–2671	future research, 7:2317
necessary and sufficient conditions, 2:384–388, 7:2175	goals, 1:264
in political science, 5:1560–1562	ideology and, 7:2315
process tracing, 4:1106, 7:2134–2137	legitimacy deficits, 5:1418
program evaluations, 6:1913–1915	Marxist view, 7:2313
See also Experiments; Methodology; Observational studies	modern, 7:2312
Research organizations. See Think tanks	outcomes, 7:2316–2317
Resistance movements, 6:1744	party linkage and, 6: 1812–1813
See also Civil wars; Colonialism; Opposition; Revolutions	peaceful, 1:251
Resource mobilization, 8:2433–2434, 8:2710	processes, 7:2315–2316
Resources. See Common goods; Natural resources	social, 7:2312–2317
Responsibility, 7:2299–2301	socialist, 8:2459
accountability and, 1:2, 7:2299, 7:2300	state-centered theories, 7:2313-2315
active and passive, 7:2300	vulnerable regimes, 7:2316
definition, 7:2299	See also Civil wars; French Revolution; Russian
environmental policy principle, 6:1733	Revolution
equality and, 3:814	Rewards of public office. See Public office, rewards
historical roots, 7:2300	Reynolds v. United States, 5:1432, 6:1721
political, 7:2300–2301	Rhetoric, 4:1048, 6:2008
risk and, 7:2323	Rhodes, R. A. W., 7:2272
solidarity and, 8:2466, 8:2467	RI. See Rational choice institutionalism
uses of concept, 7:2299–2300	Ricardo, David, 3:629, 5:1496, 8:2657
virtue, 7:2299–2300	Ricardo-Viner model, 5:1326, 5:1327, 5:1330, 7:2146
Responsive communitarianism, 2:327–331	Rice, Condoleezza, 2:432, 3:668
Responsiveness, 7:2301–2306	Rice, Susan, 8:2504
accountability and, 1:3, 7:2301-2302	Richards, Ivor Armstrong, 2:372
definition, 7:2301	Richardson, Jeremy John, 6:1902, 6:1903, 6:1922
democratic quality, 2:568	Richardson, Lewis Fry, 1:91
expectations of, 3:690, 7:2304	Richardson model, 1:91, 1:92
foci, 7:2304–2305	Riesman, David, 4:1174
forms, 7:2303–2304	Riggs, Fred, 3:649
political efficacy and, 3:718–719	Rights, 7:2318-2322
representation and, 7:2302-2303, 7:2304, 7:2305-2306	citizenship, 1:238, 1:240, 5:1571
subversion, 2: 570–571	civil, 7:2319
Responsiveness of bureaucracy, 7:2306-2309	communitarian view, 2:328-329
challenges, 1:171	constitutional, 2: 419, 7: 2337
complexity, 7:2307	cultural, 7:2319-2320
meaning, 1:171	definition, 7:2318
politics and, 4:985, 7:2307	equality, 3:803, 3:812-813
problems, 7:2307–2309	forms, 7:2320
Revisionism, 7:2309-2312	functions, 7:2320
ambiguities, 7:2311	group, 5:1432–1433
definition, 7:2309	homeland security restrictions, 2:329
history, 7:2310–2311	of indigenous peoples, 4:1110, 4:1170-1173, 5:1631
Holocaust denial, 7:2310-2311	legal, 7:2318

liberal views, 1:261, 5:1434	Rokeach, Milton, 6:2002, 7:2201, 8:2691
liberty and, 7:2141	Rokkan, Stein
minority, 2:564, 5:1630, 5:1631-1632, 5:1660	on cleavages, 3: 738–739
mobility, 5:1568–1569	historical sociology, 4:1084
moral, 7:2318	on nation building and state formation, 5:1647–1648,
natural, 5:1664, 7:2318, 7:2319, 7:2320-2321	6:1976, 6:1977–1978, 6:2025–2026, 6:2062
political, 7:2319	on parties, 6:1792, 6:1793, 6:1795, 6:1983
political development stages and, 6:1978	political system typology, 6:2042–2043
rule of law and, 7:2339	Role identity, 4:1133
social, 8:2747	Roller, Edeltraud, 6:1850–1851, 6:1852, 6:1853
theories, 7:2320–2322	Roman Catholic Church
as trumps, 7:2321–2322	acceptance of democracy, 1:229, 1:230, 7:2261
types, 7:2318–2320	Christian Democratic parties and, 1:226–232
universal, 1:240	doctrines, 1:233
of women, 1:241, 3:901, 3:907, 7:2296	in England, 6: 1720
See also Human rights; Property rights; Voting rights	fascist movements and, 1:228, 3:893, 3:894
Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), 7:2199, 8:2427	in France, 4:1085
Right-wing radicalism, 7:2200, 7:2265	just war doctrine, 6: 1758, 7: 2120
See also Conservatism	papal encyclicals on capitalism, 2:461
Riker, William H., 1:49, 2:345, 2:362, 3:710, 3:897,	philosophy and, 6: 1990
6:1770, 6:2053, 8:2712, 8:2719 Ripley, Randall, 6:1903	popes, 1:228, 1:229, 8:2600, 8:2602 size, 1:234
Risk, country, 6:2012	See also Christianity
Risk analysis. See Political risk analysis	Rome, ancient
	dictators, 3:653–654
Risk and public policy, 7:2322–2325 context, 7:2324	•
	empire, 3:654, 3:771
cost–benefit analysis, 2:485, 7:2324	law, 7:2335
policy instruments, 7:2324–2325	natural law, 5:1663–1664
political process and, 7:2323	patria, 6:1832
precautionary principle, 3:777–778, 7:2324, 8:2576	republic, 2 :417, 6 :2061, 7:2288, 7:2289
research, 7:2325	Romer, Thomas, 3:710
substantive analysis, 7:2322–2323	Roosevelt, Eleanor, 8:2679
types of risk, 7:2322	Roosevelt, Franklin D., 4:1093, 4:1280, 5:1531, 7:2224,
See also Welfare policies	8:2515, 8:2601, 8:2678
Risk society, 7:2324	Roper, Elmo, 8:2570
Ritchie, David George, 4:1126–1127	Rorty, Richard, 3:827
Rituals, 7:2325–2328	Rosanvallon, Pierre, 1:86
communicative action, 7:2327–2328	Rose, Richard, 1:247–248, 4:997
definition, 7:2325	Rosenau, James, 4:1013, 4:1014, 4:1270, 4:1312, 5:133
functions, 7:2326, 7:2327	Rosenbaum, Paul, 8:2530
performance, 7:2327–2328	Rosenbluth, Frances, 6:2061
political, 7:2326–2327, 7:2328, 8:2486–2487, 8:2578	Rosenthal, Howard, 3:710, 7:2354, 7:2356
religious, 7:2325–2326	Rosenthal, Jean-Lauran, 1:66, 1:70
Robertson, William, 4:1276	Rostow, W. W., 3:628
Robinson, James A., 1:222, 6:2059	Rotation in office, 3:719–721
Robinson, Joan, 8:2658	Rotberg, Robert, 1:160
Robust statistics, 7:2328–2332	Rothbard, Murray N., 5:1488, 7:2310
Cook's Distance, 7:2330	Rothstein, Bo, 1:222
influential points, 7:2329–2330	Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 7:2332-2335
least median estimators, 7:2331	Confessions, 7:2332
likelihood adjustments, 7:2329, 7:2332	on democracy, 2:444, 2:560, 2:573, 5:1439, 7:2332
M-estimators, 7:2330–2331	on dictatorship, 3:654
use of, 7:2328–2329	on elections by lot, 3:719
Rochester School, 6:2053	on general will, 5:1391-1392, 5:1395, 5:1396, 7:2334
Rockefeller Foundation, 3:648	individualism, 2:443
Rodrik, Dani, 1:222	on inequality, 3:803, 8:2449
Roe v. Wade, 6:1790	influence, 7:2332–2333, 7:2335
Rogowski, Ronald, 5:1326	on institutions, 4:1204
Rogue states, 2:432, 8:2593, 8:2653	life, 7:2333, 7:2334

on patriotism, 6:1833	Rustow, Dankwart, 1:160, 1:246, 8:2661
on religious tolerance, 8:2624–2625	RWA. See Right-wing authoritarianism
religious views, 7:2333, 7:2334	Rwanda
on republics, 7:2293, 7:2295	genocide, 4:967, 4:968, 7:2366
on social contract, 2:437, 2:439, 2:443, 2:444,	international criminal tribunal, 4:967, 4:968,
7:2333–2334	4: 1237, 8: 2665
on state of nature, 2:440-441, 2:442, 7:2334	
utopianism, 8:2687	Sabatier, Paul A., 1:36, 4:999, 4:1153, 6:1882, 6:1940,
writings, 7:2332–2334	6: 1942, 6: 1945
Royce, Josiah, 4:1127	Sabine, George, 4:1093
RSS. See Rashtriya Svayamesevak Sangh	Sacerdote, Bruce, 6:1980
Rubin, D. B., 1:206, 8:2530	Sack, Robert D., 8:2588, 8:2590
Ruggies, John Gerard, 7:2107	Sadat, Anwar el, 7:2149, 7:2267
Rule of law, 7:2335–2346	Sadurski, Wojciech, 7:2344
constitutionalism and, 7:2336-2337, 7:2338, 7:2340	Sageman, Marc, 5:1594
definition, 7:2335, 7:2336	Said, Edward W., 1:88, 2:305, 6:1753, 7:2086,
democracy and, 7:2337, 7:2339-2340, 7:2341	7:2087, 8:2767
democratic quality, 2:566, 2:567, 7:2343-2344	Saint-Simon, Henri de, 4:1173-1174, 6:1951-1952,
dimensions, 7:2340–2341	8:2450, 8:2687
discretion contrasted to, 3:678	Salamon, Lester, 6:1930
as end or means, 7:2341	SALT. See Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
freedom and, 7:2339	Salvemini, Gaetano, 2:462
good governance and, 4:1016	Sampling, random and nonrandom, 7:2347-2351
historical development, 5:1431, 7:2335–2338	bootstrap, 6:1709
liberalism and, 5:1431–1432	censored and truncated data, 1:212
limited government, 6:1723, 7:2335, 7:2336–2337	cluster, 7:2348
as outcome, 7:2342, 7:2345	convenience, 7:2349
research, 7:2336, 7:2341–2345	data imperfections, 1:212, 5:1599
rights and, 7:2339	definition, 7:2347
sovereignty and, 7:2338–2339	for elite interviews, 5:1341
subversion, 2: 568–569	errors, 7:2349–2351, 8:2567
supranational, 7:2342	for expert interviews, 5:1344
transitional justice and, 8:2665–2666	frames, 7:2348
Rule of rules, 7:2337, 7:2338	grounded theory, 4:1056
Rule-equality, 3:804, 3:807	Monte Carlo methods, 5:1627–1628
Ruling class. See Elites; Political class	multistage cluster, 7:2348
Ruling parties. See One-party dominance	nonrandom, 1:212, 5:1598, 7:2348-2349,
Runciman, Walter, 6:2023	7:2391–2393, 8:2519
Runoff elections, 3:751	panel data, 6: 1762–1763
Rushdie, Salman, 5:1433	in political science, 5:1598
Russett, Bruce, 4:1285, 6:2059	populations and, 7:2347, 8:2567
Russia	purposeful, 7:2349
anarchism, 1:73, 3:610	quota, 7:2349
democracy perspectives, 3:607–14	random, 5:1627–1628, 7:2348, 8:2527, 8:2566–2567
irredentism, 5:1348	sample sizes, 8:2524
Marxism, 8:2452	sampling processes, 1:212
Muslims in, 8:2601	simple, 7:2348
oligarchic capitalism, 6:1741	snowball, 7:2349
populist movements, 7:2075–2076	specification, 5:1598
Romanov dynasty, 3:609	stratified, 7:2348, 8:2567, 8:2573
sovereign democracy, 6: 2053, 6: 2061	for surveys, 7:2170, 8:2566–2567, 8:2570, 8:2573
See also Soviet Union	systematic, 7:2348
Russian Federation, 2:320, 3:613	textual data, 2:527
Russian Orthodox Church, 8:2600–2601	theoretical, 6:1776
Russian Revolution	types, 7:2348–2349
civil war, 3:893–894	units, 7:2347–2348
consequences, 5:1500, 7:2290, 8:2452–2453	Samuelson, Paul, 8:2684
coup, 2:314	Sanctions, 7:2351–2354
political order, 3:611, 3:654, 4:1071	arguments for, 6:1733
r · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	·· O

arms embargoes, 7:2352, 7:2353	redistributive policies, 7:2224
costs, 3:707–708	taxes, 8:2584–2585, 8:2586
criticism of, 3:708, 6:1733, 7:2352, 7:2353–2354	See also individual countries
economic, 3:706, 4:1111–1112, 6:1842, 7:2352, 7:2353	Scanning, mixed, 6:1920
effectiveness, 3:707, 7:2353	Scatterplots, 2:464, 2:465, 2:532, 2:533, 2:540, 4:1046
enforcement, 7:2352	7:2250–2251
failures, 3:707	Schaffer, Bernard, 3:650
foreign policy goals, 3:706	Schank, Roger C., 7:2363
history, 3:707, 7:2351–2352	Schapera, Isaac, 8:2640
for human rights violations, 4: 1111–1112, 7: 2352	Scharpf, Fritz W., 4:998, 5:1361, 5:1362, 6:1865–1866
morality, 6:1733	7:2108, 7:2243
multilateral, 7:2351–2354	Schattschneider, Elmer E., 1:52, 7:2102, 7:2105
negative, 3:706	Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 2:548
on nonstate actors, 7:2352	Schedler, Andreas, 1:112–114
positive, 3:706	Scheepers, Eisinga, 1:85
smart, 7:2352, 7:2353	Scheepers, Peer, 1:84
types, 3:706	Schein, Edgar, 6:1968
of UN Security Council, 7:2351–2354	Schelling, Thomas, 1:135, 1:136, 2:364–365,
unilateral, 7:2351, 7:2353	5:1605–1606, 6:1725
Sandholtz, Wayne, 7:2241	Schema, 7:2362–2364
Sandler, Todd, 7:2159	applications, 7:2363–2364
São Tomé and Principe, 8:2401	definition, 7:2362, 7:2363
Sapiro, Virginia, 4:966	development of concept, 7:2362-2363
Saris, William, 8:2573	events, 7:2363–2364
Sarmiento, Domingo Faustus, 1:201, 1:203	hierarchies, 7:2363
Sartori, Giovanni	memory and, 7:2363
comparative methods, 2:343, 2:344	self-, 4: 1132
on concept analysis, 2:370, 2:372, 2:375, 2:380	stereotypes and, 7:2364
on dominant-party systems, 6:1742, 6:1792	See also Scripts
on electoral behavior, 8:2714	Scheve, Kenneth, 6:1980
on parties, 6:1825, 6:1955	Schick, Allen, 7:2155
on political competition, 2:359, 2:361	Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 4:1073
on political sociology, 6:2023	Schmitt, Carl
Satisfaction, political, 3:690	on dictatorships, 3:656
See also Dissatisfaction, political	geopolitics, 4:969, 4:971, 4:972
Satisficing, 1:164, 1:165, 4:1001, 5:1605–1606, 7:2212	international relations theory, 6: 1734
Saussure, Ferdinand de, 7:2069	Nazism and, 4:1208
SC. See Social capital	on parties, 7:2280
Scaling, 7:2354–2356	political theology, 8:2602
definition, 5:1528, 7:2354	on politics, 1:liv, 1:41, 6:2056
development, 7:2354–2356	on representation, 7:2280
methods, 5:1522, 5:1528–1529	on war, 6: 1731–1732, 8: 2634
multidimensional, 5:1523–1524, 7:2355, 7:2357	Schmitter, Philippe C.
purposes, 5:1522	on comparative politics, 4: 1037
use of, 5:1559, 7:2354	democratization theory, 3:602, 3:623
See also Measurement, scales	on neo-corporatism, 5:1669–1670, 6:1870, 7:2225
Scaling methods: taxonomy, 7:2356–2362	
	on pluralism, 6:1874
categorical principal component analysis,	on political system breakdowns, 1:159
7:2357, 7:2359–2360, 7:2361–2362	on transitions, 8:2661, 8:2662
factor analysis, 7:2357, 7:2358	Schneider, Anne, 4:1152–1153, 6:1881
multiple correspondence analysis, 7:2357, 7:2361	Schön, Donald, 1:49, 6:1925, 6:1926
principal component analysis, 2:543, 7:2357–2360	Schramm, Wilbur, 5:1542
Scandinavia	Schroeder, Gerhard, 8:2653
employment policies, 6:1886–1887, 6:1889	Schudson, Michael, 5:1537
local governments, 5:1466, 5:1467–1468	Schumpeter, Joseph A.
parties, 2:412, 6:1797	on capitalist development, 8:2509
peace research, 6:1838, 8:2546	on citizenship, 1:239
populist movements, 7:2076–2077	on democracy, 2:359–360, 2:409, 6:1779, 6:1956
print media, 5:1543	on elites, 3: 761, 6: 1779

liberalism, 5:1434	nonmilitary threats, 8:2547–2548
methodological individualism, 4:1205	threats, 7:2374-2375, 7:2378-2379
on representation, 5:1502, 7:2274, 7:2279–2280	See also Environmental security
Schwartz, Shalom, 8:2691, 8:2692	Security and defense policy, 7:2374-2377
Science policy, 4:1003	characteristics, 7:2376-2377
Scientific management, 1:26	communitarian view, 2:329
Scientific paradigms, 6:1763–1764	contemporary views, 7:2375–2376
Scientific racism, 7:2197–2198	definitions, 7:2374–2375
Scottish National Party, 6:1798	domestic politics and, 3:693
Scripts, 7:2364–2367	of failed states, 8:2504
definition, 7:2365	internal aspects, 7:2376
development of concept, 7:2364-2365	military and, 7:2375
in international relations, 7:2365-2366	neutrality, 5:1696-1699
problems, 7:2365	scope, 7:2375–2376
use of, 7:2366–2367	strategies, 7:2377, 7:2378
See also Schema	traditional views, 7:2375
SDI. See Strategic Defense Initiative	unilateralism, 8:2676-2677
SDO. See Social dominance orientation	See also Arms races; Collective security;
SDT. See Social dominance theory	Counterterrorism; Environmental security; Military;
Secession, 7:2367–2369	Strategic (security) studies
definition, 7:2367	Security apparatus, 7:2377–2383
dynamics, 7:2368	definition, 7:2377
incidence, 7:2368–2369	elements, 7:2378
justifications, 7:2249, 7:2368, 8:2394	functions, 7:2379
popular sovereignty and, 8:2394	international organizations, 7:2382-2383
right of, 7:2368, 8:2511	organizational structures, 7:2379–2382
See also Self-determination	surveillance, 2:329, 8:2634
Second International, 2:315, 2:497, 5:1499, 8:2452, 8:2454	See also Counterterrorism; Intelligence; Police
Secrecy, 7:2371	Security cooperation, 7:2383–2389
Secret services, 7:2369–2372	clubs, 7:2385–2386
definition, 7:2369	coalitions, 7:2384
functions, 7:2369	concerts, 7:2386
history, 7:2371	environmental security, 3:785–787
politics and, 7:2370–2371	exclusive, 7:2383-2386
power, 7:2 370	inclusive, 7:2384, 7:2386–2389
structures, 7:2371–2372	regional, 7:2388
study of, 7:2369-2370	security communities, 7:2388–2389
surveillance, 2:329	security regimes, 7:2387–2388
See also Intelligence	See also Alliances; Collective security; Disarmament
Secularism, 7:2372–2374	Security dilemma, 7:2389–2391
assertive and passive, 1:236, 1:237	criticism of concept, 7:2390-2391
in contemporary societies, 1:236, 1:237, 7:2263-2264,	definition, 7:2389
7: 2372, 7: 2373–2374	development of concept, 4:1288, 7:2389-2390
definition, 1:235, 7:2372	neorealist view, 7:2220
increase in, 7:2260	realist view, 8:2726
in Muslim countries, 5:1350, 5:1351, 5:1352	security and defense policy, 7:2375
political, 7:2372–2374, 8:2513	study of, 7:2390
of totalitarian regimes, 8:2629-2630	territorial control and, 8:2589
in Turkey, 1:236, 5:1350	uncertainty, 7:2388, 7:2389
types of states, 7:2373	variations, 7:2390
values, 7:2372, 7:2373, 7:2374, 8:2693, 8:2694	Security studies
in Western cultures, 1:236, 4:1085, 6:2051, 7:2373-2374,	Copenhagen School, 4:1302, 4:1303,
8:2694–2695	7: 2376, 8: 2549
See also Church-state relationships; Religiosity	critical, 8:2550
Securitization, 7:2376, 8:2549–2550, 8:2552	feminist, 3:909, 3:910, 8:2551
Security	nonmilitary threats, 8:2547-2548
definitions, 7:2375, 7:2376, 7:2377-2378, 8:2547-2548	objects of security, 8:2548-2549
human, 8:2549	political development, 3:647
national, 5:1650	in post-Cold War period, 8:2546-2552

securitization, 8:2549-2550, 8:2552	Separation of powers, 8:2402-2407
See also Strategic (security) studies	accountability and, 1:2
Seeman, M., 1:57-58, 1:59	in British government, 5:1614, 8:2404
Selection bias, 7:2391-2393	credible commitment, 2:488
correcting for, 7:2392, 7:2393	development of concept, 2:417, 2:418-419,
definition, 7:2391	8:2403–2404
missing data and, 1:212, 2:519	effectiveness, 2:419
statistical models, 7:2392-2393	Montesquieu's influence, 8:2404, 8:2405
study of, 7:2391–2392	in practice, 8:2406–2407
Selectorates, 3:730–734	reasons for, 8:2402-2403
Self-determination, 8:2394–2397	in U.S. Constitution, 1:4, 1:6, 1:17-19, 8:2403, 8:2404.
competing claims, 8:2394	8:2405–2407
decolonization, 8:2396	See also Judicial independence
definition, 8:2394	Separatist movements, 5:1648–1649, 5:1655
national, 5:1655, 5:1657, 7:2368, 8:2395	September 11 terrorist attacks, 3:941, 4:1212, 4:1285,
in practice, 8:2395–2396	5:1352, 6:1728, 7:2262
right of, 7:2368, 8:2394, 8:2395	Sequential games, 4:952-960
theories, 4:1101, 8:2394–2395	See also Game theory
See also Secession; Sovereignty	Serbia
Self-government, 8:2394, 8:2395	breakup of Yugoslavia, 2:395, 3:840, 7:2366
See also Popular sovereignty	irredentism, 5:1346, 5:1347, 5:1348
Self-ownership, 5:1442, 5:1443–1444	nationalism, 5:1346, 7:2151
Self-regulation, 8:2397–2400	See also Kosovo
criticism of, 8:2398–2399	Serra, Antonio, 5:1549
definition, 8:2397	Services trade liberalization, 8:2762, 8:2763–2764
forms, 7:2256	Sex
future of, 8: 2399	constructivist view, 2:421
historical background, 8:2397	distinction from gender, 4:961
industry, 7:2256, 8:2398–2399	Seymour, Jan P., 8:2659
professional, 8:2397–2398	Shankara, 4: 1076
See also Regulation	Shaposhnikov, Boris, 6:2056–2057
Self-rule, 2:546	Sharia law, 1:lii, 1:236, 1:237, 5:1349, 5:1351, 5:1352,
Seligson, Mitchell A., 8:2479, 8:2563–2564	5:1423, 5:1631
SEM. See Structural equation modeling	Shearer, Ellen, 6:2 005
Semantic constraints, 2:381	Shepard, Roger, 7:2355
Semantic fields, 2: 376, 2: 381	Shepsle, Kenneth, 1:50, 3:710, 6:1982–1983, 8:2707
Semiotics, 6:1963	Sheridan, James, 8:2734–2735
Semipresidentialism, 8:2400–2402	Shils, Edward, 1:109, 7:2077, 7:2326
cabinets, 3:865	Shin, Doh, 1:247–248
cohabitation, 1:19, 2:591, 8:2401	Shklar, Judith N., 1:238, 6:1733
definition, 8:2400	Shugart, Matthew S., 7:2126, 8:2402, 8:2715
elements, 8:2400	SI. See Sociological institutionalism
examples, 8:2400, 8:2401	Sidanius, Jim, 8:2426, 8:2427
executive, 3:864, 3:865	Sidgwick, Henry, 8:2684
in France, 1:19, 2:591, 4:1038, 8:2400, 8:2401	Siebert, Fred Seaton, 5:1542
	Sieyès, Emmanuel, 7:2277–2278, 7:2336
increase in, 8:2400	Signaling games, 1:136, 4:958–960
as mixed regime, 8:2400–2401	Sikhism, 2:398, 6:1757
research, 8:2401	Sikkink, Kathryn, 1:39
structure, 2:591, 6:2047–2048, 7:2123	Silver, Hilary, 8:2429
use of concept, 8:2402	Simon, Herbert, 1:26–27, 1:139, 4:1000, 6:1864, 6:1919
variations, 8:2400–2402	6:1941, 7:2212
See also Presidentialism	Sims, Christopher, 8:2613–2614
Semiproportional systems, 3:752, 3:753	Simulations, 7:2118–2119, 7:2131
Sen, Amartya, 1:249, 4:1101, 4:1179, 4:1209	Simultaneous equation modeling, 8:2407–2410
Senate, U.S., Intelligence Committee, 4:1057	assumptions, 7:2183–2184
See also Congress, U.S.	development, 5:1566, 8:2408
Senghor, Léopold Sédar, 1:39–40, 1:41	identification problem, 8:2408–2409
Sennett, Richard, 4: 1174	need for, 8:2407–2408

in political science, 8:2408-2410	equality, 3:804
two-stage least squares, 8:2409	impossibility theorems, 3:709–710, 4:1206, 8:2415
Singer, J. David, 4:1281, 8:2725	institutional rules, 8:2416–2420
Single-member districts (SMDs), 3:751, 3:752,	model, 8:2418–2420
8:2713, 8:2715	referenda, 7:2229
Single-party dominance. See One-party dominance	transaction costs, 8:2649
SIPRI. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute	voting rules, 8:2718, 8:2719
Skinner, B. F., 1:140, 4:1205, 6:2002	Social classes. See Classes, social
Skinner, Quentin, 5:1453–1454	Social cleavages. See Cleavages, social and political
Skocpol, Theda, 1:250–251, 2:335, 2:346, 4:1084, 6:1979,	Social cohesion, 8:2420–2423
7:2312, 7:2313	analytical concept, 8:2422–2423
Slavery, 1:41, 1:42, 8:2625	definition, 8:2421
Smallholders. See Peasants	exclusion and, 8:2421–2422
SMDs. See Single-member districts	increases, 6:1986
Smith, Adam	measurement, 8:2421
influence on Marx, 5:1496	policy-making perspective, 8:2421–2422
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	See also Solidarity
on justice, 5:1395	Social constructivism. See Constructivism
liberalism, 5:1434, 5:1440, 8:2657	Social contract
mercantile system, 5:1548, 5:1549	
on public office rewards, 7:2162	in corporativism, 2:459
on regulatory state, 4:987, 4:989	Hobbes on, 2:442–443, 2:459, 3:696–697, 4:1099,
on sympathy, 6:2057	6:1717, 6:1723
Theory of Moral Sentiments, 5:1395, 6:2057	Kant on, 2:442, 2:443
Wealth of Nations, 4:987, 5:1401, 6:1980, 6:2057	Locke on, 2:440, 2:441, 2:443, 6:1723
Smith, Anthony, 5:1655	Rousseau on, 2:437, 2:439, 2:443, 2:444, 7:2333–2334
Smith, Charles, 7:2189	Social contract theory, 1:lii, 1:260–261, 2:436
Smith, Steve, 4:1296	See also Civil society; Contract theory
Smith, William Robertson, 7:2326	Social Darwinism, 7:2081
SMOs. See Social movement organizations	Social democracy, 8:2423–2426
Snow, David, 6:1925	definition, 8:2423
Snow, John, 2:541	distinction from liberal democracy, 2:593-594
Snyder, Claire, 1:77	economic policies, 8:2423–2426, 8:2456
Snyder, Francis, 8:2462	features, 8: 2423
Snyder, Richard, 3:917, 3:919	ideology, 2:594, 8:2455
Social activism. See Advocacy; Protests; Social movements	libertarian, 1:77
Social capital (SC), 8:2410-2415	origins, 8:2423
benefits, 1:250, 6:1974, 8:2410	in postwar period, 8:2424-2426, 8:2453, 8:2456
bonding and bridging, 1:247, 8:2411	recent developments, 8:2425-2426
changes, 6:1786-1787, 8:2674	revisionism, 8:2424
components, 8:2412–2415	success, 8:2425
definition, 6:1974, 8:2410	See also Welfare state
in democracies, 1:247, 2:348, 6:1786,	Social democratic parties
6: 1974–1975, 6: 2034	debates, 8:2424-2425, 8:2455
exchange of, 6:2057	economic policies, 8:2425
human development theory and, 4:1104	former communist parties, 2:320
impact, 1:247	history, 2:315, 6:1796, 8:2423-2424, 8:2452, 8:2456
measurement, 1:253, 6:1786-1787, 8:2412-2413	international organizations, 8:2423
perverse, 8:2411	Michels's study of German, 6:1740, 6:1804, 6:1954-1955
reciprocity, 6:1786, 8:2410	social base, 6:1794
research, 2:348, 6:1786–1787, 8:2410, 8:2411, 8:2674	Social division of labor, 1:liv
theories, 8:2410-2412	Social dominance orientation (SDO), 8:2426-2428
tolerance and, 8:2413, 8:2674	behavioral implications, 8:2428
trust, 6:1786, 6:1974, 8:2410, 8:2414–2415,	definition, 8:2426
8:2673–2674	gender and, 8:2427–2428
Social choice theory, 8:2415–2420	measurement, 8:2426–2427
agenda-setting, 1:49, 1:50	modifying, 8:2428
collective preferences, 3:709–710, 7:2203–2204,	right-wing authoritarianism and, 8:2427
8:2415–2416	Social dominance theory (SDT), 8:2426–2428
effects of electoral rules, 3:754–755, 8:2417–2420	Social engineering, 6:1908, 6:1941
circus of electoral rules, 3./3T-/33, 0.2T1/-2T20	oociai ciigiiicciiiig, 0.1700, 0.1771

Social exclusion, 8:2428–2431	social categorization theory, 4:1134, 4:1136
definition, 8:2428-2429, 8:2746	social dominance theory, 8:2426
in developing countries, 8:2430–2431	social identity theory, 4:1134–1136
history of concept, 8:2429–2430	social roots of politics, 1:liv
in Latin America, 8:2421–2422	Social revolutions. See Revolutions
policies, 8:2429-2430, 8:2746	Social sciences
See also Cleavages, social and political; Discrimination;	constructivism, 2:421–424, 6:1879
Racism	experiments, 3:868, 5:1601-1602
Social group theory of voting behavior, 3:725–726	hermeneutics, 4:1073-1074
Social identity. See Identity, social and political	hypothesis testing, 1:209–210
Social insurance, 8:2742–2743, 8:2747	institutional theory, 4:1204-1205
See also Unemployment insurance; Welfare policies	international political economy and, 4:1266
Social integration, 6:1986	political science and, 1:lxi-lxiv,
Social libertarianism, 6:1716	1: 137–138, 6: 1765
Social media, 3:668	positivism, 2:422, 7:2080, 7:2081, 7:2084–2085, 7:2209
Social mobility, 1:271, 1:273	standard model, 1:149
Social movement organizations (SMOs), 5:1592	survey research, 8:2571
Social movements, 8:2431–2443	utilitarianism, 8:2685
anti-globalization, 4:1014, 5:1580, 6:1714, 8:2763	Social stratification, 8:2443-2448
in authoritarian regimes, 6:1788-1789	in advanced societies, 8:2443-2445, 8:2447-2448
conflicts, 8:2432, 8:2437–2438	cleavages based on, 1:277
definition, 6:1788, 8:2431-2432	in communist systems, 2:324
in democracies, 6:1789, 8:2438-2439, 8:2441-2442	definition, 8:2443
environmentalism, 3:776, 3:781, 4:1052, 8:2438	functionalist view, 1:272
evolution, 1:251-252, 8:2436, 8:2439	occupational, 8:2445-2446
framing, 6: 1924–1925	recent developments, 8:2447-2448
identities, 8:2434–2435	reducing, 8:2448
informal, 6:1713-1714, 8:2431	scales, 8:2445–2446
institutional factors, 8:2435-2436	social dominance orientation, 8:2426–2428
international solidarity, 5:1322	system, 1:277, 8:2443–2445
local, 8:2437–2438	in traditional societies, 8:2443
methods, 1:251, 6:1788	See also Classes, social; Cleavages, social and political;
mobilization, 3:906–907	Equality; Inequality
networks, 6: 1937–1938	Social trust. See Trust, social
new, 5:1592, 5:1611–1612, 8:2432	Social welfare policies. See Welfare policies
in 1960s, 5: 1591–1592	Socialism, 8:2448-2454
nonconventional participation, 8:2432-2433	Chinese, 5:1500–1501, 8:2451
pluralist interest intermediation, 6:1873–1874	Christian, 8:2450
policy effects, 8:2436-2437, 8:2441-2442	crisis, 8:2453–2454, 8:2456
political opportunity structure, 8:2435	in developing countries, 8:2453, 8:2457
resource mobilization, 8:2433–2434	distinction from communism, 2:310, 8:2450-2451
rise of, 1:251	divisions, 8:2454
study of, 8:2432, 8:2433, 8:2435-2436, 8:2441	economic planning, 8:2453, 8:2457
technology use, 8:2434	in France, 5:1493, 5:1495–1496, 8:2450–2451
transnational, 8:2439-2441	guild, 2: 461–462, 6: 1869
youth, 6: 1970	historical development, 8:2449–2453
See also Advocacy; Feminist movements; Mobilization,	as ideal, 8:2452
political; Peasants' movements; Protests	individualism and, 4:1175
Social network analysis. See Network analysis	Judaism and, 5:1365
Social networks, 6:1786, 8:2410, 8:2412-2413	labor movements and, 2:315, 5:1405, 8:2451, 8:2452,
See also Networks; Social capital; Trust, social	8:2454
Social participation, 6:1786–1787	nationalism and, 5:1660-1661
Social physics, 3:755	origins, 8:2448–2449
Social psychology	in post-Cold War period, 8:2453-2454
bargaining, 1:134	redistribution, 7:2225
groupthink, 4:1057-1060	revisionism, 8:2452
racism, 7:2197	utopian, 8:2449, 8:2450, 8:2687
risky shift, 5:1503	view of capitalism, 8:2449, 8:2454, 8:2456
role theory, 4: 1133–1134	See also Communism; Maoism; Marxism

Socialist International, 8:2423	Sociology
Socialist parties, 8:2454-2456	anomia, 1:81–83
economic policies, 8:2455-2456	Chicago School, 1:137, 4:1055, 6:1774
electoral participation, 8:2454-2455	constructivism, 2:421–424
in government, 8:2455–2456	Durkheim's role, 3:696, 3:697-698, 7:2326
history, 2:315, 8:2454	economic, 4 :1206–1207
ideology, 8:2454	framing, 6: 1924–1925
international organizations, 8:2423	functionalism, 1:272
labor movements and, 2:315, 8:2454	international political, 4:1266
leadership elections, 6:1802	of knowledge, 4: 1078–1079
Lenin's view, 2:315–316	mass communications, 5:1535
political class in, 6:1954-1955	networks, 5:1692
reformist policies, 8:2455	political science and, 1:lxii-lxiii, 1:lxiv
social base, 6:1794	positivism, 4:1082
transnational networks, 6:1714	relational, 5:1691
in Western Europe, 8:2455-2456	of religion, 7:2326
See also Communist parties; Social democratic parties	systems theory, 3: 930–931, 8: 2580–2582
Socialist systems, 8:2456–2461	See also Ethnographic methods; Functionalism; Historical
alliances, 8:2458	sociology; Political sociology
bureaucracies, 8:2459	Socrates, 4 :1048–1049
characteristics, 8:2457-2458	Soft law, 8:2461-2464
Cuban, 2:311, 8:2457, 8:2460	creation, 8:2462
definition, 8:2456–2457	definition, 4:1020, 8:2461–2462
in developing countries, 8:2453, 8:2457	democracy and, 8:2464
economic planning, 8:2457	in European Union, 8:2463
explanations, 8:2459	examples, 8:2462
history, 8:2458, 8:2459-2461	nonstate actors and, 8:2463-2464
industrialization, 8:2460, 8:2461	use by international organizations, 8:2462-2463
leadership, 8:2457-2458	See also Governance, informal
legitimacy, 8:2457	Soft power, 1:154, 4:1218, 4:1284, 7:2106–2107, 7:2114
Marxism and, 8:2457	Soft regionalization, 7:2245–2246
repression, 8:2460	Software. See Information technology; Statistical software
variations, 8:2458-2459	Solidarity, 8:2464-2469
See also Communist systems	challenges, 8:2466-2468
Socialization	characteristics, 8:2464-2466
attitudes and, 7:2285, 7:2287	collective action and, 4:1224
definition, 6:2019	competing traditions, 8:2467–2468
identity and, 4:1132	corporativism and, 2:460-461
organizational, 7:2288	cosmopolitanism and, 8:2466
See also Political socialization	definition, 5:1320, 8:2421, 8:2464
Socially efficient institutions, 1:223–224	Durkheim on, 1:liv, 3:697, 5:1320, 6:1986, 8:2421, 8:2465
Society	encouraging, 6: 2008–2009
Aristotle on, 2:439	future of, 8:2468–2469
audit, 1:100–102, 1:106	international, 5:1320–1322
mass, 5:1503–1504	labor, 5:1405, 5:1407, 5:1408
risk, 7:2324	mechanical, 1:liv, 3:697, 6:1986, 8:2465
types of, 5:1503–1504	organic, 1:liv, 3:697, 3:930, 6:1986, 8:2465
See also Civil society	patriotism and, 6:1833-1834
Socioeconomic divisions. See Classes, social	structural, 8:2464–2465
Sociograms, 5:1685–1686, 5:1689	See also Social cohesion; Welfare state
Sociological institutionalism (SI)	Solidarity trade union, 1:251, 2:324
areas of study, 4:1206	Somalia, 7:2366
comparative politics, 2:347–349	Sophists, 4: 1047–1048
discursive institutionalism and, 3:684, 4:1194,	Sorel, Georges, 5:1404
4: 1195, 4: 1196	Sortition. See Election by lot
endogenizing change, 4:1188, 4:1194-1195	Soskice, David, 4:1192, 6:1981, 6:1984
institutional development, 4:1200	South Africa
policy models, 6:1882–1883	African National Congress, 1:40, 1:42, 6:1742,
See also Neo-institutionalism	6: 1743, 7: 2236

anti-apartheid movement, 6:1789, 7:2198	totalitarianism, 3:612, 8:2629, 8:2630, 8:2631,
apartheid regime, 8:2427	8:2634, 8:2635
elections, 7:2236	United Nations and, 8:2678-2679, 8:2681, 8:2683
fieldwork, 3:834	See also Cold War; Communist Party of the Soviet Union;
national identity, 5:1647	Communist systems; Détente; Marxism-Leninism;
regime change, 7:2234	Russia; Stalinism
sanctions on, 7:2352	Soviet Union, former republics of
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 8:2666, 8:2667	authoritarian regimes, 1:115
South America. See Latin America	Christian Democratic parties, 1:227
South Korea	diasporas, 3:653
central bank, 5:1413	irredentism, 2:395, 2:398
corporativism, 2:463	political institutions, 3:613
democratization, 3:658-659	transitions to democracy, 1:109
Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), 5:1580	See also Postcommunist regimes; Russia
Sovereign democracy, 6:2053, 6:2061	Soviets, 3:596, 3:611–612
Sovereignty, 8:2469-2472	Spain
border control, 5:1568-1569	civil service, 6:2068
corporativist, 2:459–460	Civil War, 1:228
debates, 2:356, 8:2471–2472	colonialism, 1:201–202, 3:721, 5:1549, 5:1648, 7:2290
definition, 8:2469–2470	communist party, 2:312, 2:317, 2:318
divisible, 1:80	democratic consolidation, 3:617
external interventions, 5:1332, 5:1335, 5:1336	democratization, 3:659, 8:2662
food, 6: 1846, 6: 1847	Falange, 2:462, 3:654, 3:888, 3:890, 3:894
of former colonies, 4:1241–1242	Franco regime, 1:214, 1:228, 2:462, 3:654, 3:894,
history of concept, 4:1275, 8:2470–2471, 8:2508–2509	5:1616, 5:1617
internal and external, 8:2470	historical memory, 4:1079–1080
migration and, 4:1150	Islamic rule, 8:2625
national, 8:2394	monarchy, 5:1616
territorial, 8:2494, 8:2589	parties, 3: 731, 6: 1798
of Westphalian ideal state, 1:80, 8:2752, 8:2753, 8:2754	regional governments, 5:1464, 5:1465
See also Popular sovereignty; Self-determination	regions, 6:1976
Soviet Union	transition to democracy, 4:1079–1080, 6:1976, 8:2662
Afghan invasion, 3:638	Spanish America. See Latin America
arms race, 1:90	Spatial autocorrelation, 7:2186
central planning, 5:1484	Spatial data. See Data, spatial
collapse, 1:160, 3:613, 3:659, 4:1284, 7:2092, 8:2461, 8:2511, 8:2635	Spatial models of politics, 8:2472–2477
	of electoral competition, 2:360
communist system, 2:310, 2:311, 2:324–325	empirical, 8:2473–2474, 8:2476
constitution, 3:612	implications, 8:2474–2475
democratic centralism, 3:611–612	left-right dimension, 8:2472
democratization, 8:2662	mathematical, 8:2472–2473, 8:2474–2475
de-Stalinization, 2:311, 2:319, 8:2485, 8:2631	policy spaces, 2:362, 8:2473–2474
as dictatorship, 3:654	types, 8:2475–2476
dissidents, 4:1208	voting rules, 8:2716–2717
Eastern Europe and, 2:325, 3:624, 3:637	Spatially lagged dependent variable model,
economic planning, 8:2453, 8:2457, 8:2483	2:524-525
economic reforms, 8:2660	Spearman, Charles, 7:2354, 7:2356
elites, 3:762, 3:763	Special interests. See Interest groups
foreign policy, 8:2453, 8:2458	Spencer, Herbert, 3:929
glasnost,' 3:611, 3:612	Spinoza, Baruch (Benedict de), 2:442, 2:443, 4:1275
intelligence gathering, 4:1212, 4:1213	Spivak, G., 7:2089
leadership, 2:526	Splawa-Neyman, J., 1:206
media, 5:1542, 5:1543	SPLC. See Southern Poverty Law Center
nuclear weapons, 8:2543-2544	Sportive nationalism, 5:1646–1647
perestroika, 3:611, 3:612-613, 8:2460	Sprout, Harold, 3:926
political system, 8:2482	Sprout, Margaret, 3:926
relations with China, 8:2458	Spykman, Nicholas J., 7:2218, 8:2560, 8:2561
statism, 8:2514–2515	Sri Lanka
superpower status, 3:636–637	militias, 5:1580

nationalism, 5:1661, 5:1662	definition, 8:2499
Tamil Tigers, 5:1580, 5:1661, 5:1662, 8:2503, 8:2592,	examples, 8:2502–2503
8:2593, 8:2597	factors in, 8:2500, 8:2501
SSSM. See Standard social science model	in former colonies, 8:2500
Stability, 8:2477–2479	process, 8:2500–2501, 8:2503
achieving, 8:2478	recovery, 8:2501–2502, 8:2503
definition, 8:2477	of Soviet Union, 1:160, 3:613, 3:659, 4:1284, 7:2092,
extreme, 8:2478	8:2461, 8:2511, 8:2635
measurement, 8:2478-2479, 8:2504	of Yugoslavia, 2:395, 3:840, 7:2092, 8:2511, 8:2653
policy, 8:2706, 8:2707–2708	See also Breakdown of political systems
positive views of, 8:2477	State failure, 8:2502–2507
state failure and, 8:2504	challenges, 8:2506
Stages model of policy making, 8:2479–2481	civil society failure and, 8:2506
applied problem solving stages, 8:2480-2481	consequences, 5:1646
of Brewer, 8:2480	definition, 8:2503
characteristics, 6:1941	examples, 8:2503
disadvantages, 8:2481	explanations, 1:160, 8:2503, 8:2505-2506
functions, 6: 1941–1942, 6: 1950	indicators, 8:2504
of Lasswell, 6:1940, 8:2479–2480	process, 8:2500–2501
limitations, 6: 1942–1943	rehabilitation, 8:2504-2505, 8:2506
variants, 6:1940-1941, 6:1947	sectoral, 8:2503-2504
See also Policy cycle	as security threat, 7:2379
Ståhl-Rubinstein bargaining model, 1:135	types, 8:2503
Stalin, Joseph	State formation, 8:2507-2512
artistic tastes, 6: 1718–1719	colonialism and, 8:2500
books, 8:2483	by conquest, 8:2508, 8:2511
career, 8:2483	definition, 8:2507
Comintern and, 2:312	economies and, 8:2509-2510
communist system, 2:324	elite roles, 5:1654
death, 2:431, 2:526, 8:2485	explanations, 8:2508
nation definition, 5:1659	international relations and, 8:2510-2511
patronage, 2:316	irrigation hypothesis, 8:2508
Russian Orthodox Church and, 8:2600-2601	Marxist view, 6:2027, 8:2508
speeches, 8:2483–2484	modern system, 8:2508-2510
United Nations and, 8:2678-2679	nation building and, 5:1645, 5:1646, 5:1654
violent repression, 2:311, 2:324–325	origins, 8:2507-2508
Stalinism, 8:2481–2485	phases, 8:2490-2494
in Albania, 2: 319	political culture and, 6:1976-1978
characteristics, 8:2482, 8:2483	primary and secondary, 8:2508
Communist International, 2:312	recent, 8:2510-2512
definition, 8:2481	rule of law and, 7:2336
de-Stalinization, 2:311, 2:319, 8:2485, 8:2631	security dilemma and, 7:2391
development, 8:2482-2485	territory and, 8:2589
origins, 8:2482	theories, 8:2507
personality cult, 8:2484	variations, 8:2510, 8:2512
purges, 2:311, 2:317, 8:2483, 8:2484	Weber on, 8:2486
reforms, 8:2484–2485	See also Nation building
in Soviet Union, 8:2481–2485	State of nature
state socialism, 8:2459-2460, 8:2514-2515	conflicts, 2:447
totalitarianism, 8:2630, 8:2631	in contract theory, 2:440-442, 2:444
use of term, 8:2481–2482	Hobbes on, 1:lii, 2:440-441, 2:442, 2:443, 2:447, 3:909,
victims, 2:324–325	4: 1099–1100, 4: 1275, 6: 2053
Stallworth, Lisa, 8:2427	Locke on, 2:444, 4:1275, 5:1439, 5:1471, 5:1472
Standard social science model (SSSM), 1:149	Rousseau on, 2:440-441, 2:442, 7:2334
Stanley, Julian, 5:1561	State socialism. See Socialist systems
State capacity, effects of globalization, 4:979	State supremacy. See Statism
State collapse, 8:2499–2502	State-centric governance, 4:988, 4:990–991
armed conflicts, 8:2727	Statecraft. See Diplomacy; Economic statecraft
civil society and, 8:2506	State-nations, 5:1658–1659

States, 8:2485–2496	Statistical models
building, 5:1645, 5:1646, 5:1654, 8:2506	assumptions, 7:2176–2189
civil society and, 1:262-263, 3:617, 8:2506	causality, 1:205-208, 5:1563-1566, 8:2524-2527
competition, 1:lvi, 8:2508	definition, 7:2176
definition, 1:158, 8:2485, 8:2505, 8:2510, 8:2511	in election research, 3:725-726
development phases, 8:2490-2494	empirical analysis, 8:2524-2527, 8:2531-2539
developments in twentieth century, 8:2494–2496	estimators, 7:2177, 7:2180
disaggregation, 4:998	hierarchical, 8:2520, 8:2533-2534
evolution of theory, 4: 1089–1090, 8: 2494–2496,	interactions, 4:1214-1216, 5:1582, 8:2531-2532,
8:2752–2753	8:2534–2536
historical sociology approach, 4:1083–1084	multiple equations, 8:2537–2539
modern system, 8:2508–2510	prediction and forecasting, 7:2115, 7:2119–2120
multilateralism, 5:1634	random coefficients, 8:2532–2533
mutual recognition, 8:2589	standard errors, 7:2184–2185
political sociology, 6: 2035–2036, 6: 2037	structural equation modeling, 8:2552–2556
power, 7:2102	See also Model specification; Regression; Variables
use of violence, 8:2708–2709	Statistical significance, 8:2521–2524
Weberian concept, 4:1083–1084, 8:2485–2490, 8:2505,	definition, 8:2521–2522
8:2509, 8:2708, 8:2738, 8:2753	research hypothesis and, 8:2522
See also Irredentism; Nation-states; Sovereignty;	sample sizes and, 8:2524
Westphalian ideal state	tests for, 4:1116–1121, 8:2522–2523
States, U.S.	Statistical software, 2:340–341, 5:1553, 7:2193
constitutions, 8:2405	Statistics: overview, 8:2524–2541
direct democracy, 2:562	categorical variables, 1:197–200
international offices, 1:127	causation, 8:2524–2525
militias, 5:1579	correlation, 2:463–468
primary elections, 3:731	cross-tabular analysis, 2:508–510
referenda, 7:2227	estimation, 8:2528–2529, 8:2539–2540
subnational autonomy, 1:123-128	experimental method, 8:2527–2528
States, virtual, 8:2496–2499	graphical displays, 2:539–541
definition, 8:2496–2497	matching, 5:1505, 5:1565, 5:1601, 8:2530
large, 8:2497	maximum likelihood estimation, 5:1509–1512, 5:1563,
peace and, 8:2498–2499	7:2329, 7:2332, 8:2529, 8:2554
political implications, 8:2497–2498	nonparametric methods, 6:1709–1712
small, 8:2497, 8:2498	observational studies, 8:2528–2531
Statism, 8:2512–2515	robust statistics, 7:2328–2332
definition, 8:2512	sampling errors, 7:2349–2351
historical evolution, 8:2513–2515	use in political science, 2:342–343, 3:794, 3:795–796,
opposition, 8:2513, 8:2514	5:1562–1563
organic, 1:110	See also Regression; Statistical models; Time-series
origins of concept, 8:2512–2513	analysis
in political science, 8:2515	Status differences, 3:821
state formation, 8:2507	See also Classes, social; Inequality
See also Welfare state	Stein, Lorenz von, 6:1952
Statistical graphics. See Graphics, statistical	Stem-and-leaf displays, 2:531-532
Statistical inference, classical and Bayesian, 8:2516-2521	Stepan, Alfred, 1:114, 1:115, 1:116, 1:159, 1:160, 5:1576
assumptions, 7:2188–2189, 7:2252	5:1658, 7:2337
Bayesian, 5:1563, 5:1627, 5:1628, 8:2516-2519,	Stern, Eric, 4:1059
8:2520–2521	Stinchcombe, Arthur L., 8:2526, 8:2540
causation and correlation, 2:385, 2:464, 2:465, 7:2116,	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
8:2525-2527	6:1838, 8:2726–2727
classical, 8:2516, 8:2517, 8:2518, 8:2519-2520	Stokes, Donald, 3:726, 6:1807
confidence intervals, 8:2519–2520	Stokes, Susan, 1:160
definitions, 8:2516	Stone, Clarence, 4:1028
distinction, 8:2519	Stone, Deborah, 4:1153, 6:1880, 6:1929, 6:1941
hierarchical modeling, 8:2520, 8:2533–2534	Stone Sweet, Alec, 7:2241
in political science, 7:2189, 8:2517–2519	Story, Joseph, 8:2403
regression analysis, 7:2252–2253	Stouffer, Samuel, 6:2056
without random sampling, 8:2519	Strange, Susan, 4:1263, 4:1264, 6:2060, 7:2112

Strata, 8:2445	Sudan
See also Social stratification	Darfur region, 8:2665
Stratarchies, 6:1803, 6:1821	Islamist movements, 5:1354–1355
Strategic (security) studies, 8:2541–2552	Suez Crisis, 5:1620, 8:2652
during Cold War, 6:1840, 8:2542-2545	Sufficiency, 2:384–388
Copenhagen School, 4:1302, 4:1303, 7:2376, 8:2549	Suharto, 5:1662
critical, 8:2542	Sultanistic regimes, 1:108, 1:109, 1:114
criticism of, 8:2545-2546	Summit meetings
feminist, 3:909, 3:910, 8:2551	economic, 3:702, 3:703–704, 4:1247, 5:1621,
history of field, 4:1281, 8:2542-2546	5:1622, 7:2238
national security state and, 8:2541-2545, 8:2551	on environmental issues, 8:2575–2576
political development, 3:647	European, 3:776
in post-Cold War period, 8:2546, 8:2551	on food sovereignty, 6: 1846
security studies, 8:2546–2552	parallel meetings, 6: 1714
terrorist threats, 8:2551–2552	protests, 1:78, 8:2441
See also Deterrence; Security and defense policy	of superpowers, 3:637, 3:666
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 3:637,	at United Nations, 5:1333, 5:1337, 7:2364
7:2388, 8:2544	Sumner, William Graham, 7:2197
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 2:431, 8:2545	Sundelius, Bengt, 4:1059
Strategic games, 4:948–952	Superpowers, 8:2559–2563
See also Game theory	client states, 5:1575, 5:1648
Strategic planning, 6:1866–1867	interventions in conflicts, 2:396
Strathern, Marilyn, 1:100	limitations of concept, 8:2561
Stratification. See Social stratification	restraints, 7:2219
Strauss, Anselm L., 4:1054, 4:1055, 4:1056, 4:1057	rivalry in Cold War, 3:636, 7:2219, 8:2542, 8:2560–2561,
Strauss, Leo, 4:1094, 6:1729, 6:1734, 6:1990–1991, 6:1997	8:2681
Streeck, Wolfgang, 4:1192	Soviet Union as, 3:636–637
Street-level bureaucracy. See Bureaucracy, street-level	United Nations and, 8:2681
Streit, Clarence, 5:1435	United States as sole, 1:154, 4:1284, 8:2561–2562
Stroessner, Alfredo, 8:2477	use of term, 8:2560, 8:2562
Structural equation modeling (SEM), 8:2552-2557	See also Bipolarity; Détente; Power and
definition, 8:2552–2553	international politics
estimation, 8:2554	Support, political, 8:2563–2566
example, 8:2555–2556	for bureaucracy, 3:714
extensions, 8:2556	definition, 8:2563
latent variables, 8:2553	diffuse and specific, 8:2564, 8:2565-2566
path diagrams, 8:2553	dissatisfaction and, 3:689, 3:690
process, 8:2554–2555	measurement, 8:2565-2566
structural and measurement models, 8:2553-2554	multidimensional, 8:2565
testing, 8:2554	objects, 8:2563–2564
Structural functionalism, 3:930–932, 4:996, 4:1205, 6:2024	Supranational courts, 5:1368
Structural realism. See Neorealism	See also European Court of Justice; International courts
Structural violence, 2:392	Supranational identity, 4: 1141, 4: 1142, 6: 1735
Structuralism	Supranationality
conflict resolution, 2:392	communitarian view, 2:328
power, 7:2111–2112	democracy and, 2:350-351
transition to democracy and, 8:2663	judicial review, 5:1374
See also Poststructuralism	legitimacy, 5:1423–1424
Stryker, Sheldon, 4:1134	organizations, 2:356
Sturzo, Luigi, 8:2628	rule of law, 7:2342
Subaltern realism, 3:643	See also European integration; International organizations;
Subaltern studies, 2:305, 7:2087, 7:2089	Regional integration
	Supreme Court, U.S.
Subgovernments, 6:1922, 6:1938	1
Subject culture, 8:2557–2559	Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 3:819
Subnational governments. See Autonomy, subnational;	ideologies of justices, 5:1367
Local governments; Provincial governments;	independence, 5:1371
Regionalization; States, U.S.	judicial review powers, 5:1373, 8:2406
Subsidiarity, 1:125, 2:546, 7:2107–2108	powers shared with other branches, 1:19
Subsidies, 6:1802, 6:1805–1806, 7:2147	presidents and, 7:2124

religious freedom cases, 5:1432	neo-corporatism, 5:1669, 5:1670, 5:1671
Roe v. Wade, 6: 1790	neutrality policy, 5:1697
Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 2:548	parties, 6:1797, 8:2425
Surkov, Vladislav, 3:613, 6:2053, 6:2061	social democracy, 8:2453
Surveillance. See Monitoring; Secret services	statism, 8:2515
Survey research, 8:2566–2571	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 6:1838,
analysis, 5:1559, 7:2170	8:2726–2727
criticism of, 8:2570	welfare state, 8:2748
definition, 8:2566	See also Scandinavia
deliberative polling, 7:2171	Swing ratio, 3:753
development, 8:2569–2570	Swing voters, 3:874
on electoral behavior, 3:725–726, 3:738, 8:2569,	Switzerland
8:2570, 8:2573	consociational democracy, 2:553, 2:554
errors, 7:2350–2351	direct democracy, 2:559, 2:561, 2:563, 2:564, 2:584,
experiments, 5:1559	5:1466, 7:2227
information obtained, 8:2568–2569	Federal Council, 3:721, 3:865
international public opinion, 4:1268–1269, 4:1270	judicial review, 5:1373
limitations, 6: 1974, 7: 2170–2171	militia, 5:1580
missing data, 2:518	multiculturalism, 5:1630
nonresponse, 8:2568	neutrality policy, 5:1697, 5:1698
on party identification, 3:726–727	pillarization, 6: 1860, 6: 1861
on political culture, 6: 1970–1973	referenda, 7:2227, 7:2228
on political efficacy, 3:717–718	republic, 7:2289
	Symbolic politics, 8:2577, 8:2578–2579
public opinion polls, 7:2168, 7:2169, 7:2170–2171, 8:2570–2571	Symbols, political, 8:2577–2579
	•
questions, 3:617, 5:1338, 5:1339, 7:2170–2171, 8:2568	definition, 8:2577
reliability, 1:150	flags, 6:2008
samples, 7:2170, 8:2566–2567, 8:2570, 8:2573	functions, 6:2008–2009, 8:2577, 8:2578
scaling, 5:1528–1530	language, 6: 2008
scientific bases, 8:2566–2568	meanings, 8:2577–2578
in social sciences, 8:2571	of national identity, 5:1645, 5:1646–1647, 5:1649,
technology, 5:1559	6:2008–2009
validity, 7:2170	positive or negative, 6:2008
See also Cross-national surveys; Interviewing;	psychology of, 6:2007–2009
Public opinion	rituals and, 7:2326–2327, 7:2328, 8:2578
Survey research modes, 8:2571–2574	Syracuse University, 7:2270–2271
choice of, 8:2573–2574	Syria, Six-Day War, 7:2121
costs, 8:2572, 8:2573	System support model, 3:689
multiple, 8:2567–2568	Systems theory, 8:2579–2582
online, 5:1559, 7:2170, 8:2567, 8:2573	advocacy coalition framework, 1:33–37
in-person interviews, 8:2567, 8:2571–2572	complexity, 2:364–367, 8:2581
response rates, 8:2572	cybernetics, 1:lxiii–lxiv, 8:2579–2580
self-completion questionnaires, 8:2567, 8:2572	definition, 8:2579
telephone interviews, 8:2567, 8:2572	democracy, 2:575
See also Interviewing	development, 8:2579–2582
Survival analysis. See Event history analysis	general, 8:2579–2580, 8:2582
Sustainable development, 8:2574–2577	natural resources management, 5:1668
challenges, 3:780-781, 8:2575-2576	planning, 6:1865
criticism of concept, 8:2574	in political science, 1:lix-lx, 1:lxiii-lxiv, 6:2058
definition, 8:2574	political systems, 6:2045
focus on future, 8:2574–2575	power, 7:2102
international politics and, 8:2575	structural functionalism, 3:930–931
principles, 8:2576	system types, 8:2579, 8:2580
See also Environmental policy	See also Political systems; World systems theory
Sweatshops, 5:1643	
Sweden	t' Hart, Paul, 4:1059
civil service, 6: 2067–2068	Taagepera, Rein, 2:361, 2:557-558, 3:753, 6:1822, 8:2715
coalition governments, 6:1742	Tacitus, 7:2294
local governments, 5:1465, 5:1467–1468	Taine, Hippolyte, 6:1952

Taiwan, 2:463, 3:731, 3:732, 5:1347, 5:1662	influence on political behavior, 5:1537–1538
Tajfel, Henri, 6:1809	political communication, 5:1532–1533, 6:1964, 6:1966
Talbot, Colin, 4:998, 4:1040	satellite, 6:1713
Taliban, 3:656, 4:1213, 5:1423, 7:2352–2353, 8:2593	See also Media, electronic; Popular culture
Tamil Tigers, 5:1580, 5:1661, 5:1662, 8:2503, 8:2592,	Tenbensel, Tim, 6:1899
8:2593, 8:2597	Territorial nationalism, 5:1656, 5:1659
TANs (transnational advocacy networks). See Advocacy	Territoriality, 8:2589–2590
networks, transnational	Territory, 8:2588–2591
Tanzania, economic policies, 6:1719	boundary changes after wars, 2:394, 2:395
Taoism. See Daoism	conflicts, 8: 2589, 8: 2727, 8: 2728 conquest of, 8: 2508, 8: 2511
Tarrow, Sidney, 7:2243, 8:2432, 8:2435	
Task uncertainty, 2:434	definition, 8:2588
Tawney, Richard, 7:2100	end of, 8:2590 globalization and, 8:2589, 8:2590–2591
Tax policy, 8:2583–2588	
administration, 8:2585 in advanced economies, 8:2584–2587	integrity, 8:2394, 8:2511
	language policies, 7:2070
arguments for, 5:1446	of local governments, 5:1465–1466
compliance, 5:1416	of nation-states, 5:1645, 8:2494, 8:2588–2589
definition, 8:2583	politics and, 1:liii, 7:2247–2248, 8:2588–2590
determinants, 8:2585–2586 direct and indirect taxes, 8:2583, 8:2586	sovereignty, 8:2494, 8:2589 See also Geopolitics; Regionalization; Secession
distributive effects, 8:2583–2584, 8:2586	
economic growth and, 8:2586–2587	Terror, state, 8:2593, 8:2595, 8:2630 Terrorism
fairness, 5:1416	anarchist, 1:74, 1:78
history, 8:2509	religion and, 5:1593–1594, 7:2260, 7:2266,
inflation and, 1:216, 8:2586	8:2592, 8:2597
in less developed countries, 8:2587–2588	totalitarianism and, 8:2635–2636
libertarian view, 5:1443, 5:1446	Terrorism, international, 8:2591–2594
local, 5:1468	definitions, 8:2591, 8:2597–2598
political debates, 8:2585–2586	explanations, 8:2592–2593, 8:2598–2599
purposes, 8:2584	new terrorism debate, 8:2592, 8:2598
redistributive, 3:820, 6:1980, 7:2223, 8:2583–2584,	nonstate sponsors, 2:432–433
8:2586, 8:2587	risk analysis, 6:2012
regressive, 3:820, 8:2584, 8:2586, 8:2587	September 11 attacks, 3:941, 4:1212, 4:1285, 5:1352,
social democratic, 8:2425	6:1728, 7:2262
types of taxes, 8:2583–2584	state responses, 8:2551–2552, 8:2593
in welfare states, 8:2425, 8:2585, 8:2586	state responses, 6.2551 2552, 6.2555 state sponsorship, 8:2595
See also Public budgeting	threat of, 6:1840, 7:2378, 7:2380
Taylor, Charles (Liberian warlord), 8:2665, 8:2734,	use of term, 8:2591–2592, 8:2593
8:2735, 8:2736	See also Counterterrorism
Taylor, Charles (scholar), 2:326, 2:402, 4:1209, 5:1629	Terrorist groups, 8:2594–2599
Taylor, Frederick W., 1:26, 6:1747, 7:2162	activities, 8:2594–2595, 8:2596
Taylor, Ian, 8:2642	characteristics, 8:2595–2597
Tchackhotine, Sergei, 6:1963	definition, 8:2594
Technological change	distinction from other phenomena of violence,
globalization and, 3:666, 3:668, 4:973, 4:974,	8:2594–2595
4: 980, 6: 2060	domestic, 8:2597
information and communication technology, 5:1684,	explanations, 8:2598–2599
6: 1939, 6: 2060	Islamist, 3:938, 3:941, 5:1352, 5:1594,
international public opinion and, 4:1270	7:2262, 8:2598
international relations theory and, 4:1283–1284	mobilization, 5:1594, 8:2595-2596
political sociology, 6:2037	motivations, 5:1594, 8:2594, 8:2595, 8:2598
See also Information technology; Internet;	networks, 8:2592–2593
Media, electronic	number of, 8:2597
Television	propaganda, 8:2595–2596
digital, 5:1533	religious, 7:2266, 8:2592, 8:2597
election coverage, 5:1538, 5:1539	totalitarianism, 8:2635–2636
history, 5: 1532–1533	types, 8:2597
impact on political system, 5:1538–1539	See also Al Qaeda

Test statistics, 8:2523	Threats. See Security
Textual data. See Data, textual	Threshold of exclusion, 3:752, 3:753
Thailand	Threshold of representation, 3:753
border disputes, 5:1661	Thucydides, 4:1048, 4:1098, 4:1274, 4:1288, 7:2222
Buddhism, 1:162	Thurstone, Louis, 5:1522, 7:2354–2355
Constitution, 5:1412	Thurstone scale, 5:1522, 7:2354–2355
coups, 5:1577, 5:1616, 6:2059	Tilburg University, 2:505–506
financial crisis (1998), 8:2498	Tilly, Charles
monarchy, 1:162, 5:1616–1617	on collective action, 8:2433
protesters, 5:1661	on democracy, 2:583
Thales, 4:1047	on ethnographic methods, 3:835
Thatcher, Margaret, 1:23, 1:43, 3:634, 5:1676, 5:1678,	historical sociology, 4:1084, 4:1086
6:2068, 7:2133	on mobilization, 5:1590
Thelen, Kathleen, 1:222, 2:346, 4:1192	on revolutions, 7:2312, 7:2315
Theocracies, 8:2599–2602	on social movements, 1:251
authoritarian, 7:2234	social movements research, 8:2432, 8:2434
contemporary, 8:2600	on state formation, 6: 2027, 8: 2509
definition, 8:2599	Time-series analysis, 8:2610–2615
democracy and, 8:2601–2602	aggregate data, 1:54
distinction from secular states, 7:2372	ARCH and GARCH models, 8:2614
distinction from securar states, 7:2572 divine right of kings, 8:2600	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
9 9,	ARFIMA models, 8:2613
history, 8:2599–2601	ARIMA models, 8:2612–2613
Islamic, 5:1349, 5:1423, 7:2290, 7:2315, 8:2600, 8:2625	definition, 8:2610
legitimacy, 5:1421, 5:1422	methods, 8:2610–2614
Taliban, 3:656, 4:1213, 5:1423, 7:2352–2353, 8:2593	in political science, 5:1562–1563, 8:2610, 8:2614
See also Church-state relationships	vector autoregression, 8:2614
Theology, political, 8:2602	Time-series cross-section data and methods, 8:2615–2621
Theory	advantages and disadvantages, 8:2531, 8:2615–2616
definition, 6:2050	estimation, 8:2616–2618
falsifiability, 7:2210	heterogeneity, 8:2618–2621
parsimony, 7:2209–2210	pooled data, 8:2615–2618
See also Democracy, theories of; Political theory	serial correlation, 8:2617–2618
Thick description, 8:2602–2607	use of, 5:1562–1563, 8:2615
definition, 8:2602	Time-series data, use in political science, 2:520–521,
distinction from thin description, 8:2602–2603, 8:2606	5:1562–1563
epistemology, 8:2603–2605	Tiryakian, Edward, 1:82
inductive approach, 8:2606–2607	Titmuss, Richard, 8:2742
use of, 7:2193–2194	TNAs. See Transnational actors
Thiebault, Jean-Louis, 5:1411	Tocqueville, Alexis de, 8:2621–2624
Thin description, 7:2193, 7:2194,	on attitude formation, 1:97
8: 2602–2603, 8: 2606	background, 8:2622
Think tanks, 8:2607-2610	on civic culture, 1:244, 6:1974, 6:2034, 8:2622
characteristics, 8:2608–2609	on civic participation, 1:249, 6:2034, 8:2671
definition, 8:2607	on constitutions, 7:2337
future of, 8: 2609	on democracy, 2:313, 2:573, 4:1083, 8:2622-2624
international, 8:2609	Democracy in America, 4:1083, 8:2621-2623, 8:2671
myths, 8:2608–2609	on despotism, 8:2623
origins, 8:2607–2608	on equality, 8:2621-2622, 8:2623
types, 8:2608	historical sociology, 4:1082-1083, 4:1086
Third International, 2:310	on individualism, 4: 1174, 4: 1175
See also Communist International	on liberty, 8:2 622
Third World	on military, 6:2061
populist movements, 7:2076	political psychology, 6:2000
use of term, 3:640	on political science, 4:1088
See also Developing world	rising expectations theory, 1:85
Third World Approaches to International Law	on universal suffrage, 5:1501
(TWAIL), 4:1242	Tocqueville effect, 1:85
Thompson, Victor, 3:649	Togliatti, Palmiro, 6:1 797
Thompson, William R., 4:1071	Tolerance, 8:2624–2627
Thomsen, Cynthia, 1:94	definition, 8:2413, 8:2624

historical background, 8:2624-2625	European policies, 3:841
human rights and, 8:2626-2627	explanations, 8:2637-2638
liberalism and, 8:2625-2626	history, 7:2145-2146, 8:2636-2637, 8:2638
limits, 8:2627	liberal theories, 3:629, 8:2638, 8:2761
Locke on, 5:1472–1473, 6:1720, 8:2625 philosophy, 8:2624–2625	multilateral, 1:147, 3:702, 3:712, 5:1328–1329, 7:2146, 7:2239, 8:2637, 8:2761–2762
positive and negative, 8:2413	nondiscrimination principle, 5:1329, 8:2676
religious, 1:237, 5:1472–1473, 6:1720, 8:2624–2625	political economy of, 3:712, 8:2637, 8:2761, 8:2762
social, 8:2624	preferential, 8:2636
social capital and, 8:2413, 8:2674	in services, 8:2762, 8:2763–2764
Tönnies, Ferdinand, 2:326, 5:1501	tariff cuts, 8:2637
Torcal, Mariano, 8:2564, 8:2565	unilateral, 8:2636
Torgerson, Warren S., 7:2355	See also Free trade agreements; General Agreement on
Tories. See Conservative parties	Tariffs and Trade; International trade; World Trade
Torture	
	Organization Trade policy
instances, 4:1110	Trade policy
international convention on, 4:1110, 4:1240	of developing countries, 8:2637
justifications, 6:1730	institutions and, 5:1327–1328
Totalitarian democracy, 3:612	politics of, 5:1326–1327
Totalitarian regimes, 8:2627–2633	See also International trade; Mercantilism; Protectionism;
characteristics, 3:655, 8:2627–2628, 8:2629,	Trade liberalization
8:2630–2631, 8:2632, 8:2634	Trade theory
communist systems as, 2:311, 2:321	comparative advantage, 3:629, 3:712, 5:1326,
definitions, 8:2627–2628, 8:2632	5:1436, 7:2146
dictatorships, 3:655–656	Hecksher-Ohlin model, 5:1326, 5:1327,
distinction from authoritarian regimes, 1:108, 1:109	5:1330, 7:2146
examples, 1:109, 8:2628–2629	new, 5:1331
explanations, 8:2629–2630, 8:2631	Ricardo-Viner model, 5:1326, 5:1327, 5:1330, 7:2146
fascist, 3:890, 8:2628–2629, 8:2631	Trade unions
goals, 8:2632–2633, 8:2634	collective bargaining, 5:1405, 5:1406
institutional, 8:2627	declining membership, 1:275
judiciaries, 5:1384	definition, 5:1406
Nazi, 8:2628–2629, 8:2630–2631, 8:2634, 8:2635	density, 5:1406
party dictatorships, 3:655-656, 8:2627, 8:2630, 8:2631,	neo-corporatism, 4:1222–1223, 5:1669,
8:2633–2634	5: 1671, 6: 1870
rule of rules, 7:2337	North American, 5:1404
secularism and, 8:2629–2630	political action, 5:1405, 5:1407
Soviet, 3:612, 8:2629, 8:2630, 8:2631, 8:2634, 8:2635	power, 5:1406, 5:1407
state socialism and, 8:2459	for public employees, 7:2157
statism, 8:2514–2515	representation, 5:1406–1407
surveillance, 8:2634	Solidarity (Poland), 1:251, 2:324
Totalitarian syndrome, 3:655	transnational networks, 6:1714
Totalitarianism, 8:2633–2636	in United Kingdom, 5:1404
contemporary relevance, 8:2635-2636	See also Labor movements
criticism of concept, 8:2631-2632, 8:2633,	Traditional rule, 8:2639–2643
8:2634–2635	in Africa, 5:1647, 8:2639–2643
definitions, 8:2633	authoritarian, 7:2234
historicism and, 7:2211	definition, 8:2639
ideology, 8:2633, 8:2634	gender inequality, 8:2641
origins of term, 8:2628–2629, 8:2633	legitimacy, 5:1421
post-, 1:109, 1:110, 2:311, 7:2234, 8:2632	nation building and, 5:1647
scholarship on, 8:2630-2633	patrimonialism, 5:1679–1680
Stalinism and, 8:2482	political cultures, 8:2558
terrorism and, 8:2635-2636	reforms, 8:2641-2642, 8:2643
utopianism and, 8:2687	Weber on, 6:1859
Touraine, Alain, 1:57, 8:2432	Tragedy of the commons, 8:2643-2648
Trade liberalization, 8:2636-2639	definition, 2:308, 8:2643
consequences, 8: 2638–2639	game theory, 7:2132
definition, 8:2636	government interventions, 8:2645
by democracies, 5:1326-1327	influence of concept, 5:1665–1666

policy solutions, 8:2644–2645	Transnational communities, 5:1569
See also Common goods	Transnational corporations. See Multinational corporations
Transaction costs, 8:2648–2651	Transnational hegemony, 4:1072
definition, 8:2648	Transnational identity, 4:1140-1141
economic theory, 8:2648–2649	Transnational networks. See Advocacy networks,
in global governance, 8:2650–2651	transnational
measurement, 8:2650	Transnational relations, nonstate actors, 6:1712-1715
in politics, 8:2648, 8:2649–2650	Transparency
Transactionalism, 5:1691	accountability and, 1:1-2, 4:1008
Transatlantic relations, 8:2651–2656	administrative, 4:1008
asymmetry, 8:2652	of central banks, 1:220
Marshall Plan, 2:431, 3:912, 8:2652	in electoral process, 3:722
in post-Cold War period, 8:2653-2655	of fiscal policy, 1:165
in postwar period, 8:2652	in international relations, 3:711–712
scope, 8:2651–2652	responsiveness and, 7:2302
tensions, 8:2652, 8:2653–2654	Transparency International, 2:478, 2:479, 7:2235
theoretical approaches, 8:2654-2655	Treaties
See also NATO	arms control, 3:637, 3:670-671, 4:1242, 8:2544
Transformation, economic, 8:2656–2661	bilateral, 1:146–147
crisis of communism, 8:2660	compliance with, 4: 1235, 4: 1253–1254
definition, 8:2656	disarmament, 3:670–671
in developing countries, 8:2658–2659	negotiations, 5:1379
heterodox liberalism, 8:2658	See also Alliances; Free trade agreements;
liberalism, 8:2657	International law
Marxism, 8:2657–2658	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
mercantilism, 8:2656–2657	3:670, 5:1634, 8:2544
neoliberalism, 8:2659–2660	Treyens, James C., 7:2363
neo-mercantilism, 8:2657	Triangular balance of power, 3:637
Transitional justice, 8:2663–2668	Triangulation, 8:2669–2671
amnesties, 8:2666	Trotsky, Leon, 2:312, 8:2395, 8:2483
debates, 6: 1731	Trotter, William, 6: 2000
definition, 8:2663	Truman, David, 4:1095, 4:1222, 5:1458, 6:1763, 6:1870
forms, 4:1112–1113, 8:2665–2668	Truman, Harry S., 2:431, 4:1280, 8:2406–2407, 8:2570
historical context, 8:2664	Truncated data. See Censored and truncated data
	Trust
historical memory and, 4:1080–1081	
impact, 4:1112–1113	definition, 8:2414
reparations, 8:2667–2668	in democracies, 8:2414
study of, 8:2664	discretion and, 3:679
trials, 8:2665–2666	in government, 6:1719, 8:2479
truth telling processes, 4:1081, 4:1236–1237,	interpersonal, 8:2414
8:2666–2667	political, 3:689, 8:2414
See also Human rights	psychological models, 7:2151
Transitions, 8:2661–2663	Trust, social, 8:2671–2674
actors, 8:2662, 8:2663	civic culture and, 1:247, 6:2034
definition, 8:2661	decline, 8:2674
elections, 3:722–724, 8:2663	definition, 8:2671
empirical research, 8:2661–2662	in democracies, 8:2672, 8:2673-2674
historical memory, 4:1078, 4:1079–1081	development, 8:2414
from military rule, 5:1576–1577, 8:2666	economic development and, 8:2673
outcomes, 8:2662	generalized, 1:223, 8:2671
pacted, 8:2662	measurement, 8:2412, 8:2672–2673
stages, 8:2662	origins of concept, 8:2671–2672
violence during, 8:2725	social capital component, 6:1786, 6:2034, 8:2410,
voter turnout, 3:759	8:2414–2415, 8:2673–2674
See also Democratic consolidation; Democratization	See also Social capital
Transnational actors (TNAs), 5:1634	Truth commissions, 4:1236–1237, 8:2666–2667, 8:2668
Transnational advocacy networks. See Advocacy networks,	Truth tables, 2:337-338, 2:340, 3:945-946
transnational	Tsebelis, George, 1:223, 4:1039, 8:2706-2707
Transnational citizenship, 5:1572	Tuchman, Barbara, 7:2366

Tuck, Richard, 7:2320	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
Tudor, Isaac, 8:2640-2641	See Soviet Union
Tufte, Edward R., 2:544, 3:753	Unions. See Labor movements; Trade unions
Tukey, John W., 2:530-531, 2:533, 2:537	Unipolarity, 1:154
Tulio, Halperin Donghi, 1:202	See also Superpowers
Tunisia, Jasmine Revolution, 3:604	Unitary states, 1:124
Turkey	United Kingdom (UK)
Armenian genocide, 4:968	administrative reforms, 1:23, 1:100, 2:452, 5:1701
Atatürk regime, 3:654, 3:656, 5:1350, 8:2514	arms race with Germany, 1:90
authoritarian regime, 1:110-111, 1:112, 1:114	audit society, 1:100–102
conflicts with Greece, 5:1662	cabinet, 1:183, 8:2404
democracy in, 1:115, 3:602, 3:658	central bank, 1:20
elections, 1:112	Chartists, 8:2451
Islam in, 1:236	church-state relationship, 1:235
Islamists, 1:116, 3:605	civil service, 6: 2067, 6: 2068, 7: 2157, 7: 2158
military, 5:1 577	Civil War, 5:1614
parties, 1:117, 3:605	conservatism, 2:405–407
potential EU membership, 3:844, 5:1577	conservative party, 2:406, 2:411–412, 6:1801, 6:1802
secularism, 1:236, 5:1350	constitution, 1:10, 1:18, 5:1614, 8:2404
statism, 8:2514	corruption scandals, 2:474–475, 2:477
See also Ottoman Empire	decline of hegemony, 4:1261
Turnout. See Electoral turnout	Falkland Islands war, 3:622, 7:2301
Tutsis, 4:968	fascist movement, 3:888, 6:1797
Tutu, Desmond, 8:2666	Glorious Revolution, 2:406, 2:407, 5:1615
Tversky, Amos, 7:2143, 7:2149	interinstitutional accountability, 1:18
TWAIL. See Third World Approaches to International Law	Iraq war, 8:2653
Two-stage least squares (2SLS) modeling, 8:2409	judiciary, 5:1383, 5:1385, 8:2404
Tylor, Bennet, 7:2325–2326	Labour Party, 3:732, 3:748, 6:1743, 6:1796, 6:1858,
• • •	
Tyranny, 5:1480	6:1868, 7:2155, 8:2424–2425, 8:2429
See also Dictatorships	local governments, 5:1465, 5:1467
II 1 I W . 2 020	mercantilism, 5:1548–1549, 8:2656
Uchendu, Victor, 3:829	monarchy, 2:406, 2:418, 2:439, 5:1613, 5:1614–1616,
UDHR. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights	5:1617
UK. See United Kingdom	Muslims, 5:1630, 5:1631, 7:2373–2374
Ukraine	National Health Service, 4:1064
elections, 7:2236	navy, 1:90, 4:970
Orange Revolution, 1:251	Northern Ireland conflict, 2:395, 2:396
UN. See United Nations	opposition, 6: 1744–1745
Uncertainty, 2:492	Parliament, 2:418, 2:474–475
See also Risk	parliamentary system, 1:18, 2:587, 2:590, 7:2276
Underdevelopment. See Developing world; Economic	parties, 3:732, 6:1743, 6:1793, 6:1810
development levels	privatization policies, 7:2133, 7:2134
UNDP. See United Nations Development Programme	public budgeting, 7:2155
Unemployment. See Labor; Policy, employment; Social	quasi-federalism, 5:1464
exclusion	radicals, 7:2199–2200
Unemployment insurance, 6:1886, 6:1889,	separation of powers, 5:1614, 8:2404
6: 1981, 8: 2751	socialism, 8:2452
UNESCO. See United Nations Educational, Scientific and	subnational autonomy, 1:124
Cultural Organization	Suez Crisis, 5:1620, 8:2652
Unilateralism, 8:2675–2677	think tanks, 8:2607, 8:2608
of Bush administration, 4:1242, 5:1635,	trade policies, 7:2145
8:2675, 8:2676	trade unions, 5:1404
definitions, 8:2675–2676	Whigs, 2:405-406, 5:1549
disarmament, 3:671	See also British Empire
economic policy, 8:2676	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
foreign policy, 5:1635, 8:2675–2676	environmental security and, 3:786
multilateralism and, 5:1635, 8:2675	establishment, 8:2683
sanctions, 7:2351, 7:2353	Human Development Index, 3:639, 4:1101, 4:1179,
security policy, 8:2676–2677	6:1853, 7:2092, 8:2574

human security report, 8:2549 women's issues, 3:902, 3:906 Millennium Development Goals, 3:639, 3:640, 5:1636, Working Group for Indigenous Populations, 4:1170-1171 8:2683, 8:2756 United States United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), alliances, 2:432 arms race, 1:90 5:1704, 5:1705, 8:2680 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural citizenship, 1:238 Organization (UNESCO), 3:840, 5:1633, colonial period, 8:2404-2405 6:2017, 7:2198 corruption scandals, 2:477 United Nations Environment Programme, 3:840, 8:2575 democracy, 4:1088 United Nations Human Rights Commission, 4:1111 direct democracy, 2:559 United Nations (UN), 8:2677-2684 employment policies, 6:1886, 6:1888, 6:1889 accountability, 1:10 executive branch, 3:864, 3:866-867 ambassadors, 3:666 hegemonic power, 4:975-976, 4:1261, 5:1676, 7:2239, 8:2562 authorization for use of force, 8:2676-2677 Charter, 2:393, 4:1237, 4:1238, 5:1321-1322, 5:1335, Homeland Security Department, 7:2379-2380, 8:2552 individualism, 4:1174, 4:1175, 6:1978-1979 5:1545, 6:1838, 8:2678-2680 Cold War and, 8:2680, 8:2681-2683 interinstitutional accountability, 1:17-19 international law and, 4:1242-1243 collective security elements, 2:299 Conference on Disarmament, 3:671 international relations field, 4:1278, 4:1299, 4:1300-1301, 4:1302 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 4:1170, 4:1171, 4:1172 judicial independence, 1:19, 5:1371 definition, 8:2677 lobbying, 5:1459, 5:1460, 5:1461-1462 development assistance, 3:912, 3:913 multiculturalism, 5:1630 disarmament resolutions, 3:670 National Archives, 2:516 environmental issues, 3:776, 3:777, 3:783, 3:786 national security state, 8:2541-2545 establishment, 2:394, 4:1280, 5:1321, 8:2677, parties, 6:1793, 6:1803, 6:1807-1810, 7:2265 8:2678-2679 political culture, 6:1978–1979 European Union role, 3:840-841 populist movements, 7:2076 foreign aid targets, 3:911, 3:914 presidential system, 2:590 functional agencies, 3:840, 4:1012, 5:1633, 5:1704, protectionism, 8:2657 8:2680-2681, 8:2682 public administration tradition, 1:25-26 General Assembly, 3:721, 8:2680, 8:2681-2683 race relations, 7:2198 Global Compact, 5:1643 relations with China, 2:432, 3:638, 4:979, 8:2497-2498 Group of 77, 3:786, 5:1637 as sole superpower, 1:154, 4:1284, 8:2561-2562 historical background, 8:2677-2678 trade policy, 1:147, 1:148 human rights issues, 4:1109, 4:1110, 4:1111, welfare state, 8:2515 4:1112, 8:2626 See also Cold War; Congress; Constitution, U.S.; Détente; humanitarian interventions, 5:1333, 5:1335 Supreme Court; Transatlantic relations International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 4:1109, Rights, 7:2319 4:1239, 7:2319, 8:2626, 8:2679 Law of the Sea Convention, 4:1239, 4:1243 Universalism, 3:824, 3:827, 6:1733-1734, 6:1996-1999, membership, 8:2511, 8:2677 8:2604-2605 University of Chicago, 4:1055, 4:1093, 4:1094, 4:1278 multilateralism, 5:1635-1636 neutral states as members, 5:1697, 5:1698 University of Michigan nongovernmental organizations at, 5:1704-1705, 5:1706 Institute for Social Research, 6:1779, 6:1782 Office for Disarmament Affairs, 3:671 Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social peacekeeping missions, 4:1112, 6:1839, 6:1841-1845, Research, 1:55, 2:507, 6:2015-2016 8:2683, 8:2729-2733 Michigan School, 3:726, 3:740 in post-Cold War period, 8:2683 See also American National Election Studies purposes, 8:2679-2680 Urban governance. See Governance, urban; Local reforms, 5:1424, 8:2683 governments sanctions, 7:2351-2354 Uruguay Round, 5:1329, 5:1330, 7:2239, 8:2637, 8:2660, 8:2762-2763 secretaries-general, 8:2681 Security Council, 2:299, 2:301, 2:404, 5:1423, 5:1424, USA PATRIOT Act, 2:329 6:1842, 7:2351-2354, 8:2680 USSR. See Soviet Union Security Council members, 3:721, 3:841, 8:2680 Utilitarianism, 8:2684-2686 structure, 4:1012, 8:2678-2681, 8:2682, 8:2683 act, 8:2684, 8:2685 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 4:1109, 4:1239, criticism of, 8:2684-2686 7:2319, 8:2626, 8:2679 definition, 8:2684

democracy and, 5:1431-1432	policy formulation and, 6:1918
in economics, 8:2684	political, 8:2692-2696
egalitarianism, 3:811	in political culture, 6:1978–1979
in ethics, 3:824, 3:825	political performance criteria, 6:1850–1851
historical development, 8:2684	political socialization, 6:2020
implicit, 8:2684	postmaterialist, 1:247, 6:1970–1971, 6:1972–1973,
institutional, 8:2685	6:1979, 6:2033, 7:2093–2095, 8:2438, 8:2693,
	8;2694
liberalism and, 5:1433, 5:1440	
responsibility, 6:1732	secular, 7:2372, 7:2373, 7:2374, 8:2693, 8:2694
rule, 8:2684, 8:2685	on state roles, 4:983–984
in social sciences, 8:2685	voting behavior and, 6:1981
war costs, 6: 1759	See also Attitudes; Beliefs
Utopian Socialists, 8:2449, 8:2450, 8:2687	Van Apeldoorn, Bastian, 7:2243
Utopianism, 8:2686–2689	Van Snippenburg, Leo B., 1:84, 1:85
communities, 2:310, 8:2449, 8:2688	VAR. See Vector autoregression
in contemporary societies, 8:2688-2689	Variables, 8:2697–2701
criticism of, 8:2687	causal, 8:2525–2526
definition, 8:2686	continuous, 8:2698–2699
forms, 8:2687–2688	definition, 8:2697
•	
functions, 8:2688	dependent, 7:2249, 8:2699
literary genre, 8:2687	discrete, 8:2698–2699
major and minor, 8:2687-2688	distinction from constants, 8:2697–2698
	dummy, 5:1527
Validity	exogenous, 8:2700
construct, 5:1515–1517	independent, 7:2249, 8:2699
content, 5:1514–1515	intervening, 8:2700
criterion-related, 5:1515	linear regression, 5:1707
definition, 5:1513	omitted (confounding), 5:1581–1582, 5:1597,
double hermeneutics, 2:429–430	7:2181–2182, 8:2699, 8:2701
external, 5:1514, 5:1561	random, 8:2698–2699
of field experiments, 5:1561	types, 8:2698–2700
instrumental variables, 8:2705	unnecessary, 5:1582, 5:1584
	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
internal, 5:1514	See also Measurement; Model specification;
of laboratory experiments, 1:150, 3:874, 5:1561	Regression
of measurement, 5:1513–1517	Variables, instrumental, 8:2701–2705
of surveys, 7:2170	analysis of experiments, 8:2701–2703
types, 5:1513–1514	analysis of observational data, 8:2703–2704
See also Measurement	definition, 8:2700, 8:2701
Value orientations, 1:85, 7:2093, 8:2691–2692, 8:2693	examples, 5:1566, 8:2701–2704
Values, 8:2691-2697	in political science, 8:2409-2410, 8:2700, 8:2704
antecedents, 8:2695-2696	strengths and weaknesses, 8:2704–2705
of civil services, 1:255	validity, 8:2705
compared to beliefs and attitudes, 1:143, 1:144,	Variables, latent. See Factor analysis; Logit and probit
8:2691–2692	analyses
	Variance. See Analysis of variance
conflicts, 8:2693	
consequences, 8:2696	Vattel, Emmerich de, 7:2120, 8:2508
cross-national differences, 2:505-506, 8:2692,	Vector autoregression (VAR), 8:2614
8:2694–2695	Vedrine, Hubert, 8:2562
cultural, 8: 2692	Venezuela
cultural change and, 8:2694–2695	Chavez and, 5:1681, 6:1859
definition, 7:2093, 8:2691	presidential system, 7:2126
in democracies, 1:247, 8:2693	Verba, Sidney
dimensions, 8:2692	on civic culture, 1:84, 1:244-245, 1:248,
freedom, 4:985–986	3:718–719, 8:2557
governance and, 4:983–984, 4:992–993	on civic participation, 1:249, 1:252
health policy and, 4:1062	on democratic stability, 1:159
of liberal democracies, 7:2201–2202	on historical institutionalism, 2: 347
materialist, 6:1970–1971, 7:2093, 8:2693	on political culture, 1:245, 1:246, 6:1968–1969, 6:1970,
normative political theory, 6: 2057	8:2557–2558

on representative democracy, 3:627	habitual, 3:757
on trust, 8:2672	incentives, 1:253, 3:874
Vernon, Raymond, 5:1642	paradox of, 3:710, 3:757
Vertical accountability. See Accountability, electoral	research on, 6: 1778–1779, 6: 1781–1782
Veto players, 8:2706-2708	by social class, 1:274–275
absorption rule and, 8:2706, 8:2707	spatial theory, 8:2416–2417, 8:2418
constraints on executive power, 3:868	See also Clientelism; Electoral behavior; Electoral turnout
definition, 8:2706	Voting rights
in hybrid regimes, 4: 1115	expansion, 6: 1790
identifying, 8:2707	of immigrants, 5:1571
institutional, 4:1039–1040, 8:2706	universal, 4:1182, 5:1501, 7:2235, 7:2280
interpreted theory, 8:2707	of women, 3:901, 3:907
number of, 8:2706, 8:2707	Voting rules. See Electoral systems
partisan, 8:2706, 8:2708	Voting rules, electoral, effects of, 8:2712–2718
policy stability and, 8:2706, 8:2707–2708	causal mechanisms, 8:2715–2716, 8:2717
preferences, 8:2706, 8:2707–2708	Duverger's law, 3:710, 6:1983, 6:2042, 8:2712,
pure theory, 8:2706–2707	8:2713, 8:2715
transaction costs and, 8:2649	efficiency, 8:2712
Vía Campesina, La, 6: 1846–1847, 6: 1848	fragmentation, 8:2712–2716
Vico, Giambattista, 5:1400–1401	on legislatures, 8:2719
Vienna Circle, 7:2082	majoritarian, 8:2712, 8:2713, 8:2716, 8:2717
Vienna Congress, 5:1632	plurality, 8:2712, 8:2713
Vietnam, war with China, 8:2458	proportional, 8:2712, 8:2713–2714, 8:2716–2717
Vietnam War, 3:638, 3:646, 4:1059, 4:1282, 7:2111, 7:2366	representation, 8:2716–2717
Violence, 8:2708–2712	social choice theory, 3:749–750, 3:754–756, 8:2417–2420
anarchist, 1:74	on spending, 6:1983
assassinations, 1:74, 2:398	study of, 8:2712
collective, 5:1503, 5:1593–1594, 8:2708	transaction costs, 8:2649–2650
cultural, 7:2079	Voting rules, legislative, 8:2718–2722
definition, 8:2708	binary amendment procedures, 8:2718–2719
democratic transitions and, 8:2725	constitutional rules, 8:2718, 8:2719–2720
direct, 7:2079	definition, 8:2718
economic development and, 8:2710	effects, 8:2720–2722
during elections, 3:746	electoral systems and, 8:2719
ethnic, 8:2711	parliamentary rules, 8:2718, 8:2720–2722
explanations, 8:2709–2711	study of, 8:2718
inequality and, 8:2710	theories, 8:2718–2719
political, 8:2708, 8:2709–2710	traditional, 8:2718
political mobilization, 5:1593–1594	traditional, 6: 2/16
1	Wayer Ole 8:2549
power and, 7:2099 protests, 8:2709	Wæver, Ole, 8:2549
state monopoly, 8:2708–2709	Wainer, Howard, 2:544
state monopoly, 8:2708–2709 state repression, 5:1594, 8:2711	Waldo, Dwight, 1:27, 1:138 Waldron, Jeremy, 5:1396
state repression, 3:1374, 6:2711 structural, 7:2079, 8:2708	Wallace, William, 4:1296
	Wallensteen, Peter, 8:2729
typologies, 8:2708	
warlords and, 8:2734–2736	Wallerstein, Immanuel, 3:631, 4:1070, 4:1084, 4:1282,
See also Conflicts; Pacifism; Terrorism, international; Wars	4:1292, 8:2758–2760
Virtual states. See States, virtual	Wallis, John, 1:222
Virtue. See Ethics	Walpole, Robert, 6:1744–1745
Visualization. See Data visualization	Walt, Steven, 7:2220–2221
Vogel, David, 7:2256	Waltz, Kenneth N.
Vogler, John, 8:2575	on balance of power, 1:132–133, 1:153–154
Volatility. See Elections, volatility	on bipolarity, 8:2560–2561
Volcker, Paul, 1:218	criticism of, 7:2209–2210, 7:2221
Voltaire, 7:2290, 7:2333	international relations theory, 1:131–133, 3:692, 4:1281,
Voting	7:2209–2210, 7:2220
apathy and, 1:85–86	levels of analysis, 4:1282
compulsory, 3:759	neorealism, 1:153–154, 3:695, 4:1288–1289,
decisions, 1:96, 1:97–98, 1:99	4 :1290–1291, 5 :1437, 7 :2220

positivism and, 7:2083	feminist scholarship, 8:2551
on power, 7:2221	gender in, 3:909, 3:910
Walzer, Michael	genocide and, 4:968
communitarianism, 2:326, 2:327	international, 8:2726
on equality, 3:810	international law on, 4:1237-1238, 4:1239
on ethics, 3:827	intrastate, 8:2726, 8:2727–2728
on humanitarian interventions, 5:1336, 5:1438	justifications, 4:1294, 5:1335, 6:1729–1730,
international relations theory, 6:1 735, 6:1 994	6: 1757–1758, 6: 1759, 6: 1837–1838,
on Iraq war, 7:2122	7:2120–2121
political philosophy, 6: 1988, 6: 1996, 6: 1998	limited, 8:2726
on war justifications, 6: 1729–1730	military regimes and, 5:1576
War and peace, 8:2723–2734	new, 3:783
armed conflicts, 8:2723–2725, 8:2726–2729	normative theory, 6: 1728–1731
	number of, 1:265, 1:266, 8:2725, 8:2727
critical view, 8:2726	
international relations research, 4:1277–1278	political theory and, 6:2056–2057
neutrality, 5:1696–1699	in post-Cold War period, 2:300, 4:1285, 6:1728, 6:1729,
normative theory, 6: 1728–1731	8:2551
outlawing of war, 6:1838	preemptive, 6:1730, 7:2120–2122
in post–Cold War period, 8:2723–2725	preventive, 6:1730, 7:2121, 7:2122
realist view, 8:2726	rationalist explanations, 3:711
religious views, 6: 1729, 6: 1757–1758,	rules governing, 6:1837
6:1837–1838, 7:2120	state formation and, 8:2491, 8:2509, 8:2511–2512
trends, 8:2727–2729	total, 8:2726
See also Democratic peace; Pacifism; Peace; Peacekeeping;	won by democracies, 3:626
Wars	See also Civil wars; Conflicts; Revolutions; Security and
War crimes, 4:1110, 4:1111, 4:1112, 8:2665	defense policy
War on terror	Warsaw Pact, 1:61, 4:1012, 8:2458
Afghan invasion, 4:1285	Washington, George, 5:1579
international coordination, 8:2593	Washington Consensus, 2:382, 2:403-404, 3:634, 4:1246,
just war doctrine and, 6:1730	5:1440, 5:1678
justifications, 6:2061	Waterbury, John, 1:117
laws, 8:2551–2552	Weak states, 1:168, 1:267, 8:2500, 8:2504
policies, 2:432	See also State collapse; State failure
terminology, 6:1729, 6:1840, 8:2592	Weapons. See Arms races
transatlantic relations and, 8:2653	Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
Warlords, 8:2734–2736	chemical and biological, 3:670, 3:671, 5:1634
activities, 8:2735	of Iraq, 7:2122
definition, 8:2734–2735	nonproliferation regimes, 5:1634
history, 8:2734	as security threat, 7:2378–2379
motives, 8:2734	terrorists' possession, 7:2379
political roles, 8:2736	See also Arms races; Nuclear weapons
relations with state, 8:2735-2736	Web sites. See Internet
Wars	Webb, Beatrice, 5:1404
alliances, 1:60-62	Webb, Eugene J., 8:2669
arms races and, 1:90	Webb, Sidney, 5:1404
casualties, 8:2723, 8:2724, 8:2725, 8:2727, 8:2728	Webber, Melvin, 6:1866
causes, 8:2725, 8:2728	Weber, Max, 8:2736-2739
civilian victims, 8:2728	action theory, 6:1969
conventional and unconventional, 8:2726	authority forms, 1:80, 5:1420, 5:1679, 5:1680, 6:1859,
corrective justice and, 6:1731–1732	6:1969, 6:2042, 7:2102, 8:2738
defining, 6:1728–1729, 8:2725–2726	on British prime minister, 1:18
dictators removed by, 3:658	on bureaucracy, 1:25, 1:166, 1:167, 1:255, 4:1004,
domestic politics and, 3:693	5:1625, 6:1747, 6:1856, 7:2271–2272, 8:2738
duration, 8:2726	on capitalism, 1:191, 3:825, 8:2736–2737
economic roots, 6:1839–1840	on charisma, 1:80, 1:224–225, 2:493, 4:1083, 5:1409,
effects of globalization, 4:978–979	5:1420, 6:1859, 7:2077, 8:2738
ending, 6: 1730–1731	on classes, 1:271–272
environmental impact, 8:2548	data analyses, 1:54
explanations, 8:2711	Economy and Society, 4:1083, 8:2738
1 ,	2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

historical sociology, 4:1083, 4:1086 on ideal type, 2:334	Great Society programs, 4:1157–1158 institutional change in, 1:222, 8:2750–2751
influence, 8:2736	interest groups, 4:1219
on international relations, 8:2490	local government roles, 5:1467
on leadership, 5:1409	origins, 8:2513–2514, 8:2747–2748
on legitimacy, 5:1415, 5:1417, 5:1420, 8:2478, 8:2486,	policy choices, 4:1003–1004
8:2509, 8:2738	political culture and, 6: 1976, 8: 2748
on parties, 6:1791, 6:1792–1793, 6:1794, 6:1800, 7:2279,	political values, 8:2695
7:2280, 8:2738	problems, 2:355, 4:1003–1004, 8:2749–2750
on path dependence, 4: 1207	public employment, 7:2156–2157, 7:2158
on political class, 6:1955	redistributive policies, 7:2224, 7:2225
on politicians, 6:1955	rights-based, 8:2747
on politics, 1:liii, 1:liv-lv, 7:2108, 8:2738-2739	socialist parties and, 8:2455–2456
on power, 1:liii, 7:2100, 7:2101, 7:2108, 8:2738	tax policies, 8:2425, 8:2585, 8:2586
on Protestant ethic, 3:825, 7:2262, 8:2737	See also Social democracy
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 4:1083,	Wellens, Karel, 8:2462
8:2736–2738	Welles, Orson, 5:1531–1532
publications, 1:137	Welsh school of critical security studies, 8:2550
on responsibility, 7:2300	Welzel, Christian, 4:1102, 4:1103, 6:1972, 6:1978
on rituals, 7:2326	Wendt, Alexander, 2:424, 2:426, 2:429, 4:1292,
on state, 4:1083–1084, 8:2485–2490, 8:2505, 8:2509,	4:1318–1319
8:2708, 8:2738, 8:2753	Western Marxism, 2:497, 5:1499
on state formation, 8:2507	Westminster model, 2:587, 4:1039, 7:2300–2301
on warlords, 8:2734	See also Parliamentary systems
See also Neo-Weberian state	Westphalia, Peace of, 1:261, 5:1648, 8:2490, 8:2508–2509
Webster, Daniel, 3:754, 7:2121	8:2752, 8:2753–2754
Weighted least squares (WLS), 8:2739–2742	Westphalian ideal state, 8:2752–2755
definition, 8:2739	critical views, 8:2753–2754
example, 8:2740–2741	definition, 8:2752–2753
feasible, 8:2740	sovereignty, 1:80, 8:2752, 8:2753, 8:2754
theory, 8:2739–2740	See also States
use of, 8:2739, 8:2741	Westphalian state system
Weingast, Barry, 1:50, 1:66, 1:70, 1:222	beginning of, 5:1648, 8:2508–2509
Weinstein, Jeremy, 3:834	international relations, 8:2490, 8:2752
Welfare, economic, 4:1178	Islam and, 5:1350
Welfare policies, 8:2742–2747	post-, 8:2754
conditionality, 8:2745, 8:2751	territorial sovereignty, 8:2494, 8:2752
cross-national differences, 8:2743-2744, 8:2748	use of term, 8:2754
debates, 8:2742, 8:2743, 8:2744-2746	See also Diplomacy
definition, 8:2742	WGI. See Worldwide Governance Indicators
dependency, 8:2745–2746	Wheare, Kenneth C., 1:127, 3:896, 3:897
history, 8:2744	Whigs, 2:405-406, 5:1426, 5:1549
meanings, 8:2742–2744	Whistle-blowing, 7:2308
needs, 8:2742, 8:2743, 8:2744–2745, 8:2750	White, Harrison, 5:1686, 5:1692
reforms, 8:2751	Whitehead, Lawrence, 8:2661
social insurance, 8:2742–2743, 8:2747	Whyte, William, 6:1774
targeted, 8:2746, 8:2751	Wicksell, Knut, 8:2649
types, 8:2744–2746, 8:2748	Widmayer, Sharon A., 7:2364
See also Health policy	Wight, Martin
Welfare state, 8:2747–2752	on balance of power, 1:153
bureaucracy, 1:178-179, 8:2747	criticism of, 4:1319
criticism of, 8:2425, 8:2453, 8:2743	English school and, 4:1291
definition, 8:2747	on international relations schools, 4:1281, 4:1282,
development and growth, 8:2424, 8:2456, 8:2495,	4: 1317, 4: 1318
8:2748, 8:2751	on international theory, 4:1289, 6:1727
employment policies, 6:1886–1888, 8:2751	on society of states, 4:1315, 4:1316
examples, 8:2515, 8:2744	Wilcoxon, Frank, 6:1709
expenditures, 8:2425, 8:2585, 8:2747, 8:2748	Wildavsky, Aaron
future of, 8:2751–2752	budgeting theory, 1:164, 4:1000, 6:1910